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Persia

Holding Institution	British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers
Reference	Mss Eur F111/359
Date(s)	7 Nov 1901-23 Aug 1905 (CE, Gregorian)
Written in	English in Latin
Extent and Format	1 file (531 folios)
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About this record

This file is formed of two parts, both comprising a set of papers collected by George Nathaniel Curzon during his term as Viceroy of India. The larger set of papers (Mss Eur F111/359/1) contains copies of reports and correspondence relating to Britain's interests in Persia and the Persian Gulf, including papers relating to Seistan [Sistan]. The second set of papers is a printed summary of the history of British policy in Persia from the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, consisting of extracts from Foreign Office correspondence and extracts from House of Commons speeches given by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs respectively.

‘Persia – especially Seistan’ [front] (1/949)



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

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

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

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

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

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SUBJECT.

A BANDED BOX CASE.

Spare copy of notes & correspondence of the "Helmand Control" file. (with 2 maps)

No. 43.

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

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

(6)

Viceregal Lodge
Simla

Seistan

(1) Do not make Seistan Railway

(2) Approach of Helmund
i.e. railway Kandahar to Girishk
or Kila Sist
i.e. make S. outpost from Kand)
not " " Quetta) Nushki to (middle Helmund
or " (Lundi Wali Mohammed

(3) Moment Russians advance
throw forward force into Seistan

(4) Block R. concession in N of
B. Abbas - Seistan R. concession in S.
This would absolutely bar advance

(5) Discuss R. advances in Persia
matter becomes Imp. reason to be
Indian question Indian forces or
we may cannot do it

(6) Let Seistan concession because it enables
us to open Helmund route

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

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(7)

K: position

(1) thought 1st duty was Frontiers
Stud. Exam^d reported

Viceregal Lodge
Simla

(2) found to differ.
Ind Army cd do far more than realised
badly placed. badly constit^d. badly organised

(3) This his main duty
Put army in order. know what we have got
put all possible in field & use to uttermost

(4) Hence his scheme for Redistrib. & field army of
9 division 122.000 men vice 56.000 men
(not counting reinforcts from England)
Local Govt agreed.

(5) This involves 5000 more men from England
ie 5 battalions
Defend (1) to maintain proportions
(2) to release suffic. native forces for front.

(6) ~~When got this organis. then K will say what reinforcement required~~
If H.M. thinks this scheme not good enough
to meet 100 000 Russians then they
must supply balance.

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

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

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

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MSS. Eur. F.111/359 (10)

Confidential.

COMMERCIAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE.

Reports received from Mr. H. W. Maclean, the Special Commissioner appointed by the Committee to Inquire into and Report upon the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in Persia, &c.

5.—REPORT ON THE TRADE OF OMAN, BAHREIN, AND ARAB PORTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

To the Chairman of the Commercial Intelligence Committee.

Sir, London, 12th April 1904.

I have the honour to submit herewith a Report on the Trade of Oman prepared after a visit to Muscat in the month of February 1904, in accordance with your instructions. Other ports in Oman are in great measure dependent on the coasting trade with Muscat and Gulf ports visited by ocean steamers, and did not appear to me to promise sufficient matter of general interest to reward the somewhat protracted journey which visits to them would have involved.

On leaving Muscat the proximity of Bahrein induced me to visit that place whence I returned to Karachi *viâ* Bushire and Koweit. In the course of the voyage I had opportunities to gather from merchants and others some impression of the trade at ports on the Pirate Coast, although I was not able to land at any of them. I have included in my Report notes on these places.

I gratefully acknowledge the kindly welcome and willing assistance accorded to me by H.B.M. Consular Officers, merchants, and other residents in Oman and the Gulf Ports.

I have, &c.
H. W. Maclean.

OMAN.

Muscat is the capital and principal port of the Sultanate of Oman. Caravans cannot readily approach it, and commerce with the interior passes through Mutra, lying in an adjacent bay. The population of these two towns may be 30,000, and that of the territory of Oman has been estimated at 500,000, chiefly Arabs. There are British, French, and American Consuls, the last named being a British subject representing a trading firm and agent for the British India Steam Navigation Company; a French trader; a Russian trader; and British Indian subjects to the number of about 1,100.

The climate is tropical, dry with intense heat in summer, but pleasant during four winter months.

Statistics of Imports and Exports at Muscat are given in the Annual Trade Reports to the Indian Government of the Political Agent at Muscat. These statistics do not include merchandise carried in native sailing craft

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trading from the smaller ports of Oman. There has been no marked increase or decrease of trade in recent years.

Total Imports (excluding specie).

	£	
Average for three years to 1900 - -	246,000	per annum.
Do. do. 1903 - - -	253,000	,,

Total Exports (excluding specie).

Average for three years to 1900 - -	127,000	per annum.
Do. do. 1903 - - -	119,000	,,

Imports.

Arms and Ammunition are imported direct from Europe. The Trade in 1895–6 amounted to only 16,000*l.* The imports in subsequent years have been :—

——	1896-7.	1897-8.	1898-9.	1899-1900.	1900-1.	1901-2.	1902-3.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
British - - -	80,000	90,000	20,000	35,000	78,000	44,000	27,000
Continental - -	5,000	10,000	6,000	5,500	12,000	11,000	13,000

The importation of firearms and ammunition into Persia and certain other territories in the Persian Gulf was prohibited in the end of 1897, but only a part of the quantities still imported into Muscat finds a sale in Oman, the bulk is sent in contraband to Persian Gulf ports.

There is no restriction imposed by the Sultan of Muscat on the importation or sale of these articles, but British and British Indian subjects participating in this trade at Muscat must furnish to the Poltical Agent the names and addresses of parties to whom they sell. This discourages them from engaging in the trade, for it is probable that legitimate sales made by them will be run by subsequent buyers in contraband to prohibited ports. Purchasers naturally prefer to deal with other traders, on whom similar regulations are not imposed, and the import from France and Belgium through Marseilles is consequently steadily increasing, while import from the United Kingdom is declining.

This trade gives large profits in Muscat, and a French and a Russian trader are enabled to run businesses which, but for the regulation referred to, they would have difficulty in retaining in competition with our own traders. A recent consignment, mostly carbines, is reported to have been sold off at over Rs. 60 each piece (with 100 rounds ammunition), the cost c.i f. Muscat, being estimated at Rs. 35.

The traffic in arms is not now an important business, but by leaving it to foreign competitors we give them an opening to settle in Muscat, and being there, perhaps to take part in other business which alone would not afford them maintenance

Grain and Provisions.—Rice is consumed by all classes, and with other grains, spices, and coffee, forms the principal trade with India. Persia has usually supplied wheat, but owing to bad harvests in that country for some years past recourse has been had to India. Loaf sugar is little used, and soft sugar from Austria has held the market until recently, but Russian bag sugar, for which some orders have recently been placed through Bombay, is now offered at lower rates (about 11*s.* 6*d.* per cwt.), and appears likely to secure the market. Cane sugar is imported from Mauritius and India, but is not a large trade.

Textiles.—White shirtings are all of Manchester manufacture, but in greys the Indian mills supply a fair part, and American unbleached sheetings have a steady market. In printed cotton goods the demand is for cheap light Manchester fabrics, check and stripe patterns predominating. Indigo dyed shirtings are in some demand for the mourning month of

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Muharrem, which at present begins in March. Native weaving industries are of little account, and the trade in yarns is not important.

For woollen and silk goods there is only a limited demand.

A few articles of continental manufacture, probably from Bombay, are found in the bazaars of Muscat, but no information was obtained of direct business with the continent.

Exports.

Dates are the principal produce, and are sent down to the coast ports, where they are purchased and packed by the exporters. To fix the value for payment of customs duty all dates are auctioned on arrival at Mutra, and certain taxes and fines due from the proprietors in the interior are levied along with the duty. The ruling price in Muscat at the close of the packing season this year (January 1904) was 820 mahmoodieh per "bar." The "Fard" dates are mostly exported to America, where there is a steady demand for this kind only.

Statistics show a steady increase in export of dates, but the rainfall has failed in Oman during the last five years, and the palms are said to have suffered.

A few other fruits, particularly dried limes, are exported to India and Persia.

Cotton, of good quality is said to have been formerly grown with success, but is not now exported.

Pearls and Shells.—Bahrein is now the headquarters of the pearl fishing industry in these regions, and little business in either pearls or shells is done in Muscat. An oyster-bed is said to exist off the island of Masorah, beyond Sur, from which fine pearls were formerly obtained.

Fish.—There is a regular trade to India in sun-dried and salted fish, but no organised effort has been made to develop this industry, in which a good trade might be done. The waters of Oman abound in excellent fish, and Muscat harbour swarms with sardines and a sort of whitebait (matoot). The goldfish, tunny, and ray are abundant. The fishermen use both line and net, and wages are very low.

Coinage.

The Maria Theresa dollar is the usual medium of exchange in Oman. Specie operations in this coin are worked through Bombay. The only coin struck in the name of the Sultan is a copper pice ($\frac{1}{4}$anna), which has been issued in excess, and circulates at a fluctuating value to the inconvenience of the public, the present rate being 260 pice per dollar. The rupee is well known in the coast ports, and is current for many transactions in Muscat but does not penetrate far into the interior. The ratio of the rupee to the dollar (about Rs. 220 per $100 before the Indian Mints were closed to free silver) has been recently 130 to 140 rupees per 100 dollars, in January 1904 Rs. 131 per $ 100.

Prices are often quoted in mahmoodieh, a money of account only; 20 gad equal 1 mahmoodi, and 11½ mahmoodieh equal one dollar.

Weights.

The Muscat man equals 237 tolah ($2\frac{3}{8}$ tolahs=1 oz. troy).

24 kias = 1 Muscat man.
3 Muscat mans = 1 Delhi man.
10 „ „ = 1 Frasla.
200 „ „ = 1 Bar.

The kias is said to equal 6 reals or dollars in weight. There is also a bazaar man of 136 reals.

Freight.

Muscat is the only port of Oman at which steamers call. There is a weekly passenger and cargo service both to and from Bombay *viâ* Karachi by

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the British India Steam Navigation Company's Persian Gulf line. Average freight is Rs. 10 per ton, weight or measurement. The direct British lines to the Persian Gulf frequently call at Muscat on the outward trip—freight usually the same as for Gulf ports, or an average of 35*s.* per ton. Arms are shipped direct from England and Marseilles at about 6*l.* per ton freight.

Native sailing craft are now employed chiefly in the coasting trade, except from the port of Sur, where the Arab owners maintain a trade, only inferior to that of Muscat, with India and the African coast as far as Zanzibar, and even with Mauritius.

Course of Trade.

Quite four-fifths of the trade of Muscat is with India, and in the hands of British Indian subjects working through partners or agents in Bombay. Indents for Manchester or other home goods are sent to those agents, who place orders with shipping firms in Bombay (payment against bill of lading), and draw on Muscat at 21 days, *plus* commission (say 2 per cent).

Cotton tissues and other manufactures suited to the climate and condition of the people of Oman can be supplied largely from goods which are already manufactured for the Indian market, but the demand is of limited extent, and traders state, I think with reason, that for the small indents made for any one commodity it is more advantageous to place orders with Bombay shippers probably dealing in large quantities of the same goods, than to deal direct with houses in Great Britain. The consignment of perhaps only a few bales is either transhipped on arrival in Bombay at once to Muscat, or if landed in India on declaration of re-export pays 1 per cent. transit duty (*plus* ½ per cent. agent's commission) The Muscat trader sells locally in rupees or dollars, usually payable in instalments concluded in about three months. Sales to the interior are in dollars cash, delivery in Muscat, or frequently on credit to be liquidated by consignments of dates or other produce in their seasons.

Oman has commercial treaties with Great Britain, France, and other Powers. I summarise the conditions of greatest interest to traders:—

Foreign merchants have liberty to trade and reside in the country, and purchase or rent lands, houses, and godowns, and to import or export any article of commerce.

All imports are subject to Customs duty of 5 per cent. *ad valorem*.

Exports are not subject to duty.

Merchandise imported into Muscat under declaration of re-export by the same owner within six months is not subject to duty in transit.

Dates and other produce from the interior are charged 5 per cent. duty on arrival at the Customs Stations at the Coast ports. This charge does not seem to be in keeping with treaty obligations, but is not complained of by our traders as a serious question, as traders of all nationalities submit to it.

The Customs were formerly farmed out at an annual rental, latterly amounting to $ 14[illegible],000, but since November 1899 have been administered for account of the Sultan, with the result, it is believed, of an increase of revenue. There are Customs ports at Muscat, Mutra, Sur, and other smaller ports, but the control exercised elsewhere than at Muscat and Mutra is lax and only nominal at Sur, which serves the most populous and fertile districts of the Sultanate and is the port next in importance to Muscat. The Arab traders of Sur, many of them flying the French flag pay only nominal duties, and consequently can afford to sell cheaper in inland markets than the British Indian traders of Muscat.

The development of trade with Oman is retarded by the insecurity of life and property inland. Merchandise is forwarded by large caravans with not less than 10 men in charge, under safe conduct of a man from each district traversed. The authority of the Sultan is little more than nominal beyond the Coast ports, and tribal feuds and raids discourage agriculture and industry in the interior.

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The simple wants and general poverty of the people offer only a limited field to foreign trade. Regular steamer service from Europe and India to Gulf ports has decreased the coasting trade formerly centring in Muscat. The inland frontiers, apparently bounded in great part by deserts, afford no access to more distant markets. Little seems to be known of the mineral resources of the interior, but some hold the country to be capable of considerable agricultural development. Behind the forbidding rock-bound coast there are reported to be wide and fertile valleys with fair water supplies from the inland mountain ranges. When law and security take the place of the disorder which now prevails in the interior, there may be considerable increase in cultivation and industry, and consequently in purchasing capacity of foreign commodities.

BAHREIN.

The population of the two islands under the rule of the Sheikh of Bahrein is said to be about 70,000. Manameh is the capital and commercial centre. Foreign residents are—the Assistant Political Agent to H. B. M. Resident at Bushire, numerous British Indian subjects, an American mission with staff of five or six missionaries (usually including a male and lady doctor), a German trader, and until recently a French trader. There is a constant immigration from Persia, chiefly of the labouring classes.

The climate is exceedingly hot in summer, the most trying period being the damp heat from mid-July to October, when the wet bulb thermometer often registers 100° Fahrenheit. The months from November to April are temperate and pleasant, midwinter even cold.

The rainfall is very scanty, and it has been surmised that the plentiful supply of spring water enjoyed by the islands must be derived from sources far in the interior of the Arab mainland.

Statistics.

Trade statistics are published annually in H. B. M. Consular Reports for the Persian Gulf, and show that trade is increasing.

Total Imports (*excluding specie*).

	£
Average for three years, 1895–97 ...	... 341,000 per annum.
„ „ 1900–02 ...	... 472,000 „

Total Exports (*excluding specie*).

	£
Average for three years, 1895–97 ...	... 379,000 per annum.
„ „ 1900–02 ...	... 534,000 „

Imports.

Cattle and Sheep are imported from Persia, as the islands do not rear a sufficient supply for food.

Coffee is used much more than tea by the Arabs. Brazilian coffee is displacing Indian, because cheaper. The average annual import of coffee for some years past has been about 7,000 cwt., and trade is increasing.

Textiles.—The largest business is in grey shirtings of Manchester and Bombay manufacture. American sheeting is also in demand in two qualities (Lamp and Hawk marks) at Rs. 110 to Rs. 120 per bale of 25 pieces of 38 or 39 yards. Indigo dyed shirtings are in some demand for the Muharrem. Cotton prints are all cheap light fabrics from Manchester; spotted blue and white, red and white, and check patterns were most noted in the bazaars. The average annual import of cotton tissues has been from 50,000*l.* to 60,000*l.* in value, and the trade is increasing.

There is a limited but increasing demand for silk and woollen goods.

Grain and Provisions.—Rice is the most important import, large quantities being taken by the fishing fleets. The average annual import is 285,000

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cwts. Wheat was formerly obtained from Persia, but scarcity in that country in recent years has created a demand for Indian wheat.

Building Timber, carried mostly by sailing craft, now comes from British East Africa.

Tombac (not tobacco) is imported from Persia.

Exports.

Pearls.—Pearl fishing is the chief industry of Bahrein, and it is said that over 3,000 boats and 30,000 men collect for the fishing season. The Bahrein fleet is much the largest. Koweit also furnishes a strong fleet, and the smaller ports in the Gulf send their contingents. The fishing season is from May to September, and operations are carried on at many different places along the coast, the grounds being open to all comers under condition of conforming to traditional rules. The shells are collected by divers, opened by knife, and thrown overboard after removal of the pearls, which are disposed of in Bahrein to dealers, many of whom come up from India for the season. Freight to Bombay by mail steamer is one half per cent. on value. The annual value of pearls exported is estimated at 350,000*l.* to 400,000*l.*

Shells.—The trade in oyster shells, long neglected, is now attracting more attention; but the bulk of the shells brought to the surface have to be thrown overboard after search for pearls, as the boats cannot carry to market more than the shells collected during the last three or four days before returning to port. Those disposed of in Bahrein are mostly oyster shells; mussel and mother-of-pearl shells are more found in Persian waters.

Dates, chiefly from the mainland, are disposed of in India and Red Sea ports.

The average annual export is about 60,000 cwt.

Horses.—A few horses, also from the mainland, are sent to India.

Textiles.—The weaving of sail cloth is a small native industry, in which Bombay yarns are employed.

Customs.

The Customs are farmed out for an annual rental of about 10,000*l.* Customs duty is 5 per cent. *ad valorem.*

Coinage.

The Maria Theresa dollar is the currency of the Arab mainland, and transactions with Bedouins are usually based on it. The Indian rupee is, however, in general use in the islands, and the employment of it for both quotations and payments is steadily extending. The Indian subsidiary silver coins are widely used for divisional money. The Turkish lira (gold) is also frequently employed as a means of effecting payments.

Large quantities of rupees and dollars are needed every year by the pearl dealers during the fishing season, and are imported from Bombay. They filter back to India through the coast ports of the Gulf in payment for imported commodities. In good pearl seasons handsome profits used to be made on these specie operations, but the regular weekly steamer service now tends to keep margins nearer the actual cost of transmitting coin.

Weights and Measures.

Weights are—

1 Rubaa=4·114 lbs. avoir.
1 Man =57·6 lbs. avoir.
1 Rafaa=576 lbs. avoir.

The lineal measure in the bazaars is a yard of 18¾ inches.

Course of Trade.

Rice and other provisions, which form a very important part of the imports, are necessarily supplied from India, and as the piece goods trade is

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only beginning to acquire fair proportions, nearly all business is done through Bombay and falls largely to British Indian traders with agents or correspondents there. The regular steamer service with Bombay at low fares for deck passages has been availed of by many petty traders to make selection of goods there personally.

The prosperity of Manameh as a trading port is not due to demand from the limited area and small population of the islands of Bahrein, but chiefly to its position as the rallying point of the pearl fishing fleets of the Gulf, which lay in supplies and dispose of pearls there during the fishing season, and before dispersing for home at its close provide themselves with stores for the winter.

The island markets of Arabia have as yet less influence on the trade of Bahrein, but it is in this direction that increase of commerce may be looked for. Manameh is the natural emporium for commerce with El Katr and El Hassa. The coast towns of these districts have facile communication with Bahrein by sailing craft, but it is said to be difficult for ocean steamers to approach El Katif or Ujair, the two larger seaports from which caravan routes run to the inland parts of El Hassa, and in times of peace to Riadh and even more distant markets in the interior of Arabia. This incipient trade, mostly piece goods business, is at present constantly blocked by local wars and feuds, but is persistently renewed when circumstances permit, and some day may develop into an important commerce with these wide but little known regions.

There is some trade with ports on the opposite Persian coast, such as Kangun and Tahiri, which are more accessible to sailing craft from Bahrein than Bushire.

KOWEIT.

The channel and inner harbour of Koweit have been buoyed recently by the British India Steam Navigation Company. The steamers of their Persian Gulf line from Bombay have maintained a regular service at this port since the summer of 1901, and now call fortnightly. The frequent overcarrying of cargo on account of rough weather in the outer bay, which has been hitherto a source of much inconvenience, should in future be less experienced.

A strong fleet is sent to the pearl fishing, but both pearls and shells are disposed of in Bahrein. Some hides and skins are exported to India, and lamb skins are bought for the Russian market.

Rice is largely imported from India, also other grains spices, and coffee. The demand for textiles, chiefly cotton piece goods, is partly for account of Busreh, to which goods are forwarded overland from the Core Abdullah.

All business is done through Bombay, as at Muscat and Bahrein. Trade to inland parts of Arabia is hampered by the disturbed state of the country.

An interest attaches to this port as a possible terminus for the projected Bagdad Railway, but the town itself is not likely to be that terminus, as it is on the further side of the bay from Busreh, with a wide expanse of shallow water in front, while on the north side of the bay the deep water is said to come nearer shore, and to be of much greater extent.

PIRATE COAST.

The ports of the Pirate Coast, such as Sharkah, Debai, Abu Dhabi, at present trade chiefly with Lingah, the nearest port of call for ocean steamers. Sailing craft from these ports can generally both make Lingah and return therefrom on the prevailing wind. Steamers occasionally call at Debai, lying in an open bay with indifferent anchorage.

Pearls and shells are the chief source of wealth of these coast villages, and are disposed of in Bahrein or Lingah.

Rice, wheat, ghee, spices, coffee, and other provisions from India, and in textiles, grey and white shirtings and cheap Manchester prints of light fabric, with some canvas and coir rope for the sailing craft, are the principal imports.

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The Maria Theresa dollar is used as currency, but the rupee is almost as well known.

The area supplied from these ports is sparsely populated, and with the exception of some trade with the northern parts of Oman, there does not appear to be outlet for an extensive commerce.

QUESTIONS AFFECTING THE PERSIAN GULF REGIONS GENERALLY.

It is satisfactory to note that the use of the rupee is increasing in the coast regions of Oman, Bahrein, and the Arab coast of the Persian Gulf, for exchange risk is eliminated where silver dollar prices are not needed. But as the Maria Theresa dollar is the common medium of exchange in the interior of Arabia, it cannot be expected that the rupee will altogether displace it at the coast ports. It has been suggested that a double rupee, which would be of about the same size and weight as a dollar, might be issued, but I fail to perceive any advantage in such a coin. The single rupee is already nearer the exchange value of the dollar, and its fiduciary value is thoroughly recognized in these regions.

The Indian subsidiary coins are reported to be widely used in Bahrein and the Arab coast, but in Oman a quarter anna or pice, similar to the Indian coin of that denomination, has unfortunately been issued in excess, its current value being about 1 pie. It is to be hoped H.H. the Sultan may prohibit further issues of this coin, and ultimately introduce Indian subsidiary coins. This would tend, I think, to establish the rupee as the currency of Oman, a result which would benefit trade as it is so largely with India.

The average rate of freight by direct British steamers between the Persian Gulf and Europe ompared with that between India and Europe might suggest that there is still room for competition. There seems to be a possible opening for a coasting trade in these regions. A line of light draught cargo steamers, connecting with ocean steamers at such points as Muscat, Bunder Abbas, and Bahrein or Bushire, might secure a great part of the trade now carried in sailing craft to the minor ports of Oman and the Persian Gulf, and during the pearl fishing season carry provisions to the fishing fleets in exchange for shells, which at present cannot be brought to market. A reliable landing, delivery, and forwarding agency is much needed at certain ports, markedly at Bushire.

The bulk of the Foreign trade of Oman, Bahrein, and the Arab coast of the Gulf is transacted through India, and is in the hands of British Indian traders, who obtain most of the manufactured goods they require from British shipping houses in Bombay. The limited market in any one of these places offers, I think, too small a field to promise a remunerative opening for a British or European trader in competition with our British Indian subjects; although perhaps an energetic trader settling in Bahrein or Bunder Abbas, if furnished with satistactory references, might secure in addition to general mercantile business, such other affairs as landing, forwarding, banking, and shipping agencies, which all together might produce an adequate recompense for residence in a somewhat trying climate and monotonous surroundings.

In any case the collective value of our trade with these regions appears to me to deserve more attention than it at present receive. Oman and the Gulf are within easy reach of Bombay by passenger steamer, and any Bombay firm making a study on the spot of the condition and needs of the traders and markets of these regions, and keeping in touch with them by occasional visits, might collect and develop many threads of business. The shell trade, for instance. might reward attention. There appears to be a fair market for this article in Europe, and larger quantities than are at present exported may be procurable in Baherin and Lingah. Economy might also perhaps result from the rough cutting of discs for buttons, &c., in Bahrein, where labour is cheap, instead of, as at present, exporting the whole shell, of which a great part must be valueless.

The inconvenience and loss of time caused by detention in quarantine stations in the Gulf is particularly vexatious to business men who wish to

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make short visits at several places, and must impede activity in pushing trade. Cannot Persia and Turkey be persuaded to adopt the rational view accepted in Muscat and Bahrein that first class passengers are much less likely than others to carry disease, and that adequate protection is afforded by making them report to the authorities at stated periods, without actual detention?

Some years ago a French Consul at Muscat suggested the installation there of a bazaar or depot of French merchandise, as perhaps the best means of developing commerce. A depot of this sort of Russian commodities has recently been formed at Busreh, and probably ere now at Bushire. Russian and French traders have only recently begun to give particular attention to trade with the Persian Gulf, where their commodities are therefore little known and may benefit from exhibition in this manner. British and British Indian merchants have long traded with these regions, and I do not think they have lacked energy and enterprise in introducing commodities for which a fairly constant demand might be created. Consequently a similar exhibition of commodities from the British Empire would have to embrace a much wider range in order to afford a probability of the introduction of suitable hitherto unknown goods. I have pointed out elsewhere that small traders, the class most likely to make use of such a bazaar, now make much use of the cheap and frequent steamer service between India and the Gulf. The bazaars and shops of Bombay, I venture to think, offer a much wider field to these traders, who go there expressly to seek articles likely to be profitable in trade, than any local exhibition would probably afford.

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

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COMMERCIAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE.

Reports received from Mr. H. W. Maclean, the Special Commissioner appointed by the Committee to Inquire into and Report upon the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in Persia.

3.—FURTHER NOTE ON THE PERSIAN CUSTOMS TARIFF, 1903.

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMERCIAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE.

SIR,

I HAD the honour to send you from Bagdad, on 12th May last, a Memorandum on the Persian Customs Tariff of February 1903, and its probable effect on commerce at Persian Gulf Ports.

The total imports and exports of Persia for the year ending 20th March 1903 are given in the Persian Customs Statistics as krans 429,305,000, and therefore could not have yielded a Customs Revenue, under 5 per cent. *ad valorem* duty, of much more than krans 21,465,200. (The trade with Turkey, subject to duties at a higher rate, is not sufficiently important greatly to affect these figures.

I estimate that these imports and exports, had they been subject to the Tariff of February 1903, would have produced over krans 29,500,000 which is equivalent to an *ad valorem* duty of about 7 per cent.

The reasons for which Persia found it necessary to seek a revision of her Customs Treaties do not come within the scope of my inquiries. The Governments with which it was necessary to negotiate were Russia and Turkey, and negotiations with Turkey were of minor importance, as the rates of duty fixed by treaty with that country would have sufficed, if applied to the trade of other countries, to produce more than the desired increase of revenue.

Persia was consequently dependent on Russia alone for the means of increasing her Customs Revenue.

	Krans.
The import and export trade of Persia with Russia for the year March 1902-03 was per Customs Statistics - -	211,820,000
Which at 5 per cent. *ad valorem* duties would have yielded	10,590,000
A rough calculation (annex. A herewith) of the revenue which would have been yielded had the new tariff been in force gives - - - - - -	7,830,000
Difference -	2,760,000

The new tariff is thus equivalent to an *ad valorem* scale of nearly 3¾ per cent. on Russian trade. On trade with the British Empire a similar calculation for the previous year showed the tariff to be equivalent to an *ad valorem* scale of a little over 9½ per cent., and on trade with all other countries together (excluding Russia) of over 10 per cent.

It appears, therefore, that Persia has consented to a reduction of duties on her commerce with Russia of some 50,000*l.* per annum in consideration of the right to increase her Customs Revenues from other sources.

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A glance at the statistics of Persian trade shows that the bulk of Persian exports fall under nine principal categories.

	Trade with or through Russia.	Total Trade.
	£	£
Dried fruits	420,000	500,000
Grain (rice)	260,000	270,000
Gums	18,000	90,000
Opium	6,000	280,000
Hides and skins	140,000	180,000
Cotton, raw	420,000	440,000
Wool „	70,000	80,000
Silk „	250,000	250,000
Carpets	50,000	240,000
	£1,634,000	£2,330,000
Other exports		550,000
		£2,880,000

Consequently nearly three-fifths of Persia's export trade passes to or through Russia. Of these exports cotton, wool, and silk are all produced chiefly in the north and north-eastern provinces, and could hardly bear the cost of transport to other seabords than the Caspian, and Russia is not necessarily dependent on Persia for her supplies of any of these articles.

Dried fruits, rice, hides and skins are products of which Russia perhaps stands more in need, but with the exception of the first mentioned she would have little difficulty in finding other sources of supply. As regards Persia, her rice is produced on the Caspian seaboard, and could not bear transport overland to Trebizond or Bushire, and similarly only the best of her dried fruits from Azerbaijan can compete in European markets through Trebizond. It is no exaggeration to say that nearly one-half of Persia's export trade is dependent on favourable treatment in Russia. The other half of her export trade is not similarly dependent on any one market.

Turning to imports, Persia is not dependent on Russia or on any other single country for her supplies, and probably would not experience any great inconvenience in replacing Russian imports by the same commodities from other countries. The two great imports from Russia, sugar and cotton textiles (accounting for 1,500,000*l.* out of 2,000,000*l.* total imports from Russia), are both much cheaper in Persia than in Russia, and the favour therefore seems rather in Russia supplying than in Persia consuming them. Consequently it does not surprise me that Russia should have been able to secure a great advantage in consenting to revise the treaty of Turkomanchai.

It is unnecessary after these remarks to point out the very great importance which attaches to the independent Commercial Convention between the United Kingdom and Persia of 9th February 1903.

I have been favoured by H. E. the Minister of Customs with many reasons for the adoption of a specific tariff. Amongst others, the difficulty of securing fair valuation for purposes of *ad valorem* duty—the temptation to collusion and bribery to which that system readily lends itself—the limited efficiency of inspections in a country where passenger traffic is so slow that surprise visits are impossible—the loss to the customs if duty is tendered in kind, are all reasons which have particular force in respect of Persia.

I do not find that the heavier duties now levied on certain articles of our trade with Persia will seriously affect our interests.

Wines and spirits are very heavily taxed, but form a very insignificant part of our trade.

The greater number of tea dealers in Persia with whom I came in contact do not anticipate any serious reduction in trade from the heavy duties to which this article is now subject.

I have drawn attention in my Report (under the heading of Cotton tissues) to the possible injury to our trade in white and grey shirtings which may

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result from the inclusion of all bleached, unbleached, dyed and printed cotton tissues in one category dutiable at krans 12 per 10 mans.

In regard to prints it may be noted that British tissues have a very slight advantage over Russian tissues in respect of duty under the Tariff, as the latter are, as a rule, somewhat heavier tissues.

The Société de Tombac has the monopoly of export of tombac to Turkish territory subject to export duty of 27 shahis per bag (say 3 per cent). The duty payable by other exporters runs from 15 per cent. to 30 per cent. on value.

This will give a great advantage over other merchants to the Société de Tombac if they can re-export from Turkish territory or export direct to other countries. They of course pay certain royalties to the Persian Government in respect of their concession, but these royalties must have been based on the value of the trade with Turkey only, as they were fixed at a time when exporters to other countries paid nearly the same duty (5 per cent. *ad valorem*).

I have not found reason to alter the opinion already expressed that the cultivation of opium can support the increase of taxation. As duty is now paid on weight, the export of adulterated opium, which goes only to China, will become somewhat less profitable.

The heavy export duty to which grain other than rice is subjected has been noticed in my Report (under the heading of Wheat).

Much comment is made in regard to the duties charged on certain articles classed as furniture—No. 22 of the Customs Tariff. It is complained that superior lamps, candlesticks, &c., which are mentioned in section "a" of category 2, are charged duty at 20 per cent. under section "b" as fancy articles, as are also a great number of superior articles of glassware and pottery. British commerce is not largely interested in these articles.

I have not made a close study of the conditions secured for the import into Russia of Persian merchandise. The duty taken off certain exports from Persia, such as dried fruits, skins, cotton and silk tissues, has been re-imposed on their entry into Russia. The products of the valuable fisheries on the Persian shores of the Caspian, at present leased to a Russian subject, are not mentioned in Tariff B.

I have previously drawn attention to the very extended coast and land frontier which will have to be guarded against contraband traffic.

I have made particular inquiry at all places visited as to the treatment accorded to merchandise presented for customs examination. It can be readily understood that many misunderstandings and differences of opinion must have arisen over the tariff, which was as new to the Customs officials as to the public. I have not been furnished with, or discovered grounds for any accusation of unfair or preferential treatment by Customs officers of the merchandise of individuals or nationalities at any Customs post yet visited.

The courtesy and attention of Customs officers has usually been favourably commented on by traders.

I have not encountered a great number of traders, either Persian or foreign, who really wished for a return to the régime existing previous to Belgian administration, that is as regards administration, for naturally few traders have hailed the Tariff with pleasure.

I have, &c.

H. W. MACLEAN.

Teheran,
5th December 1903.

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ANNEX. A.

Duty on Russian Trade, based on Customs Returns 1902-03.

Imports.

Articles.		Value.	Totals.	Estimated Duty per Tariff.
		Krs.	Krs.	Krs.
Flour	Free	2,137,000		
Other grains	,,	261,000		
Silkworm eggs	,,	613.000		
Animals	,,	640,000		
Wood	,,	532,000		
Provisions	,,	126,000		
Mineral matter	,,	379,000		
			4,688,000	—
Sugar, loaf	4 ,,	51,665,000		
,, soft	3¼ ,,	10,450,000		
			62,115,000	2,484,600
Drugs	5 to 6 ,,	254,000		
Beer and mineral waters	,, ,,	130,000		
Candles	,, ,,	539,000		
Rice	,, ,,	486,000		
Iron and steel	,, ,,	2,417,000		
Pottery	,, ,,	1,246,000		
Soap	,, ,,	201,000		
Linen goods	,, ,,	741,000		
Dyed and printed cotton goods	5 ,,	24,543,000		
Glassware	5 to 6 ,,	1,487,000		
Petroleum	,, ,,	2,704,000		
			34,748,000	1,911,100
Unbleached and bleached cotton goods	7 to 9 ,,	2,385,000		
			2,385,000	192,800
Matches	10 ,,	569,000		
Woollens	10 ,,	589,000		
Silks	10 ,,	180,000		
Carriages	10 ,,	398,000		
			1,736,000	173,600
Spices	15 ,,	147,000		
Clothing	15 ,,	601,000		
Mercury and hardware	15 ,,	3,317,000		
			4,065,000	609,700
Furniture	20 ,,	381,000		
			381,000	76,200
Tea	60 ,,	955,000		
			955,000	573,000
Spirits	100 ,,	430,000		
			430,000	430,000
			111,503,000	
Sundries not enumerated (duty, say, at 10 per cent.)		—	6,935,000	693,500
Duty at 5·95 per cent		—	118,438,000	7,144,500

Exports.

Rice	2½ per cent.	13,953,000	13,953,000	348,800
Silk cocoons	3 to 4 ,,	1,562,000	1,562,000	54,600
Animals	10 ,,	1,124,000		
Butter and fats	10 ,,	130,000		
Provisions	10 ,,	613,000		
Other grains than rice	10 ,,	479,000		
Opium	10 ,,	350,000		
Tobacco	10 ,,	197,000		
			2,893,000	289,300
			18,408,000	
Free		—	74,974,000	
Duty at ·74 per cent.		—	93,382,000	692,700

Duty on exports and imports, 3·66 per cent.

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

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BOARD OF TRADE.—COMMERCIAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE.

REPORT

RECEIVED FROM

MR. H. W. MACLEAN,

THE SPECIAL COMMISSIONER APPOINTED BY THE

COMMERCIAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OF THE

BOARD OF TRADE,

ON THE

CONDITIONS AND PROSPECTS OF BRITISH TRADE IN PERSIA.

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NOTE OF PRINCIPAL MONIES AND WEIGHT USED IN THIS REPORT.*

Persian Money.

20 shahis = 1 kran.

10 krans = 1 toman.

Average value of kran (a silver coin) in 1901 to 1903, say Krs. 55 = £1 stg.

Russian Money.

100 copecks = 1 rouble.

Average rate of exchange in 1901 to 1903, say Rbls. 9·40 = £1 stg.

Persian Weights.

640 miskals = 1 Tabriz man.

2 Tabriz mans = 1 Shah man.

100 Tabriz mans = 1 Kharwar.

1 Tabriz man = 6·547 lbs. avoir.

Russian Weights.

40 funts = 1 poud.

1 poud = 36·1127 lbs. avoir.

* For a more complete statement, *see* page 51.

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Report received from Mr. H. W. Maclean, the Special Commissioner appointed by the Commercial Intelligence Committee of the Board of Trade to Inquire into and Report upon the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in Persia.

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMERCIAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF TRADE.

SIR, Resht, 20th December 1903.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith a Report on the present condition and prospects of British trade and enterprise in Persia, as follows:—

I. A General Report.

II. Statistics as to the increase or decrease of foreign trade with Persia in recent years; and Tables of Imports and Exports for the two years March 1901-3, indicating the countries from and to which the various Articles of Commerce have been received or despatched.

III. List of the principal Articles of Commerce in Persia, with information as to quantities, prices, areas of distribution or production of articles imported or exported.

IV. The manner in which trade in Persia is commonly conducted; information as to coinage, exchanges, weights, and measures in use; transport and packing of merchandise for inland destinations; and a table showing average cost of transport between the principal foreign markets and the principal commercial centres in Persia.

V. Notes on the chief commercial centres, on local trade usages and other matters of commercial interest, and on the principal trade routes in Persia.

VI. List of samples with descriptions and prices.

In commenting on the different articles of trade I have had to follow the grouping adopted in the Persian Customs Statistics, and consequently have not been able to adhere strictly to the order indicated in the instructions issued for my guidance in this visit to Persia on behalf of the Commercial Intelligence Committee.

I desired to take this opportunity of expressing my thanks to H. M. Minister and H. M. Diplomatic and Consular Officers in Persia, as well as to the manager and agents of the Imperial Bank of Persia, to the British merchants, and other British residents in Persia, for the kind reception and valuable help invariably accorded to me. I desire also to acknowledge the ready and courteous manner in which H. E. the Minister of Customs and the various customs officials and Persian merchants to whom I have applied have furnished me with information.

I have, &c.,

H. W. MACLEAN.

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1.—General Report

on

British Trade and Enterprise in Persia.

The total trade of Persia with foreign countries, as shown by Persian Customs Statistics, now exceeds 8,000,000*l.* sterling per annum, of which over 5,000,000*l.* are imports, and 3,000,000*l.* exports. These figures do not include specie or bullion.

The Customs Statistics are entitled to confidence as the Department is now properly organised and administered. They omit, however, certain articles of trade, mostly exports, which I venture to estimate at a value of from 150,000*l.* to 200,000*l.* yearly.*

The records available for a comparison with trade at former periods are unsatisfactory. Such figures as I can offer (*see* pp. 11–14) confirm the conclusion I have formed from enquiry into a number of different lines of commerce, namely, that foreign commerce with Persia, both import and export, has steadily increased during the last decade, to the extent of perhaps twenty per cent. It is subject, however, to wide fluctuations from year to year, and comparisons of any one year with another may be quite misleading.†

The export trade is made up as follows :—

One-half, or more, raw vegetable products :—Dried fruits, 450/500,000*l.*; Raw cotton, 400/450,000*l.*; Opium, 280/320,000*l.*; Rice, 250/280,000*l.*; Gums, 80/100,000*l.*

One-fourth, raw animal products :—Silk cocoons, 200/250,000*l.*; Skins and peltries, 100/120,000*l.*; Pearls, 80/100,000*l.*; Wool, 60/80,000*l.*, &c.

One-fourth, or less, munufactures :—Carpets, 230/260,000*l.*; other textiles of silk, cotton, and wool, 150/180,000*l.*; Leather, 40/60,000*l.*

The import trade may be summarised as follows :—

Six-tenths, or more, manufactures :—Cotton yarns and tissues, 1,800/2,300,000*l.* Other tissues of wool and silk clothing, &c., 380/420,000*l.*; Metals and their manufactures, 140/170,000*l.*; Glassware and porcelain, 75/100,000*l.*, &c.

Three-tenths, food substances :—Sugar, 1,000/1,300,000*l.*; Tea, 220/240,000*l.*; Grain, 130/150,000*l.*; Spices, 40/60,000*l.*, &c.

One-tenth, or less, raw materials, &c. :—Kerosine, 40/50,000*l.*; Skins and peltries, 30/50,000*l.*; Dyes, 30/40,000*l.*; Tobacco, 30/40,000*l.*; Wool, 20/40,000*l.*

The following is a rough summary of the trade done with Russia, the British Empire, and other countries respectively :—

* The values attributed to the different descriptions of merchandise are somewhat less, I should say roughly from 10 to 15 per cent. less, than their real commercial values at point of entry into or exit from Persia. There is also, no doubt, some merchandise which still eludes Customs control, but I cannot estimate, with any accuracy, the quantity or value of such contraband. The total foreign trade of Persia might therefore be estimated at quite 9 millions, or 5½ millions imports and 3½ millions exports.

† The exports consist largely of raw produce, and are governed by the accident of good or bad harvests and by prices abroad. Imports consist principally of manufactured goods, of which large stocks in proportion to business have to be held on account of the long time they are on the way. They often arrive at the port of entry with a rush after a good trade has depleted these stocks and encouraged orders, thus swelling the trade statistics of one year at expense of another.

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Trade with Russia.

Total Trade.—Exports, about 1,500,000*l.* per annum,* imports, about 2,000,000*l.* per annum.

Exports.—Five-sixths, raw or agricultural products, of which far the most important are dried fruits, raw cotton, and rice, then hides and peltries, wool, cocoon silk, and gums.

One-sixth, manufactures:—Leather, carpets, and various tissues destined for kindred Muhammedan population in Russia.

Imports.—One-half, sugar.

One-fourth, cotton tissues.

One-fourth, other manufactures, including some 150,000*l.* value of kerosine, animals, flour, tobacco and other vegetable products.

Trade with British Empire.

Total Trade.—Exports, about half a million; imports, two millions, per annum.

Exports.—Chiefly raw products:—Dried fruits, opium, gums, pearls, raw hides. Manufactures are carpets and some silk tissues for India.

Imports.—Three-fourths, cotton yarns and tissues, which form also quite two-thirds of the total imports of these commodities to Persia.

One-eighth or less, other manufactures; and the rest tea, coffee, spices, &c., from India.

Trade with other Countries.

Total Trade.—Exports, about one million, imports, one million,† per annum.

Exports.—Opium to China, 180/200,000*l.*; cocoon silk to France and Italy, 200/230,000*l.*; carpets to Turkey, Europe, and America, 150/180,000*l.*; cotton, silk, and woollen tissues to Afghanistan and Turkey, 60/80,000*l.*

Imports.—Sugar from France and Austria, 200/220,000*l.*; woollen, cotton and silk tissues chiefly from France and Austria, 250/300,000*l.*; tea from China and Batavia, 50/60,000*l.*; raw material from Turkey and Afghanistan, 180/200,000*l.*; other manufactures, chiefly from France, Austria, and Germany, 160/190,000*l.*

Russia and the British Empire have consequently a preponderating interest in trade with Persia. Moreover, Russian trade shows a very marked increase in recent years, whilst British trade shows neither marked increase nor decrease.‡

The fact that the foreign commerce of Persia has developed in recent years, and that Russia has acquired a large share of this increase in trade whilst we have made little or no progress, has been frequently commented on, and may act or may have acted as a deterring influence to British trade and enterprise in Persia. I have endeavoured to ascertain the reasons for this fact, and venture to summarise them as follows:

* Fish, caviare, lumberwood, not noticed in the Customs statistics, may account for another 100/150,000*l.* of exports.

† Allowing for omissions and inaccuracies of classification in the Customs Statistics, the foreign trade of Persia might be estimated as follows:—Russia, 4 millions; British Empire, 3 millions; other countries, 2 millions.

‡ The Consular Reports I have made use of show on examination that quantities are converted into values at somewhat high rates. Thus the Bushire Reports, 1900-1, estimate tea at 9*d.* to 10*d.* per lb.; candles, 10*s.* 6*d* to 10*s.* 9*d.* per case; loaf sugar, 20*s.* to 21*s.* per cwt.; copper, 95*s.* per cwt. (1901). Values only have been used in this Report, as Customs statistics, based on an *ad valorem* tariff, were more reliable for values than quantities. In future they will be more reliable for quantities than values, but the administration is endeavouring to secure accuracy in this respect.

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The most cultivated, populous, and prosperous provinces of Persia in modern times lie nearer to the Caspian than to the Persian Gulf. Ispahan is about equidistant. Our commerce, therefore, has to penetrate far inland to arrive at the best markets.

We long ago established law and order in the Persian Gulf, giving our trade secure access to Bunder Abbas and Bushire, which, on the opening of the Suez Canal proved better bases for transport to Central and Eastern Persia than Trebizond. British enterprise also established a steamer service to Bagdad, opening another trade route to Hamadan. The great impetus given to our trade by these measures was already evident some 10 or 15 years ago, and further facilities for reaching new, or lessening time or cost of transport to existing, markets have not arisen. But it is during the last decade that measures tending to increase Russian trade with Persia have produced results.

The conquest of Transcaspia enabled the Persian province of Khorassan to devote itself in security to the agricultural development of its fertile soil, and the opening of the Transcaspian railway provided an outlet for these products, which could not afford the long and costly transport to the Gulf.

Meantime the manufacturing centres of Russia—formerly more distant in time and cost of transport, through the vast extent of Russia itself, from Persian markets than we were—have been brought gradually nearer by improved steamer and rail communications. Water-borne transport by the Volga and Caspian has long existed, but has been accelerated and cheapened. It is available however for the summer months only. Petrovsk and Baku now afford transport by rail the whole year round at freights only slightly higher than by the Volga route.

The construction of the Batoum-Baku Railway and the Akstafa-Julfa road opened to Odessa and Black Sea ports a trade route to Azerbaijan superior in time and cost of transport to the Trebizond route, from which European merchandise for Persia was quickly diverted to it; but this door was soon barred to imports not of Russian origin.* The superiority of this route increases as the railway from Tiflis, now open to Erivan, extends to the frontier at Julfa, which it is expected to reach within two years.

All these measures of improved communication have been justified by the development of the Russian territories which they have penetrated and benefited, but they have equally served to facilitate both import and export trade with Persia.

The merchandise which can be most quickly supplied to a depleted market reaps the best profit. There is also a saving of interest and a more rapid turn-over of capital when goods take a shorter time in transit. The improvement in communications with Russia has materially reduced the time occupied in transport, and Russian merchandise now arrives in the markets of northern Persia perhaps three months or less from date of order, whilst our goods can seldom reach the same destinations within five or even six months of order.

Russia possesses in the Armenian trader a suitable agent to press trade in the somewhat limited markets of Persia. He is a keen trader, living in the fashion of the country at small expense, and speaking and writing the language of both the Russian Armenian and of the Persian with whom he deals.

For years past Russia has opposed a formidable Customs tariff to the import of many foreign commodities, but Persia has been protected against this tariff by the five per cent. *ad valorem* duties of the Turkomanchai treaty, and some of her products will continue to be protected under the existing Russo-Persian Customs Convention. It is almost surprising that Persian exports to Russia have not increased in greater measure. With a similar advantage we might have competed at Moscow *viâ* Bushire and Enzeli in those red ground prints now being driven out of Teheran by the Russian article. The most important exports to Russia are fruits, cotton and rice, representing a million sterling annually.

* Exports to Europe continue to benefit, perhaps at the expense of imports, which have to bear the cost of returning unfreighted caravans to Trebizond.

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Fruits imported into Russia pay duty at the rate of 25 copecks per poud when coming from Persia, and Rbls. 1·80* per poud when coming from other countries. The Russian market for these products seems insatiable, and the important regions of production in Persia—Azerbaijan, Kazvin, Damghan, Shahrud and Khorassan are more accessible to Russia than to any other market. The trade in Ispahan, equidistant from the Caspian and the Gulf, is divided.

Raw cotton is a most remunerative product in Khorassan, and is freely exported to Russia from Ispahan and even from Yezd and Kerman, but the exports from the Gulf are precarious and show little sign of increase. Cotton pays in Russia 40 copecks per poud from Persia, and Rbls. 4·15 per poud from other countries. It is quoted in Moscow at about 2 roubles per poud less than American cotton (say 20 per cent.), but is undoubtedly of poor quality, and is said to yield 8 or 10 funts less of yarn per poud than American cotton (40 funts equal one poud). The Russian and Persian production combined is estimated at less than half the annual consumption in Russia. I conclude, therefore, that the Persian producer is very much dependent upon this difference in duty on exports to Russia (*see* pages 33 and 35).

