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
<b>Reference</b>	IOR/L/PS/10/319C
<b>Title</b>	File 4919/1912 Pt 2 'Abu Musa Oxide Concession: transmission of files of German Consulate at Bushire'
<b>Date(s)</b>	1916 (CE, Gregorian)
<b>Written in</b>	English in Latin
<b>Extent and Format</b>	1 volume (32 folios)
<b>Holding Institution</b>	British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers
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
#### About this record

The file consists of English translations of six letters originally written by the German Consul, Bushire (Dr Franz Listermann) to the German Imperial Chancellor, Berlin (Dr Theobold von Bethmann-Hollweg) and also from the German Ambassador, London (Count Wolff Metternich). The letters are dated between May and July 1910 and discuss the concession for the mining of red oxide on Abu Musa. They are accompanied by a covering letter from the Under Secretary of State for India to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.



1916.	<b>IOR: L/P23/10/319C</b>	1
April 8	TURKEY.	67620 APR 10 1916
India Office	No. 67620	Received by
Last Paper. 28529	<p style="text-align: center;">(Subject.)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Abu Musa Oxide Concession</u></p> <p>In copy of letter from Resident in Persian Gulf in regard to transmission of files of German Consulate at Bushire:</p>	
(Print.)	<p style="text-align: center;">(Minutes.)</p> <p>در ماکو. ← Lo</p> <p>I fear that I cannot find anything very damaging in the translations annexed</p>	
(How disposed of.)	<p>H.N.</p> <p>10.4.16</p> <p>There is not much here, but it is so well to have it.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">H.N. 11.4.16</p> <p style="text-align: center;">H.N.B</p> <p style="text-align: center;">A.N. 11.4.16</p>	
(Action completed.) <i>lm</i>	(Index.) <i>44</i>	
Next Paper. 410259	<p style="text-align: center;">284657—W. &amp; S. Ltd.—(90)—56857/84—20,000—3-16.</p>	





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
APR 10 1916


The Under Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to the communication from the Foreign Office of the 5th February 1916, No.W.20599, begs to enclose, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from the Resident in the Persian Gulf regarding the files of the German Consulate at Bushire relating to the Abu Musa Oxide Concession. The parcels containing the original German files will be transmitted to the Foreign Office as soon as they are received.

<sup>x</sup> Dated 21st  
February 1916.

<sup>x</sup> With enclosures  
in original

India Office,  
8th April 1916.





Letter from the Resident in the Persian Gulf to India Office,  
21 February 1916.

CONFIDENTIAL.

British Residency & Consulate-General,  
Bushire.

Dear Sir,

With reference to the Secretary of State's telegram dated 7th February to the address of Sir Percy Cox at Basrah stating that the Foreign Office would wish to have certain German files dealing with the Abu Musa case I have despatched by this mail in 4 parcels per registered parcel post the papers in question, taken from the German Vice-Consulate at Bushire when the incumbent Dr. Listermann was removed to India in March 1915.

Each parcel contains a file, numbered by us for convenience of reference respectively 61, 61 A, 62, (Abu Musa) and 40 (Miscellaneous papers Abu Musa). It will be seen that the files have not been properly kept and are rather mixed up, but roughly speaking No.61 contains papers from 1907-1911, 61 A papers from 1907-1908, and 62 papers from 1909 to 1912. No.40 contains letters from Messrs. Wönckhaus, draft contracts and other miscellaneous papers. A brief note of the contents of the more interesting papers in file 61 has been made by an officer who went through it.

I am sending a translation of certain of the papers by Sir Percy Cox's direction.

Yours truly,

(Sd.) A.Trevor.

The Political Secretary,  
India Office,  
London.



3

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Letter from the Resident in the Persian Gulf to India Office  
21 February 1912

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Letter from the Resident in the Persian Gulf to India Office,  
21 February 1918.

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post the papers in question, taken from the German Vice-  
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The Political Secretary,  
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5

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21 February 1916.

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Bushire.

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21 February 1912.

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
With reference to the Secretary of State's telegram dated 7th February to the address of Sir Percy Cox at Bushire stating that the Foreign Office would wish to have certain German files dealing with the Abu Musa case I have despatched by this mail in 4 parcels per registered parcel post the papers in question, taken from the German Vice-Consulate at Bushire when the incumbent Dr. Kistermann was removed to India in March 1911.

Each parcel contains a file, numbered by us for convenience of reference respectively G1, G1 A, G2, (Abu Musa) and G3 (Miscellaneous papers Abu Musa). It will be seen that the files have not been properly kept and are rather mixed up, but roughly speaking No. G1 contains papers from 1907-1911, G1 A papers from 1907-1908, and G2 papers from 1909 to 1912. No. G3 contains letters from Messrs. Winkhaus, draft contracts and other miscellaneous papers. A brief note of the contents of the more interesting papers in file G1 has been made by an officer who went through it.

I am sending a translation of certain of the papers by Sir Percy Cox's direction.

Yours truly,  
(Sd.) A. Trevor.

The Political Secretary,  
India Office,  
London.



TRANSLATION.

6

C.44.

Bushire, 19th May 1910.

From - Listemann, Bushire.

To - Imperial Chancellor, Berlin.

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In continuation of  
Despatch No.42 of  
6th instant.

Lt- Colonel Cox wrote me officially yesterday that Haji Hassan bin Samaye had already approached him direct in the matter of the shipment of oxide mentioned in my despatch No.42 and that he had refused him permission; this for my personal information. He said that he was not empowered to accept my intervention in the matter of a shipment undertaken by Hassan for his own account; that if on the occasion of the last shipment he had corresponded with the Imperial Vice-Consulate this was due to a misunderstanding, he having thought the shipment was for Wönckhaus and Co:.

On what Cox bases this latter assumption I cannot comprehend for all we asked after the initial hindrance of shipment was whether shipment would be allowed if it was on account of Messrs: Wönckhaus. For such a case also the Acting English Consul-General refused his consent on the ground that he had no instructions from his Government, and then when Cox on his return from leave spoke to Hassan at Lingeh he gave him the desired permission (so he wrote to me) without wishing to raise the question of whose account the shipment was for. Of course I do not know whether Hassan when on the subject of the new shipment informed the Consul-General direct that it was for his own account. Messrs Wönckhaus in their letter on the subject to me only say that Hassan wished to cleanse, break up and convey the oxide <sup>to</sup> of the beach with a view to shipping it to India after completion of the cleansing etc: operations, which would take a month or two. Whether on his <sup>own</sup> account (or mining Company's) or whether on account of others is not stated. As Cox sent me his letter, as usual, a few hours after the fortnightly post to Lingeh had left. I can only obtain information on this point by next post. It



TRANSLATION

3.44

Bushire, 18th May 1910.

