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تحتوي النسخة الإلكترونية على معلومات إضافية ونصوص وصور بدقة عالية تسمح بإمكانية تكبيرها ومطالعتها بسهولة.

"مذكرة عن بلاد فارس"

المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند

IOR/L/PS/18/C54

٢٥ فبراير ١٨٨٧ (ميلادي)

الإنجليزية في اللاتينية

ملف واحد (ورقتان)

رخصة حكومة مفتوحة

المؤسسة المالكة

المرجع

التاريخ/ التواريخ

لغة الكتابة

الحجم والشكل

حق النشر



حول هذا السجل

يتكون الملف من مذكرة كتبها أوين تيودور برن، سكرتير الإدارة السياسية والسرية، بمكتب الهند، يقترح فيها الكاتب وسائل لتحسين العلاقات بين شاه بلاد فارس والحكومة البريطانية من أجل الحد من نفوذ الحكومة الروسية في بلاد فارس. وينتهي الكاتب إلى أن أقصى الأمانى البريطانية في هذا الصدد هو إنشاء سكة حديدية جنوب بلاد فارس وإقامة علاقات جيدة مع الابن الأكبر للشاه.

توجد مذكرة أخرى كتبها برن، ونسخة من رسالة من مكتب الهند إلى وزارة الخارجية، توثقان محاولة سابقة غير ناجحة لإقناع ألمانيا بالانضمام لمحاولات مواجهة النفوذ الروسي في بلاد فارس.

Confidential.

1887.

NOTE ON PERSIA.

1. Although no formal treaty or engagement exists by which Russia and Great Britain mutually agree to respect the independence and integrity of the Shah's dominions, yet an *understanding* was arrived at on this subject in 1834-38, and has up to the present time been considered on both sides to subsist in full force. Various efforts have been made by this country during the past twenty years to draw closer the relations between Persia and England, such as furnishing British officers for the Shah's army, promising him moral support in questions between him and Russia, endeavouring to induce him to occupy Merv (1882), with the offer of a subsidy of five lacs a year for a term of years to meet the extra expense, &c. But these efforts have been spasmodic and fruitless, and have fallen short of the Shah's own frequently expressed desire for an offensive and defensive alliance, which is what he has all along really wanted, but which the Government of this country has not been able to give him. The time is past and gone for even a consideration of such an alliance.

2. Malcom Khan's recipe for all the evils in Persia and for the present weakness of our relations with her is the usual one, "money." He argues, perhaps not without some reason, Why waste millions on Afghan Amirs and Afghan wars, and not give even half a million to my master? If the Shah be given money, he may be induced,—according to Malcom Khan's statement some years ago,—to initiate reforms. But there is only one answer to this, viz., that no reforms will now keep Russia out of his country, which matter is, after all, the one which principally concerns the interests of Great Britain.

3. The questions which appear to be immediately occupying the mind of the Shah and his advisers are:—(1) The proposed railway in Southern Persia; (2) The dispute between Persia and Afghanistan as to the district of Hashtadan; (3) The settlement of the boundary, generally, between Persia and Afghanistan, from Zulfikar southwards to Seistan, and (4) the right to Bahrein in the Persian Gulf.

4. As to the first question, it may briefly be said that the Foreign Office (assisted by Colonel Williams, R.E., of this Office and myself) have drawn up a carefully prepared railway contract, of which the final draft was sent to Mr. Nicolson on the 11th January 1887, with an intimation that, if accepted by the Persian Government, it was believed that responsible firms in this country would be ready to take the matter up and bring it before the public. I understand that the Foreign Office would give Baron Reuter a share in the transaction, and that the Baron himself, in this case, might perhaps be induced to drop his claims of past years on the Persian Government so far as regards Southern Persia and the British scheme. It must be added, that I am not sanguine of the scheme being successfully launched on the London market, even if approved by the Shah, without a guarantee of some kind from the Imperial and Indian Governments.

5. In regard to the second question, I understand, from a telegram from Mr. Nicolson to the Foreign Office of the 24th February 1887, that the Government of India have offered to arbitrate between the Shah and the Amir as to the Hashtadan district, and that the Shah has accepted the offer. This perhaps is the best solution of a troublesome question, although it is impossible to be hopeful of the Indian Government being able to please two barbarians.