Rice is grown for export in Ghilan and Mazanderan, and could not bear the cost of transport to Trebizond or Bushire. Unhusked rice pays in Russia 5 copecks per poud from Persia and 60 copecks per poud from other countries. I have not obtained evidence as to whether this preference confers any marked benefit on the Persian producer.

An increase in exports, it is said, causes an increase in imports from the same country. The trader becomes familiar with the routine of business, the agent who disposes of his produce serves also to effect purchases, and suitable articles of commerce are brought to his notice. Banking commission on the return of funds is saved.

Russia has taken measures to encourage the import into Persia of her manufactures.

Special through rates for goods to Persia are accorded. I have not been able, in Persia, to compare them with the rates charged to frontier destinations within Russia, such as Erivan and Ashkabad. The steamship line to the Persian Gulf from Odessa has a subsidy of about 20,000*l.* per annum or 4,000*l.* per trip on five trips effected, and refund of canal dues. This expenditure secures to the Russian over the British shipper an advantage of 12 to 15 shillings per ton weight on cotton goods to Bushire.

The Banque de Prêts dePerse is connected with the Russian State Bank. Its manager is also a Russian Government official. The standing of this institution is therefore independent of current profits. For some years past, and specially during the last two years, this bank has devoted its attention to the development of Russian trade with Persia, particularly to imports into Persia, and most particularly to the import of cotton textiles. It delivers goods to clients at such prices as old-established Russian traders in Persia have been unable to compete with. Its operations have had, without doubt, a marked effect in increasing Russian trade with Persia.

Drawback, said to be the equivalent of duties previously imposed, is granted in Russia on certain commodities exported to Persia †

* *International Customs Journal*, No 23, Russia, October 1896.

† Drawback is granted on the following exports to Persia :—

		Per poud.
Cotton tissues :—		
A. Bleached or unbleached	Rbls.	4·65
B. Dyed and printed, except "Adrianople dyed"		4·87½
C. Dyed and printed, of "Adrianople" dye		5·40
Linen textiles:—		
Yarns, unbleached		30
Do. bleached		70
Tissues, unbleached		75
Do. bleached		1·15
Do. dyed or printed		1·40
Vodka :		
Grain	11 cop. per grade.	
Fruit	7 " "	
Matches, petroleum, tea, tobacco, pass in transit, or obtain refund of Excise.		
Sugar	Rs. 1·75 per poud.	

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Sugar forms quite one-half of the total imports into Persia from Russia. The peculiar regulations governing the export of this article from Russia have affected only our shipping interests. A decrease in the supply of sugar to Persia from Russia would have given place to an increase from France and Austria, not from British possessions, and the consignments from these countries would have been largely to the Persian Gulf, and would have paid freight to British ships.

Cotton tissues form one-fourth of Persian imports from Russia, and receive drawback on export form Russia to Persia, said to be equivalent to the duties levied on raw material imported over the Russian European frontier. The present rates are given in the footnote on the previous page. If the Russian and Persian cotton growers are able to obtain all or nearly all the benefit of the duty of Rbls. 4·15 per poud imposed on imports of raw cotton into Russia from other countries, by increasing their prices up to the level of the imported commodity of equal quality, then the drawback on categories A. and B. affords little or no advantage to the Russian manufacturer or exporter as compared with his British competitor.* With regard to category C., Turkey reds, at Rbls. 5·40, I have not obtained in Persia information as to the nature or value of the substances employed in this dye from which to calculate the proportion of duty paid on them. The articles falling under this category form an important part of the imports from Russia.

The Russian manufacturer caters for a large population in Russia with requirements similar to those of a large section of the Persian population, and therefore does not need to manufacture cotton prints, common glassware, pottery, paper, hardware and mercery, lamps, candlesticks, and various articles of clothing, expressly to suit the Persian market. This has been suggested to me as conferring some advantage in cheapness of production.

To turn to trade with other European countries.

The export of silk cocoons from Ghilan and Mazanderan, now of some importance, is chiefly to France and Italy, and has not interested British traders.

In imports, cane sugar has not been able to compete in the Gulf with French loaf or Austrian bag sugar. The increased demand in the southern provinces supplied from these countries appears to have more than compensated for any loss of trade in northern markets taken by Russia.

In silk tissues France and in woollen tissues Austria and France take a larger share of the trade than we do. Their imports are nearly all *viâ* Trebizond, purchased in Constantinople by Persian traders.

In white and grey shirtings Holland has begun to compete with us.

Lastly, I may draw attention to influences which have affected our own trade.

The British Empire has increased its takings from Persia of opium and gums. The grain trade has temporarily disappeared, owing to prolonged agricultural depression in the southern provinces and hampering restrictions which tended to throw land out of cultivation; it has been, in a fashion, compensated by an import of wheat, rice, and other foodstuffs, but that is a questionable benefit to our trade as a whole, as these regions, with good harvests, would have bought manufactured articles from us with their surplus agricultural wealth.

It may be asked why the regions of Southern Persia accessible to our influence should not have developed in the same measure as the northern provinces. Luristan, Bakhtiariland, and Arabistan possess well-watered and fertile districts, but the peoples of these regions are still but little amenable to the authority of the central Government, and until law and order are more firmly established but little agricultural or industrial progress can be expected. Much of the southern and eastern regions has but scant irrigation water and little rainfall. Fars and Kerman might have been

* *See* pages 35 and 36.

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expected to make greater progress. But these southern provinces have not the advantage of protected markets in which to sell their produce at artificial prices.

Our imports into Khorassan were formerly destined in part for Transcaspia, to which they entered until a few years ago at an *ad valorem* duty of 2½ per cent. Some of our cotton tissues and tea found a market there which is now cut off. A special concession is still made to Transcaspia in respect of green tea, but in such a manner as to divert this transit trade from Bunder Abbas and Khorassan to Batoum.

I have endeavoured to trace, in the foregoing remarks, the principal causes which have affected the foreign trade of Persia in recent years, and the results arising from them. The agricultural development of Northern Persia, due to greater facilities in reaching Russian and other markets and to protection of Persian products in Russian markets, has certainly increased the wealth of these provinces, and therefore their capacity to purchase commodities. Russia has no doubt obtained the greatest part of this increased import trade, but if we eliminate one commodity, sugar, her relative progress in import trade will appear much less striking, and be found to have consisted in an increase of manufactured articles, principally cotton tissues, glassware, pottery, iron, ironmongery, etc.

No improvement in communications would have sufficed to increase Russian exports of manufactured goods to Persia unless she had been able to supply these articles. It has been constantly pointed out to me that Russia's manufacturing skill has made great progress. Her common pottery now competes not only in price but in appearance and quality with other imports. Her common glassware competes on equal or superior terms with Bohemian and French wares of the same class. Her metalwork—lamps, candlesticks, enamelled-ironware—is stated to be much better in quality and finish at a given price than formerly. It is of course in cotton prints that her competition is most felt by us. Our tissues have to some extent been driven out of the northern provinces, and the fact that our imports do not show a marked decrease must be attributed to the increased consumption in other parts of the country compensating for markets lost further north.

I have formed the conclusion that Russian prints have not established a distinct ascendancy beyond such markets at Tabriz, Kazvin, Teheran, and Meshed. It may be questioned whether the trade really affords a sufficient margin of profit between the cost of production and transport and the price paid by the consumer; but without doubt it has been pressed most vigorously, and competent authorities, both Russian and British, have expressed an opinion that it has been pressed to excess, and that stocks have accumulated beyond the needs of the market.

A Russian firm have been established in Ispahan for some two years past. They may or may not be making present sacrifices in order to establish this business in general cotton prints and tissues, but should they be able to establish a business dependent on ordinary mercantile profits, then there is no reason why Russian manufacturers should not be able to compete with Manchester in all parts of Persia—and even in Mesopotamia and India—for the cost of transport from Moscow to Ispahan *viâ* Enzeli or *viâ* Bushire (with State-aided freight) is about the same. Up to the present time our shippers in the Gulf have not found this competition formidable.

It is stated that Russian manufacturers are asking for an increrse in the drawback allowed on cotton tissues, on the ground that the present allowance does not cover the taxes levied on the commodities consumed by their workmen. A drawback on woollen tissues is also talked of. Whether the Russian Government will be inclined to give effect to such suggestions is beyond the province of this inquiry. It may at least have to consider the effect on the non-manufacturing population in Caucasia and Transcaspia of increasing the marked contrast between the price of certain commodities in these places and across the Persian frontier. In Persia, tea, sugar, kerosine, prints and calicoes are all cheaper than in the Russian markets from which they are derived.

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On a general review of all these circumstances I venture an opinion that the impetus given to trade of other countries in Persia must already have produced nearly its full effect, and that our trade, which has survived this competition without very serious detriment, may expect to share in any extension of markets arising from the increase of wealth and population or from the greater consumption of foreign commodities in Persia.

Statistics kindly furnished by the Administrator-General of Customs for the first quarter of 1903-04, compared with the corresponding period of the previous year, show a considerable increase in trade.* They are not encouraging from the point of view of relative increase in our cotton textiles compared with those of Russia. But I do not attach much importance to statistical figures for a short period, and for this period in particular they are of little value to form general deductions from, as they must include much merchandise held over from the previous quarter when the new tariff first came into force.

The population of Persia at the present time approaches ten millions, so that the annual consumption of foreign commodities is little over 10*s.* per head—a little over 4*s.* per head from Russia, a little less than 4*s.* from the British Empire, and 2*s.* from other countries. As regards classes of foreign commodities the sum might be divided thus—about 4*s.* 6*d* per head for textiles, 2*s.* 6*d.* per head for sugar, 6*d.* per head for tea, and 2*s.* 6*d.* per head for other commodities.

I believe there is, on the whole, a distinct improvement in the condition of the people. The question is somewhat obscured by the depreciation in the gold value of the silver coinage of Persia, as the first impression usually is that, prices having risen, the cost of living must have increased. But prices of labour and produce appear to have risen in proportion. Information obtained at the various places visited usually tended to show that the peasant is somewhat less hardly treated by landlord and taxgatherer, and is better clothed and better fed than formerly, and that more land has been brought under cultivation. Of course these circumstances have varied in different

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* Customs statistics:—

Tea from Russia.

	Mans.	Krans.
First Quarter, 1902-03	12,170	199,322
" " 1903-04	12,568	237,513
Increase	398	38,191

Tea from British Empire.

	Mans.	Krans.
First Quarter, 1902-03	139,534	1,702,000
" " 1903-04	232,389	3,379,238
Increase	92,855	1,677,238

Cotton Tissues from Russia.

	Mans.	Krans.
First Quarter, 1902-03	196,289	5,091,483
" " 1903-04	336,577	8,117,184
Increase	140,288	3,025,701

Cotton Tissues from British Empire.

	Mans.	Krans.
First Quarter, 1902-03	720,728	15,156,522
" " 1903-04	989,466	18,975,642
Increase	268,738	3,819,120

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localities: in parts of the south, elsewhere referred to, extreme hardship has been reported and in Ghilan and Khorassan unusual prosperity. This year the southern harvest is more favorably reported on.

I consequently think that the prospects of trade are encouraging. In Section III of this Report, pp. 15-48, I have endeavoured to furnish information on each article of trade, and do not venture to pronounce as to the particular lines of commerce likely to be remunerative. We have traders already engaged in business in the chief commercial centres of Persia, actively competing with each other and with foreign importers, and ready to take advantage of commercial opportunities. I do not by any means wish to imply that there is not scope for further commercial enterprise in Persia, but desire to point out that any such venture should be duly considered, and neither capital nor merchandise rashly consigned to Persia without previous inquiry as to the prospects of successful business in the particular line concerned.

Cases of imitation of trade marks have been brought to my notice,* but this question does not appear to constitute a marked grievance in Persia.

Industrial and manufacturing enterprises in Persia have rarely met with success. The number of such undertakings of any magnitude which have survived more than a year or two is small:

The Caspian Sea Fisheries Concession.
The Lumber-wood Concession in Mazanderan.
The Rail and Tramway Company of Teheran.
The Imperial Bank of Persia.
The Banque de Prêts de Perse.

Carpet-making as conducted in Persia can hardly be described as a manufacturing enterprise, but it has proved successful, and might offer scope for further organization.

The Banque Internationale de Commerce de Moscow has withdrawn from Persia.

The enterprises which have failed to succeed in recent years are more numerous. The great cost of installing machinery on account of the heavy freight on inland transport, the cost of fuel, the inefficiency of labour which, although cheap, is unskilled and without energy, have been the chief causes of non-success.

Telegraphic communications are now available at most of the large towns. As a result of our Indo-European line, the principal towns on the great trade routes from Teheran to Tabriz, to Meshed, and to Bushire, have now telegraphic communications, and there are now lines erected and maintained by the Persian Government to Resht, to Hamadan and Kermanshah, to Yezd and Kerman, and from Bushire to Shuster and Dizful.† Only Bunder Abbas remains without connection either with India or Kerman.

The postal service has been much improved under Belgian administration. There are now bi-weekly services between Teheran and Meshed, Resht, Tabriz and Julfa, Kermanshah, Bushire, and Kerman, and intermediate places. A parcel-post to and from Europe *viâ* Russia has recently been introduced.

Road construction has made some progress. Roads which have been constructed or are being undertaken are noted in Section V, pp. 53–67.

I do not find that road construction in Persia has either shortened the time or lessened the cost of transport of merchandise. The roads already constructed have been built at great expense, and the tolls collected do not appear to provide adequate return on capital after providing for current expenses and upkeep. Wagon traffic has not in any instance driven mule or camel transport off these roads, and a comparison of rates (Annex B, pp. 77-79) shows no marked difference between freight on roads or on similar caravan routes to the Persian plateau.

* In Tabriz several close imitations (but not identical) of the trade marks of certain well-known British manufacturers of cotton sewing thread were shown me. Two British firms in Tabriz stated that close imitations (but not identical) of their trade marks had been made. A British firm in Shiraz mentioned a similar imitation in regard to one of their goods.

† Over the Resht and Kermanshah lines messages can be sent in Roman character. They work fairly well in dry weather, and when the operators are in attendance.

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Yet this question of providing more rapid and cheaper transport to inland markets seems to afford the best chance of increasing our trade in the central and northern provinces. The freight on a ton of piece-goods from Manchester to Bushire is about 2*l.* 5*s.* and from Bushire to Ispahan 10*l.* to 11*l.* The cost of transport from any seaboard to the Persian plateau is about 9*d.* per ton per mile, whilst between markets in the interior, caravans work for 4*d.* to 6*d.* per ton per mile. On the southern and south-western frontiers grain and forage are as cheap as in the central provinces.

It appears to me that an organised transport would serve better to reduce the time and cost of carriage of merchandise than a heavy expenditure on roads which, unless they inordinately increase the distance travelled, must include heavy gradients. The mule or camel can negotiate such steep gradients much more easily than the wagon, and if there is space for the caravan to carry its loads free of contact with rocks, trees and other caravans, the animals are indifferent to a pefect surface so long as it is not deep in mud, sand, or rolling stones. The load carried by a camel or mule does not impose excessive inconvenience in the packing of the merchandises in which we are most interested.

The routes based on the Persian Gulf are those which most concern our trade. Outside of it our only important trade is by the Trebizond route, and our imports by it for the year March 1902-3 amounted to 227,000*l.*, of which 66,700*l.* was tea (likely in future to follow the Batoum-Julfa route in transit), and the remainder chiefly textiles. The imports of other European nations (except Russia) were about 350,000*l.*

Our shipping interests profit not only from our own but from all trade to the Persian Gulf. We do not carry even our own merchandise to Trebizond, whereas our shipowners earn freight on all goods (except Russian) passing to or from Gulf ports.

An improvement in the conditions under which merchandise is landed and forwarded to inland destinations through Gulf ports appears to me one of the greatest benefits which could be conferred on our trade.

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II.—Trade Statistics.

From a statistical statement under preparation, kindly lent me by the Administration of Persian Customs, I estimate the trade of Persia (exclusive of the Karun) with foreign countries for the year 21st March 1902 to 20th March 1903, exclusive of Caspian Sea fish exports and bullion imports, at—

	£
Imports	4,915,982
Exports	2,889,565

Details are furnished in Annex A. Tables 1 and 2, pp. 70-74.

The administration of the Customs of Muhammerah and Karun ports was only taken over from the Sheikh of Muhammerah in the autumn of 1902, and official Persian statistics for those ports are not available.

Consular Statistics (Foreign Office "Annual Series" No. 3036—Trade of the Persian Gulf) for Muhammerah and Karun ports for the year ending 31st December 1902, give—

	£
Imports	123,458
Exports	147,283

These figures are not for the same period as the Persian statistics, but, admitting them as roughly representative of Karun trade, we have, for all Persia—

	£
Total Imports	5,039,000
„ Exports	3,036,000
	8,075,000

Statistics for the previous year, on the same basis, give—

	£
Total Imports	5,297,000
„ Exports	2,849,000
	8,146,000

The values given in the Persian statistics are those accepted by the Customs for payment of *ad valorem* duties, and therefore may be considered as fairly accurate but representing less (certainly not more) than the real value of the merchandise.

The weights given in the same statistics are for the most part gross weights.

The general rule observed in classifying articles seems to have been to ascribe merchandise to the different countries according to declarations of origin or destination, aided by marks, names, and indications on the packages.

Contraband no doubt exists, and will continue to be practised across a frontier so wide as that of Persia. Under the Belgian administration it is at least real, not open, smuggling, and out of reach of calculation.

Some important articles of Persian commerce, such as bar silver, fish, and precious stones, are not included in the Customs Statistics, presumably because they are not subject to duty.

Imports of bar silver for the Persian mint amounted to some 650,000*l.* (krans 36,216,098 silver were struck at the Teheran mint during the year March 1902-3).

The important fisheries on the Caspian, leased to a Russian subject, must furnish an export of fish and caviare to Russia of at least 80,000*l.* to 100,000*l.* annually.

The turquoise mines of Nishapur yield valuable stones most of which are exported, but information is not obtainable as to the annual output.

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There are no reliable Customs Statistics prior to 1901, consequently figures for purposes of comparison must be drawn from various sources.

In Curzon's "Persia," the total import and export trade of Persia for 1889 is quoted from official sources at 6,039,000*l.*, and an estimate based on other calculations is made of an annual trade of 7,000,000*l.* to 7,500,000*l.*

	£	£
The Bushire Consular Report ("Annual Series" No. 2186) gives for 1895-96 an average trade (excluding specie) at the Gulf ports of Bushire, Bunder Abbas, Lingah (after allowing for merchandise passing in transit through Lingah, and treating pearls as Persian produce exported only) and Muhammerah of . . .	2,500,000	
An estimate of the trade of Kermanshah for three years 1895-97 (Ispahan Consular Report "Annual Series" No. 2260) gives an annual average of .	950,000	
A Trebizond Consular Report ("Annual Series" No. 2588) furnishes information as to transit trade with Persia for two periods, 1891-95 and 1896-1900, giving an annual average of	773,000	
And Russian Customs Statistics for 1895-96 give an annual average of	3,460,000	
		7,683,000

The less important trade with Afghanistan and with Asiatic Turkey *viâ* Soujbulak and Khoi is not embraced in these figures.

Russian Trade.

The statistics show a trade with Russia in 1902-03 of—

	£
Imports	2,153,423
Exports	1,697,870
	3,851,293

and in 1901-02 of—

	£
Imports	2,056,000
Exports	1,214,000
	3,270,000

Russian Customs Returns for the three years 1888-1890 give an annual average trade with Persia of—

	£
Exports to Persia	1,006,000
Imports from Persia	1,183,000
	2,189,000

and for 1896-98 of—

	£
Exports to Persia	1,687,000
Imports from Persia	2,045,000
	3,732,000

British and British Indian Trade.

The statistics show a trade (excluding Karun) with the British Empire in 1902-03 of—

	£
Imports	1,832,288
Exports	332,858
	2,165,146

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Adding consular statistics for the Karun for 1902, Imports 96,920*l.*, Exports 98,351*l.*, the total trade becomes—

	£
Imports	1,929,000
Exports	431,000
	2,360,000

The statistics for 1901-02 (excluding Karun) are—

	£
Imports	1,929,674
Exports	543,745
	2,473,419

or, including Karun for 1901, as before—

	£
Imports	2,112,000
Exports	647,000
	2,759,000

Again, referring to Curzon's "Persia," an estimate is made for 1889 (Vol. II., page 580) of—

	£
Imports over	2,000,000
Exports under	1,000,000
	3,000,000
Less specie	172,000
	2,828,000

	£
Bushire Consular Reports give for 1895-96 an annual average trade (excluding specie) at Gulf ports as above (subject to adjustments for transit trade and pearls at Lingah) of	1,469,000
A selection from Kermanshah Estimate for 1895-97 of those lines of merchandise now British and Indian, gives	750,000
And the Trebizond transit trade 1891-95—1896-1900, according to the Trebizond Consular Report, gives an average of	368,000
	2,587,000

An examination of the statistics shows that Turkey is credited with an import into Persia of many manufactured articles, such as drugs, clothing, mercery and hardware, metals, dyes, printed and undyed cotton tissues, glass, etc. (Annex A, Table 3, p. 73), amounting to some 26,600*l.* The greater part of these articles can be traced to imports by the Kermanshah route. Many goods imported *viâ* Bagdad are repacked there for caravan transport, and the bulk of the trade in such goods by that route is British and British Indian. Small lots of British and continental goods are also bought in Constantinople and Trebizond and imported to Tabriz in assorted lots by petty traders.

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Similarly, some Persian products are entered as exported by the Kermanshah route to Turkey, which are also articles of export from Bagdad and Busreh. These products are really in transit principally to China, India, and Britain.

The returns show nearly 100,000*l.* value of carpets exported to the British Empire in 1901-02, and less than 7,500*l.* in 1902-03, accounted for by exports from Gulf ports. Our share in this trade passes largely in transit through Russia and Turkey. In 1901-02 krans 3,062,000 and in 1902-03 krans 7,695,000 are attributed to Turkey.

Khorassan now furnishes the only important export of Persian wool (of which one-half is contributed by Afghanistan), and it all passes over the Transcaspian railway and figures in the returns as an export to Russia. It is, however, quoted and dealt in on the German, British and American markets.

It must be immaterial to the Chinese and Indian tea growers whether the 25,000*l.* value of tea exported to Russia passes through Persia or goes direct to Batoum.

The Customs statistics are so compiled as to show the trade with the British Empire as a whole, and not with the United Kingdom separately. In Annex A, Tables 4 and 5 (pp. 75-76), British and Indian trade have been separated as far as possible, but the figures, collated from local returns, can be made only approximately accurate, particularly in respect of the trade through Kermanshah, where fewer indications of origin are given in the Customs Statistics than at the Gulf ports. At these latter endeavours have been made to classify goods according to country of origin and the Customs have availed themselves of indications on the packages in doing so.

The figures for Indian trade, therefore, in a measure represent commerce in articles of Indian production and consumption and articles consigned to India as a first market.

Consular statistics are not available for Kermanshah trade. For Bushire, Bunder Abbas and Muhammerah, they are given as follows :—

	1901.	1902.
	£	£
Imports :		
British	1,115,303	807,853
Indian	608,856	505,171
	1,724,159	1,313,024
Exports :		
British	133,821	134,399
Indian	290,157	217,154
	423,978	351,553

The Consular returns probably include as Indian trade all merchandise passing through Bombay and Karachi.

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III.—The Principal Articles of Commerce in Persia.

Number in Table of Statistics.

3

ANIMALS, LIVING.

Camels.

Import—Baggage camels from Mesopotamia, Transcaspia, and India. Price krs. 200 to krs. 500 (4*l.* to 8*l.*) per head.

Horses.

Import.—Draught and carriage horses are imported from Russia *viâ* Tabriz, Enzeli, and Meshed, and pack horses from Afghanistan. A pair of good carriage horses will fetch from 80*l.* upwards.

Export.—Up to 1895 there was a steady export to Bombay from Bushire of country-bred horses, known as Gulf arabs, collected by dealers operating from Shiraz and Ispahan. This trade has almost ceased, perhaps on account of a long period of drought and locust ravages in Southern Persia, and also from the higher prices ruling in the country. A smaller trade still continues from the Kermanshah region, perhaps 150 to 200 horses yearly to Bagdad, to form part of the now much more important trade from Busreh to Bombay. This Busreh trade was for some time smuggled through Muhammerah to escape the Turkish duty of £T5 per head. Consignments have been tried from Khorassan by the Seistan route to India, but there is difficulty in obtaining forage for horses on that route.

Mules.

Mules are bred and used in the country. Kermanshah, Luristan, Burujird, Khamsa, and the Bakhtiari country are important breeding districts. There may be 3,000 or 4,000 mules sold out of these districts annually. Usual type that of small transport animal averaging 12 to 13 hands, 53 or 54 inch girth. Average price 10 years ago krs. 300 to krs. 400 (8*l.* to 11*l.*). Prices now range from krs. 400 to krs. 1,000 or more, average being krs. 600 to krs. 700 (11*l.* to 13*l.*).

Sheep and Oxen.

Export.—Sheep and oxen are sent to Transcaucasia from Azerbaijan, sheep being brought down even from Kurdistan. At least 45,000 to 60,000 head of sheep are exported, of a value of not less than 25,000*l.* to 30,000*l.* Transcaspia also is supplied from Khorassan with live-stock to the value, say, of 30,000*l.* per annum.

9

ANIMAL INTESTINES.

Export.—These are chiefly sheep and goat. A small trade exists from Bushire to Germany. Tabriz market disposes of somewhat larger quantities. The demand for this article is chiefly from America and Germany. Value at Tabriz is about krs. 750 (13*l.* 13*s.*) per 1,000 (of 28 metres). Freight and charges to Constantinople are, say, 4*l.* per 1,000.

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Number in Table of Statistics.

4 ARMS AND AMMUNITION.

Import prohibited, except under special permission.—Weapons of British make are, however, much appreciated. There was for a time a brisk and profitable trade in percussion caps imported through Tabriz for Afghanistan and Bokhara. The price has fallen from krs. 2,150 to krs 1,400 per case.

7 BEVERAGES.

Beer.

Import.—Teheran is the only market. English or Continental beer cannot be delivered at prices to compete with Russian beer.

Liqueurs, Spirits, Wines.

Import.—The consumption of wines, whisky, and liqueurs is limited to foreign residents and occasional entertainments by Persian officials, and for the most part these liquors are imported direct by the private consumer. There is a somewhat greater consumption of inferior brandy, chiefly from Russia and Greece. Native wine and arrack find an extensive but clandestine sale in the large towns such as Teheran, Tabriz, and Ispahan.

Export.—None. The vine flourishes in most parts of Persia, and the vintages of Shiraz, Ispahan, and Hamadan are renowned in the country, but wine making for export has not been attempted.

5 BUTTER, CLARIFIED. GHEE (PERS. ROGAN).

Import.— Has been largely imported to Gulf ports from India during the last few years on account of drought in Southern Persia, but is usually an article of export from Bushire. Large quantities are consumed in the fishing fleets of the Gulf. Value at Bushire 8½ to 9 krans per Bushire man (7·7 lbs.) (5*d.* per lb.).

8 CANDLES (COMPOSITE).

Import.—The demand for candles is declining on account of the increased use of petroleum lamps. The import, *viâ* the Gulf, is chiefly of Belgian and Dutch candles. A class of candles of British Indian origin has been introduced recently with success. Hard candles with a high melting point are desirable to resist the heat of the Gulf. Shipments should be made in winter. The chief demand is for 12 oz. candles in cases of 30 packets. Value, c.i.f. Bushire say 5*d.* per lb.; in Shiraz krs. 36 to krs. 37 (13*s.* 3*d.*) per case. Austrian candles were formerly imported *viâ* Trebizond, value Tabriz krs. 140 to krs. 200 per case of 300 packets, but have been driven out by the Russian article. Russian candles in cases of two pouds net, 2½ pouds gross, in packets of four to seven candles per lb. Rus., cost c.i.f. Astara or Enzeli Rs. 9·10 per poud. Value Tabriz krs. 115 to krs. 130 per case. (Annex G, Specimen Invoice, p. 84). The southern markets, including Ispahan and Hamadan, are supplied from the Gulf. Price, Teheran, per case of 80 packets Russian krs. 125 to krs. 140 (45*s.* 6*d.* to 51*s.*). Tallow candles are manufactured in the country, value, krs. 12 to krs. 13 per shahman (4*d.* per lb.).

71 CARRIAGES.

There is an import of Russian carriages (chiefly small phætons) *viâ* Resht for Teheran. In Tabriz, Meshed, and Ispahan carriages are used by the wealthy, but there is not sufficient demand for a regular trade.

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24

CEREALS.

Castor Oil Seed.

The plant is grown everywhere in Persia, the oil being used for lamps. From Khorassan the seed is exported to Russia. Sabzwar and Shahrud export is estimated at 6,000 cwts. Value krs. 3 per poud and charges krs. 4 per poud to Ashkabad (say 2*s*. 6*d*. per poud delivered Ashkabad).

Flour.

Import.—Russian flour from Astrakhan is largely imported into Ghilan which does not grow wheat, and to a smaller extent to the Teheran and Tabriz markets as an article of luxury, being whiter and better milled than local flour. Indian flower has for some years been largely imported into Gulf ports, but this must be looked on as a temporary trade only arising from a succession of bad years in Southern Persia caused by draught and locusts. Bushire, wanting in water power for local mills, is supplied from India.

Linseed.

Export.—Grown for export in the Bushire and Ram Hormuz regions. Is difficult to clean, being often purposely mixed with dirt to add to weight. Value Bushire, krs. 18 to krs. 30 per Hashem man (say 8*s*. per cwt.). Value Ahwaz, uncleaned, krs. 13 to krs. 14 per Ram Hormuz man (say 5*s*. 6*d*. per cwt.).

Millet and Sesame.

Export.—Bushire and Dizful. Little grown.

Rice.

Import.—Rice is grown in Central and Southern Persia in sufficient quantities for home consumption, excepting the Gulf littoral, which takes modest supplies of Indian rice. The large imports of recent years are due to a succession of bad harvests in Southern Persia. There is, however, at all times a very important rice trade from India to Bahrein and the Arab coast of the Gulf, a part of which passes through Lingah in transit, and does not figure in the Persian Customs Statistics.

Export.—From Mazanderan and Ghilan to Russia. This is an important trade, the exports for 1902-03 amounted to 740,000 cwts., value 268,000*l*. Prices may be quoted: inferior rice, krs. 1·3 to krs. 1·8 per Tabriz man (9*s*. 4*d*. per cwt.), middle quality, krs. 2·6 to krs. 3 (17*s*. 6*d*. per cwt.). For further information reference may be made to the Consular Report on the Resht district for 1902-03, "Annual Series," No. 3109.

Wheat.

Import.—The large imports of recent years to Gulf ports are due to a succession of bad harvests in Southern Persia.

Export.—In seasons of agricultural prosperity wheat has usually been exported from Bushire and Ahwaz to Great Britain. The plains north of Bushire and along the Karun are excellent

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Number in Table of Statistics.

24 wheat lands. The return is estimated at 10 times the seed sown, but the ground is little more than scratched, and is cropped year after year. There is often a large percentage of barley mixed with the wheat, which is dealt in at Ahwaz on the basis of 8 per cent. barley and dirt. In consequence of a succession of bad harvests, prices have not admitted of important purchases for abroad since 1895, when over 25,000 tons were exported. This year a small quantity has been exported. The prices on the Karun in 1902 averaged about 7*s.* per cwt. It cannot be dealt in at Ahwaz for export at current London prices (March 1902, 27*s.* 6*d.*) at much over krs. 30 per Ismailia man (3½ cwts.) (3*s.* 1*d.* per cwt.).

The province of Kermanshah is also an important wheat-growing country, and, like the Karun region, might attain to agricultural prosperity were the excessive taxes and restrictions on export removed. The price of wheat in Kermanshah during the last year has been krs. 20 to krs. 25 per kharwar Tabriz, or 1*s.* 2*d.* to 1*s.* 7*d.* per cwt. Customs duty on export is krs. 10 per kharwar (7¼*d.* per cwt.). The local governor has been in the habit of levying an altogether unjust and illegal tax of krs. 5 per kharwar (3½*d.* per cwt.) on all grain moved out of the province, whether to other provinces or abroad.

12 CHARCOAL.

A small export to Baku from Resht.

25 CLOTHING.

Import.—Underclothing, such as socks, undervests, and drawers of all qualities both in wool and cotton, for both men and women's wear, cotton and flannel shirts, &c., is finding favour with the middle and upper classes in the larger towns. Teheran is the best market, and is supplied largely from Tabriz through Persian traders with Constantinople. A large proportion of these articles are of British origin. Cotton blankets (imitation wool), known as Austrian blankets, obtain a fairly wide sale (price Tabriz krs. 4 to krs. 6 per piece). Ladies' wearing apparel, bonnets, muffs, and general millinery find a limited market in Teheran only.

Handkerchiefs (printed) for women's headgear find a fairly wide sale.

An increasing demand for boots and shoes (men and women's) of European shape is noted. Walking boots appear to come chiefly from Austria, long riding boots (chakmeh) from Russia, and fancy shoes and slippers from France. Rubber goloshes from Russia are much used.

The underclothing imported is said to be largely composed of odd lots and clearing sale goods picked up by traders on their annual visits to Europe, and traders state that prices are so precarious it is impossible to do business in regular lines.

Export.—Persian cloaks (abbas), socks, cotton shoes (givehs), gloves, handkerchiefs, &c., are exported from Azerbaijan to Caucasia and Turkey, and find a market amongst the Muhammedan population in those regions.

10 COFFEE.

Import.—From India. Demand limited. Wholesale price, Bushire, landed and cleared, krs. 14 to krs. 17 per man (7·7 lbs.—8¾*d.* per lb.); Hamadan, krs. 14 per Tabriz man (9½*d.* per lb.).

COTTONS.—*See* TEXTILES.

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18

DRUGS.

Import.—Supplies are imported in small consignments direct from Europe by doctors, chemists, and druggists. There is one chemist in Teheran reported to do a large business with the retail traders in town and country.

53

DYES.

Aniline Dyes.

The import is prohibited in Persia, but the employment of them continues. Certain Alizarine dyes, recognised as superior and faster colours in comparison with the vegetable dyes in these tints, are now admitted into the country.

Henna.

Export.—Produced in the Yezd-Kerman region, and exported *viâ* Resht and Tabriz to Russia and Turkey. Price, Bushire, krs. 2½ per man.

Indigo.

Import.—From India. Has been a steady trade of some 40,000*l.* value per annum till 1900, but the last two years show a decided decrease. Largely used for dyeing native and imported cotton textiles; also in the carpet industry. The bulk of the trade is in the inferior qualities. The trade is likely to suffer from the decay of the native printing and dyeing industries in Persia. Synthetic indigo is now employed to some extent.

Madder.

Grown in Ispahan, Yezd, Shuster, and Kurdistan districts. Exported in small quantites from the Karun. There is also a small trade from Tabriz to Russia in madder and yellow berry.

44

FISH.

The valuable fisheries of the Caspian seaboard have been leased to the Russian firm of Lianozoff since 1888. This lease has been renewed from time to time, and is now terminable about 1925. The rental is at present some 18,000*l.* per annum, increasing in the latter years of the lease to 20,000*l.* per annum.

This industry has not been safeguarded in the Russo-Persian Customs tariff against increase of duty in Russia. It is stated, however, that the Russian Government has decided to admit the products of these fisheries (caviare, sturgeon, salmon, &c.), into Russia at rates equivalent to the former 5 per cent. *ad valorem* duties, and it is presumed this privilege will hold good up to the termination of the existing contract between the Persian Government and Lianozoff. There are important fishing interests on the Russian seaboard of the Caspian which would have profited from an increase of duty on Lianozoff's Persian products.

The more important fishing grounds are worked by the lessee. He sublets some of the smaller stations.

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22

FRUITS AND BERRIES.

Almonds.

Export.—From Bushire to India and Great Britain. Grown in the Shiraz and Ispahan districts. Almond kernels, average price, Shiraz, krs. 10 to krs. 12 per Shiraz man (say 60*s.* 8*d.* per cwt.), and in March 1903, krs. 15 per man (93*s.* per cwt.). Deteriorate if kept over a year.

From Bunder Abbas and the Kerman district to India; from Tabriz and Azerbaijan to Russia, and occasionally to Europe. The current price in July 1903 was krs. 40 to krs. 50 per poud (say 50*s.* per cwt.). Packed in sacks of 4 pouds. Russian Customs duty, 40 cop per poud or about 5 per cent. *ad valorem*. Current price in Russia, Rbls. 10 to Rbls. 12 per poud.

From Khorassan and Shahrud to Russia. Exported in the shell from Shahrud. Price, krs. 500 to krs. 600 per kharwar (34*s.* per cwt.).

Ispahan furnishes 15,000 sacks or more annually (180 lbs. per sack), exported chiefly to Russia through Kazvin. Average price in Kazvin, krs. 50 per poud. Charges to Enzeli, about krs. 4 per poud.

Apricots, Dried.

Export.—To Russia from Tabriz and Shahrud districts; simply dried, or split, stoned and dried, the bulk of the trade being in the latter form. They are not sufficiently well prepared to suit the American market. Do not keep for more than one or two years. Exported in sacks of 4 pouds, and sell in Russia at Rbls. 3 to Rbls. 3½ per poud. Apricot kernels are also exported from Azerbaijan to Russia.

Dates.

Import.—From Mesopotamia to Kermanshah for Persian markets and Russia. Price, Kermanshah, krs. 1·25 per man.

Export.—From Muhammerah, Bunder Abbas, and Minab, and occasionally from Bushire,* to India. Also from Muhammerah to Great Britain, and to Red Sea ports. Price, 1902, 2*s.* 8*d.* to 4*s.* 3*d.* per cwt.

Olives.

There are extensive olive groves at Rudbar, near Resht. A concession was granted by the Persian Government to a Russian subject for the treatment of olives in Northern Persia, and a factory has been established at Rudbar.

It is reported that this venture has not met with success, and the manufacture of olive oil has been discontinued.

Oranges and Lemons.

Exported from Mazanderan and Ghilan to Russia.

Pistachios.

Exported in small quantities from Bushire and Bunder Abbas to India, and from Azerbaijan to Russia. Some 1,200 bags are also exported annually from the Damghan district to Russia, the price being about krs. 1,200 per kharwar (75*s.* per cwt.).

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Number in Table of Statistics. 22

Some 1,500 sacks (180 lbs. each) are exported annually from Kazvin. Value about krs. 35 per poud. Expenses to Enzeli, krs. 4 per poud.

Walnuts.

Some 500 kharwars of walnuts are sent annually from the Demavend district to Russia. Average price, krs. 9 per poud, and krs. 5 per poud charges to Meshed-i-ser.

Raisins.

Export.—Principal markets, Tabriz, Kazvin, Ispahan, Meshed, Kerman. Exported from Bunder Abbas to India, but the bulk of the trade is to Russia. The most important market is that of Tabriz, supplied from the vineyards of Maragha and Urmiah. The production of sultana raisins (sabzeh) has been most profitable in these regions, and new ground is being brought under cultivation continually. The production has greatly increased, perhaps doubled, during the last 10 years. The trade is almost entirely in the hands of Armenians. The grapes, when ripe, are gathered, dipped in a solution of potash, dried for a few days, and then sorted and packed in boxes containing one poud net for the Russian market, or 12½ kilos. net for the European market. The Maragha raisins all go to Russia, whilst the Urmiah raisins, which remain clean, and do not cake together under packing, are more suited for the European markets. A Trebizond house has of late years taken considerable quantities of these raisins, probably for Germany and Britain. The price in krs. (silver) in Maragha has gradually risen, whilst the selling price in Russia has remained fairly steady at Rbls. 3 to Rbls. 3½ per poud. Ten years ago the price of raisins in Maragha was krs. 5½ to krs. 6 per poud. The price current in July 1903 was krs. 8 to krs. 10 per poud (say 10*s.* 2*d.* per cwt.) Some 300,000 pouds of sultanas (sabzeh) are calculated to go out from Kazvin annually, average value about krs. 8·50 (3*s.* 1*d.*) per poud (9*s.* 6*d.* per cwt.), and some 100,000 pouds of plain dried raisins (mavis), average value, krs. 5 per poud (5*s.* 8*d.* per cwt.), but these estimates of quantities appear too large. Expenses, Kazvin to Enzeli, are about krs. 3·50 per poud.

34

FURNITURE.

Import.—Very little cabinet work or upholstery is imported, as Persians do not furnish in European fashion.

Large quantities of cheap glass lamps are imported, also brass and white metal candlesticks, all of which are classed as furniture, and pay duty at 5 per cent. *ad valorem* under section 22, 2 (*a*) of the tariff. Superior lamps are imported from Austria and Britain. These and the immense variety of vases and fancy ware of metal and glass, or porcelain, from ash-trays to candelabra, which are imported, pay duty at 20 per cent. *ad valorem* under section 22, 2 (*b*). The several parts of such objects are now being sent out as much as possible in separate consignments as glassware, pottery, and metal, and are mounted at destination.

See note under heading of Mercery and Hardware (p. 24).

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

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GLASS AND GLASSWARE.

Wares of Glass.

Large quantities of tea glasses are imported from Russia, but the glass saucers for the same, and glass kalian (or water-pipe) bowls are imported from Austria and France. There is a fair trade in common wares, in which Britain does not compete. The bulk of the fancy glass trade is imported through Trebizond from Austria and France. Superior glassware, such as table services, dishes, goblets, &c., find a market only in Teheran, and are chiefly French Baccarat ware. There is a fair consumption of glass sugar bowls, jugs, lamp-shades, lamp-glasses, and fancy ware, mostly from Austria. The decorative and artistic classes in these wares from Austria and France do not meet with serious competition, but in all the inferior classes, Russian wares are now displacing the others. There is said to have been a marked improvement in quality and finish of these Russian goods in recent years. *See* note under Mercery and Hardware (P. 24).

Window Glass.

Import.—The consumption of window glass is comparatively small. It is used only in the houses of the well-to-do.

Prices Teheran, Russian, krs. 80 to krs. 90 per case.
Belgian „ 60 „ 90 „

23

GUMS.

Tragacinth.

Found in the districts of Shiraz, Yezd, Ispahan, Burujird, Kermanshah, Hamadan and Kurdistan. It grows wild on the hillsides, and the young plants give the best gum. The older plants give a yellow tinged gum, but if burnt down yield white juice from the stems. It has been questioned whether Persia can continue to yield the large quantities now exported of this article. The regions from which it is collected are, at any rate, very extensive. Price at Shiraz in March 1903, first quality, krs. 24 to krs. 28 per Shiraz man (say 1*s.* 3*d.* per lb.); lowest, krs. 10 per man (5¾*d.* per lb.). Kermanshah, June 1903, first quality, krs. 30 per Tabriz man (1*s.* 8*d.* per lb.) Ispahan, October 1903, first quality, krs. 60 to krs. 70 per shahman (say, 1*s.* 9¾*d.* per lb.). Exported from Bushire and Bunder Abbas to Britain and India, and from Kermanshah to Bagdad, also for Britain. Russia takes perhaps one-fourth of the exports.

Insoluble Gum.

Export.—Sent from Shiraz and Kazeroon regoins to Bushire, where it is sorted and packed for export. Prices 1902, krs. 24 to krs. 25 per Hashem man (8*s.* per cwt.), and latterly, krs. 32 (10*s.* 6*d.*). Also exported from the Bakhtiari country *viâ* Ahwaz, and from Kurdistan *viâ* Tabriz.

40

HIDES, SKINS, AND LEATHER.

Goat and Sheep Skins.

Largely exported to India from Gulf ports, also from Khorassan and Azerbaijan to Russia. A bale of 70 goat skins salted and dried weighs about 250 lbs. gross. Price, krs. 4⅕ to krs. 5 (1*s.* 9*d.*) per skin. Freight, Tabriz to Batoum, Rbls. 1·25 per poud.

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40

Lamb Skins.

There is a valuable trade in lamb skins to Russia, chiefly from Shiraz. The valuable skins, those which will retain after cleaning the natural close curl of the wool, are obtained only from the Arab flocks. The Kashgais cannot rear the same stock. The skins are collected by buying agents sent round the district, and are packed in bales of about 130 pairs. Price depends greatly on quality, it may average say krs. 20 per pair, but the finest skins are double that price. The skins of unborn lambs are reputed of finest quality, and this is said to give rise to maltreatment of ewes. Expenses of collecting, cleaning, packing, &c., come to about krs. 2 per skin, transport to Moscow and Russian Customs to some krs. 3 per skin. Shiraz skins rank next to Bokhara skins in the Moscow market. Export from Fars, 6,000 to 8,000 bales per annum. Koweit also furnishes these skins, which are forwarded to Russia *vid* Bagdad and Kermanshah. In 1902 the price there was £T8 per 100 skins. In the spring of 1903 it was £T16. In Bagdad, 1902, it was £T10, and in the spring of 1903, £T16 per 100.

These skins all go to Astrakhan, where they are dressed. It seems there is no market for them, undressed, in Great Britain.

There is a smaller trade of, perhaps, 20,000 skins from the Hamadan district, at an average price of krs. 10 per skin.

They are also imported in some quantities from Afghanistan to Meshed, and exported thence to Russia.

Leather.

An important export to Russia, consisting chiefly of sheep and goat skins tanned and dyed in Tabriz and Hamadan. Sorted in sizes, five skins to a bundle. Sheep skins, krs. 15 (5*s.* 5*d.*) to krs. 23 (8*s.* 4*d.*) per bundle. Goat skins, krs. 15 (5*s.* 5*d.*) to krs. 32 (11*s.* 6*d.*) per bundle. Hamadan skins a little more than these prices. Rough tanned skins for covering bales and cases, krs. 8 to krs. 10 per bundle (about 3*s.* 3*d.*).

Sables, Fox Skins, &c.

There is a trade of some krs. 300,000 to 400,000 per annum in fox and sable skins from the Shiraz district to Russia. Fox skins, krs. 5½ (2*s.*) to krs. 7 (2*s.* 6*d.*) each, according to quality. Fox skins are also exported from Azerbaijan to Russia to the extent of 20,000 to 25,000 skins per annum; they are worth krs. 10 (3*s.* 7*d.*) to krs. 11 (4*s.*) per pair, and sell in Russia at Rbls. 3 to Rbls. 4 per pair. From Tabriz about 5,000 or 6,000 sable skins are exported annually to Russia; price, krs. 20 to krs. 30 per skin. The weight is about 100 skins to the poud, and Russian duty on import is Rbls. 75 per poud. Sables in Shiraz are quoted at krs. 12 (4*s.* 2*d.*) to krs 22 (8*s.*) per skin. The export through Kazvin from Central Persia is estimated at 100,000 fox and 10,000 sables. Fox, krs. 8 per pair; sables, krs. 22 per pair.

The sable here referred to is the Mustela Martis (dalak). *See* Schindler's "Eastern Persian Irak," page 40.

There are a few other skins such as wolf skins, krs. 4 to krs. 5, and hare skins, exported in small quantities.

27, 28

INSTRUMENTS, MUSICAL AND SCIENTIFIC.

The demand is exceedingly limited, and there is no opening for regular business.

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MACHINERY, IMPLEMENTS, &c.

29 For agricultural machinery, implements, &c., there is positively no demand. Reaping machines, even scythes, are unknown, and would be unsuitable for the small irregular patches in which irrigated land has to be worked. Ploughs, harrows, sickles, shovels, picks, and hoes in use in the agricultural districts are all of primitive Eastern type.

Industries seem fated to disaster in Persia, and ventures in sugar, yarns, gas, matches, and pottery, have stopped work. The mint imported new machinery from Belgium a couple of years ago. Electric lighting machinery has been imported recently to Teheran and Tabriz. Some drying furnaces for cocoons have been imported to Resht. In smaller articles stocking knitting machines sell well, and sewing machines are reported to be sought after.

MATCHES.

1 Austrian matches in round boxes still have the largest sale in Persia, being imported *viâ* Trebizond, and generally used in North-Western and Central Persia, including Teheran, Ispahan, and Hamadan. Russian safety matches find an increasing market in Tabriz, Teheran and Khorassan. The Russian Customs allow a refund of excise of Rs 2 50 per case of 1,000 boxes on export to Persia. Swedish safety matches imported *viâ* the Gulf, in cases of 50 gross, which are divided into two for mule transport, find markets as far north as Ispahan and Teheran. The case of 25 gross in Shiraz, March 1903, was quoted krs. 120 to krs. 130 (55*s.* 6*d.*).

MERCERY AND HARDWARE.