From: Lieutenant, Bushire, 18th May 1910.

To: Imperial Chancellor, Berlin.

in connection of  
Deutsch No. 42 of  
8th Instanz.

Colonel Cox wrote me officially yesterday that Hajj Hassan bin Hamayy had already approached him direct in the matter of the shipment of oxide mentioned in my despatch No. 42 and that he had refused his permission; this for my personal information. He said that he was not empowered to accept my information in the matter of a shipment undertaken by Hassan for his own account; that if on the occasion of the last shipment he had corresponded with the Imperial Vice-Consulate this was due to a misunderstanding, he having thought the shipment was for Wöhrmann and Co.

On what Cox bases this latter assumption I cannot comprehend for all we asked after the initial shipment of oxide was whether shipment would be allowed if it was on account of Wöhrmann. For such a case also the Acting British Consul-General refused his consent on the ground that he had no instructions from his Government, and then when Cox on his return from Jeddah spoke to Hassan at length he gave him the desired permission (so he wrote to me) without raising the question of whether account the shipment was for Wöhrmann or for Hassan whose account the shipment was for of course I do not know whether Hassan when on the subject of the new shipment informed the Consul-General direct that it was for his own account. Wöhrmann in their letter on the subject to me only say that Hassan wished to obtain, direct of me, the oxide of the beach with a view to shipping it to India after completion of the clearing out operations, which would take a month or two. Whether on this account (or Wöhrmann's) or whether on account of others is not stated. As Cox said in his letter, at least, a few hours after the foregoing post to Jeddah had left, I can only obtain information on this point by next post.



7

It is quite true that Hassan as an English subject or protected person does not in propria personâ possess the right of representation of his personal interests through the Imperial Vice-Consulate. But as regards oxide cargoes - when these are not on account of Wönckhaus and Co. - he acts as Director of the Mining Company, in which Messrs: Wönckhaus (apart from their contracts to deliver) are interested as partners. In my opinion this justifies the <sup>intervention</sup> ~~intention~~ of the Imperial Vice Consulate, although these two points, i.e. Hassan's right to represent the Mining Company, and the partnership of Messrs: Wönckhaus in the latter, are disputed by the English. To this may be added as more external considerations (1) that Hassan has given full powers and transferred the representation of his interests in everything concerning the Abu Musa oxide affair to the German firm, (2) that hitherto all requests and correspondence have passed through this firm and the Vice Consulate; that Hassan should address a request to the English Consulate-General direct is an innovation which I only learned of ~~from~~ from Cox' letter.

Lack of time as well as serious eye trouble (as already reported) interfering greatly with my capacity for work have not so far permitted me to study the question thoroughly in all its details. So far I can only judge it as above and will answer Cox in this sense.


I will also by next post ask Messrs Wönckhaus for precise information on whose account the proposed shipment is to take place and also why Haji Hassan has this time, contrary to his former custom, addressed the English Consulate General direct. Under the circumstances the reply can not reach here under about three weeks i.e. about the same time as the arrival of this despatch in Berlin. I respectfully request Y.E. for telegraphic instructions whether, in case the shipment is proposed not for account of Wönckhaus and Co but of Hassan or the Mining Company, I am to maintain the standpoint that Hassan is acting as Director of <sup>the</sup> Company, that Wönckhaus and Co are partners in the Company and that accordingly - the maintenance of the first two points mentioned



7

It is quite true that Hassan is an English subject or  
protected person does not in proper persons possess the right of  
representation of his personal interests through the Imperial  
Vice-Consulate. But as regards oxide concessions - when these are  
not on account of Wöhler and Co. - he acts as Director of the  
Mining Company. In which capacity Wöhler and Co. (agent from their  
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this justifies the intervention of the Imperial Vice-Consulate,  
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of Company, that Wöhler and Co are partners in the Company  
and that accordingly - the maintenance of the first two points  
mentioned



8


mentioned should as a matter of fact follow from the contents of the last Memorandum handed to the British Government, - Cox's denial of the Imperial Vice Consulate's right to intervene is to be refused acceptance.

Copy Tehran.

(Sd) Listemann.

*Listemann*







From - Listemann, Bushire.


To - Imperial Chancellor, Berlin.

Dated Bushire 5th June 1910.

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C-46.                    |  
                          |  
Reference despatch.   |  
C-44 dated 19th May

After Lt-Colonel Cox had refused to permit the shipment of oxide on account of H. Hassan bin Samaye which was referred to in my despatch No. 44 dated 19th ultimo, Messrs Wönckhaus, Lingah reported to me, before receiving my enquiry on whose account the shipment was to take place, that they wished to effect shipment on their own account. To my letter informing him of this Cox replied yesterday that his instructions only empowered him to allow such shipments as were destined to put Messrs Wönckhaus in a position to fulfil their contracts concluded before the cancellation of the Mining concession; and that as these shipments had taken place two years since and therefore the shipment now projected could not come within this category he regretted he was unable to take any steps in the matter.

The stand-point of the English Consul-General seems to me unjustifiable, the object of his attitude can only be chicanery. The Note of the English Foreign Office dated 10th January 1908 which Your Excellency communicated to me in your No. 4 dated 5th January 1908 III-B 653/3580 might be regarded as a basis for the standpoint of the British Government in this question: but in that Note there is not a word about Messrs Wönckhaus' contracts, but only that the English Government saw no objection to Wönckhaus' "removing from the Island the oxide already mined and ready for shipment". This is precisely the case now, it is a question of some 400 to 500 tons of oxide which has already been mined and now only requires to be broken up and conveyed to the shore. ( That the breaking up and transport to shore do not exclude the "readiness for shipment" I have already had the honour to explain in my despatch No. 17 of the 25th March 1908, and the consent of the English Government to the shipment then on the carpet





10

carpet shows that the latter have recognised as just the standpoint there taken up by me).


