'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎98r] (200/386)

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„ n , ll( i possibly prevent or postpone hopes which the trade route itself had
h«on called into‘existence to realise, and which, without it would haye had no
been called mt' Nus bki Seistan trade route was a bona ^ enterprise, upon
being. Litlici t* pm harked in the main because of its commercial
# 2 % was
l S Lord Curzon had no hesitation in urging a strenuous continuation ot the
venture with an eye, not to an early or brilliant success of the trade route, bu
, tw(i-fold contingency, political and commercial, in the future. In the first
nHec « we id not continue to show an active interest in Se.stan, Russia would:
rfisas 3 ?»«” k"«“ «K f* ~«.
oca of fhp Lundcr Abbas road for Indian trade to Khorasan , and this t
IZ l be easy for our rivals to close by similar tactics. If we did not desire
would < y p A r fi i a n Gulf the obvious method was to block the
Russia to advance to the 1“ G t " l t t ,’ le tl J e ut 0 ure of Nortliern Khorasan, which
Sveu bf incluldlnthc British sphere of interest. It was no exaggeration to
say we could not afford to see it excluded.
l l Secondly the future of Seistan would depend upon the proper emp oy-
ment o'f the immense
system ot irrigation, might rai P fi.nf tho future of Seistan would
ttESJstww-*-535ir“
ai"S .h.»u 1« ™u«s •» ■* -S”" 1 ” 1
by us instead of having been already absorbed by otheis.
15. For these reasons Lord^Gur^recommemle^^
in reducing its discomforts ^f^nce wUhin it, to build up au
to the borders of Seistan and of Bi s aR aroa anc \ a market of so
interest in Seistan which sou s ^\ . Government of India should
much potential value ^object the that would be
.pp»™i - .1*. -
trary to be attended with reasonable hopes of success.
16. Tlie Mioufe then 33
any reference to Persia, for strategical reasons .namely^ i ^ ^ ^ 9Ug .
at any future period, aB^ssmna^^ N 4 0 advocated it for two reasons:
gestion was ^kea up by Sir H .D AW V ; » of and as the aving of a
as a menace to the ^ even of our desiring to take the offensive against
long land mareh, m the event ot ^f-JLrted bv General Bracken bury,
that Power. This line of argument w f at y home} wh o concluded
at that time head of the Intelligence p the construction
l„ V "“L power .l»re b,
of a new line into oeistan, u • an( t py developing Balu-
bringing the frontier tribes under mm |)ase of operations. When this has
chistan and converting it into a f , into p ei . s ; a The scheme was, there-
£ dr 0 o n pped. W1 It U X clear that' the idea of a Seistan railway does not