6. As to the third question, now raised in a letter from Malcom Khan to the Foreign Office, I am of opinion that the present moment is an inexpedient

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one for dealing with a matter which is full of pitfalls and difficulties. This, it will be seen by the accompanying copy of a Despatch to India, of the 17th September 1886, is also the opinion of the Secretary of State. The importance of the question is not, of course, to be underrated; but it is better, I submit, not to stir in the matter until the question of the north-west boundary of Afghanistan is settled.

7. The fourth question, that of Bahrein, is one which it is difficult to compress within the limits of this Note. It may be sufficient to say that we have for many years past resisted the unfounded claims of Persia to that island and district, and that on account of our pearl fisheries there, and for other reasons, it is vital to our interest that we should admit no discussion in reference to it.

8. In regard to Persia generally, it is, I fear, an indisputable fact that the Shah is in no way to be trusted. He is an intriguer, and is now hopelessly Russianized. Our only chance of regaining influence in Persia appears to me to rest on our present effort to construct a railway, under British auspices, from the Karun river into the interior of Persia, to establish good relations with the Zil-i-Sultan (the Shah's eldest son, although not his heir), and to endeavour to gain a footing in Ispahan and in Southern Persia generally, leaving Teheran and Northern Persia to their fate.

9. It may be added, that the last effort of this Office to do something for Persia, with the help of Germany, was in 1885. Copies of my Note on the subject and of Lord Randolph Churchill's letter to the Foreign Office are appended. That effort failed because Prince Bismarck, on being sounded in regard to it, would have nothing to say to us.

O. T. B.

25th February 1887.

APPENDIX.

Note by Sir Owen Burne, dated 18th July 1885.

On the 27th of May last Lord Granville telegraphed to Sir R. Thomson, in reply to certain representations made by the Shah touching a definite understanding being arrived at between England and Russia as to the integrity of Persia, and "thus secure the eastern frontier of Khorassan from further aggression," that "His Majesty's representations would be borne in mind by Her Majesty's Government, and if a favourable occasion presented itself of securing such an arrangement it would not be neglected," &c., &c. The Shah, through Sir R. Thomson (9th June 1885), now states that this is satisfactory so far as it goes, but that he requires a more precise and distinct statement as to the policy which England would pursue in the event of an unprovoked aggression being made by Russia upon Persian territory. "An assurance," says Sir R. Thomson, "that Her Majesty's Government would do all that may be practicable to preserve the integrity of Persia, and that they would also use their influence with Germany and other Powers with the object of preventing any unprovoked aggression being made by Russia upon Persian territory, might afford the Shah that feeling of security which would encourage him to show some firmness in existing unjust demands, and lead him to adopt more effectual measures for the preservation of his own independence."

This advice is followed by Sir R. Thomson's telegram of 17th July, in which he expresses extreme doubt if the Persian Government will adopt effectual measures against Russian movements near the Heri-Rud, "Unless we secure integrity of Eastern Khorassan by representations at St. Petersburg."

It appears to me that Sir R. Thomson's advice may be usefully followed as a sort of intermediate stop-gap. It is not very bold, but it is tolerably safe, as it cannot do us much harm to say that we will do "all that is practicable" for the Shah, that we will "use our influence with Germany," &c., and that we will make "representations to Russia."

But it seems impossible to stop here, or to believe that the Shah will attach much real importance to such assurances.

In 1883, when this question came forward for the hundredth time, and was as usual shifted off to the shoulders of futurity, this Department ventured to submit that,—

"Very little is to be hoped in regard to a successful resistance to Russian advance along the north-eastern frontier of Persia, either from diplomatic correspondence, or from Persian effort. If it is not considered possible or expedient to resist that advance by force, and to assist Persia in such resistance, if she wishes it, then there seems no advantage in engaging in a diplomatic wrangle, which is certain not in any way to influence the course of events, or to be of much advantage to our interests. In the opposite case, the determination of Her Majesty's Government can scarcely be intimidated to the Russian Government too soon or too strongly. For, as I have already inferred, two points must, in my humble judgment, be looked upon as not open to doubt (1) that Persia, of herself, can and will do nothing to interfere with Russian designs; and (2) that nothing short of an absolute certainty on the part of Russia that advance beyond a certain point means war with England all over the world will stop the proceedings foreshadowed in M. de Gier's note."