32 The multifarious wares which fall under this class are mostly imported from Russia and Austria. Enamelled iron ware is chiefly of Russian origin, and in Khorassan was reported better than the ware imported from India. This ware is not greatly sought after by the peasants, who prefer earthenware. The demand in Teheran and some of the large towns for ironmongery of the class of plain (rim, not mortise) locks, hinges, bolts, and door and window fastenings suitable for double doors and windows with very light frames is increasing.

A great many of the articles under this heading are imported in small lots by traders returning from Russia, India, or Europe, and prices are reported to be very capricious.

Cutlery.

British knives, pen-knives, scissors, &c., have a high reputation, but are undersold by cheap German and Austrian goods. The market for table cutlery is limited, as these articles are not used in Persian houses.

Note.—*It is difficult to decide precisely what articles are comprised in the totals given in the Statistics under the headings of Mercery and Hardware, Glassware, Furniture, Pottery and Manufactures of Metals.*

METALS.

33 Brass and copper are largely imported in sheets, the biggest market being Ispahan, supplied from Bushire Prices (Teheran November 1903), of copper sheets 80 inches by 50 inches, weighing 4½ to 7 Tabriz mans, krs. 17 to krs. 20, cash, per Tabriz man (about 6*s.* 8*d.*). Ditto weighing 18 to 20 Tabriz mans,

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krs. 23 to krs. 24 (about 8*s.* 6*d.*). Copper bottoms, assorted sizes, krs. 18½, cash, per Tabriz man (6*s.* 8*d.*).

Brass sheets, 40 inches by 10 inches, weighing 3 lbs. to 9½lbs. krs. 24, cash, per Tab. man (8*s.* 9*d.*).

33 Iron from India and Swedish iron are imported by the Gulf, but the demand is largest in Teheran and the northern provinces, and is supplied from Russia. A good deal of scrap iron from Bakou is imported. Prices, Teheran, bars, rods, &c., according to quality, krs. 3 to krs. 5, cash, per Tab. man (about 1*s.* 5½*d.*); sheet iron, Russian, krs. 4·20 to krs. 5, cash, per Tab. man (about 1*s.* 8*d.*). There is a fair demand for sheet tin used for making samovars, canisters, and utensils of all sorts, and for lining cases. A curious use to which it is put in country places is in window frames instead of oiled paper. Price, Teheran, for plates 17½ inches by 12½ inches, krs. 0·80 per sheet (3½*d.*).

In Teheran sheet iron, usually obtained from kerosine cases, is much used for roofing. The use of thin zinc sheets from Russia for roofing is growing in Teheran, the first cost being greater than kerosine-case sheets, but the latter have to be painted every two or three years. Price, Teheran, for zinc sheets in rolls, krs. 30 per Tab. man (10*s.* 11*d.*). There might be an opening for some corrugated iron roofing material if price lists, &c., showing cost at Teheran, were available to builders, as the increasing cost of heavy roofing timber is an inducement to adopt anything lighter than the usual flat mud roofs, which have to be repaired every three years. The zinc sheeting from Russia has to be soldered all along, and, being light, tends to strip in heavy gales.

Bar silver is now imported in very small quantities, for silversmiths' work in Shiraz, Ispahan, Teheran, and Zanjan. The heavier kran-pieces amongst the old coinage used to be melted down for this work.

Block tin ("kal") is used all over the country for whitening copper cooking utensils; the chief markets are Ispahan and Hamadan.

31 MINERALS.

Some 3,000 to 4,000 tons of red oxide of iron are exported from Ormuz yearly. The market is said not to take more than this quantity. It is shipped under contract with one of the regular lines of steamers to the Gulf. There are about 150 men employed on the Island, and the ore is delivered on board by boats from a small jetty at, it is said, 1*l.* per ton. Cost of mining and shipping probably do not exceed 5*s.* per ton.

It was stated in Bunder Abbas (the statement requires confirmation) that the salt mines of Kishm employ some 2,000 hands. The salt is exported in sailing vessels to Muscat and Calcutta. It is locally estimated to cost about krs. 5 (1*s.* 9*d.*) per 100 mans delivered on board. When the writer was in Bunder Abbas in March 1903 work was suspended, as the duty under the new tariff prohibited export.

The oxide of iron mines of Ormuz and the salt mines of Kishm are worked under a monopoly, for which krs. 20,000 per annum is paid to the Persian Government. This monopoly expires in about two years' time.

26 OIL.

Olive.

See Olives (p. 20).

Petroleum.

Imported from Russia. For years past the coast ports from Aden round the Gulf to Karachi have been supplied by a Bombay firm, who ship by their own steamers. The price has risen from krs. 10 to krs. 20 per case of two tins =65 lbs.

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The Russian line of steamers to the Gulf have entered into competition, and reduced the price. Kerman and Shiraz are supplied from the Gulf, but the country in general gets its supplies from the Caspian. Quite half of the quantities imported arrive in barrels at Enzeli, where the kerosine is canned and packed in wooden cases for transport inland. The sheet iron and tin for the cases is obtained from Baku. Prices have nearly doubled in Baku since last summer, and the cost of kerosine delivered at Enzeli is now about 33 copecks per poud. Average price, Teheran, krs. 3 to krs. 3½ per Shah man ; in November 1903, krs. 4.

37

Opium.

One of the most important exports from Persia. The principal markets are Ispahan, Shiraz, Yezd, Hamadan (from Nahavend and Burujird), and Meshed. It it exported to China, Britain, and America ; its value in the two latter countries depending on the percentages of morphia. In Ispahan the crop occupies the ground from November to June, after which the ground can be used for some other autumn crop. Opium is an expensive and somewhat precarious crop to grow, needing much labour, manure, and irrigation, and is frequently damaged by hail or rain, whilst the price is subject to wide fluctuations, being entirely dependent on the China and London markets. It is said to be often grown only because it can be readily disposed of for cash to meet rent and taxes, and not for the superior profit compared with other crops.

Three mans of raw opium will produce about 2 mans of prepared opium. The cost of preparing 12½ Shah mans is about krs. 60, and the price of prepared opium in September 1903 was krs. 120 to krs. 125 per Tab. man (about 6*s*. 10*d*. per lb.). It is exported in tin-lined cases containing 140¼ lbs. net (for China). The charges from Ispahan to Bushire are about krs. 40 per case (14*s*. 6*d*.), and by direct steamers, Bushire to Hong Kong, Rs. 20 per case, including Rs. 5 for transhipment at Bombay ; Bushire to London, 25*s*. per case. The export duty is about krs. 430 (7*l*. 6*s*.) per case.

Opium is an article which lends itself readily to adulteration. The substance most frequently added is a native resin (gunjideh). So largely has this resin been used that its price has risen from krs. 5 to krs. 30 per Shah man. The heavy export duty now levied on opium will tend to lessen adulteration. Orders have been received from China for consignments of the resin gunjideh, presumably for purposes of adulteration at that end. The annual production of opium is estimated roughly at 7,000 cases, of which about 2,000 are consumed in the country. For home consumption the opium is worked into sticks, not cakes. Hamadan accounts for 500 cases, Kermanshah 150 to 200, and Meshed for 500 cases, the remainder coming from the central provinces of Ispahan, Shiraz, and Yezd, and also the Burujird district. This estimate, at least, agrees with the statistics for 1902-03, which show an export of a little over 5,000 cases.

It is not generally thought that the increase of export duty (from 5 to about 14 per cent. *ad valorem*) will restrict the cultivation of this drug, which has been produced in past years under very wide fluctuations of price. It is regretted, however, by thoughtful persons that the tax has not been made to fall on the growing consumption of the drug in the country instead of on its export.

19

Packing Materials.

Gunny-bags from India are imported in large quantities for grain, gum, and almond exports, and, in Ispahan, for cotton. Used bags in which grain and rice have been imported are also brought in considerable quantities from the Arab coast and Bahrein, and these are sold in Bushire at low prices.

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PAPER.

Writing Paper, Envelopes, &c.

The southern markets are supplied from Britain and India. Austria supplies about the same amount through Trebizond, and Russia has a large trade in cheap paper.

Paper-Hangings.

Are little in demand, and that only at Teheran.

Packing Paper, &c.

Is supplied from Russia.

30 PEARLS, MOTHER-OF-PEARL, OYSTER AND MUSSEL SHELLS.

There are valuable fisheries on the Persian coast above Lingah, which have been allowed to rest for the last few years. Lingah is second to Bahrein as a pearl market, as food supplies for the fishing fleets are transhipped there. The pearls are all bought up by Indian dealers. Mother-of-pearl shells, mussel shells, and oyster shells are brought in, and are exported to Britain, Germany, and latterly Russia. Some attention is now being directed in the Gulf to these valuable articles, but only a small part of the take of these shells is brought to market, as the boats cannot carry them for more than a few days before running to port. Oyster shells used to be sent from Bahrein to Bushire, but are now shipped direct.

39 PERFUMES.

Imports are insignificant.

Shiraz exports rose water to India in flasks and jars. The roses are steeped in water, and boiled. The water is then twice distilled. Attar of rozes, a concentrated form, is only made to order.

45 POTTERY.

Earthenware from Russia (tea-cups, saucers, bowls, and plates) is found south as far as Shiraz and Bushire. Russian tea-pots are found everywhere, and the trade is a very big one. Formerly these articles were imported from other European countries, but at equal prices the Russian is now the superior article. These Russian wares are now imported by the Gulf ports. The cost of transport on heavy and fragile merchandise puts British trade *vid* Trebizond at a disadvantage, but this should not be so in the Shiraz and Ispahan markets.

15, 17 PROVISIONS.

A small market exists for tinned meats, cheese, biscuits, jams, &c., but only in Teheran, and chiefly among members of the European community, who, moreover, are largely supplied on private indents.

50 SOAP.

Except in Teheran, which is supplied from Russia, there is very little demand for toilet soap. The Persian does not use soap for the toilet. In the larger towns there is occasional inquiry for it amongst the upper class, but it is not generally kept in shops. Imported bar soap is sometimes used in public and private bath-

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50 houses. Common washing soap for clothes, from India, is beginning to displace the native manufacture for that purpose.

Soap is manufactured in the country, notably at Ispahan and Rudbar; value, krs. 6 to krs. 10 per man of 13 lbs. (say 2½*d.* per lb.).

20 SPICES.

This import trade is entirely an Indian one, and is steadily growing. The chief articles are pepper, cinnamon, cardamoms, turmeric, tamarinds, and ganger.

51 SUGAR.

The consumption of sugar in Persia has greatly increased in recent years. The Consular Reports for Bushire show an import at Bushire and Bunder Abbas for the two years 1897-98 of 251,500 cwts., and for the two years 1901-02 of 504,000 cwts. Kermanshah also shows an increasing trade in French sugar. Russian sugar has made still greater progress; the export to Persia for 1902 stood at 3,000,000 pouds. There has been a decrease by the Trebizond route of some 20,000 cwts. of French sugar, which has almost ceased to be imported to Azerbaijan since 1900.

Sugar cannot be insured inland, as it is a risky commodity to transport, being easily demaged by wet. The inland trade is chiefly in the hands of Persian merchants, and, as the article has a wide sale on which a quick turnover can be made, the profits in Persia are small.

It is not possible, from evidence obtainable in Persia, which is only one out of several markets for Russian sugar, to express an authoritative opinion on the effect of the fiscal measures in Russia governing the production and export of this commodity. A leading exporter describes the system shortly as follows:—Sugar in Russia maintains a level of about Rbls. 6 per poud. A Government estimate is made of each year's consumption, and of the stocks to be held in reserve, and this quantity is apportioned amongst the refineries in proportion to their declared output. Each refinery has then practically to sell abroad the quantity of its surplus output so established. There is a drawback on exported sugar of Rbls. 1·75 per poud, which is the full tax imposed on production. Anyone entitled to trade abroad can export sugar and claim the Customs certificate for drawback, which shows the quantity exported and the refinery the sugar came from. As the refineries have to produce Customs certificates in proof of export, they have either to export on their own account or buy up certificates from those who have exported. These certificates consequently often command a heavy premium, and are dealt in on the Bourse.

The result of the existing conditions of production and export, as regards Persian trade, is that Russian sugar commands the markets of Azerbaijan, Zanjan, Hamadan (price krs. 4·75 per Tab. man—3·2*d.* per lb.), Kom, Shahrud and Mazanderan (price, Meshed, krs. 4 per Meshed man—2·55*d.* per lb.), and competes with French sugar in Ispahan, Yezd, and Seistan.

Consignments have been tried by the Russian steamers to Bushire and Shiraz, but have not been appreciated, on account of hard quality, though offered at krs. 4 to krs. 4·25 per Shiraz man. Russian sugar exported to Persia enjoys a rebate on freight of about 9 copecks per poud.

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Yaltouchewsky sugar at Kief is quoted :—

Small loaves in cases, Rbls. 2·75 to Rbls. 3·05 per poud. In August 1903, Rbls. 2·85 per poud.

Small loaves in bags, Rbls. 2·70 to Rbls. 3 per poud. In August 1903, Rbls. 2·80 per poud.

Large loaves in bags, Rbls. 2·65 to Rbls. 2·95 per poud. In August 1903, Rbls. 2·75 per poud.

Soft sugar in bags, Rbls. 1·90 to Rbls. 2·10.

Kisselowsky sugar at Kieff is quoted 10 copecks higher per poud, but commands 1 to 2 shahis better price in Tabriz on account of its harder quality.

The cost of transport from Kieff to Erivan is 45 to 50 copecks per poud ; from Erivan to Julfa 20 to 50 copecks (in August 1903, 45 to 50 copecks) per poud ; and from Julfa to Tabriz 20 to 60 copecks (in August 1903, 35 to 40 copecks) per poud Porterage, commissions—Erivan Julfa, and petties, say 10 copecks per poud. Persian duty, 3 shahis per man, say 15 copecks per poud.

French sugar is imported in cases of 32 to 36 loaves at 32*s.* to 36*s.* per 100 kilos c.i.f. Gulf ports. Latterly it has been packed in bags, which saves packing and weight, and in which it is found to carry better. It holds the markets of the Gulf, Kerman, Shiraz (price krs. 5 to krs. 5·25 per Shiraz man), Ispahan, and the Kermanshah and Kurdistan districts, but has been almost driven out of Hamadan by Russian sugar (French, krs. 5·10 per Tab. man (31*s.* 6*d.* per cwt.) ; Russian, krs. 4·75 per Tab. man (29*s.* 6*d.* per cwt.). It has been driven out of the Azerbaijan market, but when transport from Trebizond to Persia rules very low, it is still bought in that place (where important stocks are held) for the Khoi and Urmiah market.

Some Belgian sugar has been taken in the Karun district. Sugar is much retailed by the loaf, and the Belgian loaf of the same weight as the French is a little more tapered in the cone, stands higher, and thus looks bigger.

In the markets accustomed to French sugar, the hardness of the Russian article is objected to, but in the north, where they have become accustomed to this quality, they drink tea whilst holding a morsel of sugar in the mouth, and on account of this habit find a defect in more soluble sugar.

Soft Sugar.

Almost the whole of this trade to the Gulf is from Austria. The sugar is imported in bags at 11*s.* 6*d.* to 12*s.* per cwt. c. i. f. Gulf ports for crystallized, which has displaced the slightly cheaper granulated variety. The latter is said to be more liable to sweat on the voyage. Austrian crystallized sugar holds the markets in the Gulf and Karun regions and in Shiraz, where it sold in March 1903 at krs. 3·50 per Shiraz man (21*s.* 10*d.* per cwt.) ; also in Kermanshah, which, however, takes only a small quantity. All the northern provinces down to Hamadan, Ispahan, and Yezd take Russian sugar. Prices in Hamadan, krs. 3·10 to krs. 3·20 per Tab. man (19*s.* 6*d.* per cwt.) ; Ispahan, krs. 7·25 to krs. 8·50 per Shah man (24*s.* 6*d.* per cwt.) ; Meshed, krs. 3 per Meshed man (18*s.* 4*d.* per cwt.).

Mauritius and Batavian sugars are too expensive for the Persian market.

68

TEA.

The average quantity landed at Bunder Abbas and Bushire for the five years ending 1900 was 46,100 cwts. per annum, and the average quantity for the two years, 1901-02, 40,800 cwts. per annum, to which may be added for the Seistan route, not pre-

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viously used, say, 1,000 cwts., total, 41,800 cwts. per annum. The average number of cases forwarded from Trebizond to Tabriz for the five years ending 1900 was 8,700 per annum, and the average for 1901-02, 9,400 per annum, showing an increase of 700 cases.

Reliable records of imports *viâ* Kermanshah are not available, but in spite of the above figures there is little doubt that the tea trade with Persia is distinctly growing.

The Customs Statistics for the last three years tend to confirm this :—

		Krs.
Total imports, year March 1900-01	...	12,300,000
1901-02	...	13,000,000
1902-03	...	14,300,000

(Exclusive of Muhammerah.)

A part of the tea formerly landed at Bunder Abbas was destined for Transcaspia, a market no longer supplied by Persian routes.

The traders in Persia interested in this line do not appear to anticipate any great reduction in the consumption of tea on account of the heavy duties imposed under the Tariff of 1903. Also, although Indian tea is more heavily taxed in proportion to value than white-tipped China and Java teas, the relative prices to the consumer will not be so much changed as to bring these latter into competition with the cheap Indian tea. The duty under the Tariff of 1903, equivalent to quite 75 per cent. *ad valorem* on low class Indian tea, will hamper the operations of traders with small capitals, who must now invest almost double the amount of capital to carry on the same business as formerly.

The Customs Statistics for 1902-03 show an export of over 9,000 cases to Russia from Azerbaijan and Khorassan—unexpected routes for a transit trade to follow ; yet the actual export is locally estimated at nearly double these figures. The reason, of course, is that tea which in Tabriz or Meshed costs 65 copecks per lb. is worth Rbls. 1·40 over the Russian border if it can be got there.

It was simpler to pay the old 5 per cent. export duty in Persia than to run the risk of capture on that side of the frontier. The Customs' cordons on the Russian frontier have been more effective of late in stopping this contraband trade.

Russia has recently opened the Batoum-Julfa and Batoum-Ashkabad routes to tea in transit for Persia. Any agent can be employed. Tea for Azerbaijan and Khorassan ought to arrive much cheaper by these routes than by the Gulf.

The Russo-China Bank offered the following conditions :—

To effect purchases in China or India on indent, charging 6 per cent. interest on invoice cost and charges to date of arrival in Batoum—to advance the deposit on account of duty (Rbls 31·50 per poud) during transit, at a commission of 1 per cent.—to effect transport from Batoum to Tabriz at about Rbls. 1·45 per poud (this rate subject to variation of 10 to 15 copecks per poud according to rates of wagon hire Erivan-Tabriz), and insurance at Rbls. 4·50 per Rbls. 1,000 ; interest on advances at 8 per cent. from arrival at Batoum to date of payment in Tabriz—commission 1 per cent. on cost and charges to Batoum.

The Banque d'Escompte de Perse are reported to have offered to effect purchases on indent for Meshed, advancing cost, charges, and deposit of duty, at the rate of 6 per cent. interest till payment in Meshed, the tea to be taken up within three months of arrival ; their commission to be 1 per cent.

Prices in Persia have, perhaps, not yet quite responded to the duty under the new tariff. It is generally believed that large stocks were held in the country at the time the tariff came into

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force. Being an article which cannot be indented for on sample, the wholesale dealer in Persia must have a capable agent in Calcutta or Hong Kong. Persia takes some 250,000*l.* worth of tea annually, but no British or Indian traders appear to have gone into the business on a large scale.

Indian Tea.

Indian tea forms quite 80 per cent. of the total imports of tea into Persia, and the bulk of it may be valued at 5 to 4 annas per lb. c.i.f. Gulf ports. It is the only tea consumed by the peasantry and lower classes, and is sold all over the country. In Hamadan, where it had been selling before the introduction of the Tariff of 1903 at krs. 11 to krs. 12 per Tab. man, the price has risen to krs. 16 to krs. 17. The teas most widely consumed in Teheran range at present from krs. 20 to krs. 25 per Tab. man, cash.

China Tea.

This forms about 8 per cent. only of the total tea imports. It is chiefly "white," that is with leaves of white or greyish colour. The demand is for better class teas, averaging about 1*s.* 2*d.* per lb., c.i.f. the Gulf. The consumption is amongst the upper classes in the larger towns, such as Shiraz, Ispahan, Teheran, and Meshed. The annual consumption in this last market is estimated by a local dealer at 5,000 to 6,000 cases of Indian, 200 cases of China, and 300 cases of Java.

The ruling price in Teheran for white tea is krs. 36 per Tabriz man, cash.

Batavian Tea.

The consumption of this variety is somewhat less than that of China tea. Batavian tea also comes chiefly under the class of "white" tea, or tea possessing a percentage of silver or grey-tipped leaves. The chest of 130 lbs. contains eight boxes. As a type, "No. 22" quality, costing about 92*s.* c.i.f. the Gulf, may be cited.

Batavian tea competes with Chinese as a better class article for the upper classes. The best markets are Teheran and Tabriz. In the Meshed market it was selling, in August 1903, at krs 6 to krs. 6·30 per lb.; Teheran krs. 35 to krs. 38 per Tabriz man, cash.

Russian Tea.

In packets of ¼ funt, ½ funt, and 1 funt, or "karvanker." The sale of these Russian packets has met with a limited success in the northern provinces on the strength of the reputation of Russian caravan tea. One sample marked on the wrapper at Rbls. 1·40 per funt for retail in Russia was offered for export to Persia wholesale from Batoum at 38 copecks. (Samples are sent with this report, as it may be interesting to know whether this is Indian or China tea.) The Russian Customs allow a drawback of 80 copecks per funt on tea exported to Persia. Very little is taken by Khorassan, and the imports to Azerbaijan are decreasing. A large quantity appears to have been imported last year for Teheran. Prices in Teheran, krs. 4 to krs. 4·80 per funt (= 80 miskals), cash, retail.

An attempt is being made to introduce the cultivation of tea at Lahijan, some 28 miles east of Resht. Some 300,000 plants, now two and three years old, are reported to be doing well, and the proprietor, formerly Persian Consul in Calcutta, states that the climate seems well suited to the Indian plant. (A sample is sent.)

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All tea entering Russian Transcaspia from Persia or Afghanistan is subject to Customs duty at Rbls. 31·50 per poud, but green tea declared at Batoum for consumption in Transcaspia is subject to a duty of Rbls. 12 per poud on arrival at the Customs offices of that province, and refund is made of the duty paid in Batoum. In this manner the trade in green tea to Transcaspia through Bunder Abbas and Meshed has been diverted to the Batoum route.

61

TEXTILES.—CARPETS.

Total exports, per Persian Customs Statistics :—

Years ending 20th March :—	Krs.
1900-01	11,368,000
1901-02	13,870,000
1902-03	13,347,000

Bushire Consular Reports show an average export from Bushire and Bunder Abbas for the six years to 1901 of 47,000*l.*, and for the two years 1901-02, of 48,000*l.* The very great increase in the export of this commodity in recent years has been from Tabriz, which is by far the largest market in Persia. The manufacture of carpets is carried on in many parts of Persia, but naturally centres in those districts where wool, grain, and consequently labour are abundant and cheap. Kerman carpets have a high reputation, and command in Constantinople the highest prices of all Persian carpets. In Tabriz the industry has been inaugurated only in recent years, but has made great strides, and the carpets produced there are of fine workmanship and fetch high prices ; the peculiarly soft fine wool of Meshed and Khorassan give these carpets also a superior value.

The region centring in Ferahan and Sultanabad produces very large quantities of carpets of all grades, although the bulk of the business is in ordinary grades for domestic use. Hamadan, Kurdistan, and Fars also produce many carpets. Fars and Kurdistan weave heavy all-wool carpets. Carpets are exported from Shiraz to Egypt and Constantinople from the Gulf. Some Kerman carpets are sent to the same markets from Bunder Abbas, but the bulk of the carpets from that district, as well as from Central and Western Persia, are either consigned or sold to Tabriz for the Constantinople market, whence they are distributed to all parts of the world. There is very keen competition amongst Persian traders in the Constantinople market, and export houses in Tabriz are endeavouring to increase direct trade with America, the best buyer.

Tiflis is also a market for Persian carpets, taking from Tabriz mostly lower grade carpets from Kurdistan and Ferahan.

Khorassan carpets can be exported to Tiflis and Constantinople *viâ* Ashkabad.

From Tabriz to Constantinople the Trebizond route used to be employed, but the Julfa-Erivan route in transit through Russia is now preferred. There are, or were, certain restrictions in respect of old (used) carpets. Railway freight from Erivan to Batoum is 60 copecks per poud, and Russian transport companies in Tabriz (August 1903) were offering through freight and insurance all risks, Tabriz to Batoum, at Rbls. 1·45 per poud. Kurdistan, Hamadan, and Ferahan carpets are also exported *viâ* Kermanshah and Bagdad, but the delay and inconvenience occasioned by Customs formalities in Turkish territory are a deterrent to the use of this route.

Persian carpets are all made on hand looms, the pile being knotted on by hand. The bulk of woollen carpets have a woollen pile only, warp and woof being cotton. Some are all wool. In silk carpets the woof is usually cotton, the warp either silk or cotton.

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The Ferahan district, in which Sultanabad lies, produces only some 60 to 80 kharwars of wool, and supplies have long been drawn from the Khonchar and Ispahan districts, and now regularly from Kermanshah also. The disturbed state of Luristan forbids the import of fine wool grown in the Shuster regions. The wool is usually imported in the form of yarn, the local population being more profitably employed in weaving. Wool, 10 years ago, was at krs. 16 per Shah man, now it is at krs. 30 to 32. In carpet making about 25 per cent. of the yarn is lost in clippings, which are valueless. The yarn employed must be good white wool; brown or dark wool can be dyed only to dark colours—even for reds the white wool is needed.

The increased duty on indigo under the Tariff of 1903 will not materially affect carpet making, as the cost of dyeing is not a large factor in the price of carpets

The bulk of the carpet industry is carried on in the weavers' homes, the women and children doing the weaving. The so-called manufacturer supplies to the weaver the design and the quantities of wool in different colours required for one carpet. (This latter, to ensure the same shades being employed throughout.) He also advances sums to account of the price arranged, the balance being paid on delivery of the finished article. The practice has the usual disadvantages of home employment, slovenly and dilatory work, with little progress towards skill and finish, as the looms, scattered over a wide area, cannot be constantly inspected. The vast majority of weavers, however, living in small isolated villages, and having also household duties, can work only in this way. The untrustworthy weaver sells the good wool entrusted to him and substitutes inferior wool, and sometimes even sells the finished work and sets up a new piece, to be delivered long after contract time.

There is only one European (British) house now competing with Persians in carpet weaving. Their method of business is as indicated above. They usually employ some 3,000 looms, on which, perhaps, 10,000 hands are kept at work. Much local experience is needed in placing out work according to the skill and trustworthiness of the weaver. They purchase and dye in their own premises all the wool employed in their carpets.

Of course, the wholesale and export traders buy great numbers of carpets made for small capitalists, or by weavers who can afford to lie out of the cost of material and labour till finished.

A manufacturer with long experience of the industry in Sultanabad considers that it would not be difficult to get women weavers to attend at a properly appointed factory, and that the economy of material, and increased skill and finish of supervised work, would enable such an undertaking to prosper.

In Tabriz, where carpet making is quite a recent industry, the weaving is done by boys who attend at the factories. Wages are about krs. 12 per month, and the midday meal say another krs. 12 per month. There is a foreman, say at krs. 50 per month.

A carpet of 9 feet by 12 feet with 15 by 15 stitches to the square inch will employ say 5 boys and an overseer. The rate of progess will depend on the intricacy of the design, say about 18 square feet per month. The Tabriz carpets have attained a reputation for good workmanship, but the local wool coming chiefly from Khoi, Urmiah, and Soujbulak is of a hard texture and makes the carpets stiff and unpliable. The quality depends greatly on the number of stitches. The coursest qualities turned out have about 8 by 8 stitches to the square inch. The average quality of Tabriz carpets runs about 15 by 15 stitches, and a fine carpet 20 by 20. Silk carpets contain from 15 by 15 to 22 by 22 stitches. It does not pay to produce the coarser qualities in

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Tabriz, the high cost of wages and wool making them nearly as expensive as the fine qualities. As regards price, so much depends on workmanship, design and colour that only general indications can be given. Kerman and Tabriz woollen carpets cost from krs. 100 to krs. 150 per square zar (about 1½ square yards). Meshed carpets a little lower, and the common Ferahan from krs. 20 to krs. 25. Ziegler's krs. 25 to krs. 35. Silk carpets from krs. 300 to krs. 500 per zar. Aniline dyes are constantly used, but the carpets made with them are for the most part disposed of in the eastern markets, Russia and Egypt.

54

TEXTILES:—COTTON, RAW.

According to Bushire Consular Reports, the average export at the Port of Bushire and Bunder Abbas for seven years ending 1901 was 11,000 cwts., and for the two years ending 1902, 7,400 cwts. In 1900, however, the export was exceptionally large. The exports to Russia for the year 1889 cannot well have exceeded 120,000 cwts., for 1898 they are given in the Russian Statistics as 261,000 cwts., and for the year ending March 1902, according to Persian statistics, they amounted to 267,000 cwts.

Persian cotton appears not to be good enough in quality to suit the Indian or home markets, and in the southern provinces it can hardly be grown at remunerative prices for export.

Russia imposes a tax of Rbls. 4·15 per poud on cotton imported over European and Black Sea frontiers, and of copecks 40 per poud on Persian cotton, a difference of Rbls. 3·75 per poud, or over 2¾*d.* per lb. This is about equal to the cost of transport to Moscow from Kerman, perhaps the most distant province from which cotton is exported to Russia. Russia can hardly be dependent for raw cotton on Persia, from which she draws only about 8 per cent. of her total imports of that staple. However, 267,000 cwts. or 827,000 pouds at Rbls. 3·75 amounts to over Rbls. 3,100,000. This difference in duty is sufficient to account for the prosperous, if somewhat dependent, condition of cotton growing in Persia, and for the complete absorption of the surplus crop by Russia.

Khorassan is the most important cotton growing province in Persia. In Meshed, the chief market (August 1903), the ruling price was krs. 550 per Meshed kharwar (3·90*d.* per lb.); in the previous year it was krs. 850 (5½*d.* per lb.).

In Nishapur, a market for some 7,000 kharwars, the prices follow the Meshed market; charges to Ashkabad are about krs. 25 per bale.

In Sabzwar, with an export of 5,000 kharwars, cotton is sold by the load of two bales, and the ruling price in August 1903 was krs. 175 per load of 30 Tabriz mans (3·90*d.* per lb.). From Shahrud some 2,000 to 3,000 bales are exported.

Central Persia, Ispahan, Yezd, Kashan, all now grow large quantities of cotton for the Russian market. Ispahan is reported to export annually some 25,000 bales of six pouds each.*

In Azerbaijan some cotton is grown in the regions bordering the Urmiah lake; the annual export may be 5,000 to 7,000 cwts. Price (July 1903), krs. 10 to krs. 11 per man of 1,000 miskals (4*d.* to 4¾*d.* per lb.).

Large quantities of cotton must be consumed in the country in the manufacture of carpets and numerous native textiles, but it is impossible to arrive at an estimate of the total crop or the acreage devoted to the culture of this staple.

* The average value in Ispahan is about krs. 30 per poud, and charges to Enzeli about krs. 2·80 per poud. Some 10,000 bales from Ispahan, 10,000 from Koom, and 10,000 from the Zirand district find their way to Kazvin, now an important market. An average value in Kazvin is about krs. 500 per kharwar (650 lbs.) and the charges to Enzeli come to about krs. 80 per kharwar.

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TEXTILES:—COTTON YARNS AND TISSUES.

Imports for the last three years (including Karun).—

	£
1900-01 ...	1,501,923
1901-02 ...	2,359,220
1902-03 ...	1,849,641

(For details of these and following figures see Annex H., pp. 84-87).

The imports for the last two years were distributed as follows:—

	British Empire.	Russia.	Other Countries.
	£	£	£
1901-02	1,563,929	679,229	116,062
1902-03	1,281,608	492,137	75,896

It is clear that Russia is our only formidable competitor at the present time.

In 1889-90 the British Empire was in possession of the trade in cotton textiles to Persia, Russia furnishing 9 or 10 per cent. only, and the contributions of Other Countries being quite inconsiderable. The same might be said of Other Countries to-day, although really France and Austria, probably then, and certainly now, possess a steady if modest trade in certain distinct lines of high class cotton prints, cretonnes, &c.

Russian competition was distinctly felt by 1892-93. In 1889 she exported to Persia about 160,000*l.* value of cotton textiles, and in 1898, when drawback of Rbls. 2·30, Rbls. 2·40, and Rbls. 2·80, gold,* per poud (according to the class of goods) was granted, her exports to Persia amounted to about 500,000*l.*

British and British Indian trade in 1889 has been estimated at about 1,714,000*l.*

Estimates made from Consular Reports give for the period 1895-97 an annual import from the British Empire of about 1,626,000*l.*, and for 1901-02 of about 1,670,000*l.*

This last amount is some 15 per cent. more than the average obtained from the Customs Statistics for 1901-03 already quoted. In drawing conclusions from these statistics it should be observed that the Consular Reports in some instances appear to convert quantities into values at somewhat high rates, whereas Customs valuations (made for the calculation of duties payable *ad valorem*) are certain to be well within real value.

Statistics show a great increase in the cotton textile trade in 1901 in imports from both Russia and the British Empire.

Russia now grants drawback on all cotton tissues exported to Persia on the following scale:—

	Rbls.
A. Bleached and unbleached	4·65 per poud.
B. Coloured, excepting Adrianople dye (red ground)	4·87½ "
C. Coloured, Adrianople dye (red ground)	5·40 "

The fact must not be lost sight of that all the raw cotton, imported over European and Black Sea frontiers, employed in Russian factories is charged Rbls. 4·15 per poud Customs duty, and Persian cotton only 40 copecks per poud. The annual consumption of raw cotton in Russia may be 260,000—280,000 tons, and the annual foreign imports, say, 160,000—170,000 tons, of which 14,000 tons are from Persia. Consequently the Russian and Persian production may be, say, 120,000 tons per annum.

*Equivalent under existing Currency Law to 3·45, 3·60 and 4·20 Rbls. per poud.

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If the Russian and Persian growers obtain the full benefit of the protective import duty, then all the cotton employed in Russian cotton factories is Rbls. 4·15 per poud dearer than it would be were no import duty imposed.

Regarded from this point of view, since 100 lbs. of raw cotton produce only about 91 lbs. of prints, the drawback is little more than equivalent to the disability imposed in Russia on trade abroad by the Customs duty of Rbls. 4·15 on imported raw material. If, however, the quantities of raw cotton offered on the Russian market from Russian and Persian sources (although, as above noted, it is less than half the annual consumption of raw cotton in Russia) be greater than the demands of that market for the particular qualities produced by the Russian and Persian growers, then these growers must compete with one another for the supply of the requirements for Russian consumption, and so permit the manufacturers to gain some advantage from the drawback.

Dyeing materials also pay Customs duty in Russia, and the greater drawback on classes B and C is said to be equivalent to the tax on these materials. Evidence on this point is not available in Persia.

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Bleached and Unbleached Cotton Tissues—White and Grey Shirtings, &c.

Total imports (excluding Karun) :—

	£
1901-02	745,753
1902-03	533,086

The trade in these tissues is still held by Great Britain, the imports from India being mostly Manchester goods. Russia is now supplying both white and grey shirtings to Persia, and, though her trade is still small, she appears to be devoting attention to these goods. Her makes, so far, have not established a footing beyond the northern provinces of Azerbaijan, Teheran, and Khorassan, and even in these markets do not compete seriously with British goods. At equal prices their qualities are not good enough, and even in the Ardebil market are only taken freely when Hamadan prices are high. In Meshed also an importer stated that British whites at krs. 40 per piece were preferred to the Russian at krs. 30. Reports from Baku would seem to indicate that the Takief factory there, of which a good deal has been expected, is not able to produce these goods at remunerative prices.

Holland has recently supplied, at prices to compete with British goods, both whites and greys, which have been appreciated, and promise to secure for themselves a firm footing on the market.

Persia also weaves plain tissues ("karbaz") from home and imported cotton twist, but the extensive markets formerly found for these fabrics in such districts as Burujird, Kurdistan, and Soujbulak have been largely captured by imported Mexicans, and this formerly large trade is now of little account.

The real competition in these goods is between rival British imports. Persian traders dealing mostly through Bombay supply the markets of Kerman, Yezd, and Khorassan by the Bunder Abbas route, although in Khorassan the trade in greys is reported to be shrinking, as this material, indigo dyed locally, is being displaced by cotton suitings and trouserings. The Jewish and Persian traders of Kermanshah and Hamadan import goods on indents payable in Bagdad, or bought there, which they dispose of not only in their local markets, but to customers in Zanjan, Ardebil, Kazvin, Teheran, and Azerbaijan, as far as Tabriz, at times invading even Ispahan. At Tabriz the trade is in the

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hands of the Persian merchants dealing with Constantinople, who buy through their agents and import *viâ* Trebizond.

The British trading firms in Shiraz and Ispahan supply the bulk of the goods consumed in Central Persia. In 1901-02 the trade by this route was not far short of that *viâ* Kermanshah, but in 1902-03 the latter maintained the value of its imports, whilst the former reduced its trade one-half.

White and grey goods, on account of their lesser value than prints, weight for weight, pay a proportionately higher duty on value under the Tariff of 1903. The duty may be equivalent to from 8 to 11 per cent. *ad valorem*, but the average would be about 8½ per cent. Part of the weight is doubtless due to the heavy filling in these goods to give them an attractive and substantial appearance to the retail buyer, but to the uninitiated it is difficult to see why the "chitsaz" (Persian printer) pays freight and duty on filling for the marshes in which the Ispahan river loses itself. Perhaps it has not been found worth while to bring out a special class of goods for this trade.

60

Printed and Dyed Tissues.

Total imports (excluding Karun)—

	£
1901-02	1,378,334
1902-03	1,157,990

Persian Prints.

For long years Ispahan possessed a flourishing printing and dyeing industry, now still existent, but no longer flourishing. Grey goods are indigo dyed, black or blue, or printed with blue and red ground, as blouses, trouserings, &c., for the rural and nomad population, who also use the same material, undyed, as undershirts, drawers, &c., doubtless part of their purchases being dyed in the villages. The nomads buy most in spring and autumn, the seasons for changing camp. White goods are printed in many pleasing and intricate designs by the handblock. These prints are seldom prepared in the piece for retail by the yard, but are printed as articles such as handkerchiefs, napkins, table-cloths, curtains, &c. (the cloth being previously seamed to the desired width), or as material for undercoats, vests, and linings, &c., in lengths for one garment. They are more costly than foreign machine-made prints, and are consumed by the middle and upper classes. For this reason they have, perhaps, a market somewhat apart from that of foreign prints, but there is no doubt that the cheap and varied imports from abroad are steadily encroaching on the home industry.

It seems certain that the heavier duty on white and grey goods (compared with that on prints), and on dyes, is a distinct blow to the already depressed printing and dyeing industries of Persia. The trade in white and grey goods is still British, but in prints we must admit that foreign manufacturers almost divide the market with us. Therefore, our trade will suffer all the reduction in imports of white and grey goods, and may gain only half the increase in imports of the printed and dyed goods displacing them. In this sense the Tariff of 1903 discriminates against British trade.

The printer ("chitsaz") buys from the importer or from the wholesale dealer ("bonekdar") on credit, which will usually run for three or four months with the former and longer with the latter. The process of printing may require two months, and the chitsaz sells his goods to the trader at 1½ to 2 months' credit. Indigo dyeing is a special branch of the trade usually carried on apart; the other colours are hand-blocked by the printer. Some of the

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chitsaz attribute the reduced consumption of these prints to the increased cost of them resulting from the rise in price of raw material and labour, but as the rise in kran prices is general, the real cause of the decline in Persian prints must be attributed to the competition of foreign goods; not precisely the same kind (for attempts have been made to imitate them abroad, and failed), but of other sorts which have taken their place.

59 *Imported Prints.*

The great increase in Russian trade has been in prints, and particularly in red-ground prints.

It seems that these red-ground prints are very widely used in Russia, which enables manufacturers to supply the wants of the export houses in a great variety of designs promptly, and at a minimum cost, from stock.

Azerbaijan.—In Tabriz the decline in British imports is due to competition from Russia. Their red-ground prints, of which 1,200 bales or more may be imported, have driven out the Manchester article. In other classes of prints the Russian competition is also severely felt by importers of Manchester goods.

In heavier goods, however, such as mixture coatings (façonné) trouserings, velvets, plushes, Russia is only beginning to establish a place.

In velvets and plushes, &c., the British manufacturer has to compete with German, and in cotton trouserings with Italian goods, whilst in high-class prints of superior finish, cretonnes, satinettes, Oxfords, French and Austrian goods find a steady market. British firms in Tabriz have to work against the Persian traders dealing through Constantinople, and, despite the intermediate profits to be paid there, Stamboulchis, as they are called, have always maintained a close competition.

Kermanshah and Hamadan.—In Hamadan, Russian prints now appear in large quantities, and these are imported direct either from Resht or from Teheran, where superior facilities are obtainable in the matter of credit. The Russian imports are chiefly in prints of stock pattern, mostly of red-ground, and other dark goods. They now form, perhaps, one-fourth of the total trade. The villagers will pay 16 or 17 shahis per zar for Russian prints of stout material and fast colour in preference to British goods at 15 shahis. The imports from Manchester, through Bagdad, chiefly in the hands of Jewish traders, are losing reputation, as these traders are constantly lowering the quality of their goods, whilst Russian goods are kept steadily at the same quality and price. Russian competition has been much more felt since the Banque d'Escompte commenced to push trade by granting large credits on easy terms in Teheran.

In light prints, red twills (a large trade), indigo-dyed shirtings, muslins, gauzes, and cotton trouserings, &c., the business is still British and British Indian

In Kermanshah, Russian goods have been known for some five years now, but have not yet taken a strong hold on the market. Their goods are of better quality and more expensive than the main lines of British imports, and seem to find a special market. At equal qualities, however, their goods appear to be offered somewhat cheaper, perhaps 1 kran per piece, than British goods.

Imports through Bagdad are mainly in the cheaper grades of Manchester prints, and the local markets, which extend to Burujird and Kurdistan, show no sign of contraction.

At least 80 per cent. of the trade is in the hands of Jewish traders.

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Large quantities of indigo-dyed shirtings are imported from India.

Under the heading of Bleached and Unbleached Tissues, reference is made to the manner in which these Mexicans, plain or indigo dyed, have displaced the home-made kerbaz in these regions.

Karun.—The business in Muhammerah is largely in the hands of small Jew traders, dealing much in odd lots and auctioned goods, which can be placed on the market at low prices.

It may be noticed that previous to the establishment of the Belgian administration of the Customs, these Jewish traders combined in an arrangement with the Sheikh of Muhammerah to compound all duty on their imports for a yearly lump sum of £T1,000.

Persian Gulf.—The Bunder Abbas, Bushire, and, more recently, Ahwaz routes supply Central Persia, Kerman, Yezd, and Khorassan. Perhaps 10 per cent. of the imports of cotton tissues may be in fancy goods, such as tulles, plushes, &c.; the rest are believed to be pretty equally divided between white and grey shirtings and dyed and printed tissues. The import of Russian textiles by their steamers from Odessa to the Persian Gulf has had no appreciable effect on British trade in these regions.

A Russian firm has established agencies in Shiraz and Ispahan. In Shiraz the goods offered by them up to March 1903 did not seem particularly suited to the market, but were offered at very low prices. As the firm deals in assorted bales at an average price, according to the Russian system, a comparison of prices of equal qualities is not possible.

Persian traders purchase largely from British importers in Bushire and consign their goods to partners or correspondents in Shiraz and Ispahan, to compete with the British traders established in these places. The direct dealings of Persian traders with Bombay and Manchester are less important.

Ispahan.—Russian printed and dyed goods have now established a firm footing in Ispahan. The firm alluded to just now is reported to have sold prints to the value of 20,000*l.* in the last 18 months (September 1903), and to have contracts running for delivery of an equal amount. In opening their business they gave an undertaking, along with their first couple of hundred bales sold, to receive back any pieces not found suitable for the market. They have already brought down a large assortment of stuffs, for a certain part of which they have found a sale apparently at remunerative prices, and it is said they intend to bring a large number of sample goods, say half a bale of each kind, to test the market in many different lines. They sell also for delivery in Teheran, where they are not represented. This firm does quite the largest business in Russian goods, such as muslins, prints, and dyed tissues, black Italians, cotton velvets, &c., but not in red-ground prints, which are mostly goods of another Russian firm bought in Teheran, and disposed of on the Ispahan market to the extent of perhaps 1,000 bales yearly.

Still, although Russian competition is distinctly felt, it has not made a serious impression on the British trade in Ispahan. The Ferahan district and Sultanabad still deal largely with Ispahan in British goods, although Russian prints are also much in evidence.

Another competition, perhaps as serious to the Ispahan traders, and certainly more aggravating, is that from Hamadan. Importers by that route are apparently able from time to time to place goods on the Ispahan markets at lower prices than the Ispahan merchant is willing to accept. An instance was cited of a red twill, which was found to arrive in Ispahan 5 or 6 krans dearer than the same

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article was offered there from Hamadan. As the imports by both routes are British goods, the manufacturer may look on this competition with greater equanimity.

Northern Markets.—The competition of Russia in northern markets is more serious. Our sales in Teheran have distinctly decreased, and are now less than ten years ago by a third or more. A gentleman with exceptional experience of this business in Teheran states that seven or eight years ago Russia furnished the Teheran market with perhaps 1,000 bales of red-ground prints (say 30 pieces of 50 yards each to a bale) as against 4,000 (20 pieces to a bale) from Manchester. To-day that position has not only been reversed, but, as the consumption has increased, Russia now sends over 5,000 bales per annum. The average cost of these prints may be 9*s.* 6*d.* per piece of 50 yards, 23 inches wide, c. i. f. Enzeli, or 10*s.* 9*d.* delivered in Teheran. The trade with Khorassan has been still more seriously reduced, and that with Yezd has equally suffered, as a great part of the piece goods taken to Yezd from Bunder Abbas or Ispahan was destined for Khorassan.

This is a somewhat formidable list of markets formerly held by British prints and now encroached upon by foreign manufactures. Yet our imports of these articles have certainly increased by the Bagdad route, and in Ispahan complaint seems rather of closer competition than of actual decrease of trade.

Even in Khorassan our prints have not been altogether driven out of the field, and a few established makes are still imported; that known as Seyd Abdul Khassemi, a six-coloured print, was quoted as a type. In Nishapur and Sabzwar, which are calculated to take nearly Rbls. 300,000 in value of Russian prints annually, the same information was still furnished that British prints of the better class are still in demand.

In Shahrud a leading merchant ventured the opinion that perhaps one-fifth of the trade is still British. This town is on the line of communications with the Caspian at Bundar Gez, and sends Russian prints (red-ground) to Yezd.

Other Coloured Goods.

In dyed tissues, black and coloured linings and Italians, cotton suitings and trouserings, serges, flannelettes, &c., the trade *viâ* the Gulf is in British hands, but statistics are not available to distinguish the values imported. Indigo dyed shirtings are largely used on the Gulf littoral, but are not appreciated inland, where home dyed goods are considered to be of faster colour. French, German, and Austrian goods, for the most part imported through Constantinople and Trebizond, have been already noticed amongst Tabriz imports.

The Customs Tariff of 1903 is, on the whole, favourable to printed goods. Some of the more delicate prints, rolled with a paper wrap on wooden boards, have to pay on the weight of these materials, as no allowance is made, and the goods would be damaged if unwound. In Kermanshah attention was drawn to a few lines of heavier goods, on which duty works out to more than the old 5 per cent. rate—such as a heavy-striped print (Tampush), about 7½ per cent.; a heavily-filled Turkey red twill, 8 per cent.; and a dyed cotton lining, 7 per cent. On the majority of printed and dyed goods, however, duty is somewhat less than the old 5 per cent. *ad valorem*, the average for the whole class working out to about 4¼ per cent. on value.

In every place visited a general comparison was invited as to the qualities of the Russian and British prints competing on the market, and the reply invariably furnished was that the Russian article at equal prices was stouter and more durable, with faster

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colours, and that these qualities were appreciated by the working class.

Russian prints are manufactured of 23 to 25-inch width, the red-ground prints all at 23-inch. It is therefore difficult to compare prices with British imports, and the retail buyer seems to make his choice between articles quoted at the same price per yard, roughly setting off the stouter material and reputed faster colouring of the Russian against the superior width of the British article. If the British manufacturer can reduce his price in direct proportion to width, it would be interesting to see an active importer try conclusions with Russian traders in their own widths.