The refusal of the Consul-General seems to me all the more wonderful as he had written me on the 11th April last in connection with the shipment per S.S. "Nasari" on account of Hassan that he had told Hassan " que lorsque nous consentions à l'enlèvement de ce chargement, il était entendu que le chargement serait pour le compte de la maison Wönckhaus and Co, afin de leur permettre d'exécuter leurs contracts; il n'était point entendu que ce fût pour le compte de Hassan. Nonobstant une fois notre accord donné je ne voulais pas retirer parole (entant que la Résidence était concernée)".

As already remarked in my despatch No.44, all I have asked was whether the shipment would be permitted in case it was for account of Wönckhaus. In any case the sentence quoted from Cox's letter shows that originally the permission to ship was granted the German firm in order that they might fulfil their contracts. Wherefore does Cox now refuse, not two months later, the permit to Wönckhaus on the pretext that the shipments necessary to completion of contracts were executed two years ago? (quite apart from the fact that as remarked above - the original general consent of the British Government to oxide shipments does not contain this limitation to the quantity required for the fulfilment of contracts).

Messrs Wönckhaus inform me further that the English representative in Lingeh had told Hassan that shipment could not be permitted him because the oxide in question "belongs to Messrs Wönckhaus". I at once asked the firm to make sure of the exact wording of this communication (to Hassan); should it be shown that emphasis was really laid (in the communication) to Hassan on the fact of the oxide belonging to Wönckhaus, that would at least be significant of the way in which Cox proceeds!

From all these facts I can only see in Cox's refusal to release the oxide an endeavour to make difficulties, at least to delay shipment, by means of a procrastinating correspondence with Berlin and London, and also to show his power over all the parties

Parties





11

parties interested. I am also convinced that he will act in the same way in case he receives from his Government instructions to release this shipment and should later a fresh shipment of oxide still remaining over be contemplated. As yet I do not know if and how much oxide may be on the Island ready mined in addition to these 400 to 500 tons. I will not fail to make enquiries and let Your Excellency know as soon as possible.

I shall make another attempt to induce Cox to release the oxide by referring him to the above cited sentence of his letter of the 11th April, but I fear that he will find some pretext or another for getting round the logical sequence of the same. I venture therefore to ask Your Excellency to take the necessary steps now with the British Government so that Cox may be instructed to release both these 400 and 500 tons and any other mined oxide which may remain over after their shipment, and to take the necessary measures for the safeguarding of preliminary labour and shipment.

As for my right to intervene with Cox even in the case of a shipment which is to take place on account of Hassan or the Mining Company I have merely informed the Consul-General briefly that I must maintain my right of intervention in such cases but consider it for the moment superfluous to go into the question, as the present shipment is for account of Wönckhaus and Co and therefore my status in the present case is beyond question.

I have already had the honour in my despatch 44 to expose the reasons which in my opinion legitimise the interference of the Imperial Vice Consulate or the Imperial Government represented by <sup>that V. Consulate</sup> ~~him~~ here. Now after examining the circumstances afresh I cannot give up the standpoint adopted by me then. If the partnership of Messrs Wönckhaus in the Mining Company and Hassan's right to represent the latter as Director, which together form the basis for the German intervention, are disputed by the English, this does not in my opinion oppose the up-holding of the standpoint described. The waiving of Hassan's right to represent also leads to the logical conclusion e.g. of declaring the forward contract made by him with Wönckhaus not binding on the  
Mining



11

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as the present shipment is for account of Böhmann and Co and  
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the reasons which in my opinion justify the interference of  
the Imperial Vice-Consulate or the Imperial Government represented  
at Bushire. Now after examining the circumstances afresh I  
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standpoint described. The status of Hassan's right to repre-  
sent also falls to the logical conclusion e.g. of leaving the  
forward contract made by him with Böhmann not binding on the  
Mining



12


Mining Company, and yet the validity of the contract was upheld by the Imperial Government and the shipments of oxide resting upon it were approved by the British Government. Lt-Colonel Cox does not fail in a single note written on the Abu Musa affair, especially when it is a question of shipments and the like, to remark expressly that all this is "without prejudice to the final ruling and decision of the whole affair by our respective Governments"; under the same reserve also I suppose must be placed the right of the Imperial Government and of this Vice Consulate to intervene in cases where Messrs Wöckhaus are not interested directly as shippers but only indirectly as partners in the (Mining) Company. If <sup>in</sup> the final decision Hassan's right to conduct the business and the German firm's partnership are recognised - and that is after all from the German point of view one of the principal aims of the negotiations - it would be most important from the point of view of German interests that the business and the working of the Mining Company should be interrupted as little as possible during the course of the said negotiations.

The importance from the local point of view of establishing the German right to intervene gains considerable weight from the fact that Wöckhaus's contract -to- deliver with Hassan runs out very shortly. It can hardly be doubted that the English -at least so far as Mr. Cox comes into question - will use this circumstance to refuse or make as difficult as possible any further German intervention by pointing to the termination of the said contract; let therefore the right to discuss questions in which Wöckhaus and Co: are already interested in their capacity of partner in the Mining Company properly represented by Hassan be established from the very beginning.

Regarding obtaining permission to ship, I beg to observe that I shall ~~not~~ represent this <sup>to</sup> Your Excellency telegraphically so as to avoid needless waste of time. But I thought it best not to send my telegram until my despatch No.44 reached Berlin and gave Your Excellency a picture of the position as it then stood which would render a more lengthy and costly description of the same

by







13


by telegram unnecessary. This telegraphic report would make the telegraphic instructions requested by me on the subject of the intervention question superfluous as this question for the time being is not acute by reason of the taking over of the shipment on account of the German firm. On the other hand I beg to request instructions by letter on the subject.


Copy Tehran.

(Sd) Listemann.

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*ML*





TRANSLATION.

14

No.C.47.

Bushire 11th June 1910.


From - Listemann, Bushire.

To - Imperial Chancellor, Berlin.

