File 3443/1914 Pt 2 'German War: German emissaries to Afghanistan' [‎107r] (222/490)

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Telegram P., dated the 16th (received 17th) July 1915.
From—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London,
To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.
I should like to have your views on Mr. Mailing’s and Sir P. Cox’s
telegrams of the 15th instant as soon as possible by telegraph. Unless there are
insurmountable military objections, the Foreign * Office urges action in the
sense of Mr. Mailing’s proposals. You must judge as to this. It seems to
me improbable that you can provide sufficient forces to carry out
Mr. Marling’s programme and make headway against opposition which armed
intervention may arouse and .this affects expediency of giving an ultimatum
to Persian Government. Of getting any further troops from Egypt I see no
possibility.
Telegram P., No. 74, dated the 18th (received 19th) July 1915,
From—His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Simla.
Please refer to your telegram No. 680 S., dated the 17th instant.
The seizure of the custom house and principal Gulf ports was suggested
with the object of dispelling the view that we are near the end of our military
resources, a view that has been carefully fostered by Germans, but if, as I
gather, it is considered by the Government of India unwise to detach troops
which would be necessary for this demonstration, we must confine ourselves
perforce to lesser measures. r lhe occupation of Bushire in normal times would
unquestionably have brought Persia to her senses and it is just possible may
do so now, but we may find that with the strong influences of the enemy
that are at work here our moderation will be interpreted as inability to do
more as it will be pointed out that in view of relatively considerable force we
maintain at Bushire we are virtually already in possession.
No doubt it would suffice if w r e even obtained promises if not execution
of reparation for the outrage recently committed, but I question if it would
be sufficient to provide requisite proof of the determination of Russians and
ourselves to insist on real neutrality on the part of the Persian Government.
An exhibition of strength is requisite for this purpose, and if it can he done
half-heartedly by us in the south it is more indispensable that in the north
Russia should act in sphere where moreover action is much more effective
owing to the position of the capital.
It is too late, with one German party in neighbourhood of Tabas, to count
upon their emissaries being stopped by Persian effort alone from entering
Afghanistan. Reliance must therefore be placed on our own measures. (As
proved by events at ?) Bushire where we have strong consular guard (with) us,
we must expect any action we take against those emissaries to be met with
reprisals against our officials in less defensive inland places by the Germans.
We have to rely on the Persian Government for their protection and that
Government has to be convinced of the earnestness of the two Powers wffio
are ready if necessary to force the Persian Government to put an end to the
activities of the Germans.
That Persia desires to become embroiled in war with two Powers, I do not
believe, but there is no denying the fact that great prestige has been given to the
German cause by the recent retirement of the Russians in Galicia and Poland,
the slow progress in the Dardanelles of the allies and also in Flanders, and the
small apparent results (of) entrance of Italy into the war, and have made less
unthinkable than before the idea of a rupture of relations between ourselves
and Persia, and if at present juncture we fail to show strength the possibility
is brought nearer of Persia being dragged into war.