The Russian prints are largely imported in assorted bales containing a selection of different qualities, colours, and designs suited to the supposed needs of the retail trader. Thus, a manufacturer producing 14 qualities will pack these in fixed proportions into bales. The bale for Persia will consist of 20 pieces of 60 arshines each, or 1,200 arshines of assorted prints at an average value, Moscow, of, say, 12 copecks (less 14 per cent. discount) per arshine. The bale will weigh, say, 4 pouds net, on which the drawback will be at Rbls. 4·87½, Rbls. 19·50, the expenses, Moscow to Tabriz, Rbls. 8, insurance 1 per cent., and Persian duty krs. 27. Specimen invoices of red-ground prints from Moscow to Tabriz and a description of the assortment of bales will be found in Annex I., pp. 88-89.

Opinion is divided as to how this method of assortment will ultimately succeed in Persia. It is, perhaps, an advantage to an inexperienced retail dealer, and may thus help to push new trade. British importers consider it quite unsuited to their business.

Several importers have observed that it is difficult to get Manchester manufacturers to take orders for less than, say, 100 pieces of a particular article, whilst the Russian makers appear to execute orders for small quantities. They do not object to the loss of a small profit, but to the necessity of refusing to oblige a regular customer in respect of an article he is accustomed to have in stock.

Local customs and usages in the textile trade are referred to in another Section of this Report, and a statement of the prices of goods will be found in the list of samples forwarded (pp. 68–69).

21

Cotton Thread, Yarns, and Twist.

Total imports—	£
1901–02	125,764
1902–03	98,919

The import of cotton sewing thread is surprisingly small, and is chiefly *viâ* Trebizond and Tabriz. Tabriz was formerly supplied from Great Britain, two firms alone disposing of some 250 to 300 cases per annum, but the market has now been taken by Germany, whose manufacturers sent out bobbins with 150 yards or less of thread, but of the same size as the British 200-yard bobbins. The Persian consumer did not at first understand the difference in number of yards, though correctly marked, and in any case preferred the smaller price. A British maker is now supplying reels marked at 150 yards, which are finding a market. There is only a small trade by the Gulf routes, the reason assigned in Ispahan being that most of the sewing is done with silk from Resht twisted locally by Jews.

The trade in cotton yarns is almost exclusively British and British Indian, and the imports are chiefly by Gulf ports.

Azerbaijan imports direct *viâ* Trebizond but also receives large quantities from Hamadan. Manchester grey water yarn, Nos. 16 to 24, is re-twisted and dyed for sewing, stocking making,

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&c.; price at Tabriz, krans 28 (10*s.* 2*d.*) per 10 lb. bundle, cash. Bombay grey water yarn, No. 16, used for coarser work such as sewing shoes, bags, &c., and in the carpet looms, as crochet cord, &c.; price at Tabriz, krans 20·50 per 10 lbs. (7*s.* 5½*d.*). Manchester grey water yarns, Nos. 28 to 32, were largely used in the manufacture of Persian cotton tissues, but has of late been displaced for this purpose to some extent by the coarser qualities.

Belgium and Italy have recently supplied similar yarns to Tabriz, which have met with success. Their qualities are good, and they are made up in bundles weighing somewhat heavier than Manchester yarns.

The imports at Bushire and Bunder Abbas, 1895-1902, were, according to Consular Reports—

1895.	1896.	1897.	1898.
£	£	£	£
38,800	52,700	36,000	63,200

Average, £47,700.

1899.	1900.	1901.	1902.
£	£	£	£
67,900	46,100	84,100	82,100

Average, £75,000.

About five-sixths of the shipments are for Bunder Abbas, whence they are forwarded to Kerman, for the carpet wheaving industry and other local weaving; to Yezd, which still produces large quantities of cotton tissues; and also to Khorassan, for the carpet industry and for weaving cotton tissues. The latter industry, however, in Khorassan is reported to be losing ground, as cotton or mixed suitings and trouserings are taking the place of the plain home-made cotton tissues (kerbaz).

In the Yez and Ispahan districts the weaving industry in cotton tissues is very extensive, though it is all house work, on cottage looms, and in articles of certain dimensions, such as kerchiefs, napkins, shawls, scarfs, braids, tapes, cords, &c. Cotton longcloth, or kerbaz, has already been noted.

Yez also produces a thick cotton drugget, "zeloo," much used for carpeting. For all these purposes large quantities of Indian and Manchester twist are employed.

Shuster has a local industry in cotton rugs ("gelims") and in coarse cloth, for which Indian twist is imported.

Prices of yarn in Teheran (November 1903) were:—

Grey, per 10-lb. bundle ... krs. 21 to krs. 32, cash.
White, „ „ ... „ 32 „ 38 „

21

TEXTILES:—GOLD AND SILVER THREAD AND LACE.

These were at one time imported in quantities, but the fashion of embroidering coats and mantles ("abbas") with these materials has almost disappeared in Northern and Central Persia. Formerly high grades of gold and silver thread, up to 900 fine, were in demand, now little but the inferior grades down to half fine are wanted. Imports are all from Bavaria *viâ* Resht and Trebizond, chiefly for the Arab population of the Gulf littoral.

63

TEXTILES:—CASHMERE AND OTHER SHAWLS.

These are imported from India in assorted bales of 25 to 32 pieces of various qualities—say 5 or 6 pieces of superior quality, value, krans 500 per piece upward, and the rest krans 300 to krans 200 per piece.

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TEXTILES:—SILK—RAW, WASTE, COCOONS.

Number in Table of Statistics. 30,56

The silk-worm is now extensively reared in Ghilan and Mazanderan.

The industry in this region is of ancient date, but disease appeared some 30 years ago and almost ruined it. The last ten years have brought renewed prosperity, and the export of cocoons from Resht is to-day a very important trade.

The following figures of the export of cocoons from Resht are taken from the Consular Report (Resht, Annual Series, No. 3,109) for 1902 :—

	Lbs.		Krs.	Krs.		£
1893,	76,160,	value	18 to 19	per Shah man,	fresh =	6,475
1895,	235,760,	,,	14 ,, 15	,,	,, =	15,000
1897,	346,080,	,,	14 ,, 16	,,	,, =	23,550
1899,	1,178,688,	,,	average 22½	,,	,, =	112,350
1900,	1,615,488,	,,	,, 20½	,,	,, =	150,265
1901,	1,112,338,	,,	,, 18	,,	,, =	93,548
1902,	2,365,896,	,,	,, 24	,,	,, =	247,502

The import of silk-worm eggs has risen from a value of 2,200*l.* in 1894 to 36,478*l.* (lbs. 14,566) in 1902-03 ; they are brought from Asia Minor, French eggs not proving a success.

Formerly hand-reeled and waste silk were largely exported to Constantinople and Marseilles ; now the export trade is almost entirely in cocoons to Marseilles and Milan. Steam reeling works have been fitted up recently by a Persian merchant, and are reported to have succeeded, the silk commanding Broussa prices. The foregoing remarks are taken from the Consular Report above referred to, which contains much information on the subject.

The average price for cocoons in 1903 has been krs. 33 per Shah man (13 lbs.), fresh. About 3 mans of fresh cocoons are equal to 1 man, dried. The cost of drying, sorting, cleaning, and packing is canvas bags may amount to about krs. 2 per man.

In consequence of the high prices offered this year it is reported that almost the whole production of cocoons has been exported, amounting to over 23,000 bales, or 1,500,000 kilos.

In addition to the export trade there is a large consumption of reeled and waste silk in the country ; perhaps one-half of the production in ordinary years is forwarded to Tabriz, Kashan, Ispahan, Yezd, Kerman, Meshed, and *viâ* Kermanshah to Bagdad. There is also a considerable manufacture of coarse silk tissues in Ghilan.

The Tabriz merchants formerly took a large share in the Resht export trade, but they are now cut out by the firms working on the spot and exporting *viâ* Batoum, There is still a consumption of Resht silk for carpet weaving, embroideries, &c.

The exports from Kermanshah are chiefly spun silk and waste silk for the Bagdad market, where many silk and mixed tissues, embroideries, &c., are produced.

Ispahan and Sultanabad import silk for the carpet industry ; Kerman for carpets and silk tissues of many sorts, kerchiefs, sashes, cloaks (abbas), and brocades. Kashan has long been famous for its varied silk tissues, from handkerchiefs to velvets, brocades, and carpets.

In the Yezd, Kashan, and Urmiah districts silk is cultivated, but in much smaller quantities than required for local consumption.

Khorassan grows silk, particularly in the neighbourhood of Turbat, but not sufficient for the weaving industries, and much is imported from Resht.

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Number in Table of Statistics. 30,56

Cocoons are worth krs. 30 to krs. 38 per man (of 6·80 lbs.) in Meshed. Five to six-and a-half mans of cocoons will yield one man of spun silk, worth krs 200, and a quarter to one-third of a man of waste silk. The proceeds of sale of this waste silk about covers the cost of spinning.

There are, perhaps, 500 hands employed in spinning in Meshed. The spinners pay a Government tax of krs. 10 per man of silk spun. The product is very inferior, as no care is taken with cocoons, and the discoloured are wound off along with the rest. Afghanistan takes a small quantity of spun silk from Meshed.

In the neighbourhood of Sabzwar the mulberry grows freely, and worms are reared from imported eggs. Cocoons are ready in July. An Armenian firm has this year commenced to buy cocoons for export, and has obtained good white selected cocoons at krs. 45 per Tabriz man. The silk spun locally is very indifferent, white and coloured cocoons being mixed.

China silk is sometimes imported for Shuster and Dizful weavers.

The export duty under the Tariff of 1903 is light, equal to about 1½ per cent. *ad valorem*.

65 TEXTILES :—SILK TISSUES.

Silks, Satins, Velvets, &c.

Import.—The principal market is Tabriz, and the trade is in the hands of Persian merchants dealing through Constantinople, and is often worked in conjunction with the woollen trade.

The goods dealt in are chiefly of French origin; other goods do not appear able to compete with them in quality and finish at equal prices. In British goods, velvets and plushes find a market.

Imports through Kermanshah and Bushire are of much less importance. These goods are mostly ordered in Great Britain, but the origin is less certain.

There is a fair demand for silk goods for ladies' wear and upholstery in the large towns. Teheran is the best market. For prices *see* Sample List, pp. 68—69.

Export.—The silk tissues manufactured in Yezd and Khorassan are exported from the latter to Transcaspia, Afghanistan, and India. A larger trade in similar articles, handkerchiefs, shawls for turbans, and girdles, striped and coloured tissues, &c., exists from Tabriz to Caucasia.

These tissues, woven from inferior silk, may run from krs. 3 to krs. 10 per zar according to quality (1*s.* to 3*s.* 6*d.* per yard).

Import duties under the Tariff of 1903 are somewhat heavier than the old 5 per cent. duty, and may average, say, 7 per cent., but vary greatly. Export duty in Persia is removed, but the import duty in Russia has been raised to the equivalent of over 10 per cent. *ad valorem* on Persian tissues.

55 TEXTILES :—WOOL, RAW.

Import.—From Afghanistan to Khorassan.

Export.—Occasional shipments are made from Bunder Abbas to Bombay, and from Bushire to Great Britain, but it is reported to be an unsatisfactory business. Little wool is sent down from Shiraz, and Bushire exports appear to be derived from the clip of the district. It is bought from the growers in bundles of 100 fleeces, and sorted for export. Price, March 1903, krs. 52 to krs. 53 per Hashem man (1·83*d.* per lb.).

The trade has probably suffered from the drought in recent years in Southern Persia.

The Bushire Consular Reports show that the annual average value of the exports from Bushire and Bunder Abbas for the

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Number in Tables of Statistics. 55

seven years to 1901 was 33,700*l.*, and that for the two years 1900-01 the value was 13,600*l.* For 1902 a further reduction is recorded. The Karun also exports wool. Consular reports give an average for the three years 1895-97 of 11,000*l.* value, and for 1900-02, 11,300*l.*

Much wool is grown in the Kermanshah district, but it is largely absorbed inland for the manufacture of carpets and home textiles, the Ferahan region drawing more and more from this district. The wool is of good quality, and well suited for carpet-making. Customs returns show 4,000 cwts. exported in 1901-02 and 630 cwts. in 1902-03. It is not improbable, however, that a good deal of frontier wool eludes statistical record, and goes to swell the export of Mesopotamia. Price, 1903, krs. 470 per kharwar; previous year, krs. 270 to krs. 300.

The export from all Gulf ports, including Busreh, appears to be often classed as Persian wool, although the great bulk of it is really from Turkish territory.

South Persian wool is of three classes: the fine Arab or Bagdadi wool; the Shuster; and the common Persian wool.

The Shuster—now a distinct breed—is evidently a cross between the Arab and Persian stock, and the wool, although of lower quality, commands (March 1903) the best price, as it enters America (if not manipulated before packing) at the lower scale of duty than Bagdadi.

All Persian wool (including Khorassan), produced in hot wind-swept regions, is naturally dirty and locks, dead, and fallen wool, are constantly passed in along with the fleeces in order to make weight. This causes much trouble in sorting, lowers the class of the wool, and gives rise to considerable complaint. It must be remembered, however, that the wool is not grown by owners of big runs, who might be reasoned with, but is the joint produce of the numerous owners of the village or tribal flocks, each of whom tries to secure an extra kran or two by adding weight to his few fleeces. The practice can, therefore, in existing circumstances, only be remedied by pressure from the principal buying market, and the most efficacious means of bringing such pressure to bear would be found in the exercise by buyers of a rigid discrimination between honest and false packed wool. This would compel the shippers to follow the same line and could not fail eventually to have its due effect upon the growers—to their own ultimate advantage.

Azerbaijan wool is all consumed in home industries It is somewhat stiff and hard in quality for carpet-making. The best comes from the Khoi and Moghan districts; the largest supplies from the Soujbulak district. Khorassan, and even Kerman, wools have been imported to Tabriz for carpet-making.

Meshed is now the only large export market for wool in Persia. All Khorassan and Seistan wool exported goes through Transcaspia, and is recorded in the Customs Statistics as an export to Russia; a large part, however, passes in transit to markets in Germany, Britain, and America.

The price of raw wool in Meshed in 1902 was krans 450 per kharwar (2·9*d.* per lb.); in 1903, krans 750 per kharwar (4·8*d.* per lb.). Nishapur is reported to produce annually some 2,500 bales of 6½ pouds each, price being quoted at krans 700 per kharwar (4½*d.* per lb.), and Sabzwar some 5,000 bales, the price in August 1903 being quoted at krans 850 per Tab. kharwar (5½*d.* per lb.). One large buyer was reported to have run up prices.

All the leading exporters of Khorassan wool make advances in cash some months before delivery. This system is described under another heading.

There are two wool clips in Khorassan; the spring clip is longer and usually whiter and commands a better price than the autumn clip, which is, however, more free from dirt.

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Number in Tables of Statistics. 63,67

TEXTILES.—WOOLLEN TISSUES, PURE AND MIXED.

Imports at Bushire and Bunder Abbas per Bushire Consular Reports—

	£
Average for 3 years, 1895-97 . . .	11,100
And for 3 years, 1899-1901 . . .	21,300

The bulk of these goods are imported from Great Britain and British India, but are probably of wider origin.

Muhammerah imports no woollen goods, except a few blankets or rugs. Kermanshah also has a very limited trade, importing perhaps 5,000*l.* to 6,000*l.*, value annually, in linings, broadcloth, façonné, suitings and trouserings, blankets, &c. Hamadan is supplied chiefly from Tabriz.

Tabriz is the greatest inlet for all woollen goods. Trebizond Consular Reports give imports—

Yearly average for five years :—

	British.	Other Countries.	Total.
	£	£	£
1886-90 .	7,900	74,000	81,900
1891-95 .	16,160	98,380	114,540
1896-1900 .	14,740	115,740	130,480

There is little doubt that the trade has made quite, if not more than, the progress indicated by the Trebizond statistics.

The bulk of the trade is in the hands of the Persian merchants, dealing through partners or agents in Constantinople, who come much more into contact with Continental manufacturers than traders by the Gulf routes.

Broadcloth is a most important line, and comes chiefly from Austria, but also from Britain, Germany and France. The largest demand is for goods of medium and low quality, and shoddy. The trade in broadcloths is still a steady and perhaps increasing line of business, although façonné suitings and trouserings have recently become popular.

These façonné goods, all wool, or cotton and wool, are much appreciated by the middle and even lower classes as suitings and trouserings, and are taking the place of broadcloths, double twills, Thibets, &c. British manufactures have taken a good place in this trade, for which German, Italian, French and Swiss goods all compete. Woollen Italians are being run out by cotton Italians, Bradford double twill by French all-wool goods, and Bradford serges and poplins by cheaper cotton fancies.

Double twills, black Italians, union-leather poplins, alpacas, &c., are often of British manufacture. Merinos, cashmere, imprimés, woollen satins, &c., are more generally of French or Continental origin.

The sale of imitation Astrakhan is of some importance as it is largely used for the manufacture of Persian headgear ("kolah").

Cloth is made up in pieces of 18-inch fold, tilloted; packed usually in cases. Bale goods are wrapped in a half piece of Mexican, which sells along with the bale at half value.

The Tabriz market continues to supply a large part of Persia—Tehran, Hamadan, Ispahan, Yezd, and Khorassan. British imports through Ispahan, especially of suitings, wool or mixed, appear to be gaining ground in Yezd and Khorassan. Also the small trade by the Bunder Abbas and Nushki routes to Khorassan shows signs of developing.

Russian imports are mainly through Resht for the Teheran market.

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Number in Table of Statistics. 63,67

The Tariff of 1903 has doubled the duty on woollen goods, and may be taken to average 11 per cent. *ad valorem* on the general run of goods imported :—

Broadcloths	. .	at about 14 per cent.	*ad valorem.*
Cashmeres	. . .	„ 10 „	„
Italians	. . .	„ 10 „	„
Poplins	. . .	„ 10 „	„
Façonnés	. . .	„ 11 „	„
Half cotton and half wool goods	. .	„ 12 „	„
Alpacas	. . .	„ 5 „	„

Goods folded with paper wraps on boards have to pay duty on the total weight, which in some cases adds largely to the amount charged.

62

TEXTILES :—SHAWLS, KERMAN.

These valuable tissues are woven in Khorassan as well as Kerman, and a merchant in Meshed claims that the Khorassan are better than the Kerman shawls.

He states that Kerman shawls are imported into Meshed, where bales are made up for the Constantinople market usually containing 10 Kerman and 20 Meshed shawls.

The trade is all to Turkey, Caucasia, and Transcaspia. A few are sent to India.

TEXTILES :—OTHER PERSIAN TISSUES.

Other Persian tissues are :—

Rugs ("*gelims*"), made of wool, a stout, very durable material much used in the country as carpeting, and woven in many localities.

Cloaks ("*abbas*") of cotton, wool, camel hair, or even silk, the manufactures of Nain, Yezd, and Bushire being well known.

52

TOBACCO.

Tombac (*Persian*).

This plant (Nicotiana Persica Lindl) is quite a distinct species, and the Persian name ("tombac") is quite different from that used for tobacco ("tetoon"). Shiraz tombac is considered in Persia to be the best, and the crop is largely disposed of inland.

Ispahan tombac, again, is grown for export. The Société de Tombac has a monopoly of the trade with Turkish possessions, subject to an export duty in Persia of 27 shahis per bag (say $7\frac{1}{4}d.$ per cwt.). They take about half the Persian production, and have an agent stationed at Ispahan.

Bushire merchants have exported to Egypt, and more largely to Aden, where it is resold for other markets, and a British firm has been receiving inquiries and orders from America and Brazil. Some difficulty has been occasioned in clearing tombac for Aden, even on a declaration of sale there, on the ground that it may be destined for Turkey. Prices were quoted in Bushire, March 1903 :—

Ispahan tombac,	1st quality,	krs. 7 per Tab. man.
„ „	inferior,	krs. $2\frac{1}{2}$ to $1\frac{1}{2}$ per Tab. man.
Shiraz „	1st quality,	krs. 8 per Tab. man.
„ „	inferior,	krs. 3 per Tab. man.

Shiraz (chiefly Lar), tombac is exported from Lingah to Aden, and from Bunder Abbas to India. It is quoted in Bunder Abbas,

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Number in Table of Statistics. 52

March 1903, at krs. 2·50 per man (9 lbs.). In Bunder Abbas and Lingah a green tombac leaf, grown in Oman, is much smoked. It is stronger than the sun-cured Persian, and was quoted at Bunder Abbas, March 1903, at krs. 30 per man (9 lbs.), the supply being limited.

Tombac is packed for export in cotton (kerbaz), and then sewn in sheepskins, with an outer wrap of gunny. The bales weigh 13 to 16 Tabriz mans net, 15 to 17 mans gross.

Tobacco.

In the province of Kermanshah a small quantity of tobacco is grown; price, krs. 3 to krs. 10 per man according to quality. It is also grown in Urmiah and Soujbulak. Large quantities of pipe tobacco ("nokhteh") are imported into Azerbaijan from Turkey; value, krs. 40 to krs. 60 per man of 10¼ lbs. Tobacco is also grown in Resht, which finds a market inland. Cheap Russian cigarettes, on which there is a drawback of the whole excise paid, are also imported.

35 WATCHES.

There is a small trade in cheap watches of Continental make.

14 WAX, RAW.

A small trade exists in bees-wax from Azerbaijan to Russia.

6 WOOD.

There is a small trade in building timber from India and Zanzibar to the Gulf ports for local needs.

The forests of Mazanderan are leased to a Russian firm. It is reported that all the valuable wood near the coast has been cut down, especially boxwood, of which only small wood now remains, and that the cost of transport to the coast makes this business less profitable than formerly.

IV.—Trade Methods and Conditions in Persia.

There seems to be a very general impression that business in Persia usually entails credit of 20, 30, or even 50 months.

In reality the great majority of transactions are closed in from two to four months, or an average of three months' credit, and much business is done on shorter terms.

Between the importer and the wholesale Persian dealer prices are quoted at long terms, piece-goods often at 18 to 22 months, woollen and silk goods at 45 to 50 months, but according to existing custom these terms are subject to discount at the recognised rate of 12 per cent. per annum. As a rule, a contract note is the only document given—

"Bought *x* goods from A. at the price of *y* krans at *z* months."

Sometimes a clause is inserted that the note shall not be taken up under discount before one or two months, and very occasionally a clause that

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payment shall be made under discount within an agreed number of months. An acknowledgment for the amount due is sometimes asked for after the client has had time to check the weights, quantities, &c., of goods delivered.

The right of the creditor to claim payment under discount appears, therefore, to rest on mercantile usage, but this is an established usage, and it is quite common for an importer to press a debtor for payments to account of a transaction at 23 months credit which has been left uncovered beyond the usual two or three months.

The transaction between the importer and the wholesale Persian trader is really, therefore, an open account, and is generally paid off in instalments.

The wholesale trader ("bonekdar") sells to the inland trader, or to the retail trade, an similar conditions, or may himself deal inland or possess his own shops. The retail trader sells usually for cash, occasionally on book accounts with customers.

Negotiable bills are not made for any of these transactions, and the bankers ("saroff") advance to traders on current account. The retail trade advance goods on credit to peddlers who work the neighbouring districts, often taking produce in exchange for goods.

The inland trader, who forwards his goods by caravan to a correspondent or agent in another town, draws real bills which can be negotiated by the native and foreign bankers. The liability of all parties to these bills is now pretty clearly established on the same basis as similar instruments in Europe. Protest for non-acceptance or non-payment is not usual with inland bills, and the days of grace to be accorded is a varying quantity.

The business morality of a client in Persia is of quite as much importance as his means, there being no code of mercantile law. Indent and consignment business with Persian traders is usually entered on with some circumspection; they appear to make a distinct difference between merchandise delivered and promise to take delivery. The formation of companies is unusual in Persia; the liability of shareholders, and to some extent of partners, is undefined, and care should be exercised to have individual guarantees before dealing with native companies.

Local trade usages are remarked on in the Notes on Commercial Centres in Persia (pp.53-67), where also the chief trade routes are shortly described.

Exchanges.

The unit of money is the kran, a silver coin, which ought to weigh one miskal, or 71·04 grains troy, and contain 900 parts silver and 100 parts copper.

"New" money is the coinage struck by machinery since 1877, "old" money is the coinage hand-struck at numerous provincial mints previous to 1877. Both are legal tender. It has been computed that the new coin in circulation contains on an average $1\frac{3}{4}$ to 2 per cent. less silver than standard, and old money $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. less than standard.

In Tabriz only "new" coin is used, in other parts of Northern Persia new coin is most commonly used, and in Southern Persia "old" coin forms the chief part of the currency.

The coinage consists of—

Nickel	...	1 shahi pieces. 2 shahi ,, (20 shahis=1 kran.)
Silver	...	5 shahi pieces. 10 ,, ,, 1 kran ,, 2 ,, ,, 5 ,, ,,

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The nickel coin is struck for the Persian mint in Belgium, and the 5 kran pieces in Russia. Only a small quantity of the latter have been circulated.

Imperial Bank of Persia notes are legal tender, and issued in denominations of 1 toman, 2 tomans, 3 tomans, 5 tomans, &c. (10 krans = 1 toman).

Gold coin is also struck at the Persian mint in pieces of 1 ashrafi, 2 ashrafies, &c., and are often called gold tomans, but have no legal parity with the silver coinage, and are dealt in at fluctuating rates.

Most of the Persian traders keep their business accounts with native bankers (sarofs) from whom they get advances in current account, and the importers also usually find it convenient to keep accounts with these sarofs.

Teheran is now the central exchange and money market.

The average rates of exchange there for 3 months date—Imperial Bank of Persia—drafts on London have been :—

For 1897 ...	... krans	51·20	... per £ stg.
,, 1898 ...	... ,,	50·85	... ,,
,, 1899 ...	... ,,	52·	... ,,
,, 1900 ...	... ,,	51·10	... ,,
,, 1901 ...	... ,,	52·50	... ,,
,, 1902 ...	... ,,	55·45	... ,,
,, 1903 ...	... ,,	55·70	... ,,

to end November.

The rate of sterling exchange in Tabriz is generally ½ to 1 per cent. below Teheran (*i.e.*, less krans per £); in Resht at par with Teheran to 1 per cent. below Teheran rates ; in Meshed ½ to 1½ per cent. below Teheran; in Ispahan and Yezd ½ to 1 per cent. above Teheran ; in Hamadan, Kermanshah, and Shiraz 1 to 1½ per cent. above Teheran ; and in Bushire 1½ to 2 per cent. above Teheran.

The imports in Southern Persia always exceed the exports, whilst that position is frequently reversed in the northern provinces, especially in the autumn, when produce is moved.

The constant stream of pilgrims to Bagdad, and Kerbela carries large quantities of krans to Bagdad, which are remitted again by bankers to Kermanshah and Bushire for purchase of drafts on London.

Competition.

The British importer finds his most formidable competitor in the Banque d'Escompte de Perse. During the last two years this bank, through its branches at Teheran, Tabriz, and Meshed, has made large imports of Russian merchandise, chiefly on indents from clients.

They keep samples and price lists from which clients can fill their orders. The following transaction in prints, reported at Tabriz, appears to comprise most of the conditions usually arranged.

The client lodged a margin (his own promissory note) with the indent. On arrival of the goods the bank debited him with invoice cost and charges in roubles, plus 2 per cent. commission, and interest ran at 8 per cent. from date of arrival. The client paid 33 per cent. of the amount in krans, for which he was granted a rate of exchange 1 to 1½ per cent. better than the ruling market rate of the day, and received delivery of the goods. The balance was payable within six months at client's option. The client at the same time obtained a three months' option at the same favourable rate of exchange for any payments to account of the balance due in roubles (being thus at liberty during these three months to pay at the current rate of exchange if rates turned in his favour). The option in exchange was probably an exceptional condition, but the bonus of 1 to 1½ per cent. on the market rate of the day was for a time constantly granted to applicants for drafts able to prove that such remittances were in payment of merchandise

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purchased in Russia. The purchaser of a fair consignment (say, 100 bales) could leave the goods with the bank for any period up to six months, paying interest at 6 per cent. only. Latterly the bank is reported to be offering less favourable terms.

Weights and Measures.

Weights and Measures are different for every province, almost for every town.

The principal weights in use are—

16 miskals = 1 seer.

5 seers = 1 kervankeh or abbasi.

8 abbasis = 1 man Tabriz.

1 man Tabriz (or Sakat)	=	640 miskals	= 6·547 lbs. avoir.
1 ,, Shiraz (or 9 abbasi)	=	720 ,,	= 7·366 ,,
1 ,, Bushire (or 9½ abbasi)	=	760 ,,	= 7·775 ,,
1 ,, Kohneh	=	1,000 ,,	= 10·229 ,,
1 ,, Shah	=	1,280 ,,	= 13·095 ,,

100 mans Tabriz = 1 kharwar = 654·766 lbs., or 5·846 cwts.

(The above equivalents in lbs. avoir. are calculated according to the ratio established by the Customs Convention of 1903.)

Other local weights :—

The Bunder-Abbas man, equal to about 9 lbs. (12 mans = 1 cwt.).

The Meshed man, 665 miskals, or about 6·80 lbs.

The Maragha man, of 1,380 miskals, ($2\frac{1}{2}$ = 1 poud), or about 14·12 lbs.

The Shuster man, reputed to be 1,536 miskals, or about 15·45 lbs. ($7\frac{1}{4}$ mans = 1 cwt.

The Hashem man, of 12,160 miskals or about 124 lbs., used in Bushire and Karun.

The Ismailia man, of 120 okes, and for wheat in the Karun, 135 okes, or about $3\frac{1}{2}$ cwts.

The Busreh man, for dates, about $1\frac{1}{4}$ cwts.

The Ram Hormuz man, of approximately 100 lbs.

Russian weights :—

40 funt = 1 poud.

1 poud = 5·5 mans Tabriz = 36·1127 lbs.

Persian measure of length :—

The unit of measure is the zar, divided into $\frac{1}{10}$ths and $\frac{1}{32}$nds.

In Teheran it is 40 inches in the bazaars, and is calculated in peace goods business at 41 to $41\frac{1}{4}$ inches.

In Shiraz it is about 42 inches.

In Tabriz it is used in piece goods business as equal to 113 centimetres, or $44\frac{1}{2}$ inches, or as 19 Tabriz zars equal to 30 Russian arshines, from which 1 zar = 44·2 inches.

In Meshed it is about 41 inches.

The Russian arshine is 28 inches.

Transport.

There are only two routes in Persia over which merchandise is transported by wagon, the Resht-Teheran and Ashkabad-Meshed roads.

The ordinary means of transport are camel, mule, and donkey caravans.

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The donkey is not much used for transport of foreign goods ; it carries too small a load, and is not big enough to keep valuable merchandise clear of water and mud. Iron bars, copper sheets, other metals, and merchandise which can be conveniently split up into small loads are, however, forwarded by donkey. On the Bunder Abbas route it is much used.

The mule caravan is very largely employed, and is everywhere available, except on the great desert tracks from Bunder Abbas, Kerman, and Yezd, to Southern Khorassan and Seistan.

The camel caravan is the best and cheapest form of transport, and competes successfully even against wagon traffic on the Resht, Ashkabad, and Erivan roads. The abominably rough and stony surface of the Bushire-Shiraz route keeps the camel caravans off that track ; they have, however, negotiated the steep gradients of the Ahwaz route, where the surface is better. (*See* Annex C., p. 80, for note as to keep of mules and camels.)

The packing of merchandise destined for inland Persia must be such as will adequately protect the goods against weeks of exposure to burning sun in summer, or rain, snow, and sodden ground in winter. The packages forwarded by mule caravan will have to endure rough handling, through animals falling or colliding with others, or from tired or careless "charvadars" letting packages fall to the ground from the animal's back when unloading nightly.

Packages transported by camel caravan suffer less in this last respect, as the animal kneels to be unloaded. Packages forwarded by wagon get much chafed by the bolt heads and other protections on the rough boards, or by other packages. The wagons are expressly constructed to allow of much play amongst the different parts. It is asserted that packages suffer more from wagon than from pack transport.

All pack animals carry their loads in two packages of approximately equal weight, slung by cords across the pack saddle. No package, therefore, must exceed half the total weight of the load. Bales are less fatiguing to the animal than cases, because they cling closer to the saddle and consequently get less swing on during movement. They are also easier to handle, and are of convenient shape.

The charvadar likes to have a small proportion of packages lighter and heavier than the average to suit the varting strength of his animals, but this is to be considered *only in consignments of a large number* of packages at one time.

Bales for mule transport should weigh from 175 to 200 lbs., and the majority of them should be about 182 lbs., except on the Ahwaz-Ispahan route where the weight should not exceed 165 lbs.

Bales for camel transport should weigh from 250 to 300 lbs., and on the Trebizond-Tabriz route the majority of them should be about 287 lbs. On the Ahwaz-Ispahan route they should not exceed 275 lbs., and cases should average 220 lbs.

Cases should weigh 10 to 15 per cent. less than bales, and an oblong form is preferable. The rate of transport for cases and sundries is always more than that for bales, usually 15 to 20 per cent.

A statement of average rates of cost of transport is given in Annex B. (pp. 77-79).

Very bulky or heavy goods pay exceptional rates, and within moderate limits can be transported by litter ("takhterawan"), slung on two mules harnessed to shafts projecting fore and aft. A safe of modest capacity by a well-known British maker has lain for the last year or two in the middle of the third stage out from Bushire abandoned by a gang of porters who had rashly contracted to transport it to Shiraz. Wagoners on the Resht and Ashkabad roads charge special rates on heavy or bulky packages which cannot be handled by two men.

Packing.

It does not appear probable that the British merchant has anything to learn from the Russian as regards packing of bales or cases. Consignees of Russian goods complain very bitterly of careless and inadequate packing.

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A Russian bale of prints (20 pieces) will have a board at top and bottom, will be corded at each end, and then wrapped in three plies of matting. Sometimes iron hoops are used instead of cords, and two plies of matting and an outer canvas instead of 3 plies of matting; the difference in cost of this superior packing is usually charged to the customer.

The matting, boards, ropes, and canvas of a Moscow bale (of 250 lbs.) weigh 30 to 35 lbs. The packing of bales made up in Erivan is much lighter, and weighs 16 to 18 lbs.

An inner wrapper is not generally used in Russian bales.

The Mexican wrap of the British bale is sold with it at about half value.

V.—Notes on the Chief Commercial Centres—Local Trade Usages—Trade Routes, &c.

Bunder Abbas.

Bunder Abbas is a port of some 6,000 inhabitants. The climate is intensely hot from mid-April to mid-October. There are, however, comparatively cool and pleasant summer resorts in the hills within one or two days' march.

The Customs Returns for 1901-02 and 1902-03 give the following figures as values of imports and exports :—

	1901-02.	1902-03.
	£	£
Imports	377,000	350,000
Exports	90,000	104,000

The British India Mail Steamers outward and inward call weekly, and most of the steamers of other lines call to take or leave cargo.

Landing, Warehousing, &c.

Steamers anchor quite two miles out and discharge to or load from native boats. There is a small pier opposite the Customs house which gives very insufficient shelter for landing cargo.

For freight engaged in Bombay, landing charges are added to freight in bill of lading, but on goods from elsewhere they are charged after arrival. The landing agent's tally clerk signs on board for cargo delivered, and the Customs Storekeeper ("hamal bashi") signs to him on shore. Goods are afterwards cleared at the Customs on delivery order from the landing agent. When claims for shortage or damage arise there is consequently great difficulty in fixing the fault.

There is a tariff for landing, sorting, and warehousing at the Customs, averaging about four annas (4*d*.) each on small bales or cases, and 8 annas (8*d*.) on large.

Robbery and pilfering of goods in the Customs godowns was formerly much complained of; more recently, however, great improvement in this respect is admitted by traders, and the staff is reported to be much better disciplined under Belgian administration. The Customs godowns are commodious, but other tenants have right of access to the enclosures, making it difficult to prevent pilfering.

The Customs farm out the post of hamal bashi for (March 1903) krans 2,500 per mensem. The governor also is reported to have a voice in the nomination, and receives about krans 400 per mensem.

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Insurance of goods from Europe is usually made to land, and often to destination inland. Insurance on exports by native merchants, as a rule, can be made only from the ship, but they seldom insure.

Trade Usages, Credits, &c.

There is little local commerce; the trade is all inland with Kerman, Yezd, Khorassan, Teheran and to a less extent with Lar.

Details of imports and exports are given yearly in Bushire Consular Reports.

There are no European firms established in Bunder Abbas, but the British India Steam Navigation Company and another British firm have agents.

Much of the business is commission and forwarding agency, but there are several Persian and a few Indian merchants who trade on their own account, consigning to partners or agents up country and receiving produce or remittances on India in payment. The bulk of the import trade is on indent to agents in Bombay who purchase there for cash against the bill of lading. Goods often arrive in Bunder Abbas before the bill of lading has been taken up by the agent in Bombay. Very few orders are sent direct to Great Britain, although piece goods and even cotton twist are chiefly British.

Bunder Abbas has no telegraphic communications—a want much felt by traders. The volume of merchandise (chiefly British) passing through this port entitles this matter to some consideration.

Trade Routes.

The principal trade routes inland are—

1, to Kerman by summer or winter route;

2, to Yezd direct, the road passing well to the west of Kerman;

3, to Seistan and Khorassan through Narmeshir, or through Kerman to Khorassan;

4, to Lar.

The Yezd route is the most important, and freight from Bunder Abbas to Teheran by this route often compares favourably with the cost *viâ* Bushire; being camel transport, glass and fragile wares are reported to arrive in better condition.

It is most desirable that attention should be paid to the policing of these routes. Merchants and charvadars state that open robbery, pilfering, and exactions are of common occurrence, and that the road gardians are perhaps the worst offenders.

For cost of transport *see* Annex B. (pp. 77-79).

Caravans avoid the Bunder Abbas region during the height of summer on account of the excessive heat.

LINGAH.

A port with 10,000 to 15,000 inhabitants. The Customs Returns for 1901-02 and 1902-03 give the following figures as values of imports and exports:—

	1901-02.	1902-03.
	£	£
Imports	128,000	74,000
Exports	144,000	148,000

These totals differ very widely from those given in the Bushire Consular Returns. The latter include transit trade.

The British India Steam Navigation Company call weekly outward and inward, and other steamers call occasionally.

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Landing, Warehousing, &c.

The anchorage is quite a mile out, and cargo is landed and embarked as at Bunder Abbas. Cargo in transit can be landed and retained in Customs warehouse for a month or six weeks and re-exported without payment of duty.

Trade Usages, Credits, &c.

There is very little inland business. Imports are chiefly cotton textiles, and grain, fruit, and other provisions for local consumption. There is a small trade with Lar, from which some consignments of tombac are exported to Aden and Turkey. The place is really important as an emporium for the coast towns and fishing fleets on both shores of the Gulf.

Sailing craft from the Pirate Coast and the fishing ground of the lower part of the Gulf can usually make a fair course on the prevailing wind both to and from Lingah. They therefore run in there for stores of all sorts, for which they pay in pearls, shells, and rupees.

The Persian Government did not appear to realise the peculiar position of Lingah in this respect, and the Customs for some time showed a disposition to bring merchandise landed in transit under the operation of its tariff, which would have driven trade elsewhere. Bahrein lies too far up the Gulf to gain much advantage, but there is little doubt that if the British possession of Basidu (Bassidore) had possessed a water-supply and landing and warehousing facilities trade would have been rapidly transferred to it. The Persian Government has, however, apparently reconsidered the matter, and is now disposed to treat the transit trade of Lingah on former lines.

The small business in mother-of-pearl, mussel and oyster shells might be considerably developed if arrangements could be made to carry supplies to the fishing fleets at their stations and receive the shells from the boats, which at present can carry to market only the take of the last few days before running to port.

Pearls all go to India, generally by British India mail steamers.

The Customs formerly charged a ½ per cent. *ad valorem* duty on pearls exported from Lingah, and it now appears likely that they will continue to adhere to this scale.

No telegraphic communication with Lingah exists.

Trade routes.

To Lar, but of little importance.

BUSHIRE.

Population 20,000 to 25,000. The Customs Returns for 1901-02 and 1902-03 give the following figures as values of imports and exports :—

	1901-02.	1902-03.
	£	£
Imports*	795,000	607,000
Exports	366,000	333,000

The British India Mail Service and local service steamers call weekly outward and inward.

Steamers of all other Gulf lines also call.

* Excluding bar silver for the Mint.

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Landing, Warehousing, &c.

Steamers anchor some three miles out, and discharge to or load from open boats. These boats are often overloaded; and the merchandise, insufficiently protected by tarpaulins from spray in rough weather, is frequently damaged.

The Customs (March 1903) signs for cargo to the ship, lands, sorts for examination, and, after clearing, delivers merchandise at the Merchants' go-downs according to a tariff scale (Annex D. pp. 80-81) equal to about kran 1 ($4\frac{1}{4}d.$) each on medium bales (180 lbs.). Double rates are charged on goods transhipped.

The Customs wharf appears to be too cramped to allow of prompt manipulation of cargo. There is another wharf, but not used apparently for Customs work. The Customs warehouse accommodation was inadequate in March 1903 but an extension was being made.

Some improvement was to be desired in efficiency of the native staff, and in office equipment, such as weighing machines, &c., to expedite sorting, clearing, and delivery of merchandise.

The pilfering from goods opened in the Customs House, which used to be so much complained of, has been much reduced under the Belgian administration.

Cases of jettison of outward cargo between shore and steamer have occurred so frequently that the merchandise of Persian subjects can be insured as a rule only from ship.

Trade Usages, Credits, &c.

The local trade of Bushire is not very important. It supplies the Persian littoral south towards Lingah, and north towards Bunder Rig and Behbahan. The bulk of business done is for markets in Shiraz and Ispahan.

The trade with Great Britain is for the most part done through the British firms established in Bushire. Three-quarters of their sales to local customers are in sterling, the purchaser taking risk of exchange, and handing approved sterling bills to the seller at due date, difference of interest for days to run being calculated at 6 per cent. The greater part of the sterling bills is bank paper received from correspondents inland, or bought locally. A part of these transactions arises from indent business for account of Persian customers, and the bill is accompanied by documents sometimes against payment only, more frequently against acceptance, and interest is charged at 6 per cent. from date of payment for the goods in Europe to due date of return remittance.

Sales made in local currency (krans) are usually on credit running from one to three months, tea, sugar, matches, metals, &c., which are quickly realised, being dealt in on shorter terms than cloths, &c., of slow overturn.

The Persian traders in Bushire consign their goods to principals or partners in Shiraz and to correspondents or agents in Ispahan.

Details of imports and exports are given annually in Bushire Consular Returns.

Trade Routes.

The only important route is *vid* Borasjun and Kazeroon to Shiraz. The land route by Ahmadi to Borasjun is little used, as it is considered unsafe on account of raiders from Tangistan.

The charvadar contracts for conveyance of merchandise between Bushire and Shiraz, but takes up or delivers his loads at Shief, and pays boatmen to effect the transport between Bushire and Shief by sea. The want of regulation and control over the boatmen, remarked on in regard to cargo to and from steamers, is equally apparent here, and goods are even more frequently damaged through overloading and inadequate covering.

There is no drinking water at Shief, and charvadars have to work from Khoshab, some 16 miles distant, coming down to Shief to deposit or pick up loads and returning at once.

There are no godowns at Shief, and merchandise is deposited on the open beach to await charvadars or boatmen, often for days, or even weeks.

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In the spring months there is good grazing for transport animals between Bushire and Shiraz, and the caravans then move by short stages to allow the animals time to feed.

The road is so rough and steep that camel caravans do not frequent it.

The distance between Bushire and Shiraz by road is not over 170 miles; Shief to Shiraz may be 150 or 155 miles or 12 stages for merchandise, but the normal term for transport is 25 to 30 days, and in the grazing season 40 to 50 days.

The charvadars endeavour to shut out competition by contracting to carry goods by relays ("do kesh") at minimum rates. That is, they carry a part of the goods a stage or two inland, leave them there, usually on the road-side with or without a guardian, and return for more. When the lot has been collected it is gradually moved up to Shiraz in the same way.

Quicker transport can usually be obtained at higher rates.

The security of travellers and merchandise by this route is not properly safeguarded. The foreign traveller is comparatively safe, but the native travellers are blackmailed by the road guards, and robberies are often committed.

There is an easier but longer route to Shiraz through Firuzabad, but it is not frequented on account of the disturbed state of Tangistan.

The Governor of Bushire proposed (March 1903) to form a company to construct a road from Shief to Dalaki (40 miles) for the conveyance of passengers and goods by wagon to the foot of the kotals, and to establish a regular service of transport animals from that point to Khan-i-Zinian, from whence the road and wagon service would be resumed to Shiraz.

A former director of customs in Bushire had made some progress with a scheme for a landing and lighterage company to undertake the cargo service between shore and steamer, and between Bushire and Shief. A part of the capital needed was subscribed, but the scheme fell through on the death of the promoter.

A Russian official is reported to have been studying recently the question of organising a more efficient transport service for Russian goods from Bushire to Shiraz and Ispahan.

Freight to Gulf ports from Great Britain, after a period of low rates caused by the appearance of a new line of British steamers, has resumed the former average of about 35*s.* per ton weight or measurement, equivalent to about 45*s.* per ton weight on piece goods.

The Russian Steam Navigation and Shipping Company, with a subsidy of about 21,000*l.* per annum for 12 years from 1903 and reimbursement of Suez Canal dues, has effected five trips this year. Freight is now quoted at 20 copecks per poud (or 26*s.* per ton weight). The Ispahan agent of a Russian firm has stated that Russian piece goods by this route arrive in Ispahan at about the same cost as *viâ* Enzeli. Up to the present time this service does not appear to have secured full cargoes in either direction.

Further information as to this steamer line will be found in Annex E., pp. 82-83, in the form of a memorandum by the Vice-Consul at Bushire on Russian steamers to Persian Gulf ports.

MUHAMMERAH.

Population 7,000 to 9,000. The Consular Statistics (including Karun) for 1901 and 1902 give the following figures as values of imports and exports:—

	1901.	1902.
	£	£
Imports (excluding re-exports) .	207,416	122,849
Exports	126,693	146,683

The only important exports from Muhammerah are dates and wheat. The horse trade really belongs to Busreh.

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The import business is in the hands of native traders, and has decreased since Koweit became a regular calling place for the British India steamers.

Cargo for or from Karun ports is transhipped here, and development of trade must be looked for in Ahwaz and Shuster rather than Muhammerah.

Karun ports—Ahwaz and Shuster. The following are Messrs. Lynch Bros'. statistics, per Consular Reports :—

	1901.	1902.
	£	£
Imports . . .	68,929	85,903
Exports . . .	59,193	96,467

Average for three years 1893–97, per Consular Reports :—

	£
Imports . . .	42,400
Exports . . .	30,100

Three-fourths of the merchandise is carried by Messrs. Lynch's river steamer, and a fortnightly service suffices at present.

Goods can be consigned to or from Europe and India on through bill of lading. The trader does not need to have an agent at Muhammerah, as Customs examination is made in Ahwaz or Shuster, where an agent is needed in any case to take charge of goods forwarded to or received from the interior.

The regions of Dizful, Shuster, Bakhtiariland, and the lower plains of the Karun, in which trade should naturally converge on the Karun, may have a population of over 300,000. Chief products, grain and wool.

At Bunder Nasri, goods not taken delivery of at the steamer side are landed at a small charge and warehoused free for one month by Messrs. Lynch.

Cargo for Shuster is transferred from Bunder Nasri by a short tram line to a smaller steamer plying between Ahwaz and Shuster. The tramway concession was granted to a Persian subject by the Persian Government to facilitate trade, and has served to obstruct and monopolise traffic. The charge is krans 3 per ton (1*s.* 1*d.*) either way, the distance being a mile and a quarter, and the working plant can carry 50 to 60 tons a day.

The Ahwaz–Shuster steamer, worked by Messrs. Lynch under arrangement with the Persian Government, runs in connection with the Muhammerah-Ahwaz steamer.

At Shuster no convenience appears to exist for landing or warehousing.

The Shuster trade is worked by Persians in Bombay. These forward goods to correspondents who return produce. The Shuster merchants have the reputation of cautious traders, working well within their means.

Dizful, Shuster, and Ahwaz are connected by telegraph (Persian only) with Bushire through Behbahan.

Trade Routes.

The excellent trade route from Shuster and Dizful to Khoremabad, Burujird, and Sultanabad is absolutely closed on account of the lawless state of the country it traverses.

The postal service has been abandoned.

The Bakhtiari route from Ahwaz and Shuster to Ispahan has received some attention this year, and several traders have stated that consignments by it have arrived in Ispahan at less cost and quicker than by the Bushire-Shiraz route. It traverses a very mountainous country, and packages forwarded should not exceed 165 lbs. in weight for mule transport, or 275 lbs. for camel transport. No regular traffic has hitherto been possible between the fall and melting of the winter snows (say December to March). Tolls are paid by the charvadar (carrier). Loaded animals pay krans 5 per horse or mule, krans 6 per camel, and krans 3 per donkey. Animals without loads half-price.