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In continuation }  
of my No.46 dated }  
5th instant. }  
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On the occasion of a brief visit from Mr. Rosenfeld the former Manager of the Lingeh Branch of Messrs Wöckhaus I discussed with him the question of the newly proposed shipment of oxide and derived the impression from what he said that Lt-Colonel Cox and his representative in Lingeh are striving to draw Hassan bin Samaye over to their side. Mr.Cox's attitude to me too seems to pursue this end inter alia : by refusing my intervention regarding shipments for Hassan and by declining to permit shipments for Wöckhaus this Vice Consulate is apparently to be scolded, the bond which link together the Vice Consulate (or Messrs Wöckhaus) and Hassan are to be loosened and the last named is to be exposed more than ever to English influences. Should Cox carry his point he would probably use it in order to give Hassan to understand that he could neither count upon German help for himself nor even expect that the German firm would be allowed to ship oxide in the future; then that would perhaps be represented as a gradual withdrawal on the part of the Imperial Government and <sup>as</sup> a precursor of a speedy final decision of the whole Abu Musa affair in favour of the English and to Hassan the moral would be preached that he would do better by a speedy surrender to save what still could be saved. The return of the prodigal would perhaps be made easier for him by the assurance that the past would be forgiven and forgotten, and the question of the mining concession regulated on a purely English basis so that Hassan too would find his advantage therein. A condition previous would of course be that he should completely forswear his former gods and make the above settlement possible by taking back and recalling all his previous actions.

That





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That Cox has such plans in view apart from other reasons for his actions. I consider highly probable. He is undoubtedly endeavouring to collect evidence to combat the strong arguments and <sup>proofs</sup> adduced in the last German Memorandum, which I conclude from various indications to be very distasteful to him; to upset the German case without the use of prejudiced means would certainly be rather difficult.

It may however be regarded as beyond question that Cox is not too scrupulous in obtaining and using material for proof and in choosing his means: Shaikh Salim's letter to his nephew Segger in which he declares he never thought of claiming the Island of Abu Musa as his property is undoubtedly not Shaikh Salim's own work and contradicts absolutely his former attitude. Similar letters, withdrawal of former declarations, calling in question the genuineness of letters and entries in books may perhaps be expected from Hasean also and might possibly, as many of his statements and documents are of the highest importance for the whole case, give quite a different turn to the decision of the case. But if Hasean declared he had faked (forged) certain letters or book entries it would be as difficult to convince him of the genuineness of the documents and the falsity of his later statement as it is to prove that the above mentioned ~~letter~~ letter does not contain Shaikh Salim's real opinion and was not written by him of his own free will and spontaneity!

It is however very probable that Hasean might succumb to attempts of this nature: the old man, who for so long has put all his capital and all his energy into the Abu Musa mines, has only one thought (and that is) to see one more success before he dies: once he has been convinced that he can achieve this success only in the way indicated then it is quite possible he would succumb to this very temptation, for he has lost much of his pristine vigour and firmness through old age, ill success and disappointment (<sup>de</sup> ~~de~~ discouragement), and even the most honourable Arab remains in the long run an Arab, and that is a man who doesn't worry about an occasional untruth.

It may well be that these fears will never be realised, but they



15

That Cox has such plans in view apart from other reasons for his actions, I consider highly probable. He is undoubtedly endeavouring to collect evidence to combat the strong statements and alleged in the last German Memorandum which I conclude from various indications to be very important to him; to up- set the German case without the use of practical means would certainly be rather difficult.

It may however be regarded as beyond question that Cox is not too scrupulous in obtaining and using evidence for proof and in choosing his means: Sheikh Salim's letter to his nephew Saeed in which he declares he never thought of claiming the land of Abu Musa as his property is undoubtedly not Sheikh Salim's own work and concludes absolutely his former attitude. Similar letters, withdrawal of former declarations, coming in question the genuineness of letters and entries in books may perhaps be expected from Hassan also and might possibly, as many of his statements and documents are of the highest importance for the whole case, give a different turn to the opinion of the court. But if Hassan declared he had falsified (forged) certain letters or book entries it would be as difficult to convince him of the genuineness of the documents and the falsity of his later statement as it is to prove that the above mentioned letter does not contain Sheikh Salim's real opinion and was not written by him of his own free will and spontaneously!

It is however very probable that Hassan might succeed to all his capital and all his energy into the Abu Musa mine. He has only one thought (and that is) to see one more success before he dies: once he has been convinced that he can achieve this success only in the way indicated then it is quite possible he would succeed to this very temptation, for he has lost much of his private vigour and firmness through old age. If success and disappointment (Sukhsamant), and even the loss of honourable and remains in the long run an evil, and that is a man who does not worry about an occasional untruth.

It may well be that these fears will never be realized, but they

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they are not groundless. Nothing is farther from my thoughts than to use such fears and anxieties as a foundation for an attitude devoid of legal basis. But I am of opinion, as I had the honour to explain in my two last reports, that the most important points about this question, namely the right of Messrs: Wöckhaus on the strength of the English Government's consent of January 1908 to ship in the future oxide already prepared, and the right of the Imperial Government and this Vice Consulate to intervene in the case of shipments on account of Hassan or the Mining Coy.; that these two points are completely justified in law, correspond to the attitude hitherto taken up by the Imperial Government and follow logically from it. My statement of the above fears and anxieties pursues exclusively the object of drawing attention to the fact that for us to hold on to the above mentioned two points is not only sound law but under certain circumstances might be of the utmost practical significance for the final settlement of the whole Abu Musa case.

As Mr. Rosenfeld told me there was no particular haste for the projected shipment I have abstained from the telegraphic request (referred to) in my despatch No. 46 for the obtaining of permission to ship or rather for the obtaining of corresponding instructions to Cox, which would have required a more lengthy statement of the case and have confined myself to stating the case by telegram only so far as the present superfluity of the telegraphic instructions regarding question of intervention asked for in despatch No. 44 was clear therefrom, and I thought for the rest I might refer to my detailed despatch No. 46 sent off last week.

(Translator's note. I haven't the foggiest notion what he means but this <sup>is</sup> what he says.)

Regarding acceptance of (the right to) ship I have written Cox again that I consider his point of view unjustified and would request him to submit the question to a further examination: answer still outstanding.

I heard from Rosenfeld that there must be a not inconsiderable.