The position grows each year more and more difficult. If Germany would find the men and England the money, then Persia would probably be safe for some time to come, and English interests in the East indirectly safeguarded.

In dealing with the Persian question the alternatives appear to me to be, roughly speaking, either,—

A joint guarantee of Germany, Austria, and England on behalf of Persian integrity, combined with a moderate subsidy to the Shah to aid him in military measures on the Khorassan border, provided that the Shah (1) consents to receive British or German officers, or both, to lead and drill his troops; (2) engages to give no supplies to Russian troops moving from Caspian eastwards; (3) ceases to spring upon us any further secret treaties; (4) consents to our marking and authoritatively defining the Perso-Afghan frontier; (5) nominates his competent son and our firm friend the Zil-i-Sultan as his heir apparent; (6) cedes Bunder Abbass or Mohammerah, the only real outlet for Russia into the Persian Gulf, to England for occupation when necessary, if not at once; or,—

To let it all go, Herat included; to occupy Candahar and Giriskh on the Helmund, to annex Bunder Abbass or Mohammerah, if necessary, to support the Zil-i-Sultan as the successor to the throne, and thereby secure Southern Persia, if its northern portion goes, and to wait for storms.

I doubt the value of any intermediate course.

In regard to this important question in its earlier stages, I recommend a glance at portions of my note on "Persia," and of Mr. Moore's note on Russian Movements in Khorassan, &c., herewith put up.

(Signed) O. T. B.

P.S. The deputation of a special Minister from England of well-known fame and repute, might advantageously precede any active measures Persia-wards. Sir H. D. Wolff, for instance, or some man of that sort, would be an admirable appointment, failing Sir Henry Rawlinson, who probably would not care to go now to Teheran.

Copy of a Letter from India Office to Foreign Office, dated 25th July 1885.

I am directed by Lord Randolph Churchill to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 17th and 22nd instant, enclosing respectively a telegram from Sir R. Thomson relative to Russian movements in Persian territory on the left bank of the Heri-Rud, and copy of an instruction which the

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Marquis of Salisbury has addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, on the general question of the interest of this country in the maintenance of the integrity of Persia.

In connection with these papers, I am desired by Lord Randolph Churchill to suggest for Lord Salisbury's consideration whether, in view of the situation in Afghanistan, as well as upon broad grounds of imperial policy, the time has not come when steps should be taken to encourage the Shah to endeavour to offer some effective resistance to the progress of Russian encroachments on his borders.

Lord Randolph Churchill is very sensible of the difficulties which are interposed to the adoption by Her Majesty's Government of measures with the object above suggested, by the weakness and apathy of the Persian Government, the commanding position which Russia has already assumed on the Khorassan frontier, the Russian proclivities of some, at any rate, of the local border authorities, and the futility of mere remonstrances at St. Petersburg.

But it appears to His Lordship that an attempt might at least be made to develop a policy towards the Shah which would inspire His Majesty with greater confidence than he at present feels in the goodwill of the British Government towards him, and indicate their sympathy with him in the difficult position in which he finds himself placed. If it be the case, as stated by Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran, in his Despatch, No. 65, of the 9th ultimo, that an assurance that Her Majesty's Government will do all that may be practicable to preserve the integrity of Persia, and will also use their influence with Germany and other powers with the object of preventing unprovoked aggression upon Persian territory, might have the effect of inducing the Shah to show some firmness in resisting unjust demands, and lead him to adopt more effectual measures for the preservation of his independence, it seems to Lord Randolph Churchill to be in the highest degree desirable that such an assurance should be given. His Lordship would further suggest whether, in connection with the overtures understood to be about to be made at Berlin by the Persian Government, communications might not be opened with Prince Bismarck on the question, with a view to ascertain his feelings in regard to it, and the extent to which the German Government might be prepared to go, now or hereafter, in co-operation with Her Majesty's Government, in the adoption of measures calculated to prevent the complete subordination of Persia to Russia which is now threatened.

In support of the foregoing views, Lord Randolph Churchill would only observe, in conclusion, that any settlement of the Afghan frontier which may now be made will certainly be incomplete, and may possibly be altogether void of effect, unless it be supplemented by such arrangements in reference to the eastern frontier of Khorassan as may tend to safeguard Herat from danger of aggressive movements from that quarter.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) J. A. GODLEY.