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‘Seistan Persia & Seistan’

Holding Institution	British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers
Reference	Mss Eur F111/350
Date(s)	22 Jun 1896-3 Mar 1900 (CE, Gregorian)
Written in	English in Latin
Extent and Format	2 volumes (301 folios)
Copyright for document	Unknown

About this record

The volumes contain papers relating to Persia [Iran], including Seistan, and the tract of land south of the Baluch-Afghan boundary between Nushki and Persia, which had become British territory following the demarcation of the Afghan-Baluch border.

The papers largely consist of printed copies of correspondence between the Governor General of India in Council (Government of India Foreign Department) and the Secretary of State for India (Lord George Francis Hamilton), and enclosed correspondence and papers.

Letters from the Governor General of India in Council to the Secretary of State for India include:

- Number 170, 16 September 1896, relating to the opening up of a trade route between Nushki and the Persian frontier, crossing the tract of British territory south of the Baluch-Afghan boundary, and the protection of the newly-demarcated frontier, with enclosed memorandum by Captain Arthur Henry McMahon,
British Commissioner, Baluch-Afghan Boundary Commission, containing his proposals for the management and administration of the tract and for the protection of the trade route

- Number 58, 31 March 1898, concerning the trade route between Baluchistan and Persia, including the suggestion that Consular Agents should be appointed at central points along it between Seistan and Meshed, with enclosures including a report by Lieutenant Frank Webb-Ware, Political Assistant at Chagai,

on his visit to Seistan at the beginning of 1896, and the measures introduced for the development of trade between Baluchistan and Persia (which includes a blueprint map, Mss Eur F111/350, f 33)

• Number 163, 15 September 1898, forwarding copies of papers regarding the situation in Makran and Panjgur, following recent ‘disturbances’ in Makran.

The file also includes:

• Copies of Government of India Foreign Department papers numbered 40-58 relating to the Kerman Consulate and British interests in Southern Persia, including correspondence between the Government of
India Foreign Department and the Secretary of State for India

• A letter from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India in Council, with enclosed despatch from Sir (Henry) Mortimer Durand, HM Minister at Tehran, to the Foreign Office, dated 12 February 1899, in which he gives his opinion on suggestions for the appointment of additional consular officers in Persia (this includes a map titled ‘Skeleton Map of Telegraph Lines in Persia.’ Mss Eur F111/350, f 187)

• A letter from Durand to the Secretary to the Foreign Department of the Government of India, 24 February 1899, enclosing a copy of his memorandum (with appendices) drawn up in 1895 on the situation in Persia, and the steps he proposed should be taken to improve the British position there

• Copies of a draft despatch from the Governor General of India in Council, 2 September 1899, regarding relations between Great Britain and Persia, including improving the British Political and Consular service in Persia, and the extent of the share of responsibility for Persia that should be devolved upon the Government of India, followed by printed comments upon the draft

• Copies of a minute by George Nathaniel Curzon, Viceroy of India, on Seistan, dated 4 September 1899, including the question of a railway connection between India and Seistan

• Handwritten pencil notes by Curzon relating to Persia and the ‘Seistan Question’.

In addition to the two maps noted above, the file also includes the following maps: map of the area south of the border between Afghanistan and Baluchistan (Mss Eur F111/350, f 300); map of the area west of the border between Persia and Afghanistan (Mss Eur F111/350, f 301); and ‘Route Plan of Robat Nala’ (Mss Eur F111/350, f 302).



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

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‘Seistan Persia & Seistan’ [head] (5/617)



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‘Seistan Persia & Seistan’ [tail] (6/617)



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

1898.

FORT WILLIAM.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.
FRONTIER.

No. 58, DATED THE 31ST MARCH 1898.

COPY.

Letter to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Trade route between Baluchistan and Persia.

Government of India Central Printing Office—No. 989 F. D.—25-3-98—14.

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

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No. 58 of 1898.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.
FRONTIER.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD GEORGE F. HAMILTON,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

FORT WILLIAM, *the 31st March 1898.*

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's Secret Despatch No. 7, dated the 26th February 1897, approved the arrangements made for the political control and protection of the desert tract between Nushki and Koh-i-Malik Siah. We have the honour to forward further papers including a report * by Lieutenant Webb-Ware, Political Assistant, Chageh, on his visit to Seistan at the beginning of last year and on the measures introduced for the development of trade between Baluchistan and Persia. Your Lordship wished to know what steps we took towards making a road from Quetta to Nushki. In his forwarding letter, Mr. Barnes states that there is a fair camel-track between Nushki and Quetta; that for about ten miles, where it passes through low hills, the track might be much improved if funds were forthcoming; but that, except on this portion, nothing in the way of road-making is at present required. Our orders will be found in our Foreign Secretary's letter † of the 18th February 1898.

* Sub-enclosure in Enclosure No. 11.

† Enclosure No. 14.

2. It is too soon yet to judge whether there is much prospect of an increase of population or cultivation, or whether it is worth while to attempt to levy a light revenue, in Chageh and the Western Sinjerani country. As to this and as to the affairs of the Nushki district, we await the result of the further enquiries which Lieutenant Webb-Ware has been making this season. Meanwhile we have agreed to the retention, during 1898-99, of an establishment of postal sowars, temporarily entertained last year to keep up communication with Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh in Seistan; and we have tentatively sanctioned for the same period additional levies, for employment on the route, and have made grants for the tour expenses of the Political Assistant and for petty public works.

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

3. Your Lordship's Revenue Despatch No. 209, dated the 2nd December 1897, commends to our attentive consideration a suggestion that Consular Agents should be appointed at central points between Seistan and Meshed on the trade route from Quetta to Meshed. We shall, in due course, address Your Lordship on this subject.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servants,

(Signed) ELGIN.

" J. WESTLAND.

" ~~J. WOODBURN.~~

" M. D. CHALMERS.

" E. H. H. COLLEN.

" A. C. TREVOR.

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

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1898.

FORT WILLIAM.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.
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No. 58, DATED THE 31ST MARCH 1898.

List of Enclosures.

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

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List of Enclosures in Secret Despatch No. 58 (Frontier), dated the 31st March 1898, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Serial No.	No. and date of paper.	From whom, or to whom.	Subject.
1	No. 30-A., dated the 22nd February 1897, with enclosure.	From the Agent to the Governor-General of India and Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Khorassan and Seistan.	Orders issued by the Governor of Tabas and Seistan for the due reception of Lieutenant Webb-Ware in Seistan.
2	(Extract.) Diary for the period from the 9th March to the 10th April 1897.	From Lieutenant F. C. Webb-Ware, Political Assistant, Chageh.	Interchange of visits between Lieutenant Webb-Ware and the Sartip of Seistan.
3	No. 3975, dated the 25th June 1897, with enclosures.	From the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.	Proposed issue of Government arms and ammunition to the levies on the Nushki-Seistan route.
4	No. 1310-C., dated the 17th July 1897, with enclosures.	From ditto .	Measures recommended by Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh and Lieutenant Webb-Ware for improving the desert route.
5	No. 1437-C., dated the 29th July 1897, with enclosure.	From ditto .	Opinion as to placing a British Newswriter in Seistan, and giving Lieutenant Webb-Ware a Native Assistant.
6	(Extract.) The Meshed Political Diary for the week ending the 20th August 1897.	From the Agent to the Governor-General of India and Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Khorassan and Seistan.	Article in the "Trans-Caspian Review" of the 8th August 1897, on the Seistan-Quetta trade route.
7	No. 44, dated the 4th September 1897, with enclosures.	From Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran.	Forwards copy of a letter to Colonel Yate about the trade route.
8	No. 5660, dated the 10th September 1897, with enclosure.	From the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.	Request for a special allotment to meet expenditure connected with a proposed tour to the Persian frontier by Lieutenant Webb-Ware during the approaching cold season.
9	No. 3302-F., dated the 13th September 1897.	To ditto .	Sanctions the issue of certain arms and ammunition.
10	(Telegram) No. 3759-F., dated the 1st October 1897.	To ditto .	In reply to his letter No. 5660, dated the 10th September 1897, states that no extra grant can be sanctioned at present.
11	No. 7661, dated the 25th November 1897, with enclosures.	From ditto .	Forwards, with remarks, Lieutenant Webb-Ware's report on the political control and protection of the country between Nushki and Chageh, and of the trade route.

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List of enclosures—concld.

Serial No.	No. and date of paper.	From whom, or to whom.	Subject.
12	(Telegram) No. 620, dated the 10th December 1897.	From the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.	Proposes to retain the postal sowars sanctioned for communication with Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh.
13	(Telegram) No. 5390-F., dated the 28th December 1897.	To ditto .	Authorises the provisional retention of the postal sowars.
14	No. 915-F., dated the 18th February 1898.	To ditto .	Orders and observations regarding the Nushki-Seistan trade route and connected matters.

(Sd.) J. LANG,

Offg. Under-Secretary to the Government of India.

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

1898.

FORT WILLIAM.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.
FRONTIER.

Enclosures of a letter to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 58, dated the 31st March 1898.

Government of India Central Printing Office—No. 989 F. D.—26-3-98.—14.

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

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Enclosure No. 1.

No. 30-A., dated Meshed, the 22nd February 1897.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Yate, C.S.I., C.M.G., Agent to the Governor-General of India and Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Khorassan and Seistan,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my telegram No. 9 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith * translation of a letter dated 12th instant received by me to-day from the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, Governor of Tabas and Seistan, reporting the orders he has given to his son Sartip Mir Masum Khan, the Deputy Governor of Seistan, for the due reception of Lieutenant Webb-Ware.

* Enclosure one.

2. No difficulties that I can think of are likely to be experienced by Lieutenant Webb-Ware in entering Seistan, provided that he has not delayed on the way.

Translation of a letter, dated the 12th February 1897, from the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, Governor of Tabas and Seistan, to Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Yate, C.S.I., C.M.G., Agent to the Governor-General of India and Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Khorassan and Seistan.

After compliments.—For a long time past I had no information about your good health and was very anxious to hear from you. The post that has just arrived from Khorassan (Meshed) has brought your kind letter. I am very glad to hear that you are quite well, and that, after a long journey in Europe and in Persia, you have safely returned to Meshed. It gives me great pleasure to get this opportunity to renew our old friendship, and I am thankful for this. As the ordinary post is leaving, I write to trouble you with these few words.

Last year I went from Meshed to Tehran, where I had an audience of His Majesty the Shah. I stayed at the capital for about five or six months. During my stay His Majesty showed me great favour and kindness, and, in addition to the Government of Seistan, conferred the Governorship of Tabas also upon me. After leaving the capital, I came to Tabas, where I arrived about three or four months ago, and now I am engaged in performing services to my Government. This is an account of the state of my affairs. I have understood what you wrote about yourself.

With regard to Mr. Webb-Ware, an officer of the British Government, whom you have recommended to me, and about whom you have sent me a letter of recommendation from the Governor-General of Khorassan and Seistan, I have made myself acquainted with the matter. Of course, officers of the British Government will be served and treated with great honour and distinction wherever they are, especially the officers who are recommended by you, with whom I have old friendship. In accordance with the order of the Governor-General and your recommendations, I sent the necessary instructions to my son Sartip Mir Masum Khan, Deputy Governor of Seistan, at once, and enjoined him to receive Mr. Webb-Ware with the necessary ceremony and honour, to serve him well in every way, to carry out his wishes, to send him any supplies that he may require without delay so that he may not suffer any inconvenience, and to treat him, during his stay on that frontier, with due respect and distinction. So you may rest assured about this matter. The cover to the address of Mr. Webb-Ware, which was enclosed in your letter, has also been sent to Seistan with instructions to the Sartip to cause it to be delivered to Mr. Webb-Ware on his arrival at Koh-i-Malik Siah, and to obtain and send me his answer in order to enable me to forward it to you. I have also written a short friendly letter to Mr. Webb-Ware himself. I have no more trouble to give you, and hope that, contrary to the past, you will always write and tell me of your good health and let me know if I can be of any service to you.

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

Enclosure No. 2.

Extract from the Chageh Diary for the period 9th March to 10th April 1897.

* * * * *

18th March 1897.—Despatching the "barbardari" ahead in the early hours of the morning, we mounted the horses proffered by the Tahvildar for the occasion and started for the last stage of our 650 miles' march. This march, although but 19½ miles, was a peculiarly trying one, owing to the country traversed being cut up by countless deep, narrow irrigation channels with water averaging in depth up to our horses' girths. I was surprised to find the crops so late; they are at least a full month later than at Nushki; this and several other small points would lead one to suppose that the Seistan climate is one whose warmth is much maligned. One of the coldest days I ever recollect was passed in Nasirabad. A mile out of the city we halted to enable news of our near approach being communicated to the local officials. For this they appeared fully prepared, as we were only kept waiting a few minutes. Half a mile from the fort of Nasirabad we were met by Naib-ul-Hukumat with a ragged following of some forty odd sowars, dressed in their best. The Naib proved to be a wizened little man verging on the "sere and yellow leaf" with eyes possessing peculiar eccentric orbit of their own. He received me, apparently, with marked cordiality, expressed the pleasure our presence animated him with, apologised for keeping us waiting at Hussainabad, and paid us innumerable compliments, which being an Irishman I found no difficulty in repaying with interest in the same coin. When the mutual exchange of compliments had ceased, the Naib inquired of me as to what was my pleasure, *viz.*, to visit the Sartip at once, or do so the following day. To this I replied that I was anxious to discharge the duties incumbent on a visitor as soon as was consistent with the Sartip's convenience. On this the Naib-ul-Hukumat led the way to the fort, within the walls of whose citadel is the official residence and darbar hall of the Deputy Governor of Seistan. After being kept waiting a few minutes—no doubt purposely—the Sartip appeared. He is a youth of about 16, whose corpulency, half-closed eyes, and air of extreme lassitude, proclaimed a weakened constitution, and enfeebled intellect, consequent on a life spent in undue indulgence in the enervating pleasures of the harem. With the young Sartip appeared also his uncle, and guardian—if I can use the term—Syed Khan, Chief of the Naruis, cousin of the murdered Darwesh Ali. After the customary mutual inquiries as to one another's health and interchange of the prescribed compliments, we took our leave, to be conducted by the Naib-ul-Hukumat, with similar formality, to the house, outside the fort, provided for our reception.

Nasirabad we found to consist of a rectangular mud fort, ornamented with towers, with exterior walls embracing an area of 150 × 200 yards. Within the fort are the quarters of the garrison—said to consist of one full battalion of infantry, half a squadron of cavalry, and three guns—and the Deputy Governor and district official's residences. On investigation, this formidable force resolved itself into a ragged disorderly mob of decrepit old men, the major portion of whom possess no offensive weapon. The dress mounts and general appearance of the cavalry are of a distinctly more efficient type; the utility, however, of drill or anything approaching training in their case, as in the case of the infantry, does not appear to be recognised. The guns too are old, neglected, worn out, unserviceable for any offensive purpose, only useful for the moral terror their presence inspires. Close under the protection of the fort walls is the city of Hussainabad containing the only bazaar in the country.

19th March 1897.—At a most untimely hour in the morning the Sartip repaid my visit. He was accompanied by Sardar Sayad Khan, the Naib-ul-Hukumat, and their respective attendants. After the usual interchange of courtesies, I endeavoured to bring the Sartip, or, to speak more correctly, the Naib, to business. To this both evinced a marked disinclination, stating in excuse that the Russian "Akhbar Navis" was straining his ears outside to hear what was passing, a subterfuge I cannot help thinking, as I have every reason to suppose that the Naib and "news-writer" are on far from unfriendly terms. Eventually they yielded. I briefly discussed the motives that had prompted

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my visit, the steps Government had taken to protect caravans, the great benefit that would accrue to trade in general and their traders in particular from the removal of all customs dues within British territory, and adverted strongly on the paramount importance of both sides preserving inviolate the frontier demarcated last year, whose sanctity, I added, I greatly regretted to find, was—doubtlessly without their knowledge—continually broken from Persian territory. They listened with attention, enquired as to whether I had any power to mitigate the severity of the crushing dues the Amir imposes on their traders, dues, they affirmed, that were slowly but surely crushing their trade, stated they were fully aware of the great benefits that would ensue from the steps I had taken to protect caravans—the most important of which they appeared to consider was Ido Pahlwan's submission—and promised to discontinue by every means in their power future raids from Persian into British territory. Added to the above, they guaranteed protection to our traders while within their jurisdiction. Of promises they were lavish, but as to whether they will carry them into effect is a far different matter. Previous to the Sartip's taking his departure, I pointed out that, loth though I was to pay so hurried a visit, my duties imperatively demanded my immediate return to my district, and requested that, in view of this, he would favour me by issuing such orders as he deemed requisite to ensure my supplies, camels, etc., being forthcoming at an early date. To this the Sartip pledged himself.

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Enclosure No. 3.

No. 3975, dated Quetta, the 25th June 1897.

From—H. S. Barnes, Esq., C.S.I., I.C.S., Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a letter No. 130, dated the 19th June 1897, with enclosure, from the Political Assistant, Chageh, requesting sanction to the issue of certain Government arms and ammunition to the levies on the Nushki-Seistan caravan road.

2. There is no doubt that the caravan road from Amir Chah to Koh-i-Malik Siah is much exposed to raids from the Damanis and other tribes in Persian country, over whom the control of the Persian Government is very slight. Our levies, so far, are armed with their country swords only, and I think it would have an excellent effect if a selected number of them at the different posts were armed with old Snider carbines. These desert posts are at great distances from each other and very lonely, and it would add much to the security of the roads and also of the posts themselves if the levies were known to be well armed. I therefore support the Assistant Political Agent's recommendation, and should be glad if the carbines he asks for could be provided. They need not be of a high quality. Old carbines, of which there are probably plenty in store with the rifling worn smooth, would answer all purposes.

No. 130, dated Quetta, the 19th June 1897.

From—The Political Assistant, Chageh,

To—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.

I have the honour to solicit that you will favour me by approaching Government, for sanction, to arm the tribal levies employed in safeguarding the lately opened Nushki-Seistan caravan road with a free issue of "called in" Government Snider carbines.

2. Events which have recently occurred have borne home to me, very forcibly, the paramount importance of arming my levies in such a manner as will enable them vigorously to assume the offensive against such parties of

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raiders as have hitherto considered western Dalbandin, the country lying around the Koh-i-Sultan, and between the latter range and junction of the Perso-Afghan frontiers, as their legitimate raiding grounds.

3. News of the attack, near Humay Koh, on Bakidad of Pishin and of the loss of his caravan and property has, as I anticipated, travelled far and exercised a most adverse effect. Goods that were *en route* from Bombay and Lahore to Quetta for the Persian market, I learn on creditable authority, have been stopped in transit, pending the receipt of further news, and great alarm is expressed by all interested as to the safety of the route.

4. The strip of country just alluded to bears an indifferent reputation. During the period I was on tour, to my certain knowledge, no less than four distinct raids took place, each originating from Persian territory.

5. The arming of my tribal levies with far-range breech-loading weapons will exercise a most salutary effect throughout the district, and a few sharp lessons, I trust, will suffice to teach these raiders to turn their attention to some less dangerous occupation.

I attach a list of such weapons as are required for my posts.

List of weapons.

Name of weapon.	Number required.
1. Condemned service Snider carbines	60
2. Ditto ditto revolvers	7
3. Ball Snider ammunition	10,000
4. Ball revolver ammunition	1,500

F. Webb-Ware, *Lieut.*,
Political Assistant, Chageh.

Enclosure No. 4.

No. 1310-C., dated Ziarat, the 17th July 1897.

From—H. S. Barnes, Esq., I.C.S., C.S.I., Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copies of the marginally noted correspondence, regarding certain measures recommended by Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh and Lieutenant Webb-Ware for improving the desert caravan route.

From Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh, with enclosures, dated Seistan, the 13th May 1897.
From Lieutenant F. C. Webb-Ware, with enclosures, No. 159, dated the 6th July 1897.

2. The Political Assistant for Chageh is fully alive to the necessity of doing all that is possible to improve the safety and the convenience of this trade route. There is no doubt that a little money might be very usefully spent in digging new wells, in improving old ones, in marking the track to prevent travellers losing their way, and in appointing paid bunniahs at two or three of the principal halting places who would be responsible for keeping in stock a certain quantity of supplies. I propose, however, to await Lieutenant Webb-Ware's promised report on his recent tour before making any definite

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recommendations. Any measures of the kind suggested could not well be carried out till the Political Assistant starts again for Nushki in October.

Dated Seistan, the 13th May 1897.

From—Surgeon-Major G. W. Brazier-Creagh, A.M.S.,
To—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.

I have the honour to forward, for your information and favourable transmission to Government of India, the attached recommendations I consider it advisable to carry out for the protection and encouragement of trade with Seistan and Khorassan, etc.

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1. That in view of the great scarcity and difficulty in obtaining supplies either by the very poor nomad Baluchis and Kafalas *en route*, would strongly recommend that each of the thanas be supplied with flour, barley, and ghee to be retailed at proper values to all comers.

2. Many of those I met on journey were eating roots, fungi, and grasses consequent on famine.

Consider it advisable to send an Engineer Officer along these routes next cold weather with some Sappers and Miners, etc., to repair and re-dig wells along route and thus secure a proper and adequate supply of water.

In several places where long weary marches have of necessity to be made owing to complete absence or foul supply, new wells will of necessity have to be dug and stone built inside to prevent their falling in and guard against surface drainage of foul nature again flowing back into wells, as camels, sheep, etc., are watered close, and most wells are in consequence polluted and source of sickness and disease to travellers.

3. A trough should be built with gutter leading from an elevated platform on which the water is raised up.

4. Iron pulleys fixed for raising the water.

5. Willow trees might with little cost or trouble be planted along waterway at thanas where there is running water, *viz.*, Dalbandin, Sandaik, Tazgai, etc., etc., and particularly at Robat, our frontier outpost, where there is a good supply of water.

6. A set of rules for the guidance of the thanadars at all stations, fixed rates for all supplies, and above all protect the wood (trees) as much as possible, or fuel must in time be *nil*. A few thousand rupees spent thus will be wisely laid out and a judicious encouragement to traders.

7. Traders should be protected on arrival at Quetta as far as possible from the brokers and rigged prices, and the bunniahs now at Nushki, into whose hands several of the Jalk traders have fallen and are in debt (*vide* previous reports under date 12th April 1897), should be prevented from intercepting onward journey to Quetta.

Seistan;
The 13th April 1897.

G. W. Brazier-Creagh,
Surgeon-Major, A.M.S.

No. 159, dated the 6th July 1897.

From—Lieutenant F. C. Webb-Ware, Political Assistant, Chageh,
To—The First Assistant to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.

In reply to your No. 3987, dated the 26th June 1897, forwarding certain suggestions by Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh on special duty in Seistan, as to

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steps that might with advantage be taken to develop and improve the new trade route, I have the honour to submit the attached remarks.

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1. To me the very first consideration of all appears to be the safety and protection of caravans passing along the new trade route.

Neither caravans or travellers will be deterred at the outset from facing mere ordinary hardships, be they well assured that they have nothing to fear for the safety of their goods while in transit. Since my return to Quetta I have been interviewed by more than one trader, and almost the very first query put is: "Will Government guarantee the safety of our goods and indemnify us for loss resulting from robbery or raids?"

2. The next consideration naturally is the comfort of caravans using the route. Under this heading "facile princeps" comes the matter of water-supply, between Nushki and Robat (Koh-i-Malik Siah), excepting along two stretches, one of 65 miles and one of 42 miles. The present supply is sufficient to meet the exigencies of all caravans. The supply can well be, and I trust shortly will be, greatly improved, facilities for drawing water increased, etc., etc., but still, as I have just said, excepting those stretches referred to, the supply is ample. Three wells are thus required. One is already nearly completed, two still remain. To detail a party of Sappers and Miners to dig two wells, of an average depth of, say, 30 feet at a distance of 300 miles from Quetta, appears to me rather a waste of scientific energy, a small party of Pathan navvies amply sufficing. The difficulty we will have to contend against is wind-driven sand. I found that almost invariably the accumulation of sand in wells was due, not to the collapse of either mouth or side walls, but to the action of sand storms. This is so thoroughly recognised by natives that the system they adopt, on these sand-swept wastes, is to cover over the entire well mouth, flush with the ground, only leaving a small orifice available through which mussacks can be lowered. They say, to build up any projection, against which sand can lodge, ensures a drift forming, and the well being quickly blocked up; whereas under their plan, the driven sand is swept across the mouth, very little effecting a lodgment in the small orifice left open.

No one who has not had personal experience of the country I am dealing with can conceive the rapidity with which, should a drift once form, wind-driven sand is capable of choking wells.

3. The ground in the vicinity of old wells' mouths—wells in use for generations—is so thoroughly saturated with filth and polluted to such a depth that, cover over the mouth as you may, nothing short of sinking new wells up stream, far removed from the polluted ground, and keeping them solely for drinking purposes, will avail: percolation from a shower of rain at present being sufficient to render their water temporarily undrinkable.

4. The system I saw commonly in vogue to prevent the damage or collapse of well mouths was both simple and effective.

First, the sand was excavated to the depth of three or four feet, then a square framework of tree trunks and branches, the size of the well shaft, built up, well backed with rammed stones. The framework within takes off the friction of both buckets and ropes, and preserves the well from injury.

5. Facilities for drawing water and watering camels might well be increased.

6. Requests for wheels to be fixed above wells' mouths were on more than one occasion made by me.

7. I thoroughly endorse Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh's suggestion relative to matter of storing supplies.

Doing so would be a very great boon to travellers and caravans, and add greatly to the popularity of the route. For the storing of the supplies proper godowns, or thanas, would of necessity have to be built and agents appointed. As this is, however, a matter that will be found dealt with at some little length in my report, I will refrain here from entering further on the subject.

8. An exhaustive list of rules and standing orders for thanas is posted in each thana; amongst these will be found the fullest instructions relative to protection of trees, the procuring of such supplies as are at present available, etc.

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9. Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh is labouring under a misapprehension when he says that a necessity exists for protecting traders, on arrival at Nushki, "from brokers and rigged prices." Seistanis are free to dispose of their wares in whatever market, or place, that may suit them best, and no pressure has ever been put on them to compel them to act otherwise. Of the bunnias whose names Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh mentioned under his report dated 12th April 1897—Purso and Jaita Mal left Nushki upwards of two years ago; beyond this, no case exists in which a Seistani trader is indebted to a Nushki bunnia.

F. C. WEBB-WARE, *Lieutenant*,
Political Assistant.

Enclosure No. 5.

No. 1437-C., dated Ziarat, the 29th July 1897 (Confidential).

From—H. S. BARNES, Esq., I.C.S., C.S.I., Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 1787-F., dated the 8th July 1897, forwarding certain papers regarding Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh's visit to Seistan.

2. I am of opinion that it would be well worth the expense to place a British News-writer in Seistan. From what we have learnt from Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh and Lieutenant Webb-Ware of the influence in Seistan of the Russian News-writer, I think it would be worth while to send there a representative of the British Government even apart from the interests of the new trade route, for Seistan is a part of Persia with which British interests generally are very closely connected. But in addition to this, seeing how easy it is for the Persians to obstruct the new route by vexatious trade regulations and how certain it is that the influence of the Russian News-writer will be used against us in the matter of trade, it appears to me very important that after Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh's departure a trustworthy native should be left in Nasirabad to keep us informed of the progress of events and to, or through, whom our traders may apply, if necessary, for assistance. It would not be difficult to find a suitable man for the appointment, and the pay should not, I think, be less than Rs. 200 a month, apart from the pay of the Kasids or sowars required to keep up communication with our frontier post at Robat. I enclose, for the information of Government, an extract from Lieutenant Webb-Ware's coming report about his recent tour, which will show that he too is at one with Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh in thinking such an appointment desirable.

3. As regards Robat, I do not consider that any additional official is required. We already have at that post a jemadar of levies and a munshi, though, perhaps, the latter might be better paid. But I do think it is of importance that Lieutenant Webb-Ware should be given a good Native Assistant to help him in managing the road and the Chageh district and whom he can leave in the desert during the hot weather. He has already frequently felt the want of such an officer, and I am sure that the appointment of a native official of greater weight and influence than the one vernacular munshi Lieutenant Webb-Ware at present possesses is really essential in order to help him in his jirga work and to assist in looking after the country. I would place this official's head-quarters at Chageh in the hot weather whence he could easily control the new route *viâ* Merui from Amir Chah to Dalbandin, and in the cold weather he would tour along the route either with or independently of the Political Assistant in charge as may be most convenient, or could be stationed between Amir Chah and Robat. It seems advisable that in the hot weather we should have some one on the 400 miles between Nushki and Koh-i-Malik Siah of greater authority than the jemadars of levies, and if we are to collect any revenue from the country, such an appointment will be a *sine qua non*. I would fix the pay of this native official at Rs. 150 rising to Rs. 200, and would give him for the present an office establishment costing about Rs. 90 a month.

	Rs.
1 Munshi	40
1 „	30
2 Peons at 10	20
TOTAL .	90

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4. With regard to Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh's remarks about Muhammad Akram Khan, Mr. Webb-Ware informs me that the man in question is really an Ishakzai Afghan of Las Jowain, that he does a considerable business as a cloth merchant and camel contractor in Seistan, and that beyond hiring to him a few camels he rendered him no assistance.

Extract.

"I was disagreeably astonished to find what ascendency Russia had apparently gained over Seistan. Their policy towards the country appears to have been a very advanced one, ours just the reverse. To my surprise I found that a Russian News-writer had been located in Nasirabad, the capital, for upwards of three years, and the influence he exercised, or the fear he engendered, in Seistan, synonymous terms was astonishing. I trust Government will answer this move by at once installing a British Agent in Nasirabad. Persia can offer, under the circumstances, no opposition. If Government does not take the step, I affirm without hesitation that the development of a direct trade route between Baluchistan and Seistan is hopeless. We have already had an instance of the influence Russia is capable of exercising in the institution of the late absurd plague cordon which, while I was in Seistan, was only employed as an engine to preclude direct trade communication between Quetta and Seistan, while between Makran and Seistan travellers and traders were free to come and go unquestioned."

Enclosure No. 6.

Extract from the Meshed Political Diary for the week ending 20th August 1897.

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5. With reference to the opening of the Seistan-Quetta route, I append herewith the purport of an article from the Trans-Caspian Review of 8th August published at Ashkabad. This is worthy of notice, as it was probably written by one of the officers on General Kuropatkin's staff, and shows with what anxiety the Russians are watching the opening of this new route for British trade with Khorassan :—

"*British India.*

"On finishing last year the labours of the demarcation of the Afghan-Baluch and Persian frontiers, the Anglo-India Government at once started making a road from Quetta to the mountain group of Koh-i-Malik Siah, where the British empire touches Afghan and Persian territory, and where to-day is rising a strong fortification. The Northern Baluch desert has become full of life, and where mercantile movement hardly existed, there is now ready to enter into existence an even road for the insinuation of English goods into the very centre of the Iran tableland. The Seistan (Persian) merchants who have lately passed by that road are unanimous in asserting that the English have succeeded in overcoming all those difficulties which formerly prevented them making use of this short road to India, and say that all the way from Nushki, a small town on the east border of Garmsil, to Koh-i-Malik Siah, in places before looked on as waterless, there are now stations with two, three, and even four wells, and there are such wells also between the stations, near which are guards protecting the caravans from Baluch robbers. The making of such a road has cost the English a great deal of money, but has brought them considerably nearer to the central markets of Persia and even to Khorassan, where it is known that Russian goods have had the best sale.

"More important is the political meaning of this road. Up to the present the British power, although it has had relations with the Persians, has had no meaning, as they were separated by impassable deserts; the position is now sharply altered. An English fortress has risen on the very frontier of Persia, connected with Quetta by a road, which, though only at present for pack

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animals, will of course soon be made first a carriage road and then a railway; and then, of course, the English artillery which will then decorate Koh-i-Malik Siah will give great weight to the utterances of the English Minister in Tehran.

"The opening of this road has inflicted a great and almost irreparable blow on Russian trade with Persia. Seistan and Kohistan, from the point of view of trade, have up to now turned to India from where they received foreign goods by the Persian port of Bandar Abbas. Only the increase in power of the Bam mountain robbers has forced the native merchants to turn towards the north, and through Khorassan to enter into trade relations with Russia.

"That bond has not yet succeeded in becoming secure, and doubtless this new and entirely safe road, purposely made so as to be free from impositions (the Persian trade caravans, by arrangement of the English, are freed on the whole road from every local impost and taxation), will break this bond again and for a long time. The loss of Kohistan and Seistan is not for us so important as the possibility of a considerable entry of English goods into Khorassan.

"By and with what means are we to fight the English competition there? About this we must think much."

This gives a rosy picture of the Nushki-Seistan route, which, I am afraid, is far removed from the actual facts.

The Russian writer talks of the guards protecting the caravans from Baluch robbers, but Lieutenant Webb-Ware gives a very different account.

In his diary for the 1st May 1897, Lieutenant Webb-Ware says:—"Raids through the most westerly portion of my district are a matter of daily occurrence. Only a few days prior to my arrival at Assad Chah, a party of raiding Damani carried off two camels and one man; the man escaped. I have just received information that a kafila was attacked near Tuzghi by another party, and two men killed, while a party of the same tribe actually had the audacity to march to attack us; that they saw good reason not to carry out their amiable project was a source of much regret to all.

"These same Damani are Persian subjects and live in, and raid from, Persian territory. I would respectfully suggest, under these circumstances, that the Persian Government be taken to task for permitting the existence of this intolerable state of affairs.

"The Damani in all do not number a thousand men, so the plea of inability to coerce them cannot well be advanced."

Again, in his diary for the 16th May 1897, Lieutenant Webb-Ware further reports that the Pishin horse trader, who was given a letter to me by Mr. Barnes, the Agent to the Governor-General for Baluchistan, as mentioned in paragraph 1 of my diary for the week ending 25th June 1897, and who was turned back by the Persians at the frontier after his long journey of 644 miles across the desert, suffered severely on his return journey.

Lieutenant Webb-Ware says:—"On his way back from Koh-i-Malik Siah, near Tuzghi, he was attacked by a party of 15 Sirhadi raiders. From his account it would appear that he made a most plucky resistance, and it was only after being severely wounded himself through the neck, and after one of his camels had been killed outright, that seeing further resistance futile, he and his small party of six abandoned their property and fled. This incident will give you a very fair idea of the assurance of these trans-frontier raiders; it must be remembered that Surgeon-Major Creagh had passed Tuzghi with his large escort but four or five days previously. I fear that we will find it an exceedingly difficult matter to put down raids in a country which lends itself so naturally to them. Nothing could possibly be more fatal to the reputation of the lately opened route and nothing will exercise a more adverse influence in discouraging others from giving the road a trial than the experience which this the pioneer party of Pishin merchants met with."

Lieutenant Webb-Ware does not mention where these Damanis came from, but presumably it is from Sarhad, and the first thing, I take it, to bring home a sense of their responsibility to the Persian Government will be a formal

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claim for compensation for the men killed and wounded and the property carried off. Once the Persian Government are made to pay up this, they will be ready to bestir themselves to prevent further claims in the future, and I would suggest that an official be appointed on either side to form a joint commission after the manner of the agreement entered into between the Russian and Persian Governments for a joint commission on the Khorassan frontier, as noted in paragraph 3 of my diary for the week ending 18th June 1897.

The Governor of Persian Baluchistan will then be bound to co-operate with Lieutenant Webb-Ware in tracing and punishing these raiders.

Meanwhile, till things settle down a bit, it will evidently be necessary to increase the number of levies along the road and to have strong guards with all travellers and caravans.

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Enclosure No. 7.

No. 44, dated Gulahek, the 4th September 1897.

From—The Hon'ble Mr. Charles Hardinge, C.B., Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch as marked in the margin, which I have addressed to Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed.

To Colonel Yate, No. 11, of 3rd September 1897.

No: 11, dated Gulahek, the 3rd September 1897.

From—The Hon'ble Mr. Charles Hardinge, C.B., Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran,

To—Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Yate, C.S.I., C.M.G., Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed.

I have received your diary of 10th August 1897, in which mention is made of the Seistan-Nushki route, and of the raids made by the Damanis on the Persian frontier against caravans passing to and from Seistan and Quetta.

I enclose to you herewith a memorandum which has been drawn up by Lieutenant-Colonel Picot, in which he discusses the remedy to be applied to this state of affairs, and I beg to state that I entirely agree with the views therein expressed.

Colonel Picot, 3rd September 1897.

I am sending a copy of this despatch and its inclosure to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.

MEMORANDUM.

I have read Colonel Yate's diary of 10th August* 1897, on the subject of the Seistan-Nushki road, wherein various extracts from Lieutenant Webb-Ware's letters are given.

* Date is wrongly cited. The diary for week ending 20th August 1897 is meant.

E. H. S. Clarke.

It would appear that parties of raiders from the Persian Frontier, Damanis and others from Sarhad have become alive to the increased traffic by Seistan, and are causing trouble to the caravans passing to and from Seistan to Quetta.

Colonel Yate proposes various remedies, and hopes that the Persian Government be taken to task for permitting such an intolerable state of affairs.

I question very much the utility of addressing the Persian Government on the subject. Their hold over tribes in Sarhad must necessarily be extremely slight, and complaints or claims for compensation would probably lead the Government to regard our schemes for the better communication with Seistan with disfavour.

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What we should seek is to withdraw rather than concentrate the attention of the Persian Government from our awakened energy towards Seistan, and I would strongly deprecate our taking any further action whatever with a view to curbing the Damanis in Persia.

Such would only tend to exalt the importance of the road, and render the Government extremely shy.

The true remedy lies in the hands of the Indian Government. The raiding is in Baluchistan, British Indian territory, and can be dealt with there. If the road is worth opening, it is worth protecting; a severe lesson to the raiders from our side of the border would effect much and give rise to no misgivings on the part of the Persian Government.

TEHRAN;
The 3rd September 1897.

H. PICOT, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Military Attaché.

Enclosure No. 8.

No. 5660, dated Quetta, the 10th September 1897.

From—H. S. BARNES, Esq., C.S.I., I.C.S., Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to submit, for the information and orders of the Government of India, a copy of a letter * received from Lieutenant F. C. Webb-Ware, Political Assistant, Chageh, requesting that he may be granted a special allotment of Rs. 5,000 to meet expenditure connected with a tour he proposes to make during the approaching cold season to the Persian frontier.

* No. 272, dated the 3rd September 1897.

2. In Foreign Department letter marginally cited the Government of India sanctioned an allotment of Rs. 3,000 per annum for the Political Assistant's office establishment and contingencies. This sum, as stated by Mr. Webb-Ware in his letter, has been distributed as follows:—

No. 2961-F., dated the 30th October 1896.

	Rs.
Office establishment	2,400
Office contingencies	600

It is evident that a sum of Rs. 600 per annum, or Rs. 50 per mensem, is insufficient to meet anything except the Political Assistant's ordinary office contingent expenditure, and I regret that this point was not brought to the notice of the Government of India at an earlier date, though it was incidentally referred to in my letter No. 1247-C., dated the 12th July 1897, in which I applied for sanction to the provision of the camp equipment required for the use of the Political Assistant and his office.

3. Last cold weather the Government of India were pleased to sanction the grant of a sum of Rs. 6,500 to meet initial expenditure connected with Mr. Webb-Ware's tour through the desert and Koh-i-Malik Siah. This sum, with levy savings, was found sufficient to cover both the initial expenditure incurred by Mr. Webb-Ware and his tour expenses, that is to say, the hire of camels for carriage of tents, treasure, and records and for the baggage of escort and levies. Last year, too, it was found necessary to provide some camels for the carriage of sick followers. I think it will be evident that these legitimate and necessary tour charges cannot be met out of the Rs. 50 per mensem available out of the original allotment, and that a further grant is necessary if Mr. Webb-Ware is to make any tour at all. The Political Assistant asks for Rs. 5,000 and a further small grant for sinking wells between Manzil and Saindak. But if the Government of India will give an allotment for tour expenses of Rs. 4,000 for the current year, I will endeavour to meet all expenditure including the cost of sinking the wells out of this sum.

4. Mr. Webb-Ware's report on his last year's tour has unfortunately been delayed owing to pressure of work in the Sind Press, but I hope it will shortly be in the hands of Government. Mr. Webb-Ware has frequently brought to my

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notice the importance of a more accurate survey of the country between Dalbandin and the Persian frontier. I would strongly recommend that, if possible, a survey officer should be detailed to accompany the Political Assistant on this year's tour, and if he can be spared, Mr. G. P. Tate would, from his previous experience, be the most suitable officer for the work. Also, if it is possible so to arrange, I would suggest that an officer of the Geological Department should be appointed to accompany the Political Assistant and to report on the various valuable mineral deposits with which the country seems to abound.

5. As Mr. Webb-Ware is anxious to start from Quetta on the present tour early in October, I shall be glad of early orders on this letter. Mr. Webb-Ware should spend as much of the cold weather as possible in the desert, exploring the country and shortening and improving the trade route. I hope, too, that much may be done in encouraging immigration into and cultivation in parts of Dalbandin and in completing arrangements for the collection of a light grazing tax and other forms of revenue. It would be a great assistance also if the Government of India would sanction the appointment of the Native Assistant and establishment suggested in my No. 1437-C., dated 29th July 1897.

No. 272, dated the 3rd September 1897.

From—The Political Assistant, Chageh,

To—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.

I have the honour to solicit your instructions on the subject of my approaching cold weather tour.

2. I would suggest the following as the outline of the tour to be carried out :—

A. Leaving Quetta for Nushki as early next month as possible, and halting at Nushki, only sufficient time to settle such cases as demand adjustment. I propose to march thence to Robat Koh-i-Malik Siah *viâ* the lately opened caravan route, inspecting the several thanas and chowkis *en route*.

B. From Robat, should time permit, I should like to follow the Perso-Baluch frontier as far south as Mirjawa and thence strike west to Kirman.

C. Not the least important result that followed my late visit to Seistan was that all raiding from that country across the border into British territory ceased; with this result before me I do not consider it too much to anticipate that a visit to the Deputy Governor, Kirman, may tend to check raids from Sarhad into Western Sinjerani country.

3. I beg to point out, however, that should you accord your sanction to such a tour as I propose, no funds are available to meet the necessary tour charges.

4. A reference to the marginally cited account shows that the Rs. 28,200 allotted to my Political Assistancy is barely adequate to cover the expenses under the various heads for which the money was directly intended; and that no provision has been made for either travelling allowance or tour expenses. This omission is noteworthy in view of the fact that the Political Assistant is intended to remain six months out of each year on tour.

	Rs.
Political Assistant's pay at Rs. 500 per mensem	6,000
Levies' pay at Rs. 1,600 per mensem	19,200
Present office establishment's pay at Rs. 158 per mensem	1,896
Increase in office establishment at Rs. 42 per mensem	504
Office contingencies at Rs. 50 per mensem	600
TOTAL	28,200

5. The expenses of my late tour were met out of a special grant of Rs. 6,500. This sum may appear to you excessive, but I beg to point out that from Nushki to the Persian frontier no supplies are available—all have to be carried on camels.

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6. To avoid similar applications being made previous to proceeding on subsequent tours, I beg to recommend that Government be approached for a special allotment of Rs. 5,000 per annum to be devoted solely to my office tour charges.

7. Added to this Rs. 5,000 I greatly need a small sum of money to meet the cost of sinking three wells between Munzil and Saindak. This is a matter to which reference has been made in my report. I regret the delay in forwarding this report, which has been in the printer's hands since the end of July 1897.

8. Between Dalbandin and the Persian frontier lies a stretch of country practically unsurveyed. I am frequently embarrassed by the inaccuracy of the maps that deal with this country. I would submit the advisability of a survey officer accompanying me this cold weather. For this duty I would propose Mr. G. Tate, Baluchistan Surveys, whose knowledge of the country makes him peculiarly qualified.

9. The Koh-i-Sultan and ranges to the west contain valuable mineral deposits such as copper, lead, antimony, alum, and sulphur. I should like the services of a young geological expert. I feel confident his labours would yield valuable results.

Enclosure No. 9.

No. 3302-F., dated Simla, the 13th September 1897.

From—E. H. S. CLARKE, Esq., Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.

I am directed to reply to your letter No. 3975, dated the 25th June 1897, on the subject of arming the levies on the Nushki-Seistan caravan road.

2. I am to convey sanction to the issue of 60 Snider carbines and 7 revolvers in serviceable condition with 3,000 rounds of ball Snider and 350 rounds of ball revolver ammunition. The Government of India, as at present advised, consider that 50 rounds for each weapon, which is the amount allowed for annual practice to the Zhob Levy Corps, should be sufficient, and that the yearly issues, in future, should not exceed the amount required to maintain an initial supply of 50 rounds. Whether this procedure is or is not possible will depend on the ability of the Assistant Political Agent to determine the number of rounds legitimately expended each year. If he cannot do so, the matter may require further consideration.

Enclosure No 10.

Telegram No. 3759-F., dated the 1st October 1897.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, Quetta.

3759-F. Your letter 5660, September 10th. No extra grant can be sanctioned at present, and local conditions may render it desirable for you to keep Webb-Ware near at hand. We may rely on Brazier-Creagh's doing what is possible in Seistan to render the Nushki trade route popular, and it seems best to let work on route itself stand over till next year, when it may be possible to send the other officers asked for, and do the business thoroughly.

Exd.—P. M. M.

Government of India Central Printing Office—No. 989 F. D.—25-3-98—41.

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

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Enclosure No 11.

No. 7661, dated Quetta, the 25th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—H. S. Barnes, Esq., I.C.S., C.S.I., Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

With reference to Foreign Department letter No. 176-F., dated the 25th January, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a report by Lieutenant Webb-Ware, Political Assistant, Chagai, on the results obtained by the measures sanctioned last year for the political control and protection of the country between Nushki and Seistan, and of the trade route by which it is traversed. I much regret the delay which has taken place in the submission of this report, which, it will be seen, is dated the 15th July. It was sent by Mr. Webb-Ware to the Sind Government Press to be printed, but owing to the pressure of work connected with the plague, it could not be put in hand for some weeks, and it only reached me a few days ago.

2. Lieutenant Webb-Ware's report is very full and interesting, and I think the Government of India will agree that he has carried out the work entrusted to him with much zeal, tact and ability. Although the number of levies allowed for the purpose was not large for a road over 450 miles long, he has nevertheless succeeded in opening and protecting the trade route, and in establishing British control throughout the Sinjerani district, and he has also done much to introduce better order into the Khan's district of Nushki. The scheme which the Government of India had in view has been well and successfully started, and though trade operations were unfortunately hampered for some time by the restrictions found necessary in Seistan on account of the plague in India, the route bids fair to be popular, and has already been traversed by several caravans. Including the local traffic between Nushki and Quetta, the total value of the export and import trade from February to August has already attained the very respectable figure of Rs. 2,96,892. As the route becomes better known, and as that portion of it which lies between Amir Chah and Koh-i-Malik Siah becomes better protected from the occasional raids of the Damanis and other Baluch tribes on the Persian side of the border, there is every reason to hope that trade will considerably increase. It certainly ought to increase if the route can be made reasonably safe and easy, for, with the exception of the route through Kashmir and Leh to Yarkand, it is now the only free trade route by land from the North-West Frontier of India to the countries beyond. The heavy duties levied by the Amir have done much to discourage trade with and through Afghanistan, and it is not impossible that the new route may in time revive much of the trade which used to pass through Herat and Kandahar to Meshed. It may also attract a considerable portion of the trade which now goes by sea to Bandar Abbas and thence into Eastern Persia.

3. I have not much to add to what Mr. Webb-Ware has written, and until he has done another cold season's work in the country, it will perhaps be advisable to defer making any specific recommendations for the future either in regard to Nushki or the administration of the Sinjerani country, more especially as the Government of India have decided for financial reasons to limit Mr. Webb-Ware's tour during the coming cold weather. But there are a few points on which it is desirable to say a few words. First, in regard to Nushki, I am afraid there is very little doubt that the Nushki district will never be properly kept in order or properly developed so long as it remains in the hands of the Khan of Kalat. The Khan takes no interest whatever in the district, and, without our assistance he is quite unable either to keep the peace between the various sections of the Rakshani and Mengal tribes, or to prevent raids from or across the border. He is also averse to spending any money either in providing proper district establishments or in developing cultivation. Consequently, if he is left to himself, he is never likely to obtain more revenue from the district than the few thousand rupees which his Naib is at present able to collect. The lands round Nushki are very fertile, especially the "dak" or alluvial plain through which the floods of the Lora pass on their way to the Chagai Hamun, and if Bunds to

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catch and store the flood water were constructed, as is done by the Brahuis on the Nari river in Kutchi, it is probable from the native accounts of the productiveness of the soil, and from what I myself have seen of the crops, that the cultivation and the revenue of Nushki could be increased ten-fold. But there is no chance of such Bunds being constructed or of cultivation being increased until tribal feuds are settled, and order insisted on, and some security of possession ensured. And there is, I am afraid, little likelihood of these results being achieved while the district remains under the present Khan's administration, for the simple reason that he will not spend the money which is necessary to secure them. With the levies which have been given to him, the Political Assistant can arrange sufficiently well to secure the safety of the trade route through the Nushki District, which to us is the matter of more immediate concern. He has also endeavoured with their aid to settle and enforce the settlement of the more acute tribal feuds, but beyond this he can not interfere in the administration, and until there is some stronger form of Government the district cannot be expected to improve. In these circumstances I have no hesitation in saying that far the most satisfactory arrangement for all parties would be to induce the Khan to assign this district to the British Government for an annual quit-rent, as he has done in the case of Quetta. If this could be arranged, I have little doubt that in a few years the revenues would more than cover the cost of administration. A good Tahsildar with a small office staff, and a force of 30 or 40 armed police, would probably be all the establishment * that would be required, and with the security that would follow settled government, cultivation would very largely increase, and the Nushki Bazaar would become an important trade centre. The control, too, of the resources of Nushki, which is the only fertile and well watered tract on the road to Seistan, would make much easier the task of supplying and protecting the road beyond through the desert. I have discussed the matter more than once with the Khan, and have impressed on him the necessity for improving the administration of Nushki. He is naturally very reluctant to entertain the idea of alienating the district, but at the same time he is very fond of money, and if it were made worth his while, I think his reluctance might be overcome. For the present he has agreed to instruct his Naib to assist Mr. Webb-Ware in every way possible, and at my suggestion he has also promised to send a few of his irregular soldiers to Nushki to support the Naib's authority. For the coming cold weather I think it will be sufficient to wait and see how these arrangements work. If they do not work, or if, in any case, the Government of India would prefer the other alternative, the matter can be taken up in the spring.

	Rs.	a.	p.	
* Tahsildar .	175	0	0	
Establishment .	300	0	0	
Police . .	500	0	0	
	975	0	0	per mensem
or say	12,000	0	0	a year.

4. As regards the Sinjerani District, that is to say, Chagai and what Mr. Webb-Ware calls the Western Sinjerani country, it is too soon yet for me to be able to say with certainty whether there is much prospect of an increase of population, or cultivation, or whether it is worth while to attempt to levy a light revenue. From the Nushki border to Koh-i-Malik Siah the country is a desert, a wilderness of sand-hills interspersed with stretches of alluvial "pat" or wide gravelly plains. For the most part it is absolutely waterless, but for the occasional wells constructed along the caravan tracks. There is one little water channel in Dalbandin, and three or four karezes in Chagai, but the acreage under cultivation must be very small, and an assessment of one-sixth or one-tenth the produce would yield very little. There are many flocks of sheep and herds of camels at certain times of the year, but the difficulty in collecting a grazing tax is that money is almost unknown, so that the tax for some time, at any rate, would have to be levied in kind at so many sheep or camels per flock. As his time last year was chiefly taken up in exploring the road to Seistan, and in travelling to Seistan and back, Mr. Web-Ware was not able to devote much time to the revenue question. Nor was he able to explore the hills in the neighbourhood of Chagai, and between Chagai and Amir Chah, where there are probably more karezes and patches of cultivation to be found. This year Mr. Webb-Ware will visit Chagai and its neighbourhood, and he will be instructed to let the people understand that they will be expected

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to pay revenue, and I will direct him also to try and frame some estimate of what it may be possible to collect. He will also be able to form a better idea this year whether there is any probability of new karezes being made, or old ones reopened, in the alluvial tracts near Shakarchah and in Dalbandin, where there are many signs of former cultivation. But I would suggest that the result of his enquiries this winter should be awaited before any orders on the subject are passed. If revenue is to be collected, it would be necessary to give Mr. Webb-Ware the services either of a Native Assistant as proposed in my letter No. 1437-C., dated the 29th July, or at any rate of a Naib-Tahsildar with a small establishment, but it is, I think, very doubtful whether any revenue we could collect at present would cover the cost of collection. If Nushki were leased from the Khan, no doubt the native officer in charge of Nushki could also collect, without increase of expense, such dues as it may be found possible to impose in the Sinjerani district, and could act as Native Assistant to the Political Officer; so in this respect also the acquisition of Nushki would be an assistance in the administration of the rest of the country. On the whole, unless we are to administer Nushki, it seems to me the information we have got is not yet sufficient to justify any expenditure on a revenue collecting establishment.

5. As regards the matters mentioned in paragraphs 21 and 28 of Appendix 1 of Mr. Webb-Ware's report, I may mention (1) that Sardar Ali Khan, Sinjerani, has been told that he will not be allowed to levy transit or custom dues of any kind whatsoever, and (2) that I anticipate no difficulty in effecting a satisfactory settlement with Sirdar Sir Nauroz Khan in regard to the boundary between Kharan and the Sinjerani district. Sir Nauroz is as anxious as we are that a boundary should be laid down, and I will endeavour to come to an agreement with him on the subject as soon as a convenient opportunity occurs. It is also desirable that the boundary between Nushki and Dalbandin, and Nushki and Chagai, should be ascertained, and Mr. Webb-Ware will be asked to make enquiries and report on these points during his winter tour.

6. The only other important point on which I need touch is the strength of the levies employed to guard the road. I am afraid the present force of levies which was sanctioned in Foreign Department letter No. 2961-F., dated the 30th October 1896, at a cost of Rs. 19,200 a year, and of which a list * is attached, will hardly be sufficient as a permanent arrangement. The distances between the present thanas are very long, and as Mr. Webb-Ware points out, the danger of raids from the Damanis and other Perso-Baluch tribes make it very necessary to strengthen the posts between Amir Chah and Koh-i-Malik Siah. Moreover, as they stand, the posts are not sufficiently strong to enable regular postal communication to be kept up between Koh-i-Malik Siah and Nushki. This is only rendered possible at present because of the additional postal sowars † subsequently sanctioned at a cost of Rs. 430 a month for the purpose of keeping up communication with Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh in Seistan. Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh has now returned, and if these sowars are withdrawn, the chain of posts will become dangerously weak, and the arrangements made will be likely to break down. I would therefore very strongly recommend that I may be allowed to keep on permanently the postal sowars temporarily sanctioned by your telegram No. 1000-F., dated the 21st April 1897. These sowars will be the more necessary if there is any intention of replacing Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh by another officer or of appointing a British News-writer in Seistan, as suggested in my letter No. 1437-C., dated the 29th July 1897; and in any case I think experience has shown that without them it will not be possible to keep up regular communication between the Post Office at Nushki and the frontier thana at Robat, which is a matter of importance to the proper control of the district. Also since his report was written Mr. Webb-Ware has sent me in a proposition statement for additions to his levies ‡ (besides the postal sowars) at a cost of Rs. 310 a month in order to strengthen the Amir Chah and Saindak thanas, to place another post between Saindak and Robat, and to give some service allowances to some of the headmen of the Mamasani Baluch who inhabit the desert west of Amir Chah. The allotment, too, of

* List I.

† See list II attached.

‡ See list III.

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Rs. 28,200 * granted last year includes nothing for petty public works such as the building of posts, the digging of wells, the supply of facilities for drawing water and watering animals, nor on account of the annual tour charges of the Political Assistant and his staff. To provide for expenditure under these heads, I think a grant of Rs. 5,000 † is at present required, and if to this is added the cost of making the postal sowars permanent, and of entertaining the additional levies asked for, a total additional grant of Rs. 13,880 a year is required. I am afraid it will hardly be possible to provide this sum from Provincial funds, and yet the expenditure is, I think, very necessary if the route is to be properly guarded and developed.

	Rs.	a.	p.
* Levies	19,200	0	0
Office establishment	3,000	0	0
Pay of Political Assistant	6,000	0	0
TOTAL	28,200	0	0

	Rs.
† Petty improvements and public works	1,500
Tour expenses	3,500

	Rs.	
Postal sowars	430	per mensem.
Additional levies	310	"
TOTAL	740	"

or 8,880 a year.

7. The road at first traversed by Mr. Webb Ware on his way to Seistan proceeds from Dalbandin to Galachah and thence by Assadchah, Isa Tahir and Kundi to Amir Chah. It will be seen, however, from the map that this road makes a considerable detour to the south, and it was found that parts of it near Galachah lie very low and are intensely hot in the summer months. On his return, therefore, Mr. Webb-Ware moved his posts to a more direct line between Amir Chah and Dalbandin, *viâ* Marui and Manzil, and when the road is properly marked out, this will no doubt be the route which caravans will take. It is nearer the hills, and therefore higher and cooler than the lower road, and it is some 65 miles shorter. It is also almost entirely free from sand. There is also a road from Kundi through Maskija direct to Saindak, which avoids Amir Chah. This was the route traversed by Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh and his party of cavalry on their way to Seistan, and as it also is almost entirely free from sand, Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh thinks it would be a better line for troops to march than that by Amir Chah. As the country is for the most part quite flat, no road making is at present required for camel traffic. All that is necessary is to mark out the road clearly so that travellers may not lose their way. This is now being done. Between Nushki and Quetta there is a fair camel track *viâ* Kanak, the Barak pass Kirdigap. If funds were forthcoming, the track might be much improved where it passes for some 10 miles through low hills into the Kaisar river between Kishengi and Nushki, but except in this portion it is not necessary, for the present, to do anything in the way of road-making.

8. From what I have learnt both from Mr. Webb-Ware and Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh, there is some reason to fear that Perso-Baluch and Afghan-Baluch boundaries, as recently demarcated, have not left to us the best caravan roads for the last 50 miles to Koh-i-Malik Siah. Seistan caravans intended for Nushki do not at present go round by the Ziarat-i-Malik Siah Koh and Robat, as this involves a considerable detour. They prefer to follow the direct line *viâ* the Shelag river to the God-i-Terreh and thence by Zeh to Amir Chah. This necessitates their crossing a small strip of Afghan territory, and though they do not appear to be interfered with at present, the Afghans have it in their power to hamper them by the imposition of dues. Even if the boundary had been carried further north, this difficulty could not have been entirely avoided, as Koh-i-Malik Siah was necessarily an obligatory point in the boundary, and should the Afghans ever attempt to interfere with the passage of Kafilas, the traders will no doubt soon learn to take the road round Koh-i-Malik Siah which avoids Afghan territory. As regards the Perso-Baluch boundary, the boundary as marked on the map obliges the road from Saindak to Robat to follow the skirt or glacis of the hills which is said to be both long and difficult owing to the numerous deep nullahs that have to be crossed. The best road from Saindak, according to Mr. Webb-Ware, is inside the range by the Kacha Pass, Said Langar, the Bogor spring, and so between the Lar Koh and Sar Robat to the Ziarat-i-Koh-i-Malik Siah. This route, I am told, is over hard soil, and is level and easy. As the boundary is marked on the map, this

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road lies on the Persian side of the border. The boundary has been carried along one of the lower ranges, and not along the main water shed, which as the map shows, is the range between this road and the Mirjawa river. It seems a pity that the boundary, when it was being demarcated, was not carried further up the Talab or Mirjawa river either to its source as Mr. Webb-Ware suggests, or at any rate to a point opposite Said Langar, and then along the main water-shed *viâ* the Lar Koh to Koh-i-Malik Siah. This would have left the best road to Amir Chah on our side of the line. Also, as pointed out by Mr. Webb-Ware in paragraph 37 of Appendix I of his Report, it would have enabled us to put a levy post in the open country on the left bank of the Mirzawa opposite Said Langar, which would have afforded the best protection to the kafila route against the raids of the Damanis. From native accounts the Mirjawa district is said to be well watered and fertile.

9. Of the various improvements suggested by Mr. Webb-Ware in paragraph 28 of Appendix II of his Report, those marked (*a*) (*b*) (*e*) and (*g*) are being carried out. The Government of India have sanctioned the issue of snider carbines to the levies, and bunniahs are already established at some of the more important posts. Suggestions (*c*), (*d*), (*f*), (*h*) and (*m*) depend upon the orders of Government in regard to the increased grant for levies and petty public works recommended in paragraph 6. I shall be able to arrange locally for a postal chowki to be built at Kishengi as proposed at (1), and the other proposals made can also be dealt with locally.

10. In conclusion, I would strongly recommend that next year, as already requested in my letter No. 5660, dated the 18th September last, a survey officer and an officer of the Geological Survey Department should, if possible, be deputed to accompany Mr. Webb-Ware on his annual tour to Robat. Much of the country in Dalbandin and between the Hamun-i-Mashkhel and Amir Chah and the Perso-Baluch frontier is still unsurveyed. It seems desirable also that the mineral products of the country, which are said to be numerous and valuable, should be examined by an expert. There appear to be considerable deposits of red and yellow ochre, iron ore, sulphur, galena and sulphate of alumina. The hills from Saindak to Robat are also said to abound in copper.

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I.

Levies Establishment under the Political Assistant, Chagai.

No.	Name of Post.	Establishment and Pay.		Total of each Post.	Remarks.
			Rs.	Rs.	
1	Yadgar Chah			350	Sardar Ali Khan's Sinjeranis. 5 Sowars.
2	Chagai				5 Sowars.
3	Dalbandin	Amir Khan, Thanadar	45		
		5 Sowars at Rs. 20 each	100		
		1 Duffadar	15		
		5 Khasadars at Rs. 10 each	50		
		1 Levy Muharir	30		
			—	240	
4	Mervi	Sharbat Khan, Thanadar	45		
		6 Sowars at Rs. 20 each	120		
		5 Khasadars at Rs. 10 each	50		
		1 Levy Muharir	30		
			—	245	
5	Amir Chah	Khan Muhammad, Jemadar	45		
		5 Sowars at Rs. 20 each	100		
		1 Duffadar Rs. 25	25		
		8 Khasadars at Rs. 10 each	80		
		1 Levy Muharir	30		
			—	280	
6	Saindak	Ido, Duffadar	35		
		4 Khasadars at Rs. 10 each	40		
			—	75	
7	Robat Koh-i-Malik Siah.	1 Jemadar	45		
		1 Duffadar	35		
		5 Sowars at Rs. 20 each	100		
		1 Duffadar	15		
		3 Khasadars at Rs. 10 each	30		
		1 Levy Muharir	30		
			—	255	
8	Political Assistant's Personal Escort.	Adam Khan, Jemadar	45		
		5 Sowars at Rs. 20 each	100		
			—	145	
9	Levies	Contingencies		10	
		Grand Total		1,600	

Quetta;
The 25th November 1897.

(Sd.) H. S. BARNES,
Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.

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II.

Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh's Dak Levy Establishment sanctioned in Foreign Department Telegram No. 1000-F., dated 21st April 1897.

No.	Name of Post.	Establishment and Pay.	Rs.	Total. Rs.	Remarks.
		TEMPORARY.			
1	Nushki	1 Sowar at Rs. 20	20		
		Allowance to Levy Muharir	10		
			—	30	
2	Shakar Chah (Mekhmall.)	1 Sowar	20		
			—	20	
3	Sakhi Muhammad Shah (Padag).	1 Sowar	20		
			—	20	
4	Dalbandin	3 Sowars at Rs. 20 each	60		
			—	60	
5	Merui	3 Sowars at 20 Rs. each	60		
		5 Khasadars, Rs. 5 allowance to each	25		
			—	85	
6	Amir Chah	Misri Khan, Jemadar	45		
		5 Sowars at Rs. 20 each	100		
			—	145	
7	Saindak	Tomandar Murad Khan's Shagulzai 4 Sowars at Rs. 15 each	60		
			—	60	
8	Robat Koh-i-Malik Siah.	Allowance to Levy Muharir	10		
		GRAND TOTAL		430	

III.

List showing additional Levies recommended for the Chagai district.

	Rs.
Saiyad Langer Post.	
1 Duffadar	35
4 Sowars at Rs. 20 each	80
Amir Chah Post.	
1 Sowar at Rs. 20	20
Baram Chah Post.	
Saiyad Khan and 2 sowars	100
Political Assistant's Personal Escort.	
1 Duffadar	35
2 Sowars at Rs. 20 each	40
TOTAL	310

(Sd.) H. S. BARNES,
Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.

QUETTA;
The 25th November 1897.
Exd.—J. E. F.

Government of India Central Printing Office—No. 547 F. D.—4-1-98—70.

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

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

(22)

Confidential.

REPORT

ON THE

BALUCH-PERSIAN CARAVAN ROUTE

AND

NUSHKI, CHAGAI AND WESTERN SINJERANI DISTRICTS

BY

Lieut. F. WEBB WARE,
Political Assistant.

Karachi:
PRINTED AT THE COMMISSIONER'S PRESS.
1897.

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

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(23)

No. 215.

Dated Quetta, the 15th July 1897.

From

LIEUTENANT F. C. WEBB WARE,
Political Assistant,
Chagai,

To

THE AGENT TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN BALUCHISTAN,
Quetta.

Sir,

In accordance with the provisions of Foreign Department letter No. 2931 F., dated 30th October 1896, I have the honour to report that, having taken up my appointment as Political Assistant, Chagai, on 15th November 1896, I started for NUSHKI on 1st January 1897, taking with me three jamadars and 17 Levy sowars.

2. In NUSHKI, much to my chagrin, I was detained 21 days, hearing and settling cases and giving effect to *jirga* findings.

3. Leaving NUSHKI on 27th January, I reached ROBAT KOH-I-MALIK SIAH on 5th March and NASIRABAD SEISTAN on 18th March.

4. In SEISTAN, Russian influence was much in evidence. Their policy towards that country has clearly been an advanced one, and has been prosecuted with vigour.

5. Several untoward events combined to make my stay in SEISTAN more lengthy than I had anticipated; and thus it was not till the 10th of April that I returned to ROBAT, and not till the 5th June that I reached Quetta.

6. To safeguard the trade route and protect caravans, before returning, I established four thanas and five chaukis, manned by a total strength of 4 Thanadars, 22 sowars and 28 Khasadar guides. For both thanas and chaukis, sufficient accommodation has been, or is now, under construction.

7. The route selected, *viz.*, *viâ* DALBANDIN, MERUI, AMIRCHAH, DRANAH KOH and ROBAT, is the most direct, and from every aspect the one best suited to the exigencies of caravan traffic.

8. The recommendations I have to offer for the more efficient administration of NUSHKI and CHAGAI will be found embodied in paragraphs 10—14 and paragraphs 24—52, Appendix I.

9. I trust that the steps I have taken to safeguard the trade route, and those which I recommend should be taken for its further protection and development, will meet with your approval.

10. Provided the PERSIAN government is not incited to offer either active or passive opposition to trade, no serious impediment exists to preclude the route selected being extensively made use of, and that in the immediate future.

I know for a fact that native commercial feeling from Bokhara to Bombay is keenly interested in the development of the new route.

11. Three Appendices are attached, *viz.*:—

I. Administration and local trade of NUSHKI, CHAGAI, and WESTERN SINJERANI country.

II. QUETTA-SEISTAN trade route.

III. NUSHKI Trade Returns for the months of February, March, April, May and June 1897.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
F. C. WEBB WARE, Lieut.,
Political Assistant, Chagai.

B 36—1

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

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APPENDIX I.

Administration and local Trade of Nushki, Chagai, and Western Sinjerani country.

For the purpose of this Appendix, I propose to treat of the country to which it refers in three distinct sections, dealing in each with one of the three divisions into which by its natural configuration the country falls, and to discuss the trade and administration aspect of each under its own separate heading.

These divisions would be—

(*a*) NUSHKI, or the country east of CHAGAI, bounded on the north and east by the lately demarcated frontier, and on the south by the SARLAT RANGE.

(*b*) CHAGAI, or the country directly west of NUSHKI, and contained between pillars CLVII and CLXXVI of the BALUCH-AFGHAN boundary on the north, the RASKOH KAMMARAN MALIK SARINDAG hills on the south, and on the west by a straight line drawn from pillar CLXXVI through LAL KHAN to the GOUKOK hill near GALACHAH.

(*c*) WESTERN SINJERANI country, or that tract west of the line just drawn and enclosed between the BALUCH-AFGHAN and BALUCH-PERSIAN frontiers.

1. The NUSHKI district to all intents and purposes is inhabited by only two tribes, the ZAGAR MENGAL and RAKHSHANI. Of these, the former, if we include the nomad members, outnumbers the latter in the proportion of seven to one.

In former times, the whole of NUSHKI undoubtedly belonged to the RAKSHANI, with its rich arable lands and pasturage, and this they retained till conquered by the MENGALS. The fact that the proprietorship of the land is chiefly in the hands of the RAKSHANI affords sufficient evidence that the MENGAL yoke pressed but lightly on the RAKHSHANI. Beyond being stripped of a few lands and the right to levy a tax on passing merchandise, they were left pretty much to themselves. The explanation of this appears to be in the fact that the MENGALS, by inclination, were essentially a pastoral race and, as large numbers do to the present day, preferred bartering their surplus stock for grain to engaging in the uncongenial toils of cultivation. To come down to more modern times, the MENGALS are divided into two great branches—the BADINI and NOZAI, each of these branches in turn being sub-divided as follows, *viz.*, the BADINI into the BAJARZAI, TARASIZAI and AMIRZAI; and the NOZAI into the MAHMUDZAI, MANDAI, AHMEDZAI, BARANZAI; and each of these sub-divisions is again still further divided into from six to eight Tomans. All the NOZAI branch, and the TARASIZAI sub-division of the BADINI branch of the Mengals, are migratory; that is to say, that, while owning extensive lands in the DAK, on the southern side of the frontier, they pass the major portion of the year—and in years of drought, the entire year—pasturing their flocks in AFGHAN REGISTAN. While none dispute the Sardarship of MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN, BAJARZAI MENGAL, yet, since the Baluch-Afghan Boundary Commission finished their labours last year and many of the leading migratory MENGALS visited Kabul, they have not shown themselves so ready to acknowledge the Sardar's sway as of old.

2. The order of precedence of the branches into which the RAKSHANI are divided is as follows: the BADINI, JAMALDINI, and MANDAI. The latter branch is of little account, as the BADINI and JAMALDINI, long years ago, combined to crush them and strip them of their possessions, and thus it came about that the MANDAI Chief, BALOCH KHAN, was reduced to his present impoverished condition.

3. The BADINI and JAMALDINI, having overthrown the common enemy, straightway turned their attention to one another. For over thirty years have these two clans been struggling for the supremacy, fortune sometimes favouring one side, sometimes the other. By hereditary right, ALAM KHAN,

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

the head of the BADINI, is undoubtedly the true RAKHSHANI Sardar; but owing to his weak and vacillating nature, his opponents, under the leadership of the JAMALDINI Chiefs, JAM BEG and his brother KAIM KHAN, have not been slow to avail themselves of the opening thus offered to increase their influence at his expense.

4. As to NUSHKI and its quarrels, I learned much last year, but it was not until I spent several weeks investigating the origin of the disputes that I realized how very bitter the feelings between the various MENGAL and RAKHSHANI factions had grown, and what very little hope of friendly adjustment offered.

5. NUSHKI forms part of KALAT territory, and hitherto, in common with other sub-divisions of KALAT, has been administered, or, as I will shortly have cause to show, mal-administered, in the Khan's name, by a Naib appointed for the purpose. The country is truly in a most deplorable condition. Administration, in the proper significance of the term, there is none. While all BALUCHISTAN has slowly but surely been progressing, and, as in the case of KALAT, benefiting by its proximity to British administration, NUSHKI has stood still, if, indeed, it has not gone backwards. Almost the only occasions on which, so far as I have been able to ascertain, we have made any attempt to interpose our authority in the district have been when some internal feud has come to a head and involved the country in desultory fighting. On such occasions, we appear to have satisfied ourselves by summoning the heads of the factions concerned to Quetta, and placing their cases before *jirgas*, but the defect in this procedure was that the losing party simply treated the *jirgas'* decisions with contempt as soon as it got to a safe distance from Quetta. Of late years, ever since a small punitive thana has been posted at NUSHKI, the force available has been too weak to give effect to judicial findings. Intermittent attempts have been made by the Thanadar to act up to his orders, but a rifle shot, or the threat of a loaded pistol, has warned him of the folly of attempting impossibilities.

6. The only other occasions of our intervention I can trace have been when the ZAGAR MENGAL Sardar, in whom the right to levy a tax on passing merchandise has been vested for many successive generations, has seen fit to heap such burdensome dues on merchandise bound for the Quetta market as to threaten to extirpate all trade. This action has occasioned on our side the entry of protests, to be forgotten almost as soon as received. The cause of our apathetic policy towards the district is probably to be assigned to the fact that NUSHKI and its DAK form a continuation of SHORAWAK, and that, as nothing exists that can possibly be construed into a well-defined natural boundary, we were apprehensive of identifying ourselves too closely with the country, lest we should be continually embroiled with the KANDAHAR authorities in disputes regarding the limits of the Baluch-Afghan boundary in the vicinity.

7. As to the Khan, he appears to have taken but scant interest in NUSHKI. It must be remembered that the portion of NUSHKI acknowledging his direct sway is only the few hundred acres watered by the KAISAR STREAM, with its ramifications, and the DAK lands immediately in the vicinity.

As regards the MENGALS who lived outside these limits, they have been subjects of either KHAN or AMIR, as suited their purposes best; but it is worthy of note that their leanings, as shown by the reference of their disputes, is most markedly towards Afghan rule. A recent exemplification of the same leaning was given us at the conclusion of last year's Boundary Commission, when all the leading Tomandars, though in many cases owning lands well within the KALAT sphere of influence, were induced to journey to KABUL and offer their allegiance to the AMIR, to be rewarded with *khilats* and apportioned various scales of pay.

8. The Khan's Naib appears to have absented himself from NUSHKI frequently. He has never attempted to consolidate his master's rule, but has been satisfied to view it year by year gradually slipping from his grasp, and has contented himself by collecting an ever dwindling revenue. The Khan's authority in NUSHKI has thus daily become more

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(25)

shadowy; revenue has been collected only at the point of the sword; water, the private property of the Khan, has been seized upon and divided; the allowances which the ZAGAR MENGAL Sardar has hitherto received from the Khan have been discontinued. The various factions, MENGAL and RAKHSHANI, have quarrelled and fought, and quarrelled again, just as pleased themselves. And as to whether the MENGAL and RAKHSHANI cultivated their fields in peace, or put their numerous feuds to the issue of the sword, appears to have interested the Khan but little. This is a matter for comment. It is evident that in proportion as these inter-tribal feuds became more acute, so more lands were thrown out of cultivation and revenue diminished. The key to the problem is to be found in the policy of the Khan's Naib, who, fully recognising the precarious nature of his master's tenure in NUSHKI, has been the foremost in fostering these same inter-tribal feuds and quarrels, with the deliberate object of keeping the various factions apart and preventing any combined action, which would first be directed towards his own overthrow. Had not last year's Boundary Commission taken place, the Khan would have been compelled in the immediate future either to take decisive action to re-establish his fast waning authority on a solid basis or be satisfied to see NUSHKI slip from his rule for ever.

9. The revenue the Khan enjoys is derived from two sources, *viz.*—

(*a*) Land revenue at the rate of $\frac{1}{10}$th on all produce, excluding that of Sardar MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN ZAGAR MENGAL, and his "following."

(*b*) Two sheep annually from each Toman in the name of "Mehmani."

As to the actual amount of revenue so raised, it is difficult for me to offer an opinion, as there are no records to which I have access. On arrival at NUSHKI, I was told by the Naib's Assistant that it amounted to merely "*thora tukra mithi*," or nothing, whereas the Naib, on my return a few months later, placed it as high as Rs. 5,000. According to my latest researches, I believe that the amount realized last year, and paid to the Khan, was Rs. 4,700, and this figure may be taken as fairly accurate.

10. We are now confronted with the problem as to what is to be our future policy towards NUSHKI. With the conclusion of last year's Boundary Commission, under which no less than 80 miles of NUSHKI bordering on AFGHANISTAN have been carefully demarcated, the only excuse we ever possessed for holding aloof has been swept aside. To maintain our policy of indifference longer is impracticable. As Capt. McMahon, when Boundary Commissioner, very truly pointed out, the presence of a number of irresponsible Chiefs on the frontier, answerable to no one, is calculated to keep us continually embroiled with the AMIR, and to be a source of continual weakness, if not of actual danger.

11. From what I have just said, I think no one will question that the district must be administered in future under the supervision of a British officer. Shadowy and precarious as I have shown the Khan's authority to be, and likely at no distant date, had the old *regime* continued, to have been summarily extinguished, still Government is averse, and rightly so, to permitting the cession of any integral portion of a Native State to British administration. Thus, only two courses appear open—

(*a*) Either to take over, under an amicable arrangement with the Khan the administration of NUSHKI, judicial and fiscal, giving the Khan in exchange a fixed amount of, say, Rs. 15,000, or close on four times' the value of the revenue which he has of late years enjoyed.

(*b*) Or to call on the Khan to administer the country on lines that promise some hope of success. And an essential feature of such an administration—as on it would hinge the entire success of the plan—would be the appointment of a capable, trustworthy official, with some small experience of British methods of collecting revenue and administration, and answerable in all matters relative to revenue

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

direct to the Khan. To give this appointment to a KALAT official of the ordinary type would, I feel assured, inevitably entail failure, rudely shake new-born confidence, and be inadvisable to the last degree. If, however, either of the schemes be adopted, funds will be required to provide accommodation for district officials, the necessary administrative buildings, and above all for the construction on the DAK of few simple irrigation works. These, owing to the conformation of the country, need not be of an expensive nature, and they would operate to catch the overflow water of the PISHIN LORA, which now flows aimlessly on the LORA HAMUN, there to perish instead of discharging its proper functions in watering the rich and fertile alluvial lands known as the DAK. No better scheme could be derived for winning the people over to pacific pursuits than to supply them with a sufficiency of irrigated land for agricultural purposes.

12. Up to the present, I have refrained from touching on a most important question. I refer to the protection of the lately demarcated frontier, especially that portion bordering on SHORAWAK. On my arrival at NUSHKI, this matter engaged my early attention. In a darbar to which I summoned the most influential men in the district, I warned all that attempts to infringe the integrity of the frontier by perseverance in such practices as they were addicted to, using NUSHKI as a base, would meet with speedy punishment. My words have had a far deeper effect than I anticipated. Not a single case has come to my knowledge where the frontier has been violated from outside. I would I could say that the state of things had been reciprocated, but as a matter of fact frequent cases have occurred in which raids have been committed in Kalat territory by offenders who have crossed the SHORAWAK borders. The boundary between pillars CXLVI and CLVII is, as far as AFGHANISTAN is concerned, a dead letter. To the Deputy Governor of SHORAWAK, MUHAMMAD SADIK KHAN ACHAKZAI, a despicably feeble creature, addicted to the use of *charas* and *bhang*, and corrupt to the last degree, this state of affairs is mainly to be attributed. He wields little or no authority, and, to repeat a rumour that has the stamp of universal credence, is disinclined to enter on a crusade against raiding from personally interested motives. To look to him for assistance in repressing such trans-frontier crime as originates in SHORAWAK is, I fear, quite futile.

13. To meet the difficulty, the method that best commends itself to me is to place one of the DAK MENGAL Tomandars—by preference, I would select CHANDAN KHAN, a man highly respected by the whole tribe—in charge of that portion of the frontier just alluded to, allot him a small Levy service, say, of Rs. 200 monthly, and hold him responsible for the repression of all raids and crimes of violence. This proposal has the further recommendation that, while enrolling as the Khan's faithful servant a large section of the MENGALS, whose leaning has hitherto been rather towards KABUL than KALAT, it would greatly tend to consolidate MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN'S Sardarship, and thus increase the Khan's power in the district. Till some such method, involving the creation of a thana on the DAK, be adopted, it is to be feared that the old system of mutual reprisals will continue.

14. In concluding this heading, I desire to emphasize one point—that, be our future policy in NUSHKI what it may, it is essential to station a sufficient force in NUSHKI to deter raiding, arrest offenders, and give force to judicial decisions. To attempt the administration of the country in the absence of some such force, experience has proved must lead to failure.

TRADE.

15. NUSHKI, from its position, even from the earliest times, has enjoyed a reputation as a trade mart of considerable importance, laying claim to a commerce which has increased and diminished in proportion as the surrounding districts from which trade is drawn either enjoyed a brief repose or were torn with inter-tribal feuds. My enquiries clearly show that trade between NUSHKI and Quetta has of late years been steadily decreasing. The cause is

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not far to seek. Some sixteen years back, the Khan found means to compel the ZAGAR MENGAL Chief to cede a half portion of the net revenue realized from "Sung" collections to KALAT. Till then, the dues levied were in accordance with a scale in vogue generations, and fairly reasonable. The result of this was, as one might anticipate, that the ZAGAR MENGAL SARDAR, to recoup himself for the heavy loss sustained, forthwith enhanced the dues, in some cases so heavily as to amount to an increase of 100%, with such disastrous results to trans-frontier trade as quickly made themselves felt in Quetta. The Octroi Darogha called attention to the serious diminution in such imports as ghi and wool; SEISTAN merchants and NUSHKI traders complained bitterly of the extortion they were subjected to; and on certainly one occasion a British officer was deputed to halt at NUSHKI to report on the matter. The only result of his visit was that further protests were addressed to both Khan and ZAGAR MENGAL Sardar, to which neither paid the slightest attention. Very soon, the consequences made themselves felt further afield. SEISTANI merchants, in despair, sought other markets for their goods, and many NUSHKI Baniahs emigrated in search of fields offering more profitable investments. The few SEISTANI *kafilas* which continued to find their way to Quetta either made a detour through SHORAWAK to avoid NUSHKI—having once paid toll to the AFGHAN authorities at CHAGAI, they had nothing further to fear—, or, when their numbers warranted a chance of success, fought their way through *viá* NUSHKI.

16. Trade converges on NUSHKI from five different sources:—

(*a*) From JALK, *viá* GALACHAH and DALBANDIN, chiefly dates.

(*b*) From SEISTAN, *viá* AMIRCHAND and DALBANDIN, sheep, goats; local SEISTANI products, including ghi, wool, *namdahs*, carpets.

(*c*) From GARMSEL, *viá* KHAWAJA ALI, ROBAT (MALIK DOKAND), ghi, wool, grain.

(*d*) From EASTERN HELMAND, *viá* the PURDIL KHAN Road, wool, ghi, grain, dried fruits.

(*e*) From SHORAWAK, by numerous routes across the frontier, ghi, wool, grain.

17. Government, by allotting to Sardar MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN a fixed annuity in lieu of his hereditary right to levy "Sung," and thus freeing the district from the dues trade had struggled against so long, has given a sorely needed impulse to trade, and the good effects of this arrangement have already made themselves widely felt. The fruits of this liberal policy, I unhesitatingly affirm, would, had it not been for the action of PERSIA in closing SEISTAN to traders, have been a stream, though possibly an intermittent one, of camel-borne trade between Quetta and PERSIA. Closing SEISTAN to trade has exercised—it is to be hoped but temporarily—a most disheartening effect on those traders whose enterprize prompted them to venture their wares by the new route. To my certain knowledge, three test caravans were refused permission to quit SEISTAN, and several others were turned back on reaching the frontier. The trade that has thus benefited by the abolition of "Sung" has been confined almost solely to the local CHAGAI-NUSHKI-SHORAWAK trade. That this trade has benefited is clearly established by the re-opening of several shops in NUSHKI and by the general revival evinced by NUSHKI imports and exports returns, which show transactions aggregating, for the months of February, March and April 1897, Rs. 95,247-14-0. These figures, however, must be taken as merely approximate, for although most trade undoubtedly passes through NUSHKI, yet a portion, which cannot well be ignored, finds its way to Quetta by other routes.

18. The system in vogue under which NUSHKI Baniahs conduct their trade is somewhat as follows:—They advance large sums to trusted BALUCH agents.

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These travel as far afield as GARMSEL, CHAGAI, and SHORAWAK, purchasing on the spot such local products as they can obtain, and in due course despatch them through NUSHKI to Quetta. When accounts are made up, the profits realized are equally divided between Baniah and agent. It is probably this system that has given rise to a misapprehension that the general indebtedness of traders, SEISTAN and others, to NUSHKI Baniahs is so serious as to heavily handicap trade.

CHAGAI.

19. At the conclusion of last year's Boundary Commission and the consequent withdrawal of the Amir's posts to the Helmand, SARDAR ALI KHAN SINJERANI was re-instated in CHAGAI.

20. He appears to have signalized his restoration by arrogating to himself such Sardari rights as he enjoyed of old, relating to the levying of "Sung" and to the raising of revenue, and by a violent quarrel with his Naib, DOST MUHAMMAD, whose services during the late Boundary Commission had been the subject of special commendation from Capt. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E. The upshot of all this was the retirement of Naib DOST MUHAMMAD to his JALK property in disgust, and a strongly worded protest from the Political Agent, Kalat, as to the matter of levying "Sung," to which the Sardar does not appear to have paid the slightest attention. In accordance with the directions I had issued prior to leaving Quetta, I found DOST MUHAMMAD, who had but lately returned to CHAGAI, awaiting my arrival, and he was joined at a shortly subsequent date by Sardar ALI KHAN. I commented strongly on the Sardar's action in levying "Sung," and desired him to discontinue the practice. To this, he acquiesced with ill-concealed resentment. On handing him the Government resolution confirming his pay as a service allowance, and announcing its increase by a sum of Rs. 50, as a reward for Naib DOST MUHAMMAD's good services, Sardar ALI KHAN's jealousy and resentment again showed themselves. He positively refused to entertain the idea of paying his Naib the sum appointed, and withdrew in high dudgeon to his tent, where he sulked the next two days. Eventually, he acceded to the provisions of the resolution, but very sore at heart. The truth is that Sardar ALI KHAN is but a poor creature, weak and vacillating, without any moral force of character, and entirely in the hands of his numerous relatives, who play upon him in the manner which best suit their individual interests.

21. On reaching DALBANDIN, I found that the revenue which Sardar ALI KHAN was levying, by way of inaugurating his restoration, was derived from three different sources :—

Abolished.
- I.—"Transit dues"—
  1. Per camel load ghi ... ... Rs. 5
  2. Per camel load wool ... ... ,, 5
  3. Per camel load dates ... ... ,, 2
  4. Per each unladen camel ... ... ,, 2
  5. On each camel load dye ... ... Ans. 4
- II.—Poll tax on travellers four annas per head.

III.—"Sardari dues"—
1. $\frac{1}{20}$th gross produce on land.
2. In case of Death ... One sheep.
3. In case of Marriage ... One sheep from bridegroom.
4. From each family yearly. One milch goat.

22. The Sardar's methods of collecting revenue are rude in the extreme, and result in continual collisions with the surrounding Tomandars, who view a visit from him or his sowars much in the same light as we would that of a flight of locusts. These proceedings have given rise to a continued state of unrest, which cannot longer be tolerated : for, to assess the country to revenue and administer it with any chance of ultimate success under present conditions, it is impracticable.

* Since writing the above, all these "Sardari dues" have been abolished by order of the Agent, Governor-General in Baluchistan.

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23. The CHAGAI district may be said to consist of two fertile portions, *viz.*, the alluvial plain surrounding CHAGAI fort and DALBANDIN. The former is watered by one single and two double *karezes*, but the supply of water from them could be considerably augmented by a little judicious excavation. At present, it is unequal to local requirements. From the contour of the surrounding hills and from the depth at which water lies, I agree with Capt. MCMAHON in believing that the present number of *karezes* could be largely increased. Unfortunately, pressing business compelled my immediate return to NUSHKI, and so I cannot speak with the assurance of a recent personal inspection.

24. Owing to the very limited attention I was able to devote to the subject, I am somewhat diffident of committing myself as to the amount of revenue that could be raised; but, after careful consideration of the question, I think that, while the amount raised by a land tax under present circumstances would be very inconsiderable, the expenses of a small tahsil and sowar establishment, with a branch thana at BARAMCHAH, could be met from the Tirni collections on the very large number of flocks— sheep, goat, and camel— the district supports. Judging by the events of late months, the population of the district promises, under British administration, to increase to an astonishing degree. In illustration, I may say that, whereas at the time of my outward journey through DALBANDIN I collected with difficulty 20 men, at the time of my return upwards of 2,000 were reported by the Thanadar to be pasturing their flocks on the broad expanse the plain offered. This was no doubt partially due to failure in the rains around, but the view taken on both northern and southern frontiers is clearly proved by the presence of AFGHAN and KHARAN officials charged with the duty of preventing further egress.

25. As I have just said, I consider that the cost of maintaining a small tahsil and requisite establishment at CHAGAI could be met from a Tirni collection. That the collection will at first be unpopular, I foresee; but when the BALUCH realize that, in exchange, personal security for themselves, to leave alone that of their flocks, will be secured to an extent hitherto not dreamed of, I think that the slight uneasiness it may give rise to will quickly wear off, never to re-appear.

26. DALBANDIN may be best described as an extensive plain, of an average breadth of 8—10 miles, confined on the north and south by the CHAPAR and RASKOH hills, and extending east and west 20 miles, until it is lost in heavy sand hills. Cultivation by means of *karezes* is only attempted in the vicinity of the DALBANDIN river, where a small irrigation channel, 18 inches wide by 4 deep, is utilized to cultivate some 20 acres of ground. With a little care and expenditure, the yield of water could be materially improved in the upper reaches of the river, but lower down the presence of extensive salt beds renders the water unfit for irrigation purposes, and precludes all hopes of the water-supply being very extensively enhanced. Examination revealed the existence of numerous patches recently under cultivation a few miles up stream. On my enquiring of the owners as to why these lands were neglected, the universal reply given was that the inducements to undertake cultivation under Sardar ALI KHAN's sway were not sufficiently attractive.

27. Outside CHAGAI and the direct vicinity of DALBANDIN, there is but little cultivation. A few miles north-west of CHAGAI, a small *karez* supplies sufficient water to irrigate a few acres, while at MARUI and in several places in the CHAGAI SARLAT are old *karezes* which only require repairing to be brought into use again. I saw during my tour, on many occasions, places where light *bands* thrown across the mouths of *nalahs* would afford sufficient water to irrigate considerable tracts in the vicinity, and many other places, notably CHAHSIR, where the proximity of water to the surface gave promise of fine heads of water.

28. A matter of considerable urgency, as regards the welfare of the district, and with it the caravan route, is the approximate demarcation

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

of a boundary between KHARAN and CHAGAI. Parties of KHARAN sowars frequently penetrate through the RASKOH KAMERAN range into what is asserted to be, and generally known as, CHAGAI territory, and there, adopting the procedure of the CHAGAI Sardar tax collectors, they carry off all they can lay hands on, and then beat a hasty retreat across the hills. The plea advanced by the KHARAN people that, under an old Afghan *Sanad*, the WASHKI NALAH fell to them will not bear close scrutiny. The Amir's post at CHAGAI never recognised any right of theirs, but regularly collected all the revenue they could from the vicinity. These incursions have given rise to a feeling of continued insecurity, and if the matter is not taken in hand, it promises shortly to develop into a serious difference, even if it does not lead to actual bloodshed.

29. The protection of the district's northern frontier is also a matter that demands some consideration. During my late tour, I was repeatedly approached by trans-frontier BALUCHIS who desired to settle within our frontier. On obtaining my permission to do so on condition that the rights of present occupants should be respected, all, almost without exception, earnestly begged me to station a small post in some place on that frontier, such as BARAMCHAH, for their protection and security, and as a tangible proof that they were living under British protection. I am strongly of opinion that their request should be granted. Between KANI and JILJIL, the frontier runs through a mountainous district, affording excellent pasturage for its numerous flocks, and recent events in NUSHKI go to show that the Afghans will not be deterred by a mere line of boundary pillars from crossing the frontier to levy revenue on tribes they have long regarded as under their direct authority.

TRADE.

30. On this subject, I have little to say, for there is no trade indigenous to the district. Among the CHAGAI SARLAT hills, out-crops of salt and alabaster have been met with, and, judging by my experience further west, an organized search is likely to reveal the presence of mineral deposits. Indeed, the sand hills throughout the district contain a high percentage of very finely divided iron,—an interesting fact I have never previously seen alluded to.

31. The wool yielded by the large numbers of flocks in the district finds a ready sale in NUSHKI.

32. Such grain as, under the present unfavourable circumstances, is grown does not suffice for local requirements. The SINJERANI, TAOKI, MAMASANI, SASOLI, and the few scattered MENGAL and NARUI Tomans, all make a practice of importing such extra grain as they require from GARMSEL. Should the Amir forbid the export of grain—by no means an improbable contingency,—then very great hardship will ensue.

WESTERN SINJERANI COUNTRY.

33. I have separated the tract which I have designated the WESTERN country from CHAGAI proper for the reason that the authority enjoyed by the CNAGAI Sardar never extended beyond the line I lay down as the eastern boundary of the Chagai district, and that the present Sardar frankly admits, thus acknowledging that his interest in the country lying beyond is nothing.

34. The KOH-I-SULTAN and KACHA ranges appear for generations to have owned no master; they are a no-man's land of ill repute, and the favoured retreat of bands of *badmashes*, whose crimes and ill deeds have driven them from the society of their fellows. Though but sparsely inhabited, the district is subjected to continual raids. The chief, but by no means the only, offenders are the DAMANI of the KOH-I-SUFAID, whose name is feared like that of Hari Singh on the Peshawar frontier. The assurance of these raiders is truly astonishing. Bands of from five to twenty raid with impunity, coming from beyond the Persian frontier over an area bounded by MERUI on the north, GALACHAH on the south, and DALBADIN on the east, carrying off all they can lay hands on: if overpowered, such is the terror their name inspires, their captors dare but

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chastise them and let them go free. They are the pests of the district, and some method should be devised to rid the country of a nuisance which threatens to destroy the prospects of the lately opened caravan route.

35. The DAMANIS are divided into four sections—the YAR MUHAMMADZAI, the GUMSHADZAI, the SUREZAI and the GUNGOZAI, and own allegiance to one JIHIND, who resides, with his fellow clansmen, secure in the rocky fastnesses of the KOH-I-SUFFAID in Persian territory, whence he issues only to raid. During the month of July, the DAMANI venture down to MUKSOTAG, KUNDI, and GORANI on the plains below to gather their date harvest, but speedily retire. The tribe in all numbers but 800 men. For the Persians, weak though they have latterly shown themselves on this frontier, to plead inability to coerce this petty tribe appears to me absurd. The present situation is intolerable: either the Persians must reduce to order the unruly tribes on their border, who raid with impunity from the security their frontier affords, or we must safeguard the district. To do so in our case, however, would involve the holding of the GALACHAH PANIHAM road at considerable expense, a large increase in the present Levy force, and the establishment of another thana between ROBAT and AMIRCHAH, with the probability of a second strong thana being requisite in some suitable position on the MIRJAWA RIVER. The DAMANI, in the few dealings they have held with British officers, have hitherto evinced a friendly disposition, but as they are essentially a predatory tribe, relying on raiding as a means of subsistence, it is greatly to be doubted whether any steps short of physical force will avail to compel them to desist from a practice they have been engaged in for generations, and probably the task would prove the more difficult in this case as they have long regarded this strip of country as a preserve of their own.

36. At SAINDAK, a strong thana is, in my opinion, requisite in any case. The distance between AMIRCHAH and ROBAT, 155 miles, is too long a stretch of country to be unprotected. The SAINDAK chauki, manned by local Levies, is quite inadequate, and scarcely reliable. Should raids continue, the desirability of posting a thana somewhere in the vicinity of the MIRJAWA RIVER must, as I have said, be seriously considered. Should Government be disinclined to face the expense involved by the establishment of so many thanas, a possible alternative would be to post a strong thana at SAINDAK—a step which cannot well be avoided—, and to place the charge of the road west of AMIRCHAH in the care of some influential Baluch Sardar, allot him, say, Rs. 150 for pay and such service as he requires, and hold him personally responsible for the repression of raids. Such an appointment is necessary, for the presence of thanadars being essential at the various posts, they can, in case of a raid, only follow the track up for a day or so and then return to their duty. A Baluch Sardar, on the other hand, with no imperative duties to bind him to the close vicinity of the caravan route, could with the assistance of his followers pursue raiders with vigour and persistency, and, being thoroughly versed in their modes of procedure, it is to be hoped, compel them to turn their attention elsewhere.

37. To me, it is a cause of considerable regret that the demarcation of the northen portion of the PERSO-BALUCH BOUNDARY was permitted to follow so exceedingly weak an alignment as that selected. A far more natural and infinitely stronger frontier would have been that offered by following the MIRJAWA RIVER up to its source, thence running direct to KOH-I-MALIK SIAH by the BUNDI and SHAMIDAR Passes. To such a line, the PERSIANS, whose interest in this remote corner appears infinitesimal, would have offered little or no opposition, and it would, while securing to us a frontier naturally strong, and well to the south of the KACHA HILLS, have placed us in possession of a well watered strip, quite different from what it is usually supposed to be, and containing what, at present, is the only practicable road, *viz.*, that by SAID LANGAR and BOGAR. Added to the natural weakness of the present boundary, it offers raiders such exceptional facilities for plying their trade as will quickly attract their attention. *Badmashes* have but to lie up in the

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hills above, secure within PERSIAN limits, fall upon any unwary caravan passing along the *daman* below, retreat once again to the hills, and within half an hour be secure from all chance of successful pursuit. On the map, the line followed by the PERSO-BALUCH BOUNDARY, after leaving the MIRJAWA RIVER for KOH-I-MALIK SIAH, is clear; on the ground, I have been unable to trace it—a difficulty in which the BALUCH of the district, judging from questions they put me, evidently participated. That the pillars exist, I do not question; but most certainly they differ considerably in the modesty of their dimensions from the massive stone pillars I found marking the northern boundary. Even while in SEISTAN, I was questioned by PERSIAN officials as to the configuration of the frontier to the south-east of KOH-I-MALIK SIAH. Under these circumstances, I am of opinion that the question of re-aligning this portion of the frontier, if not yet too late, should be very seriously re-considered. I say with assurance that, if the error that has clearly been committed be not rectified, we will repeatedly have cause to regret it in the immediate future.

37. To assess this wild country to revenue, unless a tax on minerals and assafœtida were contemplated, would be useless. The amount raised would necessarily be infinitesimal, the expense of collection considerable, and the means of evasion simple. Added to this, nothing would tend more to discourage those BALUCH from settling in the District whose presence I count on to effect its ultimate pacification.

TRADE.

38. From time immemorial, the assafætida clothed slopes of the KOH-I-SULTAN yearly induced large numbers of Pathans from Kandahar and Kakars, from places even so distant as Zhob, to quit their homes to gather it. But beyond assafætida, the same barren range has large deposits of sulphur, alum, two kinds of ochre (much sought after for dyeing), copper and antimony. To the west of KOH-I-SULTAN, the hills are seamed with out-crops and veins of ore, some exceedingly rich. The presence of ancient copper and lead smelting furnaces testify to these deposits having been known, and having been in use, for ages; while excavations of quite recent date show that the workings are not disused. An exhaustive geological survey of the district is much needed, and would yield most valuable results.

39. SARHAD as a market for the purchase of stock is already attracting attention. Two droves, one of 400 sheep the other of 800 goats and sheep, have already marched down the new trade route, and arrived safely in Quetta. Given a continued demand, it is not improbable that this may prove the initiation of an extensive industry.

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APPENDIX II.

Quetta-Seistan Trade Route.

1. By no means the least important result that followed the conclusion of last year's Boundary Commission was that the opening up of a direct caravan route between QUETTA and SEISTAN, lying wholly within the British sphere of influence, and nowhere infringing Afghan territory, fell within the limits of possibility.

2. Afghan import and export trade has, for many years past, struggled in vain against the crushing dues which His Highness the Amir has imposed. The protests of merchants have been met only by the imposition of still heavier dues, and matters have come to such a pass that many well known merchants, whose connection with AFGHAN and CENTRAL ASIAN trade dates from generations back, of late years have been compelled to withdraw from commerce. Such Central Asian trade as of old drew its goods from British sources has slowly drifted into the hands of RUSSIA, which on its part has not been backward in putting in motion every engine that ingenuity could devise, and its paramount position in Central Asia afforded to popularize its Asian and PERSIAN trade at the expense of ours.

3 With the final demarcation of the western Baluch-Afghan frontier, Government has not been slow to realize the possibility of opening up a direct caravan route between our north-west rail head and PERSIAN SEISTAN, and, at the close of last year, devoted a sum of Rs. 28,200, and later on a further grant of Rs. 6,500 for the purpose of putting to a practical test the possibility of the scheme. It is now my purpose to describe, in as brief a compass as possible, the steps that have already been taken towards the consummation of a project having for its objective the re-habilitation of trans-frontier trade.

4. NUSHKI is but 93 miles south-west of QUETTA, yet to the majority of residents in BALUCHISTAN it conveys but a name. Somehow, the visits of officers have been few and far between, and, excepting that it has long enjoyed a trade of its own, and owned an unenviable notoriety for its feuds and quarrels, interested few. In developing the caravan route, Nushki will form the base whence goods and *kafilas* will be despatched and received, and thus, as a preliminary step, it was essential that arrangements should be made to open up direct communication with QUETTA. In view of the very slender funds at my disposal, this promised to prove an insurmountable difficulty; happily, the assistance afforded by the Agent to the Governor-General solved the problem, and January 1897 saw a Post Office established in NUSHKI and a regular bi-weekly dak running.

5. Almost immediately after my arrival in NUSHKI, an opportunity offered itself of bringing home to all the fact that Government had inaugurated a new departure and was determined that in future the person of traders and the property of caravans should be regarded as sacred. It came to my knowledge that a small SEISTANI *kafila* had been seized and plundered by the Jamaldini Sardar under the plea—a mere subterfuge—that one of his *entourage* had been subjected in SEISTAN to a like outrage several months previously. I took the opportunity to dispel from the Sardar's mind the belief which he and the district had long shared that every weakly guarded caravan was their fair and legitimate prey. And to ensure the discontinuance of similar outrages, I publicly placed the charge of all caravans passing through Nushki in the hands of MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN, ZAGAR MENGAL,—now a paid Government servant—, telling him that any loss they might suffer would be required at his hands. That not a caravan has since been subjected to either outrage or loss bears testimony to the fact that the Sardar has acted up to his responsibilities.

6. On the 16th January 1897, I received the welcome news that Government had allotted to Sardar MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN Rs. 7,000 yearly in lieu of his hereditary right to levy "SUNG." The Sardar had greeted my arrival in

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

NUSHKI with ill-concealed distrust. From that day, however, a change occurred in his bearing, as marked as pleasing; henceforth, he enlisted himself unreservedly on my side, and I have nothing but praise for his conduct since. The fact that trade to the extent of Rs. 1,54,439-15-0 has passed through NUSHKI during the period from February to June 1897 speaks greatly for the stimulus to trade that has rewarded the liberal policy of Government. On these figures, I consider comment unnecessary; but I may add that the revival of trade is further attested by the re-opening of several shops in NUSHKI.

7. In addition to the undoubted benefits which the abolition of "Sung" has conferred on the district and its trade, by placing the patronage of a local Levy service in my hands, it has enabled me to adjust a long outstanding feud between two of the ZAGAR MENGAL factions which of late years had steadily been growing more and more acute, and had led to more than one outbreak. Beyond this, it has permitted me to establish a succession of small dak posts between NUSHKI and DALBANDIN, *viz*, at SHAKARCHAH, 35 miles from Nushki, and at SAKI MUHAMMAD SHAH and YADGARCHAH, 66½ and 35½ miles, respectively, from DALBANDIN, which answer the double purpose of safeguarding the caravan route and maintaining uninterrupted communication. For these posts, small but adequate dak chaukis are in course of erection, by which their comfort and welfare will be permanently secured. To the erection of these chaukis, I attach no little importance: for the existence at every few miles of posts, small though they be, held by Government sowars, brings home to such traders as traverse the route for the first time a feeling of security not easily over rated.

8. With the final settlement of the country and with the erection at NUSHKI of a thana, a small trading bazaar will quickly arise. Eager enquiries have more than once been addressed to me as to when a thana will be erected, and on my enquiring the reason for the questioner's anxiety for such a building, the answer has been that he proposed moving to NUSHKI as offering a better base for conducting his business.

9. Up to DALBANDIN, I had not thus to indent on my Quetta-raised Levies; here I proposed stationing my first thana, and this was quickly arranged. Leaving with the Thanadar instructions to guide him in his dealings with Natives and caravans, and halting only sufficient time to enlist such local Baluch as were requisite to bring the post up to its full Levy strength, and impressing on the Thanadar the imperative necessity for starting work on this thana at once, I hurried on to GALACHAH. I may say here that, on my return, I found a fine roomy thana not only finished but in actual occupation, a building whose construction reflects great credit on the energy and industry of the post.

10. Of GALACHAH, I will say but little, as it has since been abandoned for reasons presently to be stated. The steps I had taken at DALBANDIN were here repeated, with the exception that SIR NAUROZ KHAN's action in filling in the district wells had instilled such fear into the few remaining inhabitants I encountered that it was only after repeated assurances of protection, and at the expense of much trouble and patience, that I prevailed on a Tomandar to take service.

11. Leaving GALACHAH on the 13th February, I reached AMIRCHAH without mishap on the 19th. At PANIHAM, I had been compelled to re-open a well filled in flush with the ground. At AMIRCHAH, the wells were in a very similar plight. Of those sunk last year for the use of the Boundary Commission, scarcely a trace remained but sand drifts. I quickly realized the paramount importance of stationing a thana in such a commanding position. AMIRCHAH is the point of junction of the KHARAN and direc NUSHKI routes, and is of great strategical value, dominating as it does the entire KOH-I-SULTAN range, to the evil reputation of which I have already had cause to allude. Added to this, its elevation above the surrounding plain gives it a climate by no means unbearable, even during the hottest months. A couple of wells were quickly re-opened, but the water yielded was

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so putrid and offensive as to compel me to sink another well, 35 feet in depth, a couple of hundred yards up stream. I was considerably puzzled at first to get material for the construction of the thana. The ground is so impregnated with sand that as a building material it is quite useless; and yet there was nothing else. Finally, I was driven to erecting a square stockade of "Tagaz" trunks, against which a five-feet wall of boulders has been piled, while inside is a roomy "Tagaz"-thatched shed, which owing to its coolness is very popular among the sowars. If only mortar were available, thanks to the numerous blocks of stone that strew the vicinity of the well, no difficulty in constructing a suitable building need be anticipated.

12. Leaving my third thana posted at AMIRCHAH, I directed my march to SAINDAK, a distance of 67 miles, which, owing to lack of water, was quite the most trying portion of the journey. Last year, Capt. McMahon was lucky in finding at DRANAH KOH a pool of dirty water. No such luck fell to my lot. From AMIRCHAH to SAINDAK, and again from SAINDAK to AMIRCHAH, three and two days' marches, respectively, as I made them, our camels had to go waterless. For the development of the road across this stretch, two wells are urgently required. I trust the end of the year will see both completed. One well—which I hear is over 40 feet deep—has already been sunk, but work, owing to the heat, has been temporarily suspended, and this has also been the case in respect to a well now in course of construction to the north of the KOH-I-SULTAN, midway between AMIRCHAH and MANZIL, where there is another long waterless stretch of 42 miles, and the only other one between QUETTA and NASIRABAD.

13. While I was halted at SAINDAK, a local Tomandar, named IDO, much dreaded of caravans, came in. Such terror has this individual inspired that no caravan or party, unless well armed, dared of old to pass his lair. SAINDAK is so situated that, should he be so inclined, this personage could block the route and cause great trouble. In old days, SEISTAN caravans avoided SAINDAK, and after leaving BURJ, in PERSIA, they used to march direct for AMIRCHAH, skirting the northern shores of the GOD-I-ZIRREH. This track, lying as it does within AFGHAN limits, is clearly no longer practicable. To IDO I gave the choice of Government service or ejection. He accepted the first alternative—I confess to my relief—, as to root him out of these rocky retreats would have proved a far from simple task. Of his conduct since then, I have no cause to complain: he has discharged his duties in carrying the dak surely, although at times somewhat slowly.

14. Of my further journey to KOH-I-MALIK SIAH, I have little to relate. On the outward journey I followed the "damaa" north of the hills,—a very rough, circuitous track, cut up every few yards with boulder-strewn *nalahs*, and passing north of the line of boundary pillars at a point within a few miles of Robat. On my return, I tried the southern road *viâ* BOGAR, SAID LANGAR and KIRTAKA, a preferable route on every account; indeed, its only disadvantage lies in the fact that, according to the map, it passes between Robat and Kirtaka outside British limits.

15. At ROBAT, my fourth and last thana was posted. The position selected is in close vicinity to the head waters of the ROBAT spring. The thana, as it stands completed, is a rectangular, stone-and-mud built, walled enclosure, with one side devoted to living rooms. The walls are raised to such a height as to afford ample security to the occupants. Had the PERSO-BALUCH frontier followed an alignment more southerly than that selected, I would, I think, have chosen another position for the thana, as common report declares that ROBAT water towards the close of the hot season becomes charged with deleterious salts and is unhealthy.

16. Leaving the main camp pitched at ROBAT, my first march into SEISTAN took me to HURMUK, 20 miles distant. Here, I learned the unwelcome news that it was commonly rumoured that the post which the AMIR had intended should guard his interests at KOH-I-MALIK SIAH was to take up its quarters

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here. This is a matter that cannot be ignored. HURMUK* is situated on the main SEISTAN-MAKRAN and SEISTAN-NUSHKI roads, and, should a Pathan post come here, it would effectually block all traffic. From the enquiries I made, I believe that it is impossible to devise another route which would outflank Hurmuk, nor do I think any such exists. And here I should like to point out how imperatively necessary it is that the southern SEISTAN-AFGHAN frontier should be clearly demarcated. To do this would be an easy matter, for, between KOH-I-MALIK SIAH and BUND-I-~~KAMAL KHAN~~, the PERSO-BALUCH boundary runs in a straight line across sand hills and barren desert, containing not a single point I am aware of to which either PERSIAN or AFGHAN can possibly attach any importance. The demarcation of this frontier is a matter intimately connected with the welfare of the new route, and I trust that it will not be lost sight of. Up to the present, the long expected PATHAN post has not arrived at KOH-I-MALIK SIAH; but that orders have long been issued for the institution of such a post is a matter of public knowledge.

* *Vide* map attached.

Seistan

17. In SEISTAN, although the officials I met were outwardly the personification of politeness and hospitality, it needed little insight to perceive that they viewed my visit to SEISTAN with uneasiness, not to say suspicion. This appears to have been due to an absurd rumour which was current that Government intended annexation, aimed at absorbing all southern SEISTAN, and, by diverting a portion of the water of the HELMAND, proposed to reclaim the broad alluvial tracts north of the SHELA river. My visit was, so it was rumoured, only the prelude to a vigorous development of this programme. To combat this distrust was my first aim. I declined to permit SEISTAN Sardars to have audience of me, excepting in the presence of PERSIAN officials, a policy on which I had cause to congratulate myself subsequently before leaving the country, when I learned that many questions asked by BALUCH Sardars were put at the instigation of the leading Persian officials.

18. I was disagreeably astonished to find what ascendency RUSSIA had gained throughout SEISTAN. Their policy towards the country appears to have been a most progressive one, while ours has been just the reverse. I was greatly surprised to learn that a RUSSIAN news-writer had been stationed in the capital, Nasirabad, for upwards of three years, and the influence he exercises, or the fear he engenders,—in SEISTAN, synonymous terms—is truly astonishing. I trust Government will answer the move by at once installing a British Agent in NASIRABAD. PERSIA can offer, under the circumstances adverted to, but feeble opposition to such a step. If Government does not do so, the development of a direct trade route between BALUCHISTAN and PERSIA is, under the present hostile conditions, hopeless. In the institution of the late Plague precautions, we have had an illustration—which it would be as well to keep in mind—of the adverse influence which RUSSIA exerts in SEISTAN. Those so-called precautions, while I was in SEISTAN, were only employed as an engine to strangle direct trade communication between SEISTAN and Quetta, while between MAKRAN and SEISTAN travellers and traders were free to come and go unquestioned.

19. While I was in SEISTAN, a slight incident occurred which is important, owing to the light it throws on the view in which SEISTANIS regard the new trade route and the steps taken to safeguard it. One PASAND KHAN, Mamasani, came to me and claimed compensation for losses which he alleged that I had caused him by guarding the route. He stated that, but a few days prior to his interview with me, several leading members of the SEISTAN trading fraternity sent for him and told him that, as the new route was efficiently guarded, they proposed in future to dispense with his and his men's services. Pasand Khan is, it appears, on the friendliest of terms with every border ruffian between SEISTAN and NUSHKI, and it was his custom to guarantee safe conducts through only to such caravans as met his demands in a fittingly liberal spirit. Or here is another similar incident. One of the two caravans which followed me up was compelled to leave a couple of loads of indigo at SAINDAK; these loads were carefully taken charge of by the local post, and in due course surrendered to their owners on their arrival with fresh camels.

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20. SEISTAN's staple products are grain, ghi and wool. Of the former, no inconsiderable quantity is exported to MAKRAN, *viâ* KOH-I-MALIK SIAH, and is there bartered for dates, for which throughout SEISTAN there exists a large demand. If facilities for carriage were to be improved, it is by no means impossible that the future may see an extensive Perso-Baluch grain trade called into existence. Last year, all agreed that prices ranged exceptionally high, yet I purchased grain for from 25 to 32 sers the rupee. Before quitting this subject, it is, however, my duty to point out that both RUSSIA and PERSIA will regard such a trade very jealously.

21. The system under which the export of such ghi and wool as find their way to Quetta is conducted is somewhat as follows:—Towards the close of the hot weather, several villages combine to form a *kafila*. They then load their surplus stock and carry it to Quetta, where they obtain a load, generally, of indigo and English piece-goods. On arrival at Nasirabad, their goods are disposed of in open market, and the caravan is broken up, not to re-unite till the following autumn.

22. Of my return journey, I have very little to say. I found that at Drana Koh, Ido and his men had not been idle. To give practical proof of their good intentions, they showed me a well they had driven 32 feet through sandstone and solid rock.

23. News received from Quetta at Dalbandin, relating to certain dak arrangements, made me decide on abandoning Galachah and re-stationing the thana further north, either at MERUI or at GAT-I-BAROT, in a more direct line between Amirchah and Dalbandin. I had long foreseen some such change was inevitable, and indeed, in view of such a contingency, I had, when at AMIRCHAH, caused a site for a well midway between MANZIL and AMIRCHAH to be selected, and had given orders for the work to be put in hand as soon as possible. I have since learned that these orders have not been neglected. I must confess to having been, for two reasons, somewhat loth to abandon ASADCHAH: firstly, because my Thanadar, emulating the efforts of other Thanadars, had constructed a very presentable, wall-engirdled building at the expense of much time and labour; and, secondly, because holding the GALACHAH-ISA TAHIR roads acts as a very effectual check on raiding Between AMIRCHAH and MERUI, the distance is somewhat great, and, to obviate this, orders have been issued that a chauki should now be posted at MANZIL, a spot which has the advantage over ISA TAHIR in being resorted to by many nomad BALUCH.

24. I have provided ROBAT, AMIRCHAH, MERUI and DALBANDIN with Munshis. These, in addition to their ordinary Levy work, have orders to keep me fully acquainted with what goes on in their neighbourhood, the movements of caravans, raids, etc.

25. Every thana is complete with a staff of guides, whose duties are to escort passing caravans safely to the next post. At thanas where the soil gave hope of success, seeds for gardens have been left, while all of them, without exception, have been stocked with a modest supply of fowls and pigeons.

26. To sum up, from Quetta to DALBANDIN, the road is safe and secure, and the dak travels regularly. Between DALBANDIN and AMIRCHAH, while neither so secure nor in so advanced a stage, still I consider my arrangements will suffice for the present. From AMIRCHAH to KOH-I-MALIK SIAH, the distance unguarded is excessive, and another thana and chauki are much required. My arrangements are now such that I trust in future always to be able to maintain an uninterrupted through weekly dak.

27. No one who has traversed this route can fail to be struck with the marvellous facilities which the country between NUSHKI and SEISTAN offers for the construction of a railway. Scarcely a single natural obstacle exists to bar the road; throughout, the gradient is exceedingly gentle; bands of sand

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

can as a rule be avoided; of fuel, there is an abundance; while not a bridge of more than one span, or engineering work of any magnitude, is requisite. Added to this, the mineral wealth of the KOH-I-SULTAN and the hills to the west, at present lying untouched, is so considerable as in itself to offer very great inducements to railway enterprise. Such a railway would place the trade of eastern PERSIA and SEISTAN at our feet, unlock such Central Asian markets as are now closed, give us a preponderating influence in eastern PERSIA, and open to INDIA the rich grain fields of SEISTAN; while it would be impossible to estimate the strategical value.

IMPROVEMENTS.

28. As to the steps that might with advantage be taken to develop and safeguard the road, after the establishment of a British Agent in the capital of SEISTAN—in my opinion, a matter that in importance takes precedence of all,—I would suggest—

(*a*) That the various thanas be armed so efficiently as to enable them to vigorously assume the offensive when occasion demands.

(*b*) That depôts should be constructed at convenient centres (such as at ROBAT, AMIRCHAH, MERUI, and DALBANDIN) for the supply to caravans of the necessaries of life. This is a scheme that is worthy of careful consideration. Its adoption would involve the erection of expensive godowns at each centre, the appointment of Agents at NASIRABAD and NUSHKI to replenish stocks as they ran low, and the appointment of a small staff, whose pay might well be met from the profits on sales. Some such scheme as is here suggested would be quite feasible, would confer great benefit on traders, and go further than anything else to popularize the route.

(*c*) That the AMIRCHAH thana should be strengthened. AMIRCHAH, as I have shown, dominates the entire western SINJATANI district. I consider that the strength of the thana should never be allowed to fall below 20 sowars.

(*d*) That a thana should be established at SAINDAK, with a branch chauki midway between that place and ROBAT.

(*e*) That a chauki should be erected at MANZIL.

(*f*) That a sufficient sum of money should be placed at my disposal to meet the wages of a small gang of Pathan labourers for employment, next cold weather, in well-sinking and on such other works connected with the development of the route as I may consider most pressing.

(*g*) That the caravan route from NUSHKI to ROBAT should be marked throughout by means of piles of stones, posts, lines cut through "Tagaz" jungle, or otherwise.

(*h*) That existing facilities for drawing water and watering animals, especially horses, should be increased. As grass is to be found throughout, the possibility of a considerable trade in remounts is to be anticipated.

(*i*) That a substantial chauki should be built at KISHINGI, and two additional Levy sowars entertained for the Quetta-Nushki dak service with head-quarters at KARDAGAP.

(*j*) That an official should be appointed in Quetta to afford every assistance to *kafilas* and traders, to place them in touch with the best markets for the sale and purchase of goods, and to supervise their interests generally.

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(*k*) That rules should be framed for the regulation of caravan traffic while passing through Quetta, so as to secure its freedom from local taxation—bonded warehouses being established, if necessary.

(*l*) That a sufficient force should be stationed at NUSHKI to prevent further outrages and to enable the administration of the district to be efficiently conducted.

(*m*) That more commodious thanas should be erected at the various centres.

(*n*) That 20 baggage camels (five for each centre) should be purchased for carriage of grain at a cost not exceeding Rs. 60 each.

29. If, added to the above, the services of officers of the Geological Survey, Trigonometrical Survey and Intelligence Departments were placed at my disposal for the approaching cold weather tour, valuable results would ensue.

F. WEBB WARE, Lieut.,
Political Assistant, Chagai.

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

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Blueprint map of the intersection of boundary lines at Koh-I-Malik Seah [33r] (1/2)



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Blueprint map of the intersection of boundary lines at Koh-I-Malik Seah [33v] (2/2)



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

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APPENDIX III.

NUSHKI TRADE RETURNS

FOR MONTHS

February to June 1897.

36—6

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STATEMENT showing the Quantity and Value of each Article imported into

No.	ARTICLES.	Kalat and Chagal			
		Weight.		No.	Value.
		Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
I	Animals living (for sale)—				
	1—Horses, Ponies and Mules				
	2—Cattle				
	3—Sheep and Goats				
	4—Other kinds				
II	Borax				
III	Canes and Ratans				
IV	Caoutchouc				
V	Chinese and Japanese-ware				
VI	Coal and Coke				
VII	Cotton, raw				
VIII	Cotton, manufactured—				
	1—Twist and Yarn (European)				
	2—Ditto ditto (Indian)				
	3—Piece-goods (European)				
	4— Ditto (Indian)				
IX	Drugs and Medicines—				
	1—Assafœtida				
	2—Other sorts (not intoxicating)				
	3—Intoxicating Drugs (other than Opium)				
X	Dyeing Materials—				
	1—Indigo				
	2—Madder or Manjit				
	3—Safflower				
	4—Turmeric				
	5—Other kinds				
XI	Earthenware and Porcelain				
XII	Fibrous products—				
	1—Jute, raw				
	2—Jute, manufactured (Gunny Bags and Cloths)				
	3—Other Fibres, raw				
	4— Ditto manufactured				
XIII	Fruits and Nuts—				
	1—Pomegranates				
	2—All other kinds (Dates)			8	300 0 0
XIV	Grain and Pulse—	12			60 0 0
	1—Mung				
	2—Other Spring Crops	450			1,696 0 0
	3—Other Rain Crops—Onions	90			360 0 0
XV	Gums and Resins	7			14 0 0
XVI	Hides and Skins—				
	1—Hides of Cattle				
	2—Skins of Sheep, Goats, and small Animals				
XVII	Horns				
XVIII	Lac—				
	1—Dye				
	2—Shell				
	3—Stick, and other kinds				
XIX	Leather—				
	1—Unmanufactured				
	2—Manufactured				
	Carried over	559		8	2,430 0 0

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

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Afghanistan.				Seistan.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	...	...	8	300 0 0
...	...	...	.....	20	...	...	100 0 0	32	...	...	160 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	450	...	...	1,696 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	90	...	...	360 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	7	...	...	14 0 0
...	...	...	.....	20	...	...	100 0 0	579	...	8	2,530 0 0

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

No.	ARTICLES.	Kalat and Chagai.			
		Weight.		No.	Value.
		Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
	Brought forward ...	559	...	8	2,430 0 0
XX	Liquors				
XXI	Mats				
XXII	Metals and manufactures of Metals—				
	1—Brass and Copper				
	2—Iron				
	3—Other Metals				
XXIII	Oils—				
	Petroleum				
XXIV	Opium				
XXV	Paints and Colours				
XXVI	Provisions—				
	1—Ghi	...	...	...	.....
	2—Other kinds				
XXVII	Salt				
XXVIII	Saltpetre, &c.—				
	1—Saltpetre				
	2—Other Saline Substances				
XXIX	Seeds—				
	1—Oil-seed—				
	a.—Linseed				
	b.—Mustard and Rape				
	c.—Til or Gingelly				
	d.—Other Oil-Seeds				
	2—Other Seeds—				
	a.—Indigo				
	b.—Tea-Seed				
	c.—Other kinds				
XXX	Silk—				
	1—Raw				
	2—Manufactured				
XXXI	Spices, other kinds—Jira				
	Betelnuts	5	...	...	50 0 0
XXXII	Stone and Marble				
XXXIII	Sugar—				
	1—Refined				
	2—Unrefined				
XXXIV	Tea—				
	1—Indian				
	2—Foreign				
XXXV	Tobacco—				
	Snuff				
XXXVI	Wood—				
	1—Timber				
	2—Firewood				
XXXVII	Wool—				
	1—Raw				
	2—Manufactured (Piece-goods)	198	...	...	2,770 0 0
	3—Shawls				
XXXVIII	All other articles of Merchandise—				
	1—Unmanufactured				
	2—Manufactured				
	Total ...	762	...	8	5,250 0 0

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Baluchistan during the month of February 1897.

Afghanistan.				Seistan.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
...	...	...	.....	20	...	...	100 0 0	579	...	8	2,530 0 0
...	...	...	.....	53	...	...	1,608 0 0	53	...	...	1,608 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	5	...	...	50 0 0
...	...	...	.....	560	...	...	11,100 0 0	758	...	...	13,870 0 0
...	...	...	.....	633	...	...	12,808 0 0	1,395	...	8	18,058 0 0

Quetta, July 1897.

F. WEBB WARE, Lieut.,
Political Assistant, Chagai.

B 36—7

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مكتبة قطر الوطنية
Qatar National Library

BRITISH LIBRARY

STATEMENT showing the Quantity and Value of each Article exported from

No.	ARTICLES.	QUETTA.			
		Weight.		No.	Value.
		Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
I	Animals living (for sale)—				
	1—Horses, Ponies and Mules				
	2—Cattle				
	3—Sheep and Goats				
	4—Other kinds				
II	Borax				
III	Canes and Ratans				
IV	Caoutchouc				
V	Chinese and Japanese-ware				
VI	Coal and Coke				
VII	Cotton, raw				
VIII	Cotton, manufactured—				
	1—Twist and Yarn (European)				
	2—Ditto ditto (Indian)				
	3—Piece-goods (European)				
	4— Ditto (Indian)	...	...	1	350 0 0
IX	Drugs and Medicines—				
	1—Assafœtida				
	2—Other sorts (not intoxicating)				
	3—Intoxicating Drugs (other than Opium)				
X	Dyeing Materials—				
	1—Indigo				
	2—Madder or Manjit				
	3—Safflower				
	4—Turmeric				
	5—Other kinds				
XI	Earthenware and Porcelain				
XII	Fibrous products—				
	1—Jute, raw				
	2—Jute, manufactured (Gunny Bags and Cloths)				
	3—Other Fibres, raw				
	4— Ditto manufactured				
XIII	Fruits and Nuts—				
	1—Pomegranates				
	2—All other kinds (Dates)				
XIV	Grain and Pulse—				
	1—Mung				
	2—Other Spring Crops				
	3—Other Rain Crops—Onions				
XV	Gums and Resins	...	...	...	...
XVI	Hides and Skins—				
	1—Hides of Cattle				
	2—Skins of Sheep, Goats, and small Animals				
XVII	Horns				
XVIII	Lac—				
	1—Dye				
	2—Shell				
	3—Stick, and other kinds				
XIX	Leather—				
	1—Unmanufactured				
	2—Manufactured				
		...	...	...	...
	Carried over	...	...	1	350 0 0

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مكتبة قطر الوطنية
Qatar National Library



Shikarpur.				Karachi.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
...	...	17	6,779 12 0	...	...	70	1,300 0 0	...	...	88	8,429 12 0
12	...	...	52 0 0	...	...	...	.....	12	...	...	52 0 0
...	...	1½	153 0 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	1½	153 0 0
12	...	18½	6,984 12 0	...	...	70	1,300 0 0	12	...	89½	8,634 12 0

27

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مكتبة قطر الوطنية
Qatar National Library

BRITISH LIBRARY



No.	ARTICLES.	QUETTA.			
		Weight.		No.	Value.
		Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
	Brought forward ...	...	...	1	350 0 0
XX	Liquors				
XXI	Mats				
XXII	Metals and manufactures of Metals—				
	1—Brass and Copper				
	2—Iron				
	3—Other Metals				
XXIII	Oils—				
	Petroleum	16	10	...	220 14 0
XXIV	Opium				
XXV	Paints and Colours				
XXVI	Provisions—				
	1—Ghi				
	2—Other kinds				
XXVII	Salt				
XXVIII	Saltpetre, &c.—				
	1—Saltpetre				
	2—Other Saline Substances				
XXIX	Seeds—				
	1—Oil-seed—				
	a.—Linseed				
	b.—Mustard and Rape				
	c.—Til or Gingelly				
	d.—Other Oil-Seeds				
	2—Other Seeds—				
	a.—Indigo				
	b.—Tea-Seed				
	c.—Other kinds				
XXX	Silk—				
	1—Raw				
	2—Manufactured				
XXXI	Spices, other kinds—Jira				
	Betelnuts				
XXXII	Stone and Marble				
XXXIII	Sugar—				
	1—Refined	3	20	...	40 0 0
	2—Unrefined	12	25	...	71 0 0
XXXIV	Tea—				
	1—Indian				
	2—Foreign				
XXXV	Tobacco—				
	Snuff				
XXXVI	Wood—				
	1—Timber				
	2—Firewood				
XXXVII	Wool—				
	1—Raw				
	2—Manufactured (Piece-goods)				
	3—Shawls				
XXXVIII	All other articles of Merchandise—				
	1—Unmanufactured				
	2—Manufactured				
	Total ...	32	15	1	681 14 0

28

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مكتبة قطر الوطنية
Qatar National Library

BRITISH LIBRARY

Baluchistan during the month of February 1897.

Shikarpur.				Karachi.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
12	...	18½	6,984 12 0	...	...	70	1,300 0 0	12	...	89½	8,634 12 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	16	10	...	220 14 0
...	...	1	85 0 0	...	...	...	.....	...	...	1	85 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	3	20	...	40 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	12	25	...	71 0 0
12	...	19½	7,069 12 0	...	...	70	1,300 0 0	44	15	90½	9,051 10 0

Quetta, July 1897.

F. WEBB WARE, Lieut.,
Political Assistant, Chagai.

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مكتبة قطر الوطنية
Qatar National Library

STATEMENT showing the Quantity and Value of each Article imported into

No.	ARTICLES.	KALAT AND CHAGAI.					
		Weight.		No.	Value.		
		Maunds.	Sers.		Rs.	a.	p.
I	Animals living (for sale)—						
	1—Horses, Ponies and Mules						
	2—Cattle						
	3—Sheep and Goats						
	4—Other kinds						
II	Borax						
III	Canes and Ratans						
IV	Caoutchouc						
V	Chinese and Japanese-ware						
VI	Coal and Coke						
VII	Cotton, raw						
VIII	Cotton, manufactured—						
	1—Twist and Yarn (European)						
	2—Ditto ditto (Indian)						
	3—Piece-goods (European)						
	4— Ditto (Indian)						
IX	Drugs and Medicines—						
	1—Assafœtida						
	2—Other sorts (not intoxicating)						
	3—Intoxicating Drugs (other than Opium)						
X	Dyeing Materials—						
	1—Indigo						
	2—Madder or Manjit						
	3—Safflower						
	4—Turmeric						
	5—Other kinds						
XI	Earthenware and Porcelain						
XII	Fibrous products—						
	1—Jute, raw						
	2—Jute, manufactured (Gunny Bags and Cloths)						
	3—Other Fibres, raw						
	4— Ditto manufactured						
XIII	Fruits and Nuts—						
	1—Cocoanuts						
	2—All other kinds			201		1,220	0 0
XIV	Grain and Pulse—						
	1—Wheat			24		120	0 0
	2—Gram and pulse						
	3—Other Spring Crops						
	4—Rice, Husked						
	5—Rice unhusked						
	6—Other Rain Crops						
XV	Gums and Resins						
XVI	Hides and Skins—						
	1—Hides of Cattle						
	2—Skins of Sheep, Goats, and small Animals						
XVII	Horns						
XVIII	Lac—						
	1—Dye						
	2—Shell						
	3—Stick, and other kinds						
XIX	Leather—						
	1—Unmanufactured						
	2—Manufactured						
	Carried over			225		1,340	0 0

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مكتبة قطر الوطنية
Qatar National Library



Shikarpur.				Seistan.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	201	...	...	1,220 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	24	...	...	120 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	225	...	...	1,340 0 0

31

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مكتبة قطر الوطنية
Qatar National Library

BRITISH LIBRARY



No.	ARTICLES.	Kalat and Chagai.			
		Weight.		No.	Value.
		Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
	Brought forward ...	225	...	...	1,340 0 0
XX	Liquors				
XXI	Mats				
XXII	Metals and manufactures of Metals—				
	1—Brass and Copper				
	2—Iron				
	3—Other Metals				
XXIII	Oils—				
	Petroleum				
XXIV	Opium				
XXV	Paints and Colours				
XXVI	Provisions—				
	1—Ghi	...	...	...	.....
	2—Other kinds				
XXVII	Salt				
XXVIII	Saltpetre, &c.—				
	1—Saltpetre				
	2—Other Saline Substances				
XXIX	Seeds—				
	1—Oil-seed—				
	a.—Linseed				
	b.—Mustard and Rape				
	c.—Til or Gingelly				
	d.—Other Oil-Seeds...				
	2—Other Seeds—				
	a.—Indigo				
	b.—Tea-Seed				
	c.—Other kinds				
XXX	Silk—	...	...	...	...
	1—Raw				
	2—Manufactured				
XXXI	Spices, other kinds—Jira				
XXXII	Betelnuts				
	Stone and Marble				
XXXIII	Sugar—				
	1—Refined				
	2—Unrefined				
XXXIV	Tea—				
	1—Indian				
	2—Foreign				
XXXV	Tobacco—				
	Snuff				
XXXVI	Wood—	14	...	...	84 0 0
	1—Timber				
	2—Firewood				
XXXVII	Wool—				
	1—Raw				
	2—Manufactured (Piece-goods)				
	3—Shawls	345	...	...	9,369 0 0
XXXVIII	All other articles of Merchandise—				
	1—Unmanufactured				
	2—Manufactured				
	Total ...	584	...	...	10,793 0 0

32

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مكتبة قطر الوطنية
Qatar National Library

BRITISH LIBRARY

Baluchistan during the month of March 1897.

Afghanistan.				Seistan.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	225	...	...	1,340 0 0
...	...	...	.....	12	...	...	384 0 0	12	...	...	384 0 0
...	...	...	.....	5	...	...	150 0 0	5	...	...	150 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	14	...	...	84 0 0
...	...	...	.....	180	...	...	3,600 0 0	525	...	...	12,969 0 0
...	...	...	.....	197	...	...	4,134 0 0	781	...	...	14,927 0 0

Quetta, July 1897.

F. WEBB WARE, Lieut.,
Political Assistant, Chagai.

B 36—9

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مكتبة قطر الوطنية
Qatar National Library

STATEMENT showing the Quantity and Value of each Article exported from

No.	ARTICLES.	QUETTA.			
		Weight.		No.	Value.
		Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
I	Animals living (for sale)—				
	1—Horses, Ponies and Mules				
	2—Cattle				
	3—Sheep and Goats				
	4—Other kinds				
II	Borax				
III	Canes and Ratans				
IV	Caoutchouc				
V	Chinese and Japanese-ware				
VI	Coal and Coke				
VII	Cotton, raw				
VIII	Cotton, manufactured—				
	1—Twist and Yarn (European)				
	2—Ditto ditto (Indian)				
	3—Piece-goods (European)				
	4— Ditto (Indian)	...	...	22½ Bundles.	6,100 0 0
IX	Drugs and Medicines—				
	1—Assafœtida				
	2—Other sorts (not intoxicating)				
	3—Intoxicating Drugs (other than Opium)				
X	Dyeing Materials—				
	1—Indigo				
	2—Madder or Manjit				
	3—Safflower				
	4—Turmeric				
	5—Other kinds	...	...	...	.....
XI	Earthenware and Porcelain				
XII	Fibrous products—				
	1—Jute, raw				
	2—Jute, manufactured (Gunny Bags and Cloths)				
	3—Other Fibres, raw				
	4— Ditto manufactured				
XIII	Fruits and Nuts—				
	1—Cocoanuts				
	2—All other kinds				
XIV	Grain and Pulse—				
	1—Wheat				
	2—Gram and pulse				
	3—Other Spring Crops				
	4—Rice, Husked				
	5—Rice unhusked				
	6—Other Rain Crops	11	20	...	64 14 0
XV	Gums and Resins				
XVI	Hides and Skins—				
	1—Hides of Cattle				
	2—Skins of Sheep, Goats, and small Animals				
XVII	Horns				
XVIII	Lac—				
	1—Dye				
	2—Shell				
	3—Stick, and other kinds				
XIX	Leather—				
	1—Unmanufactured				
	2—Manufactured				
	Carried over	...	...	...	...
		11	20	22½	6,164 14 0

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مكتبة قطر الوطنية
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

Shikarpur.				Karachi.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
...	...	39 Bundles.	13,447 2 0	...	...	3 Bundles.	75 0 0	...	...	64½	19,622 2 0
3	...	...	18 0 0	...	...	...	.....	3	...	...	18 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	11	20	...	64 14 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	1	135 0 0	...	...	1	135 0 0
3	...	39	13,465 2 0	...	...	4	210 0 0	14	20	65½	19,840 0 0

35

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مكتبة قطر الوطنية
Qatar National Library

BRITISH LIBRARY

No.	ARTICLES.	Quetta. Weight. Maunds.	Sers.	No.	Value. Rs.	a.	p.
	Brought forward ...	11	20	22½	6,164	14	0
XX	Liquors						
XXI	Mats						
XXII	Metals and manufactures of Metals—						
	1—Brass and Copper						
	2—Iron						
	3—Other Metals						
XXIII	Oils—						
	Bitter	65	...	...	850	14	0
	Kerosine	...	...	4 tins.	24	0	0
XXIV	Opium						
XXV	Paints and Colours						
XXVI	Provisions—						
	1—Ghi						
	2—Other kinds						
XXVII	Salt						
XXVIII	Saltpetre, &c.—						
	1—Saltpetre						
	2—Other Saline Substances						
XXIX	Seeds—						
	1—Oil-seed—						
	a.—Linseed						
	b.—Mustard and Rape						
	c.—Til or Gingelly						
	d.—Other Oil-Seeds						
	2—Other Seeds—						
	a.—Indigo						
	b.—Tea-Seed						
	c.—Other kinds						
XXX	Silk—						
	1—Raw	...	...	...	...		
	2—Manufactured						
XXXI	Spices, other kinds						
	Betelnuts	...	...	...	...		
XXXII	Stone and Marble						
XXXIII	Sugar—						
	1—Refined	30	...	...	341	0	0
	2—Unrefined	40	...	...	244	8	0
XXXIV	Tea—						
	1—Indian						
	2—Foreign						
XXXV	Tobacco—						
	Snuff	9	...	...	58	8	0
XXXVI	Wood—						
	1—Timber						
	2—Firewood						
XXXVII	Wool—						
	1—Raw						
	2—Manufactured (Piece-goods)						
	3—Shawls						
XXXVIII	All other articles of Merchandise—						
	1—Unmanufactured						
	2—Manufactured						
	Total ...	155	20	26½	7,683	12	0

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مكتبة قطر الوطنية
Qatar National Library

BRITISH LIBRARY

Baluchistan during the month of March 1897.

Shikarpur.				Karachi.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
3	...	39	13,465 2 0	...	...	4	210 0 0	14	20	65½	19,840 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	65	...	...	850 14 6
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	...	...	4	24 0 0
...	...	1	200 0 0	...	...	...	.....	...	...	1	200 0 0
...	...	1	20 0 0	...	...	...	.....	...	...	1	20 0 0
4	...	...	48 0 0	...	...	...	.....	34	...	...	389 0 0
23	...	...	126 8 0	27	...	...	93 10 0	90	...	...	464 10 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	9	...	...	58 8 0
30	...	41	13,859 10 0	27	...	4	303 10 0	212	20	71½	21,847 0 0

Quetta, July 1897.

F. WEBB WARE, Lieut.,
Political Assistant, Chagai.

M 36—10

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مكتبة قطر الوطنية
Qatar National Library

BRITISH LIBRARY

STATEMENT showing the Quantity and Value of each Article imported into

No.	ARTICLES.	Kalat and Chagai			
		Weight.		No.	Value.
		Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
I	Animals living (for sale)—				
	1—Horses, Ponies and Mules				
	2—Cattle				
	3—Sheep and Goats				
	4—Other kinds				
II	Borax				
III	Canes and Ratans				
IV	Caoutchouc				
V	Chinese and Japanese-ware				
VI	Coal and Coke				
VII	Cotton, raw				
VIII	Cotton, manufactured—				
	1—Twist and Yarn (European)				
	2—Ditto ditto (Indian)				
	3—Piece-goods (European)				
	4— Ditto (Indian)				
IX	Drugs and Medicines—				
	1—Assafœtida				
	2—Other sorts (not intoxicating)				
	3—Intoxicating Drugs (other than Opium)				
X	Dyeing Materials—				
	1—Indigo				
	2—Madder or Manjit				
	3—Safflower				
	4—Turmeric				
	5—Other kinds				
XI	Earthenware and Porcelain				
XII	Fibrous products—				
	1—Jute, raw				
	2—Jute, manufactured (Gunny Bags and Cloths) ...				
	3—Other Fibres, raw				
	4— Ditto manufactured				
XIII	Fruits and Nuts—				
	1—Cocoanuts				
	2—All other kinds				
XIV	Grain and Pulse—				
	1—Wheat	135	...	...	735 0 0
	2—Gram and Pulse	26	...	...	130 0 0
	3—Other Spring Crops...				
	4—Rice, Husked				
	5—Rice unhusked				
	6—Other Rain Crops				
XV	Gums and Resins				
XVI	Hides and Skins—				
	1—Hides of Cattle				
	2—Skins of Sheep, Goats, and small Animals... ...				
XVII	Horns				
XVIII	Lac—				
	1—Dye				
	2—Shell				
	3—Stick, and other kinds				
XIX	Leather—				
	1—Unmanufactured				
	2—Manufactured				
	Carried over ...	161	...	...	865 0 0

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

Afghanistan.				Seistan.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	135	...	...	735 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	26	...	...	130 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	161	...	...	865 0 0

39

39

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

No.	ARTICLES.	Weight. Maunds.	Weight. Sers.	No.	Value. Rs.	a.	p.
	Brought forward ...	161	...	...	865	0	0
XX	Liquors						
XXI	Mats						
XXII	Metals and manufactures of Metals—						
	1—Brass and Copper						
	2—Iron						
	3—Other Metals						
XXIII	Oils—						
	Bitter						
	Kerosine						
XXIV	Opium						
XXV	Paints and Colours						
XXVI	Provisions—						
	1—Ghi	20	...	...	600	0	0
	2—Other kinds						
XXVII	Salt						
XXVIII	Saltpetre, &c.—						
	1—Saltpetre						
	2—Other Saline Substances						
XXIX	Seeds—						
	1—Oil-seed—						
	a.—Linseed						
	b.—Mustard and Rape						
	c.—Til or Gingelly						
	d.—Other Oil-Seeds						
	2—Other Seeds—						
	a.—Indigo						
	b.—Tea-Seed						
	c.—Other kinds						
XXX	Silk—						
	1—Raw						
	2—Manufactured						
XXXI	Spices, other kinds						
	Betelnuts						
XXXII	Stone and Marble						
XXXIII	Sugar—						
	1—Refined						
	2—Unrefined						
XXXIV	Tea—						
	1—Indian						
	2—Foreign						
XXXV	Tobacco—						
	Snuff						
XXXVI	Wood—	15	...	...	75	0	0
	1—Timber						
	2—Firewood						
XXXVII	Wool—						
	1—Raw						
	2—Manufactured (Piece-goods)	220	...	...	3,600	0	0
	3—Shawls						
XXXVIII	All other articles of Merchandise—						
	1—Unmanufactured						
	2—Manufactured						
	Total ...	416	...	...	5,140	0	0

40

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BRITISH LIBRARY

Baluchistan during the month of April 1897.

Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	161	...	...	865 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	20	...	...	600 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	15	...	...	75 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	220	...	...	2,600 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	416	...	...	5,140 0 0

Quetta, July 1897.

F. WEBB WARE, Lieut.,
Political Assistant, Chagai.

P 36—11

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BRITISH LIBRARY

STATEMENT showing the Quantity and Value of each Article exported from

No.	ARTICLES.	QUETTA.			
		Weight.		No.	Value.
		Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
I	Animals living (for sale)—				
	1—Horses, Ponies and Mules				
	2—Cattle				
	3—Sheep and Goats				
	4—Other kinds				
II	Borax				
III	Canes and Ratans				
IV	Caoutchouc				
V	Chinese and Japanese-ware				
VI	Coal and Coke				
VII	Cotton, raw				
VIII	Cotton, manufactured—				
	1—Twist and Yarn (European)				
	2—Ditto ditto (Indian)				
	3—Piece-goods (European)				
	4— Ditto (Indian)	...	...	1	240 0 0
IX	Drugs and Medicines—				
	1—Assafœtida				
	2—Other sorts (not intoxicating)				
	3—Intoxicating Drugs (other than Opium				
X	Dyeing Materials—				
	1—Indigo				
	2—Madder or Manjit				
	3—Safflower				
	4—Turmeric				
	5—Other kinds				
XI	Earthenware and Porcelain				
XII	Fibrous products—				
	1—Jute, raw				
	2—Jute, manufactured (Gunny Bags and Cloths) ...				
	3—Other Fibres, raw				
	4— Ditto manufactured				
XIII	Fruits and Nuts—				
	1—Cocoanuts				
	2—All other kinds				
XIV	Grain and Pulse—				
	1—Wheat				
	2—Gram and Pulse				
	3—Other Spring Crops...				
	4—Rice, Husked				
	5—Rice unhusked				
	6—Other Rain Crops	...	...	...	.....
XV	Gums and Resins				
XVI	Hides and Skins—				
	1—Hides of Cattle				
	2—Skins of Sheep, Goats, and small Animals... ...				
XVII	Horns				
XVIII	Lac—				
	1—Dye				
	2—Shell				
	3—Stick, and other kinds				
XIX	Leather—				
	1—Unmanufactured				
	2—Manufactured	...	...	9,000	12,000 0 0
	Carried over ...	...	...	9,001	12,240 0 0

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

(45)

Shikarpur.				Karachi.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
...	...	41	12,708 0 0	...	...	...	.....	...	...	42	12,948 0 0
40	...	...	240 10 0	...	...	...	.....	40	...	...	240 10 0
...	...	1	184 0 0	...	...	...	.....	...	...	9,001	12,184 0 0
40	...	42	13,132 10 0	...	...	...	.....	40	...	9,043	25,372 10 0

43

41

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No.	ARTICLES.	Quetta.			
		Weight.		No.	Value.
		Maunds.	Sers.		Rs a. p.
	Brought forward ...	...	...	9,001	12,240 0 0
XX	Liquors				
XXI	Mats				
XXII	Metals and manufactures of Metals—				
	1—Brass and Copper				
	2—Iron				
	3—Other Metals				
XXIII	Oils—	42	20	...	461 8 0
	Bitter				
	Kerosine				
XXIV	Opium				
XXV	Paints and Colours				
XXVI	Provisions—				
	1—Ghi				
	2—Other kinds				
XXVII	Salt				
XXVIII	Saltpetre, &c.—				
	1—Saltpetre				
	2—Other Saline Substances				
XXIX	Seeds—				
	1—Oil-seed—				
	a.—Linseed				
	b.—Mustard and Rape				
	c.—Til or Gingelly				
	d.—Other Oil-Seeds				
	2—Other Seeds—				
	a.—Indigo				
	b.—Tea-Seed				
	c.—Other kinds				
XXX	Silk—				
	1—Raw				
	2—Manufactured				
XXXI	Spices, other kinds				
XXXII	Betelnuts	...	...	...	.....
	Stone and Marble				
XXXIII	Sugar—				
	1—Refined	24	...	...	269 0 0
	2—Unrefined	10	...	...	54 15 0
XXXIV	Tea—				
	1—Indian				
	2—Foreign				
XXXV	Tobacco—				
	Snuff				
XXXVI	Wood—				
	1—Timber				
	2—Firewood				
XXXVII	Wool—				
	1—Raw				
	2—Manufactured (Piece-goods)				
	3—Shawls				
XXXVIII	All other articles of Merchandise—				
	1—Unmanufactured				
	2—Manufactured				
	Total ...	76	20	9,001	13,025 7 0

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Baluchistan during the month of April 1897.

Shikarpur.				Karachi.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
40	...	42	13,132 10 0	...	...	...	.....	40	...	9,043	25,372 10 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	42	20	...	461 8 0
...	...	3	66 13 0	...	...	...	.....	...	...	3	66 13 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	24	...	...	269 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	10	...	...	54 15 0
40	...	45	13,199 7 0	...	...	...	.....	116	20	9,046	26,224 14 0

Quetta, July 1897.

F. WEBB WARE, Lieut.,
Political Assistant, Chagai.

M 36—12

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Qatar National Library

BRITISH LIBRARY

STATEMENT showing the Quantity and Value of each Article imported into

No.	ARTICLES.	From Chagai and Kalat. Weight. Maunds.	Sers.	No.	Value. Rs. a. p.
I	Animals living (for sale)—				
	1—Horses, Ponies and Mules				
	2—Cattle				
	3—Sheep and Goats				
	4—Other kinds				
II	Borax				
III	Canes and Ratans				
IV	Caoutchouc				
V	Chinese and Japanese-ware				
VI	Coal and Coke				
VII	Cotton, raw				
VIII	Cotton, manufactured—				
	1—Twist and Yarn (European)				
	2—Ditto ditto (Indian)				
	3—Piece-goods (European)				
	4— Ditto (Indian)				
IX	Drugs and Medicines—				
	1—Assafœtida				
	2—Other sorts (not intoxicating)				
	3—Intoxicating Drugs (other than Opium				
X	Dyeing Materials—				
	1—Indigo				
	2—Madder or Manjit				
	3—Safflower				
	4—Turmeric				
	5—Other kinds				
XI	Earthenware and Porcelain				
XII	Fibrous products—				
	1—Jute, raw				
	2—Jute, manufactured (Gunny Bags and Cloths) ...				
	3—Other Fibres, raw				
	4— Ditto manufactured				
XIII	Fruits and Nuts—				
	1—Cocoanuts				
	2—All other kinds				
XIV	Grain and Pulse—				
	1—Wheat				
	2—Gram and Pulse	30	...	...	100 0 0
	3—Other Spring Crops...				
	4—Rice, Husked				
	5—Rice unhusked				
	6—Other Rain Crops				
XV	Gums and Resins				
XVI	Hides and Skins—				
	1—Hides of Cattle				
	2—Skins of Sheep, Goats, and small Animals... ...				
XVII	Horns				
XVIII	Lac—				
	1—Dye				
	2—Shell				
	3—Stick, and other kinds				
XIX	Leather—				
	1—Unmanufactured				
	2—Manufactured				
	Carried over ...	30	...	...	100 0 0

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

47

Afghanistan.				Seistan.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	30	...	...	100 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	30	...	...	100 0 0

47

43

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BRITISH LIBRARY

No.	ARTICLES.	From Chagai and Kalat. Weight. Maunds.	Sers.	No.	Value. Rs.	a.	p.
	Brought forward ...	30	...	...	100	0	0
XX	Liquors						
XXI	Mats						
XXII	Metals and manufactures of Metals—						
	1—Brass and Copper						
	2—Iron						
	3—Other Metals						
XXIII	Oils—						
	Bitter						
	Kerozine						
XXIV	Opium						
XXV	Paints and Colours						
XXVI	Provisions—						
	1—Ghi	10	...	...	307	0	0
	2—Other kinds						
XXVII	Salt						
XXVIII	Saltpetre, &c.—						
	1—Saltpetre						
	2—Other Saline Substances						
XXIX	Seeds—						
	1—Oil-seed—						
	a.—Linseed						
	b.—Mustard and Rape						
	c.—Til or Gingelly						
	d.—Other Oil-Seeds						
	2—Other Seeds—						
	a.—Indigo						
	b.—Tea-Seed						
	c.—Other kinds						
XXX	Silk—						
	1—Raw						
	2—Manufactured						
XXXI	Spices, other kinds						
	Betelnuts						
XXXII	Stone and Marble						
XXXIII	Sugar—						
	1—Refined						
	2—Unrefined						
XXXIV	Tea—						
	1—Indian						
	2—Foreign						
XXXV	Tobacco—						
	Snuff						
XXXVI	Wood—						
	1—Timber						
	2—Firewood						
XXXVII	Wool—						
	1—Raw	650	...	...	11,000	0	0
	2—Manufactured (Piece-goods)						
	3—Shawls						
XXXVIII	All other articles of Merchandise—						
	1—Unmanufactured						
	2—Manufactured						
	Total ...	690	...	...	11,407	0	0

48

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BRITISH LIBRARY

Baluchistan during the month of May 1897.