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they are not pronounced. Nothing is further from my thoughts than to use such fears and anxieties as a foundation for an attitude devoid of legal basis. But I am of opinion, and I had the honour to explain in my two last reports, that the most important points about this question, namely the right of Messrs. Rosenfeld on the strength of the English Government's consent of January 1908 to ship in the future oxide already prepared, and the right of the Imperial Government and this Vice Consulate to intervene in the case of shipments on account of Hassan on the Ming Co.; that these two points are completely justified in law, correspond to the attitude hitherto taken up by the Imperial Government and follow logically from it. My statement of the above facts and anxieties purveys exclusively the object of drawing attention to the fact that for us to hold on to the above mentioned two points is not only sound law but under certain circumstances right as of the utmost practical significance for the final settlement of the whole Abu Musa case. As Mr. Rosenfeld told me there was no particular haste for the projected shipment I have abstained from the telegraphic word missing (reference) in my despatch No. 48 for the obtaining of permission to ship or rather for the obtaining of courses pending instructions to Cox, which would have required a more lengthy statement of the case and have confined myself to stating the case by telegram only so far as the present subject of the telegraphic instructions regarding question of intervention asked for in despatch No. 44 was clear. I thought for the time being I might refer to my detailed despatch No. 48 sent off last week. I have the feeling that what he wanted (Rosenfeld's note) I have the feeling that what he wanted but this (what he says) is not clear. I have written Cox again that I consider his point of view unjustified and would request him to submit the question to a further examination. I have still outstanding.

I heard from Rosenfeld that there must be a not incon- siderable



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
derable quantity of ready mined oxide lying on the Island, but he was unable to give the number of tons even approximately; I will therefore by next post ask Lingeh for information.

He also told me that the English communication to Hassan mentioned in my despatch No. 46 forbidding him to ship oxide because it belonged to Messrs: Wonckhaus, was transmitted to him verbally by the former Consular Agent Agha Badr, who is ~~af~~ often utilised still as confidential intermediary by the new Vice Consul (who is not yet completely into his work) and who also receives orders from Cox himself direct. The sentence in question is therefore not to be used juridically; for Agha~~h~~ Badr would naturally dispute it and even if his statement were considered as counterbalanced by Hassan's Cox would disavow his Agent and repudiate responsibility: nevertheless the communication was probably as stated and would any how be characteristic of the English attitude.

Copy to Tehran.

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*MS*





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G-51.

Bushire, 2nd July 1910.

From - Listemann, Bushire.


To - H.E. the Imperial Chancellor

Dr. Bethmann Hollweg.

In continuation of my despatch No.C-47 of 11th ultimo. Upon my request that he would again examine the question of the shipment of 400 tons of oxide to India, Lt-Colonel Cox has now at length replied (15 days after receipt of my communication) that he cannot alter his opinion and permit shipment. He states that he approved of the previous shipment per S.S. "Nasari" because he was of the opinion that it was meant for the completion of former contracts of Messrs Wönckhaus; when he heard the shipment was to be for the account of Haji Hassan he did not wish to withdraw the permission once given, although accorded under a misunderstanding; only on his return to Bushire had he learnt moreover that according to Wassmuss Messrs Wönckhaus' contracts had already been completed by the "Louise" shipment of 1908. Under these circumstances he could according to his instructions do nothing more, and must ask me to take any further steps to obtain fresh instructions to himself through Your Excellency.

Mr. Cox therefore returns again and again to the improbable story of his "misunderstanding" about which I shall have more to say below. As for the completion of the Wönckhaus contracts by the "Louise" shipment certainly this (passage) does occur in a letter to Major Trevor dated 1st March last but at the same time attention is drawn to the fact that Cox subsequently to this shipment informed me that he had instructions to facilitate the shipment by Messrs Wönckhaus of all oxide already mined (compare my despatch No.C-21 of 6th March last). I do not know on what Mr. Wassmuss bases his opinion that the contractual obligations of the German firm were completed with the "Louise" shipment; the hitherto Manager of Wönckhaus' Lingeh Branch,

Mr.






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Mr. Rosenfeld, told me during his visit here at the beginning of June that he himself did not know whether and how far the firm had fulfilled their obligations, as the matter was dealt with in Hamburg without full information being supplied to the Branches in the Gulf.

However that may be, the fact remains that the British Government in its Note of the 10th January 1908 in no way made its permission to ship the oxide already mined conditional upon the completion of existing contracts; a fact which the British Government certainly now seems to wish to ignore, as appears from the note to the Imperial Chargé d'Affaires in London dated 22nd May last.

The description in this note of the "misunderstanding" so often dragged in by Cox is somewhat curious: by the simple clear statement of Wassmuss' letter of the 9th August 1909 "c'est la compagnie mineure de Haji Hassan bin Samaye & Co qui vont expédier ces 400 tons d'oxyde" ... Cox wishes to "understand" that Mr. Wassmuss merely wanted to emphasize his opinion that a Mining Company existed in which Wöckhaus and Coy<sup>r</sup> had an interest! I can hardly believe that Cox wishes to attribute to himself such lack of intelligence as seriously to maintain that he did not understand this plain sentence. It is easier to assume that the English party thought itself entitled to treat the Imperial Vice Consulate as quite a "quantité négligeable" and so to twist its official notes as to give them a meaning which dovetailed with British ~~xxx~~ aims but was the very opposite of the plain meaning of the words used which are as a matter of fact unmistakable. I cannot refrain therefore from agreeing with the view expressed by Mr. Wassmuss in his despatch No. C. 21 viz: that the way in which the Imperial Vice Consulate is treated by British officials is unseemly. Moreover the way in which Cox now tries to put me off with a repetition<sup>ti</sup> of his eternal "misunderstanding" seems to me hardly seemly. I venture not respectfully to ask Your Excellency whether protest<sup>ti</sup> could not be entered against this treatment of the German representative here and a repetition<sup>ti</sup> of the same prevented. If Cox once gets  
the




19

Mr. Rosenfeld, told us during his visit here at the beginning of June that he himself did not know whether and how far the firm had fulfilled their obligations, as the matter was dealt with in Bagdad without full information being supplied to the branches in the Gulf.

However that may be, the fact remains that the British Government in its note of the 10th January 1908 in no way made its permission to ship the oxide already mined conditional upon the completion of existing contracts; a fact which the British Government certainly now seems to wish to ignore, as appears from the note to the Imperial Chamber of Appeal in London dated 22nd May last.