A Dutch engineer has been despatched by the Persian Government to report on the question of irrigation in the Karun. The development of this region through irrigation works undoubtedly deserves attention.

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There is an immense tract of fertile plain, capable of yielding two crops in the year. Cotton, barley, linseed, millet, sesame, have all been grown on it, and in average years there is a sufficient rainfall to produce an abundant spring crop of wheat, obtained with a minimum expenditure of labour, and without manure.

There is an important water-supply, at present running to waste, to be obtained from the Karun river, which is heavily charged in spring with fertile mud. The remains of former barrages and canals exist; presumably, therefore, the engineering difficulties are not formidable. Greater difficulty might, perhaps, be anticipated in securing remunerative employment for the water made available. The region is inhabited by lawless Arab tribes, who claim, and to some extent use, the land, and they are neither accustomed to labour nor ambitious of change in their condition.

The winter in Ahwaz is cool and pleasant, but the summer, from May to September, is very hot, with a temperature of 101° to 104° in the shade, dry heat.

KERMANSHAH.

The Customs Returns for 1901-02 and 1902-03 give the following figures as values of imports and exports :—

	1901-02.	1902-03.
	£	£
Imports - - -	865,724	885,100
Exports - - -	182,546	155,155

All imports and exports (except Turkish) pass through Busreh and Bagdad. All Gulf steamers touch at Busreh, and cargo for Persia is transhipped there to Bagdad without Customs examination, the bulk of it being on through bills of lading, which include transhipment. The rates charged from Busreh to Bagdad by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company on through cargo are—

35*s.* per 1,000 kilos for loaf sugar.
37*s.* per ton for all other cargo.

Bombay cargo is ton weight; other cargo according to tonnage scale. Local cargo, when space is available, is taken by weight.

The Turkish steamers handle goods less carefully, and there is some doubt as to speedy settlement of claims for damage, shortage, &c. They usually take freight at 4*s.* to 6*s.* less than the Euphrates and Tigris Company.

At times, sailing boats ("serafina") are employed, freight by these averaging 15*s.* to 20*s* per ton, but it is difficult to insure by them, and valuable merchandise is seldom sent.

Freight from Bagdad to Busreh varies from 7*s.* 6*d.* to 22*s.* per ton weight. December to April is the slack season, when rates are low.

There is universal complaint of insufficient steamer transport from Busreh to Bagdad. Goods are often blocked for four or five months. The Euphrates and Tigris Company is allowed to have only two steamers running (they keep a third in reserve), and the Turkish service has been very slow, and seldom has more than two out of four steamers at work. They are, however, preparing (March 1903) to increase their fleet.

Wharfage at Bagdad is very cramped. Goods have to pass the Customs here. Merchandise declared in transit for Persia pays the full import duty of 8 per cent. *ad valorem*, and is entitled to refund of 7 per cent. on production of the transit pass countersigned at station of exit within six months.

Instead of the Turkish duty of 8 per cent. in cash, a payment of 1 per cent., accompanied by a guarantee to pay the other 7 per cent., or to produce the countersigned transit pass in order, is accepted by the Customs from parties who have lodged security. This is a regular business, and guarantees are furnished on reasonable terms, say 10 paras per package.

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Goods declared for transit are warehoused at Bagdad free for 30 days in the Customs, after which dues are—

Per day up to 7 days, 1 raij piastre per day
From 7th to 14th day, 2 „ „
„ 14th to 21st „ 3 „ „
} Per package not exceeding 112 kilos.

Per package not exceeding 224 kilos, double the above rates.
„ exceeding 224 kilos, treble the above rates.

Traders can hire godowns from the Customs at a monthly rent on more moderate terms.

The importers sell to the native merchants trading with Persia, but many native merchants, particularly Jews, deal direct with Manchester.

There are two caravan routes to Kermanshah—*viâ* Khanikin and *viâ* Mendeli. The latter is not used, being considered unsafe.

On the Khanikin route there is a wagon service for passengers as far as Shahraban (58 miles), and a good wagon road could be made to the frontier at moderate expense.

Transport of merchandise is by mule caravan in winter. Rates are usually lower in summer, when camels compete for freight.

On the Persian side, the charvadar's way-bill is checked at a Customs post on the frontier, and the merchandise passes the Customs at Kermanshah.

Previous to the Belgian administration, Customs duty at Kermanshah was nominally 2 per cent., but really 1 to 1½ per cent. *ad valorem*.

The Customs at Sinna are under the Kermanshah administration.

The greater part of the goods cleared at Kermanshah are destined for Hamadan, and transport is usually engaged from Bagdad to Hamadan.

The Kermanshah region grows splendid wheat crops at so low a price as to endure the costly transport to the sea-board at Busreh. It is most regretable that agricultural progress in this region has been hindered by excessive taxation and vexatious regulations.

TABRIZ.

The Customs Returns for 1902-03 give the following figures as values of imports and exports :—

	1902-03.
	£
Imports - - - - -	1,238,331
Exports - - - - -	724,584

Trade through Astara pays Customs duty there, but merchandise through Julfa and Khoi can be examined at Tabriz. A charge of 6 shahis per package is made on exports from Tabriz for "plombage" to the frontier. Exports through Russia must be accompanied by a declaration of origin, and the Customs charge krs. 9 for attesting each declaration.

The *ad valorem* charge of one per cent. on goods in transit through Turkey has been abolished on the Trebizond route since 1873. It is levied, however, at Constantinople on merchandise from Persia landed there for re-exportation. (*See* Annex F, p. 83, extract from letter from Mr. Longworth, Trebizond.)

Trade Usages, Credits, &c.

The Tabriz traders, through their representatives in Constantinople, are much more in contact with Continental manufacturers than traders in other parts of Persia. British cotton goods have not met with much competition from the Continent, but in silks and woollens the large proportion of Continental goods is marked. The Persian trader gets long credit of from four to eight months in Constantinople from Continental manufacturers. These bills are drawn and made payable in Constantinople. Formerly they were drawn on the Tabriz merchant and sent to Tabriz for collection.

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In Tabriz textile goods (British and Continental) are quoted at long usance, broadcloths 40 to 50 months, other goods at 18 to 24 months, but, as in other parts, these are really discount terms. In woollen and silk goods an additional term of three to five months' credit is often stipulated for, the discount in respect of this additional term, if availed of, being calculated on the cash price; for example, a broadcloth sold at krans 20 per zar, 50 months, and three months' delay, would be value less 50 months at 12 per cent, krans 10, and less three months at 12 per cent., krans 9·70 cash (not 53 months at 12 per cent., krans 9·40). Russian goods, however, are generally quoted on short credit terms.

Silk and woollen goods are still quoted in Tabriz in "churuk" money.

Every merchant keeps an account with a banker. Persian bookkeeping does not lend itself to changes of interest on daily balances, consequently when cash was scarce in the bazaars the banker, instead of altering his rate of interest, made a distinction between book transfers and cash payments, charging an agio on the latter. The book transfers were called "churuk."

At various times efforts were made to correct the inconvenience and loss to commerce of the constantly increasing agio on cash payments with the consequent depreciation of book money, but the system continued until foreign banks were established in Tabriz. The difference between churuk and cash was once fixed at 7 per cent., and later another difference of 4 per cent. was added, and still more recently a further difference of 4 per cent., under title of banker's transfers ("havaleh saraf"). At the present time the merchant usually draws on his banker at 10 or 15 days' sight, but the amount is value cash at due date The cash price, for example, of a woollen cloth quoted at krans 20 per zar churuk, would be calculated thus, *viz.*—

Deduction in respect of the 7 per cent. difference -	- churuk krans	20 × 7 ÷ 107 = krans	1·30
Do. do. first 4 per cent.	,, ,,	18·70 × 4 ÷ 104 = krans	·70
Do. do. second 4 per cent.	,, ,,	18 × 4 ÷ 104 = krans	·70
		Cash price, karns	17·30
			20·00

This cumbersome form of quotation is used in Tabriz only by the "Stamboulchis." British and Continental piece goods are often quoted on the basis of "havaleh saraf," or only 4 per cent. discount, and Russian goods in kran prices

A factory for the manufacture of porcelain and crockery was built some years ago by a Persian subject, who anticipated that the saving in freight and breakages would enable him to compete successfully with foreign wares. It is stated that a suitable clay was obtained, but that he failed to produce a satisfactory glaze, and the factory was never completed.

The monopoly of navigation on the lake of Urmiah is held by a Persian subject, but only a few sailing boats ply on it. Schemes have at different times been mooted for a service of small steamers to transport produce.

A concession for exploiting the Hassanof copper mines and other minerals of Karadagh is held by a Russian syndicate, but there was no news in Tabriz up to July 1903, of preparation for work.

Trade Routes.

The route from Trebizond *viâ* Erzeroom and Khoi is used by importers of British and Continental goods, but exporters now send many articles of merchandise in transit through Russia to Batoum, which, no doubt, decreases the quantity of freight available for caravans returning to Trebizond, and may, therefore, affect transport rates in both directions. The caravan must pay keep and profit to its owner for the year, and if it earns no freight in one direction must charge more in the other.

The average rate of freight from Trebizond to Tabriz for the three years, 1891-93, was krans 113 (£T 3·42) per kantar, and for the three years 1900-02, krans 205 (£T 4·36) per kantar, a rise of 80 per cent. in silver, but of only 28 per cent. in gold.

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Freight by this route is generally lower in winter, as camel caravans avoid it in the heat of the summer.

The route from Batoum *viâ* Tiflis, Erivan, and Julfa is available only for Russian imports. From Batoum there is now communication by rail through Tiflis to Erivan.

The general railway system of Russia is also connected with Tiflis and Erivan by the Bakou-Petrovsk line. From Erivan the railway will be carried within two years to Nakhichevan. At present merchandise for Persia is carried by wagon or camel transport to Nakhichevan over a good macadam road, and thence to Julfa by partially metalled road. From Julfa to Tabriz transport is by camel or mule caravan.

The route from Astara *viâ* Ardebil is also employed for Russian imports to Tabriz and other parts of Azerbaijan.

Goods are shipped from Baku or the Volga and Astrakhan to Astara. The caravan track from Astara to Ardebil is said to be the worst in Persia, and only trained horses are used for transport on it. A Persian company has obtained a concession for a road, and is reported to have completed five farsakhs, or one-half of the distance. The Russians are also building a road inland from Astara on their side of the frontier, but it has been carried only two or three miles to Nemin on the frontier.

From Ardebil to Tabriz there is a good caravan track, and transport is by camels and mules.

The route from Tabriz to Teheran is of minor importance to Russian trade, as Kazvin, Zanjan, and Teheran can be reached more readily from Resht. All British and continental goods from Trebizond for the Teheran and other Persian markets pass over this road by camel or mule caravan.

Russia has obtained a concession for a road from the Russian frontier through Tabriz to Kazvin, and engineers have been surveying for some time past. It was reported that the engineers recommend that the road should touch the Aras (Araxes) some miles above Julfa, in order to avoid the difficult defile of the Darreh-Diz.

Freight from Moscow *viâ* Poti to Tabriz comes to about Rbls. 1·70 per poud, and *viâ* Astara to about Rbls. 1·50 per poud. As the cost from Erivan to Tabriz is at present, say, 50 copecks per poud, improved rail and road transport to Tabriz cannot greatly improve the Russian position in that market.

Any economy or quickening of transport between Tabriz and Teheran will benefit the British and Continental imports *viâ* Tabriz for other Persian markets.

CASPIAN PORTS (Enzeli, Lengerood, Meshedi-sar, and Bunder Gez).

The Customs Returns for 1902-03 give the value of imports as £1,336,283 and of exports as £1,156,730.

The Caucas and Mercury Steam Navigation Company run a passenger service and carry the mails from Baku to Astara and Enzeli, bi-weekly in summer and weekly in winter. Numerous cargo boats from Baku and Astrakhan also touch at Astara and Enzeli. One steamer is run by Persian owners, and this boat crosses the bar at Enzeli and discharges and takes in cargo at the Customs wharf. The other steamers all anchor outside the bar and discharge to and load from boats. Cargo by the Caucas and Mercury line is landed at their own wharf and warehouses where the merchadise is inspected by the Customs officers some time after landing.

From Enzeli to Pir-i-Bazaar merchandise is conveyed by boats, and is there transferred to two-wheeled carts for transport to Resht.

The Caucas and Mercury Company also run a weekly service from Baku *viâ* Krasnavodsk to Bunder Gez and Meshedi-sar.

Trade Usages, Credits, &c.

The provinces of Mazanderan and Ghilan are prospering on account of the great increase in rice and silk production.

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The rice trade is largely in the hands of Armenian traders, and exports are all to Russia. The Banque d'Escompte de Perse is reported to have entered into this business, making advances to proprietors against consignments to be sold on commission.

A number of European firms are interested in the silk business, chiefly French, Italian, and Greek traders. The conditions on which business has been run hitherto appear to have been very lax and indefinite. Advances are made to the cultivators four or six months (and recently, in some cases, more than a year) before date of delivery of cocoons, and often to nearly the full value of the quantities contracted for. No condition is imposed as to the quality of the cocoons to be delivered and the price is not fixed till late in the season when a great part of the quantities delivered have already reached Marseilles.

The Banque d'Escompte de Perse is reported to be offering to make advances to cultivators against consignments of cocoons to be sold on commission. The cultivators are becoming better informed as to prices abroad, and several Persian firms are exporting on their own account. The exporters have in consequence had some difficulty in fixing a price this year, and have now formed a syndicate with a view to establishing more satisfactory conditions of business.

Trade Routes.

The Resht-Kazvin road is noticed under Teheran.

The route from Meshedi-sar to Teheran is for caravan traffic only, but merchandise is conveyed more quickly and at less cost than by the Resht route. Teheran and Demavend produce is usually exported *viâ* Meshedi-sar.

The Bunder Gez route carries Russian commerce with Astrabad, Shahrud, and Yezd.

KHORASSAN.

The Customs Returns for 1901-02 and 1902-03 give the following figures as values of imports and exports:—

	1901-02.	1902-03.
	£	£
Imports	439,108	408,216
Exports	329,864	416,706

Customs examiation of merchandise *viâ* Ashkabad, Dushak, and Kariz may be made at Meshed; goods not passing through Meshed are examined at Kuchan or frontier Customs stations.

Merchandise by the Seistan route is examined at Nasratabad.

Trade Usages, Credits, &c.

Meshed is the central market for wool and cotton, but agents are frequently employed to buy cotton in Kuchan, Sabzwar, and Nishapur, and wool in Turbat.

In the wool trade the big buyers all make advances at 12 per cent. interest to the wholesale Persian sellers some two or three months before the clip is ready. These advances secure a sort of option over a given quantity of wool (proportionate to the advance) at the ruling price to be fixed by arbitration when the clip is ready for delivery, the advance to be refunded, plus interest at 12 per cent., if either party declines to accept that price. The price is discussed between buyers and sellers at informal meetings of the trade till arbiters see their way to propose a price acceptable to a sufficient majority. This somewhat loose form of contract, which depends greatly upon trade usage for its efficacy, appears to work fairly well in practice.

The middleman probably buys his wool by the fleece from peasant owners to whom he has in turn made advances, and delivers it to the exporter who sorts and pays for it according to recognised proportions of each grade.

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Cotton is exported as received from the growers, imperfectly ginned and dirty, and has to be cleaned in Russia. Hand-worked machines were tried in Sabzwar, but were found to break the fibre. A Russian firm is setting up a ginning mill near Sabzwar. The plants are grown from local seed; it is alleged that the dry climate requires acclimatised seed. The buyers make advances to the growers, as in the wool trade; sometimes five or six months before delivery. The crop is gathered in by September, but is not delivered, ginned and packed till the end of the year.

Trade Routes.

The route from Ashkabad *viâ* Bajgir and Kuchan to Meshed is now a carriage road, easily traversed by carriages in summer, but very difficult in winter on account of snow on the Ashkabad-Kuchan section. The Kuchan-Meshed section is not metalled, and must be deep in mud in wet weather. Transport of merchandise is by fourgon and camel caravan.

The Post Office mails are carried by a contractor, who also runs a passenger service between Ashkabad and Meshed (two days).

The shorter but much more difficult caravan track between Meshed and Dushak on the Transcaspian Railway is also used for merchandise, but to a less extent.

Direct trade with Seistan and Bunder Abbas usually follows the Kaf Valley route, Herat and Afghan trade branching off at Kariz.

The Seistan route does not offer any advantage to trade between Great Britain and Khorassan, direct freight to Persian Gulf enabling our merchandise to arrive in Meshed more quickly and at less cost *viâ* Bunder Abbas. A great part of the trade with the south passes through Yezd.

ISPAHAN.

Chief products for export:—Opium, cotton, tombac, dried fruits and nuts, gums, skins, madder root, manufactures of copper and brass, procelain, carpets, cotton tissues, block prints.

Trade Usages, Credits, &c.

In the piece goods trade it is a common condition of purchase that a half or two-thirds of the value is payable at option of the purchaser in approved bills on Teheran 49 days' date at par; on such bills a grace of 15 days is accorded in Teheran.

The larger part of the piece goods trade is done by British firms. Usance is the usual 21 or 22 months. Contracts are not expected to be discounted before two months, and are usually paid under discount within three months.

Of the wholesale dealers' purchases one-fourth may go to the retail trade in the town, on credit running, on an average, to four months; the remaining three-fourths, sent out into the surrounding districts, may run for six or eight months.

A good deal of business is done by Persian traders in Ispahan on commission for Persian traders in Shiraz or Bushire who have bought from import houses in Bushire, and who draw from Shiraz on the Ispahan consignee at 25 to 35 days' sight, or get return of funds in produce or sterling drafts.

Little business is done by Persians direct with Great Britain. In merchandise from British India, however, the business is larger, and is done on indent to Persian agents in Bombay.

Trade Routes.

The caravan route from Bushire and Shiraz is most used, but is not safe from highway robbery.

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Pilfering from bales or cases is frequently complained of, and the charvadar disowns liability on the ground that the theft may have been committed between Bushire and Shiraz, before he took over the goods in Shiraz.

The Post Office mails and passengers are now carried as far as Maksudbeg by wagon or carriage. The service is in the hands of the contractor for the Teheran-Ispahan mails, a Persian subject.

Much of the trade with Kazvin and Resht goes through Naizar and Saveh. Dried fruits and cotton are often sent direct to Kazvin and disposed of there to exporters to Russia.

There is some trade with Yezd through Kuhpa, but foreign trade in Yezd generally follows the Bunder Abbas and Shiraz routes.

SHIRAZ.

Chief products for export—Opium, tombac, gum, skins and pelts, dried fruits and nuts, cotton, carpets.

Much of the business in Shiraz is done by Persian merchants dealing with Bombay.

In the piece-goods trade a large amount of business is reported to have been done of late in Bushire directly with the smaller traders, who consign to Shiraz and compete closely there.

Trade Routes.

To Bushire *viâ* Kazeroon.

Through freight is sometimes engaged from Shiraz to Teheran, in which case caravans diverge to the right from the trunk route at Surmeh, and, following nearly parallel tracks, pass to the east of Ispahan near Segzi and strike the Natanz-Kashan road. It is stated by charvadars that this is an easy route for caravan animals, and that, being off the main road, fodder and provisions are cheaper.

Trade with Yezd follows the Ispahan road and strikes off to the right near Dehbid.

HAMADAN.

Population estimated locally at 50,000.

Chief products for export—Leather, opium, skins and pelts, carpets.

The Hamadan tanneries are the best in Persia, and its leather, chiefly goat and sheep skins, is sent all over the country, and exported through Tabriz to Russia.

Gallnuts are obtained from Kurdistan, and a small quantity, but good,—from Luristan. Alum is obtained from Zanjan.

Trade Usages, Credits, &c.

Hamadan, however, is more important as a distributing market in the piece-goods trade, and does as large a business in certain goods as Ispahan. Whites, greys, light prints, and red twills are the chief kinds sold.

A few traders work by indent on Manchester through Bagdad shippers, with whom they lodge a 10 per cent. margin. The shipper claims amount of manufacturer's invoice and charges to Bagdad on arrival of the goods there, and usually has right of sale if the goods are not taken up within 45 days after arrival.

Interest on advances, or commission, is not usually charged on piece-goods, so presumably the shipper's profit ts made in Manchester. On other goods—2 per cent. commission appears to be the common charge.

Most of the Hamadan merchants buy in Bagdad, and quite half of the import trade is worked by the Jewish merchants of Bagdad. It is reported

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that the loss in exchange on capital thus employed in kran currency has not in every case been written off out of profits, and that for this reason capital is now less willingly invested in Hamadan trade.

The united capitals of the Hamadan merchants working the import trade has been estimated at not over 40,000*l*. It is at least evident that they work on fine margins and trust chiefly to large overturns for profit.

There are few native bankers (saroffs) doing a large business in Hamadan and the merchant has no facilities for obtaining advances. Consequently he cannot find means to hold goods on an adverse market, and is often obliged to sell in order to provide funds to take up other goods ordered.

Trade Routes.

Exports all go by the Kermanshah and Bagdad route.

Trade with Teheran follows the old "chappar" (post) route *viâ* Nuveran, but the postal service is by wagon through Sultanabad and Kom.

A Russian concession is held for a road to Kazvin, but no work, beyond surveys, has yet been done on it.

Merchandise to Ardebil, Tabriz, and Azerbaijan is sent by caravan through Zanjan or Bijar.

TEHERAN.

British firms do not import direct to this market.

The principal firms have agencies, but only for banking business, and apparently have hitherto considered that sales made in Teheran would simply curtail business in Ispahan and Tabriz. A Russian institution is now flooding Teheran with goods obtained from Russian manufacturers on the advantageous terms which a big trade and unlimited means command. It may be worth while for the British trader to consider whether his goods can afford even one, though probably in most cases two, intermediate profits before competing with these Russian goods.

Teheran, as capital of Persia, is the residence of the court and the wealthy classes, and consequently is the best market for costly goods and articles of luxury.

Trade Routes.

A Russian Company (in which the Russian Government has a large interest) owns the carriage road through Kazvin to Resht and Enzeli, under concession from the Persian Government. The tolls charged on caravan animals are :—Camels, krs. 5 ; mules, krs. 4 ; donkeys, krs. 2.

The road is now being widened between Kazvin and Kudum to nearly double its former breadth. The last 16 miles from Kudum to Resht was rendered almost impassable for some weeks this autumn (1903) after unusually heavy rains. It has been partially repaired at much expense, but is still difficult for wheeled traffic, and is much too narrow to accommodate the heavy local traffic.

The Company lease the passenger posting service to a contractor, a Russian subject.

The carriage roads to Kom and on from Kom to Sultanabad are concessions held by the Imperial Bank of Persia, and the monopoly of wheeled traffic on them is leased to the Post Office and sublet by them to a contractor, a Persian subject.

The Imperial Bank of Persia also holds concessions for the continuation of the road through Kom and Sultanabad to Khoremabad, Dizful, Shuster and Ahwaz, and from Kom to Ispahan. These enterprises up to the present time have not been entered upon.

The traffic contractor for the Kazvin-Resht road carries the Post Office mails to Resht. The contractor on the Kom road carries the mails over the Kom road to Sultanabad and Hamadan by fourgon. He also holds the Post

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

Office contract for conveyance of mails bi-weekly to Ispahan, Shiraz, Yezd, and Kerman. The Ispahan mails are carried by fourgon, and the Post Office has made advances to the contracter for the purpose, of improving the road, which was formerly only a caravan track from Kom through Kashan and Natanz to Ispahan. It is now quite practicable for wheeled traffic, and there is a regular carriage and fourgon passenger service. The contractor has also established a carriage and fourgon service as far as Maksudbeg on the Shiraz route, the remainder of the journey being by chappar. It is reported that he is preparing to improve the remainder of this route so as to admit of carriage and fourgon services to Shiraz. The fourgon service has also been carried some distance beyond Kashan on the Yezd route.

The road from Teheran to Meshed has been improved at Government expense so far as to permit of regular wheeled traffic. The Government posting establishments (" Chappar Khaneh ") and the transport of bi-weekly mails are leased to a company, who also run a carriage and fourgon passenger service at rates controlled by the Post Office, the journey being accomplished in ten to twelve days.

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VI.—List of Samples.

(Prices quoted are Wholesale Dealers’ (“ Bonekdar ”) prices to Retail Trade.)

Market.	Sample.		Description of Sample.	Inches Wide.	Price per Zar (=42″).	English Cash Equivalent.
			Russian Cotton Tissues.			s. d.
Shiraz	A	—	Black Italian	39	Krs. 2·85 at 6 months	0 11·7
	B	—	,, Trousering	23½	2·20 ,,	0 9·0
	C	—	,, ,,	24½	2·00 ,,	0 8·2
	D	—	,, ,,	24½	2·00 ,,	0 8·2
	E	—	Coloured Italian	25½	1·60 ,,	0 6·5
	F	—	Trouserings (5)	24½ / 25	1·65 ,,	0 6·8
	G	—	Prints (39)	—	·975 ,,	0 4·0
Kermanshah	A	—	Prints (5)	23	Krs. ·775 cash	0 3·4
	B	—	,, (11)	23	·75 ,,	0 3·3
	C	—	,,	23	1·10 ,,	0 4·8
	D	—	Raised twills	21	1·10 ,,	0 4·8
	E	—	Suiting	24	2·15 at 3 months	0 9·0
	F	—	Velvet	19	2·60 ,,	0 11·3
Tabriz	A	—	Prints	23	Samples of Red-ground Prints (Rabeneck) offered on Tabriz market.	
	B	—	,,	23	Samples of Red-ground Prints selling best on Tabriz market.	
	C	—	,,	—	Samples representing different classes of Prints selling best in Tabriz.	

					Manufacturers’ Price per Russian Arshine.	Less Discount.	Selling Price, Tabriz per zar. 44″.	
					cop.	Per cent.	Krs.	
		1	Prints	25	08	16	·60 cash	0 2·6
		2	,,	23	10	16	·75 ,,	0 3·3
		3	,,	24	10½	16	·825 ,,	0 3·6
		4	,,	24	11½	16	·85 ,,	0 3·7
		5	,,	24	12	16	·925 ,,	0 4·0
		6	,,	24	13	16	·95 ,,	0 4·1
		7	,, (indigo block)	22½	16	20	1·25 ,,	0 5·4
	D	—	Flannelettes	21	14	20	1·20 ,,	0 5·2
	E	—	Raised Twills	23	12	Cash	1·30 ,,	0 5·7
	F	1	Suitings, &c.	25	16	20	1·30 ,,	0 5·7
		2	,,	25	19	20	1·90 ,,	0 8·3
		3	,,	25	19½	20	1·95 ,,	0 8·5
		4	,,	20	16	16	1·40 ,,	0 6·1
		5	,,	21	17½	20	1·55 ,,	0 6·7
	G	1	,,	22½	18	16	1·40 ,,	0 6·1
		2	,,	24½	33	16	2·30 ,,	0 10·0
		3	,,	26½	36	16	2·80 ,,	0 12·2
	H	1	Velvets	18½	30	16	2·40 ,,	0 10·5
		2	,,	18	32	16	2·60 ,,	0 11·3
	I	1	T Cloths	23½	09½	Cash	·85 (less 1/17 per cent. havaleh)	0 3·5
		2	,,	25½	10¼	,,	·90 ,,	0 3·7
		3	,,	27½	11	,,	·95 ,,	0 3·9
		4	,,	30½	12	,,	1·0 ,,	0 4·2
			Dutch Cotton Tissues.					
	J	—	T Cloths	30	24 yards per piece at Krs. 29 at 16 months havaleh (1/12).			8 6
	K	1	White Shirtings	33½	40 yards per piece at Krs. 40 at 22 months havaleh.			10 10
		2	,,	32½	40 yards per piece at Krs. 45 cash (stocks low).			16 4
		3	,,	32½	40 yards per piece at Krs. 45 at 22 months havaleh.			12 3
		4	,,	36	40 yards per piece at Krs. 45 at 22 months havaleh.			12 3
			Continental Goods.					
	L	1	Broadcloth, Dresden	56	Krs. 12·50 per zar, cash			4 6·3
		2	,, ,,	56	13·55 ,, ,,			4 11·0
		3	,, ,,	56	13·625 ,, ,,			4 11·5
		4	,, Austrian	56	30·00 at 35 months churuk			6 1·5
	M	1	Suitings, &c.	55	30·00 at 35 to 40 ,, ,,			6 1·5
		2	,,	57	25·00 at 35 ,, ,,			5 1·0
	N	—	Twill	47	11·00 at 50 to 60 ,, ,,			1 4·3
	O	—	Satin Print	22½	6·50 at 30 to 33 ,, ,,			1 5·2
	P	—	Silk and Cotton	21	11·00 at 45 to 50 ,, ,,			1 4·3
	Q	—	Silk	21½	22,00 at 40 to 45 ,, ,,			2 8·5

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

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LIST OF SAMPLES—*continued.*

Market.	Sample.		Description of Sample.	Inches Wide.	Price per Zar.	English Cash Equivalent.
			RUSSIAN PRINTS, &c.			s. d.
Ispahan	A	—	Prints	24	Krs. ·80 cash, per zar (42″)	0 3·5
	B	1	Italians, linings, &c.	22	1·00 ,, ,, ,,	0 4·4
		2	,, ,,	25	2·00 ,, ,, ,,	0 8·7
		3	,, ,,	25	1·05 ,, ,, ,,	0 4·6
		4	,, ,,	25	1·35 ,, ,, ,,	0 5·9
		5	,, ,,	23 to 26	2·00 ,, ,, ,,	0 8·7
		6	Fancies	22 to 25	1·55 ,, ,, ,,	0 6·7
			PERSIAN TISSUES.			
	C	1	Cotton stripes	—	Krs. 1·00 each, cash	0 4·3
		2	,, ,,	—	1·50 ,,	0 6·5
		3	,, ,,	—	3·00 ,,	1 1·0
		4	,, ,,	—	3·50 ,,	1 3·2
Meshed	A	1	Silk	26	5·00 per zar (41″)	1 9·8
			CONTINENTAL GOODS.			
Teheran	A	1	Silk velvet	18	Krs. 6·40 cash, per metre	2 3·9
		2	,, ,,	21	6·00 ,, ,,	2 2·0
		3	,, ,,	20	5·00 ,, per yard	1 9·8
		4	,, brocade	18	5·75 ,, per metre	2 1·0
		5	Silk	20	8·00 ,, ,,	2 10·5
		6	,,	37	16·00 ,, ,,	5 9·8
		7	Silk brocade	18½	5·60 ,, ,,	2 0·4
		8	,, ,,	18	7·50 ,, ,,	2 8·7
		9	,, ,,	20	8·00 ,, ,,	2 10·8
		10	,, ,,	22	14·00 ,, ,,	5 1·0
		11	,, ,,	21	15·00 ,, ,,	5 5·4
		12	,, ,,	21	20·00 ,, ,,	7 3·2
		13	,, ,,	21	18·00 ,, ,,	6 6·5
			RUSSIAN COTTON TISSUES.			
	B	1	Raised twills	24 / 25	Krs. 3·25 cash, per zar (41″)	1 2·2
		2	Suitings, check	27	1·50 ,, ,, ,,	0 6·5
		3	,, ,,	24½	1·40 ,, ,, ,,	0 6·1
		4	,, ,,	26½	1·50 ,, ,, ,,	0 6·5
		5	Italians, black	37	2·00 ,, ,, ,,	0 8·7
		6	Linings	22	1·00 ,, ,, ,,	0 4·3
		7	,,	24	3·00 ,, ,, ,,	1 1·0
		8	,,	27	1·00 ,, ,, ,,	0 4·3
		9	,,	26½	1·25 ,, ,, ,,	0 5·4
		10	Velvet	19	3·50 ,, ,, ,,	1 3·2
		11	Fancies	25½	1·25 ,, ,, ,,	0 5·4
		12	,,	23	·55 ,, ,, ,,	0 2·4
		13	Prints, red ground	23	·75 ,, ,, ,,	0 3·2
		14	,, ,, ,,	23	·80 ,, ,, ,,	0 3·5
		15	,, ,, ,,	23	·85 ,, ,, ,,	0 3·7
		16	Prints	25 / 26	·80 ,, ,, ,,	0 3·5
		17	,,	24 / 25	·75 ,, ,, ,,	0 3·2
		18	,, Indigo	23	1·00 ,, ,, ,,	0 4·3
			RUSSIAN WOOLLEN TISSUES.			
	C	1		53	Krs. 13·00 cash, per zar (41″)	4 8·7
			TEA.			
	L	1 to 3	Russian tea selling retail in Teheran at Krs. 1, Krs. 1·10, and Krs. 1·20 per packet of ¼ pound.			
		4	Indian Pekoe selling wholesale in Teheran at Krs. 20 per Man. Tab., cash.			
		5	Java tea ,, ,, ,,		35 ,, ,,	
		6	,, ,, ,,		38 ,, ,,	
		7	China tea “White” ,, ,,		36 ,, ,,	
		8	Lahijan (Resht tea).			

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ANNEX A.

STATISTICAL TABLES.

(Compiled from Returns of the Persian Customs Administration.)

TABLE NO. I.

STATISTICS FOR YEAR 21ST MARCH 1902 TO 20TH MARCH 1903.

Value of Imports (excluding Bullion and Specie).

No.	Article.	Value of Imports from British Empire.	Russia.	Other Countries.	Total 1902-03.	Total 1901-02.	Principal details of "Other Countries," 1902-03.
		Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.
1	Matches	53,287	569,577	1,026,795	1,649,659	1,378,385	Austria . 675,000 Sweden . 244,000
2	Starch and other non-edible feculæ.	72	804	1,477	2,353	6,460	
3	Animals, living	535,840	544,988	986,027	2,166,855	948,499	Afghanistan . 737,000 Turkey . 249,000
4	Arms and ammunition	74,056	1,040	3,764	78,860	...	
5	Butter and edible fats	202,488	128,157	366,092	696,737	668,603	
6	Wood - building, worked, and sundry.	174,708	532,978	11,616	719,302	685,953	Afghanistan . 333,000
7	Beverages—wines, spirits, beer, lemonade, &c.	93,214	563,675	337,520	994,409	918,230	France . 216,000 Turkey . 68,000 Greece . 34,000
8	Candles, tapers, &c.	55,665	539,493	155,015	750,173	870,265	Belgium . 103,000 Turkey . 37,000
9	Intestines, animal	...	...	1,329	1,329	10,998	
10	Coffee	179,216	335	41,056	220,607	317,073	
11	Cocoa	10	...	4,895	4,905	...	
12	Charcoal	29,597	3,227	4,499	37,323	11,391	Turkey . 29,000 Holland.
13	Coal	...	200	...	200	4,935	
14	Wax, raw	...	144	...	144	240	
15	Ropes, cordage, twine	77,159	100,272	5,808	183,239	203,342	
16	Provisions, alimentary—Cheese, biscuits, sweets, &c.	77,629	126,636	74,532	278,797	292,255	Afghanistan . 27,000 France . 21,000
17	Salt, eggs, vegetables, honey, &c.	44,208	294,964	23,427	362,599	166,239	
18	Drugs and medicines	350,634	254,962	486,708	1,092,304	1,233,365	Germany . 188,000 France . 86,000 Austria . 70,000 Turkey . 65,000
19	Packing material	1,134,910	389,503	105,845	1,630,258	437,519	Afghanistan . 52,000
20	Spices, pepper, cinnamon, &c.	2,830,956	147,204	233,754	3,211,914	2,223,117	Turkey . 41,000 China . 195,000
21	Thread, yarn and twist :— Cotton	4,901,478	72,331	111,213	5,085,022	6,398,035	
	Wool, flax, hemp, silk	20,731	135,406	29,160	185,297	209,766	Germany . 99,000
	Gold and silver thread, imitation.	34,017	23,403	186,359	243,779	435,129	Germany . 158,000 Austria . 20,000
22	Fruits :— Dates	41,693	236	1,136,216	1,178,145	966,047	
	Almonds, pistachios, walnuts.	8,745	4,904	75,165	88,814	48,879	Turkey. Afghanistan.
	Raisins	...	27,285	26,701	53,986	37,085	
	Oranges and citrons	200	92,291	42,617	135,108	84,181	Turkey.
	Others—fresh and dried	16,192	110,202	45,999	181,393	158,807	Turkey.
23	Gums	965	30,044	18,399	49,408	4,830	
24	Grains, &c. :— Wheat	479,978	13,009	107,916	600,903	370,503	Turkey . 105,000
	Rice	2,988,502	486,155	193,861	3,668,518	3,802,911	Afghanistan . 129,000
	Flour	1,632,099	2,137,998	1,290	3,771,387	1,880,708	Turkey . 64,000
	Others—barley, maize, millet, macaroni, &c.	633,854	261,644	99,738	1,015,236	602,811	Turkey . 42,000
25	Clothing and underwear, shoes, hats, &c.	1,221,716	601,897	913,904	2,737,517	2,007,097	Austria . 319,000 France . 178,000 Turkey . 226,000
26	Oils — Petroleum	268	2,704,571	30,333	2,735,172	3,081,542	
	Others—olive, &c.	78,363	56,934	22,033	157,330	95,983	Turkey.
27	Musical instruments	14,543	62,424	20,342	97,309	143,950	
28	Scientific instruments	7,964	64,179	11,942	84,085	68,448	
29	Machines and tools of all sorts.	51,405	459,998	70,077	581,480	970,517	
30	Animal matter :— Silk-worm eggs	...	613,862	1,330,123	1,943,985	1,705,067	
	Raw—not classed	850	157,607	...	158,457	52,543	Turkey.

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Statistics—*Value of Imports—continued.*

No.	Article.	Value of Imports from British Empire.	Value of Imports from Russia.	Value of Imports from Other Countries.	Total 1902-03.	Total 1901-02.	Principal details of "Other Countries," 1902-03.
		Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.
31	Mineral matter, not specially classed.	84,459	379,915	5,807	470,181	133,250	
32	Mercery and hardware	798,080	3,317,292	3,112,872	7,228,244	5,899,967	Austria . 1,765,000 France . 546,000 Germany . 480,000 Turkey . 250,000
33	Metals—						
	Iron and steel	228,163	2,417,723	184,975	2,830,861	3,265,385	Austria . 28,000 France . 63,000 Turkey . 56,000
	Tinned sheets	23,567	58,758	60,329	142,654	82,215	Austria . 13,000 France . 15,000 Turkey . 27,000
	Manufactures of iron and steel.	1,019,385	981,122	67,673	2,068,180	953,829	Turkey . 52,000
	Tin and zinc, in ingots, foil, &c.	198,386	67,903	324,922	591,211	521,983	France . 109,000 Holland . 138,000 Turkey . 75,000
	Copper in bars, sheets, &c.	1,552,210	15,576	496,047	2,063,833	883,799	France . 344,000 Turkey . 119,000
	Manufactures of copper, tin, zinc, &c.	75,607	432,427	197,707	705,741	553,465	Belgium . 113,000
34	Furniture	82,203	381,467	62,103	525,778	929,726	
35	Watches and parts of	25,944	14,511	101,122	141,577	238,909	Switzeland . 32,000 France . 30,000 Austria . 22,000
36	Objects of art and collection.	800	4,950	100	5,850	5,204	
37	Opium	...	1,334	14,345	15,679	170,360	
38	Paper—						
	Writing and envelopes	136,136	388,313	126,822	651,271	735,082	Austria . 106,000
	Cardboard, wall-paper and hangings, &c.	13,109	230,451	67,774	311,334	182,192	Austria . 43,000
39	Perfumery	9,693	177	19,356	29,226	32,993	
40	Skins and leather—						
	Raw hides	19,187	73,454	751,193	843,834	490,639	Afghanistan 406,000 Turkey . 344,000
	Leather of all sorts	47,129	235,210	81,835	364,174	369,637	Turkey . 37,000
	Lambskins, Bagdadi	...	21,854	2,429,972	2,451,826	1,178,706	Afghanistan . 443,000 Turkey . 1,989,000
41	Leather, manufactures of	34,589	96,306	12,096	142,991	42,340	
42	Stones—						
	Precious	...	1,800	...	1,800	123,270	
	Other kinds, worked or not.	510	63,250	1,723	65,483	21,011	
43	Pens, untrimmed	...	2,012	...	2,012	2,607	
44	Fish—fresh or salt	1,945	1,198	31,490	34,633	36,607	
45	Pottery—china, porcelain, &c.	303,595	1,246,047	152,534	1,702,176	1,407,640	China . 63,000
46	Chemical products	27,297	85,188	20,381	132,866	174,661	
47	Typographic and lithographic products.	80,088	21,212	22,601	123,901	79,477	
48	Forage, &c.	...	4,567	432	4,999	805	
49	Resins and bitumen	1,220	3,772	17,443	22,435	17,580	
50	Soap	13,741	201,748	27,089	243,178	241,990	
51	Sugar—						
	Loaf and candy	178,015	51,665,791	8,721,365	60,565,171	52,769,521	France . 8,549,000
	Soft, powdered, syrups	233,766	10,450,057	5,702,076	14,385,899	10,272,181	Austria . 3,251,000 France . 208,000 Germany . 232,000
	Sweets, comfits, &c.	27,677	9,639	3,411	42,727	45,224	
52	Tobacco—						
	Unmanufactured	372	139,259	1,349,865	1,489,496	1,444,673	Turkey . 1,340,000
	Manufactured, cigars, &c.	34,348	358,609	17,096	410,053	247,902	
53	Dyes—						
	Indigo	1,236,662	15,420	73,550	1,325,632	1,765,822	Germany . 72,000
	Others—cochineal, &c.	190,241	158,074	267,527	615,842	416,342	Turkey . 196,000 Germany . 33,000
54	Cotton, raw	4,437	3,030	19,229	26,696	170,183	
55	Wool, raw	320	76,642	2,402,975	2,479,937	1,080,789	Afghanistan 2,401,000
56	Silk, raw	16,832	36,282	750	53,864	54,803	
57	Textiles—raw, others	2,036	100	...	2,136	4,663	
58	Flax and linen tissues	65,068	741,573	17,851	824,492	819,132	
59	Cotton tissues—						
	Bleached and unbleached.	26,005,271	2,385,470	929,005	29,319,746	41,016,427	Germany . 156,000 Holland . 739,000
60	Others—dyed, printed, &c.	36,067,623	24,543,731	3,078,103	63,689,457	75,808,370	Austria . 1,003,000 France . 1,364,000 Switzerland . 171,000 Germany . 127,000 Turkey . 234,000

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Statistics—*Value of Imports—continued.*

No.	Article.	Value of Imports from British Empire.	Russia.	Other Countries.	Total 1902-03.	Total 1901-02.	Principal details of "Other Countries," 1902-03.
		Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.
61	Woollen tissues—Carpets	1,500	15,760	124,209	141,469	88,562	Afghanistan 122,000
62	Shawls, Kerman	...	7,826	...	7,826	...	
63	Other kinds	1,250,761	589,229	6,813,557	8,653,547	15,659,715	Austria 3,088,000; France 2,999,000; Germany 622,000; Switzerland 67,000
64	Silk tissues—Carpets	...	600	...	600	6,000	
65	Other kinds	356,699	180,840	2,942,507	3,480,046	5,586,771	France 2,649,000; Germany 173,000; China 40,000
66	Lace	17,828	34	18,538	36,400	20,329	
67	Tissues not specially classed, and objects made of tissues, not clothing.	1,555,548	497,591	177,861	2,231,000	758,293	Germany 120,000
68	Tea	10,523,641	955,979	2,824,427	14,304,047	13,015,176	China 1,726,000; Holland 1,097,000
69	Vegetables and vegetable substances not classed.	30,825	25,329	226,797	282,951	80,810	Turkey 226,000
70	Glass—Wares of glass	59,807	1,487,706	467,238	2,014,751	3,456,787	Austria 192,000; France 126,000; Germany 110,000
	Window glass	19,009	209,832	221,224	450,065	425,151	Belgium 139,000; Austria 55,000; Turkey 24,000
	Mirrors—framed or unframed.	26,884	231,357	25,710	283,951	207,464	
71	Carriages—Of all sorts	26,446	398,905	1,360	426,711	1,115,036	
	Accessories and wheels	...	80,522	1,765	82,287	...	
	*Total (excluding bullion and specie) Krs.	100,775,871	118,438,263	51,164,891	270,379,025	278,602,453	
	Total at Krs. 55 per £ sterling £	1,832,288	2,153,423	930,271	4,915,982	5,065,499	
	Year 1901-02 £	1,929,674	2,056,000	1,079,825	Total 1901-02. 5,065,499	Total 1900-01.† 3,915,000	

Table No. 2.

Statistics for Year 21st March 1902 to 20th March 1903.

Value of Exports (excluding Bullion and Specie.)

No.	Article.	Value of Exports to British Empire.	Russia.	Other Countries.	Total 1902-03.	Total 1901-02.	Principal details of "Other Countries," 1902-03.
		Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.
3	Animals, living	363,791	1,124,848	593,552	2,082,191	1,257,415	Turkey 584,000
5	Butter and edible fats	101,069	130,429	17,295	248,793	146,756	
6	Wood—building, worked, and sundry.	1,332	182,480	34,108	217,920	146,441	
9	Intestines, animal	6,364	133,546	64,922	204,832	177,052	
12	Charcoal	17,810	215,442	4,159	237,411	234,242	
14	Wax, raw	5,414	230,949	6,694	243,057	224,116	
17	Provisions—salt, eggs, honey, vegetables, &c.	24,374	613,290	32,814	670,478	572,976	
18	Drugs and medicines	134,698	389,991	52,965	577,654	646,687	
20	Spices	14,275	57,504	174,986	247,165	186,562	Turkey 132,000
21	Thread—Cotton yarn and twist	745	162,805	6,075	169,625	281,085	
	Silk	...	174,387	837,744	1,012,131	843,256	Turkey 784,000
	Gold and silver thread	...	260,981	347,460	608,441	...	Turkey 279,000

*See note on next page. † Incomplete.

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Statistics—*Value of Exports—continued.*

No.	Article.	Value of Exports to: British Empire.	Russia.	Other Countries.	Total, 1902-03.	Total, 1901-02.	Principal details of "Other Countries," 1902-03.
		Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.
22	Fruits :—						
	Dates	956,000	131,976	70,649	1,158,625	984,044	Turkey . . 70,000
	Almonds, pistachios, walnuts.	1,791,036	5,950,678	62,389	7,804,103	7,935,121	
	Raisins	607,885	15,295,909	639,854	16,543,648	12,858,959	Turkey . . 639,000
	Oranges and citrons	8,411	283,214	3,518	295,143	220,577	
	Others—fresh or dried	51,396	1,939,563	242,694	2,233,953	3,517,653	Afghanistan . 183,000 Turkey . 59,000
23	Gums	1,883,105	1,065,822	2,232,834	5,181,761	6,123,501	Turkey, for Britain . 2,173,000
24	Grain and seeds :						
	Wheat	3,390	53,638	177,341	234,369	130,990	Turkey, for Britain . 177,000
	Rice	3,655	13,953,471	6,523	13,963,649	14,912,346	
	Other grain, seeds, flours, &c.	211,816	426,434	45,218	683,468	426,569	
25	Clothing and underwear, shoes, hats, &c.	50,209	834,522	268,505	1,153,236	1,004,336	Turkey . . 259,0000
30	Animal matter : —						
	Pearls	5,177,710	89,498	—	5,267,208	5,274,337	
	Raw, not classed	176,119	55,055	36,716	267,890	1,155,922	
32	Mercery and hardware	9,922	426,580	166,669	603,171	334,383	Germany . 36,000 Turkey . 93,000 Afghanistan . 70,000 China . 9,784,000
37	Opium	2,636,725	350,949	12,342,313	15,349,987	17,873,278	Turkey, for China and Britain . 2,541,000
39	Perfumery	198,924	10	22,413	221,347	161,521	
40	Skins : —						
	Lamb skins ("Bagdadi")	—	2,050,149	—	2,050,149	1,084,866	
	Raw, all others	1,169,554	2,999,354	634,697	4,803,605	3,805,907	Turkey . . 611,000
	Leather of all sorts	13,290	2,918,006	141,784	3,073,080	3,072,347	
42	Stones, precious	—	9,585	—	9,585	612,820	
49	Resins and bitumen	—	445,228	2,146	447,374	209,655	
51	Sugar :—						
	Loaf and candy	16,430	489,856	262,067	768,353	389,416	Afghanistan . 258,000 (Russian sugar).
	Soft, powdered, &c.	1,083	39,724	145,750	186,557	170,224	Afghanistan . 149,000
	Sweets, comfits, &c.	990	109,599	5,366	115,955	139,912	
52	Tobacco, unmanufactured.	89,335	197,131	1,137,930	1,424,396	1,417,703	Egypt . . 408,000 Turkey . . 679,000 Italy . . 50,000
53	Dyes :—						
	Henna	20,005	913,582	164,767	1,098,354	914,051	Turkey . . 156,000
	Others	72,123	198,752	82,004	352,879	379,936	Turkey . . 47,000 Afghanistan . 34,000
54	Cotton, raw	814,613	23,498,152	33,190	24,345,955	20,879,096	
55	Wool, raw	312,741	4,081,955	72,008	4,466,704	3,265,220	Turkey, for Britain . 72,000
56	Silk, raw	8,000	1,562,665	12,540,275	14,110,940	8,717,540	France . . 9,123,000 Italy . . 3,309,000 Turkey . . 99,000
60	Tissues of cotton, printed, dyed, &c.	3,850	1,177,814	1,587,094	2,768,758	1,976,282	Afghanistan . 1,279,000 United States 153,000 Turkey . 154,000
61	Tissues of wool :—						
	Carpets	404,407	2,873,001	9,378,670	12,656,078	13,295,612	Egypt . . 780,000 United States. 885,000 Turkey . . 7,695,000
62	"Kerman" shawls	119,236	709,471	865,737	1,694,444	1,784,916	Turkey . . 864,000
63	Other kinds	25,775	179,600	53,975	259,350	326,340	Afghanistan . 36,000
64	Tissues of silk :—						
	Carpets	8,908	111,412	571,527	691,847	575,338	Turkey . . 519,000 United States 49,000
65	All others	416,350	2,210,117	555,158	3,181,634	2,603,049	Turkey . . 449,000
68	Tea	12,845	1,374,443	101,053	1,488,341	1,242,583	Afghanistan . 114,000
69	Vegetables, vegetable substances not classed	133,913	15,039	7,267	156,219	252,657	Afghanistan . 92,000
	Total of other classes, of articles enumerated, all being small amounts.	207,550	683,869	402,851	1,294,270	1,611,638	
	*Total . Krs.	18,307,182	93,382,875	47,236,026	158,926,083	147,356,669	
	Total at Krs. 55 per £ sterling . £	332,858	1,697,870	858,837	2,889,565	2,679,212	
					Total, 1901-02.	Total, 1900-01.	
	Year 1901-02 . £	543,745	1,214,000	921,467	2,679,212	2,606,000	

* *Note.*—Since this report was written the Ministry of Customs and Posts of the Persian Empire has issued Commercial statistics of the foreign trade of Persia. The foregoing tables of imports and exports were compiled from draft returns kindly placed at my disposal by His Excellency the Minister of Customs; and owing to subsequent corrections in these draft returns the

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figures given under a few headings in my tables now differ from the Official Commercial Statistics, but not to any material extent. The differences for the year 1902-03 are trivial; for the year 1901-02 the following differences may be noted:—

In my Table I., Imports—*Clothing* should be increased by Krs. 62,000; *machines, &c.*, by Krs. 257,000; *dyes* should be decreased by Krs. 90,000.