Afghanistan.				Seistan.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	30	...	...	100 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	10	...	...	307 0 0
135	...	...	2,280 0 0	...	...	...	.....	785	...	...	13,280 0 0
135	...	...	2,280 0 0	...	...	...	.....	825	...	...	13,687 0 0

Quetta, July 1897.

F. WEBB WARE, Lieut.,
Political Assistant, Chagai.

x 36—13

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مكتبة قطر الوطنية
Qatar National Library

BRITISH LIBRARY

STATEMENT showing the Quantity and Value of each Article exported from

No.	ARTICLES.	QUETTA.			
		Weight.		No.	Value.
		Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
I	Animals living (for sale)—				
	1—Horses, Ponies and Mules				
	2—Cattle				
	3—Sheep and Goats				
	4—Other kinds				
II	Borax				
III	Canes and Ratans				
IV	Caoutchouc				
V	Chinese and Japanese-ware				
VI	Coal and Coke				
VII	Cotton, raw				
VIII	Cotton, manufactured—				
	1—Twist and Yarn (European)				
	2—Ditto ditto (Indian)				
	3—Piece-goods (European)	...	...	...	.....
	4— Ditto (Indian)				
IX	Drugs and Medicines—				
	1—Assafœtida				
	2—Other sorts (not intoxicating)				
	3—Intoxicating Drugs (other than Opium				
X	Dyeing Materials—				
	1—Indigo				
	2—Madder or Manjit				
	3—Safflower				
	4—Turmeric				
	5—Other kinds				
XI	Earthenware and Porcelain				
XII	Fibrous products—				
	1—Jute, raw				
	2—Jute, manufactured (Gunny Bags and Cloths) ...				
	3—Other Fibres, raw				
	4— Ditto manufactured				
XIII	Fruits and Nuts—				
	1—Cocoanuts				
	2—All other kinds				
XIV	Grain and Pulse—				
	1—Wheat				
	2—Gram and Pulse				
	3—Other Spring Crops...				
	4—Rice, Husked				
	5—Rice unhusked	20	...	...	109 13 0
	6—Other Rain Crops				
XV	Gums and Resins				
XVI	Hides and Skins—				
	1—Hides of Cattle				
	2—Skins of Sheep, Goats, and small Animals... ...				
XVII	Horns				
XVIII	Lac—				
	1—Dye				
	2—Shell				
	3—Stick, and other kinds				
XIX	Leather—				
	1—Unmanufactured				
	2—Manufactured				
	Carried over ...	20	...	...	109 13 0

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

Shikarpur.						Karachi.						Total.					
Weight.		No.	Value.			Weight.		No.	Value.			Weight.		No.	Value.		
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs.	a.	p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs.	a.	p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs.	a.	p.
222	20	...	13,686	9	0	...	...	...	.....			222	20	...	13,686	9	0
15	...	...	67	6	0	...	...	...	.....			35	...	...	177	3	0
237	20	...	13,753	15	0	...	...	...	.....			257	20	...	13,863	12	0

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مكتبة قطر الوطنية
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

No.	ARTICLES.	QUETTA.			
		Weight.		No.	Value.
		Maunds.	Sers.		Rs a. p.
	Brought forward ...	20	...	...	109 13 0
XX	Liquors				
XXI	Mats				
XXII	Metals and manufactures of Metals—				
	1—Brass and Copper				
	2—Iron				
	3—Other Metals				
XXIII	Oils—	33	20	...	436 1 0
	Bitter				
	Kerosine				
XXIV	Opium				
XXV	Paints and Colours				
XXVI	Provisions—				
	1—Ghi				
	2—Other kinds				
XXVII	Salt	4	...	...	24 0 0
XXVIII	Saltpetre, &c.—				
	1—Saltpetre				
	2—Other Saline Substances				
XXIX	Seeds—				
	1—Oil-seed—				
	a.—Linseed				
	b.—Mustard and Rape				
	c.—Til or Gingelly				
	d.—Other Oil-Seeds				
	2—Other Seeds—				
	a.—Indigo				
	b.—Tea-Seed				
	c.—Other kinds				
XXX	Silk—				
	1—Raw				
	2—Manufactured				
XXXI	Spices, other kinds				
	Betelnuts				
XXXII	Stone and Marble				
XXXIII	Sugar—				
	1—Refined				
	2—Unrefined	47	20	...	576 10 0
XXXIV	Tea—	23	20	...	141 0 0
	1—Indian				
	2—Foreign				
XXXV	Tobacco—				
	Snuff				
XXXVI	Wood—				
	1—Timber				
	2—Firewood				
XXXVII	Wool—				
	1—Raw				
	2—Manufactured (Piece-goods)				
	3—Shawls				
XXXVIII	All other articles of Merchandise—				
	1—Unmanufactured				
	2—Manufactured				
	Total ...	128	20	...	1,287 8 0

52

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

(50)

53

Baluchistan during the month of May 1897.

Shikarpur.				Karachi.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
237	20	...	13,753 15 0	...	...	...	.....	257	20	...	13,863 12 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	33	20	...	436 1 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	4	...	...	24 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	47	20	...	576 10 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	23	20	...	141 0 0
237	20	...	13,753 15 0	...	...	...	.....	366	...	...	15,041 7 0

Quetta, July 1897.

F. WEBB WARE, Lieut.,
Political Assistant, Chagai.

W 36—14

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STATEMENT showing the Quantity and Value of each Article imported into

No.	ARTICLES.	From Chagai and Kalat. Weight. Maunds.	Sers.	No.	Value. Rs. a. p.
I	Animals living (for sale)—				
	1—Horses, Ponies and Mules				
	2—Cattle				
	3—Sheep and Goats	...	...	1,200	4,400 0 0
	4—Other kinds				
II	Borax				
III	Canes and Ratans				
IV	Caoutchouc				
V	Chinese and Japanese-ware				
VI	Coal and Coke				
VII	Cotton, raw				
VIII	Cotton, manufactured—				
	1—Twist and Yarn (European)				
	2—Ditto ditto (Indian)				
	3—Piece-goods (European)				
	4— Ditto (Indian)				
IX	Drugs and Medicines—				
	1—Assafœtida				
	2—Other sorts (not intoxicating)				
	3—Intoxicating Drugs (other than Opium				
X	Dyeing Materials—				
	1—Indigo				
	2—Madder or Manjit				
	3—Safflower				
	4—Turmeric				
	5—Other kinds	70	...	...	315 0 0
XI	Earthenware and Porcelain				
XII	Fibrous products—				
	1—Jute, raw				
	2—Jute, manufactured (Gunny Bags and Cloths) ...				
	3—Other Fibres, raw				
	4— Ditto manufactured				
XIII	Fruits and Nuts—				
	1—Cocoanuts				
	2—All other kinds				
XIV	Grain and Pulse—				
	1—Wheat				
	2—Gram and Pulse				
	3—Other Spring Crops...				
	4—Rice, husked				
	5—Rice, unhusked				
	6—Other Rain Crops				
XV	Gums and Resins				
XVI	Hides and Skins—				
	1—Hides of Cattle				
	2—Skins of Sheep, Goats, and small Animals... ...				
XVII	Horns				
XVIII	Lac—				
	1—Dye				
	2—Shell				
	3—Stick, and other kinds				
XIX	Leather—				
	1—Unmanufactured				
	2—Manufactured				
	Carried over ...	70	...	1,200	4,715 0 0

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

(51)

Afghanistan.				Seistan.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,200	4,400 0 0
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	70	...	...	315 0 0
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	.....	70	...	1,200	4,715 0 0

55

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No.	ARTICLES.	From Chagai and Kalat. Weight. Maunds.	Sers.	No.	Value. Rs	a.	p.
	Brought forward ...	70	...	1,200	4,715	0	0
XX	Liquors						
XXI	Mats						
XXII	Metals and manufactures of Metals—						
	1—Brass and Copper						
	2—Iron						
	3—Other Metals						
XXIII	Oils—						
	Bitter						
	Kerosine						
XXIV	Opium						
XXV	Paints and Colours						
XXVI	Provisions—						
	1—Ghi	10	20	...	216	0	0
	2—Other kinds						
XXVII	Salt						
XXVIII	Saltpetre, &c.—						
	1—Saltpetre						
	2—Other Saline Substances						
XXIX	Seeds—						
	1—Oil-seed—						
	a.—Linseed						
	b.—Mustard and Rape						
	c.—Til or Gingelly						
	d.—Other Oil-Seeds						
	2—Other Seeds—						
	a.—Indigo						
	b.—Tea-Seed						
	c.—Other kinds						
XXX	Silk—						
	1—Raw						
	2—Manufactured						
XXXI	Spices, other kinds						
	Betelnuts						
XXXII	Stone and Marble						
XXXIII	Sugar—						
	1—Refined						
	2—Unrefined						
XXXIV	Tea—						
	1—Indian						
	2—Foreign						
XXXV	Tobacco—						
	Snuff	77	...	...	385	0	0
XXXVI	Wood—						
	1—Timber						
	2—Firewood						
XXXVII	Wool—						
	1—Raw						
	2—Manufactured (Piece-goods)	20	...	...	320	0	0
	3—Shawls						
XXXVIII	All other articles of Merchandise—						
	1—Unmanufactured						
	2—Manufactured						
	Total ...	177	20	1,200	5,636	0	0

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Baluchistan during the month of June 1897.

Afghanistan.				Seistan.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	70	...	1,200	4,715 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	10	20	...	216 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	77	...	...	385 0 0
840	...	...	14,466 0 0	...	...	...	.....	860	...	...	14,786 0 0
840	...	...	14,466 0 0	...	...	...	.....	1,017	20	1,200	20,102 0 0

Quetta, July 1897.

F. WEBB WARE, Lieut.,
Political Assistant, Chagai.

B 36—15

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STATEMENT showing the Quantity and Value of each Article exported from

No.	ARTICLES.	QUETTA.			
		Weight.		No.	Value.
		Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
I	Animals living (for sale)—				
	1—Horses, Ponies and Mules				
	2—Cattle				
	3—Sheep and Goats				
	4—Other kinds				
II	Borax				
III	Canes and Ratans				
IV	Caoutchouc				
V	Chinese and Japanese-ware				
VI	Coal and Coke				
VII	Cotton, raw				
VIII	Cotton, manufactured—				
	1—Twist and Yarn (European)				
	2—Ditto ditto (Indian)				
	3—Piece-goods (European)				
	4— Ditto (Indian)				
IX	Drugs and Medicines—				
	1—Assafœtida				
	2—Other sorts (not intoxicating)				
	3—Intoxicating Drugs (other than Opium				
X	Dyeing Materials—				
	1—Indigo				
	2—Madder or Manjit				
	3—Safflower				
	4—Turmeric				
	5—Other kinds				
XI	Earthenware and Porcelain				
XII	Fibrous products—				
	1—Jute, raw				
	2—Jute, manufactured (Gunny Bags and Cloths)				
	3—Other Fibres, raw				
	4— Ditto manufactured				
XIII	Fruits and Nuts—				
	1—Cocoanuts				
	2—All other kinds				
XIV	Grain and Pulse—				
	1—Wheat				
	2—Gram and Pulse				
	3—Other Spring Crops				
	4—Rice, husked				
	5—Rice, unhusked				
	6—Other Rain Crops				
XV	Gums and Resins				
XVI	Hides and Skins—				
	1—Hides of Cattle				
	2—Skins of Sheep, Goats, and small Animals				
XVII	Horns				
XVIII	Lac—				
	1—Dye				
	2—Shell				
	3—Stick, and other kinds				
XIX	Leather—				
	1—Unmanufactured				
	2—Manufactured				
	Carried over				

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

Shikarpur.				Karachi.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
143	...	...	8,304 0 0	17	...	...	855 0 0	160	...	...	9,159 0 0
143	...	...	8,304 0 0	17	...	...	855 0 0	160	...	...	9,159 0 0

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

No.	ARTICLES.	Quetta. Weight. Maunds.	Sers.	No.	Value. Rs.	a.	p.
	Brought forward ...	...	...	...	.....		
XX	Liquors						
XXI	Mats						
XXII	Metals and manufactures of Metals—						
	1—Brass and Copper						
	2—Iron						
	3—Other Metals						
XXIII	Oils—	7	...	...	87	0	0
	Bitter						
	Kerosine						
XXIV	Opium						
XXV	Paints and Colours						
XXVI	Provisions—						
	1—Ghi						
	2—Other kinds						
XXVII	Salt						
XXVIII	Saltpetre, &c.—						
	1—Saltpetre						
	2—Other Saline Substances						
XXIX	Seeds—						
	1—Oil-seed—						
	a.—Linseed						
	b.—Mustard and Rape						
	c.—Til or Gingelly						
	d.—Other Oil-Seeds						
	2—Other Seeds—						
	a.—Indigo						
	b.—Tea-Seed						
	c.—Other kinds						
XXX	Silk—						
	1—Raw						
	2—Manufactured						
XXXI	Spices, other kinds						
	Betelnuts						
XXXII	Stone and Marble						
XXXIII	Sugar—						
	1—Refined	9	20	...	99	0	0
	2—Unrefined	55	20	...	640	0	0
XXXIV	Tea—						
	1—Indian						
	2—Foreign						
XXXV	Tobacco—						
	Snuff						
XXXVI	Wood—						
	1—Timber						
	2—Firewood						
XXXVII	Wool—						
	1—Raw						
	2—Manufactured (Piece-goods)						
	3—Shawls						
XXXVIII	All other articles of Merchandise—						
	1—Unmanufactured						
	2—Manufactured						
	Total ...	20	...	...	118	0	0
		92	...	...	944	0	0

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Baluchistan during the month of June 1897.

Shikarpur.				Karachi.				Total.			
Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.	Weight.		No.	Value.
Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.	Maunds.	Sers.		Rs. a. p.
143	...	...	8,304 0 0	17	...	...	855 0 0	160	...	...	9,159 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	7	...	...	87 0 0
15	...	...	206 0 0	...	...	...	.....	24	20	...	305 0 0
...	...	...	.....	...	...	...	.....	55	20	...	610 0 0
5	...	...	52 0 0	...	...	...	.....	25	...	...	170 0 0
163	...	...	8,562 0 0	17	...	...	855 0 0	272	...	...	10,361 0 0

Quetta, July 1897.

F. WEBB WARE, Lieut.,
Political Assistant, Chagai.

B 36—16

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

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

(55)

Enclosure No. 12.

Telegram No. 620, dated the 10th December 1897.

From—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, Quetta,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

620. Please see paragraph 6 of my No. 7661, dated 25th November, forwarding Lieutenant Webb-Ware's report on Seistan trade route. May I keep up the postal sowars costing Rs. 430, a month, sanctioned for maintaining communication with Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh, pending orders on the recommendations made in the paragraph 6 referred to? These men have not yet been dismissed, as Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh returned unexpectedly, and there was a probability of his being replaced. Their dismissal now will, as explained, dangerously weaken the posts in the desert, and I think the sowars should be maintained permanently both on this ground and also to keep up regular communication with Mr. Webb-Ware when he is on tour and with the Robat Thana at Koh-i-Malik Siah at all times, even if no one is sent to Seistan; if Abbas Ali is sent to Seistan, it will also be necessary to maintain communication with him. Lieutenant Webb-Ware's control will be much weakened if these men are withdrawn, and any repetition of raids on caravans will have a serious effect on trade which bids fair to increase considerably. My report shows that Mr. Webb-Ware asks for extra levies even in addition to the postal sowars, and I think retention of the latter is the minimum with which we can successfully manage the control of the long desert route. I should be glad of early orders.

Enclosure No. 13.

Telegram No. 5390-F., dated the 28th December 1897.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,

To—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, Quetta.

No. 5390-F. Your telegram 620, December 10th. You are authorized provisionally to continue establishment of postal sowars on Nushki-Seistan route, at cost of Rs. 430 a month, pending issue of orders on Webb-Ware's report.

Enclosure No. 14.

No. 915-F., dated Fort William, the 18th February 1898 (Confidential).

From—Sir W. J. Cuningham, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.

I am directed to reply to Mr. Barnes's letter cited in the margin regarding the Nushki-Seistan trade route. In the first of these, Mr. Barnes suggested the appointment of a Native Assistant in Seistan on a salary of 200 rupees a month, and that Lieutenant Webb-Ware should have a Native Assistant to help him to manage the road and the Chageh district. In the second, Mr. Barnes forwarded, with further proposals, a report by Lieutenant Webb-Ware on the results obtained by the measures sanctioned in 1896 for the political control and protection of the country through which the trade route runs.

No. 1437, dated the 29th July 1897.
No. 7661, dated the 25th November 1897.

2. The Government of India deferred consideration of the proposals in the letter of the 29th July last, pending receipt of Lieutenant Webb-Ware's report on his last winter tour. This unfortunately was delayed in printing, and only reached the Foreign Department in December. I am now to convey orders on both the letters under notice.

3. Lieutenant Webb-Ware's report has been read with interest, and the Government of India agree with Mr. Barnes that he carried out the work entrusted to him with zeal, tact, and ability.

4. The report shows that the Nushki district is in an unsatisfactory condition, that the revenue has been steadily falling off, and that the Khan of

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Kalat takes scant interest in the tract. Mr. Barnes has deferred specific recommendations in regard to Nushki, until the Assistant Political Agent has spent another cold season in the district. He is inclined to think that the most satisfactory arrangement would be to induce the Khan to assign the district to the British Government on an annual quit-rent; but the Khan is reluctant to entertain the idea. For the present, the Khan has agreed to instruct his Naib to assist Mr. Webb-Ware in every way possible, and to send a few of his irregular soldiers to Nushki to support the Naib's authority. Mr. Barnes proposed to wait and see how these arrangements worked during the present cold weather. When fuller information has been gained, it may, perhaps, be possible to come to a satisfactory understanding with the Khan.

5. Mr. Webb-Ware was only able to devote a limited amount of attention to the revenue possibilities in Chageh and the Western Sinjerani country. Mr. Barnes says it is too soon yet to judge whether there is much prospect of an increase of population or cultivation, or whether it is worth while to attempt to levy a light revenue. Mr. Webb-Ware is visiting Chageh and its neighbourhood this winter, and will try and frame an estimate of what it might be possible to collect. Pending the result of these enquiries, Mr. Barnes suggests that orders should be deferred. The Government of India agree that this question should be held over until more information has been obtained as to whether there is a reasonable probability that the revenue forthcoming would cover the cost of collection. A further report will be awaited, and meanwhile the proposal to appoint a Native Assistant to the Political Officer must also be held in abeyance. Should it be hereafter necessary to revive the proposal to appoint a Native Assistant, I am to suggest that it might be feasible to provide funds for the appointment and for any small establishment necessary for the Assistant from the existing allotments* for establishments and contingencies. It is not understood why it was proposed that the Native Assistant should have more than one munshi, or why he should require any peons, when levies would probably be available for such duties as peons ordinarily fulfil.

* Rs. 2,000.
" 1,600.

6. Mr. Barnes has furnished a statement showing how the annual grant of 19,200 rupees for levy service is distributed, and he is of opinion that this amount must be increased if the safety of the road is to be assured. It is pointed out that the distances between the present thanas are great, that the risk of raids from Damanis and other Perso-Baluch tribes makes it necessary to strengthen the posts between Amir Chah and Koh-i-Malik Siah, and that posts, on the existing scale, are not strong enough to enable regular postal communication to be kept up between Koh-i-Malik Siah and Nushki. My telegram No. 5390-F., dated the 28th December 1897, authorized the provisional retention of the postal sowars, whose entertainment was temporarily sanctioned at a cost of 430 rupees a month, to keep up communication with Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh during his deputation to Seistan. I am now to convey sanction to the retention of this establishment during 1898-99. I am further to sanction the entertainment during the same period of additional levies at a cost of 310 rupees a month, as recommended by Mr. Barnes. A copy of a letter † from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, regarding the attitude of the Persian Government in the matter of the Damani raiders who disturb the trade route, is enclosed for your information.

No. 44, dated the 4th September 1897.

7. Mr. Barnes asks for an annual grant of 3,500 rupees for tour expenses, and 1,500 rupees for petty public works, such as the building of posts, the digging of wells, etc. These grants are sanctioned; but I am to suggest that expenditure against them, as well as against the grant for additional levies, should, as far as possible, be postponed until Lieutenant Webb-Ware's report on the experiences of the present season has been considered by the Government of India.

8. The total extra expenditure now sanctioned amounts to 13,880 rupees, and provision has been made in the budget of the Baluchistan Agency accordingly. The Governor-General in Council is unable to accept Mr. Barnes's request that the expenditure should be met by an assignment from Imperial Revenues. An examination of the Baluchistan estimates shows that the Special Revenues are well able to bear the charge.

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9. The proposal to appoint a Native Agent in Seistan must be deferred for the present. Khan Bahadur Maula Bakhsh, Native Attaché of the Meshed Agency, will be shortly travelling to Quetta by the Seistan route, and Hospital Assistant Abbas Ali, who accompanied Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh to Seistan, has temporarily returned there, the intention being that he should meet Khan Bahadur Maula Bakhsh, and come back with him to India. This should suffice at present to show the interest which the British Government takes in the route. The Governor-General in Council has been given to understand that the removal of the obstruction to trade caused by the action of the Afghan officials would be enough to open up the road and make it a success, and he would prefer to let the present arrangements be fairly tested before dealing with the proposal to permanently appoint a Native Agent in Seistan.

10. Orders will be issued later on the proposal that a survey officer and an officer of the Geological Survey Department should accompany Mr. Webb-Ware on his tour next winter to the Persian frontier.

Exd.—P. M. M.

Government of India Central Printing Office—No. 989 F. D.—29-3-98—14.

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

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

India Office,
London, 26th February 1897.

Secret,
No. 7.

To His Excellency The Right Honourable The Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord,

Protection of the caravan route between Nushki and the Persian border.

In your Excellency's Letter in the Foreign Department, No. 14, Secret, dated the 27th January 1897, you report the arrangements that have been made for the political control and protection of the desert tract between Nushki and the Persian border.

2. I learn that the Khan of Kalat has agreed to relinquish his claim to any share in the tolls hitherto collected at Nushki and that the Zagar Mingal Sardar has agreed to discontinue the tolls entirely, in consideration of a payment of Rs. 7,000 a year, out of which Rs. 3,400 will be an allowance for himself, while the balance will defray the cost of a Mingal levy post at Nushki.

3. The whole of the road from Quetta to Koh-i-Malik Siah will be under the control of the British Government, and free of tolls.

4. These arrangements, which should tend to the development of trade between Baluchistan and Persia, have my approval. I shall await with interest the further information promised in the last paragraph of your Letter, and shall be glad to learn what steps you take towards making a road from Quetta to Nushki.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant,
(Signed) George Hamilton.

S. 9.

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

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

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

1897.

FORT WILLIAM.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

Frontier.

No. 14, DATED THE 27TH JANUARY 1897.

COPY.

Letter to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Nushki-Chageh trade route.

Foreign Office Press—No. 55—23-1-97—26.

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

1897.

FORT WILLIAM.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

Frontier.

Enclosure of a letter to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 14, dated the 27th January 1897.

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

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No. 9086, dated Quetta, the 15th December 1896.

From—H. S. Barnes, Esq., Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 2961 F., dated the 30th October 1896, on the subject of the arrangements to be made for the political control and protection of the kafila route from Nushki to Koh-i-Malik Siah.

2. Mr. Webb Ware, the officer appointed for the control of the road, assumed charge of his duties as directed on the 15th November, and I have lost no time in discussing with him the details of the arrangements to be made. Although the sum allotted by the Government of India for the entertainment of the necessary establishments, *viz.*, Rs. 28,200 (per annum) is small, I find, for so long a line of road as that from the Nushki frontier to the Persian border, it will, I think, be sufficient at any rate for the present and as a beginning. It is, however, only sufficient for the pay and contingent expenses of the establishments to be entertained, and I have been compelled in my telegram

No. 447, dated the 24th November 1896.

marked in the margin to ask for a further grant of Rs. 6,500 to cover the initial expenditure required for starting the scheme. This request was sanctioned in your telegram No. 134 of the 2nd instant, and Mr. Webb Ware is now engaged in purchasing the necessary riding camels and equipment. I hope that he will start for Nushki before the end of this month.

3. In paragraph 2 of the letter under reply, it is stated that a special grant, at the rate of Rs. 28,200 a year, or Rs. 2,350 a month, will be sanctioned for the unexpired portion of the year, *i.e.*, from the 15th November to the 31st March. Of the monthly grant, a sum of about Rs. 2,250 will ultimately be absorbed in the pay of establishments, whose pay for March will be drawn after the 1st April, and about Rs. 100 a month will be for contingent expenditure. I therefore calculate that the grant at my disposal for the remainder of the year is Rs. 8,325*. Under the authority given in your letter, I am sanctioning Lieutenant Webb Ware's office establishment, and also a small force of 3 or 4 native officers and 25 sowars who will be enlisted in Quetta and who, with 10 sepoys from one of the native regiments in Quetta, will form Lieutenant Webb Ware's escort across the desert. Lieutenant Webb Ware will be advanced the whole of the grant available up to the end of the year, out of which he will pay his sanctioned establishment monthly and also his contingent and tour expenses. He will also be instructed to entertain, as he goes along within the limits of the grant allotted, the remainder of the levies required for the posts which he will establish at different places on the route. It is not possible to say at present what these posts will consist of, and the details cannot therefore be sanctioned in advance. It is probable that in many places it will be sufficient to entertain local footmen only, with a couple of camel sowars at each post for the purpose of communication from one post to another. At Koh-i-Malik Siah Mr. Webb Ware will leave a Munshi with a few sowars. Munshis will also be placed at one or two other places *en route*, and as he returns Mr. Webb Ware will probably leave a few sowars from his personal escort at each of the principal stations. When all the posts are established, complete lists will be sent to me, and provided the monthly grant is not exceeded, a formal proposition statement of all the establishment will be drawn up and sanctioned, and a copy sent to the Government of India for information. This appears to me to be the only satisfactory way in which, under the special circumstances of the case, the necessary arrangements can be made at such a distance from the nearest treasury. All Mr. Webb Ware's bills both for establishment and contingencies will come through my office for examination and countersignature, and he will not be permitted to exceed the sanctioned grant. Owing to the nature of the country and the scantiness of the establishment available, the levy posts will necessarily be very far apart, but I think that with good management they should prove sufficient for the purpose for which they are entertained.

		Rs.
* Rs. 2,250 × 3½ =	...	... 7,875
„ 100 × 4½ =	...	... 450
Total		... 8,325

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4. The grant for initial expenditure will be mostly spent before Mr. Webb Ware starts. Any balance will be advanced to him for the construction of levy huts or shelters *en route* and the purchase of supplies at Nushki, and the advance will be adjusted by detailed bills sent through my office and countersigned by me. Considerable preparations and much forethought and care are necessary in arranging for the march of even so small a party as 40 men across the 400 miles, which intervene between Nushki and the Persian border. The country is mostly desert and uninhabited; no supplies of any kind are obtainable at present *en route*, and the marches between the wells are very long. The grant will be spent with the utmost economy, but I think the whole of it will be required.

5. I now come to the recommendations which, as invited in paragraph 4 of your letter, I have to make for the protection of the caravan road through the Khan's district of Nushki, and for the regulation of the dues hitherto collected at Nushki by the Khan and the Zagar Mingal Sardar. An accurate description of the Nushki district, of the extent of the Khan's control over it, of the amount of the dues collected, and their injurious effect on the Nushki trade is given in paragraph 13 of Captain McMahon's report of the 21st June 1896. I have nothing to add to Captain McMahon's remarks, except that the amount of the dues collected varies very considerably from year to year, and that so far as I can ascertain the total sum collected both by the Khan and the Mingals, including a special tax over and above the dues of four annas per loaded camel, which has always been collected by the Mingal Sardar, has probably amounted to from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 12,000 a year. Shortly after my arrival here the Khan of Kalat came to see me in Quetta, and I took advantage of the opportunity to send also for the Zagar Mingal Sardar, Muhammad Ali Khan, so that, if possible, a satisfactory arrangement regarding these dues might be made without further loss of time.

6. I enclose, for the information of the Government (Appendix A), a copy of Sir Robert Sandeman's letter to the Political Agent, Kalat, No. 1350, dated the 31st March 1890, to which reference is made by Captain McMahon in paragraph 13 of his Memorandum, and in which it is distinctly laid down that the Khan of Kalat has no right to any shares in the Nushki dues. In Appendix B will be found the original scale of rates, according to which Sir Robert Sandeman after careful enquiry considered the dues should be collected. I explained to the Khan the wishes of the Government of India in connection with the opening up of the caravan route to the Persian border, and expressed a hope that he would assist in carrying out the object which the Government had in view. I also pointed out that Sir Robert Sandeman had refused to permit the late Khan to collect any dues at Nushki, that I could not concede to him larger powers in this respect than were enjoyed by his father, and that therefore I could not, without the permission of Government, allow him to collect any dues on his own account at Nushki. I further explained that, as Nushki was Kalat territory, it was the Khan's duty to assist in the protection of the road, to see that the district was properly administered, and to so arrange that the Zagar Mingal Sardar should not be able to collect dues in excess of the rates ascertained by Sir Robert Sandeman. After some conversation the Khan expressed his readiness, under the circumstances explained, to relinquish all claim on his own part to any share in the Nushki customs duties; but he pointed out, with some force, that, as he received practically no revenue from Nushki, except what he had obtained from these dues, he could not be fairly asked to establish any levy posts for the protection of the road through the Nushki district, nor could he afford to do so. He added, however, that he had no objection to give me full authority to make any arrangements I thought proper with the Mingal Sardar, both for the protection of the road and the regulation of the dues and for the maintenance of order in the district. Subsequently the Khan wrote me the letter, dated 20th November, of which a copy and a translation (Appendix C) are attached. It will be seen from this paper that the Khan waives all claim to any share in the Nushki dues, and authorises the British Government to make any arrangements it thinks suitable direct with the Mingal Sardar.

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

This, it seems to me, is a very satisfactory arrangement, and it is, I think, the most we can expect the Khan to do in the matter. His authority over the Mingals and Rakhshanis of Nushki is very slight. These tribes owe him allegiance but very little else. He has no means of enforcing his control in such an out-of-the-way corner of his territory. He would certainly not have voluntarily agreed to spend money in maintaining posts on the road in addition to giving up his dues, and even if he had, the posts would undoubtedly have been very inefficient and a source probably of more trouble than profit to the officer in charge of the road. Moreover, there would have been a divided authority on the road which would certainly have been inconvenient. It appears to me in every way better that the Khan's direct authority along the road and in the tribal country immediately adjoining it should be excluded altogether, and that we should have his permission to make our own arrangements direct with the local chiefs. This permission, subject to the approval of Government, it will be seen, the Khan has willingly agreed to give.

7. Subsequently I had an interview with the Mingal Sardar and called on him also to give assistance in the matter of the road. I pointed out that he could not be permitted to levy dues at rates higher than those authorised by Sir Robert Sandeman, and that in order to prevent complaints and exactions, it was better that the dues should be collected by the Government and the proceeds paid to him. In the end, after much discussion, the Sardar agreed to this proposal. He also agreed that only half the net proceeds of our collection should be paid to him, and that the other half (the so-called Khan's share) might be used by Government in maintaining posts on the road. Finally, in the event of Government proposing to buy up the dues altogether, he agreed to relinquish his claims entirely for the payment of Rs. 7,000 a year, out of which Rs. 3,400 would be paid as an allowance to himself and Rs. 3,600 in the maintenance of a Mingal levy post at Nushki of the strength* shown in the margin. The Sardar's agreement is contained in his letter to me of the 27th November, of which a copy and translation are attached (Appendix D).

	Rs.
* 1 Jemadar	... 50
2 Duffadars, Rs. 35 each	... 70
9 Sowars, Rs. 20 each ...	... 180
Total	... 300 p. m.

8. In accordance with this agreement, and pending the orders of Government on this report, I am instructing Lieutenant Webb Ware to appoint a Munshi at Nushki with a few sowars for the collection of dues in accordance with the rates fixed by Sir Robert Sandeman, and to keep for the present an account of the proceeds received. This will at any rate prevent the irregular and excessive exactions by which the Khan's contractor and the Mingal Sardar have been in the habit of worrying the traders, and will enable some method to be introduced into the system of collection. At the same time it must be confessed that it will not be easy to supervise even a Government Munshi at a place like Nushki, and to ensure that we receive all he collects, for Mr. Webb Ware himself will be away in the desert all through the cold weather. I would therefore strongly recommend that, in accordance with the policy adopted elsewhere, the Government of India should adopt the alternative agreed to by the Mingal Sardar, and buy up the Nushki dues once for all for the very moderate sum of Rs. 7,000 a year. The knowledge that all dues have been done away with will be a great incentive to the traders to make use of this route, and to bring grain into Quetta from Seistan, and will do more than anything else to make the route a popular one. The amount too, Rs. 7,000, is, I think, most moderate, and much less than I expected we should have to pay when I commenced these negotiations. Captain McMahon considered that in 1895 the dues realised amounted, including the Khan's share, to Rs. 15,000. This no doubt was an outside estimate, and the amount collected must necessarily have been subject to great fluctuations. But including his Sardari tax (over and above the dues) of 4 annas a camel load, the Mingal Sardar must often have received as much as Rs. 7,000 in a year. We cannot abolish the taxes without compensation, and it may be more difficult to buy them up later on if in the meantime the trade and the income from the

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tolls increase. The sum of Rs. 7,000 was only arrived at after prolonged argument and discussion, and it is I think the minimum at which the Government will be able to purchase them with the consent of the Mingal Chief. The arrangement with the Mingal Sardar has this further advantage that he has agreed to a portion of the compensation being distributed in levy service to his tribesmen with the help of which Mr. Webb Ware should be able to make arrangements for the protection of the road within the Nushki district by establishing three small posts from Nushki itself up to the border of Dalbandin. If Government should be willing to accept this arrangement, I would suggest that it should be brought into force from the 1st January, so that the tolls may be at once abolished, and the levies engaged and placed in position by Mr. Webb Ware during his winter tour. The result will be that the whole of the road from Quetta to Koh-i-Malik Siah will be under the control of the British Government and free of tolls, and with the aid of the levies maintained out of the compensation, and with the Zagar Mingal Chief in receipt of a fixed allowance, it should be easy for the officer in charge to maintain order in the Nushki district, and to put an end to the scandals described in paragraph 4 of Captain McMahon's Memorandum.

Appendix A.

No. 1350, dated the 31st March 1890.

From—The First Assistant to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,

To—The Political Agent, Kalat.

With reference to the correspondence ending with your letter No. 183, dated the 28th January 1890, on the subject of the transit dues levied at Nushki, I am directed to state that the Agent to the Governor-General agrees with Major Gaisford and yourself as to the objections to the continuance of the enhanced rate at which the tax has of late years been levied His Highness the Khan of Kalat has no right whatever to any share in these transit dues, and I am, therefore, to request that you will take steps to have the rates lowered to the original scale, both on goods proceeding to, and on those exported from, Quetta.

The dues on those articles which before the enhancement of the rates were duty free should likewise be abolished.

Appendix B.

Old rates taken from Nushki Banniahs' books, and approved by Sir R. Sandeman.

Articles.	Rates per camel load.
	Rs. a. p.
Wool	1 4 0
Ghee	4½ seers per load of 5 maunds.
Dates	0 4 0
Wheat	free.
Tobacco	1 0 0
Cloth	free.
Masalas	1 0 0
All goods coming from Quetta	1 0 0
Dhal, Mung	1 0 0
Pomegranates	1 0 0
Sheep and goats	free.
Madder	1 0 0
Rice	1 0 0

Note.—In addition to the above, the Zagar Mingal Sardar takes four annas per camel load as a Sardari tax.

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Appendix C.

Translation of a letter from His Highness the Khan of Kalat, to H. S. Barnes, Esq., Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, dated the 18th Jamadi-us-Sani (20th November 1896).

After compliments.—At yesterday's interview you spoke to me on the subject of the Nushki Sung (custom dues) and their management. As it is of great importance that some definite arrangement should be made in regard to that place, I write to inform you with a friendly pen that I relinquish my half share of the Nushki dues.

And, with reference to the trade regulations and the putting a stop to disturbances, &c., I, so far as I am concerned, give you authority to make any arrangement you consider advisable with the Zagar Mingals of Nushki in accordance with whatever may be the wishes of the high British Government and yourself.

And also, on the subject of the trade route which passes through the Nushki boundaries, you are empowered to act as you may deem advisable.

All else is well with me, and I trust all is also well with you.

Appendix D.

Translation of a letter from Sardar Muhammad Ali Khan, Zagar Mingal, resident of Nushki, to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, dated the 27th November 1896.

After compliments.—I spoke to you to-day in connection with the arrangements for the opening up of the Nushki trade route and of the realization of "Sung" (custom dues) in that country. As these arrangements are now being made, I think it proper to bring to your kind notice that the "Sung" of Nushki is divided equally between myself and the Khan of Kalat.

I have now heard that His Highness the Khan has given up his share of the "Sung" (to the British Government). Now it is better and suitable that a Munshi should be appointed in Nushki by the British Government, who will collect "Sung" in accordance with old custom and according to the directions of the late Sir Robert Sandeman. The pay of the Munshi and other expenses incurred in connection with the recovery of the "Sung" may be deducted from the gross receipts ½ (one-half) of the remaining sum which is my share should be paid to me. Hereby I give my consent to the above proposal. I further agree to give any assistance, that may be required of me, to the Munshi in the recovery of the "Sung."

If the British Government decide hereafter to abolish "Sung," as this is my only means of living and I am unable to give up my share, I will agree to the proposal, provided that I receive Rs. 7,000 per annum in exchange for my rights. Out of this Rs. 7,000, a sum of Rs. 3,400 should be paid to me alone, and I will give the rest, *i.e.*, Rs. 3,600 per annum, to the British Government on account of the pay of the following establishment:—

		Rs.
One Jemadar, @ Rs. 50 per mensem	...	600
Two Munshis or Duffadars, @ Rs. 35 each	...	840
Nine Sowars, @ Rs 20 per mensem each	...	2,160
Total	...	3,600

That is to say, Rs. 300 per mensem, or Rs. 3,600 a year. These men should be engaged through me, and I will be in every way responsible for the protection of the trade route and kafilas within Nushki and within the country of my tribe. I will then relinquish all claims to 'Sung" and transit dues.

5

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

The above two proposals will tend to promote the interests of trade, and will lead to good results as far as the convenience of merchants and the protection of the route, &c., is concerned.

Witness—

SARDAR YAR MUHAMMAD, Kurd.

TAJ MUHAMMAD KHAN, Zagar Mingal.

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

(64)

No. 14 of 1897.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.
Frontier.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD GEORGE F. HAMILTON,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

FORT WILLIAM, *the 27th January 1897.*

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's telegram, dated the 21st October 1896, conveyed sanction to the proposals set forth in our Secret despatch No. 170 (Frontier), dated the 16th September 1896, in connection with the political control and protection of the tract of country between Nushki and the Persian border which has recently come within the sphere of British influence. We thereupon instructed our Agent in Baluchistan to introduce the scheme, and we now enclose a preliminary report* from Mr. Barnes on the subject.

* No. 9086, dated the 15th December 1896, with enclosures.

2. The result of Mr. Barnes's negotiations for the regulation of the dues hitherto collected at Nushki is satisfactory. The Khan of Kalat has consented to relinquish his claim to any share in the tolls, and the Zagar Mingal Sardar agreed to discontinue the tolls entirely, in consideration of a payment of Rs. 7,000 a year, out of which Rs. 3,400 would be an allowance for himself, while the balance would defray the cost of a Mingal levy post at Nushki. Mr. Barnes recommended the acceptance of this arrangement, and we have sanctioned his proposal. We trust that our action will be approved.

3. In due course we shall communicate to Your Lordship the results of the measures taken for the encouragement of trade by this route, and our views on the question raised in the last paragraph of your Secret despatch No. 46, dated the 23rd October 1896, regarding the advisability of assessing a light revenue in the tract in question.

We have the honour to be,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) ELGIN.
„ G. S. WHITE.
„ J. WESTLAND.
„ J. WOODBURN.
„ M. D. CHALMERS.
„ E. H. H. COLLEN.
„ A. C. TREVOR.

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

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

(65)

India Office,
London, 23rd October 1896.

Secret,
No. 46.

To His Excellency The Right Honourable The Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord,

Baluchistan. Control of tract and trade routes between Nushki and Seistan.

With your Excellency's Letter in the Foreign Department (Secret, Frontier), dated the 16th September 1896, No. 170, you enclose a Memorandum by Captain McMahon, C.I.E., late British Commissioner with the Afghan-Baluch Boundary Commission, on the country between Nushki and Persia, which, owing to the recent demarcation, has come within the British sphere of influence. In this Memorandum Captain McMahon submits proposals for the management and administration of the tract and for the protection of the trade routes by which it is traversed.

2. These proposals are summarized in the 15th paragraph of his Memorandum.

3. You state that his suggestion to replace Kalat control in the Nushki district by direct British administration will be referred for the consideration of the Governor General's Agent in Baluchistan, and I shall await the report which you propose to submit later on this question.

4. With regard to the control to be exercised in the Sinjerani country, which extends from Nushki to the Persian border between Kharan on the one side and the new Afghan boundary on the other, you explain in paragraph 3 of your Letter that the claims of Sardar Sir Naoroz Khan of Kharan to the Chageh district are not tenable, and that by virtue of the Kabul Agreement of 1893 you are at liberty to exercise in it such control as you may think necessary.

5. You further state that the chief value of this country lies in the trade route which crosses it, and which will form the easiest and most direct line of communication between Quetta and Eastern Persia. There are reasons for anticipating that, with proper encouragement, a large and lucrative trade will spring up between Seistan and Quetta,

S. 53.

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

and, with the object of improving the caravan routes between Persia and Baluchistan, you consider that it would be worth while to incur some expenditure in protecting this road by placing the political control of the Chageh district under a British officer, and by maintaining levy posts along the road to guard it from Afghan incursions on the one side, and on the other from the exactions which the Naosherwanis of Kharan will certainly attempt to levy upon it, unless British authority is represented throughout its whole length.

6. You explain that to secure adequate protection, the whole of the road from Nushki to the Persian border, and the political arrangements in the country through which it passes, should be placed under a British officer, and this can only be done by adding a Political Assistant to the staff of the Governor General's Agent in Baluchistan.

7. The total cost of these arrangements is estimated to amount to about Rs. 24,550 a year. This outlay includes an increased allowance of Rs. 350 a month to Sardar Ali Khan, Sinjerani, who has been re-instated in Chageh, from which he was expelled by the Afghans in 1886. In return for this increased allowance he would be expected to maintain a few levies for the protection of the frontier beyond Chageh and towards the Helmand.

8. For the opening up and maintenance of this important trade route, and for the protection of the newly demarcated frontier, you ask sanction to the addition of a Political Assistant of the 3rd Class to your Excellency's Political Department, and to the other charges named, within the total indicated. Your Excellency is of opinion that the control of this new tract of country cannot be effectually exercised in any other way or at a smaller cost, but if you are permitted to incur the expenditure you have named, you think that it will be possible not only to ensure the protection of the kafila route, but also to establish peace and order along the whole of this portion of the Afghan border.

9. A perusal of Captain McMahon's report has led me to concur in the opinion which your Excellency's Government have formed, that the effective control of this country could not be exercised otherwise than by the agency which you have suggested. Further, the time appears to me to be exceptionally favourable for encouraging traders to make use of this route between India and Eastern Persia. I understand that the transit trade between these countries *viâ* Afghanistan has almost ceased, in consequence of the crushing imposts levied on caravans by the Afghan Government, and that the Afghan traders are eager to take advantage of this new route.

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

66

10. In the interests, therefore, of the trade between India and Persia, it seems to me to be very desirable to further its development by this route, and with this object I sanction the measures proposed by your Excellency for controlling the district and protecting the route.

11. A telegram to this effect was despatched to your Excellency on the 21st October 1896.

12. As an increase of the area under cultivation is expected to follow on the establishment of British control in this tract, I shall be glad to learn in due time whether it has been found possible to assess a light revenue, and thus lessen the cost of the establishments maintained there.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant,
(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

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

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

(67)

1896

SIMLA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.
Frontier.

No. 170, DATED THE 16TH SEPTEMBER 1896.

COPY.

Letter to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Opening up of the trade route between Nushki and the Persian frontier and the protection of the newly-demarcated frontier.

Foreign Office Press—No. 1069—15-9-96.

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

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

(68)

No. 170 of 1896.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.
Frontier.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD GEORGE F. HAMILTON,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

SIMLA, *the 16th September 1896.*

MY LORD,

We have the honour to forward, for Your Lordship's information, a copy of a letter* from Captain McMahon, C.I.E., recently the British Commissioner with the Afghan-Baluch Boundary Commission, enclosing a memorandum on the country between Nushki and Persia, which, owing to the demarcation of the Afghan-Baluch Boundary, has come within the British sphere of influence.

* No. 314, dated the 22nd June 1896.

2. It is satisfactory to learn from Captain McMahon's report that the delimitation of the southern boundary of Afghanistan has not involved the surrender of any important trade routes between Baluchistan and Persia, and that excluding the route along the Helmand, the only caravan road of any value between Nushki and Seistan has been left on the British side of the border. This road at the end nearest Quetta passes from the British district of Shorarud through the Kalat district of Nushki, and thence through the Chageh district, which is inhabited by the Sinjerani-Baluchis, to the Koh-i-Malik Siah. The delimitation of the Perso-Baluch frontier from Jalk to Koh-i-Malik Siah, and of the Afghan-Baluch border from the Sarlat range of hills to the same place has left the whole of the Chageh district within the British sphere of influence, and the question raised by Captain McMahon is how our political control in this country can best be exercised so as to ensure the protection of the trade route, and the due observance of the boundaries now laid down.

3. We do not propose at present to offer any suggestions as to Captain McMahon's proposals in regard to the Nushki district. Nushki is Kalat territory, and any arrangements for the improvement of its administration, or for the regulation or abolition of the tolls now levied by the Zagar Mingals and the Khan, or for the abolition of the traffic in slaves, to which Captain McMahon alludes, must necessarily in the first place be discussed with the Khan of Kalat. We propose to commend those portions of Captain McMahon's

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

report, which deal with these matters, to the careful attention of our Agent in Baluchistan, and we anticipate that with his assistance there should be no difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory understanding with the Khan on the subject. This is a matter on which we propose to report later. There remains the question of the control to be exercised in the Sinjerani country, which extends in a long strip from Nushki to the Persian border, between Kharan on the one side and the new Afghan boundary on the other. Sardar Sir Nauroz Khan of Kharan has always advanced claims to this country based upon the authority exercised by his father, Azad Khan, when, as a semi-independent Chief, he was in the habit of raiding impartially the borders of Kalat and Persia and Afghanistan, and of declaring himself a subject of each State in turn as suited his convenience. But Sir Nauroz Khan is now a member of the Baluch Confederacy in subordination to the Khan of Kalat, and his claims to the Chageh district are not in our opinion deserving of consideration. They are not recognised by the people of the district, and they were not admitted by the Afghans, who until quite recently maintained levy posts along the Kharan border at Panihan, Zaian, and other places along the southern edge of Dalbandin, and levied land revenue from all the cultivation in the country. By virtue of the Kabul Agreement of 1893, and as part of the consideration for the additional six lakhs which we pay under that agreement to the Amir, we have recovered this district from the Afghans, and we are at liberty to exercise in it such direct control as we may think necessary or desirable.

4. We do not altogether share Captain McMahon's rather roseate anticipations of the way in which this country can be developed. Most of it is desert, and the population is very sparse, and nomadic rather than agricultural. The chief value of the country lies in the trade route by which it is traversed—a route which is likely to be of much prospective importance, as it will form the easiest and most direct line of communication between Quetta and Eastern Persia. It will be seen from Captain McMahon's report that the Ghilzais, whose carrying trade between Ghazni and India has been killed by the Amir's fiscal policy, are eager to take advantage of this new opening, and as the road is easy, and the whole of it to the Persian border within two or three marches of Seistan will be under our control, it is highly probable that with proper encouragement a large and lucrative trade will spring up between Seistan and Quetta. Owing to the want of a market, wheat in Seistan is said to be selling at two Indian maunds for the rupee. The return trade will probably consist largely of piece-goods which, it is likely, will be supplied to this part of Persia more cheaply from Quetta than from elsewhere. Your Lordship has lately called our attention to the advantage of improving the caravan routes between Persia and Baluchistan, and from that point of view it should be worth our while to incur some expenditure in protecting this road by placing the political control of the Chageh district under a British officer, and by maintaining levy posts along the road to guard it from Afghan incursions on the one side, and on the other from the exactions, which the Naosherwanis of Kharan will certainly attempt to levy upon it, unless British authority is represented throughout its whole length. Judging from past experience, it is not too much to say that the trade route will not be opened at all unless it is taken under our direct protection and control.

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

5. We are not prepared to proceed quite so rapidly as Captain McMahon proposes, nor is it necessary to administer the Chageh country as if it were a British district. Nothing in the shape of annexation is desired or intended. The people who are quiet and inoffensive, if they are protected from the Afghans and the Naosherwanis, would be left to manage their own affairs, subject to the advice of the Political Officer. Since 1886 when Sardar Ali Khan, Sinjerani, was forcibly turned out of Chageh by the Afghans, we have paid that Chief a subsistence allowance of Rs. 10 a day. Sardar Ali Khan has now been reinstated in Chageh, but, as it is important to utilise his services on the border, we propose to raise his allowance to Rs. 350 a month, and to continue it as a service allowance in return for which he will be expected to maintain a few levies for the protection of the frontier beyond Chageh and towards the Helmand. But if we are to give the people the protection they require, the whole of the road from Nushki to the Persian border, and the political arrangements in the country through which it passes, should be placed under a British officer, and this can only be done by adding a Political Assistant to the staff of the Governor-General's Agent in Baluchistan. It would be necessary to give this officer a small office establishment, and also to place at his disposal, as suggested by Captain McMahon, a body of 50 mounted levies to be stationed at suitable places along the road. The total cost of these arrangements would, as shown in the margin, amount to about Rs. 28,200 a year. The net increase of expenditure, if the allowance hitherto paid to Ali Khan is taken into account, would be Rs. 24,550. If Your Lordship is of opinion that the opening up and maintenance of this important trade route, and the protection of the newly demarcated frontier is worth this expenditure, we would ask sanction to the addition of a Political Assistant of the 3rd class to our Political Department, and for permission to incur the other charges named within the total indicated. We are of opinion that the control of this new tract of country cannot be effectually exercised in any other way or at a smaller cost, but if we are permitted to incur the expenditure we have named, we think that it will be possible not only to ensure the protection of the kafila route, but also to establish peace and order along the whole of this portion of the Afghan border. One result of the peace that will be established will be certainly a considerable increase in the cultivation of tracts like Dalbandin, which are suitable for agricultural operations. This will mean greater facilities for the passage of caravans, and if it should be found desirable to take such a course, it is probable that some portion of the expenditure might be recovered by the levy of a light revenue in those parts of the country where the Afghans have hitherto been collecting one-half the gross produce. The levy establishment placed at the disposal of the Political Officer would enable him to collect such revenue as is available at present, and we do not propose to incur any further expense on establishments, unless the Political Officer can show that he can meet the expenditure from his collections.

	Rs.
Political Assistant, 3rd Class, Rs. 500 per mensem ...	6,000
Fifty camel sowars at Rs. 20 each per mensem ...	12,000
Native officers for these levies, say Rs. 250 per mensem...	3,000
Sardar Ali Khan and his levies at Rs. 350 per mensem ...	4,200
Office establishment Contingencies	3,000
Total	28,200
Deduct allowance now paid to Sardar Ali Khan ...	3,650
Net cost ...	24,550

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

6. We should be glad to receive early orders on this letter, as for the reasons stated at the end of paragraph 9 of Captain McMahon's letter, it is important, if the trade route is to be opened, that the necessary measures should be taken during the coming cold weather, which is the season for the caravans.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) ELGIN.
„ G. S. WHITE.
„ J. WESTLAND.
„ J. WOODBURN.
„ M. D. CHALMERS.
„ E. H. H. COLLEN.
„ A. C. TREVOR.

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

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1896

SIMLA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

Frontier.

Enclosure of a letter to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 170, dated the 16th September 1896.

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

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

(71)

No. 314.

FROM

CAPTAIN A. H. MCMAHON, C.I.E.,
BRITISH COMMISSIONER, BALUCH-AFGHAN
BOUNDARY COMMISSION,

TO

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Dated Simla, the 22nd June 1896.

SIR,

I have the honour to submit a brief memorandum on the country south of the Baluch-Afghan boundary line recently demarcated from the Sarlat range to Persia.

I trust that the measures I have suggested for the management and administration of this tract will meet with your approval and support.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient servant,

A. H. MCMAHON, *Captain*,

British Commissioner,
Baluch-Afghan Boundary Commission.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C.39 F. D.—26-6-96—60.

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

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

(72)

Memorandum on the country south of the Baluch-Afghan boundary between Nushki and Persia, recently brought within the limits of British territory.

I have been asked to give my views on this subject and will endeavour in the following lines to briefly sketch the present circumstances of the tract in question, and suggest certain measures which appear necessary to be taken with regard to the future management of it.

Vide Secret-despatch No: 149 (Frontier) of 11th Aug.t/96.

2. I attach a map which will show, at a glance, the general features of the country, and the positions of the various places named below.

General sketch map attached.

3. The country under consideration consists of two portions *i.e.*, the Nushki and Chagai districts.

Country consists of two portions.

4. The Nushki district comprises the plain country south of the boundary line from the Sarlat range to Kani. On the west it extends to Kani and Muhabbat and on the south to the Kharan border, which is now the watershed of the mountain of the Sheikh Hussain Raskoh which extends along the south of the Nushki, Chagai, and Dalbandin plains. The Sarlat and other continuous mountain ranges bound it on the east.

The Nushki district.

This tract is inhabited by the Rakhshanis and Zagar Mingals. The former are the original owners of the whole country, while the latter migrated to this country from further south, many generations ago, owing to feuds with the rest of the Mingal tribe. They now both own large tracts of cultivation south of the boundary line and in the neighbourhood of Nushki. Their country, which it will be seen is one large level plain, comprises immense tracts of good culturable lands. These, now that peace and security are about to be established in the country, will no doubt ere long be brought under cultivation, and the total area of cultivation should be in time a very large one.

The present condition of Nushki is far from satisfactory. Although in reality it belongs to the Kalat State, the Khan of Kalat has exercised no authority whatever in the country, and his only connection with the place appears to be his recent acquisition of a share in the Nushki customs duties, which will be referred to hereafter. Although, moreover, nominally under our control, we have exercised little or no authority in Nushki. In November 1891 we sent a political moonshi and a few levies there, but subsequently, in March 1892, withdrew them; and in June 1895 we again sent a Levy establishment there of the strength shown in the margin to prevent raids which were then being made by the Barechi Afghans into Nushki, and which were being encouraged by one section of the Rakhshanis to spite the other section with whom they were on bad terms. Beyond this step we have never taken any measures to exercise control in this country, and the results of our inaction are very apparent. The Rakhshani and Zagar Mingal chiefs and the various headmen of the main sections of the Rakhshanis are all at feud with each other. This does not lead to the same amount of bloodshed as it would do elsewhere, for the present want of spirit and energy among these people keeps them from taking such forcible action. Their ill-feeling spends itself in petty intrigue and spite, which has paralyzed their powers of independent action and reduced this pleasing community to the condition of a set of miserable village curs, who snarl and growl at each other without daring to fight. They unite only to bully the weaker kafilas that pass through Nushki. The stronger kafilas are generally left severely alone. The authority of the tribal chiefs over their tribes, as might be expected under the circumstances, has been reduced to almost *nil*. Powerless as enemies and useless as friends, their present condition renders them likely to be a source of future trouble on our border unless measures are taken to remedy the present state of affairs and establish sufficient authority there to prevent irresponsible tribesmen from causing trouble on the Afghan border. At present this country is neither under British nor Kalat control,

1 Jemadar @ Rs. 50 per n ensem...		50
1 Moonshi @ ,, 30	,, ...	30
1 Duffadar@ ,, 30	,, ...	30
9 Sowars @ ,, 20	,, ...	180
Contingent allowance @ Rs. 10...		10
Total	..	300 per mensem.

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and the dealings of many of the tribesmen have been with Afghanistan. Owing to the want of a central authority and the apathy and want of influence, of their chiefs, they have been reduced, in many instances, to referring their disputes to Afghan officials for settlement. As an instance of their connection with Afghan officials I should note that most of the Zagar Mingal headmen we met along the southern fringe of Registan use to go first to the Afghan Commissioner and used then to be sent on to me by him. It is obviously necessary that this state of things should be put an end to. There is yet another important reason for establishing effective control in this place, and that is with a view to stopping the trade which at present goes on there in Hazara and other slaves, male and female. These are smuggled across the Afghan border to Nushki and thence sent to purchasers throughout Baluchistan. The Amir's officials in Shorawak have endeavoured to put a stop to this, and on one occasion within the past two or three years endeavoured to station a small outpost at Nushki with that object.

The Chagai District.

5. The Chagai district extends south of the boundary line from Kani and Muhabbat on the east to beyond Koh-i-Dalil* on the west. In the south it extends to and includes Mushkija, Isa Tahir (not Meshki), Panihan, Zaian, Galichah, and Sorap, and thence along the watershed of the mountain ranges of Raskoh, Sheikh Hussain, etc., which form the southern boundary of Dalbandin and Nushki. This tract forms the present territory of the Chagai Sanjaranis†. I have already given a brief history and genealogy of the Sanjarani tribe in appendix vii of my final report on the demarcation of the boundary line. Suffice here to say that the Chagai Sanjaranis are a branch of the Sanjarani tribe whose original home was Chagai and of which the three other branches reside in Seistan, Bandar-i-Kamal Khan, Chahar Burjak and Chakan Sur on the Helmand respectively. The history of this tribe shows that from early times they have had no direct connection with either Kalat or Kharan. All their dealings have been with Afghanistan. The Afghans have always considered them Afghan subjects and when, in 1884, the Amir learnt, in connection with the march of the Afghan Boundary Commission to the Helmand, that we considered Chagai ours he forthwith sent an Afghan garrison to occupy the place. These have been in possesion from 1886 to the present time. Afghan occupation extended not only to Chagai itself but over the whole extent of the Chagai district. Government revenue, at the rate of one-half the produce, has been levied on all lands both in Chagai and in Dalbandin, while Afghan customs outposts have been stationed on the Kafila routes at Dalbandin, Sorap, Galichah, Panihan and Isa Tahir. These places vary from a distance of 50 to 80 miles to the south of the present boundary line. The Chagai Sanjaranis and Taokis own allegiance to the Chagai Sanjarani Sardar Ali Khan, who, during the period of actual Afghan occupation of Chagai, has been a refugee at Zangi Náwar near Nushki.

* Their actual occupation, as we locally ascertained, extends to the Persian border.
A. H. M.

† The name Sanjarani includes their allied and subject tribe, the Taokis, who are known as Sanjaranis.

Responsibilities involved by a definite boundary line.

6. It will be seen that the new boundary line from the Sarlat to Persia now includes within British Territory (1) the Nushki district, which has only nominally been within British jurisdiction and still lies under Kalat jurisdiction and (2) the Chagai district which has never at any time been either under British or Kalat control and which, for the past 10 years, has been in actual Afghan possession and occupation.

The laying down of a definite boundary line and the consequent changes in the ownership of the country south of the line must bring about extensive changes in the present condition of the country which necessitate a very careful consideration of the measures to be adopted in order both to turn those changes to our best advantage and prevent them, as they would otherwise do, from becoming fruitful sources of future troubles and complications.

It will be admitted in the first place that, however little we may wish to interfere in a new country, the existence of a defined and demarcated boundary line through that country renders it imperatively necessary to extend our influence and

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interfere in the country, to at least the extent that may be necessary to prevent either aggression from the Afghan side of the boundary line into our side or from our side into the Afghan side. In this case the Afghans have already taken measures to carry out on their side the responsibilities which the boundary line has thrown upon them. They have placed levy outposts at the lower Robat springs at the foot of the Koh-i-Malik Siah, at Godar-i-shah, Barabchah* and Arbu and will no doubt place others somewhere on the Shorawak border. We are called upon to take measures to effect the same object on our side. As I will endeavour to show below, there are special reasons why, for this and other objects, our direct interference in this country is urgently required.

* In the northern branch of the Barabchah nullah. The southern branches fall within British territory.

A. H. M.

7. The country south of the new boundary line, however barren and desolate the larger portion of it may be, is of far more than ordinary importance for three reasons, *i.e.* (1) the strategic importance of Chagai, (2) the importance of opening up and protecting trade between Persia and India, and (3) the desirability of gradually opening up more direct relations with Seistan.

Importance of country South of our boundary line.

8. A glance at the map will show the relative position of Chagai with regard to the Helmand, Kandahar, Quetta and Kharan. Its strategic importance should not be under rated. Situated as it is on the near edge, so to speak, of a difficult desert it closes the various roads which here converge from the Helmand and Persia on Nushhi and Quetta.

Strategic importance of Chagai.

There is, I venture to think, nothing in the nature of the country, desert though it be, sufficiently difficult to prevent bodies of lightly equipped troops marching from the Helmand to Chagai and Nushki, by different routes, either through Robat or Mamu and the Mazari pass, or through Shah Ismail and Kani; or at a pinch through Registan itself. Our combined camps amounting to some 1,200 men and over 1,000 camels may be taken as an instance of a small but heavily equipped force passing through the country without any previous local arrangements whatsoever, and that at an advanced season of the year after a period of nearly two years' drought.

The high mountain range north-west of it is inaccessible and quite impassable except by mountaineers between the Shibian and Mazari passes. The plains of fertile land east and south of it should render it possible in the near future to feed a fairly large force here entirely on local supplies. There is abundant and excellent water at many places in the near neighbourhood of Chagai; facts which it would be well to remember, either in relation to ourselves or an enemy.

A glance at the relative position of Chagai with regard to other places will I think show what an important part it might play in the flank defence of any line which depended at all on the strength of either Kandahar, or Quetta, or both against an enemy from the north or north-west. The late General Sir Charles Macgregor, Quarter Master General, used to lay great stress on the strategic importance of Kharan. He called it the "Key of Baluchistan," *vide* his "Wanderings in Baluchistan." I feel confident that, if he had, personally known the geographical circumstances of Chagai and its neighbourhood, a tract which had not then been surveyed or properly explored, he would have applied his remark, with still greater emphasis, to Chagai. Chagai effectively covers Kharan. The Amir has always been very anxious to retain Chagai and he vehemently protested against its being included within British territory when that portion of the boundary line was under consideration during the Durand Mission to Cabul, in 1893. He used to tell Sardar Muhammad Umar Khan, my late Afghan colleague, that he considered Chagai the key not only of southern Baluchistan but also of the Helmand valley.

It is very important from a military point of view that we should now take advantage of our opportunities, and extend our influence over this tract, to the extent at least of making an easy line of communication with Chagai, ready for

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use hereafter, of obtaining a thorough military knowledge of the country itself, and of encouraging the development of the country sufficiently to facilitate the maintenance of any force which future events may oblige us to move forward to Chagai. To meet the objections of those who maintain that the country is a waterless desert and impassable for any but small parties, basing their security on that supposition, and who contend that the best means of securing our flank in that direction is to keep the country a desert, I consider it advisable to lay stress on the fact that the country, as far as Robat, Mamu and Arbu, is not, even at the present moment, a desert; nor is it impassible for troops, who, once having crossed the 57 miles of desert south of the Helmand, have no very serious physical obstacles before them. I would also remind them of the fact that, when once peace and security is secured in the country, as it now must be, the gradual cultivation of culturable lands follows as a matter of course, and we will be powerless to prevent this natural result, however, much we may wish to do so. It is wiser therefore to accept the inevitable and include the development of the country in our other calculations connected with the defence of the frontier.

Opening up of Persian trade with India.

9. As regards (2) the opening up and protection of trade between Persia and India. This is an important question and a little consideration will show that it is really one of Imperial interest. Seistan and Meshed are centres of a large trade, which, as far as India is concerned, has been of late years, owing to Afghan taxation, closed to the Indian markets, except, in so far as communication by sea, *viâ* the Persian Gulf, has allowed it being carried on. The Indian Merchants resident in Meshed have of late years, I understand, bitterly complained of the falling off of their trade with India, owing to the heavy customs dues levied by the Afghans on all the direct routes that trade would naturally follow. As a case in point and one which intimately concerns the Indian Military authorities, let us take the trade in Persian horses from Meshed, which at one time appeared to offer very promising prospects in the matter of supplying good, and cheap remounts for native cavalry. This trade is now absolutely closed. The taxes levied on each horse brought from Meshed amounts, by the time Chaman is reached, to no less than 150 Cabul rupees. This amount, added to the cost price of the horse, raises the sale price of the animal above the amount purchasers are willing to give. Moreover traders complained that it was useless bringing any but mediocre animals to India, as any of more than ordinary merit were seized for little or no payment by the chiefs and headmen of Afghan towns *en route*.

Whether traders travelled by the more direct routes through Afghanistan proper and came *viâ* Khwaja Ali or Kandahar; or whether they made a wide *détour* South of the Helmand *viâ* Panihan, Galichah and other similar routes, the results were the same. In the latter case they fell into the hands of the Amir's customs collectors either at Isa Tahir, Panihan, Galichah, Sorap or Dalbandin. The effect on trade has been disastrous. Now, however, the demarcation of the Indo-Afghan boundary line to Persia has altered the whole aspect of the case. The Afghan customs outposts have been withdrawn from Panihan and Galichah and all other places South of our boundary line and their routes are therefore now open to free trade. It has been maintained by various authorities that the main trade route from Seistan follows the Shelag river bed across Afghan territory to Godar-i-Shah and thence across to Amir Chah. This theory was opposed to all I had ever learnt from Seistan traders who said the main route ran just west of the Koh-i-Malik Siah. When I recently visited Godar-i-Shah and Gumbaz-i-Shah, I found no signs of any frequented trade route there. Moreover from that place to Amir Chah is a distance of 85 miles without a drop of water on the road. This fact in itself would go far to prove that this route cannot be extensively used. When, however, we reached the Koh-i-Malik Siah, we found a large kafila road, immediately to the west of the Koh-i-Malik Siah, which passes by the Koh-i-Malik Siah Ziarat. This route was evidently most extensively used, as proved most undisputedly by the number of well worn camel tracks. The ocular and nasal evidence of the frequent offerings of sheep and goats, made at the Koh-i-Malik Siah Ziarat, by passing kafilas, gave every corroboration which the existence of the road itself and the statements of the natives of the country might require.

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

Kafilas by this route, which comes by easy and well watered stages from Seistan, can now turn off eastwards *viâ* the upper Robat (Sar Robat) spring and proceed *viâ* the route traversed by the Mission without entering Afghan territory at all; or they can diverge from the above kafila route at Duzdap, or still further south and travel *viâ* Amalaf and the various other easier routes which, passing either through Amir Chah or Mushkija, converge on Nushki *viâ* Isa Tahir, Panihan, Sorap and Dalbandin. The taxes levied by the Kharan Chief would prevent their taking routes further south than the above.

Seistan traders have often told me that, once the demarcation of the Afghan boundary enabled them to use routes from Persia through British territory, they would extensively use the above named routes. There are already indications of an approaching revival, on a very large scale, of trade between Persia and India through Nushki. While at the Koh-i-malik Siah we heard of a large kafila awaiting in Seistan the completion of demarcation work to start for India. This has by now probably reached Nushki. The Ghilzai and other Powindah headmen, who have accompanied me with their camels throughout the Mission from the Gomal to Persia, assure me that they are prepared to take every advantage of this new trade route. I have known these men for years. Some of them, in old days, carried on a very large carrying trade between Ghazni and India, but the Amir's increased customs taxes have gradually diminished that trade until it has now practically died out altogether. These men, like thousands of others, have lost their old lucrative occupation and are reduced to grazing flocks, instead of bringing large laden kafilas yearly up and down the Gomal. They now say they are about to turn their attention to the Persian trade, and transfer their camels from the Gomal to Quetta and Peshin. So much struck are they with the prospects of this new trade, that a party of my camel owners, Kharoti Ghilzais, are actually now at this most unfavourable season of the year on their way back with their camels laden with merchandize to Seistan. Others are about to start at the end of the summer, and their example will be followed no doubt by large numbers of other Powindahs. I feel confident that the development of our trade with Persia will soon bring itself to very general notice. Every encouragement should be given to it and every precaution taken to prevent obstacles being allowed to be put in the way at the outset, thereby endangering and delaying the rapid development which circumstances justify our reasonably expecting. As I will endeavour to explain below, the obstacle presented by the customs taxes at Nushki must be removed.

Opening up of more direct relations with Seistan.

10. As regards (3) the opening up of more direct relations with Seistan, the settlement of a definite boundary line and the necessity for protecting the trade route from Seistan to Nushki, give us a good opportunity of effecting this desirable object, without necessarily attracting much notice. I need not dwell at greater length on this point here as it is obvious that we ought to be in more direct communication with, and obtain more direct information concerning, a country which is probably destined to play an important part in our future frontier policy and to which Russia has for some time past paid very special attention. I hope, in connection with the other measures which I am about to suggest for the better political control of our frontier and the efficient protection of trade routes, to suggest means by which this last object can also be effected.

Measures suggested for adoption with regard to the country south of the boundary line.

11. The above remarks have sketched the main objects to be aimed at in the measures which the recent boundary settlement now calls upon us to take and it remains to be considered what measures are required to attain those objects.

Measures suggested with regard to the Chagai District.

12. I will take first the Chagai District. It has been always outside the jurisdiction of the Khan of Kalat and for years in Afghan possession. It forms a portion of the country for which, in the recent settlement of the boundary in Cabul, we pay an increased annual subsidy of 6 lakhs to His Highness the Amir. It is now therefore ours by purchase to do what we like with. No one else has a claim to it. The Kharan Chief, whose country forms the southern boundary of this district, however much he may wish to get possession of it, has not the slightest shadow

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of a right to it of any kind. On the other hand the Chagai Sanjarani Chief has good grounds for claiming Hurmagai and other places south of the mountain range which forms their present boundary which were originally Sanjarani territory.

We are now called upon to take this district under our direct administration. The Chief, Sardar Ali Khan, naturally a weak man, has been a refugee from his country for years and is wanting in personal influence over his tribe. To leave him alone to look after this large tract of country, would be to abandon it to anarchy, to encourage wholesale encroachments by Kharan on the south and Afghans on the north, and effectively close the new Persian trade route to Nushki. It is necessary, I think under the circumstances, to place a permanent official at Chagai with a small levy and revenue establishment. It would suffice at present to establish a Tahsil there under a selected native Tahsildar. The establishment need at first be but a small one as the revenue work would be light. The levy establishment also need not be a large one. The Sanjaranis are a very quiet inoffensive tribe and much more likely to welcome than resent our interference in their country. They are at present very grateful to us for relieving them from Afghan oppression, and their cultivators assured me that if we allow them to retain their lands they are willing to pay us the same revenue they paid to the Amir, *i.e.*, half their produce. The tribe know that they have now come under our rule and they have been led to expect to be brought under our direct control and to be made to pay Government revenue. No difficulty need be anticipated in administering the Chagai district as an ordinary Tahsil. The area of the country is large, but the population is extremely sparce and a few levies will be quite sufficient to keep the whole country in order. The chief, though a weak man, is well disposed towards us, and, with the support of a Government official at his back, would no doubt be able to regain influenc over his tribe.—Experience has shown in Zhob and elsewhere, that very large areas of country can be satisfactorily worked by one Tahsil establishment, and I do not think any difficulty need be anticipated here. The Tahsil would naturally be added to the Quetta and Peshin District. If the services of an additional Assistant Political Agent are given to Baluchistan that officer would be advantageously employed in the cold weather in visiting and inspecting this country.

But little encouragement would be required to bring the extensive tracts of culturable land in the Chagai and Dalbandin plains under cultivation, and there is every likelihood of the Chagai District becoming, in the near future, a remunerative acquisition. Land revenue, at the rates usual in Baluchistan, should be levied. As before mentioned the Afghans have hitherto levied half the produce. The head-quarters of the Chagai district should at first be at Chagai itself, where the fort affords rough but sufficient accommodation until other arrangements are made.

It would then remain to be decided whether Chagai or Lijji Karez, or some place higher up in the neighbouring hills, where the summer heat is less severe, should be selected as the permanent head-quarters of the Tahsil.

The Tahsildar, like others in Baluchistan, should be vested with political authority, and exercise political control over the whole area of the Chagai district and up to the Persian border. Owing to the all but uninhabited state of the country westwards, this is not such a difficult matter as the area of the tract would lead one to suppose. He should pay particular attention to the Kafila routes, and see that traders are not interfered with in any way. He should be called upon to traverse the various routes every year, and arrange for them to be periodically patrolled by his levy establishment. Whether it is necessary or not to station two or three levies at various important stages during the Kafila season is a question that experience would soon show. There are many places on the various Kafila routes where, with but little trouble and exposure, water can be reached and wells dug. The improvement of the water-supply, and various other matters affecting the convenience and comfort of traders should form an important part of the Chagai officer's duties.

A levy establishment of a jemadar, two duffadars and about 50 camel sowars are, I think, required at the first outset of the above arrangements. These

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

men should not all at first be local men, as those are hardly yet fitted for levy service. Trustworthy camel sowars could be easily recruited in other parts of Baluchistan at a moderate rate of pay, and vacancies could be filled up hereafter by such of the local men who might appear fitted for Government service.

It would be necessary to pay small sums in return for tribal service to the Chagai Sanjarani Chief and the headmen of the various important sections of the Sanjarani and the allied Taoki tribe. The subsistence allowance already granted to Sardar Ali Khan of Rs. 10 per diem should be continued as a service allowance to enable him to keep up his position as head of the tribe and render efficient service.

The Naib of the tribe, Dost Muhammad Khan, the most influential man in the tribe, should be given a service allowance of about Rs. 100 per mensem. The sum of from Rs. 20 to Rs. 30 per mensem, according to their respective status, would suffice for each of the headmen of the tribal sections, who only number some 20 in all.

In connection with the better protection of the Persian trade routes, it is necessary, I consider, to station, during the cold-weather months, an intelligent man with a few levy sowars at the upper Robat spring, near the Koh-i-Malik Siah. His duty would to prevent, or, failing ability to do so, to report any interference, on the part of the Afghan levies stationed at the lower Robat spring, with kafilas passing just outside the Afghan boundary at that point. This man, who should be carefully selected for the purpose, would, at the Koh-i-Malik Siah, be in a position to learn much that was going on in Seistan and in the neighbouring Persian province. In this manner the first step will have been made to enter into more direct relations with Seistan than has hitherto been possible. Experience would then show what other steps might be possible or desirable from time to time. An intelligent man suitable for this post could doubtless be obtained at a salary of about Rs. 50 per mensem. These men, if it be considered unwise to place them so close to the Afghan post, might be stationed at Kacha, or other neighbouring place. They are likely to have ample opportunities of communication with Chagai or Nushki, either by passing kafilas, or by sending, if necessary, one of their party to the next levy station.

Measures suggested with regard to Nushki.

13. The above suggestions deal with the country from Persia to within a few miles of Nushki. It remains now to discuss the question of Nushki itself. Here greater difficulty presents itself than elsewhere. Chagai has been shown to be ours, to do with as we like. Nushki, on the other hand, is nominally a portion of the Kalat State. The Khan of Kalat's control over this district has, it is true, been merely nominal, and his only connection with the place appears to be his share in the customs taxes levied on kafilas at Nushki. Whether we take the district entirely out of the Khan's hands or not, it is, in my opinion, essentially necessary that we should exercise direct control in that country, and put a stop to the extremely unsatisfactory state of things now prevailing there, as described in paragraph 4 above. Without our direct interference, it is impossible to expect that the Nushki Chiefs will abandon their petty feuds and devote their attention to looking after their tribes and encouraging the cultivation of their extensive lands. It is foolish also to expect that, without our direct interference, the trade route through Nushki will remain either safe or open.

As matters stand now the taxes levied on traders passing through Nushki is killing trade altogether. The case stands briefly thus: The Zagar Mingal Chief has from old times levied tolls on kafilas passing through Nushki. These tolls were originally fairly moderate. Of late years, *i.e.*, about 1877, the Khan of Kalat, by some private arrangement, acquired half the Nushki dues. To prevent this division diminishing his former income, the Zagar Mingal Sardar, Muhammad Ali Khan, largely increased the rate of taxes levied according to the old rate, and imposed new taxes on articles not previously taxed, and among other items established an *ad-valorem* duty on cloth goods. In his letter to the Political Agent, Kalat, No. 1350, dated 31st March 1890, the late Sir Robert Sandeman, Agent to the Governor-General, forbade the new rates and ordered the tolls to be reduced to the old scale. He also refused to admit the right of the

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Khan of Kalat to any share in their dues. No notice appears to have been taken by the Khan or the Zagar Mingal Sardar of that order. During the past year the Khan of Kalat, while selling other contracts for the collections of custom dues at various places in his dominions, sold the contract for the year's collection of Nushki dues to one Tola Ram for Rs. 4,000, of which he was to take half and the Zagar Mingal Chief half. Sardar Muhammad Ali Khan objects to this arrangement, and insists on collecting his share of half the Nushki taxes himself. The contractor's tax-collectors and Sardar Muhammad Ali Khan's men therefore act together in collecting customs dues and divide the proceeds. The amount collected during the past year amounted to some Rs. 15,000. Needless to say that increased rates of taxes, *ad-valorem* duties arbitrarily assessed, and the above method of collection have had a disastrous effect on the Nushki trade. The Hindu merchants there complain that their trade is rapidly dying out. In corroboration of this I should note that, while engaged in demarcation work in the neighbourhood of Ghwazha last February, a large kafila of ghi from Seistan came up the Spintizha road. The traders told me that they had come all that long way round *viâ* Shorawak in order to escape the heavy customs dues at Nushki. That we should go to the trouble and expense of settling a boundary line with the Amir, and of demarcating that line in order to free the Persian trade route from Afghan taxation, and yet allow the Khan of Kalat and the Zagar Mingal Chief to undo all the good thereby effected, and kill trade by exactions at Nushki, is obviously absurd. Even to allow them to themselves collect customs dues on a revised scale would be unwise, as, without careful supervision, the present objections would continue to exist. It should be remembered that it is not only the amount of the customs duties, but the highhanded conduct of the customs collectors that is killing the Nushki trade. Three courses are open to us, *i.e.*, (1) to abolish, by order, without compensation, all taxes at Nushki in accordance with the right which, I understand, Government, as shown by precedents elsewhere, apparently has of doing; (2) to abolish all taxes and pay the Khan of Kalat and the Zagar Mingal Chief reasonable compensation, and (3) to take over the collection of customs duties ourselves, fix a reasonable rate, and pay the Khan and Zagar Mingal Chief either a sum representing their average former income, or the balance, or a fixed portion of the balance of the collections after deducting expenses of collection, and any other charges which might reasonably be set off against that income. The matter is one which demands very early and careful consideration, for, if a revival of trade next cold-weather is checked at the outset, as it most assuredly under existing circumstances will be by the Nushki dues, it may be thrown back and retarded for many a long day to come.

To return to the subject of our direct control of Nushki, I strongly urge the advisability, for many and obvious reasons, of its being brought under our direct administration, and it should be included under the administration of the Chagai Tahsil. The present levy establishment noted in paragraph 4 should be retained there and placed under the charge of the Chagai Tahsildar. Later on, when the development of the country necessitates it, Nushki can be made a Naib-Tahsildar's charge. Revenue, in my opinion, should be taken from the Rakhshanis, Zagar Mingals and others of the Nushki district. They can fairly be called upon to pay revenue in return for the peace and security now established in their country and the protection now afforded them, by the new boundary line, from the former encroachments and raids of the Barechi Afghans. The boundary line gives them large tracts of valuable land, such as the Bulandwal lands, which, owing to Barechi interference, they have not dared for many years to cultivate. There would be no great difficulty in making the people pay revenue, and I consider it would be a wise and politic act to make them do so, for the more thoroughly we have the tribes on our immediate frontier under effective control, the less chance will there be of friction on the border, and the greater use will there be whenever, hereafter, their services in disturbed times may be required. The question of setting aside the merely nominal control of the Khan of Kalat in this tract, and of adjusting the revenue rights of the Rakshani and Zagar Mingal Chiefs to meet the requirements of Government revenue assessment without injustice to those Chiefs, is one which must be considered by the Baluchis-

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

tan authorities. The matter is not, I think, in reality, one of much difficulty. If revenue is taken from these tribes, moderate allowances for tribal service should be granted to the chiefs and principal headmen. Whether Government revenue is or is not taken in the Nushki tract, it in no way affects the question of taking Government revenue in the Chagai District. Government rights to revenue there are indisputable, and the country generally may be treated as a "tabula rasa" on which Government has now the opportunity of inscribing, with a free hand, any measures of administration it may wish, without infringing local or tribal rights.

Necessity for making a good road to Nushki from Quetta.

14. Before concluding these suggestions I should note the advisability on every ground of making a good road from Quetta to Nushki. The present camel track is a very bad one, often very steep and sometimes passing through narrow cuttings, which, in winter, are often closed by snow. A road would seldom if ever be closed by snow, and the advantage to kafilas would be immense. The necessity for it is obvious in the interests of Government administration of the country itself and in those of trade especially.

Summary.

15. To sum up;—the objects to be aimed at in our dealings with the country south of the boundary line from the Sarlat to Persia are:—

The institution of direct dealings with the country in question in order (1) to establish peace and security; (2) to prevent future frontier troubles either from aggression from without or aggression from within; (3) to enable us, at a future time, to make the best use of the important strategic position of Chagai; (4) to open up and protect what promises to be a very extensive trade between India and Persia and (5) to open up more direct relations with and acquire better information concerning Seistan and the neighbouring Persian frontier provinces. To attain these objects the following measures are suggested.—

(1) the construction of a good road from Quetta to Nushki;

(2) the supersession of the merely nominal control of Kalat in the Nushki district by direct British administration;

(3) the institution of direct British administration in the Chagai District *i.e.*, from the Nushki border to Persia;

(4) the formation in connection with (2) and (3) above of a regular Tahsil at Chagai to administer both the Nushki and Chagai Districts. The Tahsil to be added to the Quetta Pishin Districts. The services of an Additional Assistant Political Agent to be granted, if possible, to Baluchistan for the purpose of yearly visiting and looking after this tract. The establishment to consist of a small revenue establishment and a levy establishment consisting of the present levy post at Nushki and 1 Jemadar, 2 Daffadars and 50 camel sowars; the latter to be employed both in the ordinary administrative work of the Tahsil and in the protection of the Kafila routes south of the boundary line from Persia and Seistan. Moderate allowances for tribal service to be granted to the chief and headmen of the various sections of the Sanjarani tribe, and likewise to the chiefs of the Rakhshani and Zagar Mingal tribes;

(5) the taking of Government land revenue in the Chagai District, and, if possible, in the Nushki District also;

(6) the establishment of a small post of observation consisting of a carefully selected moonshi, and say 6 Levy camel sowars (included in the above 50) at Sar Robat near the Koh-i-Malik Siah, or some neighbouring place during the cold weather months.

(7) the total abolishment, or failing that, the collection by Government of customs dues, on a revised scale, at Nushki.

I venture to think that the above suggestions, if approved, could be carried out without any great difficulty. The expenditure involved is not excessive and, on the other hand, very small compared with the importance of the Imperial interests concerned. The approaching lapse of the period fixed for the contract

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

of Baluchistan Provincial Revenues will enable the increased expenditure now advocated to be considered in connection with the next Provincial contract. The question of the management of the country which has now come within our boundary line from Sarlat to Persia is one which should be carefully considere d as soon as possible. Delays will render a satisfactory settlement of the question doubly difficult.

A. H. McMAHON, *Captain,*
British Commissioner,
Baluch-Afghan Boundary Commission.

SIMLA: *The 21st June 1896.*

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C39 F. D.—26-6-56—.

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

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

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

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

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

No. 163 of 1898.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

EXTERNAL.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD GEORGE F. HAMILTON,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

SIMLA, *the 15th September 1898.*

MY LORD,

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of the papers cited in the accompanying list, regarding the late rising in Makran, the measures proposed for the future administration of the country, and the state of affairs in Panjgur.

2. Our Foreign Secretary's letter* of the 2nd August 1898 contains a full expression of our views. We await the Agent to the Governor-General's reply to it.

* Enclosure No. 3.

We have the honour to be,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) ELGIN.
" C. E. NAIRNE.
" J. WESTLAND.
" M. D. CHALMERS.
" E. H. H. COLLEN.
" A. C. TREVOR.
" C. M. RIVAZ.

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

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

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SIMLA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

EXTERNAL.

Enclosures of a letter to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 163, dated the 15th September 1898.

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

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

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Enclo. no. 1.

No. 3389, dated Quetta, the 17th May 1898.

From—Colonel Henry Wylie, C.S.I., Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

I have the honour to submit the following report, with its enclosures, regarding the recent disturbances in Makran, for the information of the Government of India.

2. It will be seen by reference to previous correspondence that, up to the end of last November, there was no sign that the arrangements then in force for the Government of Makran were not working satisfactorily. Those arrangements were, that a Nazim, supported by about ninety of the Kalat reorganised troops, controlled the country on behalf of His Highness the Khan of Kalat. The Nazim was a Hindu official of the Baluchistan Agency—Dewan Udho Dass—whose services had been specially lent to the Khan.

3. The first information that there was unrest in Makran was apparently given to Mr. Barnes by Mr. Knox, the officiating Political Agent of Kalat, last December, on the conclusion of a tour which he had made in Panjgur during November 1897. I have now received Mr. Knox's official report on that tour, which I attach to these papers, as it bears on the state of Makran immediately preceding the recent disturbances. It will be observed by reference to paragraph 11 of that report that Mr. Knox found the temper of the people in Panjgur far from satisfactory.

4. But the news that any disturbance had actually taken place reached Mr. Barnes only upon the 9th of last January in the form of a telegram from the Khan's Naib of Kej, who reported that Mehrab Khan, Gitchki, a brother of the Kej Gitchki Sirdar, had made the Nazim a prisoner, and had obtained possession of Turbat fort, on the 6th idem. Shortly afterwards information was received from Captain Burn, R.E., from Ormara, that his camp in Kolwa had been suddenly attacked by Mir Baluch Khan, Naosherwani, and Mir Rustam Khan, Gitchki, the latter being a brother of Mir Mehrab Khan. Captain Burn and Lieutenant Turner, R.E., were at that time surveying in Makran, and the former reported that a number of their party had been killed, and the main camp looted, while he escaped to the coast. Lieutenant Turner, who was working in another direction, managed to bring in his portion of the survey party to Ormara safely, and subsequently joined the force sent to restore order in the country.

5. Although the Nazim managed to escape from Mir Mehrab Khan, Gitchki, and was received and sheltered in the fort of Kalatuk by Abdul Karim, Gitchki, Naib of Kej, yet by far the larger portion of Makran was temporarily lost to the Khan of Kalat, and was in the hands of the rebels, headed by Mir Baluch Khan, Naosherwani, his son Shah Nawaz Khan, Mir Mehrab Khan, Naosherwani, Mir Mehrab Khan, Gitchki, Mir Shukarulla, Gitchki, and other persons of lesser note, and it was decided that we must at once despatch a force into Makran to re-establish order, re-instate the Khan's Nazim, and afford a rallying point for the dispersed members of our survey party.

6. A column was accordingly despatched by sea from Karachi, which rendezvoused at Pasni on the 25th of January, and started towards Turbat the next day. The column consisted of 400 of the 30th Bombay Infantry, a squadron VI Bombay Cavalry, and 2 guns of the Hazara Mountain Battery, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Mayne, 30th Bombay Infantry, and was accompanied by Lieutenant S. G. Knox as Political Officer. These troops encountered the rebels, under the above-named leaders, holding the Pass of Gok Prusht before Turbat, on the 31st January, and after a smart action completely defeated them, inflicting a loss of about 150 men: Mir Baluch Khan and Mir Mehrab Khan, Naosherwanis, and Mir Shukarulla Khan, Gitchki, being amongst the slain. Colonel Mayne with his force reached Turbat the same evening, and found the fort there occupied by Mir Mehrab Khan, Gitchki,

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who had fled from the field. Unfortunately this person subsequently escaped and has taken refuge in Persia.

7. The Nazim of Makran, accompanied by several loyal Chiefs, who had been assisting him, reached Colonel Mayne's camp on the 1st of February. These loyal Chiefs were Mir Abdul Karim, Gitchki, the Khan of Kalat's Naib of Kej, Mir Sher Muhammad, Gitchki, of Nasirabad, Mir Kamal Khan, Bizenjo, Mir Khan Muhammad Gazkandi, Rind, from Mand, Mir Mazar Khan, Boledi, Mir Ghulam Muhammad, Naosherwani, etc. The rebellion was for the time completely broken by Colonel Mayne's success at Gok Prusht, and the troops were subsequently employed as described in Lieutenant Knox's report (No. 921-B., dated the 6th instant, attached) in marching about the country re-asserting the Khan of Kalat's authority, and in supporting Lieutenant Knox in rewarding the loyal and in punishing the guilty.

8. The causes of this rising seem to have been as follows:—Mir Baluch Khan, Naosherwani, had been granted a fort called Bit in the district of Boleda in Mekran by the Khan of Kalat. This fort was occupied by Mir Azim Khan, Boledi, who held a sanad for its possession from the Khan of Kalat, and consequently refused to give it up. When the question was referred to the Agent to the Governor-General, it was given against Mir Baluch Khan, and this incensed him against the Nazim, as he considered that *he* was responsible for the decision. Mehrab Khan, Gitchki, is young, headstrong and an intriguer. He considers that he would have been Chief of the Kej Gitchkis if we (as represented by the late Sir Robert Sandeman) had not interfered to place his elder brother, Sheikh Omar, in that position. It seems certain that Mehrab Khan had been nominated by his father to the Chieftainship as being a far more capable man than Sheikh Omar. This, and apparently some quarrels with the Nazim, induced Mir Mehrab Khan to seize the opportunity of Dewan Udho Dass' being alone and comparatively unprotected, to make him a prisoner, and seize Turbat fort.

The leading men of Kej were the third factor in the rebellion, as they disapproved of the Nazim's system of taking revenue from all ranks alike; for the old practice, which was in force before the present form of Government had been established, consisted in the Khan's Naib making the various Chiefs of the petty Baluch tribes agents for the collection of revenue from their various tribesmen, for which work they enjoyed immunity from taxation.

Another cause of the recent rising, and failure of our present arrangements in Makran, is the undoubted unpopularity of the Nazim. I do not say that Dewan Udho Dass is a bad or corrupt officer, but he has the misfortune to be a Hindu ruling a Mussulman district, and as such was out of touch with the people, and seems to have been lacking in sympathy with them. It appears a doubtful policy to place a Hindu over a Muhammadan population, and we have seen the experiment fail before in Baluchistan, where I need only quote the example of Las Bela, in which State a very good and able Hindu official quite failed as Wazir, and where he has been successfully followed by a Mussalman. In addition to the above causes, the unrest, which existed along the North-West Frontier of India last year seems to have reached to Makran, and the news that an Englishman (Mr. Graves) had been murdered in South-Eastern Persia, and that our troops were heavily, and not always successfully, engaged with the Pathan tribesmen, tended to excite men's minds, and led to a belief that we were soon to be driven into the sea. It is not surprising, therefore, that, when the Makranis heard that the Nazim was a prisoner, many of them should have taken the opportunity to rise against the Khan of Kalat's authority and attack our survey camps.

9. We now come to the consideration of the best means by which the Khan of Kalat shall control Makran for the future. The plan advocated by the late Sir Robert Sandeman and Sir James Browne was to leave the collection of revenue and the executive charge of the district in the hands of the Khan's Naibs, but to place in Makran an English Political Officer, supported by a small escort of about 350 men and two mountain guns of the Indian Army. This officer would be able, in the interests of the Khan, Sirdars and

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

(82)

people, to see that His Highness's Naibs exercised no undue oppression, that the Gitchki and Naosherwani interests were kept in their proper places, and that order was maintained on the Persian frontier. I believe that all officers in any way responsible for this Agency have agreed that this arrangement is the best which can be devised, both for the good of Mekran and for ourselves; especially, when we consider the rapid advance southward of Russian emissaries and of the manner in which Persia is falling under the control of that power. But, as the Government of India have authoritatively declared that it does not approve of this plan, it has to be discarded.

10. The second plan is the one now in force. It provides for the presence of a Nazim of the Khan of Kalat for the whole of Makran and for the collection of taxes without favour from all parties. The Nazim was supported by ninety of the Khan's re-organised troops when the rising took place, but now the whole of that corps, some 260 strong, is in Makran. This body of men was raised for His Highness by a British officer lent to him for the purpose, and is called the "re-organised troops." It is divided into two portions, namely, 200 Infantry, who are nearly all Punjabis, and 60 Brahui Camelry. They are all well armed and equipped, and are trained and paid as sepoys of the Indian Army.

11. This system of government has proved a very expensive one for the Khan, and is unpopular with him and with the local Chiefs. The Nazim and his establishment cost some Rs. 26,000 per annum. The re-organised troops cost, when first raised as 200 Infantry, Rs. 52,000 per annum; but, since then, 65 Camelry have been raised, additional expenses have been incurred, and their cost is now roughly about Rs. 1,04,000 per annum as shown in Appendix No. 3. The cost of administration to the Khan is therefore some Rs 1,30,000 a year, while the income is about Rs. 40,000. He is therefore a dead loser by about Rs. 90,000 per annum, a large sum indeed for the Ruler of a mountainous and poor country to have to pay, and he naturally greatly objects to the arrangement. The Chiefs dislike the present form of government, because, under it, they are compelled to pay revenue, whereas, under the old Baluch system, they were merely tax-gatherers from the poor or less influential parties.

12. I have lately consulted with His Highness the Khan, some of the principal Chiefs of Baluchistan, the Nazim of Makran, Mr. Knox, and others on the best arrangement which we can now make for the future government of Makran. The general view is that the present system has failed. It is, as I have shown, unpopular with the Khan and with the Makran Chiefs, and its expense is prohibitive. But all those whom I have consulted agree, that if a real Baluch form of government is introduced gradually, and with care, it may succeed, and would be popular with the rulers and ruled. This Government would in great measure be a return to the ancient form of ruling by Naibs, but care will be taken by the grant of subsidies, and the placing of levy posts at various points to guard the Persian border and watch the Naosherwanis of Kharan. This scheme is as follows:—The Khan will place three Naibs in Makran, one at Turbat, one at Panjgur, and one in Kolwa, amalgamated with Mushkai. He will grant a small subsidy to the principal Rinds of Mand, and service to the Zamranis, and will place the following three thanas in the country:—

Mand	...	40 sowars.
Boleda	...	10 do.
Panjgur	...	20 do.

These sowars would be levies from either the Rinds or Bizenjos or a mixture of both, under perhaps Fakir Muhammad, the son of the Bizenjo Chief, Mir Khaira.

The cost of this plan would be as follows:—

	Rs.	
Subsidy to Rinds	... 1,200	per annum.
Service to Zamranis	... 1,200	do.
Thana of 40 men and 1 Jemadar at Mand ...	... 14,400	do.
do. 10 do. 1 do. at Boleda ...	... 3,600	do.
do. 20 do. 1 do. at Panjgur	... 7,200	do.
Total	... 27,600	do.

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It is calculated that the annual income of the Khan from Makran, if the revenue is collected by his Naibs under the former system, will at the lowest estimate be Rs. 15,000 per annum, after the Naibs have paid for themselves and their civil subordinates. The expenditure over income will, therefore, be some Rs. 12,600, but it must be remembered that there will be an annual saving effected of Rs. 26,000, by the abolition of the Nazim and his establishment, so that the Khan will really be a gainer by over Rs. 14,000 per annum.

13. It is contemplated under this arrangement to withdraw at least the Infantry of the Kalat re-organised troops from Makran. This body of men has not proved as useful as was hoped; being Punjabis or Gurkhas, they are out of touch with the people of the country, indeed they do not speak their language, and consequently are unable to move about without assistance. They look entirely to the British officer, who raised them, for pay and orders, and are really a body of troops loyal only to us, and are viewed by the Khan and his Naibs with distrust and dislike. They were not even always amenable to the orders of the Nazim, and so would be useless in Makran under the proposed Baluchi administration, even if they were willing to stay on there, which they are not. They are now claiming furlough, as they have served for three years, good-conduct pay, compensation for dearness of provisions, etcetera, which the Khan has agreed to give them as a temporary measure, pending a decision as to future arrangements. These concessions will probably keep the re-organised troops fairly contented until next winter, when I hope we may be able to bring the scheme I have proposed for the future Government of Makran into working order. When that has been accomplished, I would suggest that the Infantry of the "re-organised troops" shall be disbanded, and sent back to their homes in the Punjab, and the post of Military Adviser be abolished.

14. The question of the future of the 60 Brahui Camelry of the re-organised troops is another matter. They appear to be a fine body of men and camels, and are fully equipped like our own cavalry camel sowars. But they are not a tribal body under a Chief, and look alone to Captain Benn for leadership. It is possible that, in their present form, they may have to be broken up, and, if necessary, raised again as "levies"; but this is a matter which may be left for future consideration, as the present scheme develops.

15. Perhaps the greatest difficulty we shall have to face in Makran is the checking of Naosherwani encroachments, which are certain to recommence under the government of Naibs. We have now, however, a hold over Sir Naoroz Khan, which we have never had before, and it is that hold which I propose using. Some little time ago Sir Naoroz Khan married the rich widow of the late Kalat Mastaufi, who possesses valuable lands in the districts of Mangochar, Mastung, Quetta, and Kachhi, and I propose telling the Naosherwani Chief that we will only look after his interests in those lands if he on his part agrees to curb his tribesmen and his own greed for territory, and keep his hand off Makran. This I hope will have a good effect.

16. It will be noticed that Mr. Knox in Appendix B of his report No. 885, dated the 3rd May 1898, deals with the question of Naosherwani encroachments in Makran, and seem to suggest the advisability of demarcating the border between Kalat and Kharan. I mentioned this subject to His Highness the Khan; but he did not seem to consider it necessary, nor indeed to approve of it at all.

17. A point to be remembered in future is, that when the Political Agent of Kalat visits Makran, and when survey officers are sent there, they must be accompanied by proper escorts of Indian troops; and I quite agree with the remarks which Mr. Knox makes, in the 3rd paragraph of his report on the Makran revolt, about the future conduct of survey parties in the country.

18. I may, in conclusion, say that His Highness the Khan of Kalat fully approves of my proposal with regard to Makran and the Infantry of his "re-organised troops."

19. I trust the Government of India will permit the existing arrangements to continue in Mekran for another seven or eight months, and that in the

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meantime I may be allowed to gradually make arrangements for the introduction of the form of government I have sketched out in this report.

20. I consider that Mr. Knox should again visit Makran next winter, in order to start the new régime on a proper footing on the Khan's behalf, and that, meanwhile, he deserves great credit for the manner in which he has performed his work during the recent disturbance in that district. The Khan's Military Adviser might accompany Mr. Knox on this tour and arrange to pay up and disband the Infantry of the "re-organised troops."

21. I shall be glad if I could be furnished with printed copies of this report and its annexures.

APPENDIX 1.

No. 885, dated Kalat, the 3rd May 1898.

From—The Political Agent, Kalat,

To—The Agent to the Governor-General and Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan.

I have the honour to submit the following report on my late tour through Panjgur and the Jhallawan country.

2. On the 2nd November 1897, I started from Kalat, accompanied by an escort of the strength noted in the margin.

1 British officer and 100 rank and file, 24th Baluchis.
1 duffadar and 12 sowars, 5th Bombay Cavalry.

3. The following Chiefs and headmen of the country were also with me throughout my tour:—

Sardar Mohim Khan, Gurgnari.

Mir Samandar Khan, Lehri.

Mir Rahim Khan, Kurd.

Mir Isa Khan, Kuchik, Jemadar of Levies.

Mir Hazar Khan, Muhamad Shahi.

Mir Abdulla Jan, Muhamad Shahi.

Mir Tamaz Khan, Sirpara.

4. Mir Shams Shah, Extra Assistant Commissioner, on special duty, and the Political Adviser to His Highness the Khan, accompanied me as far as Gider, 80 miles from Kalat.

Several petty disputes were settled *en route*, while the more important matters were reserved for the Jhallawan Jirga, which was to assemble at Nal.

5. At Gidar, on the 8th November, I parted company with the Political Adviser who remained behind with some of the Jhallawan Chiefs and twenty-five sepoys under a havildar. It was necessary to leave these men behind to guard a portion of the rations which were required for our return journey and not procurable in the country.

Mir Shams Shah was directed to proceed slowly towards Nal, and, when there, to use his best endeavours to collect all the Jhallawan Chiefs and assemble a Jirga with a view to the settlement of the many long pending Jhallawan cases.

6. On the 11th of November, my party halted at Dhulari, a mere camping-ground on the further side of the inhospitable hilly country through which we had been marching steadily ever since leaving Gidar.

The camping-ground is about 3½ miles from Shireza Kalat, where there is a fort belonging to Sardar Sir Nauroz Khan, Naosherwani. There is some little cultivation in the vicinity.

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7. Here two roads to Makran branch off—one the Rakshan route through Shireza and Nagha Kalat, the other the Raghai by Saka Kalat. The former route is the shorter, but I was assured that, owing to no rain having fallen during the past two years, it was impracticable.

At Dhulari I was joined by Mir Yakub Khan, the son of the Naosherwani Sardar, who accompanied me as far as Panjgur and remained with me during my stay there.

8. At Pir Umar, some 8 miles from Isai, I was met by the Nazim of Makran, the Kardar of Panjgur, a few of the Kej Gitchkis and all the leading men in Panjgur.

9. Isai was reached on the 19th of November, and a week's halt was made, during which many important cases were settled by a local Jirga. A full settlement* (which I trust may prove lasting) was arrived at in the Panjgur Gitchki's case, and I enquired into the vexed question† of the Sung levied by Sardar Sir Nauroz Khan and the alleged encroachments of his sepoys within Makran boundaries, about which complaints innumerable have been received from both parties to the dispute.

* A translation of this settlement with a note on the case form Appendix *A* to this report.

† Appendix *B* show the general conclusions at which I arrived.

10. The number of cases disposed of at the Panjgur local Jirga is shewn below :—

Total number of cases decided	6
Left pending	0
Total ...	6

11. The temper of the people in Panjgur (and the Nazim reported a similar and rather more pronounced feeling in Kej) I found far from satisfactory. The anarchy and disorder prevailing on the Eastern Persian Frontier, together with the late disturbances among the Sarawan Chiefs, had unsettled men's minds. The Nazim told me that he had frequently been informed by the Gitchkis in Kej that the British and Persian Governments had ceased to exist, and a Baluchi millennium was at hand, when every body would be able to plunder and quarrel to his heart's content. I am inclined to think that the presence of a British officer with 100 sepoys has dispelled this pleasing illusion to which I referred in open Durbar with marked effect.

12. The revenues of Makran will suffer this year owing to the long continued drought, which has placed large tracts of country out of cultivation.

Kolwa is the only district in Makran in which rain fell during the year.

Many crops in Kej have been ravaged by locusts, and the damage done has been very considerable.

13. Mir Baluch Khan, the famous Naosherwani freebooter, who visited the Agent to the Governor-General at Quetta last year, did not come to meet me at Panjgur. He sent a letter, however, which reached me on arrival, in which he abused the Nazim, alleging many causes of complaint; notably the decision lately given against him at Quetta in the matter of Bit fort, with which the Nazim had nothing to do. Many of the complaints were of such a vague and general character that it is hard to believe that they have any foundation in fact.

It is probable that Mir Baluch Khan's non-attendance at Isai was neither due to any real disaffection nor indicative of any intention to return to his old evil courses.

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

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He has the common oriental idea that he increases his own importance by keeping people waiting, and that his dignity requires at least three or four letters and a special messenger to summon him.

14. Diwan Udho Dass's zeal and ability have been frequently brought to your notice by officers visiting Makran. I can only add my testimony to the truth of their remarks. He has a very difficult duty to perform, and the way it is carried out is beyond all praise.

15. With important matters in the Jhallawan country and Kachhi to attend to, it was impossible for me to wait Mir Baluch Khan's pleasure, and the camp broke up on the 25th and we started for Nal.

Our route as far as Saka Kalat was the one by which we had come, but here we broke off to the right down the Tank stream formed by the junction of the Raghai and Gitchk.

16. Some three marches from Saka Kalat brought us into the Mashkai valley, a little below Gwarjak, where there is a strong hill fort, built by Sirdar Azad Khan, father of the present Naosherwani Chief.

17. Passing through Jebri at the head of the Mashkai valley we were met by Mir Rustom Khan, the son of Sirdar Shahbaz Khan, Muhamad Hussani.

The Sirdar of this powerful tribe appears to be a man of considerable enterprise and intelligence.

We saw at his village some really respectable buildings and some karezes newly opened; while the people seemed contented and of a better class than usual. We found here more cultivation than at many places we had passed on our line of march, where cultivable land with an abundant supply of water lay desolate and neglected.

18. Two more marches brought us to Nal on the 5th December. Here Mir Shams Shah, with the valuable assistance of Syed Bahar Shah of Dhadar and Khan Bahadur Mir Yusuf Khan had done most excellent work.

The Jhallawan Chiefs, notably Sirdar Passand Khan, Zarakzai, the head of the Jhallawans, Sirdar Shahbaz Khan, Muhamad Hussani, and Mir Fakir Muhamad, son of the Bezenjoe Sirdar, had heartily co-operated with them, and the results were most gratifying.

Many most difficult long pending cases had come to a satisfactory conclusion.

The Mengal case, which has baffled the Jirgas for years, has been settled amicably, and both parties express themselves perfectly satisfied.

The Jhattak-Moosiani dispute, over which a score of lives have been sacrificed, was brought to a satisfactory conclusion at the end of the tour.

19. The number of cases decided by the Jhallawan Jirgas are shewn below :—

Decided	87
Left pending	26
TOTAL ...	113

20. This record, however, does not take any count of the number of trifling claims disposed of by Mir Shams Shah.

It was found impossible for the clerks to keep pace with the work, and many unimportant cases were settled by mutual consent by the Sirdars, and there seemed to be no good reason for burdening the offices with useless records.

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It is confidently expected that the parties will have the common sense to rest satisfied with these informal decisions, and that they will never again be heard of.

21. The decision arrived at in two most important cases, *i.e*, the Mengal and the Jhattak-Moosiani disputes, will be found in Appendices C and D to this report.

22. A most marked change has come over the Jhallawan Sirdars.

When I met them in Kalat last summer, they were sulky, disobedient and dilatory.

Now they appear to have really made a determined effort to work well together, and live at peace with their neighbours and one another.

I am convinced that this tour has had a beneficial effect, and would strongly recommend that the experiment be repeated and the Jhallawan country be traversed thoroughly every year or at least every other year by the Political Agent or the Political Adviser.

23. It only remains for me to bring to your notice the admirable assistance rendered me by my escort and the various Chiefs who accompanied me.

Lieutenant Twigg and his sepoys worked loyally with me throughout a long and trying tour. The health of the troops was perfect, their conduct absolutely unexceptionable, and my best thanks are due to the officer in command and his men.

As for the Chiefs and headmen who came with me, where all worked so well, it would be invidious to make distinctions.

Mir Shams Shah's work has already been alluded to above. No further comment is required.

Sirdar Mohim Khan, Gurgnari, Mir Samandar Khan, Lehri, and Mir Rahim Khan, Kurd, were my stand by in every difficulty, and fully justified the trust I reposed in them.

The Chiefs of lesser note were most useful. They worked cheerfully through many difficulties and hardships.

The assistance given me by the Naosherwanis in providing supplies—no easy task—was most valuable. Mir Yakub Khan at Panjgur I found most reasonable and ready to help. It was unfortunate that Sirdar Sir Nauroz Khan could not grant him a "Mukhtiarnama," as I was, therefore, obliged to leave many important cases pending, in which the Naosherwani Sirdar was concerned.

I hope that next year the Sirdar will himself be able to accompany me, and some of the important questions with which Appendix B is concerned may be set at rest.

P.S.—I regret very much the delay that has occurred in the submission of this report. It was, with the exception of a few details, ready for submission last January, when I was suddenly called away by the disturbances in Kej and Kalwa. I have purposely left the bulk of the report, and all remarks connected with the general feeling of the people, etc., unaltered, as I considered it best to show what was the impression I had formed of the State of Makran before the disturbances arose.

APPENDIX A.

Translation of an agreement, dated the 22nd November 1897, made between Sirdar Abdulla Khan and his uncle, Mir Muhamad Ali Khan, Gitchkis.

We the undersigned Mir Muhamad Ali Khan and Sirdar Abdulla Khan, Gitchkis, promise and give a written agreement, in a proper state of health and sense without any force or pressure, to the effect that we by our own free will

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

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and choice have settled our claims and quarrels about Sirdari rights and estates between ourselves as shewn below :—

I. Gitchk valley which belongs to the Gitchkis by hereditory rights. Its one-third share will belong to Mir Muhamad Ali Khan and two-thirds to Sirdar Abdulla Khan Gitchki.

II. Sordo fort which is the property of Sirdar Abdulla Khan will remain in his possession and Mir Muhamad Ali Khan will lodge in Washbod.

III. Sirdar Abdulla Khan will have the " Right of Sirdari " of Sordo fort and the whole property left behind by the late Bibi Maryam will go to her three daughters and their heirs.

IV. The Sirdari right according to the custom of Kej and Panjgur is due to Mir Abdulla Khan and he will enjoy the same ; and Mir Muhamad Ali Khan has no claim to it ; but Abdulla Khan will be bound to give something as subsistence allowance to Mir Muhamad Ali Khan as decided by the officers of the time, provided Mir Muhamand Ali Khan serves both the Government and the Sirdar faithfully and honestly.

V. Mir Muhamad Ali Khan will give his daughter in marriage to Abdulla Khan according to the settlement made by Colonel Reynolds ; and Sirdar Abdulla Khan will give as much dowry " Lab " as Mir Azim Khan son of Mir Muhamad Ali Khan had given to Abdulla Khan's sister.

Sealed Sirdar Abdulla Khan Gitchki.

Sealed Mir Muhamad Ali Khan Gitchki.

Sealed Kauda Muhamad Khan Naib of Panjgur and guardian of Sardar Abdulla Khan.

Signed and sealed and verified before me this day 22nd of November 1897.

(Signed) S. G. KNOX, *Lieutenant,*

Political Agent, Kalat.

Translation of the award of Jirga, in the case of Sirdar Abdulla Khan and Mir Muhamad Ali Khan, Gitchkis, dated the 22nd November 1897.

To-day this agreement was executed between Sirdar Abdulla Khan and Mir Muhamad Ali Khan Gitchki, and presented before us the members of Jirga, by the parties.

In the opinion of Jirga the mutual agreement arrived at between the parties is acceptable and the Jirga recommend that it may be confirmed (by Political Agent, Kalat).

Signed Dewan Udho Dass, Nazim of Makran.

Signed Syed Abid Hussain, Kardar of Panjgur.

Sealed Mir Muhamad Yakub Khan, son of Sir Nauroz Khan Naosherwani.

Sealed Mir Abdul Karim, Gitchki.

Sealed Mir Sher Muhamad, Gitchki, of Nasirabad.

Sealed Naib Moosa Khan.

Sealed Mir Mohim Khan, Gurgnari.

Sealed Mir Samandar Khan, Lehri.

Sealed Mir Rahim Khan, Kurd.

Sealed Mir Isa Khan, Rind.

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Sealed Kauda Muhamad Khan Naib of Panjgur.
Sealed Mir Tamaz Khan Sarpara.
Sealed Mir Hazar Khan Muhamad Shahi.
Sealed Mir Ali Naib of Khudabadan.
Sealed Mulla Mihrol Mullazai.
Sealed Mulla Abdul Rahman Mullazai.
Sealed Nabi Bux Kenagizai I.
Signed Nabi Bux Kenagizai II.
Signed Mir Muhamad Raki.
Signed Kamal Khan Gitchki.
Sealed Nur Muhammad Gitchki.
Sealed Abdulla Khan Muhamad Shahi.
Jirga recommendation approved.

CAMP ISAI ;
22nd November 1897.

(Signed) S. G. KNOX, *Lieutenant,*
Political Agent, Kalat.

APPENDIX B.

Note on the Kharan-Kalat boundary, the Sung on the Panjgur-Kalat and Kolwa-Kalat routes and the encroachments committed by Naosherwani Sepoys and others within Makran limits.

It is best to explain at the commencement that conversation with the people of the country convinces an impartial observer that there is, at present, properly speaking, no Kharan-Kalat boundry. The rights alleged rest on a very shallow foundation. It is only within quite recent years that there has been, in this part of the country, any exception to " The good old rule the simple plan that he should take who has the power and he should keep who can. "

2. I would disclaim here any authority for this note. It has been compiled from stray conversation, notes made here and there and is simply intended to give a general idea of the opinions of the people who live on the border and are naturally most interested.

3. Commencing from the extreme west, B. P. 2 of the Parso-Baluch Commission, we pass to a point where the Rod-i-Mashkel and Rakshan join to form the Tank-i-Gwarag and thence follow the watershed of the Rakshan to somewhere near the Seminj pass, where the boundary takes a sharp turn to the south on to the Rakshan river. Here the first serious difference of opinion arises, the Naosherwani Sardar says that the boundary should cut the river at Sardar-i-Chah, the Khan says at Kenig-i-Chah. The boundary now crosses the river and climbs the hills on the opposite side, traverses the watershed of Rakshan and Gitchk to Zangilak and thence drops into the valley. We leave Saka-Kalat on our right and make for the Gitchk, follow that stream to its junction with the Raghai and so down along their united waters; we pass Pashtkoh on the right of the river, where Sardar Sir Nouroz Khan has a sung post (of which more hereafter) and finally arrive at Awar, the junction of the Tank and Mashkai.

Here again we find the parties cannot agree.

Sardar Sir Nauroz Khan declares that the boundary should now go south for some five miles to a point Dahira-na-bent, thereby including cultivable land on the bank of the Mashkai.

This would seem to be a very unnatural line for it to take, but it is only fair to the Sardar to say that the whole of the strip from Dahira-na-bent to Gwarjak is, to its sorrow, a slice of " no man's land " or rather every man's land.

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

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The result is that it is parcelled out into a number of small holdings, and a fixed boundary is an impossibility. It is, for Baluchistan, fertile, with an unlimited supply of water; it is capable of great improvement and one need not go far to seek the reason. Khan's Naib and Naosherwani Naib rob every one in turn. The powerful Muhamad Hussani Sardar is not far off at Jebri, and, no doubt, occasionally gleans the crop.

It is perhaps a little above Baluch Khan's usual raiding routes, but his grandson Muhamad Umar's name is not unknown in these parts. Many people would be glad enough to catch him off his guard.

At Gwarjak there is a Naosherwani fort built some years ago by Azad Khan, the father of the present Sardar.

From Gwarjak the boundary is forced back to the north again to the watershed of the Mashkai and Raghai and runs north-east to the Doleri, a tributary of the former. It cuts the Doleri not far from its junction with the Mashkai probably at the point where the torrent takes a sharp turn northwards.

Again we come to a place where there is the making of a very pretty quarrel.

A tract of country called Kadak lies not far to the north-east. It is cultivated by the men of four sub-divisions or "takrs" of the Sajedi tribe.

Nauroz Khan maintains that he gave this land to these men and therefore claims Sardari rights over them. The Sajedi Sardar, Hayat Khan, disputes this claim. Blood has already been shed in this dispute, and it is absolutely necessary that the question should be enquired into and final orders given.

The boundary, when settled, will either include Kadak or skirt its northern border. Thence it appears to run fairly straight northwards about equally distant from the Gidar Dhar and the Garuk river, until it loses itself in the barren low hills some distance below and to the west of Nirnurgh.

4. Enough has been said to prepare the way for some explanation of the difficulties which surround the question of Nauroz Khan's right to levy Sung on the roads between Panjgur and Kolwa in Makran and Kalat.

It will be seen that he holds an almost undisputed title to the Rakshan and Raghai valleys, in which the two nearest routes to Kalat from Panjgur lie.

He has extended his influence over the Tank and lately established a thana at Pashtkoh, where the rough Soler hill track enters the Tank. This stops a possible escape for the carvans by the Mashkai route, even supposing that a Panjgur carvan would take the trouble to add four days to its journey.

5. In the Mashkai, the highway from Kalat to Kolwa, the Naosherwani power is considerable. As yet the Sardar has made no attempt to levy "Sung" at Gwarjak,* but the Makran people declare that he has stopped the route from Kolwa somewhere below. The evidence is very conflicting. Unfortunately I was unable to visit the spot with the complainants who admitted that they had only heard a rumour to this effect.

*Recent enquiries have proved that, though the Sardar and his Naib do not claim Sung rights here, the Naosherwani sepoys have recently in the short period between my two visits to Makran commenced robbing passers-by on this pretence.

6. "L'appétit vient en mangeant" Nauroz Khan has lately, *i.e.*, within the last two years, established five new chowkis for the collection of Sung.

If this propensity is not checked, he will certainly commence the levy of Sung in the Mashkai before long, if he has not already done so.

7. Of these five posts the first was dignified by the name of a chowki. An impudent robber, Paku, a Naosherwani slave, established himself in Seh Gazan and took whatever he could get, using the Sardar's name as a shield.

In a settlement lately concluded in Quetta, these lands had been given by the Sardar to Mir Ghulam Muhamad, a Naosherwani, and were only

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obtained by the Naosherwanis originally in a border foray. They lie well south of the Rakshan river beyond Isai, and the right to the Sung is absolutely imaginary.

I had, therefore, no compunction in ordering the Nazim to arrest Paku, wherever found, if he repeated this practice. I told Mir Yakub Khan to recall him at once and warned him that any body attempting to collect dues in those districts would be arrested. I wrote to Sardar Sir Nauroz to this effect.

8. Another chowki no amount of searching in the maps enabled me to discover. I gathered however that it was somewhere well to the north of the Rakshan, and stopped a route into Kharan country. There seemed to be no particular objection to this, and I refused to interfere in the absence of orders.

9. Two more chowkis were placed—the one at Kenig-i-Chah and the other at Pasht Koh. As these are apparently within Sir Nauroz Khan's territory, I did not interfere in the absence of orders.

10. The fifth chowki was the one which is alleged to have been posted in the Mashkai, but against this I must write a verdict of "Not proven."

11. These chowkis are an intolerable nuisance. Nauroz's sepoys come down into Makran limits, on the pretence of levying "Sung," grazing tax, and other rights, real or imaginary.

12. The grazing tax abuse is a crying one. Encouraged by impunity, the smaller Jhallawan Sardars follow Nauroz's example, and small parties of banditti wander over the hills and plunder the wretched shepherds of a sheep or two whenever they can.

When the robbers are hungry and in want of a dinner, they are naturally not particular as to where they get it from.

13. I gave orders to the Nazim and have since told all Sardars, who are concerned, that they must, at least in Makran limits, seek the aid of the proper authorities, and that any man, unauthorized and found levying this tax, whether he can prove that he is in the right or no, will be arrested.

This particular order has, much to my surprise, had some effect, and the various Sardars have asked for the assistance of Government officials in the most exemplary manner.

The Nazim declares that he can, with the help that the people will give him willingly, enforce these orders, but whether he can or no, at least the Sardars cannot, in future, plead ignorance.

It is possible that some good may be done by these recent orders, though I confess I am not sanguine.

APPENDIX C.

Translation of the Jirga decision in the case between Sardar Umr Khan, Moosiani, and Sardar Shahbaz Khan, Jhattak, dated 22nd December 1897.

The case about the quarrels which have been taken place between the Sardars Umr Khan, Moosiani, and Shahbaz Khan, Jhattak, and about the many men who have been killed and wounded on both sides, has to-day been placed before us, the members of the Jirga in the presence of both parties.

We have also examined the file No. 138 Political of the office of the Political Agent, Kalat and Bolan. From this examination it appears that, since the year 1888, the questions alluded to above have been pending between the parties, and that Major Temple, formerly Political Agent, Kalat, in the year 1889, decided the case in the following way:—Sardar Shahbaz Khan, Jhattak, was to pay Rs. 11,200 as bloodmoney for 7½ deaths to Sardar Umr Khan, Moosiani. But, as late as 1896, it appears that that decision had not been carried

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

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out, for blood was shed in later times about which the Jirga of the 18th September 1896 decided that Rs. 12,000 should be paid as bloodmoney and compensation for plunder by the Moosiani Sardar to Sardar Shahbaz Khan, Jhattak. From the first Rs. 11,200, which the Jhattaks were to pay, Rs. 200 were paid by the Jhattaks to the Lotanis, and the remainder was still due from Sardar Shahbaz Khan, Jhattak. And by the decision, dated 18th September 1896, Rs. 12,000 were due from the Moosiani Sardar. But, after the decision of the Rs. 11,000, the Moosianis killed two Jhattaks, whose bloodmoney, according to the custom of the country, was Rs. 3,000 to be paid by the Moosianis. Deducting this Rs. 3,000 from the Rs. 11,000, we find that Rs. 8,000 were due from the Jhattak Sardar to the Moosiani Sardar. When this Rs. 8,000 is taken into account with the Rs. 12,000, to be paid by the Moosiani Sardar, a balance is arrived out of Rs. 4,000 due from the Moosiani Sardar to the Jhattak Sardar.

The members of the Jirga, in addition to the Rs. 4,000 bloodmoney, decreed a sum of Rs. 1,000 on account of various other claims in favour of Sardar Shahbaz Khan, Jhattak. Thus, according to this decision, Rs. 5,000 in all were due from Sardar Umr Khan, Moosiani, to Sardar Shahbaz Khan, Jhattak. Afterwards in June 1897 Sardar Shahbaz Khan, Jhattak, being dissatisfied with the decision of 1896, raised a following, and attacked the Moosiani village. In this attack, five men of the Jhattaks were killed and sixteen wounded by the Moosianis; and on the side of the Moosianis the lawful wife of Sardar Umr Khan, Moosiani, died by the hand of the Jhattaks, and another person was wounded.

The Jhattak Sardar explains his action by saying that he was dissatisfied with the decision of 1896. By this action of his, *i.e.*, not abiding by the decision of 1896 all the old trouble came up anew. This is a most difficult and intricate case and one of very long-standing between the two Sardars, and from the file it is apparent that never yet has there been any true or heart-felt reconciliation, and this is the reason why, in carrying out the decisions, so much difficulty has been experienced. We, the members of the Jirga, with a view to a decision, have taken the greatest care and looked at the matter from every point of view. The result has been that to-day Sardar Umr Khan, Moosiani, taking with him Sardar Pasand Khan, Zarakzai, Syed Mir Bahar Shah, and all the Jhallawar Sardars, has gone to Sardar Shahbaz Khan, Jhattak, and implored him to put an end to their differences, and for this reason has taken all the Sardars with him to intercede for him.

Sardar Shahbaz Khan, Jhattak, has also agreed to his proposal, and said that he also wishes a settling up of accounts between them, and that no further cause of quarrel may remain.

Sardars Shahbaz Khan, Jhattak, and Umr Khan, Moosiani, with one accord, have informed the Jirga that, concerning their ancient quarrels about bloodmoney, wounds and various kinds of compensation, all claims except the bloodmoney of Sona and Badal Jhattaks have been settled between them the two parties, by mutual good will and consent in consequence of the intercession of the Jhallawar Sardars and other notables, and no claims now remain, and they will not make any in future.

This decision has been arrived at with perfect consent and purity of heart, against which they will never rebel, and this decision also covers the decision of 18th September 1896.

Sardar Shahbaz Khan especially declares that, although his claims against the Moosiani are larger than the opposing claim against himself, he has of his own free will, because of the intercession above alluded to, pardoned everything to the Moosiani Sardar.

Sardar Pasand Khan, Zarakzai, Syed Mir Bahar Shah, and other Sardars, who want to intercede with Sardar Shahbaz Khan, Jhattak, confirm this statement, and declare that both parties have entirely abondoned their respective

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claim. Except the bloodmoney of Sona and Babal Jhattaks, everything remaining has been pardoned to the Moosiani Sardar. About these two claims the Moosiani Sardar has admitted that the bloodmoney is due from him, and he confesses their murder.

Hence, in accordance with the custom of the country, Rs. 3,000 has been fixed as the aforesaid bloodmoney, which the Moosiani Sardar will pay to the Jhattak Sardar, as agreed by him. In addition to the bloodmoney, we the members of the Jirga have thought it advisable to impose a fine of Rs. 1,000 on the Moosiani Sardar, which he has cheerfully agreed to pay to the Government, and we have decided not to impose any fine on the Jhattak Sardar, because he has cheerfully abandoned his claim on the Moosiani Sardar, and with a clear heart has become reconciled to him.

On this account it is right to treat him with clemency.

Sardar Umr Khan has asked for time to enable him to pay the full Rs. 4,000, and we, with the consent of both parties, have agreed that the Moosiani Sardar shall pay the amount within two years in two equal instalments.

The first instalment of Rs. 2,000, which includes the Government fine, will be paid on the 22nd December 1898. The second will be paid on the same date in the following year.

As the question of the bloodmoney of Sona and Badal Jhattaks has been decided, the Jhattak and Moosiani Sardars have agreed in the presence of the entire Jirga, that now all their former quarrels have been disposed of for ever, and now between them no claim or dispute remains. They will honestly and truthfully abide by this decision in future.

Therefore a detailed agreement executed by them forms part of the file. And now, because these very intricate and long pending disputes have been with the good will and consent of both parties finally put an end to, it is hoped that in future they will remain at peace, and no further claim or quarrel will remain, and they will live amicably, and the Jirga congratulate themselves on the success of their strenuous exertions. Therefore this report is put forward with a view to final sanction.

Signed Mir Shams Shah, Political Adviser to His Highness the Khan.

Seal of Sardar Pasand Khan, Zarakzai.

Seal of Sardar Mir Rustom Khan, Mohamad Hussani.

Seal of Mir Fakir Mohamad Khan, Bizanjo.

Seal of Sardar Umr Khan, Moosiani.

Seal of Sardar Shahbaz Khan, Jhattak.

Seal of Sardar Sultan Mohamad Khan, Harooni.

Seal of Sardar Mohim Khan, Gurgnari.

Seal of Mir Wali Mohamad Khan, Mengal.

Seal of Mir Moosa Khan, Bajoi.

Seal of Rais Misri Khan.

Seal of Mir Jamshir Khan, Dayan.

Mark of Sardar Kamal Khan, Sayadzai.

Seal of Khalifa Abdul Karim.

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

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APPENDIX D.

Translation of the award of local Jirga, dated 21st December 1897, in the case:

MIR IBRAHIM KHAN, SON OF MIR RAHIM KHAN, MENGAL OF WADH,

versus

SIRDAR SHAKAR KHAN, SON OF SIRDAR NURDIN OF WADH.

Claim Rajdari.

To-day in the presence of both the parties this case was placed before us the members of Jirga. The file together with the Jirga award of the 26th September 1896 and the statement of Mir Hamza Mengal was read over.

From the correspondence in the file and from the evidence of the parties themselves it appears that there are two disputes to be settled:—

(1) Mir Hamza Mengal complains that Sirdar Shakar Khan cannot control his tribe. He ought to prove this, and, in the event of his failing to do so, should be punished.

(2) There is a dispute between Sirdar Shakar Khan and Mir Ibrahim Khan as to the collection of revenue, etc., from the members of the tribe and as to the control of the tribe.

The parties declare that the case was settled in the Sibi Jirga of the 2nd February 1897, but Mir Wali Muhamad (son of Mir Ibrahim Khan) says that Sirdar Shakar Khan does not abide by the orders contained in the settlement referred to.

These two questions have to-day been fully discussed.

As regards the first dispute, Sirdar Shakar Khan says that at the time Mir Hamza complained against him he was opposed to him owing to certain private disagreements.

At that time Sirdar Shakar Khan and Mir Ibrahim Khan were not on friendly terms with each other at the time, and now both the parties have been reconciled and are at peace. In those days Mir Hamza, seeing that the parties were at variance, complained against Sirdar Shakar Khan, but now the Sirdar humbly requests and strongly recommends that, as he and Mir Ibrahim Khan have been reconciled, no explanations may be required from Mir Hamza in this matter, for he has also been reconciled with him.

As regards the second dispute, Sirdar Shakar Khan says that he has willingly settled the matter with Mir Ibrahim Khan and that both the parties have settled this matter by mutual consent, and there are no further disputes between them. He agrees to abide by the Jirga settlement made at Sibi on the 2nd February 1897.

Mir Wali Muhamad, who is the attorney from Mir Ibrahim Khan, approves of this, and says that, as explained by Sirdar Shakar Khan, his case has been settled amicably. Sirdar Shakar Khan also says that he and Mir Wali Muhamad have both approved of this settlement of the second dispute before the Political Agent, Kalat, and there is no further dispute about this.

As regards Sirdar Shakar Khan's recommendation to the first dispute, we the members of the Jirga in compliance with the request of Sirdar Shakar Khan recommend that Mir Hamza may be pardoned.

As regards the second dispute both the parties have been reconciled, and say that they approve of and are bound to carry out the award of the Jirga of 2nd February 1897, and that there is no further dispute between them. We the members of the Jirga forward this report for favour of approval.

(Signed) Mir Shams Shah, Political Adviser to His Highness the Khan.

Seal of Sardar Pasand Khan.

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Seal of Mir Rustom Khan, Muhamad Hussani.
Seal of Mir Fakir Muhamad, Bezenjo.
Seal of Sardar Sultan Muhamad, Harooni.
Seal of Mir Wali Muhamad, Mengal.
Seal of Sirdar Mohim Khan, Gurgnari.
Seal of Mir Karim Buksh, Khidrani.
Seal of Mir Abdul Karim, Zarakzai.
Seal of Din Muhamad, Pandrani.

Translation of an Ikrarnama by Mir Wali Muhamad, son of Mir Ibrahim Khan, Mengal, and Sirdar Shakar Khan, Mengal.

CLAIM FOR DISTRIBUTION OF LANDS OF WADH, ETC.

There is a dispute between us as to the distribution of the lands in Wadh, etc., which belong to us mutually. For the distribution of the above lands, we by our mutual consent appoint Mir Fakir Muhamad, Bezenjo, our arbitrator, with a view that he should properly divide the lands between ourselves. We shall approve of the distribution and settlement of our land shares by him in every respect, and we shall not bring any objections against his decision.

We therefore beg to present this Ikrarnama regarding the arbitration of Mir Fakir Muhamad in this case, and request that it may be approved of.

Seal of Sirdar Shakar Khan.
Seal of Mir Wali Muhamad.

To-day both the parties brought this Ikrarnama before us the members of the Jirga and confirmed and consented to it in our presence.

As this is a serious case and concerns the distribution of land shares which cannot be settled without an arbitrator and as the parties agree that Mir Fakir Muhamad, Bezenjo, shall divide their lands between them, we the members of Jirga therefore recommend that the parties should present this Ikrarnama for approval.

(Signed) Mir Shams Shah, Political Adviser to His Highness the Khan.

Seal of Sirdar Pasand Khan.
Sealed by Sirdar Shakar Khan, Mengal.
Seal of Mir Fakir Muhamad, Bezenjo.
Seal of Mir Rustom Khan.
Seal of Sirdar Sultan Muhamad, Harooni.
Seal of Mir Wali Muhamad, Mengal.
Seal of Sirdar Karim Baksh, Khidrani.
Seal of Sirdar Shahbaz Khan, Lathani.
Seal of Sirdar Kamal Khan, Syadzai.
Seal of Khalifa Abdul Karim.
Seal of Sardar Umr Khan, Moosiani.

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APPENDIX 2.

No. 921-B., dated Quetta, the 6th May 1893.

From—The Political Agent, Kalat,

To—The Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.

I have the honour to submit a report on the late disturbances in Makran and showing the steps taken to restore order throughout the country.

To avoid confusion, I thought it advisable to describe generally the progress of events in Makran during the past five months, leaving some matters to be dealt with in full detail in the appendices, attached to the report.

2. At 1 A.M. on the morning of the 6th January 1898, at Turbat in Kej, Mir Mehrab Khan, Gitchki, made a treacherous attack on the Nazim of Makran, Diwan Udho Dass, and took him prisoner.

In the confusion attending this attack, a levy sowar and a Hindu treasurer were killed.

Mir Mehrab Khan then proceeded to treat with the havildar in command of the party of the Kalat State Troops, holding Turbat fort, with the result that the fort with a certain amount of Kalat State property fell into the hands of the rebels.

The Nazim, however, was released and managed to escape to Kalatuk, where he was sheltered by the Khan's Naib, Mir Abdul Karim, Gitchki. The Nazim's report on the march of events before my arrival at Turbat forms Appendix I.

3. Mir Mehrab Khan had thus successfully established a revolution in Kej. He now sent messages to his brother, Mir Rustam Khan, who had been appointed as escort to Captain Burn, Royal Engineers, the officer in charge of No. 24 Survey Party, working in the Kolwa hills.

Mir Rustam Khan concerted an attack with Mir Baluch Khan, Noshirwani, on the survey main camp, while Captain Burn was out on a hill some miles away.

The attack was in every way successful. A large quantity of loot was secured, many men of the party were killed, and much valuable property destroyed.

As I understand Captain Burn has issued a full report on this outrage, I shall here confine myself to a few general remarks and recommendations for the future conduct of survey parties in this country.

Mir Rustom Khan's part in the affair is absolutely indefensible. Even from the point of view of a Baluch, which is often held to excuse acts which our stricter morality would condemn without hesitation, his attack was treacherous in the highest degree. At the same time, I am inclined to think that the survey party would have suffered less and perhaps even remained unmolested, if they had not taken with them two temptations, irresistible to a frontier tribesman.

In the first place, there were a large number of rifles which, it may be remarked in passing, proved useless when the emergency, for which they had been provided, arose. These rifles were in the possession of men who had little, or no, knowledge of how to use them. It is of the first importance that, if rifles are carried at all, they should be in the hands of regular troops.

In the second place, Captain Burn had arranged to take with him all the money required for the payment of his party for a period of nearly six months. This sum amounted to nearly Rs. 20,000 at the time of the attack. I would strongly recommend that, in future, the survey officer should not keep with him more than, at the outside, Rs. 5,000 for working expenses. It would be simple enough to arrange with the Local Government and the bunniahs for small supplies of money as they were needed.

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4. To return to Turbat, Mir Mehrab Khan, Gitchki, was joined a few days later by his brother and Mir Baluch Khan.

The number of the rebels increased rapidly, as the news of their success was spread abroad. Appendix II shows a list of the principal leaders, the various acts of hostility for which each was responsible, where they now are, and the punishment awarded to each delinquent.

Small parties of the rebels moved in the direction of the sea coast, looted Pasni and virtually destroyed all the telegraph lines from Pasni to Gwadur. They attempted with some success to drive off camels from the country between Ormara and Pasni, as Mir Mehrab Khan rightly judged that an advance of troops from Ormara would be hindered, or even absolutely stopped, if camels were not forthcoming.

They threatened the loyal Chiefs, who were protecting the Khan's representative at Kalatuk, and did all in their power to induce them to join the revolt. Some of their methods were truly ludicrous. Mir Abdul Karim and Sardar Sh'Omer were informed by the mullahs that, if they persisted in thwarting the triumph of Islam, they would become monkeys with long tails.

5. As soon as Captain Burn's telegram was received in Karachi, the General Officer Commanding detached a wing of the 30th Bombay Infantry under Colonel Mayne to Ormara. This prompt action was of the greatest service. The news spread quickly and convinced the wavering that the British Government intended to support the Khan's representative, while the more intelligent Chiefs realized that the suppression of the rebellion was only a matter of time.

6. I joined Colonel Mayne's column on the 17th January at Ormara. Transport difficulties delayed our departure for Pasni, whither it was decided to change the base of operations, until the 20th. We reached Pasni on the 25th, and here the column was increased to 400 infantry and two mountain guns.

On the 27th, Colonel Mayne's force started for Turbat. I remained behind to help on the cavalry who arrived on the 27th. We left Pasni on the morning of the 28th and caught up the main body on the morning of the 31st.

We were just in time for the fight. Baluch Khan with his following, estimated at about 1,500 men, had decided to oppose Colonel Mayne's advance on Turbat at a defile, called Gok-Prusht. The enemy's flanks were turned, and their defeat was complete. They fled in disorder, leaving Mir Baluch Khan and Mir Mehrab Khan, Noshirwanis, and Mir Shukr Ullah, an influential Gitchki from Tump, dead on the field. Their total loss in killed and wounded may be estimated at about 150. Our own loss was small.

7. The force marched into Turbat that evening and found the fort occupied by Mir Mehrab Khan, Gitchki. It was watched night and day but not attacked, as it was considered necessary to await the arrival of explosives and of the sappers and miners.

The sappers and miners marched in on the evening of the 2nd of February, and an attack was planned for the following morning, when a report was brought in that Mir Mehrab Khan had escaped during the night.

8. I received information that Mir Sher Muhammad, Gitchki, of Nasirabad was harbouring some of Mir Mehrab Khan's family, and it was resolved to surround and surprise his fort of Charbuk. This was done by the cavalry and the Kalat State troops from Nasirabad. The main body came up on the morning of the 4th, and a parley was held. Mir Sher Muhammad was informed that we intended to search his fort and examine all the men to see if any of Mir Mehrab Khan's following were there. He consented, and the fort was searched, but nothing could be found to implicate Sher Muhammad. Two regrettable incidents occurred. It was necessary, in order to give the surprise a chance of success, to order the cavalry not to allow anybody to issue

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

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from the fort, until the remainder of the force arrived; and a man was shot down as he came out into the darkness. Some desultory firing followed from the fort, which was replied to by our piquets, and another Makrani was wounded.

Again, with Mir Sher Muhammad shut up in Charbuk and no responsible person to arrange for supplies, the troops had to take what they could get; some damage was done to the crops, and some goats were killed by the men.

The decision of these just grievances was referred to an arbitrator, nominated by Mir Sher Muhammad, and, what is rare on these occasions, agreed to by the other party, myself, as representing the Government.

Mir Sher Muhammad's choice fell on Naib Mir Moosa Khan, Rekizai, the Khan's Naib of Lehri. I have already had the pleasure of testifying, in my Panjgur report, to his excellent qualities, which were again in evidence on this occasion. His decision was very fair and, as far, as I could judge, satisfied both parties.

A copy of it forms Appendix III, and I trust that the settlement arrived at will meet with your approval.

Such accidents must occur, when a force moves through a hostile country, and I think this a fitting opportunity to bring to your notice the admirable discipline maintained by Colonel Mayne throughout the whole force during the operations in Makran. This case of Sher Muhammad and some very excusable mistakes which occurred on the first day after our arrival in Turbat, when some Chiefs were disarmed, were the only occasions on which the friendly natives of the country had any reason to complain of the Makran Field Force.

It should not be forgotten that Mir Sher Muhammad is not entitled to any great sympathy. He has always been troublesome, and his conduct during the rising has been by no means unflinchingly loyal.

Before the troops arrived in Kej, he was continually importuning the Nazim to make over to him Nasirabad fort, as the price of his devotion.

I have little doubt in my own mind that the information on which I acted was correct, and that he had assisted Mir Mehrab Khan's family in getting out of the country. I was glad then to take advantage of an outburst of loyalty, in which he proposed his readiness to follow me to London, to suggest the advisability of his accompanying me to Quetta to assist us in our deliberations on the future of Makran. He is now with me, and I am more confident of a peaceful hot weather for Makran than I should have been, if he had remained behind.

9. As there were not sufficient rations for a move on Mand, the column returned to Turbat, and a portion was detached under the command of Major Even, 30th Bombay Infantry, to proceed to Bolida. I accompanied this portion of the force. We reached Chib, perhaps the most important village in the Bolida district, on the 19th February. Mir Mehrab Khan, Naosherwani, the owner of Chib fort, had been killed at Gok-Prusht, and the village was deserted. We halted two days, and Chib and Kooshk forts were demolished, while Bit fort was left in charge of Mir Azim Khan, Boledhi, until it could be garrisoned by Kalat State Troops.

This has since been done, and Jemadar Abd-ur-Rahman has been left there with a garrison of 30 camel-sowars and 30 sepoys of the Kalat State Troops. He has orders to prevent any Naosherwani from setting foot in the Bolida district, to arrest any Naosherwani who comes there armed and to shoot him, if he resists. The Jamadar is, I believe, a thoroughly reliable man, fearless and loyal, and I trust that the mere knowledge that these are his orders will keep the peace in Bolida, until some more satisfactory arrangement can be arrived at. A sum of Rs. 100 per mensem has been sanctioned for "roza" and payment for information. This money is to be placed at the disposal of Jemadar Abd-ur-Rahman, but he is to submit a monthly account of his expenditure to the Nazim, and a copy is to be sent to me.

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Bolida has been described as the door of Makran, and I have felt justified in taking very strong measures for its protection. The Naosherwani interests have had here a far better and more established title than in any other part of Makran, and here they will probably try and make their first reprisals. If the Jemadar does his work thoroughly, it will be impossible for the Naosherwanis to make any attack in force on any part of Makran without our being fully warned. If we are so warned, the Makran administration with the force at its disposal should be able to make an adequate defence.

10. The Bolida and Turbat Columns met at Kalatuk on the 24th February and made a combined march on Mand.

Nasirabad was the first place where any important business was transacted. It will be remembered that the fort of Nasirabad was taken over from Mir Sher Muhammad, Gitchki, by Captain LeMesurier, and that a party of 40 sepoys from the Kalat State Troops was stationed there. This detachment was, I understand, intended to overawe Mir Sher Muhammad, and keep the Nasirabad district quiet.

As Mir Sher Muhammad had already received a very severe lesson at Charbuk, and I had already thought of taking him with me to Quetta for the next six months, there seemed to be no object in keeping a garrison any longer at Nasirabad.

11. On the other hand, I had received orders that Tump was to be assessed for revenue, and it was of the utmost importance that a strong force should be posted there for the maintenance of the Khan's authority.

Accordingly, I arranged that the party of the Khan's troops should march to Tump with the column and occupy Mir Murad Gitchki's fort there.

Mir Murad is the Sirdar of Tump and a foolish old man, who has been in the habit of amusing himself by firing off a harmless old cannon from the top of his fort, while his friends and relations partition the family estate below.

From his strength we had nothing to fear; from his weakness everything.

I saw the Sirdar at Balachah and communicated to him the decision at which I had arrived. He demurred at first, but, when I told him that he could not be allowed to play at living in a fort without governing the country, he accepted the position. Tump fort was garrisoned on the 27th of February by 40 Kalat State sepoys under Jemadar Madad Khan. Later, a Subadar and 60 sepoys of the 30th Bombay Infantry were added, but these have since been withdrawn under orders from the Government of India. Arrangements have been made for the garrison to be raised to a strength of 100 men, of whom 10 are camel-sowars.

While at Tump, I collected all the motabars and headmen and informed them that their district was to pay revenue in future. They agreed.

12. The column next marched to Mand. All the heads of the principal sections of the Rind tribe met me here. Appendix IV shows the settlement arrived at by me with them and some further remarks on our future policy with regard to them.

I regret that I was here unable to settle the disputes between the Rinds and Askanis. I had hoped that the Askanis could be induced to come in, but the difficulty of rationing the force was great, and for this reason it was impossible to wait until they could make up their minds.

13. On my return journey my time was fully taken up with consolidating the arrangements already made and in settling petty disputes *en route*.

14. The force arrived at Turbat on the 8th March. Some of the people had already returned.

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

Mullah Khudadad, the Rais of Turbat, had come back, bringing with him a rook rifle, which had belonged to Captain Burn, as a peace offering.

Mullah Mobarik of Koolanch was brought in two days later by Mir Sheikh Kasim Khan, Gitchki. I had intended to bring this man with me to Quetta, but was induced to change my mind later. I contented myself with taking an agreement from him that he would be absolutely responsible for the safety of the telegraph line from Pasni to Gwadur. The agreement was strengthened by the security of Sh'Omer, the Gitchki Sirdar, and Mirs Abdul Karim and Sheikh Kasim Khan, Gitchkis. Mullah Mobarik also promised me that he would arrest the men who were chiefly concerned in the wire-cutting and bring them to me in Quetta or Kalat within two months' time.

15. It now remained for me to settle the punishment to be inflicted on the offenders. It was, I found, impossible to do this in accordance with any ordinary forms of justice or enquiry. Many of the guilty were absent, and the few men present, who were of sufficient importance to settle such cases, belonged to the victorious party, and I had no hopes that they would be able, or willing, to give a fair decision. I had recourse, therefore, to a method which had at least the merits of simplicity and rapidity. I must first mention that, throughout the whole of my proceedings, I was guided by the advice of the Brahui Sirdars who were with me. From them I very seldom differed; and then only when I had reason to believe that their advice was vitiated by either hostility or partiality. I pronounced what I thought was a fair punishment on the Kej valley, namely, a fine of Rs. 50,000. I then drew up a general list in which I included all those who had been reported to me as concerned in the recent outbreak.

Evidence was next taken as to the property of each delinquent and the extent of his guilt. I had before written letters to all the persons, mentioned in my list, to the effect that, if they came in to me, they would not be imprisoned and their cases would be settled locally. I concluded by warning them that, if they did not come in and submit, their punishment would be doubled. In fixing the fine afterwards of those who had not returned, I reduced this sentence to the proportion of three to two, as I was informed that the double rate would press too hardly. Some consideration was also paid to those who had suffered in the loot and pillage which followed the action of Gokprusht. This was not done by the troops but by rascals from the hills and vagabonds of every description who took advantage of the general confusion to come down under cover of the darkness and loot the Kej villages.

On the above data the proportion which each individual was to bear in the payment of the fine was fixed.

I directed the Nazim to levy this fine with all possible lenity and consideration in the matter of instalments.

As for the absentees, their estates were to be confiscated to the Khan, and the Khan's Naib was ordered to look after their cultivation and to keep a careful account of the profits which accrued. The proprietor's share was to be credited to the Khan and, when the total amounted to the fine fixed on the owner, the estates were to be declared free. If, in the meantime, the proprietors returned, their estates were to be handed back to them, provided they made suitable arrangements for the payment of the fine imposed. Any remonstrances were to be addressed to the British authorities at Quetta or to His Highness the Khan, and such remonstrances would be carefully considered.

I imagine that in nearly all instances the proprietors will return. The few exceptions will be those who have committed themselves too deeply to believe, in spite of our promises, that they can ever hope for pardon. Such persons are best out of the country. They will probably be men of no importance, such as Mir Rustam Khan's sowars who were the actual murderers of some of the helpless members of the survey party. When the fines are paid, their estates should be handed over to their heirs. If these cannot be found, the land should be adjudged to His Highness.

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16. On the 12th February, before leaving Turbat, I held a durbar, at which Colonel Mayne and some of the British officers of the expedition and all the principal headmen and Sirdars of Makran, who were present, attended. Some Khillats were presented to certain Sardars who had done good service.

I addressed the durbar, reviewing briefly the troubles that had occurred and the punishment which had resulted. The list of fines was read out. The durbar was reminded that the Government was always ready to listen patiently to all reasonable grievances, but that those who circulated wild rumours and joined in, or excited others to, sedition could not hope in this way to get redress. I invited all, who had grievances, to send in their petitions to me. Those that I should not have time to dispose of now, I hoped to be able to settle, when the country was visited, as it probably would be, six months hence.

I said that many stories had been circulated about the tyranny exercised by Abdul Karim, Gitchki, the Khan's Naib, and by the Nazim, but that no definite complaints had reached me. Any petitions on this question would receive careful consideration.

I finally warned all the Baluchis that they were expected to help the Khan's officials in securing the peace of the country.

17. The force was now divided into two portions. Colonel Mayne, with most of the infantry, marched down to Ormara; the cavalry, guns and sappers and miners, with 100 infantry, under the command of Captain Jacob, 30th Bombay Infantry, proceeded with me to Kalat *viâ* Kolwa and the Mashkai valley.

18. On our way up to Kolwa, the demolition of the forts at Sharig, Nag, Hor Kalat and Sehra was the only matter which calls for notice in this report.

At Bedi, the eastern point of the Kolwa plain, all the principal headmen of Kolwa were collected. The chief tribes here are the Mirwanis, Kodais and Umranis, a section of the Bezenjos. There has always been some doubt whether revenue should be levied on these people or no.

I was informed that, towards the close of Captain Macdonald's administration, orders were given to Mir Rahim Khan, Kurd, the Khan's Naib in Kolwa, to collect revenue from them. The orders were communicated to the tribes concerned and were on the point of being enforced, when Captain Macdonald and his staff were withdrawn from Makran. No revenue was therefore realized, but, since the Nazim's administration was established, there appears to have been an understood principle that everybody throughout Makran was expected to pay revenue, unless they could show Khan's sanads to the contrary. It is doubtful whether these tribes can show any sanads, but the levy of revenue from them raises a large question, because they are equal to, if not superior in rank to, many tribes elsewhere in Baluchistan, who are exempt.

In my interview with the headmen, I, with an immediate end in view, placed the matter on the broad ground of the right of a Government to levy revenue. I informed them that, as they claimed exemption on the ground of independence, now was the time to give a proof of their claim. If, abstaining from internal dissensions, they could keep Kolwa quiet and by their united strength prevent the Naosherwanis of whose encroachments all complain, from living in and plundering Kolwa (the two expressions are practically the same), they would show that their claim had a foundation in fact and was worth consideration.