The description in this note of the "unfulfilling" or "often dragged in by Cox" is somewhat curious; by the single clear statement of Wasmuth's letter of the 9th August 1908 "Cox" is completely misread as Haji Hassan bin Sawayy & Co but what "unfulfilling" Cox wishes to "unfulfilling" that Mr. Wasmuth merely wanted to emphasize his opinion that a mining contract existed in which Wasmuth and Cox had an interest; I can hardly believe that Cox wishes to attribute to himself such lack of intelligence as not to understand that he did not understand this plain sentence. It is easier to assume that the English party thought itself entitled to treat the Imperial Vice Consulate as quite a "quantité négligeable" and so to twist the official notes as to give them a meaning which contradicted with British law and was the very opposite of the plain meaning of the words used which are as a matter of fact unmistakable. I cannot refrain therefore from agreeing with the view expressed by Mr. Wasmuth in his despatch No. 251 viz: that the way in which the Imperial Vice Consulate is treated by British officials is unseemly. Moreover the way in which Cox now tries to put me off with a repetition of his eternal "unfulfilling" seems to me hardly seemly. I venture to respectfully request you to ascertain whether possibly could not be entered against this treatment of the German representative here and a repetition of the same prevented. If Cox once gets



20

the impression that he can with impunity treat interpret and misunderstand official Notes in the above fashion, any further correspondence with him will be rendered extraordinarily difficult and unfruitful. With equal right he might later on declare - provided he saw advantage in it - that he understood my statement that the proposed shipment was to take place on account of Wöckhaus and Coy: to mean that I wished to emphasise the existence of the said firm and perhaps to draw attention to the fact that the firm had a certain interest in the Abu Musa affair. In short, he could later declare with reference to every single official note that he understood the precise opposite of what it clearly and plainly meant.



I venture also to repeat my request that it may be laid down that this Vice Consulate has the right of intervention in such cases where it is only a question of the German firm's indirect interest in the affairs of the Mining Company managed by Hassan; I beg to remark that the English intervene in cases where the interests of an English party are much more remote and dubious than in the present case: e.g. the date question of last summer. Not to lay down such a ruling would in addition to the above mentioned disadvantages also inevitably result in a considerable weakening of the position of the Imperial Vice Consulate vis-à-vis the British Consulate General and third parties, and the English Consulate-General would then think it could permit itself things quite other than the above described method of treating German official notes.


Finally I venture to request Your Excellency to move the Government of Great Britain to instruct Lt-Colonel Cox to facilitate shipment of the 400 tons of oxide ~~xi~~ and also <sup>all</sup> outstanding already mined oxide in accordance with the position taken up in the note of the 10th January 1910 in which the removal of all mined oxide was agreed to without making the same dependent upon the fulfilment of existing contracts.

Copy to Minister Tehran.

WVO







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

From - German Embassy, London.  
To - Imperial Chancellor, Berlin.  
No. 767 (reference III a 10967)

London 23 August 1910.

To my Note to the British Government regarding Abu Musa in continuation of III a 8610 of the 22nd ultimo, the enclosed reply has been received. In it the British Government endeavours to prove that the shipments of ore intended by Messrs Wöckhaus and Co: are no longer designed to make it possible for the firm to complete the contracts for delivery entered into before the legal question was raised, which was the condition under which the British Government had permitted shipment. Therefore the demand of the firm (they say) is a clear violation of the agreement between the English and German Governments; the British Consul-General, Bushire in forbidding shipment has merely carried out the intentions of the British Government as expressed in the memo: of 10th July 1908; the British Government might claim to have the right to adhere to that memo.; as meanwhile the wording of other Notes might be interpreted to mean that the shipment of all oxide already mined was permitted unconditionally they will agree to the desired shipment and instruct Lt-Colonel Cox accordingly. Meanwhile they hope the Imperial Government will not support other requests of this nature which Messrs Wöckhaus and Co may make.

In conclusion they declare that in the former case mentioned in my Note the English representative acted correctly.

Regarding the first part of this reply Note ( of the British Government) I have the honour to remark that their observations do not constitute an answer to the corresponding points made in the marginally noted (i.e. the German communication). In view of the clear wording of the English Notes of the 4th and 23rd July 1908 which indeed have induced the Government here to agree to our request, I had based myself in previous negotiations solely on these unconditional declarations of the English Government and have not gone into the  
pretexts







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
Pretexts which Lt-Colonel Cox made to the Imperial Vice-Consul.

I have to-day asked Sir E. Grey to instruct Lt-Colonel Cox by telegram, if this has not already been done, to put no difficulties in the way of the shipment. The Foreign Secretary will place himself in communication with the India Office and communicate with me shortly regarding instructions to Cox.

(Sd) P. Metternich.

*Mt*





23

From - German Ambassador, London.  
To - Imperial Chancellor, Berlin.

London, 12th December 1911.

No. III a' 17097/11.



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In continuation of |  
despatch dated 1st |  
April last and com- |  
munication of |  
31/10/1911. |


In a Note of the 6th instant the Foreign Office has sent me in duplicate (copy herewith) the long-expected second Memo: of the British Government relative to the Abu Musa affair.

In the <sup>covering</sup> note of same date copy of which is forwarded herewith the British Government inform me that in their opinion the results of the further investigations undertaken on receipt of the second German Memo: and reproduced in this their Memo: completely justify the English standpoint in the whole question.

As however they do not wish to continue any longer the dispute, which has already lasted nearly 4 years, or to cause the commercial house interested any further loss, and as they moreover have endeavoured from the beginning and still are endeavouring to treat the whole question in dispute in the friendliest spirit possible, the British Government propose settlement of the dispute on the lines of the following compromise:-

1. The English Government recognise the desire of Messrs Wöckhaus and Co. for compensation for the interruption of their work - an interruption which is to be attributed to the fact that Hassan Samaih was not in a position to carry out his contract with the firm - and are ready to facilitate the fulfilment of this wish. The English Government propose that the firm should submit to them through the German Government an exact account of their claims for compensation under this heading, as they (British Government) have  
hitherto





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hitherto received no precise information regarding the extent of losses incurred, although some light was thrown on the subject in paragraph 5 of their Note of the 22nd August 1910 received 23rd August.