In my Table II., Exports.—*Animals, living*, should be decreased by Krs. 50,000; *gums* by Krs. 50,000; and *sugar, loaf*, by Krs. 126,000.

I have excluded bullion and specie from my tables. The figures given in the Official Commercial Statistics for bullion and specie are:—Imports for the year 1901-02, Krs. 19,384,778, and for the year 1902-03, Krs. 3,031,000, but they appear to me obviously incomplete, being, I should say for 1901-02 about one-half, and for 1902-03 not one-tenth of the actual values imported.

Bullion in the form of bar silver is known to be imported in large quantities to be coined at the Persian mint; imports for other purposes are very small.

I have also excluded exports of *fish* from my tables. The figures given in the Official Commercial Statistics are:—Exports for the year 1901-02, Krs. 3,340,239, and for the year 1902-03, Krs. 30,067,190. These exports are almost entirely from the Caspian, as the value of fish exported from the South of Persia does not exceed Krs. 100,000 annually.

Persian fishing rights on the whole Caspian littoral are leased to a Russian subject for a long period of years at an annual rental of, at present, about 18,000*l*., which seems a very small royalty on such an export as that stated for 1902-03. I believe the value of fish and fish products exported by this concessionaire has not been controlled hitherto by the Persian Customs Administration; moreover, in the Russian Customs Statistics for 1898 the value of fish (fresh, dried, salted, smoked, &c., and roe of fish) imported from Persia in that year is given at Rbls. 960,000 only, and I have not obtained information of a phenomenal growth in this trade in recent years.

The totals of imports and exports in my Tables I and II, after taking into account the differences above noted, will be found to agree with the totals of the sums of all the articles enumerated in the Official Commercial Statistics, but not with the figures given in the Abstract of Imports and Exports prefixed to them. These are not totals of the sums of the articles therein enumerated, nor is any explanation furnished of the differences.

Table No. 3.

(1) Articles Exported to Turkey but apparently not consumed in Turkey.

	Krs.
*Raisins	639,000
†Gums—tragacinth, &c.	2,173,000
†Wheat	177,000
†Opium	2,541,000
†Skins, raw	611,000
†Wool, raw	72,000
Krs.	6,213,000
£	112,900

(2) Articles Exported to Russia, of which part is in transit only.

Intestines	133,000
Wool, raw	4,081,000
Carpets	2,873,000
Krs.	7,087,000
£	128,800

(3) Articles Imported from Turkey apparently not of Turkish Origin.

	Krs.
†Beverages, wines, spirits, lemonades, &c.	68,000
†Candles, tapers, &c.	37,000
†Drugs	65,000
‡Clothing and underwear, shoes, hats, &c.	76,000
† " " "	150,000
†Mercery and hardware	250,000
†Iron and steel	56,000
†Tinned sheets	27,000
†Manufactures of iron and steel	52,000
†Tin and zinc in ingots, &c.	75,000
†Copper in bars, &c.	119,000
†Leather of all sorts	37,000
†Dyes, other than indigo	196,000
‡Cotton tissues, dyed, printed, &c.	234,000
†Glass, window	24,000
Krs.	1,466,000
£	26,600

* Trebizond route, known to be for Germany and Britain.
† Kermanshah route.
‡ Trebizond route.

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

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TABLE NO. 4.

STATISTICS OF THE VALUE OF THE TRADE WITH UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH INDIA FOR THE YEAR 21ST MARCH 1902 TO 20TH MARCH 1903.

Value of Imports.

Article.	Approximate Value of Imports from		Total, 1902-03.	Total, 1901-02.	Remarks.
	United Kingdom.	India.			
	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	
Matches	—	53,000	53,287	—	
Animals, living	—	536,000	535,840	1,660	Probably camels *vid* Seistan.
Butter and edible fats	—	202,000	202,488	14,811	
Wood—building, sawn, &c.	32,000	143,000	174,708	109,252	
Coffee	—	179,000	179,216	282,665	
Drugs	180,000	170,000	350,634	368,708	
Spices	—	2,831,000	2,830,956	1,163,156*	
Packing, empty	—	1,135,000	1,134,910	194,379	
Thread, yarn, and twist	2,645,000	2,255,000	4,901,478	6,282,233	
Grain—					
Wheat	—	480,000	479,978	368,688	Bad harvests in South Persia.
Rice	—	2,988,000	2,988,502	3,118,490	
Others—barley, maize, &c.	—	654,000	653,854	310,270	
Flour	—	1,632,000	1,632,099	328,793	
Clothing	1,172,000	50,000	1,221,716	491,974*	
Mercery and hardware	410,000	388,000	798,080	945,159	
Metals—					
Iron	182,000	46,000	228,163	294,587	
Tin plates	9,000	15,000	23,567	100	
Manufactures of iron, &c.	220,000	800,000	1,019,385	66,774*	Increase largely due to telegraph material.
Tin, zinc, &c.	140,000	58,000	198,386	120,172	
Copper	1,352,000	200,000	1,552,210	629,705*	
Manufactures of copper, tin, Zinc, &c.	35,000	41,000	75,607	23,338	
Paper—					
Writing, &c.	112,000	24,000	136,136	94,161	
Other cardboard, &c.	11,000	2,000	13,109	10,480	
Pottery of all sorts	220,000	83,000	303,395	157,384*	
Sugar—					
Loaf	100,000	78,000	178,015	3,321	
Soft	130,000	103,000	233,766	1,016,913	
Sweets	20,000	8,000	27,677	26,895	
Dyes—					
Indigo	—	1,237,000	1,236,662	1,736,209	
Others	90,000	100,000	190,241	66,564	
Tissues—					
Flax and linen	35,000	30,000	65,068	41,125	
Cotton, bleached and unbleached.	25,005,600	1,090,000	26,005,271	35,472,271	
Cotton, others	34,068,000	2,000,000	36,067,623	37,735,239	
Carpets, wool	1,000	—	1,500	2,000	
Tissues—					
Woollen, all others	551,000	700,000	1,250,761	2,314,019	
Silk, all others	290,000	67,000	356,699	648,075	
Lace	2,000	16,000	17,828	13,000	
Objects, not clothing	1,000,000	555,000	1,555,548	118,376*	
Tea	—	10,524,000	10,523,641	9,922,800	
Minor imports Krs.	714,000	665,000	1,377,667	1,638,259	
Total (excluding Karun) Krs.	68,727,000	32,048,000	100,775,871	106,132,065	
At Krs. 55 to the £	1,249,590	582,698	1,832,288	1,929,674	
Karun Trade, per Consular Report, excluding re-exports £	40,787	56,193	(1902) 96,980	(1901) 183,169	

* It has not been possible to examine closely into these differences, but they probably in some cases arise from a re-arrangement of Customs classification, and in others from Kermanshah imports being assigned to Turkey.

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TABLE No. 5.

STATISTICS OF THE VALUE OF THE TRADE WITH UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH INDIA FOR THE YEAR 21ST MARCH 1902 TO 20TH MARCH 1903.

Value of Exports.

Article.	Approximate Value of Exports to		Total, 1902-03.	Total, 1901-02.
	United Kingdom.	India.		
	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.	Krs.
Animals, living	...	364,000	363,791	228,812
Butter and edible fats	...	101,000	101,069	109,960
Drugs	1,000	134,000	134,698	155,606
Fruits—				
Dates	...	956,000	956,000	571,940
Almonds, &c.	300,000	1,491,000	1,791,036	2,342,049
Raisins	...	608,000	607,885	455,645
Oranges and citrons	...	8,000	8,411	1,828
Others, fresh or dried	...	51,000	51,396	156,103
Gums	1,255,000	628,000	1,883,105	2,330,448
Grain—				
Wheat	3,000	...	3,390	1,398
Rice	2,000	2,000	3,655	4,322
Others—grains, flour, &c.	46,000	166,000	211,816	249,055
Animal matter, raw—				
Pearls	...	5,178,000	5,177,710	5,274,337
Other	123,000	53,000	176,119	991,115
Opium	2,482,000	175,000	2,656,725	8,340,670
Perfumes	30,000	169,000	198,924	126,314
Skins, raw	5,000	1,165,000	1,169,554	712,357
Tobacco, unmanufactured	...	89,000	89,335	349,099
Textiles—				
Cotton, raw	...	815,000	814,613	455,184
Wool, raw	58,000	255,000	312,741	328,437
Carpets, wool	104,000	300,000	404,407	5,437,090
Shawls, Kerman	...	119,000	119,236	147,072
Carpets, silk	1,000	8,000	8,908	2,300
Silk, all other tissues	...	416,000	416,359	68,117
Vegetable substances not classed	...	134,000	133,913	198,451
Minor exports	176,000	336,000	512,386	868,602
Total (excluding Karun) Krs.	4,586,000	13,721,000	18,307,182	29,906,011
At Krs. 55 to the £ sterling	83,383	249,475	332,858	543,745
Karun trade per Consular Reports £	34,879	63,472	(1902) 98,351	(1901) 103,389

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ANNEX B.

COST OF TRANSPORT.

Route.	Means of Transport.	Approximate Distance in Miles.	Bale Goods. Rate of Transport (Local Usage).	Bale Goods. Equivalent rate. Per Kharwar (650 lbs.).	Per ton (2,240 lbs.).	Per Ton per Mile.	Merchandise delivered in Days.
				Krs.	£ stg.	Pence.	
Ahwaz to Ispahan	Mule / Donkey	277	Krs. 4 per Shuster man of 15·45 lbs. Krs. 3·75 per Shuster man in 1903.	167	10·54	9·12	26
Ahwaz tram	—	1¼	Krs. 3 per ton	—	·05	—	—
Ardebil-Hamadan	Camel, mule.	—	Krs. 150 per Kharwar Tabriz	150	—	—	20
Ashkabad-Meshed	Wagon or camel.	160	Krs. 90 per Kharwar Tabriz; krs. 80 to krs. 100 per Kharwar Tabriz—in winter krs. 140.	90	5·63	8·40	12
Astara-Tabriz	Horse to Ardebil, camel from Ardebil.	200	Krs. 45 per load of 450 lbs.	65	4·04	4·80	15
Astara-Nijni	—	—	Copecks 20 per poud on dried fruits.	—	1·32	—	—
Bagdad-Hamadan	Mule, camel.	—	Krs. 120 per load of 70 mans Tabriz; krs. 90 to krs. 160 per load of 70 mans Tabriz.	170	10·58	8·00	25
Bagdad-Kermanshah, *vid* Khanikin.	Mule; camel May to September.	220	Krs. 82 per load of 450 lbs.; 1902-03 krs. 70 to krs. 90 per load.	117	7·42	9·29	15 to 20
Bagdad-Busreh	—	—	12*s.* per ton weight; 10*s.* winter, 20*s.* summer. Gum trag, 14*s.* 6*d.* per 20 cwts. Wool, 1*s.* 6*d.* per bale of, say, 350 lbs., 9*s.* 8*d.* per 20 cwts. Skins, 14*s.* 6*d.* per 20 cwts.	—	1·60	—	7
Batoum-Constantinople	Steamer	—	. . . . .	—	1·40	—	7
Batoum-London	Steamer	—	. . . . .	—	1·95	—	25
Batoum-Tabriz	Rail, wagon	—	Tea, Rs. 1·45 to Rs. 1·60 per poud.	—	—	—	—
Bombay-Persian Gulf	Steamer	—	Rs. 10 per 40 cubic feet of, say, 15 cwts. Spices and general cargo, Rs. 10 per 20 cwts. (13*s.*) Tea, Rs. 10 per 40 cubic feet of, say, 8 cwts. (2*l.* 6*s.* per 20 cwts.).	—	—	·89	—
Bunder Abbas-Kerman	Camel or donkey.	300	Krs. 190 per Kharwar Tabriz; 1902, krs. 190 to krs. 200. (Consular Reports, 1901, krs. 82 to krs. 164).	190	11·90	9·50	30
Bunder Abbas-Birjand	Camel or donkey	600	Consular Report, 7*s.* 4*d.* per man of 80 lbs.	—	—	—	25
Bunder Abbas-Meshed	Camel or donkey.	970	Krs. 410 per Kharwar Tabriz; krs. 380 to krs. 430.	410	10·26	—	—
			Cosular Reports, 1902, krs. 345.	—	25·69	6·36	110
Bunder Abbas-Yezd	Camel or donkey.	520	Krs. 430 per Kharwar Shah; 1902, from krs. 415 to krs. 450.	215	—	—	80
Bunder Gez-Shahrud	Mule	85	Krs. 18 per load of 6 pouds	54	13·38	6·17	45
Bushire-Shiraz	Mule, donkey.	160	Krs. 101 per Kharwar Shiraz; 1901-02, lowest, krs. 75; highest, krs. 150.	90	1·00	—	40
Busreh-Bagdad	Steamer	—	37*s.* per 40 cubic feet on London cargo. General London cargo (spices, &c.), 37*s.* per 20 cwts. On all Bombay and local cargo, 40*s.* per 20 cwts. (sugar, by Serafina, say, 15*s.* per 20 cwts.).	—	5·57	8·36	25 to 30 (in grazing season 50).
				—	2·46	—	40 (owing to delay in Busreh).
				—	2·0	—	—
Calcutta-Batoum	Steamer	—	Rs. 28 per ton of 50 cubic feet	—	—	—	—
Constantinople-Batoum	Steamer	—	. . . . .	—	1·30	—	7

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COST OF TRANSPORT—*continued*.

Route.	Means of Transport.	Approximate Distance in Miles.	Bale Goods. Rate of Transport (Local Usage).	Equivalent Rate. Per Kharwar (650 lbs.).	Per Ton (2,240 lbs.)	Per Ton per Mile.	Merchandise delivered in Days.
				Krs.	£ stg.	Pence.	
Constantinople-Trebizond	Steamer	—	. . . .	—	1·25	—	6
Enzeli-Resht . . .	—	—	Krs. 3 per load of 70 mans Tabriz.	—	—	—	—
Erivan-Batoum . .	Rail	—	Copecks 65 per poud on carpets. Dried fruits, 40 copecks.	—	4·30	—	7
Erivan-Julfa . .	Wagon, camel.	130	Copecks 25 per poud . .	—	1·65	3·04	10
Hamadan-Bagdad .	Mule; camel in summer.	320	Krs. 40 per 70 mans Tabriz; krs. 25 to krs. 50.	57	3·55	2·60	25
Hamadan-Ardebil .	Mule	340	Krs. 100 per Kharwar Tabriz	100	6·04	4·24	20
Hamadan-Resht .	Mule, camel.	280	„ „ „ „	100	6·04	5·18	12
Hamadan-Teheran . .	Mule; camel.	190	„ „ „ „	100	6·04	7·63	12
Hong Hong-Batoum .	Steamer	—	45*s.* per ton measure . .	—	—	—	—
Ispahan-Teheran . .	Mule, camel.	280	Krs. 115 per Kharwar Tabriz	115	7·16	5·37	15
Ispahan-Yezd . .	Mule, camel.	150	. . . .	—	—	—	—
Julfa-Erivan . .	Wagon or camel.	130	Copecks 20 per poud (raisins, 15 copecks); copecks 18 to copecks 25 per poud.	—	1·32	2·40	10
Julfa-Tabriz . . .	Camel or mule.	80	Krs. 20 per load of 14 pouds; krs. 10 to krs. 25 per load.	26	1·60	4·85	8
Kazvin-Resht . .	Wagon, camel.	—	Krs. 30 per Kharwar Tabriz	—	—	—	—
Kermanshah-Bagdad .	Mule; camel in summer	220	Krs. 35 per load of 70 mans Tabriz; krs. 30 to krs. 40.	50	3·11	3·40	20
Kermanshah-Hamadan .	Mule; camel in summer.	100	Krs. 30 per 70 mans Tabriz; krs. 25 to krs. 35 per load.	43	2·67	6·40	8
London-Trebizond .	Steamer	—	1*l.* 19*s.* per ton weight on piece goods.	—	1·95	—	25
Manchester-Bagdad .	Steamer.	—	72*s.* per 40 cubic feet of, say, 15 cwts. General cargo, 64*s.* 6*d.* per 20 cwts.	—	4·80	—	75 delay at Busreh.
Manchester-Persian Gulf .	Steamer	—	35*s.* per 40 cubic feet of. say, 15 cwts. Recently, 25*s.* per ton.	—	2·325	—	35
Meshed-Ashkabad .	Camel, wagon.	160	Krs. 65 per Kharwar Tabriz; krs. 60 to krs. 70.	65	4·05	6·0	12
Meshedi-sar-Teheran .	—	160	To Barfrush, krs. 3 per load of 55 mans Tabriz. Barfrush to Tehran, krs. 120 per Kharwar Tabriz. Krs. 100 to krs. 160.	—	—	—	10
Moscow-Ashkabad . .	Rail, steamer	—	*Vid* Petrovsk, Rbls. 1·28 per poud.	—	8·46	—	35
	Railway, steamer, and river steamer.	—	*Vid* Nijnf, Rbls. ·85 per poud during Volga season.	—	5·62	—	60
Moscow-Erivan . .	Rail	—	*Vid* Belazara, Rbls. 1·48 per poud.	—	8·60	—	—
Moscow-Astara . .	Rail, steamer	—	*Vid* Poti, Rbls. 1·17 per poud	—	7·75	—	—
	Rail, steamer	—	To Bakou *vid* Belazara, Rbls. 1·27 per poud.	—	—		25 by rail.
			To Bakou *vid* Nijni, Rbls. ·702 per poud.				
			To Bakou *vid* Yaroslav, Rbls. ·622 per poud.	—	—	—	40 by Volga.
Moscow-Resht Enzeli	—	—	In summer 75 copecks per poud	—	—	—	—
			In winter 115 copecks per poud.				
			Spring and autumn 90 copecks per poud.				
			Average 90 copecks per poud.	—	5·95	—	—
Muhammerah-Ahwaz .	Steamer	—	13*s.* 6*d.* per ton weight or measure, including transhipment.	—	·90	—	2 (steamers fortnightly).
			Sugar, 10*s.* 6*d.* per ton weight.				
			Local, krs. 30 to krs. 40 per ton weight.				
Odessa-Persian Gulf .	Steamer	—	Copecks 25 per poud; copecks 29 to copecks 30.	—	1·65	—	30 (quarterly).

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COST OF TRANSPORT—*contd.*

Route.	Means of Transport.	Approximate Distance in Miles.	Bale Goods. Rate of Transport (Local Usage).	Equivalent Rate. Per Kharwar (650 lbs.)	Per Ton (2,240 lbs.)	Per Ton per mile.	Merchandise delivered in Days.
				Krs.	£ stg.	Pence.	
Persian Gulf—Bombay	Steamer	—	Rs. 10 per ton weight or measure.	—	·90	—	12
Persian Gulf London, Manchester	Steamer	—	25s. per ton weight or measure Gum Trag, 25s. per 40 cubic feet.	—	2·00	—	—
			Wool, 25s. pur 40 cubic feet	—	2·50	—	—
			Skins, 25s. per 40 cubic feet.	—	2·50	—	—
			Opium per case, 1l. 5s.				
			Carpets, 25s. per 40 cubic feet.	—	4·00	—	—
Quetta—Meshed	Camel	1,050	Krs. 350 per Kharwar Tabriz: 1902-03, krs. 340 to krs. 360. Consular Report, 1902, krs. 270.	350	21·90	4·99	150
Quetta—Birjand	Camel	773	10s. per maund of 80 lbs., per. Consular Report, 1902.	—	14·00	4·35	—
Resht—Hamadan	Mule	280	Krs. 140 per Kharwar Tabriz, krs. 125 to krs. 150.	140	8·70	7·45	15
Resht—Ispahan	Camel, mule.	430	Krs. 3·25 per Shah man; krs. 3 to krs. 3½ per Shah man.	162	10·00	5·63	25
Resht-Enzeli—Teheran	Camel, mule, wagon.	200	Krs. 120 per Kharwar Tab.; krs. 100 to krs. 140 Kharwar Tab. (Consular Reports, 1902, 8l. 0s. by wagon, and 8l. 12s. by camels; sugar 7l 10s. wagon 7l. 10s. camels per ton).	120	7·50	9·00	15 to 20
Shiraz—Ispahan	—	310	Krs. 96 per Kharwar Shiraz; 1901-2, lowest krs. 70, highest krs. 130.	85	5·30	4·10	20
Tabriz—Astara	Horse; camel to Ardebil.	200	Krs. 40 per load of, say, 450 lbs.; krs. 30 to krs. 45.	58	3·60	4·35	15
Tabriz—Batoum	Camel and rail.	—	Krs. 110 per load of 480 lbs.; krs. 100 to krs. 120 in 1902.	—	9·33	—	25
Tabriz—Julfa	Camel, mule.	80	Krs. 18 per load of 14 pouds; krs. 15 to krs. 25.	24	1·49	4·45	8
Tabriz—Teheran	Camel, mule.	360	Krs. 3·05 per Shah man; 1902-3, lowest, krs. 2·10, highest, krs. 3·50.	152	9·50	6·30	20 to 25
Tabriz—Trebizon	Camel, mule.	500	Krs. 102 per load of 480 lbs.; 1902-3, krs. 80 to krs. 150 per load. Average 1898—1903, krs. 100.	138	8·60	4·12	50
Teheran—Ispahan	—	280	Krs. 1·25 per Shah man.	63	3·92	3·35	15 to 20
Teheran—Meshed	Camel, mule.	560	Krs. 225 per Kharwar Tabriz; krs. 220 to 250 per Meshed Kharwar.	225	14·00	6·00	35 to 40
Teheran—Resht	Camel, mule, wagon.	200	Krs. 75 per Kharwar Tabriz	75	4·65	5·60	15
Teheran—Tabriz	Camel, mule.	360	Krs. 152 per Kharwar Tabriz	152	9·50	6·30	20 to 25
Trebizond—Constantinople.	Steamer.	—	. . . . .	—	1·25	—	6
Trebizond—London	Steamer.	—	. . . . .	—	1·95	—	25
Trebizond—Tabriz	Camel, mule.	500	Krs. 195 per Kantar of 230 kilos; 1901-03, lowest, krs 136, highest, krs. 288 Average last 6 years, krs. 190.	252	15·70	7·55	50
Yezd—Meshed	Camel, mule.	500 say	Krs. 170 per Kharwar Tabriz; krs. 160 to krs. 180.	170	10·60	5.10	50
			Mules, krs. 250 per Khrawar Tabriz.	—	—	—	30

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ANNEX C.

KEEP OF MULES AND CAMELS.

The mule caravan nearly always includes a proportion of horses, usually one horse as leader to the string of five animals. The horse carries a lightly heavier load than the mule, but is more expensive to keep, and does not last so long in work.

The keep of a mule in work is about three mans straw and 1½ mans (10 lbs.) barley per day. This, on the Bushire-Shiraz route, may cost krs. 1·50 per day; on the Kermanshah road, krs. 1 per day.

During the spring months, when grazing is abundant, no barley is given. Grazing lasts for about three months on the Bushire-Shiraz route, and during that time the cost of keep will not exceed krs. ·50 per day. The aftermath of the harvest fields provides partial grazing for some time longer, but the barley ration has to be given. On the Kermanshah route grazing has to be purchased, generally about krs. 1 per day for six animals. On this route the charvadar is accustomed to give his animals a complete rest for 25 to 35 days during the grazing season.

The cost of forage at caravanserais is always above the wholesale price in the neighbourhood by at least 20 to 30 per cent. Most of the charvadars keep accounts with the lessees of these caravanserais at a high rate of interest.

The mule driver attends to five animals on the average. On the Kermanshah route his wages are krs. 10 to krs. 15 per month and his food, which must be good and sufficient, consisting of bread, sour curds, (mast), cheese, and one ration of meat a day. On the Bushire route similar terms are given, and wages and keep are estimated at krs. 70 to krs. 80 per month.

The mule matures for work earlier than the horse, and will last in caravan work at least 10 years, and, with good treatment, up to nearly double that time.

The camel driver tends seven camels, and his average wage is krs. 25 per month and keep, in all krs. 50 to krs. 60 per month. So long as there is grazing, camels do not need other food. A good animal will last for 15 years in regular work, but the camel is peculiarly subject to sickness and accident.

ANNEX D.

BUSHIRE—TARIFF OF LANDING CHARGES.

	Krs.
Piece goods in bales :—	
Each bale containing 200 pieces	4·00
„ „ 150 pieces	3·00
„ „ 25 pieces Mexicans or 100 pieces white shirtings	2·00
Medium bales containing from 20 to 50 pieces cloth of all kinds, weight being almost half that of large bales	1·00
Small ordinary bale (each already prepared for half mule load)	0·50
Yarns in bales :—	
40 packet bales, weight 40 maunds	1·60
30 „ „ „ 30 „	1·20
20 „ „ „ 20 „	0·80
Empty bags in bundles :—	
Canvas (Chathani), per bundle	2·00
Mat bags	2·00
Empty gunnies	2·00
Coir ropes	2·00
Paper in bales :—	
Large	1·60
Small	0·80

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	Krs.
Athari in mats and bales :—	
Large	1·60
Small	0·80
Lemon, in mats	2·00
Athari, in mats	0·60
Athari, rice, adave, potatoes, sugar, which are in bags and do not weigh more than 30 maunds	0·40
Indigo :—	
In cases, large	1·60
„ small	0·80
In bags	0·60
Loaf sugar, tea, tin plates, &c., per case	0·40
Glassware, chinaware, small	0·70
Matches :—	
Large	1·60
Small	0·80
Kerosine oil, per case	0·30
Wines and spirits :—	
Per case of 12 bottles	1·00
„ 30 „ upwards	2·00
Candles :—	
Per case	0·20
Large cases	1·60
Sundry goods, in cases, *viz.*, presents, toys, &c., which do not weigh more than 10 maunds	0·50
Brass sheets :—	
In large cases	1·60
In small cases	0·80
Copper and brass in sheets, per sheet, large and small	0·30
Lead, per bar	0·30
Silver, per bar	0·80
Skins :—	
Cow, per bundle of one coorooche	2·50
Goat, „ „	1·60
Camel, each piece	0·20
Charcoal :—	
In double bags	0·80
In single bags	0·40
Iron nails, each bundle	0·60
Goods in casks and kegs :—	
No. 1 size	1·50
„ 2 „	0·75
„ 3 „	0·50
Iron :—	
½ cwt.	0·20
1 „	0·40
Camphor, in cases	0·80
Medicines :—	
Large cases	1·60
Small cases	0·80
Planks :—	
1-inch piece	0·20
2 „ „	0·40
2½ „ „	0·50
3 „ „	0·60

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ANNEX E.

MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY MR. VICE-CONSUL SEQUEIRA, BUSHIRE (DATED OCTOBER 1903).

The amount of annual subvention granted by the Russian Government to the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company is 21,000*l.*, besides the re-imbursement of the dues paid for passage through the Suez Canal. These concessions are granted in consideration of the Company maintaining a regular steam service between Odessa and the Persian Gulf ports and Busreh. These concessions are for a period of 12 years beginning in 1903, but the Imperial Order granting them does not specify the number of sailings in a year which the Company is to perform to maintain a regular service. So the exact meaning of regular service appears to have been left for determination by the Company according to the amount of cargo they might be able to secure to feed their steamers running to the Gulf.

To judge from the arrivals* at Bushire since January last it seems that the number of sailings from Odessa will not be more than four or five annually, for the present.

I have not been able to find out what the rate of freight from Odessa to Gulf ports was at the start.† But the rate at present quoted is 20 copecks per poud, or, roughly speaking, 26*s.* per ton of 20 cwts. It appears that at the beginning freight used to be charged according to the measurement, that is, per ton of 40 cubic feet, which, in the case of piece goods, used to be somewhat more than the freight by weight. So it can be safely said that in the case of piece goods the rate of freight has been reduced to some extent. Whether this reduction has increased Russian imports into the Gulf is a question which cannot be answered in the affirmative. But, certainly, the reduction in the rate of freight will tend to encourage Russian imports in course of time if a market can be found for them. Hitherto, only one Russian (Moscow) firm has sent out piece goods to any appreciable extent, this firm has its own agents in Shiraz and Ispahan. The consignments hitherto brought out from Odessa, excepting piece goods, have been very insignificant, consisting of loaf-sugar, glass and earthenware, lace, &c.

In 1901, the Russian steamers brought out about 20,000 cases of kerosine sent by a Batoum firm, which had opened an agency here. This agency has since been closed, the venture having proved a failure owing to competition.‡ The "Trouver" in her last voyage¶ to the Gulf brought 20,000 cases of kerosine for this firm.

As regards the rate of freight from Bushire to Odessa, it used to be 40*s.* minimum and 48*s.* maximum per ton of 40 cubic feet, but this has now been reduced to 32 copecks per poud, or about 41*s.* per ton of 20 cwts. This reduction in the case of country packed cotton bales becomes very considerable. Sixteen of these bales go to a ton of 20 cwts., whereas by measurement they give about 5 tons of 40 cubic feet. So the freight on the country packed cotton bales may be said to have been reduced from 200*s.* to 41*s.* It is this article which has specially supplied some little return freight to the Russian steamers. In all about 1,000 bales of cotton have been shipped to Odessa for the Moscow firm alluded to above by their Ispahan and Shiraz agencies. Another article which has contributed towards the return freight is tobacco shipped for Port said for the Société des Tombac, and it is reported that some negotiations are going on for the carriage of all the tobacco for the Société by the Russian steamers, but that no definite arrangement has yet been come to, as the Société is wanting to have monthly shipments, which the Russian Steamship Company is not in a position to arrage for at the present. From further inquiry I find that the Société proposes to issue tenders in Bushire whenever they have tobacco for shipment. It is also reported that the Russian Company is trying to compete with the existing British lines for the carriage of shells, but as the bulk of the Gulf shells are exported to Hamburg and the Russian line has no direct steamers running to that port, the shippers are not likely to avail themselves of the Russian line, which can only undertake the carriage by means of transhipment at Port Said, and it is said that shells suffer much by transhipment.

As regards the so-called museums, none have as yet been opened at Bushire, but samples are shown when wanted. I hear that the samples will be shortly displayed.

* "Trouver," 24th January; "Trouver," 23rd May; "Korniloff," 13th July; "Trouver," 29th August. According to the notice issued in the "Odessky Listok," of 17th May 1903, the "Trouver" is expected to sail from Odessa on the 17th October 1903. So the total number of sailings during the present year will be five.

† Odessa Consul quoted 26*s.* 3*d.* to 29*s.* 3*d.* per long ton, for cotton goods in January 1903.

‡ By a British Indian firm long established in this business.

¶ 29th August 1903.

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In Busreh, it appears from an advertisement in a Turkish paper received by Mr. Khaleel by last mail, that the following goods are displayed:—

Piece goods of all sorts.
Earthenware of all sorts.
Glassware of all sorts.
Flour.
Matches.
Walking sticks.

Having endeavoured to give the information required by Mr. Maclean, I think I may offer a few remarks about the Russian competition in the carrying trade of the Gulf. Without venturing to express any opinion as to the future which lies before this maritime undertaking, I think it will not be out of place to consider how far it will be successful in competing with the existing British lines. In this connexion the chief element which must contribute towards the success of the undertaking is the amount of return freight which can be secured. What practically keeps the British lines going is the enormous export of grain from Turkish Arabia shipped at Busreh. Compared with that, the export trade from Persia sinks almost into insignificance, unless grain is also available for export. Now, grain is an article of export which is not likely to find space on board a Russian steamer returning from the Gulf to Odessa, as that would mean carrying coal to Newcastle, Russia being one of the largest grain-exporting countries. The chief articles of export from Persia *viâ* the Gulf are tobacco, shells, grain, opium, carpets, &c., and these will all go in English bottoms.

The three existing British lines are working together, and they may be trusted to take care of themselves against the Russian competing line.

ANNEX F.

Extract from Letter from Mr. H. L. Longworth, H. M. Consul at Trebizond, September 24th, 1903.

British and foreign goods passing through Trebizond in transit for Persia are not dutiable in Turkey. The *ad valorem* charge of 1 per cent., reduced from 6 per cent. in 1858, has been, since September 1873, abolished, with the view of drawing to this route the then existing transit trade through the Caucasus. Russia, however, in order to foster home industries, adopted in 1883 a protective policy, and closed the Caucasus to the transit trade of the world. Hence Turkey has gained, since then, no advantage by waiving the right of levying the duty, at a loss to the Trebizond Customs revenue of from 7,000*l.* to 10,000*l.* a year.

Merchandise for Persia may be kept for two years in the Trebizond transit warehouse at a monthly charge of half a piastre (1*d.*) per package.

At Bagdad the duty paid is, I believe, 8 per cent., 7 per cent. of which is returned if the goods cross the frontier within six months.

The same may be said of Persian goods sent in transit through Trebizond to Constantinople for re-exportation to foreign countries.

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ANNEX G.

SPECIMEN INVOICE OF 60 CASES CANDLES FROM MOSCOW TO TABRIZ.

Assortment as follows:—

44 cases—7 candles to the funt.
8 " 6 " "
6 " 5 " "
2 " 4 " "

60 cases = 120 pouds nett = 140 pouds gross.

	Rbls.	
Cost price at Rbls. 8·25 per poud	990	
Charges to Astara	91·29	
Buying commission, 1 per cent.	9·90	
	1,091·19	
	Krs.	
At different rates of exchange	6,220·18	
Charges:—		
Ardebil and Astara	739·67	
Tabriz	268·50	Krs. 7,228·35

ANNEX H.

NOTE ON THE IMPORTATION OF COTTON TISSUES.

The total imports of cotton tissues into Persia for the last three years were:—

	1900-01.	1901-02.	1902-03.
	£	£	£
Imports per Persian Customs Statistics (excluding Karun), year March 21st to March 20th:—			
Thread and twist	61,608	116,328	92,455
Bleached and unbleached, plain	450,720	745,753	533,086
Others, printed, dyed, &c.	780,564	1,378,334	1,157,990
Total	1,292,892	2,240,415	1,783,531
Imports, Muhammerah and Karun per Consular Reports (excluding transhipments to Turkey), years to 31st December 1900, 1901, 1902:—			
Thread and twist	7,172	9,436	6,464
All others	201,859	109,369	59,646
Total imports to Persia	1,501,923	2,359,220	1,849,641

The contribution of the British Empire for 1900-01 was about 1,030,000*l.*, but it must be borne in mind that the Belgian administration of Customs was not fully organised for the whole period, and that no official statistics have been issued for that year the figures for which, given here, have been collected from different sources, and are made use of simply because, although certainly incomplete, they are more reliable than any previous Customs Returns.

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The imports for 1901–02 were derived from—

British Empire.	Russia.	Other Countries.
£	£	£
1,563,929	679,229	116,062

Out of the 116,062*l.* some 30,000*l.*, contributed by Turkey, are doubtless foreign piece goods, bought and rebaled in Constantinople and Bagdad.

The imports of 1902–03 were derived as follows:—

—	British Empire.	Russia.	Other Countries.		
	£	£	£		£
Thread and twist	89,118	1,315	2,022	Germany	1,800
Bleached, unbleached, and plain	472,823	43,372	16,891	Holland	13,400
				France	24,800
Others	655,775	446,250	55,965	Austria	18,200
				Germany	2,300
Total (excluding Karun)	1,217,716	490,937	74,878		
Imports, Muhammerah and Karun, per Consular Report (excluding transhipments to Turkey), year to December 31st, 1902:—					
Thread and twist	6,380	—	84		
All others	57,512	1,200	934	France	500
Total imports	1,281,608	492,137	75,896 = 1,849,641*l.*		

These figures may make it clear that Russia is our only formidable competitor in the piece goods trade at the present time.

In Curzon's "Persia" the total imports of cotton tissues for 1889 are quoted from an official source as 1,857 000*l.*, of which Great Britain contributed 1,714,000*l.*, half of it white and grey shirtings, and Russia the remaining 143,000*l* all prints. The same authority, (Vol. II., page 580), gives the total exports of manufactured goods from Russia to Persia as 256,000*l.* Russian Customs Statistics for 1898 show that cotton textiles were five-sevenths of the total exports of manufactured goods to the Persia for that year. The same proportion for 1889 would give 183,000*l.* as the value of cotton tissues exported to Persia; consequently it may be assumed that in 1889 the British Empire had command of the trade in cotton textiles to Persia, Russia only furnishing 9 or 10 per cent., and the contributions from other countries being inconsiderable. The latter statement might quite well be made regarding other countries to-day, although, as a matter of fact, France and Austria, probably then, and certainly now, possess a steady if modest trade in certain distinct kinds of high-class cotton prints, cretonnes, &c.

Trade with Russia.

The Russian competition in the piece goods trade began to be very distinctly felt in Azerbaijàn about 1892-93, and was already marked in Teheran at that time. In Khorassan it dates from the opening of the Transcaspian Railway to mercantile traffic. In 1898 the Russian Customs Department reported an export of cottons to Persia as follows:—

	Rbls.
Cotton yarn	15,054
,, tissues without drawback	211,313
,, ,, with drawback at Rbls. 2·30 per poud	336,865
,, ,, ,, ,, Rbls. 2·45 ,,	2,529,616
,, ,, ,, ,, Rbls. 2·80 ,,	2,106,932
Total	5,199,780=553,000*l.*

This value, on the weights given, works out at about 2*s.* per lb. Presumably it includes the allowance for drawback, and if this allowance, say 20 per cent, be deducted, the net value agrees pretty closely with what I gathered from merchants might be fairly taken as an average c.i.f. value of cotton goods imported into Persia, *viz.*, about 1*s.* 7*d.* per lb. Taking, therefore, 80 per cent. of the above total, there still remains 442,000*l.*

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as representing the value of Russian cottons imported into Persia in 1898. The gives three records from which to draw conclusions as to the progress of Russian trade in cotton textiles to Persia:—

In 1889, 143,000*l.* to 183,000*l.*, say 163,000*l.*

In 1898, say 442,000*l.*

In 1901–02, 679,000*l.*, and in 1902-03, 492,000*l.* Average 585,000*l.*

The year 1901 was marked by a considerable increase in trade generally, and in the piece goods trade in particular.

Trade with British Empire.

With regard to British and British Indian trade, it is more difficult to get satisfactory records. Our trade enters Persia by many routes, and it is almost hopeless to search for simultaneous returns from all of them. British and British Indian statistics are far from complete, as much of our trade is carried on through intermediate markets in Bagdad and Constantinople.

The Annual Reports of the Consulate at Bushire, carefully complied from reliable sources, such as ship manifests, &c., may be accepted as fairly accurate for quantities. The values given are optimistic. These reports show imports of cotton textiles at the ports of Bushire and Bunder Abbas for the last eight years as follows:—

	1895.	1896.	1897.	1998.	1899.	1900.	1901.	1902.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
	848,600	521,300	870,300	597,300	594,400	622,600	970,400	616,100
Average		685,000		733,800		608,500		793,000
"			709,400				700,750	

The average for three years 1895-97 is 746,700*l.*, and for three years 1900-02, 736,400*l.* The imports by these two important routes thus show a slight decrease.

Lingah is a place of great importance as an emporium for the smaller Gulf ports and fishing fleets, but is not a trade route to the interior of Persia. The total value of cotton textiles passed through the Custom House at Lingah into Persia for the two years 1900-01 to 1902-03 was only 67,560*l.* The Bushire Consular Reports, which include transit trade, show for the two years, 1901-02, an excess of imports over exports of cottons of 62,700*l.* The imports at Lingah for Persia are, therefore, only some 30,000*l.* to 35,000*l.* per annum.

The foregoing Consular Statistics are for imports of all cotton textiles, but the proportion of other than British and British Indian manufactures is very small (in 1901, 5 per cent.).

The Consular Statistics for Mahammerah give the following as the value of the imports of cotton textiles:—

1895.	1896.	1897.	1898.	1899.	1900.	1901.	1902.
£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
70,300	78,200	57,000	106,200	135,200	209,000	118,700	66,100

of which the following went on to Karun river ports:—

18,500	46,900	15,000	29,800	29,800	31,900	26,800	44,700

But a great part of the Muhammerah imports were for account of Koweit markets, as evidenced by the fall in imports since the summer of 1901, when the British India steamers commenced to call regularly at the latter port.

As regards Kermanshah there are no reliable statistics available prior to 1901. The Persian Customs Statistics for 1901-02 and 1902-03 are:—

Imports of British and British Indian cotton textiles (21st March to 20th March):—

	1901-02.	1902-03.
	£	£
Thread and twist	13,474	14,300
Bleached and unbleached tissues, plain	280,818	254,913
Other tissues, printed, dyed, &c.	355,874	361,694
	650,166	630,907

An Ispahan Consular Report ("Annual Series," No. 2260) gives an estimated average for three years to 1897 of imports through Bagdad: taking the figures for cotton goods, which are known to be all British and British Indian, the average amounts to 592,000*l.* per annum. Inquiries in Bagdad, Kermanshah, and Hamadan have all tended to show that this route into Persia has long carried an important trade, which has steadily, but not phenomenally, improved during the last 10 years.

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The Trebizond route to Tabriz for many years carried our most important trade with Persia. The Persian Customs Statistics of imports of British and British Indian cotton textiles for the year 1902-03 give the following particulars :—

	1902-03 (21st March to 20th March).
	£
Thread and twist	4,256
Bleached and unbleached tissues	28,366
Other tissues	103,152
	135 774

A Consular Report for Trebizond ("Annual Series," No. 2,588) gives total value of imports of British cotton taxtiles in transit for Persia, for periods of five years, as follows :—

	£	£
Five years 1886 to 1890	2,059,900	= 412,000 per annum.
„ 1891 „ 1895	1,445,800	= 249,160 „
„ 1896 „ 1900	997,900	= 199,600 „

As already noted, Russian Competition with British prints in Azerbaijan was well marked in 1892-93. A British merchant in Tabriz has kindly classified the annual statistics of a Trebizond forwarding agent, and the result shows that the number of bales known to be British cotton textiles forwarded from Trebizond to Tabriz has steadily fallen from 22,000 in 1890 to 8,000 in 1902, which confirms the Trebizond figures.

From the figures given in the foregoing it is possible to form an estimate as to the progress of British and British Indian trade in cotton textiles to Persia, thus :—

		£	£
1889	Curzon's "Persia." from an official source, Krs. 60,000,000	=	1,714,000

1895-96-97 (average) based on Consular reports :—

	£	£
Bushire (746,000*l.* less 5 per cent.)	709,000	
Lingah, say	32,000	
Muhammerah	68,500	
Kermanshah	592,000	
Tabriz (between 250,000*l.* and 199,600*l.*)	225,000	
		1,626,500

1901-02 (average) based on Consular reports :—

	£	£
Bushire (793,000*l.* less 5 per cent.)	754,000	
Lingah	31,000	
Muhammerah	92,000	
Kermanshah	640,000	
Tabriz, say	150,000	
Seistan (route only opened in 1899)	3,000	
		1,670,000

From the Persian Customs Statistics, adding Karum, the average for the period most nearly corresponding to that to which the figures last given belong, appears as follows :—

Customs Statistics (*plus* Karun) :—

	£	£
1901-02	1,590,929	
1902-03	1,281,608	
	£2,872,537	Averag e, (half) 1,436,268

The difference between the last and previous total does not exceed 15 per cent. As before mentioned, the Bushire Consular Reports convert quantities into values at somewhat high rates, whereas the Customs valuation for *ad valorem* duty is certain to be well within real value.

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

ANNEX I.

SPECIMEN INVOICE OF 16 BALES OF MERCHANDISE (PRINTS, WIDTH, 23 INCHES) FROM MOSCOW.

Bales.	Weight in Pouds and Funts. Gross.	Net.	Pieces.	Arshines Rus.			Rbls.	Rbls.
					1 colour	at cop. 9	1,501·27	
12	57·15	51·15	240	16,680¾	Schotlandka	„ 9½	130·51	
1	4·22	4·	20	1,373¾	2 colours	„ 10	419·95	2,051·73
3	14·4	12·15	60	4,199½	Discount	6 per cent.		123·10
								1,928·63
Drawback on 67$\frac{30}{40}$ pds. at Rbls. 3·60 gold = Rbls. 243·90; equivalent at the rate of Rbls. 7·35 per Rbls. 5 gold to								358·53
								1,570·10
Customs charges								12·80
Transport, Moscow–Astara								115·35
							Rbls.	1,698·25

Charges paid in Persia :—

		Krs.
Astara.—Commission, &c. &c.		55·00
	Customs duty at 5 per cent. (previous to Feb. 1903)	448·00
Ardebil.—Freight, Astara-Ardebil		241·75
	Petties	4·00
	Commission	32·00
Tabriz.—Freight, Ardebil-Tabriz		200·00
	Porterage	8·00
	Krs.	988·75

SPECIMEN INVOICE OF 30 BALES PRINTS FROM MOSCOW.

Bales.	Weight in Pouds and Funts. Gross.	Net.	Pieces.	Arshines Rus.			Rbls.	Rbls.
					2 colours	at cop. 10	1 461·00	
7	46·31	42·35	210	14,610¼	5 „	„ 11	1,144·00	
5	33·13	30·32	150	10,407	1 „	„ 9	3,377·00	5,982·85
18	125·7	115·26	540	37,522¾	Discount	6 per cent.		358·97
								5,623·88
Drawback for 189$\frac{10}{40}$ pds., at Rbls 3·60 gold = 681·30 at rate of 7·35								1,001·51
								4,622·37
Customs charges								34·67
Transport, Moscow-Akstafa								320 50
							Rbls.	4,977·54

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Charges paid in Persia :—	Rbls.
Akstafa.—Commission, &c. . .	24·25
Julfa.—Freight, Akstafa-Julfa .	103·05
Petties	3·58
Commission . . .	6·00
Rbls.	136·88 at 1·70¼ per 10 Krs.=Krs. 803·90.

	Krs.
Julfa—Petties, &c.	44·70
Freight, Tabriz	360·00
Tabriz—Customs duty 5 per cent. (duty previous to Feb. 1903)	1,260·00
Porterage	15·00
Krs.	2,483·60

DETAILS OF ASSORTMENT OF 124 BALES OF RUSSIAN PRINTS, TURNEY RED.

I. One Coloured Prints.

(*a*) Twenty-four bales, each 32 pieces 23 ins., 70-72 arshines, red and white, small designs.

(*b*) Twenty-four bales, each 32 pieces 23 ins., 70-72 arshines, red and white, medium and large designs.

(*c*) Six bales, each 32 pieces 23 ins., 70-72 arshines, red and yellow, small designs.