If they could not do this, it followed that they must be protected and they could not expect to be protected for nothing; in other words, the Khan would levy revenue.

19. At Bedi, I was glad to meet the servants of Sirdar Sir Naoroz Khan, K.C.I.E. I took the opportunity to send a friendly letter to him, asking him to find out from Shah Nawaz Khan, son of Mir Baluch Khan, Naosherwani, the reason for his father's revolt. I expressed a hope that the Sirdar would soon be able to return to Quetta, where many questions of importance awaited his presence for settlement.

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

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The Sirdar, I understood from his servant, fearing that he might be suspected of assisting rebels, was inclined to stand aloof from the malcontent Naosherwanis who had caused the disturbance in Kolwa.

I therefore added in my letter that this was unnecessary, that the defiant attitude of this portion of the Naosherwani family, both towards their Sardar and the Government of India, was largely the cause of the present troubles, and that the Government would welcome any sign that Baluch Khan's family had sought the protection of, and submitted to, their lawful Sirdar.

20. The revolt in Makran has now been suppressed, and I trust that the temporary arrangements which I have described in the preceding pages will be sufficient to keep the peace during the present hot weather. But these arrangements will not keep the country quiet for ever, and it will be absolutely necessary to send an officer into Makran next year. My stay in the country was necessarily limited. It was an object of the first importance to get the troops out of Makran as soon as possible. My movements were bound to coincide with theirs, and I found that a delay of one or two days, caused by myself, would entail a corresponding delay of a month or two for them, as rations would have to be brought from Karachi.

The task, therefore, of establishing anything resembling a permanent system of Government was out of the question, even if I had been rash enough to venture on carrying out such a scheme without having it first sanctioned by higher authority. This duty is reserved for next year.

21. Before making any suggestions as to the form which such a Government should take, it will be convenient to set forth, as shortly as possible, the reasons which, in my opinion, caused the outbreak.

In paragraph 11 of my report on Panjgur affairs, No. 887, dated 3rd May 1898, I wrote: "The temper of the people I found far from satisfactory, etc., etc." This was only another way of describing some traces of the wave of fanaticism which has swept over our North-Western Frontier. Everywhere men were ready for a revolt on the first opportunity.

But Makran warriors are not very ready to risk their lives and fortunes for their religion, and we must look for more immediate causes of dissatisfaction. These were three in number, and each grievance concerned one of the three principal parties of the conspiracy respectively.

The latter were—

(1) Mir Baluch Khan, Naosherwani.

(2) Mir Mehrab Khan, Gitchki.

(3) The headmen of the Kej valley.

I give Baluch Khan the place of honour, because, without his support, the revolt would have been impossible. His grievance was Bit fort. When he came to Quetta in the spring of 1897, the Khan gave him a sanad, granting him the fort and revenues of Bit. Mir Azim Khan, Buledhi, refused to give up the fort and produced a sanad from the Khan. This sanad was upheld and Mir Baluch Khan was informed that the revenues remained his, but the fort could not be handed over to him. It is also asserted that, when Baluch Khan went to collect the revenues, Azim Khan fired at him from the fort walls. Baluch Khan maintained that Azim Khan would never have dared to do this, unless he knew that some stronger influence was working with him; and, rightly or wrongly, the Naosherwani chief attributed this conduct to the Nazim's advice. As far as I know, his suspicion was groundless. As soon as the news of the first Bit settlement reached Makran, Azim Khan wrote very strong letters to Captains Macdonald and Benn, asking why he, who had always loyally assisted the British Government, had been treated in this manner. It seems therefore improbable that the Nazim, who was in Kelat, when the news reached Makran, could have incited Azim Khan to resistance.

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Baluch Khan felt this deeply. He would probably have preferred the fort to the revenues. A Baluchi of the old spirit loves money, but he loves power more. He clings tenaciously to its very shadow. Mir Murad's passion for artillery practice noted above is an instance in point.

I have heard a story to the effect that the Nazim cheated Baluch Khan out of a portion of the Bit revenues. This is incredible. Udho Dass is neither a fool nor a brave man. He would have to be both to indulge in conduct of this kind. I have before me, however, a letter written by Mir Baluch Khan to Sirdar Allahyar Khan, Rustomzai, in which he says that he has only received the Bit revenues for one year. He seems to have expected two years' revenue. But the sanad, granting the revenues, was only signed in May last and the year is not yet over. This is probably the origin of the story I have alluded to.

Baluch Khan openly proclaimed that the British Government had broken faith with him in the matter of Bit fort, and I think the reasons, set forth above, are sufficient to account for his conduct.

Mir Mehrab Khan, Gitchki, has always been hostile to the English. There is no doubt that, if Sir Robert Sandeman had not visited the country, he would have been the Gitchki Sirdar. Indeed, he would be so tomorrow, if Makran was abandoned to its fate, as he is a far more capable man than his brother, Sh'Omer, the lawful Sirdar.

Finding the Nazim off his guard and knowing that Mirs Abdul Karim and Sheikh Kasim Khan, Gitchkis, who alone could have opposed him were 30 miles away, Mir Mehrab Khan seized his opportunity.

It is not known that he had any further reasons for his conduct, but there seems to have been a prevailing opinion in Makran that the British Government would not use force, and that raising disturbances was sound policy and produced wealth and honours.

The headmen of the Kej valley objected to the payment of revenue. Their influence is considerable, especially when they pose as public champions against the oppressive practice of levying taxes.

The Khan's Naibs used to employ them as agents for the collection of revenue and, unless they were exempt from payment themselves, they proved very unsatisfactory agents.

His Highness the Khan, with the advice of the Political Agent, Captain LeMesurier, established a government which had some force at its disposal, and all classes, with the exception of a very few favoured individuals, had to pay alike.

It was hardly to be expected that the new system would be relished by men who had long been exempt and Mehrab Khan commenced his rule by showering sanads of exemption in every direction.

The result of careful enquiry inclines me to believe that the complaints against the tyranny of the Nazim and Mir Abdul Karim had little foundation in fact. The manner of levying revenue was that which obtains in the rest of British Baluchistan. Two people of the country were assessors, a patwari represented the Government and the two parties haggled over the question until they came to an agreement. If an agreement was found impossible, the Nazim heard the case, inspected the ground and finally fixed the amount.

22. It now remains for me to make suggestions for the future Government of the country.

With British management, Makran might perhaps pay its own expenses, but the initial outlay would be considerable and the risk great. Such an arrangement is also, I understand, in direct opposition to the policy of the Government of India.

23. It is extremely doubtful that, under any system resembling the present, Makran will ever be self-supporting, and I think that the sacrifice we

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

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demand from its present ruler has hardly received sufficient consideration. The Khan's share of the revenues of Makran amounts to about Rs. 40,000. If the recent confiscations be upheld and we take into account the effect of the late military operations, an increase of Rs. 10,000 may be hoped for.

With proper management, such as would be possible under the present form of Government, an increase of another Rs. 20,000 might be hoped for within ten years. These last figures I have obtained from Diwan Udho Dass whose opinion, on a matter of this kind, may be held to be fairly reliable.

Beyond ten years, it is perhaps idle to speculate at present.

To sum up, we may hope, in ten years' time, to collect an average income of Rs. 70,000 per annum.

Against this we have to place an expenditure of roughly one lakh of rupees on the Kalat State troops and about Rs. 25,000 on the expenses of administration.

That is, we ask the savage Baluch ruler of a comparatively poverty-stricken State, in the interests of law and order, to deliberately face an annual deficit of Rs. 55,000 and over for the next ten years. We certainly cannot hold out any definite hope of adiminution in this deficit.

The Kalat State troops' expenditure tends to increase and, whatever may have been said in the past, it is chimerical to expect that these troops will ever serve, much less maintain any degree of efficiency, without a British officer to look to their pay, discipline and general well being.

Neither Brahui, Punjabi nor Goorkha will serve under the Khan direct, and the abolition of the post of Military Adviser means the disbandment of the Kalat State troops.

24. But let us grant that it is possible to raise a force of purely local men who would serve under a local commandant. In order to obtain objects which I understand the Government have in view, namely, a peaceful and prosperous district, it is absolutely necessary to have that force sufficiently well-armed to overawe the natives of the country. They must not only be able to fight successfully, but they must be able to prevent any chance of fighting. Does it seem, then, wise to place a force of this description at a long distance from the capital ? What guarantee have we that Brahuis, for instance, finding themselves well-armed, would not, in a moment of impatience or alarm, raise the standard of revolt ? They have done so before (1897) with far less chance of success.

Again, is it not probable that such a force would overawe the government of the country (I presume a native administration) as much as, if not more than, they would the natives of the country. Udho Dass's Nizamat has been a continuous struggle with the Kalat State troops.

I do not so much fear actual mutiny as I anticipate the endless intrigues and mutual complaints which have characterized the Nazim's régime.

The troops in Makran are discontented. The duties are light and the one besetting danger in Makran is idleness.

Again, the question of granting sufficient furlough and at the same time of not dangerously denuding Makran of troops is a difficult one with the force at present at our disposal. The withholding of furlough is a fruitful source of discontent. The only remedy for this is more troops and more troops mean more expense.

Makran prices are generally at famine rates and compensation for dearness of provisions did not form part of the scheme for raising the Kalat State troops. The men put the high prices down to the tyranny of the Government representative and, unless the latter is prepared to sacrifice the interests of the State to those of the troops, he is detested. This ill-feeling vents itself in complaints about short rations, swindling and oppression of all kinds. In the present instance Diwan Udho Dass, a far cleverer man than his adversaries, successfully proved

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his perfect integrity. But it is quite possible, though I have no proof, that he was tempted to retaliate on his accusers. He too can bring his accusations and complaints against the troops, interference with the people of the country, looting on occasions, etc., etc. The only result of this quarrelling is to raise a cloud of accusations and denials—accusations impossible to prove, denials impossible to refute.

The administration is hopelessly weakened and the dissatisfaction extreme.

25. For this state of things there is only one remedy. A British officer must live in Makran, look after the troops and settle their grievances.

26. If it is decided to keep one there, it would be as well to utilise his services politically, and it would not be necessary to keep such an expensive official as the Nazim in Kej. The present pay of the Military Adviser would be sufficient. He would be well able to hold his own with the Kalat State troops at his back, and the only difficulty would be the expense of the arrangement as pointed out above.

27. There is one method of slightly decreasing this deficit, and that is, to insist on the Gitchkis who share the revenues bearing their share of the cost of the administration. This is a perfectly legitimate measure, but the probable result in practice would be that the Gitchkis would cease to exert themselves in, even if they did not actively oppose, the collection of revenue and our receipts would fall off.

28. If a prosperous and well-governed Makran is worth the deficit of Rs. 55,000, it would be perfectly simple to induce the Khan to consent to the proposal.

29. With a system of levies which could be maintained for about Rs. 30,000, I see no reason why our principal objects should not be attained. I conceive these to be—

(*a*) a peaceful Baluch border,

(*b*) the safety of the telegraph line between Ormara and Gwadur,

(*c*) the safety of British officers and survey parties who are required to move about the country.

I would leave the revenue to be collected by the Khan's officials according to the traditions of the country. The revenue returns will of course fall off, but the Khan will not lose, as his outlay will be Rs. 30,000 as against the lowest estimate of Rs. 55,000 noted above. Against this expenditure of Rs. 30,000 he can set off whatever revenue his Naibs can collect—probably at least Rs. 15,000.

Provided the Naosherwanis are bound down to some such agreement as has already been referred to in my telegram No. 34, dated 28th February 1898, of which a proposed draft forms Appendix V, the border could be controlled by a strong Bezenjo thana in Mand.

The safety of the telegraph line would be insured by the subsidies already granted, if there are no causes of irritation at work in the country, as, for instance, the recent levy of revenue from all alike.

British officials and survey parties will have to be escorted by regular troops at least for some time to come.

30. This would be a return to the old Baluch form of Government, the only alteration being the provision of a certain number of levies who would be regularly paid by the Political Adviser much on the system in which the Jhallawan subsidies are disbursed.

There is no reason why the state of the country should be any worse than it is in the Jhallawan hills or Kharan and the spread of civilization is bound to come gradually, and, in my opinion, far more surely than if British methods are hastily forced upon a people ill-fitted for their reception.

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31. I feel that I have laid myself open to the charge of having raised objections without putting forward proposals except of a very general nature, but, if I might be favoured with instructions as to the line of policy to be followed, I would endeavour to remedy this defect in a subsequent report.

32. In conclusion, I have much pleasure in bringing to your notice the assistance given me by the Brahui Sirdars who accompanied me. They were—

Sirdar Mohim Khan, Gurgnari.

Mir Moosa Khan, Rekizai.

Mir Rahim Khan, Kurd.

Mir Jhanda Khan, Rustomzai.

They had to undergo many hardships and their services were invaluable.

APPENDIX I.

No. 32, dated Camp Nag, the 18th March 1898.

From—The Nazim of Makran,

To—The Political Agent, Kalat.

I beg to report that at about 1 A.M. on the 6th January last, Mir Mehrab Khan, Gitchki, attacked me while I was asleep in my house, made me a prisoner and killed Munshi Basaram, Muhasib, and Walidad, Levy Sowar, and wounded Munshi Kunjlal. I had only three or four Levy Sowars with me, as the remainder had gone with my camp in the direction of Nasirabad. The sepoys who were in the fort were unable to come to my assistance, as the attack was a complete surprise, and I was arrested before they had time to realise that anything had gone wrong. Mehrab Khan then promised to release me if Turbat fort was delivered up, but threatened to kill me if it was not, and I have little doubt that he meant to keep his word. Though in the meantime I tried my best to get help from the sepoys in the fort, but could not get it, and there appeared to be no alternative but to comply with his terms, and the fort was accordingly handed over to him.

After Mir Mehrab Khan got possession of the Turbat fort, he released me and looted a great deal of Government and private property as per two lists herewith attached. He was still anxious to put me to death, but as I had managed to keep a few Kej Motbars, who had assembled in the meantime with me, he could not do so.

At about 3 P.M. on the 6th January 1898, Sheikh Kasim Khan, Gitchki, who had been sent by me to Nasirabad, came in, together with Mir Khan, Mohamed Gazkandi, Rind of Mand, and Mir Mazar, Headman of Buledha, and took me, the party of the Kalat State troops, civil establishment, my family and families of the establishment to Kalatuk.

About 1½ miles from Turbat I was met by Mir Abdul Karim, Mir Sher Mohamed, Mir Shakrulla, Gitchkis.

Some of our things had been saved, and as we could not take them with us to Kalatuk owing to want of carriage, they were left by Sheikh Kasim Khan in charge of Turbat Headmen. When Mir Shakrulla met us, he was sent to Turbat to take care of the above things and to send them on to Kalatuk. He did this honestly, but while he was at Turbat, Mir Mehrab Khan managed to persuade him to join the rebels.

After a few days Mir Baluch Khan, Naosherwani, who, it would seem, according to a previously concerted arrangement, had looted Captain Burn, joined Mehrab Khan at Turbat. Mir Mehrab Khan, Naosherwani of Buledha, and Mir Hyatan, Rind of Wakai, came in and assisted the rebels.

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During my stay at Kalatuk, Sirdar Mir Morad of Tump, Mir Bahram Khan, Gitchki of Nodiz, Mir Kamal Khan, Bizanjo, Mir Hussain Khan, Bizanjo, who had come from Nal with Mir Abdul Karim's family, several Headmen of Zamran, Mir Lalla of Dasht, came in with armed followers to help me. Sirdar Mir Morad was sent back by me to hold the Tump forts, while the others, together with Mir Abdul Karim Khan, Shaikh Kasim Khan, Mir Sher Mohamed and Mir Khan Mohamed, Gazkandi Rind, remained with me at Kalatuk. Ghulam Mohamed, Naosherwani, joined me some days later, but before the fight at Gokprusht.

After Mir Baluch Khan, Naosherwani, joined with Mir Mehrab Khan in Turbat, the number of the latter's followers increased day by day, and they both threatened daily to attack us at Kalatuk. On the night of the 27th January 1898, they came to Kalatuk with one thousand men, but returned to Turbat without fighting—probably because they had heard that Colonel Mayne's troops had left Pasni for Kej.

I would like to mention here, to show how utterly unprepared I was for this hostile action on the part of Mir Mehrab Khan, that the latter had visited me on the afternoon of the 5th January 1898, and we had a most friendly interview.

He talked to me about a dispute which I had to settle at Nasirabad, declared that Sher Mohamed, Gitchki, would not abide by any settlement I could make, and suggested that he should be given the work at Nasirabad. I promised to consider the question and to help him if I could. I asked him to help me to get a horse for my journey to Nasirabad, where I should find my camp and he offered me a seat on the camel he was then riding. He left me about 6 P.M. apparently pleased and friendly.

Losses of the Kalat State property during Mehrab Khan's disturbances.

Serial No.	Articles.	Amount.	Remarks.
		Rs. A. P.	
1	Cash looted by Mehrab Khan ...	6,234 6 11	
2	Cash looted by Mohamed Umer Khan.	600 0 0	
3	6 snider rifles with 5 ammunition boxes.	...	Value unknown.
4	Wheat, 123 maunds, @ 9 seers per rupee.	546 10 8	
5	Barley, 230 maunds 22 seers, @ 12 seers per rupee.	768 8 0	
6	Barley and goats looted by Mohamed Umer.	1,200 0 0	
7	Mung, 4 maunds 2 seers, @ 9 seers per rupee.	18 0 0	
8	Empty bags, 35, @ 4 annas each ...	8 12 0	
9	8 Sulcetahs @ Rs. 7 each ...	56 0 0	

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

(95)

Losses of the Kalat State property during Mehrab Khan's disturbances—contd.

Serial No.	Articles.	Amount.			Remarks.
		Rs.	A.	P.	
10	4 ropes @ Rs. 2-8 each ...	10	0	0	
11	50 iron pegs @ 1 anna each ...	3	2	0	
12	2 weighing instruments ...	2	0	0	
13	2 treasury boxes (safe), iron ...	150	0	0	Approximate price.
14	1 treasury box, wooden ...	8	0	0	Ditto.
15	3 boxes containing forms and stationery.	200	0	0	Ditto.
16	3 tables	12	0	0	Ditto.
17	5 chairs	15	0	0	Ditto.
18	1 carpet	45	0	0	Ditto.
19	3 boxes containing medicines and pots, etc.	200	0	0	Ditto.
20	1 Sholdari looted by Mohamed Umer Khan.	60	0	0	Ditto.
21	3 numdahs and 2 durries ...	30	0	0	Ditto.
22	Miscellaneous	100	0	0	Ditto.
23	1 box containing revenue records, etc.	...			
	Total rupees ten thousand two hundred and sixty-seven, annas seven and pies seven only.	10,267	7	7	

UDHO DASS,
Nazim of Makran.

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List showing the amount of the private property lost during Mehrab Khan's disturbances.

Serial No.	Name.	Amount. Rs. A. P.	Remarks.
1	Diwan Udho Dass, Nazim of Makran	*1,607 8 0	* This includes price of two horses taken away by Naib Mohamed Umer of Kolwa.
2	Melu Ram, Head Clerk	37 10 0	
3	Bosa Ram, late Accountant ...	384 15 6	
4	Bhanjanlal, Muharir	61 8 0	
5	Billuram, Muharir, Punjgar ..	62 11 6	
6	Ishardas, Treasurer	36 6 0	
7	Ganeshdas, Patwari	36 15 0	
8	Kunjlal, Patwari	†873 0 0	† This includes value of the golden ornaments.
9	Amirali, Patwari	60 0 0	
10	Udhodas, Compounder	9 4 3	
11	Sardar Khan, Munshi, Pasni ...	324 14 0	
12	Jhangiram, Muharir, Kalmat ...	81 5 0	
13	Sidhuram, Chaprasi	42 2 0	
14	Ghulam Haider, Chaprasi ...	5 8 0	
15	Tungi Khan, Duffadar, Levy ...	179 9 0	
16	Arz Mohamed, Sowar	4 4 0	
17	Badal Khan, Sowar	5 0 0	
18	Saleh Mohamed, Sowar	11 7 0	
19	Shakar Khan, Sowar	96 0 0	
20	Wahid Baksh, Khalasi	171 14 0	
21	Jumma, Footman	177 8 0	
22	Mir Abdul Karim Khan, Naib, Kej ...	‡4,519 6 0	‡ This includes price of three horses.
23	Mir Shaikh Kasim Khan ...	997 0 0	
24	Het Ram, private tutor	41 8 0	
25	Gur Charan, private servant ...	26 4 0	
26	Bhandari, private servant ...	2 12 0	
	Total rupees nine thousand eight hundred and fifty-six, annas three and pies three only.	9,856 3 3	

UDHO DASS,
Nazim of Makran.

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APPENDIX II.

Statement showing principal Chiefs of Makran who took part against us.

No.	Name and race.	To what extent.	Where they now are.	Remarks.
1	Mir Mehrab Khan, Gitchki ...	Imprisoned Nazim, looted Government property and fought at Gokprusht.	Wandering in Persia with two adherents	Owner of considerable property in Kej. I propose to confiscate it absolutely to His Highness the Khan.
2	Mir Rustom Khan, Gitchki ...	Attacked Captain Burn and looted Government property.	Rohana, in Persia, his mother's home...	Brother of Mehrab Khan. As he was in charge of Captain Burn, his crime is quite indefensible even according to Baluchi notions.
3	Mir Sarfiraz Khan, Gitchki ..	Only joined his brother and held Khoosh Kalat fort against us.	Ditto ditto ...	Mehrab Khan's brother. He is almost blind and incapable of harm, may be left out of consideration.
4	Mir Baluch Khan, Noshirwani ...	Looted Captain Burn. Fought at Gokprusht.	Killed	Had certain imaginary rights in Kolwa. All Noshirwani property there should be confiscated, and it should be laid down as an axiom that no Noshirwani may set foot in Kolwa again.
5	Mir Shukr Ullah, Gitchki ...	Ditto ditto ...	Ditto	His son offers to submit. There are large estates in Tump. A fine of Rs. 2,500 has been inflicted.
6	Mir Shah Namaz Khan, Noshirwani ...	Looted Captain Burn	It is reported he has fled to Naoroz and some say he is in Zamoran hills.	Mir Baluch Khan's son. Confiscation of Kolwa estates will be a sufficient punishment.
7	Mohamed Umer, Noshirwani ...	Strongly suspected of looting Mr. Turner's main camp; also of selling Nag fort, which he held as Khan's Naib, to Mir Baluch Khan.	Ditto ditto ...	Ditto ditto.
8	Mir Mehrab Khan, Noshirwani ...	Fought at Gokprusht	Killed	Bolida estates should be confiscated. His family is hiding in Zamoran hills.

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

Statement showing principal Chiefs of Makran who took part against us—contd.

No.	Name and race.	To what extent.	Where they now are.	Remarks.
9	Gul Mohamed, Noshirwani ...	Fought at Gokprusht	Killed	Estates in Bit should be confiscated.
10	Hyatan, Rind	Ditto	Ditto	A fine of Rs. 1,950 has been inflicted on his estates in Tump.
11	Mir Ashraf, Rind	Ditto	Was with Mehrab Khan	A fine of Rs. 2,700 has been inflicted on his estates in Mand, Tump and Dasht.
12	Mulla Khudadad, Rais of Turbat ...	Concerned in imprisonment of Nazim and principal conspirator.	Turbat	Has been fined a sum of Rs. 1,100.
13	Mulla Mobarak Wadela of Koolanch ...	Cut the wires. Fought at Gokprusht and joined the conspiracy.	Has returned to Koolanch ...	Has been fined a sum of Rs. 1,300.
14	Mir Saka, Kalmati	Fought at Gokprusht and looted Pasni...	Is in Gwadur and has asked permission to be allowed to return to Pasni.	A fine of Rs. 3,600 has been inflicted on his estates in Kalmat and Pasni.

S. G. KNOX,
Political Agent, Kalat.

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APPENDIX III.

Translation of an agreement between the Political Agnet, Kalat, and Mir Sher Mohamed, Gitchki, dated the 5th March 1898.

We, the undersigned, agree and promise in writing that the claim of Mir Sher Mohamed about destruction of wheat crops, killing of goats and the blood-money for one person killed and another wounded, etc., etc., will be settled by Mir Moosa Khan, Rekizai, as arbitrator.

Whatever the aforesaid Mir Moosa Khan may decide to be a fair payment will be accepted by us both. Therefore this has been written as an Ikrarnama, which may be produced when necessary.

S. G. KNOX,
Political Agent, Kalat.

Seal of Mir Sher Mohamed, Gitchki.

Translation of the award of Mir Moosa Khan, Rekizai, arbitrator in the case of Mir Sher Mohamed, Gitchki, versus *Political Agent, Kalat.*

I have been appointed arbitrator in the question of the amount of damage done by the Government troops to the property of Sher Mohamed, Gitchki. According to your order I have enquired into the affair.

As far as the goats are concerned, I have enquired from the people and Mir Sher Mohamed, who said that 122 goats have been slaughtered. I have settled that 60 goats at Rs. 120 shall be paid for.

Three donkeys have been killed and their price is fixed at Rs. 30.

A bull has been killed. It has been valued at Rs. 10.

The value of the Khasil (green wheat) is fixed at Rs. 75.

For the man who was killed I fix Rs. 100 for this reason that, when 15 men of Colonel Reynold's camp were killed by Mir Sher Mohamed in Gwadur, the blood-money was fixed at Rs. 100 per man.

On account of a silver hilted sword, I have fixed Rs. 25 and for the silver Rs. 10.

The total amounts to Rs. 370.

Therefore I have reported accordingly for your information.

Seal of Mir Moosa Khan, Rekizai.

APPENDIX IV.

The Rinds of Mand have always been a difficult problem in the settlement of Makran.

Occupying, as they do, on inhospitable country in close proximity to the Persian Frontier and having no regular chieftain or Sirdar, they are infinitely more difficult to manage than far more important tribes.

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They have always disputed the payment of revenue to His Highness the Khan of Kalat. A reference to the documents, attached to this Appendix will show the views they hold on this question and how the matter was finally settled.

The revenue of Mand is not of itself important, but the Rinds, to the best of their ability, extended the application of the sanad, verified by Sir Robert Sandeman, to all Rinds owning lands in any part of Makran and also to all persons remotely connected with the Rinds by marriage or in other ways.

The result was that other tribes refused to pay revenue on the ground that they were far superior to the Rinds in rank, position, civilization, etc.

There will, however, be no objections to the grant of the sanad which I propose to ask His Highness now to grant to them, and I anticipate no difficulty in inducing His Highness to accept my recommendations.

It will be seen that in my report I have advocated the location of a strong thana in Mand. I have selected the Bezenjos for this duty, as they possess great influence in Makran, being allied by marriage to the Gitchkis and owning considerable property in Kej and elsewhere.

At the same time they have important interests nearer Quetta and Kalat, and it would not be difficult to bring pressure to bear on them if they misbehave.

This thana, supplemented by a small subsidy, say Rs. 100, to some of the leading Rinds, will, I hope, be amply sufficient to maintain the peace of the border and complaints about Rind and Askani quarrels and Rind depredations in Persian territory should be things of the past.

S. G. KNOX,

Political Agent, Kalat.

Translation of sanad given by Mir Shahdad, Gitchki, Naib of Kej, to the Rinds of Mand, dated 16th Rabi-ul-Sani 1301 H. / 14th February 1884 A. D.

Because in these times the sections of the Rinds which have enjoyed lands in Mand and Tump without paying Government taxes from old times have been exempt from payment of revenue in both districts—now also they are exempt. On the condition that they keep firmly the promise which they have written in the presence of the officer of the Government (may his magnificence continue) they will remain exempt. But if they turn away from the keeping of that promise, afterwards His Highness the Khan, Wali of Kalat, is the master, and whatever punishment he chooses to inflict in the imposition of revenue he has the power to do so. Therefore these few letters have been written by way of an agreement. This occurred on the 16th Rabi ul-Sani 1301 Hijra answering to the 14th February 1884 A. D.

Sirdar Mir Bhai Khan, Gitchki.

Mir Murad, Sirdar of Tump, Gitchki.

Mir Shahdad, Gitchki, Naib of Kej.

Sirdar Mir Gohur Khan, Zarakzai.

Sirdar Jam Ali Khan.

Sirdar Assad Khan, Raisani.

Illegible.

Verified before me.

TUMP;
The 14th February 1884.
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R. G. SANDEMAN.

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

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Dated the 3rd March 1898.

From —The Political Agent, Kalat,

To—The Rinds of Mand which was read in open durbar at Giab (Mand).

There has been a great deal of talk and confusion about a sanad which, it was said, had been given to the Rinds of Mand by Sir Robert Sandeman.

This sanad has been produced and read in open durbar to-day, and it has been made clear that the sanad was only verified by Sir Robert Sandeman. It is clear that the latter officer could not give away a revenue which did not belong to him, but was the property of His Highness the Khan. Sir Robert Sandeman only verified a document which was given to the Rinds by the Khan's Naib Shahdad. It has over and over again been ruled that sanads given by the Khan's Naibs are of no value, and therefore this sanad is also valueless.

Therefore it has been decided that for the present a new sanad shall be given to the Rinds in which I, the Political Agent, Kalat and Bolan, and the Sirdars whose seals are below, promise to recommend to the Khan that the lands of the Rinds, situated in Mand, shall be exempt from revenue so long as they shall behave themselves and refrain from the committing of thefts and cutting of telegraph wires, which have been so common in the past. If they offend in these respects, they will be made to pay revenue.

As regards the lands which have become the property of the Rinds in Dasht, Tump and elsewhere, by marriage or otherwise within recent times, the Rinds have claimed to have these also exempted from revenue. It is nowhere the custom in Baluchistan that lands which have formerly paid revenue to the Khan become exempt merely because by accident they have come into the hands of persons who hold other lands which are exempt.

This claim of the Rinds of Mand also has been found to cause a great deal of trouble in the collection of revenue from other people, and we shall not make any recommendation on this point, nor would it be advisable for His Highness the Khan to make any such remission.

Finally, it must be borne in mind that this sanad is merely provisional and to be legal requires to be signed by His Highness the Khan whose signature we will endeavour to obtain.

CAMP GIAB;
The 3rd March 1898.

S. G. KNOX,
Political Agent, Kalat.

Seal of Sirdar Mohim Khan, Gurgnari.

Seal of Mir Moosa Khan, Rekizai.

Seal of Mir Rahim Khan, Kurd.

Seal of Mir Jhanda Khan, Rustomzai.

Translation of an Ikrarnama taken by the Political Agent, Kalat, from the Rinds of Mand at Giab (Mand) on the 3rd March 1898.

We, the Rind Motabars, assembled to-day in durbar, have had explained to us the purport of the document signed by the Political Agent, Kalat, and the Sirawan Sirdars who are with him.

We recognize that the Khan has the right to levy revenue from us, and that it is only out of kindness to us, who are a poor people, that he may promise not to realize it from us while we refrain from doing acts of mischief and causing disturbances. We also understand that the Political Agent and the Sirdars are not going to make any recommendation in favour of lands

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acquired by the Rinds in Dasht, Tump and elsewhere; the reasons for this decision have been explained to us, we understand them and acquiesce in the decision.



Seal of Mir Khan Mohamed, son of Mir Wali Mohamed, Gazkandi, Rind.



Seal of Mir Bahram, son of Sherdil, Purtoszai.



Seal of Sadik, son of Hotgolabi, Meerozai.



Seal of Sh'Murad, son of Hamal, Kiazai.



Seal of Mauladad, son of Kadirdad, Omerzai.



Seal of Mir Nur Mohamed, son of Shahbaz, Kenagi, Rind.



Seal of Shafi Mohamed, son of Shai Raza, Shai-o-Mir, Rind.

Verified before me.

S. G. KNOX,
Political Agent, Kalat.

APPENDIX V.

Draft of proposed agreement to be taken from Sirdar Sir Naoroz Khan, K.C.I.E., Noshirwani.

I, Sirdar Sir Naoroz Khan, K.C.I.E., in the full possession of my health and senses, of my own free will, consent to be bound by the conditions noted below :—

1. I agree that I am responsible for the conduct of the various members of the Naosherwani family that they do not encroach on the property of others or forcibly acquire possessions in Makran or any other part of His Highness the Khan's dominions.
2. I recognise the justice of the punishment inflicted on the Naosherwanis who took part in the late rising in Makran to wit that all their rights and property of every description in Makran has been forfeited to His Highness the Khan.

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3. I understand clearly that the result of this punishment is that the fact of any Naosherwani attempting to exercise any rights or to acquire any property in Kolwa, Bolida, Kej or any other part of Makran, except in the district of Punjgar, will be taken as a proof that I have failed in my responsibilities as laid down in article 1 of these conditions, and I agree to any decision the Agent to the Governor-General may come to in the case.

4. I agree to the principle that as I and my family enjoy extensive and valuable estates in the districts of Quetta, Mustung, Mungoochar, Kachchi and elsewhere under the protection of the British Government and His Highness the Khan of Kalat, and as I receive pay from the British Government, the British Government has a perfect right to insist on my respecting and on my compelling the other members of the family of the Naosherwanis to respect the rights of His Highness the Khan in Makran—more especially as the British Government objects to His Highness the Khan protecting his rights by force of arms. My Government pay and all the estates aforesaid are security for my respecting these conditions which I have agreed to.

5. I further promise that no Naosherwani shall acquire any fresh lands in any part of Makran in any manner whatever unless he first obtain the formal written consent both of the Agent to the Governor-General and His Highness the Khan of Kalat to the acquisition. I clearly understand that any possessions or acquisitions which have not been consented to by the Agent to the Governor-General and His Highness the Khan will never be recognized as lawful, and that it is my duty to inform the British Government and His Highness of any attempt to defeat this condition.

6. In conclusion as the strict enforcement of these conditions will be difficult for me, I request that the British Government will be pleased to allow me to deal with the members of my own tribe in regard to this matter in my own fashion, and that no complaints of any harsh measures rendered necessary for the strict enforcement of these conditions will be entertained by the Agent to the Governor-General.

APPENDIX 3.

Copy of a note by Captain R. A. E. Benn, I.S.C., Military Adviser to His Highness the Khan of Kalat.

Agent to the Governor-General,—I send you a more detailed statement showing the probable annual cost of the Kalat State troops for the future :—

I.—Punjabi Infantry.

		Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.
(*a*) Annual allotment originally sanctioned for 205 Punjabis	...				55,000	0	0
(*b*) Concessions granted during 1896-97 on account of—							
(*i*) Rs. 2 extra to 180 Punjabi Infantry sepoys	...	4,320	0	0			
(*ii*) One extra native officer ...	...	480	0	0			
(*iii*) Feed of transport camels ...	...	1,425	0	0			
(*iv*) Six levy sowars for Military Adviser	...	1,500	0	0			
(*v*) Increase in subscription to pay and pension of Military Adviser	...	1,580	0	0			
					9,305	0	0
Carried over	...				64,305	0	0

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II.—Brahui Camel Corps.

		Rs.	A.	P.
Brought forward	...	64,305	0	0
Annual allotment	...	30,281	0	0

III.—Concessions now granted to men in Makran.

	Rs.	A.	P.		
(*i*) Extra Re. 1 to men in Makran ...	... 2,640	0	0		
(*ii*) Furlough passage money ...	... 918	0	0		
(*iii*) Probable cost to His Highness the Khan if rate of atta in Makran is fixed at not less than 12 seers per rupee (present rate = 6 seers)	6,804	0	0	10,362	0 0
Total				... 1,04,948	0 0

The 11th May 1898.

R. A. E. BENN.

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

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ENCLOSURE No. 2.

No. 938 Z., dated Ziarat, the 21st July 1898.

From—COLONEL H. WYLIE, C.S.I., Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my telegram No. 0179, dated the 21st June 1898, I have the honour to enclose, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the marginally noted report submitted by the Political Agent in Kalat, together with the translations of two letters received from Mir Hasil Khan, Rustomzai, and from Mir Mehrab Khan, Gitchki, which contain the latest news regarding the condition of affairs in Makran.

Letter No. 1562, dated the $\frac{3rd}{11th}$ July 1898.

No. 1562, dated the $\frac{3rd}{11th}$ July 1898.

From—The Political Agent in Kalat,

To—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.

As verbally directed, I have the honour to submit a report showing the present situation of affairs in Makran and a short sketch of such events as have taken place since the Field Force left the country.

2. I regret the general uncertainty that characterizes the report. This uncertainty is due to the fact that the reports of Naib Mir Abdul Karim, Gitchki, and of the native officers of the Kalat State troops, and certain private letters, the only means of information at my disposal, are extremely vague and contradictory.

3. From these I gather that, about the middle of May last, Mir Mehrab Khan, Gitchki, accompanied by Mir Shah Nawaz Khan and Muhammad Umar, Nausherwanis, invaded Kej with a force, variously estimated at from one to three thousand men. The Nausherwani following was chiefly composed of Damanis and Bamanis, hill tribes from over the Persian border, and formed the main part of the expedition.

4. The attention of the Persian Government should, I think, be called to the conduct of these tribes and to the general question of refugees that take shelter in Persian territory, and thence lead expeditions composed of Persian subjects against country under British protection. As a matter of fact, the Damanis and Bamanis are beyond Persian control, and the question of these two tribes will have to be faced sooner or later, both for the sake of Makran and of the new trade route through Nushki.

5. Though it stayed in Kej only a few days, the expedition, according to all accounts, did considerable damage. The principal objective was Kalatuk, where Naib Mir Abdul Karim, Gitchki, lives. A strong party of the Kalat State troops, under Subadar Wazira, seems to have been able to do little or nothing to stop the destruction of property. Indeed the Subadar gave Naib Mir Abdul Karim a letter, saying that he did not consider his party strong enough to oppose the rebels. On the other hand, Jemadar Abdul Rahman, Lehri, at the head of a few camel sowars of his own tribe, and some men of the country under Mir Sheikh Kasim Khan, Gitchki, is reported to have attacked this same enemy, killed four and wounded eight, and brought his own people back in safety.

6. However, acting with Subadar Wazira's advice, Naib Mir Abdul Karim, Gitchki, bought off the rebels with a sum, stated to amount to Rs. 8,000. Mehrab Khan returned to Persia while the Nausherwanis went off and raided Balguttar, a valley whose people owe allegiance to Sardar Muhammad Hassan of Sami.

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7. Boleda also has suffered from the Damani raid led by these Naushirwanis.

8. Panjgur was threatened, but was saved by the energy of the Kardar, who, greatly to his credit, appears to have thoroughly established his influence over the Baluch of that part of the country, and can persuade them to fight in their own defence.

9. The latest news from Panjgur shows that Kaoda Muhammad Khan, Khan's Naib of that place, has been giving trouble. He is a great friend of Naib Abdul Karim, Gitchki, and of the Nazim of Makran, Diwan Udho Das. During the late troubles, the Kardar was obliged to keep all parties, as far as possible, contented, and, for this reason, had to work a good deal with Mir Muhammad Ali Khan, the Naib's chief enemy. This policy did not suit Muhammad Khan who has for some time past been discontented, and seems to have at last shut himself up in the fort of Isai and to have defied the Kardar's authority. The Kardar has taken the initiative and attacked the Naib, but the latest reports show that the fort is holding out. There is little or no danger, as Kaoda Muhammed Khan shares the unpopularity of the Nazim and Naib Mir Abdul Karim, and the whole country has sided with the Kardar against him. Although he is the Khan's Naib, Kaoda Muhammad Khan is no favourite of the Khan, who will be glad to hear of his being in trouble. Naib Abdul Karim, Gitchki, reported the occurrence from Kej by telegram and said that Kaoda Muhammad Khan was ready to give up the fort at my orders. I at once telegraphed back that he was to deliver up the fort at once and come peaceably to Quetta, where the matter would be enquired into.

10. Mir Hasil Khan, son of Sardar Allahyar Khan, Rustomzai, left Quetta on the 3rd June 1898, and I have received a telegram saying that he has reached Baho in Persia and has seen Mir Mehrab Khan, Gitchki, who refuses to come in except to a British officer. I propose to reply that Hasil Khan should induce Mehrab Khan to promise to refrain from disturbances in Kej until December, when a British officer, to whom Mir Mehrab Khan can tender his submission, is sure to be in Makran.

11. The absence of news about the present movements of the Naushirwanis induces me to believe that they also have retired to the Persian hills. A rumour reached me that Naib Yar Muhammad, Umrari Sardar of Chambor, had been killed in a fight with Mir Muhammad Umar, Naushirwani. The report is now over a fortnight old and since it has not been confirmed, and news, both from Kej and Panjgur, is silent on the subject, I do not credit it. As far as my information goes, Kolwa has remained perfectly quiet.

12. Lastly, we come to the attitude of that very mysterious character, Sardar Sir Nauroz Khan, K.C.I.E., the Naushirwani Chief. He planned the Damani raid; he is building a fort on the Mash Khel river, in which he can take refuge from the vengeance of the British Government; he has been promised unlimited land in Afghanistan and is going to take advantage of the concession; he has told his son to look after Kharan, to which he does not intend to return; he has heard that the British Government know of his duplicity in connection with the Makran rising is in deadly terror, and nothing will induce him to come into Quetta or even to Kharan.

These are a few of the reports that the ingenious inhabitants of the country are spreading about. They agree in little else except that Nauroz Khan is hostile to the British and will not come in to Quetta. His absence is of no great importance, except that it postpones indefinitely any such agreement as is proposed in my report No. 921 B., dated the 6th May 1898.

13. If Nauroz Khan does not come in before the Political Agent, Kalat, starts on his Makran tour next year, Kharan should be the first place visited by him. I have decided not to pay the monthly subsidy to the Sardar's men, until the Sardar himself comes in, and I would respectfully venture to suggest the advisability of your addressing the Sardar, asking from him a clear expression of his intentions and when he means to reach Quetta or Kalat.

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

He has been ordered to come in to Quetta and does not show any intention of doing so. It would be as well if the letter were sent by a special sowar, who should be directed to take it to the Sardar himself and not to return without a reply. When this comes, we shall be in a position to make plans for the next Makran tour.

Translation of a letter from MIR HASIL KHAN, Rustomzai, Bahwa Kalat, Persian Frontier, to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, dated the 21st June 1898.

After compliments.—I beg to state that I arrived at Bahwa Kalat, Persian Frontier, on the 19th instant, and saw Sardar Mir Mehrab Khan, but made no attempt to talk with him on business matters that day. I met him again on the 20th instant, and, in reply to my questions, the Sardar said that he would not go to Quetta at present, as he was afraid of the Sarkar. He said that he had surrendered Shahdad to Government, who had promised to release him in five months' time, while he has been in prison for about four years. For this reason he could not see his way to come to Quetta. He, however, said he would be willing to meet the Political Agent, Kalat, Mir Shams Shah or any other European officer, either in Kej or Panjgur, if he were informed of the date and place of their arrival, and would talk matters over. He added that, if the Sarkar did not agree to this, he would send one of his representatives, with papers, along with myself, to Quetta to negotiate for him. He said that he would never agree to Abdul Karim Khan being allowed to continue as Naib (of Kej), nor to Diwan Udho Das as Nazim of Makran. If these officials were not dismissed, he would refuse to come in to Panjgur at all to see any officer. If Government, he said, were to remove them from their offices, he would hold himself responsible for Kej, and in that case there would be no necessity to station troops there. I offered to remain here (as a hostage) while he went to Quetta to arrange matters, but he refused to agree to this plan.

Translation of a letter from MIR MEHRAB KHAN, Gitchki, Bahwa Kalat, Persian Frontier, to COLONEL H. WYLIE, C.S.I., Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, dated the 29th Muharram 1316=20th June 1898.

After compliments.—I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your two letters. I cannot sufficiently express the pleasure their receipt has given me. I have already submitted a petition to the Political Agent, Kalat, regarding my affairs, but I have also one request to make to you and I hope that you will be pleased to agree to it. The request is this, that many men have been disrespectful to Kings, but they have overlooked their faults and have pardoned them.

Couplet.—It behoves men of high dignity to be gracious.

A beggar is humble because he cannot be otherwise.

I cannot do without Kej, and I do not think that the Sarkar will increase the stability of their Government, or will acquire a good name by killing me or by sending daily expeditions against a humble individual like myself.

Couplet.—From the time of Adam down to that of the present King, it has been customary for Chiefs to forgive poor people who have sinned.

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

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

Encls. no. 3.

(102)

No. 1134 E.-A.

FROM

SIR WILLIAM CUNINGHAM, K.C.S.I.,
Secretary to the Government of India,

To

COLONEL HENRY WYLIE, C.S.I.,
Officiating Agent to the Governor-General
in Baluchistan.

FOREIGN DEPT.

SIMLA, *the 2nd August 1898.*

SIR,

I am directed to reply to your letters, as marked in the margin, concerning affairs in Makran. In these letters and their enclosures you have given a sketch of the condition of Makran previous to the late rising, an account of the causes which led to the disturbance and recommendations for the future.

No. 3389, dated the 17th May 1898.
„ 938 Z., „ 21st July „

2. To deal first with recent arrangements in Makran and the causes of the disturbances, it seems to the Government of India that Dewan Udho Dass, the Khan of Kalat's Nazim, went much further in getting into his own hands the entire administration of the country than the Khan ever proposed, or the Government of India, in lending his services to the Khan, ever intended. When His Highness asked for the services of Dewan Udho Dass, it was in order that he might superintend the work of the Khan's Naibs of Kej, Panjgur and Kolwa, who were ordered to work under him. These Naibs were not responsible for the whole administration, which is, on the contrary, supposed to be conducted by the tribal Sardars, and which can in no other way be carried on in accordance with Brahui custom. The Nazim seems not only to have laid aside the Khan's Naibs, but to have called upon the leading men of Kej to pay revenue, although they had been formerly charged by the Naibs with the duty of collecting it; and he also seems to have usurped the authority of the Sardars themselves. It is not to be wondered at that, in these circumstances, he incurred a measure of unpopularity great enough in itself to cause a rising of the people against him.

3. The disturbances are said also to have been due to discontent aroused by two decisions given by the Agent to the Governor-General of the day against Mir Baluch Khan, Naosherwani, and Mehrab Khan, Gitchki, besides the malcontents gained confidence from the general feeling of unrest on the border, and from a belief that the British were soon to be driven into the sea.

4. The complete manner in which local disturbers of the peace were routed by the small body of troops under the able leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. G. Mayne, Commanding the 30th Regiment of Bombay Native Infantry, must have dispelled this last illusion. The other causes of discontent cannot, however, fail to be associated, in the minds of the Sardars and tribesmen of Makran, with successive acts of interference by the British power.

5. As you are aware, the Government of India, after very careful consideration of the whole subject, decided that interference in the affairs of Makran ought, so far as possible, to be avoided. This opinion is not shaken by the events of last winter. The Governor-General in Council finds indeed, in your report and the connected papers, a further plea for that active intervention amounting to military occupation which found favour with the late Sir Robert Sandeman and Sir James Browne; and it is not to be denied that

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

the British Government by making itself responsible, in a greater or less degree, for the administration of the country, could contribute to its prosperity and peace. That does not, however, exhaust the reasons for and against intervention. The work of administration cannot be undertaken without an extension of responsibility which is not measured by the expenditure in men and money necessary to keep internal order, but by other and far-reaching considerations of Imperial policy which are beyond the purview of the local officer. The Government of India find no evidence of the rapid advance southwards of foreign emissaries, which is put forward by you as one reason for active interference; but, even if the fact were admitted, they are not satisfied that the disturbing influences apprehended could be most effectually counteracted in the manner which you advocate.

6. The Government of India would welcome the introduction of an efficient administration based on the system of Brahui Sardarships, and this is indeed the direction in which they have always desired to work. By this they do not mean a system of government by the Khan's Naibs, which is not the system of the country; nor can they contemplate favourably a return to the former plan of government by local Sardars with the Khan's Naibs supposed to watch His Highness's interests—neither side being guided or controlled; for that would inevitably mean a return to the old state of disorder and abuses, intensified in all probability. The Governor-General in Council thinks, therefore, that some endeavour should still be made to adopt the Brahui system of administration by Sardars and Naibs combined with a representative of the Khan to superintend the latter and advise the whole. The selection of Dewan Udho Dass to fill the position of Nazim has not been fortunate; but there is still reason to hope that, with a judiciously selected officer, who might preferably perhaps be a Muhammadan, better results could be obtained. The Nazim should have no direct hand in the administration and collection of the revenue. He should be responsible to the Khan of Kalat that the levies are paid, and that the Naibs do their duty and account for the revenue collected, and he should keep His Highness informed of what goes on in the districts under his supervision.

7. One of the first measures to be adopted is the abolition of the infantry of the Kalat re-organized troops. It is clear that various circumstances, and especially the manner in which they have been raised and recruited, have prevented this body of men from being regarded as 'the Khan's troops,' although they are so called and are maintained at the cost of His Highness. "They look entirely to the British officer who raised them for pay and orders, and are really a body of troops loyal only to us, and are viewed by the Khan and his Naibs with distrust and dislike." The employment of such a body of troops in Makran is in effect British interference and occupation, disguised by their name, and by their up-keep being defrayed by the Khan, but none the less really entailing that very responsibility which the Government of India have desired to evade. The system under which they have been employed has the further disadvantage of involving the responsibility of the Government of India without affording them real freedom of action. The abolition of the infantry will involve the abolition of the appointment of military adviser to the Khan of Kalat.

8. Although it is true that the re-organized troops should be got rid of without delay, it is equally necessary to put something in their place. Your proposals are to raise tribal levies to be established in thanas at Mand, Bolida and Panjgur, and to convert the 60 Brahui camelry into a tribal levy under a chief. The Governor-General in Council believes that this would be working in the right direction, but does not think that the possibility of the latter measure can safely be left to future consideration as your proposed scheme develops. Care must be taken, in withdrawing the appearance of military strength which the re-organized infantry gives, to substitute a means of upholding the Khan of Kalat's authority. The Governor-General in Council would wish to learn how the conversion of the camel corps can be effected, and what the mounted levies would cost. Information may be given, at the same time, of the money which is likely to be recovered and paid to the Khan on account of His Highness's advances for initial outlay on the infantry and camel corps.

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

9. The Governor-General in Council understands you to favour the plan of sending a Political Officer on frequent, perhaps annual, tours in Makran, accompanied by an escort of India troops, as affording an efficient substitute for the employment of a trustworthy Nazim. It will, however, be understood, from what has gone before, that this would not be in accordance with the policy of the Government of India. The authority behind the Nazim is, or should be, the Khan; the authority behind a Political Agent and an escort of Indian troops must, in the eyes of all, be the Government of India. The Governor-General in Council is not in a position to say definitely that the work to be done next autumn can be accomplished without the presence of a Political Agent, and it is understood that the people of Makran have been given to expect the presence of a British officer. His Excellency in Council would, however, if possible, dispense with a tour of any British officer, and cannot regard any settlement of the local administration as satisfactory which will require repeated tours of the kind.

10. In the conclusion of your letter first cited, you ask that existing arrangements should be allowed to continue for seven or eight months, and that, in the meantime, you may be allowed to make arrangements for the introduction of the form of government which you have sketched. It is, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, inevitable that the present system should continue until next autumn, and that the interval should be utilized in maturing plans for the future. The various considerations stated in this letter indicate the objects to which attention ought now to be directed, namely, the introduction of a local Brahui administration, with the Khan of Kalat's interests efficiently safeguarded by the nomination of Naibs, who will really act on his behalf and who will be supervised by a representative of the Khan, supported by levies taken from the people of the country and maintained at the expense of the Khan. This can only be brought about, if at all, by strengthening the local Sardars against Naosherwani encroachment, and enabling them to administer without relying on, or dreading, as the case may be, the continual interference of the British power.

11. It is observed in the enclosures to your second letter that Mr. Knox is informed that Mir Mehrab Khan, Gitchki, invaded Kej last May, with the assistance of Damanis and Bamanis from the Persian side of the border. It is said that these people are beyond Persian control, but a recommendation is made to the effect that the attention of the Persian Government should be called to their conduct. It does not seem to the Government of India that any benefit can be expected from calling the attention of the Persian Government to these tribes, unless the British Government is ready to insist on Persia bringing them under control. In the present state of the Makran districts on this side of the boundary, the Government of India are not in a strong position for making any such representation.

12. The Governor-General in Council agrees with you that Lieutenant Knox deserves credit for the manner in which he has performed his work. He is young to have been placed in so responsible a position and he has shown himself to be a capable officer. It should be reported what steps are being taken or what progress has been made towards realizing the fines and confiscations ordered by Lieutenant Knox, and what expenditure he incurred on rewards, how it was met, and whether he adequately rewarded all who did conspicuously good service in the late disturbances.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient servant,

(Sd.) W. J. CUNINGHAM,

Secretary to the Government of India.

Foreign Office Press—No. 732—2-8-98—60.

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

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

ENCLOSURE No. 4.

Telegram, No. 314, dated Quetta, the 3rd August 1898.

From—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Please see Knox's report on Makran, paragraph 9, attached to my letter 938 Z. of twenty-first ultimo. Telegram just received *viâ* Las Bela shows that affairs at Panjgur have rapidly altered. Kaoda Muhammad Khan has called in the Naushirwanis who have joined him, some reinforcing him in Isai Fort and others in neighbourhood, so that general loot of Panjgur seems likely. Kardar and Khan's re-organised troops have abandoned siege of Isai and retired into Garm Khan Fort. They appear in bad way: twenty-five sick, one killed, two wounded out of sixty, and ask for re-inforcements which Khan cannot furnish. I am sending Knox to Kalat and Gidar; he will raise and despatch tribal force to support Khan's authority in Panjgur, for, if Kardar is killed or compelled to flee, we may expect general rising throughout Makran, as Kardar reports that general impression is that we have abandoned Makran. Sir Nauroz Khan is in Birjand too far off to assist, but his son, Yakub Khan, has been directed to recall his clansmen from Panjgur, and been warned that he is responsible for any harm they commit.

ENCLOSURE No. 5.

No. 5221, dated Quetta, the 4th August 1898.

From—COLONEL H. WYLIE, C.S.I., Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a report on Panjgur affairs by Mr. Knox, No. 73 C., dated the 3rd instant.

2. Subsequently to the writing of that report, I received telegram No. 1283 of yesterday's date from the Political Agent in Southern Baluchistan, and this morning I received the same officer's telegram No. 1294 (copies attached), both bearing on the state of affairs in Panjgur.

3. I had the honour of telegraphing to you yesterday the purport of the former message, and of briefly informing you of the steps I proposed taking to restore order in Panjgur.

4. You will see from former correspondence that the situation in Panjgur has rapidly altered for the worse, and I will now try to explain what that situation was, and what it now is.

5. The two officials in Panjgur are, first, the Kardar, by name Saiyid Abid Husain, who may be said to represent the existing form of government, for he is the ruler under the orders of Dewan Udho Das, Nazim of Makran, and second, Kaoda Muhammad Khan, the Naib. Both these persons are servants of the Khan of Kalat, but the latter is in disfavour with His Highness. The former, who is an ex-native officer of our army and distinguished himself in Burma, was appointed by Mr. Barnes, and Kaoda Muhammad Khan, who is a Panjguri, was posted by Captain LeMesurier with the Khan's consent, but failed to propitiate His Highness with the usual present on appointment. These two men have been at enmity from the first, but it was understood that the Kardar was the stronger of the two, and was liked by the Baluchi inhabitants of Panjgur. Moreover he was supported by about sixty of the Khan's re-organized troops. The immediate cause of the present rupture seems to have been that Kaoda Muhammad Khan was arranging to receive in a small fort near Panjgur a body of Naushirwanis. Hearing this the Kardar seized the fort, whereupon Kaoda Muhammad Khan shut himself up in Isai Fort, and refused to acknowledge the Kardar's authority. The Kardar thereupon laid siege to Isai in

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a perfunctory manner, but wrote that he was not strong enough to assault it unless we sent him a gun. During this siege he held the small fort of Garm Khan, and seems to have lost one man killed and two wounded of the Kalat State troops.

6. Knowing how unpopular Kaoda Muhammad Khan was with the people of Panjgur, Mr. Knox considered that he would soon have to flee the district or surrender, and he despatched two Brahui "Motibars" from here to recommend him to come to Kalat, when he promised to enquire fully into the matters in dispute between him and the Kardar, of which we know very little at present. The only reply to this message has been that Kaoda Muhammad Khan declined to surrender.

7. From the more recent telegrams which I attach to this report, it appears that Kaoda Muhammad Khan has now induced that section of the Naushirwanis which was actively engaged against us in Makran early this year to join him, and some of these have thrown themselves into his fort of Isai, while others are advancing from various directions on Panjgur, which district they will probably loot. Meanwhile the Kardar seems to be in a bad way, for the Kalat State troops are suffering much from sickness, and his Baluchi friends do not appear to be trustworthy. He reports that the general idea is that we mean to give up interfering in Makran, and consequently all those, who are averse to the form of government which are established there under the Nazim, will unite in endeavouring to upset it. Indeed if the Kardar is killed, or compelled to flee from Panjgur, I think we must expect a general rising in Makran, and this idea is confirmed by messages I have just received from Mir Mehrab Khan, Gitchki, who declines to come to Quetta, or to keep quiet until next cold weather.

8. I am taking the following steps to quell the disturbance in Panjgur, which I hope will meet with the approval of the Government of India. I am writing to Mir Yakub Khan, Naushirwani, who, in the absence of his father, Sir Nauroz Khan in Persia, is managing Kharan affairs, directing him to recall his clansmen from Panjgur, and warning him that he will be held responsible if they commit any depredations in that district. I am sending Mr. Knox to Kalat to see the Khan, and ascertain what his wishes and views are. I am suggesting to His Highness that a tribal force shall be raised for temporary service, and despatched under its own leaders, to support the Kardar and restore order in Panjgur. Mr. Knox will proceed as far as Gidar to see that this force (which there will be no difficulty in raising) is efficient, but I do not propose that he shall accompany it to Panjgur. This force would be paid from Makran revenues. Mr. Knox will be accompanied by a Bombay Cavalry escort of 30 sabres, which should be sufficient for his personal safety.

9. The only other method of re-establishing order in Panjgur would be to despatch a column of our own troops there, and this could hardly be done at this season of the year, although I think that Government must contemplate sending a strong escort with the Political Agent of Kalat through Makran next winter, whatever may be the future policy decided upon towards that tract.

No. 73 C., dated the 3rd August 1898.

From—The Political Agent, Kalat,

To—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.

I have the honour, in continuation of my letter No. 1562, dated the 5th June 1898, to submit a further report, showing the present situation of affairs in Panjgur.

1. Copy of a telegram from the Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, dated the 26th July 1898.
2. Copy of a telegram from the Head Clerk, Kalat Agency, to the Political Agent, Kalat, dated the 29th July 1898.
3. Copy of a telegram from the Political Agent, Southern Baluchistan, dated the 31st July 1898.

Copies of three telegrams as per margin are enclosed.

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2. From these it will be seen that affairs have taken a more serious turn than I anticipated in the letter quoted above. This is chiefly owing to the alliance which has apparently been formed between Mir Muhammad Umar, Naushirwani, and the Khan's Naib, Kaoda Muhammad Khan. My information implies that it is an affair of money, and that the Kaoda has offered Muhammad Umar a large sum of money to help him to escape from Panjgur.

3. This offer and the prospect of looting Panjgur would be quite sufficient to induce Muhammad Umar to make friends with anybody, and there seems to be little reason to doubt the general truth of the news from Panjgur.

4. As matters stand at present, Panjgur will probably be looted, but, although 25 sick men are a serious matter to a garrison, the full strength of which is about 60 sepoys, I do not expect that Muhammad Umar, or the Kaoda, or a combination of these two, will be able to turn the Kardar out of the fort of Garm Khan.

5. No Baluch Chief can maintain a large following such as would be required for the siege of a fort like Garm Khan for any length of time, so it is unlikely that the Kardar will be put to it for want of provisions.

6. But it will be impossible for the Kardar with his small force to prevent the Kaoda's escape or the loot of Panjgur, and the result will probably be immense increase of prestige for the Naushirwanis, and further and more audacious expeditions in Kej and Kolwa.

7. Only one plan suggests itself to me for the quelling of this disorder, and that would be for myself, accompanied by a strong tribal escort, to proceed immediately to Panjgur. I could reach Panjgur within 20 days of receipt of orders. This would probably check the Naushirwani raiding at all events, and would, to a certain extent, restore confidence in Makran.

	Rs.
* 60 Sowars at Rs. 25 per mensem ...	1,500
5 Motibars averaging Rs. 70	350
Miscellaneous expenses	150
TOTAL ...	2,000

8. The expense of such a move would probably amount to Rs. 2,000 per mensem,* and the tour would probably last a month.

9. At present it would be difficult to meet these expenses from the Makran revenues, but the charge would, if necessary, be met later, partly from Makran revenues and partly from the Khan's interest money.

Telegram, dated the 26th July 1898.

From—The Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, Karachi,

To—The Political Agent, Kalat.

Following from Kardar, Panjgur:—*Begins.* Kaoda still holding out Umar and other Naushirwains preparing to help him. Assistance from Boleda not yet arrived; moreover Subedar Karamdad has called Kasim Ali with detachment to Kej. Kindly wire him not to interfere, also expedite assistance. Sir Nauroz's Naibs, Ali and Ghulam Muhammad, also secretly helping rebels. Kindly write to Yakub Khan: extraordinary preparations being made in Khodabadan Fort. *Ends.*

Telegram, No. 135, dated the 26th July 1898.

From—The Head Clerk, Kalat Agency,

To—The Political Agent, Kalat.

Mir Kamal Khan, Amir Bakhsh, and Kardar, Panjgur, report that Kaoda Muhammad Khan is making lame excuses for coming to Kalat and evacuating Isai Fort. Muhammad Umar, Naushirwani, is said to have collected a large lashkar which is shortly expected for Kaoda's assistance, and Kaoda is probably prevaricating till its arrival. Original reports posted to-day. Kardar's man waiting for reply. May give him roza, eight annas per day, from Makran revenues?

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

Telegram, dated Karachi, the 31st July 1898.

From—The Political Agent, Southern Baluchistan,

To—The Political Agent, Kalat.

Kardar, Panjgur, through Bela, dated 22nd July, asks me forward you following:—Two Motibars, sent from Gidar to treat with Kaoda Muhammad Khan, report they have tried their best to persuade Kaoda, but Kaoda refuses to deliver up fort and come to Quetta. Naushirwani lashkar had arrived at Askan 22nd, and he expected to be attacked any day. Three lengthy reports received by me about Naushirwanis from Jemadar Kasim Ali contained following information:—Five of rebels had seized temporarily, but since report of Naushirwani approach has commenced again. Three sepoys wounded, of whom one has died. Kaoda has been replenished with gunpowder and rations from outside, and has begun burning houses in vicinity of fort, which troops used as shelter during the day to fire from: 26 men, including doctor in hospital and 25 in Garm Khan where treasure and much ammunition is stored, leaving only about 10 to 15, gone to watch Isai.

Telegram, No. 1283, dated the 3rd August 1898.

From—The Political Agent, Southern Baluchistan,

To—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.

Following by special sowar from Kardar, Panjgur, undated:—*Begins.* Muhammad Umar's brother, with sixty men and some breech-loading rifles, entered Isai Fort last night. Muhammad Umar has taken Kohbun Fort and is gathering *lashkar*. Shah Nawaz Khan arrives at Askan with one thousand Damanis to back Muhammad Umar. We can no longer keep siege of Isai Fort. If no help reaches at once, all of us will be killed. Baluchis are flying in hurry with their families. If we are by accident killed in Isai, Garm Khan Fort must fall into their hands, as the rumour in Makran is that British Government has given up Makran. This news is taken to be correct by the country owing to no help having been received during this long time of Isai siege. Kindly wire to Political Agent, Kalat, and Agent, Governor-General. Kindly believe that no more news from us will reach you, as I may not get another man to go. *Ends.* Kasid waiting at Bela. Last reports from Jemadar Kasim Ali, Kalat State Troops, dated 22nd July, stated that, out of about 60 men with him, 25 were guarding Garm Khan Fort, where there is treasure, and abont twenty thousand rounds ammunition, and 26 men were in hospital, which left him but few men to watch Isai. Resaidar Wahad Bux, with Jemadar Tejbir and fifteen camel sowars of Kalat State Troops, bad left Nasirabad for Panjgur on 19th July. Bela Kasid left Bela on 1st, and must have started from Panjgur about 26th. Above has been sent to Political Agent, Kalat.

Telegram, No. 1294, dated Karachi, the 3rd August 1898.

From—The Political Agent, Southern Baluchistan,

To—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.

Reports just received from Jemadar Kasim Ali, Panjgur, confirm Kardar's regarding disturbances in Panjgur wired this morning. Kasim Ali states Muhammad Umar, Naushirwani's brother, entered Isai Fort on night of 26th to assist Kaoda, and is said to have nearly 100 breech-loading rifles with him; also states no reliance can be placed on Panjguris collected by Kardar, who were in charge south gate and allowed enemy to scale walls with ladders. Shah Nawaz Khan's Naushirwani lashkar of nearly thousand men had reached one march from Panjgur. Kasim Ali adds his hands tied by Kardar; he finds himself in very difficult position.

4

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

(106)

Extract from Diary of the Baluchistan Agency for week ending 8th August 1898.

* * * * * * *

VI.—POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE.

* * * * * * *

In his diary for the same week the Political Agent in South-Eastern Baluchistan reports that he has heard from the Kardar of Panjgur that Kaoda Muhammad Khan, who shut himself up in the Isai Fort, has refused to come to terms. The two Motabirs who were sent out have also returned unsuccessful.

A rebel force of Naushirwanis arrived at Askan on the 22nd July, and, emboldened by Kaoda Muhammad Khan's refusal to come to terms, commenced firing. The rebels are said to have received fresh supplies of powder and food.

ENCLOSURE No. 6.

Telegram, No. 0268, dated Ziarat, the 26th August 1898.

From—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Reports from Panjgur show that Naushirwani lashkar appeared there thirteenth instant, and Kardar has shut himself up in Garm Khan Fort and expects an attack.

ENCLOSURE No. 7.

Telegram, No. 0279, dated Ziarat, the 1st September 1898.

From—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Latest news from Panjgur states that Kardar captured Isai Fort on twentieth ultimo, and that Kaoda has fled. The Kardar reports all now quiet, and that he does not require help.

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

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

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1898.

SIMLA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

EXTERNAL.

No. 163, DATED THE 15TH SEPTEMBER 1898.

COPY.

Letter to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Affairs in Makran.

Foreign Office Press—No. 899—12-9-98—29.

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

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

SIMLA RECORDS—2.

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1898

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET—E.

Progs., September 1898, Nos. 40—58.

KERMAN CONSULATE.
British interests in Southern Persia.

Foreign Office Press—No. 943—26-9-98—16.

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

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

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REFERENCES TO FORMER CASES.

Branch, date and Nos.	Brief title of file.
Secret E., Aug. 1898, Nos. 11-237 ...	Mr. Graves's murder.
Secret F., April „ „ 103-120 }	Nushki-Chageh route.
„ Jan. 1897 „ 388-410 }	
Secret E. „ 1898 „ 144-149 ...	Desire of Russia to acquire a coaling station in the Persian Gulf.
Frontier A, Nov. 1897 „ 18-23 ...	Khorassan Trade Report.
External B, Oct. „ „ 93-98 ...	Karachi-Jask Telegraph Line.
Secret E., June „ „ 150-153 }	Consular Agent at Bundar Abbas.
„ Nov. 1893 „ 568-581 }	
„ March „ „ 562-578 }	
Secret F., June 1897 „ 87-150 & 1-77. }	Bubonic Plague.
„ April „ „ 214-361 }	
Secret E., Aug. 1896 „ 175-230 ...	Death of Nasr-ed-Din, Shah of Persia.
„ March „ „ 225-230 ...	Consular Officer at Momein.
„ Oct. 1895 „ 214-220 ...	Consul at Manwyne.
„ Nov. 1896 „ 214-223 ...	Persian affairs.
Secret F., Oct. „ „ 160-165 ...	Nushki-Persian Frontier.
Secret E., March „ „ 79-95 ...	Karun subsidy.
„ Sept. 1895 „ 107-115 }	Captain Sykes.
„ Feb. „ „ 215-223 }	
„ June 1894 „ 306-313 }	
„ Nov. 1893 „ 538-559 }	
Secret F., Aug. 1894 „ 3-25 ...	Russian activity in Seistan.
Secret E., May 1894 „ 53-56 ...	Political control of Makran.
„ Nov. „ No. 112 ...	Oppression at Kerman.
„ July „ Nos. 110-111 }	Kerman Consulate.
„ Sept. 1892, No. 62 }	
Frontier B, Feb. 1893, Nos. 1-2	Route map for the Western Himalayas, Kashmir, Punjab and Northern India, &c.
Secret F., May 1892 „ 62-154 ...	Russian General in Gwadur, &c.
External A, Oct. 1891 „ 52-89 ...	Kez and Panjgur.
Secret E., March 1894 „ 251-253 ...	Yezd Vice-Consulate.
General A, June 1886 „ 1-44 ...	Furlough to Mr. Cordery.
Secret E. „ 1891 „ 171-184 }	Baluchistan-Seistan Railway.
„ July 1889 „ 97-115 }	
„ Sept. „ „ 106-113 }	
„ Aug. 1887 „ 433-434 }	British policy in Persia.
„ „ „ „ 277-408 }	
	Review of the Trade in India in 1896-97.

REFERENCES TO LATER CASES.

Branch, date and Nos.	Brief title of file.
Secret E., Sept. 1898, Nos. 144-212 ...	Persian loan.
„ „ „ „ 213-239 ...	General situation in Persia.
S. E. Inwards 25-374/416.	Affairs of Persian Baluchistan.
— — — 228/29	Russian activity in Southern Persia
— — — 606.	Same subject

(To be continued on back, if necessary.)

KEEP-WITHS PRINTED.

(1) Notes on the case.
(2) Demi-official correspondence.
(3) An extract from the *Pioneer*.

KEEP-WITHS NOT PRINTED.

List of papers restored to Records.
Originals. Buff notes. Proofs.
Demi-official letters to the Registrars, Finance and Military Departments, with buff note.

PRECIS-DOCKET.

GOVT. OF INDIA. } 1898 { FOREIGN DEPT.

SECRET—E.

SEPTEMBER.

Nos. 40—58.

BRIEF SUBJECT.

Kerman Consulate.

British interests in Southern Persia.

LIST OF PAPERS.

No. 40.—From Her Majesty's Secy. of State for India, No. 37 (Secret), dated the 29th Oct. 1897—Proposes that India should contribute towards the maintenance of the Kerman Consulate and asks for careful consideration of the proposal.

Nos. 41-43.—Enclos.

No. 44.—Extract from a tel. from the Poltl. Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 5th Dec. 1897—Intimates that the Baluchis believe that there is no Shah, and that the Sultan of Turkey has crushed the Christian nations. Suggests some decided demonstration.

No. 45.—Extract from a letter from the Poltl. Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 126, dated the 5th Dec. 1897—Suggests measures for re-establishing British prestigé in Persian Baluchistan.

No. 46.—Extract from a tel. from the Asstt. Supdt., Indo-European Telegraphs, dated the 23rd Dec. 1897—Repeats a tel. from the Poltl. Resident in the Persian Gulf, regarding the measures to be taken for protecting British interests at Jask and Charbar.

No. 47.—Extract from a tel. to Her Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, No. 1917 E.-A., dated the 25th Dec. 1897—Communicates purport of the above, and intimates that the Govt. of India will take no action without his recommendations.

No. 48.—Extract from a tel. from Her Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, dated the 25th Dec. 1897—Reports the critical state of affairs at Charbar, and suggests measures for protecting British subjects and the tel. line.

No. 49.—Tel. from Her Majesty's Secy. of State for India, dated the 27th Dec. 1897—Enquires whether the detachments of Native Infantry proposed for Charbar and Jask can be sent, and whether they would suffice. Makes enquiries as to future arrangements with reference to British interests in Persian Baluchistan.

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REFERENCES TO LATER CASES—(*continued*).

Branch, date and Nos.	Brief title of file.

(Continuation of Précis-Docket.)

No. 50.—Tel. to Her Majesty's Secy. of State for India, No. 10 E.-A., dated the 4th Jan. 1898—Replies to the above.

No. 51.—Tel. from Her Majesty's Secy. of State for India, dated the 18th Feb. 1898—Asks for a reply to Progs. No. 40 above.

No. 52.—Tel. to Her Majesty's Secy. of State for India, No. 383 E.-A., dated the 23rd Feb. 1898—Replies that the Govt. of India are willing to meet in 1898-99 half the cost of sending back Captain Sykes to Kerman, provided such moiety does not exceed Rs. 6,000.

No. 53.—Despatch from Her Majesty's Secy. of State for India, No. 54 (Poltl.), dated the 19th May 1898—Contribution from Indian revenues towards expenses of the Kerman Consulate.

No. 53 A.— Enclo.

No. 54.—Tel. to the Agent to the Govr.-Genl. in Baluchistan, No. 1007 E.-A., dated the 1st July 1898—Asks for the Nushki trade figures for 1897.

No. 54A.—Tel. from the Agent to the Govr.-Genl. in Baluchistan, No. 282, dated the 4th July 1898—Gives the trade figures for 1897-98.

No. 54B.—Extract from the Diary of the Poltl. Asstt., Chageh, for the week ending 31st May 1898—Reports that Nushki import and export returns for the first four months of 1898 amount to Rs. 3,11,000.

Nos. 55-56.—Enclos. in a letter from the Poltl. and Secret Dept., India Office, London, No. 28, dated the 24th June 1898—Despatch of Captain Sykes to Kerman. Payment from Indian revenues of a moiety of the cost of sending him to Kerman.

No. 56A.—Extract from the Meshed Poltl. Diary No. 25 for the week ending 24th June 1898—Appointment of Mr. Ziedler to some post in Seistan.

No. 57.—Despatch to Her Majesty's Secy. of State for India, No. 135 (Secret-External), dated the 11th Aug. 1898—British interests iu Southern Persia.

No. 58.—Endts. to Fince. and Mily. Depts. and to the Intelligence Branch, Nos. 1208-1210 E.-A., dated the 23rd Aug. 1898—Forwards copies of the foregoing despatch for information.

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

(110)

K. W.

SECRET—E., SEPTEMBER 1898.

Nos. 40—58.

K. W. No. 1.

KERMAN CONSULATE.

BRITISH INTERESTS IN SOUTHERN PERSIA.

(Progs. of 1240-43.)

FROM HER MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE, No. 37 (SECRET), DATED THE 29TH OCTOBER (RECEIVED 16TH NOVEMBER) 1897.

With reference to previous correspondence, forwards copy of a letter from the Foreign Office, renewing their request that a contribution should be made from Indian revenues towards the cost of the British Consular establishment at Kerman. Intimates that he is inclined to attach considerable importance to the maintenance of this establishment and to the selection of a suitable European representative, and that, unless the Government of India are willing to contribute, it is improbable that a suitable, if indeed any, successor to Captain Sykes can be provided at Kerman. Asks for careful consideration of the matter.

Circulated.

16th November 1897.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

E.

G. S. W[HITE].

M. D. C[HALMERS].

E. H. H. C[OLLEN].

C. M. R[IVAZ].

UNDER-SECRETARY.

It has been admitted generally that the presence of a competent officer at Kerman is greatly needed for the protection of British interests, both commercial and political. This want was for a time supplied by the appointment of Lieutenant Sykes as Consul at Kerman. No pay was attached to the post, but Lieutenant Sykes received £250 a year as office allowance. This arrangement lasted about two years, and now at its termination Her Majesty's Government desire, with a view to the revival of the arrangement, that the Government of India may consider the question of the payment of a contribution from Indian revenues towards the expenses of a Consular establishment at Kerman.

It is said in the last enclosure to the despatch below that the post of Consul at Kerman was created "in consequence of the earnest and repeated representations made by Her Majesty's Diplomatic and Consular representatives in Persia as to the necessity of affording protection to the numerous British Indian subjects trading in Persian Baluchistan, and as to the important political and commercial interests involved." Such being the case, Her Majesty's Treasury see no reason to continue the allowance paid, unless the Indian Government is prepared to contribute at least half the cost of the establishment.

The Secretary of State, in referring the matter for the consideration of the Government of India, lays great stress "on the importance, in the interest of India, of securing the means of observing political and commercial movements in this part of Persia, and on the lines of transit to Afghanistan." It also appears to His Lordship "that the maintenance of a Consular Agent in Kerman may be useful in counteracting any adverse influences which may be brought to bear against the development of British and British Indian trade in this region."

The arrangement under which Lieutenant Sykes received an office allowance of £250 a year for conducting the Consular duties at Kerman was an economical one and one which any successor can scarcely be expected to assent to. It is said that Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran recently proposed that the outlay for salary and office allowance might be put at £500 a year. If the expenses of the Consular establishment are not to exceed this sum, the Government of India would be expected to pay half. The question then arises—will the Government of India consent to pay this?

977 F. D.

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When the Consulate was first opened, the Government of India distinctly declined to make any allotment for it. But while this is so as regards the Kerman Consulate, the Government of India are interested in the opening of a British Agency or Consulate at Bunder Abbas. There is, however, this to be noted that no final decision has yet been arrived at as regards the latter question, the consideration of which will be resumed when the normal conditions of the trade of Bunder Abbas have been restored by the withdrawal of the Russian sanitary restrictions which have interfered with the overland trade.

Secret E., July 1894, Nos. 110-111.

Proceedings No. 26 of Secret E., July 1896, Nos. 19-28.

Proceedings No. 153 of Secret E., June 1897, Nos. 150-153.

If the question of Consular representation at Bunder Abbas is shortly to be taken up again, and an officer is eventually appointed to that post, it will help to settle the other question as to the payment by the Indian Government of a moiety of the cost of the Kerman Consulate; for the two questions are connected—in that the proposal originally put forward by the Persian Gulf Residency was that the Consul at Kerman should also hold charge of Bunder Abbas. If the two charges are held by the same officer, much of the objection to the Indian Government paying a moiety of the cost of the Kerman Consulate will have been overcome.

This may be considered Colonel Yate's proposal, but backed by Colonel Wilson—*vide* Proceedings Nos. 23 and 26 of Secret E., July 1896, Nos. 19-28.

Finance Department for consideration and remarks. The two questions may be dealt with together and brought up again when the plague restrictions have been removed. Meanwhile it is to be decided what reply should be sent to the Secretary of State as to the Indian contribution on account of the Kerman Consulate.

F. A. DEB.—*10th December 1897.*

R. W. S.—*11th December 1897.*

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

1. As a precaution against Russian activity in Kain and Seistan, it was proposed in 1894 to establish British Agencies in South-Eastern Persia. Secretary noted that, "if we could afford to establish a Consul for Kerman and Bunder Abbas, I think that, both politically and commercially, the results would be very good."

We did not know how to find the money, and so we refused to contribute. Moreover, it was noted at the time that "money would be better spent on a Vice-Consul at Bunder Abbas, where there was a large British Indian trade," securable "at Rs. 50 a month."

Secret E., July 1894, Nos. 110-111.

2. Since that date we have the following:—

(i) Lieutenant Sykes went to Kerman as Consul in 1894.

We have heard complaints of oppressive treatment received during his absence by British Indian subjects at Kerman and Bunder Abbas.

Secret E., Proceedings, November 1894, No. 112.

(ii) Sir Mortimer Durand wrote from the Embassy at Tehran on the 20th December 1894:—

Secret E., Proceedings, September 1895, Nos. 107-115.

"I feel sure that the Government of India, to whom the maintenance of British influence in Persia is no doubt a matter of serious interest, will wish to do anything in their power to increase the efficiency of the new Consulate. I trust that, as Her Majesty's Government has seen its way to establishing a Consulate at Kerman, the Government of India will not think the small expenditure involved in these proposals is an excessive contribution on the part of Indian Revenues."

The contribution asked was estimated in this office at Rs. 255 exclusive of the initial expenditure on equipment, etc.

His Excellency noted in reply:—

"I fail to find any reason for altering our recorded opinion that we had no funds to spend on this Consulate, and if we had, we should not spend them at Kerman."

(iii) Kerman is at one end of a section of an important trade route inland. At the other end is Bunder Abbas, also an important centre of British Indian trade. In 1895 the export and import trade with British India and the Colonies amounted to over 41 and 75 lakhs respectively.

K. Ws., Secret E., November 1897, Nos. 150-153.

Finance and Commerce Department can say how small a proportion of this trade is with the Colonies.

The volume of trade is great, but the number of traders is believed to be small.

(iv) In August 1895 it was proposed to tack on Bunder Abbas to Kerman. The proposal was negatived partly from fear lest its acceptance would involve the Government of India in paying the cost without exercising a reasonable amount of control over the appointment and expenditure.

Secret E., Proceedings, July 1896, Nos. 19-28.

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If India contributed to the cost of Kerman, India would be entitled to chief control, and the above reasons would become less cogent.

(v) The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf has recently been told that the appointment of a Consular Agent to watch British interests at Bunder Abbas may become necessary in time, but from a commercial point of view he is not much needed at present :—

Secret E., June 1897, Nos. 150-153.

"The Government of India will be able to judge more definitely when the Russian sanitary cordon is withdrawn."

The double appointment will create, it is anticipated, little inconvenience. But the total cost could scarcely be less than Rs. 10,000 a year, though Sir Mortimer Durand estimates £500 (or Rs. 8,000). But his estimate does not include housing, etc. The Vice-Consul receives £350 at Mohammerah and £100 office allowance.

Page 4, K. Ws., Secret F., August 1894, Nos. 3-25.

Whether we will contribute or not, seems purely a question of funds.

3. It is for consideration whether the Bombay Government, the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan and the Political Resident at Bushire should not be consulted, if Finance Department can find the money.

I would remind Deputy Secretary that Major Meade has been complaining that the Imperial Treasury does not, in his opinion, bear a fair share of the Bushire charges. We might take this into consideration in replying, and demand a *quid pro quo*. If Foreign office give Rs. 250 out of £500 at Kerman, I don't see why they should only give (say) £35 at Bushire.

10th December 1897. J. LANG.

SECRETARY.

I am inclined to think that this matter might lie by for a bit until we see whether the enquiries and proceedings in connection with the murder of Mr. Graves are likely to in any way assist consideration of the future position in Persian Baluchistan.

2. Our letter to Mr. Sykes in External B, May 1895, No. 81, may be read. He did useful work in connection with the Perso-Baluch frontier demarcation, but that is now finished, and, speaking generally, I do not think it can be said that Captain Sykes's presence at Kerman has, from a political point of view, been of any special value to the Government of India. The Finance Department might be invited to offer remarks from the standpoint of commerce.

3. It occurred to me that a possible solution of the financial difficulty in respect to a Consular establishment at Kerman or Bunder Abbas might be found in reduction of the status of the similar establishment recently sanctioned for Yunnan. As to this, please see Secret E., October 1895, Nos. 214-220, and March 1896, Nos. 225-230. I incline to the opinion that, in Indian interests, money would perhaps be more profitably spent on keeping a duly qualified Consular officer in South-Eastern Persia. It would, however, perhaps be difficult to make any suggestion in this direction.

H. DALY.

1st January 1898.

HIS EXCELLENCY.

It would be no use, I am not sure if it would be wise, to propose less expenditure on the Yunnan Consular establishment in order to transfer some to Kerman. Present reports seem to indicate that the state of Persian Baluchistan may show the political need of having an office there, but it may be too late to put one. I should be inclined, however, to wait a little before definitely answering on political grounds.

As to commercial grounds, we may ask the Finance Department.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

I understand that Secretary is making the enquiry into the general question of our commercial interests in Persian Baluchistan which we reserved when sending our reply on other points to the Secretary of State, and that he will consult the Finance Department on the matter. This seems to me a part of that general question.

E.

8th January 1898.

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(*Extracts from notes.*)

(Progs. No. 49.)

TELEGRAM FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, LONDON, DATED THE 27TH (RECEIVED 28TH) DECEMBER 1897.

Enquires whether the detachments of native infantry proposed for Charbar and Jask can be sent, and whether they would suffice. Makes certain further enquiries.

SECRETARY.

* * * * * * * *

3. The latter part of the telegram from the Secretary of State raises wide issues and may perhaps wait till the question about troops is decided. On the political aspect of the position in, and future of, Persian Baluchistan, we should get an opinion from Mr. Barnes. As to commercial interests and telegraph matters, we shall have to consult the Finance and Public Works Departments. In a recent despatch the Secretary of State has pressed the Government of India to reconsider the question of contributing to the cost of a Consul for Kerman.

28th December 1897. H. DALY.

HIS EXCELLENCY.

Yes, as to confining operations, I do not quite follow why Meade should leave Jask? E.

I think the first thing is to instruct Colonel Meade to leave Jask and to confine any operations which he orders to the protection of Jask and Charbar.

Next, to ask the Military Department if they can send 100 men for the protection of Charbar and 50 for the protection of Jask, and if those numbers will suffice; if not, what strength should be sent for the protection of the stations only and not of the land line. I cannot delay referring these questions to consider and note on the policy to be pursued if matters in Persian Baluchistan come to a crisis, but I think it must be evident that the Indian Government cannot undertake the military protection of Persian Baluchistan.

28th December 1897. W. J. CUNINGHAM.

On the latter point one thing to my mind is clear, *i.e.*, that it is useless to attempt an effective military intervention in, or at any rate occupation of, Persian Baluchistan with the forces now at the disposal of the Government of India, and though it may take time to ascertain to what extent our interests may be otherwise affected, I would say thus much in any reply to the Secretary of State.

I confess I do not much like admitting the principle by sending the detachments now asked, and then small detachments in isolated positions are always objectionable. Still Jask and Charbar are, I believe, both on the sea coast, and we are bound, I suppose, to protect the Telegraph staff. It is for the Military Department and the Commander-in-Chief to say what we can do, and I would ask their opinion urgently.

28th December 1897. E.

---

* * * * * * * *

YOUR EXCELLENCY.

We are asked if we can send 100 native infantry to Charbar and 50 to Jask; these places are on the coast, approximately 400 and 600 miles west of Karachi.

Map put up.

Another gun-boat is also applied for, so I gather one is there already.

So far as regards strength, the detachments asked for will probably meet the purpose, which is stated to be for local defence only.

It would appear to be the legitimate duty of the ~~25th~~ Bombay Infantry (Marine Battalion) stationed at Bombay to undertake the work, but it might be necessary to replace the men if drawn from it; failing this the men could be provided from 30th Baluchis at Karachi, but the corps has 168 Baluchis and Brahuis in its ranks which might be an objection. 21st

Unless there is any gain as to time by employing troops from Karachi, it seems generally preferable to utilize the 21st Bombay Infantry; I note that supplies for three months are required, and these would certainly be shipped quicker at Bombay than Karachi.

30th December 1897. A. R. BADCOCK.

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

I agree entirely in His Excellency the Viceroy's note, but am now prepared to send the detachments asked for merely as guards to staff at Telegraph offices.

31st December 1897. G. S. W[HITE].

To Military Department, U. O. No. 7688-D., dated the 31st December 1897.

(*Notes in the Military Department.*)

HON'BLE MEMBER.

31st December 1897. P. J. MAITLAND.

I agree with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

1st January 1898. E. H. H. C[OLLEN].

To Foreign Department, U. O. No. 3-B., dated the 1st January 1898.

(*Notes in the Foreign Department.*)

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

Submitted with draft telegram to the Secretary of State.

R. W. S.—*2nd January 1898.*

SECRETARY.

I suppose the detachments will not be sent until actual instructions to that effect are received from Secretary of State.

3rd January 1898. H. DALY.

HIS EXCELLENCY.

For approval. Pending reply, the Military Department may be asked to order that the two detachments should be got ready to start, provisioned as proposed.

3rd January 1898. W. J. CUNINGHAM.

3rd January 1898. E.

(Progs. No 50.)

[Telegram to the Secretary of State, No. 10-E.A., dated the 4th January 1898.]

The case was unavoidably delayed for the telegram from the Secretary of State of the 27th December 1897, the Viceroy's reply of the 4th January 1898, and the connected correspondence, etc., copies or extracts of which are now placed below. Send now to the Finance Department with reference to His Excellency's note of 8th January on page 3.

30th January 1898. H. DALY.

To Finance Department, U. O. No. 128-E.A., dated the 31st January 1898.

(*Notes in the Finance Department.*)

Finance Department U. O. R. No. 680, dated the 31st January 1898.

Statistical Branch U. O. R. No. 430-F. T., dated the 1st February 1898.

DIRECTOR-GENERAL.

Submitted.

L. L.—*1st February 1898.*

SECRETARY.

There is no information in this Department beyond the mere statistics of trade with Persia, which I place below. The trade with Kandahar includes trade with South-Eastern Persia, but we cannot say how much of it is trade with that region.

I think that, as far as trade interests are concerned, this Department can hardly express an opinion as to the need of Consular Agents at the cost of Indian revenues. The question

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should, perhaps, be considered in the Foreign Department with the despatch from the Secretary of State of 2nd December 1897, which was sent to that Department by us on the 11th January.

3rd February 1898. J. E. O'CONOR.

HON'BLE MEMBER.

I take it from the above, that so far as trade is concerned, there is no great need for having Consular Agents in South-Eastern Persia.

We ought, therefore, for financial reasons, to object to any proposal that India should pay for such Agents for commercial objects. If the Foreign Department come to the conclusion that political objects render the Agents desirable, we shall consider whether the financial considerations should give way.

4th February 1898. J. F. FINLAY.

Exclusively so, I think. J. E. O'CONOR. I suppose this trade is mostly with Bombay and Karachi.

Can these ports give us any information as to the particular Persian Gulf ports interested in the trade, *i.e.*, the figure belonging to each? Also, do not the Political Department reports show the trade of each port?

5th February 1898. J. W[ESTLAND].

DIRECTOR-GENERAL.

The Bombay and Sind trade and navigation volumes show the figures of their trade with Persia as a whole and not those of the trade with each port in the Persian Gulf. This information is not given either in the monthly statement of trade furnished to this office.

Tables relating to the trade of each of the ports in the Persian Gulf with India are appended to the Administration Report * of the Persian Gulf Political Residency and Maskat Political Agency for 1896-97. A comparative statement has been prepared from those tables, and placed below. Such of the Consular Reports on the trade of Persia as have been received are likewise put up.

* Put up and flagged.

The figures differ considerably from those in our accounts: please see the tables marked A and C below. L. L.

T. D. G.—*7th February 1898.*

L. L.—*8th February 1898.*

SECRETARY.

The local Custom houses do record the trade by ports, though the information is not sent to us or published, and I think it would be necessary to get it compiled from the documents used for the compilation of the trade returns.

8th February 1898. J. E. O'CONOR.

HON'BLE MEMBER.

9th February 1898. J. F. FINLAY.

All we can do at present is to give such information as we possess to the Foreign Department.

10th February 1898. J. W[ESTLAND].

DIRECTOR-GENERAL.

The file may be returned now to the Foreign with the three tables below (marked A, B, C), and the Consular reports † put up. They contain such information as we possess.

† These the Foreign Department possess—still they may be sent.

L. L.—*11th February 1898.*

11th February 1898. J. E. O'CONOR.

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

A.

Statement showing the Trade (in merchandise) of India with Persia by sea in the

	Official year.				
	1892-93.	1893-94.	1894-95.	1895-96.	1896-97.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Imports	68,70,921	73,42,050	79,46,772	87,27,980	68,59,831
Exports	1,89,97,865	1,83,71,198	2,38,00,754	1,71,44,384	1,33,60,105
Total	2,58,68,786	2,57,13,248	3,17,47,526	2,58,72,364	2,02,19,936

	Nine months—April to December.				
	1893.	1894.	1895.	1896.	1897.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Imports	57,57,922	62,11,209	72,77,482	55,96,025	55,58,005
Exports	1 28,59,368	1,77,23,717	1,17,02,517	1,05,38,634	96,14,721
Total	1,86,17,290	2,39,34,926	1,89,79,999	1,61,34,659	1,51,72,726

B.

Statement showing the Trade (in merchandise) of India with Kandahar in the

	Official year.				
	1892-93	1893-94.	1894-95.	1895-96.	1896-97.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Imports	23,44,284	33,58,490	29,90,902	41,05,414	41,84,046
Exports	29,76,569	32,81,724	30,97,615	25,70,016	22,73,765
Total	53,20,853	66,40,214	60,88,517	66,75,430	64,57,811

	Seven months—April to October.				
	1893.	1894.	1895.	1896.	1897.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Imports	17,45,716	14,66,205	18,91,132	23,25,181	22,02,486
Exports	20,92,194	14,64,410	15,28,740	13,94,497	13,81,136
Total	38,37,910	29,30,615	34,19,872	37,19,678	35,83,622

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C.

Statement showing the Trade with India of the undermentioned ports in the Persian Gulf during the years 1894, 1895, and 1896.

(Figures taken from the Administration Report of the Persian Gulf Political Residency and Maskat Political Agency for 1896-97).

		1894.	1895.	1896.
		Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Bushire	Imports	69,91,000	44,64,140	39,03,138
	Exports	18,76,660	12,39,190	12,99,928
	Total	88,67,660	57,03,330	52,03,066
Lingah	Imports	55,08,500	40,54,870	26,59,550
	Exports	44,84,700	46,81,600	46,24,700
	Total	99,93,200	87,36,470	72,84,250
Bunder Abbas	Imports	93,98,480	75,51,950	51,53,339
	Exports	33,69,120	41,85,170	20,86,923
	Total	1,27,67,600	1,17,37,120	72,40,262
Bahrain	Imports	47,94,880	46,05,650	49,88,650
	Exports	49,76,430	41,29,250	51,72,850
	Total	97,71,310	87,34,900	1,01,61,500
	GRAND TOTAL	4,13,99,770	3,49,11,820	2,98,89,078

To Foreign Department unofficially.

F. D. (S. B.) U. O. I. No. 141-F. T., dated the 11th February 1898.

On return of the case from Finance Department, we had to send to them for copy of the despatch from the Secretary of State, No. 209 (Revenue), dated 2nd December 1897, referred to in Mr. O'Conor's note at page 6. The copy only reached me yesterday.

19th February 1898. H. Daly.

(Progs. of No 51.)

Telegram from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated the 18th (received 19th) February 1898.

Refers to his Secret Despatch No. 37, dated 29th October, regarding the re-establishment of the Kerman Consulate, and desires to know the decision of the Government of India by telegram.

Secretary.

Please see the notes from page 5 and the despatch from the Secretary of State in the linked file.

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

2. I think that, under existing circumstances, it would be well to agree to bear in 1898-99 half the cost of sending Captain Sykes back to Kerman within a fixed limit in rupees —say Rs. 6,000 for the moiety. We should reserve a perfectly free hand for the future. I put up a draft telegram to the Secretary of State, for consideration. Finance Department would, of course, have to be consulted before it could issue.

19th February 1898.

H. DALY.

HIS EXCELLENCY.

I cannot suggest any improvement in Captain Daly's proposal. Her Majesty's Government will certainly expect compliance. The Secretary of State thinks the re-establishment of the Consulate important. In the present state of political affairs it is important to know what the Persians are doing in South-Eastern Persia and to have early information of the state of the country.

19th February 1898.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

I think we must agree to this temporary arrangement. We are certainly interested in the Telegraph line and therefore in the suppression of disturbances, while there has also been something done since we last refused to contribute in developing the Seistan route, and there is a possibility of more.

Ask concurrence of Finance Department.

19th February 1898.

E.

Finance Department.

21st February 1898.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

To Finance Department, U. O. No. 235-E.A., dated the 21st February 1898.

Finance Department (S. B.) U. O. R. No. 707-F. T., dated the 21st February 1898.

DIRECTOR-GENERAL.

Submitted. The proposed telegram to Secretary of State is immediately below these notes.

L. L.—*21st February 1898.*

21st February 1898.

J. E. O'CONOR.

Secretary.

21st February 1898.

J. F. FINLAY.

Hon'ble Member.

I agree to telegram.

22nd February 1898.

J. W[ESTLAND].

To Foreign Department unofficially.

F. D. (S. B.) U. O. I. No. 172-F. T., dated the 22nd February 1898.

SECRETARY.

Telegram may issue?

R. W. S.—*23rd February 1898.*

23rd February 1898.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

(Progs. ep 52)

(TELEGRAM to the Secretary of State for India, No. 383-E.A., dated the 23rd February 1898.)

977 F. D.

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(K.W. No 2.)

EXTRACT FROM DEMI-OFFICIAL LETTER FROM CAPTAIN P. M. SYKES, KARACHI, DATED THE 24TH JANUARY (RECEIVED 21ST FEBRUARY) 1898.

Suggests the necessity of the Consulate at Kerman being maintained as a permanent measure.

* * * * * * * *

No present orders are required.

5th February 1898. H. DALY.

Exd.—B. M.

Government of India Central Printing Office—No. 977 F. D.—11-3-98.—41.

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SECRETARY.

Early in December last, Mr. Graves, an Inspector of Telegraphs, was murdered near the mouth of the Rapch river in Persian Baluchistan. The local tribes were in revolt against Persian authority, and the Tehran Legation recommended that detachments of Native Infantry should be sent to Jask and Charbar for the protection of the English telegraph staff.

On the 27th December, the Secretary of State, telegraphing as to this suggestion, said,

"Have you any observations to make on the policy which, having regard to British Indian interests, commercial, telegraph and political, it is desirable that we should consider or follow if matters in Persian Baluchistan come to a crisis?"

The Viceroy answered on the 4th January that the Government of India were prepared to send 100 men to Charbar and 50 to Jask, for defensive purposes; but added,

"I cannot reply without further consideration regarding extent of British Indian interests in Persian Baluchistan, but effective military intervention or occupation could not be attempted by the Government of India with the forces now at our disposal."

2. Shortly before this, in Secret despatch No. 37, dated the 29th October 1897, the Secretary of State for India, on the motion of the Foreign Office, had re-opened the question of a contribution from Indian revenues towards the cost of a Consulate at Kerman. The Foreign Office observed—"A British Consular post was established at Kerman in October 1894..... in consequence of the earnest and repeated representations of Her Majesty's Diplomatic and Consular Representatives in Persia as to the necessity of affording protection to the numerous British Indian subjects trading in Persian Baluchistan, and as to the important political and commercial interests involved."

Lord George Hamilton said—"I shall be obliged if Your Excellency's Government will give your careful consideration to the matter, having regard not only to the arguments contained in the Foreign Office letter, but also to the importance, in the interest of India, of securing the means of observing political and commercial movements in this part of Persia, and on the lines of transit to Afghanistan.

"It further appears to me that the maintenance of a Consular Agent in Kerman may be useful in counteracting any adverse influences which may be brought to bear against the development of British and British Indian trade in this region."

3. On the 18th February 1898, the Secretary of State, referring to this despatch of the 29th October 1897, telegraphed—

"Hardinge desires to send Sykes as Consul immediately to Kerman to watch proceedings of the force being despatched by Persian Government to deal with revolt and punish murderers of Graves. Lord Salisbury approves, provided India contributes half the cost.....Please telegraph your decision. I think it important to re-establish Consulate."

The Viceroy replied on the 23rd February that the Government of India would meet in 1898-99 half the cost of sending Captain Sykes back to Kerman, provided such moiety did not exceed Rs. 6,000; but said—

"We are not prepared at present to give final opinion as to value of Consulate in Indian interests either on commercial or political grounds... .....As to permanent arrangements, and whether India should contribute thereto, we should hope to express full opinion by despatch a few months hence when commercial aspects have been fully examined and political situation may be clearer."

4. Meanwhile we had received, through the Finance Department, a copy of a Revenue despatch from the Secretary of State, No. 209, dated the 2nd December 1897, forwarding a letter from the Foreign Office, which transmitted the report for 1896-97 on the Trade, Commerce and Agriculture of Khorassan. The Foreign Office wrote,

"It will be seen that British trade in these regions has suffered severely from Russian competition and the measures taken by the Russian Government, but that the opening of the new route from Quetta to Meshed may help British Indian merchants to improve their position later to some extent, provided Consular protection and other facilities are afforded to them at central points on the road between Seistan and Meshed. At present there are no British Consular Agents either at Nasirabad or at Birjand, and in the absence of such Agents at those points, British merchants are likely to meet many obstacles (see page 7 of the Report)."

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"I am to request that you will move the Secretary of State for India to refer the matter to the Indian Government for their opinion as to the desirability of creating Consular Agencies at the places named, to be paid from Indian funds."

Lord George Hamilton said in his despatch—

"I trust that the suggestion ..... of appointing Consular Agents at points along the trade route between Quetta and Meshed, may receive the attentive consideration of Your Excellency's Government. It appears to me a measure desirable from many points of view, and especially in connection with the facilities which might be afforded by that route for the transport of arms and ammunition between the Persian Gulf and Baluchistan."

On the 31st March we sent home, with Secret despatch No. 58 (Frontier), papers relating to the development of trade between Baluchistan and Persia, and to the control of the desert tract between Nushki and Koh-i-Malik Siah. The despatch concluded by referring to the suggestion as to appointing Consular Agents at central points between Seistan and Meshed and promised a report in due course.

5. The history of the Kerman Consulate is briefly this:—In 1892, Lord Kimberley had declared himself unable, "considering the large share already borne by India of the cost of Diplomatic and Consular representation in Persia," to acquiesce in a proposal, put forward by the Foreign Office at the instance of Sir F. Lascelles, to create, "at the entire charge of the Indian Government," a single Vice-Consulship for Yezd and Kerman. In 1893 Captain (then Lieutenant) Sykes was permitted to proceed "on leave" to Kerman upon an invitation which he had received from the Farman Farma, who was then Governor-General of Kerman. Lieutenant Sykes subsequently went to Tehran and England, and about the end of 1894, he returned to Kerman as Consul. He received no pay, but the Foreign Office gave him an office allowance of £250 a year. The Government of India declined to contribute. His appointment was for two years. He returned to England about a year ago, and came out to the Persian Gulf last autumn on a mission connected with the measures taken to check the arms trade. He has now, as shown above, gone back to Kerman as Consul at the joint charge of the Home and Indian Governments.

Secret E., March 1893, Nos. 562-578.

Proposals for opening up the trade route from Nushki to Seistan were made in Secret despatch No. 170 (Frontier), dated the 16th September 1896, upon information obtained by Captain McMahon, while demarcating the Afghan-Baluch boundary in that direction. The Secretary of State telegraphed his sanction to the proposals on the 21st October 1896, and followed this up with a despatch, Secret No. 46, dated the 23rd October 1896, in which he said—

Secret F., October 1896, Nos. 160-165.

Secret F., January 1897, Nos. 388-410.

"There are reasons for anticipating that, with proper encouragement, a large and lucrative trade will spring up between Seistan and Quetta, * * * * the time appears to me exceptionally favourable for encouraging traders to make use of this route between India and Eastern Persia. I understand that the trade between these countries *via* Afghanistan has almost ceased, in consequence of the crushing imposts levied on caravans by the Afghan Government, and that the Afghan traders are eager to take advantage of this new route."

6. Mr. Curzon has drawn* a vivid picture of Persian misrule in Persian Baluchistan, and disorder there is no new thing. In November 1896, Colonel Picot, the Military Attaché at Tehran, noted—"Disquieting information has been received from the Gulf *via* Charbar of the unsettled state of Persian Baluchistan." We have since received several reports of the discontent prevailing. In April 1897, Mr. Hardinge, our Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, reported that a rising appeared to have already taken place, and that a new Governor, with re-inforcements, was being sent from Tehran. He was "to negotiate with the Baluch Chiefs during the summer, and in the event of failure to proceed against them in force..... in the autumn." In July, Mr. Hardinge reported no improvement had taken place. The operations undertaken to punish those concerned in Mr Graves's murder appear to have secured safety for our telegraph line near the coast; but the restoration of order inland is probably by no means attained, and according to our latest news, Sir Mortimer Durand thinks the detachments at Jask and Charbar must be retained till the autumn.

* "Persia," Vol. II, page 264.

External A., June 1897, Nos. 96-108.

Secret E., September 1897, Nos. 139-187.

7. To discover what observations, if any, the Government of India should make in respect to the general policy to be followed, "if affairs in Persian Baluchistan come to a crisis,"

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

it appears necessary to consider in some detail the general question of our position, interests and policy in Persia :—

(i) The earliest papers which need at present be referred to are, I think, those recorded as Secret E., August 1887, Nos. 277-408, regarding Railway projects in Persia, and proposals to strengthen British influence in Persia. From the notes then written I extract the following :—

Sir Mortimer Durand :—"I would try to cultivate the friendship of the mountain tribes and of the people generally and to gain, without hostile demonstrations towards Persia or Russia, the strongest footing from a political point of view, which the peculiar circumstances of the country render possible to us. To this end the measures which Colonel Murdoch Smith advocates seem to me entirely desirable. What he proposes is in effect that we should restore the state of affairs formerly existing by which we had capable military officers scattered about Persia in connection with the Telegraph Department, and that we should utilise the services of these officers as Political Agents, letting them move freely about the country and make friends with the people and Chiefs ..... The pay of the officers appointed would be little higher in the aggregate than the pay of the existing telegraph establishment, and their appointment would create no apprehension, as they would be simply telegraph officers—with no ostensible consular of diplomatic powers."

Lord Roberts :—"By reviving the military organisation of the Persian Telegraph Department, we should increase our influence in Persia ; we should provide an admirable school at a trifling cost for the stamp of men whose services would be most useful in the event of troubles with Russia ; we should obtain better information of what is going on and we should know more of the military resources of the country.....

"Every means should be taken to strengthen our influence in Persia, and nothing can do this more effectually than locating selected British officers at certain places and bringing British produce and British money into the country."

Sir Theodore Hope :—"I fear that the real truth is that we can now do very little to strengthen our influence in Persia, and that if war came, we do not possess the means of operating there on the Russian flank in addition to what we should be forced to do in other quarters. There is in my opinion no real basis for influence except strength, and that we do not and cannot possess in this quarter.....

"As to the telegraph officers becoming semi-politicals, I do not see any objection to this, or any difficulty in the arrangement being made compatible with the contemplated reorganisation of the Indo-European Telegraph Department (if that measure be determined on)."

Sir Auckland Colvin :—"I think Persia lies outside our ring fence ; and that, as we cannot hope to maintain any position which we may assume there, we should most carefully avoid the discredit of compulsory retreat from any position which we may be led into assuming. I think it should be our aim to be on the most friendly terms with the Persian Court ; and to aim at opening up, so far as any encouragement which can be given to private English enterprise goes, the interior of the country. But I would not lend the Indian Government resources to Persian needs ; or assume any but a position of benevolent interest. We have in my judgment already suffered severely, in Indian opinion, from the policy pursued through long years in those parts, the outcome of which has been uninterrupted, compulsory retreat towards our frontiers, before those against whom it was known that it has been our object to establish ourselves. I hope nothing will be done to work back on those tracks."

Sir George Chesney :—"I am strongly in favour of continuing to employ military officers in the Persian Telegraph Department after the manner suggested.....
.....

"In the event of the coming struggle with Russia, Persia might, under certain conditions, form a valuable base for offensive operations against her ; those conditions being that we found ourselves in a position to act with greater vigour and force in that quarter than Russia could bring against us.....If, on the other hand, as is perhaps more likely to happen, the outbreak of war should find Russia much stronger than ourselves in the direction of Persia,.....then any entanglement which committed us to the necessity of holding on to that country, or of retiring with loss of credit, would be a most unfortunate source of embarrassment....."

Sir Andrew Scoble :—"I am entirely in favour of adopting Colonel M. Smith's proposal to replace British military officers in charge of the Telegraph Department in Persia. ..... I would answer the Secretary of State in the sense indicated by Mr. Durand."

Sir James Peile :—"Certainly Persia cannot be brought within the line of what we have to defend, but I am strongly of opinion that we might be more active there in establishing influence."

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After discussion in Council, Lord Dufferin telegraphed to the Secretary of State on the 16th June 1887 :—

"I find majority of my Council are not inclined to guarantee a Persian railway, or even to share a guarantee with Her Majesty's Government.....

"The Commander-in-Chief, Mr. Scoble and myself consider that, if Her Majesty's Government think it advisable from political motives to promote the construction of such a railway in Persia, the Government of India would be justified in sharing the obligation entailed by suggested guarantee."

A despatch followed on the 24th June 1887 which contained the following :—

"In respect to the general policy to be pursued towards Persia, we entirely agree with Your Lordship's opinion that it is expedient and important to strengthen British influence in that country We do not conceal from ourselves that the geographical position of Russia, her energetic policy, and the rapid development of her military resources in the east, have given her great power at Tehran; and it seems improbable that any exertions on our part could now regain for us the position which we once held at the Court of the Shah. But we believe that something may yet be done to prevent, or at least to retard, the complete subjection of Persia to Russian domination, and to preserve for ourselves a measure of influence which may be of material advantage to us hereafter. We also realise the importance of opening up Persia to British enterprise. Having these objects in view, we should regard with satisfaction any steps calculated to gain for us the good-will and confidence of the Shah and his people, and to place us in more close and cordial relation with them. We have already endeavoured by stationing a British officer in Eastern Persia to strengthen our position in that part of the country; and we think that an effort should now be made, not only to revive our influence with the Persian Government, but also, and more especially, to obtain some practical hold over the Southern and Western Provinces, where Russia has at present made little way. In certain eventualities, these mountainous tracts, inhabited by brave and hardy tribes, might afford us a very valuable field of action. With regard to the last point, we are of opinion that the proposals of Colonel Murdoch Smith, relating to telegraph arrangements in Persia, are of much importance.....We are unanimous in thinking that the development of communication in Persia, with British aid and guidance, is in itself desirable."

(ii) Secret E., August 1897, Nos. 433-434, contains a letter from the India Office to the Foreign Office of the same date (the 24th June 1887) as the above despatch from the Government of India. This letter says—

"Viscount Cross.....considers it to be desirable, in the commercial as well as the political interests of British India, that a commanding influence in Southern and Central Persia should be secured for the English Government. The object is of importance at the present time, but it is likely to become of much more importance as the position of Russia on the North-West Frontier of India becomes more developed."

(iii) Secret E., July 1889, Nos. 97-115, contains papers relating to railway projects in and near Persia. Lord Lansdowne telegraphed to the Secretary of State on the 20th January 1889—

"Extension through Baluchistan is regarded by military authorities here as most valuable adjunct to defences of India, and as deserving of utmost encouragement; but our concurrence should be conditional on adoption of our gauge and on location of line in accordance with our requirements."

(iv) In Secret E., September 1889, Nos. 106-113, is a letter, dated the 2nd July 1889, from the Foreign Office to the Treasury about the grant of a Charter to the new Persian Bank, in which Lord Salisbury's opinion is thus stated—

"The collapse of this concession would, on political grounds, be a serious evil. Persia stands at this moment at a very critical point in her history. If no development of her resources can be accomplished, decay, which for several generations past has set in, can only be expected to continue, and her absorption by a powerful military neighbour can only be a question of years. On the other hand, if her wealth and prosperity can be increased, if advantage can be taken of her great natural capabilities, and, above all, if communications with the sea and with India by railway can be established, the difficulties in the way of a Russian subjugation will be largely increased; and if sufficient interval for the accomplishment of that growth can be obtained, the danger will probably be dispelled altogether. If the railways are made, Persia will be able to fight for herself, and may obtain friends to fight for her. If the railways are not made, she must be the defenceless prey of an invader."

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

(v) Secret E., June 1891, Nos. 171-184, is full of interesting papers and notes about railway schemes, including memoranda written in October 1889 and October 1890 by Sir Henry Brackenbury, when Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office. Sir Edwin Collen noted in November 1890—"Speaking for the Department only, I may say that the project for a railway from Baluchistan to Seistan would, if carried out, be a great strategical victory." Sir Henry Brackenbury said—

"So long as Russian railway communication does not extend south of the existing Trans-Caspian line, my opinion is that she cannot invade British India with forces larger than our army could deal with, and it follows that we should do nothing which would cause her to extend her railways southwards.

"To construct a railway to Seistan would, it seems to me, compel her to make such extensions. It would be to play the game of the Russian military party..... and to hasten on what we should endeavour to postpone.

"But if the circumstances should change, and Russia should take the lead in making railways southwards, then it may be necessary for us to follow her lead; and we shall be in a better position to do so if all possible lines are previously surveyed. We are sure to have the earliest information of any such attempts on her part, and we ought to be able to keep pace with her."

Lord Lansdowne thereupon noted—

"The political objection has been stated with great force by General Brackenbury. I concur with what he has written, and I am convinced that a sudden access of activity on our part would lead to corresponding activity in railway development on the part of Russia. Our policy is to obtain as much knowledge as we can of the routes along which we may ultimately be compelled to construct lines of railway."

It was practically settled that a reconnaissance for a line to Nushki should be made; but when the case went to the Finance Department, Sir David Barbour asked what this was to lead up to and said—"If it is intended to make this reconnaissance the starting point for a railway towards the Helmand, or the Persian frontier, I think the whole case should be put forward and considered before any further steps are taken."

The case was then brought up in Council on the 21st May 1891 and the order was—"No further action required regarding reconnaissance."

8. Before examining later papers, I will give here a few extracts from the Hon'ble G. N. Curzon's 'Persia,' which was published in 1892:—

"Seistan presents to Russia a positive and a negative value.....should she at any time find it politic or necessary to absorb Khorassan, the possession of Seistan would give her the whole, and not the northern portion only, of that province.....Russia in Khorassan means Russia at Herat; and Russia in Seistan would mean Russia at Sebzewar and Farrah as well, the two most important strategical points on the march from Herat to Kandahar.

Vol. I, pages 236-238.

"I do not for a moment lay stress upon the other aspect of the positive value to Russia of Seistan—*viz.*, as facilitating her approach to the Southern Seas—because I assume that a Russian port upon the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean would no more be tolerated by any English Minister or Government, than would an English port on the Caspian by any Czar.....The negative value of Seistan to Russia is the inverse aspect of its positive value to Great Britain. In other words, Russia would like to get hold of Seistan herself, in order to prevent Seistan from being got hold of by Great Britain; and because, in the latter event, not only would the ambitious and far-reaching schemes that I have sketched be frustrated, but England would be in a position very seriously to menace ~~the~~ Asiatic status of her rival.....The advantage which she derives.....from the Trans-Caspian Railway enables Russia to flood the markets of North-Eastern Persia with her manufactures, and to undersell her sole competitor, *viz.*, British India, in the bazars of Meshed..... The one means by which the latter could compete on nearly even terms with her rival would be by adopting her rival's tactics—by pushing forward a railway on the south to match the Trans-Caspian Railway on the north.....Such a railway starting from India must point, as its first objective, to Seistan.

"The commercial importance of such a line will not, I think, be denied, as bringing India into closer connection with the bazars of Khorassan. Not less obvious, however, would be the strategical advantage, as enabling England to occupy a flanking position in defence of that Afghan territory which she has undertaken to safeguard .....

"The potential resources of Seistan and the uses of a new entrance for Indian and exit for Persian goods across the east border are so great that I believe such a railroad might in time become a profitable speculation.....

Vol. I, page 629.

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"Russia ..... turns a longing eye southwards and yearns for an outlet upon the Persian Gulf and on the Indian Ocean. The movements ... along the south and east borders of Khorassan, the activity of her agents in regions far beyond the legitimate radius of an influence restricted to North Persia, her tentative experiments in the direction of Seistan—are susceptible of no other interpretation than a design to shake the influence of Great Britain in Southern Persia, to dispute the control of the Indian Seas, and to secure the long-sought base for naval operations in the east. This can only be accomplished in either of two directions—by a war with Turkey and the capture of Baghdad, or by a semi-peaceful advance through Persia to the Gulf....."

Vol. II, 597.

"We may make it certain that, whatever destiny befall her in the north, in regions beyond the sphere of our possible interference, Persia shall retain inviolate the centre and south and be able to say to an invader, 'thus far and no further.' British ascendency, commercial and political, in the southern zone..... is the only means by which this aim can be secured. A line can be drawn across Persia from Seistan on the east, *via* Kerman and Yezd, to Ispahan, and prolonged westward to Burujird, Hamadan and Kermanshah, south of which no hostile political influence should be tolerated."

Vol. II, pages 620-621.

9. In 1894, Colonel Yate, then Officiating Agent to the Governor-General at Meshed, sent in some papers relating to Russian intrigues in Seistan. The case was fully noted on by Mr. Clarke. Sir George White was of opinion that "it would be unsound military policy to contemplate and prepare for separate operations in Seistan."

Secret F., August 1894, Nos. 3-25.

Sir Henry Brackenbury referred to the memoranda* he had written at the War Office and said—

* See paragraph 7(v) above.

"All Colonel Yate's proposals are based on the supposition that we want to push forward into Seistan..... I hold that both from a military and a political point of view such an advance would be a grave error. I regret that we have meddled so much in Seistan. It is our sending emissaries there which has led the Russians to do the same..... Political activity in Persia that cannot be supported by arms is worse than useless. It incites Russia to activity which can be supported by arms."

The Viceroy noted—"I agree with the Hon'ble Military Member, and I have reason to believe that the same view will be taken at home." Colonel Yate was answered accordingly, and was instructed to avoid in future, as far as possible, any appearance of interference in that part of the country. The papers were reported to the Secretary of State, and Sir Henry Fowler† answered—"I quite agree with the view taken by your Government, and, in concurrence with the Earl of Kimberley, I endorse the instructions which ..... you have conveyed to your Agent and Her Majesty's Consul-General for Khorassan and Seistan."

† No. 46 in Secret F., November 1894, Nos. 44-53.

No. 568 in Secret E., March 1893, Nos. 562-578.

10. In 1892 the Secretary of State invited any observations which the Government of India might desire to make upon certain suggestions as to consular representation at Yezd and Kerman. The Bombay Government, who were consulted, gave the following figures of trade‡ between the ports of that Presidency and the Persian Gulf:—

‡ The trade (in merchandize) of India with Persia by sea is given at page 7 of the current notes as—

	Rs.
1892-93	2,58,64,786
1893-94	2,57,13,248
1894-95	3,17,47,526
1895-96	2,58,72,364
1896-97	2,02,19,936

	Rs.
1887-88	1,79,87,373
1888-89	1,95,13,654
1889-90	2,26,04,805
1890-91	2,22,26,599
1891-92	2,47,20,296

and said—"In view of these statistics and the close trade relations that exist between Bombay and the Persian Gulf ports and the importance to the city of Bombay of developing outlets for its yarn and cloth, the Governor in Council is inclined to think that a contribution of one-half of such moderate emoluments as would be likely to secure the services of leading Musalmans of Yezd and Kerman as Consular Agents might with advantage be recommended for a period of five years."

Colonel Talbot, then Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, was in favour of the appointment of an English gentleman belonging to a commercial firm as Vice-Consul at Bundar Abbas which, "as the seaport of Kerman, and to a great extent of Yezd also," he regarded as "even more important than those towns as a centre from which to spread British influence in Eastern Persia." The Secretary of State was informed that the Government of India were

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disposed to agree, if a suitable gentleman could be found and if the proposed allowance of Rs. 50 a month could be saved in the Bushire Residency expenditure. The expected savings did not accrue and a final decision* was postponed in view of Lieutenant Sykes's visit to Kerman. A Vice-Consulate was, however, opened† at Yezd in September 1893. The case for a Consular Agent at Bundar Abbas was again‡ taken up in 1897, and the Political Resident was told—"At present the Government of India do not consider that, from a commercial point of view, such an agent is much needed. In any case the proposal must be held over until the normal conditions of trade have been restored by the withdrawal of the Russian sanitary cordon." The Foreign Office list for 1898 shows the following consular appointments in Persia, in addition to those at Tehran, Bushire and Meshed, (the appointments at the last two places are held by officers of our Political Department) :—

Tabriz—Consul-General—(pay £650+£270 office allowance).

Resht and Asterabad—Consul—(pay £600+£150 „ „).

Kerman—Consul— (office allowance £250, Captain Sykes).

Ispahan—Consul—(pay £560+£117 office allowance).

Mohammerah—Vice-Consul—(pay £350+£140 office allowance).

Yezd—Vice-Consul—(unpaid. The Vice-Consul is the Manager of the local branch of the Bank of Persia).

11. At No. 215 in Secret E., November 1896, Nos. 214-223, is an important despatch from Sir Mortimer Durand to Lord Salisbury, regarding the then existing condition of affairs in Persia, which includes the following :—

"At present our merchants naturally consider that an Englishman's life is not safe at Shuster ..... The only way, so far as I can see, to establish security for the future and to let our trade develop from this natural centre, is to appoint a Resident Vice-Consul under the protection of a trustworthy armed force. That force, I think, might take the form of an escort of Indian troops, but it would, in my opinion, be much better on all accounts to raise at the expense of the Persian Government a body of Bakhtiaris and Arabs under British officers. It will be remembered that the Russians have an armed force under Russian officers at Tehran itself. They could not logically object to our having a similar force in the south, and the Persian Government, if resolutely pressed, would, I believe, agree.....

"Moreover the consequences would not be wholly unpleasant to them. The Persian Government would not like paying for the corps, and they would not like the trouble of overcoming possible Russian opposition; but, on the other hand, they could make some reduction in their existing force, and they know that a body of trustworthy troops under British officers would give the Central Government a firm hold in the province where it was quartered.....A force equivalent to a single regiment would, I believe, amply suffice for Shuster and the neighbourhood.....

"Such a force would be a nucleus for the extension of our influence among the Bakhtiaris and Arabs.....and, if we ever desired to extend the system, the foundation would have been laid. A similar corps could at any time be raised in Ispahan, where the Zil-es-Sultan would, I feel sure, be delighted to see it.

"I fully realise the objections to this proposal, and I have not put it forward without long and serious consideration. It means pressure brought to bear upon the Persian Government at a time when in many ways we are getting on very well with them; it also means some trouble in hereafter securing regular payments; it probably means some expense to ourselves; and it may mean that we shall alarm Russia and provoke her to some vigorous countermove. She is at present believed to be seriously contemplating the establishment of Consulates in Ispahan, Shiraz and Bushire; and any such step as I have proposed might accelerate her movements. Nevertheless, from the point of view of this Legation, I think we should gain more by it than we could lose.....I would not, however, advocate that we should insist, at all hazards, upon raising such a force as I have suggested. I should like to see it raised, for I believe nothing else would so effectually strengthen our influence in the south of Persia; but if the Persians agreed in preference to the establishment of a considerable Indian escort at Shuster, or if they made prompt and effective arrangements on their own account for the despatch to Shuster of thoroughly trustworthy troops from elsewhere, then we might suspend the proposal.....What we really want in the first place is to secure the safety of our traders and their property, and possibly we may find that this can be secured without raising a force under British officers. If so, perhaps we need not press for anything more."

Sir Mortimer Durand asked to be favoured with Lord Salisbury's views upon this proposal; but we have apparently received nothing further relating to it.

* No. 579 in Secret E., November 1893, Nos. 568-581.
† Secret E., March 1894, Nos. 251-253.
‡ Secret E., June 1897, Nos. 150-153.

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12. The Foreign Office letter received with the despatch of the 2nd December 1897, specially drew attention to the loss suffered by British trade in the regions near Meshed through Russian competition. The plague and the precautionary measures adopted have, of course, operated as a check on Indian exports, and the activity which the Russians have displayed in connection with plague precautions will not be forgotten. On the 22nd January 1897, Sir Nicholas O'Conor reported from St. Petersburgh—'Count Kapnist spoke to me a few days ago of the fears generally entertained here that the Indian Government was not disposed to adopt sufficiently stringent regulations to stay the progress of the disease and prevent its spreading from Bombay to the Persian Gulf, as well as to other places.' Our Ambassador forwarded at the same time a précis of an article in the Russian 'Official Gazette,' dated January 4th-16th, 1897, which contained the following :—

Secret F., June 1897, Nos. 1-77.

> "In order to obtain timely information respecting the advance of the plague towards Russian Central Asiatic territories, Medical Officers will be despatched to the ports of Bender Bushire and Bender Abbas, in the Persian Gulf, as also to Kerman and Yezd in the interior of Persia. None will be sent to Tehran and Meshed, as there are Russian Doctors already there.....Similarly no Doctor need be stationed at Sabzwar in view of the proximity to Meshed."

On the 18th January 1897, four days before Sir Nicholas O'Conor's report, Sir Mortimer Durand, in addressing Lord Salisbury about plague precautions, said—

Secret F., June 1897, Nos. 87-150.

> "The Residency Surgeon himself supervises the quarantine at Bushire, and the Indian Government has placed under his orders Military Assistant Surgeons for the ports of Lingah and Bunder Abbas, about which the Russian authorities of Trans-Caspia have shown such anxiety. Your Lordship is probably aware that caravan routes run from these ports to the north of Persia, and the Russian authorities have, I believe, gone so far as to propose the deputation of Russian Doctors not only to Lingah and Bunder Abbas, but also to Yezd and Kerman. I do not think the Persian Government intend to accept this proposal."

Two months later (18th March 1897) Mr. Hardinge forwarded a report by the Physician to the Legation which said—"The Russian Government have sent Doctors to the following places : Julfa, Tehran, Meshed, Kerman, Bushire and Bunder Abbas."

In October 1897, our Embassy at Constantinople sent to our Resident at Baghdad, for report, a confidential communication from Jerusalem, which stated that M. Krouglow, a Russian Consular Officer proceeding to Baghdad, had been "instructed to report, on his arrival at Baghdad, on the much-desired scheme of securing for Russia a coaling station in the Persian Gulf, though I have not been able to ascertain whether any particular place, outside the Persian territory, has been fixed upon."

Secret E, January 1898, Nos. 144-149.

Colonel Loch passed copies of the papers to Colonel Meade at Bushire, and the latter wrote demi-officially in January 1898, referring to the movements of three Russians, two of whom were doctors, who came to Bushire in and after February 1897. Colonel Meade said—"These Russians told Lumsden" (the Residency Surgeon) "that they had been deputed by their own Government to enquire into and study the plague. Lumsden pointed out to them that there was not any plague in the Persian Gulf, and there can, I fancy, be little doubt that they were also employed in enquiring into political matters in the Persian Gulf, and that there is some intention on the part of Russia to get a coaling station here.' In December 1897 Colonel Loch reported that, from hints he had received, it appeared that Russia had designs on Koweit. The Secretary of State telegraphed on the 7th February 1898, enquiring whether the Viceroy had confirmation of this. The reply was 'I have received no confirmation regarding Russian designs on Koweit, but Colonel Meade reports that M. Adamoff, who accompanied two Russian doctors, ostensibly on plague duty last year, visited Baghdad in August after touring about the Gulf. Adamoff is not a doctor'."

With a Revenue despatch No. 60, dated the 24th March 1898, the Secretary of State recently sent out some papers respecting quarantine regulations and sanitary control in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. They include an extract from a letter, dated the 3rd-15th February 1898, from Count Mouravieff to the Russsan Ambassador at Constantinople, which contains the following :—

> "Les derniers rapports de nos Agents Consulaires en Turquie et ceux des médecins envoyés à nouveau en mission dans l'Empire Ottoman témoignent que les établissements quarantaines dans la Mer Rouge et surtout dans le Golfe Persique ne répondent pas à leur but.....
>
> "Votre Excellence est priée.....de faire des démarches instantes auprès de la Sublime Porte en vue de l'amélioration de ses installations quarantaines, comme aussi d'engager notre Délégué au Conseil Supérieur de Santé d'insister auprès du dit Conseil pour en obtenir l'exécution rigoureuse de ses ordres et décisions dans les établissements quarantaines de la Mer Rouge et du Golfe Persique par où l'épidémie pestilentielle régnant aux Indes pourrait facilement pénétrer."

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The India Office, to whom the Foreign Office sent the papers for any observations, replied that they seemed to call for none from the Indian point of view.

13. I have noted and extracted at length in the hope that, by rendering frequent references to collections unnecessary, the consideration of what should now be said may be facilitated. It is to British Indian interests, 'commercial, telegraph and political,' that we have to look. Political and commercial interests appear to be so closely bound up that they must, I think, be considered together. The Viceroy's telegram of the 23rd February 1898, which was concurred in by the Finance Department, expressed a hope that a full opinion could be given "a few months hence when commercial aspects have been fully considered and political situation may be clearer." The telegram had reference to the question of the value to India of the Kerman Consulate, but that is part and parcel of the general question. I do not know what steps, if any, the Finance Department have been taking to examine the commercial aspects of the case; but it is perhaps doubtful whether, under present conditions, they can add much to their notes at pages 5-8 above. Sir Mortimer Durand has noticed, since he went to Tehran, the difficulty of obtaining from traders themselves any comprehensive proposals for the general good of British commerce. We are not likely to get any fresh statistics from the Persian Gulf for some months yet. The Trade Report for 1896-97 was not received till late in October last, and Colonel Talbot, who had local knowledge, noted in 1896 that the figures of trade were generally not available before May or June. In noting on the Khorassan Trade Report for 1896-97 (which is the Report referred to in the Revenue despatch* from the Secretary of State, No. 209, dated the 2nd December 1897) Mr. O'Conor said—"It would be an advantage if we could have a complete report on the trade of Persia as a whole each year. At present we have only fragmentary reports like this one on the trade of Meshed, another on the trade of Shiraz, and one or two others. But we have no general connected review of the trade of the whole country. The commercial intercourse between Persia and India is close and (considering the material condition of that country) not unextensive, and there would be a distinct advantage in the possession of a general report on the trade of the country, such as we have of the trade of China and of Java. It would be of importance to English as well as to Indian merchants having in view the methods by which Russia seeks to thrust out both British and British Indian goods from the Persian as as well as from the Turkistan markets. I would venture to suggest that this report could be compiled at Tehran under the orders of Her Majesty's Minister as in European countries, and that the reports of the Consuls might either be printed as appendices to the report or continue to be published separately. It would not be out of place for the Government of India to make this suggestion to Her Majesty's Government, for Indian revenues contribute to the payment of the Diplomatic and Consular establishment in Persia."

Frontier A., November 1897, Nos. 18-23.

* See para. 4 of this note.

Sir James Westland agreed that 'it is a pity we don't get a critical review,' but doubted "if we ought to interfere in the matter of our own motion." Accordingly nothing was done.

The Statement of Moral and Material Progress of India for 1895-96 says—"The trade across the land frontier of India was valued at Rx. 9,180,000, or about the same as the preceding year. Trade by land to and through Afghanistan showed some small recovery; though Indian goods for Central Asia prefer the cheaper and quicker route by sea and by the trans-Caspian railway." ..... "The value of India's trade with some of the chief countries has advanced or decreased thus :—

	Total Value.	
	1891-92.	1895-96.
	Rx.	*Rx.*
With the United Kingdom	82,812,000	83,304,000
„ France	12,009,000	9,657,000
„ China	16,701,000	15,755,000
„ Germany	5,254,000	10,413,000
„ the Straits Settlements	7,603,000	8,285,000
„ Belgium	6,790,000	6,682,000
„ Italy	3,540,000	3,561,000
„ Ceylon	3,396,000	4,214,000
„ Japan	1,361,000	3,237,000
„ the United States	5,079,000	7,053,000
„ Russia	1,370,000	2,269,000"

The notes at page 7 show that the trade of India (in merchandise) with Persia was Rx. 3,175,000 in 1894-95, Rx. 2,587,000 in 1895-96, and Rx. 2,022,000 in 1896-97.

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Mr. O'Conor's Review of the Trade of India in 1891-92 showed the trade with Persia in that year as Rx. 2,723,344 against Rx. 2,451,125 in 1890-91. In his remarks under Persia he wrote—"The only feature in the trade of the year requiring notice is the large increase in the export of India tea. The exports of foreign and Indian tea for the last five years are as follow :—

	Foreign. lbs.	Indian. lbs.
1887-88	1,245,526	263,073
1888-89	2,148,808	402,488
1889-90	1,673,175	1,118,126
1890-91	2,973,817	1,221,478
1891-92	3,115,691	2,789,175

"The neglect of this market for India tea, lying as it does at our doors, has often in previous years been the subject of comment in these annual reviews, and it is very satisfactory to see that at length the opening has been seen and advantage taken of it. It is to be hoped that the market will now be firmly held, and the trade rapidly increase."

In the review for 1896-97 he said :—"The serious decline in the trade" (of Persia) "is such as might have been expected, having regard to the fact that the largest part of the trade of Persia is conducted with Western India. It is unfortunate that the trade in Indian tea should have received such a check while foreign tea was sent to Persia in larger quantity. The figures of the trade in both are appended :—

	Foreign Tea. lbs.	Indian Tea. lbs.
....	.....	.....
1892-93	3,240,763	1,406,625
1893-94	3,306,020	2,497,525
1894-95	3,961,397	3,172,806
1895-96	2,252,814	3,188,099
1896-97	2,387,319	1,993,823"

14. The opinions and conclusions expressed and arrived in the papers I have quoted may, perhaps, be summarised as under :—

(i) It is expedient to strengthen British influence in Persia; to retain either a "practical* hold" over or "commanding† influence" in the southern and western provinces; and to accomplish‡ the development of the natural resources and capabilities of the country. We know, however, that according to general belief, the influence of Russia is steadily exerted to thwart any measure of reform or progress in Persia—to prevent anything which could tend to strengthen or solidify the country, and arrest its downward course.

* Despatch from Government of India, dated the 24th June 1887.
† India Office to Foreign Office, dated the 24th June 1887.
‡ Foreign Office to Treasury, dated the 2nd July 1889.

(ii) It is desirable to give encouragement to private British enterprise, and to the development of communications, by British aid and under British guidance. It appears, however, practically certain that communications won't be materially improved unless British capital comes in. Sir Mortimer Durand wrote, towards the end of 1895,—"The improvement of the very rough road between Bushire and Shiraz would be a good thing, and so no doubt would be the opening out of internal roads by which the produce of the country districts would be tapped. But the Persian Government have no money to spend upon public works of this kind. They have not 20 yards of respectable road in Tehran itself, where the main thoroughfares are very bad indeed for wheeled traffic."

(iii) It is important to secure means of observing political and commercial movements in the Kerman neighbourhood; and, generally, to counteract influences adverse to the development of British trade. With the latter end consular protection may be needed at Nasirabad and Birjand. Lord George Hamilton considers Consular Agents on the Quetta-Meshed route especially desirable "in connection with the facilities which might be afforded by that route for the transport of arms and ammunition between the Persian Gulf and Baluchistan." (The Government of India, as at present advised, will probably not attach special importance to this consideration.)

On the other hand—

(iv) It is essential to avoid any entanglement which might render it necessary either to hold portions of Persia by force of arms, or to retire thence with loss of credit and prestige.

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

(v) It must be remembered that the forces at present at the disposal of the Government of India are insufficient for effective occupation of any part of Persia, and may, at any time, owing to demands elsewhere, be insufficient even for effective intervention.

As bearing on measures the adoption of which may be for consideration, I may note—

(*a*) The determination to avoid any appearance of activity in Seistan has, to a great extent, been reversed by the opening of the Nushki-Seistan trade route and by our action last year in sending Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh to Seistan in connection with plague precautions.

(*b*) In 1889 the Military authorities in India regarded railway extension through Baluchistan as a "most valuable adjunct to the defences of India." In the same year Lord Salisbury laid great stress on the importance of opening up communications in Persia "with the sea and with India by railway."

In 1891, Sir Henry Brackenbury,* with whom Lord Lansdowne concurred, said—"I would ask that it may be clearly understood that my objection was and is to the construction of a railway to Seistan *at the present time*." He thought that, if Russian railway communication was extended south of the existing Trans-Caspian line, it might be necessary for us to follow her lead and that "we ought to be able to keep pace with her." The Merv-Kushk extension is being pushed on and may be finished shortly right down to the Afghan frontier at Tauurah (Sheikh Junaid), which is more than 150 miles south of the nearest point reached by the Trans-Caspian Railway system in 1891, and only about 70 miles from Herat. As far as I am aware, we have made no substantial progress in the matter of acquiring information of practical value as to routes along which it may be held desirable, now or in the not far distant future, to construct railways towards or into Persia. On the other hand we have just (2nd May) received through the India Office a report from our Military Attaché at St. Petersburgh that "material required to equip a line of rail, of the normal Russian guage, from the terminus of the present Merv-Kushk extension to Herat" is to be stored at Kushk. Such a measure was perhaps to be expected—as I see the "Pioneer" has suggested—; but the India Office regard the information as "undoubtedly important", and their letter to the Foreign Office says—"For the first time ..... since the demarcation of the border line between Russian and Afghan territories, the Russian authorities appear to be making preparations that afford some ground for doubting their intention to abide by the Boundary Convention, and for supposing that they are contemplating the eventuality of a military movement from their side into the territory of the Amir of Kabul."

* See paragraph 7 (v) above.

Sir Nicholas O'Conor has been instructed to report any further information he may be able to obtain on the subject, and—if the report has been or is received by him "in any shape that can be officially quoted"—"to take a favourable opportunity of mentioning the matter to the Russian Government and of enquiring as to its meaning."

15. In the linked file (which may perhaps be held in await until some general decision has been arrived at on the present case) are papers relating to (i) the existing system of subsidising local headmen for the protection of our telegraph lines; (ii) the position of subordinate officers of the Indo-European Telegraph Department in the matter of political duties, (iii) discussions as to the political charge of the Persian-Makran Coast.

In a despatch No. 6, Telegraph, dated the 22nd July 1897, the Secretary of State noticed a suggestion made by the Director-in-Chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, for establishing a News-writer or Native Assistant at Bampur. The despatch in reply (No. 9, Telegraph, dated 21st October 1897) said—"We are of opinion that from a political point of view any advantages to be derived from such an appointment are incommensurate with the extra expense involved." I notice the point here because I think there can be no doubt that a British Consular Officer at Bampur might be able to exercise valuable influence in preventing trouble on the borders of Baluch-Makran. I do not venture to say this alone would justify expenditure on such appointment, but it appears evident that the appointment would be valuable also from a commercial and a telegraphic point of view. The following is the Hon'ble G. Curzon's account† of Bampur :—

† Vol. II, pages 263-264.

"Between Serbaz and Bam-Namashir, which I have spoken of earlier as the frontier province of Kerman, is the considerable district of Bampur, whose chief town, bearing the same name, is the capital of the Governor of Persian Baluchistan, who is himself a subordinate to the Prince Governor of Kerman.....A garrison is kept here of fifty artillery with six guns, as well as three hundred regular infantry and fifty cavalry. There is also a permanent Baluch Militia, five hundred strong, in the neighbourhood."

In a telegram, dated the 12th April, the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan reported the return to Baluch-Makran of Mehrab Khan, Gitchki, who was one of the leaders of the recent outbreak, and while I write another telegram, dated the 5th May, has come from

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the Agent to the Governor-General which says—"All Makran reports agree that Mehrab, Gitchki, is with the Askanis at Pishin* meditating an attack on Kej. Please move Persian Government to turn him out." Captain Sykes has drawn attention to the importance of Bampur, and the place is one which should, apparently, be borne in mind, *if* any general scheme of new consular appointments in Southern Persia is to be considered.

* A trifle north of latitude 26° and just outside our border.

16. I suppose we may set aside the scheme of 1887 for reviving the military organisation of the Persian Telegraph Department. Apparently the only military officer now employed in the Persian Gulf and Persian Sections of the Indo-European Telegraph Department is Lieutenant-Colonel Wells, R.E., the Director of the Persian Section. I believe that, since 1887, a great deal of information has been collected in respect to the military resources of Persia. (The Intelligence Branch could, of course, speak about this.) The employment of military men on political or consular duties in Persia is, perhaps, therefore not so important a consideration as it was ten years ago. What we do seem to need in political and commercial interests is a more extended consular system. The details of any reorganisation and expansion of the existing staff would, of course, be primarily a matter for the Tehran Legation; but, as far as I am able to judge from the papers I have examined, we ought to have a British officer permanently at Kerman, and, if the position is to be made really satisfactory, at least three others, in addition to the existing† scale, who might perhaps be posted at Birjand, Nasirabad and Bampur.

India List for January 1897, page 31.

† Given at the end of paragraph 10 above.

If these officers were all of the rank of Vice-Consul, the additional expenditure (including Kerman) could apparently not be less than £1,960 a year, taking the charges for each Vice-Consul at pay £350 and office allowance £140. On many grounds, however, it might be best to fill such appointments with selected officers of the Staff Corps. They could hardly be given less than £500 a year on appointment, rising to £600, and with office allowances and incidental expenses, the total cost might be set down at about £3,000 a year. On the other hand it seems possible that savings might be secured by reducing the status of some of the existing Consular appointments.

With a re-arrangement such as above suggested, one or two Native Consular Agents for Bunder Abbas and similar points would probably be desirable, at any rate as a temporary measure, in order to secure necessary information as to trade: while the Political Agent at Maskat might, as suggested by Colonel Meade, have general charge of the Persian Makran coast.

Supposing that the whole scheme cost even as much as £5,000 a year, it seems to me that it would be well worth trying, at any rate as an experiment for, say, five years. Her Majesty's Government would presumably bear some share, if not half.

There is, however, the further consideration that in the south, at any rate, it might be very desirable, if not essential, to give the Consular officers reliable escorts. Assuming, as I suppose we may safely do, that escorts of Indian troops could not or would not be given, the scheme sketched by Sir Mortimer Durand (paragraph 11 above) to provide escorts, locally raised at Persian expense but under British officers, seems a very attractive one. It ought not to cost the British Government much. As far as I am aware, Persia at present has *no* troops who could be described as "thoroughly trustworthy." It has to be remembered that Sir Mortimer was writing at a time when the position in and recent occurrences in the Shuster neighbourhood would have justified "resolute pressure" being brought to bear on the Persian Government. Whether such pressure could now be brought is, perhaps, an open question; but the disorder in Persian Baluchistan and the riots at Bushire give us just ground for complaint.

17. I have noted the opinions recorded in regard to railway extension. The considerations involved are so largely military that I hesitate to venture any opinion. The despatch‡ of the 24th June 1887 said, in regard to the Ahwaz-Tehran railway, "we observe that Her Majesty's Government are already committed to a decided line of policy.....It appears ..... that if capital were to be raised by public subscription for the construction of the projected railway and for the navigation of the Karun, a guarantee of not less than 3 per cent given by the Imperial Government, or given by the Government of India and endorsed by the Imperial Government, would be indispensable."

‡ See paragraph 7(i) above.

18. I have placed in the file External B., October 1897, Nos. 93-98, which contains demi-official correspondence regarding a suggestion to dispense with the coast line of telegraph from Karachi to Jask, and to replace it by an inland line from Kalat to Kashan by Panjgur, Bampur, Kerman and Yezd. The matter was shelved and need not be discussed here; but Mr. Barnes's demi-official letter of the 2nd August 1897 may be read. I also put up Secret E., March 1896, Nos. 79-95, regarding the Karun River subsidy. The notes beginning with Sir James Westland's at page 3 of the K. W. may be read. The case may perhaps be usefully referred to in any despatch which may now go home on the general question. The

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

Secret despatch from the Government of India, No. 166, dated the 20th August 1895, said—"The interests involved in the Karun service are, in our opinion, purely Imperial and not Indian, and if this service now ceases altogether, the interests of India will not be affected thereby."

19. It would undoubtedly be a great advance if the customs arrangements in Southern Persia could be reformed and placed, if possible, under British control. "Such a measure," to quote from a recent letter of Mr. Hardinge's, "will not only greatly benefit British commerce, but also the Persian Government, since it is anticipated that European control will largely augment the total revenue derived from the customs by putting an end to bribery and other abuses....."

The matter is, perhaps, scarcely one which the Government of India could have taken the initiative in bringing forward. It has, however, been under notice at home in the course of correspondence connected with a projected Persian loan, and I give the following extracts from recent Foreign Office Prints:—

Lord Salisbury to Mr. Hardinge, March 5th, 1898 (telegraphic).—"The Imperial Bank of Persia.....are unable to make any further advance to the Persian Government from their own resources, as they have already advanced £216,000, which is the full amount sanctioned by their charter.

"It is absolutely necessary, if the loan is to be obtained from other financiers, that the bank should be able to state that the customs of the Persian ports, which are to be assigned as security for the loan, have been placed under the control of European employés of their own nomination....."

Imperial Bank of Persia to Lord Salisbury, March 11th, 1898.—"The efforts which have been made by the Imperial Bank of Persia to negotiate a loan for the Government of Persia have been unsuccessful.....

"We are.....assisting the Persian Government directly and indirectly to the extent of about £430,000.....while the bank considers the security of the customs in the manner offered to be good, yet..... we have found that objections are raised on every side, not to the nature of the security offered, but emphatically to lending to a Government the stability of which is regarded as doubtful and the enforcement upon which of financial obligations is not guaranteed.

"Under these circumstances, the Imperial Bank of Persia can do no more than urge Her Majesty's Government, as strongly as is consistent with propriety, to guarantee a loan of £400,000, which, we believe, will be sufficient to meet the needs of the Persian Government..... in consideration of the exceptional circumstances of the case; the urgency of financial relief to Persia; the indisputable character of the security, and the great and permanent advantage to English influence and commerce in that country....."

Treasury to Foreign Office, March 16th, 1898.—"The Chancellor of the Exchequer...has no doubt that the request for a British guarantee must be declined. Indeed, it is not clear that there is any real necessity for a loan. The financial difficulties seem to be mainly the result of the Shah's refusing to let money go out of his Treasury for the necessities of his Government.

"The Chancellor of the Exchequer does not believe that the Persians are to be trusted to fulfil their obligations in respect of any loan unless Europeans were placed in charge of the revenues hypothecated to its service. He imagines that, if we did this in the south of Persia, the Russians would follow suit at once in the north. If, therefore, it is essential to our interests to obtain some hold over the south of Persia, it appears to him that a 'sphere of influence' must be first defined by agreement with Russia."

Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office, March 18th, 1898.—"Understanding..... that Her Majesty's Government is not prepared to guarantee a small loan for Persia,...we submit the following:—An exceptional effort is now being made to borrow £50,000 on the security of the customs of Kermanshah and Bushire ..... we would venture to suggest a written assurance from Her Majesty's Government of the fullest protection and support so far as may be found necessary in the event of default or failure in due performance on the part of the Persian Government for the contracts and conditions relating to the loan on the security of the customs revenues of Bushire and Kermanshah."

Foreign Office to Imperial Bank of Persia, March 19th, 1898.—"The Persian Government accept the conditions of repayment of the contemplated advance of £50,000 as stipulated in your letter of the 18th instant, and agree to hand over the control of the customs at Kermanshah and Bushire immediately as security for this advance... .....Mr. Hardinge does not anticipate any serious difficulties in obtaining the observance by the Persian Government of the terms of the contract.

"But the bank may rely upon the support of Her Majesty's Government in holding the Government of Persia to the performance of its obligations."

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Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office, March 21st, 1898.—".....We telegraphed to the chief manager of the bank in Tehran on the 20th instant, requesting him to hold £50,000 at the disposal of the Government of Persia."

These loan negotiations appear to have had their origin in the employment of the Nasr-ul-Mulk in connection with the Persian Ministry of Finance. The Nasr-ul-Mulk, whom Mr. Hardinge describes as "the only man in Persia having the requisite education and ability to reform the finances", was appointed Finance Minister in February last. In reporting this, Mr. Hardinge wrote*—"The Nasr-ul-Mulk's appointment has been received as an unmistakable sign of the intention of the present Government to execute reforms in the administration..... The encouragement and assistance which he expects and should receive from Her Majesty's Legation will doubtless act upon him as an incentive towards the realisation of his scheme already prepared for the gradual reorganisation of the finances of the country, which is sorely needed not only in Persian interests, but in the interests of all foreign countries holding a commercial or political stake in the progress and development of the resources of Persia."

Progs. No 163 of S.E., Sept/95, Nos 144-212.

* To Lord Salisbury, No. 29, dated the 12th February 1898.

From letters† received to-day (10th May) from Mr. Hardinge, it appears that the Persian Government made an attempt to evade their undertaking in respect to the control of the customs at Bushire and Kermanshah. The Sadr Azam gave way however, and agreed that "the receivers of the bank should encash all the duties and have also the right to see that they are duly leived." We may hear shortly what precisely has been arranged.

Progs. Nos 172-174 176, ibid.

† To Lord Salisbury, Nos. 24 and 26, dated the 27th and 30th March 1898 (copies).

The revenue of Persia may, I understand, be set down at nearly £1,500,000, though frequently not much more than £1,000,000 has been actually collected. Of recent years there have been recurring deficits of about £50,000 a year; but, on the other hand, the public debt is apparently small.

20. To sum up, the observations which should perhaps be made might, I think, be somewhat on the following lines:—

(i) Adhere generally to previous views regarding the importance of extending our influence in Southern Persia; of developing Persian resources; and encouraging British and British Indian trade.

(ii) Insist on the necessity of avoiding any entanglement which might drain our own military strength.

(iii) Indicate, within limits, the extent to which expenditure might, as an experimental measure, be undertaken from Indian revenues upon extending our influence and protecting and encouraging our trade. Enquire to what extent Her Majesty's Government would share in such expenditure. Offer remarks here as to the points at which, subject to the opinion of the Tehran Legation, it might be well to place Consular Agents. Mention that better rule on the Perso-Baluch border should re-act beneficially on our side of the frontier and assist the Government of India in adhering to the policy of not pushing out posts into Makran.

(iv) Notice the possible necessity, in some places at any rate, of giving any newly appointed Consular Officers reliable escorts. Advert to Sir Mortimer Durand's scheme, but endorse his apprehensions of the risk of countermoves by Russia. Notice, on the other hand, that serious disorder in Persia might afford Russia legitimate or plausible ground for interference.

(v) Refer to the great advantages which reform of the customs should bring.

I make no suggestion as to railway communications between Persia and India. That seems to me a matter, firstly, for the military authorities, and, secondly, for the Finance and Commerce Department. As far as I can judge, political, and perhaps commercial, interests would, for the present at any rate, be sufficiently met by establishing a better system of Consular Agencies in Persia, by reforming the customs, and by improving communications between the Persian coast and the inland provinces. If a new consular system is introduced and additional officers are appointed, it will probably be for consideration whether the extra men should be brought in all at once, or at intervals. No doubt there might be advantages in introducing the new scheme gradually.

The despatch of the 24th June 1887 closed with the words—"The decision..... will rest with the Secretary of State in Council, but, as Your Lordship has asked for our opinion, we have stated it without reserve." Any despatch now issued might close with a similar remark, "Her Majesty's Government" being read for "the Secretary of State in Council."

21. There is one other point which I would like to notice. I have alluded to the rumoured schemes of Russia to obtain a port in the Persian Gulf. Now that she has obtained an open port in the Far East, it seems quite possible that she may, before long, make real efforts to get at least a coaling station in the Nearer East; and seeing what pressure she can bring to bear on Turkey, apprehensions as to Koweit may not be baseless. Captain Douglas of the Intelligence

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Branch has described Koweit as "perhaps the best port on the northern part of the Persian Gulf." I do not know whether the possibility of practically closing the Persian Gulf by a heavily armed fort in the neighbourhood of the Straits of Ormuz has ever been considered. If it has not, it seems to me that local examination might well be made. The suggestion may seem a startling one; but British men and British money cleared the Gulf of pirates and made it a highway for trade. It might, therefore, be justifiable for British guns to close it against anything but legitimate commercial traffic. At any rate it would surely be worth while to know what could be done in this direction, if occasion arose. At page 5 of the *Pioneer* of the 7th May is an article, headed "Two Russian Expeditions," which is worth looking at. We have heard nothing officially, as far as I know, of a projected Russian exploring expedition to Baluchistan and South-Eastern Persia. We might ask the Secretary of State about it.