2. The English Government also recognise the desire of Messrs Wönckhaus and Co. to be placed again as far as possible in the position they were in commercially at the moment of the interruption of their (mining operations) and will to this end use their influence with the Shaikh of Shargah to get him to approve of a fresh concession to selected individuals for the continuance of said mining operations. The English Government will also endeavour to bring about a unification of the contents (?) so that the contract dated 1st July 1906 can be extended for a period equivalent to the duration of the interruption of operations i.e. from 10th October 1907 to 1st June 1910.

So that the contract could e.g. run from 1st May 1912 to 31st December 1914.


Should Messrs Wönckhaus in accordance with this proposal be restored to their old contract, their losses as treated under No. 1 would obviously be confined to the delay in receiving their commercial profits on account of the interruption of work.

Also it may be noticed that notwithstanding any reciprocally - accepted clauses in the present contract the parties are not bound to enter into a fresh agreement after termination of the (said) contract.

3. The English Government maintain in its entirety their former position, that the Shaikh of Shargah was acting within his rights as an absolute Sovereign when he recalled the concession, and they (the Government) expressly lay down that neither they themselves nor the Shaikh of Shargah can be held in any way responsible for losses incurred by Messrs Wönckhaus and Co. but rather the firm's claim for compensation lies exclusively against Hassan Samaih. Meanwhile the English Government undertake to do their best to arrange that the firm

shall





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hitherto received no precise information regarding the ex-  
tent of losses incurred, although some light was thrown on  
the subject in paragraph 5 of their note of the 22nd August  
1910 received 23rd August.

2. The English Government also recognizes the desire of  
Messrs Wöhrmann and Co. to be placed again as far as possible  
in the position they were in commercially at the moment of  
the interruption of their (mining operations) and will do  
this and use their influence with the Sheikh of Bushire to  
to get him to approve of a fresh concession to be granted in-  
dividual for the continuance of said mining operations. The  
English Government will also endeavor to bring about a mi-  
litation of the contract (?) so that the contract dated 1st  
July 1908 can be extended for a period equivalent to the du-  
ration of the interruption of operations i.e. from 19th  
October 1907 to 1st June 1910.

So that the contract could e.g. run from 1st July 1910 to  
1st December 1914.

Should Messrs Wöhrmann in accordance with this proposal  
be restored to their old contract, their losses as treated  
under No. 1 would obviously be confined to the delay in re-  
ceiving their commercial profits on account of the interrup-  
tion of work.

Also it may be noted that notwithstanding any restric-  
tions - accepted clauses in the present contract the parties  
are not bound to enter into a fresh agreement after termination  
of the (said) contract.

3. The English Government maintains in its entirety their  
former position, that the Sheikh of Bushire was acting within  
his rights as an absolute sovereign when he recalled the con-  
cession, and that (the Government) expressly lay down that  
neither they themselves nor the Sheikh of Bushire can be held  
in any way responsible for losses incurred by Messrs Wöhrmann  
and Co. but rather the firm's claim for compensation lies ex-  
clusively against Messrs Wöhrmann. Notwithstanding the English Go-  
vernment undertakes to do their best to arrange that the firm  
shall




25

shall receive compensation as eventually assessed.

In conclusion the Note expresses the hope that the Imperial Government, having regard to the good intentions which have influenced the English Government in proposing this compromise, will show itself ready to co-operate in the settlement of this long drawn out dispute by recommending Messrs Wöckhaus to accept the compromise.

I have not yet received any reply to my Note of the 6th November 1911 addressed to the Government here in compliance with the marginally noted instructions regarding shipment of oxide from Abu Musa.

(Sd) Count Wolff Metternich.





26

III A.4130.

From - Wozekhaus Hamburg.

To - German Foreign Office, Berlin.

Dated - 21st March 1912.

We thank the Foreign Office for their communications to us which show the inclination of the English Government in principle to come to a good understanding with us over the Abu Musa dispute.

Certainly the communication of the English Government contains (an expression of) the wish for a good understanding; but the way broadly sketched therein is quite impossible as it lies in the power neither of the English <sup>Government</sup> nor of any other factor to restore the status quo ante.


Nevertheless we are <sup>l</sup>avourably impressed by the communication of the English Government and hereby declare ourselves inclined in principle towards a good understanding between ourselves and the other party to the question.

We do so especially from a desire that the English Government also may recognise our good-will and that this fact may result in as good relations as possible with the English Authorities and officials there for our ~~our~~ establishments in the Persian Gulf. We honestly and urgently desire to stand always on good terms with the English organs in the Persian Gulf and wish unpleasant incidents and the like to be excluded for the future.

Immediately upon receipt of the communications we addressed Mr. Brown, who has gone through and worked through the whole matter, with the request he would as soon as possible make proposals on the basis of which a good understanding might be arranged.

We would also remark that in our letter to Mr. Brown we laid stress upon bringing into play the greatest possible moderation in claims for compensation in order, so far as lies in our power to make the settlement of this ancient matter as easy as possible for the Foreign Office and the English Government.

Upon






27

Upon receipt of proposals from that side we will permit ourselves to present our claims for compensation to the Foreign Office and we hope this will be the case in four to six weeks.

Yours obediently,  
(Sd) Robert Wernkehaus & Co.

*W*





28

FRAGMENT of an undated and very lengthy letter from  
Listemann to            γ.  
(The remainder is partly missing and partly undecypherable).

Ø Some time in 1913 apparently.

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x            x            x            x            obviously this is  
the only reason for such expressions <sup>in</sup> ~~on~~ the English Note as  
"H.M.G. will endeavour" - "will do their best" - etc.  
That in **fact** the English Government will decide the question  
alone and without questioning Shaikh Segger is as evident as  
that the Shaikh would never be in a position to pay the amount  
of compensation but the British Government would bear the burden  
if it came to paying! (Sir Percy Cox's letter which forms my  
enclosure No.2 shows sufficiently what is the English view of  
Shaikh Segger's "independence" and his "sovereign right of  
jurisdiction" !) Perhaps it would be worth considering whether  
the "binding obligation" of the English Government (would run  
to) payment in the shape of a guarantee?