(*d*) Six bales, each 32 pieces 23 ins., 70-72 arshines, red and yellow, medium and large designs.

The red and yellow coloured prints sell at the same price as the red and white.

II. Two and Three Coloured Prints.

(*a*) Six bales, each 32 pieces 23 ins., 70-72 arshines, red and pink prints, small designs.

(*b*) Eight bales, each 32 pieces 23 ins., 70-72 arshines, red and pink, large designs.

(*c*) Sixteen bales, each 32 pieces 23 ins., 70-72 arshines, red and pink, medium designs.

(*d*) Four bales, each 32 pieces 23-ins., 70-72 arshines, red and green, small, medium and large designs.

(*e*) Four bales, each 32 pieces 23 ins., 70-72 arshines, red, green, and pink, small, medium, and large designs.

III. Five and Six Coloured Prints.

Twenty-six bales, each 32 pieces, 70-72 arshines, large designs, with one or two pieces per bale border prints, and one piece large stripes.

Selling prices of above for prints in an assortment of 25 per cent. pink ticket, and 75 per cent. blue ticket quality, were about as follows :—

I. Krs. 0·70 per Tabriz arshine.
II. „ 0·75 „ „
III. „ 0·85 „ „
Less 3-5 months at 12 per cent.=cash.

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

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Kalat State

1905

(63)

Confidential.

A Note by Major H. L. Showers, C.I.E., on the present state of affairs in Kalat and a review of the system of Administration now being pursued.

1. A brief account of the events in the State that have led up to the present situation is necessary.

2. The earlier history of the country is admirably summed up in the following extract:—

"A chief of the Kambarani tribe obtained possession of Kalat in the early part of the 17th century. Kalat proper was then a very small and uninfluential State. The Khans therefore gradually engaged the assistance of the Chiefs of their kindred tribes in the neighbourhood by giving them jagirs * of land in Kalat itself. They were bound to furnish in return troops in certain specified quotas raised among their own independent tribes and these chiefs so far became no doubt *quoad* these jagirs quasi-feudal vassals of the Khans, though at first wholly independent in their own territories. By means of troops so raised the territories of the Khan were gradually extended through conquest, but the force furnished by the chiefs was the only one at the disposal of the Khan up to the reign of Nasir Khan II. Thus connected together and finding the necessity for mutual cohesion and co-operation.....the independent tribes, the petty state of Kalat and their joint conquests gradually became more or less voluntarily amalgamated into one federal state under the authority of the Khan. As will be seen, however, the conditions of the arrangement apparently still secured to the confederate chiefs practically entire self-Government within their own previously independent territory†."

* Note, all revenue free.

† Minute by the Hon'ble Sir E. C. Bayley, K.C.S.I., on Kalat affairs.

3. This extract clearly shows how the Kalat State in its present form came into existence and the delicate and slender nature of the bond uniting the head of the Confederacy and his fellow chiefs. And, as is also evident from the minute, it was the failure of Khan Khudadad Khan to act up to the "federal pact" by which the State was constituted, and of the Sind authorities who supported him, to appreciate the true relation between him and the Chiefs that are mainly responsible for the incessant rebellion and disorders that marked this Khan's reign. The pact itself however is a most extraordinary one, suited perhaps to the early days in, and the conditions under, which it originated, but absolutely impossible as a basis on which to found anything in the form of a stable Government among wild ignorant and lawless frontier tribes. Among such people the *primus inter pares* position of the Khan could never be understood or properly respected. Nothing but a commanding superiority of force at its head could hold such a community together.

4. The most prominent of the Khans were Abdullah Khan and Nasir Khan I.(A.D. 1755—1795). Both engaged in much warfare and added territory to the Khanate. It was this no doubt that made their reigns successful and held the confederacy together. Even the great Napoleon was only able to secure the stability of his throne by engaging constantly in war and dazzling his people by the brilliance of his victories.

5. Nasir Khan's elder brother, Khan Mahabbut Khan, obtained from Nadir Shah the grant of Kachi, or the low lying country between Sibi and the Sind border, as blood compensation for Khan Abdullah Khan who was killed fighting with the Kaloras. And it is here that the Khan has his principal niabats, or districts, which pay him revenue and the inhabitants of which are his immediate subjects.

6. Nasir Khan I. was the great organizer of the Brahuis. He laid down a complete set of rules for the management of tribal affairs and the "rawaj" or tribal custom thus established is followed to this day. Generally, whatever approach to a recognised constitution Kalat possesses may he said to date from his time.

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7. A fundamental feature of the constitution was the recognition of three hereditary offices the holders of which were to advise and assist the Khan in the administration of the State. The offices were those of the Sarawan and Jhalawan Sirdars and of the Khan's Wazir. The two former represented the independent Brahui tribes in the Khan's council, while the Wazir represented the Khan's personal authority and his revenue paying subjects. The Sarawan Sirdari was hereditary in the Raisani family and the Jhalawan in the Zarakzai family.

8. In 1857 Mir Khudadad succeeded to the Khanship and thenceforward to the signing of the Mastung Treaty in 1876 a state of almost continuous rebellion and disorder prevailed in the country. Our intervention at that juncture came apparently just in time to save Mir Khudadad from being driven from his throne by the Brahui tribesmen.

9. The practical effect of our arbitration was the recognition of the independence of the Brahuis. They had waged a long and successful war against the Khan and in the settlement that followed they were treated (and rightly so) not as rebellious subjects but as a separate and independent party contending against another party of their own confederacy.

10. From the above summary it will be seen that the Kalat State is composed of two very distinct parties, *viz.* (*1*) the Khan, his Wazir (when he has one) and his niabats and (*2*) the Brahui tribes, each tribe governed by its own chief and the whole under the Sarawan and Jhalawan Sirdars above referred to.

11. I will deal with the Brahuis first. There is little or nothing to choose between the Sarawan and Jhalawan Brahuis in their relation to the Khan. What difference there is due to the fact that the tribes that are classed as real Brahuis, *viz.*, the Iltazais, Kambaranis, Kalandaranis, Gurgnanis, Samalaris, &c., ... and who recognise the Ahmadzais (the Khans are Ahmadzais) as the head of their family as well as the head of the State, are all to be found in Jhalawan. Though these tribes are not to be compared in importance to the great independent tribes of Jhalawan as the Zehris, the Mengals, the Bizanjos and the Muhammad Hasanis, and though they have equally with the latter always opposed the Khan when Brahui rights were in question, yet the existence of the tie must no doubt have given the Khan more influence and authority in Jhalawan than he was able to secure in Sarawan.

12. On the top of this we have the fact that the Sarawan tribes being closer at hand have come more in contact with and more under the guidance and control of British officers than their Jhalawan brothers. Thus it is that such measures as we have taken to bring the Kalat tribes under control by the granting of allowances, the establishment of Thanas, &c., have been taken only in Sarawan and Kachi while in Jhalawan we have until comparatively lately only interfered when absolutely necessary, and the Khan's hold over the country therefore feeble and fast dying though it is, is, nevertheless, not so absolutely extinct in Jhalawan as it certainly is in Sarawan.

13. From the first our connection with Sarawan has been a close one; it was the Sarawan chiefs that brought Sir R. Sandeman up the Bolan Pass to Quetta and Mastung, it is they who have kept the pass open for us and who for their assistance and loyalty during the Afghan War were given liberal allowances *by Government which are still continued to them or their successors. Also the proximity of their country to Quetta and other parts of British Baluchistan has brought them into daily contact with British officers and British administration.

* Note—The Raisani or Sarawan Sirdar receives Rs. 500 and the other leading Sirdars Rs. 300 each a month.

14. The effect of the hold thus gained over the tribes has been to secure a considerable degree of peace, good order, and security to the country such as never existed before and which is still not to be found in Jhalawan. For one thing disputes between the Khan and the Sirdars have, as arranged by the

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Mastung Treaty, always been referred to the representative of the British Government and no case of armed collision between the two parties has occurred since 1876. In inter-tribal matters too no feud in Sarawan has ever resulted in serious disturbance, the reason being that from the moment of our advent in Baluchistan the Chiefs have always referred to us cases they were unable to dispose of themselves.

15. The question arises here how and why we interfered to procure the settlement of such cases. There is nothing on this subject in the Mastung Treaty and under its terms we have no more right to interfere in tribal matters than we had before 1876. The answer seems obvious, *viz.*, that the Khan never has had the Brahui tribes under his control, that our intervention and indeed Sandeman's whole Mission and his every proceeding was a recognition and confirmation of their claims to independence and that, the limits of British territory having been pushed to their very doors and their having been brought into intimate relations with a strong Government who could not allow the continuances of disorder in its immediate neighbourhood, it was inevitable that the tribes should look to us and that we should respond to their expectation to take measures for the preservation of peace and good order among them.

16. The measures in question taken for the first few years after the Treaty were not of a very marked character. The chiefs were left to govern their tribes themselves and it was only the more important cases that came to us for adjustment, when they would be either submitted to a Shahi Jirga convened by us or the Political Officers would use their influence to obtain an adjustment by compromise, arbitration, "shariat", etc. This small degree of intervention was the more sufficient in that the Sarawan Sirdar, in the person of Sir Assad Khan Raisani, possessed in those days the influence and authority attached to his high position. In the settlement of cases beyond the powers of the tribal chiefs or of those between chief and chief he did an enormous amount of valuable work and the decline of his authority, which it is to be feared we have ourselves contributed to bring about, is one of the principal reasons that has now made a somewhat greater degree of interference on our part necessary.

17. However even with the Sarawan Sirdar's assistance a more definite step than those hitherto taken was soon found necessary for the proper control of the tribes. As the attached copy of a memorandum (marked "A") will show Major Temple, the then Political Officer, reported in 1889 that there were constant and annually recurring complaints by the Dehwars (cultivators) of Mastung against the Brahuis, who were in the habit of "looting the crops, robbing the gardens and stealing property from the houses of the Dehwars". All attempts to obtain the redress of these complaints and the punishment of the offenders proved ineffectual, this being due to the apathy and indifference and perhaps to the weakness of the tribal chiefs. In the circumstances Major Temple recommended and the Agent to the Governor-General sanctioned the appointment of certain levy sowars to be paid for out of the allowances granted by Government to the four chiefs whose tribes were concerned. The sowars were posted at Mastung under a Brahui Thanadar whose duty it was to keep the Brahuis in order.

18. This then is the origin of the present system of levy Thanas by which we endeavour to control these numerous and powerful tribes. That the system has grown and must grow still further is due to various causes. Firstly we have the decline of the Sarawan Sirdar's authority already referred to. In connection with Jaffir Khan's raids in 1897 Mir Mehrulla Khan Raisani, who held the position of Sarawan Sirdar on behalf of the minor Raisani chief, was suspected of disloyalty (whether rightly or wrongly it is bootless now to enquire) and imprisoned. In addition to this by a settlement made in the Raisani-Rustamzai dispute the Raisanis were prohibited from residing in Kanak, their summer home for generations past while a big land dispute with the Shahwanis over the Eri lands in Kachi was also given against them. These blows to their prestige combined with the youth and inexperience of the young chief, S. Sir Assad Khan's successor, have been fatal to Raisani power and influence. The Sirdar's authority

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over his fellow chiefs has all but disappeared and with some of them he is actually at feud. And with the practical disappearance of a common head who held the Sarawan Brahuis together there has come, not as might at first sight be supposed, a strengthening of the position of the other chiefs, but a weakening of their authority with their respective tribesmen. All the larger tribes are subdivided into powerful groups the heads of which in the absence of superior force or other restraining influence are ever ready to act in independence of, if not in opposition to, the tribal chiefs. A tribe may combine in a feud against another tribe but with rare exceptions the chief's authority is not sufficient for the proper and efficient management of the tribes and they stand in constant and daily increasing need of assistance and support. A further cause of the decline of the chiefs' power is their poverty, which on the one hand precludes the exercise of hospitality and liberality—such strong factors in the obtaining and preserving influence among these tribes—and on the other obliges them to exact from their tribesmen every penny of their Sirdari dues. Their incomes which were probably sufficient in past times for all their needs, can certainly not have increased, with the tendency that portions of the tribes have to assume independence, while at the same time the cost of living must have gone up considerably as Baluchistan became civilized and developed under our rule. In place of a Rs. 5 calico garment, a Sirdar must now wear a gold-laced affair costing anything from Rs. 100 to Rs. 1,000 while a carriage and pair or a dog-cart or, failing them, a hired tumtum is now quite the most approved mode of travel where the roads allow.

19. But be the cause what it may, experience has shown without any doubt that there is not a single Sarawan tribe that is thoroughly and effectively under the control of its chief. It has been my constant endeavour to make the tribes self-governing by supporting the chiefs' authority and leaving to them the settlement of as many cases among their own tribesmen as possible. We have an excellent example of what may be done in this respect in the condition of the Bugti tribe and the big tribes in the Derajat, *e.g.*, the Mazaris and Legharis, but whether the clan feeling is less strong among the Brahui than the Baluch tribes or whether we are unfortunate in our Sirdars, there is hardly a tribe in Kalat whose internal condition can be described as satisfactory or whose chief can be called a reliable and satisfactory administrator.

20. Though the above remarks refer mainly to Sarawan tribes, it is much the same thing in Jhalawan. I do not think the authority of the Zarakzai chief as the Jhalawan Sirdar has even extended much beyond the Zehri group of tribes. The other big tribes as the Mengals, Bizanjos and Muhammad Hasanis seem hardly to recognise him at all. At all events the Sirdari, in the hands of a semi-lunatic like Pasand Khan, has lost much of its old status and the Sirdar has but few adherents even among the Zehris. We find therefore that here, as in Sarawan, the country is practically quite destitute of any proper and organised system of administration.

21. Thus I have, I trust, made it clear that our intervention as the guiding and controlling hand in Brahui affairs both in Sarawan and Jhalawan is the inevitable rôle of the supreme power in the country. We take the place in fact of the suzerain powers who preceded us, *viz.*, the Persians first and then the Durani rulers of Kandahar, with this difference that—being on the spot, while they were at a distance—our control must of necessity be not general and intermittent but of a close, organised and continuous nature. We have no wish to take this responsibility on ourselves, but if we wish for good order and security in this important frontier region we have no option but to fill the administrative void we find existing. The old administrative system of the country, always of doubtful efficiency, has now completely broken down. Were it a sound and workable system we might try and build it up again; but since the events in Khan Khudadad's reign, the Brahuis will never again—if they ever did to any real extent—accept the Khan as their ruler in any but a nominal and general way, and without a head no administration can exist. The two subordinate heads, *viz.*, the Sarawan and Jhalawan Sirdars, have also failed to maintain

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whatever of influence and authority they once possessed, while lastly "the independent self-governing tribes" have been proved by experience to be incapable of proper self-government.

22. It is in view of these facts then that our control of the Brahui tribe has slowly but surely been increasing from year to year and it is on them that I have based any administrative measures I have taken or recommended during the last four years. On taking charge of the Agency in December 1900, I found the Political Adviser devoting his whole-time to the administration of the Brahuis and of the important funds known as the Khan's funds and Jirga Fund, while the Khan's immediate affairs (the *raison dêtre* of his appointment) received little or no attention at his hands. I also found existing a standing Jirga consisting of three minor Sirdars, *viz.*, Mir Usaf Khan, Kurd; Mir Samandar Khan, Lehri, and Syed Bahar Shah, in whose hands were left the settlement of Jirga and other cases, and who had thus acquired an influence and authority in the country quite out of proportion to their rank and which was certainly undesirable and pernicious. The institution had survived from the time of the so-called Brahui rebellion when the imprisonment of Mir Mehrulla Khan, Raisani, caused the majority of the chiefs to fly the country. Thirdly, I found the following Levy Thanas established in the country (1) Mastung with a sub-Thana at Aloo, (2) Zehri, (3) Saruna, (4) Dandhor, (5) Usta Muhammad. No 1 is in Sarawan, 2 and 3 are in Jhalawan, and 4 and 5 in Kachi. This machinery I could see at once was quite insufficient for the proper control of the tribes. For instance I found that the Mastung Thana, consisting only of eight men, had to deal with the whole Sarawan country extending from Quetta to Kalat and from the Bolan to near Nushk. The men and their horses were worked to death, and the Thanadar was at his wits ends in meeting all the demands made on his time and attention. Such a state of things obviously did not mean an efficient discharge of the obligation circumstances had thrust upon us; and, if we did the thing at all, it seemed right in our own interests and in those of the people that we should do it properly.

23. The first step taken was the abolition of the triumvirate above referred to. All Jirga cases were withdrawn from their hands and referred thenceforth to properly constituted Jirgas on which the Sirdars of the tribes concerned were invited to sit. In all matters too I worked in consultation with the Sirdars and I have always endeavoured to range them, especially in the case of the Raisani Sirdar, on my side. This is undoubtedly the correct line to follow, for as long as the Raisani and other influential chiefs work loyally with us we cannot go far astray in our conduct of tribal affairs. The three minor Sirdars did not relish the decline of their power and for a considerable time after they made all the mischief in the administration they safely could without committing themselves. One of them Mir Samandar Khan, is now dead, and the other two, seeing the error of their ways, are now once more rendering useful service.

24. The next matter taken up was the question of the Political Adviser's duties. He not only had too much to do, but much, if not all, of what he did was outside his proper sphere. He was therefore relieved of the charge of the Khan's and Jirga Funds and of all matters connected with expenditure from the funds, *e.g.*, the charge of the Public Works in the State. At the same time the Native Assistant in the Bolan was appointed Native Assistant Sarawan, his place in the Bolan being taken by a Tahsildar (a new appointment). The Native Assistant was put in charge of the Public Works, the Levies, the Police, and Magisterial work along the Nushki line, while he exercised a general supervision over the accounts of the Kalat Funds in the Political Agent's Office. The Political Adviser was left with the charge, under the Political Agent's direction, of the Brahui tribes, both Sarawan and Jhalawan, and the Khan having been approached with a view to his giving effect to the Hon'ble Mr. Barnes' suggestions for the carrying out of improvements in the niabats, the Political Adviser assumed charge of the scheme then inaugurated. The details of the scheme will be dealt with further on.

25. Following, or concurrently with, these measures the question of the Levy Thanas was taken up. These Thanas are composed of a tribal Thanadar,

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usually a man of influence and consideration among the tribes he has to deal with, a duffadar or two, a munshi and a certain number of tribal sowars and footmen *. They do an immense amount of work in the stopping of feuds, the summoning or arrest of parties, the settlement of cases, the collection of transport and supplies for troops and travellers, etc., etc., acting in all matters under the orders of the Political Agent or the Political Adviser on behalf of the Political Agent. They in fact constitute the only machinery at the disposal of the Political Agent for the administration of the tribes. The Thanadars take the place of the Tahsildar and Police Thanadar rolled into one of a circle in a British district. At the same time this mode of dealing with the people is quite understood and accepted by them; while to the Sirdars it is a help and a support. All the system needs to make it entirely satisfactory and efficient is that it should be somewhat extended as to the number of Thanas, the pay of the Thanadars and the number of men under their orders. For purposes of comparison I append two papers (marked B and C) which show respectively the levies at the Political Agent's disposal in the Kalat State and those employed in the British district of Quetta-Pishin. In Kalat there are 152† men and in Quetta-Pishin there are 426 men. When it is remembered that Kalat is nearly 20 times the size of Quetta-Peshin and that in the latter as in all other British districts in Baluchistan there are numerous troops all over the country to assist in the maintenance of order, while there is not a man in Kalat, the extreme inadequacy of the Kalat establishment will readily be understood.

* Note—The Mastung Thana even now only consists of 15 men all told. It was less in 1901.

† Note.—The statement does not take into account the Bolan Levies from which the Political Agent in the absence of other sources draws a few men for his personal escort, and a Government Levy Thana of 20 men at Dhandur in Kachi.

26. As already mentioned the Thanadar of Mastung (Khan Bahadur Mir Dauran Khan, a brother of the Kurd Chief) had an impossible charge when I first arrived in the Agency; and the following steps were taken to meet the difficulty (*i*). A new Thana was established at Mungochar, (2) a full Thanadar was placed at Aloo and the Sarawan country was divided into three circles, *viz.*, Mastung, Aloo and Mungochar each with its own Thana and Thanadar. At the same time Levy posts or sub-Thanas have been established at Kirdagap, Doctor Chah Guru, Kotul and Soro. For the neighhourhood of Kalat itself, which is neither Sarawan or Jhalawan, the Jemadar of the Quetta-Kalat postal service was given a small extra allowance and was constituted a Thandar in respect of the local Brahuis. These measures it need hardly be said have resulted in a great increase of administrative efficiency.

27. Still more has been done in Jhalawan. After much correspondence a Native Assistant was sanctioned for the country in September 1903 and located at Khozdar. A commodious set of quarters within a walled enclosure has been provided for him and his party, a body of 18 levies has been formed for him and regular postal communication has been established between Kalat and Khozdar. For the first year the Native Assistant's orders were to do little or nothing beyond looking about him and making himself acquainted with the pepole and submitting reports of passing events. In September last, however, the Jhalawan Chiefs unanimously asked that the Native Assistant should be invested with authority to deal with local cases and the request has been acceded to. Before I left Quetta on leave a detailed set of rules for the Native Assistant's guidance was drawn up and this has since been sanctioned by the Agent to the Governor-General and issued to the Native Assistant. It was of the first importance to have an official on the spot in Jhalawan while it will no doubt greatly tend to the peace of the community and the contentment of the people if their ordinary cases are promptly disposed of. Thus, if the Native Assistant does not attempt too much at first, and if he maintains a judicious attitude in his relations with the Khan's officials on the one part and the Brahuis on the other, we shall certainly have made a useful beginning towards the pacification and development of the Jhalawan country.

28. Apart from Khozdar, to the old Thana at Zehri and Saruna have been added Thanas at Surab, Mashkai and Mar Lak and sub-Thanas at Samotri and

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Wad. Surab is a perfect hot bed of tribal feuds and intrigue. Many small tribes, *e. g.*, the Harunis, Rodinis, Sumalaris, who have no common head, live there and their cases give constant trouble. For the same reason the Thanedar selected is a Sarawan Brahui, as no independent and impartial man could be obtained locally. Mashkai is so remote from Kalat that the Political Agent was often totally in the dark as to what was passing there. It is at the same time a place of some importance, being the head-quarters of the powerful Muhammad Hasani tribe and the seat of a sub-niabat of the Khan's, while the route through the Mashkai valley to Mekran is the best and most used of all the routes to that country. Mar Lak, Samotri and Wad are places in the Mengal country and the posts there will contribute to some extent towards the better control of this large and lawless tribe.

29. In Jhalawan a strong guiding hand at the head of affairs is more urgently needed than in Sarawan even. Very few indeed of the chiefs have the authority and influence they should have. In spite of the allowances they receive from the Khan's fund many are wretchedly poor, if not actually in debt, and all are illiterate and ignorant.

NOTE.—The leading Sirdars get Rs. 300 per mensem, others 200 100 or 50, respectively, but the distribution is not satisfactory and should be revised.

With an imbecile chief the condition of the Mengals is anything but satisfactory and some more definite and pronounced steps than those hitherto taken will soon be found necessary for the control of the tribe. The Zehri group of tribes under S. Pasand Khan are all at sixes and sevens. Most of the tribes, *e.g.*, the two most powerful of them, the Musianis and the Jhataks, detest him and his authority, and there is constant friction and trouble in the country. And yet in the absence of any other central authority they have perforce, outwardly at any rate, to give him their adherence and his power for mischief continues. Then there are several small tribes, *e.g.*, the Gurgnaris, the Harunnis, the Samalaris, who stand more or less alone and among whom some central authority is decidedly required (*vide* remarks about the Surab Thana in paragraph 28 above). According as it serves their interest best from time to time they gravitate either towards the Khan or the Zarakzai Sirdar or they stand aloof from both. Were S. Pasand Khan and S. Shakar Khan Mengal more suited to the responsible position they fill it would no doubt be possible to carry on much as we have done in the past without any particular intervention on our part, but unfortunately they are quite the reverse of suitable and if the country is not to fall into the utmost disorder our taking the reins into our own hands is imperative. Unfortunately too in neither case is the future outlook promising. Pasand Khan's eldest son, Mir Muhammad Khan, is subject to periodical fits of mental derangement and could not succeed to the chiefship. His second son, Mir Bate Khan, who was Thanedar of Zehri, has just died. His third son, Mir Khan Muhammad, a boy of 16, is a young scapegrace, who if he ever comes to any good at all is entirely unfitted for the chiefship at present. There remains the rightful heir to the Sardari, *viz.*, Mir Shahbeg Khan, the 10-year old son of the late Chief S. Gohar Khan. It will be years before he is fit to take up a responsible position and were S. Pasand Khan to be removed by death or otherwise, I know of no man in the country who could carry on the affairs of these tribes (Zehri) during a minority without the strongest support from ourselves. In the Mengal tribe it is the same. The Chief's only son, Mir Aladina Khan, a boy of 13 is a miserable little creature who gives no promise of being any less incompetent than his father.

The arrangement now given effect to, therefore, under which the Political Agent, with his Assistant on the spot in Khozdar, working through the Sirdars and with due regard to the Khan's position, lends a guiding hand to the affairs of the country seems the most suitable and at the same time the least pronounced step that could be taken to meet the circumstances of the difficult Jhalawan problem.

7

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30. Turning now to the Khan's niabats, I will briefly describe the position. On taking charge of the Agency in December 1900, I found that the late Agent to the Governor-General, Sir Hugh Barnes, had passed in his letter No. 6192 of the 4th July 1900, to Government some severe strictures on the Khan's administrative capacity and the state of his affairs and that Kazi Jalaluddin, the lately appointed Political Adviser, had been specially selected and deputed to Kalat to advise His Highness and assist in bettering his niabat administration. Nothing however had been done and there seemed no prospect of any step in the required direction being taken. At the same time, that the grossest mismanagement and corruption existed in the niabats was obvious. The Khan never visited any of them or took any intelligent interest in their affairs. All he thought of was the money he got out of them. The naibs too were mostly men of low origin, dishonest, ignorant and incompetent. They kept no proper accounts and what they did keep they evaded submitting as long as possible. Thus there were no means of checking the receipts and expenditure and the whole object of the naibs was to give the Khan as little as they thought would satisfy him and keep as much as they could for themselves. That this was the state of affairs really needs no demonstration. It was notorious and patent to all. And the naibs being such, the internal condition of their charges can well be imagined. Supported by a degraded and ruffianly body of the Khan's troops the naibs did just as they liked, oppressed and extorted all they could from the people and governed with hardly a shadow of justice or system. Nor was this all, for, taking advantage of the Khan's loose rule, the grasping Brahuis were encroaching on the niabats in all directions and the general confusion around them was certainly tempting them to lawlessness and causing inconvenience.

31. Thus as already mentioned one of my earliest steps was to relieve the Political Adviser of certain other and inappropriate duties he was performing and get him to seriously consider a scheme for the improvement of the niabats. A scheme having been devised the Khan was approached and his full consent to its introduction obtained.

32. The arrangement was that the six important niabats named in the margin were placed in the Political Adviser's charge and he was authorised to draw from the niabat revenues a certain monthly sum about Rs: 550 from each niabat) to meet the cost of establishment and other expenses. A band of trained and competent officials (taken from Government service in many cases) was enlisted, a regular system of accounts was introduced and rules for the settlement of cases were prescribed. The result has been unmistakable improvement in every direction, conspicuously so in respect of the revenue receipts which have gone up enormously, they have been doubled and trebled in most cases in every niabat. The scheme encountered the most strenuous opposition from the great body of the Kalat officials from the Khan's brother "the General" downwards who saw the goose that laid the golden eggs passing from their hold. Their chief efforts were directed to putting the Khan against the scheme and these, it is to be feared, met at one time with some success. Strong measures were therefore necessary if the whole business was not to end in a *fiasco*. In the reorganization of the niabat establishments the various naibs had been left undisturbed in their position and all other officials appointed were placed under their orders though of course their former arbitrary sway was at an end. The most powerful of the naibs was naib Akram (one of the Khan's slaves!) who was in charge of the rich and important Bhag niabat. He took the lead in the secret opposition to the Political Adviser but his zeal in this cause getting the better of his discretion, he passed from secret intrigue to overt hostility and the opportunity was taken to remove him—this with the Khan's acquiescence. This step broke the back of the opposition, but what is still more important the Khan himself eventually came to see that the scheme was intended solely for his own

Note —
1. Mastung.
2. Bhag.
3. Dhadur.
4. Gandawa.
5. Lehri.
6. Nasirabad.

The remaining niabats are Kalat, Khozdar and Surab with their sub-niabats. These are unimportant and are not supervised by the Political Adviser.

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benefit and that there was not the remotest desire—as mischievous persons had doubtless represented—to interfere with his rightful authority. Thus before I left Kalat last October he was giving the project open and genuine support It seems hardly necessary to enlarge on the advantages and suitability of the arrangement by which the Khan entrusts, under his own general control, the management of his revenue paying districts to a trained revenue official paid by himself. There must be many analogous cases among the Native Chiefs of India, for how many have the experience and capacity to administer their States without calling in expert assistance from outside? I once heard it remarked that if the Khan could not manage his own affairs he should be turned out, but this would I think be a most inadequate ground on which to take so extreme a step.

33. I will here recapitulate briefly the factors which go to make up the existing position of affairs in the State and then proceed to describe the measures necessary in my opinion for the consolidation and future success of the system now being pursued.

The Khan is the nominal head of the whole State, but his real authority only extends to his niabats or revenue paying possessions. The great mass of the Kalat people are revenue-free Brahui or Baluch tribesmen who, though they may on occasions recognise the Khan to serve some temporary purpose, consider and maintain themselves entirely independent, being indeed extremely zealous of any attempt on his part to exercise authority over them. On the British Government therefore has devolved the task of administering their affairs and the Political Agent under the orders of the Governor-General's Agent and having with him the Assistant Political Agent, Kalat, and three Native Assistants (*viz.*, the Political adviser, who is his assistant in a general way, the Native Assistant Sarawan and the Native Assistant Jhalawan) disposes not only of all tribal matters which the Chiefs themselves cannot adjust, but also of disputes between the tribes and the Khan's officials and revenue paying subjects. The machinery at his disposal consists further of the tribal chiefs in receipt of allowances and of nine Thanadars in charge of Thanas.

NOTE.—In these remarks no account has been taken of Mekran, the Las Bela State, the Bolan Pass and Kharan which also belong to the Kalat Agency.

The great bulk of the cases are settled in the Agency by jirgas convened by the Political Agent or otherwise. Any case which cannot be locally settled is referred to the bi-annual Shahi Jirga convened by the Governor-General's Agent. This system has worked well, the proof of it being that at no time since our connection with the State has it enjoyed a greater degree of peace and comparative good order than during the last four years. Of the nine niabats into which the Khan's revenue-paying possessions are divided, three are administered (very inefficiently) direct from Kalat and six are under a Kalat paid official who administers them on behalf of the Khan. This system too is working satisfactorily.

34. To ensure the continued success of these systems and therefore a state of peace, prosperity, contentment and loyalty in the country it is only necessary that they should be somewhat more fully developed. The existing Thanas should be strengthened by the addition of more men—50 per cent. all round say—and by increasing the pay of the Thanadars. Apart from the heavy duties performed by the men a show, if not the employment, of force is sometimes necessary to procure compliance with orders and half a dozen men should always be available for emergent duties of this sort. At present a Thana is often left almost destitute of levy-men. The pay of the Thanadars should be quite double what it is, as the duties they perform are difficult and responsible and it is important that we should secure the services of the best men in the country. At present no Thanadar receives more than Rs. 100 per mensem while many get no more than Rs. 50 or Rs. 35, and these rates are not sufficiently attractive to tempt good men to abandon their homes and their private concerns and encounter the hardships of public service. Then a few additional Thanas are required, two in Sarawan,

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viz., at Johan and Kirdagap, two in Jhalawan, *viz.*, at Wad, the head-quarters of the Mengals and in the Mulla Pass, and a thana at Kalat.

35. Machinery such as this however requires close and constant supervision to keep it in proper working order. We have now a Native Assistant in Sarawan and a Native Assistant in Jhalawan, and both officers should give their whole time to their respective tribes and be responsible for them to the Political Agent. This was arranged for in respect of Jhalawan in September last and before I proceeded on leave I made similar proposals as regards Sarawan. These proposals were, I believe, accepted in the first instance, but were subsequently modified by the proviso that the Native Assistant Sarawan while having the charge of Sarawan tribes should act as an Assistant to the Political Adviser. This arrangement seems to me both unnecessary and unworkable. In the first place the Political Adviser will have quite enough work as he can efficiently perform if he pays proper attention to the Khan and his affairs and it is only by neglecting these that he can give any of his time to Brahui affairs, and secondly to place one high native official under another and create a division of authority can never be satisfactory. It will give rise to jealousies and friction and, the sense of full responsibility being lacking, we cannot expect to find the Native Assistant's best energies and capacity brought into play. While proposing to put the Native Assistant Sarawan in charge of the Sarawan Brahuis and Thanas, I arranged that the work hitherto performed by him should be transferred to the Assistant Political Agent. The work in question comprises the Magisterial and other work along the Nushki railway line, the charge of the Levies and the Public Works and the supervision of the Political Agent's office during the Political Agent's absence on tour, etc. To this will be added correspondence in connection with the projected new cantonment near Mastung. Thus there will be plenty for him to do as for every one else in the Agency and his correct rôle is undoubtedly as sketched above, *viz.*, to be employed in or near the Agency head-quarters ready whenever necessary to take the Political Agent's place.

36. The difficulty standing in the way of the improvements mentioned in paragraph 33 above is the want of funds and a consideration of the subject confronts us with question of principle which should I think be looked in the face and once for all set at rest. However weak his authority the Khan is undoubtedly the head of the Baluch Confederacy and technically, if nothing else, the Baluch and Brahui tribesmen are his subjects. I take it therefore that we can rightly consider him responsible for the due administration of the country both as to its "Khalsa" portion (to use an Indian word) and its tribal portion. But the administrative system of the State being inherently weak and rotten has broken down, while the present Khan, owing to personal shortcomings, is less than ever able to rule his State unassisted. The supreme power in the country therefore has had to step in and take measures for the control of that portion of the Khan's subjects that he himself can not control. Is he or is he not liable for the cost of the measures we take for him? There can surely be only one answer and that in the affirmative. Of course the Khan might claim that if he is to be charged with the cost of controlling the tribes he would sooner do it himself and according to his own methods. But what would these methods be? Nothing but the raising of a force of ruffianly mercenaries by whose means the country would soon relapse into the State of anarchy and confusion on the putting a stop to which our original intervention in 1875-76 was based. Such wholesale retrogression under which the fruits of 30 years of endeavour in the pacification and civilization of the country would be gone in a day, can never find favour with Government.

37. There are two alternatives to asking the Khan to pay, *viz.*, either that Government should pay or that we should assess the tribes to revenue in return for the administration given them. But these are advanced measures which I would not certainly recommend. The adoption of either would carry with it the assumption that the tribes were no longer, even technically, the Khan's subjects. Such an idea should be discouraged as long as possible I think. The substance of the Khan's position in the country is vanishing quite fast enough without any help

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from us and our policy should be to at all events preserve the shadow of it. Also as regards the second alternative the time has not yet come for such a measure; and it hardly can come until the present system has been fully developed and is then found to be in some respect insufficient or unsatisfactory. I will only mention here that should taxation be resorted to the measure can be based quite fairly on the fact that the tribes all hold grants of land from the Khan on a service tenure under which they furnished, when called upon to do so, troops to the Khan's army. Well, troops are now never furnished and nor have they been for a great many years, but the terms of the original grants have never been cancelled. I may also say that in an indirect way we are already taxing the tribesmen by levying court fees on petitions and civil suits.

38. It was doubtless in view of the Khan's responsibility that certain funds have been obtained from him and devoted to the improvement and administration of the State. Thus we have the fund known as the Khan's Fund which is mainly recruited from the interest obtained for the 43 lacs found in Kalat on the abdication of the late Khan and invested for the State in Government paper. With regard to this interest money there are, apart from the Khan's obligation to bear the cost of administering the Brahuis, two further arguments justifying our disposing of it, *viz.*, (1) that the Khan as a good Moslem cannot touch money obtained as interest and (2) that the 43 lacs never belonged to the present Khan. They were part of the hoard accumulated by the late Khan and they now belong to the State as a whole and must be used for the benefit of the State. The interest money however was not sufficient for all requirements and some years ago the Khan made over to us the Rs. 55,000 per annum he receives for the Bolan Pass and Quetta quit rents. The original object with which this sum was given us was the maintenance of the Mekran Camel Corps and, although we still pay out of it some Rs. 40,000 a year to the Nazim for the levies etc., that took the place of the camel corps on its disbandment, it would be fair to restore the item to the Khan if it can be managed, especially now that the Mekran Levy Corps having been raised there will be a considerable reduction in the number of the Nazim's levies. Without this extra sum however the Khan's fund would be unable to meet the present expenditure, leave alone the increased expenditure involved in the proposed improvements. But this need cause no difficulty if the two points I wish to make, *viz*, the Khan's liability and our right to devote the interest money to the use of the State at large, are conceded. We give the Khan a subsidy of one lac a year to assist him in his administration. Under the circumstances of the case could we not reasonably ask the Khan to expend this lac or a portion of it on the arrangements we find ourselves obliged to make on his account? Or another solution would be to ask the Khan to meet out of this lac or otherwise the charges about Rs. 50,000 per annum for the maintenance of the ex-Khan and his household and at the same time to let the niabats bear the cost of the Political Adviser and his establishment, about Rs. 30,000 per annum. These large items are now debited, but hardly fairly so, to the Khan's Fund. Relieved of such burdens the interest money would suffice for all administrative purposes, and there could never be the least objection to its being fully and permanently devoted to such purposes. Even without the great increases in his revenue effected under the niabat scheme the Khan would be very little worse off than at present. He would receive back his Rs. 15,000 per annum and disburse sums aggregating some Rs. 80,000, or a difference of only Rs. 15,000. This would be a small thing for him to do when it is remembered that it is we who placed him where he is and that it is probably only due to our presence in the country that he maintains himself there. It should also be borne in mind that the whole of his large and now daily increasing income of some seven lacs is spent entirely on himself, if it is not being hoarded up and that no penny of it is ever expended on the benefit of the country or otherwise outside the Kalat Miri.

39. To improve the niabat system very little more is required. The monthly sums placed in each niabat at the Political Adviser's disposal should be slightly increased to admit of the employment of a few extra officials and to leave the Political Adviser with a surplus with which to carry out works of improvement

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and public utility. Also it is very necessary that the Khan's "sepoys" employed in the niabats should be placed entirely under the Political Adviser's control. It is obviously undesirable that in carrying out schemes of reform he and his staff should have in their midst an unreliable body of armed men not subject to his authority.

40. The first thing however is that the Political Adviser should give his whole time to the Khan and his niabats. His Highness stands greatly in need of some one at his elbow to whom he can turn for advice and support and whose influence it may be hoped, would in time have the effect of raising the tone of the Khan's life and surroundings and awake in him a sense of the dignity and responsibility attaching to his high position. In the rich and productive niabats there is a very wide field for useful development and improvement. To mention only a single case, the newly started silk industry should, if persevered in, give most satisfactory results, not only in the augmentation of the Khan's revenues, but in finding profitable employment for the poverty-stricken, and therefore unsettled and lawless-people of the country.

41. The above then is the existing position of affairs in the Kalat State and I trust the views expressed as to the issues involved and the policy to be pursued by us in relation thereto will meet with approval. My main contentions briefly are :—

(1) That *de facto*, if not *de jure*, the tribes are independent of the Khan's authority.

(2) That nevertheless the Khan, as the hereditary head of the Confederacy, is responsible for the proper administration of the country.

(3) That we, as the dominant power in the country, have by the force of circumstances, had the obligation laid on us of administering the tribes on the Khan's behalf.

It is on the virtual, if not the open, acceptance of these principles that our whole proceedings in relation to the State have been and are based and if it is desired to preserve the integrity of the State the surest, if not the only means of doing it is to continue in the same course. Government I know are averse to interference as far as avoidable, but after all it is not so very much that we do. We merely seek to control the tribes and support the Chiefs by means of tribal levies under tribal thanadars; while as to the thana system in general it existed in Baluchistan long before our time and is still universal in Afghanistan. To attempt anything less than this would be quite ineffective; while if it did not bring us actual discredit it would probably involve us in a situation far more difficult and complicated than that now before us. In carrying out the system we ask the Khan for nothing of the income he derives from his niabats: merely for the interest of the late Khan's hoarded treasure and if necessary for a portion of the subsidy given him by Government for the better administration of the State. As to the Khan's immediate affairs both domestic and niabat we interfere not at all. Under our advice he adopted a beneficial scheme of reorganisation in his niabats and now the scheme is in working order we need have nothing more to do with it beyond keeping a general eye on the proceedings of the Political Adviser for whom, as he is a Government official lent to the State, we are in a way responsible. A further advantage in the employment of the Political Adviser is that in the event of the Khan's death—and his health is very indifferent and—a minority ensuing there would be no dislocation of the administrative system as presumably nothing more would be necessary than to give the Political Adviser somewhat fuller powers under a fuller supervision by the Political Agent.

42. In conclusion I attach to this note a statement showing some of the work done and the improvements effected in the Agency in the past four years. It will give some idea of the Political Agent's duties and show how extensive a field lies before us in the pacification of this promising but backward country, in the reclaiming the tribes from their present wild and unsettled lives and in

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converting them thus from a source of weakness, if not of a danger, to the frontier into loyal, reliable and useful subjects of the Empire, capable of furnishing, if required, not less than 50,000 troops or levies in its defence. In view of the strong and ever-increasing Afghan element in our Indian army it seems strange that more use is not made of the admirable counterpoise offered by the hardy and warlike Baluch and Brahui tribes. A most useful beginning has been made in the raising of the Mekran Levy Corps at Mastung, and if the result proves satisfactory the exploitation of this promising source of recruitment will, let us hope, be continued.

H. L. SHOWERS, *Major*,
Political Agent, Kalat.

APPENDIX A.

Copy of a Memorandum (by the late Major H. M. Temple, Political Agent in Kalat, 1889)

In the present year the zamindars of Mastung have come to Quetta three times, and have made a series of complaints both to the Political Agent and to the Agent to the Governor-General. Complaints of this kind occcur yearly. During the spring the Brahuis come up from the plains, and considerable numbers of them settle in Mastung, where many of them possess lands which they cultivate. Many also who have no lands, undertake labour such as reaping the crops, etc. On the approach of the cold weather the Brahuis return to the plains.

As long as they remain in Mastung there are constant complaints against the Brahuis. These complaints are made chiefly by the dehwars. These men are for the most part zamindars in Mastung. They are the permanent inhabitants and do not leave Mastung at any time of year.

The complaints are generally in consequence of damage done by the Brahuis who loot the crops, rob the gardens, and steal property from the houses of the dehwars. They naturally endeavour to obtain redress, but they are unable to do so, because there is in almost every case great difficulty in tracing a lawless act to any particular offender. The Brahuis live in groups of tents known as "dhunis." The dehwars cannot enter these "dhunis" to prosecute their enquiries or to apprehend suspected persons. As were they to do so, they would be attacked. In many cases they have traced the footprints of depredators, to a certain "dhuni" but were unable to prove a case against any particular person Whenever the Sirdars are applied to for redress they take refuge in the excuses such as their inability to take action, because no proof has been brought against any particular man.

Before Sir Robert Sandeman came to Baluchistan, the Khan and the Brahuis were always at war with one another. The Khan was constantly trying to coerce and punish the Brahuis, but he was not strong enough to do so effectively; hence the internecine strife which raged for about 20 years after the present Khan succeeded his brother Nasir Khan. The result of the arrangements made after Sir Robert Sandeman's arrival in Baluchistan was the intervention by British officers between the Khan and the Brahuis. Since the establishment of the Baluchistan Agency, the Khan has not interfered with the Brahuis. Were he to do so matters would speedily return to the former disturbed condition which was rife before peace was established in Baluchistan by the efforts of Sir Robert Sandeman. As the Khan has now no concern with the Brahuis and as in cases in which his subjects are concerned reference is made to us, the Khan cannot be said to be in fault, as regards the present unfortunate state of affairs.

Ever since the Baluchistan Agency has been established the tribesmen have been dealt with through their Sirdars. To enable the Sirdars to hold their own in their own tribes and to support and strengthen hereditary position, they

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have been paid from the office of the Agent to the Governor-General as noted in the margin. In addition to this the tribesmen of some of the Sarawan tribes have been entertained in service in the Bolan.

	Rs.
S. Assad Khan	400
Yar Mohamed	300
Dost Mohamed	300
Syad Khan	300
Rashid Khan	300
Nur Mohamed	300

Whenever complaints against Brahuis have been made by the zamindars—and they have been made often, the Sirdars of the tribes concerned have been communicated with, with a view to justice being done, and with the object of obtaining the restoration of the property stolen, on the surrender of the accused persons concerned. It has, however, in practice been found, that such applications to the Sirdar, are not effective. Excuses such as want of proof, the absence of the accused persons, and various other subterfuges are made use of. The zamindars get no redress, while they are subjected to increasing depredations, and hence the outcry they make.

The tribes mostly concerned in the complaints made by the zamindars are :—

(*a*) The Bangalzais.
(*b*) The Shahwanis.
(*c*) The Mohamed Shahis.
(*d*) The Lehris.

I would therefore propose that the Sirdars of the above tribes should each of them be called upon to furnish 2 sowars each. Each sowar should get Rs. 20. A sum of Rs. 40 should therefore be deducted from the pay of each of the above Sirdars—*i.e.*, out of the pay which they receive monthly. Unless the above step is taken the Sirdars will I am assured continue to make the same excuses in the future, which they have made in the past. These sowars should only be appointed for the hot weather months, as in the cold weather the Brahuis will be in the plains. The money should I would propose be handed over to my office, I would then engage two sowars from each tribe, as above. I would also send a jamadar with them, I think I can arrange for a jamadar without calling upon the Sirdars. For the present year the sowars would probably only be wanted for August, September and October. After the end of October they might be discharged. Perhaps next year there may not be the same necessity for sending the sowars, as the Sirdars will see that we are in earnest, and that excuses cannot be accepted in future. They will then perhaps look after their tribesmen.

Up to this point only the complaints of the zamindars against the Brahuis have been considered. The zamindars have however made a number of complaints against the Khan's officials. If the sowars are sent, they will be instructed to deal with the complaints against the Brahuis. As regards the Khan's officials, if the complaints continue it will be necessary to bring pressure to bear on them.

Agent to the Governor-General's order.

I have directed Rs. 40 a month to be cut from the subsidies of each of the 4 Sirdars (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), (*d*), and paid to 2 sowars from each tribe. Make a note of this and ask Major Temple to let us know up to what time he wishes the deduction made and to let us know when the full subsidy may again be paid.

(Sd). J. B.

The 16th August 1889.

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APPENDIX B.

List of the levies paid from the Khan's Fund.

Serial No.	Name of Thana or post.	Sanctioned Strength.								
		Rasaldars.	Thanadars.	Jamadars.	Duffadars.	Muharirs	Camel sowars.	Sowars.	Footmen.	Total.
1	Zahri Thana	...	1	1	1	1	...	8	...	12
2	Saruna ,, ...	...	...	1	2	1	...	6	...	10
3	Kasmeji (Marlak)	...	...	1	...	1	...	1	5	8
4	Surah ,, ...	...	...	1	...	1	...	4	4	10
5	Wad Post	...	...	...	...	...	...	5	...	5
6	Mashkai Thana	...	...	1	...	1	...	4	4	10
7	Mastung ,, ...	...	1	...	2	1	...	7	4	15
8	Kanak Post	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	2
9	Aloo Thana	...	...	1	...	1	...	4	5	11
10	Mungchur Thana	...	...	1	...	1	...	6	1	9
11	Gandawa ,, ...	...	1	...	...	1	...	3	...	5
12	Sowars posted at Kalat for Jalawan Dak	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	...	3
	Levies attached to offices.									
13	Office of the Political Agent, Kalat ...	...	...	...	...	...	5	...	...	5
14	Ditto Political Adviser, Kalat ...	...	0	1	1	...	4	14	...	20
15	Ditto Assistant Political Agent, Kalat.	...	...	...	...	...	...	7	...	7
16	Ditto Native Assistant, Jalawan...	1	...	...	1	...	...	18	...	20
	Total ...	1	3	8	7	9	9	90	25	152

KANNAYA LALL,
for *Political Adviser, Kalat.*

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APPENDIX C.

List of Levies in the Quetta-Pishin District, Baluchistan, corrected up to 31st December 1904.