10th May 1898. H. DALY.

P.S.—I have examined a great number of papers in connection with the above note, but I put up only those to which reference may be necessary. A collection of recent Foreign Office Prints, &c., about the loan (paragraph 19 of my note) is tied up separately at the bottom of this file.

I have not discussed the point that the death of the late Shah did not—as some had expected—lead to serious convulsions in Persia. The Shah's assassination appears to have taken every one by surprise and no safe deductions can, I think, be based on the (practically) peaceful accession of the Vali Ahd.

11th May 1898. H. DALY.

HIS EXCELLENCY.

I do not wish to add to Captain Daly's full and thoughtful note. The question put by the Secretary of State refers to the policy to be considered or followed if matters in Persian Baluchistan come to a crisis. It does not seem as if the disturbances there were now going to end (without extraneous help) in Persian Baluchistan breaking away from Persian control. If, however, that should take place, it would be necessary to keep out Russian control; and the two ways of doing that, which are indicated, are the development of the natural resources and capabilities of the country so as to strengthen Persia, or the increase of British influence in order that British and not Russian control may step into the place of Persian authority. Neither can be put off until the crisis has arisen.

A tolerably long step appears to have been taken in placing the control of Bushire customs under receivers of the Imperial Bank of Persia. The confidence which that should give to trade would be increased by stationing British Consular officers at selected inland points. The development of trade, increase of British influence and improvement in the position of Persian authority would march together.

It is perhaps hardly practical to give attention now to railway communication towards Seistan, but it does seem clear that the forward movement on the part of Russia, which our activity in the direction of Seistan would, it was feared, stir up, has already taken place; and it does not seem wild to imagine that a move on the part of Russia towards the Persian Gulf is contemplated as possible in the not distant future. I therefore think that the communication which should be made to the Secretary of State may be on the lines indicated in Captain Daly's 20th paragraph.

16th May 1898. W. J. CUNINGHAM.

SECRETARY.

You submitted yesterday to His Excellency the case about the Kerman Consulate and our interests in Southern Persia. I now put up some additional pp.* which have reached me since I noted on the main file and which may perhaps be sent to His Excellency in continuation.

* Copies of letters from Mr. Hardinge to Lord Salisbury, Nos. 47, 52 and 55, dated the 22nd, 29th and 30th March 1898.

2. The letter of the 22nd March gives an account of the disturbances at and near Bushire and of the action taken and ordered.

3. The letter of the 29th March contains an interesting account of the political situation at Tehran and the prospects of reforms in the administration.

4. The letter of the 30th March announces the completion of the formalities in respect to the Agreement between the Bakhtiari Chiefs and Messrs. Lynch for the construction of a road from Ahwaz to Ispahan. Mr. Hardinge's letter of 20th October 1897 at No. 159 in Secret E., January 1898, Nos. 157-159, may be read.

17th May 1898. H. DALY.

HIS EXCELLENCY.

18th May 1898. W. J. CUNINGHAM.

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I quite agree as to the value of Captain Daly's note, and I think it states the case very fairly. I cannot help feeling, however, that we might with advantage abstain from such an exhaustive despatch as is foreshadowed by his proposals in paragraph 20. What we have to answer is a single sentence at the end of the telegram of December 27th, and the enquiry there made had reference to what our action should be, supposing a crisis occurred in Persian Baluchistan. We have already replied that military intervention is impossible, so far as we are concerned, and I cannot imagine that there will be any difference of opinion on that point. But if we take up that position I see no advantage in discussing possible dangers, such, *e.g.*, as the acquisition of a coaling port by Russia, which must be just as obvious to Her Majesty's Government as to us. If we lay stress upon these things, depend upon it we shall be called upon to contribute at any rate a share of the cost; and we simply have neither the men nor the money.

2. The despatch of June 24th,* 1887, paragraph 4, says all that can now be said, and we have nothing to do but to adhere to that description of the general position.

* Secret E., August 1887, Nos. 277-408 (No. 408).

3. So far as commercial interests are concerned, I understand the Finance Department to hold that there is no case for our embarking in the expense of Agents, and certainly the figures supplied do not show a large trade. I think that the hopes entertained by some as to the future of the new route to Seistan may some day be realised, but that nothing is so likely to prevent or postpone this as premature activity. I take it for certain that, as General Brackenbury pointed out in the papers to be found in the discussion of 1891,† any step we take will stir up Russia to take another. On the other hand, the Tea interest in the Kangra Valley pressed upon me the other day the desirability of Consular Agents in Seistan, and reports I have just seen from Lieutenant Webb-Ware indicate that the route is being used. I do not think we are yet in a position to go further than the 1887‡ despatch went on this side of the question, and I entirely concur with the majority of the then Council in their views on the railway extension, but I should not wish to say finally that we would not contribute to the establishment of Consular Agents, if and when Her Majesty's Government thought it could be safely attempted and were prepared to share the expense. In the event of a sudden crisis all that it seems to me that we can do is to call upon Her Majesty's Government to see that Indian interests—and especially our right of access to the Persian markets—are not prejudiced. Two Powers, I imagine, alone can be concerned—Persia itself and Russia—and with both it is for Her Majesty's Government to deal diplomatically.

† Secret E., June 1891, Nos. 171-184.

‡ Secret E., August 1887, Nos. 277-408 (No. 408).

4. As regards telegraphs. So long as the line is a coast one, I presume it will fall rather to the navy to protect the stations, though we might have to furnish detachments as we have done recently. Our interest in the line is large enough to warrant our doing this, so long as we confine ourselves to the defence of the few stations on the coast. I heard from Mr. Ffinch in Calcutta of the idea of an inland line, but as it is postponed *sine die*, I do not think we need refer to it. It might alter the whole conditions materially.

5. Politically our chief interest consists in the effect of disturbance on our own people. I think I should mention that the Government of India in 1894 laid it down that we were not to keep troops in Makran or undertake any responsibilities there, and say that we adhere to that policy, but that recent events show that we may be called upon to interfere, and that disorder on the border will of course increase the chances.

6. Perhaps Captain Daly could put up a draft based on his note and these suggestions.

11th June 1898. E.

(Progs. No. 53-53 A.)

FROM HER MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 54 (POLITICAL), DATED THE 19TH MAY (RECEIVED 6TH JUNE) 1898.

With reference to our telegram of the 23rd February 1898, forwards a copy of a letter from the Foreign Office, accepting an arrangement under which Indian revenues will contribute, during the year 1898-99, a moiety, not exceeding Rs. 6,000, of the total expenses connected with the provisional deputation of Captain Sykes to Kerman. Adds that he now awaits the promised despatch in the telegram referred to above on the subject of the participation of India in a more permanent arrangement.

Circulated.
6th June 1898.
7th June 1898.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.
E.
J. W(ESTLAND).
M. D. C(HALMERS).
E. H. H. C(OLLEN).
A. C. T(REVOR).
C. M. R(IVAZ).

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

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[27]

TELEGRAM FROM HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, TEHRAN, DATED THE 7TH (RECEIVED 8TH) JUNE 1898.

Resignation of the Sadr Azam. Formation of a Cabinet of Ministers. Appointment of the Mushir-ed-Dowleh as President.

The Amin-ed-Dowleh was appointed Sadr Azam on the 8th December 1897, with absolute power over all the Departments of State. He was desirous of introducing reforms in the administration of Persia, and asked for assistance from Her Majesty's Government against Russian opposition.

Secret E., March 1898, Nos. 9-11.
" " April " No. 117.

It is not known what led him to resign office.

No orders required.

K. F.—8th June 1898.

F. A. DEB.—8th June 1898.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

As to the appointment of the Nizam-es-Sultaneh as Minister of Finance, please see No. 159 in Secret E. Proceedings, June 1897, Nos. 154-162.

9th June 1898. J. LANG.

SECRETARY.

It is noteworthy that the Nasr-ul-Mulk* does not seem to have found a place in this new Cabinet. I don't delay to hunt up pp. about the various members, for, even with them, we could at present only conjecture as to the meaning and importance of the Sadr Azam's resignation, &c. No doubt we shall hear more about it presently.

* See page 24 of notes.

2. I have run into this file Sir M. Durand's letter of 12th April 1898, about the Agreement as to postponement of railway construction in Persia. The Agreement has yet two years to run.

10th June 1898. H. DALY.

HIS EXCELLENCY.

For information.

11th June 1898. W. J. CUNINGHAM.

14th June 1898. E.

SECRETARY.

I submit a draft despatch. It would require the concurrence of the Military and Finance Departments, but may, perhaps, be submitted to His Excellency in the first instance.

2. Several new receipts have come in while my draft has been in press. I have arranged these, with the other current Foreign Office prints and Tehran papers, in two bundles in the linked file. One bundle contains the papers as to the loan, customs, &c. The other bundle contains papers which chiefly relate to the general position in Persia. The papers are arranged, as far as possible, in the order in which they were received in, or issued from, the Foreign Office.

3. As to the loan, the Foreign Office letter of 18th May 1898, to the Imperial Bank of Persia, shows that 'Her Majesty's Government would be willing to propose to the Persian Government that a British Commissioner should be appointed, under whose direct control the Customs Collectors at the Gulf Ports, Kermanshah and Shiraz, should be placed, and the Commissioner would supervise the collection of all the customs revenue at the places mentioned.'

~~(Last printed paper in the bundle.)~~

Such an arrangement would no doubt be an excellent one in Indian interests; but the suggestion does not appear to have reached a stage at which it can be properly alluded to in our despatch.

Sir Mortimer Durand, in his letter No. 67, dated 29th April 1898 (received by the Foreign Office on 23rd May), said—'The Bank Agent has now begun work in Bushire, and so far the new arrangements appear to have provoked no opposition; but I think it is doubtful whether they will be brought into effective operation there or at Kermanshah without considerable trouble. They touch many personal interests.'

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Progs. № 227 of S.E., Sept. '98, № 213-239.

4. As to the general situation, Sir Mortimer wrote on the 29th April 1898 in his No. 63— 'The Sadr Azam is showing considerable courage in facing his many difficulties, and so far he is holding his own; ..... I am not at all sure that he is strong enough to maintain his position, and, if he fails in raising the loan upon which he has set his heart, I fear that his hands will be greatly weakened.'.....

'The most disquieting feature in the whole situation is the absolute emptiness of the treasury, which hampers the Sadr Azam at every turn.'

Progs. № 231, ibid.

Sir M. Durand's No. 68 of the 29th April contains a report on the progress made in settling frontier difficulties in Persian Baluchistan.

Progs. № 234, ibid.

His telegram No. 66, dated the 7th June, to Lord Salisbury, states that the Amin-ed-Dowleh 'is quite resigned to his dismissal and will have nothing to do with the loan. We may regard him as effaced..... ...I asked Amin-ed-Dowleh for his views regarding terms of Bank's offer. He said that control of Southern Customs by European Agents would be great difficulty, but that he thought Shah had come round to his views and would not willingly accept Russian offer. Minister for Foreign Affairs says that a loan of some sort is indispensable.' I suppose that the 'Russian offer' is that referred to in Mr. Hardinge's telegram No. 341, dated 1st March 1898, which said—'Confidential information reaches me to the effect that the Persian Government have been informed by the Russian Legation that a Russian Bank is prepared to lend the money on the same conditions as were proposed three or four years ago, but which, on account of their being too onerous, were rejected by the late Shah.'

Progs. № 148 of S.E., Sept/98, № 144-212.

Progs. № 229 of S.E., Sept/98, № 213-239.

5. It is noteworthy that Colonel Picot's summary for the 28th March to the 28th April 1898 contains the following:—'Rumours are heard of the intention of the Russian Government to despatch a scientific party to Baluchistan. The Persian Government have not yet been approached on the subject, and seem to think the articles which have been published in the Russian papers are in the light of "ballons d'essai."' In connection with the question of railway extension, I have now placed in the file External A, October 1891, Nos. 52-89. The notes by Lord Lansdowne, Lord Roberts and Sir Henry Brackenbury, dated the 9th, 14th and 18th August 1891, may be read.

Pages 6-8 of K. W.

6. I do not know whether the Finance Department has separate figures and accounts of trade by the Nushki route. I find that the information given by Lieutenant Webb Ware, as to trade in 1897, omitted the month of January. I have telegraphed to the Agent to the Governor-General to enquire whether he can give figures for the complete year 1897, and for any period* subsequent to January 1898. If the reply comes in time and is helpful, I will revise the end of paragraph 3 of the draft despatch.

* A letter since received gives the trade in the first 4 months of 1898 as Rs. 3,11,000.

2nd July 1898. H. Daly.

7. I hope to submit the Makran file for orders early next week. It has been with me for some little time, but it is a difficult case to deal with.

1st July 1898. H. Daly.

His Excellency.

If Your Excellency approves, the draft despatch may be referred to the Military and Finance Departments for consideration and concurrence.

2nd July 1898. W. J. Cuningham.

I think paragraph 5 as it stood went a little too far, but I should accept it as modified by me.

4th July 1898. E.

Military Department.

Please pass to Finance.

4th July 1898. W. J. Cuningham.

Military Department unofficially.

(NOTES IN THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT.)

The draft despatch below is for consideration and concurrence.

S. C. R.—6th July 1898.

G. W. deRhéP.—6th July 1898.

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

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

The situation is summed up in Captain Daly’s note, from page 11.

6th July 1898. C. H. SELWYN.

SECRETARY.

We may concur in the draft and pass the file to Finance Department.

7th July 1898. E. G. BARROW.

HON’BLE MEMBER.

9th July 1898. P. J. MAITLAND.

This is an important despatch, and before I express by concurrence in the draft, I should *m/* like it to be seen by the Commander-in-Chief.

I am not quite sure that I quite agree in the passage A in paragraph 3. Russian activity may have been *post hoc*, rather than *propter hoc*.

12th July 1898. E. H. H. C(OLLEN).

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief through Quarter-Master-General.

I cannot think that we have shown any such activity in Seistan or anywhere in Persia as to justify the assumption in paragraph 3 of the draft (marked A) that the forward movement of Russia is due to anything England has done.

I should imagine it is only the outcome of the normal policy of Russia that has caused and is causing her action. Possibly also the necessity of securing the food-supplies of Khorassan for her army has induced her to force her influence on that province.

It has been an accepted theory for many years that a desire for an outlet on the Persian Gulf is the chief spur to her movements, but I should suppose that her recent successful tactics in the far East may possibly modify her wish for a port in the Gulf. I am inclined to wait for a confirmation of recent reports regarding projected railways to south of Persia before accepting them.

All the same I think it is of the utmost importance to establish our influence in Persia on a more substantial basis than heretofore in the interests of our legitimate trade, and I would support the establishment of Vice-Consuls at several of the more important trade centres.

Subject to my first paragraph, I accept the draft despatch.

19th July 1898. C. E. N(AIRNE).

Military Department unofficially.

I think there can be no doubt that, under certain contingencies, Seistan may play a very important strategic part in the military drama of the future, but I need not discuss that subject now.

I agree with the Commander-in-Chief. I do not think that anything we have done has led, or would lead, to a forward move on the part of Russia. I believe that they have steadily pursued a policy of railway extension in Asia, with the very proper and reasonable intention—from the point of view of Russia—of making Russia the dominating power in Asia, and eventually the mistress of Asia. Russia intends, and I have always expected this, to connect her Trans-Caspian and Siberian Railway systems. No activity on our part—and it is not generally “premature”—will either help or hinder such a consummation. I have never been one of those who view with great alarm the possibility of a contest with Russia, and I detest the phrase “Russian Scare.” But we should be wanting in the elements of the commonest prudence, if we did not endeavour to improve our military position, just as Russia is constantly doing, and which she will do, whether we are active or inactive.

Anything which can be done to improve our influence in Persia is so much to the good, although I agree with the majority of Lord Dufferin’s Government in considering that India should not pay for Persian railways. Indeed, in my opinion, Her Majesty’s Government might well bear all charges in Persia, as involving Imperial as distinct from Indian interests. But the Kerman Consulate is a small matter, and I do not object to the proposal that India should pay a share.

E. H. H. C(OLLEN).

23rd July 1898.

Finance Department unofficially.

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(NOTES IN THE FINANCE DEPARTMENT.)

The Foreign Department draft despatch below is sent to this Department for consideration and concurrence, as stated in the Foreign Secretary's note of 2nd July 1898.

With reference to the question of a contribution from the Indian revenues towards the cost of the appointment of British Consular Agents at important points in Southern Persia, and the continuance of the arrangement of bearing half the charges for the Kerman Consulate, which are dealt with in paragraph 5 of the despatch, please see the last but two sentences of paragraph 3 of His Excellency the Viceroy's note of 11th June 1898 on page 26, His Excellency's further note of 4th July 1898 and Hon'ble Member's note of 22nd February 1898 on page 9 in connection with the Foreign Department telegram to the Secretary of State of 23rd February 1898.

The draft will, perhaps, be agreed to.

(Submitted through *Statistical Bureau* with reference to paragraph 3 of the draft.)

A. M.—27th July 1898.

N. G. B.—27th July 1898.

DIRECTOR-GENERAL.

As regards commerce, please see the preceding notes* in this Department, and paragraphs 4, 10, 13 and 20 of Captain Daly's note† of 10th May 1898, paragraph 3 of His Excellency's note‡ of 11th June 1898, and paragraph 6 of Captain Daly's note§ of 1st July 1898.

* Pages 5-8.
† Pages 11-12, 16-17, 19-20 and 24.
‡ Page 26.
§ Page 28.

The exports of Foreign and Indian tea to Persia during 1897-98 were 1,259,871lb and 1,464,394lb, respectively.

We have got no statistics of the trade with Persia by different trade routes. The total Indian trade with Persia by sea during 1897-98 amounted to Rx. 2,096,023 (merchandise only).

D. N. G.—28th July 1898.

SECRETARY.

The statistics of the direct trade with Persia by sea are given at page 20 of the notes. In the year 1897-98 there was only a slight recovery from the contraction of the previous year, the increase in the exports being about Rs. 6,80,000. There was a great decline in the tea trade, the reduction being 1,127,448lb for Foreign and 529,429lb for Indian tea. This is evidently due to the plague in Bombay, but as yet we have only the totals of the trade, the detailed statistics and reports from the Customs Collectors having yet to come in. The destination of the trade by land is not precisely known, but in 1897-98 the tea exported from Sind and British Baluchistan amounted to 3,808lb Indian and 34,384lb Foreign.

28th July 1898. J. A. ROBERTSON.

HON'BLE MEMBER.

We may concur in the draft despatch. It will be noticed, however, that paragraph 5 commits the Government of India to contribute towards the cost of British Consular Agents at important points in Southern Persia, if and when Her Majesty's Government think this could be safely attempted.

28th July 1898. S. JACOB.

I agree to the despatch. I suggest an insertion of two or three words in paragraph 3 as a hint whose fault it is; and a verbal amendment in 5, where His Excellency's correction necessitates the cancellation of the word "measure."

29th July 1898. J. W(ESTLAND).

Foreign Department unofficially.

(NOTES IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.)

Submitted for final orders.

F. A. DEB.—29th July 1898.

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(Progs. No. 55-56.)

ENCLOSURE IN A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE, LONDON, No. 28, DATED THE 24TH JUNE (RECEIVED 20TH JULY) 1898.

1. Despatch of Captain Sykes to Kerman to watch the proceedings about to be taken by the Governor of that district to subdue the revolt and to punish the murderers of Mr. Graves.
2. Payment from Indian revenues of a moiety of the cost of sending Captain Sykes to Kerman on certain conditions.

For information. No orders.

H. P. C.—26th July 1898.

F. A. DEB.—26th July 1898.

29th July 1898. J. LANG.

(Progs. No. 56 A.)

EXTRACT FROM THE MESHED POLITICAL DIARY, No. 25, FOR THE WEEK ENDING THE 24TH JUNE 1898.

Appointment of Mr. Ziedler to some post, the name of which could not be ascertained, in Seistan. The officer was formerly First Assistant to the Russian Consul-General at Seistan.

SECRETARY.

Copies of fresh receipts* from the India Office have been added to the two bundles of prints, &c., below.

* There are, I think, a few more papers in circulation; but, as far as I remember, they contain nothing of much importance.
H. DALY.

2. A Reuter's telegram of the 2nd August contained the following:—

'Paris correspondent of *Times* says Russia recently intervened and forbade Persia to conclude loan which virtually been arranged with group of British Banks making offer† to advance larger sum on security of Customs.'

† See my note at page 28. The draft agreement which the Russian Legation at Tehran were pressing on the Sadr-i-Azam is among the papers about the loan, &c.

In a telegram, dated the 15th June 1898, to Sir M. Durand, Lord Salisbury referred to the Persian Government's unpunctuality in making the half-yearly payments for the Régie loan, and said— Progs. No. 200 of S.E., Sept/98, No. 144-212.

'This is one of the points which makes the danger of a loan to Persia from France or Russia so serious, for the Government of either of those countries would probably seize the Customs-houses in the interests of their financiers on the first occasion of default on the part of Persia.'

It was decided by Her Majesty's Government that, if the Imperial Bank of Persia could negotiate with the Persian Government a contract for a loan on satisfactory terms, 'the representatives of the Bank, in charge of the collection of the Customs revenue at the ports of Bushire, Bunder Abbas, Lingah and Muhammerah' should be 'recognised and protected in the performance of their duties by the British Legation and Consulates.' If Reuter's news is correct, it looks as if our interests may have received a severe blow. As the actual position is somewhat obscure, I have qualified the reference, in paragraph 4 of the draft despatch, to the arrangement in regard to receivers of the Bank of Persia.

I do not object, but Reuter and *The Times'* Paris correspondent is not the best foundation on which to build. are
E.

3. The Hon'ble Member in the Finance Department accepts the draft despatch with a slight addition at the beginning of paragraph 3 and a verbal alteration in paragraph 5.

4. The notes by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Hon'ble Military Member at page 29 will be read. I may invite attention to paragraph 9 of my note at page 16, and to the report just received from Meshed that M. Ziedler, formerly First Assistant to the Russian Consul-General at Meshed, is 'to be appointed to some post in Seistan.' Her Majesty's Government will doubtless have heard of this through the Tehran Legation.

H. DALY.

5th August 1898.

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HIS EXCELLENCY.

To see the notes by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Military and Finance Hon'ble Members.

Perhaps it would meet the views of the former if the passage at A in paragraph 3 were changed to—

"Russian activity in the direction of Seistan is not likely to be counteracted by anything that it is in our power to do there. Activity on our part would tend rather to excite it."

The Hon'ble Finance Member's alterations will be accepted.

5th August 1898. W. J. CUNINGHAM.

It is, I admit, difficult to prove cause and effect in such cases, but I think more has been read into the passage on which His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Hon'ble Military Member comment than was intended. Personally I did not understand it to refer to the ambition of Russia to get a port on the Persian Gulf, or to an extension of Russian railways (on the latter I agree pretty much with Sir E. Collen). What I had in my mind was something much smaller, but still what we considered of sufficient importance to report to the Secretary of State in 1894. I think that we were all agreed then that Colonel Yate's proceedings were calculated to excite Russian activity—indeed he admits as much himself (see marked passage on page 5 of the notes enclosed in his letter of March 11th, 1894). See also notes, especially that of Sir H. Brackenbury, dated June 30th, 1894. I believe that Colonel Yate's activity was premature, that it gave rise to Russian activity at the time, and made it difficult, if not impossible, to interfere with the institution of a cordon of Russian posts in Persian territory last year on the excuse of plague.

Proceedings, August 1894, No. 20.

Same Collection, No. 4.

I do not, however, think it necessary to ask for the inclusion of my theories in this despatch, and I think that the easiest way to meet my Hon'ble Colleagues is to make the passage at A simply historical. I propose that it should run as follows:—

"Lord Dufferin's Government entertained apprehensions that activity in the direction of Seistan might lead to a forward move on the part of Russia, and we drew attention to the same subject in our despatch of July 24th, 1894."

I take it this will remove any difficulty my Hon'ble Colleagues feel, and that they will concur in the issue of the despatch as so amended.

6th August 1898. E.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
HON'BLE SIR E. C(OLLEN).

8th August 1898. W. J. CUNINGHAM.

I accept the draft as amended.

8th August 1898. C. E. N(AIRNE).

I gladly accept the amendment.

9th August 1898. E. H. H. C(OLLEN).

Issue with the amendment.

10th August 1898. W. J. CUNINGHAM.

(Bogo No 57)

[To Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 135 (Secret-External), dated the 11th August 1898.]

Foreign Office Press—No. 783—15-8-98—52.

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

Copies of our Secret despatch* to the Secretary of State, No. 135 (External), dated the 11th August 1898, may be sent to the Finance and Military Departments for information. It is a full and self-contained despatch, and the previous papers need not, therefore, be sent. Draft endorsement submitted for approval.

* With notes.

H. P. C.—16th August 1898.

F. A. DEB.—16th August 1898.

17th August 1898. J. LANG.

18th August 1898. H. DALY.

† With copy of notes. (Progs. No. 58.)—(Endorsements to the Finance Department,† Military Department† and Intelligence Branch,† Nos. 1208-1210 E.-A., dated the 23rd August 1898.)

Recorded and indexed by K. L. G.

Recording and indexing examined by F. A. deB.

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

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

K. W. No. 2.

[*Extracts from demi-officials.*]

Dated Bushire, the 5th December 1897.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel M. J. Meade,
To—Sir W. J. Cuningham, K.C.S.I.

* * * * *

There is also a general idea,* so I hear, that the Sultan † has recently defeated the Christian powers, and this may have led to, or at any rate increased, the present disordered state of things.‡ A Mr. Graves, an elderly man whom I met at Jask on my way here, the Inspector of the land line, has been murdered as I have informed you by telegram, and I do not know yet if this sad event is the result of the idea I have mentioned or was merely an isolated bit of looting. Anyhow our prestige must have sunk to make such a crime possible, and I think there is no doubt that we should re-establish it in a very plain and decided manner. I shall leave this in the *Pigeon* as soon as I can get here from Basrah, and will march to the scene of the crime which was midway between Jask and Charbar near the Rapch river. I will report fully to you by wire and letter, and I trust that Government will give me a pretty free hand in dealing with the whole question. I will go into it very carefully. * * * *

* Among the Baluchis in Persian Baluchistan.

† of Turkey.

‡ In Persian Baluchistan.

* * * * * *

Dated Maskat, the 2nd January 1898.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel M. J. Meade.
To—Sir W. J. Cuningham, K.C.S.I.

* * * * * *

I do not think, after this expedition, and the punishment which will fall on the murderers, or failing them on the tribe generally, that any one will care to murder an Englishman again; but, as a precautionary measure, it will be better to give Campbell a small guard when he inspects the line. A few men should also be kept at Jask and Charbar, and, if possible, they should be mounted so as to be able to hurry out whenever any trouble occurs. The murder of Mr. Graves was an isolated piece of ruffianism, and had, I feel sure, no political meaning. It was committed for loot, and was a stupid crime, as they could have taken all they wanted without killing the poor old man. That they did go to such lengths shews clearly, however, that our prestige had fallen terribly low, and, if it had not been promptly taken up, other attacks on British subjects would no doubt have followed. As it is, I hope we may be able to put things on such a footing that the lives and property of our people will be as safe on the Makran Coast as in England itself. One point is, I consider, essential, and that is, that we should be properly represented by a Political Officer. Sealy, the Telegraph Director of this section of the line, is an exceedingly nice fellow, and I hardly like urging a measure by which he will suffer pecuniarily. It is, however, my duty to tell you that neither he nor the other officers of the Telegraph Department have the slightest knowledge of the people beyond the immediate vicinity of the line itself. The Director at Karachi exercises no political control whatever, and never visits the country supposed to be in his political charge. Ffinch and Sealy cannot speak a word of Baluchi, and were useless when it came to deal with the inhabitants of the country we entered. I say this without casting any reflection on either of those officers, both of whom were untiring in their efforts to assist in every way they could, but I wish it to be understood that, if we want to exercise efficient political control on the Makran Coast, it should be put in charge of a Political Officer. On the whole, I think the Political Agent, Maskat, is the best man for it. It is only a night's run from here to Jask or Charbar, and as the gun-boats have to be near Maskat during the summer, he could be on the scene of any disturbance quicker than anyone else. There ought, however, to be weekly calls of the mail steamers at Maskat, which is, in my opinion, too important to be only visited once a fortnight. If you will allow Fagan to have charge of the coast, I think you may depend that British interests will be properly looked after. I am much indebted to him for the assistance he has rendered in the enquiry into the murder, and I found his previous experience in the Police and in the Thagi Department very useful. In other matters, too, he gave me great help, and I am very glad that I was allowed to employ his services on this particular duty. I think the Political Agent from here should run over each cold weather, see the local headmen, pay the subsidies himself or withhold them if necessary, decide claims for compensation, and generally do whatever is necessary.

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The Telegraph Department, in a mistaken spirit of economy, have got in an inferior class of men, * * * who command no respect. These men, who are the clerks in charge at Jask and Charbar, are, of course, in difficult positions, and, being afraid, they treat the Baluchis as if they were addressing superiors. The Baluchis have in consequence become arrogant, and think they can bully our people with impunity. The Persian suzerainty is the great stumbling block. If we took over the protectorate, there would be no difficulty in dealing with these people, who could easily be taught that they must behave themselves, but the Persians have little or no authority, and yet insist on taking every penny they can out of the unfortunate people. Our position at present is an anomalous one. We acknowledge the suzerainty of Persia, and yet have relations with these Chiefs and pay them subsidies or stop paying them without any reference to the Persian Government. This little expedition has shewn me how difficult it is for the Persians to put even 100 men at any point on this coast, or to move them a mile inland when they have got there. To undertake any general scheme for really subduing these Baluchis or to keep them in order afterwards would be quite beyond their power. I believe the Persian Government is on the verge of dissolution, and will not ere long be in the position to assert, much less enforce, any authority over the more distant portions of the empire. When that time comes, we will have to consider if we can afford to allow certain places to fall into the hands of any other Power. The present opportunity seems to me a good one to occupy Jask and Charbar, as the ally of Persia, with her consent, and solely in defence of our own people, as Persia has shewn herself powerless to protect them. Once we are there, no one else can come. For these reasons, I think a small party should be sent from India, and I hope to hear soon that it can be done.

* * * * * *

Postscript to demi-official letter from Captain P. M. Sykes, Karachi,* to Sir William Cuningham, K.C.S.I., Foreign Secretary, dated the 24th January 1892.

Do not the events † of the last few months tend to show the necessity of the Consulate at Kerman being maintained ?

† Disturbances in Persian Baluchistan, murder of Mr. Graves, etc.

---

* Permanent address care of British Resident, Bushire.

Government of India Central Printing Office—No. 977 F. D.—11-3-98.—41.—R. B.

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

(128)

Telegram, dated the 1st July 1898.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, Quetta.

Demi-official. Webb Ware's reports give trade by Nushki route as exceeding 4½ lakhs from February to December 1897 inclusive. Can you give the figure for the whole year 1897? His diaries give trade for January 1898 as one lakh eleven thousand. Have you any information as to value of trade since January?

(128)

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

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

129

K. W. No. 3.

Extract from the Pioneer, *dated the 7th May 1898.*

TWO RUSSIAN EXPEDITIONS.

The Russians are about to send an exploring expedition to Baluchistan under the auspices of the Imperial Geographical Society of St. Petersburgh, and the survey to be made is to take in as much as may be found practicable of South-Eastern Persia. Hitherto, writes a correspondent of the *Morning Post*, this region of Western Asia has escaped the kindly attentions of our Muscovite friends, and it is not easy, at the first blush, to understand the why and wherefore of such an undertaking at the present moment. Considering the nature, indeed, of British interests in the stretch of country indicated, a Russian Mission can hardly fail to strike us as rather unfriendly in its way, if not distinctly provocative. Of course, we are assured that the expedition is of a purely scientific character, and its only object the investigation of the districts abutting on the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. But as two out of the five experts who are to compose the party are to be Russian staff officers, Englishmen may be pardoned for looking a trifle more closely into the matter. The term "purely scientific" is construed very widely by the Muscovites, and covers a good deal more, as a rule, than appears on the surface. The first expedition that entered Manchuria, a decade ago, was stated to be of a "purely scientific" character, but this did not preclude the party from taking a couple of field guns with them, and, of course, the artillerymen required to work them. It was explained at the time that the guns were for the purpose of experiments on the velocity of sound at high altitudes. The explanation was accepted, and now we see the result. As a matter of fact, the British Indian authorities have been, and are still, pushing an exhaustive survey of the whole of Baluchistan and the south-east of Persia as rapidly as circumstances will permit, and there is no more reason for a Russian Expedition for this purpose than for a British survey of Eastern Siberia. There are probably two distinct motives operating with the St. Petersburgh authorities in sanctioning the expedition to which we refer. In the first place, they have been a good deal nettled at the construction of new trade route through Baluchistan by the British. This road has tapped the commerce between India and Turkistan, and sent it round by way of our neighbour State, and the Muscovites would now like to ascertain if it be possible to divert it again. In the second place, there are a great number of Russian statesmen and publicists who believe that they ought to secure an outlet somewhere on the Persian Gulf or its vicinity, and that it is well to begin to look about them in time. But whatever the motives, or combination of motives may be, the expedition to Baluchistan is one that will require watching.

The Danish Lieutenant Olafsen's second expedition to the Pamirs deserves all the more attention, writes the *Standard's* Berlin correspondent, as the comprehensive preparations clearly show that like all the Russian "scientific" expeditions to distant and unknown regions it will be of very great political importance. The Czar himself is most keenly interested in it, and has ordered the official authorities to do all they can to help it. The journey will last about two years. The expedition will go from St. Petersburgh by land through Caucasia, Trans-Caucasia and Turkistan to the village of Osh on the Chinese frontier, and then to Lake Yashikul which lies twelve thousand feet above the level of the sea in the Alichur Pamir, the fauna and flora of which are to be studied. It will then go to the Khanate of Wakhan to study and survey the numerous ruins there. It will spend next winter in Bokhara, and establish a meteorological station in Ishkashim. Next summer it will go up the Amu Darya to Khiva, photograph the ruins there, and then return from its capital, Merv, *viâ* Tehran and Enzeli, on the Caspian. From Osh onward it will consist of fifteen men and thirty beasts of burden. Owing to the unreliability of the tribes, however, Olafsen will get a well-armed and equipped escort of two hundred men from the Russian Government. The scientific members of the expedition are the physicist Hjuler and the botanist Paulsen. The scientific equipment is excellent, and includes tents, boxes to be carried on horseback, a transportable boat for the Pamir Lakes, sounding, astronomical, meteorological and all other scientific instruments; and a phonograph to receive specimens of the native dialects. All these things are of Danish manufacture, and will pass through Russia freight and duty free. Olafsen takes with him a large number of decorations, which are highly valued in Central Asia.

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

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

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130

No 40

No. 37 (Secret), dated India Office, London, the 29th October 1897.

From—The Right Hon'ble Lord George Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India,

To—His Excellency the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India in Council.

With reference to the marginally noted telegrams,* and to previous correspondence ending with the letter from your predecessor's Government, No. 283 (Secret-External), dated 1st November 1893, I forward herewith a copy of a letter from the Foreign Office, of the 12th October, renewing their request that a contribution should be made from Indian revenues towards the cost of the British Consular establishment at Kerman.

* To Viceroy, dated 23rd June 1894.
From Viceroy, dated 29th June 1894.

55 July/94, 110/117

2. I am inclined to attach considerable importance to the maintenance of this establishment, and to the selection of a suitable European representative. Unless Your Excellency's Government are willing to contribute, it appears from the enclosed letter that it is improbable that a suitable, if indeed any, successor to Captain Sykes can be provided at Kerman.

3. I shall be obliged if Your Excellency's Government will give your careful consideration to the matter, having regard not only to the arguments contained in the Foreign Office letter, but also to the importance in the interest of India of securing the means of observing political and commercial movements in this part of Persia, and on the lines of transit to Afghanistan.

4. It further appears to me that the maintenance of a Consular Agent in Kerman may be useful in counteracting any adverse influences which may be brought to bear against the development of British and British Indian trade in this region.

ENCLOSURES.

No 41

No. 1.

Telegram dated the 23rd June 1894.

From—The Secretary of State, London,
To—The Viceroy, Calcutta.

Foreign, Secret. Your Secret Despatch, 1st November 1893; Consul, Kerman. Sykes applicant for post. Are you prepared to make any allotment towards salary? His Indian pay and allowances and an office allowance might meet requirements of the case.

No. 2.

No 42

Telegram dated 29th June 1894.

From—The Viceroy, Simla,
To—The Secretary of State, London.

Foreign, Secret. Your telegram of 23rd June. We are not prepared to make any allotment for Kerman Consulate.

No. 3.

No 43

Dated Foreign Office, London, the 12th October 1897.

From—Sir F. H. Villiers, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
To—The Under-Secretary of State for India.

I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to request that you will recall Lord George Hamilton's attention to the circumstances under which a British Consular post was established at Kerman in October 1894. It will be remembered that this step was taken in consequence of the earnest and repeated representations made by Her Majesty's Diplomatic and Consular Representatives in Persia as to the necessity of affording protection to the numerous

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British Indian subjects trading in Persian Baluchistan, and as to the important political and commercial interests involved. The Government of India at the time reserved their opinion in regard to the Consular appointment in question (see their Secret despatch of 1st November 1893), and it is understood that, when again approached in June 1894, they stated that they were not prepared to make any provision for the payment of a salary to Lieutenant Sykes who had applied for the post.

Under these circumstances, an application was made to the Treasury, who finally agreed to grant a small allowance of two hundred and fifty pounds a year to an officer who would be willing to undertake the duties of a Consular officer at Kerman without further remuneration. This arrangement was originally sanctioned for two years as a provisional measure.

On being requested to authorize the continuance of the allowance of two hundred and fifty pounds a year, the Treasury have stated that, as the post was admittedly required for the convenience and assistance of British Indian subjects, part at least of the cost ought in equity to be borne by Indian revenues.

In the meantime, a report has been received from Sir M. Durand, Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran, on the Consular establishment in Persia, in which he recommends the maintenance of a permanent post at Kerman. He suggests that, if an officer of the rank of Vice-Consul were appointed, the outlay for salary and office allowance might be put at five hundred pounds a year.

It does not appear probable that any officer could be found willing to succeed Lieutenant Sykes in the discharge of Consular duties at Kerman in return for the small allowance of two hundred and fifty pounds. Lord Salisbury feels, however, precluded from making any further application to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury in this connection, unless the Government of India are prepared to contribute half the cost of the Kerman establishment.

Under these circumstances, I am to inquire whether Lord George Hamilton will again refer the matter to the Government of India with a view to the re-consideration of their decision.

No 44.

(Extract.)

Telegram dated Bushire, the 5th December 1897.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

* * * * *

It is reported that Baluchis believe that there is no Shah, and that Sultan of Turkey has crushed Christian nations. This idea may have something to say to the recent lawless acts culminating in this savage murder. If so, some decided demonstration may be necessary. I will report fully.

(Murder of Mr. Graves.)

* * * * *

No 45.

(Extract.)

No. 126, dated Bushire, the 5th December 1897.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel M. J. Meade, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

* * * * *

4. * * * As I have already reported to the Government of India, the state of affairs there has for some time been far from satisfactory, and now that an Englishman has been murdered, I think measures should at

(Persian Baluchistan.)

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once be taken to re-establish our prestige in Persian Baluchistan, and provide effectually for the protection of British lives and property, as well as for the maintenance of the telegraph line.

* * * * *

No 46.

(Extract.)

Telegram dated the 23rd December 1897.

From—The Assistant Superintendent, Indo-European Telegraphs, Karachi,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Following from Resident, Persian Gulf :—*Begins.* * * * It will also have an excellent effect if a company native infantry be sent to Jask and Charbar, respectively, for the protection of British interests. I presume Persian Government will be called upon to defray all charges incurred in connection with this enquiry, as its objects are to avenge death of a telegraph official and to insure safety of the line of telegraph which they are bound to protect. All subsidies can be diverted for this purpose.

* * * * *

No 47.

(Extract.)

Telegram No. 1917-E.A., dated the 25th December 1897.

From—The Viceroy, Calcutta,
To—Hon'ble Hardinge, Tehran.

* * He* considers it would have excellent effect if a company of native infantry were sent to Jask and another to Charbar for protection of British interests. He presumes Persian Government will defray all charges connected with enquiry. I doubt expediency of sending Indian troops, and I shall take no action without recommendations from you.

* (Lieutenant-Colonel Meade.)

No 48.

(Extract.)

Telegram dated the 25th December 1897.

From—Her Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Following sent to Foreign Office to-day :—

* * In the meantime Director-in-Chief, Indo-European Telegraph Department, has telegraphed to me from Coast that, owing to the revolt of the Baluch tribes against the Persian Government, the state of affairs at Charbar is very critical, and that he has telegraphed to India for a party of 50 men to be sent to Charbar at once for protection of English telegraph staff. A Baluch Chief with an armed party is looting British Indians and property within 12 miles of Charbar, and is endeavouring to organise assistance from other tribes to attack Charbar and to carry off telegraph staff and families. Hussein Khan, the most powerful frontier Chieftain, who was last reported to be operating against Persian troops in Bampur, has recommended Mr. Ffinch and party to leave the country. The Persian Government will for the next three months at least be absolutely unable to cope with the rising, and, in view of the recent deplorable murder and the danger threatening the telegraph staff and line, I venture to support Mr. Ffinch's suggestion and to strongly recommend that a party of 100 men of a native infantry regiment be immediately sent to Charbar, and 50 men to Jask, with necessary supplies and equipment for three months for purely protective purposes. * *

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* Their withdrawal could be arranged to take place as soon as order is restored and satisfaction given for Mr. Graves' murder.

I see no other way of adequately protecting our subjects and the telegraph line.

* * * * *

No 49.

Telegram dated the 27th December 1897.

From—The Secretary of State, London,
To—The Viceroy, Camp.

Hardinge's telegram 99, 25th of December. Can you send to Charbar and Jask the detachment of native infantry, and would they suffice? If not, what force would you suggest? Have you any observations to make on the policy which, having regard to British Indian interests, commercial, telegraph and political, it is desirable that we should consider or follow if matters in Persian Baluchistan come to a crisis.

No 50.

Telegram P., No. 10-E.A., dated the 4th January 1898.

From—The Viceroy, Calcutta,
To—The Secretary of State for India.

Your telegram 27th December. We are prepared to send 100 men to Charbar and 50 to Jask for protection of telegraph staff at those places. Above strength should suffice for purely defensive purposes. Do you wish the troops to start immediately? I cannot reply without further consideration regarding extent of British Indian interests in Persian Baluchistan, but effective military intervention or occupation could not be attempted by the Government of India with the forces now at disposal.

No 51.

Telegram P., dated the 18th February 1898.

From—The Secretary of State, London,
To—The Viceroy, Calcutta.

My despatch 29th October. Hardinge desires to send Sykes as Consul immediately to Kerman to watch proceedings of the force being despatched by Persian Government to deal with revolt and punish murderers of Graves. Lord Salisbury approves, provided that India contributes half the cost as proposed in enclosure 3 to despatch cited. Please telegraph your decision. I think it important to re-establish Consulate.

No 52.

Telegram P., No. 383-E.A., dated the 23rd February 1898.

From—The Viceroy, Calcutta,
To—The Secretary of State, London.

Kerman Consulate. Your telegram 18th February. We are not prepared at present to give final opinion as to value of Consulate in Indian interests either on commercial or political grounds; but, in view of present situation in Persian Baluchistan, we are willing to meet in coming financial year half the cost of sending back Sykes to Kerman, provided such moiety does not exceed six thousand rupees. As to permanent arrangements and whether India should contribute thereto, we should hope to express full opinion by despatch a few months hence when commercial aspects have been fully examined and political situation may be clearer.

Exd.—R. B.

Government of India Central Printing Office—No. 976 F. D.—11-3-98—00.

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

No. 53.

India Office,
London, 19th May 1898.

Political,
No. 54.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord,

On receipt of your telegram of the 23rd February, I communicated to the Foreign Office my willingness to contribute from Indian revenues for the year 1898-99 a moiety of the total expenses connected with the provisional deputation of Captain Sykes to Kerman, provided such moiety does not exceed Rs. 6,000.

2. I enclose herewith the reply* of the Foreign Office accepting this arrangement, and await the despatch promised in the latter portion of your telegram on the subject of the participation of India in a more permanent arrangement.

* Dated 4th May 1898.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

(Signed) George Hamilton.

No. 53A.

Enclosure.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office,
4th May 1898.

Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 1st of March, relative to the question of maintaining the Consulate at Kerman, I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to state that, after communication with the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, His Lordship accepts the arrangement by which Captain Sykes will draw, provisionally, and for the ensuing financial year only, an office allowance at the rate of five hundred pounds per annum, the Government of India having undertaken to defray from Indian revenues a moiety of the total expenses in connection wiih the temporary post, provided that such moiety does not exceed six thousand rupees.

It is understood that meanwhile the question of the permanent continuance of the post will be considered.

I am, &c.,

The Under-Secretary of State
for India.

(Sd.) F. H. Villiers.

No. 54.

Telegram, No. 1007 E.-A., dated the 1st July 1898.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, Quetta.

1007 E.-A. My telegram to-day. Nushki trade figures. Your 4454, June 27th, just received. Figures for 1897 now only required.

1

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No. 54A.

Telegram, No. 282, dated Quetta, the 4th July 1898.

From—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram 1007 E.-A., July first. The figure for financial year 1897-98 is five lakhs ninety-eight thousand six hundred and thirty. No returns were kept prior to February 1897.

No. 54B.

Extract from the Diary of the Political Assistant, Chageh, for the week ending 31*st May* 1898.

* * * * * *

2. I am pleased to report that Nushki import and export returns for the first four months of the current year amount to the sum of Rs. 3,11,000. The kafila season of 1897-98 is noteworthy as showing the steady expansion of the new route. In 1896-97 the Perso-Quetta kafila season closed at the end of February; the present season is still open. A kafila is now preparing to start for Meshed, while I am in receipt of information to the effect that a Seistani caravan is on its way to Quetta. Such activity in Quetta-Persian trade has never been known in the history of Quetta. I attribute this greatly to the sense of security engendered by the five forts and thirteen block-houses that stud the road between Nushki and Koh-i-Malik Siah.

* * * * * * *

No. 55.

Received with letter from the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, No. 28, *dated the* 24*th June* 1898.

Foreign Office to India Office.

SIR, February 17th, 1898.

I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to state that a telegram has been received from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, reporting that Captain Sykes is now available for duty at his post, and that he has instructed him to proceed to Kerman, to watch the proceedings of the Governor, who is advancing with a large force to subdue the revolt in Baluchistan and to punish the murderers of the late Mr. Graves.

The presence of a British Consular Officer in the Kerman district seems specially required in the present condition of affairs, and Lord Salisbury proposes to approve the instructions given by Mr. Hardinge to Captain Sykes.

I am, however, to remind you that no decision has been arrived at with regard to the permanent establishment of a Consulate at Kerman, and to state that His Lordship would be glad to learn Lord George Hamilton's opinion on the arrangement suggested in the letter from this office of the 12th of October last, which depended on the Government of India being prepared to contribute half the cost of the proposed establishment.

I am, Sir, &c.,

(Sd.) F. H. VILLIERS.

2

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No. 56.

India Office,
1st March, 1898.

Sir,

I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Villiers' letter of the 17th February on the subject of the despatch of Captain Sykes to Kerman to watch the proceedings about to be taken by the Governor of that district to subdue the revolt and to punish the murderers of Mr. Graves.

His Lordship referred to the subject of the 3rd paragraph of Mr. Villiers' letter under reply to the Viceroy by telegraph, and I am to inclose a copy of the reply of the Government of India.

Should the arrangement proposed by the Government of India commend itself to Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for India in Council will be prepared to sanction the payment out of Indian revenues of a moiety of the cost of sending Captain Sykes to Kerman, provided that such moiety does not exceed Rs. 6,000. This arrangement will be merely temporary and will have effect only in the year 1898-99, and in the meanwhile the question of its continuance will be considered.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
(Sd.) A. Godley.

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.
(For later papers see Political despatch No. 54 of 19th May.)

No. 56 A.

Extract from the Meshed Political Diary No. 25 for the week ending 24th June 1898.

* * * * * * *

1. Information has been received that Mr. Ziedler is to be appointed to some post—the name of which could not be ascertained—in Seistan. This officer was formerly First Assistant to the Russian Consul-General here.

* * * * * * *

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

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

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No. 57.

No. 135 of 1898.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

External.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD GEORGE F. HAMILTON,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

SIMLA, *the 10th August 1898.*

MY LORD,

In a telegram, dated the 27th December 1897, Your Lordship enquired whether we had any observations to make on the policy which, having regard to British Indian interests, commercial, telegraph and political, it is desirable that Her Majesty's Government should consider or follow if matters in Persian Baluchistan come to a crisis. Your telegram had reference to the suggested despatch to Charbar and Jask of detachments of native infantry for the protection of the telegraph staff and stations. The Viceroy's telegram of the 4th January informed Your Lordship that we were prepared to send such detachments; but could not reply, without further consideration, regarding the extent of British interests in Persian Baluchistan, though effective military intervention or occupation could not be attempted with the forces at our disposal. In answer to another telegram, dated the 18th February 1898, Your Lordship was informed that we were not then prepared to give a final opinion as to the value, in Indian interests, of a Consulate at Kerman; but were willing, in view of the existing situation in Persian Baluchistan, to meet in 1898-99 half the expense of sending Captain Sykes back to Kerman, provided such moiety did not exceed Rs. 6,000. We have now received Your Lordship's Political Despatch No. 54, dated the 19th May 1898, showing that the Foreign Office have accepted this provisional arrangement.

2. Disorder in Persian Baluchistan is, unfortunately, no new thing; but the recent disturbances do not appear to involve risk that the Persian Government will be unable to maintain their authority in the province. The view that military intervention by the Government of India would be impossible will, we have no doubt, be accepted; and, in respect to the general position, we need only re-affirm the statement given in the fourth paragraph of the Secret Despatch from Lord Dufferin's Government, No. 100 A., dated the 24th June 1887. Politically our chief interest lies in the effect which disturbances in Persian Baluchistan may exercise upon our side of the frontier. Your Lordship is aware that in Baluch-Makran it has been our steady policy to adopt measures calculated to safeguard the interests of the Khan of Kalat, and to secure peace and order with the minimum of direct interference on our part. In 1894 we declined* to take steps which might have committed us to holding Makran with troops in spite of our previous

* *Vide* enclosures to our Secret Despatch No. 65 (External), dated the 25th April 1894.

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

decision to the contrary. We desire to adhere to the policy of avoiding, as far as possible, any extension of our responsibilities in that direction; but recent events have shown that we may be called upon to intervene in Makran, and disorder across the border would undoubtedly prove a serious factor in the question. The history of the late disturbances in Makran, with our views as to the situation there, will shortly be placed before Your Lordship in a separate despatch.

3. As regards our commercial interests in Persia we are under a disadvantage in respect that we receive from the Diplomatic and Consular Officers no general report on the trade of the country, such as we have of the trade of China, Java, &c. The information we possess does not indicate a very extensive trade. We incline to the opinion that the hopes entertained of the future success of the new route from Quetta to Seistan may in course of time be realised; but we consider that premature activity is likely to prevent or postpone that result. Lord Dufferin's Government entertained apprehensions that activity in the direction of Seistan might lead to a forward move on the part of Russia, and we drew attention to the same subject in our despatch of the 24th July 1894; we entirely concur in the opinion held by the majority of the Governor-General's Council in 1887 on the subject of railway extension; and the information supplied to Your Lordship since the issue of your Revenue Despatch No. 209, dated the 2nd December 1897, will probably enable you to agree that the appointment of Consular Agents in Seistan is not rendered urgently advisable by considerations connected with possible trade in arms and ammunition between the Persian Gulf and Baluchistan. The desirability of arranging for such Agents has, however, been recently pressed on the attention of the Viceroy by representatives of the tea interest in the Kangra Valley. Our returns of trade show that in 1887-88 the Indian tea exported to Persia was only slightly in excess of 260,000 lbs., or little more than one-fifth of the amount of foreign tea imported into Persia. The figures for the last five years are quoted in the margin. The unfortunate check to the trade in Indian tea in 1896-97 is to be ascribed to conditions prevailing in India, and, in particular, to the dislocation of trade caused by the plague. The total trade by the Quetta-Seistan route did not reach 1¾ lakhs of rupees in the year 1896; in 1897 it exceeded 5 lakhs, and in the first four months of 1898 it was Rs. 3,11,000. Improved conditions for trade in Persia would doubtless be beneficial to Indian interests by developing outlets for yarn and cloth manufactured in Bombay.*

	Foreign tea. lbs.	Indian tea. lbs.
1893-94	... 3,306,020	... 2,497,525
1894-95	... 3,961,397	... 3,172,806
1895-96	... 2,252,814	... 3,188,099
1896-97	... 2,387,319	... 1,993,823
1897-98	... 1,259,871	... 1,464,394

* *Vide* letter from the Bombay Government which was forwarded with the Secret Despatch from Lord Lansdowne's Government No. 49 (External), dated the 1st March 1893.

4. Various matters connected with our trading interests in Persia were discussed in Sir Mortimer Durand's Confidential despatch to the Foreign Office No. 51, dated the 14th August 1896. We could not provide escorts of Indian troops for Consular Officers in Persia, and we share Sir Mortimer's apprehensions that action on our part might lead to countermoves by Russia. On the other hand, serious disorder in Persia might afford Russia a legitimate or plausible ground for interference, while better rule on the Perso-Baluch border—which might perhaps be facilitated by the appointment of a British Consular Officer at some such point as Bampur—should re-act beneficially on our side of the frontier and assist us in confining to the narrowest possible limits our responsibilities in Baluch-Makran. The recent arrangement whereby receivers of the Imperial Bank of Persia were to encash all customs duties at Bushire and Kermanshah and to have also the right to see that the duties are duly levied appears likely, if established, to prove an important step towards developing the natural resources of Persia and increasing British influence. We have also noticed with satisfaction the completion of the formalities in respect to the agreement between the Bakhtiari Chiefs and Messrs. Lynch for the construction of a road from Ahwaz to Ispahan.

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5. On a review of the whole situation, we are of opinion that the question of the appointment of British Consular Agents at important points in Southern Persia is one that requires further consideration, but that the Government of India might be prepared, at any rate as an experiment, to contribute towards the cost of such a measure, if and when Her Majesty's Government think it could be safely attempted. We are willing to continue for a fixed period of, say, five years to bear half the charges for the Kerman Consulate subject to the present limit of Rs. 6,000. The confidence which an improved system of customs should give to traders would doubtless be increased if British Consular Officers were maintained at selected points inland. The development of trade, the increase of British influence and the consolidation of Persian authority should then advance together. In the event, however, of any sudden crisis, the Government of India could, in our opinion, do no more than rely on Her Majesty's Government to see that Indian interests—and especially our right of access to the Persian markets—were not prejudiced. As regards telegraphs, so long as the line follows the coast, Indian interests are sufficiently involved to justify us in furnishing protective detachments as we are now doing at Jask and Charbar; but we could not do more than provide in this manner for the defence of the few telegraph stations on the coast. We have recently heard of the resignation of the Amin-ed-Dowleh, on whom the title of Sadr Azam was conferred so lately as last December, and from whom and from his colleagues so much was apparently hoped for in the direction of reforms. We are as yet without precise information as to the significance or cause of the Sadr Azam's resignation.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) ELGIN.
" C. E. NAIRNE.
" J. WESTLAND.
" M. D. CHALMERS.
" E. H. H. COLLEN.
" A. C. TREVOR.
" C. M. RIVAZ.

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

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

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No. 58.

Nos. 1208-1210 E.-A., dated Simla, the 23rd August 1898 (Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing despatch is forwarded to the Finance Department, Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Quarter-Master-General's Department, for information.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 135 (External), dated the 11th August 1898.

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

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

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

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

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No. 16, dated Tehran, the 12th February 1899.

From—Sir Mortimer Durand, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran,

To—The Marquess of Salisbury, K.G., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship's despatches No 61 of the 27th of June and No. 8 (Consular) of the 29th of September 1898, calling for my opinion with regard to certain suggestions for the appointment of additional Consular officers in Persia.

The matter has engaged my attention for several years, and I have more than once expressed my opinion upon it. In September 1895, I wrote a memorandum reviewing the state of affairs in Persia, and submitting proposals for the improvement of our position. An officer had shortly before been sent to act as Consul in Kerman, and I wrote with reference to this appointment—"It will strengthen our influence materially if we have more men of this kind in other parts of Persia as occasion offers, and if our representatives in Bushire and Ispahan and Khorassan are encouraged to travel and make friends among the Chiefs and tribesmen. We need not excite the ready alarm of the Russians by too frequent journeys along their border, but I think we should spend some money in encouraging travel elsewhere, and in establishing agencies at important points. For instance, I feel very doubtful whether the Government of India are right in deprecating the establishment of a British officer in Seistan; and, under certain conditions, we might find it very useful to have a man in Shuster to help in the opening of the roads in the Lur and Bakhtiari country."

Paragraph 18.

I also advocated an improvement in the position of the Consul-General in Tabriz.

Paragraph 17.

In August 1896, I submitted a detailed proposal for the establishment of a Consulate at Shuster on the Karun, where our traders had been brutally ill-used; and I suggested that, for their protection and the maintenance of order, we might raise a tribal levy under British officers.

A year later, when in England, I followed up these suggestions by advocating the retention of the Kerman appointment, and again asking for the establishment of a Consul on the Karun.

The result was that the Kerman appointment was continued provisionally, and since that time the nomination by the Russians of a Consul for Seistan has led to our also appointing a Consul for that district, but I believe no further steps have been taken to carry out my suggestions.

These suggestions formed part of a general scheme of policy based upon an examination of the state of affairs in Persia in 1895. The further suggestions which I now desire to submit must, I think, in like manner, form part of a general scheme of policy, based upon an examination of the state of affairs in Persia at the present time. The question of our Consular establishments cannot be considered apart from the larger question.

Almost the whole of the memorandum of 1895 applies to the present position, and the paper contains a general statement of the views which I held then, and hold still, regarding the manner in which we should deal with Persia. I would, therefore, ask that the memorandum may be read, and that this despatch may be considered as a supplement, bringing it up to date. I can then confine myself to pointing out the changes which have taken place since the memorandum was written, supplying at the same time such further information as may be necessary to give a comprehensive view of the present state of affairs.

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For convenience sake, though I trust the whole memorandum will be considered, I will here quote the penultimate paragraph, which sums up my views and proposals. It ran as follows :—

Paragraph 29.

"Persia is misgoverned and her condition is not satisfactory. Her finances are in disorder, and her resources undeveloped, and she contains some elements of disturbance, while there is no armed force upon which the Government can depend for the maintenance of its authority. The influence of Russia, which is antagonistic to our own, predominates at Tehran, and it is believed to be exerted against the interests of the country.

"On the other hand, Persia has practically no debt, and her natural resources are great. Her internal condition is not hopeless, or such as to cause immediate alarm. And the influence of Russia, th ugh predominant, is not exclusive. Russia has still a strong position throughout the country, and Russia, recognising her own weakness in Asia, seems unlikely for the present to take any step in Persia which would seriously offend us.

"The general situation, therefore, might be worse, but it is not one with which we can rest altogether satisfied.

"It is not probable that Russia will combine with England in reorganising the Persian administration and in developing her trade; and there is little help to be got in this direction from other European nations, none of whom carry any weight in Tehran.

"England by herself, especially if thwarted by Russia, cannot hope to overcome the opposition of interested persons in high places, and to carry a scheme of reform which shall regenerate Persia. She can hardly hope, indeed, to carry any reform of radical importance, and must fall back upon her existing policy, contenting herself with maintaining the integrity of Persia; watching and checking Russian aggression; gaining the good-will, respect and confidence of the Persian Government and people; developing trade; and taking such opportunities as may occur of urging measures beneficial to the country.

"With a view to maintaining the integrity and independence of Persia, it is desirable to make timely arrangements for securing a quiet succession on the Shah's death, and we should endeavour to strengthen our influence over the heir-apparent by keeping an English with him, by improving the position of our representative at Tabriz, and in other ways. We should let it be understood that aggressive action by Russia in the north of Persia will immediately result in decided action by us in the south.

"In order to strengthen the friendly feelings entertained towards us in many parts of the country, we should encourage picked officers to travel among the Chiefs and people, and we should, as occasion offers, establish fresh agencies at important points. We should try to obtain for the people such benefits as a good currency.

"The Persian Government should be made to understand that they must not trifle with us in the future, as they have occasionally done in the past; but we should try to gain their good-will, and to help them in any way we can. Just now there is an opportunity of putting them under a great obligation by relieving them to some extent of the burden of the Regie Debt, which they find very harassing. The Shah has begged us earnestly to help him in this way, and has at the same time formally asked our advice as to the reforms which should be made in his administration. I think we should give this advice to the best of our power, and should clear off the Regie Debt by lending the Persian Government half a million at 3 or 4 per cent on approved security and on certain defined conditions. These conditions should include advantages to our trade, such as the opening of the Upper Karun, and also a satisfactory guarantee that the revenue and expenditure of the Persian Government shall, for the future, be made to balance.

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"The probable result of such action on our part will be the introduction of a certain measure of administrative reform, and the strengthening of our influence in Persia, especially in the south, where we ought to be able to revive it and make it very strong.

"If we do not help the Persian Government in the manner indicated, we run the risk of alienating the Sadr-i-Azam, who has been sore with us about the Regie Debt, and of driving him and the Shah, whose greed for money is increasing with age, into some compromising transaction with Russia."

I will now proceed to enumerate the principal changes which have taken place since these words were written.

The old Shah, Nasr-ed-din, who had then ruled for nearly fifty years, is now dead. He has been succeeded by his second son, Mozaffer-ed-din, who has proved an amiable but very weak ruler. The Sadr-i-Azam, or Prime Minister, all-powerful in 1895, was overthrown in the following year. He has now returned to office, but with a shadow of his former power. All real power is at present in the hands of the Shah's irresponsible advisers, notably his doctor, the Hakim-ul-Mulk. There is practically no Government. Some of the troops have disbanded themselves and the rest are unpaid. The pay of the Civil establishments is also in serious arrears. The finances, which were in disorder in 1895, are in worse disorder now. The Sadr-i-Azam has borrowed three hundred thousand pounds (£300,000) from the Russian Bank in Tehran, but all attempts at raising a substantial loan have broken down; the revenues, except from customs, are coming in very slowly; and at this moment the one hope of getting any considerable sum of money lies in the sale of the Provincial Governorships to the highest bidder. This destructive system, abolished by the new Shah when he came to the throne, has been revived by the Sadr-i-Azam. And it is said that this year's auction is to be on a very large scale indeed. There is much murmuring throughout the country at the state of things in Tehran, and the discontent is increased by the high price of food, which has led here and there to some serious rioting. Altogether the internal condition of Persia is very unsatisfactory.

The Russians meanwhile have not been inactive. To the north a road from Enzeli to Tehran, which had but little progress before the visit of General Kuropatkin to Persia in 1895, has since then been vigorously pushed on, and it is now nearly ready for wheel traffic throughout its length. This is a most important advantage to Russia, both from a commercial and from a military point of view. Even now two-thirds of the imported goods sold in Tehran are Russian. In the north-west Russia has pushed forward her railway towards Kars, and has surveyed a line from Kars to the Tabriz frontier, while within Azerbaijan there has been a remarkable propaganda among the Nestorian Christians, some thousands of whom have been won over to the orthodox Church, thereby obtaining Russian protection, and opening the door to Russian interference. To the north-east the Russians have constructed a good cart-road from Asterabad to the Meshed frontier, and by energetically encouraging their trade in Khorassan they have secured a commanding position in this valuable market. They have also made use of the outbreak of plague in India to push down "Sanitary" posts along the Afghan border, in the direction of Seistan, where also they are trying to introduce their trade and where they are shortly to have a Consul. Even in the centre of Persia, as far south as Ispahan, the Russians have shown fresh activity by establishing there a Consulate on a considerable scale of expenditure; and our Consul reports that the sale of Russian goods has already begun to increase. I will not go into detail here, or enumerate the persistent rumours which reach me as to Russian schemes in various directions, but it is, I think, quite clear from the facts I have mentioned that the Russians have been working consistently, and not without effect, to push their trade and to enhance their political influence in the country.

It is only natural that their operations, and the unsatisfactory state of internal affairs, should have had a depressing effect upon British trade.

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We are being rapidly ousted from the Khorassan market. In Tehran itself our trade is undoubtedly suffering and will suffer more as the Resht road is opened to traffic. In the north-west our Trebizond trade has fallen off to a serious extent. Even in the Gulf ports, where by the way there has been some attempt at Belgian and German competition, we are not doing as well as we might be. The shrinking of our Khorassan trade has told here, and the most recent returns cannot, I think, be regarded as satisfactory.

On the other hand, it must not be supposed that recent changes in Persia have all been unfavourable to our interests. This is not the case. In one respect we have reason to be very well satisfied. Three years ago almost every man in the country, Persian or European, believed that the death of the Shah would be the signal for general disorder, and for some marked advance on the part of Russia, posssibly involving the break up of the country. I stated in my memorandum of 1895 my reasons for doubting the correctness of this view, but it was the prevalent view, and I asked Her Majesty's Government to make timely preparations. This danger at least has been averted. When His Majesty was murdered, it was very doubtful whether there would not be an outbreak of the Tehran garrison, which would have been followed by serious trouble all over Persia, and the Russian troops were in fact held in readiness for an immediate advance; but thanks to English money the outbreak did not take place and the succession was peaceful. If the present Shah should die as suddenly as his father, we may reasonably hope that the succession will again pass over quietly. This is no doubt a negative gain, but from our point of view it is very important. The Shah too, though weak, is well meaning, and not I think at all inclined to submit to Russian dictation. He has retained his English doctor in spite of determined attacks on the part of the Russian and French Legations, who wanted to put in a Frenchman, and he has nominated as his heir-apparent, his eldest son, who was opposed by the Russians; and his most influential adviser, the Hakim-ul-Mulk, is believed to be very friendly to us.

Paragraphs 7 and 17.

See paragraph 17 of the memorandum of 1895.

To turn to other matters mentioned in my memorandum of 1895 and connected points, we have defined the long disputed boundary between Persia and Kalat, and have pushed forward from India along the trade route to Seistan, and have sent officers into Seistan itself, and have made arrangements for the improvement of the trade route from Ahwaz to Ispahan. We have severely punished a tribe on the Gulf coast, which was responsible for the murder of one of our telegraph officers, and we have sent a detachment of British Indian troops to protect the telegraph line for the future. This has had a good effect. Disturbances have occurred in Kalat territory, but they have not spread to Persian Baluchistan, and the ruler of this important province has throughout behaved in the most friendly manner. On the Karun, at Shuster, our people have suffered seriously from the fanaticism of the town mob, which has been fostered, if not created, by the weakness of the Persian Government; but we are on good terms with the Arabs and Bakhtiaris who hold the neighbouring country, and a little decided action on the part of the Persian Government would soon set matters right in Shuster itself, where the people were at one time particularly friendly to us. In the south we have greatly strengthened our position by insisting upon, and obtaining, the removal of an obnoxious Governor of Bushire. I dwelt in my memorandum of 1895 upon the importance of the principle involved, and I would invite special attention to the point. The effect of the case has been most remarkable. Altogether it is certain from the reports of officers, who have had recent opportunities of judging, that in the southern zone our reputation just now stands very high indeed.

Paragraph 25.

In Tehran itself we have had to deal, and still have to deal, with some hostility or obstructiveness on the part of influential officials, but among them also our action in the south has had its effect, and recent events in the Soudan

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have created a great impression here. I do not think our political influence at the capital is any weaker than it was in the time of the late Shah. On the contrary I think that at this moment it is stronger.

Even with regard to trade there are some encouraging features in the prospect. Perhaps as this matter is one of very great importance, and as it is especially connected with the question of our Consular establishments, I had better examine it in some detail.

I may begin by pointing out that we have in Tehran an English Bank, the Imperial Bank of Persia, with a capital of six hundred and fifty thousand pounds (£650,000), and branches at Tabriz, Resht, Meshed, Ispahan, Shiraz, Yezd and Bushire. This is the only Bank in Persia which can legally issue notes. It has, I believe, done some unsatisfactory business in India, but so far as its business is concerned it is in a flourshing condition. It did signal service on the occasion of the Shah's death, when it provided, at a few hours' notice, large sums of money both at Tehran and at Tabriz, thus enabling the provisional Government to pay up the troops who were in a very dangerous state. The Bank has been threatened to some extent by Russian competition, but so far it more than holds its own.

Our trade enters Persia by a variety of routes, of which the following may be mentioned :—

1. From Trebizond into the north-west corner of Persia near Bayazid.
2. From the Turkish frontier near Khanikin, "the Baghdad route."
3. By the Karun ports, Mohammerah and Ahwaz.
4. By Bushire.
5. By Lingah, Bunder Abbas and minor ports in the eastern parts of the Gulf.
6. From Kalat territory.
7. From Afghanistan.

The last-named route has been practically closed for the time, partly by the exactions of the Amir, and partly by the Russian sanitary posts, which have stopped the passage of caravans between the Afghan border and South-Eastern Persia.

Of the other routes that by Trebizond still brings in a considerable volume of British trade, but less than half it once brought in. The estimated yearly value of this trade is now about three hundred and two thousand pounds (£302,000). Curzon's estimate for 1889 was about six hundred and ten thousand (£610,000). It should be observed, however, that although the decrease is doubtless due in part to Russian competition, it is also due in part to the Armenian massacres and the troubled state of the country during the last few years. There was a dreadful massacre in Trebizond itself which shook the confidence of our traders. Trade checked in this way is likely to be diverted to other channels rather than lost, and I believe this is what has happened. Part of our Trebizond trade has now passed over to the more southerly routes, especially that by Baghdad.

The trade by the Baghdad route has increased in importance, and seems likely to increase still further, especially if the railway system spreads in Asia Minor and Turkish Arabia. In the absence of any English competition, the Germans have unfortunately obtained a concession for making the road from Tehran to Khanikin; and British trade in this quarter is threatened by the Russian road from Resht to Kazvin, which, under the terms of the concession, may be prolonged to Hamadan. Still at present the bulk of the goods imported by this route are British, and we hold the Kermanshah and Hamadan markets to the exclusion of all European competitors. From there we push forward into Kurdistan and other districts, including Tehran and Ispahan. Our trade for last year was estimated by the Bank Agent in the Custom House at a total of £1,048,155, of which £838,524 is British. And the exports are said to

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have been exceptionally small this year because of a bad opium crop. Also the water in the Tigris was so low that transport was much impeded. Curzon's estimate for 1889 was £ 327,796.

The Karun route may some day be one of the most important of all. The existing value of our trade is small, and the last figures* show a decrease on those given by Curzon for 1890, the total being only £126,550 as against £180,680. But there is reason to hope that the state of things will not continue. We are now opening out the road from Ahwaz to Ispahan, and believe that we shall thereby effect a large saving of time and cost in comparison with the Bushire and Ispahan route, which is long and difficult. Also we are trying to open out roads northwards from the Karun to Sultanabad, the centre of the carpet trade, and to Hamadan and the surrounding country. I attach much value to the Karun route, which from the nature of things is entirely in our hands, and protected from any serious competition. Some good judges believe it will before long be our main trade route. Its future, however, is by no means certain, and we must not feel too sanguine about it.

The Bushire route is at present the most important of all, the volume of British trade for 1897 being estimated at £1,155,039. This route must always be important, and seems likely to do well even if the Karun route develops. At present it fills the country with British goods as far as Ispahan, where the Russian competition is small, and even supplies Tehran, eight hundred miles from the sea.

The eastern ports have suffered from the shrinking of the Khorassan and Afghan markets, and can show no increase on the figures given for 1889. Still they supply a very large tract of country, and their trade should not suffer any further from Russian competition. They ought easily to hold their own in Yezd, Kerman and South-Eastern Persia generally. The value of their trade to us is estimated at £1,026,990 a year.

The trade by the Kalat route is as yet small, but promises well. If we can succeed in pushing our goods into Seistan from the south of Khorassan by a caravan road from Quetta, and especially if the Government of India should decide to construct a railway, there may be a real future for this route. The estimated value of the trade for 1898 is £39,329.

Altogether, if one looks at the map of Persia, the position held by our trade is very remarkable. It is in full possession of the country up to and including a line drawn from Khanikin by Kermanshah, Hamadan, Ispahan, Yezd and Kerman to Seistan. Beyond that line it has begun to give ground both in the north-west and in Tehran and in Khorassan; but, in spite of the great geographical disadvantages, it has by no means been excluded. Its total value is estimated at three million four hundred and eighty-eight thousand pounds (£3,488,000). This is an increase of nearly half a million on the estimate given by Curzon for 1889, a rise of 16 per cent in nine years. This is not I think a discouraging state of things, especially when it is considered that the last seven years have been for Persia a very unlucky period in various ways. Year after year great tracts of territory in Southern Persia have been devastated by locusts. Then we have had troubles consequent on the Tobacco Regie, and a severe epidemic of cholera, and disorder following on the death of the Shah, and a succession of bad crops causing a great rise in the prices of food. In Shiraz there has been such scarcity that three years ago the Persian Government contemplated importing wheat from India. Export of wheat has been forbidden for some time; and naturally the purchasing power of the population has been comparatively low, which has told on imports. And I imagine the plague in India has had a depressing effect on the Bombay and Karachi trade. Altogether, though we have suffered and must suffer from Russian competition in the north, our trade has on the whole increased, and with better seasons it gives fair promise of prosperity. It should be noted that the shrinking of the

* For the Karun and Gulf ports I have failed to get any complete figures later than those for 1897.

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

Khorassan trade is partly due to the fact that our goods now reach Central Asia by Batoum and Baku and the Trans-Caspian Railway. The "Novoe Vremya" writes very mournfully about this.

Such are the principal changes which have taken place in Persia of late years; but before summing them up with a view of examining the present state of affairs and submitting proposals for improving our position, I think it may be desirable to state briefly what are our present establishments in the country, and what amount of money we spend on them. I append a sketch map which will give some idea of the political geography.

The Diplomatic and Consular staff is as follows:—

At Tehran, the capital, we have a Minister with three Diplomatic Secretaries, two Oriental Secretaries, a Surgeon and a Vice-Consul. The total cost of the Legation is estimated at £16,640 a year, of which India pays £7,000.

At Meshed, to the north-west, we have two officers of the Indian Political Service, who are also Consul-General and Vice-Consul, and a Surgeon. The total cost of the Agency is estimated at £8,600 a year. This is paid by India.

At Asterabad, further west, we have a native Agent, cost £48 a year. This is paid by Her Majesty's Government.

At Resht we have a Consulate, cost £750 a year. This is paid by Her Majesty's Government.

At Tabriz, we have a Consulate-General, cost of which is estimated at £920 a year. This is paid by Her Majesty's Government.

To the west of Tehran, at Kermanshah, on the Baghdad road, we have a native Agent, who costs £24 a year. This is paid by India.

Midway between the two seas at Ispahan, we have a Consulate costing £750 a year. This is paid by Her Majesty's Government. There is also a native Agent, who costs £24.

Further south again at Shiraz, we have a native Agent, costing £160 a year. This is paid by India.

To the east of Shiraz, half-way to the frontier of India, we have a Consulate at Kerman, who costs £500 a year. This appointment is provisional. Half the cost is paid by India and half by Her Majesty's Government.

The Consul at Kerman is now in Seistan, where it is proposed to keep a Consul in future.

Finally, along the coast of the Persian Gulf, we have—

At Mohammerah a Vice-Consulate, which costs £490 a year. This is paid by Her Majesty's Government.

At Bushire a Resident, who is also Consul-General for Fars, with three Assistants, one of whom is Vice-Consul, and a Surgeon. The cost of the Residency is estimated at £7,700 a year. This is paid by India.

The political work on the coast between Bushire and the Kalat frontier is in the hands of the Director of the Persian Gulf Telegraphs, who gets an allowance of £120 a year. This is paid by India.

The Resident at Bushire has also under his orders native Agents at Bahrein, Shargah and Lingah, and they cost about £240 a year.

This completes the statement of our diplomatic, political and Consular establishments in Persia and the Persian Gulf. It will be seen that we employ twenty-one British officers, and that the total cost is about thirty-six thousand nine hundred and seventy pounds (£36,970). Of this total, as far as I can make out, Her Majesty's Government pay £12,876 and the Government of India £24,094.

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I should add that in the case of non-Indian Consulates, I have made no allowance for travelling charges, as these are quite uncertain. We might perhaps add about £1,500 a year for this and other minor charges which I need not mention.

Besides the Diplomatic and Consular establishments, it is to be observed that we maintain in Persia and the Persian Gulf a considerable Telegraph Department, with a numerous staff of English clerks. This Department has been, and to some extent still is, a valuable organisation for political and intelligence purposes. The Telegraph clerks can supply much useful information at times, and in out-of-the-way places they are often called upon to act in somewhat responsible situations.

The sketch map appended to this despatch shows the line of telegraph through Persia and the Gulf, of these the lines extending from Tehran to Bushire and the line along the Gulf coasts to Fao, Jask, Charbar and the Kalat border are maintained by our telegraph staff, and are thoroughly efficient. The Persian line from Tehran to Meshed is inspected by our Telegraph staff, and the Government of India give a grant-in-aid of twenty thousand rupees a year towards the cost of maintenance. We have an English clerk at Meshed. This line works well. The line from Tehran to Julfa in the north-west is in the hands of the Indo-European Telegraph Company, which has its head-quarters in London, but it is of no great use to us for political purposes, as it is closely watched by the Russians. This line is efficient. The rest of the lines shown on the map are maintained and worked by the Persian Government and are very inefficient indeed.

We can go on to review as a whole the state of affairs in Persia in 1899, and to consider what steps we can take to improve our position.

The internal condition of the country, which was bad enough in 1895, is now in some respects decidedly worse. The Shah, though a more amiable man than his father, is weak and easily misled; the Prime Minister has no power, and cannot control his colleagues or the provincial authorities; the finances are in complete disorder, and the revenues are coming in very slowly; the troops are unpaid, and inclined to be mutinous; food is dear all over the country; and the people are discontented. Meanwhile, the Russians have been actively pushing their trade and political influence in the north of Persia, and with some success. They have even succeeded in establishing posts along the Afghan border, and in making themselves felt in Seistan and Ispahan. On the other hand, it is as true now as it was in 1895 that the internal condition of Persia is not hopeless. She has practically no debt, and her resources are great. And though the influence of Russia is perhaps predominant in Tehran, yet England has still a strong position throughout the country. The quiet succession of the Shah was regarded as being, and was in fact, a great success for us; and the Shah's nomination of his eldest son as heir-apparent, though the Russians were known to favour a younger son, also tended to increase our reputation. In various respects His Majesty has shown good-will towards us, and a decided disinclination to put himself under Russian control. In the south of Persia, that is up to a line drawn from Khanikin on the Turkish frontier through Kermanshah, Hamadan, Ispahan, Yezd and Kerman to Seistan, our trade and our political influence are paramount, and indeed, so far as Russia is concerned, almost exclusive. Russia has only just begun to touch the fringe of the zone at Seistan and Ispahan. Neither her Consular establishments nor her trade extend beyond these points. In the north zone, on the other hand, although the local influence of the Russians is strong, we have our Consular establishments right up to the Russian border; and our trade, though it is suffering from Russian competition, is by no means beaten out of the field. The southern zone in fact, is very much more in our hands politically and commercially than the northern zone is in Russian hands. All over Persia a large part of the telegraph system is worked by us in one form or another, and our bank has established itself in Tabriz and Resht and Meshed.

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Altogether, considering the advantages Russia has enjoyed, we have much reason to be surprised that our position should be so good as it is. Nevertheless, though things might be much worse than they are, it cannot be denied that both from a political and a commercial point of view our position is being threatened. We have now to consider what are the steps which we should take to maintain and improve it.

In discussing this point I shall proceed on the assumption that we cannot hope to come to terms with Russia, and persuade her to join us in a policy of reform and development. I suggested in my memorandum of 1895 that such a proposal if made by us might possibly be accepted by Russia, especially if it formed part of a larger scheme for the general settlement of our relations in Asia, and I pointed out how advantageous such an arrangement would be for both countries. But I assumed that the scheme was impracticable, and that we must continue to work alone, with Russia watchful and more or less antagonistic.

Paragraph 10.

Under these conditions the question is what we can do by ourselves.

In my memorandum of 1895, I answered that question in the following words:—"England by herself, especially if thwarted by Russia, cannot hope to overcome the opposition of interested persons in high places, and to carry a scheme of reform which will regenerate Persia. She can hardly hope indeed to carry any reform of radical importance, and must fall back upon her existing policy, contenting herself with maintaining the integrity and independence of Persia; watching and checking Russian aggression; gaining the good-will, respect and confidence of the Persian Government and people; developing trade and taking such opportunities as may occur of urging measures beneficial to the country".

Paragraph 29.

In the body of the memorandum, I explained at length the difficultes in the way of all attempts at reform, and I proposed certain definite steps which we should take in prosecution of the general policy stated above.

Substantially the answer now must, I think, be the same as it was in 1895, for substantially the position is the same. But the changes which I have noted in the internal condition of the country, and the recent efforts of the Russian in the north and centre of Persia, seem to make it necessary that I should supplement the proposals I made three years ago, and should explain in somewhat greater detail the measures which I think desirable.

The chief proposal which I have to make meets the question raised in Your Lordship's despatches under reply. It is that we should increase and render more efficient our Consular establishments in Persia. As stated at the beginning of this despatch, I have at various times recommended the establishment of consulates in Seistan, Kerman and on the Karun, and I have also advocated an improvement in the position of the Consul-General at Tabriz. Since then the Consul at Van and the Consul-General at Tabriz have recommended the establishment of a Vice-Consulate at Urumia, while the Resident at Bushire has suggested to me the appointment of Vice-Consuls at Bahrein and Bunder Abbas. The last suggestion is supported by Captain Sykes. The Resident at Bushire has also suggested certain arrangements for the better maintenance of our interests in Shiraz. The appointment of a Russian Consul at Ispahan has led me to consider the necessity of making some improvement in the position of our Consul. The Government of India contemplate the possibility of appointing an English Consular Officer to Bampur. Finally it has been urged upon me that a Vice-Consul would be extremely useful at Kermanshah.

Your Lordship desires to have from me a report showing the places at which the appointment of Consular officers would in my opinion be desirable, the limits of their respective districts, the grounds of my recommendation, and a detailed estimate of the expenditure which those appointments would entail.

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My opinion upon all the suggestions above mentioned is as follows :—

(*a*) In the first place we should have an officer in Seistan, and perhaps native Agents at some points between Seistan and Meshed.

(*b*) The Kerman Consulate should be made permanent, and perhaps a British Vice-Consul or native Agent should be sent to Bampur.

(*c*) The Resident in Bushire should spend the summer in Shiraz, and any necessary expense for a house and other details should be incurred.

(*d*) We should raise the pay of the Consul at Ispahan and improve his position.

(*e*) We should appoint a Consul for the Karun and Arabistan, with head-quarters at Ahwaz, Shuster or Mohammerah. It may be necessary to put under him one or two native Agents.

(*f*) We should replace the native Agent at Kermanshah by a British Vice-Consul.

(*g*) If the Government of India agree, I am inclined to think that we should have a Vice-Consul in Bunder Abbas, with charge of the trade throughout South-Eastern Persia. Also, if the Government of India wish it, there can be no objection on the part of this Legation to the appointment of a British officer to Bahrein.

(*h*) Finally we should perhaps place a British Vice-Consul in Urumia or thereabouts, and we should improve the position of the Consul-General at Tabriz.

The grounds for these recommendations are apparent from all I have written before.

(*a*) With regard to the first recommendation, the importance of Seistan has long been recognised, and the recent reports of Messrs. Webb Ware and Brazier-Creagh seem to put the matter beyond a doubt. We must keep Seistan in our zone. It is too valuable, and would be too dangerous in Russian hands, for us to let the Russians continue unchecked their efforts to close it to us and our trade. The necessity for having native Agents in neighbouring districts is not, I think, so clear. I have no great belief in the agency or what Surgeon-Major Creagh calls "crafty, diplomatic natives," unless they are very closely supervised. They often do more harm than good. But Captain Sykes will be able to advise after spending some months in Seistan.

(*b*) It seems to me beyond dispute that a Consulate in Kerman is becoming yearly more necessary. We must maintain a thorough hold on Persian Baluchistan, in the interests of our adjoining protectorate and of our trade. Kerman is the capital of this large and important province, and the head-quarters of the Governor-General, and a trade centre of some consequence. I am inclined to think that, if we have a British officer in Kerman, we do not want another at Bampur. For the present at least I should try to do without, although we might send a native Agent there if the Consul thinks we can get a man who will not stir up mischief among the border tribes.

(*c*) Shiraz is a place of great importance, both commercially and as the capital of Fars, and the residence of the Governor-General. Our Consul-General for Fars should know something of the province and its ruler, over whom he should endeavour to establish a personal influence. Our interests in Shiraz should not be left to the present native Agent, who, according to all the accounts I receive, does very little good and some harm. I feel some doubt whether Resident in Bushire, who has a great deal of work to do in the Persian Gulf, is not over-weighted by the charge of Fars,

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

and it may be necessary hereafter to appoint a special officer to that charge, but for the present I would try the arrangement I have suggested.

(*d*) It is, I think, evidently wrong that at a place like Ispahan, where our trade and our political influence have hitherto been in full possession, the newly-appointed Russian Consul should be better equipped than our own. The former has £800 a year pay, a Secretary, and a free house, with other privileges, including an escort of Cossacks. The latter has £600 a year pay, of which he has to give back £60 in house-rent and £150 office allowance. I would make him a Consul-General and raise his allowances to the level of the Russian Consul's.

(*e*) A Consulate on the Karun is perhaps the most necessary of all the appointments I have suggested. Ahwaz may hereafter become a very important trade centre, and from there we should work upon the Arabs and Bakhtiaris and Lurs, establishing our hold upon them, and opening up the routes through their country, and perhaps raising from among them an irregular levy. The Resident in Bushire would prefer for the present to keep our Consul at Mohammerah. I doubt the expediency of this, as he should get into touch with the Lurs and Bakhtiaris quite as much as with the Arabs of the Lower Karun. However this may be, the Consul will probably require a native Agent or two for commercial work. We should, I think, for the present at least, leave the Karun under the Consul-General for Fars. Our merchants would prefer his being in direct communication with Tehran, and Captain Sykes in his report on the Karun recommends this; but I do not think we should, until the necessity is very clearly proved, take away the district from the charge of the Consul-General. It is better that we should have the whole of the Gulf coast in one hand.

(*f*) A British Vice-Consulate at Kermanshah is, I think, very desirable. Our trade by the Baghdad route is increasing, and the route is a very important one in all respects. As I have shown, the British imports and exports by this route approach a million sterling. We must keep our hold on it if possible. Our native Agent, although a man of wealth and consequence, has from the time I have been in Persia done nothing for us, and has been a source of unending trouble and expense to the Legation owing to his quarrels with the Persians. It is the more important to keep our hold on Kermanshah, because the Russians may at any time push on their road from Kazvin to Hamadan. A Vice-Consul at Kermanshah should be directly under the orders of the Consul-General at Tehran.

(*g*) With regard to Bunder Abbas, the British trade of this port and Lingah aggregates over a million. Hitherto the Government of India have not been willing to establish a Vice-Consulate at this point, but I would suggest a reconsideration of their view. A Vice-Consul at Bunder Abbas, passing his summers at Yezd and his winters in working up the trade of South-Eastern Persia, ought to be able to do much good. Yezd is an important commercial centre with a branch bank. The Vice-Consul might also perhaps relieve the Telegraph Department of their political duties, but his main work should be in connection with trade. As to Bahrein I have nothing to say. The interest of this Legation in Bahrein is so indirect that this seems to me to be a matter entirely for the Government of India.

(*h*) As to a Vice-Consul in Urumia or the neighbourhood, I am not quite sure. I should have thought that full information as to what

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is going on in this quarter could have been procured through the English and American missionaries,* and also that the Russian Consul-General at Tabriz might visit the district at times as he has lately done. But the north-western corner of Azerbaijan is of importance, both as the point where our Trebizond trade enters, and with regard to the Armenian question on the Turkish frontier, and as a post from which to keep a watch on Russian proceedings. On the whole, therefore, I should be disposed to send a man there, though he will probably be followed by a Russian.

I have also recommended that we should improve the position of our Consul-General at Tabriz. The grounds for this are obvious. The British representative in this important place, the head-quarters of the heir-apparent and a great centre, gets £650 a year pay, and £270 office allowance. The Russian Consul-General gets £2,000 a year pay, and has a large staff of Secretaries and Munshis. The Turkish Consul-General has £1,020 pay and allowances, and is helped by a Vice-Consul and Attaché. Even the French representative, who is not a Consul-General, and has very small interests to represent, gets £1,200 a year in pay and allowances, and has the aid of a Vice-Consul. All the foreign representatives have free houses. It may be argued that we ought not to attempt to rival the Russian Consul-General at this point. I think this is open to question, but in any case it seems to me unjust to our representative and unwise in our own interests, to place him in a position of such marked inferiority towards his colleagues. Mr. Wood urges that he should be allowed a personal assistant or confidential clerk. If the Vice-Consul is appointed in the first place to Tabriz, which will attract less attention, and spends a part of his time there, a confidential clerk will perhaps be unnecessary. But the danger is that he will spend too much of his time there.

With regard to the limits of the new Consular districts, I cannot as yet give a precise answer in all cases. The limits of the Seistan Consulate, for example, must be fixed hereafter when experience has shown us the best line of division to the northward. The powers of the Kerman Consulate should extend to the territory ruled by the Persian Governor-General at Kerman. The limits of a Vice-Consulate at Bampur I cannot state with accuracy. The Consul on the Karun should have charge of the country down to the sea, and westward to the Turkish frontier, and eastward to the eastern border of the Bakhtiaris, and northwards to the northern border of Luristan. The Vice-Consul at Kermanshah should have charge of the Kermanshah and Hamadan districts, and of the country northwards to the border of Azerbaijan. The Vice-Consul in Urumia should perhaps be appointed simply Vice-Consul at Tabriz, whence he can be deputed to act under the Consul-General's orders. The Vice-Consul at Bunder Abbas should have charge of the Gulf ports east of Bushire, which form a Persian Governorship, and of Yezd and of Luristan. I will work out the precise limits of the several districts in communication with the officers on the spot.

All or about all the Consulates in Persia should have a small guard of Indian troopers, say six men, as at Meshed. These should be picked men, if possible from Lancer regiments, and the non-commissioned officer should be a trained surveyor.

As to the cost of the additional appointments which I have proposed, I feel it extremely difficult to make a satisfactory estimate, because the English and Indian ways of looking at such charges are so essentially different. The posts under the Government of India are maintained on a considerable scale, and cost a considerable sum of money. Those under the Foreign Office are maintained on a very moderate footing, and cost comparatively little. For example, the Consulate-General at Tabriz costs altogether £920 a year, while the Consulate-General at Meshed costs £8,600. I believe the sumptuary allow-

* Note.—The American missionaries are greatly troubled by the Russian propaganda and are entirely with us.

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

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ance of the Consul-General at Bushire is larger than the pay of the Consul-General at Tabriz. As the work of the Consulates in Persia is not only Consular but Political, and as a certain amount of show is very desirable in the East, I think the rates of pay and allowances given by Her Majesty's Government are much too low, and this view is evidently shared by the Russians. But I hesitate to propose appointments kept up on the Indian scale, because they would probably seem to Her Majesty's Government out of all proportion to the importance of Persia. Another difficulty is that any new post maintained by the Government of India, for example, Seistan or Bahrein, would probably be brought on the list of the Indian Political Department, and the Government of India would have to fix the pay with reference to the interests of that department as a whole. However, I would suggest as a basis of calculation that each Consul should have £600 a year pay, £150 office allowance and £50 house-rent—total £800; and that each Vice-Consul should have £400 pay, £50 a year office allowance and £50 house-rent—total £500. I doubt whether this is enough, but anything less than this would certainly be too little. The Consuls-General at Tabriz and Ispahan should have at least £800 a year pay, £270 office allowance and a free house. The total expenditure on all the appointments suggested would be five thousand and six hundred pounds (£5,600) as shown below:—

	£
* Seistan	800
Kerman	800
Bampur	800
Bunder Abbas	500
Bahrein	500
Karun	800
Kermanshah	500
Urumia	500
Extra expenditure at Tabriz and Ispahan, say ...	700
Total ...	5,600

These proposals may be embarrassing from the point of view of the Foreign Office with reference to the rest of the Consular Service. I can only represent the matter from a local point of view. But I would observe that life in most parts of Persia is for an Englishman terribly isolated. It is very different from the life in European Consulates, or in seaport towns anywhere. It is also in some ways very expensive, especially in regard to presents and the transport of supplies. And, as I have said before, the work is largely of a political character. Possibly the difficulty could be met by attaching an Indian allowance to Persian Consulates.

I have made no allowance for travelling expenses. It is very difficult to estimate these. But it should be clearly understood that our officers in Persia ought to travel freely, and to know their districts. I mentioned this point in my memorandum of 1895. In a country like Persia a man is of comparatively little use if he remains all the year round at his head-quarters. He should go about among the people and the nomad tribes, and inspect the trade routes, and generally see and be seen. For this purpose he should have a proper scale of camp equipage procured from India. At present a Consul in Persia has no travelling tents kept up for him, and if he travels he does so in a style which in India would be considered very unbecoming. He sleeps in a dirty little room in a Persian posthouse, if he finds one empty. If not, he gets into a mud hut in the nearest village. This kind of thing does harm, and should not be allowed. In one case tents have been granted to a Consul. This should be done for every officer in Persia, and every officer in Persia should be prepared to live in his tents for a considerable part of the year.

* This may be somewhat increased by the necessity of maintaining native Agents.

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Against the cost of the appointments and increase of pay proposed may be set off a certain amount of reduction. If the Resident at Bushire spends his summer in Shiraz, we can, I think, do away with the native Agent. This would save £160 a year. If we have a Consul at Ahwaz or Shuster, we can abolish the Vice-Consulate at Mohammerah. This would save £490, or a little less, as we may want to keep a Persian Agent there and possibly one at Dizful to do routine work. The native Agent at Kermanshah can be abolished, which would save £24 a year. Finally, we can turn the Resht Consulate into a Vice-Consulate, thereby saving £300 a year. A Consul at Resht is not necessary. He gets no information of Russian movements outside Persia, and he has no British trade to look after. A Vice-Consul could do all that is required. The money now spent at Kerman would be saved if a permanent Consulate were established there. I may perhaps be excused for suggesting that we might possibly employ to better advantage some of the money spent at Meshed. No doubt it is an important centre, politically and commercially, and the Government of India, who find the money, may not care to divert any portion of it to other posts in Persia. But after all a large portion of our trade in Persia is British Indian trade, and the maintenance of Persia as a political entity is largely, if not mainly, desirable on account of our Indian Empire. It certainly seems to me that some portion of the £8,600 spent at Meshed, and possibly some portion of the £7,700 spent at Bushire, might be better employed elsewhere. At all events something could be spared for Seistan. However, there is room for difference of opinion on this point, and I can only suggest a saving of £1,474 on Resht, Mohammerah, Kerman, Kermanshah and Shiraz. The saving at Shiraz could hardly take effect immediately, as we should have to give the Nawab some pension. We might, however, add to our savings the Karun subsidy of £2,000 a year. In all probability Messrs. Lynch would not receive this proposal with favour, but I do not think they would abandon the Karun, where they are now firmly established. Half of the sum would go to Her Majesty's Government, and half to the Government of India. The prospective payments and savings of the two Governments might perhaps be arranged as follows:—

Payments.	*England.* £	*India.* £
Seistan...	...	800
Kerman	400	400
Bunder Abbas	...	500
Karun	400	400
Kermanshah	500	...
Urumia	500	...
Bampur	...	500
Bahrein	...	500
Ispahan and Tabriz ...	700	...
Total ...	2,500	3,100

Savings.	*England.* £.	*India.* £.
Karun subsidy	1,000	1,000
Shiraz	...	160
Kerman	250	250
Kermanshah	...	24
Mohammerah	490	...
Resht	300	...
Total ...	2,040	1,434

The total cost to Her Majesty's Government, therefore, would be £460 a year, and to the Government of India £1,666 a year.*

* If we find it necessary to keep native Agents on the Karun and between Seistan and Meshed, then the totals would be slightly increased.

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

To aid the work of our Consular officers and traders, we want better roads within our zone. I suggested in 1895 that an officer might be useful in Shuster to aid in the opening of the roads in the Lur and Bakhtiari country, and we have kept these objects steadily in view. The road through the Bakhtiari country from Ahwaz to Ispahan is now making progress. I hope to march over it a few weeks hence. After doing so I hope to return through the Lur country, and if possible to open the road from Dizful to the north. It is very desirable that our Karun trade should have an outlet northwards, and that the Sultanabad and Kurdistan carpets, and the Hamadan and Kermanshah exports, should be able to get by the Karun. The carpets now go largely by Resht and Russia. In other directions we may be able to get roads made or improved as time goes on. The newly-appointed Governor of Shiraz, who seems very friendly, has promised me that he will do his utmost for the Shiraz-Bushire road, and he may possibly do something. An attempt is now being made to establish cart traffic between Sultanabad and Tehran, and the Imperial Bank of Persia have obtained the concession for a road from Kum to Ispahan. The advantage of this latter road to our trade is, however, doubtful. What we want above all is good roads from the point where our ships unload to the limits of our zone.

This leads me to a point, which I think we should consider seriously. Since I have been in Persia I have tried to estimate the possibilities of a successful railway on various lines of country, but I have so far failed to discover a likely opening. It is conceivably possible, however, that careful examination by an expert might reveal a route which would prove a commercial success. I understand that the Government of India do not favour the idea of a railway from Quetta to Seistan. The Russians are at this moment anxious about an alleged concession to an English syndicate for a railway from Bunder Abbas to Shiraz. Such a line could not, I think, pay its expenses. A route might possibly be found from the Karun to Ispahan and the north. The Baghdad line seems to offer a chance. The Germans have done no work on this road, and their concession, unless secretly renewed, has in reality lapsed. I shall endeavour if the chance occurs to me to get some hold on this road, without incurring any embarrassing obligations. It seems to me that it might possibly be worth while to send from India an officer accustomed to the work of frontier lines to look over the several routes and make suggestions. His journeys might, of course, excite the suspicion of the Russians, but I do not know that this would do much harm. In the meantime I presume that Her Majesty's Government would prefer that the Persian agreement with Russia prohibiting railway construction should not be renewed. It expires this year. I am not at all sure that the Russians wish to renew it, for it seems easier for them to build paying railways than for any one else, but I should be glad to know the views of Her Majesty's Government. I was consulted about the matter once—see my despatch No. 61 of the 12th of April 1898, and the late Sadr-i-Azam then assured me that the Shah was very much opposed to the renewal of the agreement.

There is one more agency which we ought to employ to strengthen our Consular staff. I have already explained the position of the Telegraph Department in Persia and on the Persian Gulf. I am using it now to some extent as a means of obtaining intelligence, and it has at times been very useful in this way; but it should be made useful in other ways as well. Wherever we have a Consul or Vice-Consul as at Kermanshah, Ahwaz or Kerman, we ought to have an efficient telegraph line. The line in these places is thoroughly inefficient, and in Seistan there is no line at all. We can do something by pressing the Persian Government to repair and restore, and at times by lending efficient signallers, and by deputing officers to inspect and advise. These things must be done with tact; but so far the Persian Government seem to have entertained no jealousy of our Telegraph Department, which, on the contrary, has always been regarded with favour. It is difficult to make exact proposals with reference to this point, because circumstances vary so much in different

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cases; but speaking generally it seems desirable to spend some trouble and money, if necessary, in getting the Persian telegraph system into our hands as much as possible. We should try to construct the proposed land line from Kuhsan to the Kalat frontier, and should connect it or get the Persian Government to connect it through Seistan with Meshed. Eventually it should also be connected with the coast. I think we ought also to pay our Director better than we do. He ranks here next to the Minister, and he cannot maintain his position on a salary of £950 a year. The Manager of the Imperial Bank gets more than three times this sum. It is important that the Director should be on good terms with the Persian Ministers and notables, and be able to entertain them to some extent, and he should also be able to move about the country decently equipped. I will go into this matter separately and in detail, if Her Majesty's Government or the Government of India are prepared to accept the principle that the Telegraph Department should be regarded in some sense as a political organisation, and that some expense may legitimately be incurred to make it more efficient in that respect. I have now stated the main proposal which I have to make for improving our position in Persia. It is briefly that we should increase the numbers and efficiency of our Consular staff by the addition of certain Consulates and Vice-Consulates, and by improving the position of our representatives in Tabriz and Ispahan; that we should open out roads in the Karun district and elsewhere, and possibly prospect for a railway; and that we should organise the Telegraph Department for political purposes.

But, as I said before, this despatch should be regarded as supplementary to my memorandum of 1895, which went fully into the question of our position in Persia. I would again request that reference may be made to that memorandum, and that the proposals therein made may be considered. There are one or two to which I should like to refer again. In the penultimate paragraph I wrote :—"The Persian Government should be made to understand that they must not trifle with us in the future, as they have occasionally done in the past, but we should try to gain their good-will and help them in any way we can." In a former paragraph I had explained how the Persians relying on our forbearance were inclined at times to treat us with disregard, and I suggested that we should take certain measures to correct their attitude in this respect. I recommended that, on the other hand, a loan should be granted to Persia upon easy terms. I think we should adhere to the principle of these recommendations. As present the Persians think we have lost interest in things Persian; that we will do nothing for them, and that we will not take the trouble to resent anything they do against us. I should like to disabuse their minds of both of these ideas.

I may perhaps with advantage give one or two instances of what I mean. I noticed in my memorandum of 1895 the case of the island of Siri, which the Persians occupied some years ago, and have since retained in spite of our protest. I noticed also the case of the Perso-Baluch border, where the Persians were constantly encroaching: and I explained the necessity for exercising some check upon the selection of Governors in the south of Persia. In these two latter cases we have succeeded in changing the attitude of the Persian Government. The border has been delimited, and in a recent instance an obnoxious Governor was recalled from Bushire on our demand. This has done much good. But cases still occur in which our interests and our representations are treated with small respect. For example, the Persian Government, during my absence on leave, asked the Military Attaché in this Legation, to arbitrate in an important dispute between our native Agent in Kermanshah and some Persian subjects. The Persian Foreign Minister undertook in writing to execute the award whatever it might be. The award was given in December of 1897, and in spite of continuous pressure from the Legation execution has been evaded up till now, every sort of frivolous pretext being advanced to put us off. In another arbitration case, which occurred during my absence on leave, Mr. Hardinge agreed to abide by the award of the Prime Minister. The award provided for the transfer of certain mines from the

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

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possession of a British protected subject, and the payment to him of certain sums of money which he had given as presents to the Foreign Minister and other high officials. The mines were at once transferred, but the money has never been paid. Again the Imperial Bank of Persia has by its concession the exclusive right of issuing bank notes, yet bank notes have for years been issued in large numbers by certain Persian associations, and though many representations have been made on the subject, the practice continues unchecked. I have just heard that several thousand notes have been printed in England, on behalf of one of these associations, and that they are now on their way to Bushire. I shall submit these cases separately for orders, and in the meantime I do not ask for any general ruling or assurance on the part of Her Majesty's Government with regard to our future treatment of such matters, but I have thought it desirable to bring the point to notice, in order that the attitude of the Persian Government towards us may be clearly understood.

On the other hand, if the Persians are again anxious for a loan, and if they can satisfy us that the money will be properly spent, and not "eaten" by the chief officials, I would secure them a loan on easy conditions, relying for the payment of instalments, not on material guarantees of the usual type, such as would satisfy the Stock Exchange, but on the great power we have of putting pressure upon the Persian Government.

To insist upon material guarantees of the usual type is, I fear, to defeat our object. In the despatch No. 135 from the Government of India of the 11th of August 1898, the following passages occur:—

"The recent arrangement whereby receivers of the Imperial Bank of Persia were to encash all customs duties at Bushire and Kermanshah, and to have also the right to see that the duties are duly levied, appears likely, if established to prove an important step towards developing the natural resources of Persia, and increasing British influence."

"We have recently heard of the resignation of the Amin-ed-Dowleh, on whom the title of Sadr-i-Azam was conferred as lately as last December, and from whom and from his colleagues so much was apparently hoped for in the direction of reforms. We are as yet without precise information as to the significance or cause of the Sadr-i-Azam's resignation."

The fact is that the cause of the late Sadr-i-Azam's resignation, or rather removal, was precisely the arrangement for the control of the customs duties. Unable to find any money for the daily expenses of the Shah and the conduct of the administration, and feeling that his retention in power depended upon his doing so, the unfortunate Sadr-i-Azam very reluctantly accepted the offer of a small loan from the Imperial Bank, and put their receivers in charge of the customs. The measure was intensely unpopular among the Persian merchants, who had to pay their customs dues, and among the officials at headquarters, who resented the interference of the Feringi. The Sadr-i-Azam was loudly denounced for having "sold Bushire to the English", and in a few weeks he was dismissed from office. He is now living in seclusion at Tehran, never leaving his house, and his lifelong rival, the Amin-es-Sultan, who is opposed to all reform and was strongly supported by the Russians, has been appointed Sadr-i-Azam in his place. In my memorandum of 1895 I explained the great difficulty of effecting any reforms, notably in the customs system, and I added:—

"By pressing for them inconsiderately, we run the risk, not only of failure, but of making ourselves disliked by the Shah and Sadr-i-Azam and other influential persons, and of driving them into the arms of Russia."

These words are just as true now as they were in 1895, and I would earnestly recommend that we should act with great caution in these matters. If we contemplate at any time helping the Persians to a loan, we should avoid insisting upon the immediate control of the Customs Houses. A clause providing that control will be given if the instalments on the loan are not paid, is, I think, the utmost that we require. The Customs Houses at Bushire,

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Lingah and Bunder Abbas, through which passes yearly over three millions of trade, lie under the guns of our ships, and we could at any time put a boat's crew and a Bank Agent in possession of each, even if we had no agreement at all. In my opinion therefore we can guarantee a loan, and thus let Persia have money at very low interests, and put her under a real obligation without any appreciable risk. I hope that this view of the case will be considered by Her Majesty's Government, and that we shall, in the case of another loan being contemplated, rely on our power rather than on material guarantees.

I doubt whether that power is fully recognised by ourselves. The Persians have no doubt of it. They see that our frontier, that is the frontier of Kalat and sea, not to speak of Afghanistan, marches with theirs for something like fifteen hundred miles. They know very well that the Russians cannot help them in the south and south-east: and that in the Gulf provinces such show of authority as they still exercise depends upon our forbearance, if not upon our support. For example, the port of Lingah is now in possession of a revolted Arab Sheikh, whom the Persians have recognised as Governor. They have no power to coerce him, and begged me to send a gun-boat to do so. He would most gladly hoist our flag to-morrow. On the Karun also the Arabs are in possession, and ready at a word from us to throw off the semblance of Persian supremacy. The Gulf ports—Mohammerah, Bushire, Lingah, Bunder Abbas—are at the mercy of our ships. So great is the respect of the Persians for our power that even in the extreme north of our zone, among the fanatical townbred population of Ispahan, any demonstration on our part has immediate effect. Two or three years ago there was trouble in Ispahan, and the Mullas were stirring up mischief against the Europeans. It happened that at this moment a British squadron was sent into Turkish waters, and news of the movement was brought to Persia by the public telegrams. The Missionary Bishop at Ispahan wrote to inform me that the hostile demonstrations against the Europeans had ceased at once, and that the attitude of the Mullas had completely changed. He said that the change was caused by the news about our fleet, which was apparently interpreted as an indication that the English were getting angry. Almost equal sensitiveness was shown last year when the news of the battle of Omdurman became known. It spread like wildfire all over the country, and was the common subject of conversation not only at the capital, but in remote villages of Persian-Baluchistan, where the markedly respectful attitude of the people attracted the notice of our officers. I mention these facts to show that we are greatly feared in Persia, and that consequently we can with ease make our wishes respected. The reason why the Persians often disregard them is what I have mentioned before, that they think our forbearance is practically unlimited. But whenever they see that we are in earnest, and that Her Majesty's Government is interested in a case, the Shah and his Ministers speedily become convinced of the necessity for meeting our wishes. I would ask Her Majesty's Government to believe that we have still great power and reputation in Persia.

Having such power we can afford both to be decided in insisting upon our legitimate interests, and to be sympathetic and easy in our terms if the Persians ask us for help, pecuniary or other.

We can also do something to check Russian encroachments. In my memorandum of 1895 I suggested our letting it be understood that aggressive action by Russia in the north of Persia would immediately result in decided action by us in the south. I still think that this is our proper policy. I do not mean that we should bully or unduly threaten the Persian Government, but I would let them understand that we cannot regard without concern any such action as, for example, the pushing down of the Russian sanitary wedge towards Seistan, and that we shall, if these things happen, ask for compensations which the Persian Government may dislike. It is easy to do this, and it may help the Persian Government to resist demands which otherwise they would find it difficult to avoid accepting. I think they should realise that any serious concession made in the north is likely to involve an equivalent concession in the south. Hitherto they have realised only the converse of the proposition.

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

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I fully recognise that it may be embarrassing for us to commit ourselves beforehand to any particular method of action, but the principle should be understood. If Her Majesty's Government do not give me orders to the contrary, this is the line I propose to take in the future.

Similarly, to turn to another clause of my recommendations of 1895, if Her Majesty's Government do not give me orders to the contrary, I propose in the event of the Shah's death to recognise provisionally the succession of the Valiahd as I did three years ago.

I may now perhaps usefully recapitulate what I have written regarding the state of Persia in 1899, and the steps which should be taken to improve our position in the country.

The internal condition of Persia is exceedingly bad, worse in some respects than in 1895. The finances are in greater disorder, the troops and civil establishments are unpaid, food is dear, the Shah is a weak ruler who maintains no discipline, and his Prime Minister has no powers, so that there is practically no Government. The Russians have shown considerable activity in the northern provinces, pushing on roads, and energetically encouraging their trade, and making use of their missionaries among the Christian populations. They have put "sanitary" posts along the Afghan border, and have tried to establish their trade and influence in Seistan. They have also established a Consulate at Ispahan.

Nevertheless the internal condition of Persia is by no means hopeless, her debt being practically nothing, and her resources considerable. And although Rusia has been active in some respects, we still hold a strong position. Our trade and our influence are completely dominant up to the Khanikin-Seistan line; and though our trade has suffered in the north, it is still alive. Our bank does business all over Persia, and is the only bank that can legally issue notes. Our Telegraph Department controls a large part of the Persian telegraph system. Our political influence is still great, even in the north, and our power is much feared. Still it cannot be denied that our position is threatened.

To maintain and improve it we should increase by five or six the number of our English Consular officers, and should encourage them all to travel and know their districts. We should also improve the condition of our Consulates at Tabriz and Ispahan. We should try to open out new trade routes, and to make those which exist a little better than they are. Possibly we might prospect for a railway. We should also make more use of our Telegraph Department, trying to get into our hands as much of the Persian telegraph system as possible, and to have all our Consular posts in effective communication with Tehran. We should insist upon our interests being specially considered within our zone, that is up to the Khanikin-Seistan line. Amongst other things we should exercise some unofficial control over the appointment and dismissal of the Persian Governors. We should be strict in keeping the Persians to their engagements and resisting injustice; but, on the other hand, having the power to coerce Persia very easily, we should be considerate in our dealings with her if she wants help, and, under certain circumstances, we should guarantee a loan for her, refraining at the same time from taking material guarantees of an unpalatable description, or forcing upon her reforms for which she is not prepared. We should decide now to recognise the Shah's eldest son if the Shah dies. Finally, we should let it be clearly understood that encroachment by Russia in the north will entail concessions to us in the south.

In conclusion, I think it will be as well to notice two objections which may be brought against these proposals. The first is that, if we already have in Persia a larger Consular staff than the Russians, as the sketch map shows, there seems to be no necessity for our increasing it. There is force in this objection, but the fact remains that the Russians are pushing our trade out of Northern Persia, and that they have begun to touch the northern fringe of our zone.

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The second objection which may be urged is that our action would be resented by the Russians and will lead to countermoves on their part. I fully recognise the force of this objection. No one can have realised more clearly than I have done the inexpediency of provoking Russia by an appearance of overactivity. I have repeatedly impressed this view upon our officers in Persia, and my memorandum of 1895 and later despatches, notably of August 14th, 1896, show how constantly the idea has been present in my mind. Nothing can be more foolish than fussy demonstrations, or attempts to gain small successes at the expense of the Russians; and except when active measures are necessary for the maintenance of our material interests, I would never advocate them. I have throughout recognised that our proper course in this country is to stand on the defensive and to avoid striking at the Russians, or performing any risky evolutions which might tempt them to fall upon us. But at the same time it seems to me that there must be limits to our caution in these respects, and that, if we are to maintain our position in Persia, we must be prepared to face a certain amount of displeasure on the part of the Russians. As I have shown in this despatch they do not remain inactive because we do so. Our abstention, at the instance of the Government of India, from interference in Seistan, has not prevented them from pushing down to the Afghan frontier and trying to strangle our Indian trade, or from endeavouring with some success to establish their trade and influence in Seistan itself. Our studious friendliness in Tehran, though pleasantly reciprocated, does not prevent them from doing all they can to injure our Bank, the Russian "Banque des Prêts" getting up runs upon it, and even the Russian Legation refusing its notes. Nor has our friendly attitude prevented them from establishing a Consulate in Ispahan, or pushing on the construction of the Resht road. Whether we remain quiet or not the Russians, very properly, go on working for their own hand, and unless we make an effort sooner or later we shall find ourselves being quietly elbowed out of one position after another. If we do not make the effort now, we certainly may provoke them to increased activity, but it may have a contrary effect, and in any case I believe that, if we keep strictly within our rights, and make no unnecessary demonstrations, we have no need to be afraid of what they can do. They ought not to be able to meet us on equal terms in our zone. Every Persian believes that sooner or later the country will be divided between England and Russia, and the Southerner, from the Zil-es-Sultan downwards, looks to coming under the rule of England. In a loosely knit country like Persia, the weak central Government cannot easily override local influence. In this respect it is fortunate for us that the Persians have fixed their capital so far north as Tehran. Even in Tehran, moreover, the influence of the Russians has its limits. Their geographical position makes them a threatening power in the north, and as most of the Government officials at Tehran are Northerners, with property and interests in the north, the influence of the Russians in Tehran is no noubt considerable. The northern official thinks it wise to keep on good terms with his future masters. But it must be remembered that the Persian lives from day to day, and thinks the country will probably last his time, and being inordinately conceited, not to say arrogant, the Persians are far from liking the Russians, whose overbearing ways they find it hard to endure. Altogether the Russians are not omnipotent in Tehran; on the contrary, although the Persian Government is very much afraid of them, it still opposes to them a steady passive resistance about which they complain very bitterly. The Shah and his advisers, who believe that we shall take the south, only if Russia takes the north, will go as far as they dare in helping us to resist Russian encroachment, and if we show that we are in earnest, I think they will go a long way. It must not be thought that they are entirely under Russian domination. They are not. Therefore in my opinion we should make up our minds that the time has now come for us to lay down a definite line of policy in Persia, and that for the future we must adhere to it, without too much regard for any displeasure which we may thereby cause to the Russians.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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‘Seistan Persia & Seistan’ [edge] (308/617)



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Sir H.M.Durand presents his compliments to the Secretary to the Foreign Department of the Government of India and with reference to his despatch NO:6 of February the I6th, I899 and telegram to the Viceroy of February the 20th, has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum on the situation in Persia drawn up in December I895.

Septr?

Tehran,

February 24th, I899.

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

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CONFIDENTIAL.

(6704.)

Memorandum by Sir M. Durand on the Situation in Persia.

AS I have now been nearly a year in Persia, it may be desirable that I should submit for orders my opinion upon the existing condition of affairs, and upon the steps which should be taken to improve our position in the country.

Review of internal condition.

2. Some time ago I asked Lieutenant-Colonel Picot, Military Attaché in this Legation, who has acquired a considerable knowledge of Persia, to make a careful inquiry into the state of the administration, and to let me have all the information he could collect on a variety of points. I append to this Memorandum some interesting papers drawn up by him. Colonel Picot's facts are, I believe, substantially correct, and though I see no prospect of the introduction of the drastic measures of reform which he recommends, his suggestions are of much value. I have also appended to this Memorandum a statement by Nawab Hasan Ali Khan, Oriental Secretary, showing the revenues of Persia, and a note on the antecedents and character of the Sadr-i-Azam, or Prime Minister. These papers, and the Reports of my predecessors, afford so much information regarding the internal condition of Persia, and the state of her foreign relations, that it will be unnecessary for me to enter upon a detailed examination of the circumstances which I find surrounding me. It will be enough for any proposals I may have to make if I set out the leading facts.

Finances.

3. There is no doubt that judged by European standards, the internal condition of Persia is very unsatisfactory.

The Governorships of provinces and other high posts are systematically sold by the Shah to the highest bidder, and sold for short periods, so that the country is plundered and the administration disorganized. The Central Government is weak, and is defied not only by the provincial authorities, but by the Mullas, or priesthood, whose power has become greater than it should be. The finances are in disorder, and during the last three years there has been an annual deficit of about 50,000*l*. Heavy arrears of pay are due to the troops and the civil establishments.

Army.

The army is a worthless rabble, without serviceable arms or drill, or the semblance of discipline. There are no trustworthy Courts of Justice; there are practically no roads, so that the expansion of trade is greatly hampered; finally, the country is being flooded with copper money, which is causing much loss and suffering to the poorer classes, and is giving rise to bread riots.

Depreciation of currency.

Among the principal causes of this state of affairs are the greed and timidity of the Shah. It is his want of firmness and courage that has led to the regrettable increase in the power of the priesthood, for whom the Persians have little love, and his perpetual

Greed and timidity of Shah.

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The Shah's sons.

demands for money can only be met by starving the public Departments.* But the Shah is not the only one in fault. The Heir-Apparent is a man of weak character, and allows his northern Province of Azerbaijan to be dangerously misruled. The Zil-es-Sultan is allowing disorder to spread in the south, if he is not joining with the Mullas to excite it. The Shah's third and favourite son, the Naib-us-Sultaneh, who holds the office of Commander-in-chief, enriches himself at the expense of the troops, whom he neglects and robs. The Sadr-i-Azam has gradually drawn into his own hands almost the whole work of the Government offices, which he is unable to discharge. Though clever and bold in his management of the Shah, and in fighting his numerous enemies, he has shown little administrative capacity or power of organization. He trusts no one, and tries to do everything himself, with the result that the various public Departments have practically ceased to exist, while he himself is completely overdriven, and the business of the Administration is carried on in the most unmethodical and slipshod manner.† Moreover, the centralization of powers in the hands of the Sadr-i-Azam has led to another evil. Having everything in his own control, he draws from various sources an income generally estimated at something between 70,000*l.* and 100,000*l.* a-year; and the removal of any administrative abuse would almost inevitably deprive him of a portion of this sum. The Sadr-i-Azam declares that the profits of his various offices go to his relatives and subordinates, not to himself; but this, if true, seems to make little practical difference. I am afraid the Sadr-i-Azam can only be regarded as himself a serious obstacle to all reform. Finally, it must be pointed out that the failings of the men now in power are not solely responsible for the present state of the country. The Administration is, and has been for generations, corrupt right through. The first idea of every Persian official is illicit gain. No doubt the proceedings of the Shah and others who ought to set an example tend to increase the prevailing corruption, but they have not created it. Its roots lie deep in the national character. Of all the Asiatics with whom I have had to deal, the Persians appear to me to be the most shameless liars and thieves.‡ And there is no patriotism upon which one can work. Patriotism is replaced here by national conceit, which makes the Persians look down with contempt upon all other countries, but will not make them sacrifice the smallest personal interest for the good of their own.

The Sadr-i-Azam. His centralization of functions.

Consequent evils.

Revenues derived from various offices, and consequent interest in existing conditions.

Evils partly caused by character of nation.

Altogether it cannot be denied that the internal condition of Persia is far from promising.

Relations with foreign Powers.

4. The outlook with regard to her relations with foreign Powers is, from our point of view, not much more satisfactory. Though so feeble as to be at the mercy of almost any assailant, Persia is inclined to adopt towards all Powers but one an aggressive and peremptory tone. She encroaches steadily on the frontiers of Kelat, Afghanistan, and Turkey, and her reliance on the good nature of England is so complete that she frequently permits herself to treat our representations with neglect, and even at times with a careless levity amounting to contempt.

Persia's tendencies to encroach.

Neglect of British representations.

Her fear of Russia.

Towards Russia, on the other hand, her attitude is one of respect and fear.

* The Shah's methods of collecting money from private individuals are numerous, and at times amusing. Before we left Tehran last May I used to meet him driving about on a round of visits. Every Notable whom he honoured in this way had to produce a "pishkesh" of from 50*l.* to 200*l.* If His Majesty makes a good shot at a moufflon, as he often does, those about him at once subscribe a purse of gold pieces as a token of their admiration. He is fond of playing chess in the afternoon for two or three gold pieces a game. His opponent always loses, and His Majesty pockets the gold. It is said that not long ago he was caught in a snowstorm when out shooting. He found shelter in a hut on the hill-side, and before leaving it he asked what "pishkesh" the owner meant to offer for the honour done to him. Eventually the man produced six Russian imperials (something under 5*l.*), which the Shah carried off.—H. M. D.

† The Sadr-i-Azam's office is a black leather hand-bag, into which he thrusts his letters and telegrams as he receives them. Every one addresses him direct on every conceivable subject, so the bag is always bulging with papers; and at any spare moment he takes out a few and passes orders on them. Once a paper leaves this bag it is forgotten, and very likely lost, for the two officials who act as his Secretaries are incompetent to a degree that cannot be described. Yet they practically transact all the important correspondence of the Persian Government.—H. M. D.

‡ The Sadr-i-Azam tells me he has lately found out that the Minister of Posts, son of the President of the Council, personally steals from the post-office parcels which he believes to be valuable. The Sadr-i-Azam can do nothing, because the President of the Council only laughs at his son's proceedings, and is too strong to be attacked. As to untruthfulness, I have hardly ever spoken to one Persian statesman about another without being warned that I must never believe a word the other says.—H. M. D.

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She feels the pressure of Russia along her northern border from the Caucasus to Meshed, and she regards as almost certain the eventual absorption of Northern Persia in the dominions of the Tsar. As almost all the leading men at the head-quarters of the Government are northerners, and as the capital itself is in the north, this has a very marked effect upon the policy. The Shah and his Government seem to be constantly haunted and oppressed by the sense of their proximity to Russia. There can, in fact, be no doubt that in Tehran the influence of Russia is predominant, and I am afraid there can be no doubt that it is antagonistic to our own. I may add that, according to general belief, the influence of Russia is steadily exerted to thwart any measure of reform or progress in Persia—to prevent anything which could tend to strengthen and solidify the country, and arrest its downward course.

Hostility of Russia to reform.

5. This is one aspect of the case, and it must be admitted that, both with regard to the internal condition of Persia and with regard to her foreign relations, we have some ground for disquieting thought. The Sadr-i-Azam, when in one of his dismal moods, is fond of saying that all is hopeless—that there is not a gleam of light anywhere. But there is something to be said on the other side, and I will state briefly what seem to me to be the more hopeful features of the case.

Despondency of Sadr-i-Azam.

6. In the first place, with regard to the internal condition of the country, it seems to me that the prevailing disorganization is not in itself of a desperate nature. It is true that things are out of order, from the European point of view, but I doubt whether they are much more out of order than they ordinarily are in an Asiatic State. In some ways there has been a considerable advance in Persia during the last twenty years. For example, trade has increased, and a more or less regular system of posts and telegraphs has been established. Judged by an Asiatic standard, Persia is, in fact, not very far gone. I have seen native States in India in a worse condition, and have seen them rapidly recover prosperity when taken in hand by the Indian Government. Though the finances are in disorder, Persia has great natural resources, and practically no debt. That is the foundation of everything, and a capable official, with some power of organization, could, in a few years, if given a free hand and supported by the Shah, make Persia a very flourishing country. The people, with all their falseness, are intelligent and docile. They are obedient to their Shah, whom they regard as the first monarch in the world, and their lazy good temper, and want of fanaticism, make them easy to manage. Even the recurring deficits are not so serious a matter in Persia as they would be elsewhere. Every one is accustomed to irregularity in the payment of salaries, and the salary of a Persian forms a comparatively unimportant part of his income. Salary or no salary, he makes his living somehow—the soldier chiefly by money-lending, and the civil official by extortion of various kinds. A considerable part of the deficit, too, is caused by the existence of an excessive pension list; and when the Treasury is short of money the pensions are not paid—which is rather an advantage than otherwise.* Altogether, though the condition of Persia is certainly more or less dangerous, it is not, in my opinion, really desperate—not such that one need look for an immediate or very speedy dissolution from internal causes. If the Persians were left to themselves they would probably get along well enough in their own slovenly way for generations to come, and a very moderate measure of reform would make the country as prosperous as it ever need be.

Disorganization not of a desperate nature.

7. Again, though Russian influence is the strongest foreign influence in Tehran, and though it is generally believed that Russia is cynically working for the ruin of the country,† yet it is very evident that the influence of Russia is by no means exclusive or unlimited. It may be stated with tolerable accuracy that no other European Continental nation carries any weight at all in Persia, but England undoubtedly carries great weight.

Limits to Russian influence.

Having regard to the geographical position of Russia, it seems to me strange that we should be as strong as we are. In spite of the indifference we

British influence.

* It is said that for less than one year's payment made to himself the Shah will often continue a lapsed pension for another life. He gets the ready money, and the Treasury is responsible for the pension. 150*l.* paid to the Shah a few weeks ago secured a life pension of 200*l.* a-year.—H. M. D.

† I have seen no proof of this.—H. M. D.

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

have shown at times, our connection with Persia has sufficed to prevent for many years any material encroachment on Persian territory, or any sensible curtailing of Persian independence, and thinking Persians know this well. Much as the Russians long for the cool mountain breezes and fertile plains of Khorassan, they have had to lay their line of advance in Asia through a sandy desert. Practically, the Persian frontier is where it was nearly seventy years ago. It must, I think, be admitted that this is mainly due to the respect of the Russians for the power of England, and the fact is recognized here. No doubt we have lost some opportunities, and might be stronger in Tehran than we are, but the Persian Government still looks to us for support against Russian dictation, and Russia still hesitates to take any step with regard to this country which would be likely to give us serious umbrage. I do not think, therefore, that we need be altogether dissatisfied with the state of our influence in Persia, or that we need apprehend at present any important move by the Russians against her.

Improbability of important move on the part of the Russians, owing to weakness of Russia in Central Central Asia.

This may be a mistaken view, and the death of the present Shah may be the signal, as many predict, for Russia to step forward and declare a Protectorate or annex a province. But I see no reason to believe that she has such an intention. At present Russia seems to me to be very sensible of her weakness in Asia. Her frontier officers are boastful and aggressive in their attitude, but nevertheless she shows much nervousness about her Central Asian possessions, and I think it is only natural that she should do so. She sees herself in Asia with small and scattered forces, far from thir base, possessed of very faulty communications, and surrounded by a population of doubtful temper. She sees us with superior numbers, backed by arsenals and abundant supplies, and able to draw on a fighting population numbering tens of millions, which we seem to be able to trust as she cannot trust her Turkomans and Uzbegs. Political developments in Europe, the effect of which we cannot calculate here, may of course make Russia decide at any time to go to war with us; but, judging merely from her attitude in Asia for some years past, I cannot but believe that she fears us, in Asia, quite as much as we fear her, and more than we ought to fear her. Even from Persia, where we have not a regiment, we could now, by a little judicious manœuvring on the Turkoman frontier, arouse excitement and alarm from the Caspian to Merv. Hereafter, if, for example, a great war should clear the air in Europe, and set Russia free, as she was set free by the Crimean War and the Turkish War, to devote herself to the East, and consolidate her recent advances, she may be willing to provoke us in Asia. At present she does not seem to have any wish to do so; and, if this view is correct, there is no reason to anticipate any serious attempt on her part to disturb the existing situation in this country for some time to come.

8. Supposing that the state of affairs is approximately as I have described it, the general conclusion would be that the internal condition of Persia is unsatisfactory, and to some degree dangerous, and that she is too much under the influence of Russia; but that there is no cause for immediate alarm on either account, as the country may hold together for a long time if left to itself, and Russia does not seem to be inclined at present to enter upon any course of action which would bring her into serious conflict with us.

Alternative policies.

9. The question then arises what steps should be taken to maintain and improve our position in Persia, and to guard against future eventualities. I will not stop to discuss the preliminary question whether any steps should be taken at all. It may possibly be argued that things seem to be going fairly well as it is, and that practically we want nothing more in Persia than we have got, but such an argument would be quite untenable.

Our position in Persia as a check upon Russian expansion is not an altogether bad one, but it is not as good as it has been; and unless we are vigilant and careful to make use of our opportunities, it may easily become worse. It may become rapidly and seriously worse if Persia should fall into bankruptcy and disorder, and thereby afford to Russia legitimate or plausible ground for interference. Moreover, we have to think of Persia as a market for our trade. It is evident that from that point of view the existing situation leaves much to be desired.

Possibility of a friendly understanding with Russia.

10. The first course which suggests itself is the radical change of policy which at one time found an advocate in Sir Henry Drummond Wolff. If Russia is not prepared to make any serious encroachment upon Persia, it occurs

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to one as possible that we might come to a friendly understanding with her, and that we might enter with her upon joint action for the reorganization and development of this country. Such a scheme is very attractive. At present the Persian Government plays off Russia and England against each other, with the result that neither can do much, and that Persia remains misruled and undeveloped. If once England and Russia fairly came together, we might divide Asia between us, and we could do anything we liked in Persia without the the smallest difficulty. A joint demand for the necessary reforms would be irresistible, and there would probably be no attempt at resisting it. A guaranteed loan, sufficient to permit of the reorganization of the finances and the construction of certain public works could be easily raised, and we could then proceed to open out the country by land and water communications, to extend the area of cultivation, to increase the revenue, and to create a considerable trade. The country has so many natural advantages, and is in many ways so well off even now, that much detailed interference with the administration would not be required. A little steady pressure on certain main lines by the English and Russian Legations acting together would make Persia in a very few years a solvent, flourishing country, and in course of time it should become a comparatively rich one.* Both England and Russia would gain largely from a commercial point of view; but the question is whether Russia would ever fall in with such a scheme, and whether, if so, we could hope to carry it out without disagreement and ultimate trouble. This seems to me unlikely. It is possible that the proposal, if made by us, might be accepted by Russia, especially if it formed part of a larger scheme for the general settlement of our relations in Asia. It may also be argued that if, when asked, Russia refused to join us in saving Persia from misrule and possible ruin, and developing a trade lucrative to herself, we should at least have made her show her hand. Nethertheless, I am inclined to think that it is very doubtful whether the experiment should be tried. My belief is that Russia would evade our proposal, and would make capital out of it at our expense by denouncing us to the Shah and his officials, who are all interested in maintaining the present state of things. If Russia did join, she would sooner or later play us false, and leave us to press alone unpalatable reforms which she would secretly oppose. Our ways are not her ways, and in the end we should probably be sorry we ever tried to work with her. She might perhaps agree to divide Persia with us, but I do not believe she would seriously help us in trying to regenerate Persia.

Joint demand for reforms.

Russia would be unlikely to support serious reforms.

Danger of entering on joint policy.

It must be remembered, too, that the coercion of Persia by Russia and England in the manner indicated would tend to destroy in her all spirit of independence, and would accustom her to be treated as a subordinate State. That might be rather a dangerous lesson for us to teach her.

Altogether, attractive as the scheme is at first sight, I do not think it holds out a good prospect of success. That, however, is a matter of opinion, and it might be worth while to sound the Russian Government as to the principle of the proposal.

11. I have not tried to ascertain the views of the Russian Legation on this subject. The Russian Minister, M. de Bützow, is a most agreeable man, but he is very reserved and cautious. He would not, I feel sure, commit himself to an opinion, and it would not probably be desirable for me to sound him unless authorized to do so. I have given him more than one opportunity of discussing Persian affairs in a friendly spirit, but he seems to be afraid of speaking to me on the subject.

Reticence of Russian Minister with regard to Russian policy.

12. If we are not to try the experiment of coming to an understanding with Russia for the regeneration of Persia, it remains to be considered what we can do independently of her. At the outset of this inquiry we may, I suppose, put aside all idea of ousting or overcoming her influence, and of gaining an exclusive or predominant influence ourselves. It is true that Islam is still a living force.

British action independent of Russia.

The paragraph should not end here.

* The country about Tehran itself affords a good example of what might be done. Some little water is brought down by underground channels from the long line of mountains 6 or 7 miles away, and wherever it is used for irrigation fine trees and crops spring up; but the bulk of the water supply is allowed to run to waste. Every year, with the melting of the snows, brown torrents pour across the plain, cutting deep channels through the stony soil, and destroying the so-called roads, and making it almost impossible to take a carriage outside the rampart. A few well-built dams along the foot of the range would bring under cultivation a great stretch of fertile country now lying barren.—H. M. D.

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Possibility of forming a Mahommedan League.

If the principal Mahommedan countries which still retain their independence could be brought to see the advantage of banding themselves together for defence against the Power which threatens all alike, England with her 60,000,000 of Indian Mussulmans would be the natural head of a great League which would hold Southern Asia from the Bosphorus to the Punjab, and would command the sympathies of Mahommedans all over the world. When I was in Cabul the Ameer used to mourn over the fatal dissensions among the Mussulman Powers. But those Powers are too hostile to each other, and too selfish, ever to unite for a common end, and perhaps it is just as well. It might not be prudent in our own interests, even if it were possible, to make independent Islam too formidable.

Combination improbable.

Failing such a combination it is, though conceivably possible, in the highest degree unlikely that we shall ever have a chance of ousting Russian influence from Persia, and bringing the country under our political control. We must evidently be content for the present to aim at something less.

13. Very little, I think, can be done to improve the position through the medium of countries other than Russia. The more foreign capital is invested in Persia the better, from one point of view. Everything of the kind tends to consolidate the country and draw upon it the attention of Europe. But Persia is not in a condition to attract foreign capital, and until it does so foreign nations will not trouble themselves about it. I have found the German, Austrian, and Belgian Legations very friendly, and have received help from them in minor matters; but for all practical purposes England and Russia are the only Powers represented in Tehran. We must depend on ourselves for anything we want to do in this country.*

Impossibility of carrying out general scheme of reform.

14. That being the case, we must, I fear, resign the hope of carrying any general scheme of reform, and making Persia a well-ruled, flourishing country. Some administrative improvements we may gradually succeed in introducing, but the task will not be an easy one, for even if Russia does not oppose us, every reform must involve damage to powerful vested interests, and there is apparently no one in Persia who has a real patriotic desire to set matters straight.

Vested interests.

For example, the sale of Governorships is the cause of untold oppression. Our great friend, the Firmán Farmá, was recently appointed to the Governorship of Kerman. For this appointment he had to pay to the Shah 10,000*l.*, to the Sadr-i-Azam 2,000*l.*, and to others smaller sums. These gifts will have to be repeated, perhaps increased, next March, if he is to keep his place for another year. He is now said to be squeezing the people very hard to recoup himself and provide the State revenue, and the same thing is going on all over the country. But it is useless for us to advocate the proper payment of officials and the abandonment of the farming system, while the Shah and the Sadr-i-Azam have both so much to gain by it. Nothing short of a joint authoritative demand by England and Russia could suffice. The Shah makes, perhaps, 100,000*l.* a-year in this way, and the Sadr-i-Azam from 10,000*l.* to 20,000*l.*

Sadr-i-Azam.

Take another example—the army. One of the first necessities in Persia is a body of trustworthy troops to support the authority of the Government. But any attempt at reform in the army touches the Shah's favourite son, who makes a large sum yearly by leaving the troops in arrears of pay, and miserably clothed, and without arms. But if we urged the regular payment of the troops, the Shah would not press his son, and the Russians, with whom he is on very friendly terms, would probably support him against our interference.

Naib-us-Sultaneh.

Again, the immoderate issue of copper coin, or "black money" as the Persians call it, is doing much harm, and may lead to serious trouble. The reason given for this unfortunate proceeding is that after paying the "pishkesh" demanded by the Shah for the farm of the Mint, which amounts to 26,000*l.* a-year, it is impossible to coin silver at a profit. This, I believe, is true, but the matter is further complicated by the discovery that the real farmer of the Mint is the Sadr-i-Azam, who, in conversation with me, denounces the iniquity of the Shah in extorting this payment and ruining the country.

Shah's "pishkesh."

Customs.

As one more instance of the difficulty of doing anything for the reform of the Administration, I would cite the case of the Customs. There is no doubt

* As one of the French Legation put it to me when I first came to Tehran: "You and the Russians play the game; the rest of us look on and mark the points."—H. M. D.

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

that the Persian Customs, properly managed, would yield far more than they do, but the Sadr-i-Azam farms them from the Shah, and gives about 200,000*l.* a-year for them. By sub-letting them himself he makes a profit of about 45,000*l.* a-year. Naturally, any real reform of the Customs system, which would result in the loss of this sum, must be a severe blow to him, though he says his brother and his subordinates intercept the money.

These examples will perhaps suffice to show how difficult it would be for us to effect any radical reforms in the Persian Administration. By pressing for them inconsiderately we run the risk, not only of failure, but of making ourselves disliked by the Shah and the Sadr-i-Azam and other influential persons, and of driving them into the arms of Russia.

15. The sphere of our possible action is therefore restricted within comparatively narrow limits. We could, no doubt, by appealing to the cupidity of the Shah, get a certain amount done. He will do almost anything for money. We might, for example, if we secured him a loan which would enable him to pay off the Régie debt, and to keep a large sum of money for himself, induce him to hand over to us the management of his Southern Customs, and to let us try reorganizing his finances. But any such scheme involves, I fear, the downfall of the Sadr-i-Azam, hitherto regarded as our one strong friend in Persia, and before he fell he would fight desperately, backed by the Russian Legation. He is not an altogether blameless Minister according to European standards, and at times he has been far from satisfactory in his dealings with us. It is possible, as some believe, that since 1892 he has secretly gone over to Russia, but he certainly was with us once, and did much to further our interests, and though not a good administrator, he is probably as good as others, while he is personally most pleasant to deal with. So long as he seems inclined to be friendly it would, I think, be a mistake to force him into opposition for the sake of introducing reforms which might after all prove impracticable. I believe it would not be very difficult to overturn him, and in some ways the Shah would be more manageable than he is; but it is better, in my opinion, to leave him in undisturbed enjoyment of the income he makes by ruling the country after Persian methods, and to confine ourselves to the objects which we may hope to attain with his co-operation.

Restriction of sphere of British action.

Loan to Persian Government for purpose of financial reorganization.

Would probably involve fall of Sadr-i-Azam.

This undesirable.

16. Being unable to put forward any general scheme for the reorganization of Persia, or to advocate pressure on our part for the institution of any radical reforms, I can only recommend that we should adhere to the line of policy which we have followed with more or less energy for many years past. Our efforts will then be mainly directed to preserving the integrity of Persia, gaining the good-will, respect, and confidence of the Persian Government and people, supporting Persia to resist intimidation, watching the proceedings of the Russians, developing our trade with Persia, and taking any opportunities which may occur for advocating measures beneficial to the country. It remains to consider what particular means we should adopt for the accomplishment of these objects.

General line to be followed.

17. As to maintaining the integrity of Persia, I have already mentioned the widespread belief that at the death of the present Shah Russia will make some serious forward move. I doubt it greatly; but I think we should admit the possibility that she may have something of the kind in contemplation, and should as far as possible guard against it. Though the Shah appears to be in excellent health, he is no longer a young man, and he tries his constitution in various ways. It would be as well to prepare beforehand for his death, so that when it comes we may know exactly what to do. Russia has more than once given an assurance that she desires to maintain the integrity of Persia, and both Russia and England have in one way or another recognized the Vali Ahd as his father's heir. I think it would be desirable to arrange with the Russians a scheme of action to be adopted by us both in case the Shah should die in the Vali Ahd's lifetime. A joint declaration by Russia and England in favour of the Vali Ahd immediately on the Shah's death would, I believe, suffice to deter the brothers, here and at Ispahan, from any attempt to seize the throne, but we should settle beforehand what we are going to do, and should show the Russians that we are not indifferent in the matter. If the British and Russian Legations received general instructions on this point they could concert details here, and submit their views for approval. The question is whether Russia and England agree to support the claim of the Vali Ahd to succeed at his father's

Integrity of Persia.

Necessity of preparation in view of Shah's death.

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death, the territories of Persia remaining undiminished and her political rights unimpared.

Russia would probably be willing to come to terms with us about this matter, as the Zil-es-Sultan is showing renewed activity, and she is still suspicious of him. At all events, it seems desirable to try her. We must not, when the Shah dies, find ourselves without a plan of action, and uncertain what Russia means to do, with the result that we shall have to follow her lead, and perhaps have to acquiesce in some very unsatisfactory proceedings on her part.

Weakness of Vali Ahd.

As to the Vali Ahd himself we are at a considerable disadvantage. He is weak and timid, and he has been brought up in a bad atmosphere, surrounded by a family clique of incompetent and untrustworthy officials, who belong to Azerbaijan, and are too much under Russian influence. Still, the Vali Ahd is not hopelessly in Russian hands. He has been to some extent strengthened of late by the Firmán Firmá, his kinsman, and our most open adherent in Persia. He has also taken into his service an English doctor, and has stuck to him in spite of all the efforts of the Russian Consulate; and some of the most important of his Azerbaijan officials have of late incurred the severe displeasure of the Russians, so that there is hope even of them. I saw something of His

His good qualities.

Royal Highness when he was here a few months ago, and I found that, though not prepossessing, he had his good qualities. He is less dishonest and less cruel than his brothers, and more open-handed than the Shah. He is also on the best of terms with the Sadr-i-Azam. If he lives to succeed he will probably make a better Shah than his father, and I see no reason why he should be more in Russian hands, unless he has already entangled himself in some secret engagement, of which I can find no indication.

Advisability of being on good terms with him.

In these circumstances, it seems to me desirable to get on good terms with the Vali Ahd, and to increase our influence over him as much as possible. He has been sore at our decorating his brother, and the Sadr-i-Azam thinks we should do well to give him the Grand Cross of the Bath. In spite of the evident objections to so doing, I should be inclined to recommend this if it were not for the recent riots at Tabriz, which are due to the misgovernment of his officials and his own weakness. This would be a bad time to decorate him, but

The establishment at Tabriz.

there are two things which I think we ought to do. The English doctor is very anxious to be made Surgeon to the Consulate-General, and to get an allowance

Should be placed on better footing.

of 150*l.* a-year for the appointment. His pay is low, and the Vali Ahd is poor, and, unless we give the allowance, I fear Dr. Adcock may be forced to leave him. This would be a great pity, for Dr. Adcock is a well-meaning man, and it is important to us to have an Englishman always at the Vali Ahd's elbow. If the Vali Ahd dies before his father, which is not unlikely, the allowance will not have cost us much. If he lives to succeed the money will have been well spent. Secondly, I think the allowances of the Consul-General at Tabriz should be increased by at least 200*l.* a-year. At present they are not sufficient to enable our Consul-General to keep up his position. The statement appended to this Memorandum will show how unfavourably they compare with those of his Russian, French, and Turkish colleagues. We ought, I think, to give our Consul-General as much as the French give their Representative. If the increase cannot be managed in any other way, I would recommend the reduction of the pay at Resht, where there is comparatively little to do. It is really important that at the head-quarters of the Heir-Apparent to the Persian Throne the official who has charge of our interests should be on a proper footing.

By the measures I have suggested we shall do something to strengthen our hold on the Vali Ahd, and to prepare for the future. Our action will be noted by the Shah's other sons, and will help to convince them, if they have any doubts, that we mean to give the Vali Ahd our support. It will have a quieting effect in Azerbaijan and throughout the country. We need not fear that we shall alienate the other sons. If the Vali Ahd should die, the next heir will turn to us the more readily for the knowledge that if we acknowledge him we shall back him actively.

I have not overlooked the possibility that the action I have recommended may alarm the Russians, and stimulate them to assert themselves more forcibly at Tabriz; but both Mr. Wood and Dr. Adcock think there is no danger of this,

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and though they may be somewhat prejudiced in the matter, their arguments appear to be sound.

I see no necessity to consider now what we should do if the Vali Ahd were to die before his father. The nomination of another heir would then lie with the Shah. I will deal with this matter separately.

I do not know that I can suggest any other measures of precaution to insure a quiet succession at the Shah's death, and to guard against any infraction of the integrity of the country, unless it be a definite and unconcealed decision on the part of Her Majesty's Government that any occupation of Persian territory by Russia in the north will be immediately followed by corresponding action on our part in the south. My belief is that the Russians would forego much to keep us out of Southern Persia, for our presence there would be a perpetual trouble to them in the north, and would also bar their way to the Gulf, which they hope eventually to reach.

Knowledge that Russian action in the north would be followed by corresponding British action in the south would probably act as a deterrent.

It is a very serious thing to advocate the establishment of a British possession or Protectorate in Persia, for it is impossible to say to what proportions this might develop, or what exertion of armed strength it might entail, and our military resources are not capable of unlimited expansion; but my impression is that even if we found it necessary to advance from the ports into the interior of the country it might possibly be desirable, from a military point of view, to have a portion of our Indian garrison—European and native—stationed in the upland districts of Persia, and forming the nucleus of a larger force raised from among the Arabs, Bakhtiaris, and other tribes. At any rate, the Russians and Persians should, I think, understand that any encroachment by Russia in the north will result in our taking such measures as we may consider necessary to make sure of the Persian Gulf ports. This should act as a deterrent.*

Advisability of gaining good-will, respect, and confidence of Persian Government and people.

18. In enumerating the objects of our policy as they appeared to me, I said we ought to try to gain the good-will, respect, and confidence of the Persian Government and people. This may seem a somewhat vague object to set before us, but the words are not meaningless. All over Persia we do now enjoy a considerable measure of good-will and respect and confidence, and there are definite means of strengthening those feelings, which are of practical use to us. In the large towns we are perhaps no better liked than other foreigners, but in the country generally the English name still stands high. As an illustration of this I may mention an incident which occurred here a few days ago. The local Governor of a district near Hamadan is, like other Persian Governors, making haste to be rich, and in so doing he has fallen foul of an old Chieftain from the Kurd border. This man, who refused to pay as much as the Governor wanted, and who was possibly, as alleged, in the habit of lifting his neighbours' cattle, was recently surprised by a body of 600 horsemen, who burned his villages, seized his property, and killed some of his people—men and women. He made good his escape after a running fight, and, leaving the country with his son and one or two attendants, he rode straight to this Legation, a distance of perhaps 250 miles, and claimed the protection of the British flag. He said he had heard that the English insisted on justice to all. He has now received assurances from the Shah and Sadr-i-Azam, and has gone away happy. A fact of that kind is not without meaning, and the reports of English officers who travel among the Turkomans, Bakhtiaris, and other wild tribes show clearly that at present they entertain very friendly feelings towards us. If we show more interest in them we shall strengthen those feelings, and throughout Persia we can win over men to our side if we choose to try. For example, the establishment of a Consulate at Kerman, and the appointment to it of Mr. Sykes, has been a very good move. Mr. Sykes is a capable, manly young officer of just the right stamp. He has attached firmly to our interests one of the most important men in Persia, the Firmán Firmá, and has acquired a great reputation for himself among the country people. It will strengthen our influence materially if we have more of this kind in other parts of Persia as occasion offers, and if our Representatives at Bushire and Ispahan and Khorassan are encouraged to travel and make friends among the Chiefs and

Intercourse with British officers.

Kerman Consulate.

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* Not long ago the Sadr-i-Azam said to me that he did not believe Russia and England would ever divide Persia between them, because the Russians were too greedy; they wanted the Gulf, and would rather wait any time for that than take only a part of Persia, and let us have part.—H. M. D.

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tribesmen. We need not excite the ready alarm of the Russians by too frequent journeys along their border, but I think we should spend some money in encouraging travel elsewhere, and in establishing Agencies at important points. For instance, I feel very doubtful whether the Government of India are right in deprecating the establishment of a British officer in Seistan; and, under certain conditions, we might find it very useful to have a man in Shuster to help in the opening of the roads through the Lur and Bakhtiari country, but we must have picked officers, working with definite instructions and objects, not untried boys on leave wandering about and getting into mischief.

Reform of currency.

19. There are other means by which we could gain the good-will of the people of Persia, notably by securing for them a respectable currency. If we could gain the credit of restoring the circulation of silver, and saving the poorer classes from the suffering caused to them by the "black money," we should undo almost all, perhaps more than all, the harm done to us by the tobacco troubles. Copper is now at a discount of from 15 to 25 per cent., and all wages are paid in the depreciated coin; but, as I have explained, such reforms are difficult to bring about.

Unsatisfactory attitude of Persian Government.

20. As to the Persian Government, I feel sure we already enjoy their confidence in so far that they believe we mean them no harm, but they think we are selfish, and not inclined to do much for them. Their respect I do not think we enjoy as fully as we ought to do; at least they have peculiar ways of showing it. I have been much surprised at the peremptory tone in which the Persian officials have at times permitted themselves to address this Legation, and at the semi-contemptuous carelessness with which in other cases our repeated representations have been ignored or evaded. This may have been due to various causes: to over-centralization and overwork; to Oriental laziness; to the overweening conceit of the Persians, and their fondness for showing off; to the belief in our inexhaustible good nature. But whatever the cause, such behaviour should not be passed over. It is a mistake, from a practical point of view, to stand any want of respect from Asiatic Governments. I have therefore selected two instances in which it seemed to me that we had not been properly treated by the Persian Government, and have pressed these somewhat seriously upon their notice. One case, in which the Persian Government directly refused to abstain from aggression on a disputed frontier district, and was generally troublesome, I have already reported at length. In the other instance I found that a number of claims justly advanced by British merchants and others, and supported by this Legation, had been allowed to remain for years unsettled, and that some of the Shah's principal Ministers, including the Minister of Justice and Commerce, and the President of the Council, were personally interested in defeating them. This seemed a very useful case to take up, and the Sadr-i-Azam declaring himself unable to overcome the resistance of the influential persons concerned, I brought the matter to the notice of the Shah. The result was that although the Minister of Justice and Commerce tendered his resignation, the Shah, who can make himself obeyed when he chooses, insisted upon a proper settlement of each claim, and they were all cleared off.* I hope that these two cases will have a good effect in Tehran.