Should the English make difficulties over a moderate pay-  
ment a further pursuit <sup>of</sup> ~~on~~ the case appears distinctly ~~xxx~~ rich  
in expectation. The English Memo: of 6th December 1912 in  
spite of the ~~xxxxxx~~ haughty language in which it <sup>is</sup> couched  
(lit. proud note which it strikes) contains very numerous weak  
and very debateable points which it would not be hard to refute.  
Real conyincing <sup>refutations</sup> ~~conclusions~~ of the German Memorandum are  
scarcely to be found in it. As in the first English Memorandum  
this one often puts statements in the place of proofs; what the  
German Memo: states is of course incorrect, what the English  
says **is** right; that needs no proof. The witnesses adduced by  
the German document are of course quite unreliable, those on  
the English side above suspicion. It is for example incompre-  
hensible why the Persian, Shia' merchants of Bushire who have  
no relations with the Arabian littoral, should have more accu-  
rate information about conditions in those parts than the Arab  
Sunni merchants of Basra; the little error made by these latter  
when they speak of Abu Musa "in Persia" is anyhow all the more  
pardonable





38

FRAGMENT of an undated and very lengthy letter from  
Platzmann to  
(The remainder is partly missing and partly unrecognizable.)  
Some time in 1913 apparently.

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Obviously this is  
the only reason for such expressions in the English Note as  
"H.M.G. will endeavour" - "will do their best" - etc.  
That in fact the English government will decide the question  
alone and without questioning Shaikh Sa'eed is as evident as  
that the Shaikh would never be in a position to pay the amount  
of compensation but the British Government would bear the burden  
if it came to paying! (Mr Percy Cox's letter which forms my  
enclosure No. 2 shows sufficiently what is the British view of  
Shaikh Sa'eed's "independence" and his "sovereign right of  
jurisdiction"!) Perhaps it would be worth considering whether  
the "binding obligation" of the English government (would run  
to) payment in the shape of a guarantee?

Should the English make difficulties over a moderate pay-  
ment a further pursuit in the case appears distinctly less  
in expectation. The English Memo: of 6th December 1913 in  
spite of the ~~rather~~ language in which it is couched  
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Sunni merchants of Basrah; the little error made by these latter  
when they speak of Abu Musa "in Persia" is anyhow all the more  
paradoxical



pardonable because as is well known the Persian Government fell into it themselves years ago! The remark that some of the witnesses cited on the German side are "petty merchants" would suit quite as well or better a very large number of the English witnesses. If all pearl merchants who work with foreign capital (vide 15 below of the English Memorandum) are therefore unreliable, one must refuse to believe and trust the whole guild of native pearl merchants, for hardly one of them possesses the fairly large capital necessary for the pearl trade, nearly all of them work partly with foreign capital! In the same way there is hardly an Arab or Persian merchant who does not when occasion offers smuggle as much tobacco coffee arms etc as he can! If the testimony of Abdullah bin Hassan Gelladari is refused as biased because he is the agent of Messrs Wönckhaus it is noteworthy that he was once Agent for the German firm for about 9 months, from the beginning <sup>to</sup> of the end of 1912, i.e. about 2 years after he had given up his witnessing! If Nejeif (enclosure 57 of the English Memo) swears he never offered Mr. Brown his share in the mining concession for sale, Mr. Brown (as he stated at the time vide enclosure 33 German Memo: November 1909) is ready to take his oath to the contrary, and it is only a question of whether more trust is to be reposed in the oath of a European or a Persian; usually the English ha<sup>ve</sup> little doubt about this question. When Mr. Brown on the 22nd October 1907 sailed for Abu Musa, says the English Memo: at page 33, he took a German flag with him and wanted to hoist it over the accumulated oxide. Mr. Brown disputes vigorously ever having had such a mad idea; the boat he was using belonged to Messrs Wönckhaus and carried the German flag as it did on all other journeys and when in harbour at Lingah, that is all. And so the Arabs on the island fired upon the German flag. The account given by the Arab eyewitnesses of the attack on the boat contradicts in important points, e.g. in the time stated, the written report drawn up by Mr. Brown immediately after his return to Lingah: whereas the Arabs only spoke out some four months later, when their recollection



23

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recollection



30

recollection could hardly be quite fresh. The first Arab eyewitness only saw 10 to 15 Arabs in all on the beach some of whom were standing by the accumulated oxide; the other sees 30 in the same place! The circumstance distinctly reported by Mr. Brown that in the afternoon a boat manned by armed Arabs pushed off to attack his boat, is wanting (in the testimony of) the Arab eyewitnesses.

I only wished at this stage to give this small selection of inaccuracies etc.: It seems to me not difficult to refute many other important points of the English Memorandum and I will at once begin collecting material for that purpose in case no settlement should be arrived at on the basis of Brown's proposals.

At this point I beg once more to draw attention to the fact that the Abu Musa affair has stirred up a lot of dust in the whole Gulf and that it would of necessity greatly shake the position of Messrs Wöckhaus and German trade generally if in this particular case after years of struggle the firm named were put off with a small sum by way of compensation. The English would make the widest possible use of this in order to make it clear to the natives that one word of the British Resident sufficed to exclude the Germans from this or that business and that in spite of years of trouble on the part of the Germans nothing can be done against it.

I must also give expression to the conviction which I have had for a long time but especially since the second German Memorandum became known to the English authorities here, namely that the latter know the weakness of their position very well and therefore are trying to defer settlement of the case. The treatment of each request for another shipment of oxide and of many other questions offered splendid opportunities for this system of procrastination; it seems as though the Resident, furnished in most matters with such ample full powers, were unable to take the slightest decision in the Abu Musa case without obtaining instructions from London round by Calcutta! I have not thought it necessary to report fully in every case  
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
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to (Y.E.) upon the numberless small difficulties which have been made. But I am entirely under the impression that all the<sup>s</sup> difficulties and the meticulously "dilatatory" treatment of the case had for their object to tire out persons interested on the German side of the case and to disgust them (if I may permit myself this drastic expression) with the whole Abu Musa business to such an extent that they would only long to bring the case to an end in any way that gave an appearance<sup>a</sup> of compensation. I can honestly assure (Y.E.) on the strength of a 7 years' experience here and 4 $\frac{1}{2}$  years' acquaintance with the Abu Musa case that such a settlement would cause untold harm to German trade in the Gulf, which already has to contend against such great difficulties.

Should therefore a really satisfactory and sufficient settlement not be obtainable from the English I have the honour to request (Y.E.) to proceed further with the matter and act against the second English Memo: which as already stated offers many a weak and assailable spot and hardly one really conclusive proof.

A further shipment of oxide to India is expected shortly.

L.





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