My view is that, while treating the Persian Government with all possible courtesy, we should not allow them to trifle with us. We should, I think, do all we can to show our interest in Persia, and our desire for her welfare, but the Government of this country, which may be said to depend for its very existence upon our support, should be made to understand that any representation we may make must be treated seriously. A little wholesome fear, mixed with confidence in our intentions, will tend to make the relations between the Persians and ourselves very much more satisfactory than they are at present.

21. As to securing the good-will of the Persian Government, the question is what we can do for them. This question, unfortunately, is only too easy to answer. The Shah and the Sadr-i-Azam, who constitute the Persian Government, want practically nothing from us but money. The Shah no

* I would take this opportunity of observing that the Shah is by no means a "Roi fainéant." All important matters go to him for disposal, and papers come down from his Palace with long autograph notes on them. These are often wide of the mark, but the fault is not entirely his. The cases are in no way prepared for him, and he has often to decide on very imperfect information. He regards his officials as mere boys, and attaches little value to their opinions.—H. M. D.

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doubt would wish us to support him in case the Russians made any inconvenient demand, and the Sadr-i-Azam will perhaps be glad of our backing if he gets into trouble again with the Shah, but these are contingencies about which neither greatly troubles himself. What both really want us to do now is to relieve them of the burden of the Régie debt, and then let them alone to rule the country as they please. The Shah regarded the debt from the beginning as a hateful extortion, and he resents it doubly now, when the fall of silver has largely increased the value in krans of the payment which has to be made. He thinks we could relieve him from the payment if we chose, and that if we were really friendly we would do so. He does not believe that Her Majesty's Government is powerless to set aside the claims of a trading Company, and he never will believe it. The Sadr-i-Azam understands the question much better, but he also considers that we ought to help him. His argument is that the Shah never gives him a day's peace about the matter, but reproaches him incessantly for having introduced the Régie, and says that he is personally responsible for the debt, and must find the money. The Sadr-i-Azam points out that it is most difficult for him to do this, and urges that, as his support of our schemes has brought him into the trouble, the least we can do is to come to his assistance. His Highness forgets that our support has probably helped to keep him so long in power, but it is, I think, natural that he should feel as he does, and that both he and the Shah should be rather sore on the subject, for we pressed the Régie strongly upon them. The sum to be paid yearly is not large from our point of view, but the revenue of Persia is little more than 1,000,000*l.*,* and the yearly deficit of late having been about 50,000*l.*, the payment of over 40,000*l.* more† as interest on the loan is a not inconsiderable tax. I need hardly explain that, as the pay of officials and soldiers is in arrear, the Régie debt does not make us more popular in Persia. There are always plenty of people to point out that the revenues of the country are being eaten by the Feringi, while the Persian is denied his due.

Régie debt. Eagerness of Shah and Sadr-i-Azam to be free from it.

22. I do not know whether the good-will of the Persian Government is regarded as a matter of sufficient importance to make us incur any pecuniary obligation on behalf of it; nor do I know whether it would be practicable to come to any understanding with the Régie shareholders; but what would greatly relieve the Sadr-i-Azam, and probably enable us to gain considerable advantages for ourselves, would be the taking over of the debt on proper security, and the reduction of the interest to 3 or 4 per cent. This would save the Persian Government some thousands of pounds a-year; it would look well in Persian eyes; it would apparently cost us nothing, as we could borrow the money at a lower rate; and it would put into our hands a very useful lever. No doubt we might find ourselves in the more or less invidious position of having to press for the payment of interest to ourselves, but practically that is the position now, for each instalment has to be extracted from the Sadr-i-Azam by this Legation. We should incur no greater odium if the money were for ourselves, and if we made judicious terms as to the repayment of the principal, we might materially increase our hold on the Persian Government. They would, I think, give us almost any security we liked to ask, so long as we confine ourselves to the south.‡

Suggestion that Her Majesty's Government should take over debt on proper security and reduction of interest.

I must admit that such a measure would not suffice to restore the finances of Persia to an orderly condition, but it would be a sensible relief, and I greatly fear that unless something of the kind is done the effect may be to alienate the Sadr-i-Azam, who has undoubtedly been more or less sore with us since the Régie days. I fear also that the end of the thing may be an appeal to the Russians. They are apparently not unwilling to lend Persia money, and the Sadr-i-Azam has warned me that he will not be able to prevent the Shah from coming to terms with them if we do not help him. This may be merely an attempt to frighten us, but I believe there is truth in what the Sadr-i-Azam

Danger of Persia applying to Russia for relief.

* It ought to be nearly a million and a-half, but of late years the revenues are not being realized in full.—H. M. D.

† The deficit is exclusive of the interest on the loan, which has hitherto been paid from special sources. The last instalment was borrowed.—H. M. D.

‡ It is possible that the Persian Government think we should be less hard with them if the money was ours. We should have to warn them about this.—H. M. D.

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says. I reported not long ago how the Shah was tempted on the occasion of the offer made by the Ottoman Bank.*

The loan would enable us to obtain other objects of our policy.
Increase of weight of advice.
Trading advantages.

23. But besides securing the good-will of the Persian Government, the grant to them of pecuniary aid ought to facilitate the attainment of the other objects of our policy. It should increase the weight of our advice when we oppose any attempt at encroachment by the Russians, and it should enable us to gain some tangible advantages for our trade, and in other respects. If we meet the Shah's wishes in the matter, we may naturally expect him to do something for us, and this the Shah recognizes. He has definitely informed me that if we help him about the Régie debt he will throw open the Upper Karun to British trade, and will undertake to maintain security along the routes branching out eastward and northward from Shuster to Ispahan and Boojnoord. This shows that His Majesty is prepared to make some concessions, for he has hitherto been very nervous about any interference on our part with the Upper Karun. In case Her Majesty's Government were disposed to consider the possibility of granting the help for which he asks, we should, I think, come to a most unmistakable agreement beforehand as to the precise nature of those concessions. We cannot be too frank in these ways in dealing with the Persians, who have no fine feelings about money matters, and whose way is to take all they can get, and if possible give nothing in return.

Navigation of Upper Karun.
Opening of roads.
Shuster as a commercial centre.

24. As to trade advantages, the difficulty is to obtain from traders themselves any comprehensive proposals for the general good of British commerce. The improvement of the very rough road between Bushire and Shiraz would be a good thing, and so no doubt would be the opening out of internal roads by which the produce of the country districts would be tapped. But I can think of no important objects to be gained other than roads, and the Persian Government have no money to spend upon public works of this kind. They have not 20 yards of respectable road in Tehran itself, where the main thoroughfares are very bad indeed for wheeled traffic. The opening of the Upper Karun, and the establishment of a commercial centre at Shuster, would, I suppose, be a considerable gain, especially if the dam at Ahwaz could be repaired, and if transhipment at that place could be obviated by a system of locks. But English firms would have to find the money for this, recouping themselves by the sale of water to irrigate the surrounding country, and I cannot speak with confidence of the results of such an undertaking.

Increase of influence in Southern Persia.

25. Trading matters apart, I think that the grant of pecuniary help to the Persian Government would give us a good opportunity for asserting ourselves more strongly in Southern Persia. I would press for a delimitation of the Perso-Beluch frontier, where Persia is constantly encroaching, and I would insist upon the withdrawal of the Persian flag from the Island of Sirri, if the Indian Government appear to Her Majesty's Government to have made out a clear case. I would also let it be understood that, in view of our large interests in Southern Persia, we expect the Persian Government to show some consideration for our wishes in such questions as the appointment or removal of Governors. We could hardly make this an official claim, or a condition of any help given to the Persian Government, but they used to consult us in such cases, and I should like to be authorized to bring about an official understanding on the subject. We ought not to have objectionable men forced upon us in Bushire or such places simply because they have bid a little higher than the rest. I do not think there would be much difficulty in exercising some check upon bad selections if it were known that Her Majesty's Government took some interest in the matter. Nothing would give us greater weight in Southern Persia than the knowledge that if a Governor were not acceptable to us he would not be appointed. A few years ago this was practically the case, and I should like to see so satisfactory an arrangement again in force.

Perso-Beluch frontier.

Check on appointment of objectionable Governors.

Pecuniary assistance might lead to administrative reform.

26. Even in the matter of administrative reform it seems to me just possible that the grant of pecuniary help to Persia may enable us to do some sensible good. I have no doubt whatever of this if pecuniary help were granted on a considerable scale. For example, the reform of the currency is, I feel sure, simply a question of bribing the Shah. If his present "pishkesh" were

* I attach to this Memorandum a note sent to me some time ago by my Oriental Secretary Nawab Hasan Ali Khan, who is very much in the confidence of the Sadr-i-Azam. He wishes me to say that he is still of the opinion he then expressed.—H. M. D.

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guaranteed, and a certain sum offered to him in hard cash, he would give over the Mint to the Imperial Bank, or any one else we liked to name. So it would be with other matters. If this Legation could dispose of large sums it could do almost anything it pleased with the Shah. Nothing could be more inexpedient than the grant to him of a yearly subsidy, which is what he wants. He would do nothing whatever if once the subsidy was fixed and secure; but by a frank system of payment for value received we could get practically anything the Shah could give. He would appoint any Governors we chose to name. He would without hesitation depose the Sadr-i-Azam, who keeps his power simply because he succeeds in providing the Shah with money. The Shah's concessions, in fact, would be limited by nothing but his fears, by the threats of the Russians, or the prospect of a popular outbreak. It is difficult to put this point too plainly.

If aid were granted on a large scale, practically no limits to Shah's concessions.

I presume, however, that Her Majesty's Government would not care to enter upon a policy of the kind I have described, or to lend the Shah a million and undertake the reorganization of his finances on the terms proposed by the Ottoman Bank, which would probably involve, as I have explained, the fall of the Sadr-i-Azam. I will confine myself, therefore, to a consideration of what we might effect by helping the Persian Government only in the matter of the Régie debt.

But drastic reform would probably entail fall of Sadr-i-Azam.

Therefore consideration should be limited to assistance in matter of Régie debt.

I must preface the consideration of this question by stating that during the last few days the Shah, while pressing for help about the debt, has twice formally asked me to obtain for him the advice of Her Majesty's Government as to what reforms he should undertake, "whether in the finances, or the army, or the administration of justice." I would observe, to prevent misconception, that I have not invited this request by holding out any hopes that the Régie Loan would be paid off. On the contrary, I have steadily declined to admit that there was any likelihood of the matter being considered by Her Majesty's Government, and have declined even to promise that I would make any recommendation to that effect. I have pointed out that such a measure of pecuniary aid would be useless to save Persia from bankruptcy, and that it was unreasonable to expect aid from England when Persia was doing nothing to help herself.

Shah's formal requests for advice.

It is possible that this argument may have suggested to the Shah that a request for advice about reforms might be a good move, but the request was quite spontaneous and unconditional.

Of course, too much importance must not be attached to it. The Shah, if he had once got his money, would always be able to find excuses for not acting upon any advice which he might have received, and, as I have told him, he must know better than any one the causes of the present state of things. Nevertheless, I believe that both the Sadr-i-Azam and the Shah are at this moment really impressed with the serious nature of the position into which they have drifted, and that they might possibly be willing to do something in the way of reform if it did not involve too great a sacrifice. The Sadr-i-Azam tells me that the constant anxiety about money is becoming such a strain that he is getting quite worn out, and the Shah at his last interview with me spoke very strongly about it. It is just possible that the advice they receive may to some extent be followed.

Probably actuated by realization of serious financial condition.

At all events, the Shah has deliberately asked for advice, and whether it is followed or not, I suppose it must be given. We have at least an opportunity for plain speaking, and even if much does not come of it the result can hardly be bad.

Opportunity for plain speaking.

I do not know whether it will be expected that I should make any suggestions as to the nature of the advice which should be offered, but I shall perhaps be excused if I say a few words on the subject.

With regard to the administration of justice, I would suggest that it would be undesirable to enter into details. Whatever is said may be twisted into an attack upon the Mullas, who really administer what justice there is, and the matter is not one of the first importance. The Persians do not require an elaborate judicial system, and could not work one.

Administration of justice not of primary importance.

With regard to the army, it is evident that the sound thing is to pay the troops regularly, and attend to their well-being in other ways, so that they may become a trustworthy force, upon which the Persian Government can depend for the maintenance of order. But the Shah does issue with fair regularity the

Army.

Necessity for regular payment of troops.

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money required for the up-keep of the army, and it is unlikely that he will displace his favourite son from the command to insure that the money is paid to the troops. However, the advice to pay the troops regularly and attend to their well-being can do no harm, I think. It will please the Sadr-i-Azam, who detests the Naib-us-Sultaneh, and the Shah may possibly make use of it to put some little restraint on his son.

Possible employment of British officers.

To make the Persian army worth anything at all except for purposes of internal order is out of the question unless it is officered by Europeans. I do not know whether Her Majesty's Government would care to propose that any part of it should be handed over to us to train. Such an arrangement would have its advantages, but it would of course be much resented by the Russians, even if the operations of our officers were confined to the south, and the Shah would fight shy of it because it would cost money. If we made him profit by it we could, I think, get him to agree.

Finances.

Strong warning should be addressed regarding further depreciation.

With regard to the finances I would suggest a strong warning as to the results of practically forcing the Mint to issue excessive quantities of copper by exacting too high a payment for the Farm. Here we shall carry the Sadr-i-Azam with us to some extent, and if no great good comes of our advice, we shall at all events get the credit of having tried to stem the flood of "black money."

Suggestion that trained British official be lent to Persian Government for inquiry into financial condition.

Perhaps also it might be desirable to suggest the loan of a trained English official to inquire into the financial system and report to the Persian Government on the matters requiring reform. The Russians would view such an appointment with jealousy, and the official selected would have many difficulties to overcome; but the Sadr-i-Azam might be disposed to accept the offer under certain conditions, and if we got a judicious man who would work quietly and not try to sweep too clean, we could in time, I think, do much good. The result of the offer might, however, be that the Persian Government would bring in some Frenchman or German.

The abolition of the sale of Governorships, and the reform of the pernicious system of accounts described by Colonel Picot, should, I think, be pressed on the Shah. The latter piece of advice may perhaps give the Sadr-i-Azam an opening.

Reform of Customs.

I have said nothing about reforms in the Customs Department, which offers the most fruitful field for a large increase of revenue.* Every one is agreed that by the Customs Farm the Sadr-i-Azam will stand or fall, and it is, I think, to our interest at present that he should not fall.

Question touches Sadr-i-Azam too closely.

Pensions.

A warning to be less lavish in granting and continuing pensions would be desirable.

Shah's expenditure.

Finally, though we could hardly go into the details of the Shah's expenditure, he might, as he has asked for advice, be reminded that care in this respect is as important as anything. He could effect large savings in his Civil List if he chose to do so. In some ways he squanders money very reckessly.

Both these warnings would be received with pleasure by the Sadr-i-Azam, and the Shah might pay some attention to them.

Reforms should not be forced too energetically.

27. It may perhaps be argued that if we are to give the Shah financial help he should be made to pay attention to them, and generally to follow our advice. Of course it is true that if we give help we are entitled to expect that our advice will not be altogether disregarded. But I would not insist upon its being swallowed at a gulp. That would, I think, be a mistake. We must not expect too much, and the reforms suggested are very large. It would be better, I think, to put upon the Persian Government the duty they are trying to pass off upon us. I would give the best advice we can, and leave the Persian Government to think over the whole question, only making it a condition precedent to the grant of pecuniary help that the Persian Government must satisfy us of its ability and intention, by increase of revenue or decrease of expenditure, or both combined, to balance its accounts for the future. I believe that the Sadr-i-Azam, making use of our offer as a lever, could do this if he chose; and his doing so would mean a substantial measure of reform.

Necessity for watching Russian movements outside Persia.

28. Before closing this Memorandum, which has grown to an unexpected length, there is one other matter upon which I must touch, namely, the

* It is generally believed that at least as much money goes to the sub-farmers, and to the traders who never pay the full duties, as reaches the Sadr-i-Azam. That would mean a waste by leakage of a quarter of a million.—H. M. D.

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watching sf Russian proceedings. This is not a purely Persian question. So long as the Sadr-i-Azam is our friend he will keep us fairly well informed of what the Russians are doing in Persia itself, but he knows nothing of what is going on outside Persia; and this it is very desirable, both for the Government of India and for this Legation, to ascertain as accurately as possible. The Meshed Agency has hitherto been our principal centre of intelligence in this respect, and it does not seem to me that the arrangement has been altogether successful. I therefore asked Colonel Picot to go into this question also, with special reference to military considerations, and I submit a Memorandum by him on the subject. We must, I think, watch Russian proceedings from Russian territory, not from outside, if we are to know what is going on. I do not wish to travel outside my province, and will therefore say no more on this point, except that if Her Majesty's Government should think it desirable to establish centres of information elsewhere it might be found possible to reduce to some extent the expenditure at Meshed and Resht. The Meshed Agency, however, is under the Government of India, and they may not agree in this opinion.

Possible reduction of expenditure at Meshed and Resht, and establishment of other centres of observation.

29. I have now submitted my views and proposals regarding the situation in this country. To recapitulate briefly, they are as follows:—

Summary of foregoing views and proposals.

Persia is misgoverned, and her condition is not satisfactory. Her finances are in disorder, her trade and resources undeveloped, and she contains some elements of disturbance, while there is no armed force upon which the Government can depend for the maintenance of its authority. The influence of Russia, which is antagonistic to our own, predominates at Tehran, and it is believed to be exerted against the interests of the country.

On the other hand, Persia has practically no debt, and her natural resources are great. Her internal condition is not hopeless, or such as to cause immediate alarm. And the influence of Russia, though predominant, is not exclusive. England has still a strong position throughout the country; and Russia, recognizing her own weakness in Asia, seems unlikely for the present to take any step in Persia which would seriously offend us.

The general situation, therefore, might be worse, but it is not one with which we can rest altogether satisfied.

It is not probable that Russia will combine with England in reorganiziug the Persian administration, and devcloping her trade; and there is little help to be got in this direction from other European nations, none of whom carry any weight at Tehran.

England by herself, especially if thwarted by Russia, cannot hope to overcome the opposition of interested persons in high places, and to carry a scheme of reform which shall regenerate Persia. She can hardly hope, indeed, to carry any reform of radical importance, and must fall back upon her existing policy, contenting herself with maintaining the integrity and independence of Persia; watching and checking Russian aggression; gaining the good-will, respect, and confidence of the Persian Government and people; developing trade; and taking such opportunities as may occur of urging measures beneficial to the country.

With the view of maintaining the integrity and independence of Persia, it is desirable to make timely arrangements for securing a quiet succession on the Shah's death; and we should endeavour to strengthen our influence over the Heir-Apparent by keeping an English doctor with him, by improving the position of our Representative at Tabriz, and in other ways. We should also let it be understood that aggressive action by Russia in the north of Persia will immediately result in decided action by us in the south.

In order to strengthen the friendly feelings entertained towards us in many parts of the country, we should encourage picked officers to travel among the Chiefs and people, and we should, as occasion offers, establish fresh Agencies at important points. We should also try to obtain for the people such benefits as a good currency.

The Persian Government should be made to understand that they must not trifle with us in the future, as they have occasionally done in the past; but we should try to gain their good-will, and to help them in any way we can. Just now there is an opportunity of putting them under a great obligation by relieving them to some extent of the burden of the Régie debt, which they find very harassing. The Shah has begged us earnestly to help him in this

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way, and has at the same time formally asked for our advice as to the reforms which might be made in his administration. I think we should give this advice to the best of our power, and should clear off the Régie debt by lending the Persian Government half-a-million at 3 or 4 per cent., on approved security, and on certain clearly defined conditions. These conditions should include advantages to our trade, such as the opening of the Upper Karun, and also a satisfactory guarantee that the revenue and expenditure of the Persian Government shall for the future be made to balance.

The probable result of such action on our part will be the introduction of a certain measure of administrative reform, and the strengthening of our influence in Persia, especially in the south, where we ought to be able to revive it, and make it very strong.

If we do not help the Persian Government in the manner indicated, we run a risk of alienating the Sadr-i-Azam, who has been sore with us about the Régie debt, and of driving him and the Shah, whose greed for money is increasing with age, into some compromising transactions with Russia.

30. I will only add that the present occasion seems to be of an exceptional nature. In spite of all I have said to prevent false hopes, the Shah and Sadr-i-Azam entertain the most sanguine expectations from the result of the recent elections in England. They are excited and elated by it, feeling convinced that England will now take a serious and benevolent interest in Persian affairs. They are also more disposed than usual to be impressed by what is said to them. The attitude of Her Majesty's Government will be closely watched here, and any action taken now will, I believe, have a marked and lasting effect upon the future course of our relations with Persia.

(Signed) H. M. DURAND.

Tehran, September 27, 1895.

List of Papers appended to this Memorandum.

1. Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Picot, of the 31st August, 1895, inclosing "Part I, Notes on Persian Administration," and "Part II, Proposals for Reform of the Central Administration of Government."
2. Note by Nawab Hasan Ali Khan on the "Descent, Biography, and Character of Ali Asghar Khan, Sadr-i-Azam."
3. "List of the Total Revenues of Persia," by Nawab Hasan Ali Khan.
4. Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Picot on "Past and Present Policy in Persia"
5. Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Picot, of the 1st July, 1895, inclosing a Memorandum on the "News Agencies of Central Asia and the Caucasus," and Notes on the Resht and Tabriz Consulates.
6. Private letter of the 24th June, 1895, from Nawab Hasan Ali Khan.

H. M. D.

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APPENDIX 1.

Lieutenant-Colonel Picot to Sir M. Durand.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Tehran, August* 31. 1895.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for your information, a series of papers embodying the result of an inquiry into Persian administration, and dealing with the question of interior reform.

I have carefully borne in mind the necessity of retaining, as far as that were possible, those forms of government to which the people are already accustomed, and have therefore brought forward proposals under the form of modification rather than radical change.

The difficulty really lies with the official classes, who are deeply interested in maintaining the existing state of affairs, and in very many cases opposed to financial reform.

These papers will, I venture to hope, prove of some value, Part I presenting a fairly accurate picture of Persian official life, and Part II offering many suggestions for better government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) H. PICOT, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Military Attaché.

PART I.—*Notes on Persian Administration.*

No. 1.

(Confidential.)

Appointments of Governors in the provinces.

For the purposes of administration the land area of Persia may be divided into provinces, districts, "belooks," and villages under Governors-General, Governors, Deputies, and Khedkhodas, or village Headmen.

The Governors-General and the more important Governors purchase their appointments at Tehran, where they are offered for sale to the highest bidders. These again effect sales of the minor appointments, and so on down the whole length of the official ladder. The appointments are generally for one year.

On the departure of the successful purchaser to the province, a Memorandum showing the revenue and expenditure for the year is placed in his hands, no mention, however, being made of the purchase-moneys.

Revenue.

The revenue is derived from direct and indirect taxation.

The direct is that levied on land, forming the main portion of the revenue; the indirect that from the customs, road taxes ("rah dari"), octroi, special guild taxes, and tribal taxes.

This direct and indirect form of taxation is what is known as the "asl" or real revenue.

Direct taxation.

The basis of the land revenue is the village. There are in Persia two sorts of villages for purposes of taxation, viz., those owned by individual proprietors, and those owned by the peasants. In the first case the proprietor is alone responsible for the collection of the taxes; in the latter the Khedkhoda.

The tax is estimated roughly on the cultivated land, on the water supply, on cattle, and heads. No regular system can be adduced, local circumstance, custom, and ancient right being among the many factors.

Both cash and kind payments are made, the cash revenue being derived from such cultivation as vines, rice, and comprising also poll and cattle tax.

Indirect taxation.

The indirect taxation will be dealt with separately.

Expenditure.

Under the head of expenditure are included army expenditure, buildings, repairs, remittances of taxation, salaries, and pensions.

Additional taxation.

As already stated, the direct and indirect taxation form what is known as the "asl" or real revenue of the country, but in addition thereto is another tax called the "farh," or additional.

"Farh" may be termed an extra levy in cash, proportionate to the cash payments of the "asl" revenue. It ranges from ½ to 5 or 6 krans on every toman of the "asl" tax, and has gradually taken root as part of the system of taxation, though it forms no part of the revenue of the country at large.

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The Governors look to the "farh" as their special perquisite, and through its means recoup themselves for their initial purchase-moneys. The privilege is grossly abused, double and treble the accepted amount being often squeezed from the people. The latter are accustomed to this quasi legitimate tax, and would be content to accept it were it not so grossly exceeded.

Effect of the purchase of appointments on administration.

The high sums paid to the Shah give the Governors a good excuse for manipulating public funds to their own advantage.

The army may be left unpaid, heavy reductions made on the salaries and pensions, &c.; new expenses may be created, for instance, in the Province of Khorassan, where the revenue is registered at 500,000, expenditure at 420,000, surplus at 80,000 tomans; the Government will reduce the surplus to a vanishing point.

With the co-operation of the Accounts Department of the capital the annual accounts will be falsified, and large sums directly peculated.

It would be difficult and useless to enumerate the various methods of obtaining money, but enough has been said to show the shifts to which the Governors are obliged to resort with a view to recover what they consider their rightful dues. The burden, as a matter of course, invariably falls on the great producer, the peasant.

No. 2.—*The Accounts Department, or "Daftr."*

Finance Department.

The "Daftr," or Accounts Department, is the great accounting Department of the State. At its head is a Minister ("Vazir-i-Daftr") nominated by the Shah, and assisted by a staff of "Mustauffis," or Accountants.

These Mustauffis are recruited from Irak, where certain families have provided Accountants for generations. They generally have a very elementary education, and undergo no special training.

Scope of work.

The duties of the Daftr concern the whole accounts of the kingdom, and comprise the preparation of the Ministerial Estimates, and of all branches of the public service, the compilation of the Budget, the issue of Memorandums showing revenue and expenditure; finally, the compilation and audit of all accounts.

One or more Mustauffis are set aside for the accounts of each province, Ministry, or Department. These men carry out the duties already enumerated, centralization being the first and last word of the system.

Military Accounts Branch.

To suit the exigencies of army administration a separate Military Accounts Office has been created. This branch is nominally subordinate to the Daftr.

The Military Accounts Branch prepares the estimates for each regiment and province for the information of the Daftr, and for insertion in the Budget. It also compiles estimates for the expenditure required in each Department of War, for buildings, arsenal, arms, &c., and keeps the account of expenditure.

Method of audit in the "Daftr."

At the end of the year accounts are submitted by each Governor, Minister, or Head of Department, and are taken in hand by the special Accountant of the Daftr already spoken of.

The Memorandums serve as the basis of check, receipts as a rule serving as vouchers for expenditure. One important exception must be mentioned. For more important items of expenditure the receipts alone are not accepted; in their place a "Barat" or written order is required. This Barat is drawn up by the Mustauffi, and after receiving the signature of the Minister of the Daftr is sent on for the approval of the Sadr Azm and the seal of the Shah. This Barat system enables the Daftr and the Sadr Azm to pass in special review all heavy disbursements, and though the Memorandums may have authorized the expenditure, yet the Governor or Minister is held responsible until the Barat replaces the receipt. A great power is thus relegated to the Sadr Azm, who acts as a final referee. Very heavy sums are sometimes paid for bribes to the higher authorities for these Barats.

Method of audit in the Military Accounts Branch.

The system of audit in the Military Accounts Branch differs but little from that in the Daftr. The Barat system is also in vogue, the Naib-es-Sultaneh (Minister of War and son of the Shah) exercising great power in respect thereto.

The accounts are finally centralized in the Daftr, but that Department interferes but little with its sister branch owing to the personal influence of the Naib-es-Sultaneh.

Result of system of accounts.

The practical outcome of the system is to give the Daftr complete and irresponsible control over every branch of accounts, over the estimates, the expenditure, and the audit.

Its staff forms a powerful and interested corporation, and its work is submitted to no scrutiny. It is true its final statements are submitted to the Sadr Azm, but that official has no competent organization to examine the accuracy of the work.

The Sadr Azm deals with the Daftr very closely, but not in the sense to be desired.

Another cause of the absolutism of the Daftr may be found in the difficulty, not to say impossibility, of the uninitiated to read the peculiar character adopted by all accountants of the Mustauffi class.

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No. 3.—*The Army and the Minister of War.*

Commencement of the regular system.

Previous to the reign of Fateh Ali Shah and his son Abbas Mirza, the army was organized on an irregular footing, except for the partially regular artillery, Chiefs binding themselves to furnish a certain number of troops, cavalry or infantry, during times of war.

Only in the early part of the century, with the appearance of European officers, was the regular system introduced.

The recruiting is based on the village system, each village being held to furnish its quota of recruits. There is, however, no regularity in the system. In the first place, the rough calculations on which numbers are based were made long since, and have not been revised; and, besides, the present dynasty having come from the direction of Astrabad, first took the northern provinces, and thence drew their men and material for the subjugation of the rest of Persia. The people of the north, too, being of the same race as their conquerors, are considered the most loyal, and are therefore made to furnish the greater part of the infantry. Azerbaijan and Irak are the chief recruiting-grounds.

The cavalry are chiefly drawn from Khorassan, where large numbers of Kurdish horsemen were originally established to check the inroads of the Turkomans.

The artillery is at present supplied on a voluntary system, Azerbaijan again providing most of this branch.

Term of service.

Service is for life, but in practice the men are continually exchanged. Out of a regiment 800 strong, 180 to 200 men only probably live out their lives as soldiers, a money payment to the Commanding Officer sufficing to purchase discharge.

Money payments by villages to their own soldiers.

The pay being almost *nil*, the villages are often obliged to offer a bonus varying from 10 to 50 tomans to the recruit as an inducement to serve; further, an annual payment is made averaging from about 3 tomans.

No regard is paid to age or capacity, any objection raised by the Commanding Officer being easily silenced by a money payment.

Appointment of officers, and sale of rank.

The appointment of officers is made by nomination, and as a rule the Minister of War nominates up to the rank of Major. For higher grades a Firman from the Shah is required, countersigned by the Minister of War. In all cases a money payment is required varying from 50 to 500 tomans; sometimes more is paid.

The number of officers is limited only in the regiments. There is no limit to the grant of honorary titles, the sale of which is a regular matter of traffic.

Payment of men on leave.

Men on leave draw the equivalent of six months' pay from the village or district. They are paid by the village authorities, who are allowed corresponding deductions in the village taxes. Actually the men receive but a small portion of their dues, the rest being eaten up by the Governors, Commanding Officers, tax-collectors, and the Minister.

Payment of men in garrison.

In garrison the men receive six months' pay from the village, six months from the provincial revenue or the Treasury.

The sums required for disbursements to the troops in the provinces are, as already stated (*vide* Part 1, Paper No. 1), included in the Governors' Memorandums, and payments are effected accordingly.

These expenditures are, as a rule, dealt with by the Accountants of the Military Accounts Branch, who are specially detached to the provinces for the purpose of obtaining receipts, checking expenditure, authenticating documents, &c. The appointments are much sought after, 1,000 tomans being sometimes paid as purchase-money.

Payment of troops in the capital.

The payment of troops in Tehran is effected by the Minister of War, who draws in a lump sum annually the moneys required for the troops and the various Supply Departments. The direct disbursements are made by the Military Accounts Branch of the Ministry. This system is of recent growth, and it is only within the last few years that the Government Treasury has ceased to deal directly with the troops and Supply Departments.

The troops are paid invariably many months in arrears.

The Military Accounts Branch loans out money at high rates of interest to native bankers, and to enable it to command the necessary capital the pay of the troops has to be utilized.

Short payments are also invariably made, and as all the superior ranks demand a share in the profits, from the Minister to the subaltern, the regiments are maintained far below their regulation strength. As a rule from 200 to 300 men are always short in every 800.

Disbursements by the War Departments.

A certain fixed sum is set aside annually in the Budget expenditure of the several War Departments, and is taken over by the Military Accounts Branch of the War Minister.

Each and every one of the Departments which comprise the arsenal workshops, ammunition, equipment, harness, ordnance, clothing, and stores is under the immediate control of the Minister, and is exploited in his interests. No check can be exercised, for he not only orders the expenditure, but manufactures and takes over the supplies, and then finally carries out his own audit.

Result of financial administration.

To sum up, the whole machinery of the army is so administered as best to serve the private aims of the individual. The troops are left unpaid, ill-clothed, badly fed, discontented, and ill-disciplined. Disorder reigns in every branch of the Service; in truth, nothing is left undone which a wicked ingenuity can devise for spoiling as good material as a soldier could ever hope for.

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No. 4.—*The Customs.*

Customs administration previous to present time.

In the early part of the present century the Customs were in the hands of the various Governors of the frontier provinces, who purchased annually the right of collection for certain sums; gradually, as the Customs increased in importance, higher offers of purchase were made until, and more especially in Azerbaijan, the revenue so derived assumed an importance to render it advisable for the Central Government to take some responsibility in the matter. A special officer was sent to control the administration in Azerbaijan, and from this step sprang the idea of creating the post of a "Vazir-i-Gumruk" (Minister of Customs), an appointment instituted a little before the first journey of the Shah to Europe. Still, however, important frontiers remained in the hands of private contractors until the Amin-es-Sultan (father of the present Sadr Azm) pointed out to the Shah the feasibility of realizing with proper control much larger returns.

His Majesty thereupon placed the entire administration of the Customs in the hands of the late Amin-es-Sultan, with the result of a rapid increase in the revenue—an increase amounting before his death to a sum of some 300,000 tomans per annum. The late Amin further amalgamated the octroi and "rah dari" duties to the Customs. At his death these passed on as an hereditary office to his son, the present Sadr Azm, since which time the total revenue has remained at the same figure it reached three or four years before the death of the late Amin-es-Sultan, viz., about 900,000 tomans per annum.

Note.—A slight rise took place in 1895.

Administration of Customs.

The Sadr Azm in turn sells the right of collection of customs, including "rah dari" and octroi duties, along the several frontiers to the various provincial Governors or private individuals, the transaction being in the nature of a private contract, and, generally speaking, passing from hand to hand, and renewed annually. Whatever profits accrue over and above the specified sum paid annually into the Treasury (900,000 to 1,000,000 tomans) becomes the perquisite of the Sadr Azm, the same principle holding, one may say, throughout Persian administration and exactly parallel to the case of the Ministers of Posts and Telegraphs (*vide* Part I, Papers Nos. 9 and 10), who take as perquisite all revenue derived from their Administration, less a certain fixed sum paid into the Treasury.

Note.—Reliable native sources give the profits of the Sadr Azm at 200,000 tomans per annum, *i.e.*, 40,000*l.*

Customs rates.

As previously mentioned, the Customs form one of the chief sources of the revenue of Persia.

Under this head are included taxes on imports and exports, "rah dari" (road tax), and octroi.

Two rates of customs duties are levied, the one on foreigners, the other on natives.

The customs duties levied on foreigners have their basis in the terms of the Treaty of Turkmanchai (between Persia and Russia, of the 10th (22nd) February, 1828), the conditions of which briefly stated are as follows:—

"Article III. Merchandize imported to or exported from Persia is subject to a 5 per cent. duty at the time of entry or departure; and afterwards is not liable to any other customs rights."

The customs duties levied on natives consist of the payment on imports and exports of a nominal 3 per cent. only (but this sum varies from year to year), and, in addition, the duties of "rah dari" and octroi, the amounts for which constantly vary, depending in reality on the power of the contractor to extract money from the merchant; so that by the time merchandize is brought into the country, or *vice versâ*, the native merchant has had to pay from 10 to 15 per cent.

Effect of the Treaty of Turkmanchai.

By the Treaty of Turkmanchai Persia deprived herself of all flexibility in her foreign commercial relations, for though her conditions of commerce with Russia are reciprocal, they are not so with other nations; France, for instance, whilst claiming the right of the most-favoured-nation clause, can import into Persia at 5 per cent. *ad valorem*, whereas Persia might have to pay 30 per cent. to import into France, the rate changing whenever France is led to alter her commercial relations with other Powers. Feeling the intolerableness of this burden, Persia some years ago endeavoured to effect a modification in the terms of the Commercial Articles in the Treaty, but the negotiations failed, and Persia now finds her hands so tied as to be entirely dependent on the will of Russia for any improvement in the terms of her Customs relations with other countries.

Effect of a fixed valuation of customs.

Again, by fixing the value of the customs at 900,000 or 1,000,000 tomans, and through a long period rigidly adhering to this original valuation, Persia has further diminished her flexibility. By her system of Government sales she has further blinded herself to the actual state of her foreign commercial relations, and has, moreover, cut herself adrift from all touch with sources of reliable information concerning the real value of her customs. It is at present to the interest of the Administration, the contractors, the Treasury officials, in fact to the interest of almost all connected directly or indirectly with the Customs, to furnish an inexact picture of receipts and expenditure; trustworthy Reports, therefore, are unobtainable. From Consular Reports, however, there seems little doubt of the great increase still developing in the imports and exports during the last fifteen years.

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Yet again the breaks the system offers in the chain of responsibility prevent proper control by the Central Government. Not only is the Treasury the loser, but the chief and sub-contractors likewise, for bribery enters largely into Customs transactions; and in practice, I am told, both foreign and native merchants take advantage of the venality of the Customs agents, the former rarely paying more than 4 per cent. import duty, and perhaps even less, the loss in this case falling directly on the local contractor.

No. 5.—*The Treasury.*

Staff of Treasury.

The staff of the Treasury consists of an official with the rank of Minister. The Amin-ul-Mulk, own brother of the Sadr Azm, now holds this post. He is assisted by various writers and cashiers.

The duties of the Treasury comprise:—

1. The receiving of all surplus provincial revenue noted in the Memorandums issued by the Daftr. In exchange it gives receipts which serve as vouchers in the final accounts of the Governors.

2. Receiving the fixed revenues derived from Customs and Mint, sale of Governorships, Concessions, and other miscellaneous items.

3. Disbursing moneys according to the special instructions of the Daftr—instructions which generally take the form of Barats.

4. Making payments agreeably to the Memorandum prepared by the Daftr for the use of the Treasury.

The Treasury Memorandum differs but little from that prepared for the provinces. It shows all the receipts, whether from revenue, Customs, or Mint, for which the Treasury will be held responsible, and specifies as disbursements all the usual fixed expenditure.

The Barat system (*vide* Part I, Paper No. 2) is much employed in the Treasury, for no extraordinary disbursements can be made except on the Barats vouched for by the Minister of the Daftr and the Sadr Azm.

Conduct of business.

The business of the Treasury is conducted very irregularly, and its funds are utilized by the Minister and others concerned much in the same way as are those of the Military Accounts Branch by the Naib-es-Sultaneh, Minister of War. In many respects the Treasury is treated as a private banking concern, relations being entered into with private bankers ("sarafs"), and moneys loaned out at high rates of interest.

To carry out this programme the Treasury seldom is able to disburse moneys on due date, and a very large number of Barats are kept out for eight or nine months even without receiving attention.

The actual disbursing business is managed through these "sarafs," on whom the Minister issues cheques or pays orders in replacement of the original Government Barats. Great delays ensue, and the holders of the cheques, rather than run the risk of indefinite delay, often prefer to compound with the "sarafs," receiving from 1 to 3 krans in the toman (10 krans). Large profits thus accrue to the great advantage of the Minister and the bankers.

Audit of accounts of Treasury.

At the end of the year the Treasury submits its accounts to the Daftr, where they are written up by the Mustauffis set aside for the purpose. After verification they receive the signature of the Minister of the Daftr and the Sadr Azm.

General remarks on the administration.

A cursory glance at the foregoing will show that this branch of the public finances is managed on the lines of a private monopoly. The fact that the Minister is own brother to the Sadr Azm gives him enormous power, and nullifies the audit which is supposed to be exercised by the Daftr. It also nullifies the value of the audit by the Minister of the Daftr and the Sadr Azm.

The Treasury, as regards management, is the counterpart of the Military Accounts Branch. The one is conducted in the interest of the Prime Minister, the other in that of the Naib-es-Sultaneh, Minister of War, neither being under the effective control of the Daftr owing to the high positions occupied by the respective patrons of the subordinate Departments.

I make special mention of this contrast, because I think it accounts in great part for the want of influence of the Sadr Azm in all matters affecting the army administration, the Minister of War always being able to reply to any criticism on the part of the Prime Minister by pointing his finger at the Treasury.

I ought not to forget to mention that the Amin-ul-Mulk finances all the private business of the Customs for his brother, the Sadr Azm.

No. 6.—*Ministry of Pensions and Charitable Bequests.*

Organization and scope.

This so-called Ministry is presided over by a Minister known as the "Vazir-i-Vazaief," through whose agency an annual expenditure of 500,000 tomans is said to be effected.

On the pensioned lists are found students of religious law, members of the priesthood, "Syeds," and various Government servants.

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The students receive pensions to enable them to prosecute their studies, which they carry out quite independently of all control of the Minister or Government. The same holds good also with the Ulema and Syeds, on whom no special demands are made.

The pensions to private individuals depend on favouritism, hereditary right, &c., and are rarely granted for good service. The State seldom benefits by the death of the pensioners, for though one-third of the sum granted is supposed to lapse, two-thirds descending to the family, well-placed bribes secure the full sum, and Government is invariably mulcted of its rights.

Charitable foundations.

Charitable foundations consist chiefly of landed property left by the charitably disposed for the building and maintenance of religious schools, mosques, tombs; for the construction and maintenance of caravanserais, roads, &c.

In the absence of Government control and registration, little is known of the value of these charities. In the time of Nadir Ali Shah the revenue is supposed to have been not less than 9,000,000 tomans per annum; at the present time a rough estimate mentions 4,000,000 tomans as a probable figure; in any case, there is little doubt that a very large sum is annually expended.

The management of the revenue rests primarily with the legal trustee, who is theoretically responsible for his trust; practically he is given a free hand, and misappropriation or peculation is the chief feature of the system. Of administration by higher authority there is none.

Only in one foundation does Government directly interfere, the Holy Tomb at Meshed being the exception to the general rule.

General remarks.

The system, both as regards pensions and charitable foundations, presents many anomalies. Government receives little or no return for its large expenditure in pensions, and instead of by their means wielding an enormous influence over that troublesome class of people, the students and Moolahs, is more or less a slave in their hands. The moneys wasted on so-called theological training, if directed into proper educational channels, would serve not only to spread theological knowledge, but to place the liberal sciences within reach of large numbers of students.

The charitable foundations are either lying idle or dwindling through corruption. The Government shirks all responsibility, and prefers to leave the field open to exploitation.

The income accruing from the bequests would, under the most ordinary management, suffice to repair perhaps every caravanserai in the country, and to restore the colleges to a high state of prosperity.

It is difficult to account for the apathy.

No. 7.—*The Ministry of Justice.*

Administration.

The office of Minister of Justice has until quite lately been united to that of Commerce.

The duties of the Minister of Justice theoretically consist of taking general note of the law throughout the country, of enforcing the execution of judgments delivered bythe Ulema according to the Religious Law, and of hearing all cases referred to him under the "Urf," or law of custom. As a matter of fact, the power of the Minister is quite a personal matter; at times his influence may extend far afield, at others hardly reaching beyond the walls of his own dwelling. A strong Minister will have his agents in every province and chief town to take note of the local course of justice; but it seldom happens that the chief is sufficiently influential to invest his agents with proper authority.

The Religious Law, or "Sharh."

A glance at the system of law is necessary to explain the method of administration. There is but one codified law in Persia, denominated the "Sharh," or Religious Law. It is based on the Koran and traditions, and has been developed by celebrated jurisconsults to a degree of excellence. It takes note of many purely civil matters, divorces, contracts, wilis, transfers of property, and certain matters of criminal jurisdiction. With the exception of the latter all are administered by the Ulema.

The "Ulema."

The Ulema are recruited from religious students who, after studying at the great colleges of Kerbela, Nejf-Samara, qualify as teachers and expounders of all questions appertaining to the Sharh. Once qualified, the Mujtahid is independent and irresponsible, and though their Decrees have not the force of judgments as such are understood in Europe, yet their influence is great. Their power, however, is limited, in that the execution of their decisions rests with the civil authorities, the office of the Ulema being, so to speak, entirely judicial.

The "Urf," or law of custom.

In addition to the Sharh, there is the uncodified, unwritten law commonly known as the "Urf," based on usage and tradition.

The Urf is now administered by any official of rank who may have power to enforce the execution of his judgment. Competence depends on that factor alone.

There is no special ruling as to the hearing of cases, the parties concerned having the power to represent their grievances wherever they may consider it to their best interests to do so.

The execution of sentences generally rests with the authority delivering judgment.

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It therefore follows that matters brought forward must correspond in some degree to the position of the authority to whom reference is made, for though most officials have judicial powers, only the most influential can secure execution.

The instruments of justice.

The actual execution of judgment rests with a class of people known as "Farrashes." In the capital the chief Farrash-Bashi is a personage of much consideration, and a servant of the Shah. Under his orders are subordinate Farrashes, whose business it is to give effect to the orders of the Minister of Justice and others.

In the provinces the Farrash-Bashi is nominated by the Governor. All judgments, whether religious or civil, Sharh or Urf, are executed by his staff of Farrashes.

Usurpation of power by the Ulema.

It will be seen that theoretically there is a strongly marked line between the Sharh and Urf laws. The first sign of weakness, however, on the part of the civil authorities, or the slightest relaxation of their control, at once adds to the influence of the Ulema, and with it comes an usurpation of the Urf laws by the religious authorities.

No. 8.—*The Ministry of Commerce.*

The Ministry.

As already stated, this Ministry till quite recently formed part of the Ministry of Justice, presumably because the rôle of the Minister confined itself almost entirely to the judicial side of commercial business.

Organization.

Theoretically, the organization of the Ministry takes the same lines as that of Justice, the Minister relying on special agents to control or direct commercial justice in the provinces and chief towns. The position and functions of the agents depend entirely on the amount of support the Minister is able to extend. More often than not they are absolutely useless, and ignored by the civil authorities who usurp their powers.

Commercial business.

Competence in the case of ordinary law is dependent solely on the power of the officials to give effect to their judgments, or to the decisions of special Committees of merchants to which complicated cases are referred.

Commercial business is conducted according to the Urf laws, but advantage is always taken by the Ulema of any disorganization in the Urf Administration to intervene between merchant and merchant.

Of late years their intervention on behalf of the native merchant has been temporarily such as to cripple foreign trade and to render the relations between the foreigner and the people almost impossible.

The cases have been numberless where they have been able to set aside the decisions of the civil authorities, and even the special orders of the Sadr Azm himself, to whom, in the absence of any responsible Minister, all final appeals are now made.

No. 9.—*The Ministry of Posts.*

First commencements.

The first effort towards any definite organization of Posts commenced with the institution of "Chappar Khanas," postal stations built on the high roads between the capital and the provinces, for the better and quicker conveyance of the orders of the Sovereign.

At the same time private individuals, merchants, &c., employed foot runners for the conveyance of their own and other correspondence, which they undertook to deliver at a certain charge.

Gradually the Government messengers were allowed to carry private letters without fixed charge, and later permission was given to travellers to make use of the Chappar horses, a privilege at first jealously guarded.

Establishment of European system.

On the return of His Majesty from the first journey to Europe in 1872, an Austrian officer, named Roederer, was engaged to organize a regular postal service with the Emin-ed-Dowleh, at the head of the Administration as Minister.

For the first two or three years the service was little used. It then gradually developed to a relative degree of activity, and now that the people have gained confidence is used as a means of transmitting large sums of money, valuables, &c.

Insurances are effected through Lloyd's or other Company by telegraph.

Monopolization of Posts.

The Posts are administered on the usual principle, that is, more or less on the lines of a private monopoly, subsidized in this case by the Government. The Minister is not called upon to render an account of his trust, but is simply expected to maintain the Department at a certain degree of efficiency, and is at liberty to dispose of the profits as he may think fit.

The subsidy is a relic of the old days, when the Government was in the habit of granting a certain sum for the maintenance of establishments and horses at the different Chappar services. These allowances have never been allowed to lapse, and form part of the stock in trade of the Ministry.

Revenue.

Any attempt to form an estimate of the revenue can only be guesswork, for the

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Minister and his associates are naturally interested in showing that the receipts are of no account. Those who should be able to judge maintain that the monopoly is much valued, and the retention of the Posts for so many years by the same official may be taken as fair proof of their value.

Development is much impeded by the disturbed state of the interior, insecurity to life and property along the great highways doing much to hinder progress.

No. 10.—*Ministry of Telegraphs.*

Administration.

The Telegraph Department is organized on the lines of a private monopoly subsidized and assisted by Government.

The Administration consists of a Minister with a staff of Persian and European officials.

The actual revenue is fixed at 19,000 tomans per annum, and this sum is theoretically paid into the Treasury every year by the Minister. Actually nothing whatever is realized, for against this credit must be debited the expenses for new lines, new instruments, salaries of certain of the staff, all of which are met by Government.

The Indo-European and Indian Government telegraphs pay a percentage, being the international tax on messages passing over their lines. This sum actually reaches the Treasury, and suffers but slight shrinkage *en route*.

The system of monopoly acts in a manner detrimental to progress and extension; the Minister, though one of the most enlightened of Persian officials, works the lines in his own interests; an enormous staff, especially in the subordinate ranks, is maintained at the expense of Government; projects for new lines are almost invariably obstructed by the Minister, who fears that extension might lead to further demands on his private purse; and, lastly, no check on the accounts can be maintained by Goverment, or any estimate made as to the working value of the Administration.

No. 11.—*The Foreign Office.*

The Ministry.

The Foreign Office is presided over by the Kavam-ul-Mulk, an old gentleman in his dotage, who is privileged to figure in name as Chief of the Department. The actual Chief is the Prime Minister, the Sadr Azm, who, with his Frist Secretary, the Mushir-ul-Mulk, personally conducts the affairs of the Ministry.

The staff consists of several Secretaries dealing with English, Russian, Turkish Diplomatic business, Consular affairs, ceremonies of Court, records. As a rule all foreign Representatives communicate directly with the Sadr Azm.

Diplomatic and Consular Service.

The Diplomatic and Consular Services form part of the Foreign Office, the Ambassadors and Ministers receiving their nominations from the Shah, and retaining their appointments at the pleasure of His Majesty; similarly, the more important Consuls obtain their nominations by Royal favour.

Many of the appointments are of pecuniary value owing to the large returns derived from passports, the sale of patronage and justice, &c. The posts of Constantinople and Tiflis are more especially sought after on this account.

The Consulships abroad are usually given to bankers or others to whom the position may be a matter of consideration, and who pay accordingly.

General note.

The Foreign Office suffers in exactly the same manner as every other Department of the State—over-centralization, want of confidence in the subordinates, sale of office, a disinclination on the part of the authorities to scrutinize too closely the action of its servants, an entire lack of system and of business management being the main features of its administration.

No. 12.—*The Council of State.*

Sketch of the Council.

The Council is an institution dating from the beginning of the reign of the present Shah. A short sketch of its beginnings may prove of interest, as the principle involved in its constitution is one of great importance.

In the early part of the reign the well-known Mirza Taghi Khan became Persian Minister. He was a man of much character, ability, and patriotism; made the law feared, and strengthened the authority of the Central Government. After some years of office the Shah did him to death.

Another Sadr Azm, Mirza Aga Khan, of milder disposition and less disinterested character, took his place. He was dispossessed after seven years of office.

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At his fall the Shah divided the responsibility between the different Ministers, giving them the power to report directly to the Sovereign. These, together with other influential personages, formed themselves into a Council to report on all important questions of public interest. The President, though shown much consideration, retained his rank of Minister only, and was not called Prime Minister.

About twelve years ago another departure was made in favour of a Prime Minister, and the Mustauffi-ul-Mamalik was nominated as such. The other Ministers were, however, held responsible in their various Departments, and retained their separate privileges.

At the death of the Mustauffi, the Ministers again conjointly assisted in the government, and this system continued to within the last three years, when the Amin-es-Sultan, then Minister of the Court and now Sadr Azm, or Prime Minister, was promoted to the vacant post.

Since that date the value of the Council has been discounted, and for all practical purposes it has ceased to exist.

His Majesty has failed apparently to grasp the meaning of a Council of State. He regards the assembly, half suspiciously, as something which might possibly interfere with the Royal prerogative, not as a valuable means for the control of the various Ministries, or as an agency for the higher criticism of the Financial Department, a Department which now has nothing between itself and the Crown except the Sadr Azm. General note.

The Sadr Azm's motive in absorbing the Council is apparent, as thereby he removes the only Assembly which could stand between himself and the Throne, or which might have proved an obstacle to his schemes of centralization.

No. 13.—*Employment and Payment of Public Servants.*

Appointments depend on inherited right, family interest, favouritism, seldom on merit alone. Employment.

Government service is a matter of great consideration in Persia, and the staff of servants is exceedingly large when compared to the field of labour, so large that numbers of officials are maintained with pay and without employment.

A considerable sum of money is annually budgeted for on account of its servants, but fixed pay is a figure of speech, the influence of the individual being the one determining factor.

In the provinces the payment of the subordinates and of all those borne on the Provincial Lists is a matter which depends very much on the financial prosperity of the Governor. If his affairs are doing well, and the demands made by the Central Government have been within reason, the officials may be paid. If, on the contrary, the demands have been excessive, the salaries will either be withheld, paid in part, or not paid at all. Payment of public servants.

In the latter case every individual sufferer will set about making good his losses from the people, who eventually reap the harvest of the misdeeds of their superiors.

(Signed) H. PICOT, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Military Attaché.

Tehran, August 31, 1895.

PART II.—*Proposals for Reform of the Central Administration of Government.*

No. 1.

(Confidential.)

The papers on Persian administration, Part I, have entered into the question of administration in some detail, and have shown the evils resulting from too great a concentration of power, the effacement of the individual Minister, the weakening of the central authorities, want of permanency in the administration of the provinces, disorganization and want of control over the finances, &c. Reform in administration.

In this, the second part of my sketch, I propose dealing with the subject of reform and such other matters, financial or commercial, as may assist the country in re-establishing its finance and credit.

In drawing up this scheme I have attempted to keep the following points continually before me:— Object aimed at in scheme of reform.

1. To retain the old forms whilst endeavouring to reconstruct; in other words, to avoid novelty.

2. To restore the central authority, and to extend its control and direction to every Department of the public service, whether in the provinces or the capital.

3. To re-establish the responsibility and individuality of the Ministers, as well as of other chief officers of the State. To extend their powers in the provinces.

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4. To give permanency and continuity of purpose in the Administration.

5. To reintroduce some rational method into the management of the public finances, more especially to subject them to high control.

Proposal for restoration of the Council of State.

To give effect to this programme the first and most important step is that the Council of State should be revived, with increased power, dignity, and authority. At present the Council is composed of the various Ministers, or other personages specially nominated by the Shah. I would extend these nominations to ex-Ministers, highest military and civil functionaries, men of great social rank or scientific attainment, and so make it representative of the best social and [?] characteristics of the country.

Its deliberative powers.

To it would be delegated the highest powers; as a deliberative body the Council would concern itself with all measures of a permanent nature, and would advise His Majesty on questions of administrative regulation.

Its judicial powers.

As the highest judicial authority it would take note of the conduct of the law, and would as the highest Court of Appeal pass judgment in civil and criminal cases.

Its financial powers.

As the highest financial authority it would scrutinize the work of the Finance Minister, and deal finally with all his accounts (*vide* "Daftr," Part I, Paper No. 2). This duty would be performed by the Board of Accounts of the Council, the staff of which would be chosen from others than men of the Mustauffi class of the Daftr.

Division of the Council into Boards for the conduct of its business.

To cope with these multifarious duties, and to prevent the Council being swamped with detail, it would divide itself into Committees or Boards for the consideration of its law, finance, commerce, &c. Each Board would have its own permanent establishment. The direction of the Council would extend to every Department of the State, and its thoroughness would react on all sides, more particularly on that which is concerned with finance.

Nothing new or novel has been propounded, though an effort has been made to revive an effete assembly, and to make it what it should be—a body controlling and directing every branch of the public service.

Its numbers have been somewhat added to, in order to make it more representative, to give it the means of coping with its increased labours, and to enable it, by force of public opinion, to resist absorption at the hand of any one individual member of the State.

Proposal for the revival of the Council of Ministers.

Part of my scheme for the restoration of the central authority includes also the revival of the Council of Ministers, but as this can only spring from an awakening of the Ministers to a sense of responsibility, I may at once pass on to that question, and show how I would raise their status, both as Heads of Departments and as members of the Council.

List of the chief Ministries.

The following is a list of the principal Ministers as they now exist in name:—

The Prime Minister.
The Minister of War.
„ „ Interior.
„ „ Finance.
„ „ Justice.
„ „ Commerce.
„ „ Foreign Affairs.
„ „ Pensions, Charitable Institutions.
„ „ Posts.
„ „ Telegraphs.
„ „ Industries, Fine Arts.
„ „ Court.

Ministerial responsibilities.

My purpose is to give to each Minister—

1. Responsibility in his own Department, and to rigidly limit his powers to tha Department.

2. To subject his administrative work to the general survey of the Council of State, his financial work to the audit of the Minister of Finance, and final examination of the Board of Accounts of the Council.

3. To restore him to his proper place in the State and Ministerial Councils.

I will take each Ministry in turn.

No. 2.—*The Ministry of War.*

Present view of the Ministry.

It has been shown in Part I, Paper No. 3, that the Minister of War unites in his own person several separate and distinct offices, such as those of the Minister of War, Financial Secretary, the Commander-in-chief, and Paymaster-General.

As Minister of War and Financial Secretary he prepares the Army Estimates, provides the war material, equipment, clothing, tents, &c., meets all pay disbursements, and checks the accounts of expenditure.

As Commander-in-chief he accepts the material and equipment provided by himself as Minister of War.

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As Paymaster-General he deals with the executive disbursements to the troops. On him, therefore, devolves the whole responsibility, administrative, financial, and executive.

It is true that the army accounts are theoretically centralized and audited in the Daftr of the Finance Minister, but the officers of that Department dare not oppose the favourite son of the Shah, and on the principle of "Live and let live," interfere as little as possible with the finances of the Naib-es-Sultaneh.

The system is one of extreme centralization.

I do not propose dealing with the intricate question of army administration further than is necessary to bring the financial and supply branches into a semblance of order, and to define the relative position of the Civil and Military Departments of War.

Proposals for better administration.

It seems absolutely necessary to break up the confused organization which now centres on the Minister of War. This can, perhaps, best be arrived at by relegating the duties of supply and finance to a civilian War Minister; the duties purely military to a Commander-in-chief.

The Minister of War, his Directors-General of Supply Departments, and his Financial Secretary.

The former would be directly responsible to the Council of State, and would be assisted by various Directors-General, experts charged with the Supply Departments of War under the responsibility of the Minister.

A Financial Secretary would deal with the accounts of the army. This officer's duty would comprise the compilation of the Estimate for inclusion in the Budget of the Minister of Finance, the issues of all moneys to the Supply Departments, the administration of the Army Pay Department, the primary audit before submission to the Great Accounts Department, the Daftr for final scrutiny by the Board of Accounts of the Council.

I cannot insist too strongly on the importance of a thorough check on the army expenditure. The accounts of the Financial Secretary would be first examined in his own checking office by accountants nominated by the Minister of War, and chosen from other than the Mustauffi class of the Daftr.

They would then be passed on for rigid audit in the Daftr of the Minister of Finance (*vide* "Finance" or "Daftr," Part II, Paper No. 4), and by him would be submitted to the Council of State for final scrutiny by their Board of Accounts.

The Commander-in-chief.

The military branch would be under the orders of the Commander-in-chief, who would be responsible for the personnel of the army, its drill and discipline. Being directly responsible to the Council of State, and not to the Minister of War, he would act as a check on the latter, and would see that the army were not starved, either as regards establishment, war material, or pay. I would add much to the importance of this officer by extending his duties to the provinces, and by bringing the whole army under one military control. At present the powers of the Minister of War in his capacity as Commander-in-chief are limited to a certain extent; for instance, the Zil-es-Sultan practically commanding the troops in his Governorship, the Vali Ahd commanding those in Azerbaijan, the Governor-General doing the same in Khorassan.

Whether under the changed order suggested it would be advisable to retain the services of the Naib-es-Sultaneh is very doubtful. The increased power of the Commander-in-chief might act as a sop to his vanity, and induce him to remain in office, but under no circumstances should any son of the Shah be allowed to occupy a position directly dealing with finance. This should be reserved entirely for a civilian officer.

The principle is the same as that on which I would bar any official occupying a position equalling or excelling that of the Naib-es-Sultaneh (the Sadr Azm, for example) concerning himself directly and personally with any of the Finance Departments of the State.

No. 3.—*Ministry of Interior.*

Present view of the Ministry.

This very important Ministry is now merged with that of Finance, both being conducted by the Sadr Azm, the *de facto*, though not nominal, Minister of these great branches of the public service.

In Part I, Papers Nos. 1 and 2, the questions affecting Interior and Finance, such as the sale of office, the appointment of Governors, the system of revenue, have been entered into, and though it can hardly be said that Interior and Finance require reorganization in any more urgent degree than any other branches of the Service, yet the scope of their dealings has such vital bearing on public interests that the urgency of reform is here even more apparent, and demands most careful attention.

Proposals for better administration.

I have throughout the present papers urged the necessity of dividing responsibility, and of making the different Ministers actual, not nominal, Chiefs of Departments. Secondly, of introducing a practical and efficient control of the public finances. To carry out this programme, the duties of Interior and Finance must be separated, and the functions conducted independently one of the other.

The nature of the office of the Sadr Azm is such that he might very properly fill the place of the Minister of Interior. The duties I would limit—

1. To the nomination of provincial Governors and Sub-Governors.
2. To the control of the provincial administration.
3. To the control of the police, safety of roads, and sanitary measures.

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As regards nomination of Governors.

As regards item I, the nomination of Governors, I have referred more particularly to this in the article on provincial administration, Part II, Paper No. 7.

As regards control of provincial administration. Proposal for permanency of staff.

With reference to the duties of control, and with a view to the establishment of a general system in the provinces, it is very necessary that the Minister of Interior, like all other Ministers of first rank, should have a permanent staff removed from the accidents of Governorship, and responsible to the Minister himself for the proper conduct of their duties.

The chief members of this staff would be the Farrash-Bashi, whose office has been explained in Part I, Paper No. 7, and a permanent Secretary. On this organization of a permanent staff I lay great stress. Through its agency the Minister will be brought into direct touch with the provinces; a body of trained men will be maintained in whom the Minister has confidence, dependent on him for the orders they may receive, and independent of the personal idiosyncrasies of the temporary Governor. The power of the Central Government will thus be enormously increased, and we should not see, as at present, the orders of Government set on one side by the obstruction or bad will of the Governor.

No. 4.—*Ministry of Finance.*

Present view of Ministry.

According to the present order of finance in Persia, the great accounting Department of the kingdom is the Daftr, a central organization composed chiefly of accountants called Mustauffis, by whom not only are the central accounts administered, but also every account of any importance, whether it be provincial, Ministerial, or local. Held together by ties of birth and self-interest, they are able to manipulate the accounts with impunity. The system may be described as the outcome of a great swindling corporation with feelers extending to the furthermost limits.

The Daftr treats the Ministerial and provincial Estimates which are drawn up by the Mustauffis nominated from the Daftr for the purpose. It then compiles the Budget, prepares the Memorandums of expenditure (*vide* Part I, Paper No. 2), issues or checks the special orders directing disbursements, finally centralizes and audits all accounts. In fact, from first to last, it controls every financial transaction of importance.

Proposals for reform.

Reform should, I venture to think, seek—

1. To limit the field and influence of the Mustauffis.
2. To prevent their interference with the finances of the Ministers or provinces except in so far as their legitimate audit is concerned.
3. To establish a higher and more responsible agency for the final acceptance of the accounts of the kingdom, to which the Accounts Department of the Finance Minister would be subordinate.
4. To create more permanency in the system of finance in the provinces.
5. To centralize under the Finance Administration the Treasury, the Customs, and Mint.

Proposal for separation of the Ministries of Interior and Finance.

The first step will be to separate the Ministries of Interior and Finance, for both cannot be controlled by one personage, and under no circumstances should the chief officer of the State, the Sadr Azm, have any direct dealings with this Ministry, *i.e.*, with finance.

I would therefore make Finance into a distinct Ministry, under a capable and trusted official, noted for his integrity and courage.

It goes without saying that he cannot be a member of the Mustauffi corporation.

Proposals for the employment of the Mustauffi class.

Now, as regards the Mustauffis, their proper field is in the Daftr of the Minister of Finance, and there alone should they be employed.

Their duties would be concerned with the examination of the Ministerial Estimates, the compilation of the Budget, the preparation of the Memorandums of expenditure (*vide* Part I, Paper No. 2), and the audit of the Ministerial and other accounts.

Proposal for the better administration of the Ministerial accounts.

To prevent their interference with the finances of the Ministers or provinces, each Ministry will have its own separate Accounts Office, with accountants nominated by the Ministers themselves, but quite independent of the Mustauffi class, who, as already stated, will be employed exclusively in the Ministry of Finance.

The Ministerial Accounts Office will prepare their own Estimates, issue their own orders for expenditure, and submit their accounts for audit in the Daftr.

Proposal for subjecting the Daftr, or Ministry of Finance, to high scrutiny of the Board of Accounts of the Council of State.

The necessity for having some control capable of dealing with the audit of the Accounts Department of the Minister of Finance cannot be too strongly insisted on. This high duty will be performed by the Board of Accounts of the Council of State. I have already mentioned this Board (Part II, Paper No. 1), and need say no further except, on the thoroughness of the check exercised by that Board will depend the financial probity of Persia.

As regards permanency in system of finance in provinces. Proposal for permanency of staff.

Of great importance, too, is the establishment of some permanency in the system of finance in the provinces. A system which allows, for instance, a constant change in the person of the chief agent of the Minister, viz., the "Peshkar," or "Vazir," is one which can only be detrimental to efficiency.

The Peshkar is the right hand man of the Governor; on him devolves the collection or administration of the revenue, the issues of moneys, the submission of accounts and

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vouchers to the Daftr. He occupies a position second only to the Governor, by whom he is nominated, and, as a rule, lasts just as long as his patron. This constant change upsets the even tenour of business, and all those agents connected with finance in the province should form part of the permanent staff of the Minister.

Permanency alone will bring the Minister into touch with the province, preserve traditions, and create a continuity of purpose.

Proposals for the better control of the Customs, Mint, and Treasury by the Ministry of Finance.

I now come to the question of centralizing under the Minister of Finance the Customs, Mint, and Treasury. Each and every one of these is controlled by or in the interests of the Sadr Azm.

The Customs and Treasury are administered by the Amin-ul-Mulk, his brother.

The Customs and Mint.

The Mint by a banking firm of Castelli and Tumaniansk, who have lately taken a contract for a term of years, the Sadr Azm being a sleeping partner. To show the extent of the interests involved, I may mention that the personal profits of the Sadr Azm, as regards customs alone, amount, according to those who are best able to make the estimate, from 160,000 to 200,000 tomans per annum, *i.e.*, from 32,000*l.* to 40,000*l.*, and this notwithstanding the leakage on every side. The Mint is said to have brought a clear 14,000*l.* last year after paying a royalty of 120,000 tomans (24,000*l.*) to the Shah.

I cannot give any figures as to the Treasury, but the property is highly spoken of.

Proposals for better administration of Customs.

The scheme I would suggest is one that would appeal to a very influential body of Persians, and would not give the absolute control to Europeans, against whom the feeling in Persia is yet strong. It is to make the Customs one of the Departments of the Minister of Finance. The Minister would exercise control, assisted by a Board of two advisers: the senior an European of experience, an Englishman or German for choice, the best that money can tempt to lend his services to Persia; the junior a Persian official. Both these officers should have the titles of Directors-General, and rank as Ministers.

It might be possible to extend European supervision to the ports and land frontiers, as there the contact would be with the merchant class, not with the people, but such extension would require tact, and should proceed gradually.

Some difficulties lie in the way of such a scheme, the chief of which are the certain opposition of the Sadr Azm, and the covert hostility of Russia.

During the spring of 1895 the Ottoman Bank offered His Majesty a loan of 1,000,000*l.*, with which it was suggested the Régie debt should be paid off, the other 500,000*l.* replenishing the Imperial coffers. Four per cent. interest was demanded on the guarantee of the Customs. His Majesty was excited by the proposal, and his relations with the Sadr Azm were for some time much strained.

The agent of the Ottoman Bank, seeing where the opposition lay, offered to the Sadr Azm, on the part of the promoters, an annual payment of 120,000 tomans. This was refused. The sequel proved interesting, for the Prime Minister enlisted the sympathies of the Russian Legation, and His Majesty the Shah was made aware of the strong objection of the Russian Government to a scheme which would give administrative control of the Customs to the Ottoman Bank. It was also hinted that Russia could find the money on the same guarantee.

There seems little doubt that sooner or later the bait held out by adventurous banks or foreign Governments will be too strong for the cupidity of the Shah, who will finally compel the Sadr Azm to relinquish his monopoly.

For this reason I venture to think any support given to the Sadr Azm to enable him to retain the Customs is thrown away, and that a reform under Persian administration, assisted by European experts, has many advantages, and would cause the least possible objection to Russia.

The Mint.

Concurrent with changes in the Customs, reform could be introduced in the Mint; but till money is obtained through the Customs, I see no hope for special treatment of the currency question.

Proposals for better control of the Treasury.

As regards the Treasury, no personal interest should be allowed to stand in the way, and I would insist on the Treasury taking its place as one of the Departments of the Minister of Finance. Its accounts would, like all other accounts, be audited by the Daftr, and finally scrutinized by the Board of Accounts of the Council of State.

Whatever conclusions might be arrived at as regards the Customs or Mint, there should be no hesitation about the Treasury.

No. 5.—*Ministry of Commerce.*

Present view of the Ministry.

In dealing with the subject of commerce, attention has already been drawn, in Part I, Paper No. 8, to the defects in the commercial administration due to—

1. The absence of authority on the part of the Minister, and consequent irresponsibility.
2. Want of supervision in the provinces.
3. Shortcomings in the law or commercial procedure of giving and regulating justice.
4. The interference of the Moolahs and Governors with commercial affairs.

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The attributes of the Minister.

The attributes of the Minister are clear, and it is necessary that he should be placed in a position for their due fulfilment. Briefly, he should—

1. Control the finances of his Ministry.

2. Watch the commercial and industrial interests of his country, collect statistical information, and, in conjunction with the Minister of Finance, criticize all proposals for the development of commerce, taxation, &c.

3. Survey the Commercial Tribunals.

This programme does not appear outside the capacity of an ordinary business man of experience; but it is indispensable that commerce should be independent of other Departments, and work entirely within its own circle. For these reasons a separate and responsible Minister should be appointed.

Proposals for better administration of Ministry.

The first step towards imbuing the Minister with a sense of individuality is to make him absolutely responsible for the accounts of his Department. For this purpose he should have a Ministerial Accounts Office, composed of men, nominated by himself, of a different class to the Mustauffis of the Finance Minister (*vide* Part II, Paper No. 4). The system of check already propounded, viz., by the Accounts Department of the Minister of Finance (the Daftr), finally by the Board of Accounts of the Council of State, will be quite sufficient to secure honest work in this as in other Ministries. The expenditure would be slight in any case.

Proposal for extending influence of Minister by establishment of permanent agents in the provinces.

Now as to provincial duties: these can only be adequately carried out by means of permanent agents, through whom alone can commercial business be controlled or a regular system of commercial law and procedure be attained. A strong Minister even now, under the present system, has power to enforce his will in the provinces through his personal agents, but these suffer through the temporary nature of their appointments, being liable to removal whenever the Minister falls into disfavour. By making the agents members of the permanent staff of the Ministry, not of the Minister, this evil would, to a great extent, be removed.

As regards the class of agents: these might be chosen from the commercial classes, and to them would be delegated the judicial functions of the Minister. They would settle all ordinary disputes, and for the more serious cases assemble Committees of influential personages to assist them in giving judgment.

The Committees might be of a semi-permanent nature, and could even become representative by election. They would be presided over by the permanent agent.

Administration of commercial justice in the capital.

In the capital the Committee might be formed of merchants chosen for their knowledge of commercial business.

In foreign disputes, *i.e.*, between Persian and European, the existing procedure would remain in force. This consists in the assembly of Committees presided over by a Foreign Office agent, the hearing being watched by Representatives of the Governments concerned. In time, however, as the ordinary Commercial Tribunals inspired confidence, the probability is that foreign Powers would gladly submit to their jurisdiction, thereby rendering commercial justice a matter of law instead of diplomacy.

As regards the execution of judgment.

Now, as regards the execution of justice, the agents would concern themselves solely with the judicial side of the law, the executive function resting solely with the civil authorities, *i.e.*, with the Governor and the permanent staff of the Minister of Interior.

General note.

The effect of permanency in the administration of commercial law would cause the registration of a mass of precedents, out of which a codification of the commercial law might be expected to grow.

The hands of the Minister would be enormously strengthened by means of the agents. He would be brought into close communication with the classes, and statistics would be forthcoming on which to base his calculations. The powers of the Moolahs, too, would be greatly reduced.

The scheme itself presents no novelty as to system, being a pure modification of the existing framework.

No. 6.—*Ministry of Justice.*

Present view of Ministry.

It has been shown in Part I, Paper No. 7, that justice, as it is understood in Europe, does not exist in Persia. Various reasons were adduced for this state of affairs. These were:—

1. The weakening of the power of the Minister, and the withdrawal of all responsibility.

2. The want of proper division of labour as evinced by the combination of Justice and Commerce into one Ministry.

3. The subservience of the agents of the Minister in the provinces to the will of the Governors.

4. Want of method in the administration of justice and in the execution of judgment.

5. The excessive power of the local Governors, and their interference in the purely judicial work.

Many of these abuses can, I believe, be removed without introducing such radical changes as would be distasteful to the ruling classes or the people.

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Following the principle already enunciated in the foregoing papers, it would seem necessary to establish a responsible Ministry, with a permanent staff in the capital and the provinces. **Proposal for the establishment of a permanent staff.**

The system of government in Persia has already allowed of a capable Minister appointing his agents in the chief centres of the country, but these, unfortunately, are liable to removal with the downfall of their chief, and consequently their authority is of a very temporary and abstract nature.

There is no reason why the agents should not form part of the permanent staff of the Ministry in the same way that the Peshkar forms part of the permanent staff of the Minister of Finance, or the Farrash Bashi of the Minister of Interior. If the principle of permanency were once recognized, the groundwork of government would have been laid. The permanent staff would carry out their duties at the chief centres, whilst they would have sub-agents or honorary Magistrates to assist them in every part of the country.

(The latter need not necessarily be paid, for many would serve as a matter of honour and prestige).

All ordinary cases would be tried by these agents; more serious cases would be referred to the decision of Committees composed of several Magistrates, presided over by one of the permanent agents.

A separation of the judicial and executive functions would form part of this system. It would be the duty of the Governors and his permanent staff of Farrash-Bashis, Farrashes, &c., to see that the orders of the judicial agents were properly executed. It is essential that the judgments or decrees of the agents should be given effect to by the civil authorities; the agents or Magistrates confining themselves entirely to the judicial side of the law. **Separation of the judicial from the executive functions.**

So far I have only spoken of the Urf law as administered civilly. There is also the Sharh, or Religious Law, to be considered. **Administration of Sharh laws.**

It has been stated in Part I, Paper No. 7, that the Ulema have the absolute right to judge certain cases which come under the jurisdiction of the Religious Law. Now such right can by no means be interfered with.

The Ulema must remain sole arbiters in their own branch. Like the agents of the Urf law, however, they will be dependent on the civil authority for the execution of their judgments. I would remark that a systematic administration of the Urf Laws would do much to diminish the influence of the Moolahs, and so, in a very direct way, add to the influence of Government.

A permanency of system such as suggested would establish lay justice on a firmer basis, whilst registration of cases by the permanent staff would in the course of time lead to a codification of the Urf laws. Special attention should be given to procedure and law in the capitals, for there would the system crystallize and the law assume finality. **General note.**

The sharp separation of the judicial from the executive function would also do much to purify justice.

As regards finance, the Minister of Justice would, like all other Ministers, be responsible for the preparation of the Estimates and expenditure in his own Department, and the regular rendering of his accounts to the audit of the Finance Minister to the scrutiny of the Board of Accounts of the Council of State.

No. 7.—*Provincial Administration.*

Having now dealt with the Central Departments, I come to the question of the provinces. **Present view of administration.**

Firstly, I must refer back to Part I, Paper No. 1, where a brief sketch was given of the method of government and the system of taxation and revenue, the evils resulting from the sale of appointments, the maladministration of the revenues, the manipulation of the accounts in the interests of the Governors and Mustauffis of the Daftr.

In the preceding papers an endeavour has been made to show how many of these evils can be minimized; how the Ministers, through the agency of a permanent staff, can be brought into closer union with the provinces, and what an enormous effect this will have on systematic administration; how the accounts would assume a healthier tone through the restriction of the power of the Mustauffi class, and the introduction of a comprehensive control by the Minister of Finance in the first instance, by the Board of Accounts of the Council in the second.

There remain now two chief questions as far as the provinces are concerned: one, the status of the Governors; the other, the great question of the revenue.

Hitherto the Governor has taken his position in the provinces as the private farmer of the estates of the King, not as his responsible Representative in the true meaning of the word. **Present view of position of Governors in the provinces.**

He has purchased his right to exploit the people, and the Central Government has always felt that it had no power to criticize his methods, or to interfere except in very exceptional and scandalous circumstances.

The appointment of permanent agents to responsible positions, and the consequent displacement of the Governors' own servants, at once alters the status of the Governor,

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reducing him to the status of a superior agent of the central authorities. Nothing therefore remains but to treat him as such, and to pay him a certain fixed salary like any other member of the staff.

Revenues, and proposals with regard thereto.

I will now proceed to the question of revenue. The two main sources of direct revenue are the "asl" and "farh" taxations, the former of which alone reaches the Treasury, the latter belonging by custom to the Governor, whom it recoups for the original outlay of appointment. Now the people are perfectly content to pay both the "asl" and "farh" revenue, objecting only when the "farh" is exacted beyond all reason. (I have elsewhere (Part I, Paper No. 1) stated that the "farh" sometimes exceeds three times the amount of the "asl" tax). Now the unwritten law is that the "farh" should bear some relative proportion to the "asl" revenue, and I take it, if that law were strictly enforced, it would be a matter of indifference to the people whether the collection were made by Government or by others. That being so, I would lay it down as a principle that Government alone should deal with the question of revenue; also, that under no circumstances should a private individual be allowed any rights over the public revenues of the country.

The means for the execution of this programme are at hand in the provincial permanent staff.

A few words as regards this agency.

The permanent staff would consist of—

The Secretary to the Government nominated by the Minister of Interior.

The Farrash Bashi, by the same.

The Peshkar, by the Minister of Finance.

The Treasurers, by the Minister of Finance.

The Commander of the local troops, by the Minister of War.

The agents and Magistrates of justice, by the Minister of Justice.

The agents of Posts, Telegraphs, and Charitable Institutions, by their respective Ministers.

The Peshkar, Treasurers, Sub-Treasurers, &c., would control the actual collection of the revenue, as also its expenditure, and the accounting for the same.

Khedkhodas, as at present, would be employed as the agents for actual collection in the villages.

As regards expenditure, each Minister would give authority to his agents for the provincial disbursements of his Department. The agents would issue orders for payment, which would be checked by the Peshkars from the Memorandums of the Finance Minister.

After verification and counter-signature of the Governors the payments would be valid.

The Peshkar would render his accounts regularly to the Minister of Finance for audit by the Daftr.

Reassessment of taxation.

The real difficulty might lie in the reassessment of the taxation of the "asl" and "farh" revenues.

Before Government could take any action or alter in any way the existing procedure, it would be necessary to have accurate information of the actual amounts now paid by each community, and then, with due regard to local circumstance, custom, a hundred and one other conditions, to fix the actual amounts to which the community were liable.

This information could best be acquired by Special Committees nominated by the Ministers of Interior and Finance, which would make the necessary inquiries on the spot. Their statistics and proposals would be considered by the Minister, and thoroughly discussed in Council, final orders being issued after due deliberation. All subsidiary orders specifying the amounts, time, and method of collection would be circulated in every district or village, and the people would at last know for what they were liable.

Naturally every effort must be made to protect the peasant, and to see that additional exactions are not made. The chain of responsibility commencing with the Minister, and reaching down to the permanent agent, who is directly in touch with the people, would seem sufficient to secure fair administration and justice. The peasant would always have the agents of the Minister of Justice to refer to, and further might appeal directly to the Provincial Council, which would deal especially with revenue disputes.

I may mention that the permanent agents of the various Ministers in the capital of the province would be formed into a Council of Advisers to the Governor. They would meet constantly under the presidentship of one of the members to discuss questions of common interest, as also to secure that unity of labour which is so essential to success.

No. 8.—*The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister.*

Proposals as regards the Ministry.

The foreign relations in Persia are entirely dependent on the Prime Minister, who alone of all the Ministers is in constant communication with the Sovereign. It would seem very desirable, therefore, that he should be nominated definitely as the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Prime Minister would perhaps prefer the existing method, which enables him to absorb the duties of the office whilst remaining himself in the background; the principle

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being the same as that which gives him the control of the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Commerce without any displacement of the nominal Ministers. An explanation of this attitude may be found perhaps in the desire of the Sadr Azm not to excite the jealousy of His Majesty the Shah, who might resent too great an accumulation of power in the hands of any one individual.

Under the system suggested there will be no necessity for this personal effacement, and the Prime Minister will have nothing to fear by assuming before the world his titles of office as Prime Minister, Minister of Interior, and Foreign Affairs.

It will be noticed that the Prime Minister will have no immediate dealings with any of the great financial Departments of State, such as Finance (Daftr), Treasury, Customs, Mint, Pensions, Charitable Institutions, &c. This abstention will give great weight to his voice in the State and Ministerial Councils, besides adding immensely to his prestige in the country. It will also afford him the necessary leisure for the proper administration of his own special duties.

No. 9.—*Ministry of Posts.*

It has been explained in Part I, Paper No. 9, that the administration of the Posts is now conducted on the lines of a private enterprise subsidized by Government, and that, despite the insecurity of roads and want of confidence on the part of the public, the service has developed in a marked degree.

Proposal for the abolition of the monopoly, and creation of Posts as a State Department.

This development has taken place without any corresponding benefit to the Treasury, the whole of the profits going into the private purse of the Minister.

As there is every reason for believing the revenue from this source to be already of considerable value, and that a great extension of business would take place concurrently with the improvement in the administration of the provinces, it would appear advisable to bring the Ministry into accord with the various other revenue-producing sources of income; in other words, to make it one of the Departments of State administered in the interests of Government and the people.

No. 10.—*Ministry of Telegraphs.*

The tenour of my remarks in the preceding paper on the Ministry of Posts applies also in great measure to the sister Department of Telegraphs.

Proposal for the abolition of the monopoly, and the creation of Telegraphs as a State Department.

In one respect there is a difference, viz., that the Minister accounts annually for a sum of 19,000 tomans to the Imperial Treasury. Actually he creates expenses, so that Government is debited with a like amount, and practically the income derived is *nil*.

There is yet a fair field for telegraphic extension in Persia, and provincial reform would certainly react favourably on this as on other Departments of State.

I would strongly urge the advisability of Government dealing directly with the Telegraphs, and of making the Minister a public servant instead of a private monopolist.

No. 11.—*Ministry of Pensions and Charitable Bequests.*

The interests which are at stake on the above account are doubtless great, demanding the full attention of a competent Ministry; at the same time reforms are not of such immediate importance as, for instance, in the Departments of Interior, Finance, or Justice. It would be politic to allow the reorganization of pensions, together with inquiry into the management of charitable bequests, to wait over till some progress had been made in other Departments.

The Ministry.

Following on the installation of the Ministry, the influence of the Minister should be extended in the provinces by the agency of a permanent staff. The latter would, under instructions from the Minister, carry out the ordinary business connected with the Pension Department, and take note of the due fulfilment of each and every bequest to which the country is heir. They would settle all simple disputes, and refer the more serious either to superior Committees, the Minister, or the Council of State.

Proposals for the nomination of a capable Minister with permanent staff.

Duties of permanent staff.

Before the agents, however, could take up the ordinary routine of duty the Minister would be obliged to have recourse to special Committees. These would visit the provinces and review the pensions and charitable bequests in detail as well as in general. The reports would be studied by the Minister, discussed by the Council of Ministers, and finally threshed out by the Council of State. The agents would then be placed in possession of registration lists, be given details of pensions or bequests. The legal trustee would, as before, carry out the conditions of the bequests, the agent having the right to interfere as soon as mismanagement became apparent.

Preparatory steps necessary.

What the final effect of a business direction of this Department would be can best be

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guaged by the monetary interests at stake, interests said to mean the expenditure of several million tomans per annum.

(Signed) H. PICOT, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Military Attaché.*

Tehran, August 31, 1895.

APPENDIX 2.

Note by Nawab Hasan Ali Khan on the Descent, Biography, and Character of Ali Asghar Khan, Sadre Azam.

ZAL BEG, a Georgian (Christian) countryman, has been one of the captives of Agha Mohamad Shah, the founder of the Kajar dynasty. This captive was presented to Kassim Khan, of Kajar tribe, maternal grandfather of the present Shah.

Zal Beg, as is customary in the Eastern countries, was a captive slave of Kassim Khan, who was married to a woman, native of Ispahan, of whom he had four sons, viz., Agha Hassein, Aga Taki, Aga Ibrahim, and Sekandar Khan.

After the demise of Kassim Khan, his daughter inherited the captive slave and his family, who continued in the service of that lady until she became Mohamad Shah's wife, and for long after, when the present Shah was made the Heir-Apparent to the Throne of Persia.

Zal Beg died. Then the mother of the present Shah sent the four sons of the deceased captive slave to Tabriz to her son, the Heir-Apparent, with whom they remained until all of them returned with him to Tehran at the time of his accession. They all held confidential private service at the Palace.

Aga Ibrahim, the third son of Zal Beg, held the office of an Abdar, and by degrees rose to be Abdar Bashi.

Aga Ibrahim was naturally a clever man, but without a suspicion of education. He could not read or write his own name, which gave him more credit with his august Master. He was very poor, married an Ispahani woman, who was his second wife, of whom he got six sons and two or three daughters, viz., Ali Asghar Khan, Sadre Azam; Ismail Khan, Amin-ul-Mulk; Kassim Khan, Sahib Jama; Hassan Khan; Mohamad Khan; and one other.

Aga Ibrahim, when Abdar Bashi, had a very small house in the town, and was perfectly contented with his lot. His eldest son, Ali Asghar Khan, was his favourite, and took a great care in his education.

Ali Asghar Khan, the present Sadre Azam, was a good-looking and naturally talented boy, and proved well in the Persian and Arabic education he used to receive. At the age of about from 16 to 20 he was an accomplished Persian and Arabic scholar; then his attention was turned to romance and poetry. His poems are some very good, which displays his belief in Saufism; he has natural liberal ideas. His own hearty wish at the beginning of his age had been to be free from the political world, and to continue in his romantic thoughts and to lead the life of a Dervish, much against his father's idea and will. He has had a great struggle with his father on the subject, but had, eventually, to bend to the wish and will of his father, which is one of the first duties of the religion. He then entered the service of the Shah as Sahib Jama, Chief of the Shah's Transport.

In that capacity, with the aid of his father, he proved himself very useful to the Shah, also won the good-will of the people in general by his becoming demeanour and his generosity.

In 1883, when the Shah visited the Shrine of Mashad, Aga Ibrahim, Amin-us-Sultan, who at that time had risen to a most important position, died. The offices which were held by the deceased, together the title of Amin-us-Sultan, were given to the present Sadre Azam, which duties he performed to the utmost satisfaction of the Shah.

In 1884, finding by long experience that his august Master was entirely humiliated by the dictations of Russia in Persian politics, he, for the first time, with the consent of the Shah, formed an intimate friendship with the British Legation and began an opposition against the Russian Minister, and with the aid and the advices of Sir A. Nicolson he was generally successful in his contentions against the Russian Representative (Prince Dolgorouki).

I need not mention about his co-operations with Sir H. D. Wolff in the interests of the English in Persia, as all he has done and said are already known to us.

I have known him personally since 1887, and by degrees I was able to win his confidence and got very intimate with him. I may state, therefore, some of his personal characteristics for your information.

So far as my observations led me to understand, I have found him to be of a most liberal mind, extraordinary generous, quick in understanding and observation, not avaricious, ambitious, rather superstitious, hates being defeated in anything he undertakes, political or private. He even hates to lose at any game, because he thinks it a defeat. Not sensual, women have no influence over him, has no craving for money, though his office bring him a good sum, but does not keep it—charitable. In his earlier days as Amin-us-Sultan it is known that he used to visit poor people's houses in the night in disguise and used to relieve them. Very cheerful in his reception, calm as a rule, dreadful

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when his anger rises, very fond of music, careless about his dress and generally untidy, very seldom consults his assistants on important affairs, and prefers thinking over the subject himself shut up in a room; quick reader and writer, decisive, not fanatic. He had not touched wine until he went to Europe, but since he enjoys it. He is forgiving, but if once a man plays unfair with him, although he forgives, yet he does not have such confidence in him that he had before. He is rather vain, fond of society, patriotic.

His success and the copious favours he has received and receives from the Shah have caused a great jealousy by his fellow-Ministers against him, and this immediately after the Shah's return from Europe in 1889, when he was greatly working in the interests of the English enterprise, viz., Concession for the road to Shushter, Régie, mining, &c., all of which were against the Russian political interests.

His enemies, viz., Amin-u-Dowleh, late Mushire-u-Dowleh, Naib-us-Saltaneh, Zil-us-Sultan, Sahibi Dewan, Azud-ul-Mulk, Kavam-ud-Dowleh, and nearly all the attendants of the Palace were working against him, intriguing at the same time with the Russian Minister and M. Spyrs to bring troubles on him.

The most unpopular English institution of all was the Régie, against which, with the intrigues of the Naib-us-Saltaneh, M. Bützow made a protest in 1890 before that enterprise was inaugurated.

Sadre Azam, with the counsel of this Legation, fought the Russian Minister and proved to him that the Persian Government were not bound by the Treaty not to grant a monopoly to any one they liked.

The conduct of the manager of the Régie, in spite of the Sadre Azam's continual advice for the quiet working enterprise, roused first the interested merchants in this trade and then the people against the Régie, which gave the Russian Minister here and his Consul-General at Tabriz, as well as the enemies of Sadre Azam, the most favourable opportunity and instrument, one to thwart British interest and destroy their opponent, and the other (Sadre Azam's enemies) to ruin him completely. So they began to work against the Régie, which they reckoned would naturally ruin the Sadre Azam. In this scheme both the enemies of Sadre Azam and the Russians succeeded in the abolition of this enterprise; and no doubt, if not entirely ruined His Highness, still his influence with the Shah and his popularity with the people were much impaired, nor in such a momentous time, according to his own confidential conversation with Mr. Greene and myself, he received any practical help from our Legation, for whose interest, he grieved to say, had worked.

From that time, and by other incidents which happened since, Sadre Azam's real influence with the Shah began to fade, and His Majesty, through the constant intrigues of the Naib-us-Saltaneh and Zil-us-Sultan and others, is impressed with a conviction that Sadre Azam has been the cause of getting him into debt to the English Company.

The Russian Minister, having succeeded in his scheme and having got the better over his opponent, thought it advisable to win the one man's friendship whom he preferred to the others, nevertheless, they were his colleagues in the scheme.

The opportunity afforded him in 1892, when Sadre Azam fell out with the Shah and sent in his resignation, which His Majesty did not accept. Then the Russian Minister came in and showed his friendship and help. He had an audience with the Shah and advised His Majesty to reconcile Sadre Azam, as no other Minister could do any good for him except Amin-us-Sultan, &c. The reconciliation was made and His Highness was in that year raised to the position of Sadre Azam. The Russian Minister took the credit to himself, and took a good care also to make it known to all the world that he was the cause of reinstating the Sadre Azam.

From that time Sadre Azam, discouraged by abolition of the Régie and other English enterprises which were, through his assistance, introduced, and by the callous indifference of his Master in bettering the state of his country, he has become comparatively careless in the affairs of the country in general, and submits to the wishes of the Shah with forbearing disgust. Now and then his patience gives way and attempts to resign and quarrels with the Shah, but those round him, such as his relations and his protégés, force him to be reconciled.

His friends, that is real friends, are few, I may say none than his wife and family, but those who now profess to be his loyal friends are Amin Khelvat, Ikbal-u-Dowleh, Mushire-ul-Mulk, and a few more in the same standing, but these men to begin with are not influential enough, nor, I think, if Sadre Azam came to grief would stand by him.

Vali Ahd professes a great friendship for Sadre Azam, but we know what sort of weak creature he is, whose assistance, as long as the Shah lives, is of no avail to his Highness the Sadre Azam, and in the event of the Shah's death he may be influenced by those around him against Sadre Azam.

I have heard repeatedly from Sadre Azam in our confidential conversation, saying that he rather would be a peasant in Europe than in his present situation here, in which position he cannot do any good for his country under this present Shah, who, he said, has not a particle of patriotism in him, and thinks nothing for the country, but a greed for money and women. Nor, he said, it is any use trying to make him do anything. He was telling me these words with most painful feelings.

(Signed) NAWAB.

September 22, 1895.

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

APPENDIX 3.

LIST of the Total Revenues of Persia, by Nawab Hasan Ali Khan.

Names of Provinces.	In Cash.	In Kind.						Amounts made by the Governors and Farmers over and above the Revenues.
		Wheat and Barley.	Rice.	Cotton.	Pease.	Kah.	Green Barley Grass.	
	Tomans krs. shs.	Kharwars mans.	Kharwars mans.	Kharwars mans.	Kharwars mans.	Kharwars mans.	Kharwars mans.	Tomans krs. shs.
Arabistan	154,261 2 19	1,760 0	..	..	..	800 0	..	12,000 0 0
Assadabad	3,060 4 16	2,571 61	..	..	..	1,600 8½	..	..
Astrabad	11,465 9 9	..	9,183 39	..	..	..	..	12,000 0 0
Azarbijan	795,567 9 6	55,000 79	50,224 0	..	..	5,957 50	..	150,000 0 0
Brujird	61,212 1 19	4,866 75	..	..	..	1,040 0	..	5,000 0 0
Bushire	112,038 8 9	..	..	..	..	..	..	20,000 0 0
Customs for all Persia	950,000 0 0	..	..	..	..	..	..	228,500 0 0
Chardeh Kalatch	1,049 2 0	40 0	..	..	..	..	..	500 0 0
Damawand	2,294 2 4	1,454 66	..	..	..	..	..	500 0 0
Farse	513,656 7 18	7,678 42	..	..	..	..	..	130,000 0 0
Firuzkuh	1,571 5 12	197 0	..	..	..	..	..	500 0 0
Garroos	12,996 5 7	1,862 42	..	..	..	..	..	3,000 0 0
Gilan	353,525 6 6	..	..	..	..	..	..	30,000 0 0
Gulpaygan	22,781 0 19	1,466 98	..	..	..	216 19	..	..
Ispahan	393,622 3 3	9,463 24	..	..	..	6,000 0	..	160,000 0 0
Janshakan	7,330 1 19	96 0	..	..	..	..	..	..
Kashan	71,588 3 3	1,033 88	..	..	..	920 92	..	5,000 0 0
Kazvin	96,891 0 7	8,444 17	..	..	..	809 83	..	24,000 0 0
Kazzuz and Farahan	67,896 1 4	16,821 39	..	..	..	7,704 0	..	..
Kangawar	1,721 0 12	527 45	..	..	..	158 50	..	9,000 0 0
Kamareh	9,097 5 12	1,836 66	..	..	..	..	..	..
Khar	10,635 2 12	6,073 60	..	..	..	4,683 83	..	..
Khamseh	86,239 8 3	10,698 0	..	..	..	3,078 0	..	22,000 0 0
Kharakan	5,180 1 4	1,466 65	..	..	..	..	..	..
Khorasan and Seistan	663,704 4 11	40,295 69	..	..	..	5,367 13	..	100,000 0 0
Kirman and Beluchistan	234,778 5 14	19,148 43	..	..	..	18,318 43	..	140,000 0 0
Kirmanshah	96,308 0 13	10,688 21	..	..	..	3,997 66	..	60,000 0 0
Koom	29,678 8 8	3,756 64	..	..	..	..	..	4,000 0 0
Kurdistan	89,956 6 11	..	..	..	..	..	..	40,000 0 0
Luristan	60,375 3 0	5,268 0	..	..	..	2,956 20	..	5,000 0 0
Malayer and Lusirkan	53,789 7 9	4,248 86	..	..	..	1,110 0	..	5,000 0 0
Hamadan	69,361 4 16	7,316 0	..	..	..	413 85	..	8,000 0 0

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APPENDIX 4.

Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Picot on Past and Present Policy in Persia.

(Confidential.)

HITHERTO our efforts at reform in Persia have been directed towards the extension of its commerce, or to the development of its internal resources, in the vain hope of thereby materially improving the finances or adding to the stability of the country.

Such efforts have ended in failure, the finances have steadily gone from bad to worse, the country has lost rather than gained in stability, and British prestige has to some extent declined.

Failure may be traced to such causes as the fear of His Majesty that reform might lead to a diminution of his power, the complete disorganization of the public services, the inability of the Central Government to protect foreigners, and, lastly, the nervous jealousy of Russia.

Setting on one side for the moment the question of Russian jealousy, the history of the past few years has shown clearly the impossibility of introducing reform by means of the ordinary civilizing methods of trade without, as a preparatory step, clearing the ground by the introduction of elementary reform in the country itself. We have, in other words, essayed to cure an internal disorder by the application of external remedies.

We should have directed our effort at the administration itself, for maladministration is at the root of all the evil from which Persia now suffers, and I am convinced that no good can come except following on a reorganization of the system of government.

What that system is I have attempted to make clear in Part I of my notes on "Administration."

In Part II, always adhering to the principle that the salvation of Persia depends primarily on internal reform, I have traced out the broad lines on which that reform might take its course.

The next question is by what means or persuasion can Persia be induced to act energetically on her own behalf. Experience has proved both the inability and unwillingness of the official classes to carry out any measures of reform, and has demonstrated that foreign pressure alone can supply the necessary motive power towards progress.

Hitherto jealousy, commercial or political, has always prevented England and Russia from exercising joint pressure; whatever the cause of jealousy, its effects, as far as England is concerned, cannot be deemed satisfactory. We have only partially succeeded in our trading purposes, Persia remains weak, and Russia advances steadily in influence and authority; added to this non-success, the struggle has engendered a bitter feeling between ourselves and our rivals.

With these resultants I venture to think some doubt may be expressed of the value of the line of policy adopted in the past. In my opinion nothing short of war can prevent the spread of Russian influence in Northern Persia. The logic of facts proves this to be a hopeless task, and there is little doubt she will acquire a predominance in the affairs of the north. The old lines of policy, therefore, having failed to create a strong Persia, considerations of a fresh departure naturally arise.

It is possible that Russia would meet us half-way were a proposal formulated adequately defining the legitimate spheres of commercial activity of either nation. The advantages of such a course are obvious, and I can see no sufficient reason for objecting to Russia pushing all purely commercial schemes in such manner as she may think fit. Part of the agreement would necessarily include joint action in restoring order in the financial and internal administration of the country, as without such action disintegration and political division would inevitably follow.

It is also possible that Russia might be willing to come to an understanding as regards the limitation of our respective spheres of influence, and yet be unwilling to touch the country on the vital question of reform, suggesting, perhaps, a partial control of certain branches of administration—of the Customs or Mint, for instance. Such suggestion should, I venture to think, be accepted with caution, as without concurrent reform in Finance, Interior, and Justice, political division would rapidly result. It should be a *sine quâ non* that foreign interference should go hand in hand with progress in internal administration.

The last contingency is of Russia preferring the *status quo* and of refusing to co-operate at all. In that case little can be done, except to again approach His Majesty, and to make him understand that all political assistance will be contingent on administrative reform

It would also seem necessary to assert ourselves more confidently, and to let it be known that we are as keenly alive to our interests in the south as Russia is in the north.

Financial assistance, in whatever form, should be made dependent on material concession. His Majesty is at this moment seeking relief from the burden entailed by the Régie debt. He hints that Her Majesty's Government could readily obtain half-a-million of money, pay off the Régie debt, and reimpose the same at a lower rate of interest, say at 4 per cent., thereby benefiting Persia at once to the extent of 10,000*l*.

I know nothing of the difficulties which may stand in the way of the furtherance of

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this scheme, but if it were thought desirable to assist His Majesty in this or in any other manner financially, I would suggest that two separate guarantees should be demanded (other, of course, than the Customs guarantee of the southern ports).

The first is the opening of the Upper Karun to British trade, with permission to run commercial steamers on its waters.

His Majesty does not apparently favour this project, fearing, it is said, the development of our trading Companies on the lines of the old East India Company—an idea fostered by Russia and France. The Sadr Azm is probably also interested in retaining a Persian monopoly above Ahwaz, for rumour declares that he has a financial interest in the Nasiri Company; in any case, neither the weak fears of the Shah, nor Court intrigue, should be allowed to stand in the way.

I attach much importance to the opening out of the Karun, not that British trade is likely to develop by leaps and bounds, but because, till in direct touch with Shuster and Dizful, we shall never be able to compel Persia to open up the roads radiating therefrom, or to insist on the tribes being kept in order.

The second guarantee is one that should safeguard our interests against such action as was taken by Russia a few years ago, when she obtained a concession giving her the power to block all railway construction in Persia till the year 1900.

This concession struck directly at British development in the south, and showed how regardless Persia can be on occasion of the interests of Great Britain.

(Signed) H. PICOT, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Military Attaché.

Tehran, August 31, 1895.

APPENDIX 5.

Lieutenant-Colonel Picot to Sir M. Durand.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Tehran, July* 1, 1895.

DURING the recent visit of Colonel Yate to Tehran I had an opportunity of discussing with him the advisability of extending our Agency system of espionage in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and have now the honour of transmitting a Memorandum on the subject, for your information.

I also attach certain notes on the position of Her Majesty's Consulates of Tabriz and Resht, in Northern Persia, which to some extent bear on the same question.

I am, &c.

(Signed) H. PICOT, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Military Attaché.

Memorandum respecting "News Agencies of Central Asia and the Caucasus."

(Confidential.)

During the war scare of 1885 about the only information we had regarding the movements of Russian troops into Trans-Caspia was from the telegrams and reports of Mr. Peacock, the Consul at Batoum. Since then the Consulate-General at Meshed has been established, and a watch is kept on the various cantonments of Trans-Caspia as far north as Samarkand. As a rule our reports record the movements of Russian troops only after their arrival in Trans-Caspia.

This is not sufficient; what we require is early and accurate information of activity in the Caucasus, in Baku, Petrovsk, or Astrakan.

We may, I think, take it for granted that Russia will foresee coming events, and gradually prepare for the struggle by timely concentrations. Long before the outbreak of hostilities her troops will be quietly moving towards Trans-Caspia and Khorassan by way of the Caucasus, and to the Oxus by Orenbourgh and Siberia; whilst both Astrakan and Tashkend will be pouring in supplies by the Trans-Caspia Railway system. It is at this time early information will be of the utmost importance.

Our only source at present is Mr. Stevens, the Consul at Batoum, and his powers are limited to watching the arrivals and departures of Russian troops at Batoum from Odessa. He has no funds, neither has he any special organization for recording the movements of troops across the Caspian. Some years ago we had a Consul at Tiflis, but the appointment was allowed to drop with the departure of Mr. Lyall. The re-establishment of this post does not appear to be a matter of great moment, more especially as such a measure might lead Russia to demand similar concessions in India.

On the Caspian itself we have no Consular officer. The Consul at Resht, in Persia, is some 20 miles inland from the port of Enzileh, and is entirely removed from all chances of getting news of any movements that may be going on in Russian ports to the north. His value for such purposes is practically *nil.*

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The question I would now ask is, would it be worth while supplementing our News Agencies in Central Asia by the establishment of other and similar Agencies at Tiflis, Baku, Petrovsk, and Astrakan. We now expend a large sum of money on a system which may fail at the most critical time, and would probably fail on the outbreak of war. It supplies us with doubtful, yet useful, information regarding the present development of Russian resources in Central Asia, but can give no indication of those preparatory movements of which it is vital to us to have the earliest information.

There is no reason for thinking any prohibitive expense would be incurred in thus extending the field of our observations, but this can only be determined after consultation with Mr. Stevens at Batoum.

As regards the other question touched upon, viz., of Russian operations by Orenbourgh and Siberia, I am afraid we must remain, as at present, dependent on such rumours and reports as come by way of Afghanistan, Kashghar, and Meshed, checked to a great extent by our knowledge of the resources of the Oxus regions, and the activity displayed by Russia in other parts of her Empire.

(Signed) H. PICOT, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Military Attaché.

Tehran, July 1, 1895.

Consulates in Northern Persia: Tabriz.

(Confidential.)

During the last two years, dating from the arrival of Her Majesty's Consul-General in Tabriz in 1893, much correspondence has taken place on the subject of Her Majesty's Consulate-General.

Mr. Wood pointed out that the means placed at his disposal for the maintenance of the dignity of his position and the prestige of the British Government were such as could not bear comparison with those of his foreign colleagues, consequently the Consulate occupied a very secondary and humiliating position. Mr. Wood went to some trouble to prove his statements, and compared the relative positions of the various Consulates in so far as their emoluments and staff are concerned.

Extracts from his letters of the 26th November, 1894, and the comparative statement, are attached.* It will be seen that Her Majesty's Consul-General receives a salary of 650*l.* per annum, with 270*l.* for office allowances, and is provided with an unfurnished house, at one time Her Majesty's Legation in Persia.

The Russian Consul-General receives a salary of 2,000*l.* per annum, has a furnished town and country house, six horses, and carriages provided by Government, besides many public servants, and is, in addition, assisted by a large staff consisting of two Secretaries, two Mirzas, two clerks. The Secretaries are paid for at the rate of 880 gold imperials, the Mirzas 100*l.* per annum. All are provided with quarters.

The French Consul receives 800*l.* per annum, 400*l.* allowances. He is assisted by a Vice-Consul on a salary of 228*l.*, and a Mirza paid at the rate of 23 tomans per mensem. All have free quarters.

The Turkish Consul-General draws about 1,020*l.* per annum, is assisted by a paid Vice-Consul and Attaché. All with free quarters.

An examination of the foregoing shows that the staff maintained by Russia is much larger than that of the other Powers. Russian interests are doubtless greater, and her expenditure is in proportion; her case, therefore, as regards expenditure, does not appear to offer a fair field for comparison.

As regards the other Consulates the position is otherwise, and there should be at least no great disparity between the means and advantages allotted to Her Majesty's Consul-General and those enjoyed by his Turkish and French colleagues. Mr. Wood, however, maintains that a great disparity does exist, and that his means are such as do not admit of his performing his duties, social and political, in a manner befitting the Representative of Government. The details already given explain that Her Majesty's Consul-General receives 650*l.* per annum as against 1,200*l.* of the French Consul, and 1,020*l.* of the Turkish Consul-General, or a difference of 550*l.* and 370*l.* respectively. For the sake of argument the Vice-Consuls attached to the latter Consulates need not be considered, as their emoluments may be taken to represent the sum set apart as office allowance in the British Consulate. The actual difference of salary is very great, and it is evident that Her Majesty's Consul-General is not as well equipped for the part he is expected to play as those of the other Powers.

After a visit to Tabriz, and some study of the conditions of life in that city, I may venture to give it as my opinion that it is impossible for any one to properly carry out his duties on a salary of 650*l.* per annum.

It is difficult to reconcile the fact that the Consulate at Resht is paid for at the rate

* Apparently omitted by mistake. Lieutenant-Colonel Picot is not now here, and I cannot lay my hand on the comparative statement. But this note will serve the purpose.—H. M. D., *September* 29.
A comparative statement was sent to the Foreign Office by Mr. Wood in his despatch No. 1 of the 3rd January, 1893.

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of 600*l.* per annum whilst that at Tabriz receives only 650*l.* The reduction of the former post to the status of a Vice-Consulate would effect a large saving, and perhaps it might be possible to utilize a part of that saving towards improving the position of the post at Tabriz.

An additional 200*l.* per annum seems to be absolutely necessary to place Her Majesty's Consulate-General on a proper footing.

Another alternative, and the only one which presents itself to my mind, is that an officer with large private means should be appointed, to whom the loss of 200*l.* or 300*l.* a-year would be a matter of no great moment.

(Signed) H. PICOT, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Military Attaché.

Tehran, June 30, 1895.

Consulates in Northern Persia: Resht.

In a Memorandum dated the 1st July, 1895, on the subject of "News Agencies of Central Asia and the Caucasus," I made a reference to Her Majesty's Consulate at Resht, stating that, as regards furnishing any information of Russian movements on the Caspian, this Consulate could render little or no assistance.

Further inquiries have led me to question the necessity or advisability of maintaining an officer of the rank of Consul at a post where British interests can be so little served as at the place in question.

The staff at Resht consists of one Consul and a native Assistant; the total cost, not including incidental expenses, being 750*l.* per annum. The duties of Her Majesty's Consul extend to the Provinces of Mazanderan and Gilan, and are presumably both political and commercial.

On the east is the important town of Astrabad, with its port of Bander Gez. There Russia does a large import trade, watched by a Consul at Astrabad, and a Vice-Consul at Bander Gez (generally the agent of the Mercury Company line of steamers). The exports consist of cotton, raisins, rice, wool, &c.; the imports of sugar, cotton goods, tea, petroleum, &c. British trade is hardly worth mentioning, and our interests are sufficiently served by a native agent, who sends information of tribal movements on the Atrek and Gurgan, and general reports on the state of the province.

Mail-steamers on this side of the Caspian ply from Ozanada to Bander Gez and Meshed-i-Sar. They proceed no further west, the consequence being that Astrabad has become an outpost of Tehran, not of Resht, and all reports are sent direct to Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran. Once every two or three years the Consul makes a tour to Astrabad, and renews his acquaintance with the province.

The next port, and the more important, is that of Meshed-i-Sar, the outlet for Barfurush and Mazanderan. Here again Russia does a large export and import trade.

Resht, as already explained, is a town lying 20 miles inland from the port of Enzileh. The trade is almost entirely with Russia. English merchants compete on a small scale in certain classes of cotton goods, a competition becoming every year more and more difficult.

British enterprise is further represented by a branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia, established to facilitate exchange operations. This business has so far not been very lucrative.

It is possible that a second branch may be opened at Meshed-i-Sar, as the manager has an idea of profiting by the large exchange, and of engaging directly in the trade with Russian houses; however, this is entirely problematical.

Commercially, therefore, it would appear that our Consul has but little chance of pushing British trade.

Politically, his influence is still more questionable. At one time Astrabad was thought politically to be a place of importance, owing to its proximity to the countries of the Yamut and Tekke Turkomans. This led to the Consular appointments of Captain Lovett and Colonel Stewart; but whatever importance the place may have had in the past, such has entirely ceased with the Russian occupation of the Trans-Caspian regions, and this was so far recognized as to lead to the abolition of the Consulate some years ago.

Resht is even less favourably situated, and the presumption that the Consul can be of any political value may be dismissed as incorrect.

There may be other reasons, of which I am in ignorance, necessitating the maintenance of an officer of the rank of British Consul at Resht; but, as regards our commercial interests, I am of opinion that equally good and sufficient service could be performed by a Vice-Consul.

(Signed) H. PICOT, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Military Attaché.

Tehran, June 30, 1895.

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APPENDIX 6.

Letter from Nawab Hasan Ali Khan.

(Private.) *June* 24, 1895.

My dear Sir Mortimer,

WITH reference to Sadre Azam's confidential conversation about the loan, &c., my own private opinion and advice would be that if the English Government ever wished to do anything in return for the friendly actions of Sadre Azam since Sir A. Nicolson's time, as he (Sadre Azam) believes has done a great deal in reviving our influence, this was the opportunity for us to kill two birds with one shot, *i.e.*, to oblige Sadre Azam in getting him out of the mesh, and at the same time, through him, to get something from the Persian Government assuring our continual paramount influence in this country. Should our Government shut their ears to your advice, His Highness will, under circumstances, seek some other remedy, which no doubt would be through the Russians, when the result no doubt will be injurious to our influence in this country.

Yours, &c.

(Signed) NAWAB.

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

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India Office,
London, 30th June 1899.

Secret,
No. 30.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord,

I forward herewith, for consideration by your Excellency's Government, a copy of a letter* from the Foreign Office, giving cover to a Despatch from Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran, on the subject of the maintenance of our influence in Persia.

Persia: maintenance of British influence.

* Dated 5th May 1899.

2. I shall await the views of your Excellency's Government on this subject, and I request that you will at the same time consider whether it is possible to improve your Political service on the Persian Gulf, in order to secure the services of officers who have special knowledge of the language and people. It will be observed that the reorganisation and increase of Consular officers in Persia is only one measure for strengthening British influence in that country. I shall be glad to receive an expression of your views upon the other questions discussed by Sir Mortimer Durand.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant,

George Hamilton

S. 39.

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

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

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ENCLOSURE.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office,
5th May 1899.

Sir,

I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India in Council, the accompanying copy of a Despatch* from Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran, No. 16, dated 12th February 1899, submitting a scheme for the reorganization of the Consular Staff in Persia.

* Not reprinted.

Lord Salisbury will be glad to be favoured with any observations which Lord George Hamilton may wish to offer on these proposals.

I am, &c.,
T. H. SANDERSON.

The Under Secretary of State
for India.

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

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CONFIDENTIAL.

(7101.)

Despatch from Sir M. Durand respecting appointment of Additional Consular Officers in Persia.

[With a Map.]

Sir M. Durand to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 20.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord, *Tehran, February* 12, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches Nos. 61 of the 27th June and No. 8, Consular, of the 29th September, 1898, calling for my opinion with regard to certain suggestions for the appointment of additional Consular officers in Persia.

The matter has engaged my attention for several years, and I have more than once expressed my opinion upon it. In September 1895 I wrote a Memorandum reviewing the state of affairs in Persia, and submitting proposals for the improvement of our position. An officer had shortly before been sent to act as Consul in Kerman, and I wrote with reference to this appointment: "It will strengthen our influence materially if we have more men of this kind in other parts of Persia as occasion offers, and if our Representatives in Bushire and Ispahan and Khorassan are encouraged to travel and make friends among the Chiefs and tribesmen. We need not excite the ready alarm of the Russians by too frequent journeys along their border, but I think we should spend some money in encouraging travel elsewhere, and in establishing Agencies at important points. For instance, I feel very doubtful whether the Government of India are right in deprecating the establishment of a British officer in Seistan; and, under certain conditions, we might find it very useful to have a man in Shuster to help in the opening of the roads in the Lur and Bakhtiari country."

I also advocated an improvement in the position of the Consul-General in Tabreez.

In August 1896 I submitted a detailed proposal for the establishment of a Consulate at Shuster, on the Karun, where our traders had been brutally ill-used, and I suggested that for their protection and the maintenance of order we might raise a tribal levy under British officers.

A year later, when in England, I followed up these suggestions by advocating the retention of the Kerman appointment, and again asking for the establishment of a Consul on the Karun.

The result was that the Kerman appointment was continued, provisionally, and since that time the nomination by the Russians of a Consul for Seistan has led to our also appointing a Consul for that district; but I believe no further steps have been taken to carry out my suggestions.

Those suggestions formed part of a general scheme of policy, based upon an examination of the state of affairs in Persia in 1895. The further suggestions which I now desire to submit must, I think, in like manner, form part of a general scheme of policy, based upon an examination of the state of affairs in Persia at the present time. The question of our Consular establishments cannot be considered apart from the larger question.

Almost the whole of the Memorandum of 1895 applies to the present position, and the paper contains a general statement of the views which I held then, and hold still, regarding the manner in which we should deal with Persia. I would therefore ask that the Memorandum may be read, and that this despatch may be considered as a supplement bringing it up to date. I can then confine myself to pointing out the

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changes which have taken place since the Memorandum was written, supplying at the same time such further information as may be necessary to give a comprehensive view of the present state of affairs.

For convenience sake, though I trust the whole Memorandum will be considered, I will here quote the penultimate paragraph, which sums up my views and proposals. It ran as follows :—

"Persia is misgoverned, and her condition is not satisfactory. Her finances are in disorder, and her resources undeveloped, and she contains some elements of disturbance, while there is no armed force upon which the Government can depend for the maintenance of its authority. The influence of Russia, which is antagonistic to our own, predominates at Tehran, and it is believed to be exerted against the interests of the country.

"On the other hand, Persia has practically no debt, and her natural resources are great. Her internal condition is not hopeless, or such as to cause immediate alarm. And the influence of Russia, though predominant, is not exclusive. England has still a strong position throughout the country; and Russia, recognizing her own weakness in Asia, seems unlikely for the present to take any step in Persia which would seriously offend us.

"The general situation, therefore, might be worse, but it is not one with which we can rest altogether satisfied.

"It is not probable that Russia will combine with England in reorganizing the Persian Administration, and in developing her trade; and there is little hope to be got in this direction from other European nations, none of whom carry any weight in Tehran.

"England by herself, especially if thwarted by Russia, cannot hope to overcome the opposition of interested persons in high places, and to carry a scheme of reform which will regenerate Persia. She can hardly hope, indeed, to carry any reform of radical importance, and must fall back upon her existing policy, contenting herself with maintaining the integrity of Persia; watching and checking Russian aggression; gaining the goodwill, respect, and confidence of the Persian Government and people; developing trade; and taking such opportunities as may occur of urging measures beneficial to the country.

"With a view to maintaining the integrity and independence of Persia, it is desirable to make timely arrangements for securing a quiet succession on the Shah's death, and we should endeavour to strengthen our influence over the heir apparent by keeping an English doctor with him, by improving the position of our Representative at Tabreez, and in other ways. We should let it be understood that aggressive action by Russia in the north of Persia will immediately result in decided action by us in the south.

"In order to strengthen the friendly feelings entertained towards us in many parts of the country, we should encourage picked officers to travel among the Chiefs and people, and we should, as occasion offers, establish fresh agencies at important points. We should try to obtain for the people such benefits as a good currency.

"The Persian Government should be made to understand that they must not trifle with us in the future as they have occasionally done in the past; but we should try to gain their goodwill, and to help them in any way we can. Just now there is an opportunity of putting them under a great obligation by relieving them to some extent of the burden of the Régie Debt, which they find very harassing. The Shah has begged us earnestly to help him in this way, and has at the same time formally asked our advice as to the reforms which should be made in his Administration. I think we should give this advice to the best of our power, and should clear off the Régie Debt by lending the Persian Government half-a-million at 3 or 4 per cent. on approved security, and on certain defined conditions. These conditions should include advantages to our trade, such as the opening of the Upper Karun, and also a satisfactory guarantee that the revenue and expenditure of the Persian Government shall, for the future, be made to balance.

"The probable result of such action on our part will be the introduction of a certain measure of administrative reform, and the strengthening of our influence in Persia, especially in the south, where we ought to be able to revive it and make it very strong.

"If we do not help the Persian Government in the manner indicated, we run the risk of alienating the Sadr-i-Azam, who has been sore with us about the Régie Debt, and of driving him and the Shah, whose greed for money is increasing with age, into some compromising transaction with Russia."

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I will now proceed to enumerate the principal changes which have taken place since these words were written.

The old Shah, Nasr-ed-Din, who had then ruled for nearly fifty years, is now dead. He has been succeeded by his second son, Mozaffer-ed-Din, who has proved an amiable but very weak Ruler. The Sadr-i-Azam, or Prime Minister, all powerful in 1895, was overthrown in the following year. He has now returned to office, but with a shadow of his former power. All real power is at present in the hands of the Shah's irresponsible advisers, notably his doctor, the Hakim-ul-Mulk. There is practically no Government. Some of the troops have disbanded themselves, and the rest are unpaid. The pay of the civil establishments is also in serious arrears. The finances, which were in disorder in 1895, are in worse disorder now. The Sadr-i-Azam has borrowed 300,000*l.* from the Russian Bank in Tehran, but all attempts at raising a substantial loan have broken down. The revenues, except from customs, are coming in very slowly; and at this moment the one hope of getting any considerable sum of money lies in the sale of the Provincial Governorships to the highest bidder. This destructive system, abolished by the new Shah when he came to the throne, has been revived by the Sadr-i-Azam; and it is said that this year's auction is to be on a very large scale indeed. There is much murmuring throughout the country at the state of things in Tehran, and the discontent is increased by the high price of food, which has led here and there to some serious rioting. Altogether, the internal condition of Persia is very unsatisfactory.

The Russians, meanwhile, have not been inactive. To the north, the road from Enzeli to Tehran, which had made but little progress before the visit of General Kouropatkine to Persia in 1895, has, since then, been vigorously pushed on, and it is now nearly ready for wheel traffic throughout its length. This is a most important advantage to Russia, both from a commercial and from a military point of view. Even now two-thirds of the imported goods sold in Tehran are Russian. In the north-west, Russia has pushed forward her railway towards Kars, and has surveyed a line from Kars to the Tabreez frontier, while within Azerbaijan there has been a remarkable propaganda among the Nestorian Christians, some thousands of whom have been won over to the Orthodox Church, thereby obtaining Russian protection and opening the door to Russian interference. To the north-east, the Russians have constructed a good cart-road from Asterabad to the Meshed frontier, and, by energetically encouraging their trade in Khorassan, they have secured a commanding position in this valuable market. They have also made use of the outbreak of plague in India to push down "sanitary" posts along the Afghan border in the direction of Seistan, where also they are trying to introduce their trade, and where they are shortly to have a Consul. Even in the centre of Persia, as far south as Ispahan, the Russians have shown fresh activity by establishing there a Consulate on a considerable scale of expenditure, and our Consul reports that the sale of Russian goods has already begun to increase.

I will not go into detail here, or enumerate the persistent rumours which reach me as to Russian schemes in various directions; but it is, I think, quite clear, from the facts I have mentioned, that the Russians have been working consistently, and not without effect, to push their trade and to enhance their political influence in the country.

It is only natural that their operations and the unsatisfactory state of internal affairs should have had a depressing effect upon British trade. We are being rapidly ousted from the Khorassan market. In Tehran itself our trade is undoubtedly suffering, and will suffer more as the Resht road is opened to traffic. In the north-west our Trebizond trade has fallen off to a serious extent. Even in the Gulf ports, where, by the way, there has been some attempt at Belgian and German competition, we are not doing as well as we might be. The shrinking of our Khorassan trade has told here, and the most recent Returns cannot, I think, be regarded as satisfactory.

On the other hand, it must not be supposed that recent changes in Persia have all been unfavourable to our interests. This is not the case. In one respect we have reason to be very well satisfied. Three years ago almost every man in the country, Persian or European, believed that the death of the Shah would be the signal for general disorder and for some marked advance on the part of Russia, possibly involving the break-up of the country. I stated in my Memorandum of 1895 my reasons for doubting the correctness of this view, but it was the prevalent view, and I asked Her Majesty's Government to make timely preparations. This danger, at least, has been averted.

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When His Majesty was murdered it was very doubtful whether there would not be an outbreak of the Tehran garrison, which would have been followed by serious trouble all over Persia, and Russian troops were, in fact, held in readiness for an immediate advance; but, thanks to English money, the outbreak did not take place, and the succession was peaceful. If the present Shah should die as suddenly as his father, we may reasonably hope that the succession may again pass over quietly. This is, no doubt, a negative gain, but, from our point of view, it is very important. The Shah, too, though weak, is well-meaning, and not, I think, at all inclined to submit to Russian dictation. He has retained his English doctor in spite of determined attacks on the part of the Russian and French Legations, who wanted to put in a Frenchman; and he has nominated as his heir apparent his eldest son, who was opposed by the Russians; and his most influential adviser, the Hakim-ul-Mulk, is believed to be very friendly to us.

To turn to other matters mentioned in my Memorandum of 1895, and connected points, we have defined the long disputed boundary between Persia and Kelat, and have pushed forward from India along the trade route to Seistan, and have sent officers into Seistan itself, and have made arrangements for the improvement of the trade route from Ahwaz to Ispahan.

We have severely punished a tribe on the Gulf coast which was responsible for the murder of one of our telegraph officers, and we have sent a detachment of British Indian troops to protect the telegraph line for the future. This has had a good effect. Disturbances have occurred in Kelat territory, but they have not spread to Persian Beluchistan, and the Ruler of this important province has throughout behaved in the most friendly manner. On the Karun, at Shuster, our people have suffered seriously from the fanaticism of the town mob, which has been fostered, if not created, by the weakness of the Persian Government; but we are on good terms with the Arabs and Bakhtiaris who hold the neighbouring country, and a little decided action on the part of the Persian Government would soon put matters right in Shuster itself, where the people were at one time particularly friendly to us. In the south we have greatly strengthened our position by insisting upon, and obtaining, the removal of an obnoxious Governor of Bushire. I dwelt in my Memorandum of 1895 upon the importance of the principle involved, and I would invite special attention to the point. The effect of the case has been most remarkable. Altogether, it is certain, from the reports of officers who have had recent opportunities of judging, that in the southern zone our reputation just now stands very high indeed.

In Tehran itself we have had to deal, and still have to deal, with some hostility or obstructiveness on the part of influential officials, but among them also our action in the south has had its effect, and recent events in the Soudan have created a great impression here. I do not think our political influence at the capital is any weaker than it was in the time of the late Shah. On the contrary, I think that at this moment it is stronger.

Even with regard to trade, there are some encouraging features in the prospect. Perhaps, as this matter is one of very great importance, and as it is especially connected with the question of our Consular establishments, I had better examine it in some detail.

I may begin by pointing out that we have in Tehran an English Bank, the Imperial Bank of Persia, with a capital of 650,000*l*., and branches at Tabreez, Resht, Meshed, Ispahan, Shiraz, Yezd, and Bushire. This is the only bank in Persia which can legally issue notes. It has, I believe, done some unsatisfactory business in India, but so far as its business in this country is concerned, it is in a flourishing condition. It did signal service on the occasion of the Shah's death, when it provided, at a few hours' notice, large sums of money both at Tehran and at Tabreez, thus enabling the Provisional Government to pay up the troops, who were in a very dangerous state. The bank has been threatened to some extent by Russian competition, but so far it more than holds its own.

Our trade enters Persia by a variety of routes, of which the following may be mentioned:—

1. From Trebizond into the north-west corner of Persia, near Bayazid.
2. From the Turkish frontier near Khanikin—"the Bagdad route."
3. By the Karun ports: Mohammerah and Ahwaz.
4. By Bushire.
5. By Lingah, Bundar Abbas, and minor ports in the eastern parts of the Gulf.
6. From Kelat territory.
7. From Afghanistan.

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The last-named route has been practically closed for the time, partly by the exactions of the Ameer and partly by the Russian sanitary posts, which have stopped the passage of caravans between the Afghan border and South-Eastern Persia.

Of the other routes, that by Trebizond still brings in a considerable volume of British trade, but less than half it once brought in. The estimated yearly value of this trade is now about 302,000*l.* Curzon's estimate for 1889 was about 610,000*l.* It should be observed, however, that, although the decrease is doubtless due in part to Russian competition, it is also due in part to the Armenian massacres and the troubled state of the country during the last few years. There was a dreadful massacre in Trebizond itself, which shook the confidence of our traders. Trade checked in this way is likely to be diverted through other channels rather than lost, and I believe this is what has happened. Part of our Trebizond trade has now passed over to the more southerly routes, especially that by Bagdad.

The trade by the Bagdad route has increased in importance, and seems likely to increase still further, especially if the railway system spreads in Asia Minor and Turkish Arabia. In the absence of any English competition, the Germans have unfortunately obtained a Concession for making the road from Tehran to Khanikin; and British trade in this quarter is threatened by the Russian road from Resht to Kazvin, which, under the terms of the Concession, may be prolonged to Hamadan. Still, at present, the bulk of the goods imported by this route are British, and we hold the Kermanshah and Hamadan markets to the exclusion of all European competitors. From there we push forward into Kurdistan and other districts, including Tehran and Ispahan. Our trade for last year was estimated by the bank agent in the Custom-house at a total of 1,048,155*l.*, of which 838,524*l.* is British; and the exports are said to have been exceptionally small this year because of a bad opium crop. Also, the water in the Tigris was so low that transport was much impeded. Curzon's estimate for 1889 was 327,796*l.*

The Karun route may some day be one of the most important of all. The existing value of our trade is small, and the last figures* show a decrease on those given by Curzon for 1890, the total being only 126,550*l.* as against 180,680*l.* But there is reason to hope that the state of things will not continue. We are now opening out the road from Ahwaz to Ispahan, and believe that we shall thereby effect a large saving of time and cost in comparison with the Bushire and Ispahan route, which is long and difficult. Also, we are trying to open out roads northwards from the Karun to Sultanabad, the centre of the carpet trade, and to Hamadan and the surrounding country. I attach much value to the Karun route, which, from the nature of things, is entirely in our hands, and protected from any serious competition. Some good judges believe it will before long be our main trade route. Its future, however, is by no means certain, and we must not feel too sanguine about it.

The Bushire route is at present the most important of all, the volume of British trade for 1897 being estimated at 1,155,039*l.* This route must always be important, and seems likely to do well even if the Karun route develops. At present, it fills the country with British goods as far as Ispahan, where the Russian competition is small, and even supplies Tehran, 800 miles from the sea.

The eastern ports have suffered from the shrinking of the Khorassan and Afghan markets, and can show no increase on the figures given for 1889. Still they supply a very large tract of country, and their trade should not suffer any further from Russian competition. They ought easily to hold their own in Yezd, Kerman and South-eastern Persia generally. The value of their trade to us in 1897 was estimated at 1,026,990 a-year.

The trade by the Kelat route is as yet small, but promises well. If we can succeed in pushing our goods into Seistan from the south of Khorassan by the caravan road from Quetta, and especially if the Government of India should decide to construct a railway, there may be a real future for this route. The estimated value of the trade for 1898 is 39,329*l.*

Altogether if one looks at the map of Persia the position held by our trade is very remarkable. It is in full possession of the country up to and including a line drawn from Khanikin by Kermanshah, Hamadan, Ispahan, Yezd and Kerman to Seistan. Beyond that line it has begun to give ground both in the north-west and in Tehran and in Khorassan, but, in spite of great geographical disadvantages, it has by no means been excluded. Its total value is estimated at over 3,488,000*l.* This is an increase of nearly 500,000*l.* on the estimate given by Curzon for 1889, a rise of

* For the Karun and the Gulf ports I have failed to get any complete figures later than those of 1897.

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16 per cent. in nine years. This is not, I think, a discouraging state of things, especially when it is considered that the last seven years have been for Persia a very unlucky period in various ways. Year after year great tracts of territory in southern Persia have been devastated by locusts. Then we have had troubles consequent on the Tobacco Regie, and a severe epidemic of cholera and disorder following on the death of the Shah, and a succession of bad crops, causing a great rise in the prices of food. In Shiraz there has been such scarcity that three years ago the Persian Government contemplated importing wheat from India. Export of wheat has been forbidden for some time, and naturally the purchasing power of the population has been comparatively low, which has told on imports. And I imagine the plague in India has had a depressing effect on the Bombay and Karachi trade. Altogether, though we have suffered and must suffer from Russian competition in the north, our trade has on the whole increased, and with better seasons it gives fair promise of prosperity. It should be noted that the shrinking of the Khorassan trade is partly due to the fact that our goods now reach Central Asia by Batoum and Baku, and the Trans-Caspian Railway. The "Novoya Vremja" writes very mournfully about this.

Such are the principal changes which have taken place in Persia of late years; but before summing them up, with a view of examining the present state of affairs and submitting proposals for improving our position, I think it may be desirable to state briefly what are our present establishments in the country, and what amount of money we spend on them. I append a sketch map which will give some idea of the political geography.

The Diplomatic and Consular staff is as follows:—

At Tehran, the capital, we have a Minister with three Diplomatic Secretaries, two Oriental Secretaries, a surgeon, and a Vice-Consul. The total cost of the Legation is estimated at 16,640*l.* a-year, of which India pays 7,000*l.*

At Meshed, to the east, we have two officers of the Indian Political Service, who are also Consul-General and Vice-Consul, and a surgeon. The total cost of the Agency is estimated at 8,600*l.* a-year.

This is paid by India.

At Asterabad, to the north-east, we have a native Agent, who costs 48*l.* a-year. This is paid by Her Majesty's Government.

At Resht we have a Consulate, which costs 750*l.* a-year. This is paid by Her Majesty's Government.

At Tabreez, to the north-west, we have a Consulate-General, the cost of which is estimated at 920*l.* a-year. This is paid by Her Majesty's Government.

To the west of Tehran, at Kermanshah, on the Bagdad road, we have a native Agent, who costs 24*l.* a-year. This is paid by India.

Midway between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, at Ispahan, we have a Consulate, costing 750*l.* a-year. This is paid by Her Majesty's Government. There is also a native Agent, who costs 28*l.*

Further south again, at Shiraz, we have a native Agent, costing 160*l.* a-year. This is paid by India.

To the east of Shiraz, half-way to the frontier of India, we have a Consul at Kerman, who costs 500*l.* a-year. This appointment is provisional. Half the cost is paid by India and half by Her Majesty's Government.

The Consul at Kerman is now in Seistan, where it is now proposed to keep a Consul in future.

Finally, along the coast of the Persian Gulf we have:—

At Mohammerah a Vice-Consulate, which costs 490*l.* a-year. This is paid by Her Majesty's Government.

At Bushire a Resident, who is also Consul-General for Fars, with three Assistants, one of whom is Vice-Consul, and a surgeon. The cost of the Residency is estimated at 7,700*l.* This is paid by India.

The political work on the coast between Bushire and the Kelat frontier is in the hands of the Director of the Persian Gulf Telegraphs, who gets an allowance of 120*l.* a-year. This is paid by India.

The Resident at Bushire has also under his orders native Agents at Bahrein, Shargah, and Lingah, and they cost about 240*l.* a-year.

This completes the statement of our Diplomatic, Political, and Consular establishments in Persia. It will be seen that we employ twenty-one British officers, and that the total cost is about 36,970*l.* Of this total, as far as I can make out, Her Majesty's Government pay 12,876*l.*, and the Government of India, 24,094*l.*

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I should add that in the case of non-Indian Consulates I have made no allowance for travelling charges, as these are quite uncertain. We might perhaps add about 1,500*l.* a-year for this and other minor charges, which I need not mention.

Besides the Diplomatic, Political, and Consular establishments, it is to be observed that we maintain in Persia and the Persian Gulf a considerable Telegraph Department, with a numerous staff of English clerks. This department has been, and to some extent still is, a valuable organization for political and intelligence purposes. The telegraph clerks can supply much useful information at times, and in out-of-the-way places they are often called upon to act in somewhat responsible situations.

The sketch map appended to this despatch shows the lines of telegraph through Persia and the Gulf. Of these the lines extending from Tehran to Bushire, and the line along the Gulf coasts to Fao, Jask, Charbar, and the Kelat, are maintained by our telegraph staff, and are thoroughly efficient. The Persian line from Tehran to Meshed is inspected by our telegraph staff, and the Government of India give a Grant-in-aid of 20,000 rupees a year towards the cost of maintenance. We have an English clerk at Meshed. This line works well. The line from Tehran to Julfa in the north-west is in the hands of the Indo-European Telegraph Company, which has its head-quarters in London, but it is of no great use to us for political purposes, as it is closely watched by the Russians. This line is efficient. The rest of the lines shown on the map are maintained and worked by the Persian Government, and are very inefficient indeed.

We can now go on to review as a whole the state of affairs in Persia in 1899, and to consider what steps we can take to improve our position.

The internal condition of the country, which was bad enough in 1895, is now in some respects decidedly worse. The Shah, though a more amiable man than his father, is weak, and easily misled; the Prime Minister has no power, and cannot control his colleagues or the Provincial authorities; the finances are in complete disorder, and the revenues are coming in very slowly; the troops are unpaid, and inclined to be mutinous; food is dear all over the country, and the people are discontented. Meanwhile the Russians have been actively pushing their trade and political influence in the north of Persia, and with some success. They have even succeeded in establishing posts along the Afghan border, and in making themselves felt in Seistan and Ispahan. On the other hand it is as true now as in 1895 that the internal condition of Persia is not hopeless. She has practically no debt, and her resources are great. And though the influence of Russia is perhaps predominant in Tehran, yet England has still a strong position throughout the country. The quiet succession of the Shah was regarded as being, and was in fact, a great success for us; and the Shah's nomination of his eldest son as heir apparent, though the Russians were known to favour a younger son, also tended to increase our reputation. In various respects, His Majesty has shown goodwill towards us, and a decided disinclination to put himself under Russian control. In the south of Persia, that is up to a line drawn from Khanikin on the Turkish frontier, through Kermanshah, Hamadan, Ispahan, Yezd, and Kerman to Seistan, our trade and our political influence are paramount, and indeed, so far as Russia is concerned, almost exclusive. Russia has only just begun to touch the fringe of the zone at Seistan and Ispahan. Neither her Consular establishments nor her trade extend beyond these points. In the north zone on the other hand, although the local influence of the Russians is strong, we have our Consular establishments right up to the Russian border; and our trade, though it is suffering from Russian competition, is by no means beaten out of the field. The southern zone in fact is very much more in our hands, politically and commercially, than the northern zone is in Russian hands. All over Persia a large part of the telegraph system is worked by us in one form or another, and our bank has established itself in Tabreez and Resht and Meshed. Altogether, considering the advantages Russia has enjoyed, we have much reason to be surprised that our position should be as good as it is. Nevertheless, though things might be much worse than they are, it cannot be denied that, both from a political and a commercial point of view, our position is being threatened. We have now to consider what are the steps we should take to maintain and improve it.

In discussing this point I shall proceed on the assumption that we cannot hope to come to terms with Russia, and persuade her to join us in a policy of reform and development.

I suggested in my Memorandum of 1895 that such a proposal, if made by us, might possibly be accepted by Russia, especially if it formed part of a larger scheme

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for the settlement of our relations in Asia, and I pointed out how advantageous such an arrangement would be for both countries. But I assume that the scheme is impracticable, and that we must continue to work alone, with Russia watchful and more or less antagonistic.

Under these conditions, the question is what we can do by ourselves.

In my Memorandum of 1895 I answered that question in the following words :—

"England by herself, especially if thwarted by Russia, cannot hope to overcome the opposition of interested persons in high places, and to carry a scheme of reform which will regenerate Persia. She can hardly hope, indeed, to carry any reform of radical importance, and must fall back upon her existing policy, contenting herself with maintaining the integrity and independence of Persia, watching and checking Russian aggression, gaining the goodwill, respect, and confidence of the Persian Government and people, developing trade and taking such opportunities as may occur of urging measures beneficial to the country."

In the body of the Memorandum I explained at length the difficulties in the way of all attempts at reform, and I proposed certain definite steps which we should take in prosecution of the general policy stated above.

Substantially the answer now must, I think, be the same as in 1895, for substantially the position is the same. But the changes which I have noted in the internal condition of the country, and the recent efforts of the Russians in the north and centre of Persia, seem to make it necessary that I should supplement the proposals I made three years ago, and should explain, in somewhat greater detail, the measures which I think desirable.

The chief proposal which I have to make meets the question raised in your Lordship's despatches under reply. It is that we should increase and render more efficient our Consular establishments in Persia.

As stated at the beginning of this despatch, I have at various times recommended the establishment of Consulates in Seistan, Kerman, and on the Karun, and I have also advocated an improvement in the position of the Consul-General at Tabreez. Since then the Consul at Van and the Consul-General at Tabreez have recommended the establishment of a Vice-Consulate at Urumia, while the Resident at Bushire has suggested to me the appointment of Vice-Consuls at Bahrein and Bunder Abbas. The last suggestion is supported by Captain Sykes.

The Resident at Bushire has also suggested certain arrangements for the better maintenance of our interests in Shiraz. The appointment of a Russian Consul at Ispahan has led me to consider the necessity of making some improvement in the position of our Consul. The Government of India contemplates the possibility of appointing an English Consular officer to Bampur. Finally, it has been urged upon me that a Vice-Consul would be extremely useful at Kermanshah.

Your Lordship desires to have from me a Report showing the places at which the appointment of Consular officers would, in my opinion, be desirable, the limits of their respective districts, the grounds of my recommendations, and a detailed estimate of the expenditure which those appointments would entail.

My opinion upon all the suggestions above mentioned is as follows :—

(*a.*) In the first place we should have an officer in Seistan, and perhaps native Agents at some points between Seistan and Meshed.

(*b.*) The Kerman Consulate should be made permanent, and perhaps a British Vice-Consul or native Agent should be sent to Bampur.

(*c.*) The Resident in Bushire should spend the summer in Shiraz, and any necessary expense for a house and other details should be incurred.

(*d.*) We should raise the pay of the Consul at Ispahan, and improve his position.

(*e.*) We should appoint a Consul for the Karun and Arabistan, with head-quarters at Ahwaz, Shuster, or Mohammerah. It may be necessary to put under him one or two native Agents.

(*f.*) We should replace the native Agent at Kermanshah by a British Vice-Consul.

(*g.*) If the Government of India agree, I am inclined to think that we should have a Vice-Consul in Bunder Abbas, with charge of the trade throughout South-Eastern Persia. Also if the Government of India wish it, there can be no objection on the part of this Legation to the appointment of a British officer to Bahrein.

(*h.*) Finally, we should perhaps place a British Vice-Consul in Urumia or thereabouts, and we should improve the position of the Consul-General at Tabreez.

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The grounds for these recommendations are apparent from all I have written before.

(*a.*) With regard to the first recommendation, the importance of Seistan has long been recognized, and the recent reports of Messrs. Webb Ware and Brazier Creagh seem to put the matter beyond a doubt. We must keep Seistan in our zone. It is too valuable, and would be too dangerous in Russian hands, for us to let the Russians continue unchecked their efforts to close it to us and our trade. The necessity for having native Agents in neighbouring districts is not, I think, so clear. I have no great belief in the agency of what Surgeon-Major Creagh calls "crafty, diplomatic natives," unless they are very closely supervised. They often do more harm than good. But Captain Sykes will be able to advise after spending some months in Seistan.

(*b.*) It seems to be beyond dispute that a Consulate in Kerman is becoming yearly more necessary. We must maintain a thorough hold on Persian Beluchistan, in the interests of our adjoining Protectorate and of our trade. Kerman is the capital of this large and important province, and the head-quarters of the Governor-General, and a trade centre of some consequence. I am inclined to think that if we have a British officer in Kerman we do not want another at Bampur. For the present, at least, I should try to do without, although we might send a native Agent there if the Consul thinks he can get a man who will not stir up mischief among the border tribes.

(*c.*) Shiraz is a place of great importance, both commercially and as the capital of Fars, and the residence of the Governor-General. Our Consul-General for Fars should know something of the province and its Ruler, over whom he should endeavour to establish a personal influence. Our interests in Shiraz should not be left to the present native Agent, who, according to all the accounts I receive, does very little good and some harm. I feel some doubt whether the Resident in Bushire, who has a great deal of work to do in the Persian Gulf, is not overweighted by the charge of Fars; and it may be necessary hereafter to appoint a special officer to that charge, but for the present I would try the arrangement I have suggested.

(*d.*) It is, I think, evidently wrong that at a place like Ispahan, where our trade and our political influence have hitherto been in full possession, the newly-appointed Russian Consul should be better equipped than our own. The former has 800*l.* a-year pay, a Secretary, and a free house, with other privileges, including an escort of cossacks. The latter has 600*l.* a-year pay, of which he has to give back 60*l.* in house rent, and 150*l.* office allowance. I would make him a Consul-General, and raise his allowances to the level of the Russian Consul's.

(*e.*) A Consulate on the Karun is perhaps the most necessary of all the appointments I have suggested. Ahwaz may hereafter become a very important trade centre, and from there we should work upon the Arabs and Bakhtiaris and Lurs, establishing our hold upon them, and opening up the routes through their country, and perhaps raising from among them an irregular levy. The Resident in Bushire would prefer for the present to keep our Consul at Mohammerah. I doubt the expediency of this, as he should get into touch with the Lurs and Bakhtiaris quite as much as with the Arabs of the Lower Karun. However this may be the Consul will probably require a native Agent or two for commercial work. We should, I think, for the present at least, leave the Karun under the Consul-General for Fars. Our merchants would prefer his being in direct communication with Tehran, and Captain Sykes in his Report on the Karun recommends this; but I do not think we should, until the necessity is very clearly proved, take away the district from the charge of the Consul-General. It is better that we should have the whole of the Gulf coast in one hand.

(*f.*) A British Vice-Consulate at Kermanshah is, I think, very desirable. Our trade by the Bagdad route is increasing, and the route is a very important one in all respects. As I have shown, the British imports and exports by this route approach 1,000,000*l.* We must keep our hold on it if possible. Our native Agent, although a man of wealth and consequence, has from the time I have been in Persia done nothing for us, and has been a source of unending trouble and expense to the Legation owing to his quarrels with the Persians. It is the more important to keep our hold on Kermanshah, because the Russians may at any time push on their road from Kazvin to Hamadan. A Vice-Consul at Kermanshah should be directly under the orders of the Consul-General at Tehran.

(*g.*) With regard to Bunder Abbas, the British trade of this port and Lingah aggregates over 1,000,000*l.* Hitherto the Government of India have not been willing

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to establish a Vice-Consulate at this point, but I would suggest a reconsideration of their view. A Vice-Consul at Bunder Abbas, passing his summers at Yezd and his winters in working up the trade of South-Eastern Persia, ought to be able to do much good. Yezd is an important commercial centre, with a branch bank. The Vice-Consul might also perhaps relieve the Telegraph Department of their political duties, but his main work should be in connection with trade. As to Bahrein I have nothing to say. The interest of this Legation in Bahrein is so indirect, that this seems to me to be a matter entirely for the Government of India.

(*h.*) As to a Vice-Consul in Urumia or the neighbourhood I am not quite sure. I should have thought that full information as to what is going on in this quarter, could have been procured through the English and American missionaries,* and also that the Consul-General at Tabreez might visit the district at times as he has lately done. But the north-western corner of Azerbaijan is of importance, both as the point where our Trebizond trade enters, and with regard to the Armenian question on the Turkish frontier, and as a post from which to keep a watch on Russian proceedings. On the whole, therefore, I should be disposed to send a man there, though he will probably be followed by a Russian.

I have also recommended that we should improve the position of our Consul-General at Tabreez. The grounds for this are obvious. The British Representative in this important place, the head-quarters of the heir apparent, and a great trade centre, gets 650*l.* a-year pay, and 270*l.* office allowance. The Russian Consul-General gets 2,000*l.* a-year pay and has a large staff of Secretaries and Munshis. The Turkish Consul-General has 1,020*l.* pay and allowances, and is helped by a Vice-Consul and Attaché. Even the French Representative, who is not a Consul-General, and has very small interests to represent, gets 1,200 a-year in pay and allowances, and has the aid of a Vice-Consul. All the foreign Representatives have free houses. It may be argued that we ought not to attempt to rival the Russian Consul at this point. I think this is open to question, but, in any case, it seems to me unjust to our Representative, and unwise in our own interests, to place him in a position of such marked inferiority to all his colleagues. Mr. Wood urges that he should be allowed a personal assistant or confidential clerk. If the Vice-Consul is appointed in the first place to Tabreez, which will attract less attention, and spends part of his time there, a confidential clerk will perhaps be unnecessary. But the danger is that he will spend too much of his time there.

With regard to the limits of the new Consular districts, I cannot as yet give a precise answer in all cases. The limits of the Seistan Consulate, for example, must be fixed hereafter, when experience has shown us the best line of division to the northward. The powers of the Kerman Consulate should extend to the Kerman territory ruled by the Persian Governor-General at Kerman. The limits of a Vice-Consulate at Bampur I cannot state with accuracy. The Consul on the Karun should have charge of the country down to the sea, and westward to the Turkish frontier, and eastward to the eastern border of the Bakhtiaris, and northwards to the northern border of Luristan. The Vice-Consul at Kermanshah should have charge of the Kermanshah and Hamadan districts, and of the country northwards to the border of Azerbaijan. The Vice-Consul in Urumia should perhaps be appointed simply Vice-Consul at Tabreez, whence he can be deputed to act under the Consul-General's orders. The Vice-Consul at Bunder Abbas should have charge of the Gulf ports at east of Bushire, which form a Persian Governorship, and of Yezd and of Luristan. I will work out the precise limits of the several districts in communication with the officers on the spot.

All, or about all, the Consulates in Persia should have a small guard of Indian troopers, say six men, as at Meshed. These should be picked men, if possible from Lancer regiments, and the non-commissioned officers should be trained surveyors.

As to the cost of the additional appointments which I have proposed, I feel it extremely difficult to make a satisfactory estimate, because the English and Indian ways of looking at such charges are so essentially different. The posts under the Government of India are maintained on a considerable scale, and cost a considerable sum of money. Those under the Foreign Office are maintained on a very moderate footing, and cost comparatively little. For example, the Consulate-General at Tabreez costs altogether 920*l.* a-year, while the Consulate-General at Meshed costs 8,600*l.*

I believe the sumptuary allowance of the Consul-General at Bushire is larger

* The American missionaries are greatly troubled by the Russian propaganda, and are entirely with us.

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than the pay of the Consul-General at Tabreez. As the work of the Consulates in Persia is not only Consular but political, and as a certain amount of show is very desirable in the East, I think the rates of pay and allowances given by Her Majesty's Government are much too low, and this view is evidently shared by the Russians. But I hesitate to propose appointments kept up on the Indian scale, because they would probably seem to Her Majesty's Government out of all proportion to the importance of Persia.

Another difficulty is that any new post maintained by the Government of India, for example Seistan or Bahrein, would probably be brought on the list of the Indian Political Department, and the Government of India would have to fix the pay with reference to the interests of that Department as a whole. However, I would suggest as a basis of calculation that each Consul should have 600*l.* a-year pay, 150*l.* office allowance, and 50*l.* house rent—total 800*l* ; and that each Vice-Consul should have 400*l.* pay, 50*l.* a-year office allowance, and 50*l.* house rent—total 500*l.* I doubt whether this is enough, but anything less than this would certainly be too little. The Consuls-General at Tabreez and Ispahan should have at least 800*l.* a-year pay, 270*l.* office allowance, and a free house.

The total expenditure on all the appointments suggested would be about 5,600*l.*, as shown below—

	£
Seistan	800*
Kerman	800
Bampur	500
Bunder Abbas	500
Bahrein	500
Karun	800*
Kermanshah	500
Urumia	500
Extra expenditure at Tabreez and Ispahan, say	700
Total	5,600

These proposals may be embarrassing from the point of view of the Foreign Office with reference to the rest of the Consular service. I can only represent the matter from a local point of view. But I would observe that life in most parts of Persia is for an Englishman terribly isolated. It is very different from the life in European Consulates, or in seaport towns anywhere. It is also in some ways very expensive, especially in regard to presents and the transport of supplies. And, as I have said before, the work is largely of a political character. Possibly the difficulty could be met by attaching an Indian allowance to Persian Consulates.

I have made no allowance for travelling expenses ; it is very difficult to estimate these ; but it should be clearly understood that our officers in Persia ought to travel freely, and to know their districts. I mentioned this point in my Memorandum of 1895.

In a country like Persia a man is of comparatively little use if he remains all the year round at his head-quarters, He should go about among the people and the Nomad tribes, and inspect the trade routes, and generally see and be seen. For this purpose he should have a proper scale of camp equipage, procured from India. At present a Consul in Persia has no travelling tents kept up for him, and if he travels he does so in a style which in India would be considered very unbecoming. He sleeps in a dirty little room in a Persian posthouse, if he finds one empty ; if not, he gets into a mud hut in the nearest village. This kind of thing does harm, and should not be allowed. In one case tents have been granted to a Consul. This should be done for every officer in Persia, and every officer in Persia should be prepared to live in his tents for a considerable part of the year.

Against the cost of the appointments and increase of pay proposed may be set off a certain amount of reduction. If the Resident at Bushire spends his summer in Shiraz, we can, I think, do away with the native Agent. This would save 160*l.* a-year. If we have a Consul at Ahwaz or Shuster we can abolish the Vice-Consulate at Mohammerah. This would save 490*l.*, or a little less, as we may want to keep a Persian Agent there, and possibly one at Dizful, to do routine work. The native Agent at Kermanshah can be abolished, which would save 24*l.* a-year. Finally, we can turn the Resht Consulate into a Vice-Consulate, thereby saving 300*l.* a-year. A Consul at Resht is not necessary. He gets no information of Russian movements

* This may be somewhat increased by the necessity of maintaining native Agents.

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outside Persia, and he has no British trade to look after. A Vice-Consul could do all that is required. The money now spent at Kerman would be saved if a permanent Consulate were established there. I may perhaps be excused for suggesting that we might possibly employ to better advantage some of the money spent at Meshed. No doubt it is an important centre, politically and commercially, and the Government of India, who find the money, may not care to divert any portion of it to other posts in Persia. But after all a large portion of our trade in Persia is British Indian trade, and the maintenance of Persia, as a political entity, is largely, if not mainly, desirable, on account of our Indian Empire. It certainly seems to me that some portion of the 8,600*l.* spent at Meshed, and possibly some portion of the 7,700*l.* spent at Bushire, might be better employed elsewhere. At all events something could be spared for Seistan. However, there is room for difference of opinion on this point, and I can only suggest a saving of 1,474*l.* on Resht, Mohammerah, Kerman, Kermanshah, and Shiraz. The saving at Shiraz could hardly take effect immediately, as we should have to give the Nawab some pension. We might, however, add to our savings the Karun subsidy of 2,000*l.* a-year. In all probability Messrs. Lynch would not receive this proposal with favour, but I do not think they would abandon the Karun, where they are now firmly established. Half of the sum would go to Her Majesty's Government and half to the Government of India. The prospective payments and savings of the two Governments might perhaps be arranged as follows:—

PAYMENTS.

	England.	India.
	£	£
Seistan..	..	800
Kerman	400	400
Bunder Abbas	..	500
Karun	400	400
Kermanshah	500	..
Urumia	500	..
Bampur	..	500
Bahrein	..	500
Ispahan and Tabreez	700	..
Total	2,500	3,100

SAVINGS.

Karun subsidy	1,000	1,000
Shiraz	..	160
Kerman	250	250
Kermanshah	..	24
Mohammerah	490	..
Resht	300	..
Total	2,040	1,434

The total cost to Her Majesty's Government, therefore, would be 460*l.* a-year, and to the Government of India 1,666*l.* a-year. If we find it necessary to keep native agents on the Karun, and between Seistan and Meshed, these totals would be slightly increased.

To aid the work of our Consular officers and traders we want better roads within our zone. I suggested in 1895 that an officer might be useful in Shuster to aid in the opening of the roads in the Lur and Bakhtiari country, and we have kept these objects steadily in view. The road through the Bakhtiari country from Ahwaz to Ispahan is now making progress. I hope to march over it in a few weeks hence. After doing so I hope to return through the Lur country, and, if possible, to open the road from Dizful to the north. It is very desirable that our Karun trade should have an outlet northwards, and that the Sultanabad and Kurdistan carpets, and the Hamadan and Kermanshah exports, should be able to get out by the Karun. The carpets now go largely by Resht and Russia. In other directions we may be able to get roads made or improved as time goes on. The newly-appointed Governor of Shiraz, who seems

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

very friendly, has promised me that he will do his utmost for the Shiraz-Bushire road, and he may possibly do something.

An attempt is now being made to establish cart traffic between Sultanabad and Tehran, and the Imperial Bank of Persia have obtained the concession for a road from Kum to Ispahan. The advantage of this latter road to our trade is, however, doubtful. What we want above all is good roads from the point where our ships unload to the limits of our zone.

This leads me to a point which I think we should consider seriously. Since I have been in Persia I have tried to estimate the possibilities of a successful railway on various lines of country, but I have so far failed to discover a likely opening. It is conceivably possible, however, that careful examination by an expert might reveal a route which would prove a commercial success. I understand that the Government of India do not now favour the idea of a railway from Quettah to Seistan. The Russians are at this moment anxious about an alleged Concession to an English Syndicate for a railway from Bunder Abbas to Shiraz. Such a line could not, I think, pay its expenses.

A route might possibly be found from the Karun to Ispahan and the north. The Bagdad line seems to offer a chance. The Germans have done no work on this road, and their Concession, unless secretly renewed, has in reality lapsed. I shall endeavour, if a chance occurs, to get some hold on this road, without incurring any embarrassing obligations. It seems to me that it might possibly be worth while to send from India an officer accustomed to the work of frontier lines to look over the several routes and make suggestions. His journeys might, of course, excite the suspicion of the Russians, but I do not know that this would do much harm. In the meantime, I presume that Her Majesty's Government would prefer that the Persian Agreement with Russia prohibiting railway construction should not be renewed. It expires this year. I am not at all sure that the Russians wish to renew it, for it seems easier for them to build railways than for any one else; but I should be glad to know the views of Her Majesty's Government.

I was consulted about the matter once (see my despatch No. 61 of the 12th April, 1898), and the late Sadr-i-Azam then assured me that the Shah was very much opposed to the renewal of the Agreement.

There is one more agency which we ought to employ to strengthen our Consular staff. I have already explained the position of the Telegraph Department in Persia and on the Persian Gulf. I am using it now to some extent as a means of obtaining intelligence, and it has at times been very useful in this way; but it should be made useful in other ways as well. Wherever we have a Consul or Vice-Consul, as at Kermanshah, Ahwaz, or Kerman, we ought to have an efficient telegraph line. The line in these places is thoroughly inefficient, and in Seistan there is no line at all. We can do something by pressing the Persian Government to repair and restore, and at times by lending efficient signallers, and by deputing officers to inspect and advise. These things must be done with tact; but so far the Persian Government seems to have entertained no jealousy of our Telegraph Department, which, on the contrary, has always been regarded with favour. It is difficult to make exact proposals with reference to this point, because circumstances vary so much in different places; but, speaking generally, it seems desirable to spend some trouble, and money if necessary, in getting the Persian telegraph system into our hands as much as possible. We should try to construct the proposed land line from Kashan to the Kelat frontier, and should connect it, or get the Persian Government to connect it, through Seistan with Meshed. Eventually it should also be connected with the coast. I think we ought also to pay our Director better than we do. He ranks here next to the Minister, and he cannot maintain his position on a salary of 950*l.* a-year. The Manager of the Imperial Bank gets more than three times this sum. It is important that the Director should be on good terms with the Persian Ministers and Notables, and be able to entertain them to some extent, and he should also be able to move about the country decently equipped. I will go into this matter separately and in detail, if the Government of India are prepared to accept the principle that the Telegraph Department should be regarded in some sense as a political organization, and that some expense may legitimately be incurred to make it more efficient in that respect.

I have now stated the main proposals which I have to make for improving our position in Persia. It is briefly that we should increase the numbers and efficiency of our Consular staff by the addition of certain Consulates and Vice-Consulates, and by improving the position of our Representatives in Tabreez and Ispahan; that we should open out roads in the Karun district and elsewhere, and possibly prospect for a

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railway; and that we should organize the Telegraph Department for political purposes.

But, as I said before, this despatch should be regarded as supplementary to my Memorandum of 1895, which went fully into the question of our position in Persia. I would again request that reference may be made to that Memorandum, and that the proposals therein put forward may be considered. There are one or two to which I should like to refer again. In the penultimate paragraph I wrote:—

"The Persian Government should be made to understand that they must not trifle with us in the future as they have occasionally done in the past, but we should try to gain their goodwill, and help them in any way we can."

In a former paragraph I had explained how the Persians, relying on our forbearance, were inclined at times to treat us with disregard, and I suggested that we should take certain measures to correct their attitude in this respect. I recommended that, on the other hand, a loan should be granted to Persia upon easy terms. I think we should adhere to the principle of these recommendations. At present the Persians think we have lost interest in things Persian; that we will do nothing for them; and that we will not take the trouble to resent anything they do against us. I should like to disabuse their minds of both of these ideas.

I may perhaps with advantage give one or two instances of what I mean. I noticed in my Memorandum of 1895 the case of the Island of Siri, which the Persians occupied some years ago, and have since retained in spite of our protest. I noticed also the case of the Perso-Beluchistan border, where the Persians were constantly encroaching, and I explained the necessity for exercising some check upon the selection of Governors in the south of Persia. In these two latter cases we have succeeded in changing the attitude of the Persian Government. The border has been delimited, and in a recent instance an obnoxious Governor was recalled from Bushire on our demand. This has done much good. But cases still occur in which our interests and our representations are treated with small respect. For example, the Persian Government, during my absence on leave, asked the Military Attaché in this Legation to arbitrate in an important dispute between our native Agent in Kermanshah and some Persian subjects. The Persian Foreign Minister undertook in writing to execute the Award, whatever it might be. The Award was given in December 1897, and, in spite of continuous pressure from the Legation, execution has been evaded up till now, every sort of frivolous pretext being advanced to put us off. In another arbitration case which occurred during my absence on leave, Mr. Hardinge agreed to abide by the Award of the Prime Minister. The Award provided for the transfer of certain mines from the possession of a British-protected subject, and the payment to him of certain sums of money which he had given as presents to the Foreign Minister and other high officials. The mines were at once transferred, but the money has never been paid. Again, the Imperial Bank of Persia has, by its Concession, the exclusive right of issuing bank notes, yet bank notes have for years been issued in large numbers by certain Persian Associations, and though many representations have been made on the subject, the practice continues unchecked. I have just heard that several thousand notes have been printed in England on behalf of one of these Associations, and that they are now on their way to Bushire. I shall submit these cases separately for orders, and in the meantime I do not ask for any general ruling or assurance on the part of Her Majesty's Government with regard to our future treatment of such matters, but I have thought it desirable to bring the point to notice, in order that the attitude of the Persian Government towards us may be clearly understood.

On the other hand, if the Persians are again anxious for a loan, and if they can satisfy us that the money will be properly spent, and not "eaten" by the chief officials, I would secure them a loan on easy conditions, relying for the payment of instalments not on material guarantees of the usual type, such as would satisfy the Stock Exchange, but on the great power we have of putting pressure upon the Persian Government.

To insist upon material guarantees of the usual type is, I fear, to defeat our object. In the despatch from the Government of India of the 11th August, 1898, the following passages occur:—

"The recent arrangement whereby receivers of the Imperial Bank of Persia were to encash all customs duties at Bushire and Kermanshah, and to have also the right to see that the duties are duly levied, appears likely, if established, to prove an important step towards developing the natural resources of Persia and increasing British influence."

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"We have recently heard of the resignation of the Amin-ed-Dowleh, on whom the title of Sadr-i-Azam was conferred as lately as last December, and from whom and from his colleagues so much was apparently hoped for in the direction of reforms. We are as yet without precise information as to the significance or cause of the Sadr-i-Azam's resignation."

The fact is that the cause of the late Sadr-i-Azam's resignation, or rather removal, was precisely the arrangement for the control of the customs duties. Unable to find any money for the daily expenses of the Shah and the conduct of the Administration, and feeling that his retention in power depended upon his doing so, the unfortunate Sadr-i-Azam very reluctantly accepted the offer of a small loan from the Imperial Bank, and put their receivers in charge of the customs. The measure was intensely unpopular among the Persian merchants, who had to pay their customs dues, and among the officials at head-quarters, who resented the interference of the Feringi. The Sadr-i-Azam was loudly denounced for having "sold Bushire to the English," and in a few weeks he was dismissed from office. He is now living in seclusion at Tehran, never leaving his house, and his lifelong rival, the Amin-es-Sultan, who is opposed to all reform, and was strongly supported by the Russians, has been appointed Sadr-i-Azam in his place.

In my Memorandum of 1895 I explained the great difficulty of effecting any reforms, notably in the customs system, and I added:—

"By pressing for them inconsiderately, we run the risk not only of failure, but of making ourselves disliked by the Shah and Sadr-i-Azam and other influential persons, and of driving them into the arms of Russia."

These words are just as true now as they were in 1895, and I would earnestly recommend that we should act with great caution in these matters. If we contemplate at any time helping the Persians to a loan, we should avoid insisting upon the immediate control of the custom-houses. A clause providing that control will be given if the instalments on the loan are not paid is, I think, the utmost that we require. The custom-houses at Bushire, Lingah, and Bunder Abbas, through which passes yearly over 3,000,000*l.* of trade, lie under the guns of our ships, and we could at any time put a boat's crew and a bank agent in possession of each, even if we had no Agreement at all. In my opinion, therefore, we can guarantee a loan, and thus let Persia have money at very low interest, and put her under a real obligation without any appreciable risk. I hope that this view of the case may be considered by Her Majesty's Government, and that we shall, in the case of another loan being contemplated, rely on our power rather than on material guarantees.

I doubt whether that power is fully recognized by ourselves. The Persians have no doubt of it. They see that our frontier, that is, the frontier of Kelat and the sea, not to speak of Afghanistan, marches with theirs for 1,500 miles. They know very well that the Russians cannot help them in the south and south-east, and that in the Gulf Provinces such show of authority as they still exercise depends upon our forbearance, if not upon our support. For example, the port of Lingah is now in possession of a revolted Arab Sheikh, whom the Persians have recognized as Governor. They have no power to coerce him, and begged me to send a gun-boat to do so. He would most gladly hoist our flag to-morrow. On the Karun also the Arabs are in possession, and ready at a word from us to throw off the semblance of Persian supremacy.

The Gulf ports Mohammerah, Bushire, Lingah, and Bunder Abbas are at the mercy of our ships. So great is the respect of the Persians for our power that even in the extreme north of our zone, among the fanatical town-bred population of Ispahan, any demonstration on our part has immediate effect. Two or three years ago there was trouble in Ispahan, and the Mollahs were stirring up mischief against the Europeans. It happened that at this moment a British squadron was sent into Turkish waters, and news of the movement was brought to Persia by the public telegrams. The Missionary Bishop at Ispahan wrote to inform me that the hostile demonstrations against the Europeans had ceased at once, and that the attitude of the Mollahs had completely changed. He said that the change was caused by the news about our fleet, which was apparently interpreted as an indication that the English were getting angry.

Almost equal sensitiveness was shown last year when the news of the battle of Omdurman became known. It spread like wildfire all over the country, and was the common subject of conversation not only at the capital but in remote villages of Persian Beluchistan, where the markedly respectful attitude of the people attracted the notice of our officers. I mention these facts to show that we are greatly feared in

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Persia, and that consequently we can with ease make our wishes respected. The reason why the Persians often disregard them is what I have mentioned before, that they think our forbearance is practically unlimited. But whenever they see that we are in earnest, and that Her Majesty's Government is interested in a case, the Shah and his Ministers speedily became convinced of the necessity for meeting our wishes. I would ask Her Majesty's Government to believe that we have still great power and reputation in Persia.

Having such power we can afford both to be decided in insisting upon our legitimate interests and to be sympathetic and easy in our terms if the Persians ask us for help, pecuniary or other.

We can also do something to check Russian encroachments. In my Memorandum of 1895 I suggested our letting it be understood that aggressive action by Russia in the north of Persia would immediately result in decided action by us in the south. I still think that this is our proper policy. I do not mean that we should bully or unduly threaten the Persian Government, but I would let them understand that we cannot regard without concern any such action as, for example, the pushing down of the Russian sanitary wedge towards Seistan, and that we shall, if these things happen, ask for compensations which the Persian Government may dislike. It is easy to do this, and it may help the Persian Government to resist demands which otherwise they would find it difficult to avoid accepting. I think they should realize that any serious concession made in the north is likely to involve an equivalent concession in the south. Hitherto they have realized only the converse of the proposition. I fully recognize that it may be embarrassing for us to commit ourselves beforehand to any particular method of action, but the principle should be understood. If Her Majesty's Government do not give me orders to the contrary, this is the line I propose to take in the future.

Similarly, to turn to another clause of my recommendations of 1895, if Her Majesty's Government do not give me orders to the contrary I propose, in the event of the Shah's death, to recognize provisionally the succession of the Valiahd, as I did three years ago.

I may now perhaps usefully recapitulate what I have written regarding the state of Persia in 1899, and the steps which should be taken to improve our position in the country.

The internal condition of Persia is exceedingly bad, worse in some respects than in 1895. The finances are in greater disorder, the troops and civil establishments are unpaid, food is dear, the Shah is a weak Ruler who maintains no discipline, and his Prime Minister has no powers, so that there is practically no Government. The Russians have shown considerable activity in the northern provinces, pushing on roads, and energetically encouraging their trade, and making use of their missionaries among the Christian populations. They have put "sanitary" posts along the Afghan border, and have tried to establish their trade and influence in Seistan. They have also established a Consulate at Ispahan. Nevertheless, the internal condition of Persia is by no means hopeless, her debt being practically nothing, and her resources considerable; and although Russia has been active in some respects we still hold a strong position. Our trade and our influence are completely dominant up to the Khanikin–Seistan line; and though our trade has suffered in the north it is still alive. Our bank does business all over Persia, and is the only bank that can legally issue notes. Our Telegraph Department controls a large part of the Persian telegraph system. Our political influence is still great, even in the north, and our power is much feared. Still it cannot be denied that our position is threatened.

To maintain and improve it we should increase by five or six the number of our English Consular officers, and should encourage them all to travel and know their districts. We should also improve the condition of our Consulates at Tabreez and Ispahan. We should try to open out new trade routes, and to make those which exist a little better than they are. Possibly, we might prospect for a railway. We should also make more use of our Telegraph Department, trying to get into our hands as much of the Persian telegraph system as possible, and to have all our Consular posts in effective communication with Tehran. We should insist upon our interests being specially considered within our zone—that is, up to the Khanikin–Seistan line. Amongst other things, we should exercise some unofficial control over the appointment and dismissal of the Persian Governors. We should be strict in keeping the Persians to their engagements, and resisting injustice; but, on the other hand, having the power to coerce Persia very easily, we should be considerate in our dealings with her if she wants help, and, under certain circumstances, we should guarantee a loan

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‘Skeleton Map of Telegraph Lines in Persia.’ [187r] (1/2)



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for her, refraining at the same time from taking material guarantees of an unpalatable description, or forcing upon her reforms for which she is not prepared. We should decide now to recognize the Shah's eldest son if the Shah dies. Finally, we should let it be clearly understood that encroachment by Russia in the north will entail concessions to us in the south.

In conclusion, I think it will be as well to notice two objections which may be brought against these proposals:

The first is, that if we already have in Persia a larger Consular staff than the Russians, as the sketch map shows, there seems to be no necessity for our increasing it. There is force in this objection; but the fact remains that the Russians are pushing our trade out of Northern Persia, and that they have begun to touch the northern fringe of our zone.

The second objection which may be urged is that our action would be resented by the Russians, and would lead to counter-moves on their part. I fully recognize the force of this objection. No one can have realized more clearly than I have done the inexpediency of provoking Russia by an appearance of over-activity. I have repeatedly impressed this view upon our officers in Persia, and my Memorandum of 1895 and later despatches—notably, that of the 14th August, 1896—show how constantly the idea has been present to my mind. Nothing can be more foolish than fussy demonstrations, or attempts to gain small successes at the expense of the Russians, and, except when active measures are necessary for the maintenance of our material interests, I would never advocate them. I have throughout recognized that our proper course in this country is to stand on the defensive, and to avoid striking at the Russians, or performing any risky evolutions which might tempt them to fall upon us. But, at the same time, it seems to me that there must be limits to our caution in these respects, and that, if we are to maintain our position in Persia, we must be prepared to face a certain amount of displeasure on the part of the Russians. As I have shown in this despatch, they do not remain inactive because we do so. Our abstention, at the instance of the Government of India, from interference in Seistan, has not prevented them from pushing down to the Afghan frontier and trying to strangle our Indian trade, or from endeavouring, with some success, to establish their trade and influence in Seistan itself.

Our studious friendliness in Tehran though pleasantly reciprocated, does not prevent them from doing all they can to injure our bank, the Russian Banque des Prêts getting up runs upon it, and even the Russian Legation refusing its notes. Nor has our friendly attitude prevented them from establishing a Consulate in Ispahan, or pushing on the construction of the Resht road. Whether we remain quiet or not the Russians, very properly, go on working for their own hand, and unless we make an effort sooner or later we shall find ourselves being quietly elbowed out of one position after another. If we do make the effort now we certainly may provoke them to increased activity, but it may have a contrary effect, and in any case I believe that if we keep strictly within our rights, and make no unnecessary demonstrations, we have no need to be afraid of what they can do. They ought not to be able to meet us on equal terms in our zone. Every Persian believes that sooner or later the country will be divided between England and Russia, and the southerner from Zil-es-Sultan downwards, looks to coming under the rule of England. In a loose-knit country like Persia, the weak Central Government cannot easily over-ride local influence. In this respect it is fortunate for us that the Persians have fixed their capital so far north as Tehran. Even in Tehran, moreover, the influence of the Russians has its limits. Their geographical position makes them a threatening power in the north, and as most of the Government officials at Tehran are northerners, with property and interests in the north, the influence of the Russians in Tehran is no doubt considerable. The northern official thinks it wise to keep on good terms with his future masters. But it must be remembered that the Persian lives from day to day, and thinks the country will probably last his time, and, being inordinately conceited, not to say arrogant, the Persians are far from liking the Russians, whose overbearing ways they find it hard to endure. Although the Russians are not omnipotent in Tehran—on the contrary, although the Persian Government is very much afraid of them, it still opposes to them a steady, passive resistance about which they complain very bitterly. The Shah and his advisers, who believe that we shall take the south only if Russia takes the north, will go as far as they dare in helping us to resist Russian encroachment, and if we show that we are in earnest I think they will go a long way. It must not be thought that they are entirely under Russian domination. They are not. Therefore in my opinion we should make up our minds

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that the time has come for us to lay down a definite line of policy in Persia, and that for the future we must adhere to it without too much regard for any displeasure which we may thereby cause to the Russians.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. M. DURAND.

Inclosure.

Skeleton Map of Telegraph Lines in Persia.

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

Gate on Kerman (189)
Seistan

THE RESIDENCY,
JODHPORE,
RAJPUTANA.

Kennedy House
Simla
2. July. 99

My Dear Lawrence

H. E. was speaking to me about Consular appointments in Persia last night & I advocated the linking together of Kirman & Bandar Abbas rather than Kirman & Seistan for Territorial

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

reasons but I ought to have added for Jurisdictional reasons as well -
Seistan is under the Jurisdiction of the Persian Governor General of Khorassan but would never do to have an independant Consul there - The Consul or Vice Consul there should & think be

(190)

under the orders of the Assistant to the A.G.G. & Consul General at Meshed, otherwise he could get nothing done. He might send all his reports in duplicate, one to Meshed & one to Quetta, but it would be necessary for him to work through the British Consulate General at Meshed. & a Persian man of

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'Seistan Persia & Seistan' [190v] (388/617)

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

not do this —
at Bundar Abbas though
the Persian Consul would
naturally come under
the orders of the Resident
in the Persian Gulf &
this is just what is
necessary —
Should the question
come up will you kindly
mention this to H. E.
as I think I failed to
properly explain my
meaning last night.
Sing Grs. Chas. E. Yate.

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

Gate on Consuls General at Bushire & Baghdad

Simla

(191)

28. July. 99

WESTERN RAJPUTANA STATES
JODHPORE

My Dear Lawrence

H. E. was talking to me about the Persian Gulf & I should like to have suggested for H. E's consideration the advisability of placing the Consuls General at Bushire and Baghdad upon a similar footing as regards Pay & allowances to the Consul General at Meshed. Will you kindly bring this to H. E's notice for me should opportunity offer.

At Bushire and Baghdad the pay is consolidated at Rs. 2500.

At Meshed the pay is Rs. 2000 with a sumptuary allowance

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

of Rs. 350 (This was formerly Rs 1000 but it was reduced in 1896. I don't know why.) Total Rs. 2350 and the Officer there has to give a certificate that the allowance of Rs 350 has been duly spent.

However frugal & saving a man may be (and there is no one in three out of the way places to act as a check in this respect) this system of a large somptuary allowance accompanied by a certificate that it has been spent necessitates a certain amount of money at any rate

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

(192)

being expended in the place. A man may bank the whole of his Rs. 2000 but he must spend the Rs 750 or whatever the amount may be. & that is something.

I have heard great complaints in the Gulf of the want of hospitality shewn by both a Resident at Bushire & at Baghdad & such a state of things militates against our prestige in those parts.

At Bushire as at Muscat it is not only Europeans, but Natives as well, that ought to be entertained & the Resident should keep an open kitchen for all comers, be they Foreigners or Native Chiefs & their Followers. Entertainment

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

of this kind may in some cases be
encouraging work, but I can
think of nothing better to keep us
more up to the mark than a
minimum of pay of rank combined
with a maximum in the way of
sumptuary allowance that must be
spent. Personally I should like
to see the sumptuary allowance
at all three places raised to Rs.
1000. to ensure a proper status
being maintained. Baskir especially.

Sincerely yours

Chas. E. Yate

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

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Foreign Department.

NOTE BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY.

I send round to each of my colleagues a draft of this very lengthy, but not, I hope, superfluous despatch, which is both the summing up of a correspondence of long duration with the Secretary of State about our Consular and other establishments in Persia; the suggested response to particular enquiries addressed to us in consequence of a recent despatch from Sir M. Durand; and an attempt—so far as I can gather, the first that has been made—to place upon a definite footing the share of responsibility for Persia that legitimately devolves upon the Government of India, and to indicate a line of conduct for the future. These, at least, are the objects which I have had in view in writing it; and if the result is to give, in any degree, shape or permanence to our policy towards Persia, perhaps the labour will not have been wasted.

I shall be grateful if my colleagues will favour me with their views or suggestions on the whole or any part of the draft. The despatch, if approved, will not leave until the mail of September 14th.

C[URZON],—2-9-99.

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

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MINUTE BY THE VICEROY ON SEISTAN, DATED SEPTEMBER 4TH, 1899.

I propose, in this Minute, to examine the present aspect of the Seistan question in relation to our general policy towards Persia, and to the attitude of Russia in Persia. In my book on Persia, I wrote a chapter on Seistan (Vol. I, Chap. IX) which contained as full an account of that district, its history, inhabitants, features, and commercial and political significance, as was then (1892) procurable. I also discussed the political ambitions of Russia in connection with Seistan (Vol. I, pages 201, 216-218, 235-244; Vol. II, pages 597-598, 605), and the question of a possible Seistan Railway from India in the future (Vol. I, pages 237-244, 628-629). I ventured further to make certain recommendations, namely, that we should establish Consular or other representation (*a*) at Yezd, (*b*) at Kerman, (*c*) in Seistan, (*d*) at Bunder Abbas; (*e*) that the Kerman-Meshed trade route should be improved; (*f*) that a British trade route should be opened from Quetta to Seistan; (*g*) that the question of railway extension in the direction of Seistan should be considered. Of these recommendations, I am glad to say that, during the interval that has since elapsed, (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), (*e*) and (*f*) have already been carried into execution. In the despatch with which this Minute is enclosed, (*d*) is recommended by the Government of India. I propose shortly to discuss the present aspect of (*g*). The references which have been given will dispense me from recapitulating the elementary facts about Seistan; and I may commence with an account of what has happened during the past 7 years, leading up to a description of the *status quo*.

2. Seistan was in 1892 a *beluk* or sub-division of the district of Kain (capital Birjand) which is a part of the province of Khorasan (capital Meshed). The Government of Kain has for long been in the hereditary possession of a powerful family of Arab origin, whose head bears the title of Amir of Kain, and who, until the centralising tendencies of recent years, exercised an authority almost independent of that of the Shah. Mir Alam Khan, who had filled the post for over a quarter of a century, died in 1891. For reasons into which it is not necessary to enter, the younger of his two sons, Ismail Khan, known as the Shaukat-ul-Mulk (now about 50 years of age), succeeded him as Governor of Kain at Birjand. The elder son, Ali Akbar Khan, known as the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, became Governor of Tabbas and Seistan,—posts which he only retains by the process, familiar in Persia, of the annual payment of a large sum in cash to the Shah. The third son, Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, now just grown up, was made *Sartip* or Commandant of the Kain forces. The Shaukat-ul-Mulk and he have generally, but perhaps erroneously, been believed to incline towards Russia, whose aim has been to get Seistan, now to some extent separated from Kain, re-incorporated in it, and absorbed as an ordinary administrative district in the province of Khorasan. Such an amalgamation would emphasize the dependence of Seistan upon Meshed, from which it is now in some measure separate.

3. Meanwhile the elder brother, or Hashmat-ul-Mulk, has not himself resided in Seistan, but has deputed one of his sons, Mir Masum Khan, a fat and lethargic youth of about 18, to act as Deputy Governor at Nasirabad under the tutelage of his mother, a lady with considerable powers of intrigue. This son is supposed to intrigue with the uncle at Birjand and is not on the best of terms with his father, who in 1898 sent an elder son, named Muhammad Reza Khan, to supersede him as Deputy Governor. Upon Mir Masum Khan declining to go, the quarrel was patched up; and he still acts for his father in Seistan. Thus the local situation is that of Russia endeavouring to increase her hold upon

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the ruler of Kain (to whom she sent, a few weeks ago, a special mission conveying presents valued at £1,400); and the ruler of Kain endeavouring to oust his brother and to establish a hold upon Seistan himself.

4. Since the appointment of a British Consul-General at Meshed (in consequence of a similar Russian appointment) in 1889, Seistan, which is included in the Consul's jurisdiction, has been frequently visited and reported upon by British officers either from India or from Meshed. The Hon'ble G. Napier visited it in 1892-93. Colonel Yate made a tour thither in 1894, and strongly urged the appointment of a British Indian representative in Seistan, to balance the Russian native agent, whom he found exercising considerable influence. He enlarged upon the wheat-producing capabilities of Seistan, the cheapness of grain there as compared with the dearness outside, the advantage of exporting the surplus supply to Quetta, the utility of a postal service from Chaman *viâ* Seistan to Meshed, in place of the Kandahar-Herat line; and he recommended the construction of a line of wells and the planting of levy posts from Nushki to the Seistan border, so as to open a new caravan route for Indo-Persian trade. His report was shown to the Shah, who agreed with Colonel Yate's description of the political situation in Seistan, and, in so far as they concerned Persia, with his recommendations. The Government of India were, however, at that time under the impression, which has since been abandoned, that any evidence of British interest in Seistan or in Eastern Persia would merely bring down the Russians (who have come down without it), and would tempt them to extend their railway southwards (which they have since done independently of any British move). Accordingly Colonel Yate's proposals were rejected.

5. Two years later Captain McMahon, who had been employed upon the demarcation of the Baluch-Afghan boundary (in pursuance of the Durand Agreement of 1893), submitted a memorandum to the Government of India (dated June 21st, 1896), in which he strongly recommended the opening of the route which had been negatived in 1894, and the adoption of proper measures for its protection, and for the exercise of political authority up to the Persian border. The Government of India accepted these proposals, and submitted them to the Secretary of State in a despatch, dated September 16th, 1896. The latter replied on October 23rd, giving his sanction, and observing that—"In the interest of the trade between India and Persia, it seems to me very desirable to further its development by this route". In the ensuing month Lieutenant Webb Ware was appointed Political Officer at Chageh, and was instructed to establish levy posts, and to take other steps for the prompt execution of the new scheme.

6. This officer started upon his first visit to Seistan in January and returned in June 1897. He found Russian influence much in evidence in Seistan, where he pleaded for the early installation of a British Agent. With regard to the commercial possibilities of Seistan, he reported that "Seistan's staple products are grain, ghi (clarified butter) and wool. If facilities for carriage were to be improved, it is by no means impossible that the future may see an extensive Perso-Baluch grain-trade called into existence". Upon his outward, and again upon his return, journey, he took steps, by the opening of wells, by the building of guard-houses and godowns, and by the institution of levy posts, for the energetic promotion of the new trade route; and he submitted a number of further proposals, with that object in view, to the Government of India.

7. Lieutenant Webb Ware's visit to Seistan overlapped that of Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh, who in April of the same year was hurriedly despatched by the Government of India to Seistan, to carry out any plague precautions that might be required in that neighbourhood in anticipation of the preventive proceedings that Russia had announced her intention of putting into effect. His report testified to the great activity of Russia in Seistan, and contained a glowing and highly coloured picture of the capabilities of the country, which, with a somewhat proleptic fancy, he designated the Pearl of Persia. "Being a rich grain-growing, large pasturage, camel and flock-rearing district, whose resources under proper control could be hugely increased, it might be turned

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

into a regular garden". He described the climate as far from bad, and the difficulties of access from Meshed as greater than those from Baluchistan. He thought that a large field was open for the import of green tea into Persia by the Nushki route; and he strongly recommended the appointment of a native agent and assistant apothecary in Seistan.

8. A year later Khan Bahadur Maula Bakhsh, Native Attaché to the British Consulate at Meshed, and a very capable officer, was deputed to return to India by the new route, in the company of a trial caravan of Meshed merchants. Their journey lasted from April till July 1898—unfortunately the hottest and least propitious season of the year. At its close Maula Bakhsh, whose report is the best that I have yet read upon the country traversed, wrote that—"The Indian traders with my caravan, although disappointed by losses of camels, difficulties of transport and want of water at certain places, have not formed an unfavourable view of the new trade route, and they intend to advise their firms to send goods by it in the future". There were wanted, however, better arrangement for water-supply, more godowns, and superior provision for storing fodder. The road was pronounced not yet suitable for merchants, travellers, or pilgrims, unaccustomed to rough travelling. Nevertheless the journey from Meshed to Quetta—62 marches or 1,090 miles—was performed by Maula Bakhsh and his caravan in 65 days. Including the average number of halts, *viz.*, 10, he pointed out that the normal duration of the journey—*i.e.*, 72 days, would yet be shorter than the 75—90 days usually occupied in traversing the alternative route, 966 miles long, between Meshed and Bunder Abbas.

9. In the same year, 1898, Lieutenant Webb Ware submitted his first Annual Report, which, in spite of the obstructive measures adopted by the Russian officers on the pretext of plague in Khorasan, recorded a gratifying advance. In an appendix on Nushki trade, he pointed out that the route was growing in favour, and that out of nothing had been created a trade, which had risen from 1½ lakhs in 1896 to Rs. 5,90,000 in 1897. The main impediments were the total lack of supplies, other than those specially imported, on the road between Nushki and the Seistan frontier, and the illegal extortion of the Persian toll-collectors (many of them in Russian pay) in Persian territory. Notwithstanding, he thought that the Quetta-Seistan route would eventually beat the Bunder Abbas route to Meshed, because merchandise carried by the latter required to change hands several times in transit, because a longer time was required for the journey thereby, and because the road was less secure than one running uninterruptedly through British territory.

10. In the present year, the same officer's second Annual Report testifies to a continued improvement both in the amenities of the route, and in the trade returns, which have increased by Rs. 1,38,000 since 1897. A new bazar, containing 126 shops, has been laid out at Nushki, which has developed from a petty group of daub and wattle huts into a small town; and which, now that the Nushki district has been (in the summer of 1899) permanently taken over by the Government of India, is certain of a prosperous future. Throughout the past year a weekly *dâk* has been maintained from Quetta to the Seistan frontier, in correspondence with a bi-weekly Persian *dâk* from thence *viâ* Nasirabad and Birjand to Meshed. Alterations and short cuts in the route have reduced the distance from Nushki to Meshed to 954 miles, as compared with 966 miles from Bunder Abbas to the same destination.

11. An independent light has been thrown upon Seistan in the same period by the visit of Captain Sykes, who was despatched thither as Consul at the end of 1898 in consequence of the appointment of a Russian Consul to Nasirabad. Captain Sykes, who has for some time been Her Majesty's Consul at Kerman, and who has been greatly interested in the rival Bunder Abbas-Kerman-Meshed trade route, arrived in Seistan in January 1899, with prepossessions already so strongly formed in favour of the older route, and against the new competitor, that before he had been there a week, he pronounced against the permanent appointment of a Political Officer to Seistan, and in

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favour of his own return to Kerman. He was also in a position to say that "the Quetta route (which he had never seen) is hopelessly handicapped by its natural disadvantages". These and other conclusions of Captain Sykes were vigorously disputed by Colonel Temple, our Agent and Consul-General at Meshed. But they are not without their value, as showing the reverse side of the shield to that which has perhaps, with a pardonable optimism, been displayed by the various officers, who have been concerned in the inception or development of the enterprise from the Indian side. In subsequent letters, Captain Sykes reiterated his opinions as to the superiority in respect of water, camel-grazing, and supplies of the Bunder Abbas route; but so far receded from his original attitude as to admit that there was a great opening on the Indian route for imports of tea and indigo, and that on political grounds its opening was important, adding, "The larger the parties that visit Seistan and the more frequently they appear, the greater the political effect will be". On February 14th, he explained "how necessary it is to provide the funds, by the careful expenditure of which Seistan may be brought nearer to India", and urged that "it is of paramount importance to take advantage of the proximity of our frontiers and not to allow Russian trade and influence to be pushed to our very door". On April 18th, while adhering to his views about the superiority of the Bunder Abbas road over the Indian route, he nevertheless remarked that "the Seistanis generally, and the Baluchis in particular, all look towards the East and South, while their local commerce is now mainly carried on with Quetta", and that "the revival of the Seistan-Quetta route, the buildings erected along it and the other proofs of British activity, have helped to increase our prestige". He now advocated placing a smart Muhammadan native agent in Seistan "to supervise the post which I earnestly hope will be made permanent"; and in a later letter, on May 11th, he urged "the establishment of an Indian Post Office at Birjand, as well as in Seistan, with a competent news-writer for each district"; which "modest scheme should be sanctioned and carried out without delay". In the last letter received from him, dated June 1st, Captain Sykes expressed his final opinion as adverse to the appointment of a British Consul for Kain and Seistan, unless a Russian Consul were sent (in which case it would become obligatory). It will be seen, therefore, from a synopsis of Captain Sykes's reports, that, while he remains unfavourable to the prospects of the Quetta-Seistan route, as compared with the old trans-Persian road, he has come round to the opinion, which no previous traveller in Seistan has questioned, that it is essential that British interests, commercial and political, should be sustained in that quarter by an energetic and liberal maintenance of the line of connection with India, but that, for their support in Seistan itself, it will be sufficient for the present, unless a more active course be imposed by Russian initiative, to rely upon Indian native agents. These recommendations I have accepted in the draft despatch to the Secretary of State. I should add that Colonel Temple, who has throughout disputed many of Captain Sykes's statements and dissented from his conclusions—partly owing to a not unfounded suspicion that Captain Sykes was advising in a spirit of undue independence of Meshed—has urged, in view of the recent renewal of plague alarms in Eastern Persia, that a native agent, if sent from India, should be a medical officer, charged in addition with the necessary political work. Although I believe these alarms to have been factitious, and to have been fomented by Russia for political purposes in 1899, as in 1897, I have so far acted upon Colonel Temple's advice as to send a Hospital Assistant from Quetta to Seistan as news-writer and medical reporter for a period of 6 months. Such is the present state of our information, and of affairs, in Seistan.

12. It will be seen from what I have written that Seistan is, by virtue of its position and its features, an object of much interest both to Russia and Great Britain. Situated at the point of junction of the frontiers of Persia, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan, its future affects the destinies of all three countries. Lying, as it does, almost midway between Meshed and the Persian Gulf, no advance can be made from Khorasan to the sea except through Seistan. Its position upon the exposed flank of Afghanistan would render its occupation of

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

great value to any Power contemplating either a move against that country, or an advance upon Kandahar. Nor will it be denied that the Kandahar-Herat line could not be held with safety by India, nor the valley of the Helmand defended, were a hostile Power in possession of Seistan. Furthermore, the grain-producing capabilities of the district, to the bygone richness of which eloquent testimony is borne by the immense number of ruined cities encumbering the soil, and which could without serious difficulty be revived by a scientific employment of the waters of the Helmand, render Seistan of much value, as a possible granary, either to a Power engaged upon a forward advance, or to a Power interested in commercial and industrial expansion.

13. The force of these circumstances has, it will have been observed, compelled the Government of India to display a concern in Seistan, which, at the start, they were most reluctant to acknowledge, and which, at varying intervals since, they have, with unconscious inconsistency, affected to repudiate. I have already cited the reply returned to Colonel Yate in 1894. Between 1894 and 1898 the Nushki-Seistan trade route was, with the sanction and upon the encouragement of the Secretary of State, deliberately opened by the Government of India; a Political Officer was appointed to administer the district between Nushki and the Persian border; officers were repeatedly despatched to report upon the country and to evince an interest in its fortunes. And yet as recently as August 10th, 1898, the Government of India wrote to the Secretary of State that they shared the apprehensions of Lord Dufferin's Government in 1887 that "activity in the direction of Seistan might lead to a forward move on the part of Russia"; and that "premature activity was likely to prevent or postpone the future success of the new route from Quetta to Seistan".

14. I am quite unable to understand either the force of this logic or the consistency of this conduct. The cautious and, in its motive, praiseworthy abstention of the Government of India from displaying any interest in Seistan, did not for one moment affect the designs, or retard the advance of Russia in that direction. Russian news-writers were firmly established in the district before anything more than a casual visit had been paid by a British officer. While members of the Government of India were writing notes to show that, if even a caravan route were opened from Quetta in the direction of Seistan, the Russians would extend their trans-Caspian Railway southwards, the latter were already at work, laying their rails from Merv to the Kushk post, and preparing the plant for an ultimate extension to Herat. Sir M. Durand, in a paragraph of his recent despatch, has exposed the hollowness of this plea; and I venture to hope that it may not figure again in our reasoning.

15. Similarly, I am unable to comprehend how—the trade route having been deliberately opened—any activity in developing it can either be premature, or can possibly prevent or postpone hopes which the trade route itself has been called into existence to realise, and which, without it, would have had no being. Either the Nushki-Seistan trade route is a *boná-fide* enterprise, upon which we have designedly embarked, in the main, because of its commercial possibilities, but also not without an eye to the extreme political importance of Seistan; or it is a fortuitous and foolish experiment, not likely or intended to succeed. In the latter case let us be wise and drop it. In the former let us be honest, and make the best job of it that we can.

16. I have no hesitation in recommending the last named course: and I do so, not because I am carried away by the gratifying, though modest, achievements of the new trade route up to date, nor because I contemplate for it an early and brilliant success. On the contrary I regard the obstacles and difficulties as considerable; and, knowing the traditional conservatism of the East, I recognise that commerce will not readily be diverted into a new, and, at first sight, somewhat unattractive channel. But I urge a strenuous continuation of the venture, with an eye to a twofold contingency, political and commercial, in the future.

17. In the first place if we do not continue to show an active interest in Seistan, Russia will. If we do not give the impression there of preponderant

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influence, Russian authority will soon supplant ours. If, either by plague cordons or otherwise, the Nushki-Seistan traffic be killed, there will only remain the single access of the Bunder Abbas road for Indian trade to Khorasan; and this it will be easy for our rivals to close by similar tactics. If we do not desire Russia to advance to the Persian Gulf, the obvious method is to block the most direct of her paths. Looking to the future of Northern Khorasan, which is inevitably destined to pass under Russian control, it should be our object to draw the line of demarcation between the Russian and the British spheres at the point best suited to our interests, and not to hers. The home districts of Khorasan end with Turbat-i-Haidari, 80 miles south of Meshed. They will doubtless follow the fortunes of the capital.

18. South of this district comes that of Kain already possessing a semi-independent chiefship, which might very well be retained as a buffer between the opposing spheres. Seistan should, for all the reasons given, be included in the British sphere of interest. It is no exaggeration to say that we cannot afford to see it excluded.

19. Secondly, a study of the history and features of Seistan, no less than of all modern reports upon it, leads to the conclusion that the future of that country will depend, as did its past, upon the proper employment of the immense water-supply from the Helmand that now runs riot and goes to waste in vast lagoons, and reed-beds, and swamps. The greater part of Seistan is, during several months in the year, under inundation. Captain Sykes, in one of his letters, has estimated its present population at 60,000. In another, he has said that, under a proper system of irrigation, the land would support "perhaps a tenfold population". In a third he has said that, if the Helmand were properly controlled, the population might rise to a million or more. It is clear, therefore, that the future of Seistan will lie with those who control the entire course of the Helmand. It should be in their power to turn the desert into a garden, and to make the wilderness blossom like a rose.

20. Now it can hardly be doubted that a day will come, when, in response to an external challenge, Great Britain will be obliged to advance to Kandahar. So fully is this probability admitted, that the arrangements for the advance, including the rails, the mobilisation camp, and the water-supply at Chaman have already been made. When Kandahar is re-occupied, the valley of the Helmand will be occupied with it. Then will come the time, when the channel and the valley of that river, now running parallel to the British border, though at no great distance from it, having passed under British control, the regeneration of Seistan will for the first time become practicable, and it will be possible to revive its former fame as one of the granaries of that part of Asia. No wise man can be anxious to precipitate or even to hasten that consummation. But on the other hand no wisdom in the world can greatly retard it; and when the hour strikes, it would seem to me to be as well that Seistan should be waiting to be regenerated by us, instead of having already been absorbed in the regenerative embraces of others.

21. For these reasons, I recommend that in the intervening years, the Government of India should continue, by constant, but unpretentious, activity in fostering the trade route, in providing for its security, and in reducing its discomforts, and by a steady assertion of British authority up to the borders of Seistan and of British influence within it,—to build up an interest in Seistan which shall save for India an area and a market of so much potential value. With this object I urge that we should be willing to spend a little money—it will amount at the most to only a few thousand pounds—upon a venture that would be defensible, even if it were doomed to failure, but that appears, on the contrary, to be attended with reasonable hopes of success.

22. There remains only to be considered the question of a possible railway connection between India and Seistan. This question has been discussed at intervals during the past 12 years, and the history of the discussion is not without its lessons for the future. The first idea of some such railway appears to have originated with the late Sir J. Browne, who, as early as 1884, advocated a line

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from the neighbourhood of Quetta *viâ* Nushki, not to Seistan, but to Safar on the Helmand. This proposal was put forward, without any reference to Persia, for strategical reasons, namely, in order to prevent, at any future period, a Russian advance upon Kandahar. It is interesting to me to learn from a study of the papers, what I did not know before, *viz.*, that five years later, when I was travelling in Persia, and was first writing about this question, it had just been raised both in India and in Persia by a report from Colonel Bell, at that time head of the Intelligence Department in India, who in the autumn of 1888 marched from India by Kharan and Mashkel to Seistan, and strongly recommended the construction of a railway, and a lease in perpetuity of Seistan from the Persian Government, with a view to the grant of a great irrigation concession to Reuter or to some other Company. The suggestion was eagerly taken up by Sir H. D. Wolff, whose imagination was at that time suffused with halcyon dreams of a regeneration of Persia by universal railways; and was recommended by him both to the Government of India and to Lord Salisbury. Lord Lansdowne's Government in a telegram, dated January 20th, 1889, said that "Railway extension through Baluchistan was regarded by the military authorities as a most valuable adjunct to the defences of India and as deserving of the utmost encouragement". Sir H. Wolff's proposals did not make much advance, but were reiterated by him in despatches to the Foreign Office, dated July 25th, and August 19th, 1890. Unfortunately in these, as in his original despatch of February 19th, 1889, Sir H. Wolff rested his defence of the scheme upon extremely contentious and entirely unacceptable grounds. He advocated it for two reasons: as a menace to the Trans-Caspian Railway of Russia, and as the saving of a long land march in the event of our desiring to take the offensive against that Power. This line of argument was completely riddled in a Memorandum, dated October 2nd, 1890, by General Brackenbury, at that time Head of the Intelligence Department at home. He pointed out that a single line to a remote corner of Persia could not counterbalance the position of Russia in that country, would not help us in the least on the Afghan border or in Afghan-Turkistan, and would be of no use for assuming the offensive. He concluded by saying—"By far the more important task is, not the construction of a new line into Seistan, but the consolidation of our power there by bringing the frontier tribes under our influence, and by developing Baluchistan and converting it into a fertile base of operations. When this has been done, it will be time to push forward into Persia".

23. General Brackenbury's criticism was destructive of the proposal viewed as an offensive and strategical scheme. But a corresponding flaw in his own argument was at once pointed out by Lord Salisbury, who noted that the real object of a Seistan railway would be not to attack Russia in Northern Persia, but to save Southern Persia from falling into her grasp, which could be done either by a line from Quetta, or, as he would himself prefer, by a line from the sea.

24. General Brackenbury's criticism was sent out to the Government of India, and was thus noted upon by Sir G. Chesney on January 13th, 1891—"The railway can only be regarded as a work of military precaution. From this point of view it appears to me that the time cannot be far distant when it will be deemed necessary. Still more important is a railway from the Persian Gulf north to Seistan; but the connecting link between this line and the Quetta railway system will also be found necessary".

25. A little later Sir H. Brackenbury, now Military Member in India, again noted upon the scheme; and it is interesting to read his remarks in the light of his former opinion. He now explained (April 27th, 1891) that he had only objected to a Seistan railway so long as the Russian railway did not extend south of the Trans-Caspian line, and because to construct a railway to Seistan would compel her to make extensions. "But if circumstances should change, and if Russia should take the lead in making railways southward, then it may become necessary for us to follow her lead. We ought to be able to keep pace with her".

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

26. These conditions had not yet been realised, and the Government of India decided to proceed no further with the scheme. The question of a more southerly line from the sea was at the same time considered in connection with Sir R. Sandeman's proposals to take over Kej and Panjgur—a project which was revived in 1894 by his successor, Sir J. Browne. On both occasions, however (as again at a later date), the proposal to assume administrative responsibility for Makran was negatived by the Government of India, and with it the idea of a Makran railway from the sea to Seistan was dropped also. Since then the question has not been revived.

27. It will be clear from the above narrative, firstly, that the idea of a Seistan railway does not appear to have ever been considered by the Government of India from the only point of view in which, in my opinion, it ought to be regarded, *viz.*, as a protective, and not an offensive, measure. The reason perhaps is that, at that time, Russia had not given such unmistakable evidence of her intention to move southward from Meshed, and to draw Seistan within the radius of her political influence. The railway was accordingly discussed and condemned, as a means of attacking Russia in Northern Persia, not as a means of keeping Russia out of Southern Persia. Moreover at that time, the Quetta-Seistan trade route not having yet been opened, the possible commercial value of the line was not taken into account at all. Secondly, it will be noticed that the conditions postulated by Sir H. Brackenbury in London as precedent to any idea of railway construction in this quarter have since been realised. Baluchistan is rapidly being developed; the frontier tribes have passed completely under our control; a permanent line of communication with Seistan has been opened; while the very conditions which he said, when in India, might compel a change of attitude on our part—*viz.*, Russian initiative in the process of southerly extension from her existing railway system—have been fulfilled by the construction on her part, without provocation or incentive from us, of the Merv-Kushk line. It is clear, therefore, that the question stands on a different footing from any that it has previously occupied; and that the facts and arguments which weighed with our predecessors are inapplicable to the present situation.

28. As regards the physical and engineering difficulties by which such a line might be confronted, I may cite the following opinion from the report in 1897 of Lieutenant Webb Ware: "No one who has traversed this country can fail to be struck with the marvellous facilities which the country between Nushki and Seistan offers for the construction of a railway. Scarcely a single material obstacle exists to bar the road; throughout the gradient is exceedingly gentle; bands of sand can as a rule be avoided; of fuel there is an abundance; while not a bridge of more than one span, or engineering work of any magnitude, is requisite. Added to this the mineral wealth of the Koh-i-Sultan and the hills to the west, at present lying untouched, is so considerable as in itself to offer very great inducements to railway enterprise. Such a railway would place the trade of Eastern Persia and Seistan at our feet, unlock such Central Asian markets as are now closed, give us a preponderating influence in Eastern Persia, and opened to India the rich grain fields of Seistan".

29. It would appear, therefore, that so far as gradients, water-crossings, and fuel are concerned, little or no difficulty would be met with in laying a line across the 400 and odd miles that intervene between Nushki and Seistan. On the other hand, I am inclined to think that at present a very serious obstacle would present itself in the complete dearth of water over long stretches of this route, and in the problem of the shifting sands. Both of these difficulties have been overcome by Russia, though only at great expense, and with the aid of a large permanent staff, upon her Trans-Caspian Railway. She has had, moreover, the assistance of a settled population and the advantage of numerous inhabited sites along the railway line. These advantages would, at any rate, at the start be wanting in the case of a Quetta-Seistan railway. For some time the trade by such a line, though it would probably develop with great rapidity, would not be remunerative; while the railway would have no other immediate use,

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

inasmuch as it would not be a line of connection between important centres of population, industry, or arms, but would, so to speak, end in the air. If it stopped at the Anglo-Persian border, it would still be 90 miles distant from Nasirabad, the capital of Seistan. The chances of prolongation to the latter would appear to be problematical in view of the engagements against the introduction of railways, which Persia has allowed to be imposed upon her by Russia. The question of the military protection of the line, if constructed, is one upon which expert opinion would be required to pronounce; although, in the yearly increasing tranquillity of the districts which it would traverse, I do not conceive that any serious difficulty would thereby be caused.

30. The Government of India have in the accompanying despatch suggested the desirability of coming to an understanding with Russia concerning spheres of interest in Persia, which would leave Seistan within the British zone. In such a case there might be no necessity, at any rate for the present, for a Quetta-Seistan railway. We could then devote ourselves to the diligent promotion of the resuscitated caravan route, and look forward to the day, when, the Helmand being in our hands, we might convert Seistan into a flourishing outpost on the flanks of British India, that would call for railway connection with the lines and resources of the interior.

31. Even in the event of such an understanding being declared impracticable, while I hold firmly to the opinion that we should then be bound to adopt such measures for the protection of Southern Persia and of our interests in that quarter as we might deem desirable, and while I concur with Lord Salisbury in thinking that a Quetta-Seistan railway might be found to be one of these, I am yet in favour of consolidating our position in the interim, of fostering the incipient trade, of acquiring further information about the tracts to be traversed, and of familiarising the Perso-Baluch border lands, and Seistan in particular, with our presence and influence, before we decide upon such a forward move. It would at any time be a comparatively easy task to connect Quetta by railroad with Nushki (90 miles); and such an extension would afford no inconsiderable relief to the Persian caravans, who now have to proceed with their camels to Quetta, where there is no camel-grazing and, where the prices for fodder are high, instead of returning at once, after a few days' rest, from Nushki. But I should like to see Nushki also developed, as I believe it is likely to be, by an interval of settled British administration, and by the measures which I am recommending in connection with the trade route, before I advocate even this advance. In a few years' time we shall be in a better position to pronounce upon ideas, the execution of which would for the present be somewhat in the nature of an experiment.

September 4th, 1899. CURZON.

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

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MINUTE BY THE VICEROY ON SEISTAN, DATED SEPTEMBER 4TH, 1899.

I propose, in this Minute, to examine the present aspect of the Seistan question in relation to our general policy towards Persia, and to the attitude of Russia in Persia. In my book on Persia, I wrote a chapter on Seistan (Vol. I, Chap. IX) which contained as full an account of that district, its history, inhabitants, features, and commercial and political significance, as was then (1892) procurable. I also discussed the political ambitions of Russia in connection with Seistan (Vol. I, pages 201, 216-218, 235-244; Vol. II, pages 597-598, 605), and the question of a possible Seistan Railway from India in the future (Vol. I, pages 237-244, 628-629). I ventured further to make certain recommendations, namely, that we should establish Consular or other representation (*a*) at Yezd, (*b*) at Kerman, (*c*) in Seistan, (*d*) at Bunder Abbas; (*e*) that the Kerman-Meshed trade route should be improved; (*f*) that a British trade route should be opened from Quetta to Seistan; (*g*) that the question of railway extension in the direction of Seistan should be considered. Of these recommendations, I am glad to say that, during the interval that has since elapsed, (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), (*e*) and (*f*) have already been carried into execution. In the despatch with which this Minute is enclosed, (*d*) is recommended by the Government of India. I propose shortly to discuss the present aspect of (*g*). The references which have been given will dispense me from recapitulating the elementary facts about Seistan; and I may commence with an account of what has happened during the past 7 years, leading up to a description of the *status quo*.

2. Seistan was in 1892 a *beluk* or sub-division of the district of Kain (capital Birjand) which is a part of the province of Khorasan (capital Meshed). The Government of Kain has for long been in the hereditary possession of a powerful family of Arab origin, whose head bears the title of Amir of Kain, and who, until the centralising tendencies of recent years, exercised an authority almost independent of that of the Shah. Mir Alam Khan, who had filled the post for over a quarter of a century, died in 1891. For reasons into which it is not necessary to enter, the younger of his two sons, Ismail Khan, known as the Shaukat-ul-Mulk (now about 50 years of age), succeeded him as Governor of Kain at Birjand. The elder son, Ali Akbar Khan, known as the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, became Governor of Tabbas and Seistan,—posts which he only retains by the process, familiar in Persia, of the annual payment of a large sum in cash to the Shah. The third son, Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, now just grown up, was made *Sartip* or Commandant of the Kain forces. The Shaukat-ul-Mulk and he have generally, but perhaps erroneously, been believed to incline towards Russia, whose aim has been to get Seistan, now to some extent separated from Kain, re-incorporated in it, and absorbed as an ordinary administrative district in the province of Khorasan. Such an amalgamation would emphasize the dependence of Seistan upon Meshed, from which it is now in some measure separate.

3. Meanwhile the elder brother, or Hashmat-ul-Mulk, has not himself resided in Seistan, but has deputed one of his sons, Mir Masum Khan, a fat and lethargic youth of about 18, to act as Deputy Governor at Nasirabad, under the tutelage of his mother, a lady with considerable powers of intrigue. This son is supposed to intrigue with the uncle at Birjand and is not on the best of terms with his father, who in 1898 sent an elder son, named Muhammad Reza Khan, to supersede him as Deputy Governor. Upon Mir Masum Khan declining to go, the quarrel was patched up; and he still acts for his father in Seistan. Thus the local situation is that of Russia endeavouring to increase her hold upon

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

the ruler of Kain (to whom she sent, a few weeks ago, a special mission conveying presents valued at £1,400); and the ruler of Kain endeavouring to oust his brother and to establish a hold upon Seistan himself.

4. Since the appointment of a British Consul-General at Meshed (in consequence of a similar Russian appointment) in 1889, Seistan, which is included in the Consul's jurisdiction, has been frequently visited and reported upon by British officers either from India or from Meshed. The Hon'ble G. Napier visited it in 1892-93. Colonel Yate made a tour thither in 1894, and strongly urged the appointment of a British Indian representative in Seistan, to balance the Russian native agent, whom he found exercising considerable influence. He enlarged upon the wheat-producing capabilities of Seistan, the cheapness of grain there as compared with the dearness outside, the advantage of exporting the surplus supply to Quetta, the utility of a postal service from Chaman *viâ* Seistan to Meshed, in place of the Kandahar-Herat line; and he recommended the construction of a line of wells and the planting of levy posts from Nushki to the Seistan border, so as to open a new caravan route for Indo-Persian trade. His report was shown to the Shah, who agreed with Colonel Yate's description of the political situation in Seistan, and, in so far as they concerned Persia, with his recommendations. The Government of India were, however, at that time under the impression, which has since been abandoned, that any evidence of British interest in Seistan or in Eastern Persia would merely bring down the Russians (who have come down without it), and would tempt them to extend their railway southwards (which they have since done independently of any British move). Accordingly Colonel Yate's proposals were rejected.

5. Two years later Captain McMahon, who had been employed upon the demarcation of the Baluch-Afghan boundary (in pursuance of the Durand Agreement of 1893), submitted a memorandum to the Government of India (dated June 21st, 1896), in which he strongly recommended the opening of the route which had been negatived in 1894, and the adoption of proper measures for its protection, and for the exercise of political authority up to the Persian border. The Government of India accepted these proposals, and submitted them to the Secretary of State in a despatch, dated September 16th, 1896. The latter replied on October 23rd, giving his sanction, and observing that—"In the interest of the trade between India and Persia, it seems to me very desirable to further its development by this route". In the ensuing month Lieutenant Webb Ware was appointed Political Officer at Chageh, and was instructed to establish levy posts, and to take other steps for the prompt execution of the new scheme.

6. This officer started upon his first visit to Seistan in January and returned in June 1897. He found Russian influence much in evidence in Seistan, where he pleaded for the early installation of a British Agent. With regard to the commercial possibilities of Seistan, he reported that "Seistan's staple products are grain, ghi (clarified butter) and wool. If facilities for carriage were to be improved, it is by no means impossible that the future may see an extensive Perso-Baluch grain-trade called into existence". Upon his outward, and again upon his return, journey, he took steps, by the opening of wells, by the building of guard-houses and godowns, and by the institution of levy posts, for the energetic promotion of the new trade route; and he submitted a number of further proposals, with that object in view, to the Government of India.

7. Lieutenant Webb Ware's visit to Seistan overlapped that of Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh, who in April of the same year was hurriedly despatched by the Government of India to Seistan, to carry out any plague precautions that might be required in that neighbourhood in anticipation of the preventive proceedings that Russia had announced her intention of putting into effect. His report testified to the great activity of Russia in Seistan, and contained a glowing and highly coloured picture of the capabilities of the country, which, with a somewhat proleptic fancy, he designated the Pearl of Persia. "Being a rich grain-growing, large pasturage, camel and flock-rearing district, whose resources under proper control could be hugely increased, it might be turned

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

into a regular garden". He described the climate as far from bad, and the difficulties of access from Meshed as greater than those from Baluchistan. He thought that a large field was open for the import of green tea into Persia by the Nushki route; and he strongly recommended the appointment of a native agent and assistant apothecary in Seistan.

8. A year later Khan Bahadur Maula Bakhsh, Native Attaché to the British Consulate at Meshed, and a very capable officer, was deputed to return to India by the new route, in the company of a trial caravan of Meshed merchants. Their journey lasted from April till July 1898—unfortunately the hottest and least propitious season of the year. At its close Maula Bakhsh, whose report is the best that I have yet read upon the country traversed, wrote that—"The Indian traders with my caravan, although disappointed by losses of camels, difficulties of transport and want of water at certain places, have not formed an unfavourable view of the new trade route, and they intend to advise their firms to send goods by it in the future". There were wanted, however, better arrangement for water-supply, more godowns, and superior provision for storing fodder. The road was pronounced not yet suitable for merchants, travellers, or pilgrims, unaccustomed to rough travelling. Nevertheless the journey from Meshed to Quetta—62 marches or 1,090 miles—was performed by Maula Bakhsh and his caravan in 65 days. Including the average number of halts, *viz.*, 10, he pointed out that the normal duration of the journey—*i.e.*, 72 days, would yet be shorter than the 75—90 days usually occupied in traversing the alternative route, 966 miles long, between Meshed and Bunder Abbas.

9. In the same year, 1898, Lieutenant Webb Ware submitted his first Annual Report, which, in spite of the obstructive measures adopted by the Russian officers on the pretext of plague in Khorasan, recorded a gratifying advance. In an appendix on Nushki trade, he pointed out that the route was growing in favour, and that out of nothing had been created a trade, which had risen from 1⅓ lakhs in 1896 to Rs. 5,90,000 in 1897. The main impediments were the total lack of supplies, other than those specially imported, on the road between Nushki and the Seistan frontier, and the illegal extortion of the Persian toll-collectors (many of them in Russian pay) in Persian territory. Notwithstanding, he thought that the Quetta-Seistan route would eventually beat the Bunder Abbas route to Meshed, because merchandise carried by the latter required to change hands several times in transit, because a longer time was required for the journey thereby, and because the road was less secure than one running uninterruptedly through British territory.

10. In the present year, the same officer's second Annual Report testifies to a continued improvement both in the amenities of the route, and in the trade returns, which have increased by Rs. 1,38,000 since 1897. A new bazar, containing 126 shops, has been laid out at Nushki, which has developed from a petty group of daub and wattle huts into a small town; and which, now that the Nushki district has been (in the summer of 1899) permanently taken over by the Government of India, is certain of a prosperous future. Throughout the past year a weekly *dâk* has been maintained from Quetta to the Seistan frontier, in correspondence with a bi-weekly Persian *dâk* from thence *viâ* Nasirabad and Birjand to Meshed. Alterations and short cuts in the route have reduced the distance from Nushki to Meshed to 954 miles, as compared with 966 miles from Bunder Abbas to the same destination.

11. An independent light has been thrown upon Seistan in the same period by the visit of Captain Sykes, who was despatched thither as Consul at the end of 1898 in consequence of the appointment of a Russian Consul to Nasirabad. Captain Sykes, who has for some time been Her Majesty's Consul at Kerman, and who has been greatly interested in the rival Bunder Abbas-Kerman-Meshed trade route, arrived in Seistan in January 1899, with prepossessions already so strongly formed in favour of the older route, and against the new competitor, that before he had been there a week, he pronounced against the permanent appointment of a Political Officer to Seistan, and in

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

favour of his own return to Kerman. He was also in a position to say that "the Quetta route (which he had never seen) is hopelessly handicapped by its natural disadvantages". These and other conclusions of Captain Sykes were vigorously disputed by Colonel Temple, our Agent and Consul-General at Meshed. But they are not without their value, as showing the reverse side of the shield to that which has perhaps, with a pardonable optimism, been displayed by the various officers, who have been concerned in the inception or development of the enterpise from the Indian side. In subsequent letters, Captain Sykes reiterated his opinions as to the superiority in respect of water, camel-grazing, and supplies of the Bunder Abbas route; but so far receded from his original attitude as to admit that there was a great opening on the Indian route for imports of tea and indigo, and that on political grounds its opening was important, adding, "The larger the parties that visit Seistan and the more frequently they appear, the greater the political effect will be". On February 14th, he explained "how necessary it is to provide the funds, by the careful expenditure of which Seistan may be brought nearer to India", and urged that "it is of paramount importance to take advantage of the proximity of our frontiers and not to allow Russian trade and influence to be pushed to our very door". On April 18th, while adhering to his views about the superiority of the Bunder Abbas road over the Indian route, he nevertheless remarked that "the Seistanis generally, and the Baluchis in particular, all look towards the East and South, while their local commerce is now mainly carried on with Quetta", and that "the revival of the Seistan-Quetta route, the buildings erected along it and the other proofs of British activity, have helped to increase our prestige". He now advocated placing a smart Muhammadan native agent in Seistan "to supervise the post which I earnestly hope will be made permanent"; and in a later letter, on May 11th, he urged "the establishment of an Indian Post Office at Birjand, as well as in Seistan, with a competent news-writer for each district"; which "modest scheme should be sanctioned and carried out without delay". In the last letter received from him, dated June 1st, Captain Sykes expressed his final opinion as adverse to the appointment of a British Consul for Kain and Seistan, unless a Russian Consul were sent (in which case it would become obligatory). It will be seen, therefore, from a synopsis of Captain Sykes's reports, that, while he remains unfavourable to the prospects of the Quetta-Seistan route, as compared with the old trans-Persian road, he has come round to the opinion, which no previous traveller in Seistan has questioned, that it is essential that British interests, commercial and political, should be sustained in that quarter by an energetic and liberal maintenance of the line of connection with India, but that, for their support in Seistan itself, it will be sufficient for the present, unless a more active course be imposed by Russian initiative, to rely upon Indian native agents. These recommendations I have accepted in the draft despatch to the Secretary of State. I should add that Colonel Temple, who has throughout disputed many of Captain Sykes's statements and dissented from his conclusions—partly owing to a not unfounded suspicion that Captain Sykes was advising in a spirit of undue independence of Meshed—has urged, in view of the recent renewal of plague alarms in Eastern Persia, that a native agent, if sent from India, should be a medical officer, charged in addition with the necessary political work. Although I believe these alarms to have been factitious, and to have been fomented by Russia for political purposes in 1899, as in 1897, I have so far acted upon Colonel Temple's advice as to send a Hospital Assistant from Quetta to Seistan as news-writer and medical reporter for a period of 6 months. Such is the present state of our information, and of affairs, in Seistan.

12. It will be seen from what I have written that Seistan is, by virtue of its position and its features, an object of much interest both to Russia and Great Britain. Situated at the point of junction of the frontiers of Persia, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan, its future affects the destinies of all three countries. Lying, as it does, almost midway between Meshed and the Persian Gulf, no advance can be made from Khorasan to the sea except through Seistan. Its position upon the exposed flank of Afghanistan would render its occupation of

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great value to any Power contemplating either a move against that country, or an advance upon Kandahar. Nor will it be denied that the Kandahar-Herat line could not be held with safety by India, nor the valley of the Helmand defended, were a hostile Power in possession of Seistan. Furthermore, the grain-producing capabilities of the district, to the bygone richness of which eloquent testimony is borne by the immense number of ruined cities encumbering the soil, and which could without serious difficulty be revived by a scientific employment of the waters of the Helmand, render Seistan of much value, as a possible granary, either to a Power engaged upon a forward advance, or to a Power interested in commercial and industrial expansion.

13. The force of these circumstances has, it will have been observed, compelled the Government of India to display a concern in Seistan, which, at the start, they were most reluctant to acknowledge, and which, at varying intervals since, they have, with unconscious inconsistency, affected to repudiate. I have already cited the reply returned to Colonel Yate in 1894. Between 1894 and 1898 the Nushki-Seistan trade route was, with the sanction and upon the encouragement of the Secretary of State, deliberately opened by the Government of India; a Political Officer was appointed to administer the district between Nushki and the Persian border; officers were repeatedly despatched to report upon the country and to evince an interest in its fortunes. And yet as recently as August 10th, 1898, the Government of India wrote to the Secretary of State that they shared the apprehensions of Lord Dufferin's Government in 1887 that "activity in the direction of Seistan might lead to a forward move on the part of Russia"; and that "premature activity was likely to prevent or postpone the future success of the new route from Quetta to Seistan".

14. I am quite unable to understand either the force of this logic or the consistency of this conduct. The cautious and, in its motive, praiseworthy abstention of the Government of India from displaying any interest in Seistan, did not for one moment affect the designs, or retard the advance of Russia in that direction. Russian news-writers were firmly established in the district before anything more than a casual visit had been paid by a British officer. While members of the Government of India were writing notes to show that, if even a caravan route were opened from Quetta in the direction of Seistan, the Russians would extend their trans-Caspian Railway southwards, the latter were already at work, laying their rails from Merv to the Kushk post, and preparing the plant for an ultimate extension to Herat. Sir M. Durand, in a paragraph of his recent despatch, has exposed the hollowness of this plea; and I venture to hope that it may not figure again in our reasoning.

15. Similarly, I am unable to comprehend how—the trade route having been deliberately opened—any activity in developing it can either be premature, or can possibly prevent or postpone hopes which the trade route itself has been called into existence to realise, and which, without it, would have had no being. Either the Nushki-Seistan trade route is a *bonâ-fide* enterprise, upon which we have designedly embarked, in the main, because of its commercial possibilities, but also not without an eye to the extreme political importance of Seistan; or it is a fortuitous and foolish experiment, not likely or intended to succeed. In the latter case let us be wise and drop it. In the former let us be honest, and make the best job of it that we can.

16. I have no hesitation in recommending the last named course: and I do so, not because I am carried away by the gratifying, though modest, achievements of the new trade route up to date, nor because I contemplate for it an early and brilliant success. On the contrary I regard the obstacles and difficulties as considerable; and, knowing the traditional conservatism of the East, I recognise that commerce will not readily be diverted into a new, and, at first sight, somewhat unattractive channel. But I urge a strenuous continuation of the venture, with an eye to a twofold contingency, political and commercial, in the future.

17. In the first place if we do not continue to show an active interest in Seistan, Russia will. If we do not give the impression there of preponderant

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influence, Russian authority will soon supplant ours. If, either by plague cordons or otherwise, the Nushki-Seistan traffic be killed, there will only remain the single access of the Bunder Abbas road for Indian trade to Khorasan; and this it will be easy for our rivals to close by similar tactics. If we do not desire Russia to advance to the Persian Gulf, the obvious method is to block the most direct of her paths. Looking to the future of Northern Khorasan, which is inevitably destined to pass under Russian control, it should be our object to draw the line of demarcation between the Russian and the British spheres at the point best suited to our interests, and not to hers. The home districts of Khorasan end with Turbat-i-Haidari, 80 miles south of Meshed. They will doubtless follow the fortunes of the capital.

18. South of this district comes that of Kain already possessing a semi-independent chiefship, which might very well be retained as a buffer between the opposing spheres. Seistan should, for all the reasons given, be included in the British sphere of interest. It is no exaggeration to say that we cannot afford to see it excluded.

19. Secondly, a study of the history and features of Seistan, no less than of all modern reports upon it, leads to the conclusion that the future of that country will depend, as did its past, upon the proper employment of the immense water-supply from the Helmand that now runs riot and goes to waste in vast lagoons, and reed-beds, and swamps. The greater part of Seistan is, during several months in the year, under inundation. Captain Sykes, in one of his letters, has estimated its present population at 60,000. In another, he has said that, under a proper system of irrigation, the land would support "perhaps a tenfold population". In a third he has said that, if the Helmand were properly controlled, the population might rise to a million or more. It is clear, therefore, that the future of Seistan will lie with those who control the entire course of the Helmand. It should be in their power to turn the desert into a garden, and to make the wilderness blossom like a rose.

20. Now it can hardly be doubted that a day will come, when, in response to an external challenge, Great Britain will be obliged to advance to Kandahar. So fully is this probability admitted, that the arrangements for the advance, including the rails, the mobilisation camp, and the water-supply at Chaman have already been made. When Kandahar is re-occupied, the valley of the Helmand will be occupied with it. Then will come the time, when the channel and the valley of that river, now running parallel to the British border, though at no great distance from it, having passed under British control, the regeneration of Seistan will for the first time become practicable, and it will be possible to revive its former fame as one of the granaries of that part of Asia. No wise man can be anxious to precipitate or even to hasten that consummation. But on the other hand no wisdom in the world can greatly retard it; and when the hour strikes, it would seem to me to be as well that Seistan should be waiting to be regenerated by us, instead of having already been absorbed in the regenerative embraces of others.

21. For these reasons, I recommend that in the intervening years, the Government of India should continue, by constant, but unpretentious, activity in fostering the trade route, in providing for its security, and in reducing its discomforts, and by a steady assertion of British authority up to the borders of Seistan and of British influence within it,—to build up an interest in Seistan which shall save for India an area and a market of so much potential value. With this object I urge that we should be willing to spend a little money—it will amount at the most to only a few thousand pounds—upon a venture that would be defensible, even if it were doomed to failure, but that appears, on the contrary, to be attended with reasonable hopes of success.

22. There remains only to be considered the question of a possible railway connection between India and Seistan. This question has been discussed at intervals during the past 12 years, and the history of the discussion is not without its lessons for the future. The first idea of some such railway appears to have originated with the late Sir J. Browne, who, as early as 1884, advocated a line

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from the neighbourhood of Quetta *viâ* Nushki, not to Seistan, but to Safar on the Helmand. This proposal was put forward, without any reference to Persia, for strategical reasons, namely, in order to prevent, at any future period, a Russian advance upon Kandahar. It is interesting to me to learn from a study of the papers, what I did not know before, *viz.*, that five years later, when I was travelling in Persia, and was first writing about this question, it had just been raised both in India and in Persia by a report from Colonel Bell, at that time head of the Intelligence Department in India, who in the autumn of 1888 marched from India by Kharan and Mashkel to Seistan, and strongly recommended the construction of a railway, and a lease in perpetuity of Seistan from the Persian Government, with a view to the grant of a great irrigation concession to Reuter or to some other Company. The suggestion was eagerly taken up by Sir H. D. Wolff, whose imagination was at that time suffused with halcyon dreams of a regeneration of Persia by universal railways; and was recommended by him both to the Government of India and to Lord Salisbury. Lord Lansdowne's Government in a telegram, dated January 20th, 1889, said that "Railway extension through Baluchistan was regarded by the military authorities as a most valuable adjunct to the defences of India and as deserving of the utmost encouragement". Sir H. Wolff's proposals did not make much advance, but were reiterated by him in despatches to the Foreign Office, dated July 25th, and August 19th, 1890. Unfortunately in these, as in his original despatch of February 19th, 1889, Sir H. Wolff rested his defence of the scheme upon extremely contentious and entirely unacceptable grounds. He advocated it for two reasons: as a menace to the Trans-Caspian Railway of Russia, and as the saving of a long land march in the event of our desiring to take the offensive against that Power. This line of argument was completely riddled in a Memorandum, dated October 2nd, 1890, by General Brackenbury, at that time Head of the Intelligence Department at home. He pointed out that a single line to a remote corner of Persia could not counterbalance the position of Russia in that country, would not help us in the least on the Afghan border or in Afghan-Turkistan, and would be of no use for assuming the offensive. He concluded by saying—"By far the more important task is, not the construction of a new line into Seistan, but the consolidation of our power there by bringing the frontier tribes under our influence, and by developing Baluchistan and converting it into a fertile base of operations. When this has been done, it will be time to push forward into Persia".

23. General Brackenbury's criticism was destructive of the proposal viewed as an offensive and strategical scheme. But a corresponding flaw in his own argument was at once pointed out by Lord Salisbury, who noted that the real object of a Seistan railway would be not to attack Russia in Northern Persia, but to save Southern Persia from falling into her grasp, which could be done either by a line from Quetta, or, as he would himself prefer, by a line from the sea.

24. General Brackenbury's criticism was sent out to the Government of India, and was thus noted upon by Sir G. Chesney on January 13th, 1891—"The railway can only be regarded as a work of military precaution. From this point of view it appears to me that the time cannot be far distant when it will be deemed necessary. Still more important is a railway from the Persian Gulf north to Seistan; but the connecting link between this line and the Quetta railway system will also be found necessary".

25. A little later Sir H. Brackenbury, now Military Member in India, again noted upon the scheme; and it is interesting to read his remarks in the light of his former opinion. He now explained (April 27th, 1891) that he had only objected to a Seistan railway so long as the Russian railway did not extend south of the Trans-Caspian line, and because to construct a railway to Seistan would compel her to make extensions. "But if circumstances should change, and if Russia should take the lead in making railways southward, then it may become necessary for us to follow her lead. We ought to be able to keep pace with her".

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26. These conditions had not yet been realised, and the Government of India decided to proceed no further with the scheme. The question of a more southerly line from the sea was at the same time considered in connection with Sir R. Sandeman's proposals to take over Kej and Panjgur—a project which was revived in 1894 by his successor, Sir J. Browne. On both occasions, however (as again at a later date), the proposal to assume administrative responsibility for Makran was negatived by the Government of India, and with it the idea of a Makran railway from the sea to Seistan was dropped also. Since then the question has not been revived.

27. It will be clear from the above narrative, firstly, that the idea of a Seistan railway does not appear to have ever been considered by the Government of India from the only point of view in which, in my opinion, it ought to be regarded, *viz.*, as a protective, and not an offensive, measure. The reason perhaps is that, at that time, Russia had not given such unmistakable evidence of her intention to move southward from Meshed, and to draw Seistan within the radius of her political influence. The railway was accordingly discussed and condemned, as a means of attacking Russia in Northern Persia, not as a means of keeping Russia out of Southern Persia. Moreover at that time, the Quetta-Seistan trade route not having yet been opened, the possible commercial value of the line was not taken into account at all. Secondly, it will be noticed that the conditions postulated by Sir H. Brackenbury in London as precedent to any idea of railway construction in this quarter have since been realised. Baluchistan is rapidly being developed; the frontier tribes have passed completely under our control; a permanent line of communication with Seistan has been opened; while the very conditions which he said, when in India, might compel a change of attitude on our part—*viz.*, Russian initiative in the process of southerly extension from her existing railway system—have been fulfilled by the construction on her part, without provocation or incentive from us, of the Merv-Kushk line. It is clear, therefore, that the question stands on a different footing from any that it has previously occupied; and that the facts and arguments which weighed with our predecessors are inapplicable to the present situation.

28. As regards the physical and engineering difficulties by which such a line might be confronted, I may cite the following opinion from the report in 1897 of Lieutenant Webb Ware: "No one who has traversed this country can fail to be struck with the marvellous facilities which the country between Nushki and Seistan offers for the construction of a railway. Scarcely a single material obstacle exists to bar the road; throughout the gradient is exceedingly gentle; bands of sand can as a rule be avoided; of fuel there is an abundance; while not a bridge of more than one span, or engineering work of any magnitude, is requisite. Added to this the mineral wealth of the Koh-i-Sultan and the hills to the west, at present lying untouched, is so considerable as in itself to offer very great inducements to railway enterprise. Such a railway would place the trade of Eastern Persia and Seistan at our feet, unlock such Central Asian markets as are now closed, give us a preponderating influence in Eastern Persia, and opened to India the rich grain fields of Seistan".

29. It would appear, therefore, that so far as gradients, water-crossings, and fuel are concerned, little or no difficulty would be met with in laying a line across the 400 and odd miles that intervene between Nushki and Seistan. On the other hand, I am inclined to think that at present a very serious obstacle would present itself in the complete dearth of water over long stretches of this route, and in the problem of the shifting sands. Both of these difficulties have been overcome by Russia, though only at great expense, and with the aid of a large permanent staff, upon her Trans-Caspian Railway. She has had, moreover, the assistance of a settled population and the advantage of numerous inhabited sites along the railway line. These advantages would, at any rate, at the start be wanting in the case of a Quetta-Seistan railway. For some time the trade by such a line, though it would probably develop with great rapidity, would not be remunerative; while the railway would have no other immediate use,

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inasmuch as it would not be a line of connection between important centres of population, industry, or arms, but would, so to speak, end in the air. If it stopped at the Anglo-Persian border, it would still be 90 miles distant from Nasirabad, the capital of Seistan. The chances of prolongation to the latter would appear to be problematical in view of the engagements against the introduction of railways, which Persia has allowed to be imposed upon her by Russia. The question of the military protection of the line, if constructed, is one upon which expert opinion would be required to pronounce; although, in the yearly increasing tranquillity of the districts which it would traverse, I do not conceive that any serious difficulty would thereby be caused.

30. The Government of India have in the accompanying despatch suggested the desirability of coming to an understanding with Russia concerning spheres of interest in Persia, which would leave Seistan within the British zone. In such a case there might be no necessity, at any rate for the present, for a Quetta-Seistan railway. We could then devote ourselves to the diligent promotion of the resuscitated caravan route, and look forward to the day, when, the Helmand being in our hands, we might convert Seistan into a flourishing outpost on the flanks of British India, that would call for railway connection with the lines and resources of the interior.

31. Even in the event of such an understanding being declared impracticable, while I hold firmly to the opinion that we should then be bound to adopt such measures for the protection of Southern Persia and of our interests in that quarter as we might deem desirable, and while I concur with Lord Salisbury in thinking that a Quetta-Seistan railway might be found to be one of these, I am yet in favour of consolidating our position in the interim, of fostering the incipient trade, of acquiring further information about the tracts to be traversed, and of familiarising the Perso-Baluch border lands, and Seistan in particular, with our presence and influence, before we decide upon such a forward move. It would at any time be a comparatively easy task to connect Quetta by railroad with Nushki (90 miles); and such an extension would afford no inconsiderable relief to the Persian caravans, who now have to proceed with their camels to Quetta, where there is no camel-grazing and, where the prices for fodder are high, instead of returning at once, after a few days' rest, from Nushki. But I should like to see Nushki also developed, as I believe it is likely to be, by an interval of settled British administration, and by the measures which I am recommending in connection with the trade route, before I advocate even this advance. In a few years' time we shall be in a better position to pronounce upon ideas, the execution of which would for the present be somewhat in the nature of an experiment.

September 4th, 1899. CURZON.

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

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

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MINUTE BY THE VICEROY ON SEISTAN, DATED SEPTEMBER 4TH, 1899.

I propose, in this Minute, to examine the present aspect of the Seistan question in relation to our general policy towards Persia, and to the attitude of Russia in Persia. In my book on Persia, I wrote a chapter on Seistan (Vol. I, Chap. IX) which contained as full an account of that district, its history, inhabitants, features, and commercial and political significance, as was then (1892) procurable. I also discussed the political ambitions of Russia in connection with Seistan (Vol. I, pages 201, 216-218, 235-244; Vol. II, pages 597-598, 605), and the question of a possible Seistan Railway from India in the future (Vol I, pages 237-244, 628-629). I ventured further to make certain recommendations, namely, that we should establish Consular or other representation (*a*) at Yezd, (*b*) at Kerman, (*c*) in Seistan, (*d*) at Bunder Abbas; (*e*) that the Kerman-Meshed trade route should be improved; (*f*) that a British trade route should be opened from Quetta to Seistan; (*g*) that the question of railway extension in the direction of Seistan should be considered. Of these recommendations, I am glad to say that, during the interval that has since elapsed, (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), (*e*) and (*f*) have already been carried into execution. In the despatch with which this Minute is enclosed, (*d*) is recommended by the Government of India. I propose shortly to discuss the present aspect of (*g*). The references which have been given will dispense me from recapitulating the elementary facts about Seistan; and I may commence with an account of what has happened during the past 7 years, leading up to a description of the *status quo*.

2. Seistan was in 1892 a *beluk* or sub-division of the district of Kain (capital Birjand) which is a part of the province of Khorasan (capital Meshed). The Government of Kain has for long been in the hereditary possession of a powerful family of Arab origin, whose head bears the title of Amir of Kain, and who, until the centralising tendencies of recent years, exercised an authority almost independent of that of the Shah. Mir Alam Khan, who had filled the post for over a quarter of a century, died in 1891. For reasons into which it is not necessary to enter, the younger of his two sons, Ismail Khan, known as the Shaukat-ul-Mulk (now about 50 years of age), succeeded him as Governor of Kain at Birjand. The elder son, Ali Akbar Khan, known as the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, became Governor of Tabbas and Seistan,—posts which he only retains by the process, familiar in Persia, of the annual payment of a large sum in cash to the Shah. The third son, Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, now just grown up, was made *Sartip* or Commandant of the Kain forces. The Shaukat-ul-Mulk and he have generally, but perhaps erroneously, been believed to incline towards Russia, whose aim has been to get Seistan, now to some extent separated from Kain, re-incorporated in it, and absorbed as an ordinary administrative district in the province of Khorasan. Such an amalgamation would emphasize the dependence of Seistan upon Meshed, from which it is now in some measure separate.

3. Meanwhile the elder brother, or Hashmat-ul-Mulk, has not himself resided in Seistan, but has deputed one of his sons, Mir Masum Khan, a fat and lethargic youth of about 18, to act as Deputy Governor at Nasirabad under the tutelage of his mother, a lady with considerable powers of intrigue. This son is supposed to intrigue with the uncle at Birjand and is not on the best of terms with his father, who in 1898 sent an elder son, named Muhammad Reza Khan, to supersede him as Deputy Governor. Upon Mir Masum Khan declining to go, the quarrel was patched up; and he still acts for his father in Seistan. Thus the local situation is that of Russia endeavouring to increase her hold upon

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the ruler of Kain (to whom she sent, a few weeks ago, a special mission conveying presents valued at £1,400); and the ruler of Kain endeavouring to oust his brother and to establish a hold upon Seistan himself.

4. Since the appointment of a British Consul-General at Meshed (in consequence of a similar Russian appointment) in 1889, Seistan, which is included in the Consul's jurisdiction, has been frequently visited and reported upon by British officers either from India or from Meshed. The Hon'ble G. Napier visited it in 1892-93. Colonel Yate made a tour thither in 1894, and strongly urged the appointment of a British Indian representative in Seistan, to balance the Russian native agent, whom he found exercising considerable influence. He enlarged upon the wheat-producing capabilities of Seistan, the cheapness of grain there as compared with the dearness outside, the advantage of exporting the surplus supply to Quetta, the utility of a postal service from Chaman *viâ* Seistan to Meshed, in place of the Kandahar-Herat line; and he recommended the construction of a line of wells and the planting of levy posts from Nushki to the Seistan border, so as to open a new caravan route for Indo-Persian trade. His report was shown to the Shah, who agreed with Colonel Yate's description of the political situation in Seistan, and, in so far as they concerned Persia, with his recommendations. The Government of India were, however, at that time under the impression, which has since been abandoned, that any evidence of British interest in Seistan or in Eastern Persia would merely bring down the Russians (who have come down without it), and would tempt them to extend their railway southwards (which they have since done independently of any British move). Accordingly Colonel Yate's proposals were rejected.

5. Two years later Captain McMahon, who had been employed upon the demarcation of the Baluch-Afghan boundary (in pursuance of the Durand Agreement of 1893), submitted a memorandum to the Government of India (dated June 21st, 1896), in which he strongly recommended the opening of the route which had been negatived in 1894, and the adoption of proper measures for its protection, and for the exercise of political authority up to the Persian border. The Government of India accepted these proposals, and submitted them to the Secretary of State in a despatch, dated September 16th, 1896. The latter replied on October 23rd, giving his sanction, and observing that—"In the interest of the trade between India and Persia, it seems to me very desirable to further its development by this route". In the ensuing month Lieutenant Webb Ware was appointed Political Officer at Chageh, and was instructed to establish levy posts, and to take other steps for the prompt execution of the new scheme.

6. This officer started upon his first visit to Seistan in January and returned in June 1897. He found Russian influence much in evidence in Seistan, where he pleaded for the early installation of a British Agent. With regard to the commercial possibilities of Seistan, he reported that "Seistan's staple products are grain, ghi (clarified butter) and wool. If facilities for carriage were to be improved, it is by no means impossible that the future may see an extensive Perso-Baluch grain-trade called into existence". Upon his outward, and again upon his return, journey, he took steps, by the opening of wells, by the building of guard-houses and godowns, and by the institution of levy posts, for the energetic promotion of the new trade route; and he submitted a number of further proposals, with that object in view, to the Government of India.

7. Lieutenant Webb Ware's visit to Seistan overlapped that of Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh, who in April of the same year was hurriedly despatched by the Government of India to Seistan, to carry out any plague precautions that might be required in that neighbourhood in anticipation of the preventive proceedings that Russia had announced her intention of putting into effect. His report testified to the great activity of Russia in Seistan, and contained a glowing and highly coloured picture of the capabilities of the country, which, with a somewhat proleptic fancy, he designated the Pearl of Persia. "Being a rich grain-growing, large pasturage, camel and flock-rearing district, whose resources under proper control could be hugely increased, it might be turned

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into a regular garden". He described the climate as far from bad, and the difficulties of access from Meshed as greater than those from Baluchistan. He thought that a large field was open for the import of green tea into Persia by the Nushki route; and he strongly recommended the appointment of a native agent and assistant apothecary in Seistan.

8. A year later Khan Bahadur Maula Bakhsh, Native Attaché to the British Consulate at Meshed, and a very capable officer, was deputed to return to India by the new route, in the company of a trial caravan of Meshed merchants. Their journey lasted from April till July 1898—unfortunately the hottest and least propitious season of the year. At its close Maula Bakhsh, whose report is the best that I have yet read upon the country traversed, wrote that—"The Indian traders with my caravan, although disappointed by losses of camels, difficulties of transport and want of water at certain places, have not formed an unfavourable view of the new trade route, and they intend to advise their firms to send goods by it in the future". There were wanted, however, better arrangement for water-supply, more godowns, and superior provision for storing fodder. The road was pronounced not yet suitable for merchants, travellers, or pilgrims, unaccustomed to rough travelling. Nevertheless the journey from Meshed to Quetta—62 marches or 1,090 miles—was performed by Maula Bakhsh and his caravan in 65 days. Including the average number of halts, *viz.*, 10, he pointed out that the normal duration of the journey—*i.e.*, 72 days, would yet be shorter than the 75—90 days usually occupied in traversing the alternative route, 966 miles long, between Meshed and Bunder Abbas.

9. In the same year, 1898, Lieutenant Webb Ware submitted his first Annual Report, which, in spite of the obstructive measures adopted by the Russian officers on the pretext of plague in Khorasan, recorded a gratifying advance. In an appendix on Nushki trade, he pointed out that the route was growing in favour, and that out of nothing had been created a trade, which had risen from 1½ lakhs in 1896 to Rs. 5,90,000 in 1897. The main impediments were the total lack of supplies, other than those specially imported, on the road between Nushki and the Seistan frontier, and the illegal extortion of the Persian toll-collectors (many of them in Russian pay) in Persian territory. Notwithstanding, he thought that the Quetta-Seistan route would eventually beat the Bunder Abbas route to Meshed, because merchandise carried by the latter required to change hands several times in transit, because a longer time was required for the journey thereby, and because the road was less secure than one running uninterruptedly through British territory.

10. In the present year, the same officer's second Annual Report testifies to a continued improvement both in the amenities of the route, and in the trade returns, which have increased by Rs. 1,38,000 since 1897. A new bazar, containing 126 shops, has been laid out at Nushki, which has developed from a petty group of daub and wattle huts into a small town; and which, now that the Nushki district has been (in the summer of 1899) permanently taken over by the Government of India, is certain of a prosperous future. Throughout the past year a weekly *dák* has been maintained from Quetta to the Seistan frontier, in correspondence with a bi-weekly Persian *dák* from thence *viâ* Nasirabad and Birjand to Meshed. Alterations and short cuts in the route have reduced the distance from Nushki to Meshed to 954 miles, as compared with 966 miles from Bunder Abbas to the same destination.

11. An independent light has been thrown upon Seistan in the same period by the visit of Captain Sykes, who was despatched thither as Consul at the end of 1898 in consequence of the appointment of a Russian Consul to Nasirabad. Captain Sykes, who has for some time been Her Majesty's Consul at Kerman, and who has been greatly interested in the rival Bunder Abbas-Kerman-Meshed trade route, arrived in Seistan in January 1899, with prepossessions already so strongly formed in favour of the older route, and against the new competitor, that before he had been there a week, he pronounced against the permanent appointment of a Political Officer to Seistan, and in

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favour of his own return to Kerman. He was also in a position to say that "the Quetta route (which he had never seen) is hopelessly handicapped by its natural disadvantages". These and other conclusions of Captain Sykes were vigorously disputed by Colonel Temple, our Agent and Consul-General at Meshed. But they are not without their value, as showing the reverse side of the shield to that which has perhaps, with a pardonable optimism, been displayed by the various officers, who have been concerned in the inception or development of the enterpise from the Indian side. In subsequent letters, Captain Sykes reiterated his opinions as to the superiority in respect of water, camel-grazing, and supplies of the Bunder Abbas route; but so far receded from his original attitude as to admit that there was a great opening on the Indian route for imports of tea and indigo, and that on political grounds its opening was important, adding, "The larger the parties that visit Seistan and the more frequently they appear, the greater the political effect will be". On February 14th, he explained "how necessary it is to provide the funds, by the careful expenditure of which Seistan may be brought nearer to India", and urged that "it is of paramount importance to take advantage of the proximity of our frontiers and not to allow Russian trade and influence to be pushed to our very door". On April 18th, while adhering to his views about the superiority of the Bunder Abbas road over the Indian route, he nevertheless remarked that "the Seistanis generally, and the Baluchis in particular, all look towards the East and South, while their local commerce is now mainly carried on with Quetta", and that "the revival of the Seistan-Quetta route, the buildings erected along it and the other proofs of British activity, have helped to increase our prestige". He now advocated placing a smart Muhammadan native agent in Seistan "to supervise the post which I earnestly hope will be made permanent"; and in a later letter, on May 11th, he urged "the establishment of an Indian Post Office at Birjand, as well as in Seistan, with a competent news-writer for each district"; which "modest scheme should be sanctioned and carried out without delay". In the last letter received from him, dated June 1st, Captain Sykes expressed his final opinion as adverse to the appointment of a British Consul for Kain and Seistan, unless a Russian Consul were sent (in which case it would become obligatory). It will be seen, therefore, from a synopsis of Captain Sykes's reports, that, while he remains unfavourable to the prospects of the Quetta-Seistan route, as compared with the old trans-Persian road, he has come round to the opinion, which no previous traveller in Seistan has questioned, that it is essential that British interests, commercial and political, should be sustained in that quarter by an energetic and liberal maintenance of the line of connection with India, but that, for their support in Seistan itself, it will be sufficient for the present, unless a more active course be imposed by Russian initiative, to rely upon Indian native agents. These recommendations I have accepted in the draft despatch to the Secretary of State. I should add that Colonel Temple, who has throughout disputed many of Captain Sykes's statements and dissented from his conclusions—partly owing to a not unfounded suspicion that Captain Sykes was advising in a spirit of undue independence of Meshed—has urged, in view of the recent renewal of plague alarms in Eastern Persia, that a native agent, if sent from India, should be a medical officer, charged in addition with the necessary political work. Although I believe these alarms to have been factitious, and to have been fomented by Russia for political purposes in 1899, as in 1897, I have so far acted upon Colonel Temple's advice as to send a Hospital Assistant from Quetta to Seistan as news-writer and medical reporter for a period of 6 months. Such is the present state of our information, and of affairs, in Seistan.

12. It will be seen from what I have written that Seistan is, by virtue of its position and its features, an object of much interest both to Russia and Great Britain. Situated at the point of junction of the frontiers of Persia, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan, its future affects the destinies of all three countries. Lying, as it does, almost midway between Meshed and the Persian Gulf, no advance can be made from Khorasan to the sea except through Seistan. Its position upon the exposed flank of Afghanistan would render its occupation of

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

great value to any Power contemplating either a move against that country, or an advance upon Kandahar. Nor will it be denied that the Kandahar-Herat line could not be held with safety by India, nor the valley of the Helmand defended, were a hostile Power in possession of Seistan. Furthermore, the grain-producing capabilities of the district, to the bygone richness of which eloquent testimony is borne by the immense number of ruined cities encumbering the soil, and which could without serious difficulty be revived by a scientific employment of the waters of the Helmand, render Seistan of much value, as a possible granary, either to a Power engaged upon a forward advance, or to a Power interested in commercial and industrial expansion.

13. The force of these circumstances has, it will have been observed, compelled the Government of India to display a concern in Seistan, which, at the start, they were most reluctant to acknowledge, and which, at varying intervals since, they have, with unconscious inconsistency, affected to repudiate. I have already cited the reply returned to Colonel Yate in 1894. Between 1894 and 1898 the Nushki-Seistan trade route was, with the sanction and upon the encouragement of the Secretary of State, deliberately opened by the Government of India; a Political Officer was appointed to administer the district between Nushki and the Persian border; officers were repeatedly despatched to report upon the country and to evince an interest in its fortunes. And yet as recently as August 10th, 1898, the Government of India wrote to the Secretary of State that they shared the apprehensions of Lord Dufferin's Government in 1887 that "activity in the direction of Seistan might lead to a forward move on the part of Russia"; and that "premature activity was likely to prevent or postpone the future success of the new route from Quetta to Seistan".

14. I am quite unable to understand either the force of this logic or the consistency of this conduct. The cautious and, in its motive, praiseworthy abstention of the Government of India from displaying any interest in Seistan, did not for one moment affect the designs, or retard the advance of Russia in that direction. Russian news-writers were firmly established in the district before anything more than a casual visit had been paid by a British officer. While members of the Government of India were writing notes to show that, if even a caravan route were opened from Quetta in the direction of Seistan, the Russians would extend their trans-Caspian Railway southwards, the latter were already at work, laying their rails from Merv to the Kushk post, and preparing the plant for an ultimate extension to Herat. Sir M. Durand, in a paragraph of his recent despatch, has exposed the hollowness of this plea; and I venture to hope that it may not figure again in our reasoning.

15. Similarly, I am unable to comprehend how—the trade route having been deliberately opened—any activity in developing it can either be premature, or can possibly prevent or postpone hopes which the trade route itself has been called into existence to realise, and which, without it, would have had no being. Either the Nushki-Seistan trade route is a *boná-fide* enterprise, upon which we have designedly embarked, in the main, because of its commercial possibilities, but also not without an eye to the extreme political importance of Seistan; or it is a fortuitous and foolish experiment, not likely or intended to succeed. In the latter case let us be wise and drop it. In the former let us be honest, and make the best job of it that we can.

16. I have no hesitation in recommending the last named course: and I do so, not because I am carried away by the gratifying, though modest, achievements of the new trade route up to date, nor because I contemplate for it an early and brilliant success. On the contrary I regard the obstacles and difficulties as considerable; and, knowing the traditional conservatism of the East, I recognise that commerce will not readily be diverted into a new, and, at first sight, somewhat unattractive channel. But I urge a strenuous continuation of the venture, with an eye to a twofold contingency, political and commercial, in the future.

17. In the first place if we do not continue to show an active interest in Seistan, Russia will. If we do not give the impression there of preponderant

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influence, Russian authority will soon supplant ours. If, either by plague cordons or otherwise, the Nushki-Seistan traffic be killed, there will only remain the single access of the Bunder Abbas road for Indian trade to Khorasan; and this it will be easy for our rivals to close by similar tactics. If we do not desire Russia to advance to the Persian Gulf, the obvious method is to block the most direct of her paths. Looking to the future of Northern Khorasan, which is inevitably destined to pass under Russian control, it should be our object to draw the line of demarcation between the Russian and the British spheres at the point best suited to our interests, and not to hers. The home districts of Khorasan end with Turbat-i-Haidari, 80 miles south of Meshed. They will doubtless follow the fortunes of the capital.

18. South of this district comes that of Kain already possessing a semi-independent chiefship, which might very well be retained as a buffer between the opposing spheres. Seistan should, for all the reasons given, be included in the British sphere of interest. It is no exaggeration to say that we cannot afford to see it excluded.

19. Secondly, a study of the history and features of Seistan, no less than of all modern reports upon it, leads to the conclusion that the future of that country will depend, as did its past, upon the proper employment of the immense water-supply from the Helmand that now runs riot and goes to waste in vast lagoons, and reed-beds, and swamps. The greater part of Seistan is, during several months in the year, under inundation. Captain Sykes, in one of his letters, has estimated its present population at 60,000. In another, he has said that, under a proper system of irrigation, the land would support "perhaps a tenfold population". In a third he has said that, if the Helmand were properly controlled, the population might rise to a million or more. It is clear, therefore, that the future of Seistan will lie with those who control the entire course of the Helmand. It should be in their power to turn the desert into a garden, and to make the wilderness blossom like a rose.

20. Now it can hardly be doubted that a day will come, when, in response to an external challenge, Great Britain will be obliged to advance to Kandahar. So fully is this probability admitted, that the arrangements for the advance, including the rails, the mobilisation camp, and the water-supply at Chaman have already been made. When Kandahar is re-occupied, the valley of the Helmand will be occupied with it. Then will come the time, when the channel and the valley of that river, now running parallel to the British border, though at no great distance from it, having passed under British control, the regeneration of Seistan will for the first time become practicable, and it will be possible to revive its former fame as one of the granaries of that part of Asia. No wise man can be anxious to precipitate or even to hasten that consummation. But on the other hand no wisdom in the world can greatly retard it; and when the hour strikes, it would seem to me to be as well that Seistan should be waiting to be regenerated by us, instead of having already been absorbed in the regenerative embraces of others.

21. For these reasons, I recommend that in the intervening years, the Government of India should continue, by constant, but unpretentious, activity in fostering the trade route, in providing for its security, and in reducing its discomforts, and by a steady assertion of British authority up to the borders of Seistan and of British influence within it,—to build up an interest in Seistan which shall save for India an area and a market of so much potential value. With this object I urge that we should be willing to spend a little money—it will amount at the most to only a few thousand pounds—upon a venture that would be defensible, even if it were doomed to failure, but that appears, on the contrary, to be attended with reasonable hopes of success.

22. There remains only to be considered the question of a possible railway connection between India and Seistan. This question has been discussed at intervals during the past 12 years, and the history of the discussion is not without its lessons for the future. The first idea of some such railway appears to have originated with the late Sir J. Browne, who, as early as 1884, advocated a line

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

from the neighbourhood of Quetta *viâ* Nushki, not to Seistan, but to Safar on the Helmand. This proposal was put forward, without any reference to Persia, for strategical reasons, namely, in order to prevent, at any future period, a Russian advance upon Kandahar. It is interesting to me to learn from a study of the papers, what I did not know before, *viz.*, that five years later, when I was travelling in Persia, and was first writing about this question, it had just been raised both in India and in Persia by a report from Colonel Bell, at that time head of the Intelligence Department in India, who in the autumn of 1888 marched from India by Kharan and Mashkel to Seistan, and strongly recommended the construction of a railway, and a lease in perpetuity of Seistan from the Persian Government, with a view to the grant of a great irrigation concession to Reuter or to some other Company. The suggestion was eagerly taken up by Sir H. D. Wolff, whose imagination was at that time suffused with halcyon dreams of a regeneration of Persia by universal railways; and was recommended by him both to the Government of India and to Lord Salisbury. Lord Lansdowne's Government in a telegram, dated January 20th, 1889, said that "Railway extension through Baluchistan was regarded by the military authorities as a most valuable adjunct to the defences of India and as deserving of the utmost encouragement". Sir H. Wolff's proposals did not make much advance, but were reiterated by him in despatches to the Foreign Office, dated July 25th, and August 19th, 1890. Unfortunately in these, as in his original despatch of February 19th, 1889, Sir H. Wolff rested his defence of the scheme upon extremely contentious and entirely unacceptable grounds. He advocated it for two reasons: as a menace to the Trans-Caspian Railway of Russia, and as the saving of a long land march in the event of our desiring to take the offensive against that Power. This line of argument was completely riddled in a Memorandum, dated October 2nd, 1890, by General Brackenbury, at that time Head of the Intelligence Department at home. He pointed out that a single line to a remote corner of Persia could not counterbalance the position of Russia in that country, would not help us in the least on the Afghan border or in Afghan-Turkistan, and would be of no use for assuming the offensive. He concluded by saying—"By far the more important task is, not the construction of a new line into Seistan, but the consolidation of our power there by bringing the frontier tribes under our influence, and by developing Baluchistan and converting it into a fertile base of operations. When this has been done, it will be time to push forward into Persia".

23. General Brackenbury's criticism was destructive of the proposal viewed as an offensive and strategical scheme. But a corresponding flaw in his own argument was at once pointed out by Lord Salisbury, who noted that the real object of a Seistan railway would be not to attack Russia in Northern Persia, but to save Southern Persia from falling into her grasp, which could be done either by a line from Quetta, or, as he would himself prefer, by a line from the sea.

24. General Brackenbury's criticism was sent out to the Government of India, and was thus noted upon by Sir G. Chesney on January 13th, 1891—"The railway can only be regarded as a work of military precaution. From this point of view it appears to me that the time cannot be far distant when it will be deemed necessary. Still more important is a railway from the Persian Gulf north to Seistan; but the connecting link between this line and the Quetta railway system will also be found necessary".

25. A little later Sir H. Brackenbury, now Military Member in India, again noted upon the scheme; and it is interesting to read his remarks in the light of his former opinion. He now explained (April 27th, 1891) that he had only objected to a Seistan railway so long as the Russian railway did not extend south of the Trans-Caspian line, and because to construct a railway to Seistan would compel her to make extensions. "But if circumstances should change, and if Russia should take the lead in making railways southward, then it may become necessary for us to follow her lead. We ought to be able to keep pace with her".

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26. These conditions had not yet been realised, and the Government of India decided to proceed no further with the scheme. The question of a more southerly line from the sea was at the same time considered in connection with Sir R. Sandeman's proposals to take over Kej and Panjgur—a project which was revived in 1894 by his successor, Sir J. Browne. On both occasions, however (as again at a later date), the proposal to assume administrative responsibility for Makran was negatived by the Government of India, and with it the idea of a Makran railway from the sea to Seistan was dropped also. Since then the question has not been revived.

27. It will be clear from the above narrative, firstly, that the idea of a Seistan railway does not appear to have ever been considered by the Government of India from the only point of view in which, in my opinion, it ought to be regarded, *viz.*, as a protective, and not an offensive, measure. The reason perhaps is that, at that time, Russia had not given such unmistakable evidence of her intention to move southward from Meshed, and to draw Seistan within the radius of her political influence. The railway was accordingly discussed and condemned, as a means of attacking Russia in Northern Persia, not as a means of keeping Russia out of Southern Persia. Moreover at that time, the Quetta-Seistan trade route not having yet been opened, the possible commercial value of the line was not taken into account at all. Secondly, it will be noticed that the conditions postulated by Sir H. Brackenbury in London as precedent to any idea of railway construction in this quarter have since been realised. Baluchistan is rapidly being developed; the frontier tribes have passed completely under our control; a permanent line of communication with Seistan has been opened; while the very conditions which he said, when in India, might compel a change of attitude on our part—*viz.*, Russian initiative in the process of southerly extension from her existing railway system—have been fulfilled by the construction on her part, without provocation or incentive from us, of the Merv-Kushk line. It is clear, therefore, that the question stands on a different footing from any that it has previously occupied; and that the facts and arguments which weighed with our predecessors are inapplicable to the present situation.

28. As regards the physical and engineering difficulties by which such a line might be confronted, I may cite the following opinion from the report in 1897 of Lieutenant Webb Ware: "No one who has traversed this country can fail to be struck with the marvellous facilities which the country between Nushki and Seistan offers for the construction of a railway. Scarcely a single material obstacle exists to bar the road; throughout the gradient is exceedingly gentle; bands of sand can as a rule be avoided; of fuel there is an abundance; while not a bridge of more than one span, or engineering work of any magnitude, is requisite. Added to this the mineral wealth of the Koh-i-Sultan and the hills to the west, at present lying untouched, is so considerable as in itself to offer very great inducements to railway enterprise. Such a railway would place the trade of Eastern Persia and Seistan at our feet, unlock such Central Asian markets as are now closed, give us a preponderating influence in Eastern Persia, and opened to India the rich grain fields of Seistan".

29. It would appear, therefore, that so far as gradients, water-crossings, and fuel are concerned, little or no difficulty would be met with in laying a line across the 400 and odd miles that intervene between Nushki and Seistan. On the other hand, I am inclined to think that at present a very serious obstacle would present itself in the complete dearth of water over long stretches of this route, and in the problem of the shifting sands. Both of these difficulties have been overcome by Russia, though only at great expense, and with the aid of a large permanent staff, upon her Trans-Caspian Railway. She has had, moreover, the assistance of a settled population and the advantage of numerous inhabited sites along the railway line. These advantages would, at any rate, at the start be wanting in the case of a Quetta-Seistan railway. For some time the trade by such a line, though it would probably develop with great rapidity, would not be remune.ative; while the railway would have no other immediate use,

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

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inasmuch as it would not be a line of connection between important centres of population, industry, or arms, but would, so to speak, end in the air. If it stopped at the Anglo-Persian border, it would still be 90 miles distant from Nasirabad, the capital of Seistan. The chances of prolongation to the latter would appear to be problematical in view of the engagements against the introduction of railways, which Persia has allowed to be imposed upon her by Russia. The question of the military protection of the line, if constructed, is one upon which expert opinion would be required to pronounce; although, in the yearly increasing tranquillity of the districts which it would traverse, I do not conceive that any serious difficulty would thereby be caused.

30. The Government of India have in the accompanying despatch suggested the desirability of coming to an understanding with Russia concerning spheres of interest in Persia, which would leave Seistan within the British zone. In such a case there might be no necessity, at any rate for the present, for a Quetta-Seistan railway. We could then devote ourselves to the diligent promotion of the resuscitated caravan route, and look forward to the day, when, the Helmand being in our hands, we might convert Seistan into a flourishing outpost on the flanks of British India, that would call for railway connection with the lines and resources of the interior.

31. Even in the event of such an understanding being declared impracticable, while I hold firmly to the opinion that we should then be bound to adopt such measures for the protection of Southern Persia and of our interests in that quarter as we might deem desirable, and while I concur with Lord Salisbury in thinking that a Quetta-Seistan railway might be found to be one of these, I am yet in favour of consolidating our position in the interim, of fostering the incipient trade, of acquiring further information about the tracts to be traversed, and of familiarising the Perso-Baluch border lands, and Seistan in particular, with our presence and influence, before we decide upon such a forward move. It would at any time be a comparatively easy task to connect Quetta by railroad with Nushki (90 miles); and such an extension would afford no inconsiderable relief to the Persian caravans, who now have to proceed with their camels to Quetta, where there is no camel-grazing and, where the prices for fodder are high, instead of returning at once, after a few days' rest, from Nushki. But I should like to see Nushki also developed, as I believe it is likely to be, by an interval of settled British administration, and by the measures which I am recommending in connection with the trade route, before I advocate even this advance. In a few years' time we shall be in a better position to pronounce upon ideas, the execution of which would for the present be somewhat in the nature of an experiment.

September 4th, 1899. CURZON.

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

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

P. G
490 E(a).

B

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

OFFICE NOTE.

(209)

Secret.

H. E.'s Persia despatch

Bunder Abbas, Linjah Bushire & Mohammerah

Para 25. The shares of the External Trade for the Persian ports, Arab coast & Bahrein in the three years 1895, 1896 & 1897 were approximately as follows

British –	80.12
Turkish –	10.47
China –	6.18
Egypt –	1.00
French –	2.00
Other European countries & miscellaneous	0.23
	100.00

In 1895 there is one separate entry of ½ lakh under Russia imports; but all other European trade, except that of the United Kingdom, is lumped together as "European countries" (I assume that Turkey, which is separately shown, means Asiatic Turkey).

If the Turkish trade were treated as local, as no doubt nearly the whole of it is, the proportions for External Trade would be –

British	89.49
China –	6.90
Egypt –	1.12
France –	2.24
Other European countries & miscellaneous	.25
	100.00

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

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In the same three years the shipping which entered & cleared at the same ports was as under.

	Steamers	Tonnage of Steamers	Total tonnage steam & sail
British	2514	2,727,402	2,871,147
Turkish	53	60,495	155,482
French	56	64,330	72,064
German	13	14,647	14,647
Other European countries	6	5,189	6,107
Local	–	–	337,546
Total	2642	2,872,063	3,456,993

British percentage of steamer tonnage - just under 95%.

If the Turkish trade is treated as local, the British percentage of the whole tonnage, steam & sail, engaged in the external trade is just under 97%.

Para 26. I am not sure whether H. has seen the papers about occurrences at Zobara & Bahrein in 1895 & 96 — Please see

359 in Secret E, Oct 95, 336-381.
201 " " ", March 96, 193-202
19 " " ", August 96, 1-21
2 " " ", Sept 96, 1-7.

red slips

O. 3.

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

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

(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)

Para 31. Possibly it might be worth mentioning that Major Brazier Creagh, RMS, was on tour in Kerman & that neighbourhood with Capt Sykes in 1893/94 & thus had some previous local knowledge —

Para 40. The total value of French trade in 1897 was Rps 11,64,953 = £ 77,663.

2. The Persian Gulf Administration Report for 1897-98 gives the following figures for the trade of Shiraz

	1895 Rs	1896 Rs	1897 Rs
Exports	63,98,190	48,98,090	58,16,057
Imports	1,55,07,780	79,14,010	85,12,600
Total	2,19,05,970	1,28,22,100	143,28,657

The principal decreases since 1895 are in opium under exports & in cotton goods & tea under imports —

5.9.99. H Daly

P.S. Copies of the despatch have been distributed to Honorable Members, but I think another copy should go separately to the Finance Dept for examination there.

H.D.

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

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

(212)

(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)

H E

I submit Capt. Daly's note for information

I have given Mr Finlay a copy of the despatch & explained how the figures of expenditure were arrived at.

H J Barnes
5/9

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

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

(213)

(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)

H E.

I send up the clean proof of the 'Persia' Despatch with the alterations made which G E desired

The alteration in the figures of French trade in para 40 is explained in Capt Dalys note attached.

H Barnes
6/5

The totals given in the Military Dept & the Indian Marine charges have all been checked

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

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

~~B~~

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

OFFICE NOTE.

Secⁿ

The total of French trade with the Gulf ports in 1897 was

	Exports Rps.	Imports Rps.
Bushire	40,723	8,99,230
Bandar Abbas	nil	2,25,000
	40,723	11,24,230

Total Rps 11,64,953 = £77,663

Mohammerah Exports 0
Imports £ 4,955 ×

Grand Total £82,618

Of this £73,899 was sugar

[illegible] 6/9

I regret that I accidentally omitted Mohammerah from the total given yesterday

trade with Lingah, Bahrein or Arab ports.

× all sugar.

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

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

I.S.C. for P.S.W. (15)

Seistan

(215)

No. 1913, dated Quetta, the 3rd March 1900.

From—H. S. Barnes, Esq., C.S.I., Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, copy of the diary of the Political Assistant, Chagai, for the week ending the 31st January 1900.

Diary of the Political Assistant, Chagai, for the week ending 31st January 1900.

25th—Wir Sahib Chah to Makak Karez	26½ miles.
26th—Makak Karez to Saindak	11 „
27th and 28th—Halt at Saindak.	
29th—Saindak to Kirtaka	18 „
30th—Kirtaka to Chah Muhammad Raza	21½ „
31st—Chah Muhammad Raza to Killa Robat	28 „

2. The Deputy Inspector, Police, Nushki, reports that Mahmud Khan, the chief of the trans-frontier Mengals, and Muhammad Aslam Khan, Deputy Governor of Shorawak, have fallen out. The cause of difference appears to be due to the latter laying claim to a share of the grain seized and confiscated by the former on the Nushki-Shorawak frontier.

3. With reference to paragraph 5 of my diary for the week ending 16th January 1900, the import of wheat into Nushki still continues.

4. Mahmud Khan, Mengal, who, as recently announced, has had to yield to the pressure brought to bear on him by his fellow-tribesmen, and allow grain Kafilas to pass to Nushki, is now levying a tax of Rs. 2 per camel on each camel, laden with grain, passing through the district under his control.

5. I am informed that Mahmud Khan is in receipt of a letter from Kandahar to the effect that the question of the alignment followed by the Nushki-Shorawak frontier, between pillars 148 and 157, is now occupying the attention of His Highness the Amir, and that he may expect his instructions on this subject on or about Nauroz, *viz.*, 19th March.

6. Two Levy sowars of the Killa Robat Thana, Levy establishment, have recently returned from Kirman, where they were sent on duty. They report that between Koh-i-Malik Siah and Kirman camel grazing and water is to be met with at every stage throughout, with the exception of one stage, said to be about 40 miles long, and that the road itself is for the most part level. Major Sykes and myself are making an effort to open direct trade communication between Kirman and Quetta *viá* Killa Robat.

7. Midway between Mushki Chah and Makak Karez, a distance of 51½ miles, a halting place has been made by sinking wells. The Baluch, who sank these wells for me, term the new halting place Wir Sahib Chah. The compliment is of a somewhat doubtful nature, as to water the wells yield is distinctly bitter. The stages east and west of the new halting place are both over 20 miles. In accordance with my usual practice, I am subdividing each of the stages by wells. These wells will be ready in the course of the next few weeks.

8. The chief objections persistently urged against the Quetta-Nushki-Seistan trade route would appear summed up to be briefly as follows:—

(*a*) The length of the route as compared to that of the Bunder Abbas route.

(*b*) The want of water and camel grazing throughout.

(*c*) The numerous belts of sand which are met with.

(*d*) The arid character of the country traversed by the route.

(*e*) The want of places where caravans can rest and recuperate.

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Writing from the extreme western extremity of the Baluch section of the route and after a lengthy inspection of it, I venture to submit that so far from the above being the case—

(*a*) If the length of the re-aligned Quetta-Seistan route to Meshed be compared with that *viâ* Bunder Abbas, it will be found that the saving in mileage, in favour of the latter, is, approximately, 107 miles. I am of opinion that this figure can still further be reduced by 8 or 9 miles by making improvements, on my side of the Persian frontier, and by nearly 40 miles, beyond the Persian frontier, by running the direct route from Hurmak *viâ* the foot of the Olang Koh range to Neh, etc., in place of *viâ* Girdi Talab and Seistan as at present. A still further saving in mileage could naturally be effected by taking the route direct from Neh to Kirtaka, but as this would entail a passage through a strip of Afghan territory, it is unnecessary to consider it further. In spite of the attraction, in mileage offered by the Bunder Abbas route, it is significant to note that the aproximate average cost of the carriage of the same weight of goods from Meshed to Quetta by the Seistan-Nushki route was during the year 1898-99, no less than 4 karans less than in the case of goods sent *viâ* Bunder Abbas.

(*b*) At every stage between Quetta and Killa Robat, with the possible exception of the Kishingi stage, 11½ miles north-east of Nushki, there is water sufficient to supply the daily requirements of a thousand camels and the camelmen, accompanying me, who are naturally experts in the matter of camel grazing, state that having due regard to the season of the year the camel grazing is good.

(*c*) The only sand now met with is a small belt near Yadgar Chah some 200 yards broad. This belt can easily be avoided; but as it offers no impediment to the passage of caravans, it appears to me that no advantage is to be gained by making the detour necessaay to do so.

(*d*) To stigmatize the country through which the route passes as arid is misleading: it would be more appropriate to term it waste land. I see no reason why Chagai, in the course of the next few years, should not support a fair population. The steady increase in the number of karezes, during the last two years, appears to support this view.

(*e*) The thanas provide resting places for caravans who wish to halt to rest and recuperate.

At three of the five thanas supplies of every kind can be procured as will also be the case in respect to the other two thanas before I quit this frontier.

Ind.—B. P.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 1024 F. D.—12-3-1900.—32.

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

(216)

No. of 1899.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.
External.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD GEORGE F. HAMILTON,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

SIMLA, *the th September 1899.*

MY LORD,

We desire to address Your Lordship and, through Your Lordship, Her Majesty's Government on the subject of the relations of Great Britain with Persia. We might find an adequate reason for so doing in the fact that Your Lordship in your despatch of June 30th, 1899, enclosing a copy of a recent despatch to the Foreign Office from Sir M. Durand, Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran, concerning the maintenance of our influence in Persia, has directly invited an expression of the views of the Government of India upon this matter; and, while calling our attention to the desirability of improving the Political and Consular Service in that country, has at the same time stated your desire to be made acquainted with our opinions upon the remaining questions discussed by Sir M. Durand. But, in any case, we should have felt it our duty at an early date to address Your Lordship on the subject. Although the relations of Great Britain with Persia have for a period of exactly a century occupied a large, and perhaps at times a disproportionate, space upon the field of international diplomacy; although during that time Great Britain has twice broken off diplomatic relations and has once been at war with Persia in vindication of British interests in or upon the borders of that country; and, although large sums of money have been throughout the present century and are still annually expended in the maintenance of those interests, both by Her Majesty's Government and by the Government of India, we have not been able to discover in our records any clear definition of the principles upon which our policy towards the Persian kingdom is based, of the objects which it should keep in view, or of the scope and limits of the respective shares of responsibility, political and financial, which should be assumed by the two partners, *viz.*, Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India, who are jointly concerned in the defence of Anglo-Indian interests in the dominions of the Shah.

2. We feel that there is at the present time the greater need for such a discussion, because of the facts, which must be patent to all, that the Persian Government appears well nigh to have exhausted all power of recuperation or reform; and that the country, but feebly held together by any tie either of race, religion, or loyalty, is only saved from a fate to which it must otherwise have long ago succumbed, partly by a superficial vitality not infrequently seen in political organisms, especially in the East, even when in an advanced stage of decay, still more by the rival ambitions of the two great European Powers between whom its territories are placed, and who are the real arbiters of its

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

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destiny. These conditions have already displayed a durability in excess of any *a priori* expectations, and they may yet continue for a while, in the absence of any startling change of environment, to survive. But they cannot, in the nature of things, be permanent. A nation and a Government, such as the Persian, may tremble for long upon the verge of certain dissolution, from the absence of the particular impulse that is required to propel them over the brink. But in the last resort, and often by accident, the impetus is communicated, and the already shattered structure tumbles into irretrievable ruin.

3. We think that there are signs that such an issue, if not immediately impending in Persia, is drawing near. The rule of the present Shah is distinctly and uniformly weaker than that of his predecessor. The dissolvent agencies at work in the Persian kingdom are more active and persistent. Meanwhile, the encroachments of Russian power are steadfastly pursued and are less veiled by any pretence of concealment. Other Governments and nationalities, either impelled by the secret obligations of international sympathies, or attracted by a desire to share in the probable spoils, are appearing upon the scene; and there is every reason to believe that, as in the case of the Ottoman Empire and of China, so also here, the property of the sick man, should no steps be taken in advance to prolong his existence, and should the end come before any testamentary dispositions have been made, is likely to be subject of bitter contention between the various parties who may demand to be included among his heirs.

4. We desire, therefore, not merely to examine, in response to Your Lordship's invitation, the particular steps that may require to be taken for the maintenance or extension of British interests in Persia at the present juncture, but to survey a wider field, and, while there is yet time, to discuss how those interests should be definitely safeguarded in the future that seems to be imminent, and what part in the outlay or in the measures that may be necessitated for that end, should be assumed respectively by Her Majesty's Government and by the Government of India. Sir M. Durand himself concludes his despatch by saying that "the time has come for us to lay down a definite line of policy". We concur in this opinion, but we interpret the obligation thus admitted in a broader sense than Her Majesty's Minister has done; and we think that no mere stop-gap measures, however useful they may individually be, will avail for the permanent protection of our position in Persia, unless a clear understanding be arrived at in advance as to what that position is and what it demands.

5. It may not be inappropriate to state, in the first place, what we conceive British, *i.e.*, Anglo-Indian, interests in Persia to be. They are commercial, political, strategical and telegraphic. The total annual value of British trade with Persia has been estimated by Sir M. Durand (and, from the calculations that we have made, we believe the estimate to be below the mark) as approximately three and-a-half millions sterling; and while a great deal of this trade, particularly in the south and east, is with British India, yet the northern and western avenues of entry are devoted in the main to commercial connections with the British Isles. The total volume of Anglo-Persian trade continues, in spite of the difficulties encountered and the increasing insecurity in Persia, to rise and, under a more efficient and less venal régime, would probably attain to much larger dimensions. Similarly, although the experience of the past decade has not been encouraging to British mercantile investment in Persia, as the experience of the Tobacco Régie, the Persian Mining Rights Company, and other ventures, has shown, there is nevertheless a good deal of British capital sunk in various industrial undertakings in different parts of the country.

6. The political interests of Great Britain in Persia, although they date originally from a period before India had become a British interest at all, were, in their revival a century ago, in the main Indian in inception, and are still largely Indian in character. It would be unfair, however, at the present day to

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

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attribute to them an exclusively Indian complexion. Ever since the first visit of the late Shah to Europe, Persia has been drawn increasingly into the vortex of European politics. Neither France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Holland, nor Belgium own possessions contiguous to the Persian dominions. Their commercial stake in the country is relatively small. Notwithstanding they find it to their interest to maintain, what are in some cases costly and extensive, diplomatic establishments at Tehran, and they occupy a minor, but nevertheless a definite, position upon the local diplomatic stage. It is to be surmised, therefore, that, even had British India not existed, or had it passed into other hands, the British Government would nevertheless before now have been compelled to take an active political interest in Persian fortunes. Persia is in fact one of those countries which, whether or not they had fallen into the orbit of Western Powers, more vigorous than themselves, must inevitably have attracted the attention of Europe, partly from their increasing infirmity, but still more from the opportunities suggested by their latent, though neglected, sources of strength. The two-fold British interest and responsibility here indicated have indeed been recognised by the system, now of long standing, under which the charges of the diplomatic establishment maintained by Her Majesty's Government at Tehran are shared between the Imperial and the Indian exchequers. That such a division of common interest has become necessary, that the politics of Tehran, which with one eye turned towards India looks with the other towards St. Petersburgh and Constantinople, are but one aspect of the eternal Eastern question, and that the control of British diplomacy at Tehran must therefore be vested in the hands of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, are propositions which 40 years ago were hotly contested by certain schools of thought, but that will not any longer be a matter of dispute. They serve to illustrate the Imperial, as distinct from the purely Indian, character of Anglo-Persian relations.

7. The strategical interests of Great Britain in Persia arise from conditions with which India is most intimately concerned. Long before the boundaries of British India had been extended to their present limits, or before Russia had become a great Central Asian Power, approaching or impinging at many points upon the Indian frontiers, the fortunes of Persia, though not at that time a coterminous country, had become a matter of vital concern to the British dominion in India. In the early years of the present century, when the ambitions of France were the main source of apprehension, it was through Persia that a blow at British supremacy was expected to be struck, and that an invasion of India was planned. The same idea has re-appeared at intervals since. Now that the boundaries of Afghanistan, which have been demarcated and guaranteed by Great Britain, march for many hundreds of miles with those of Persia; that Persian territory is also coterminous for hundreds of miles with Baluchistan, a State under a British Protectorate, and in large measure actually administered by the officers of the Government of India; and that the sea which washes the southern coasts of Persia is one in which, both from its proximity to the Indian Ocean and as a result of the exertions of the past century, Indian interests and influence have become supreme—it is clear that Persia has assumed a strategical importance, in relation to British India, which might not be serious, were the resources or the designs of that country itself alone to be considered; but which is indisputably great, when it is remembered that closely pressing upon Persia and upon Afghanistan is the ever-growing momentum of a Power whose interests in Asia are not always in accord with our own, and that the Persian Gulf is beginning to attract the interest of other and sometimes rival nations. These conditions, however, while they indicate the supreme concern which those who are responsible for the government of India cannot fail to feel in the fortunes of Persia, are nevertheless sufficiently obvious in their general application to render it unnecessary for us to point out their far more than local range, or to argue that they affect not merely the destinies of British dominion in India, but those of the British Empire. It is from this point of view that we hold strongly the opinion that Persia in its strategical, no less than in its political, aspect is not only an Indian, but is also an Imperial,

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

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concern, and that we feel no hesitation in appealing to Her Majesty's Government for a frank and generous recognition of this common responsibility.

8. The telegraphic interests of Great Britain in Persia may be said to be evenly divided between the mother-country and India. For whilst on the one hand the wires that have been constructed between the north-west frontier and Tehran, and which provide the earlier link in the Persian section of the main overland connection with the East, are in the hands of a Company whose domicile is in London, from Tehran onwards to the Gulf the undertaking is conducted by an establishment that is recruited and paid for by the Government of India, while its head-quarters are in the India Office in London. This two-fold system exists in order to maintain a connection which may be said to be equally British and Indian, since it is equally indispensable to the interests of both countries; but which also has an ulterior and wider scope, inasmuch as the Trans-Persian wires, and the sub-marine cables by which they are supplemented in the Persian Gulf, are largely utilised for the conveyance of messages between Great Britain and places lying beyond India, notably the Australasian Colonies. From a calculation based upon the aggregate results of the past five years, we have ascertained that no less than 30 per cent of the total traffic is of this description. Nevertheless the cost, in so far as it is borne by either Government, devolves exclusively upon the Indian, and not upon the Home, Exchequer.

9. Such are the main interests of Great Britain in Persia. It will be observed that the shares that may be claimed by the mother-country and by India in the sum total of those interests, have in the passage of time become so interwoven and fused as to render the task of separating or distinguishing them neither easy nor profitable. It may not be difficult, as we shall endeavour to argue later on, to distinguish between sources of expenditure which should more properly fall to the charge of the one or the other partner. But we maintain that enough has been said to prove that on the broad field of international policy Persia is not exclusively an Indian interest, but is emphatically an Imperial interest of Great Britain; and that the latter should be prepared to exert her full strength for the defence of that interest, should it be jeopardised or impugned.

10. In discussing the manner in which it is desirable that these principles, if accepted, should be carried into action, we are anxious at the outset to make our position, in one respect, perfectly clear. We have no desire to make an addition to the political or territorial responsibilities of India, for which we have not, under existing conditions, the means either in money or in men. We are not about to propose that there should be established any Protectorate, open or covert, over any part of the Shah's dominions, that might compel us in the future to hold the country so protected by force of arms. We can conceive of circumstances that might some day tempt both the Indian and the Home Governments from this attitude of reserve, and that would in a case where the vital interests of the Empire were at stake, force us to consider a burden for which our shoulders are still unprepared. But for the present our ambitions are exclusively limited to making secure the interest which we have already built up, and still more to preventing it from being undermined or taken from us by others, with the result not only of a considerable accretion of strength to them, but of positive detriment to ourselves. We have, in fine, no desire to disturb the political *status quo* in Persia so long as it can be maintained. We prefer indeed, weak as it is, to invest it with such renewed vitality as may be found possible. But we press for an early decision and for early action, since, unless we bestir ourselves, there is good reason for fearing that the already trembling balance may be disturbed by others to our disadvantage.

11. We now proceed to draw a picture of the present state of British interests in Persia, as they present themselves to our eyes, and to examine the dangers by which they appear to be threatened. Sir M. Durand has to a certain extent anticipated us in this task; and in so far as he has touched upon the same ground as that which we propose to cover, we shall not recapitulate

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

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what he has said. On the other hand, we think that we are in a position to fill in the outlines of his sketch with a good deal of additional detail; and it will be our duty to discuss the situation from the standpoint more particularly of those Indian interests, of which we are the constituted guardians.

12. The political destinies of a country and a Government, as weak as we have stated those of Persia to be, are likely to be determined in the main by her geographical position in relation to her neighbours. Of the four foreign Powers whose territories adjoin her own, two may be eliminated from the present discussion as being themselves lacking in the strength or vitality, likely to render their influence decisive, or their aggression to be feared. These are Turkey and Afghanistan, the latter of which, moreover, is under engagements with Great Britain that render it impossible for her to be considered, in her foreign relations, as an independent Power. There remain Russia and Great Britain. There is a curious correspondence, but there are also notable differences, between the positions of these two Powers *vis à vis* with Persia. The entire northern frontier of Persia is now contiguous with Russian territory, with the exception of that portion which borders upon the Caspian Sea—a distinction, but not a difference, inasmuch as that sea has to all intents and purposes been converted into a Russian lake. Russian territory also overlaps the north-east corner of the Persian dominions. Great Britain enjoys a somewhat similar preponderance of influence on the south, by virtue of her hitherto unchallenged supremacy, both naval and commercial, in the Persian Gulf; while, owing to recent developments on the side of Baluchistan, her land territories also touch those of Persia upon the south-east. But there are these broad differences between the two positions: firstly, that whereas the Russian territories that are limitrophe with Persia on the north are continuous either with those of European or with those of Asiatic Russia, the immense resources of both of which dominions can be brought by a skilfully designed system of railways, and deposited with little trouble and with no delay, upon the Persian frontier itself—the forces of Great Britain, if required for purposes either of menace or attack, would require to be conveyed by sea and would be separated by a great distance from their base; the land connection on the Perso-Baluch side being as yet too precarious and remote to admit of its being taken into serious consideration in the present context; secondly, that whereas the Russian land approaches upon the north are in her own exclusive possession, the maritime access of Great Britain on the south is equally open to any other Power possessing a naval marine. Hence the marked and inevitable distinction between the power of persuasion or menace possessed by Russia in the north, as compared with that at the disposal of Great Britain in the south, the advantage enjoyed by the former being enhanced by the fact that the Persian capital and Court are situated in the northern or Russian and not in the southern or British zone of influence.

13. In these circumstances it is not surprising to read of the increasing and indisputable supremacy which Russia has established in Northern Persia, as described by Sir M. Durand. While not repeating his demonstration, we may supplement it by saying that, while we think that no efforts should be spared to safeguard so much as is left to us of the trade that enters the country by the Trebizond-Tabriz route, of the trade of Tehran, and of that of North-East Persia (concerning which it may be noted that the imports into Meshed from British India which in 1893-94 represented a value of £198,500 and in 1894-95 of £312,000, have in 1897-98 sunk to £130,000), and while as long as the capital remains at Tehran, which is also the centre of important British interests in the shape of the Telegraph administration and the Imperial Bank of Persia, it is essential that British influence there should be asserted on a scale as nearly as possible equivalent to that of Russia—we are yet of opinion that the advantages enjoyed by Russia in the field under discussion are so overwhelming as to render any attempt to dispute or to shake her position there fruitless; and that our own energies can with greater wisdom and with superior chances of success be directed towards the protection and consolidation of the

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

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British sphere of influence in the centre and south. It is to a more critical examination of this subject that we now turn.

14. Sir M. Durand has in his despatch drawn a line across Persia from Khanikin on the Turkish frontier on the west, through Kermanshah, Hamadan, Ispahan, Yezd and Kerman to Seistan and the Afghan frontier on the east, as indicating approximately the existing line of partition between the British and Russian spheres of influence both political and commercial in Persia.

15. Following the same order from the west, we concur with what he has written about the importance of fostering the Baghdad trade route *viâ* Kermanshah to Tehran, British commerce by which approaches in value to £1,000,000 per annum. This is a route of peculiar value both to British and to Indian trade, and one upon which we should on no account forfeit the supremacy. We have no hesitation in recommending, with Sir M. Durand, the substitution of a British Vice-Consul at Kermanshah for the present native agent: although we think that the cost of the proposed appointment which lies outside of what may be called the more strictly Indian zone, and which will be subordinate to the Consulate-General at Tehran, should be borne by Imperial and not by Indian revenues.

16. Whatever be the prospects of opening up, either by road or by railway (and concerning the latter we are sceptical), the country that lies northward of the Karun River, and that is inhabited by the Lurs and other nomad tribes, it is certain that British influence has obtained a material foothold in that corner of the Shah's dominions, through which the Karun flows in its middle and lower course, and where the road now being constructed through the Bakhtiari country, by contract between the Bakhtiari Chiefs and Messrs. Lynch, should open an alternative and almost exclusively British door of commercial access to Ispahan. We do not express any opinion as to the ideas which Sir M. Durand has more than once put forward as to the desirability of raising a local irregular force under British officers from the tribes in this part of Persia. Such a scheme would appear to postulate a firmer and more permanent footing than we have as yet established in South-West Persia. Nevertheless we think that no opportunity should be lost of strengthening our influence with the Arab, Bakhtiari and Lur tribes—an effort to challenge which from a rival quarter appears likely before long to be made—and we concur in Sir M. Durand's recommendations as to the desirability of establishing a Consulate on the Karun, reserving for a subsequent paragraph our opinion as to the proper incidence of the cost.

17. Continuing in an easterly direction, we have noticed from the recent Consular Report of Mr. J. R. Preece, Her Majesty's Consul at Ispahan, that "British trade in Ispahan has shown during the last two years, if not an absolute decrease, at all events no expansion whatever", while great strides have been made in Russian importations, notably of glassware and hardware. We agree with Sir M. Durand in thinking that the British Consul should be raised in respect of title and pay to the same level as the recently arrived Russian representative, although, as this is a matter which mainly concerns the English Foreign Office, we are not clear that we are called upon to advise upon the subject. We cannot, however, too strongly emphasise our opinion that in any partition either of commercial or political spheres of influence in Persia, Ispahan, the old (and, if Persia should ultimately break up, possibly a future) capital, the seat of the Sefavi dynasty, the principal market of Central Persia, and (far more than Tehran) the focus of Persian nationality, must, on every ground, be included in the zone in which British interests are supreme.

18. We also concur with Sir M. Durand in thinking that British interests are most inadequately represented at Shiraz by the present native agent, who is a nonentity, without influence or power; and that the experiment of bringing the Resident in the Persian Gulf, who is also Consul-General for Fars, to reside

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

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during the summer at the capital of the province, which is within his official area of jurisdiction, should be given a further trial. Colonel Wilson in 1895 and Colonel Meade in 1898 spent the summer months at Shiraz, but were compelled to hire house accommodation at their own expense. If these visits are made recurrent, we are inclined to think that, as no suitable house appears to be open either to purchase or to rent, a site should be purchased and a house erected thereon. To this suggestion also we will revert. Shiraz is a place of considerable importance; and were it not for the great influence that has for long been exercised there by the officials of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, British interests must have suffered from the neglect to which they have hitherto been exposed.

19. The districts lying to the east of Ispahan and Shiraz contain the important cities and trade-centres of Yezd and Kerman, connected by one of the principal postal and caravan tracks of Persia. Both of these towns and districts lie south of the natural line of division between Northern and Southern Persia; and in both British commercial and political influence has, in recent years, been actively vindicated. In September 1893, Mr. Fergusson, the Manager of the local branch of the Imperial Bank, was appointed unpaid Vice-Consul. Sir M. Durand now suggests that a Vice-Consul, if appointed to Bunder Abbas, might pass his summer at Yezd, where it is no doubt intrinsically desirable that British commercial interests should be represented by some one not engaged in business or trade. We will for the moment reserve our comments upon this suggestion. At Kerman, which is the capital of an important province, and the seat of a Governor-General, the appointment of a British Consul, which was first sanctioned under exceptional circumstances in the case of Captain Sykes in 1894, has at frequent intervals since, the latest being our despatch of August 10th, 1898, been the subject of discussion between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India. The present position is this, that for 5 years the Government of India have expressed their willingness to contribute one-half of the cost of the Kerman Consulate up to a limit of Rs. 6,000 per annum. The views of the Foreign Office upon this proposal, which was communicated to it by Your Lordship on September 21st, 1898, have not yet been received by us. Sir M. Durand now proposes that this Consulate should be made permanent, and that possibly a native agent under its orders should be sent to Bampur. Before discussing these proposals, we think it advisable to analyse the larger issues raised by the questions of Seistan and the Persian Gulf.

at Yezd.

20. Concerning Seistan, its importance and the present position there, we refer Your Lordship to a Minute which has been written by the Viceroy, who has made a special study of the question, and which is enclosed with this despatch. The facts enumerated by him are, we think, sufficient to show that Seistan is, by reason of its geographical position in relation both to North Khorasan, to Western Afghanistan, to British Baluchistan, and to the Persian Gulf, a position of no small strategical importance. Seistan is the present meeting point of the advanced pioneers of British and Russian influence. Perhaps on the whole, owing to recent activity on our part, the British position and chances are the more hopeful. It is essential in the future, for reasons which have been argued in the Viceroy's Minute, that Seistan should be retained in the British zone. It is fortunately not too late to secure that consummation. The steps which should be taken with that object will be examined when we formulate our final recommendations at the close of this despatch.

21. South of Seistan lies the still imperfectly known district of Persian Baluchistan. Every year this province is being brought into closer contact with British associations, partly from the visits of British officers, partly from the wide-spreading influence exercised by the Nushki–Seistan Trade route, still more from the close connections, political and racial, prevailing between the inhabitants of the two sides of the Perso-Baluch border—a condition of affairs which is likely to be confirmed by the inevitable increase of British influence in the dominions of the Khan of Kalat.

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

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22. Our inspection of the various sub-areas composing what we have described as the British sphere, has now brought us to the Persian Gulf—a subject which—no doubt from its more exclusively Indian aspect and bearing—has only been lightly touched upon by Sir M. Durand, but upon which it is necessary that we should address Your Lordship at greater length.

23. The *de jure* position in the Persian Gulf is that of a sea open to the flag of all nations, the northern shores and territorial waters of which are included in the dominions of Persia, while its western and southern coasts are partially owned and partially claimed by Turkey, or are in the occupation of Arab tribes, who have entered into treaty relationships of varying character, constituting a sort of veiled Protectorate, with Great Britain. The islands in the Gulf are owned either by Persia, or by Arab Chiefs (in the case of Bahrein under British protection); but upon one of the Persian Islands, *viz.*, Kishm, Great Britain possesses a piece of land by virtue of an original grant from the Imam of Maskat, to whom the island once belonged. Outside the entrance to the Persian Gulf, but included in the same political system, are, on the northern shore of the Arabian Sea, the coasts of Persian Baluchistan, along which the overland wires of the Indo-European Telegraph Company run as far as Jask, where a reserve of English territory exists under an agreement concluded in 1887 between the British and Persian Governments, and where a detachment of Indian troops, who had previously been stationed there between the years 1879 and 1887, was replaced in January 1898 in consequence of the murder of a British telegraph official and the disturbed state of Persian Baluchistan. A larger detachment was at the same time despatched to Charbar, near the eastern limits of the same province. On the southern and western coasts is the still independent kingdom or Sultanate of Oman (Maskat).

24. The *de facto* position upon the waters and on the shores of the Persian Gulf reflects a more positive British predominance than the preceding paragraph might indicate. In the early years of the present century, the slave trade was rampant in the Gulf, and the vessels of the Indian Marine were engaged in a long and arduous struggle with the Arab pirates who infested its southern coasts. This conflict which was conducted entirely by British agency and means, without any help from the Persian Government, resulted in the establishment of treaty relations with the great majority of the Arab Chiefs, under which they bound themselves to observe perpetual peace and to refer all disputes to the British Resident at Bushire. The *pax Britannica*, which has ever since, with rare exceptions, been maintained, is the issue of these arrangements and is the exclusive work of this country. Of similar origin were the soundings of the channels and the surveys of the shores of the Persian Gulf, which the navigators of all nations owe to the labours of a long line of naval officers of the Indian service. Meanwhile, British trade has acquired almost a monopoly of the foreign commerce of the Gulf ports. Indian Bunias from Shikarpur and Sind have settled in considerable numbers at Lingah, Bunder Abbas, Bushire and Bahrein. They frequently farm the customs. The foreign imports and exports pass through their hands. These are for the most part conveyed to and from the Gulf in British ships, more than one Anglo-Indian Company (the 'British India,' the 'Bombay and Persia,' and the 'Anglo-Arabian and Persian Gulf') having maintained for years a merchant steamer service between Karachi and Basrah, touching at the Gulf ports on the way, whilst the rival ventures that have occasionally been attempted by foreign nations have uniformly failed and have been withdrawn.

25. As the result of careful calculations of the trade returns of the three years, 1895-96-97, which are the latest at our disposal, we have ascertained that the total value of Imports and Exports in the Persian Gulf (including the Persian ports of Bunder Abbas, Lingah, Bushire, and Mohammerah; the Arab ports on the opposite coast; and Bahrein) in that triennial period amounted to £17,241,300 (at the rate of Rs. 15=£1). Of this total, Local trade accounted for £5,124,000, and External trade for £12,117,300; while of the latter total the trade with British possessions (including India) amounted to £9,709,500,

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

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or over 80 per cent of the entire External trade. In the same three years, out of a total of 2,161 steamers which entered and cleared from the Gulf ports, 2,039 were British, and their tonnage represented 84 per cent of the total tonnage. If the returns of Persian ports alone be required, the figures are Total trade, £11,172,000, of which Local trade = £2,169,400 and External trade = £9,002,600, the British proportion of the latter being £7,494,200, or 83 per cent. To these totals in either case there should, in our opinion, certainly be added those of Basrah, which amounted in the same triennial period to £2,157,300. Unfortunately the manner in which these have been prepared, do not admit of our distinguishing the countries of origin or destination. The proportion, however, that should properly be assigned to Anglo-Indian commerce may be inferred from the British percentage of shipping, that entered or cleared from that port in the three years referred to. It amounted to no less than 93 per cent both of the number and tonnage of the steamers engaged.

26. During the last thirty years the maintenance of the sub-marine cables of the Indo-European Telegraph Company from Fao to Jask, and of the land lines from that place to Karachi, has also devolved upon the Indian Government, and has tended to increase an already preponderant influence over both the waters and the shores of this sea. Latterly there has been a deliberate but necessary consolidation of our influence in certain quarters where trouble threatened or where rivalry was feared. At the north-west extremity of the Gulf, we have, under instructions from Her Majesty's Government, entered into engagements with the still independent Sheikh of Koweit, by which he has bound himself and his successors not to receive the representative of any other Power and not to alienate any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power—a proceeding which was dictated by the increasing encroachment of Turkish authority and by the incipient intrigues of other Powers. Similar machinations are known to be in progress at Bahrein, and will require to be counteracted by a more strict enforcement of the conditions to which the Sheikh is by treaty bound. Outside the entrance to the Persian Gulf, but included within the sphere of its political influence, the Arab State of Maskat has for years been controlled by British influence; its trade is similarly in Anglo-Indian hands; and its ruler has not merely for years been subsidised by the Government of India, but in 1891 entered into an Agreement with us, under the orders of Her Majesty's Government, not to alienate any portion of his dominions to any other Power.

27. Such, briefly summarised, is the position that has been won by Great Britain, not without the expenditure of many millions of money and the sacrifice of many valuable lives, in the Persian Gulf. In its vindication we have more than once been called upon to enter into military occupation of ports or islands in the Gulf. The island of Kharak was occupied by Indian forces from 1838 to 1842, and again in 1856-57. Bushire was held during the latter years, as also were Mohammerah and Ahwaz upon the Karun. The occupation of these places was an illustration of the vigour with which in past years our ascendency has been maintained. Their abandonment was a proof of the reluctance which has invariably been displayed to emphasise or to perpetuate these responsibilities. The latter, however, no less than the British position in Southern Persia in general, are now threatened by an external competition, to the evidences of which we next turn.

28. Sir M. Durand has in general terms described the commanding position which the proximity of the Trans-Caspian Railway and of her Central Asian garrisons, the construction of the Ashkabad-Kuchan-Meshed cart-road, and the annual expenditure of large sums of money, have enabled Russia to take up in the politics and commerce of the province of Khorasan. We proceed to develop the argument by showing how the Khorasan position has been and is being utilised as the base of a further and more southerly advance.

29. It was in 1889 that the campaign of what may be termed the Russification of Khorasan was opened with the appointment of a Russian Consul-General at Meshed. In 1891 a native trader, named Haji Agha, appeared as

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

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Russian News-agent at Birjand; and an emissary of bad character, named Muhammad Rahim Khan, who had already been dismissed from the Russian service, was again taken into employ, and was posted as News-agent at Nasirabad in Seistan. In the succeeding years Russian Armenians, trained at Tiflis, were busily at work surveying the country in a southerly direction, as far as the borders of Persia and Baluchistan. In 1895 a more direct blow at the large Anglo-Indian trade which at that time still made its way through Khorasan into the Russian possessions in Central Asia, was struck by the introduction of a Customs Tariff in Trans-Caspia, absolutely prohibiting the entry into the Russian territories of all British or Indian products except indigo, tea and muslin, and these only under a heavy duty. In the same year M. Zaroudny, a Russian politico-geologist, Anglice surveyor, paid his first visit to Kain and Seistan. Russian News-agents were also placed at Tabbas and Neh, as well as at Birjand and Nasirabad.

30. In the meantime, in the latter part of 1896, the Government of India had decided upon taking active measures to open the long closed trading route from Quetta to Seistan. These intentions, and the prospective British interest in Seistan to which they testified, excited much concern in Russia; and in the following year the outbreak of plague in India offered to the Russian authorities a welcome opportunity of, at the same time, endeavouring to strangle the new enterprise at its birth, and increasing their own influence in Seistan. Under the pretext of establishing a protective cordon to safeguard the Perso-Afghan frontier in Persian interests from a disease which existed neither in Baluchistan nor in Afghanistan, Russian Cossacks under Russian officers were planted at a number of places in Persian territory, where they turned back every caravan (ignoring an agreement that had been arrived at between Great Britain and Persia for a 10 days quarantine upon caravans arriving from infected countries), declined to accept any orders except those which came directly from the Russian Legation, and for a time absolutely closed the Herat-Meshed road, in spite of orders to the contrary from the Persian Government—the object of this measure being to divert Afghan trade from Meshed to Panjdeh and Merv in Russian territory. It was significant that upon crossing the Russian frontier the caravans, which had been refused passage through Persia under any conditions, were only detained for three days in quarantine. The Persian Government, after a feeble protest, acquiesced in these proceedings; and it may almost be said that Southern Khorasan passed for a time under Russian control.

31. It was with the object of anticipating a similar Russian intervention in Seistan that, in the spring of 1897, the Government of India despatched Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh to superintend any preventive measures that might be required in that district. Already Lieutenant Webb Ware, who had visited Seistan in March, in connection with the trade route, had reported: "I was disagreeably astonished to find what ascendency Russia had gained throughout Seistan". Major Brazier-Creagh, a few months later, wrote: "I was by no means surprised to find what ascendency the Russians had gained in the country. In the past four years Russian activity has been very manifest. It is not limited to Seistan, but extends all along the Perso-Afghan frontier up to Meshed, News-writers and agents being established at all the important trade centres, *viz.*, Neh, Birjand, Tabbas, Khaf, and Turbat-i-Haidari".

32. The recommendations made by the British officer were ignored by the Persian authorities; and he had not been long in Seistan when the expected Russian doctor (Miladchevsky by name), with an escort of eight Cossacks, appeared upon the scene, a detachment of ten Cossacks under a Russian officer being also posted at Turbat-i-Haidari, 80 miles south of Meshed, a point of junction of several caravan roads, so as effectually to stop any traffic to or from Seistan. An incidental result of Dr. Miladchevsky's visit to Seistan was the dismissal, in consequence of a report from him, of the two native Russian agents to whom reference has been made, and their replacement by the Persian sub-contractors for customs for Kain and Seistan. These individuals proved to be equally faithless to the interests of their employers, and were

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

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relieved of the representation of Russian interests in April of the present year. It was then announced that a Russian, named Ziedler, had been appointed Russian Consul in Seistan—an announcement which was immediately followed by the despatch of Captain Sykes, hitherto British Consul at Kerman, to Seistan in a similar capacity. The Russian Consul would appear not yet to have taken up his post; and the Russian authorities are believed to be waiting to see the next move of Her Majesty's Government before deciding upon their own action.

33. Meanwhile in 1898, M. Zaroudny re-appeared upon the scene of his former labours, and on the present occasion pushed his politico-scientific studies as far south as Persian Baluchistan and Bampur. Early in the present year the Agent to the Governor-General at Meshed reported that two Russian officers, 1 doctor and 10 Cossacks were still at Turbat-i-Haidari, and 1 Russian Officer, 2 Medical Assistants and 10 Cossacks at Karez. There are also 58 Persian sowars scattered about at different places between Meshed and Seistan, who are paid through the Russian officers and take their orders from them. The recrudescence of plague in India has in fact provided an excuse for the continuance, just as its original appearance was pleaded in support of the introduction, of a *quasi*-Russian Protectorate in Southern Khorasan. A more active assertion of the same pretensions has since been witnessed in the mission of M. Stroeff, Dragoman to the Russian Consulate at Meshed, with presents valued at £1,400, to the Persian Governor of Kain, who is brother to the Governor of Seistan and is believed to covet the succession to that post. The sanitary plea was also advanced in the course of the past summer to explain the despatch of Russian doctors to Kerman and even to Shiraz. An interesting commentary upon these proceedings may be found in an observation in Lieutenant Webb Ware's report upon the Quetta-Seistan trade route for 1897-98, where he says that "the chief hindrance to the further development of this route is to be found in the obstructive measures taken by the Russian officers striving to further the interests of that country at the expense of India."

34. The facts which we have enumerated will, we think, be sufficient to convince Your Lordship of two propositions: firstly, that Russia regards with unconcealed aversion the opening of the British commercial route from India to Seistan and Khorasan, and will spare no efforts to rob it of success; secondly, that she regards with an interested eye the future of Seistan itself, and is already preparing, by a display of armed force and by the assumption of executive authority, to pave the way for an eventual inclusion within the Russian sphere of that portion of the Shah's dominions.

35. In the same context, and as illustrating the political and strategical object which such an advance may be believed to have in view, it will not be forgotten that during the past few years, the Russian Government have constructed a railway from Merv to Kushk upon the Afghan frontier within 80 miles of Herat, and have stacked at the terminus the railway plant for a future extension to Herat itself. Should any doubt be entertained as to the purpose for which this extension (which is destitute of any commercial justification) was planned, it may be solved by a reference to the frank admission made to Sir N. O'Conor by M. deWitte, Russian Minister of Finance, in June 1898, that it was designed "to enable Russia to attack Afghanistan in case of complications with England". When it is remembered that such an attack can only be made in direct violation of solemn international engagements, it is not, we think, incumbent upon us to argue at further length that the political ambitions of Russia in Eastern Persia, and in close proximity to the Afghan border, have an ulterior significance which it would be folly to ignore.

36. Nor can we divorce these proceedings from the idea that, in seeking to obtain a preferential footing in Seistan, Russia is not merely endeavouring to block a promising avenue of Anglo-Indian trade, and to acquire a position of potential menace to British interests on the western flank of Afghanistan, but that she is also concerned in the prosecution of an advance, which is not expected to terminate until it has brought her to the Persian Gulf. It is known

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

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that at least on one occasion negotiations for the cession to Russia of a Persian port at the eastern extremity of the Gulf have taken place between the Russian and the Persian Governments; and, if such negotiations have hitherto either proved abortive, or have been nominally repudiated by one or other of the parties concerned, it is yet, we think, in our power to show that they are not only not inconsistent with, but are definitely corroborated by, the evidences of Russian activity in Central and Southern Persia to which we now turn.

37. In 1897, a Russian Consul was appointed for the first time to Ispahan, where Russian imports had not hitherto greatly exceeded a total of 300 bales per annum. He was given a salary and title in excess of those enjoyed by the British representative. During the present year this official, Prince Dabiya, has been heard of at Shiraz and Bushire as the guest of the French Vice-Consul, and subsequently at Mohammerah and Shushter on the Karun, where he freely denounced British methods and ambitions. Sir M. Durand has recently informed us by telegraph that the corps of so-called Persian Cossacks at Tehran (*i.e.*, Persian soldiers trained and commanded by Russian officers) has been raised from 1,000 to 1,500 men, and that detachments of this corps have for the first time been taken with them to the south by the Governors of Shiraz and Arabistan. For the present the Russian officers have stayed behind; but it is not difficult to imagine the circumstances in which they might claim to rejoin their regiments. In 1897, M. Krugelow was sent from Jerusalem as Russian Consul to Baghdad, with the special object of reporting upon the acquisition by Russia of a coaling station in the Persian Gulf. This gentleman has taken much interest in Koweit, where Russian emissaries from Baghdad have been residing continuously during the present year. In this context it will not be forgotten that the concession recently sought for with the aid of the Russian Embassy at Constantinople by Count Kapnist, a Russian of high rank, for a railway from Tripoli in Syria to the Persian Gulf contemplated a terminus at Koweit.

38. In Bushire and Bunder Abbas the Russians have lately developed a marked interest. Two Russian doctors (Drs. Marc and Oust) arrived at Bushire in 1897 for the now familiar purpose of studying the plague, which, however, did not make its appearance until two years later, in 1899. Dr. Marc in 1897 occupied his waiting hours in visiting Bunder Abbas, from whence he was in the habit of despatching official reports to his Government, and where he magnanimously treated all patients free of charge. His medical pursuits at this place were assisted by a third Russian, named Adamoff, who appears to have been an artillery officer, and who subsequently visited Bushire and Basrah. In 1898 two other Russian doctors, named Rodzewitz and Kornajevski, appeared upon the scene, and visited Basrah, Bushire and Bunder Abbas. In December 1898 a fifth Russian doctor, named Paschkowski, arrived in the Gulf, and did not fail to pay the regulation visit to Bunder Abbas; while he displayed a considerable professional activity during the recent outbreak of plague at Bushire, where he has announced that, upon his approaching return to Russia, he is to be replaced by two compatriots. In connection with this medical propaganda, it will be in Your Lordship's recollection that when the first rumours were circulated of plague at Bushire in the past summer, the Russian Legation at Tehran at once announced their intention of sending doctors, with Cossack escorts, to Bushire as well as Shiraz, in order to establish a plague cordon for the protection of those places from the Indian pestilence, and that Russian doctors took up their quarters both at Shiraz and Kerman. These precautions might be thought to indicate a praiseworthy desire to close every conceivable channel of entry into Asiatic Russia against the plague, were they not, as has already been shown, in striking contrast with the laxity of system, that is at the same time observed both on the Perso-Russian and on the Russo-Afghan frontiers, across which alone can plague succeed in entering the Russian dominions. In continuation of our story it may be mentioned that in 1895 a Russian officer visited and surveyed the island of Hormuz opposite to Bunder Abbas, and that other and non-medical Russian emissaries

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

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have also recently been heard of at the latter place (the two latest, M. Babitchieff and Baron de Schedenore, as lately as August in the present year). It should not, moreover, be forgotten that it was Russian opposition that in 1898 broke down the loan to the Persian Government from the Imperial Bank of Persia, the security of which was to be the customs of the southern ports, to be collected by agents of the Bank.

39. We are aware that on April 18th of the present year, with reference to reports that have been published of Russian designs upon the island of Kishm, adjoining Hormuz, Count Mouravieff assured Sir C. Scott, Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, that "there was absolutely no intention on the part of the Russian Government to add to the burden of their existing responsibilities by acquiring outlying ports or stations which would require naval defence in time of war"; and we do not doubt that this emphatic assurance represents the views sincerely entertained by the Emperor of Russia. But our faith in the value of this assurance has been somewhat shaken by the later information received from a Persian official of high rank and station, known personally to the Viceroy, to the effect that he believes Russia to have acquired certain rights in regard to a port in the Persian Gulf, which however it may not suit her at once to enforce. Moreover there is in practice a limit to the duration of all such pledges, which, even if given by the sovereign, are not always regarded as binding by his officials; and previous experience is not altogether encouraging to the belief in a prolonged existence of the present undertaking, should circumstances compel an opposite course. There are moreover other means, well-known to Her Majesty's Government from recent experience in other parts of the world, of obtaining political and territorial influence, independently of the actual acquisition of harbours or stations.

40. It is, in our opinion, more than a coincidence that simultaneously with the increasing Russian interest in Central and Southern Persia which we have described, there should also have been a notable revival of French activity in those quarters. In 1896 the Messageries Maritimes Company commenced a subsidised service from Bombay to the ports of the Persian Gulf; although, owing to vessels of unsuitable draught having been employed, the enterprise was not a success and was shortly abandoned. In 1897 a French Vice-Consul (M. Ferrand) was for the first time appointed at Bushire, although the value of French trade with the Persian Gulf in that year amounted only to the modest total of ~~£7,750~~. He was succeeded in 1898 by M. Bryois, who recently informed the agent of one of the British Trading Companies at Bushire that the French Government intended shortly to establish a subsidised line of steamers to Mohammerah and the Karun. It was perhaps in connection with this project that in March 1899, M. Bryois paid a visit to the Karun, where a French scientific party, under M. de Morgan, has for some time been engaged in politico-archæological researches in Arabistan. When the French Chargé d'Affaires, Comte d'Arlot, recently visited Ispahan, the Zil-es-Sultan vouchsafed the corroborative information to the British Legation that the object of these movements on the part of the French was to obtain a footing at Mohammerah, Shushter and Dizful. During our recent negotiations with the Sheikh of Koweit about the future of that harbour, it was with some surprise that we learned from him that the French had already approached him on the subject. In Bahrein a so-called French merchant, M. Goguyer, who until recently was engaged in Maskat in an attempt to revive the traffic in arms under the French flag, has been reported as endeavouring to induce the inhabitants to purchase French protection by the payment of small sums. In 1899 a French Consular Agency was established at Lingah, where the same ingenious system of manufacturing French subjects (for the most successful illustration of which we must look to Siam) was started, and where the French flag was hoisted by the Dragoman of the French Vice-Consul at Bushire. Finally, Her Majesty's Government are better aware than ourselves of the recent negotiations for a French loan to the Persian Government upon the security of the customs of the Gulf ports, and a promise of a railway monopoly in that country.

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

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41. French interests in the Persian Gulf, either political or commercial, are so small; her own territories are so distant; and the Gulf lies so far out of the track of her merchant vessels or men-of-war, that we are unable to construe these proceedings in any other light than as an attempt to cause trouble and annoyance to a possible rival, and to lend an independent assistance to the plans of a European ally. Substantial confirmation of these views will, in our opinion, be derived from a study of recent French action at Maskat, where, although French trade is infinitesimal, and a French man-of-war has been in the habit of paying a passing visit on an average only once in the year, the French Government have nevertheless during the past six months been endeavouring to obtain, under the guise of coaling facilities, a position which would provide them with an independent *pied à terre* in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf. This policy has been foreshadowed by the free grant of the French flag to Arab dhows, owning allegiance to the Sultan of Maskat, and is facilitated by the influence over the latter petty potentate that has been acquired by the French Vice-Consul, whose anti-British inclinations and intrigues are so well known to Her Majesty's Government as to require no recapitulation here. Confirmation of our suspicions regarding a Franco-Russian *entente* in Persia and in the Persian Gulf is further afforded by a telegram, dated June 7th, 1899, from Sir M. Durand to Colonel Meade, which has already been communicated both to Your Lordship and to the Foreign Office, and in which Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran remarks: "You may be quite certain that Russia and France are working in unison".

42. It should be noted that in the recent papers, with copies of which we have been favoured by Her Majesty's Government, we have found a repudiation of French ambitions in the quarter under discussion, no less explicit than that which we have already quoted from the lips of Count Mouravieff. On July 19th, 1899, M. Cambon said to Lord Salisbury that "France had no political aspiration whatever in the Persian Gulf; that she did not desire any kind of fortification or settlement or political privileges, or anything beyond the maintenance of those rights already insured to her by treaty". We have been gratified to read this assurance, by which we hope that succeeding French ministries may hold themselves bound. But we regret that it has not been communicated, not merely to Her Majesty's Government, but also to the French Agents in those regions, who do not appear to be equally acquainted with the views of the Government that they serve.

43. In recent years Germany has begun to display a positive and an increasing interest in Persia and also in the Persian Gulf. This interest has been the historical, and perhaps the natural, sequel of a commercial policy that has for some time aimed at securing the control of the principal railways in the Turkish dominions in Asia Minor, and of a political ambition, that more recently still, would appear to aim at the protection of the Ottoman Empire, alike in Europe and Asia. The obvious corollary to a system of German railways in Asia Minor, would be similar railroads to the Persian border and through Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf. Already, as Sir M. Durand has informed the Foreign Office, the Germans have procured a concession for the construction of a road from Khanikin, on the Turko-Persian frontier, to Tehran, and have apparently only abstained from pressing for a railroad in the same quarter, because of the violent opposition with which the Russian Minister met the proposal at Tehran. The second son of the Shah, Prince Malik Mansur, has been spending several months in 1898-99 in Germany, where his education and proclivities are reported as having acquired a marked philo-Teutonic tinge. German military instructors have been proffered for the reorganisation of the Persian army. Prolongations of the Turko-German railways to Baghdad and to the Persian Gulf have been and are still being freely discussed; and the German Government are endeavouring to procure an interest in the overland Turkish Telegraph to Fao. In the Gulf itself a German Consulate was established in 1897 at Bushire, to safeguard the interests of six German subjects in the entire ports of that sea. A Bremen firm opened business at Bushire, but the specially charterel steamers which were sent out from Germany appear to have been a

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

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failure. At Basrah a more resolute attempt is being made to capture the local market. Quite recently a number of Germans have for some time been engaged in a study of the situation at Bunder Abbas. During the spring of the present year, a German man-of-war, the "Arcona", visited Maskat, Lingah, and Bushire; and reports have reached us of the likely appearance, at no distant date, of a German line of merchant steamers in the Gulf.

44. While we regard these symptoms of increasing German interest in the Persian Gulf as emphasising the international aspect which the Persian question appears more and more destined to assume, and therefore as adding to the complexities of an already sufficiently difficult situation, we do not question the *bonâ fide* commercial enterprise which is carrying German trade there, as to so many other open seas and ports in the world, and we can conceive that we may even find, in the existence of German political interests, an occasional ally or safeguard for our own. German interests, however, have a tendency to grow with some rapidity, and by steps which are not always acceptable to their neighbours: and we think that the need for an early decision upon the future policy to be adopted by Her Majesty's Government is not diminished, but is enhanced, by the appearance of so active a competitor upon the scene.

45. Apart from the recurrent symptoms of activity on the southern and western shores of the Persian Gulf, with which Her Majesty's Government are familiar, the Turkish Government have also in recent years displayed an increasing interest in its political fortunes. A determined attempt has been made to fortify the shadowy pretensions of the Ottoman Porte to suzerainty over Koweit. A Turkish title has been conferred upon the Sheikh; and forces have more than once been assembled at Basrah for a contemplated expedition against that place. Intrigues are constantly in progress at Bahrein. During 1898 and 1899 a Turkish corvette has been a frequent visitor at Lingah, where, the Sheikh being of Arab descent, Turkish interests are supposed to exist. Finally, the decisions of the Venice Conference and the proceedings of the Sanitary Board at Constantinople have enabled Turkey to claim an interest in the navigation of those waters, of which she has not been slow to take advantage.

46. The only other recent evidences of foreign intervention in the Persian Gulf, of which we are cognisant, are a concession for the pearl-fisheries in that sea, which was given in 1898 by the Persian Government to a Spaniard and a Belgian, under Russian auspices; and the contemplated appearance at the Gulf ports of customs officers of Belgian nationality, similar to those who have already been placed in charge of the customs houses at Kermanshah and Tabriz, and whose influence, said to be omnipotent at the present moment with the Sadr Azam, is known to be entirely enlisted on the side of France and Russia.

47. We have gathered together these symptoms of external, and notably of Russian or of Russophil, interest in Southern Persia and in the Persian Gulf, not because we desire to invest them individually with an importance to which they are not entitled, but because collectively they indicate, in a manner that is not open to misinterpretation, the policy and ambitions of foreign Powers, and because we desire to impress upon Her Majesty's Government the fact that in an area, by land and by sea, which Great Britain regards with good reason as falling within her sphere of influence, that influence is being directly and increasingly challenged by other nations, who, in proportion as their foothold becomes more securely established, will resist any preferential claims, upon whatever foundation in history or in fact they may rest, and will claim for themselves an equality of right which in theory it may be difficult to contest.

48. More particularly do these considerations apply to the case of Russia, whose advance across the deserts that form a natural barrier of division between Northern and Southern Persia, cannot be regarded with anything but uneasiness by the Government of India, and the appearance of whose flag in the Persian Gulf would import a novel element of unrest into a situation that is at no time without its anxious features. We desire deliberately to say to

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

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

Your Lordship, with a full consciousness of our responsibility in so saying, that difficult as we find it in existing circumstances to meet the financial and military strain imposed upon us by the ever increasing proximity of Russian power upon the northern and north-western frontiers of India from the Pamirs to Herat, we could not contemplate without dismay the prospect of Russian neighbourhood in Eastern or Southern Persia, the inevitable consequence of which must be a great increase of our own burdens; while the maritime defensibility of India would require to be altogether reconsidered, were the dangers of a land invasion to be supplemented by the appearance of a possible antagonist as a naval power in waters contiguous to Indian shores.

49. We cannot pretend to divine the future, or to say whether any European Power, and if so which, will at any time push her advance to the point of claiming a maritime outlet in or near to the Persian Gulf. The fate of Mesopotamia lies beyond our ken: and it may be that in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, some stronger Power may one day exercise dominion at Baghdad, may occupy Basrah, and may demand access for its vessels to the neighbouring waters of the Gulf. Such a consummation, it is in our opinion, in the interests of British policy, as long as may be possible, to postpone. But upon the question of allowing any European Power, and more especially Russia, to overrun Central and Southern Persia, and so to reach the Gulf, or to acquire naval facilities in the latter even without such territorial connections, we do not conceive that any doubt whatever can be entertained; and we imagine that it will be accepted as a cardinal axiom of British policy that no such development would be acquiesced in by Her Majesty's Government. We would arrive with the greater confidence at this conclusion, since we were lately informed by Your Lordship that on April 15th of the present year, Lord Salisbury communicated to the Persian Government with reference to rumours of the cession of a port in the Gulf to Russia, that "Her Majesty's Government felt it to be their duty to renew the intimation that it would not be compatible with the interests of the British Empire that any European Power should exercise control or jurisdiction over the ports of the Persian Gulf".

50. Such being the existing situation in Southern Persia, and the principles of policy accepted by Her Majesty's Government being as already stated, we pass to a consideration of the manner in which these principles should be translated into action, and of the steps which should, in our opinion, be taken at the present juncture for the protection of the common interests of Great Britain and the Indian Empire.

51. We are aware that more than half a century ago, there were exchanged, and have more than once since been repeated, certain explicit assurances concerning the integrity and independence of Persia between the Governments of Great Britain and Russia. The first of these assurances were entered into by Lord Palmerston and Count Nesselrode. The former in a despatch, dated September 5th, 1834, placed on record that "the Governments of Great Britain and Russia are acting, with regard to the affairs of Persia in the same spirit, and are equally animated by a sincere desire to maintain, not only the internal tranquillity, but also the independence and integrity of Persia". Count Nesselrode, in despatches, dated October 20th, 1838, and January 29th, 1839, reiterated these pledges on behalf of his Government. Again in 1873 the continued existence of these mutual assurances was referred to with satisfaction by Count de Brunnow, as reported in a despatch by Lord Granville, dated July 10th, 1873. Finally, on March 12th, 1888, M. de Giers intimated, through M. de Staal, to Lord Salisbury that the Russian Government "have no objection to placing again on record that their views on this point are in no way altered"; and a communication to the effect that the engagements between Great Britain and Russia to respect and promote the integrity and independence of the Persian kingdom had again been renewed and confirmed, was accordingly made by Sir H. D. Wolff to the Shah.

52. Whilst it may be presumed that these pledges, so frequently renewed, are still in existence, and while we have no desire to infer that they are

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

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

within measurable distance of being broken, we are yet of opinion that they are in themselves quite insufficient to arrest the centripetal progress of Russian influence in Persia, or to save either the Persian kingdom, or British interests in it, from the erosive agencies that we have described. Within the limits of a nominally still existing integrity and independence so many encroachments upon both those attributes are possible, that by almost imperceptible degrees they pass into the realm of constitutional fiction, where they may continue to provide an exercise for the speculations of the jurist, long after they have been contemptuously ignored by statesmen.

53. If this proposition be accepted, and if we cannot rely upon written pledges to safeguard the future of Persia, it behoves us to examine the various alternative policies that have been or can be proposed. The first of these is the policy of a regeneration of Persia by Anglo-Russian means; *i.e.*, joint action by Great Britain and Russia to insist upon reforms, to reorganise the administration and finances, to develop the resources of the country, to lend the requisite means, in fact to convert the Persian Government by combined philanthropy from a moribund into a solvent institution. This policy was discussed and rejected by Sir M. Durand in his Memorandum of September 1895, on the ground that Russia would denounce us to the Shah to begin with, and would play us false afterwards; and in his despatch of February 1899, he again "proceeds upon the assumption that we cannot hope to come to terms with Russia, and persuade her to join us in a policy of reform and development." We concur with Her Majesty's Minister in believing that the reform of Persia by a policy of friendly co-operation between Russia and ourselves is out of the question; and we do so in the main for the reason, which no one familiar with Persia will deny, that Russia is interested not in the reform of Persia, but in its decay; that in the background of her ambitions is the vision of a country and a people falling from inherent debility into her grasp; and that any policy which might tend to strengthen the country or to revivify the people, is to be resisted as tending to thwart the fulfilment of those ambitions. We might give many illustrations in support of this proposition; but we will content ourselves with one. Sir M. Durand has lately supplied to the Foreign Office the version given by the Sadr Azam of the agreement between the Persian and Russian Governments, by which the former bound itself in 1889 not to grant any railway concessions to any other Power than Russia, except with the consent of the latter, for a period of 10 years. Whatever be the real facts of the case, there can be no doubt that this engagement, as long as it has lasted, and so long as it continues to last, is an effective barrier to any genuine development of the country. It was due to expire in the present year. Our latest information from Sir M. Durand is that it has, under pressure from the Russian Government, been renewed for another term of five years.

54. The alternative policy recommended by Sir M. Durand is that we should plainly intimate that any Russian encroachments in Northern Persia will provoke corresponding measures for the protection of British interests in the south. In his Memorandum of September 1895, Her Majesty's Minister suggested that this declaration should be made to the Russian Government. In his despatch of February 1899 he proposed that it should also be made to the Persian Government; so that both parties should be well aware of the steps that would follow upon any further Russian aggression. It has been objected to this policy that such an engagement might impose upon the British Government an unwelcome obligation to intervene and to add to British responsibilities in Southern Persia, at the moment most opportune to Russia, and least opportune to ourselves. There is force in this objection; although we think that it might be met by introducing sufficient elasticity into the proposed intimation to leave Her Majesty's Government free to act for the protection of British interests in Southern Persia, not in a specified manner at a specified moment, but in what manner and at what juncture might commend itself to their judgment. Moreover the value of the objection is somewhat weakened by the consideration that did Russia take any such step in Northern Persia as is here contemplated, counter-action of some sort, with or without a previous

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

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

intimation, would in all probability be imposed upon Her Majesty's Government; while the knowledge that a Russian advance in the north might be the signal for a corresponding British move in the south would, it can scarcely be doubted, operate as a deterrent upon any premature activity on the part of Russia, since she might thereby gravely jeopardise the realisation of her own dreams of ultimate access to Southern Persia and the Persian Gulf.

55. Nevertheless before we recommend that such a policy should be essayed, we desire to raise the question whether, though it be impossible to conclude an agreement with Russia for the joint patronage and development of Persia, it might not yet be possible to come to an understanding with her for the separate patronage and development of that country in distinct and clearly defined compartments by the two great Powers, in other words for a recognition of British and Russian spheres of interest in the dominions of the Shah. This is a solution the desirability of which has not been lost sight of by Sir M. Durand, but which for certain reasons he did not feel called upon to discuss. Recent events in China have familiarised the public mind with the idea of such spheres of interest, although their existence would appear to be still somewhat lacking both in clearness of definition and in precision of outline. The Viceroy has observed in recent telegrams from Lord Salisbury to Sir M. Durand with reference to a Persian loan and to mining concessions in that country, indications of a willingness to concede to Russia liberties in the north of Persia, parallel in scope and substance with those conceded to Great Britain in the south; and it is worthy of consideration whether in an expansion of this suggestion might not be found a feasible scheme.

56. We have already alluded to the line across Persia drawn by Sir M. Durand from Khanikin on the Turkish frontier, through Kermanshah, Hamadan, Ispahan, Yezd, and Kerman to Seistan, as indicating the northern limits of the sphere within which British political influence and trade are paramount. To some extent this partition is assisted by geographical conditions, the great deserts of Central Persia constituting a natural barrier between the north and the south, and roughly dividing the one from the other. But this situation is modified both in the west of Persia, where there are no deserts, and where there is no physical line of demarcation between the respective spheres of influence; in the centre of Persia, where Ispahan can hardly be said to constitute the natural frontier of any geographical zone; and also in the extreme east where Seistan, the inclusion of which in the British sphere would be an obligatory point, lies not to the south but to the north of the great desert. These considerations might not affect the success of any engagement that was carried out with equal *bona fides* by both parties: but they might become a fruitful source of friction were such a good understanding not to be counted upon in the future. In any case, we would recommend that the line of partition, suggested by Sir M. Durand, should be so far amended as to substitute Kashan for Ispahan. It would be undesirable that any Russian railway should penetrate further south than Kashan, which indeed is separated by a considerable range of hills from Ispahan, or that Russia should have right of access to the very fringe of the latter district.

57. We have observed that in China the Agreement recently concluded between Her Majesty's Government and Russia as to spheres of interest has related to railways only. Either party has pledged itself not to seek on its own account or on behalf of others for railway concessions in the rival sphere, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for such concessions, supported by the other in that sphere. *Prima facie* there does not appear to be any reason why such an agreement should not equally be extended to mines, roads, and other industrial or economic undertakings. The value of such an understanding is considerable; because although political influence is not expressly mentioned, yet in eastern countries commercial and industrial enterprises are the familiar agencies through which political influence is exercised by alien powers, and because that influence is apt to follow in the wake of railways and trade. We do not think, if such an agreement were arrived at with

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

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

Russia, with reference to the Persian territories lying north and south of the predicated line, that there would be an end to Russian designs in Southern Persia or in the Persian Gulf. Such a result might, perhaps, ensue from an engagement that no political influence should be exercised by either party on the opposite side of the line. But there would be manifest difficulties in arriving at any such understanding; since it would be out of the question to remove the British representatives, either at Tehran, at Tabriz, or at Meshed, whose functions necessarily involve the exercise of some sort of political influence, while a corresponding objection would no doubt be felt by the Russian Government. But even an engagement limited to railway and commercial exploitation would have this effect, that it would deprive Russia of the means by which political or territorial ambitions in the rival sphere could most easily be carried out, and would render it difficult for her to push them to success, as long as Great Britain remained on the alert.

58. There are, however, difficulties and drawbacks in the case of such an understanding which it would be impolitic to ignore. We have already hinted at one of their number. The facts with reference to Seistan which have been mentioned by the Viceroy in his Minute, by Sir M. Durand, and also in this despatch, indicate the absolute necessity of including that district within the British sphere. Nevertheless Seistan is physically and administratively a part of the province of Khorasan, from which it is severed by no clear line of division, the Governorship of Seistan being vested in a member of the old ruling family of Kain, the two existing heads of which are brothers, residing respectively at Tabbas and Birjand. It also seems exceedingly doubtful to us whether Russia would, by any such agreement as we are discussing, forego her designs upon Seistan itself, and still more her chances of reaching the eastern extremity of the Persian Gulf. Nor again is it clear that she would be willing to cancel the engagement with regard to railway construction, which she has recently renewed with the Persian Government, and to hand over the southern half of Persia to possible railway exploitation by British agency, in return for a monopoly of similar exploitation (which may be said to be already at her disposal) in the northern half. These, however, are considerations which could only be decided by the attitude of Russia herself, were she approached on the subject by Her Majesty's Government. We indicate them merely for the purpose of showing that we are far from confident that the suggestion, if put forward, will meet with a favourable reception.

59. A more serious drawback, from the point of view of British interests, is the fact that the capital of Persia would lie in the northern or Russian sphere, and that Russian influence there, already predominant, could hardly fail to become supreme. The situation that has recently arisen in China would present itself with ten-fold gravity and emphasis. A desire would not merely be intimated to connect the capital with the Russian railway system: but a line itself would, we may imagine, at once be made to Tehran, while corresponding lines would in all probability be constructed from the Russian frontier in Georgia to Tabriz, and in Trans-Caspia to Meshed. With the three great cities of Northern Persia thus permanently linked with the Russian system, the power of pressure exercised by the Russian Government, which is already considerable, would be positively overwhelming. The Shah would tend more and more to become a Russian puppet, and Northern Persia a Russian proconsulate. We should look with great anxiety, in such a case, upon the fate of such institutions as the Imperial Bank of Persia, and the Indo-European Telegraph Department, whose head-quarters are in Tehran. We should fear a marked diminution of influence on the part of Her Majesty's representative at the capital; and we do not conceal our anticipations that in the long run such a partition might involve the permanent break up of the Persian kingdom, and, if it did not ultimately lead to rival Russian and British Protectorates in the north and south, might at any rate result in the selection of another capital, and in the rule of more than one native prince in Persia.

60. Neither will it be overlooked by Her Majesty's Government that, while any such arrangement with Russia might preclude that Power from

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

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

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obtaining control over Central and Southern Persia and in that way reaching the Persian Gulf, it would not for one moment retard, but might on the contrary accelerate her advance to the same objective through Mesopotamia by way of Baghdad. This is a problem, however, which we do not feel called upon at present to discuss, and which would require to be examined on independent grounds. Nor again would an Anglo-Russian agreement preclude France, or Germany, or any other Power from endeavouring to acquire in Southern Persia or in the Gulf the position from which Russia would *ex hypothesi* have debarred herself. There might even be combined action between them for that object. These however are features inseparable from the solution which we are discussing, and which should not be of a formidable character, if the influence of the principal competitor were removed from the scene. They might be the cause of future annoyance to the British Government; but they could hardly, under any conditions, constitute a menace to the Indian Empire.

61. There remains the further danger, distinctly contemplated by Sir M. Durand in discussing the question of a possible understanding with Russia, that she would not abide by the terms of any such understanding. Sufficient grounds for this induction may unquestionably be found in the history of Russian advance in Central Asia during the past half century. But an appreciation of the inclinations and idiosyncrasies of both parties to an agreement, in the light, where possible, of past experience, is an element in the drawing up of a fresh bargain which is not likely to be lost sight of by either agent, whether it be regarded as involving a discount from, or an appreciation of, the value of the new contract. Moreover such contracts, if not of perpetual duration, or even if ultimately infringed by one of the two parties, have been shown in many cases to be of immense value, in the respite that they afford from the strain of an otherwise ceaseless rivalry, and in the opportunity presented for a peaceful consolidation of existing interests.

62. We have now placed before Your Lordship the *pros* and *cons*, as they present themselves to our eyes, of the alternative policies in Persia. Should Her Majesty's Government decide upon making any overtures to the Russian Government in the direction indicated, and should they either be rejected, or result in failure, it will still be possible to adopt the alternative recommended by Sir M. Durand. Indeed, if the terms of a reasonable arrangement are proffered by one party, and are refused by the other, the natural corollary would appear to be that the originator of the proposal should reserve to himself the right to protect by whatever means may be at his disposal the interests which he has endeavoured to conserve by friendly co-operation; and should meet what would in such a case be conscious aggression on the one side by retaliation on the other.

63. In either case, however, though still more in the case of a failure to arrive at an understanding with Russia, we conceive that it is incumbent upon Her Majesty's Government and upon the Government of India to come to an early decision upon the subsidiary question, raised by Sir M. Durand, namely, as to the steps that require forthwith to be taken in order to safeguard British and Indian interests in the so-called British sphere in Persia from the competition with which we have shown them to be threatened.

64. Sir M. Durand, in his despatch, has made a calculation of the sums annually expended by Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India respectively upon the British establishments at present maintained in Persia. He arrives at a grand total of £36,970 per annum distributed in the following proportions: Her Majesty's Government, £12,876; Government of India, £24,094. Inasmuch as these figures are not, in all respects, correct, and as they omit several items of charge for which Indian revenues are responsible, we have made an independent computation, which is here presented, for purposes of comparison in tabular form. In a further column we present the charges also borne by the Government of India and Her Majesty's Government severally in respect of Mesopotamia and the Tigris—*i.e.*, Turkish Arabia, an area, which though not belonging to the Persian dominions, is so closely adjacent

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

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thereto as to constitute a part of the same political system, and for the maintenance of British interests in which the Government of India have hitherto been called upon to pay, as inseparably connected with the trade and politics of the Persian Gulf :—

I.—Sir M. Durand's figures.

A—Charges borne by Her Majesty's Government—

	£
Tehran	9,640
Astrabad	48
Resht	750
Tabriz	920
Ispahan	778
Kerman	250
Mohammerah ...	490
Travelling allowances ...	1,500
	14,376

B—Charges borne by Government of India—

Tehran	7,000
Meshed	8,600
Kermanshah ...	24
Shiraz	160
Kerman	250
Bushire	7,700
Gulf Telegraph ...	120
Bahrein ... ... / Shargah ... ... / Lingah	240
	24,094

II.—Government of India's figures.

A—Charges borne by Her Majesty's Government—

	£
Tehran	9,640
Astrabad	48
Resht	750
Tabriz	920
Ispahan	778
Kerman	250
Mohammerah ...	490
Travelling allowances ...	1,500
½ Karun subsidy ...	1,000
* Consular clerk at Bushire	90
	15,466

† *B—Charges borne by Government of India—*

Tehran	7,000
Meshed	9,154
Kermanshah ...	24
Shiraz	160
‡ Kerman	400
Bushire	8,460
Gulf Telegraph ...	120
Bahrein ... ... / Shargah ... ... / Lingah	240
§ Seistan Consulate ...	400
Tehran-Meshed Telegraph line ...	1,335
Makran Telegraph subsidy	580
Gwadur Native Assistant	60
½ Karun subsidy ...	1,000

Indian Marine charges—

Maintenance of "Lawrence"	8,268	8266
Subsidy for "Sphinx" ...	21,000	1~~3~~000 5
Repairs of "Sphinx" ...	2,687	3276
Coal of "Sphinx" and "Lawrence"	3,665	3960
Coaling Depôts	250	470

Indian Military charges—

‖ Detachments in Persian Gulf	981	60
Total Indian charges ...	~~65,784~~	~~58~~,886

* That is £120 sanctioned by despatch No. 91 (Political), dated 3rd August 1899, minus £30 fee allowance withdrawn.

† The Indian charges are taken from the accounts for 1897-98. They include superannuation charges, and the figures are turned into pounds sterling at 1s. 4d. per Rupee. The Indian Marine Charges have been furnished by the Examiner of Marine Accounts; the Indian Military Charges by the Comptroller of Military Accounts, Bombay Command.

‡ Annual expenditure up to Rs. 6,000, *i.e.*, £400 sanctioned for five years from 1898.

§ Annual expenditure up to Rs. 6,000, *i.e.*, £400 sanctioned in 1899.

‖ This is exclusive of extra cost for detachments at Jask and Charbar.

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

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

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III.

EXPENDITURE IN TURKISH ARABIA.

A—Charges borne by Her Majesty's Government—

	£
Baghdad, Mosul and Karbela	131

B—Charges borne by Government of India—

Baghdad Residency	4,970
Basrah Consulate	1,400
Tigris Subsidy	1,600

Indian Marine charges—

Maintenance of "Comet"	~~4,000~~ 2506
Total Indian charges ...	~~8,070~~ 10476

65. According to these figures, which we have been at much pains to verify, it appears that upon the various establishments maintained by the British Government in Persia, the Imperial Government spends £15,466 and the Government of India ~~£65,784~~ per annum. If Turkish Arabia be included in the calculation, as we think it must in fairness be, and as it was in a statement prepared for and presented to the Royal Commission on Indian expenditure in 1896, the totals will amount to Great Britain £15,597, India ~~£74,754~~.

66. It will not, we apprehend, be denied that these contributions do not at all fairly represent the respective proportions of Imperial and of Indian interest in Persia and its surroundings. The argument into which we entered in an earlier part of this despatch will have failed in its purpose if it has not given good grounds for thinking that in the determination of British interests in Persia too much stress has hitherto been laid upon the Indian, and too little upon the British, quota; and that a more even partition both of responsibility and of financial burden might with reason be adopted in the future.

67. This however is a question which we are not at the present moment called upon to discuss with any minuteness, the more so as it is understood to be one of the subjects that have attracted the attention of the Royal Commission above alluded to, and that are likely to be dealt with in its Report. We observe that in the evidence so far printed and published, some attention has been paid to the case, and we reserve till the appearance of the final Report, any further remarks that we may have to offer thereon.

68. We would observe, however, in strict connection with the question now under examination, *viz.*, the increase of Consular and other establishments in Persia—which is itself a branch of the wider subject—that in the reconsideration of the case for which the Government of India have more than once pleaded, it appears to us that one of two principles may with advantage be borne in view. The entire charges which are placed upon the revenues of the British Empire for Persia and Turkish Arabia may be added together, and may be divided in certain proportions, to be revised, if necessary, at definite intervals, between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers. Some such principle was adopted, when in 1859 the British Mission at Tehran was re-transferred to the Foreign Office, and when it was laid down by Lord John Russell that the ratio of the charges met by India and Great Britain should be as 12 to 5. We are not aware that this principle has ever since been formally repudiated or surrendered, although it appears to have been widely departed from in practice.

69. The other method would be that of determining what are the spheres or localities in Persia of special concern either to Her Majesty's Government or to the Government of India, and of debiting the charges incurred for them against the revenues respectively of the United Kingdom and of India. It

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

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

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would not be difficult in our opinion to constitute such a partition of interest, which would be determined by a combination of geographical, political and commercial conditions. The parts of Persia that border upon Afghanistan, Baluchistan and the eastern end of the Persian Gulf would naturally fall within the Indian sphere. The northern and western portions contiguous to the Caucasian provinces of Russia, to Turkey, and to Mesopotamia, would possess a greater interest for Her Majesty's Government. To a considerable, though still only a partial, extent this principle has already been acted upon; whilst it will be in the recollection of Your Lordship that the Government of India have in one case pressed for a vindication of it, which they have felt to be equally demanded by policy and justice. In February and again in August 1895, our predecessors expressed a very strong opinion that they should not be called upon to contribute towards the Karun service, as long as the subsidy for the mail service on the Tigris was met exclusively from Indian revenues. They stated their opinion that "the interests involved in the Karun service are purely Imperial and not Indian, and, if this service ceases altogether, the interests of India will not be affected thereby". It was only after the receipt of an urgent appeal from the Foreign Office, and on the explicit understanding that the whole question of the distribution of the charges on account of the Tigris and the Karun should be referred to the Royal Commission then sitting, that the Government of Lord Elgin, not without a vigorous dissent from the then Finance Member, Sir J. Westland, consented to continue the payment of a moiety of the Karun subsidy pending the stipulated decision. We cordially endorse the views which were expressed by our predecessors in respect of the Imperial and non-Indian character of this charge, and we shall be glad to learn what are the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the subject.

70. The mention of the Karun and Tigris services affords an incidental illustration of the commercial considerations by which the allocation of responsibility that we are discussing might be determined. It is, of course, difficult to decide in the case of any particular market or harbour the exact shares of interest in it that may be claimed by British or by Indian trade. The former is more likely to be in the ascendant in the north, the latter in the south, of Persia. Broadly speaking, however, we do not think it will be disputed that the supervision and promotion of British commerce in foreign countries are a responsibility properly devolving upon the Imperial Government. The fact that a considerable proportion of the trade of any foreign town or port passes to or from India (and even of such trade a large part is apt to be often British in origin) is not a reason for placing the consular or other charges exclusively upon the Indian revenues, any more than a corresponding preponderance of Colonial trade in any particular quarter would be regarded as a reason for demanding a contribution from the Colonies. We imagine the real line of distinction to be that, whereas the commercial interests of Her Majesty's Indian subjects, outside of India, are in the main the concern of the Imperial Government, yet in cases where the political importance of a place or district exceeds the commercial, and where that political importance is Indian rather than English in character, the Government of India may legitimately be called upon to defray sometimes a large proportion, sometimes the whole of the cost. In this way we may account for the exclusive financial responsibility of India for Meshed, for Bushire and the other ports of the Gulf, and for Baghdad (although we regard the latter as an extreme and questionable extension of the principle). On the other hand the charges for Ispahan, Kermanshah, Tabriz, &c., fall, or ought in our judgment to fall, upon the Imperial revenues. Tehran, as the capital, is, in a sense, a meeting ground of the two systems; and a division of the cost between the two Governments has accordingly been in existence ever since 1835, although the passage of time has witnessed a gradual reduction of the Indian contribution, and may, we hope, lead to a further reconsideration of the matter, when the present arrangement expires in 1901.

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

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

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71. We will now proceed to apply the principles which have been enunciated to a consideration of the particular question referred to us by Your Lordship, *viz.*, the suggestions of Sir M. Durand on the one hand, and our own views or proposals on the other, concerning the increase of Consular and other establishments in Persia. We may say at once that we are anxious to regard the question from a broad-minded and liberal point of view, that we have no desire to haggle with Her Majesty's Government over shares of responsibility or of cost, and that we are quite willing to add to our own charges for the protection of British interests in Persia, in the confident belief that Her Majesty's Government will not be behindhand with a similar generosity. Our argument as to the magnitude and significance of those interests and the reality of the dangers with which they are assailed would have been insincere, were we unprepared to give to it a practical demonstration.

72. For the sake of clearness we will divide the country into different spheres, representing with sufficient accuracy the rough lines of demarcation between British and Indian interest. In the northern and central sphere, and in the western sphere, the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government is in our judgment more directly involved. In the eastern sphere, and in the southern or maritime sphere, we admit a corresponding preponderance of Indian interest.

73. Commencing with the first named of these areas, we find that Sir M. Durand recommends an improvement in the pay and status of Her Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz. In so far as our judgment on the matter is desired, it is in entire accord with the proposal. We are more doubtful about the suggestion to appoint an additional Vice-Consul at Tabriz, with the intention of posting him later on at Urumia; since we incline to the opinion that the ultimate destiny of the Persian Nestorians has been irretrievably fixed by their recent wholesale conversion to the Russian faith. We concur with Sir M. Durand as to the desirability of reducing the Consulate at Resht to a Vice-Consulate. We have before expressed our hearty concurrence with his proposals concerning the Consulate at Ispahan. These proposals without exception concern in their financial aspect the British, and not the Indian, Exchequer.

74. In the western sphere Sir M. Durand advocates the appointment of a British Vice-Consul at Kermanshah, subordinate to the Consul-General at Tehran, and paid for by England, in place of the present native agent, whose modest allowance of £24 is drawn, for some unaccountable reason, from the charges for the Meshed Agency, *i.e.*, from Indian funds. The figures of British trade passing through Kermanshah from Baghdad to Tehran appear to us amply to justify the proposed change. We are less confident about a suggestion made by Sir M. Durand, originally in connection with this route, but also with a wider application, namely, that we should depute an Indian officer to examine the various possible routes for railways in Persia and to make suggestions. Such a proceeding would, in our opinion, be both premature and uncalled for. We are very doubtful whether in her present state of evolution Persia is prepared for railways. The recent renewal of the prohibitive agreement with Russia shows that the latter Power does not for the present at any rate intend them to be introduced. Enquiries of the proposed character would be certain to arouse suspicion; and finally we believe that we are already in possession of the materials enabling us to judge of the railways, very few in number, that under existing conditions it would be prudent, if it were possible, to construct in Persia.

75. Further to the south Sir M. Durand recommends the substitution of a Consul for the Karun and Arabistan at a salary of £800 (to be divided between the Imperial and Indian revenues) for the present Vice-Consul at Mohammerah, whose salary of £490 is defrayed from Imperial sources. He also contemplates the abandonment at an early date of the handsome annual subsidy of £2,000 now paid in equal moieties by the two Governments to Messrs. Lynch for their service upon the Karun. Our previous attitude on this subject will prepare

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

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Your Lordship for our ready acceptance of these views. But we think that the entire cost of the proposed Consulate and of such subordinate native agencies as may be required should be borne by Her Majesty's Government, since we cannot too emphatically reiterate our opinion that India is only indirectly interested in the Karun question. We shall be prepared to show a corresponding liberality in quarters of more manifest importance to India. A Consul at Mohammerah (or Ahwaz or Shushter) would of course correspond with the British Resident at Bushire, as well as with Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

76. We next turn to the eastern sphere, where Indian interests may be described as supreme. Sir M. Durand throws out a hint that money might perhaps be saved at Meshed, where the existing establishment imposes upon Indian funds a charge of no less than £9,154 a year. We are inclined to agree with him. Although in view of the proximity of Afghanistan, and of the militant character of Russian pretensions in Khorasan, it is desirable to maintain an adequate British representation at Meshed, we think that the present scale is excessive, and that the results obtained are incommensurate with the cost. We are considering whether by a reduction of the grade of the Political Agent now stationed there, and by the removal of the Political Assistant to some spot where his services would be of greater value, we might not be able to effect a considerable money saving, to be better applied elsewhere. We are sceptical also as to the value received for the large secret service grant at present made to the Meshed Agency, and expended in the main in procuring unreliable and almost worthless information through native and ill-informed agents. On the other hand, we are prepared to compensate for a less extravagant expenditure at Meshed by a more vigilant attention to Seistan, and by strenuously fostering the trade route connecting that district with British Baluchistan. The political and strategical importance of Seistan appears to us to justify and even to necessitate the former attitude. We are encouraged to adopt the latter by the figures of trans-Nushki traffic, which have risen from a total of 1½ lakh in 1896 to Rs. 5,90,000 in 1897 and (in spite of an adverse season) to Rs. 7,28,000 in 1898, in which year the imports alone into Quetta from Seistan reached the value of Rs. 2,50,880.

77. We have some time past been examining the question of the permanent appointment of a British officer to Seistan; and the deputation of Captain Sykes from Kerman to Seistan in the present year, and the sanction of an annual expenditure of £400 from Indian revenues upon a Seistan Consulate, have already been mentioned. The reports of Captain Sykes are strongly adverse to the permanent appointment of a British officer to Seistan; and whilst we do not entirely concur with his reasoning, and regard his views as to some extent coloured by other prepossessions, we nevertheless are of opinion that such an appointment might for the present be postponed; the more so as it appears likely that the nomination of a Russian Consul to Seistan, though previously announced, is likely not to be persevered in, unless a British representative appears permanently upon the scene. Should a Russian officer be finally appointed, we think that there will be no alternative but to send a British officer also. In the meantime we are prepared to depute a reliable native agent from our Indian service to reside at Nasirabad, the capital of Seistan, and to appoint a second to reside at Birjand, the capital of Kain, both of these officials to be under the orders of the British Resident at Meshed, in correspondence with the Persian arrangements under which Seistan and Kain constitute a portion of the Governorship-General of Khorassan. We estimate that the annual cost of these two posts will amount to £150—£200 per annum more than the already sanctioned charge for the Seistan post; and this addition we are prepared to meet. In making these proposals we have the satisfaction of knowing that we are sure of the support both of Your Lordship and of the Foreign Office; since, in a Revenue despatch, dated December 2nd, 1897, Your Lordship, in sending to us a letter from the Foreign Office, expressing their good hopes of the future of the Quetta-Meshed route, provided that Consular protection and other facilities were furnished at points along the road, commended these remarks to the Government of India, and added: "I trust that

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

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

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the suggestion of appointing Consular Agents at points along the trade route between Quetta and Meshed may receive the attentive consideration of Your Excellency's Government. It appears to me a measure desirable from many points of view, and especially in connection with the facilities which might be afforded by that route for the transport of arms and ammunition between the Persian Gulf and Baluchistan."

78. As regards the trade route in question, we propose to take active measures for its development within our own territory. We contemplate spending additional, though not extravagant, sums upon the better provision of wells, accommodation, supplies of fodder and other stores, and the protection of the track. We may even require to appoint a second British officer, to relieve Lieutenant Webb Ware of the excessive strain now imposed upon him by the administration of an extensive district, in addition to the protection of a road over 400 miles in length. We hope by these measures, which will be unostentatiously pursued, to escape the jealousy aroused by a too open challenge of rival ambitions in Seistan, and to build up in that neighbourhood a substantial commercial and political interest, which will find no mean ally in what we believe to be the natural predisposition of the inhabitants. Experience alone can inform us whether the anticipations that have been framed by the prospects of the Nushki-Seistan trade route are over-sanguine, as in some quarters they are freely said to be. If unsuccessful, the experiment which we now propose to make can be abandoned without discredit. If, as we believe, it will be found to have both a political and a commercial value, we shall be better enabled in the future to pronounce upon the larger schemes which have sometimes been put forward in connection with Seistan, and a reference to which will be found in the Minute written by the Viceroy. At present, it does not seem to us to be necessary to take them into consideration.

79. We agree with Sir M. Durand in thinking that a British Consul should be permanently appointed to Kerman. We have already sanctioned a contribution of Rs. 6,000 or £400 a year to the cost of this post; and we are prepared to continue the payment of this sum. We believe that there are good reasons for which Her Majesty's Government may desire to continue the payment of a similar moiety of the cost. But should their acceptance of the increments proposed elsewhere, notably in the case of the Karun, be facilitated by our assumption of the entire cost of the Kerman Consulate, we should be prepared favourably to consider such a proposal; or, if it were preferred, to divide with them the cost of the Karun and Kerman Consulates combined. The financial result would in either case be approximately the same.

80. Sir M. Durand has suggested a British Vice-Consul, or a native agent at Bampur. For the present we think that the latter will be the preferable alternative; and we are prepared to undertake the outlay, which will not exceed about £300 per annum. The officer in question would be under the orders of the British Consul at Kerman.

81. Finally we come to the southern sphere, including the coasts and ports of the Persian Gulf. Your Lordship will have been prepared by what has previously been said for the announcement of our willingness to submit to some sacrifices for the defence of an interest, so substantially grounded, and so conspicuously assailed. We are unable to agree with Sir M. Durand in the suggestion that any material reduction of expenditure can be effected at Bushire. On the contrary we are disposed to think that, if the best men in our service are to be attracted to that post, we may even require to add to its pecuniary attractions. We agree with him, however, in thinking that the Resident at Bushire should reside at Shiraz, and exercise his consular functions there during the summer months. We understand from Colonel Meade that the cost of a site for a house (no suitable building being available either for hire or purchase) would be from £1,000 to £1,200, and of building and furnishing about £1,500. We think that this expense might be borne in equal proportions by the Imperial and Indian Governments; and we are prepared to undertake the annual outlay

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

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that may be required for up-keep and repairs, and for the provision of a substitute for the present native agent, during the time that the Resident is living at Bushire.

82. We are heartily in accord with Sir M. Durand in thinking that a British officer should be appointed to Bunder Abbas, with charge of the Gulf ports east of Bushire, and of British interests in the maritime provinces of South-eastern Persia. The necessity of such an appointment was mooted, as long ago as 1879, by Colonel Ross, at that time British Resident at Bushire. It was raised again in 1882, 1884, 1885, 1888 and 1892, and on the majority of these occasions was supported by petitions from the not insignificant Hindu and Khoja population engaged in trade at Bunder Abbas. In 1893, the appointment as Vice-Consul of an Englishman engaged in business at that port was agreed to by the Government of India and was sanctioned by the Secretary of State (Lord Kimberley), but was subsequently dropped upon the inexplicable grounds that the estimated cost of Rs. 50 a month or £40 a year could not be saved out of the Bushire Residency funds. In 1896, the question was again discussed between the Government of India and the Resident (Colonel Wilson); and the former so far departed from their former attitude as to say that the proposal must be held over until the normal conditions of trade had been restored by the withdrawal of the Russian sanitary cordon. These conditions have since been fulfilled, and we are prepared to look with a more favourable eye upon a proposal, the intrinsic recommendations of which are not open to dispute. We are willing to accept the financial responsibility for the proposed appointment, although we think that it may be possible to meet it without additional cost by the transfer to Bunder Abbas of the Political Assistant now stationed at Meshed. Sir M. Durand suggests that the officer appointed to this post should pass the summer months at Yezd (Bunder Abbas being an impossible site of residence during the hot season), taking the place there of the present unpaid Commercial Vice-Consul. Upon this point we would propose to consult Her Majesty's Consul at Kerman, which is in close connection with Bunder Abbas and the coast; and we will submit to Your Lordship at a later date our final views upon this subject.

83. Sir M. Durand mentions, as a matter affecting exclusively the Government of India, the possible appointment of a British officer at Bahrein. We do not hesitate to state to Your Lordship that such an appointment is in our opinion both desirable and obligatory. Trouble, similar to that which we have already incurred in Maskat, is brewing in Bahrein, the treaty engagements of which petty State with Her Majesty's Government provide no legitimate excuse for such complications. It is necessary to anticipate them by placing a British officer permanently in the island; and we are at the present time awaiting Colonel Meade's definite proposals on the matter. We are inclined to think that it will probably be sufficient to nominate an officer of a subordinate class. From time to time he will also visit Koweit. It remains to be decided whether he should also have under his political jurisdiction the Trucial Chiefs of the Arab or Pirate coast, or whether these should be placed under the officer at Bunder Abbas. We incline to the former opinion, but reserve this matter for subsequent decision.

84. We have now dealt with each one of Sir M. Durand's specific proposals, and have stated our own views in support, in amendment, or in supplement of them. It remains for us to mention some additional proposals of our own, and to comment upon certain independent suggestions submitted by Her Majesty's Minister. We entertain, and have already in the present year acted upon, the opinion that Her Majesty's naval forces should be more strongly and frequently represented than they have hitherto been in the Persian Gulf, and that there should be recurrent visits from the Admiral of the East Indian station. During the past spring Admiral Douglas, at the request of the Viceroy, paid such a visit, and his presence was of material assistance during the recent crisis at Maskat. We are doubtful of the wisdom of the existing system, under which the political charge of the Makran coast, and the

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

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distribution of the Telegraph subsidies, is vested in the Director-General of the Indo-European Telegraph Department at Karachi, to whom a special salary of £120 is paid by the Government of India for the purpose. It has been proposed to us that this charge should be transferred to the Political Agent at Maskat; and for the present we reserve our opinion as to the advantages of such a change. It would be eminently desirable that Maskat should be connected by cable with Jask, since at present there is no telegraphic communication with any part of Oman. But this too is a question that must wait for a later solution.

85. Sir M. Durand has proposed that all British Consular officers in Persia should have a small guard of Indian troopers similar to those now maintained at Meshed. We are not clear that such a proposal is at present desirable, and are apprehensive that it might lead to movements on the part of Russia, for which not even the necessities of a plague cordon could be pleaded in justification, and which would scarcely be distinguishable from armed occupation. In this respect we re-echo the opinion which the Government of India expressed to Your Lordship as recently as August 10th, 1898, to the effect that Indian interests are sufficiently involved to justify us in furnishing protective detachments, as we are now doing at Jask and Charbar, for Telegraph stations on the coast; but that our military provision must, for the present, be limited to this service.

86. Her Majesty's Minister also recommends the grant of a supply of travelling tents to every British officer in Persia. As the majority of these, under the proposed arrangements, will be upon the Indian list, the suggested outlay would require in such cases to be met from Indian funds. We do not think that any general rule is required. We are in the habit of including camp equipment in the outfit of any officer whose duties require him to travel. We may observe, however, that tents are more likely to be required in out-of-the-way parts of the country than they are along the main roads, where the existing *chapar* or postal service, although destitute of almost every superficial merit, is nevertheless more rapid and therefore as a rule more convenient than travelling by caravan.

87. Lastly, Sir M. Durand makes certain recommendations with regard to the improvement and better organisation of the Telegraph service in Persia, both native and European. We concur with his suggestion that no opportunity should be lost of getting the Persian wires, which are abominably mismanaged, transferred to our control. He then revives a suggestion, of which much has been heard during the last 20 years, that we should "organise for political purposes" the existing establishment of the Indo-European Telegraph Department; although we do not gather very clearly from his despatch what are the precise measures recommended for that purpose. The last occasion on which a somewhat similar proposal appears to have been made was in 1887, when a Memorandum, dated April 27th of that year, was drawn up by Sir Murdoch Smith, who was despatched on a semi-political Mission to Persia, and who recommended that capable military officers should be scattered about the country, nominally in charge of the Telegraph stations, but in reality as political agents. In a despatch, dated June 24th, 1887, the Government of India expressed a general, but guarded, approval of the scheme. In our opinion there are two sides to the question, for each of which much can be said. It is surprising to us that an institution and a service that have exercised such an influence and are so generally popular in Persia, as the Indo-European Telegraph Department, should not have been attended with more visible political effect. On the other hand, in proportion as the working of the line has become systematised, so there has been less call for the type of Engineer Officer who was required during earlier and more troubled days. The work at the majority of the stations does not admit of much leisure on the part of the signallers and line inspectors. At the more important posts we believe that a considerable, though unobtrusive, influence is already exerted by the superior officers; and we are not convinced that the appearance upon the scene of a number

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

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of English officers, whose telegraphic duties would in reality be subordinate to political or semi-political functions, might not arouse suspicion and even produce some friction. We do not desire, however, to pronounce definitely upon the subject, and shall be glad to be acquainted with the views that are entertained by Your Lordship.

88. Before leaving the subject of Persia, we desire to add an appeal upon a matter which we have already argued to be so closely connected therewith as to be inseparable from a discussion of our interests in that part of the world. The proposals that we have submitted do not contemplate any change in the existing arrangements in Turkish Arabia. Nevertheless, we cannot too strongly state our conviction that those arrangements, financially considered, are unduly harsh in their application to India, and unduly lenient in their incidence upon Great Britain. That the charges borne by Indian revenues for the maintenance of our political and commercial position upon the Tigris and at Baghdad, should amount to £8,970 a year, while the contribution of Her Majesty's Government to the same objects is limited to £131 a year, appears to us to be a partial and inequitable division. We recognise that there are advantages to British interests generally in maintaining at Baghdad an establishment on the scale and of the importance that are associated with an Indian Residency of the second class. But the objects for which such an establishment is there kept up are neither exclusively, nor, as we think, mainly Indian in character. The same remark applies to the Basrah Consulate, where Her Majesty's Government have recently taken into their hands the appointment of the Consul, while leaving the entire charge to be defrayed from Indian funds. Least of all can such a claim be made for the Tigris subsidy, which, in our opinion, falls into the category of commercial arrangements properly devolving upon Her Majesty's Government; although under existing conditions the total cost is borne by Indian revenues. We trust that, in any reconsideration of the case, a more generous division of financial responsibility may commend itself to Her Majesty's Government.

89. We have now completed our survey of the proposals that have been submitted to us for examination, and of the situation in Persia as it presents itself to our eyes. In commending our views to the earnest consideration of Your Lordship and of Her Majesty's Government, we trust that we may have succeeded in impressing upon both, the gravity of the situation with which Great Britain and India are jointly faced, and the necessity, while there is yet time, of meeting it with definite and united counsels. We conclude by reiterating the confident hope, already expressed in our despatch of August 16th, 1898, that in the last resort, and in any sudden emergency, we may rely upon Her Majesty's Government for the protection of interests which are vital both to India and to the British Empire.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

" W. S. A. LOCKHART.

" E. H. H. COLLEN.

" C. M. RIVAZ.

" C. E. DAWKINS.

" T. RALEIGH.

" R. GARDINER.

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

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

No. of 1899.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.
External.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD GEORGE F. HAMILTON,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

SIMLA, *the th September 1899.*

MY LORD,

We desire to address Your Lordship and, through Your Lordship, Her Majesty's Government on the subject of the relations of Great Britain with Persia. We might find an adequate reason for so doing in the fact that Your Lordship in your despatch of June 30th, 1899, enclosing a copy of a recent despatch to the Foreign Office from Sir M. Durand, Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran, concerning the maintenance of our influence in Persia, has directly invited an expression of the views of the Government of India upon this matter; and, while calling our attention to the desirability of improving the Political and Consular Service in that country, has at the same time stated your desire to be made acquainted with our opinions upon the remaining questions discussed by Sir M. Durand. But, in any case, we should have felt it our duty at an early date to address Your Lordship on the subject. Although the relations of Great Britain with Persia have for a period of exactly a century occupied a large, and perhaps at times a disproportionate, space upon the field of international diplomacy; although during that time Great Britain has twice broken off diplomatic relations and has once been at war with Persia in vindication of British interests in or upon the borders of that country; and, although large sums of money have been throughout the present century and are still annually expended in the maintenance of those interests, both by Her Majesty's Government and by the Government of India, we have not been able to discover in our records any clear definition of the principles upon which our policy towards the Persian kingdom is based, of the objects which it should keep in view, or of the scope and limits of the respective shares of responsibility, political and financial, which should be assumed by the two partners, *viz.*, Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India, who are jointly concerned in the defence of Anglo-Indian interests in the dominions of the Shah.

2. We feel that there is at the present time the greater need for such a discussion, because of the facts, which must be patent to all, that the Persian Government appears well nigh to have exhausted all power of recuperation or reform; and that the country, but feebly held together by any tie either of race, religion, or loyalty, is only saved from a fate to which it must otherwise have long ago succumbed, partly by a superficial vitality not infrequently seen in political organisms, especially in the East, even when in an advanced stage of decay, still more by the rival ambitions of the two great European Powers between whom its territories are placed, and who are the real arbiters of its

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destiny. These conditions have already displayed a durability in excess of any *a priori* expectations, and they may yet continue for a while, in the absence of any startling change of environment, to survive. But they cannot, in the nature of things, be permanent. A nation and a Government, such as the Persian, may tremble for long upon the verge of certain dissolution, from the absence of the particular impulse that is required to propel them over the brink. But in the last resort, and often by accident, the impetus is communicated, and the already shattered structure tumbles into irretrievable ruin.

3. We think that there are signs that such an issue, if not immediately impending in Persia, is drawing near. The rule of the present Shah is distinctly and uniformly weaker than that of his predecessor. The dissolvent agencies at work in the Persian kingdom are more active and persistent. Meanwhile, the encroachments of Russian power are steadfastly pursued and are less veiled by any pretence of concealment. Other Governments and nationalities, either impelled by the secret obligations of international sympathies, or attracted by a desire to share in the probable spoils, are appearing upon the scene; and there is every reason to believe that, as in the case of the Ottoman Empire and of China, so also here, the property of the sick man, should no steps be taken in advance to prolong his existence, and should the end come before any testamentary dispositions have been made, is likely to be subject of bitter contention between the various parties who may demand to be included among his heirs.

4. We desire, therefore, not merely to examine, in response to Your Lordship's invitation, the particular steps that may require to be taken for the maintenance or extension of British interests in Persia at the present juncture, but to survey a wider field, and, while there is yet time, to discuss how those interests should be definitely safeguarded in the future that seems to be imminent, and what part in the outlay or in the measures that may be necessitated for that end, should be assumed respectively by Her Majesty's Government and by the Government of India. Sir M. Durand himself concludes his despatch by saying that "the time has come for us to lay down a definite line of policy". We concur in this opinion, but we interpret the obligation thus admitted in a broader sense than Her Majesty's Minister has done; and we think that no mere stop-gap measures, however useful they may individually be, will avail for the permanent protection of our position in Persia, unless a clear understanding be arrived at in advance as to what that position is and what it demands.

5. It may not be inappropriate to state, in the first place, what we conceive British, *i.e.*, Anglo-Indian, interests in Persia to be. They are commercial, political, strategical and telegraphic. The total annual value of British trade with Persia has been estimated by Sir M. Durand (and, from the calculations that we have made, we believe the estimate to be below the mark) as approximately three and-a-half millions sterling; and while a great deal of this trade, particularly in the south and east, is with British India, yet the northern and western avenues of entry are devoted in the main to commercial connections with the British Isles. The total volume of Anglo-Persian trade continues, in spite of the difficulties encountered and the increasing insecurity in Persia, to rise and, under a more efficient and less venal régime, would probably attain to much larger dimensions. Similarly, although the experience of the past decade has not been encouraging to British mercantile investment in Persia, as the experience of the Tobacco Régie, the Persian Mining Rights Company, and other ventures, has shown, there is nevertheless a good deal of British capital sunk in various industrial undertakings in different parts of the country.

6. The political interests of Great Britain in Persia, although they date originally from a period before India had become a British interest at all, were, in their revival a century ago, in the main Indian in inception, and are still largely Indian in character. It would be unfair, however, at the present day to

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attribute to them an exclusively Indian complexion. Ever since the first visit of the late Shah to Europe, Persia has been drawn increasingly into the vortex of European politics. Neither France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Holland, nor Belgium own possessions contiguous to the Persian dominions. Their commercial stake in the country is relatively small. Notwithstanding they find it to their interest to maintain, what are in some cases costly and extensive, diplomatic establishments at Tehran, and they occupy a minor, but nevertheless a definite, position upon the local diplomatic stage. It is to be surmised, therefore, that, even had British India not existed, or had it passed into other hands, the British Government would nevertheless before now have been compelled to take an active political interest in Persian fortunes. Persia is in fact one of those countries which, whether or not they had fallen into the orbit of Western Powers, more vigorous than themselves, must inevitably have attracted the attention of Europe, partly from their increasing infirmity, but still more from the opportunities suggested by their latent, though neglected, sources of strength. The two-fold British interest and responsibility here indicated have indeed been recognised by the system, now of long standing, under which the charges of the diplomatic establishment maintained by Her Majesty's Government at Tehran are shared between the Imperial and the Indian exchequers. That such a division of common interest has become necessary, that the politics of Tehran, which with one eye turned towards India looks with the other towards St. Petersburgh and Constantinople, are but one aspect of the eternal Eastern question, and that the control of British diplomacy at Tehran must therefore be vested in the hands of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, are propositions which 40 years ago were hotly contested by certain schools of thought, but that will not any longer be a matter of dispute. They serve to illustrate the Imperial, as distinct from the purely Indian, character of Anglo-Persian relations.

7. The strategical interests of Great Britain in Persia arise from conditions with which India is most intimately concerned. Long before the boundaries of British India had been extended to their present limits, or before Russia had become a great Central Asian Power, approaching or impinging at many points upon the Indian frontiers, the fortunes of Persia, though not at that time a coterminous country, had become a matter of vital concern to the British dominion in India. In the early years of the present century, when the ambitions of France were the main source of apprehension, it was through Persia that a blow at British supremacy was expected to be struck, and that an invasion of India was planned. The same idea has re-appeared at intervals since. Now that the boundaries of Afghanistan, which have been demarcated and guaranteed by Great Britain, march for many hundreds of miles with those of Persia; that Persian territory is also coterminous for hundreds of miles with Baluchistan, a State under a British Protectorate, and in large measure actually administered by the officers of the Government of India; and that the sea which washes the southern coasts of Persia is one in which, both from its proximity to the Indian Ocean and as a result of the exertions of the past century, Indian interests and influence have become supreme—it is clear that Persia has assumed a strategical importance, in relation to British India, which might not be serious, were the resources or the designs of that country itself alone to be considered; but which is indisputably great, when it is remembered that closely pressing upon Persia and upon Afghanistan is the ever-growing momentum of a Power whose interests in Asia are not always in accord with our own, and that the Persian Gulf is beginning to attract the interest of other and sometimes rival nations. These conditions, however, while they indicate the supreme concern which those who are responsible for the government of India cannot fail to feel in the fortunes of Persia, are nevertheless sufficiently obvious in their general application to render it unnecessary for us to point out their far more than local range, or to argue that they affect not merely the destinies of British dominion in India, but those of the British Empire. It is from this point of view that we hold strongly the opinion that Persia in its strategical, no less than in its political, aspect is not only an Indian, but is also an Imperial,

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concern, and that we feel no hesitation in appealing to Her Majesty's Government for a frank and generous recognition of this common responsibility.

8. The telegraphic interests of Great Britain in Persia may be said to be evenly divided between the mother-country and India. For whilst on the one hand the wires that have been constructed between the north-west frontier and Tehran, and which provide the earlier link in the Persian section of the main overland connection with the East, are in the hands of a Company whose domicile is in London, from Tehran onwards to the Gulf the undertaking is conducted by an establishment that is recruited and paid for by the Government of India, while its head-quarters are in the India Office in London. This two-fold system exists in order to maintain a connection which may be said to be equally British and Indian, since it is equally indispensable to the interests of both countries; but which also has an ulterior and wider scope, inasmuch as the Trans-Persian wires, and the sub-marine cables by which they are supplemented in the Persian Gulf, are largely utilised for the conveyance of messages between Great Britain and places lying beyond India, notably the Australasian Colonies. From a calculation based upon the aggregate results of the past five years, we have ascertained that no less than 30 per cent of the total traffic is of this description. Nevertheless the cost, in so far as it is borne by either Government, devolves exclusively upon the Indian, and not upon the Home, Exchequer.

9. Such are the main interests of Great Britain in Persia. It will be observed that the shares that may be claimed by the mother-country and by India in the sum total of those interests, have in the passage of time become so interwoven and fused as to render the task of separating or distinguishing them neither easy nor profitable. It may not be difficult, as we shall endeavour to argue later on, to distinguish between sources of expenditure which should more properly fall to the charge of the one or the other partner. But we maintain that enough has been said to prove that on the broad field of international policy Persia is not exclusively an Indian interest, but is emphatically an Imperial interest of Great Britain; and that the latter should be prepared to exert her full strength for the defence of that interest, should it be jeopardised or impugned.

10. In discussing the manner in which it is desirable that these principles, if accepted, should be carried into action, we are anxious at the outset to make our position, in one respect, perfectly clear. We have no desire to make an addition to the political or territorial responsibilities of India, for which we have not, under existing conditions, the means either in money or in men. We are not about to propose that there should be established any Protectorate, open or covert, over any part of the Shah's dominions, that might compel us in the future to hold the country so protected by force of arms. We can conceive of circumstances that might some day tempt both the Indian and the Home Governments from this attitude of reserve, and that would in a case where the vital interests of the Empire were at stake, force us to consider a burden for which our shoulders are still unprepared. But for the present our ambitions are exclusively limited to making secure the interest which we have already built up, and still more to preventing it from being undermined or taken from us by others, with the result not only of a considerable accretion of strength to them, but of positive detriment to ourselves. We have, in fine, no desire to disturb the political *status quo* in Persia so long as it can be maintained. We prefer indeed, weak as it is, to invest it with such renewed vitality as may be found possible. But we press for an early decision and for early action, since, unless we bestir ourselves, there is good reason for fearing that the already trembling balance may be disturbed by others to our disadvantage.

11. We now proceed to draw a picture of the present state of British interests in Persia, as they present themselves to our eyes, and to examine the dangers by which they appear to be threatened. Sir M. Durand has to a certain extent anticipated us in this task; and in so far as he has touched upon the same ground as that which we propose to cover, we shall not recapitulate

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what he has said. On the other hand, we think that we are in a position to fill in the outlines of his sketch with a good deal of additional detail; and it will be our duty to discuss the situation from the standpoint more particularly of those Indian interests, of which we are the constituted guardians.

12. The political destinies of a country and a Government, as weak as we have stated those of Persia to be, are likely to be determined in the main by her geographical position in relation to her neighbours. Of the four foreign Powers whose territories adjoin her own, two may be eliminated from the present discussion as being themselves lacking in the strength or vitality, likely to render their influence decisive, or their aggression to be feared. These are Turkey and Afghanistan, the latter of which, moreover, is under engagements with Great Britain that render it impossible for her to be considered, in her foreign relations, as an independent Power. There remain Russia and Great Britain. There is a curious correspondence, but there are also notable differences, between the positions of these two Powers *vis à vis* with Persia. The entire northern frontier of Persia is now contiguous with Russian territory, with the exception of that portion which borders upon the Caspian Sea—a distinction, but not a difference, inasmuch as that sea has to all intents and purposes been converted into a Russian lake. Russian territory also overlaps the north-east corner of the Persian dominions. Great Britain enjoys a somewhat similar preponderance of influence on the south, by virtue of her hitherto unchallenged supremacy, both naval and commercial, in the Persian Gulf; while, owing to recent developments on the side of Baluchistan, her land territories also touch those of Persia upon the south-east. But there are these broad differences between the two positions: firstly, that whereas the Russian territories that are limitrophe with Persia on the north are continuous either with those of European or with those of Asiatic Russia, the immense resources of both of which dominions can be brought by a skilfully designed system of railways, and deposited with little trouble and with no delay, upon the Persian frontier itself—the forces of Great Britain, if required for purposes either of menace or attack, would require to be conveyed by sea and would be separated by a great distance from their base; the land connection on the Perso-Baluch side being as yet too precarious and remote to admit of its being taken into serious consideration in the present context; secondly, that whereas the Russian land approaches upon the north are in her own exclusive possession, the maritime access of Great Britain on the south is equally open to any other Power possessing a naval marine. Hence the marked and inevitable distinction between the power of persuasion or menace possessed by Russia in the north, as compared with that at the disposal of Great Britain in the south, the advantage enjoyed by the former being enhanced by the fact that the Persian capital and Court are situated in the northern or Russian and not in the southern or British zone of influence.

13. In these circumstances it is not surprising to read of the increasing and indisputable supremacy which Russia has established in Northern Persia, as described by Sir M. Durand. While not repeating his demonstration, we may supplement it by saying that, while we think that no efforts should be spared to safeguard so much as is left to us of the trade that enters the country by the Trebizond-Tabriz route, of the trade of Tehran, and of that of North-East Persia (concerning which it may be noted that the imports into Meshed from British India which in 1893-94 represented a value of £198,500 and in 1894-95 of £312,000, have in 1897-98 sunk to £130,000), and while as long as the capital remains at Tehran, which is also the centre of important British interests in the shape of the Telegraph administration and the Imperial Bank of Persia, it is essential that British influence there should be asserted on a scale as nearly as possible equivalent to that of Russia—we are yet of opinion that the advantages enjoyed by Russia in the field under discussion are so overwhelming as to render any attempt to dispute or to shake her position there fruitless; and that our own energies can with greater wisdom and with superior chances of success be directed towards the protection and consolidation of the

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British sphere of influence in the centre and south. It is to a more critical examination of this subject that we now turn.

14. Sir M. Durand has in his despatch drawn a line across Persia from Khanikin on the Turkish frontier on the west, through Kermanshah, Hamadan, Ispahan, Yezd and Kerman to Seistan and the Afghan frontier on the east, as indicating approximately the existing line of partition between the British and Russian spheres of influence both political and commercial in Persia.

15. Following the same order from the west, we concur with what he has written about the importance of fostering the Baghdad trade route *viâ* Kermanshah to Tehran, British commerce by which approaches in value to £1,000,000 per annum. This is a route of peculiar value both to British and to Indian trade, and one upon which we should on no account forfeit the supremacy. We have no hesitation in recommending, with Sir M. Durand, the substitution of a British Vice-Consul at Kermanshah for the present native agent: although we think that the cost of the proposed appointment which lies outside of what may be called the more strictly Indian zone, and which will be subordinate to the Consulate-General at Tehran, should be borne by Imperial and not by Indian revenues.

16. Whatever be the prospects of opening up, either by road or by railway (and concerning the latter we are sceptical), the country that lies northward of the Karun River, and that is inhabited by the Lurs and other nomad tribes, it is certain that British influence has obtained a material foothold in that corner of the Shah's dominions, through which the Karun flows in its middle and lower course, and where the road now being constructed through the Bakhtiari country, by contract between the Bakhtiari Chiefs and Messrs. Lynch, should open an alternative and almost exclusively British door of commercial access to Ispahan. We do not express any opinion as to the ideas which Sir M. Durand has more than once put forward as to the desirability of raising a local irregular force under British officers from the tribes in this part of Persia. Such a scheme would appear to postulate a firmer and more permanent footing than we have as yet established in South-West Persia. Nevertheless we think that no opportunity should be lost of strengthening our influence with the Arab, Bakhtiari and Lur tribes—an effort to challenge which from a rival quarter appears likely before long to be made—and we concur in Sir M. Durand's recommendations as to the desirability of establishing a Consulate on the Karun, reserving for a subsequent paragraph our opinion as to the proper incidence of the cost.

17. Continuing in an easterly direction, we have noticed from the recent Consular Report of Mr. J. R. Preece, Her Majesty's Consul at Ispahan, that "British trade in Ispahan has shown during the last two years, if not an absolute decrease, at all events no expansion whatever", while great strides have been made in Russian importations, notably of glassware and hardware. We agree with Sir M. Durand in thinking that the British Consul should be raised in respect of title and pay to the same level as the recently arrived Russian representative, although, as this is a matter which mainly concerns the English Foreign Office, we are not clear that we are called upon to advise upon the subject. We cannot, however, too strongly emphasise our opinion that in any partition either of commercial or political spheres of influence in Persia, Ispahan, the old (and, if Persia should ultimately break up, possibly a future) capital, the seat of the Sefavi dynasty, the principal market of Central Persia, and (far more than Tehran) the focus of Persian nationality, must, on every ground, be included in the zone in which British interests are supreme.

18. We also concur with Sir M. Durand in thinking that British interests are most inadequately represented at Shiraz by the present native agent, who is a nonentity, without influence or power; and that the experiment of bringing the Resident in the Persian Gulf, who is also Consul-General for Fars, to reside

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during the summer at the capital of the province, which is within his official area of jurisdiction, should be given a further trial. Colonel Wilson in 1895 and Colonel Meade in 1898 spent the summer months at Shiraz, but were compelled to hire house accommodation at their own expense. If these visits are made recurrent, we are inclined to think that, as no suitable house appears to be open either to purchase or to rent, a site should be purchased and a house erected thereon. To this suggestion also we will revert. Shiraz is a place of considerable importance; and were it not for the great influence that has for long been exercised there by the officials of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, British interests must have suffered from the neglect to which they have hitherto been exposed.

19. The districts lying to the east of Ispahan and Shiraz contain the important cities and trade-centres of Yezd and Kerman, connected by one of the principal postal and caravan tracks of Persia. Both of these towns and districts lie south of the natural line of division between Northern and Southern Persia; and in both British commercial and political influence has, in recent years, been actively vindicated. In September 1893, Mr. Fergusson, the Manager of the local branch of the Imperial Bank, was appointed unpaid Vice-Consul at Yezd. Sir M. Durand now suggests that a Vice-Consul, if appointed to Bunder Abbas, might pass his summer at Yezd, where it is no doubt intrinsically desirable that British commercial interests should be represented by some one not engaged in business or trade. We will for the moment reserve our comments upon this suggestion. At Kerman, which is the capital of an important province, and the seat of a Governor-General, the appointment of a British Consul, which was first sanctioned under exceptional circumstances in the case of Captain Sykes in 1894, has at frequent intervals since, the latest being our despatch of August 10th, 1898, been the subject of discussion between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India. The present position is this, that for 5 years the Government of India have expressed their willingness to contribute one-half of the cost of the Kerman Consulate up to a limit of Rs. 6,000 per annum. The views of the Foreign Office upon this proposal, which was communicated to it by Your Lordship on September 21st, 1898, have not yet been received by us. Sir M. Durand now proposes that this Consulate should be made permanent, and that possibly a native agent under its orders should be sent to Bampur. Before discussing these proposals, we think it advisable to analyse the larger issues raised by the questions of Seistan and the Persian Gulf.

20. Concerning Seistan, its importance and the present position there, we refer Your Lordship to a Minute which has been written by the Viceroy, who has made a special study of the question, and which is enclosed with this despatch. The facts enumerated by him are, we think, sufficient to show that Seistan is, by reason of its geographical position in relation both to North Khorasan, to Western Afghanistan, to British Baluchistan, and to the Persian Gulf, a position of no small strategical importance. Seistan is the present meeting point of the advanced pioneers of British and Russian influence. Perhaps on the whole, owing to recent activity on our part, the British position and chances are the more hopeful. It is essential in the future, for reasons which have been argued in the Viceroy's Minute, that Seistan should be retained in the British zone. It is fortunately not too late to secure that consummation. The steps which should be taken with that object will be examined when we formulate our final recommendations at the close of this despatch.

21. South of Seistan lies the still imperfectly known district of Persian Baluchistan. Every year this province is being brought into closer contact with British associations, partly from the visits of British officers, partly from the wide-spreading influence exercised by the Nushki–Seistan Trade route, still more from the close connections, political and racial, prevailing between the inhabitants of the two sides of the Perso-Baluch border—a condition of affairs which is likely to be confirmed by the inevitable increase of British influence in the dominions of the Khan of Kalat.

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22. Our inspection of the various sub-areas composing what we have described as the British sphere, has now brought us to the Persian Gulf—a subject which—no doubt from its more exclusively Indian aspect and bearing—has only been lightly touched upon by Sir M. Durand, but upon which it is necessary that we should address Your Lordship at greater length.

23. The *de jure* position in the Persian Gulf is that of a sea open to the flag of all nations, the northern shores and territorial waters of which are included in the dominions of Persia, while its western and southern coasts are partially owned and partially claimed by Turkey, or are in the occupation of Arab tribes, who have entered into treaty relationships of varying character, constituting a sort of veiled Protectorate, with Great Britain. The islands in the Gulf are owned either by Persia, or by Arab Chiefs (in the case of Bahrein under British protection); but upon one of the Persian Islands, *viz.*, Kishm, Great Britain possesses a piece of land by virtue of an original grant from the Imam of Maskat, to whom the island once belonged. Outside the entrance to the Persian Gulf, but included in the same political system, are, on the northern shore of the Arabian Sea, the coasts of Persian Baluchistan, along which the overland wires of the Indo-European Telegraph Company run as far as Jask, where a reserve of English territory exists under an agreement concluded in 1887 between the British and Persian Governments, and where a detachment of Indian troops, who had previously been stationed there between the years 1879 and 1887, was replaced in January 1898 in consequence of the murder of a British telegraph official and the disturbed state of Persian Baluchistan. A larger detachment was at the same time despatched to Charbar, near the eastern limits of the same province. On the southern and western coasts is the still independent kingdom or Sultanate of Oman (Maskat).

24. The *de facto* position upon the waters and on the shores of the Persian Gulf reflects a more positive British predominance than the preceding paragraph might indicate. In the early years of the present century, the slave trade was rampant in the Gulf, and the vessels of the Indian Marine were engaged in a long and arduous struggle with the Arab pirates who infested its southern coasts. This conflict which was conducted entirely by British agency and means, without any help from the Persian Government, resulted in the establishment of treaty relations with the great majority of the Arab Chiefs, under which they bound themselves to observe perpetual peace and to refer all disputes to the British Resident at Bushire. The *pax Britannica*, which has ever since, with rare exceptions, been maintained, is the issue of these arrangements and is the exclusive work of this country. Of similar origin were the soundings of the channels and the surveys of the shores of the Persian Gulf, which the navigators of all nations owe to the labours of a long line of naval officers of the Indian service. Meanwhile, British trade has acquired almost a monopoly of the foreign commerce of the Gulf ports. Indian Bunias from Shikarpur and other parts of Sind have settled in considerable numbers at Lingah, Bunder Abbas, Bushire and Bahrein. They frequently farm the customs. The foreign imports and exports pass through their hands. These are for the most part conveyed to and from the Gulf in British ships, more than one Anglo-Indian Company (the 'British India', the 'Bombay and Persia', and the 'Anglo-Arabian and Persian Gulf') having maintained for years a merchant steamer service between Karachi and Basrah, touching at the Gulf ports on the way, whilst the rival ventures that have occasionally been attempted by foreign nations have uniformly failed and have been withdrawn.

25. As the result of careful calculations of the trade returns of the three years, 1895-96-97, which are the latest at our disposal, we have ascertained that the total value of Imports and Exports in the Persian Gulf (including the Persian ports of Bunder Abbas, Lingah, Bushire, and Mohammerah; the Arab ports on the opposite coast; and Bahrein) in that triennial period amounted to £17,241,300 (at the rate of Rs. 15=£1). Of this total, Local trade accounted for £5,124,000, and External trade for £12,117,300; while of the latter total the trade with British possessions (including India) amounted to £9,709,500,

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or over 80 per cent of the entire External trade. In the same three years, out of a total of 2,161 steamers which entered and cleared from the Gulf ports, 2,039 were British, and their tonnage represented 84 per cent of the total tonnage. If the returns of Persian ports alone be required, the figures are Total trade, £11,172,000, of which Local trade = £2,169,400 and External trade = £9,002,600, the British proportion of the latter being £7,494,200, or 83 per cent. To these totals in either case there should, in our opinion, certainly be added those of Basrah, which amounted in the same triennial period to £2,157,300. Unfortunately the manner in which these have been prepared, do not admit of our distinguishing the countries of origin or destination. The proportion, however, that should properly be assigned to Anglo-Indian commerce may be inferred from the British percentage of shipping, that entered or cleared from that port in the three years referred to. It amounted to no less than 93 per cent both of the number and tonnage of the steamers engaged.

26. During the last thirty years the maintenance of the sub-marine cables of the Indo-European Telegraph Company from Fao to Jask, and of the land lines from that place to Karachi, has also devolved upon the Indian Government, and has tended to increase an already preponderant influence over both the waters and the shores of this sea. Latterly there has been a deliberate but necessary consolidation of our influence in certain quarters where trouble threatened or where rivalry was feared. At the north-west extremity of the Gulf, we have, under instructions from Her Majesty's Government, entered into engagements with the still independent Sheikh of Koweit, by which he has bound himself and his successors not to receive the representative of any other Power and not to alienate any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power—a proceeding which was dictated by the increasing encroachment of Turkish authority and by the incipient intrigues of other Powers. Similar machinations are known to be in progress at Bahrein, and will require to be counteracted by a more strict enforcement of the conditions to which the Sheikh is by treaty bound. Outside the entrance to the Persian Gulf, but included within the sphere of its political influence, the Arab State of Maskat has for years been controlled by British influence; its trade is similarly in Anglo-Indian hands; and its ruler has not merely for years been subsidised by the Government of India, but in 1891 entered into an Agreement with us, under the orders of Her Majesty's Government, not to alienate any portion of his dominions to any other Power.

27. Such, briefly summarised, is the position that has been won by Great Britain, not without the expenditure of many millions of money and the sacrifice of many valuable lives, in the Persian Gulf. In its vindication we have more than once been called upon to enter into military occupation of ports or islands in the Gulf. The island of Kharak was occupied by Indian forces from 1838 to 1842, and again in 1856-57. Bushire was held during the latter years, as also were Mohammerah and Ahwaz upon the Karun. The occupation of these places was an illustration of the vigour with which in past years our ascendency has been maintained. Their abandonment was a proof of the reluctance which has invariably been displayed to emphasise or to perpetuate these responsibilities. The latter, however, no less than the British position in Southern Persia in general, are now threatened by an external competition, to the evidences of which we next turn.

28. Sir M. Durand has in general terms described the commanding position which the proximity of the Trans-Caspian Railway and of her Central Asian garrisons, the construction of the Ashkabad-Kuchan-Meshed cart-road, and the annual expenditure of large sums of money, have enabled Russia to take up in the politics and commerce of the province of Khorasan. We proceed to develop the argument by showing how the Khorasan position has been and is being utilised as the base of a further and more southerly advance.

29. It was in 1889 that the campaign of what may be termed the Russification of Khorasan was opened with the appointment of a Russian Consul-General at Meshed. In 1891 a native trader, named Haji Agha, appeared as

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Russian News-agent at Birjand; and an emissary of bad character, named Muhammad Rahim Khan, who had already been dismissed from the Russian service, was again taken into employ, and was posted as News-agent at Nasirabad in Seistan. In the succeeding years Russian Armenians, trained at Tiflis, were busily at work surveying the country in a southerly direction, as far as the borders of Persia and Baluchistan. In 1895 a more direct blow at the large Anglo-Indian trade which at that time still made its way through Khorasan into the Russian possessions in Central Asia, was struck by the introduction of a Customs Tariff in Trans-Caspia, absolutely prohibiting the entry into the Russian territories of all British or Indian products except indigo, tea and muslin, and these only under a heavy duty. In the same year M. Zaroudny, a Russian politico-geologist, Anglice surveyor, paid his first visit to Kain and Seistan. Russian News-agents were also placed at Tabbas and Neh, as well as at Birjand and Nasirabad.

30. In the meantime, in the latter part of 1896, the Government of India had decided upon taking active measures to open the long closed trading route from Quetta to Seistan. These intentions, and the prospective British interest in Seistan to which they testified, excited much concern in Russia; and in the following year the outbreak of plague in India offered to the Russian authorities a welcome opportunity of, at the same time, endeavouring to strangle the new enterprise at its birth, and increasing their own influence in Seistan. Under the pretext of establishing a protective cordon to safeguard the Perso-Afghan frontier in Persian interests from a disease which existed neither in Baluchistan nor in Afghanistan, Russian Cossacks under Russian officers were planted at a number of places in Persian territory, where they turned back every caravan (ignoring an agreement that had been arrived at between Great Britain and Persia for a 10 days quarantine upon caravans arriving from infected countries), declined to accept any orders except those which came directly from the Russian Legation, and for a time absolutely closed the Herat-Meshed road, in spite of orders to the contrary from the Persian Government—the object of this measure being to divert Afghan trade from Meshed to Panjdeh and Merv in Russian territory. It was significant that upon crossing the Russian frontier the caravans, which had been refused passage through Persia under any conditions, were only detained for three days in quarantine. The Persian Government, after a feeble protest, acquiesced in these proceedings; and it may almost be said that Southern Khorasan passed for a time under Russian control.

31. It was with the object of anticipating a similar Russian intervention in Seistan that, in the spring of 1897, the Government of India despatched Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh to superintend any preventive measures that might be required in that district. Already Lieutenant Webb Ware, who had visited Seistan in March, in connection with the trade route, had reported: "I was disagreeably astonished to find what ascendency Russia had gained throughout Seistan". Major Brazier-Creagh, a few months later, wrote: "I was by no means surprised to find what ascendency the Russians had gained in the country. In the past four years Russian activity has been very manifest. It is not limited to Seistan, but extends all along the Perso-Afghan frontier up to Meshed, News-writers and agents being established at all the important trade centres, *viz.*, Neh, Birjand, Tabbas, Khaf, and Turbat-i-Haidari".

32. The recommendations made by the British officer were ignored by the Persian authorities; and he had not been long in Seistan when the expected Russian doctor (Miladchevsky by name), with an escort of eight Cossacks, appeared upon the scene, a detachment of ten Cossacks under a Russian officer being also posted at Turbat-i-Haidari, 80 miles south of Meshed, a point of junction of several caravan roads, so as effectually to stop any traffic to or from Seistan. An incidental result of Dr. Miladchevsky's visit to Seistan was the dismissal, in consequence of a report from him, of the two native Russian agents to whom reference has been made, and their replacement by the Persian sub-contractors for customs for Kain and Seistan. These individuals proved to be equally faithless to the interests of their employers, and were

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relieved of the representation of Russian interests in April of the present year. It was then announced that a Russian, named Ziedler, had been appointed Russian Consul in Seistan—an announcement which was immediately followed by the despatch of Captain Sykes, hitherto British Consul at Kerman, to Seistan in a similar capacity. The Russian Consul would appear not yet to have taken up his post; and the Russian authorities are believed to be waiting to see the next move of Her Majesty's Government before deciding upon their own action.

33. Meanwhile in 1898, M. Zaroudny re-appeared upon the scene of his former labours, and on the present occasion pushed his politico-scientific studies as far south as Persian Baluchistan and Bampur. Early in the present year the Agent to the Governor-General at Meshed reported that two Russian officers, 1 doctor and 10 Cossacks were still at Turbat-i-Haidari, and 1 Russian Officer, 2 Medical Assistants and 10 Cossacks at Karez. There are also 58 Persian sowars scattered about at different places between Meshed and Seistan. who are paid through the Russian officers and take their orders from them. The recrudescence of plague in India has in fact provided an excuse for the continuance, just as its original appearance was pleaded in support of the introduction, of a *quasi*-Russian Protectorate in Southern Khorasan. A more active assertion of the same pretensions has since been witnessed in the mission of M. Stroeff, Dragoman to the Russian Consulate at Meshed, with presents valued at £1,400, to the Persian Governor of Kain, who is brother to the Governor of Seistan and is believed to covet the succession to that post. The sanitary plea was also advanced in the course of the past summer to explain the despatch of Russian doctors to Kerman and even to Shiraz. An interesting commentary upon these proceedings may be found in an observation in Lieutenant Webb Ware's report upon the Quetta-Seistan trade route for 1897-98, where he says that "the chief hindrance to the further development of this route is to be found in the obstructive measures taken by the Russian officers striving to further the interests of that country at the expense of India".

34. The facts which we have enumerated will, we think, be sufficient to convince Your Lordship of two propositions: firstly, that Russia regards with unconcealed aversion the opening of the British commercial route from India to Seistan and Khorasan, and will spare no efforts to rob it of success; secondly, that she regards with an interested eye the future of Seistan itself, and is already preparing, by a display of armed force and by the assumption of executive authority, to pave the way for an eventual inclusion within the Russian sphere of that portion of the Shah's dominions.

35. In the same context, and as illustrating the political and strategical object which such an advance may be believed to have in view, it will not be forgotten that during the past few years, the Russian Government have constructed a railway from Merv to Kushk upon the Afghan frontier within 80 miles of Herat, and have stacked at the terminus the railway plant for a future extension to Herat itself. Should any doubt be entertained as to the purpose for which this extension (which is destitute of any commercial justification) was planned, it may be solved by a reference to the frank admission made to Sir N. O'Conor by M. deWitte, Russian Minister of Finance, in June 1898, that it was designed "to enable Russia to attack Afghanistan in case of complications with England". When it is remembered that such an attack can only be made in direct violation of solemn international engagements, it is not, we think, incumbent upon us to argue at further length that the political ambitions of Russia in Eastern Persia, and in close proximity to the Afghan border, have an ulterior significance which it would be folly to ignore.

36. Nor can we divorce these proceedings from the idea that, in seeking to obtain a preferential footing in Seistan, Russia is not merely endeavouring to block a promising avenue of Anglo-Indian trade, and to acquire a position of potential menace to British interests on the western flank of Afghanistan, but that she is also concerned in the prosecution of an advance, which is not expected to terminate until it has brought her to the Persian Gulf. It is known

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that at least on one occasion negotiations for the cession to Russia of a Persian port at the eastern extremity of the Gulf have taken place between the Russian and the Persian Governments; and, if such negotiations have hitherto either proved abortive, or have been nominally repudiated by one or other of the parties concerned, it is yet, we think, in our power to show that they are not only not inconsistent with, but are definitely corroborated by, the evidences of Russian activity in Central and Southern Persia to which we now turn.

37. In 1897, a Russian Consul was appointed for the first time to Ispahan, where Russian imports had not hitherto greatly exceeded a total of 300 bales per annum. He was given a salary and title in excess of those enjoyed by the British representative. During the present year this official, Prince Dabiya, has been heard of at Shiraz and Bushire as the guest of the French Vice-Consul, and subsequently at Mohammerah and Shushter on the Karun, where he freely denounced British methods and ambitions. Sir M. Durand has recently informed us by telegraph that the corps of so-called Persian Cossacks at Tehran (*i.e.*, Persian soldiers trained and commanded by Russian officers) has been raised from 1,000 to 1,500 men, and that detachments of this corps have for the first time been taken with them to the south by the Governors of Shiraz and Arabistan. For the present the Russian officers have stayed behind; but it is not difficult to imagine the circumstances in which they might claim to rejoin their regiments. In 1897, M. Krugelow was sent from Jerusalem as Russian Consul to Baghdad, with the special object of reporting upon the acquisition by Russia of a coaling station in the Persian Gulf. This gentleman has taken much interest in Koweit, where Russian emissaries from Baghdad have been residing continuously during the present year. In this context it will not be forgotten that the concession recently sought for with the aid of the Russian Embassy at Constantinople by Count Kapnist, a Russian of high rank, for a railway from Tripoli in Syria to the Persian Gulf contemplated a terminus at Koweit.

38. In Bushire and Bunder Abbas the Russians have lately developed a marked interest. Two Russian doctors (Drs. Marc and Oust) arrived at Bushire in 1897 for the now familiar purpose of studying the plague, which, however, did not make its appearance until two years later, in 1899. Dr. Marc in 1897 occupied his waiting hours in visiting Bunder Abbas, from whence he was in the habit of despatching official reports to his Government, and where he magnanimously treated all patients free of charge. His medical pursuits at this place were assisted by a third Russian, named Adamoff, who appears to have been an artillery officer, and who subsequently visited Bushire and Basrah. In 1898 two other Russian doctors, named Rodzewitz and Kornajevski, appeared upon the scene, and visited Basrah, Bushire and Bunder Abbas. In December 1898 a fifth Russian doctor, named Paschkowski, arrived in the Gulf, and did not fail to pay the regulation visit to Bunder Abbas; while he displayed a considerable professional activity during the recent outbreak of plague at Bushire, where he has announced that, upon his approaching return to Russia, he is to be replaced by two compatriots. In connection with this medical propaganda, it will be in Your Lordship's recollection that when the first rumours were circulated of plague at Bushire in the past summer, the Russian Legation at Tehran at once announced their intention of sending doctors, with Cossack escorts, to Bushire as well as Shiraz, in order to establish a plague cordon for the protection of those places from the Indian pestilence, and that Russian doctors took up their quarters both at Shiraz and Kerman. These precautions might be thought to indicate a praiseworthy desire to close every conceivable channel of entry into Asiatic Russia against the plague, were they not, as has already been shown, in striking contrast with the laxity of system, that is at the same time observed both on the Perso-Russian and on the Russo-Afghan frontiers, across which alone can plague succeed in entering the Russian dominions. In continuation of our story it may be mentioned that in 1895 a Russian officer visited and surveyed the island of Hormuz opposite to Bunder Abbas, and that other and non-medical Russian emissaries

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have also recently been heard of at the latter place (the two latest, M. Babitchieff and Baron de Schedenore, as lately as August in the present year). It should not, moreover, be forgotten that it was Russian opposition that in 1898 broke down the loan to the Persian Government from the Imperial Bank of Persia, the security of which was to be the customs of the southern ports, to be collected by agents of the Bank.

39. We are aware that on April 18th of the present year, with reference to reports that have been published of Russian designs upon the island of Kishm, adjoining Hormuz, Count Mouravieff assured Sir C. Scott, Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, that "there was absolutely no intention on the part of the Russian Government to add to the burden of their existing responsibilities by acquiring outlying ports or stations which would require naval defence in time of war"; and we do not doubt that this emphatic assurance represents the views sincerely entertained by the Emperor of Russia. But our faith in the value of this assurance has been somewhat shaken by the later information received from a Persian official of high rank and station, known personally to the Viceroy, to the effect that he believes Russia to have acquired certain rights in regard to a port in the Persian Gulf, which however it may not suit her at once to enforce. Moreover there is in practice a limit to the duration of all such pledges, which, even if given by the sovereign, are not always regarded as binding by his officials; and previous experience is not altogether encouraging to the belief in a prolonged existence of the present undertaking, should circumstances compel an opposite course. There are moreover other means, well-known to Her Majesty's Government from recent experience in other parts of the world, of obtaining political and territorial influence, independently of the actual acquisition of harbours or stations.

40. It is, in our opinion, more than a coincidence that simultaneously with the increasing Russian interest in Central and Southern Persia which we have described, there should also have been a notable revival of French activity in those quarters. In 1896 the Messageries Maritimes Company commenced a subsidised service from Bombay to the ports of the Persian Gulf; although, owing to vessels of unsuitable draught having been employed, the enterprise was not a success and was shortly abandoned. In 1897 a French Vice-Consul (M. Ferrand) was for the first time appointed at Bushire, although the value of French trade with the Persian Gulf in that year amounted only to the modest total of £82,618 (of which £73,899 was sugar). He was succeeded in 1898 by M. Bryois, who recently informed the agent of one of the British Trading Companies at Bushire that the French Government intended shortly to establish a subsidised line of steamers to Mohammerah and the Karun. It was perhaps in connection with this project that in March 1899, M. Bryois paid a visit to the Karun, where a French scientific party, under M. de Morgan, has for some time been engaged in politico-archæological researches in Arabistan. When the French Chargé d'Affaires, Comte d'Arlot, recently visited Ispahan, the Zil-es-Sultan vouchsafed the corroborative information to the British Legation that the object of these movements on the part of the French was to obtain a footing at Mohammerah, Shushter and Dizful. During our recent negotiations with the Sheikh of Koweit about the future of that harbour, it was with some surprise that we learned from him that the French had already approached him on the subject. In Bahrein a so-called French merchant, M. Goguyer, who until recently was engaged in Maskat in an attempt to revive the traffic in arms under the French flag, has been reported as endeavouring to induce the inhabitants to purchase French protection by the payment of small sums. In 1899 a French Consular Agency was established at Lingah, where the same ingenious system of manufacturing French subjects (for the most successful illustration of which we must look to Siam) was started, and where the French flag was hoisted by the Dragoman of the French Vice-Consul at Bushire. Finally, Her Majesty's Government are better aware than ourselves of the recent negotiations for a French loan to the Persian Government upon the security of the customs of the Gulf ports, and a promise of a railway monopoly in that country.

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41. French interests in the Persian Gulf, either political or commercial, are so small; her own territories are so distant; and the Gulf lies so far out of the track of her merchant vessels or men-of-war, that we are unable to construe these proceedings in any other light than as an attempt to cause trouble and annoyance to a possible rival, and to lend an independent assistance to the plans of a European ally. Substantial confirmation of these views will, in our opinion, be derived from a study of recent French action at Maskat, where, although French trade is infinitesimal, and a French man-of-war has been in the habit of paying a passing visit on an average only once in the year, the French Government have nevertheless during the past six months been endeavouring to obtain, under the guise of coaling facilities, a position which would provide them with an independent *pied à terre* in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf. This policy has been foreshadowed by the free grant of the French flag to Arab dhows, owning allegiance to the Sultan of Maskat, and is facilitated by the influence over the latter petty potentate that has been acquired by the French Vice-Consul, whose anti-British inclinations and intrigues are so well known to Her Majesty's Government as to require no recapitulation here. Confirmation of our suspicions regarding a Franco-Russian *entente* in Persia and in the Persian Gulf is further afforded by a telegram, dated June 7th, 1899, from Sir M. Durand to Colonel Meade, which has already been communicated both to Your Lordship and to the Foreign Office, and in which Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran remarks: "You may be quite certain that Russia and France are working in unison".

42. It should be noted that in the recent papers, with copies of which we have been favoured by Her Majesty's Government, we have found a repudiation of French ambitions in the quarter under discussion, no less explicit than that which we have already quoted from the lips of Count Mouravieff. On July 19th, 1899, M. Cambon said to Lord Salisbury that "France had no political aspiration whatever in the Persian Gulf; that she did not desire any kind of fortification or settlement or political privileges, or anything beyond the maintenance of those rights already insured to her by treaty". We have been gratified to read this assurance, by which we hope that succeeding French ministries may hold themselves bound. But we regret that it has not been communicated, not merely to Her Majesty's Government, but also to the French Agents in those regions, who do not appear to be equally acquainted with the views of the Government that they serve.

43. In recent years Germany has begun to display a positive and an increasing interest in Persia and also in the Persian Gulf. This interest has been the historical, and perhaps the natural, sequel of a commercial policy that has for some time aimed at securing the control of the principal railways in the Turkish dominions in Asia Minor, and of a political ambition, that more recently still, would appear to aim at the protection of the Ottoman Empire, alike in Europe and Asia. The obvious corollary to a system of German railways in Asia Minor, would be similar railroads to the Persian border and through Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf. Already, as Sir M. Durand has informed the Foreign Office, the Germans have procured a concession for the construction of a road from Khanikin, on the Turko-Persian frontier, to Tehran, and have apparently only abstained from pressing for a railroad in the same quarter, because of the violent opposition with which the Russian Minister met the proposal at Tehran. The second son of the Shah, Prince Malik Mansur, has been spending several months in 1898-99 in Germany, where his education and proclivities are reported as having acquired a marked philo-Teutonic tinge. German military instructors have been proffered for the reorganisation of the Persian army. Prolongations of the Turko-German railways to Baghdad and to the Persian Gulf have been and are still being freely discussed; and the German Government are endeavouring to procure an interest in the overland Turkish Telegraph to Fao. In the Gulf itself a German Consulate was established in 1897 at Bushire, to safeguard the interests of six German subjects in the entire ports of that sea. A Bremen firm opened business at Bushire, but the specially chartered steamers which were sent out from Germany appear to have been a

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failure. At Basrah a more resolute attempt is being made to capture the local market. Quite recently a number of Germans have for some time been engaged in a study of the situation at Bunder Abbas. During the spring of the present year, a German man-of-war, the "Arcona", visited Maskat, Lingah, and Bushire; and reports have reached us of the likely appearance, at no distant date, of a German line of merchant steamers in the Gulf.

44. While we regard these symptoms of increasing German interest in the Persian Gulf as emphasising the international aspect which the Persian question appears more and more destined to assume, and therefore as adding to the complexities of an already sufficiently difficult situation, we do not question the *boná fide* commercial enterprise which is carrying German trade there, as to so many other open seas and ports in the world, and we can conceive that we may even find, in the existence of German political interests, an occasional ally or safeguard for our own. German interests, however, have a tendency to grow with some rapidity, and by steps which are not always acceptable to their neighbours: and we think that the need for an early decision upon the future policy to be adopted by Her Majesty's Government is not diminished, but is enhanced, by the appearance of so active a competitor upon the scene.

45. Apart from the recurrent symptoms of activity on the southern and western shores of the Persian Gulf, with which Her Majesty's Government are familiar, the Turkish Government have also in recent years displayed an increasing interest in its political fortunes. A determined attempt has been made to fortify the shadowy pretensions of the Ottoman Porte to suzerainty over Koweit. A Turkish title has been conferred upon the Sheikh; and forces have more than once been assembled at Basrah for a contemplated expedition against that place. Intrigues are constantly in progress at Bahrein. During 1898 and 1899 a Turkish corvette has been a frequent visitor at Lingah, where, the Sheikh being of Arab descent, Turkish interests are supposed to exist. Finally, the decisions of the Venice Conference and the proceedings of the Sanitary Board at Constantinople have enabled Turkey to claim an interest in the navigation of those waters, of which she has not been slow to take advantage.

46. The only other recent evidences of foreign intervention in the Persian Gulf, of which we are cognisant, are a concession for the pearl-fisheries in that sea, which was given in 1898 by the Persian Government to a Spaniard and a Belgian, under Russian auspices; and the contemplated appearance at the Gulf ports of customs officers of Belgian nationality, similar to those who have already been placed in charge of the customs houses at Kermanshah and Tabriz, and whose influence, said to be omnipotent at the present moment with the Sadr Azam, is known to be entirely enlisted on the side of France and Russia.

47. We have gathered together these symptoms of external, and notably of Russian or of Russophil, interest in Southern Persia and in the Persian Gulf, not because we desire to invest them individually with an importance to which they are not entitled, but because collectively they indicate, in a manner that is not open to misinterpretation, the policy and ambitions of foreign Powers, and because we desire to impress upon Her Majesty's Government the fact that in an area, by land and by sea, which Great Britain regards with good reason as falling within her sphere of influence, that influence is being directly and increasingly challenged by other nations, who, in proportion as their foothold becomes more securely established, will resist any preferential claims, upon whatever foundation in history or in fact they may rest, and will claim for themselves an equality of right which in theory it may be difficult to contest.

48. More particularly do these considerations apply to the case of Russia, whose advance across the deserts that form a natural barrier of division between Northern and Southern Persia, cannot be regarded with anything but uneasiness by the Government of India, and the appearance of whose flag in the Persian Gulf would import a novel element of unrest into a situation that is at no time without its anxious features. We desire deliberately to say to

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Your Lordship, with a full consciousness of our responsibility in so saying that difficult as we find it in existing circumstances to meet the financial and military strain imposed upon us by the ever increasing proximity of Russian power upon the northern and north-western frontiers of India from the Pamirs to Herat, we could not contemplate without dismay the prospect of Russian neighbourhood in Eastern or Southern Persia, the inevitable consequence of which must be a great increase of our own burdens; while the maritime defensibility of India would require to be altogether reconsidered, were the dangers of a land invasion to be supplemented by the appearance of a possible antagonist as a naval power in waters contiguous to Indian shores.

49. We cannot pretend to divine the future, or to say whether any European Power, and if so which, will at any time push her advance to the point of claiming a maritime outlet in or near to the Persian Gulf. The fate of Mesopotamia lies beyond our ken: and it may be that in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, some stronger Power may one day exercise dominion at Baghdad, may occupy Basrah, and may demand access for its vessels to the neighbouring waters of the Gulf. Such a consummation, it is in our opinion, in the interests of British policy, as long as may be possible, to postpone. But upon the question of allowing any European Power, and more especially Russia, to overrun Central and Southern Persia, and so to reach the Gulf, or to acquire naval facilities in the latter even without such territorial connections, we do not conceive that any doubt whatever can be entertained; and we imagine that it will be accepted as a cardinal axiom of British policy that no such development would be acquiesced in by Her Majesty's Government. We would arrive with the greater confidence at this conclusion, since we were lately informed by Your Lordship that on April 15th of the present year, Lord Salisbury communicated to the Persian Government with reference to rumours of the cession of a port in the Gulf to Russia, that "Her Majesty's Government felt it to be their duty to renew the intimation that it would not be compatible with the interests of the British Empire that any European Power should exercise control or jurisdiction over the ports of the Persian Gulf".

50. Such being the existing situation in Southern Persia, and the principles of policy accepted by Her Majesty's Government being as already stated, we pass to a consideration of the manner in which these principles should be translated into action, and of the steps which should, in our opinion, be taken at the present juncture for the protection of the common interests of Great Britain and the Indian Empire.

51. We are aware that, more than half a century ago, there were exchanged, and have more than once since been repeated, certain explicit assurances concerning the integrity and independence of Persia between the Governments of Great Britain and Russia. The first of these assurances were entered into by Lord Palmerston and Count Nesselrode. The former in a despatch, dated September 5th, 1834, placed on record that "the Governments of Great Britain and Russia are acting, with regard to the affairs of Persia in the same spirit, and are equally animated by a sincere desire to maintain, not only the internal tranquillity, but also the independence and integrity of Persia". Count Nesselrode, in despatches, dated October 20th, 1838, and January 29th, 1839, reiterated these pledges on behalf of his Government. Again in 1873 the continued existence of these mutual assurances was referred to with satisfaction by Count de Brunnow, as reported in a despatch by Lord Granville, dated July 10th, 1873. Finally, on March 12th, 1888, M. de Giers intimated, through M. de Staal, to Lord Salisbury that the Russian Government "have no objection to placing again on record that their views on this point are in no way altered"; and a communication to the effect that the engagements between Great Britain and Russia to respect and promote the integrity and independence of the Persian kingdom had again been renewed and confirmed, was accordingly made by Sir H. D. Wolff to the Shah.

52. Whilst it may be presumed that these pledges, so frequently renewed, are still in existence, and while we have no desire to infer that they are

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

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within measurable distance of being broken, we are yet of opinion that they are in themselves quite insufficient to arrest the centripetal progress of Russian influence in Persia, or to save either the Persian kingdom, or British interests in it, from the erosive agencies that we have described. Within the limits of a nominally still existing integrity and independence so many encroachments upon both those attributes are possible, that by almost imperceptible degrees they pass into the realm of constitutional fiction, where they may continue to provide an exercise for the speculations of the jurist, long after they have been contemptuously ignored by statesmen.

53. If this proposition be accepted, and if we cannot rely upon written pledges to safeguard the future of Persia, it behoves us to examine the various alternative policies that have been or can be proposed. The first of these is the policy of a regeneration of Persia by Anglo-Russian means; *i.e.*, joint action by Great Britain and Russia to insist upon reforms, to reorganise the administration and finances, to develop the resources of the country, to lend the requisite means, in fact to convert the Persian Government by combined philanthropy from a moribund into a solvent institution. This policy was discussed and rejected by Sir M. Durand in his Memorandum of September 1895, on the ground that Russia would denounce us to the Shah to begin with, and would play us false afterwards; and in his despatch of February 1899, he again "proceeds upon the assumption that we cannot hope to come to terms with Russia, and persuade her to join us in a policy of reform and development." We concur with Her Majesty's Minister in believing that the reform of Persia by a policy of friendly co-operation between Russia and ourselves is out of the question; and we do so in the main for the reason, which no one familiar with Persia will deny, that Russia is interested not in the reform of Persia, but in its decay; that in the background of her ambitions is the vision of a country and a people falling from inherent debility into her grasp; and that any policy which might tend to strengthen the country or to revivify the people, is to be resisted as tending to thwart the fulfilment of those ambitions. We might give many illustrations in support of this proposition; but we will content ourselves with one. Sir M. Durand has lately supplied to the Foreign Office the version given by the Sadr Azam of the agreement between the Persian and Russian Governments, by which the former bound itself in 1889 not to grant any railway concessions to any other Power than Russia, except with the consent of the latter, for a period of 10 years. Whatever be the real facts of the case, there can be no doubt that this engagement, as long as it has lasted, and so long as it continues to last, is an effective barrier to any genuine development of the country. It was due to expire in the present year. Our latest information from Sir M. Durand is that it has, under pressure from the Russian Government, been renewed for another term of five years.

54. The alternative policy recommended by Sir M. Durand is that we should plainly intimate that any Russian encroachments in Northern Persia will provoke corresponding measures for the protection of British interests in the south. In his Memorandum of September 1895, Her Majesty's Minister suggested that this declaration should be made to the Russian Government. In his despatch of February 1899 he proposed that it should also be made to the Persian Government; so that both parties should be well aware of the steps that would follow upon any further Russian aggression. It has been objected to this policy that such an engagement might impose upon the British Government an unwelcome obligation to intervene and to add to British responsibilities in Southern Persia, at the moment most opportune to Russia, and least opportune to ourselves. There is force in this objection; although we think that it might be met by introducing sufficient elasticity into the proposed intimation to leave Her Majesty's Government free to act for the protection of British interests in Southern Persia, not in a specified manner at a specified moment, but in what manner and at what juncture might commend itself to their judgment. Moreover the value of the objection is somewhat weakened by the consideration that did Russia take any such step in Northern Persia as is here contemplated, counter-action of some sort, with or without a previous

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intimation, would in all probability be imposed upon Her Majesty's Government; while the knowledge that a Russian advance in the north might be the signal for a corresponding British move in the south would, it can scarcely be doubted, operate as a deterrent upon any premature activity on the part of Russia, since she might thereby gravely jeopardise the realisation of her own dreams of ultimate access to Southern Persia and the Persian Gulf.

55. Nevertheless before we recommend that such a policy should be essayed, we desire to raise the question whether, though it be impossible to conclude an agreement with Russia for the joint patronage and development of Persia, it might not yet be possible to come to an understanding with her for the separate patronage and development of that country in distinct and clearly defined compartments by the two great Powers, in other words for a recognition of British and Russian spheres of interest in the dominions of the Shah. This is a solution the desirability of which has not been lost sight of by Sir M. Durand, but which for certain reasons he did not feel called upon to discuss. Recent events in China have familiarised the public mind with the idea of such spheres of interest, although their existence would appear to be still somewhat lacking both in clearness of definition and in precision of outline. The Viceroy has observed in recent telegrams from Lord Salisbury to Sir M. Durand with reference to a Persian loan and to mining concessions in that country, indications of a willingness to concede to Russia liberties in the north of Persia, parallel in scope and substance with those conceded to Great Britain in the south; and it is worthy of consideration whether in an expansion of this suggestion might not be found a feasible scheme.

56. We have already alluded to the line across Persia drawn by Sir M. Durand from Khanikin on the Turkish frontier, through Kermanshah, Hamadan, Ispahan, Yezd, and Kerman to Seistan, as indicating the northern limits of the sphere within which British political influence and trade are paramount. To some extent this partition is assisted by geographical conditions, the great deserts of Central Persia constituting a natural barrier between the north and the south, and roughly dividing the one from the other. But this situation is modified both in the west of Persia, where there are no deserts, and where there is no physical line of demarcation between the respective spheres of influence; in the centre of Persia, where Ispahan can hardly be said to constitute the natural frontier of any geographical zone; and also in the extreme east where Seistan, the inclusion of which in the British sphere would be an obligatory point, lies not to the south but to the north of the great desert. These considerations might not affect the success of any engagement that was carried out with equal *bona fides* by both parties: but they might become a fruitful source of friction were such a good understanding not to be counted upon in the future. In any case, we would recommend that the line of partition, suggested by Sir M. Durand, should be so far amended as to substitute Kashan for Ispahan. It would be undesirable that any Russian railway should penetrate further south than Kashan, which indeed is separated by a considerable range of hills from Ispahan, or that Russia should have right of access to the very fringe of the latter district.

57. We have observed that in China the Agreement recently concluded between Her Majesty's Government and Russia as to spheres of interest has related to railways only. Either party has pledged itself not to seek on its own account or on behalf of others for railway concessions in the rival sphere, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for such concessions, supported by the other in that sphere. *Prima facie* there does not appear to be any reason why such an agreement should not equally be extended to mines, roads, and other industrial or economic undertakings. The value of such an understanding is considerable; because although political influence is not expressly mentioned, yet in eastern countries commercial and industrial enterprises are the familiar agencies through which political influence is exercised by alien powers, and because that influence is apt to follow in the wake of railways and trade. We do not think, if such an agreement were arrived at with

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Russia, with reference to the Persian territories lying north and south of the predicated line, that there would be an end to Russian designs in Southern Persia or in the Persian Gulf. Such a result might, perhaps, ensue from an engagement that no political influence should be exercised by either party on the opposite side of the line. But there would be manifest difficulties in arriving at any such understanding; since it would be out of the question to remove the British representatives, either at Tehran, at Tabriz, or at Meshed, whose functions necessarily involve the exercise of some sort of political influence, while a corresponding objection would no doubt be felt by the Russian Government. But even an engagement limited to railway and commercial exploitation would have this effect, that it would deprive Russia of the means by which political or territorial ambitions in the rival sphere could most easily be carried out, and would render it difficult for her to push them to success, as long as Great Britain remained on the alert.

58. There are, however, difficulties and drawbacks in the case of such an understanding which it would be impolitic to ignore. We have already hinted at one of their number. The facts with reference to Seistan which have been mentioned by the Viceroy in his Minute, by Sir M. Durand, and also in this despatch, indicate the absolute necessity of including that district within the British sphere. Nevertheless Seistan is physically and administratively a part of the province of Khorasan, from which it is severed by no clear line of division, the Governorship of Seistan being vested in a member of the old ruling family of Kain, the two existing heads of which are brothers, residing respectively at Tabbas and Birjand. It also seems exceedingly doubtful to us whether Russia would, by any such agreement as we are discussing, forego her designs upon Seistan itself, and still more her chances of reaching the eastern extremity of the Persian Gulf. Nor again is it clear that she would be willing to cancel the engagement with regard to railway construction, which she has recently renewed with the Persian Government, and to hand over the southern half of Persia to possible railway exploitation by British agency, in return for a monopoly of similar exploitation (which may be said to be already at her disposal) in the northern half. These, however, are considerations which could only be decided by the attitude of Russia herself, were she approached on the subject by Her Majesty's Government. We indicate them merely for the purpose of showing that we are far from confident that the suggestion, if put forward, will meet with a favourable reception.

59. A more serious drawback, from the point of view of British interests, is the fact that the capital of Persia would lie in the northern or Russian sphere, and that Russian influence there, already predominant, could hardly fail to become supreme. The situation that has recently arisen in China would present itself with ten-fold gravity and emphasis. A desire would not merely be intimated to connect the capital with the Russian railway system: but a line itself would, we may imagine, at once be made to Tehran, while corresponding lines would in all probability be constructed from the Russian frontier in Georgia to Tabriz, and in Trans-Caspia to Meshed. With the three great cities of Northern Persia thus permanently linked with the Russian system, the power of pressure exercised by the Russian Government, which is already considerable, would be positively overwhelming. The Shah would tend more and more to become a Russian puppet, and Northern Persia a Russian proconsulate. We should look with great anxiety, in such a case, upon the fate of such institutions as the Imperial Bank of Persia, and the Indo-European Telegraph Department, whose head-quarters are in Tehran. We should fear a marked diminution of influence on the part of Her Majesty's representative at the capital; and we do not conceal our anticipations that in the long run such a partition might involve the permanent break up of the Persian kingdom, and, if it did not ultimately lead to rival Russian and British Protectorates in the north and south, might at any rate result in the selection of another capital, and in the rule of more than one native prince in Persia.

60. Neither will it be overlooked by Her Majesty's Government that, while any such arrangement with Russia might preclude that Power from

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obtaining control over Central and Southern Persia and in that way reaching the Persian Gulf, it would not for one moment retard, but might on the contrary accelerate her advance to the same objective through Mesopotamia by way of Baghdad. This is a problem, however, which we do not feel called upon at present to discuss, and which would require to be examined on independent grounds. Nor again would an Anglo-Russian agreement preclude France, or Germany, or any other Power from endeavouring to acquire in Southern Persia or in the Gulf the position from which Russia would *ex hypothesi* have debarred herself. There might even be combined action between them for that object. These however are features inseparable from the solution which we are discussing, and which should not be of a formidable character, if the influence of the principal competitor were removed from the scene. They might be the cause of future annoyance to the British Government; but they could hardly, under any conditions, constitute a menace to the Indian Empire.

61. There remains the further danger, distinctly contemplated by Sir M. Durand in discussing the question of a possible understanding with Russia, that she would not abide by the terms of any such understanding. Sufficient grounds for this induction may unquestionably be found in the history of Russian advance in Central Asia during the past half century. But an appreciation of the inclinations and idiosyncrasies of both parties to an agreement, in the light, where possible, of past experience, is an element in the drawing up of a fresh bargain which is not likely to be lost sight of by either agent, whether it be regarded as involving a discount from, or an appreciation of, the value of the new contract. Moreover such contracts, if not of perpetual duration, or even if ultimately infringed by one of the two parties, have been shown in many cases to be of immense value, in the respite that they afford from the strain of an otherwise ceaseless rivalry, and in the opportunity presented for a peaceful consolidation of existing interests.

62. We have now placed before Your Lordship the *pros* and *cons*, as they present themselves to our eyes, of the alternative policies in Persia. Should Her Majesty's Government decide upon making any overtures to the Russian Government in the direction indicated, and should they either be rejected, or result in failure, it will still be possible to adopt the alternative recommended by Sir M. Durand. Indeed, if the terms of a reasonable arrangement are proffered by one party, and are refused by the other, the natural corollary would appear to be that the originator of the proposal should reserve to himself the right to protect by whatever means may be at his disposal the interests which he has endeavoured to conserve by friendly co-operation; and should meet what would in such a case be conscious aggression on the one side by retaliation on the other.

63. In either case, however, though still more in the case of a failure to arrive at an understanding with Russia, we conceive that it is incumbent upon Her Majesty's Government and upon the Government of India to come to an early decision upon the subsidiary question, raised by Sir M. Durand, namely, as to the steps that require forthwith to be taken in order to safeguard British and Indian interests in the so-called British sphere in Persia from the competition with which we have shown them to be threatened.

64. Sir M. Durand, in his despatch, has made a calculation of the sums annually expended by Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India respectively upon the British establishments at present maintained in Persia. He arrives at a grand total of £36,970 per annum distributed in the following proportions: Her Majesty's Government, £12,876; Government of India, £24,094. Inasmuch as these figures are not, in all respects, correct, and as they omit several items of charge for which Indian revenues are responsible, we have made an independent computation, which is here presented, for purposes of comparison in tabular form. In a further column we present the charges also borne by the Government of India and Her Majesty's Government severally in respect of Mesopotamia and the Tigris—*i.e.*, Turkish Arabia, an area, which though not belonging to the Persian dominions, is so closely adjacent

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thereto as to constitute a part of the same political system, and for the maintenance of British interests in which the Government of India have hitherto been called upon to pay, as inseparably connected with the trade and politics of the Persian Gulf :—

I.—Sir M. Durand's figures.

A—Charges borne by Her Majesty's Government—

	£
Tehran	9,640
Astrabad	48
Resht	750
Tabriz	920
Ispahan	778
Kerman	250
Mohammerah ...	490
Travelling allowances ...	1,500
	14,376

B—Charges borne by Government of India—

Tehran	7,000
Meshed	8,600
Kermanshah ...	24
Shiraz	160
Kerman	250
Bushire	7,700
Gulf Telegraph ...	120
Bahrein ... ... / Shargah ... ... / Lingah	240
	24,094

II.—Government of India's figures.

A—Charges borne by Her Majesty's Government—

	£
Tehran	9,640
Astrabad	48
Resht	750
Tabriz	920
Ispahan	778
Kerman	250
Mohammerah ...	490
Travelling allowances ...	1,500
½ Karun subsidy ...	1,000
* Consular clerk at Bushire	90
	15,466

† *B—Charges borne by Government of India—*

Tehran	7,000
Meshed	9,154
Kermanshah ...	24
Shiraz	160
‡ Kerman	400
Bushire	8,460
Gulf Telegraph ...	120
Bahrein ... ... / Shargah ... ... / Lingah	240
§ Seistan Consulate ...	400
Tehran-Meshed Telegraph line ...	1,335
Makran Telegraph subsidy	580
Gwadur Native Assistant	60
½ Karun subsidy ...	1,000
Indian Marine charges—	
Maintenance of "Lawrence"	8,266
Subsidy for "Sphinx" ...	15,000
Repairs of "Sphinx" ...	3,276
Coal of "Sphinx" and "Lawrence"	3,960
Coaling Depôts	470
Indian Military charges—	
‖ Detachments in Persian Gulf	981
Total Indian charges ...	60,886

* That is £120 sanctioned by despatch No. 91 (Political), dated 3rd August 1899, minus £30 fee allowance withdrawn.

† The Indian charges are taken from the accounts for 1897-98. They include superannuation charges, and the figures are turned into pounds sterling at 1*s.* 4*d.* per rupee. The Indian Marine charges have been furnished by the Examiner of Marine Accounts; the Indian Military charges by the Comptroller of Military Accounts, Bombay Command.

‡ Annual expenditure up to Rs. 6,000, *i.e.*, £400 sanctioned for five years from 1898.

§ Annual expenditure up to Rs. 6,000, *i.e.*, £400 sanctioned in 1899.

‖ This is exclusive of extra cost for detachments at Jask and Charbar.

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III.

EXPENDITURE IN TURKISH ARABIA.

A—Charges borne by Her Majesty's Government—

	£
Baghdad, Mosul and Karbela	131

B—Charges borne by Government of India—

Baghdad Residency	4,970
Basrah Consulate	1,400
Tigris Subsidy	1,600
Indian Marine charges—	
Maintenance of "Comet"	2,506
Total Indian charges ...	10,476

65. According to these figures, which we have been at much pains to verify, it appears that upon the various establishments maintained by the British Government in Persia, the Imperial Government spends £15,466 and the Government of India £60,886 per annum. If Turkish Arabia be included in the calculation, as we think it must in fairness be, and as it was in a statement prepared for and presented to the Royal Commission on Indian expenditure in 1896, the totals will amount to Great Britain £15,597, India £71,362.

66. It will not, we apprehend, be denied that these contributions do not at all fairly represent the respective proportions of Imperial and of Indian interest in Persia and its surroundings. The argument into which we entered in an earlier part of this despatch will have failed in its purpose if it has not given good grounds for thinking that in the determination of British interests in Persia too much stress has hitherto been laid upon the Indian, and too little upon the British, quota; and that a more even partition both of responsibility and of financial burden might with reason be adopted in the future.

67. This however is a question which we are not at the present moment called upon to discuss with any minuteness, the more so as it is understood to be one of the subjects that have attracted the attention of the Royal Commission above alluded to, and that are likely to be dealt with in its Report. We observe that in the evidence so far printed and published, some attention has been paid to the case, and we reserve till the appearance of the final Report, any further remarks that we may have to offer thereon.

68. We would observe, however, in strict connection with the question now under examination, *viz.*, the increase of Consular and other establishments in Persia—which is itself a branch of the wider subject—that in the reconsideration of the case for which the Government of India have more than once pleaded, it appears to us that one of two principles may with advantage be borne in view. The entire charges which are placed upon the revenues of the British Empire for Persia and Turkish Arabia may be added together, and may be divided in certain proportions, to be revised, if necessary, at definite intervals, between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers. Some such principle was adopted, when in 1859 the British Mission at Tehran was re-transferred to the Foreign Office, and when it was laid down by Lord John Russell that the ratio of the charges met by India and Great Britain should be as 12 to 5. We are not aware that this principle has ever since been formally repudiated or surrendered, although it appears to have been widely departed from in practice.

69. The other method would be that of determining what are the spheres or localities in Persia of special concern either to Her Majesty's Government or to the Government of India, and of debiting the charges incurred for them against the revenues respectively of the United Kingdom and of India. It

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would not be difficult in our opinion to constitute such a partition of interest, which would be determined by a combination of geographical, political and commercial conditions. The parts of Persia that border upon Afghanistan, Baluchistan and the eastern end of the Persian Gulf would naturally fall within the Indian sphere. The northern and western portions contiguous to the Caucasian provinces of Russia, to Turkey, and to Mesopotamia, would possess a greater interest for Her Majesty's Government. To a considerable, though still only a partial, extent this principle has already been acted upon; whilst it will be in the recollection of Your Lordship that the Government of India have in one case pressed for a vindication of it, which they have felt to be equally demanded by policy and justice. In February and again in August 1895, our predecessors expressed a very strong opinion that they should not be called upon to contribute towards the Karun service, as long as the subsidy for the mail service on the Tigris was met exclusively from Indian revenues. They stated their opinion that "the interests involved in the Karun service are purely Imperial and not Indian, and, if this service ceases altogether, the interests of India will not be affected thereby". It was only after the receipt of an urgent appeal from the Foreign Office, and on the explicit understanding that the whole question of the distribution of the charges on account of the Tigris and the Karun should be referred to the Royal Commission then sitting, that the Government of Lord Elgin, not without a vigorous dissent from the then Finance Member, Sir J. Westland, consented to continue the payment of a moiety of the Karun subsidy pending the stipulated decision. We cordially endorse the views which were expressed by our predecessors in respect of the Imperial and non-Indian character of this charge, and we shall be glad to learn what are the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the subject.

70. The mention of the Karun and Tigris services affords an incidental illustration of the commercial considerations by which the allocation of responsibility that we are discussing might be determined. It is, of course, difficult to decide in the case of any particular market or harbour the exact shares of interest in it that may be claimed by British or by Indian trade. The former is more likely to be in the ascendant in the north, the latter in the south, of Persia. Broadly speaking, however, we do not think it will be disputed that the supervision and promotion of British commerce in foreign countries are a responsibility properly devolving upon the Imperial Government. The fact that a considerable proportion of the trade of any foreign town or port passes to or from India (and even of such trade a large part is apt to be often British in origin) is not a reason for placing the consular or other charges exclusively upon the Indian revenues, any more than a corresponding preponderance of Colonial trade in any particular quarter would be regarded as a reason for demanding a contribution from the Colonies. We imagine the real line of distinction to be that, whereas the commercial interests of Her Majesty's Indian subjects, outside of India, are in the main the concern of the Imperial Government, yet in cases where the political importance of a place or district exceeds the commercial, and where that political importance is Indian rather than English in character, the Government of India may legitimately be called upon to defray sometimes a large proportion, sometimes the whole of the cost. In this way we may account for the exclusive financial responsibility of India for Meshed, for Bushire and the other ports of the Gulf, and for Baghdad (although we regard the latter as an extreme and questionable extension of the principle). On the other hand the charges for Ispahan, Kermanshah, Tabriz, &c., fall, or ought in our judgment to fall, upon the Imperial revenues. Tehran, as the capital, is, in a sense, a meeting ground of the two systems; and a division of the cost between the two Governments has accordingly been in existence ever since 1835, although the passage of time has witnessed a gradual reduction of the Indian contribution, and may, we hope, lead to a further reconsideration of the matter, when the present arrangement expires in 1901.

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71. We will now proceed to apply the principles which have been enunciated to a consideration of the particular question referred to us by Your Lordship, *viz.*, the suggestions of Sir M. Durand on the one hand, and our own views or proposals on the other, concerning the increase of Consular and other establishments in Persia. We may say at once that we are anxious to regard the question from a broad-minded and liberal point of view, that we have no desire to haggle with Her Majesty's Government over shares of responsibility or of cost, and that we are quite willing to add to our own charges for the protection of British interests in Persia, in the confident belief that Her Majesty's Government will not be behindhand with a similar generosity. Our argument as to the magnitude and significance of those interests and the reality of the dangers with which they are assailed would have been insincere, were we unprepared to give to it a practical demonstration.

72. For the sake of clearness we will divide the country into different spheres, representing with sufficient accuracy the rough lines of demarcation between British and Indian interest. In the northern and central sphere, and in the western sphere, the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government is in our judgment more directly involved. In the eastern sphere, and in the southern or maritime sphere, we admit a corresponding preponderance of Indian interest.

73. Commencing with the first named of these areas, we find that Sir M. Durand recommends an improvement in the pay and status of Her Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz. In so far as our judgment on the matter is desired, it is in entire accord with the proposal. We are more doubtful about the suggestion to appoint an additional Vice-Consul at Tabriz, with the intention of posting him later on at Urumia; since we incline to the opinion that the ultimate destiny of the Persian Nestorians has been irretrievably fixed by their recent wholesale conversion to the Russian faith. We concur with Sir M. Durand as to the desirability of reducing the Consulate at Resht to a Vice-Consulate. We have before expressed our hearty concurrence with his proposals concerning the Consulate at Ispahan. These proposals without exception concern in their financial aspect the British, and not the Indian, Exchequer.

74. In the western sphere Sir M. Durand advocates the appointment of a British Vice-Consul at Kermanshah, subordinate to the Consul-General at Tehran, and paid for by England, in place of the present native agent, whose modest allowance of £24 is drawn, for some unaccountable reason, from the charges for the Meshed Agency, *i.e.*, from Indian funds. The figures of British trade passing through Kermanshah from Baghdad to Tehran appear to us amply to justify the proposed change. We are less confident about a suggestion made by Sir M. Durand, originally in connection with this route, but also with a wider application, namely, that we should depute an Indian officer to examine the various possible routes for railways in Persia and to make suggestions. Such a proceeding would, in our opinion, be both premature and uncalled for. We are very doubtful whether in her present state of evolution Persia is prepared for railways. The recent renewal of the prohibitive agreement with Russia shows that the latter Power does not for the present at any rate intend them to be introduced. Enquiries of the proposed character would be certain to arouse suspicion; and finally we believe that we are already in possession of the materials enabling us to judge of the railways, very few in number, that under existing conditions it would be prudent, if it were possible, to construct in Persia.

75. Further to the south Sir M. Durand recommends the substitution of a Consul for the Karun and Arabistan at a salary of £800 (to be divided between the Imperial and Indian revenues) for the present Vice-Consul at Mohammerah, whose salary of £490 is defrayed from Imperial sources. He also contemplates the abandonment at an early date of the handsome annual subsidy of £2,000 now paid in equal moieties by the two Governments to Messrs. Lynch for their service upon the Karun. Our previous attitude on this subject will prepare

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Your Lordship for our ready acceptance of these views. But we think that the entire cost of the proposed Consulate and of such subordinate native agencies as may be required should be borne by Her Majesty's Government, since we cannot too emphatically reiterate our opinion that India is only indirectly interested in the Karun question. We shall be prepared to show a corresponding liberality in quarters of more manifest importance to India. A Consul at Mohammerah (or Ahwaz or Shushter) would of course correspond with the British Resident at Bushire, as well as with Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

76. We next turn to the eastern sphere, where Indian interests may be described as supreme. Sir M. Durand throws out a hint that money might perhaps be saved at Meshed, where the existing establishment imposes upon Indian funds a charge of no less than £9,154 a year. We are inclined to agree with him. Although in view of the proximity of Afghanistan, and of the militant character of Russian pretensions in Khorasan, it is desirable to maintain an adequate British representation at Meshed, we think that the present scale is excessive, and that the results obtained are incommensurate with the cost. We are considering whether by a reduction of the grade of the Political Agent now stationed there, and by the removal of the Political Assistant to some spot where his services would be of greater value, we might not be able to effect a considerable money saving, to be better applied elsewhere. We are sceptical also as to the value received for the large secret service grant at present made to the Meshed Agency, and expended in the main in procuring unreliable and almost worthless information through native and ill-informed agents. On the other hand, we are prepared to compensate for a less extravagant expenditure at Meshed by a more vigilant attention to Seistan, and by strenuously fostering the trade route connecting that district with British Baluchistan. The political and strategical importance of Seistan appears to us to justify and even to necessitate the former attitude. We are encouraged to adopt the latter by the figures of trans-Nushki traffic, which have risen from a total of 1½ lakh in 1896 to Rs. 5,90,000 in 1897 and (in spite of an adverse season) to Rs. 7,28,000 in 1898, in which year the imports alone into Quetta from Seistan reached the value of Rs. 2,50,880.

77. We have some time past been examining the question of the permanent appointment of a British officer to Seistan; and the deputation of Captain Sykes from Kerman to Seistan in the present year, and the sanction of an annual expenditure of £400 from Indian revenues upon a Seistan Consulate, have already been mentioned. The reports of Captain Sykes are strongly adverse to the permanent appointment of a British officer to Seistan; and whilst we do not entirely concur with his reasoning, and regard his views as to some extent coloured by other prepossessions, we nevertheless are of opinion that such an appointment might for the present be postponed; the more so as it appears likely that the nomination of a Russian Consul to Seistan, though previously announced, is likely not to be persevered in, unless a British representative appears permanently upon the scene. Should a Russian officer be finally appointed, we think that there will be no alternative but to send a British officer also. In the meantime we are prepared to depute a reliable native agent from our Indian service to reside at Nasirabad, the capital of Seistan, and to appoint a second to reside at Birjand, the capital of Kain, both of these officials to be under the orders of the British Resident at Meshed, in correspondence with the Persian arrangements under which Seistan and Kain constitute a portion of the Governorship-General of Khorassan. We estimate that the annual cost of these two posts will amount to £150—£200 per annum more than the already sanctioned charge for the Seistan post; and this addition we are prepared to meet. In making these proposals we have the satisfaction of knowing that we are sure of the support both of Your Lordship and of the Foreign Office; since, in a Revenue despatch, dated December 2nd, 1897, Your Lordship, in sending to us a letter from the Foreign Office, expressing their good hopes of the future of the Quetta-Meshed route, provided that Consular protection and other facilities were furnished at points along the road, commended these remarks to the Government of India, and added: "I trust that

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the suggestion of appointing Consular Agents at points along the trade route between Quetta and Meshed may receive the attentive consideration of Your Excellency's Government. It appears to me a measure desirable from many points of view, and especially in connection with the facilities which might be afforded by that route for the transport of arms and ammunition between the Persian Gulf and Baluchistan."

78. As regards the trade route in question, we propose to take active measures for its development within our own territory. We contemplate spending additional, though not extravagant, sums upon the better provision of wells, accommodation, supplies of fodder and other stores, and the protection of the track. We may even require to appoint a second British officer, to relieve Lieutenant Webb Ware of the excessive strain now imposed upon him by the administration of an extensive district, in addition to the protection of a road over 400 miles in length. We hope by these measures, which will be unostentatiously pursued, to escape the jealousy aroused by a too open challenge of rival ambitions in Seistan, and to build up in that neighbourhood a substantial commercial and political interest, which will find no mean ally in what we believe to be the natural predisposition of the inhabitants. Experience alone can inform us whether the anticipations that have been framed by the prospects of the Nushki-Seistan trade route are over-sanguine, as in some quarters they are freely said to be. If unsuccessful, the experiment which we now propose to make can be abandoned without discredit. If, as we believe, it will be found to have both a political and a commercial value, we shall be better enabled in the future to pronounce upon the larger schemes which have sometimes been put forward in connection with Seistan, and a reference to which will be found in the Minute written by the Viceroy. At present, it does not seem to us to be necessary to take them into consideration.

79. We agree with Sir M. Durand in thinking that a British Consul should be permanently appointed to Kerman. We have already sanctioned a contribution of Rs. 6,000 or £400 a year to the cost of this post; and we are prepared to continue the payment of this sum. We believe that there are good reasons for which Her Majesty's Government may desire to continue the payment of a similar moiety of the cost. But should their acceptance of the increments proposed elsewhere, notably in the case of the Karun, be facilitated by our assumption of the entire cost of the Kerman Consulate, we should be prepared favourably to consider such a proposal; or, if it were preferred, to divide with them the cost of the Karun and Kerman Consulates combined. The financial result would in either case be approximately the same.

80. Sir M. Durand has suggested a British Vice-Consul, or a native agent at Bampur. For the present we think that the latter will be the preferable alternative; and we are prepared to undertake the outlay, which will not exceed about £300 per annum. The officer in question would be under the orders of the British Consul at Kerman.

81. Finally we come to the southern sphere, including the coasts and ports of the Persian Gulf. Your Lordship will have been prepared by what has previously been said for the announcement of our willingness to submit to some sacrifices for the defence of an interest, so substantially grounded, and so conspicuously assailed. We are unable to agree with Sir M. Durand in the suggestion that any material reduction of expenditure can be effected at Bushire. On the contrary we are disposed to think that, if the best men in our service are to be attracted to that post, we may even require to add to its pecuniary attractions. We agree with him, however, in thinking that the Resident at Bushire should reside at Shiraz, and exercise his consular functions there during the summer months. We understand from Colonel Meade that the cost of a site for a house (no suitable building being available either for hire or purchase) would be from £1,000 to £1,200, and of building and furnishing about £1,500. We think that this expense might be borne in equal proportions by the Imperial and Indian Governments; and we are prepared to undertake the annual outlay

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that may be required for up-keep and repairs, and for the provision of a substitute for the present native agent, during the time that the Resident is living at Bushire.

82. We are heartily in accord with Sir M. Durand in thinking that a British officer should be appointed to Bunder Abbas, with charge of the Gulf ports east of Bushire, and of British interests in the maritime provinces of South-eastern Persia. The necessity of such an appointment was mooted, as long ago as 1879, by Colonel Ross, at that time British Resident at Bushire. It was raised again in 1882, 1884, 1885, 1888 and 1892, and on the majority of these occasions was supported by petitions from the not insignificant Hindu and Khoja population engaged in trade at Bunder Abbas. In 1893, the appointment as Vice-Consul of an Englishman engaged in business at that port was agreed to by the Government of India and was sanctioned by the Secretary of State (Lord Kimberley), but was subsequently dropped upon the inexplicable grounds that the estimated cost of Rs. 50 a month or £40 a year could not be saved out of the Bushire Residency funds. In 1896, the question was again discussed between the Government of India and the Resident (Colonel Wilson); and the former so far departed from their former attitude as to say that the proposal must be held over until the normal conditions of trade had been restored by the withdrawal of the Russian sanitary cordon. These conditions have since been fulfilled, and we are prepared to look with a more favourable eye upon a proposal, the intrinsic recommendations of which are not open to dispute. We are willing to accept the financial responsibility for the proposed appointment, although we think that it may be possible to meet it without additional cost by the transfer to Bunder Abbas of the Political Assistant now stationed at Meshed. Sir M. Durand suggests that the officer appointed to this post should pass the summer months at Yezd (Bunder Abbas being an impossible site of residence during the hot season), taking the place there of the present unpaid Commercial Vice-Consul. Upon this point we would propose to consult Her Majesty's Consul at Kerman, which is in close connection with Bunder Abbas and the coast; and we will submit to Your Lordship at a later date our final views upon this subject.

83. Sir M. Durand mentions, as a matter affecting exclusively the Government of India, the possible appointment of a British officer at Bahrein. We do not hesitate to state to Your Lordship that such an appointment is in our opinion both desirable and obligatory. Trouble, similar to that which we have already incurred in Maskat, is brewing in Bahrein, the treaty engagements of which petty State with Her Majesty's Government provide no legitimate excuse for such complications. It is necessary to anticipate them by placing a British officer permanently in the island; and we are at the present time awaiting Colonel Meade's definite proposals on the matter. We are inclined to think that it will probably be sufficient to nominate an officer of a subordinate class. From time to time he will also visit Koweit. It remains to be decided whether he should also have under his political jurisdiction the Trucial Chiefs of the Arab or Pirate coast, or whether these should be placed under the officer at Bunder Abbas. We incline to the former opinion, but reserve this matter for subsequent decision.

84. We have now dealt with each one of Sir M. Durand's specific proposals, and have stated our own views in support, in amendment, or in supplement of them. It remains for us to mention some additional proposals of our own, and to comment upon certain independent suggestions submitted by Her Majesty's Minister. We entertain, and have already in the present year acted upon, the opinion that Her Majesty's naval forces should be more strongly and frequently represented than they have hitherto been in the Persian Gulf, and that there should be recurrent visits from the Admiral of the East Indian station. During the past spring Admiral Douglas, at the request of the Viceroy, paid such a visit, and his presence was of material assistance during the recent crisis at Maskat. We are doubtful of the wisdom of the existing system, under which the political charge of the Makran coast, and the

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distribution of the Telegraph subsidies, is vested in the Director-General of the Indo-European Telegraph Department at Karachi, to whom a special salary of £120 is paid by the Government of India for the purpose. It has been proposed to us that this charge should be transferred to the Political Agent at Maskat; and for the present we reserve our opinion as to the advantages of such a change. It would be eminently desirable that Maskat should be connected by cable with Jask, since at present there is no telegraphic communication with any part of Oman. But this too is a question that must wait for a later solution.

85. Sir M. Durand has proposed that all British Consular officers in Persia should have a small guard of Indian troopers similar to those now maintained at Meshed. We are not clear that such a proposal is at present desirable, and are apprehensive that it might lead to movements on the part of Russia, for which not even the necessities of a plague cordon could be pleaded in justification, and which would scarcely be distinguishable from armed occupation. In this respect we re-echo the opinion which the Government of India expressed to Your Lordship as recently as August 10th, 1898, to the effect that Indian interests are sufficiently involved to justify us in furnishing protective detachments, as we are now doing at Jask and Charbar, for Telegraph stations on the coast; but that our military provision must, for the present, be limited to this service.

86. Her Majesty's Minister also recommends the grant of a supply of travelling tents to every British officer in Persia. As the majority of these, under the proposed arrangements, will be upon the Indian list, the suggested outlay would require in such cases to be met from Indian funds. We do not think that any general rule is required. We are in the habit of including camp equipment in the outfit of any officer whose duties require him to travel. We may observe, however, that tents are more likely to be required in out-of-the-way parts of the country than they are along the main roads, where the existing *chapar* or postal service, although destitute of almost every superficial merit, is nevertheless more rapid and therefore as a rule more convenient than travelling by caravan.

87. Lastly, Sir M. Durand makes certain recommendations with regard to the improvement and better organisation of the Telegraph service in Persia, both native and European. We concur with his suggestion that no opportunity should be lost of getting the Persian wires, which are abominably mismanaged, transferred to our control. He then revives a suggestion, of which much has been heard during the last 20 years, that we should "organise for political purposes" the existing establishment of the Indo-European Telegraph Department; although we do not gather very clearly from his despatch what are the precise measures recommended for that purpose. The last occasion on which a somewhat similar proposal appears to have been made was in 1887, when a Memorandum, dated April 27th of that year, was drawn up by Sir Murdoch Smith, who was despatched on a semi-political Mission to Persia, and who recommended that capable military officers should be scattered about the country, nominally in charge of the Telegraph stations, but in reality as political agents. In a despatch, dated June 24th, 1887, the Government of India expressed a general, but guarded, approval of the scheme. In our opinion there are two sides to the question, for each of which much can be said. It is surprising to us that an institution and a service that have exercised such an influence and are so generally popular in Persia, as the Indo-European Telegraph Department, should not have been attended with more visible political effect. On the other hand, in proportion as the working of the line has become systematised, so there has been less call for the type of Engineer Officer who was required during earlier and more troubled days. The work at the majority of the stations does not admit of much leisure on the part of the signallers and line inspectors. At the more important posts we believe that a considerable, though unobtrusive, influence is already exerted by the superior officers; and we are not convinced that the appearance upon the scene of a number

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of English officers, whose telegraphic duties would in reality be subordinate to political or semi-political functions, might not arouse suspicion and even produce some friction. We do not desire, however, to pronounce definitely upon the subject, and shall be glad to be acquainted with the views that are entertained by Your Lordship.

88. Before leaving the subject of Persia, we desire to add an appeal upon a matter which we have already argued to be so closely connected therewith as to be inseparable from a discussion of our interests in that part of the world. The proposals that we have submitted do not contemplate any change in the existing arrangements in Turkish Arabia. Nevertheless, we cannot too strongly state our conviction that those arrangements, financially considered, are unduly harsh in their application to India, and unduly lenient in their incidence upon Great Britain. That the charges borne by Indian revenues for the maintenance of our political and commercial position upon the Tigris and at Baghdad, should amount to £8,970 a year, while the contribution of Her Majesty's Government to the same objects is limited to £131 a year, appears to us to be a partial and inequitable division. We recognise that there are advantages to British interests generally in maintaining at Baghdad an establishment on the scale and of the importance that are associated with an Indian Residency of the second class. But the objects for which such an establishment is there kept up are neither exclusively, nor, as we think, mainly Indian in character. The same remark applies to the Basrah Consulate, where Her Majesty's Government have recently taken into their hands the appointment of the Consul, while leaving the entire charge to be defrayed from Indian funds. Least of all can such a claim be made for the Tigris subsidy, which, in our opinion, falls into the category of commercial arrangements properly devolving upon Her Majesty's Government; although under existing conditions the total cost is borne by Indian revenues. We trust that, in any reconsideration of the case, a more generous division of financial responsibility may commend itself to Her Majesty's Government.

89. We have now completed our survey of the proposals that have been submitted to us for examination, and of the situation in Persia as it presents itself to our eyes. In commending our views to the earnest consideration of Your Lordship and of Her Majesty's Government, we trust that we may have succeeded in impressing upon both, the gravity of the situation with which Great Britain and India are jointly faced, and the necessity, while there is yet time, of meeting it with definite and united counsels. We conclude by reiterating the confident hope, already expressed in our despatch of August 10th, 1898, that in the last resort, and in any sudden emergency, we may rely upon Her Majesty's Government for the protection of interests which are vital both to India and to the British Empire.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) CURZON OF KEDLESTON.
" W. S. A. LOCKHART.
" E. H. H. COLLEN.
" C. M. RIVAZ.
" C. E. DAWKINS.
" T. RALEIGH.
" R. GARDINER.

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

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

Prof 9/9/99

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I have studied these papers with gr at interest.

The draft despatch practically divides itself into two parts. The first deals with the momentous question of how best to prepare for the break up of Persia, an event which seems to be inevitable, and which it is indisputable, may be of vast and far-reaching importance to the British Empire. The second is one of only financial administrative detail, *viz.*, how to allocate certain charges (connected with the proposed arrangements) between the Home and Indian Exchequers.

I confess I should like to have seen these two subjects treated in separate despatches. To discuss a matter of such a different degree of importance as the affirmation of the policy which is to govern the action of the Empire in a position of such gravity, in juxtaposition with the question of the division of a few thousand pounds between Great Britain and India is, I venture to think, incongruous, and I fear is rather calculated to distract attention from the main and weighty issue. Neither Great Britain nor India are, I trust, in such a financial position as to make the sum in question an item of any significance by the side of the other issue which involves matters intimately connected with the maintenance of our Indian dominion and the security of the eastern trade of the Empire generally on which so considerable a portion of our greatness depends.

I will explain in Council why this has been done.
C[URZON].

I venture to submit that, in the first of the two despatches into which I should like to see the present draft divided, it would be sufficient to indicate the general lines on which any expenditure involved in the immediate proposals might be distributed between England and India, leaving the details to be worked out when the general policy to be adopted was finally decided upon.

If I correctly interpret the policy which it is intended to enunciate, it is that, while we desire to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia so long as practicable, we recognise the improbablity of the date of the break up of that power being far distant, and we desire, therefore, to now take all suitable means for consolidating our position in the portion of that State which must eventually fall to our lot if we are to maintain our Imperial position in the East.

It is an indisputable proposition that neither the Indian army, as at present constituted, nor the Indian Exchequer, is equal to the strain of assuming a British Protectorate over the whole of the centre and south of Persia. Nor is it worth while to discuss such a contingency since no British Ministry is at all likely to authorise it—at least for many a year to come.
C[URZON].

The line selected for the ultimate boundary between Russia and England in those parts appears to be by common consent the Khanikin-Seistan one. It is stated in the draft despatch, however, that under existing conditions we have neither the money nor the men to undertake such a responsibility.

May I venture to question this dictum? Should we adopt in the future such a programme as the absorption of the southern and central portions of Persia up to the Khanikin-Seistan line, it appears to me that the whole position of affairs would be altered. Concurrently with an unquestionably great increase in responsibilities in Persia, we would obtain very important relief in the pressure on our Indian frontier. The strategical position would be entirely changed. Resting on England in the west, India in the east, and the Persian Gulf to the south, we would so threaten Russia's advance on India that it seems to me the latter country would, for the time at any rate, be practically safe. Instead of Russia constantly worrying us, she would, I submit, have the tables turned on her, and be in the position of dreading an advance by us which would threaten to cut her line of communications and possibly convert the Caspian from a Russian to an English lake. That we ourselves would incur heavy responsibilities I do not question, but I argue they would in the main be a transfer of anxieties from India to Persia.

As regards the money required, from what I have read of Persia (mainly in Your Excellency's book thereon), I gather that Persia well administered is quite capable of paying for her defence, and though from the same source I have formed but a poor opinion of the Persian proper as material for soldiers, still I understand that the tribes of the mountainous districts properly organised and well led would not form bad troops with a stiffening of our Imperial forces to support them.

Turning now to what is perhaps my more correct province, the consideration of the possible occupation of this line of country by a system of railways, I would like first to note

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a suggestion which has occurred to me, *viz.*, that the highhanded action of Russia in prohibiting railway construction in Persia for another five years is due to the fact that, at present so far as railways are concerned, she has all she can conveniently do in the completion of her Siberian-Manchurian system which is to give her the command of all Northern China. Five years hence her main lines on that side will be completed, and she will be able to turn her energies in another direction. If I am correct in this surmise, are we wise to give Russia the time and opportunity she wishes? Should we not on our part be at any rate doing what we can to take advantage of the time at our disposal? Russia does not wait for England when she sees an opportunity, through England being engaged elsewhere or on other grounds, for a move in advance, and I personally do not believe that any action or inaction on our part will seriously delay Russia one day beyond when she is prepared to move. On these grounds I do not myself attach any serious weight to the argument against action on our part of not giving Russia an excuse. Russia, with or without an excuse, will make her advance on the Persian Gulf as soon as she feels herself in a position to do so. In my view she is probably at present fully occupied so far as railway construction is concerned, and it pays her to bide her time. Imperial ideas also have just now rather the upper hand in England.

Very likely true.
C[URZON].

So far as railway construction is involved, we are not in a position to prevent the situation which Colonel Gardiner deprecates. Persia is still an independent country, and is at liberty to sign away her freedom in respect of railways, if she is weak enough to do so.
C[URZON].

I do not advocate any direct attempt to build railways in Persia itself at present. It seems to me that our approaches from the West and East may, and should, come first, but I think by selecting young officers with the necessary qualifications as Vice-Consuls, &c., and allowing them to march about and thoroughly investigate the subject in a quiet sort of way under colour of opening out trade routes, &c., we could obtain valuable reconnaissances of the various routes, and in a few years have ample details at our disposal from which to lay down our projects when the time comes for their execution. Where it was practicable also to start road-making, we might ensure that the roads would fit in with our railway schemes hereafter, and any extensions of telegraphs might also be adapted to the railway policy of the future. All this might be done in connection with the consolidation of our position in the southern and central portions of Persia which we look to as some day to come under our control without taking any more open or definite steps than we are apparently prepared to do at present.

This has been done for years. There is scarcely a caravan tract or route in Persia with which we are not quite familiar. I must myself have read the reconnaissances of at least 20 young officers specially deputed to Persia for the purpose.
C[URZON].

The Bakhtiari road is now being made. Concessions for the Tehran-Kum and Dizful-Khorremabad roads have for years been in the possession of British individuals or institutions. But roads do not pay in a country where traffic is solely by camels and mules. Persia is not yet ready for wheeled traffic.
C[URZON].

Your Excellency, in the draft despatch, writes that we are already in a position to judge of the railways very few in number that under existing conditions it would be prudent, if it were possible, to construct in Persia. I understand Your Excellency recognises as the line of the future the Khanikin-Seistan route, and that this might be connected with the Persian Gulf (1) at Bushire and (2) at Bunder Abbas, or some point further to the eastward. (I write from recollection of the views expressed in Your Excellency's book which unfortunately I have not got by me to refer to.) With such a definite scheme in their minds, our officers could quietly obtain all the details necessary for the preparation of a reliable project, the detailed execution of which would afterwards be a simple matter particularly if the road and telegraphic communications had been adapted to fall in with the scheme.

Possibly, but a remote future.
C[URZON].

With the exception of a few lines (and I am doubtful about that), no British Company will dream of constructing railways in Persia without either a British or an Indian guarantee. But neither Government is at all likely to give it.
C[URZON].

The foregoing refers to action within Persia itself. To the eastward Your Excellency's Minute foreshadows a steady improvement in the connection between India (Baluchistan) and Seistan culminating in the construction of a railway. In this policy I venture to express my entire concurrence. As part of it I presume we should have before long a light inexpensive line of telegraph, and it seems to me that the opening of such a line (following the alignment of the railway of the future) might well be made the excuse for bringing under our control the telegraphs of Eastern Persia, and putting into an efficient state, by advice, free supervision and judicious supply of materials, their connection with the European managed lines to the west and with the Persian Gulf lines to the south. As a means of consolidating our position in the country without any very great expenditure or display, this line of action, which is more or less suggested in the papers, would undoubtedly be of great value.

A report has recently been presented by Mr. Armstrong, who was specially deputed to examine the country between Quetta and Seistan with a view to a line of telegraph. His report, concurred in by Mr. Pitman, is entirely unfavourable. He estimates the initial cost of such a line at Rs. 11,40,700, the annual charges at Rs. 1,16,800.
C[URZON].

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To the westward, that is between the Mediterranean and the Persian frontier at Khanikin, it would seem possible to do a good deal. The revival at home of the interest in the Baghdad railway project now noticeable in the public press gives us an opportunity. The endeavours that are being made, both by ourselves and others, to obtain the control of the telegraphs through Mesopotamia and down to the Persian Gulf afford also another opening. In my humble opinion both are matters of great Imperial interest, and I cannot look on any chance of the control of the country to the north-west of the Persian Gulf passing into the hands of any strong Power as otherwise than a serious menace to our interests, both Imperial and Indian. From the latter point of view, the growth of the Indian export trade concurrently with the growth of the new Indian industries, tea, jute, cotton, coal, &c., which is a marked feature of the present stage of our Indian Empire, compels us, I consider, to lay great stress on the importance of keeping open and extending the markets for the products of these industries. In this connection the maintenance of our supremacy on the shores of the Persian Gulf and the safeguarding and spreading by all practicable measures of the markets for our goods in Persia and Asia Minor, seems to me a matter of the very highest importance. From these remarks, it will be gathered that I do not lay any great weight on the Euphrates valley system of railways in the narrow light of its forming an alternative, more or less overland, route to India, but that I view it as a means both strategically and commercially of holding on to, and opening out, the markets of the vast area they would serve to the trade of Great Britain from the West and our Indian Empire from the East.

I agree. C[URZON].

The reference in the despatch is to the possible acquisition by Powers other than Russia of a position in Southern Persia and the Gulf—not in the western sphere, *i.e.*, Turkish Arabia. But this may be made clearer, and the paragraph can be strengthened.

C[URZON].

On this account I venture to deprecate the tone of paragraph 60 of the draft despatch which, I submit, scarcely gives the weight that should be attached to the western portion of the subject under consideration.

The only other remark I would wish to make is that paragraph 62 seems to me to be wanting in any definite expression of opinion on our part. We place the *pros* and *cons* before the Secretary of State, but do not clearly state the course of action we recommend.

This can be added if Council accept the policy laid down.

C[URZON].

I understand the despatch as accepting the sphere of influence policy, and that what we desire is that negotiations be entered into with Russia on that basis. If I am correct, would it not be well to say so in unmistakeable language?

While I am in accord with the despatch in so far as it goes, I venture to submit these remarks for Your Excellency's consideration.

R. G[ARDINER],—6-9-99.

Politically and financially it would be wise to accept some expenditure in order to build up our influence in Eastern and Southern Persia and in the Persian Gulf. Such expenditure will be in the nature of a premium for insurance against disturbance: for the day that Russia attains a strong position in South-East Persia, or, through the co-operation of some foreign Power, in the Gulf, the military and financial strain already imposed upon us would be enormously increased.

That Russia aims at acquiring such a position is to my mind beyond question. With Afghanistan converted into a place *d'armes*, she will follow the line of least resistance; turn the corner of that hornet's nest; and reach down to the Gulf where she may certainly expect diplomatic, if not material, support.

It is just possible that Russian pressure southward might be averted if a diplomatic agreement were arrived at dividing Persia into British and Russian spheres of influence. Perhaps I may hazard the opinion that a satisfactory agreement of this character is improbable. It seems to me that Russia would have more to lose than to gain by it.

This also is my opinion, but it is not Lord Salisbury's. C[URZON].

Even if such an agreement were possible, we should still not be relieved from the necessity of incurring expenditure to establish our position in the British sphere. On the contrary, the rate of expenditure would probably be greater, for, if no agreement is signed, I think it is clear that our efforts, though constant and well considered, would have to be unostentatious and tentative, so as not to precipitate an active rivalry.

What precise expenditure in the contingency either of a partition of Persia into spheres, or of a continuance of the *status quo*, Indian revenues may be called upon to bear, it is impossible at this moment to define. As I have said I think some expenditure is justifiable and inevitable. I may go further and say that I think no item of military or political expenditure with the exception of the re-armament of our native troops is probably more urgent.

But it must be recollected that we have practically reached the limits of taxation in India; that indeed the salt-tax is too high and ought to be reduced to give us the one financial reserve possible for emergencies; that the demands for military expenditure are enormous; and that,

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though we expect to place our currency on a sound basis, and thereby to quicken the development of India's resources, the effect of this reform will not show itself in our revenue for some time to come.

However, looking to the masterly analysis of Imperial and Indian interests in Persia in this draft, to the striking disproportion between the Imperial and Indian contributions in Persia and Turkish Arabia now revealed, and to the fact that our demand for a revision of this expenditure is likely to be powerfully supported by Lord Welby's Commission, it is not improbable that the policy now advocated will result in some immediate saving to India.

In connection with the question of revision, it is important to determine what principle shall govern the division of financial responsibility between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers.

Two alternative principles are proposed—

(1) The whole cost of diplomatic, consular, naval, telegraphic and other charges in Persia and Turkish Arabia might be divided in some fixed proportion.

(2) The Imperial and Indian Governments might, respectively, accept responsibility for those areas in which Imperial or Indian interests predominate, with a joint contribution towards the central (Tehran) establishment.

There are arguments on either side; but I incline to the latter arrangement, if it can be carried out.

My reasons are that, if India were responsible for the Indian area—which would, I take it, include Seistan—any action to be taken could be taken more *quickly* and more *quietly*. That is chiefly a political reason, though there is much to be said for having our contribution entirely within our control. And, financially, references to London for increasing any part of a total contribution divided in fixed proportions would be troublesome. Moreover, if, in an emergency, we anticipated London, we should very likely find it difficult to get the Home Government to accept any responsibility for the amount expended in anticipation.

I quite agree with Mr. Dawkins's preference, and also with his reasons for arriving at it. I would add another, *viz*, that the second arrangement is far more likely to be accepted by the Home Government than the first. I am willing to add a paragraph as suggested. On the other hand, it must be remembered that under the second plan India will certainly have to pay more (and probably in an increasing ratio) than under the first.

C[URZON].

Possibly some argument in this direction could be introduced into paragraph 69 of the draft.

I may illustrate my contention by a reference to such expenditure as the Quetta-Seistan route may entail. Such expenditure must, I think, grow in a tentative and gradual manner and by small amounts at a time.

I had hoped to be able to append to this note some remarks on the figures given in the draft of the Imperial and Indian shares of the existing expenditure. These figures are being checked and examined in the Finance Department, but I regret that the process is not yet finished, and I did not like to delay this note further.

If I have any remarks to make, I will submit them separately. They will not, in any case, touch the principles laid down in the draft.

C. E. D[AWKINS],—7-9-99.

I quite concur in the policy outlined, and have no criticism to offer on the details.

I should* like to have some further information on the military part of the question: say, a note showing the bases from which, and the lines along which, we can move troops towards the Persian frontier. Perhaps the Military Members of Council can explain this part of the case.

* I do not think that a note will be required. With the assistance of my Military Colleagues, I can explain the matter in Council.

C[URZON].

My chief reason for voting to postpone the Khyber and Kabul valley proposals was that, if we spend money and possibly stir up quarrels in that direction, we may hamper ourselves in the important work of strengthening our position towards Persia and the Gulf.

T. R[ALEIGH],—7-9-99.

The only remark I have to make is that I entirely concur in all that is said in the proposed despatch. As regards the Quetta-Seistan railway, it is perhaps a question whether the connection between Quetta and Nushki might not with advantage be executed at once, but, for the reasons given in His Excellency the Viceroy's minute, it seems advisable to postpone even this portion of the work for the present, and wait till things develop a bit.

C. M. R[IVAZ],—9-9-99.

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

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No. of 1899.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

External.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD GEORGE F. HAMILTON,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

SIMLA, *the th September 1899.*

MY LORD,

We desire to address Your Lordship and, through Your Lordship, Her Majesty's Government on the subject of the relations of Great Britain with Persia. We might find an adequate reason for so doing in the fact that Your Lordship in your despatch of June 30th, 1899, enclosing a copy of a recent despatch to the Foreign Office from Sir M. Durand, Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran, concerning the maintenance of our influence in Persia, has directly invited an expression of the views of the Government of India upon this matter; and, while calling our attention to the desirability of improving the Political and Consular Service in that country, has at the same time stated your desire to be made acquainted with our opinions upon the remaining questions discussed by Sir M. Durand. But, in any case, we should have felt it our duty at an early date to address Your Lordship on the subject. Although the relations of Great Britain with Persia have for a period of exactly a century occupied a large, and perhaps at times a disproportionate, space upon the field of international diplomacy; although during that time Great Britain has twice broken off diplomatic relations and has once been at war with Persia in vindication of British interests in or upon the borders of that country; and, although large sums of money have been throughout the present century and are still annually expended in the maintenance of those interests, both by Her Majesty's Government and by the Government of India, we have not been able to discover in our records any clear definition of the principles upon which our policy towards the Persian kingdom is based, of the objects which it should keep in view, or of the scope and limits of the respective shares of responsibility, political and financial, which should be assumed by the two partners, *viz.*, Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India, who are jointly concerned in the defence of Anglo-Indian interests in the dominions of the Shah.

2. We feel that there is at the present time the greater need for such a discussion, because of the facts, which must be patent to all, that the Persian Government appears well nigh to have exhausted all power of recuperation or reform; and that the country, but feebly held together by any tie either of race, religion, or loyalty, is only saved from a fate to which it must otherwise have long ago succumbed, partly by a superficial vitality not infrequently seen in political organisms, especially in the East, even when in an advanced stage of decay, still more by the rival ambitions of the two great European Powers between whom its territories are placed, and who are the real arbiters of its

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destiny. These conditions have already displayed a durability in excess of any *a priori* expectations, and they may yet continue for a while, in the absence of any startling change of environment, to survive. But they cannot, in the nature of things, be permanent. A nation and a Government, such as the Persian, may tremble for long upon the verge of certain dissolution, from the absence of the particular impulse that is required to propel them over the brink. But in the last resort, and often by accident, the impetus is communicated, and the already shattered structure tumbles into irretrievable ruin.

3. We think that there are signs that such an issue, if not immediately impending in Persia, is drawing near. The rule of the present Shah is distinctly and uniformly weaker than that of his predecessor. The dissolvent agencies at work in the Persian kingdom are more active and persistent. Meanwhile, the encroachments of Russian power are steadfastly pursued and are less veiled by any pretence of concealment. Other Governments and nationalities, either impelled by the secret obligations of international sympathies, or attracted by a desire to share in the probable spoils, are appearing upon the scene; and there is every reason to believe that, as in the case of the Ottoman Empire and of China, so also here, the property of the sick man, should no steps be taken in advance to prolong his existence, and should the end come before any testamentary dispositions have been made, is likely to be subject of bitter contention between the various parties who may demand to be included among his heirs.

4. We desire, therefore, not merely to examine, in response to Your Lordship's invitation, the particular steps that may require to be taken for the maintenance or extension of British interests in Persia at the present juncture, but to survey a wider field, and, while there is yet time, to discuss how those interests should be definitely safeguarded in the future that seems to be imminent, and what part in the outlay or in the measures that may be necessitated for that end, should be assumed respectively by Her Majesty's Government and by the Government of India. Sir M. Durand himself concludes his despatch by saying that "the time has come for us to lay down a definite line of policy". We concur in this opinion, but we interpret the obligation thus admitted in a broader sense than Her Majesty's Minister has done; and we think that no mere stop-gap measures, however useful they may individually be, will avail for the permanent protection of our position in Persia, unless a clear understanding be arrived at in advance as to what that position is and what it demands.

5. It may not be inappropriate to state, in the first place, what we conceive British, *i.e.*, Anglo-Indian, interests in Persia to be. They are commercial, political, strategical and telegraphic. The total annual value of British trade with Persia has been estimated by Sir M. Durand (and, from the calculations that we have made, we believe the estimate to be below the mark) as approximately three and-a-half millions sterling; and while a great deal of this trade, particularly in the south and east, is with British India, yet the northern and western avenues of entry are devoted in the main to commercial connections with the British Isles. The total volume of Anglo-Persian trade continues, in spite of the difficulties encountered and the increasing insecurity in Persia, to rise and, under a more efficient and less venal régime, would probably attain to much larger dimensions. Similarly, although the experience of the past decade has not been encouraging to British mercantile investment in Persia, as the experience of the Tobacco Régie, the Persian Mining Rights Company, and other ventures, has shown, there is nevertheless a good deal of British capital sunk in various industrial undertakings in different parts of the country.

6. The political interests of Great Britain in Persia, although they date originally from a period before India had become a British interest at all, were, in their revival a century ago, in the main Indian in inception, and are still largely Indian in character. It would be unfair, however, at the present day to

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attribute to them an exclusively Indian complexion. Ever since the first visit of the late Shah to Europe, Persia has been drawn increasingly into the vortex of European politics. Neither France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Holland, nor Belgium own possessions contiguous to the Persian dominions. Their commercial stake in the country is relatively small. Notwithstanding they find it to their interest to maintain, what are in some cases costly and extensive, diplomatic establishments at Tehran, and they occupy a minor, but nevertheless a definite, position upon the local diplomatic stage. It is to be surmised, therefore, that, even had British India not existed, or had it passed into other hands, the British Government would nevertheless before now have been compelled to take an active political interest in Persian fortunes. Persia is in fact one of those countries which, whether or not they had fallen into the orbit of Western Powers, more vigorous than themselves, must inevitably have attracted the attention of Europe, partly from their increasing infirmity, but still more from the opportunities suggested by their latent, though neglected, sources of strength. The two-fold British interest and responsibility here indicated have indeed been recognised by the system, now of long standing, under which the charges of the diplomatic establishment maintained by Her Majesty's Government at Tehran are shared between the Imperial and the Indian exchequers. That such a division of common interest has become necessary, that the politics of Tehran, which with one eye turned towards India looks with the other towards St. Petersburgh and Constantinople, are but one aspect of the eternal Eastern question, and that the control of British diplomacy at Tehran must therefore be vested in the hands of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, are propositions which 40 years ago were hotly contested by certain schools of thought, but that will not any longer be a matter of dispute. They serve to illustrate the Imperial, as distinct from the purely Indian, character of Anglo-Persian relations.

7. The strategical interests of Great Britain in Persia arise from conditions with which India is most intimately concerned. Long before the boundaries of British India had been extended to their present limits, or before Russia had become a great Central Asian Power, approaching or impinging at many points upon the Indian frontiers, the fortunes of Persia, though not at that time a coterminous country, had become a matter of vital concern to the British dominion in India. In the early years of the present century, when the ambitions of France were the main source of apprehension, it was through Persia that a blow at British supremacy was expected to be struck, and that an invasion of India was planned. The same idea has re-appeared at intervals since. Now that the boundaries of Afghanistan, which have been demarcated and guaranteed by Great Britain, march for many hundreds of miles with those of Persia; that Persian territory is also coterminous for hundreds of miles with Baluchistan, a State under a British Protectorate, and in large measure actually administered by the officers of the Government of India; and that the sea which washes the southern coasts of Persia is one in which, both from its proximity to the Indian Ocean and as a result of the exertions of the past century, Indian interests and influence have become supreme—it is clear that Persia has assumed a strategical importance, in relation to British India, which might not be serious, were the resources or the designs of that country itself alone to be considered; but which is indisputably great, when it is remembered that closely pressing upon Persia and upon Afghanistan is the ever-growing momentum of a Power whose interests in Asia are not always in accord with our own, and that the Persian Gulf is beginning to attract the interest of other and sometimes rival nations. These conditions, however, while they indicate the supreme concern which those who are responsible for the government of India cannot fail to feel in the fortunes of Persia, are nevertheless sufficiently obvious in their general application to render it unnecessary for us to point out their far more than local range, or to argue that they affect not merely the destinies of British dominion in India, but those of the British Empire. It is from this point of view that we hold strongly the opinion that Persia in its strategical, no less than in its political, aspect is not only an Indian, but is also an Imperial,

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concern, and that we feel no hesitation in appealing to Her Majesty's Government for a frank and generous recognition of this common responsibility.

8. The telegraphic interests of Great Britain in Persia may be said to be evenly divided between the mother-country and India. For whilst on the one hand the wires that have been constructed between the north-west frontier and Tehran, and which provide the earlier link in the Persian section of the main overland connection with the East, are in the hands of a Company whose domicile is in London, from Tehran onwards to the Gulf the undertaking is conducted by an establishment that is recruited and paid for by the Government of India, while its head-quarters are in the India Office in London. This two-fold system exists in order to maintain a connection which may be said to be equally British and Indian, since it is equally indispensable to the interests of both countries; but which also has an ulterior and wider scope, inasmuch as the Trans-Persian wires, and the sub-marine cables by which they are supplemented in the Persian Gulf, are largely utilised for the conveyance of messages between Great Britain and places lying beyond India, notably the Australasian Colonies. From a calculation based upon the aggregate results of the past five years, we have ascertained that no less than 30 per cent of the total traffic is of this description. Nevertheless the cost, in so far as it is borne by either Government, devolves exclusively upon the Indian, and not upon the Home, Exchequer.

9. Such are the main interests of Great Britain in Persia. It will be observed that the shares that may be claimed by the mother-country and by India in the sum total of those interests, have in the passage of time become so interwoven and fused as to render the task of separating or distinguishing them neither easy nor profitable. It may not be difficult, as we shall endeavour to argue later on, to distinguish between sources of expenditure which should more properly fall to the charge of the one or the other partner. But we maintain that enough has been said to prove that on the broad field of international policy Persia is not exclusively an Indian interest, but is emphatically an Imperial interest of Great Britain; and that the latter should be prepared to exert her full strength for the defence of that interest, should it be jeopardised or impugned.

10. In discussing the manner in which it is desirable that these principles, if accepted, should be carried into action, we are anxious at the outset to make our position, in one respect, perfectly clear. We have no desire to make an addition to the political or territorial responsibilities of India, for which we have not, under existing conditions, the means either in money or in men. We are not about to propose that there should be established any Protectorate, open or covert, over any part of the Shah's dominions, that might compel us in the future to hold the country so protected by force of arms. We can conceive of circumstances that might some day tempt both the Indian and the Home Governments from this attitude of reserve, and that would in a case where the vital interests of the Empire were at stake, force us to consider a burden for which our shoulders are still unprepared. But for the present our ambitions are exclusively limited to making secure the interest which we have already built up, and still more to preventing it from being undermined or taken from us by others, with the result not only of a considerable accretion of strength to them, but of positive detriment to ourselves. We have, in fine, no desire to disturb the political *status quo* in Persia so long as it can be maintained. We prefer indeed, weak as it is, to invest it with such renewed vitality as may be found possible. But we press for an early decision and for early action, since, unless we bestir ourselves, there is good reason for fearing that the already trembling balance may be disturbed by others to our disadvantage.

11. We now proceed to draw a picture of the present state of British interests in Persia, as they present themselves to our eyes, and to examine the dangers by which they appear to be threatened. Sir M. Durand has to a certain extent anticipated us in this task; and in so far as he has touched upon the same ground as that which we propose to cover, we shall not recapitulate

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what he has said. On the other hand, we think that we are in a position to fill in the outlines of his sketch with a good deal of additional detail; and it will be our duty to discuss the situation from the standpoint more particularly of those Indian interests, of which we are the constituted guardians.

12. The political destinies of a country and a Government, as weak as we have stated those of Persia to be, are likely to be determined in the main by her geographical position in relation to her neighbours. Of the four foreign Powers whose territories adjoin her own, two may be eliminated from the present discussion as being themselves lacking in the strength or vitality, likely to render their influence decisive, or their aggression to be feared. These are Turkey and Afghanistan, the latter of which, moreover, is under engagements with Great Britain that render it impossible for her to be considered, in her foreign relations, as an independent Power. There remain Russia and Great Britain. There is a curious correspondence, but there are also notable differences, between the positions of these two Powers *vis à vis* with Persia. The entire northern frontier of Persia is now contiguous with Russian territory, with the exception of that portion which borders upon the Caspian Sea—a distinction, but not a difference, inasmuch as that sea has to all intents and purposes been converted into a Russian lake. Russian territory also overlaps the north-east corner of the Persian dominions. Great Britain enjoys a somewhat similar preponderance of influence on the south, by virtue of her hitherto unchallenged supremacy, both naval and commercial, in the Persian Gulf; while, owing to recent developments on the side of Baluchistan, her land territories also touch those of Persia upon the south-east. But there are these broad differences between the two positions: firstly, that whereas the Russian territories that are limitrophe with Persia on the north are continuous either with those of European or with those of Asiatic Russia, the immense resources of both of which dominions can be brought by a skilfully designed system of railways, and deposited with little trouble and with no delay, upon the Persian frontier itself—the forces of Great Britain, if required for purposes either of menace or attack, would require to be conveyed by sea and would be separated by a great distance from their base; the land connection on the Perso-Baluch side being as yet too precarious and remote to admit of its being taken into serious consideration in the present context; secondly, that whereas the Russian land approaches upon the north are in her own exclusive possession, the maritime access of Great Britain on the south is equally open to any other Power possessing a naval marine. Hence the marked and inevitable distinction between the power of persuasion or menace possessed by Russia in the north, as compared with that at the disposal of Great Britain in the south, the advantage enjoyed by the former being enhanced by the fact that the Persian capital and Court are situated in the northern or Russian and not in the southern or British zone of influence.

13. In these circumstances it is not surprising to read of the increasing and indisputable supremacy which Russia has established in Northern Persia, as described by Sir M. Durand. While not repeating his demonstration, we may supplement it by saying that, while we think that no efforts should be spared to safeguard so much as is left to us of the trade that enters the country by the Trebizond-Tabriz route, of the trade of Tehran, and of that of North-East Persia (concerning which it may be noted that the imports into Meshed from British India which in 1893-94 represented a value of £198,500 and in 1894-95 of £312,000, have in 1897-98 sunk to £130,000), and while as long as the capital remains at Tehran, which is also the centre of important British interests in the shape of the Telegraph administration and the Imperial Bank of Persia, it is essential that British influence there should be asserted on a scale as nearly as possible equivalent to that of Russia—we are yet of opinion that the advantages enjoyed by Russia in the field under discussion are so overwhelming as to render any attempt to dispute or to shake her position there fruitless; and that our own energies can with greater wisdom and with superior chances of success be directed towards the protection and consolidation of the

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British sphere of influence in the centre and south. It is to a more critical examination of this subject that we now turn.

14. Sir M. Durand has in his despatch drawn a line across Persia from Khanikin on the Turkish frontier on the west, through Kermanshah, Hamadan, Ispahan, Yezd and Kerman to Seistan and the Afghan frontier on the east, as indicating approximately the existing line of partition between the British and Russian spheres of influence both political and commercial in Persia.

15. Following the same order from the west, we concur with what he has written about the importance of fostering the Baghdad trade route *viâ* Kermanshah to Tehran, British commerce by which approaches in value to £1,000,000 per annum. This is a route of peculiar value both to British and to Indian trade, and one upon which we should on no account forfeit the supremacy. We have no hesitation in recommending, with Sir M. Durand, the substitution of a British Vice-Consul at Kermanshah for the present native agent: although we think that the cost of the proposed appointment which lies outside of what may be called the more strictly Indian zone, and which will be subordinate to the Consulate-General at Tehran, should be borne by Imperial and not by Indian revenues.

16. Whatever be the prospects of opening up, either by road or by railway (and concerning the latter we are sceptical), the country that lies northward of the Karun River, and that is inhabited by the Lurs and other nomad tribes, it is certain that British influence has obtained a material foothold in that corner of the Shah's dominions, through which the Karun flows in its middle and lower course, and where the road now being constructed through the Bakhtiari country, by contract between the Bakhtiari Chiefs and Messrs. Lynch, should open an alternative and almost exclusively British door of commercial access to Ispahan. We do not express any opinion as to the ideas which Sir M. Durand has more than once put forward as to the desirability of raising a local irregular force under British officers from the tribes in this part of Persia. Such a scheme would appear to postulate a firmer and more permanent footing than we have as yet established in South-West Persia. Nevertheless we think that no opportunity should be lost of strengthening our influence with the Arab, Bakhtiari and Lur tribes—an effort to challenge which from a rival quarter appears likely before long to be made—and we concur in Sir M. Durand's recommendations as to the desirability of establishing a Consulate on the Karun, reserving for a subsequent paragraph our opinion as to the proper incidence of the cost.

17. Continuing in an easterly direction, we have noticed from the recent Consular Report of Mr. J. R. Preece, Her Majesty's Consul at Ispahan, that "British trade in Ispahan has shown during the last two years, if not an absolute decrease, at all events no expansion whatever", while great strides have been made in Russian importations, notably of glassware and hardware. We agree with Sir M. Durand in thinking that the British Consul should be raised in respect of title and pay to the same level as the recently arrived Russian representative, although, as this is a matter which mainly concerns the English Foreign Office, we are not clear that we are called upon to advise upon the subject. We cannot, however, too strongly emphasise our opinion that in any partition either of commercial or political spheres of influence in Persia, Ispahan, the old (and, if Persia should ultimately break up, possibly a future) capital, the seat of the Sefavi dynasty, the principal market of Central Persia, and (far more than Tehran) the focus of Persian nationality, must, on every ground, be included in the zone in which British interests are supreme.

18. We also concur with Sir M. Durand in thinking that British interests are most inadequately represented at Shiraz by the present native agent, who is a nonentity, without influence or power; and that the experiment of bringing the Resident in the Persian Gulf, who is also Consul-General for Fars, to reside

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during the summer at the capital of the province, which is within his official area of jurisdiction, should be given a further trial. Colonel Wilson in 1895 and Colonel Meade in 1898 spent the summer months at Shiraz, but were compelled to hire house accommodation at their own expense. If these visits are made recurrent, we are inclined to think that, as no suitable house appears to be open either to purchase or to rent, a site should be purchased and a house erected thereon. To this suggestion also we will revert. Shiraz is a place of considerable importance; and were it not for the great influence that has for long been exercised there by the officials of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, British interests must have suffered from the neglect to which they have hitherto been exposed.

19. The districts lying to the east of Ispahan and Shiraz contain the important cities and trade-centres of Yezd and Kerman, connected by one of the principal postal and caravan tracks of Persia. Both of these towns and districts lie south of the natural line of division between Northern and Southern Persia; and in both British commercial and political influence has, in recent years, been actively vindicated. In September 1893, Mr. Fergusson, the Manager of the local branch of the Imperial Bank, was appointed unpaid Vice-Consul at Yezd. Sir M. Durand now suggests that a Vice-Consul, if appointed to Bunder Abbas, might pass his summer at Yezd, where it is no doubt intrinsically desirable that British commercial interests should be represented by some one not engaged in business or trade. We will for the moment reserve our comments upon this suggestion. At Kerman, which is the capital of an important province, and the seat of a Governor-General, the appointment of a British Consul, which was first sanctioned under exceptional circumstances in the case of Captain Sykes in 1894, has at frequent intervals since, the latest being our despatch of August 10th, 1898, been the subject of discussion between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India. The present position is this, that for 5 years the Government of India have expressed their willingness to contribute one-half of the cost of the Kerman Consulate up to a limit of Rs. 6,000 per annum. The views of the Foreign Office upon this proposal, which was communicated to it by Your Lordship on September 21st, 1898, have not yet been received by us. Sir M. Durand now proposes that this Consulate should be made permanent, and that possibly a native agent under its orders should be sent to Bampur. Before discussing these proposals, we think it advisable to analyse the larger issues raised by the questions of Seistan and the Persian Gulf.

20. Concerning Seistan, its importance and the present position there, we refer Your Lordship to a Minute which has been written by the Viceroy, who has made a special study of the question, and which is enclosed with this despatch. The facts enumerated by him are, we think, sufficient to show that Seistan is, by reason of its geographical position in relation both to North Khorasan, to Western Afghanistan, to British Baluchistan, and to the Persian Gulf, a position of no small strategical importance. Seistan is the present meeting point of the advanced pioneers of British and Russian influence. Perhaps on the whole, owing to recent activity on our part, the British position and chances are the more hopeful. It is essential in the future, for reasons which have been argued in the Viceroy's Minute, that Seistan should be retained in the British zone. It is fortunately not too late to secure that consummation. The steps which should be taken with that object will be examined when we formulate our final recommendations at the close of this despatch.

21. South of Seistan lies the still imperfectly known district of Persian Baluchistan. Every year this province is being brought into closer contact with British associations, partly from the visits of British officers, partly from the wide-spreading influence exercised by the Nushki–Seistan Trade route, still more from the close connections, political and racial, prevailing between the inhabitants of the two sides of the Perso-Baluch border—a condition of affairs which is likely to be confirmed by the inevitable increase of British influence in the dominions of the Khan of Kalat.

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22. Our inspection of the various sub-areas composing what we have described as the British sphere, has now brought us to the Persian Gulf—a subject which—no doubt from its more exclusively Indian aspect and bearing—has only been lightly touched upon by Sir M. Durand, but upon which it is necessary that we should address Your Lordship at greater length.

23. The *de jure* position in the Persian Gulf is that of a sea open to the flag of all nations, the northern shores and territorial waters of which are included in the dominions of Persia, while its western and southern coasts are partially owned and partially claimed by Turkey, or are in the occupation of Arab tribes, who have entered into treaty relationships of varying character, constituting a sort of veiled Protectorate, with Great Britain. The islands in the Gulf are owned either by Persia, or by Arab Chiefs (in the case of Bahrein under British protection); but upon one of the Persian Islands, *viz.*, Kishm, Great Britain possesses a piece of land by virtue of an original grant from the Imam of Maskat, to whom the island once belonged. Outside the entrance to the Persian Gulf, but included in the same political system, are, on the northern shore of the Arabian Sea, the coasts of Persian Baluchistan, along which the overland wires of the Indo-European Telegraph Company run as far as Jask, where a reserve of English territory exists under an agreement concluded in 1887 between the British and Persian Governments, and where a detachment of Indian troops, who had previously been stationed there between the years 1879 and 1887, was replaced in January 1898 in consequence of the murder of a British telegraph official and the disturbed state of Persian Baluchistan. A larger detachment was at the same time despatched to Charbar, near the eastern limits of the same province. On the southern and western coasts is the still independent kingdom or Sultanate of Oman (Maskat).

24. The *de facto* position upon the waters and on the shores of the Persian Gulf reflects a more positive British predominance than the preceding paragraph might indicate. In the early years of the present century, the slave trade was rampant in the Gulf, and the vessels of the Indian Marine were engaged in a long and arduous struggle with the Arab pirates who infested its southern coasts. This conflict which was conducted entirely by British agency and means, without any help from the Persian Government, resulted in the establishment of treaty relations with the great majority of the Arab Chiefs, under which they bound themselves to observe perpetual peace and to refer all disputes to the British Resident at Bushire. The *pax Britannica*, which has ever since, with rare exceptions, been maintained, is the issue of these arrangements and is the exclusive work of this country. Of similar origin were the soundings of the channels and the surveys of the shores of the Persian Gulf, which the navigators of all nations owe to the labours of a long line of naval officers of the Indian service. Meanwhile, British trade has acquired almost a monopoly of the foreign commerce of the Gulf ports. Indian Bunias from Shikarpur and other parts of Sind have settled in considerable numbers at Lingah, Bunder Abbas, Bushire and Bahrein. They frequently farm the customs. The foreign imports and exports pass through their hands. These are for the most part conveyed to and from the Gulf in British ships, more than one Anglo-Indian Company (the 'British India', the 'Bombay and Persia', and the 'Anglo-Arabian and Persian Gulf') having maintained for years a merchant steamer service between Karachi and Basrah, touching at the Gulf ports on the way, whilst the rival ventures that have occasionally been attempted by foreign nations have uniformly failed and have been withdrawn.

25. As the result of careful calculations of the trade returns of the three years, 1895-96-97, which are the latest at our disposal, we have ascertained that the total value of Imports and Exports in the Persian Gulf (including the Persian ports of Bunder Abbas, Lingah, Bushire, and Mohammerah; the Arab ports on the opposite coast; and Bahrein) in that triennial period amounted to £17,241,300 (at the rate of Rs. 15=£1). Of this total, Local trade accounted for £5,124,000, and External trade for £12,117,300; while of the latter total the trade with British possessions (including India) amounted to £9,709,500,

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or over 80 per cent of the entire External trade. In the same three years, out of a total of 2,161 steamers which entered and cleared from the Gulf ports, 2,039 were British, and their tonnage represented 84 per cent of the total tonnage. If the returns of Persian ports alone be required, the figures are Total trade, £11,172,000, of which Local trade = £2,169,400 and External trade = £9,002,600, the British proportion of the latter being £7,494,200, or 83 per cent. To these totals in either case there should, in our opinion, certainly be added those of Basrah, which amounted in the same triennial period to £2,157,300. Unfortunately the manner in which these have been prepared, do not admit of our distinguishing the countries of origin or destination. The proportion, however, that should properly be assigned to Anglo-Indian commerce may be inferred from the British percentage of shipping, that entered or cleared from that port in the three years referred to. It amounted to no less than 93 per cent both of the number and tonnage of the steamers engaged.

26. During the last thirty years the maintenance of the sub-marine cables of the Indo-European Telegraph Company from Fao to Jask, and of the land lines from that place to Karachi, has also devolved upon the Indian Government, and has tended to increase an already preponderant influence over both the waters and the shores of this sea. Latterly there has been a deliberate but necessary consolidation of our influence in certain quarters where trouble threatened or where rivalry was feared. At the north-west extremity of the Gulf, we have, under instructions from Her Majesty's Government, entered into engagements with the still independent Sheikh of Koweit, by which he has bound himself and his successors not to receive the representative of any other Power and not to alienate any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power—a proceeding which was dictated by the increasing encroachment of Turkish authority and by the incipient intrigues of other Powers. Similar machinations are known to be in progress at Bahrein, and will require to be counteracted by a more strict enforcement of the conditions to which the Sheikh is by treaty bound. Outside the entrance to the Persian Gulf, but included within the sphere of its political influence, the Arab State of Maskat has for years been controlled by British influence; its trade is similarly in Anglo-Indian hands; and its ruler has not merely for years been subsidised by the Government of India, but in 1891 entered into an Agreement with us, under the orders of Her Majesty's Government, not to alienate any portion of his dominions to any other Power.

27. Such, briefly summarised, is the position that has been won by Great Britain, not without the expenditure of many millions of money and the sacrifice of many valuable lives, in the Persian Gulf. In its vindication we have more than once been called upon to enter into military occupation of ports or islands in the Gulf. The island of Kharak was occupied by Indian forces from 1838 to 1842, and again in 1856-57. Bushire was held during the latter years, as also were Mohammerah and Ahwaz upon the Karun. The occupation of these places was an illustration of the vigour with which in past years our ascendency has been maintained. Their abandonment was a proof of the reluctance which has invariably been displayed to emphasise or to perpetuate these responsibilities. The latter, however, no less than the British position in Southern Persia in general, are now threatened by an external competition, to the evidences of which we next turn.

28. Sir M. Durand has in general terms described the commanding position which the proximity of the Trans-Caspian Railway and of her Central Asian garrisons, the construction of the Ashkabad-Kuchan-Meshed cart-road, and the annual expenditure of large sums of money, have enabled Russia to take up in the politics and commerce of the province of Khorasan. We proceed to develop the argument by showing how the Khorasan position has been and is being utilised as the base of a further and more southerly advance.

29. It was in 1889 that the campaign of what may be termed the Russification of Khorasan was opened with the appointment of a Russian Consul-General at Meshed. In 1891 a native trader, named Haji Agha, appeared as

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Russian News-agent at Birjand; and an emissary of bad character, named Muhammad Rahim Khan, who had already been dismissed from the Russian service, was again taken into employ, and was posted as News-agent at Nasirabad in Seistan. In the succeeding years Russian Armenians, trained at Tiflis, were busily at work surveying the country in a southerly direction, as far as the borders of Persia and Baluchistan. In 1895 a more direct blow at the large Anglo-Indian trade which at that time still made its way through Khorasan into the Russian possessions in Central Asia, was struck by the introduction of a Customs Tariff in Trans-Caspia, absolutely prohibiting the entry into the Russian territories of all British or Indian products except indigo, tea and muslin, and these only under a heavy duty. In the same year M. Zaroudny, a Russian politico-geologist, Anglice surveyor, paid his first visit to Kain and Seistan. Russian News-agents were also placed at Tabbas and Neh, as well as at Birjand and Nasirabad.

30. In the meantime, in the latter part of 1896, the Government of India had decided upon taking active measures to open the long closed trading route from Quetta to Seistan. These intentions, and the prospective British interest in Seistan to which they testified, excited much concern in Russia; and in the following year the outbreak of plague in India offered to the Russian authorities a welcome opportunity of, at the same time, endeavouring to strangle the new enterprise at its birth, and increasing their own influence in Seistan. Under the pretext of establishing a protective cordon to safeguard the Perso-Afghan frontier in Persian interests from a disease which existed neither in Baluchistan nor in Afghanistan, Russian Cossacks under Russian officers were planted at a number of places in Persian territory, where they turned back every caravan (ignoring an agreement that had been arrived at between Great Britain and Persia for a 10 days quarantine upon caravans arriving from infected countries), declined to accept any orders except those which came directly from the Russian Legation, and for a time absolutely closed the Herat-Meshed road, in spite of orders to the contrary from the Persian Government—the object of this measure being to divert Afghan trade from Meshed to Panjdeh and Merv in Russian territory. It was significant that upon crossing the Russian frontier the caravans, which had been refused passage through Persia under any conditions, were only detained for three days in quarantine. The Persian Government, after a feeble protest, acquiesced in these proceedings; and it may almost be said that Southern Khorasan passed for a time under Russian control.

31. It was with the object of anticipating a similar Russian intervention in Seistan that, in the spring of 1897, the Government of India despatched Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh to superintend any preventive measures that might be required in that district. Already Lieutenant Webb Ware, who had visited Seistan in March, in connection with the trade route, had reported: "I was disagreeably astonished to find what ascendency Russia had gained throughout Seistan". Major Brazier-Creagh, a few months later, wrote: "I was by no means surprised to find what ascendency the Russians had gained in the country. In the past four years Russian activity has been very manifest. It is not limited to Seistan, but extends all along the Perso-Afghan frontier up to Meshed, News-writers and agents being established at all the important trade centres, *viz.*, Neh, Birjand, Tabbas, Khaf, and Turbat-i-Haidari".

32. The recommendations made by the British officer were ignored by the Persian authorities; and he had not been long in Seistan when the expected Russian doctor (Miladchevsky by name), with an escort of eight Cossacks, appeared upon the scene, a detachment of ten Cossacks under a Russian officer being also posted at Turbat-i-Haidari, 80 miles south of Meshed, a point of junction of several caravan roads, so as effectually to stop any traffic to or from Seistan. An incidental result of Dr. Miladchevsky's visit to Seistan was the dismissal, in consequence of a report from him, of the two native Russian agents to whom reference has been made, and their replacement by the Persian sub-contractors for customs for Kain and Seistan. These individuals proved to be equally faithless to the interests of their employers, and were

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relieved of the representation of Russian interests in April of the present year. It was then announced that a Russian, named Ziedler, had been appointed Russian Consul in Seistan—an announcement which was immediately followed by the despatch of Captain Sykes, hitherto British Consul at Kerman, to Seistan in a similar capacity. The Russian Consul would appear not yet to have taken up his post; and the Russian authorities are believed to be waiting to see the next move of Her Majesty's Government before deciding upon their own action.

33. Meanwhile in 1898, M. Zaroudny re-appeared upon the scene of his former labours, and on the present occasion pushed his politico-scientific studies as far south as Persian Baluchistan and Bampur. Early in the present year the Agent to the Governor-General at Meshed reported that two Russian officers, 1 doctor and 10 Cossacks were still at Turbat-i-Haidari, and 1 Russian Officer, 2 Medical Assistants and 10 Cossacks at Karez. There are also 58 Persian sowars scattered about at different places between Meshed and Seistan, who are paid through the Russian officers and take their orders from them. The recrudescence of plague in India has in fact provided an excuse for the continuance, just as its original appearance was pleaded in support of the introduction, of a *quasi*-Russian Protectorate in Southern Khorasan. A more active assertion of the same pretensions has since been witnessed in the mission of M. Stroeff, Dragoman to the Russian Consulate at Meshed, with presents valued at £1,400, to the Persian Governor of Kain, who is brother to the Governor of Seistan and is believed to covet the succession to that post. The sanitary plea was also advanced in the course of the past summer to explain the despatch of Russian dectors to Kerman and even to Shiraz. An interesting commentary upon these proceedings may be found in an observation in Lieutenant Webb Ware's report upon the Quetta-Seistan trade route for 1897-98, where he says that "the chief hindrance to the further development of this route is to be found in the obstructive measures taken by the Russian officers striving to further the interests of that country at the expense of India".

34. The facts which we have enumerated will, we think, be sufficient to convince Your Lordship of two propositions: firstly, that Russia regards with unconcealed aversion the opening of the British commercial route from India to Seistan and Khorasan, and will spare no efforts to rob it of success; secondly, that she regards with an interested eye the future of Seistan itself, and is already preparing, by a display of armed force and by the assumption of executive authority, to pave the way for an eventual inclusion within the Russian sphere of that portion of the Shah's dominions.

35. In the same context, and as illustrating the political and strategical object which such an advance may be believed to have in view, it will not be forgotten that during the past few years, the Russian Government have constructed a railway from Merv to Kushk upon the Afghan frontier within 80 miles of Herat, and have stacked at the terminus the railway plant for a future extension to Herat itself. Should any doubt be entertained as to the purpose for which this extension (which is destitute of any commercial justification) was planned, it may be solved by a reference to the frank admission made to Sir N. O'Conor by M. deWitte, Russian Minister of Finance, in June 1898, that it was designed "to enable Russia to attack Afghanistan in case of complications with England". When it is remembered that such an attack can only be made in direct violation of solemn international engagements, it is not, we think, incumbent upon us to argue at further length that the political ambitions of Russia in Eastern Persia, and in close proximity to the Afghan border, have an ulterior significance which it would be folly to ignore.

36. Nor can we divorce these proceedings from the idea that, in seeking to obtain a preferential footing in Seistan, Russia is not merely endeavouring to block a promising avenue of Anglo-Indian trade, and to acquire a position of potential menace to British interests on the western flank of Afghanistan, but that she is also concerned in the prosecution of an advance, which is not expected to terminate until it has brought her to the Persian Gulf. It is known

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that at least on one occasion negotiations for the cession to Russia of a Persian port at the eastern extremity of the Gulf have taken place between the Russian and the Persian Governments; and, if such negotiations have hitherto either proved abortive, or have been nominally repudiated by one or other of the parties concerned, it is yet, we think, in our power to show that they are not only not inconsistent with, but are definitely corroborated by, the evidences of Russian activity in Central and Southern Persia to which we now turn.

37. In 1897, a Russian Consul was appointed for the first time to Ispahan, where Russian imports had not hitherto greatly exceeded a total of 300 bales per annum. He was given a salary and title in excess of those enjoyed by the British representative. During the present year this official, Prince Dabiya, has been heard of at Shiraz and Bushire as the guest of the French Vice-Consul, and subsequently at Mohammerah and Shushter on the Karun, where he freely denounced British methods and ambitions. Sir M. Durand has recently informed us by telegraph that the corps of so-called Persian Cossacks at Tehran (*i.e.*, Persian soldiers trained and commanded by Russian officers) has been raised from 1,000 to 1,500 men, and that detachments of this corps have for the first time been taken with them to the south by the Governors of Shiraz and Arabistan. For the present the Russian officers have stayed behind; but it is not difficult to imagine the circumstances in which they might claim to rejoin their regiments. In 1897, M. Krugelow was sent from Jerusalem as Russian Consul to Baghdad, with the special object of reporting upon the acquisition by Russia of a coaling station in the Persian Gulf. This gentleman has taken much interest in Koweit, where Russian emissaries from Baghdad have been residing continuously during the present year. In this context it will not be forgotten that the concession recently sought for with the aid of the Russian Embassy at Constantinople by Count Kapnist, a Russian of high rank, for a railway from Tripoli in Syria to the Persian Gulf contemplated a terminus at Koweit.

38. In Bushire and Bunder Abbas the Russians have lately developed a marked interest. Two Russian doctors (Drs. Marc and Oust) arrived at Bushire in 1897 for the now familiar purpose of studying the plague, which, however, did not make its appearance until two years later, in 1899. Dr. Marc in 1897 occupied his waiting hours in visiting Bunder Abbas, from whence he was in the habit of despatching official reports to his Government, and where he magnanimously treated all patients free of charge. His medical pursuits at this place were assisted by a third Russian, named Adamoff, who appears to have been an artillery officer, and who subsequently visited Bushire and Basrah. In 1898 two other Russian doctors, named Rodzewitz and Kornajevski, appeared upon the scene, and visited Basrah, Bushire and Bunder Abbas. In December 1898 a fifth Russian doctor, named Paschkowski, arrived in the Gulf, and did not fail to pay the regulation visit to Bunder Abbas; while he displayed a considerable professional activity during the recent outbreak of plague at Bushire, where he has announced that, upon his approaching return to Russia, he is to be replaced by two compatriots. In connection with this medical propaganda, it will be in Your Lordship's recollection that when the first rumours were circulated of plague at Bushire in the past summer, the Russian Legation at Tehran at once announced their intention of sending doctors, with Cossack escorts, to Bushire as well as Shiraz, in order to establish a plague cordon for the protection of those places from the Indian pestilence, and that Russian doctors took up their quarters both at Shiraz and Kerman. These precautions might be thought to indicate a praiseworthy desire to close every conceivable channel of entry into Asiatic Russia against the plague, were they not, as has already been shown, in striking contrast with the laxity of system, that is at the same time observed both on the Perso-Russian and on the Russo-Afghan frontiers, across which alone can plague succeed in entering the Russian dominions. In continuation of our story it may be mentioned that in 1895 a Russian officer visited and surveyed the island of Hormuz opposite to Bunder Abbas, and that other and non-medical Russian emissaries

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have also recently been heard of at the latter place (the two latest, M. Babitchieff and Baron de Schedenore, as lately as August in the present year). It should not, moreover, be forgotten that it was Russian opposition that in 1898 broke down the loan to the Persian Government from the Imperial Bank of Persia, the security of which was to be the customs of the southern ports, to be collected by agents of the Bank.

39. We are aware that on April 18th of the present year, with reference to reports that have been published of Russian designs upon the island of Kishm, adjoining Hormuz, Count Mouravieff assured Sir C. Scott, Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, that "there was absolutely no intention on the part of the Russian Government to add to the burden of their existing responsibilities by acquiring outlying ports or stations which would require naval defence in time of war"; and we do not doubt that this emphatic assurance represents the views sincerely entertained by the Emperor of Russia. But our faith in the value of this assurance has been somewhat shaken by the later information received from a Persian official of high rank and station, known personally to the Viceroy, to the effect that he believes Russia to have acquired certain rights in regard to a port in the Persian Gulf, which however it may not suit her at once to enforce. Moreover there is in practice a limit to the duration of all such pledges, which, even if given by the sovereign, are not always regarded as binding by his officials; and previous experience is not altogether encouraging to the belief in a prolonged existence of the present undertaking, should circumstances compel an opposite course.. There are moreover other means, well-known to Her Majesty's Government from recent experience in other parts of the world, of obtaining political and territorial influence, independently of the actual acquisition of harbours or stations.

40. It is, in our opinion, more than a coincidence that simultaneously with the increasing Russian interest in Central and Southern Persia which we have described, there should also have been a notable revival of French activity in those quarters. In 1896 the Messageries Maritimes Company commenced a subsidised service from Bombay to the ports of the Persian Gulf; although, owing to vessels of unsuitable draught having been employed, the enterprise was not a success and was shortly abandoned. In 1897 a French Vice-Consul (M. Ferrand) was for the first time appointed at Bushire, although the value of French trade with the Persian Gulf in that year amounted only to the modest total of £82,618 (of which £73,899 was sugar). He was succeeded in 1898 by M. Bryois, who recently informed the agent of one of the British Trading Companies at Bushire that the French Government intended shortly to establish a subsidised line of steamers to Mohammerah and the Karun. It was perhaps in connection with this project that in March 1899, M. Bryois paid a visit to the Karun, where a French scientific party, under M. de Morgan, has for some time been engaged in politico-archæological researches in Arabistan. When the French Chargé d'Affaires, Comte d'Arlot, recently visited Ispahan, the Zil-es-Sultan vouchsafed the corroborative information to the British Legation that the object of these movements on the part of the French was to obtain a footing at Mohammerah, Shushter and Dizful. During our recent negotiations with the Sheikh of Koweit about the future of that harbour, it was with some surprise that we learned from him that the French had already approached him on the subject. In Bahrein a so-called French merchant, M. Goguyer, who until recently was engaged in Maskat in an attempt to revive the traffic in arms under the French flag, has been reported as endeavouring to induce the inhabitants to purchase French protection by the payment of small sums. In 1899 a French Consular Agency was established at Lingah, where the same ingenious system of manufacturing French subjects (for the most successful illustration of which we must look to Siam) was started, and where the French flag was hoisted by the Dragoman of the French Vice-Consul at Bushire. Finally, Her Majesty's Government are better aware than ourselves of the recent negotiations for a French loan to the Persian Government upon the security of the customs of the Gulf ports, and a promise of a railway monopoly in that country.

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41. French interests in the Persian Gulf, either political or commercial, are so small; her own territories are so distant; and the Gulf lies so far out of the track of her merchant vessels or men-of-war, that we are unable to construe these proceedings in any other light than as an attempt to cause trouble and annoyance to a possible rival, and to lend an independent assistance to the plans of a European ally. Substantial confirmation of these views will, in our opinion, be derived from a study of recent French action at Maskat, where, although French trade is infinitesimal, and a French man-of-war has been in the habit of paying a passing visit on an average only once in the year, the French Government have nevertheless during the past six months been endeavouring to obtain, under the guise of coaling facilities, a position which would provide them with an independent *pied à terre* in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf. This policy has been foreshadowed by the free grant of the French flag to Arab dhows, owning allegiance to the Sultan of Maskat, and is facilitated by the influence over the latter petty potentate that has been acquired by the French Vice-Consul, whose anti-British inclinations and intrigues are so well known to Her Majesty's Government as to require no recapitulation here. Confirmation of our suspicions regarding a Franco-Russian *entente* in Persia and in the Persian Gulf is further afforded by a telegram, dated June 7th, 1899, from Sir M. Durand to Colonel Meade, which has already been communicated both to Your Lordship and to the Foreign Office, and in which Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran remarks: "You may be quite certain that Russia and France are working in unison".

42. It should be noted that in the recent papers, with copies of which we have been favoured by Her Majesty's Government, we have found a repudiation of French ambitions in the quarter under discussion, no less explicit than that which we have already quoted from the lips of Count Mouravieff. On July 19th, 1899, M. Cambon said to Lord Salisbury that "France had no political aspiration whatever in the Persian Gulf; that she did not desire any kind of fortification or settlement or political privileges, or anything beyond the maintenance of those rights already insured to her by treaty". We have been gratified to read this assurance, by which we hope that succeeding French ministries may hold themselves bound. But we regret that it has not been communicated, not merely to Her Majesty's Government, but also to the French Agents in those regions, who do not appear to be equally acquainted with the views of the Government that they serve.

43. In recent years Germany has begun to display a positive and an increasing interest in Persia and also in the Persian Gulf. This interest has been the historical, and perhaps the natural, sequel of a commercial policy that has for some time aimed at securing the control of the principal railways in the Turkish dominions in Asia Minor, and of a political ambition, that more recently still, would appear to aim at the protection of the Ottoman Empire, alike in Europe and Asia. The obvious corollary to a system of German railways in Asia Minor, would be similar railroads to the Persian border and through Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf. Already, as Sir M. Durand has informed the Foreign Office, the Germans have procured a concession for the construction of a road from Khanikin, on the Turko-Persian frontier, to Tehran, and have apparently only abstained from pressing for a railroad in the same quarter, because of the violent opposition with which the Russian Minister met the proposal at Tehran. The second son of the Shah, Prince Malik Mansur, has been spending several months in 1898-99 in Germany, where his education and proclivities are reported as having acquired a marked philo-Teutonic tinge. German military instructors have been proffered for the reorganisation of the Persian army. Prolongations of the Turko-German railways to Baghdad and to the Persian Gulf have been and are still being freely discussed; and the German Government are endeavouring to procure an interest in the overland Turkish Telegraph to Fao. In the Gulf itself a German Consulate was established in 1897 at Bushire, to safeguard the interests of six German subjects in the entire ports of that sea. A Bremen firm opened business at Bushire, but the specially chartered steamers which were sent out from Germany appear to have been a

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failure. At Basrah a more resolute attempt is being made to capture the local market. Quite recently a number of Germans have for some time been engaged in a study of the situation at Bunder Abbas. During the spring of the present year, a German man-of-war, the "Arcona", visited Maskat, Lingah, and Bushire; and reports have reached us of the likely appearance, at no distant date, of a German line of merchant steamers in the Gulf.

44. While we regard these symptoms of increasing German interest in the Persian Gulf as emphasising the international aspect which the Persian question appears more and more destined to assume, and therefore as adding to the complexities of an already sufficiently difficult situation, we do not question the *bonâ fide* commercial enterprise which is carrying German trade there, as to so many other open seas and ports in the world, and we can conceive that we may even find, in the existence of German political interests, an occasional ally or safeguard for our own. German interests, however, have a tendency to grow with some rapidity, and by steps which are not always acceptable to their neighbours: and we think that the need for an early decision upon the future policy to be adopted by Her Majesty's Government is not diminished, but is enhanced, by the appearance of so active a competitor upon the scene.

45. Apart from the recurrent symptoms of activity on the southern and western shores of the Persian Gulf, with which Her Majesty's Government are familiar, the Turkish Government have also in recent years displayed an increasing interest in its political fortunes. A determined attempt has been made to fortify the shadowy pretensions of the Ottoman Porte to suzerainty over Koweit. A Turkish title has been conferred upon the Sheikh; and forces have more than once been assembled at Basrah for a contemplated expedition against that place. Intrigues are constantly in progress at Bahrein. During 1898 and 1899 a Turkish corvette has been a frequent visitor at Lingah, where, the Sheikh being of Arab descent, Turkish interests are supposed to exist. Finally, the decisions of the Venice Conference and the proceedings of the Sanitary Board at Constantinople have enabled Turkey to claim an interest in the navigation of those waters, of which she has not been slow to take advantage.

46. The only other recent evidences of foreign intervention in the Persian Gulf, of which we are cognisant, are a concession for the pearl-fisheries in that sea, which was given in 1898 by the Persian Government to a Spaniard and a Belgian, under Russian auspices; and the contemplated appearance at the Gulf ports of customs officers of Belgian nationality, similar to those who have already been placed in charge of the customs houses at Kermanshah and Tabriz, and whose influence, said to be omnipotent at the present moment with the Sadr Azam, is known to be entirely enlisted on the side of France and Russia.

47. We have gathered together these symptoms of external, and notably of Russian or of Russophil, interest in Southern Persia and in the Persian Gulf, not because we desire to invest them individually with an importance to which they are not entitled, but because collectively they indicate, in a manner that is not open to misinterpretation, the policy and ambitions of foreign Powers, and because we desire to impress upon Her Majesty's Government the fact that in an area, by land and by sea, which Great Britain regards with good reason as falling within her sphere of influence, that influence is being directly and increasingly challenged by other nations, who, in proportion as their foothold becomes more securely established, will resist any preferential claims, upon whatever foundation in history or in fact they may rest, and will claim for themselves an equality of right which in theory it may be difficult to contest.

48. More particularly do these considerations apply to the case of Russia, whose advance across the deserts that form a natural barrier of division between Northern and Southern Persia, cannot be regarded with anything but uneasiness by the Government of India, and the appearance of whose flag in the Persian Gulf would import a novel element of unrest into a situation that is at no time without its anxious features. We desire deliberately to say to

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Your Lordship, with a full consciousness of our responsibility in so saying that difficult as we find it in existing circumstances to meet the financial and military strain imposed upon us by the ever increasing proximity of Russian power upon the northern and north-western frontiers of India from the Pamirs to Herat, we could not contemplate without dismay the prospect of Russian neighbourhood in Eastern or Southern Persia, the inevitable consequence of which must be a great increase of our own burdens; while the maritime defensibility of India would require to be altogether reconsidered, were the dangers of a land invasion to be supplemented by the appearance of a possible antagonist as a naval power in waters contiguous to Indian shores.

49. We cannot pretend to divine the future, or to say whether any European Power, and if so which, will at any time push her advance to the point of claiming a maritime outlet in or near to the Persian Gulf. The fate of Mesopotamia lies beyond our ken: and it may be that in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, some stronger Power may one day exercise dominion at Baghdad, may occupy Basrah, and may demand access for its vessels to the neighbouring waters of the Gulf. Such a consummation, it is in our opinion, in the interests of British policy, as long as may be possible, to postpone. But upon the question of allowing any European Power, and more especially Russia, to overrun Central and Southern Persia, and so to reach the Gulf, or to acquire naval facilities in the latter even without such territorial connections, we do not conceive that any doubt whatever can be entertained; and we imagine that it will be accepted as a cardinal axiom of British policy that no such development would be acquiesced in by Her Majesty's Government. We would arrive with the greater confidence at this conclusion, since we were lately informed by Your Lordship that on April 15th of the present year, Lord Salisbury communicated to the Persian Government with reference to rumours of the cession of a port in the Gulf to Russia, that "Her Majesty's Government felt it to be their duty to renew the intimation that it would not be compatible with the interests of the British Empire that any European Power should exercise control or jurisdiction over the ports of the Persian Gulf".

50. Such being the existing situation in Southern Persia, and the principles of policy accepted by Her Majesty's Government being as already stated, we pass to a consideration of the manner in which these principles should be translated into action, and of the steps which should, in our opinion, be taken at the present juncture for the protection of the common interests of Great Britain and the Indian Empire.

51. We are aware that, more than half a century ago, there were exchanged, and have more than once since been repeated, certain explicit assurances concerning the integrity and independence of Persia between the Governments of Great Britain and Russia. The first of these assurances were entered into by Lord Palmerston and Count Nesselrode. The former in a despatch, dated September 5th, 1834, placed on record that "the Governments of Great Britain and Russia are acting, with regard to the affairs of Persia in the same spirit, and are equally animated by a sincere desire to maintain, not only the internal tranquillity, but also the independence and integrity of Persia". Count Nesselrode, in despatches, dated October 20th, 1838, and January 29th, 1839, reiterated these pledges on behalf of his Government. Again in 1873 the continued existence of these mutual assurances was referred to with satisfaction by Count de Brunnow, as reported in a despatch by Lord Granville, dated July 10th, 1873. Finally, on March 12th, 1888, M. de Giers intimated, through M. de Staal, to Lord Salisbury that the Russian Government "have no objection to placing again on record that their views on this point are in no way altered"; and a communication to the effect that the engagements between Great Britain and Russia to respect and promote the integrity and independence of the Persian kingdom had again been renewed and confirmed, was accordingly made by Sir H. D. Wolff to the Shah.

52. Whilst it may be presumed that these pledges, so frequently renewed, are still in existence, and while we have no desire to infer that they are

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within measurable distance of being broken, we are yet of opinion that they are in themselves quite insufficient to arrest the centripetal progress of Russian influence in Persia, or to save either the Persian kingdom, or British interests in it, from the erosive agencies that we have described. Within the limits of a nominally still existing integrity and independence so many encroachments upon both those attributes are possible, that by almost imperceptible degrees they pass into the realm of constitutional fiction, where they may continue to provide an exercise for the speculations of the jurist, long after they have been contemptuously ignored by statesmen.

53. If this proposition be accepted, and if we cannot rely upon written pledges to safeguard the future of Persia, it behoves us to examine the various alternative policies that have been or can be proposed. The first of these is the policy of a regeneration of Persia by Anglo-Russian means; *i.e.*, joint action by Great Britain and Russia to insist upon reforms, to reorganise the administration and finances, to develop the resources of the country, to lend the requisite means, in fact to convert the Persian Government by combined philanthropy from a moribund into a solvent institution. This policy was discussed and rejected by Sir M. Durand in his Memorandum of September 1895, on the ground that Russia would denounce us to the Shah to begin with, and would play us false afterwards; and in his despatch of February 1899, he again "proceeds upon the assumption that we cannot hope to come to terms with Russia, and persuade her to join us in a policy of reform and development." We concur with Her Majesty's Minister in believing that the reform of Persia by a policy of friendly co-operation between Russia and ourselves is out of the question; and we do so in the main for the reason, which no one familiar with Persia will deny, that Russia is interested not in the reform of Persia, but in its decay; that in the background of her ambitions is the vision of a country and a people falling from inherent debility into her grasp; and that any policy which might tend to strengthen the country or to revivify the people, is to be resisted as tending to thwart the fulfilment of those ambitions. We might give many illustrations in support of this proposition; but we will content ourselves with one. Sir M. Durand has lately supplied to the Foreign Office the version given by the Sadr Azam of the agreement between the Persian and Russian Governments, by which the former bound itself in 1889 not to grant any railway concessions to any other Power than Russia, except with the consent of the latter, for a period of 10 years. Whatever be the real facts of the case, there can be no doubt that this engagement, as long as it has lasted, and so long as it continues to last, is an effective barrier to any genuine development of the country. It was due to expire in the present year. Our latest information from Sir M. Durand is that it has, under pressure from the Russian Government, been renewed for another term of five years.

54. The alternative policy recommended by Sir M. Durand is that we should plainly intimate that any Russian encroachments in Northern Persia will provoke corresponding measures for the protection of British interests in the south. In his Memorandum of September 1895, Her Majesty's Minister suggested that this declaration should be made to the Russian Government. In his despatch of February 1899 he proposed that it should also be made to the Persian Government; so that both parties should be well aware of the steps that would follow upon any further Russian aggression. It has been objected to this policy that such an engagement might impose upon the British Government an unwelcome obligation to intervene and to add to British responsibilities in Southern Persia, at the moment most opportune to Russia, and least opportune to ourselves. There is force in this objection; although we think that it might be met by introducing sufficient elasticity into the proposed intimation to leave Her Majesty's Government free to act for the protection of British interests in Southern Persia, not in a specified manner at a specified moment, but in what manner and at what juncture might commend itself to their judgment. Moreover the value of the objection is somewhat weakened by the consideration that did Russia take any such step in Northern Persia as is here contemplated, counter-action of some sort, with or without a previous

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intimation, would in all probability be imposed upon Her Majesty's Government; while the knowledge that a Russian advance in the north might be the signal for a corresponding British move in the south would, it can scarcely be doubted, operate as a deterrent upon any premature activity on the part of Russia, since she might thereby gravely jeopardise the realisation of her own dreams of ultimate access to Southern Persia and the Persian Gulf.

55. Nevertheless before we recommend that such a policy should be essayed, we desire to raise the question whether, though it be impossible to conclude an agreement with Russia for the joint patronage and development of Persia, it might not yet be possible to come to an understanding with her for the separate patronage and development of that country in distinct and clearly defined compartments by the two great Powers, in other words for a recognition of British and Russian spheres of interest in the dominions of the Shah. This is a solution the desirability of which has not been lost sight of by Sir M. Durand, but which for certain reasons he did not feel called upon to discuss. Recent events in China have familiarised the public mind with the idea of such spheres of interest, although their existence would appear to be still somewhat lacking both in clearness of definition and in precision of outline. The Viceroy has observed in recent telegrams from Lord Salisbury to Sir M. Durand with reference to a Persian loan and to mining concessions in that country, indications of a willingness to concede to Russia liberties in the north of Persia, parallel in scope and substance with those conceded to Great Britain in the south; and it is worthy of consideration whether in an expansion of this suggestion might not be found a feasible scheme.

56. We have already alluded to the line across Persia drawn by Sir M. Durand from Khanikin on the Turkish frontier, through Kermanshah, Hamadan, Ispahan, Yezd, and Kerman to Seistan, as indicating the northern limits of the sphere within which British political influence and trade are paramount. To some extent this partition is assisted by geographical conditions, the great deserts of Central Persia constituting a natural barrier between the north and the south, and roughly dividing the one from the other. But this situation is modified both in the west of Persia, where there are no deserts, and where there is no physical line of demarcation between the respective spheres of influence; in the centre of Persia, where Ispahan can hardly be said to constitute the natural frontier of any geographical zone; and also in the extreme east where Seistan, the inclusion of which in the British sphere would be an obligatory point, lies not to the south but to the north of the great desert. These considerations might not affect the success of any engagement that was carried out with equal *bona fides* by both parties: but they might become a fruitful source of friction were such a good understanding not to be counted upon in the future. In any case, we would recommend that the line of partition, suggested by Sir M. Durand, should be so far amended as to substitute Kashan for Ispahan. It would be undesirable that any Russian railway should penetrate further south than Kashan, which indeed is separated by a considerable range of hills from Ispahan, or that Russia should have right of access to the very fringe of the latter district.

57. We have observed that in China the Agreement recently concluded between Her Majesty's Government and Russia as to spheres of interest has related to railways only. Either party has pledged itself not to seek on its own account or on behalf of others for railway concessions in the rival sphere, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for such concessions, supported by the other in that sphere. *Prima facie* there does not appear to be any reason why such an agreement should not equally be extended to mines, roads, and other industrial or economic undertakings. The value of such an understanding is considerable; because although political influence is not expressly mentioned, yet in eastern countries commercial and industrial enterprises are the familiar agencies through which political influence is exercised by alien powers, and because that influence is apt to follow in the wake of railways and trade. We do not think, if such an agreement were arrived at with

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Russia, with reference to the Persian territories lying north and south of the predicated line, that there would be an end to Russian designs in Southern Persia or in the Persian Gulf. Such a result might, perhaps, ensue from an engagement that no political influence should be exercised by either party on the opposite side of the line. But there would be manifest difficulties in arriving at any such understanding; since it would be out of the question to remove the British representatives, either at Tehran, at Tabriz, or at Meshed, whose functions necessarily involve the exercise of some sort of political influence, while a corresponding objection would no doubt be felt by the Russian Government. But even an engagement limited to railway and commercial exploitation would have this effect, that it would deprive Russia of the means by which political or territorial ambitions in the rival sphere could most easily be carried out, and would render it difficult for her to push them to success, as long as Great Britain remained on the alert.

58. There are, however, difficulties and drawbacks in the case of such an understanding which it would be impolitic to ignore. We have already hinted at one of their number. The facts with reference to Seistan which have been mentioned by the Viceroy in his Minute, by Sir M. Durand, and also in this despatch, indicate the absolute necessity of including that district within the British sphere. Nevertheless Seistan is physically and administratively a part of the province of Khorasan, from which it is severed by no clear line of division, the Governorship of Seistan being vested in a member of the old ruling family of Kain, the two existing heads of which are brothers, residing respectively at Tabbas and Birjand. It also seems exceedingly doubtful to us whether Russia would, by any such agreement as we are discussing, forego her designs upon Seistan itself, and still more her chances of reaching the eastern extremity of the Persian Gulf. Nor again is it clear that she would be willing to cancel the engagement with regard to railway construction, which she has recently renewed with the Persian Government, and to hand over the southern half of Persia to possible railway exploitation by British agency, in return for a monopoly of similar exploitation (which may be said to be already at her disposal) in the northern half. These, however, are considerations which could only be decided by the attitude of Russia herself, were she approached on the subject by Her Majesty's Government. We indicate them merely for the purpose of showing that we are far from confident that the suggestion, if put forward, will meet with a favourable reception.

59. A more serious drawback, from the point of view of British interests, is the fact that the capital of Persia would lie in the northern or Russian sphere, and that Russian influence there, already predominant, could hardly fail to become supreme. The situation that has recently arisen in China would present itself with ten-fold gravity and emphasis. A desire would not merely be intimated to connect the capital with the Russian railway system: but a line itself would, we may imagine, at once be made to Tehran, while corresponding lines would in all probability be constructed from the Russian frontier in Georgia to Tabriz, and in Trans-Caspia to Meshed. With the three great cities of Northern Persia thus permanently linked with the Russian system, the power of pressure exercised by the Russian Government, which is already considerable, would be positively overwhelming. The Shah would tend more and more to become a Russian puppet, and Northern Persia a Russian proconsulate. We should look with great anxiety, in such a case, upon the fate of such institutions as the Imperial Bank of Persia, and the Indo-European Telegraph Department, whose head-quarters are in Tehran. We should fear a marked diminution of influence on the part of Her Majesty's representative at the capital; and we do not conceal our anticipations that in the long run such a partition might involve the permanent break up of the Persian kingdom, and, if it did not ultimately lead to rival Russian and British Protectorates in the north and south, might at any rate result in the selection of another capital, and in the rule of more than one native prince in Persia.

60. Neither will it be overlooked by Her Majesty's Government that, while any such arrangement with Russia might preclude that Power from

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obtaining control over Central and Southern Persia and in that way reaching the Persian Gulf, it would not for one moment retard, but might on the contrary accelerate her advance to the same objective through Mesopotamia by way of Baghdad. This is a problem, however, which we do not feel called upon at present to discuss, and which would require to be examined on independent grounds. Nor again would an Anglo-Russian agreement preclude France, or Germany, or any other Power from endeavouring to acquire in Southern Persia or in the Gulf the position from which Russia would *ex hypothesi* have debarred herself. There might even be combined action between them for that object. These however are features inseparable from the solution which we are discussing, and which should not be of a formidable character, if the influence of the principal competitor were removed from the scene. They might be the cause of future annoyance to the British Government; but they could hardly, under any conditions, constitute a menace to the Indian Empire.

61. There remains the further danger, distinctly contemplated by Sir M. Durand in discussing the question of a possible understanding with Russia, that she would not abide by the terms of any such understanding. Sufficient grounds for this induction may unquestionably be found in the history of Russian advance in Central Asia during the past half century. But an appreciation of the inclinations and idiosyncrasies of both parties to an agreement, in the light, where possible, of past experience, is an element in the drawing up of a fresh bargain which is not likely to be lost sight of by either agent, whether it be regarded as involving a discount from, or an appreciation of, the value of the new contract. Moreover such contracts, if not of perpetual duration, or even if ultimately infringed by one of the two parties, have been shown in many cases to be of immense value, in the respite that they afford from the strain of an otherwise ceaseless rivalry, and in the opportunity presented for a peaceful consolidation of existing interests.

62. We have now placed before Your Lordship the *pros* and *cons*, as they present themselves to our eyes, of the alternative policies in Persia. Should Her Majesty's Government decide upon making any overtures to the Russian Government in the direction indicated, and should they either be rejected, or result in failure, it will still be possible to adopt the alternative recommended by Sir M. Durand. Indeed, if the terms of a reasonable arrangement are proffered by one party, and are refused by the other, the natural corollary would appear to be that the originator of the proposal should reserve to himself the right to protect by whatever means may be at his disposal the interests which he has endeavoured to conserve by friendly co-operation; and should meet what would in such a case be conscious aggression on the one side by retaliation on the other.

63. In either case, however, though still more in the case of a failure to arrive at an understanding with Russia, we conceive that it is incumbent upon Her Majesty's Government and upon the Government of India to come to an early decision upon the subsidiary question, raised by Sir M. Durand, namely, as to the steps that require forthwith to be taken in order to safeguard British and Indian interests in the so-called British sphere in Persia from the competition with which we have shown them to be threatened.

64. Sir M. Durand, in his despatch, has made a calculation of the sums annually expended by Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India respectively upon the British establishments at present maintained in Persia. He arrives at a grand total of £36,970 per annum distributed in the following proportions: Her Majesty's Government, £12,876; Government of India, £24,094. Inasmuch as these figures are not, in all respects, correct, and as they omit several items of charge for which Indian revenues are responsible, we have made an independent computation, which is here presented, for purposes of comparison in tabular form. In a further column we present the charges also borne by the Government of India and Her Majesty's Government severally in respect of Mesopotamia and the Tigris—*i.e.*, Turkish Arabia, an area, which though not belonging to the Persian dominions, is so closely adjacent

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thereto as to constitute a part of the same political system, and for the maintenance of British interests in which the Government of India have hitherto been called upon to pay, as inseparably connected with the trade and politics of the Persian Gulf :—

I.—Sir M. Durand's figures.

A—Charges borne by Her Majesty's Government—

	£
Tehran	9,640
Astrabad	48
Resht	750
Tabriz	920
Ispahan	778
Kerman	250
Mohammerah ...	490
Travelling allowances ...	1,500
	14,376

B—Charges borne by Government of India—

Tehran	7,000
Meshed	8,600
Kermanshah ...	24
Shiraz	160
Kerman	250
Bushire	7,700
Gulf Telegraph ...	120
Bahrein ... ... }	240
Shargah ... ... }	
Lingah ... ... }	
	24,094

II.—Government of India's figures.

A—Charges borne by Her Majesty's Government—

	£
Tehran	9,640
Astrabad	48
Resht	750
Tabriz	920
Ispahan	778
Kerman	250
Mohammerah ...	490
Travelling allowances ...	1,500
½ Karun subsidy ...	1,000
* Consular clerk at Bushire	90
	15,466

† *B—Charges borne by Government of India*

	£	
(Persian Legation)—		
(a) Expenses in India ...	1,608	
(b) Contribution paid at Home towards the cost of the Legation	7,000	
(c) Telegraph subsidy to Persian Government for Makran line ...	580	
Meshed	8,640	
Kermanshah		Charges included in Indian accounts under Meshed.
Shiraz		Charges included in Indian accounts under Bushire.
Gulf Telegraph		
Bahrein		
Shargah		
Lingah		
‡ Kerman	400	
§ Seistan	400	
Tehran-Meshed Telegraph line	1,239	
Bushire	7,769	
Karun subsidy paid from the Home Treasury ...	1,000	
Gwadur Agency charges	197	
Indian Marine charges—		
Maintenance of "Lawrence" ...	8,266	
Subsidy for "Sphinx"	15,000	
Repairs of " ...	3,276	
Coal of "Sphinx" and "Lawrence" ...	3,960	
Coaling depôts ...	470	
Indian Military charges—		
‖ Detachments in Persian Gulf	1,247	
Total Indian charges...	61,052	

* That is £120 sanctioned by despatch No. 91 (Political), dated 3rd August 1899, minus £30 fee allowance withdrawn.

† The Indian charges are taken from the accounts for 1897-98. They include superannuation charges, and the figures are turned into pounds sterling at 1*s.* 4*d.* per rupee. The Indian Marine charges have been furnished by the Examiner of Marine Accounts; the Indian Military charges by the Comptroller of Military Accounts, Bombay Command.

‡ Annual expenditure up to Rs. 6,000, *i.e.*, £400 sanctioned for five years from 1898.

§ Annual expenditure up to Rs. 6,000, *i.e.*, £400 sanctioned in 1899.

‖ This is exclusive of extra cost for detachments at Jask and Charbar.

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III.

EXPENDITURE IN TURKISH ARABIA.

A—Charges borne by Her Majesty's Government—

	£
Baghdad, Mosul and Karbela	131

B—Charges borne by the Government of India in Turkish Arabia—

Baghdad Residency	5,098	
Basrah Consulate (to be paid at the Home Treasury)	1,400	6,498
Tigris Postal subsidy		1,600
Maintenance of "Comet"		2,506
Total Indian charges ...		10,604

65. According to these figures, which we have been at much pains to verify, it appears that upon the various establishments maintained by the British Government in Persia, the Imperial Government spends £15,466 and the Government of India £61,052 per annum. If Turkish Arabia be included in the calculation, as we think it must in fairness be, and as it was in a statement prepared for and presented to the Royal Commission on Indian expenditure in 1896, the totals will amount to Great Britain £15,597, India £71,656.

66. It will not, we apprehend, be denied that these contributions do not at all fairly represent the respective proportions of Imperial and of Indian interest in Persia and its surroundings. The argument into which we entered in an earlier part of this despatch will have failed in its purpose if it has not given good grounds for thinking that in the determination of British interests in Persia too much stress has hitherto been laid upon the Indian, and too little upon the British, quota; and that a more even partition both of responsibility and of financial burden might with reason be adopted in the future.

67. This however is a question which we are not at the present moment called upon to discuss with any minuteness, the more so as it is understood to be one of the subjects that have attracted the attention of the Royal Commission above alluded to, and that are likely to be dealt with in its Report. We observe that in the evidence so far printed and published, some attention has been paid to the case, and we reserve till the appearance of the final Report, any further remarks that we may have to offer thereon.

68. We would observe, however, in strict connection with the question now under examination, *viz.*, the increase of Consular and other establishments in Persia—which is itself a branch of the wider subject—that in the reconsideration of the case for which the Government of India have more than once pleaded, it appears to us that one of two principles may with advantage be borne in view. The entire charges which are placed upon the revenues of the British Empire for Persia and Turkish Arabia may be added together, and may be divided in certain proportions, to be revised, if necessary, at definite intervals, between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers. Some such principle was adopted, when in 1859 the British Mission at Tehran was re-transferred to the Foreign Office, and when it was laid down by Lord John Russell that the ratio of the charges met by India and Great Britain should be as 12 to 5. We are not aware that this principle has ever since been formally repudiated or surrendered, although it appears to have been widely departed from in practice.

69. The other method would be that of determining what are the spheres or localities in Persia of special concern either to Her Majesty's Government or to the Government of India, and of debiting the charges incurred for them against the revenues respectively of the United Kingdom and of India. It

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would not be difficult in our opinion to constitute such a partition of interest, which would be determined by a combination of geographical, political and commercial conditions. The parts of Persia that border upon Afghanistan, Baluchistan and the eastern end of the Persian Gulf would naturally fall within the Indian sphere. The northern and western portions contiguous to the Caucasian provinces of Russia, to Turkey, and to Mesopotamia, would possess a greater interest for Her Majesty's Government. To a considerable, though still only a partial, extent this principle has already been acted upon; whilst it will be in the recollection of Your Lordship that the Government of India have in one case pressed for a vindication of it, which they have felt to be equally demanded by policy and justice. In February and again in August 1895, our predecessors expressed a very strong opinion that they should not be called upon to contribute towards the Karun service, as long as the subsidy for the mail service on the Tigris was met exclusively from Indian revenues. They stated their opinion that "the interests involved in the Karun service are purely Imperial and not Indian, and, if this service ceases altogether, the interests of India will not be affected thereby". It was only after the receipt of an urgent appeal from the Foreign Office, and on the explicit understanding that the whole question of the distribution of the charges on account of the Tigris and the Karun should be referred to the Royal Commission then sitting, that the Government of Lord Elgin, not without a vigorous dissent from the then Finance Member, Sir J. Westland, consented to continue the payment of a moiety of the Karun subsidy pending the stipulated decision. We cordially endorse the views which were expressed by our predecessors in respect of the Imperial and non-Indian character of this charge, and we shall be glad to learn what are the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the subject.

70. The mention of the Karun and Tigris services affords an incidental illustration of the commercial considerations by which the allocation of responsibility that we are discussing might be determined. It is, of course, difficult to decide in the case of any particular market or harbour the exact shares of interest in it that may be claimed by British or by Indian trade. The former is more likely to be in the ascendant in the north, the latter in the south, of Persia. Broadly speaking, however, we do not think it will be disputed that the supervision and promotion of British commerce in foreign countries are a responsibility properly devolving upon the Imperial Government. The fact that a considerable proportion of the trade of any foreign town or port passes to or from India (and even of such trade a large part is apt to be often British in origin) is not a reason for placing the consular or other charges exclusively upon the Indian revenues, any more than a corresponding preponderance of Colonial trade in any particular quarter would be regarded as a reason for demanding a contribution from the Colonies. We imagine the real line of distinction to be that, whereas the commercial interests of Her Majesty's Indian subjects, outside of India, are in the main the concern of the Imperial Government, yet in cases where the political importance of a place or district exceeds the commercial, and where that political importance is Indian rather than English in character, the Government of India may legitimately be called upon to defray sometimes a large proportion, sometimes the whole of the cost. In this way we may account for the exclusive financial responsibility of India for Meshed, for Bushire and the other ports of the Gulf, and for Baghdad (although we regard the latter as an extreme and questionable extension of the principle). On the other hand the charges for Ispahan, Kermanshah, Tabriz, &c., fall, or ought in our judgment to fall, upon the Imperial revenues. Tehran, as the capital, is, in a sense, a meeting ground of the two systems; and a division of the cost between the two Governments has accordingly been in existence ever since 1835, although the passage of time has witnessed a gradual reduction of the Indian contribution, and may, we hope, lead to a further reconsideration of the matter, when the present arrangement expires in 1901.

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71. We will now proceed to apply the principles which have been enunciated to a consideration of the particular question referred to us by Your Lordship, *viz.*, the suggestions of Sir M. Durand on the one hand, and our own views or proposals on the other, concerning the increase of Consular and other establishments in Persia. We may say at once that we are anxious to regard the question from a broad-minded and liberal point of view, that we have no desire to haggle with Her Majesty's Government over shares of responsibility or of cost, and that we are quite willing to add to our own charges for the protection of British interests in Persia, in the confident belief that Her Majesty's Government will not be behindhand with a similar generosity. Our argument as to the magnitude and significance of those interests and the reality of the dangers with which they are assailed would have been insincere, were we unprepared to give to it a practical demonstration.

72. For the sake of clearness we will divide the country into different spheres, representing with sufficient accuracy the rough lines of demarcation between British and Indian interest. In the northern and central sphere, and in the western sphere, the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government is in our judgment more directly involved. In the eastern sphere, and in the southern or maritime sphere, we admit a corresponding preponderance of Indian interest.

73. Commencing with the first named of these areas, we find that Sir M. Durand recommends an improvement in the pay and status of Her Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz. In so far as our judgment on the matter is desired, it is in entire accord with the proposal. We are more doubtful about the suggestion to appoint an additional Vice-Consul at Tabriz, with the intention of posting him later on at Urumia; since we incline to the opinion that the ultimate destiny of the Persian Nestorians has been irretrievably fixed by their recent wholesale conversion to the Russian faith. We concur with Sir M. Durand as to the desirability of reducing the Consulate at Resht to a Vice-Consulate. We have before expressed our hearty concurrence with his proposals concerning the Consulate at Ispahan. These proposals without exception concern in their financial aspect the British, and not the Indian, Exchequer.

74. In the western sphere Sir M. Durand advocates the appointment of a British Vice-Consul at Kermanshah, subordinate to the Consul-General at Tehran, and paid for by England, in place of the present native agent, whose modest allowance of £24 is drawn, for some unaccountable reason, from the charges for the Meshed Agency, *i.e.*, from Indian funds. The figures of British trade passing through Kermanshah from Baghdad to Tehran appear to us amply to justify the proposed change. We are less confident about a suggestion made by Sir M. Durand, originally in connection with this route, but also with a wider application, namely, that we should depute an Indian officer to examine the various possible routes for railways in Persia and to make suggestions. Such a proceeding would, in our opinion, be both premature and uncalled for. We are very doubtful whether in her present state of evolution Persia is prepared for railways. The recent renewal of the prohibitive agreement with Russia shows that the latter Power does not for the present at any rate intend them to be introduced. Enquiries of the proposed character would be certain to arouse suspicion; and finally we believe that we are already in possession of the materials enabling us to judge of the railways, very few in number, that under existing conditions it would be prudent, if it were possible, to construct in Persia.

75. Further to the south Sir M. Durand recommends the substitution of a Consul for the Karun and Arabistan at a salary of £800 (to be divided between the Imperial and Indian revenues) for the present Vice-Consul at Mohammerah, whose salary of £490 is defrayed from Imperial sources. He also contemplates the abandonment at an early date of the handsome annual subsidy of £2,000 now paid in equal moieties by the two Governments to Messrs. Lynch for their service upon the Karun. Our previous attitude on this subject will prepare

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Your Lordship for our ready acceptance of these views. But we think that the entire cost of the proposed Consulate and of such subordinate native agencies as may be required should be borne by Her Majesty's Government, since we cannot too emphatically reiterate our opinion that India is only indirectly interested in the Karun question. We shall be prepared to show a corresponding liberality in quarters of more manifest importance to India. A Consul at Mohammerah (or Ahwaz or Shushter) would of course correspond with the British Resident at Bushire, as well as with Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

76. We next turn to the eastern sphere, where Indian interests may be described as supreme. Sir M. Durand throws out a hint that money might perhaps be saved at Meshed, where the existing establishment imposes upon Indian funds a charge of no less than £9,154 a year. We are inclined to agree with him. Although in view of the proximity of Afghanistan, and of the militant character of Russian pretensions in Khorasan, it is desirable to maintain an adequate British representation at Meshed, we think that the present scale is excessive, and that the results obtained are incommensurate with the cost. We are considering whether by a reduction of the grade of the Political Agent now stationed there, and by the removal of the Political Assistant to some spot where his services would be of greater value, we might not be able to effect a considerable money saving, to be better applied elsewhere. We are sceptical also as to the value received for the large secret service grant at present made to the Meshed Agency, and expended in the main in procuring unreliable and almost worthless information through native and ill-informed agents. On the other hand, we are prepared to compensate for a less extravagant expenditure at Meshed by a more vigilant attention to Seistan, and by strenuously fostering the trade route connecting that district with British Baluchistan. The political and strategical importance of Seistan appears to us to justify and even to necessitate the former attitude. We are encouraged to adopt the latter by the figures of trans-Nushki traffic, which have risen from a total of 1½ lakh in 1896 to Rs. 5,90,000 in 1897 and (in spite of an adverse season) to Rs. 7,28,000 in 1898, in which year the imports alone into Quetta from Seistan reached the value of Rs. 2,50,880.

77. We have some time past been examining the question of the permanent appointment of a British officer to Seistan; and the deputation of Captain Sykes from Kerman to Seistan in the present year, and the sanction of an annual expenditure of £400 from Indian revenues upon a Seistan Consulate, have already been mentioned. The reports of Captain Sykes are strongly adverse to the permanent appointment of a British officer to Seistan; and whilst we do not entirely concur with his reasoning, and regard his views as to some extent coloured by other prepossessions, we nevertheless are of opinion that such an appointment might for the present be postponed; the more so as it appears likely that the nomination of a Russian Consul to Seistan, though previously announced, is likely not to be persevered in, unless a British representative appears permanently upon the scene. Should a Russian officer be finally appointed, we think that there will be no alternative but to send a British officer also. In the meantime we are prepared to depute a reliable native agent from our Indian service to reside at Nasirabad, the capital of Seistan, and to appoint a second to reside at Birjand, the capital of Kain, both of these officials to be under the orders of the British Resident at Meshed, in correspondence with the Persian arrangements under which Seistan and Kain constitute a portion of the Governorship-General of Khorassan. We estimate that the annual cost of these two posts will amount to £150—£200 per annum more than the already sanctioned charge for the Seistan post; and this addition we are prepared to meet. In making these proposals we have the satisfaction of knowing that we are sure of the support both of Your Lordship and of the Foreign Office; since, in a Revenue despatch, dated December 2nd, 1897, Your Lordship, in sending to us a letter from the Foreign Office, expressing their good hopes of the future of the Quetta-Meshed route, provided that Consular protection and other facilities were furnished at points along the road, commended these remarks to the Government of India, and added: "I trust that

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the suggestion of appointing Consular Agents at points along the trade route between Quetta and Meshed may receive the attentive consideration of Your Excellency's Government. It appears to me a measure desirable from many points of view, and especially in connection with the facilities which might be afforded by that route for the transport of arms and ammunition between the Persian Gulf and Baluchistan."

78. As regards the trade route in question, we propose to take active measures for its development within our own territory. We contemplate spending additional, though not extravagant, sums upon the better provision of wells, accommodation, supplies of fodder and other stores, and the protection of the track. We may even require to appoint a second British officer, to relieve Lieutenant Webb Ware of the excessive strain now imposed upon him by the administration of an extensive district, in addition to the protection of a road over 400 miles in length. We hope by these measures, which will be unostentatiously pursued, to escape the jealousy aroused by a too open challenge of rival ambitions in Seistan, and to build up in that neighbourhood a substantial commercial and political interest, which will find no mean ally in what we believe to be the natural predisposition of the inhabitants. Experience alone can inform us whether the anticipations that have been framed by the prospects of the Nushki-Seistan trade route are over-sanguine, as in some quarters they are freely said to be. If unsuccessful, the experiment which we now propose to make can be abandoned without discredit. If, as we believe, it will be found to have both a political and a commercial value, we shall be better enabled in the future to pronounce upon the larger schemes which have sometimes been put forward in connection with Seistan, and a reference to which will be found in the Minute written by the Viceroy. At present, it does not seem to us to be necessary to take them into consideration.

79. We agree with Sir M. Durand in thinking that a British Consul should be permanently appointed to Kerman. We have already sanctioned a contribution of Rs. 6,000 or £400 a year to the cost of this post; and we are prepared to continue the payment of this sum. We believe that there are good reasons for which Her Majesty's Government may desire to continue the payment of a similar moiety of the cost. But should their acceptance of the increments proposed elsewhere, notably in the case of the Karun, be facilitated by our assumption of the entire cost of the Kerman Consulate, we should be prepared favourably to consider such a proposal; or, if it were preferred, to divide with them the cost of the Karun and Kerman Consulates combined. The financial result would in either case be approximately the same.

80. Sir M. Durand has suggested a British Vice-Consul, or a native agent at Bampur. For the present we think that the latter will be the preferable alternative; and we are prepared to undertake the outlay, which will not exceed about £300 per annum. The officer in question would be under the orders of the British Consul at Kerman.

81. Finally we come to the southern sphere, including the coasts and ports of the Persian Gulf. Your Lordship will have been prepared by what has previously been said for the announcement of our willingness to submit to some sacrifices for the defence of an interest, so substantially grounded, and so conspicuously assailed. We are unable to agree with Sir M. Durand in the suggestion that any material reduction of expenditure can be effected at Bushire. On the contrary we are disposed to think that, if the best men in our service are to be attracted to that post, we may even require to add to its pecuniary attractions. We agree with him, however, in thinking that the Resident at Bushire should reside at Shiraz, and exercise his consular functions there during the summer months. We understand from Colonel Meade that the cost of a site for a house (no suitable building being available either for hire or purchase) would be from £1,000 to £1,200, and of building and furnishing about £1,500. We think that this expense might be borne in equal proportions by the Imperial and Indian Governments; and we are prepared to undertake the annual outlay

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that may be required for up-keep and repairs, and for the provision of a substitute for the present native agent, during the time that the Resident is living at Bushire.

82. We are heartily in accord with Sir M. Durand in thinking that a British officer should be appointed to Bunder Abbas, with charge of the Gulf ports east of Bushire, and of British interests in the maritime provinces of South-eastern Persia. The necessity of such an appointment was mooted, as long ago as 1879, by Colonel Ross, at that time British Resident at Bushire. It was raised again in 1882, 1884, 1885, 1888 and 1892, and on the majority of these occasions was supported by petitions from the not insignificant Hindu and Khoja population engaged in trade at Bunder Abbas. In 1893, the appointment as Vice-Consul of an Englishman engaged in business at that port was agreed to by the Government of India and was sanctioned by the Secretary of State (Lord Kimberley), but was subsequently dropped upon the inexplicable grounds that the estimated cost of Rs. 50 a month or £40 a year could not be saved out of the Bushire Residency funds. In 1896, the question was again discussed between the Government of India and the Resident (Colonel Wilson); and the former so far departed from their former attitude as to say that the proposal must be held over until the normal conditions of trade had been restored by the withdrawal of the Russian sanitary cordon. These conditions have since been fulfilled, and we are prepared to look with a more favourable eye upon a proposal, the intrinsic recommendations of which are not open to dispute. We are willing to accept the financial responsibility for the proposed appointment, although we think that it may be possible to meet it without additional cost by the transfer to Bunder Abbas of the Political Assistant now stationed at Meshed. Sir M. Durand suggests that the officer appointed to this post should pass the summer months at Yezd (Bunder Abbas being an impossible site of residence during the hot season), taking the place there of the present unpaid Commercial Vice-Consul. Upon this point we would propose to consult Her Majesty's Consul at Kerman, which is in close connection with Bunder Abbas and the coast; and we will submit to Your Lordship at a later date our final views upon this subject.

83. Sir M. Durand mentions, as a matter affecting exclusively the Government of India, the possible appointment of a British officer at Bahrein. We do not hesitate to state to Your Lordship that such an appointment is in our opinion both desirable and obligatory. Trouble, similar to that which we have already incurred in Maskat, is brewing in Bahrein, the treaty engagements of which petty State with Her Majesty's Government provide no legitimate excuse for such complications. It is necessary to anticipate them by placing a British officer permanently in the island; and we are at the present time awaiting Colonel Meade's definite proposals on the matter. We are inclined to think that it will probably be sufficient to nominate an officer of a subordinate class. From time to time he will also visit Koweit. It remains to be decided whether he should also have under his political jurisdiction the Trucial Chiefs of the Arab or Pirate coast, or whether these should be placed under the officer at Bunder Abbas. We incline to the former opinion, but reserve this matter for subsequent decision.

84. We have now dealt with each one of Sir M. Durand's specific proposals, and have stated our own views in support, in amendment, or in supplement of them. It remains for us to mention some additional proposals of our own, and to comment upon certain independent suggestions submitted by Her Majesty's Minister. We entertain, and have already in the present year acted upon, the opinion that Her Majesty's naval forces should be more strongly and frequently represented than they have hitherto been in the Persian Gulf, and that there should be recurrent visits from the Admiral of the East Indian station. During the past spring Admiral Douglas, at the request of the Viceroy, paid such a visit, and his presence was of material assistance during the recent crisis at Maskat. We are doubtful of the wisdom of the existing system, under which the political charge of the Makran coast, and the

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

distribution of the Telegraph subsidies, is vested in the Director-General of the Indo-European Telegraph Department at Karachi, to whom a special salary of £120 is paid by the Government of India for the purpose. It has been proposed to us that this charge should be transferred to the Political Agent at Maskat; and for the present we reserve our opinion as to the advantages of such a change. It would be eminently desirable that Maskat should be connected by cable with Jask, since at present there is no telegraphic communication with any part of Oman. But this too is a question that must wait for a later solution.

85. Sir M. Durand has proposed that all British Consular officers in Persia should have a small guard of Indian troopers similar to those now maintained at Meshed. We are not clear that such a proposal is at present desirable, and are apprehensive that it might lead to movements on the part of Russia, for which not even the necessities of a plague cordon could be pleaded in justification, and which would scarcely be distinguishable from armed occupation. In this respect we re-echo the opinion which the Government of India expressed to Your Lordship as recently as August 10th, 1898, to the effect that Indian interests are sufficiently involved to justify us in furnishing protective detachments, as we are now doing at Jask and Charbar, for Telegraph stations on the coast; but that our military provision must, for the present, be limited to this service.

86. Her Majesty's Minister also recommends the grant of a supply of travelling tents to every British officer in Persia. As the majority of these, under the proposed arrangements, will be upon the Indian list, the suggested outlay would require in such cases to be met from Indian funds. We do not think that any general rule is required. We are in the habit of including camp equipment in the outfit of any officer whose duties require him to travel. We may observe, however, that tents are more likely to be required in out-of-the-way parts of the country than they are along the main roads, where the existing *chapar* or postal service, although destitute of almost every superficial merit, is nevertheless more rapid and therefore as a rule more convenient than travelling by caravan.

87. Lastly, Sir M. Durand makes certain recommendations with regard to the improvement and better organisation of the Telegraph service in Persia, both native and European. We concur with his suggestion that no opportunity should be lost of getting the Persian wires, which are abominably mismanaged, transferred to our control. He then revives a suggestion, of which much has been heard during the last 20 years, that we should "organise for political purposes" the existing establishment of the Indo-European Telegraph Department; although we do not gather very clearly from his despatch what are the precise measures recommended for that purpose. The last occasion on which a somewhat similar proposal appears to have been made was in 1887, when a Memorandum, dated April 27th of that year, was drawn up by Sir Murdoch Smith, who was despatched on a semi-political Mission to Persia, and who recommended that capable military officers should be scattered about the country, nominally in charge of the Telegraph stations, but in reality as political agents. In a despatch, dated June 24th, 1887, the Government of India expressed a general, but guarded, approval of the scheme. In our opinion there are two sides to the question, for each of which much can be said. It is surprising to us that an institution and a service that have exercised such an influence and are so generally popular in Persia, as the Indo-European Telegraph Department, should not have been attended with more visible political effect. On the other hand, in proportion as the working of the line has become systematised, so there has been less call for the type of Engineer Officer who was required during earlier and more troubled days. The work at the majority of the stations does not admit of much leisure on the part of the signallers and line inspectors. At the more important posts we believe that a considerable, though unobtrusive, influence is already exerted by the superior officers; and we are not convinced that the appearance upon the scene of a number

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of English officers, whose telegraphic duties would in reality be subordinate to political or semi-political functions, might not arouse suspicion and even produce some friction. We do not desire, however, to pronounce definitely upon the subject, and shall be glad to be acquainted with the views that are entertained by Your Lordship.

88. Before leaving the subject of Persia, we desire to add an appeal upon a matter which we have already argued to be so closely connected therewith as to be inseparable from a discussion of our interests in that part of the world. The proposals that we have submitted do not contemplate any change in the existing arrangements in Turkish Arabia. Nevertheless, we cannot too strongly state our conviction that those arrangements, financially considered, are unduly harsh in their application to India, and unduly lenient in their incidence upon Great Britain. That the charges borne by Indian revenues for the maintenance of our political and commercial position upon the Tigris and at Baghdad, should amount to £8,970 a year, while the contribution of Her Majesty's Government to the same objects is limited to £131 a year, appears to us to be a partial and inequitable division. We recognise that there are advantages to British interests generally in maintaining at Baghdad an establishment on the scale and of the importance that are associated with an Indian Residency of the second class. But the objects for which such an establishment is there kept up are neither exclusively, nor, as we think, mainly Indian in character. The same remark applies to the Basrah Consulate, where Her Majesty's Government have recently taken into their hands the appointment of the Consul, while leaving the entire charge to be defrayed from Indian funds. Least of all can such a claim be made for the Tigris subsidy, which, in our opinion, falls into the category of commercial arrangements properly devolving upon Her Majesty's Government; although under existing conditions the total cost is borne by Indian revenues. We trust that, in any reconsideration of the case, a more generous division of financial responsibility may commend itself to Her Majesty's Government.

89. We have now completed our survey of the proposals that have been submitted to us for examination, and of the situation in Persia as it presents itself to our eyes. In commending our views to the earnest consideration of Your Lordship and of Her Majesty's Government, we trust that we may have succeeded in impressing upon both, the gravity of the situation with which Great Britain and India are jointly faced, and the necessity, while there is yet time, of meeting it with definite and united counsels. We conclude by reiterating the confident hope, already expressed in our despatch of August 10th, 1898, that in the last resort, and in any sudden emergency, we may rely upon Her Majesty's Government for the protection of interests which are vital both to India and to the British Empire.

We have the honour to be,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) CURZON OF KEDLESTON.
" W. S. A. LOCKHART.
" E. H. H. COLLEN.
" C. M. RIVAZ.
" C. E. DAWKINS.
" T. RALEIGH.
" R. GARDINER.

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

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Foreign Department.

Simla; the 13th September, 1899.

Memorandum.

The following is a statement of the cases in the Foreign Department to be brought up in Council on Friday, the 15th September 1899.

Serial No.	Description of last paper in file.	Subject.	Remarks.
1	Draft Despatch to the Secretary of State.	Maintenance of British influence in Persia.	The file was circulated to Hon'ble Members, who, as well as the Private Secretary to the Viceroy, are being separately furnished with copies of the relevant papers and notes in the case.

To. W. R. Lawrence, Esqre C.I.E.,
Private Secy. to H.E. the Viceroy.

H. S. BARNES,
Offg. Secretary.

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

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

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I send round to each of my colleagues a draft of this very lengthy, but not, I hope, superfluous despatch, which is both the summing up of a correspondence of long duration with the Secretary of State about our Consular and other establishments in Persia; the suggested response to particular enquiries addressed to us in consequence of a recent despatch from Sir M. Durand; and an attempt—so far as I can gather, the first that has been made—to place upon a definite footing the share of responsibility for Persia that legitimately devolves upon the Government of India, and to indicate a line of conduct for the future. These, at least, are the objects which I have had in view in writing it; and if the result is to give, in any degree, shape or permanence to our policy towards Persia, perhaps the labour will not have been wasted.

I shall be grateful if my colleagues will favour me with their views or suggestions on the whole or any part of the draft. The despatch, if approved, will not leave until the mail of September 14th.

C[URZON],—2-9-99.

I have studied these papers with great interest.

The draft despatch practically divides itself into two parts. The first deals with the momentous question of how best to prepare for the break up of Persia, an event which seems to be inevitable, and which it is indisputable, may be of vast and far-reaching importance to the British Empire. The second is one of only financial administrative detail, *viz.*, how to allocate certain charges (connected with the proposed arrangements) between the Home and Indian Exchequers.

I confess I should like to have seen these two subjects treated in separate despatches. To discuss a matter of such a different degree of importance as the affirmation of the policy which is to govern the action of the Empire in a position of such gravity, in juxtaposition with the question of the division of a few thousand pounds between Great Britain and India is, I venture to think, incongruous, and I fear is rather calculated to distract attention from the main and weighty issue. Neither Great Britain nor India are, I trust, in such a financial position as to make the sum in question an item of any significance by the side of the other issue which involves matters intimately connected with the maintenance of our Indian dominion and the security of the eastern trade of the Empire generally on which so considerable a portion of our greatness depends.

I will explain in Council why this has been done.
C[URZON].

I venture to submit that, in the first of the two despatches into which I should like to see the present draft divided, it would be sufficient to indicate the general lines on which any expenditure involved in the immediate proposals might be distributed between England and India, leaving the details to be worked out when the general policy to be adopted was finally decided upon.

If I correctly interpret the policy which it is intended to enunciate, it is that, while we desire to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia so long as practicable, we recognise the improbablity of the date of the break up of that power being far distant, and we desire, therefore, to now take all suitable means for consolidating our position in the portion of that State which must eventually fall to our lot if we are to maintain our Imperial position in the East.

It is an indisputable proposition that neither the Indian army, as at present constituted, nor the Indian Exchequer, is equal to the strain of assuming a British Protectorate over the whole of the centre and south of Persia. Nor is it worth while to discuss such a contingency since no British Ministry is at all likely to authorise it—at least for many a year to come.
C[URZON].

The line selected for the ultimate boundary between Russia and England in those parts appears to be by common consent the Khanikin-Seistan one. It is stated in the draft despatch, however, that under existing conditions we have neither the money nor the men to undertake such a responsibility.

May I venture to question this dictum? Should we adopt in the future such a programme as the absorption of the southern and central portions of Persia up to the Khanikin-Seistan line, it appears to me that the whole position of affairs would be altered. Concurrently with an unquestionably great increase in responsibilities in Persia, we would obtain very important relief in the pressure on our Indian frontier. The strategical position would be entirely changed. Resting on England in the west, India in the east, and the Persian Gulf to the south, we would so threaten Russia's advance on India that it seems to me the latter country would, for the time at any rate, be practically safe. Instead of Russia constantly worrying us, she

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would, I submit, have the tables turned on her, and be in the position of dreading an advance by us which would threaten to cut her line of communications and possibly convert the Caspian from a Russian to an English lake. That we ourselves would incur heavy responsibilities I do not question, but I argue they would in the main be a transfer of anxieties from India to Persia.

As regards the money required, from what I have read of Persia (mainly in Your Excellency's book thereon), I gather that Persia well administered is quite capable of paying for her defence, and though from the same source I have formed but a poor opinion of the Persian proper as material for soldiers, still I understand that the tribes of the mountainous districts properly organised and well led would not form bad troops with a stiffening of our Imperial forces to support them.

Turning now to what is perhaps my more correct province, the consideration of the possible occupation of this line of country by a system of railways, I would like first to note a suggestion which has occurred to me, *viz.*, that the highhanded action of Russia in prohibiting railway construction in Persia for another five years is due to the fact that, at present so far as railways are concerned, she has all she can conveniently do in the completion of her Siberian-Manchurian system which is to give her the command of all Northern China. Five years hence her main lines on that side will be completed, and she will be able to turn her energies in another direction. If I am correct in this surmise, are we wise to give Russia the time and opportunity she wishes? Should we not on our part be at any rate doing what we can to take advantage of the time at our disposal? Russia does not wait for England when she sees an opportunity, through England being engaged elsewhere or on other grounds, for a move in advance, and I personally do not believe that any action or inaction on our part will seriously delay Russia one day beyond when she is prepared to move. On these grounds I do not myself attach any serious weight to the argument against action on our part of not giving Russia an excuse. Russia, with or without an excuse, will make her advance on the Persian Gulf as soon as she feels herself in a position to do so. In my view she is probably at present fully occupied so far as railway construction is concerned, and it pays her to bide her time. Imperial ideas also have just now rather the upper hand in England.

Very likely true.
C[URZON].

So far as railway construction is involved, we are not in a position to prevent the situation which Colonel Gardiner deprecates. Persia is still an independent country, and is at liberty to sign away her freedom in respect of railways, if she is weak enough to do so.
C[URZON].

I do not advocate any direct attempt to build railways in Persia itself at present. It seems to me that our approaches from the West and East may, and should, come first, but I think by selecting young officers with the necessary qualifications as Vice-Consuls, &c., and allowing them to march about and thoroughly investigate the subject in a quiet sort of way under colour of opening out trade routes, &c., we could obtain valuable reconnaissances of the various routes, and in a few years have ample details at our disposal from which to lay down our projects when the time comes for their execution. Where it was practicable also to start road-making, we might ensure that the roads would fit in with our railway schemes hereafter, and any extensions of telegraphs might also be adapted to the railway policy of the future. All this might be done in connection with the consolidation of our position in the southern and central portions of Persia which we look to as some day to come under our control without taking any more open or definite steps than we are apparently prepared to do at present.

This has been done for years. There is scarcely a caravan tract or route in Persia with which we are not quite familiar. I must myself have read the reconnaissances of at least 20 young officers specially deputed to Persia for the purpose.
C[URZON].

The Bakhtiari road is now being made. Concessions for the Tehran-Kum and Dizful-Khorremabad roads have for years been in the possession of British individuals or institutions. But roads do not pay in a country where traffic is solely by camels and mules. Persia is not yet ready for wheeled traffic.
C[URZON].

Your Excellency, in the draft despatch, writes that we are already in a position to judge of the railways very few in number that under existing conditions it would be prudent, if it were possible, to construct in Persia. I understand Your Excellency recognises as the line of the future the Khanikin-Seistan route, and that this might be connected with the Persian Gulf (1) at Bushire and (2) at Bunder Abbas, or some point further to the eastward. (I write from recollection of the views expressed in Your Excellency's book which unfortunately I have not got by me to refer to.) With such a definite scheme in their minds, our officers could quietly obtain all the details necessary for the preparation of a reliable project, the detailed execution of which would afterwards be a simple matter particularly if the road and telegraphic communications had been adapted to fall in with the scheme.

Possibly, but a remote future.
C[URZON].

With the exception of a few lines (and I am doubtful about that), no British Company will dream of constructing railways in Persia without either a British or an Indian guarantee. But neither Government is at all likely to give it.
C[URZON].

The foregoing refers to action within Persia itself. To the eastward Your Excellency's Minute foreshadows a steady improvement in the connection between India (Baluchistan) and Seistan

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culminating in the construction of a railway.

A report has recently been presented by Mr. Armstrong, who was specially deputed to examine the country between Quetta and Seistan with a view to a line of telegraph. His report, concurred in by Mr. Pitman, is entirely unfavourable. He estimates the initial cost of such a line at Rs. 11,40,700, the annual charges at Rs. 1,16,800. C[URZON].

In this policy I venture to express my entire concurrence. As part of it I presume we should have before long a light inexpensive line of telegraph, and it seems to me that the opening of such a line (following the alignment of the railway of the future) might well be made the excuse for bringing under our control the telegraphs of Eastern Persia, and putting into an efficient state, by advice, free supervision and judicious supply of materials, their connection with the European managed lines to the west and with the Persian Gulf lines to the south. As a means of consolidating our position in the country without any very great expenditure or display, this line of action, which is more or less suggested in the papers, would undoubtedly be of great value.

To the westward, that is between the Mediterranean and the Persian frontier at Khanikin, it would seem possible to do a good deal. The revival at home of the interest in the Baghdad railway project now noticeable in the public press gives us an opportunity. The endeavours that are being made, both by ourselves and others, to obtain the control of the telegraphs through Mesopotamia and down to the Persian Gulf afford also another opening. In my humble opinion both are matters of great Imperial interest, and I cannot look on any chance of the control of the country to the north-west of the Persian Gulf passing into the hands of any strong Power as otherwise than a serious menace to our interests, both Imperial and Indian. From the latter point of view, the growth of the Indian export trade concurrently with the growth of the new Indian industries, tea, jute, cotton, coal, &c., which is a marked feature of the present stage of our Indian Empire, compels us, I consider, to lay great stress on the importance of keeping open and extending the markets for the products of these industries. In this connection the maintenance of our supremacy on the shores of the Persian Gulf and the safeguarding and spreading by all practicable measures of the markets for our goods in Persia and Asia Minor, seems to me a matter of the very highest importance. From these remarks, it will be gathered that I do not lay any great weight on the Euphrates valley system of railways in the narrow light of its forming an alternative, more or less overland, route to India, but that I view it as a means both strategically and commercially of holding on to, and opening out, the markets of the vast area they would serve to the trade of Great Britain from the West and our Indian Empire from the East.

I agree. C[URZON].

The reference in the despatch is to the possible acquisition by Powers other than Russia of a position in Southern Persia and the Gulf—not in the western sphere, *i.e.*, Turkish Arabia. But this may be made clearer, and the paragraph can be strengthened.
C[URZON].

On this account I venture to deprecate the tone of paragraph 60 of the draft despatch which, I submit, scarcely gives the weight that should be attached to the western portion of the subject under consideration.

The only other remark I would wish to make is that paragraph 62 seems to me to be wanting in any definite expression of opinion on our part. We place the *pros* and *cons* before the Secretary of State, but do not clearly state the course of action we recommend.

This can be added if Council accept the policy laid down. C[URZON].

I understand the despatch as accepting the sphere of influence policy, and that what we desire is that negotiations be entered into with Russia on that basis. If I am correct, would it not be well to say so in unmistakeable language ?

While I am in accord with the despatch in so far as it goes, I venture to submit these remarks for Your Excellency's consideration.

R. G[ARDINER],—6-9-99.

Politically and financially it would be wise to accept some expenditure in order to build up our influence in Eastern and Southern Persia and in the Persian Gulf. Such expenditure will be in the nature of a premium for insurance against disturbance: for the day that Russia attains a strong position in South-East Persia, or, through the co-operation of some foreign Power, in the Gulf, the military and financial strain already imposed upon us would be enormously increased.

That Russia aims at acquiring such a position is to my mind beyond question. With Afghanistan converted into a place *d'armes*, she will follow the line of least resistance; turn the corner of that hornet's nest; and reach down to the Gulf where she may certainly expect diplomatic, if not material, support.

It is just possible that Russian pressure southward might be averted if a diplomatic agreement were arrived at dividing Persia into British and Russian spheres of influence. Perhaps I may hazard the opinion that a satisfactory agreement of this character is improbable. It seems to me that Russia would have more to lose than to gain by it.

This also is my opinion, but it is not Lord Salisbury's. C[URZON].

Even if such an agreement were possible, we should still not be relieved from the necessity of incurring expenditure to establish our position in the British sphere. On the contrary, the

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rate of expenditure would probably be greater, for, if no agreement is signed, I think it is clear that our efforts, though constant and well considered, would have to be unostentatious and tentative, so as not to precipitate an active rivalry.

What precise expenditure in the contingency either of a partition of Persia into spheres, or of a continuance of the *status quo*, Indian revenues may be called upon to bear, it is impossible at this moment to define. As I have said I think some expenditure is justifiable and inevitable. I may go further and say that I think no item of military or political expenditure with the exception of the re-armament of our native troops is probably more urgent.

But it must be recollected that we have practically reached the limits of taxation in India; that indeed the salt-tax is too high and ought to be reduced to give us the one financial reserve possible for emergencies; that the demands for military expenditure are enormous; and that, though we expect to place our currency on a sound basis, and thereby to quicken the development of India's resources, the effect of this reform will not show itself in our revenue for some time to come.

However, looking to the masterly analysis of Imperial and Indian interests in Persia in this draft, to the striking disproportion between the Imperial and Indian contributions in Persia and Turkish Arabia now revealed, and to the fact that our demand for a revision of this expenditure is likely to be powerfully supported by Lord Welby's Commission, it is not improbable that the policy now advocated will result in some immediate saving to India.

In connection with the question of revision, it is important to determine what principle shall govern the division of financial responsibility between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers.

Two alternative principles are proposed—

(1) The whole cost of diplomatic, consular, naval, telegraphic and other charges in Persia and Turkish Arabia might be divided in some fixed proportion.

(2) The Imperial and Indian Governments might, respectively, accept responsibility for those areas in which Imperial or Indian interests predominate, with a joint contribution towards the central (Tehran) establishment.

There are arguments on either side; but I incline to the latter arrangement, if it can be carried out.

My reasons are that, if India were responsible for the Indian area—which would, I take it, include Seistan—any action to be taken could be taken more *quickly* and more *quietly*. That is chiefly a political reason, though there is much to be said for having our contribution entirely within our control. And, financially, references to London for increasing any part of a total contribution divided in fixed proportions would be troublesome. Moreover, if, in an emergency, we anticipated London, we should very likely find it difficult to get the Home Government to accept any responsibility for the amount expended in anticipation.

I quite agree with Mr. Dawkins's preference, and also with his reasons for arriving at it. I would add another, *viz*, that the second arrangement is far more likely to be accepted by the Home Government than the first. I am willing to add a paragraph as suggested. On the other hand, it must be remembered that under the second plan India will certainly have to pay more (and probably in an increasing ratio) than under the first.

C[URZON].

Possibly some argument in this direction could be introduced into paragraph 69 of the draft.

I may illustrate my contention by a reference to such expenditure as the Quetta-Seistan route may entail. Such expenditure must, I think, grow in a tentative and gradual manner and by small amounts at a time.

I had hoped to be able to append to this note some remarks on the figures given in the draft of the Imperial and Indian shares of the existing expenditure. These figures are being checked and examined in the Finance Department, but I regret that the process is not yet finished, and I did not like to delay this note further.

If I have any remarks to make, I will submit them separately. They will not, in any case, touch the principles laid down in the draft.

C. E. D[AWKINS],—7-9-99.

I quite concur in the policy outlined, and have no criticism to offer on the details.

I should* like to have some further information on the military part of the question: say, a note showing the bases from which, and the lines along which, we can move troops towards the Persian frontier. Perhaps the Military Members of Council can explain this part of the case.

* I do not think that a note will be required. With the assistance of my Military Colleagues, I can explain the matter in Council.

C[URZON].

My chief reason for voting to postpone the Khyber and Kabul valley proposals was that, if we spend money and possibly stir up quarrels in that direction, we may hamper ourselves in the important work of strengthening our position towards Persia and the Gulf.

T. R[ALEIGH],—7-9-99.

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The only remark I have to make is that I entirely concur in all that is said in the proposed despatch. As regards the Quetta-Seistan railway, it is perhaps a question whether the connection between Quetta and Nushki might not with advantage be executed at once, but, for the reasons given in His Excellency the Viceroy's minute, it seems advisable to postpone even this portion of the work for the present, and wait till things develop a bit.

C. M. R[IVAZ],—9-9-99.

In the few days allowed me for its study—at a time when there have been many other calls upon my attention—I have gone carefully through His Excellency the Viceroy's draft despatch on the maintenance of our influence in Persia.

In it the case has been so clearly and comprehensively set forth that I cannot pretend to offer any suggestion for its amendment or improvement.

The discussion at next Friday's Council-meeting may possibly develop some fresh aspect of the situation which may alter my views, but with this reservation I accept the draft as it stands.

With permission I will keep my copy of the draft despatch and the documents, which accompanied it, for further study, until the 15th instant.

W. S. A. L[OCKHART],—12-9-99.

I must, in the first place, venture to express the gratitude I feel towards His Excellency the Viceroy, for having placed before us this remarkable survey of our past, present and future policy in respect to Persia; I do not suppose that any more important document has ever been placed before this Council.

The proposal which is made to Her Majesty's Government is whether it may not be possible to come to an understanding with Russia for the separate patronage and development of Persia in distinct and clearly defined compartments by the two Powers; in other words, for a recognition of British and Russian spheres of interest in the dominions of the Shah.

No one can doubt the great importance of the question. If Russia were to be allowed to occupy Northern Persia, including Khorasan and its provincial appanage, Seistan, the independence of Afghanistan would be threatened, the outposts of the Russian and British armies would ere long confront each other on the frontier of Baluchistan, and a great portion of Western Afghanistan would be ready to fall an easy prey to the advance of Russia.

Some of the drawbacks of the policy suggested are stated with great impartiality, force, and clearness in the despatch, but I venture to think that there are other conditions which may be indicated, and I ask to be permitted to lay these before His Excellency and my colleagues, for their consideration.

We will assume, for the moment, that Russia assents to the arrangement proposed. She can employ her energies in the development of Northern Persia and in pushing roads and railways, and in all the numerous activities which would then be within her scope. We, on the other hand, would be equally empowered to pursue a similar policy south of the line Khanikin-Kermanshah-Kashan-Yezd-Kerman-Seistan. I do not think it requires any large prophetical powers to foretell what would, most probably, come to pass. In the northern sphere of influence the military power of Russia would become predominant, Russian trade might indeed be further developed; but the great aim would be to strengthen the strategic position, so that, when the time comes, an irresistible advance, backed by all the resources of Khorasan, could be made upon the Herat province.

Would be irresistible as it is

It will be said that we should have strengthened our military position in a corresponding way in the Southern Zone. I doubt it. It is not our practice to spend large sums of money on the development of a country with a view to those strategical advantages which are not infrequently regarded as the dream and fantasy of the soldier. The money would not come at first from England—where such enterprises would immediately and very readily be denounced as barren and profitless undertakings. Could it be supplied from India? I do not think so, unless it had to be produced under some overwhelming feeling of alarm, unless the Government of this country and Her Majesty's Government were convinced that some present and extraordinary danger had to be confronted. I do not for a moment deny that Southern Persia or the southern "sphere of influence", might not be considerably developed. Cultivation might be increased and agriculture improved; the cotton and tobacco industry would be fostered; the revenue derived from opium increased; mineral production might be augmented and the various manufactures of silk and woollen tissues would receive the impetus of water or steam power. The roads would be made better and safer, and, in course of time, even railways for commercial objects might be introduced.

The material advantages which would result to Southern Persia and to our trade should not be minimised, but they will be of little value in checking the onward progress of Russia in our sphere of influence in Asia, unless railways were made not only in Seistan, but from the Gulf ports, so that from our sea base we could operate expeditiously against her advance towards our Southern Zone—an advance she would certainly make at some time or other—or threaten her

They would come v practicable

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on the flank should she advance into Afghanistan. I would ask what chance there is of such railways being made during the period Russia would be employed with more active schemes in the Northern Zone. I cannot believe that either the Imperial or the Indian Government would be willing to embark in such projects, and even if they were, the stronger financial position of England does not counterbalance the inevitable delay which would ensue before such projects were carried into effect. The simpler Russian system, with all its defects, would leave us far behind in the race.

The result of this policy of partition cannot but lead to the enormous increase of Russian influence in the north—and of the display, in some form or other, of her military power. Already she is approaching predominance, but is it too late for Great Britain to assert her position? The partition of influence would ultimately mean the partition of Persia—and this would most certainly lead, sooner or later, to the partition of Afghanistan, a step which, I have always maintained, would lead to the most intolerable burden being laid upon India, and should be resisted by all the might of England. But even supposing that this latter step were long delayed, but that in the interval Russia were to occupy Northern Persia, and England the Southern Zone, can it be supposed that our position would possess the same kind of strength as that of Russia in the north? We should occupy our Southern Zone with as small a garrison as would be compatible with the struggle between the dictates of prudence, and of economy; we should decline, at all events for some time to come, to embark on what we should call rash and ambitious railway schemes not likely to pay commercially, and meanwhile our rival in the north would have consolidated her power either for a movement southwards, or into Western Afghanistan. It is true we should, so far, have guarded the Gulf ports, but their protection, important though it be, is, I venture to think, only a part of this great question.

It is scarcely capable of increase except by armed occupation. It is already overwhelming.
C[URZON].

I have asked the question whether it is too late to regain our influence in Northern Persia. It is true our trade in that zone has suffered, but we are not, we are told, yet beaten out of the field; our influence may be waning, but it is not yet eclipsed. Why should we not try a more powerful policy? It will cost money, but England can afford that to preserve her Indian Empire. The Imperial Bank of Persia is an English Bank with branches at several places. Can it not be further supported by English credit and English gold? Can we not intervene more liberally in the financial condition of Persia, and place our Consular establishments on a scale worthy of a great country with great interests at stake? If our "intelligence" is bad, let us have better agents; if Russian Consuls have Cossack escorts, ours should have escorts from the Indian Army; and the Telegraph Department might be strengthened by the employment of selected Engineer officers who know the country. Above all, let us be prepared to tell Russia that we intend to maintain the integrity of Persia, just as, I trust, we shall maintain the integrity of Afghanistan.

What I have asked for is, I venture to think, the maximum that any British Government would be likely to concede. It is far more than most Governments would grant. It may even turn out to be more than the present Government will accept. I do not hesitate to say that we shall forfeit the chance of consolidating our position in Central and Southern Persia, if now, at the eleventh hour, we ask the Home Government to authorise a policy of expansion in the north. We shall invite a rebuff, which will not only be humiliating to ourselves, but will leave British interests in Persia worse off than before, instead of better.
C[URZON].

E. H. H. C[OLLEN],—12-9-99.

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

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

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

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

Persia

India Office,
London, 9th March 1900.

Secret,
No. 8.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord,

With reference to your Excellency's Letter No. 175 (Secret) of the 21st September last, on the subject of the maintenance of British relations with Persia, I forward herewith, for the information of your Government, a copy of the correspondence* which has passed between this Office and the Foreign Office on the subject.

Persia: maintenance of British influence.

* To Foreign Office, dated 20th December 1899.
From ditto, dated 27th February 1900.

2. Your Excellency will observe, from the Foreign Office letter of the 27th February, that no action is being taken with regard to the Consulates at Mohammerah, Tabriz, Ispahan, and Resht, pending the receipt of Sir M. Durand's revised proposals, which he intends in due course to submit, in reference to the change in the situation that may result from the recent Russian loan.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant.
(Signed) George Hamilton.

S. 9. A

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

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

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ENCLOSURES.

No 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.

India Office,
20th December 1899.

Sir,

I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to forward herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a Letter from the Government of India, dated the 21st September 1899, No. 175, Secret, External, with enclosed Minute, containing their observations upon Sir Mortimer Durand's Despatch which formed an enclosure to your letter of the 5th May last.

In this letter the Government of India review the situation in Persia, the interests of Great Britain and of Foreign Powers in its several provinces, and the measures that have hitherto been adopted in support of those interests. After discussing the lines of policy open to Her Majesty's Government and expressing their opinion in favour of an understanding (if possible) with Russia regarding the British and Russian spheres of interest in Persia, the Government of India make certain specific recommendations some of which are financial and others of a political character.

The proposals discussed in paragraphs 73, 74, and 75 involve expenditure from Imperial revenues, and are matters for the consideration of the Foreign Office before any opinion on them can be expressed by the Secretary of State for India. With respect to the Karun subsidy, referred to in paragraph 75, I am to invite attention to the letter from this Office of the 31st October last.

The proposals (in paragraph 87), relating to the extension of telegraph lines in Southern Persia form the subject of separate correspondence with the Foreign Office, concluding with the letter to the Foreign Office of 12th December.

The other proposals of the Government of India are contained in paragraphs 76 to 83 inclusive, and include the improvement of the Nushki-Seistan route, the permanent establishment, subject to certain financial arrangements, of a Consul at Kerman with a Native Agent at Bampur, and the measures designed to strengthen British influence in the Persian Gulf and on its littoral.

With regard to the Seistan route I am to forward, for Lord Salisbury's information, a copy of the marginally-noted correspondence* with the Government of India. Pending the decision of the financial question, Lord George Hamilton considers it premature to make permanent the Consulate at Kerman, but he proposes to approve the appointment of the Native Agent at Bampur.

* Letter from India, No. 113.
Despatch to India, No. 33.
Letter from India, No. 148.
Letter from India, No. 189.
Despatch to India, No. 141.

Of the recommendations contained in paragraphs 80 to 84, his Lordship is of opinion that only two, viz., the establishment of a British Officer at Bahrein and the appointment of a Political Assistant at Bunder Abbas, are of immediate importance, and he proposes to take steps for giving effect to them. In regard to the Bahrein appointment, the Secretary of State for India awaits a reply to my letter of the 15th ultimo, and on receipt of it the Government of India will lose no time in forwarding their final and detailed proposals for establishing a representative on that island.

I have, &c.,
A. GODLEY.

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

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

No. 2.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office,
27th February 1900.

Sir,

With reference to your letter marked Secret of December 20th last, I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to state, for the information of Lord George Hamilton, that Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran was authorised by telegraph, on the 6th instant, to act upon a request, addressed to him direct by the Government of India, that he should obtain the recognition of Captain *French as Her Majesty's Consul at Seistan, and of Lieutenant Hunter as Vice-Consul at Bunder Abbas and Assistant Resident at Bushire.

Sir M. Durand was informed at the same time that Lord Salisbury was willing to agree to the immediate establishment of a full Consulate at Mohammerah and to an increase in the salaries at present assigned to the Consuls at Tabriz and Ispahan, the cost involved in these charges to be met by the saving on the diminished Karun subsidy and the reduction of the post at Resht to a Vice-Consulate.

Sir M. Durand now telegraphs that in view of the effect on the political situation which will be produced by the recent Russian loan, he would prefer to reconsider, when matters have further developed, the measures which he recommended.

Lord Salisbury is disposed to concur that this is advisable, and has accordingly agreed to defer a final decision until the receipt of Sir M. Durand's further recommendations.

I am, &c.,
F. H. VILLIERS.

The Under Secretary of State
for India.

* Major Chenevix French.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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~~Seistan trade route~~

Daly note
Secret E. Pro 1898 40-58

~~General Policy Indian~~ Govt II (288)

Revenue Desp from Sec State Dec 2.97 sending letter from F.O. who wrote good hopes of Quetta-Meshed route provided Consular protect & other facilities at points on road Seistan-Meshed at pres no Brit Cons agents at Nasirabad or Birjand

Seistan

S of S. wrote commending this suggn of Sgt. "I trust that the suggn of appt Consular agents at points along the trade route between Q. & M. may receive the attentive consid^n of G.E. Sw. It appears to me a meas desirable from many pts of view & especi in connection with the facil wh might be afforded by that route for the transport of arms & ammun between the P.G. & Bel"

Daly. May 10 98 after recovery part recommend Brit Off at Kerman & at Birjand. Nasirabad & Bampur

If these Vice Consul at £350 + 140 (Office allow) each total £1960 p a

But if selected officers of Staff Corps then £500-£600 each or total of £3000 p a

& that consular agents at B.A. give PA at Muscat charge of P. Mekran coast

Given of £5000 a year try for 5 years
Hmy bear some share

275

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Route N - Seistan

Bell in Oct 88 took that via Kharan & Maskhel (vice Maigregors via Amir i Chah & Shah Godar) -
water - grazing - firewood everywhere
no topogr diffic

- Bell suff (Nov 24 88) appears should give us their pieces S. W. of Helmund to Kuh MS & that we shd divert treate part of Helmund S. wds

- Bell says rent S. in perpetuity 2000 sq miles & food grain soil

---

Contd from previous page
Sir J Gordon after journey thro Persia went to Calcutta in Jan 91 & saw L & discussed Wolff scheme. Sir R Sandeman now strong for line from Pusni - Panjgur Kelat Quetta

- Sir R Sandemans proposals to take over Kej & Panjgur negatived by Govt of India Aug 1891

// Sir J Browne required the Govt after a tour in 1894 & proposed that Brit Govt should take over admin of Mekran required by Govt in letter March 10 1894
For Dep (Secret E) May 94 53-6
vide Lord Elgins note of Feb 18 1894 deprecating the question being revived

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
Yate
Seistan Cont
Confidential
Yate
Persian
Seistan
Hashmat ul Mulk
Sardar Khan
Sardar Khan
Ghulam Khan
Ghulam Khan
Ali Akbar Kh

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

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

(293)

Sir G White noted v Yate : no money & build railway & outposts — communications are useless

Sir H Brack : our meddling there has brought on Russians & Polit activity in P that cannot be supported / arms is useless

E Yin agreed..

ie Yate was snuffed out almost — consid

Sir J Indian answer him July 18. 1894.. any adv to Seistan "would be a direct incentive to R to push forward railways into Khorasan — a result wh would far more than counterbalance any adv likely to accrue to Indian trade

also y send Brit officers R officers will follow

This attitude since abandoned by opening of Nushki-S. trade route

1896. 1½ lakhs

Nushki trade figures 1897-8. 5. 98.630 Rs

no returns prior to Feb. 97

Jan-April 98. 3 11.000 Rs 4 mos

due to 5 forts & 13 blockhouses

280

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

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

Seistan Question (1) (294)

Cap McMahon after decrease wrote memo June 21. 1896. pointing out possib of new trade route from Koh i Malik Siah S. of Boundary line to Mishki

- Shilyan & Pourndaler told Mr they would move to this route

- He went on to recom a ~~Brit~~ Tahsildar official at Chagai with small levy & seven estab with pol authority up to P. border

1 jemadar
2 duffadars
50 camel sowars

also a few at upper Nobat springs

- make good road Quetta to Mishki

Sg. 1 sent this home with despatch Sep 16. 1896 propose to place pol control of Chagai sub a Brit officer with 50 levies to maintain levy posts along it

Net cost of new proposals 24 550 Rs p.a

perhaps later recoup of light revenue

S of S Oct 23 1896 accepted "In the interests of the trade between I. & P. it seems to me very desirable to further its development of this route" & ∴ I sanction proposals

- Webb Ware appd officer Nov 1896

He is to pr & estab levy posts & munshis at some places

Sg. 1. March 31. 1898 send desp to S of S Enclosing report on first visit of W.W to S in 1897 & measures to develop trade mentions Mission of Brazier Creagh to

281

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

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

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

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in E Persia, & open to India the rich grain fields of Seistan; while it would be impossible to estimate the strategical value

Seistan trade Para 20

§ 91 (UOC) answer Hamer on Feb 18 1898 holds over gr of revenue in Chagai & W Sinjerani & question of native assistant there

Sanctions grants for additional levies town expenses etc up to 13.880 Rs but from Beluch revenues.

Proposal to appoint a Native agent in S deferred for the present - Maula Bakhsh will shortly be returning from Meshed over route & Abbas Ali Hosp assist has gone to S & meet him on return. This enough for present

Bragier Creagh sent off himself in April to anticipate R sending an officer 97 & Cossacks to that ~~district~~ in connection with to preventive plague measures

Quetta & Robat (frontier post) 527½ miles
but he went by S route from Dalbandin to Amir Chah 93 Q. Nushki
434 - R - Seistan
- Sekkon 80 miles
Robat - Seistan Nasirabad 94 miles

p5 He violently attacks our Boundary Corps for putting forward at Sar Robat vice Ziarat Malik Shah (where good posit for frontier post)

p11 He reports Russian influence & authority Seistan - meshed news writers & agents at Deh Birjand. Tabas Khaf, Turbat & H

- their closing of Perso-Afghan & Perso-Baluch trade routes from alleged fear of plague

- he mentions R. news writer Mirza Moh Rahim Khan afterwards dismissed 1898 R Consulate started Nov 96 completed March 1897 - in Husainabad also a shopkeeper Moh Akram Khan

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

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

Maula Bakhsh returned from Meshed Quetta
April 7 – Jul 28 1898
Sent by Gate with a trial caravan of Meshed traders
32 camels. p 3 account of

p 10 He had long convers with Hashmat ul Mu
before leaving Meshed. Latter told him of
intrigues & him of his brother (of Kain) & of
Russian party
He had decided to recall Mir Masum Khan et al.
from S. & his mother & to send his elder son
of a concub. et 21 – Moh Raza Khan instead
temporary to visit S himself & then
send back M M Khan – mother – the whole
thing being a device to get rid of the lady
– He had also agreed to dismiss Naib ul Hukumat
" intrigues & wiv & Brg Cr Allah Yar Khan

p 33 at B. he also came across Rahim Khan
ex-R agent in Seistan – dismissed by R Cons Gen at M
said house " was his own prop & offered it to
Brit. offered to show his office reports

Really a surveyor } He mentioned Nicholai Alexieff Zarouglny
a combined Polit & Geologist who visited
Kain & Seistan in 1895 & again in 1898

Russian agencies in Kain & Seistan

1891 Rahim Khan a native of Meshed – who had been
news agent for R in S often turned out
was reppd
Hajo Agha (grocer) appd to Birjand
Both were news agents appd & paid by Vlassov
(with no consular status or powers)
They were despised by local chiefs " low birth
got little inform & had to send up foolish gossips & no posit
Finally Dr Miladchersky R Doctor to K & S in
1897 reported both useless & meanwhile
Accord both recalled & dismissed
& R. for called for statistics of Indo-Persian
trade by Q. & S. before appty successors –
one at Nasiraba / one at Birjand / meanwhile they engaged as news writers the
2 Persian Contractors for Kain & Seistan Customs

He travelled at night

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

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

Webb Ware: annual Report for 1898
dated June 18 1898
record one of advant trade for 1896 = 1½ lakhs
1897-8 5.89.929 Rs
- speaks of obstructive measures of R officers on pretext of plague
- & renewed R activity in Seistan

Appendix II Report on Q.S. Caravan route
grows steady in favour
trade created only of
Lt Napier in 92 stated only 2 ft Kaplas annually S to Persia
Thomson in 93 said no Indian products reached S

p 12 describes new Thanas blockhouses wells etc

p 23 Complete dearth of supplies along route all have at present to be brought from Nushki

24 He thinks Q.S. route will beat Abbas route: (1) no latter goods change hands several times in transit (2) much greater time (3) greater protection on Brit territory

25 He says Pathan sowars have begun to make dashes upon Caravans crossing the toe

Retarding features are in P territory. illegal exactions of P. toll collectors (in R pay)

p 27 App III He strongly advocates putting native agents in Seistan & S E Khorasan

He gives an account of R activity in S. from 1891

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

Seistan Question (3)

(298)

Sykes letters

(1) Jan 11. 1899 He left Kerman Oct 19 1898 & travelled with wood & Mr Sun Tel Dep via Bam - crossed desert to Kwash (capital of Sarhad) Ladis.
(where he heard that in July 98 2 R explorers had travelled S - Bazman - Bampur - Pahra)
Kuh. M.S. joined W.W. at Hurmah Jan. 99

(2) Jan 17. 1899 from Nasratabad treat reception from Mir M Khan
Sykes votes straight away for occas presence of a Pol Officer vice Consul & asks to go back to Kerman & votes bang off v Quetta - Seistan route

Temple in every letter Feb 11. 99 mentions
R have 2 R officers - a doctor & 10 Cossacks at Turbat H
" 1 " " 2 med assist & 10 D Kasez
" 2 native agents in Seistan since 1891 (now P. sub contractors for customs)
" recently ~~employed~~ appd Consul to S
Ziedler appd but not taken up
" 58 Persian towars paid thro R officers as 12 places

Since dismissed Sykes April 99

(3) Sykes of Feb 1 99 is joined in S. of W.W. & Tate
Tate joins Sykes & surveys. W.W. & wood go back to Nosrat
- He still says G.S. route cannot compete with B.A. but ought to be opened all for point reasons
They discussed whether Seistan & Kerman shd be under same Consul ∴ trade route passes thro both districts
- He is for visit of Pol. Officer at intervals only
∴ no hered chiefs of any impt
& ∴ S only contains 60000 cultivators & low state of cultiv & civilis

Temple shows up Sykes & completely

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

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(4) Sykes 14th 1899 – discusses respective merits of trade routes, tests:
- water
- camel grazing
- villages for supplies of fodder
- charg road
- climate

(a) Quetta – Seistan route
Q – Robat 497 m
R – Sehkuha 90
587 m

Q – Nushki 96 m – hilly country
5500 ft 3050 ft
R – Robat no village or hamlet
- Afghan toe road only temp
- danger of Sarhad raids
- no supplies or grazing
merchants won't use

(2) Abbas – Rigan 254 m – water good
Rigan – Sehkuha 242 – worse than Q. Seistan
496

Good supplies & grazing all the way ∴ villages
But lots at Dahan Abbas Ali 30 m S of Rigan
of 1/8 a camel
∴ Quetta route 100 m longer & Ab route better in every respect
Still great opening for Indian route in exports of tea & indigo (Kangra valley)
- He thinks Hirjand might not to be neglected as Seitter
- Post road Robat – Seistan has been plan sub protection of Sirdar Purdil Khan

(5) Sykes March 28. 99 on Helmund water dispute
S of Helmund were properly controlled would support nice less than 100000 – 1 million or more

April 18. Seistan capable of supplying perhaps a tenfold popul

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'Seistan Persia & Seistan' [299r] (605/617)

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

(6) Sykes April 18 99 (299)

He describes Lake & Nayar

He is now coming round for he says (a) that Seistanis generally & Beluchis in partie all look towards E & S. & local commerce now many can on with G. (ghi & wool) (b) that revival of G S. route have increased our prestige

But he repeats views about commercial failure of G S route.

No hope for Seistan until scientific irrigation from Helmund & this can only be done in Afghan territory

He recommends (1) placing smart Mahom at Seistan to supervise the post which earnestly hope will also be made permanent

(2) second do at Birjand

(7) Sykes May 11 99 from Birjand

Call of Shanhatul Mulk at 48 { spectacles – toothless opium smoker

He recommends estab of Indian P O at Birjand & Seistan with a competent newswriter for each district who should also be post master

No need for more permanent estab at present

(8) Sykes June 1 99 from Birjand

arrival of M de Stroeff (Dragoman) R Consulate at M with presents – £ 140 for arms of Kain with Cossack

Shanhatul Mulk regarded whole affair with & became more cordial suspicion

His final opinion is ! a Consul for Kain & Seistan (the post of founded should include Tun & Tabas " under S.)

But we must do what R do. If they have R consul we must have a Brit C.

Better under Meshed

Temple on this June 24 recommends

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

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medical officer to S (to check Russian plague preventive designs in S Khorasan) who should be Assist to Cons Gen at Meshed

- He strongly deprecates a consul at S indep of Meshed

(with 2 subord for estab of plague observation posts - they might also look after postal arrangts Heluch - Birjand)

Summer 1899 we have sent a Hospital Assist for Q to S. as news writer & medical reporter for 6 mos

ie all trade going thro N whether Seistan afghan or Persia

Webb-Ware's 2' annual Report June 30 99

Trade route cont to of wrong inspite of severe adverse cons in 98-99 - Increase of 138.152 Rs. in total value of N trade Returns ie. 728.082 rise 589.929 Rs

New Bazar. 126 shops laid out in N.

- urges tel Q - Nushki that new overland line shall go via Q - Seistan route

- Weekly dak Q - Robat has been meant thrown year - hooked on to Tri-weekly P. dak Robat Nasratabad Birjand Meshed

- Batch of horses M - Q. fore thro & well sold

He says p18 Short cuts 8½ in route now make N - Meshed 954 m
B.ab - 966 "

Asst for railway to Nushki - Caravanbashes have to go on with their camels to Q now where no camel grazing & prices for fodder high rice letting at once after a few days rest

∴ traders press for cart track to N

WW also advocates Telegraph

- Utility of route to Indian Sheah pilgrims to Meshed

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Map of the area south of the border between Afghanistan and Baluchistan [300r] (1/2)



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Map of the area south of the border between Afghanistan and Baluchistan [300v] (2/2)



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Map of the area west of the border between Persia and Afghanistan [301r] (1/2)



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Map of the area west of the border between Persia and Afghanistan [301v] (2/2)



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

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‘Route Plan of Robat Nala’ [302v] (2/2)



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

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

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

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

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

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