Serial No.	Posts.	Risaldars or Jemadars.	Mounted.	Foot.	Total.	Remarks.
	LEVIES.					
1	Arambi	2	...	3	5	
2	Baleli	...	...	2	2	
3	Bahlolwar	1	...	7	8	
4	Buz-i-Aziz Khan	1	...	5	6	
5	Barshore	1	2	10	13	
6	Bostan	2	2	4	8	
7	Chaman Fort	2	...	7	9	
8	Chaman New	7	9	26	42	
9	Churmian	1	...	2	3	
10	Dinar Karez	1	...	2	3	
11	Dobandi	2	7	28	37	
12	Fullers' Camp	...	...	2	2	
13	Ghazaband Pass	1	...	3	4	
14	Gulistan	2	8	...	10	
15	Gwaja Pass	1	...	6	7	
16	Gowal	1	...	...	1	
17	Hama Pass	1	...	4	5	
18	Jalogir	1	...	2	3	
19	Khanai	1	...	2	3	
20	Khanozai	1	...	2	3	
21	Khushdil Khan	2	3	8	13	
22	Killa Abdullah	3	2	14	19	
23	Kuchlak	2	2	...	4	
24	Kurrnen	1	7	10	18	
25	Mian Ghundi	1	6	1	8	
26	Peshin	13	39	13	65	
27	Quetta	11	38	2	51	
28	Roghani	1	...	4	5	
29	Salad	1	...	4	5	
30	Samungli	1	3	...	4	
31	Sanzal	1	...	3	4	
32	Sara Khulla Pass ...	1	...	3	4	
33	Saranan	...	...	2	2	
34	Saran Tongi	1	...	1	2	
35	Sariad	1	...	5	6	
36	Shamshi Khan	1	...	8	9	
37	Shararud (Punjpai)	1	5	4	10	
38	Shelabagh	1	...	3	4	
39	Spina tegha	1	...	5	6	
40	Syed Hamid...	...	...	3	3	
41	Yaru Karez	1	3	...	4	
42	Yusuf Kuch	1	...	2	3	
43	Zaraband	...	...	3	3	
	Total ...	75	136	215	426	

KANNAYA LALL,
for *Political Adviser, Kalat.*

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

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A statement showing the principal work done and the improvements effected in the Kalat Agency during the four years 1901-04.

1. In 1900 the Khan had placed a lac of rupees in the Political Agent's hands for the repair of his Miri at Mastung and other purposes Rs 50,000 and more had been spent on the Miri but the work proved most unsatisfactory and extensive changes and further repairs were found necessary in January 1901. The matter gave much trouble and involved considerable correspondence but the Miri is now in a thoroughly satisfactory condition.

2. The metalled road from Quetta to Kalat, which has not been touched since its construction in 1896-97 and had become in parts unfit for wheeled traffic, was repaired and has since been maintained in perfect order.

3. A site for a new Gadi bund was selected by the Political Agent in August 1901, and the bund which used annually to be washed away, has not since broken. By means of this bund large areas of land belonging both to the Khan and the Brahui tribes are brought under irrigation.

4. Mastung having been selected as the head-quarters of the Agency, a new station has been formed there on a site selected by and acquired by the Political Agent. The various new buildings erected comprise a new Agency house lying in extensive and well laid out grounds, an office building, three blocks of clerks, quarters, levy lines, a levy thana and Jail combined, a dispensary, a school, a bazaar, and certain buildings for the use of officials paid from the Khan's Funds. The first named three buildings were constructed by the Public Works Department, but all the rest under the immediate direction of the Political Agent.

5. A new summer station at an elevation of 8,500 ft. has been discovered and formed at Gish in the Harboi hills, 16 miles east of Kalat. Here a small tworoomed house has been built and the place is certainly destined as the Kalat State develops to be the recognised summer residence of the Political Agent and other local officials.

6. A small road-side, rest-house has been built at Guru half way between Mastung and Mungochar on the Quetta-Kalat road.

7. A "Kalat" house has been built at Sibi for the use either of the Khan or of the Political Officers of the Agency. The Political Agent has frequently to visit Sibi in connection with Kachi cases and a house there was most necessary for the Agency.

8. Previous to 1901 the Government horse-breeding operations had not touched the Jhalawan country but in that year the Political Agent arranged for a Government horse to be sent to Kalat and, this step proving successful, two horses were sent in the year following, while the number now has been increased to four and suitable stallion stables, paid for half from Imperial revenues and half from Kalat funds, have been provided. In addition to this three good stallions have been obtained for the Khan for his private stud, a donkey-stallion has been purchased for Makran and placed at Panjgur. while a horse and a donkey stallion have been obtained for the Jam of Las Bela.

9. Six new levy thanas have been established, *viz.*, at Mungochar in Sarawan, Gandava in Kachi, at Surab in Upper Jhalawan, at Khozdar, at Mar Lak in the Mengal country and in the Mashkai valley half way between Kalat and Mekran. At each of these places suitable thana buildings have been erected while a seventh building has been provided at Zehri for the Thana already existing there.

10. In addition to the thanas small levy posts have been established at seven different places, *viz.*, at Doctor Chah, Guru, Kotul and Soroo along, and for the safety of the Quetta-Kalat road, at Ladgasht on the Persian border, at Samotri in the Mengal country and at Wad with the working Mengal Sirdar.

11. Several very useful roads have been constructed all over the district, the total length of these either completed or in hand being about 330 miles.

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13. A fine Juniper forest extending to some 44,000 acres and which was fast being ruined has been reserved in the Harboi hills with the consent of the tribes concerned and chowkidars appointed for its protection. This is the first forest reserved in the Kalat State.

13. The first school in the Kalat State will shortly be opened at Mastung—the chiefs in the neighbourhood having subscribed handsomely towards the building and His Highness the Khan having promised a sum for the maintenance of the institution.

14. On behalf of the Khan and as a Coronation Memorial a race-course has been constructed at Kalat. This is much appreciated by the people.

15. In the spring of 1904 an experiment in sericulture was carried out at Mastung from seed obtained from the Kashmir Darbar. The result was eminently satisfactory, the silk produced having been pronounced by London and Lyons experts as quite equal to, if not better than the best Kashmir silk. At the same time Sir Thomas Wardle, a well known authority on Indian silk questions, thinks the future of the silk industry in the Kalat State most promising and deserving of every encouragement.

16. Arboriculture has been encouraged and many thousands of trees have been planted.

17. Since 1901 the Quetta Nushki railway has been under construction through the district entailing considerable work in the taking up of land the settlement of claims for compensation, the police, levy and magisterial arrangements, the formation and control of bazaars with their octroi and other funds, etc.

18. In 1901 the charge of the Bolan Pass was transferred from the Kurd Sirdars to the Kurd Chief. The Chief had fled to Kandahar and on his return two years later he asked to resume charge of the pass which had in the meanwhile been given to his brothers. The restoration was effected but owing to the bitter feud existing in the family the transfer was not an easy one to carry out.

19. The long standing family dispute above referred to between the Kurd Chief and his brother and which had caused much inconvenience in the administration of the tribe was adjusted in 1901 after long and difficult discussion.

20. In 1903 a redistribution of the Bolan Levies was carried out. The old distribution was out of date and the services of the men were not being utilized to the best advantage.

21. In March 1903 the Saruna boundary case was settled. The case had been outstanding for years and has been the cause of constant dispute and disturbance between the Mengals of Kalat and the Chuttas of Las Bela.

22. A scheme for the better administration of the Khan's niabats, the keynote of which had been sounded by the Honourable Mr. Barnes in 1900, was carried into effect in 1902. In spite of many difficulties and the strenuous opposition of the whole body of the corrupt and unscrupulous Kalat officials the scheme has been entirely successful and has already resulted in enormous increases of the Khan's revenue. It is not too much to say that the Khan's very existence is involved in this scheme, for the present Khan has little or no ability for administration and between the capacity of his officials and the encroachments of the Brahuis he would soon have stripped bare of possessions. There is now an organized and efficient staff of officials in each of the six niabats concerned, suitable offices and quarters have been built for them and revenue and judicial work is systematically carried on.

23. The arrangements for the important cession of the Khan's lands to Government and the actual handing over of the tract were carried out through the Kalat Agency.

24. In 1904 the ex-Khan was removed from Loralai to Pishin when the Pishin fort was taken over and many alterations and additions were carried out by the Kalat Agency for the accommodation of the household.

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25. Owing to the incapacity of the Chief the affairs of the large Mengal tribe have not been in a satisfactory condition. In September 1903 all the leading men in the tribe responded to the Political Agent's summons and came to Kalat when the question of the control of the tribe was fully discussed and with the consent of all parties Mir Wali Muhammad, the Chief's cousin, was appointed the working Sardar of the tribe. This arrangement is still in force.

26. Sirdar Rustam Khan, the Chief of the powerful Muhammad Hassani tribe, who had been "yagi" (contumacious) for the past two years came in and tendered his obedience to the Political Agent in 1902. In this he relied on a verbal assurance given by the Political Agent to his friends that he would be treated with fairness and the respect due to his rank. Though it has not so far been possible to remove the cause of his discontent this Sardar is now one of the most loyal and useful men in the country.

27. At a large Jirga convened by the Political Agent at Kalat in September 1902 the important case of the fight between the Haruni and Rodini tribes in which S. Pasand Khan had quite gratuitously taken a share was satisfactorily settled. As a part of the settlement the Sirdar had to pay no less than Rs. 7,000 as blood money and other compensation which it may be hoped will act as a salutary check on his high-handed methods in the future.

28. In 1901 a difficult case arose between the Khan and the Brahuis of Pringabad. Certain Brahuis had acquired in the village cultivating rights over lands that ordinarily paid the Khan one-sixth share of the produce as revenue, but, owing either to the weakness or the dishonesty of the Khan's naib at Mastung, a far smaller share than the right one had been recovered for some seasons past. In view of the tendency of the Brahuis to encroach on the Khan's rights on all possible occasions it was important that this case should be properly settled. The difficulty in a case of this sort lies in the fact that the Brahui Sirdars naturally side with their tribesmen and honest advice or assistance is not to be expected from them. However after much intrigue and some bluster on the part of the Brahuis (including a threat against the Political Agent or Political Adviser's life, which, by the way, was duly punished) the matter was settled by the Brahuis agreeing to pay the full and undoubtedly correct demand.

29. The big Sanari land case between the Bugtis and Bajkanis in the Southern Baluchistan Agency was entrusted to the Political Agent, Kalat, in October 1902, and settled to the satisfaction of all parties.

30. In 1904 the Mekran Levy Corps some 350 strong was raised in the Agency by Captain F. McConaghey under the general direction of the P. A.

31. In 1902-3 the Khan and a large number of Kalat Sirdars and followers were taken to and steered through the Delhi Darbar *en route* to the Darbar and again on the return journey to Baluchistan the Khan, who had with him 150 followers, was taken on a visit to various Indian cities. It was the first time he had ever been out of Baluchistan, but he and his wild crew were brought safely back to Kalat without the occurrence of any hitch in the arrangements or of any serious contretemps.

32. In addition to the establishment of the new thanas referred to at No. 9 above the administrative machinery of the Agency has been improved by the appointment of an Assistant Political Agent, a Native Assistant in Sarawan and a Native Assistant in Jhalawan, while the office establishment has been reorganized and strengthened.

33. In connection with the Jhalawan appointment a site for the Native Assistant's head-quarters has been selected and acquired, various buildings have been erected, office and levy establishments have been provided, a postal service with Kalat has been organized and detailed instructions for the Native Assistant's guidance have been prepared.

34. The following honors have been recommended for and granted to Sirdars of the Agency :—

S. Ghaus Bukhsh, Raisani, K.C.I.E.,
S. Kaisar Khan, Magasi, Nawab.
Mir Mehrulla Khan, Raisani, C.I.E.,
Mir Rahim Khan, Kurd, Khan Sahib.
Mir Mehrab Khan, Gichki, Sirdar.

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35. The above summary takes no account of the many long and important tours performed, *e g.*, three times to Mekran, twice with troops for operations and negotiations in Persian territory and again when 180 leading men of Western Baluchistan were collected and presented to His Excellency the Viceroy at Pasni; and from Karachi to Quetta through the heart of the Jhalawan country. Nor has any mention been made of the development of Pasni and the large increase that has accrued to its revenues. Nor has any mention been made of Kharan whose Chief, Sir Nauroz Khan, has maintained a most friendly and satisfactory attitude towards the Political Agent and given no trouble whatever to the Baluchistan Agency in the last four years.

The above record of work done and improvements carried out far surpasses in scope and importance anything that has been accomplished in Kalat before. At the same time there has been no reversal of the policy hitherto followed in the State and no new departures and drastic changes. As regards the Brahuis all that has been done is to give more thorough effect to a system of administration in force for several years past by the establishment of additional Brahui thanas and the exercise through their means of a more effective control than had previously obtained. As regards the Khan's niabats the scheme now in force was conceived in outline by Sir H. Barnes and generally approved by Government. But effect had not been given to the scheme and there was every prospect of its being entirely lost sight of.

Further it is fair to claim that in the methods pursued there has been nothing that either Khan or Sirdars could take the least exception to. In fact it is through the Khan and the Sirdars that I have always worked paying every possible attention to the Khan's susceptibilities, to tribal usage, to the prejudices of the tribes and their love of independence. Results speak for themselves and I doubt if at any time in the history of the country has such peace and good order prevailed as we have had during the past four years. The great body of the Sirdars are at this moment absolutely loyal to the Political Agent and the Agent to the Governor-General and the Government he represents with all my relations with the Khan have been uninterruptedly cordial and at my last meeting with him he expressed the earnest hope that I would return to Kalat without fail on the expiry of my leave.

H. L. SHOWERS, *Major*,

Political Agent, Kalat.

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(Confidential.)

REPORT ON RECONNAISSANCES MADE WHILE ATTACHED TO THE SEISTAN ARBITRATION COMMISSION.

INTRODUCTION.

Towards the end of December 1902 I received telegraphic orders to join the Seistan Mission which was shortly to start from Quetta for Seistan, travelling by way of Nushki and the Helmand.

My duties were to make a railway reconnaissance of the route traversed by the expedition. Our line of march lay through Southern Afghanistan, and the opportunity of obtaining some knowledge of the country from a Railway Engineer's point of view was regarded as highly valuable. My staff consisted of two native surveyors.

I reached Quetta in time to start with the Mission on the 10th January, thanks to Colonel McMahon who engaged my transport beforehand, and to Mr. Woodside, Executive Engineer, Quetta-Nushki Railway, who supplied me with tents and instruments. I accompanied the party as far as Bund-i-Seistan, where the head works of the main canal are situated on the Perso-Afghan frontier, about 35 miles from the capital, Nasratabad.

The total length of this reconnaissance was 338 miles, 213 from Nushki to the Helmand and 125 down the valley to Bund-i-Seistan. There the Mission halted to commence arbitration proceedings; and as the country beyond was flat and featureless, both the British Commissioner and I were of opinion that my services as Railway Intelligence Officer with the party were no longer required. It was, therefore, agreed that I should return by an alternative route, and investigate the alignment of a railway which should lie wholly in British territory from the Persian frontier at Robat to Nushki.

The general direction of this reconnaissance coincides with what is generally known as the Seistan trade route; its length is about 360 miles from our frontier post at Robat, or 344 miles from the Afghan frontier at the point where I crossed it, Maki Nawar, near Ziarat Shah-i-Mardan.

The advantages of a railway along this route were, in Colonel McMahon's opinion, two-fold; in that, lying within our own border, it could be put in hand at any time, and that, being a flanking line to an invader from Seistan or the Helmand, it is strategically preferable to the direct line down the valley.

The weakness of an unsupported line of such length in proximity throughout to a possibly hostile frontier is, however, apparent. Its liability to attack at various points on its length would, if Afghanistan were unfriendly, hamper operations in force at its western extremity, if it did not make them quite too hazardous to attempt.

It, therefore, seemed desirable, for the sake of the completeness of the scheme, that a reconnaissance should be made for a railway from some suitable junction on the trade route to a port on the coast; with the double object of stiffening the Nushki-Seistan Railway, by providing a second line of advance and retreat, and of preventing its being outflanked, and left in the air, by an invading force advancing through Southern Baluchistan.

My own predilection was in favour of a connection with Karachi, but both Colonel McMahon and Major Showers, Political Agent, Kalat, were desirous that the claims of Pasni as a terminal port should not be neglected. I accordingly investigated routes to both places.

Note.—Both are now of opinion that Karachi is the better objective.

The length of these reconnaissances in Southern Baluchistan was 730 miles. They were unavoidably carried out in almost the hottest time of the year, between the 10th April and the 14th June, when it is barely possible to do such work as exhaustively as in the usual working season. But the necessity for a railway from the coast to Seistan has been so frequently dwelt upon by military writers (as if the feasibility of the scheme was not a matter for doubt), that it

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seemed undesirable to lose the opportunity, that my being in the country with staff and transport offered, of placing the practicability or impracticability of the route beyond all question.

Deducting my pay, the total cost of this last reconnaissance was not much over Rs. 2,000.

I may add that, omitting alternative and rejected routes, which alone come to several hundred miles, the total length of the reconnaissances under report amounts to almost 1,500 miles.[1] The expenditure, *viz.*, pay of self and staff, survey khallasis, transport, &c., totals about Rs. 21,000, or Rs. 14 per mile.

[1] Includes 66 miles, Bund-i-Kamal Khan to Afghan frontier near Robat.

The various lines are shown on a large and rather unwieldy map to the scale of 4 miles = 1″, and on a smaller and more convenient one to the scale of 16 miles = 1″. The general scale for the barometric section of the alignment traversed is 1 mile = 1″ Horizontal,

100 feet = 1″ Vertical,

but long stretches of easy country, such as the Nushki-Seistan line and the northern section of the Kondi-Coast line are plotted to the scale of

4 miles = 1″ Horizontal.

400 feet = 1″ Vertical.

The reports and estimates are three :—

(*a*) Nushki to Bund-i-Seistan *via* the Helmand.

(*b*) Nushki to Robat or Bund-i-Seistan *via* the trade route.

(*c*) Kondi [a point on (*b*)] to Karachi or Pasni.

In addition to the foregoing, a chart of the Makran coast is attached, and the various Trigonometrical survey sheets of the routes traversed.

Sd. W. A. Johns

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Reconnaissance and Estimate for a Railway from Nushki to the Helmand and thence to the Persian frontier at Bund-i-Seistan.

The strategic value of a line from Nushki to the south-eastern elbow of the Helmand at Landi Wali Muhammad Khan, whence it could bifurcate up-stream to Girishk and Kandahar, and downstream to Persia, was frequently urged by the late General Sir James Browne, R.E.

Little or nothing, however, was known of the last 80 miles of the route till in January 1903 a detachment of the Mission, including Mr. Ward, Executive Engineer, Punjab Canals, marched along it from Galur *via* Alungi Pat and Nawab Chah to Landi Wali Muhammad.

The main body, with which I stayed, followed the line of march of the Boundary Commission of 1885, while a third party took an intermediate route, of which I was unable to obtain a continuous section. Thanks to Mr. Ward, who kindly took a section of his route, I have been able to submit sections of the eastern and western lines of march, while from information received from Mr. Tate, who followed the intermediate route, I am satisfied that the features of the country he traversed are practically the same as those of Mr. Ward's section.

It will be noted that the alignment now recommended for subsequent investigation (shown dotted on the plan) is in many places several miles away from any of the routes followed by members of the Mission, and that no section has been taken along it. I should, therefore, explain the circumstances under which the reconnaissance was carried out. The presence of a railway officer with the Seistan Arbitration Commission might have been objected to as having no connection with the arbitration proceedings. The prejudice of the Afghans against railways is well known; so, to avoid all cause of provocation, it was essential that my work should be done as unostentatiously as possible. To this end I was appointed geologist of the party, and spent my time ostensibly collecting specimens, while I placed my two surveyors at the disposal of Mr. Tate, who was carrying out a compass traverse of the lines of march. By this arrangement my men were able to make a section of the road, while Mr. Tate's surveyors made the traverse. My own work was limited to seeing as much of the country as possible along the line of march.

So long as the caravan road along which we marched followed an alignment that was suitable for a railway, this procedure was quite satisfactory. When, however, the caravan road left the natural route for a railway, as it frequently did, (for its direction was entirely governed by the position of the various wells), or when we unexpectedly ran up against an almost impracticable Kotal, as we did crossing the northern spur of the Chageh mountains, it was quite impossible for me to separate from the main body for a day or two, and examine alternative alignments; still more out of the question would it have been to pick out the correct alignment and take a section along it. To have done so would have attracted a most undesirable amount of attention.

The reconnaissance was, therefore, limited to the examination of certain caravan roads from a Railway Engineer's point of view. Fortunately the configuration of the country is of such a nature that I can speak with considerable confidence as to the possibilities of railway construction, and point out with fair exactness where the best alignment will most probably be found. Even this is of value, for if ever the time arrives when the construction of a line to the Helmand is called for, the knowledge of where the difficult portions occur will be of great assistance in organising a survey; while a record of unsuccessful attempts to find a route, such as mine at the Gazi Chah and Umbai Passes through the Chageh spur, may save days of fruitless exploration.

With this explanation of the scope of the reconnaissance I may proceed to give a detailed description of the country along the route followed by the Mission.

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General description of Route.—Its physical features for the first 80 miles from Nushki are easily understood. A narrow belt of low sandhills extends from Nushki to the south-eastern outliers of the Chageh range. Among these sandhills are wide open depressions or "nawars", divided from each other by ridges of sand of an insignificant character.

North of this belt of sand lies the valley of the Lora, a wide sparsely cultivated clay "put", which ends in a salt marsh or "Hamun", once a lake of considerable extent. This Hamun occupies the eastern flank of the Chageh mountains. North of the Lora are the rolling sands of the Registan that meet and swallow up the last rocky spurs, north of Umbai.

Though these last sandhills appear extremely formidable, I am not certain that they are any worse than those encountered in parts of the Jodhpur-Bikanir Railway. There is, however, no necessity to enter them except at their south-western extremity, north of Umbai.

While the general direction of a railway would lie east and west, the caravan road for the first two marches, Nushki to Lalla, takes a south-westerly course among the low sandhills first mentioned, its route being determined by the wells at Zangi nawar and Lalla. From the latter it runs W. N. W. to Zahro, where there are wells on the edge of the Registan, and thence to Kani, where the wells are among some low sandhills. These two marches are over hard clay "put" with wide patches of Shora. The Lora in flood spreads itself over a considerable portion of the plain, but its actual channels are hardly noticeable.

So far, this route offers no difficulties to railway construction, but there is an objectionable amount of sand in the first 30 miles, and one sand Kotal 100 feet high, which, however, can be avoided.

A better alignment will, I think, be found along the dotted line W. N. W. from Nushki, which follows one of the roads to Shorawak, and crosses the sandhills direct instead of obliquely. Thence, it descends the Lora valley to Zahro and Kani. Care should be taken to avoid striking the Lora too high up, where it runs in a deep channel. I rode over part of this route a year and-a-half ago, and got through the sand very easily.

It is in the next 28 miles beyond Kani that the principal difficulties, in fact the only serious difficulties, between Nushki and the Helmand present themselves.

The first is an abrupt Kotal some six miles from Kani with a long gentle slope on its western side. It can be entirely avoided by either of the routes shown dotted on the plan. The second is much more serious, and consists of a long fairly open gorge through the Chageh outliers at Umbai, terminating, in an abrupt rise of 300 feet, on to a plateau.

The total ascent of the road is 600 feet in three miles, or 700 feet in five miles, but the difficulties are greater than these figures would ordinarily represent.

The mountains are volcanic, very rugged and broken, and a tunnel does not appear feasible, as there is a general rise in the country—*vide* sketch.



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The summit, however, could easily be reached by a 1—20 zig-zag, if necessary, and beyond it there is absolutely no obstacle to a railway.

Moreover, this outlying range tails out to nothing in a northerly direction among the sandhills of the Registan, and it is in that direction that the permanent alignment should be looked for. Before, therefore, any detailed surveys of the Umbai Pass should be attempted, an endeavour should be made to turn the mountains by the route shown on the plan. I am sorry that I cannot speak more definitely of this bit of the alignment, but my guide knew of no path through the sandhills by which I could follow the dotted line, and rejoin the camp at Galur. It was all waterless sandhills, he said, and, as a fact, he knew nothing of the country. I examined the range for about 8 miles north of our line of march, and, the further I went, the lower grew the mountains, and the worse grew the sand. There was nothing formidable, however, in the sandhills from a Railway Engineer's point of view, so far as the limits of my investigation took me, and the mountains appeared to tail out entirely.

An alternative pass from Gazi Chah to Galur, along another caravan road south of Umbai, of which my surveyor took a section, was much more difficult than the Umbai route.

Up to this point Zahro and Kani may be regarded as obligatory points within limits, but the only really obligatory point between Nushki and the Helmand is the spot selected for crossing this patch of sand and foothills.

From Galur at the head of the pass we descended to the Helmand in three parties by as many lines of march as has already been mentioned. I took the longest with the main body, as it seemed the least likely way to attract attention. Our road ascended gradually over open stony glacis and dasht for 55 miles to Mamu, along the northern flank of the Chageh range. Nearing Mamu were some wide and rather deep nulla-beds, elsewhere the country was easy. Thence we turned N. W. and descended to the Helmand for 74 miles on a general falling gradient of from 1—100 to 1—80. With the exception of a few miles of low insignificant sandhills on each side of Jalal Khan's Nawar, and the final ridge overlooking the Khadir of the Helmand, which will require a little contouring, the country is stony plain on which the rails could almost be laid direct. A railway, of course, would not take so unnecessarily circuitous a route as this (for the caravan road is compelled to follow a line of springs and wells at the foot of the mountains), and ascend 1,000 feet to Mamu, merely to descend again, but would keep much lower down on the glacis, probably to the south of Arbu hill. If our objective were Khwaja Ali, and not Landi Wali Muhammad Khan, a suitable alignment could thus be obtained, *via* Arbu and Jalal Khan's Nawar.

Mr. Ward's road to Landi Wali Muhammad, after traversing a few miles of low hills below Galur, emerged on a stony dasht bounded on the right by the western fringe of the Registan. The level expanse of the plain was broken by steep ridges about 40 or 50 feet high, not unlike the banks of some ancient river or lake. Between the ridges the dasht dropped slightly to the Helmand, but the main fall occurred at these ridges. The total fall was, however, very much less than *via* Mamu, and only amounted to 1,400 feet in 80 miles. From Mr. Ward's description of the country, and from Mr. Tate's account of the intermediate route, I believe that the best alignment for a railway would be in the general direction shown dotted on the plan. It would probably avoid a rather abrupt rise of 250 feet in four miles, with a corresponding fall a little further on, which is the one objectionable feature in an alignment directly following Mr. Ward's route from Alungi Pat. I am told that it would follow what appears to be an old wide nulla-bed almost throughout. However that may be, it is quite clear that there is no serious difficulty in reaching the Helmand from Galur. Further, I am of opinion that, after taking all circumstances into consideration, strategic and commercial, Landi Wali Muhammad, at the great bend in the river from south to west, should be our objective, if ever a railway from Nushki to the Helmand be undertaken. It is the shortest route, gets to inhabited country first, traverses the minimum of desert and the maximum of cultivation (though that cultivation is only a tenth of what it might be), and offers facilities for an extension up the river bank to Girishk,

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and thence to our future system at Kandahar. At, and above, Landi Wali Muhammad the inhabitants are Pathans, and the country is, I am told, well tilled and productive.

From Wali Muhammad downwards the railway would probably have to turn the southern flank of the Koh-i-Khan Nashin (with a wide detour to avoid steep gradients), as a line along the northern edge of the mountain overlooking the river would, according to Mr. Ward, be very costly, with deep cuttings and lofty viaducts. At a point near Deshu the line would again enter the Helmand valley.

Thenceforth its course would be through a perfectly level Khadir; the only works would be a few bridges over irrigation channels, and the alignment calls for no further remark till we approach its northern bend near Bund-i-Kamal Khan. There, if our objective be Sabzawar and Herat, it may be desirable to cross the river (a comparatively simple job), and descend the right hand Khadir. Otherwise the line should remain on the left bank. There is, however, no longer any Khadir on that side beyond Bund-i-Kamal Khan, as the stream adheres to the southern bluffs, and the railway must ascend on to the highland, or dasht, which will entail a little earthwork and minor bridging for a few miles. Further on, near Dikdela, a slight detour will be necessary to avoid some bluffs on both sides of an old channel of the Helmand. I may add that after reaching Khwaja Ali, where we met our Afghan escort, I thought it better to discontinue the barometric section, as there were sowars at every one's elbow, and it was no longer wanted.

The valley of the Helmand from the Koh-i-Khan Nashin to Kala Fath, where it begins to expand into a delta before entering the Hamun or lake, may be briefly described as a narrow alluvial plain, about two miles wide, bounded on both sides by clay scarps and the desert. This line of bluffs varies from 300 feet in height, near Deshu, to 100 feet, near the delta. Its formation is either lacustrine or fluviatile, debris and silt brought down by the river, through which the present channel has been cut; I am inclined to believe the latter. The Khadir between the bluffs, though fertile, is but thinly populated by indolent Baluchis, and only partially cultivated by means of small irrigation channels leading from the river, which flows at a level some 15 feet below that of the tilled land. Its average fall is three feet per mile.

The country is known as the Garmser, or hot country,—its general elevation is about 1,800 feet above the sea level. Huge mud ruins, said to be Persian, and remains of bricks, tiles, and pottery, testify to its ancient populousness and fertility.

I estimate its present total production, in good seasons, at about 5,000 tons of wheat and barley, and an infinitesimal quantity of pulse and cotton. Trees cannot live owing to the frightful simoom that blows up the valley all through the hot months. Vegetables appear to be unknown, the inhabitants eating, instead, the raw blades of young wheat.* The foregoing estimate is little better than a guess, but I don't think that it is much under the mark. It is based on a rough calculation of the area of the growing wheat crop. On the occasion of our visit, the country was suffering from a double famine; our Afghan escort following on a season of drought, when for the first time, in a period of seventy years the flow of the Helmand had entirely dried up.

* *Note.*—Subsequently confirmed by Mr. Ward's report on acreage under cultivation above Bund-i-Seistan (*vide* Appendix).

In normal seasons the bulk of the crop is available for export; some of it reaches Quetta and Nushki, or goes to Jalk and Panjgur in exchange for dates; the balance is bartered with the nomad tribes of the desert in exchange for ghi, wool, and livestock. The surplus from a bumper crop is often valueless owing to the isolation of the country, but with improved means of communication a considerable impetus to cultivation would ensue—always within the limits, it should be remembered, of the culturable area, which cannot exceed 100 × 2, or 200 square miles, and is not probably half this; less in size, in fact, than an ordinary Indian Tahsil.

At the terminus, however, is Seistan, and here we find an industrious population and a considerable extent of cultivation.

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Probably 25,000* tons of grain = about 6 wagons per diem, would be available for export yearly; perhaps, under the stimulus of a railway, all the available land would be devoted to cotton growing. An excellent class of cotton is grown in Bokhara, and the Russians are introducing its cultivation along the Trans-Caspian Railway. It is in this direction that the land and water of Seistan might be utilised to the fullest advantage. There is land in sufficiency, the soil is good, and the climate similar to that of Central Asia; while the normal discharge of the Helmand is not less than that of the Jhelum canal, say, 3,000 to 4,000 cubic feet per second.

* *Note.*—This is rather an over-estimate (*vide* Mr. Ward's letter in Appendix) under present conditions. Mr. Ward, from actual measurement, gives the area under crop in Persian Seistan as 5[illegible],000 acres. 20,000 should be added to this for Afghan territory below Kala Fath. Allowing for the two yearly crops, the total produce cannot at present exceed 35,000 tons per annum, a considerable quantity of which must be consumed locally.

Commercially speaking, *should the country ever become ours*, a railway to the Helmand and Seistan might almost rank with our Punjab Canal Railways as a paying scheme.

Under existing circumstances, it is fruitless to consider the subject in any other light than that of a possible strategic railway, and then, for reasons which will be subsequently stated, it is possibly a less effectual weapon than a flanking line along the trade route. That point I leave to the military authorities, merely adding that a further obvious consideration is that we can proceed with the latter scheme, which is in our own territory, and not with the former.

It is not my province to discuss the comparative advantages and disadvantages of going out across a desert to meet an enemy, instead of leaving him the enormous task of coming to attack us; nor am I in a position to speak of the opportunity that a rail head near Seistan affords for checkmating hostile designs on the Gulf; but there is one point on the route now described which deserves the attention of the military authorities. A reference to the map will show that, so far as a *direct* attack on Nushki from the direction of the Helmand is concerned, Galur must be a strategic position of first class importance.

Situated as it is at the head of the Gazi Chah and Umbai Passes, with the almost impassable Registan on one hand, and on the other the equally impassable mass of the Chageh mountains, an invader must make it his objective, not merely for these reasons, but because of its abundant water-supply in the shallow wells of Safai, Galur, and Shah Ismail Ziarat.

It will be seen that a practically surface line about 80 miles in length, entirely inside our own border, would land our forces within a day's march of this spot, whence flying columns could stop all attempts to cross the desert from the Helmand (unless they were supported by a railway), by filling up the wells, and disputing every water hole with the enemy's advance parties. For the desert could not be crossed even by a moderate force, in the face of any opposition, until detachments had held and cleared out all the water holes along the various caravan roads centering on Galur.

If ever, therefore, we are caught with our frontier defences incomplete, and an attack threatening Nushki, it would seem that the construction of this 80 miles of light line might be put in hand with advantage, either direct from Nushki, or as a branch from the Nushki-Seistan Railway.

Bridging.—Should it be desirable to cross the Helmand and proceed in the direction of Herat, several good sites will be obtainable between Bund Kamal Khan and Chahar Burjak. The river bottom there is coarse shingle and hard sand, almost amounting to soft sandstone; whereas lower down it is alluvial silt and sand. The length of the bridge would be about 1,200 feet. Probably 60 feet spans on wrought iron cylinders filled with concrete would be the most economical design; but open foundation might be possible.

The low water depth of the river is in many places not more than 2 feet or 2 feet 6 inches, and the current, except in flood, is quite moderate. Sand-bag cofferdams or islands could very easily be made according to the style of foundations adopted.

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Note regarding floods.—See Appendix regarding flood of 1885. Mr. Ward does not state the approximate rise of the river in feet, but it evidently was quite twice the height of normal high floods. The spring of 1885, more particularly early April, was extraordinarily wet all over Afghanistan and Baluchistan.

The maximum rise of the river did not appear to be as much as 10 feet Its banks were fairly stable, so training works would be light.

For a temporary crossing it would be better to choose a site lower down, where piles could be driven.

Curvature.—Easy, except in the section near Galur.

Grades.—1—150 to Kani.

From Kani through the hills, 1—50.

The descent to the Helmand, 1—80.

Stations.—No remarks. Their sites will largely be governed by the localities of the wells along the alignment.

Materials.—The country is destitute of building materials, except sand and ballast.

The Chageh mountains are of volcanic formation, and the stone would be difficult to work.

Good bricks could be burnt in the Helmand with imported coal dust, or, in small quantities, with brushwood, in the old-fashioned flame kilns used by the inhabitants some centuries ago.

Water-supply.—It should be understood that there was more or less water at every camp on the march except for the last 50 miles across the desert. At some places it was obtained from ordinary wells of moderate depth, or from springs at the base of the hills; but the most abundant supply was generally got from shallow excavations, either in nulla-beds, or in depressions among the sandhills.

The water was always more or less charged with salts, and unsuited for locomotives. It was scanty at Lalla and Gale Chah, but at Zahro, Kani, Galur, Nawab Chah, Salihan, and Mamu it was fairly abundant.

Little difficulty, therefore, need be apprehended about obtaining a sufficient water-supply between Nushki and the Helmand. It will be quality, rather than the quantity, which will give trouble, though sometimes these saline waters neutralise each other. The Helmand water was sweet.

I take the opportunity to mention that these wells and water holes are seldom in the open plain or "put", but nearly always among sandhills; sometimes below a foot or two of coarse surface sandstone. I can give no explanation of this curious phenomenon. It may be due to capillary attraction, or to the continuation of the clay "put" below the sandhills; but my observation is at variance with this latter reason, as, where sandhills occur, the substratum generally is sand. Attention to this may save a lot of unsuccessful attempts to obtain water during construction.

Estimate.—For a broad gauge line between Nushki and Bund-i-Seistan *via* the Helmand—

			Rs.	*Rs.*
15 miles	...	...	@ 70,000	10,50,000
44 „	...	...	@ 55,000	24,20,000
41 „	...	...	@ 1,30,000	53,30,000
63 „	...	...	@ 80,000	50,40,000
32 „	...	...	@ 1,30,000	41,60,000
140 „	...	...	@ 55,000	77,00,000
Total ... 335 „	...	...		2,57,00,000
Add 6 lakhs for bridge over Helmand, or additional cost of line on left bank	...	...	...	6,00,000
		GRAND TOTAL	...	2,63,00,000
			=Rs.	78,500 per mile.

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The foregoing provides for 62lb rails with wooden sleepers, the necessary bridging; ballasting, where sand and shingle are not available at site, a small amount of rolling-stock, with stations, &c., on an economic scale.

Arrangements for survey and construction.—Two survey parties will be sufficient; one starting from Nushki and doing the first 60 miles to Kani; the second, a strong one, doing the difficult alignment at Umbai. When that has been approximately settled, a third party can be sent ahead between Alungi Pat and the Helmand. All parties should be well equipped with transport and pakhals. Plate-laying could commence from Nushki very soon after the first party had taken the field.

The foregoing report has hardly touched on the extreme desolation of the country, a wilderness of clay, sand, stones, and mountains, practically uninhabited, except by the nomad tribes of the Registan.

Local labour does not exist, but swarms of Pathans from Kandahar and coolies from the Punjab will flock to the construction of the line if peace conditions prevail.

Even in time of war there should be no difficulty in obtaining all the labour required.

W. A. Johns.

Foreign Office Press—No. 1153—25-9-03—60.

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

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Appendix to Report on Helmand line.

Since my report was written, I have received a letter from Mr. Ward, Executive Engineer with the Seistan Arbitration Commission. It is so full of information regarding the crops and the country beyond Bund-i-Seistan that I propose giving extracts from it, which are printed below in the form of an Appendix to my report.

W. A. J.

"After clearing an old channel of the Helmand near Dikdela, you rise on to the high dasht you saw opposite Khoga (Bund-i-Seistan). I have been along this dasht from Bund-i-Seistan to Kila-i-Nau; it is much cut up by big lakes, but you could get a fair to an easy run down to the cultivated plain of Kila-i-Nau. If you took your line to Nasratabad, you would probably bridge the Rud-i-Seistan somewhere between Burj-i-Sarband and Kila-i-Nau, or cross higher at Shahristan. The channel has in quite modern times carried the whole Helmand. In 1839 when Connolly passed through, he was told 9 years ago it was the Helmand. Ferrier found the main stream here in 1845. This year in high flood it carried 6,000 to 8,000 cusecs. Near Shahristan it flows in a narrow channel in the dasht. Perhaps you would bridge it at such a place".

Note.—Rud-i-Seistan is the main canal of Seistan, I think. See plan.

W. A. J.



"Anyway there seems scope for doing it cheaply, but your bridge must be big enough to pass the Helmand, should it choose to come back again.

"We gauged 70,000 cusecs in the Helmand this year, but the biggest flood known was in 1885, when at Kila Fath and Chahar Burjak the waters extended from dasht to dasht, and no tamarisk was visible above the flood waters. The Helmand has an enormous drainage area, about 60,000 square miles, nearly, if not quite, half that of the Indus at Attock.

"I do not feel at home in discussing the question of how a railway should clear the Hamun. * * * I do not think it is necessary to go to Nasratabad, but it would suffice to cross the Hamun somewhere south of Koh-i-Khwaja.

"You would need an embankment several miles long, and flood openings, say ½ a mile at a guess, over there; arrived on the other side you have to get up a vertical cliff* about 50 feet high on to the dasht, which rises gradually to Bandan. We journeyed from Tabasin, 10 miles beyond Bandan,† through Bandan to Baring, and crossed the Hamun in tutins.‡ The road seemed to me to have an easy grade, and, at any rate, there would be no difficulty in running out 1—100. You could also run out a gradient to the Hamun level, but you would have some big cuts and banks. The Hamun is

* *Vide* map.
† Bandan is about 30 miles west of Hamun.
‡ A boat of reeds.

W. A. J.

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shallow. Horses walked the whole way behind the tutins. I suppose a banked cause-way about 20 miles long, of an average height of 6 or 8 feet, with one or two miles of flood openings arranged at suitable places, would effectually negotiate the Hamun.

Much better to round the Hamun if a line across it cannot be built in a season when the Hamun is dry. W. A. J.

“From Shahristan to the Hamun you might need several large bridges, but by the road we rode to the city, there was only one which would need a span of 100 feet to 150 feet, and about half a dozen which could be negotiated with 20 spans. You could probably rely on getting a similar road running between two big canals, and then you would only have to cross the distributaries.

“If you went round the north of the Hamun, you would need to bridge the Helmand above Kila-i-Fath, to get a crossing in a valley, where the range through which the river could deviate is restricted, and then run outside the flood limits of the present river to Chakansur and cross the Kash, then on to Jauain and cross the Farreh Rud, and then up the Harud valley to Khushk, I suppose. The bridges for these rivers would be of the same order as the Helmand bridge. They bring down a lot of water occasionally, as they have large drainage areas in low hills near by. The Hamun is bounded by vertical cliffs all round, I believe in some places very high (200 feet ?). But we know little or nothing of the north edge. * * * *

“We measured about 20,000 acres of wheat and barley from Koh-i-Khan Nashin to Bund-i-Seistan.

“We estimate about the same in the Nad-i-Ali district of Afghanistan (right bank of Helmand; half of this was destroyed by flood).

“We measured about 20,000 acres between the two branches of the Helmand (Persian territory, $\frac{1}{2}$ or $\frac{1}{4}$ destroyed by flood). We estimate about 30,000 acres Seistan on left bank of Helmand.

“The Kharif area is about $\frac{3}{4}$ of the acreage of the Rabi area, half of which is melons of immense value locally, and probably some to a railway, as it must enable some more wheat to be sold than otherwise would be. The balance is juar (the greater sorghum), maize, some cotton, til, tobacco, onions, some pulses. I may add that, if the present rulers encouraged agriculture, they could very easily grow from three to five times the present quantity of wheat and barley (they grow roughly equal quantities of wheat and barley). The stereotyped and universal reply to the question, why don’t you cultivate this land ? is, we have lots of land; there is no need to cultivate this”.

These remarks apply to Seistan proper. In Garmsel there is, I believe, practically only one grain crop, the Rabi. Hence my low estimate of the produce of the valley above Kila Fath. W. A. J.

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(Confidential.)

Reconnaissance for a Railway between Nushki and the Perso-Afghan Frontier near Robat.

Nushki-Robat	...	...	360 miles.
Nushki-Afghan Frontier	...	...	344 „
Nushki-Bund-i-Kamal Khan (on Helmand)		...	406 „

Unlike the reconnaissance of the Helmand route, this was a genuine investigation of the most suitable alignment for a railway between Nushki and the places noted above; and the plan and section submitted may be regarded as indicating the eventual location of the line within the usual narrow limits.

The main features of the alignment from an engineering point of view are easily explained. For the first third of its length, until within a few miles of Dalbandin, the line runs along the northern glacis of the Sheikh Hussain, Ras Koh, and Kambaran range. Near Dalbandin it crosses a narrow belt of sandhills and attains the southern glacis of the Chageh, Koh-i-Sultan, and neighbouring mountains, along which its middle third lies. The remaining third from Ware Sahib Chah to Robat is on the northern glacis of the Saindak, Kacha Koh, and Robat range. The general direction of the line varies from south-west at Nushki to north-west at Robat, and is in the form of a crescent concave towards the north. From end to end of its 360 miles of length a cheap line could be built without any works whatever, except a short low bridge or two at Baghak below Nushki.

Elsewhere "Dips" could be made at all nulla crossings with a minimum of cutting, and the preliminary dressing of the formation would be of the lightest description.

Some easy bank and cutting will be required through the sand belt at Dalbandin; and, beyond Ekmach, my alignment should, perhaps, be kept a little more to the south, so as to reach the point where the watercourses finally merge in the plain, or, at any rate, become mere shallow wide depressions. This portion of the reconnaissance from Ekmach to Trato was made on days of continuous duststorms, when, though I followed a compass bearing, it was impossible to fix my position on the map at any intermediate point. The line on the plan, therefore, may not quite coincide with the correct route, and may be drawn rather further to the north than intended. I mention the matter as the difference of a mile or two on a talus is sufficient to make all the difference between a surface line, with "Dips" only, and one with considerable bridging.

Note.– On maps Ekmach and Yakmach. It is the same word.

A few curves will be necessary between Mushki Chah and Ware Sahib Chah to avoid some isolated rocky mounds, but minute details of this description need scarcely be dwelt on in a reconnaissance report. Suffice it to say that it would be difficult anywhere in India to find an equal length of line either cheaper to construct or less easy to damage.

Unlinking the rails and sleepers, and making bonfires of the latter, is the only way in which traffic could be interrupted. For this reason it would, perhaps, be desirable to use steel sleepers throughout. The shingle and grit of these glacis is just the road bed that suits them, while the short stretches of earthy plain and marsh could be thoroughly well ballasted.

Another advantage of the steel sleeper over the wooden in a line of this description is that it has no tendency to float when a rush of water crosses a "Dip."

In locating the alignment the engineer's aim should be to keep as far as possible on the lower edge of the glacis, where the shingle makes a natural

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ballast, and the nullas cease to have defined channels. Dips, if kept well below ground level, are seldom damaged by the heaviest flood; but, where experience shows that bridges are required, such works can subsequently be added without inconvenience, and the line gradually brought up to first class standard.

A section on the scale of 4 miles=1″ horizontal, and 400 feet =1″ vertical, is submitted; but for the purposes of this report the rough levels given on the plan will probably be found sufficient. In some respects, too, a section on so small a scale may give a misleading impression of the roughness of the country, *e.g.*, near Kirtáka and Saindak, where the ups and downs are really the rolling surface of the glacis. The section, however, gives full details of the character of the country traversed by the alignment. It was taken with a barometer, distances being measured by a cyclometer borrowed from the officer of the Survey of India with the Seistan Mission. For work of this sort I know of nothing to equal it. Readings can be taken to two places of decimals of a mile, and a man can wheel it all day at three miles per hour.

It will be noted from the plan that three alternative routes are shown through the sandhills near Dalbandin—

(*a*) One, which is that along which the section was taken, turns sharp to the south and zig-zags through them *via* the Kanian nulla and Alum Khan Chah; thus attaining the Kambaran glacis as quickly as possible, and crossing the sand belt by what I believe is the shortest route.

(*b*) The midmost route is along the caravan road, and may, on the whole, be neglected; for, though the sands are far from formidable, and the alignment shorter than (*a*), while a good supply of water is found in the nawars or basins among the sandhills; still these advantages are discounted by the long slant with which the alignment crosses the belt. The twenty miles of alternate sand-hill and basin would be more difficult to maintain, and very little cheaper to build, than the longer line, which has only 5 miles of very insignificant sandhills.

(*c*) The third alternative, however, deserves attention when the survey of the line is undertaken. My information led me to believe that the belt of sand extended without a break from the Mash-khel Hamun to Nushki; whereas, when I reached the Laghar Koh, I observed what appeared to be a wide gap in it, giving a clear passage to the north in the direction of Dalbandin. The local levy sowars informed me that there was an unobstructed road from Laghar Koh and Mull, between the sand and a low range of hills to the north, *via* Ushke Nali to Dalbandin; but that much of it was over salt marsh which was flooded in wet weather, and always bad going, while recent rains had filled up the wells.

I would recommend that the survey officer, after starting operations at Nushki, should march along route (*a*) to Dalbandin, and thence return by the northern one through the salt marsh. Where two alignments are so easy, it is difficult sometimes to arrive at a decision. Probably (*a*) is the better, all things considered, but both should be ridden over before either is finally adopted.

I was quite satisfied with the alignments obtained, (*a*) and (*b*), and thought further investigation would lead to unnecessary delay, as my transport animals were all done up, and could barely reach Nushki. I tried some short cuts near Mushki Chah and the Koh-i-Dalil, but they proved unsatisfactory. Future survey officers may note that it is no use attempting anything of the sort there.

Near Robat the plan shows two lines; one, dotted, along the glacis towards the Persian frontier, and requiring no further notice; and a full line (along which I marched), entering Afghan territory, and crossing the heavy sand belt on each side of the Shelag River by a circuitous route. Thence it runs across

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a "put" for a few miles till it reaches the low scarp. of the Tarakhun Desert; Pushkiniki, where the bluff changes to a gentle slope, will be found a suitable place for the ascent. But other places, such as Irkuft, where the main caravan road is, will likely prove equally easy.

From Pushkiniki a line can be taken to Bund-i-Kamal Khan on the Helmand, involving a minimum of bank and cutting, though not actually a surface line. My object in investigating this alignment was that, if our system ever reaches Robat, the Amir of Afghanistan might not object to a branch to Kamal Khan or Bund-i-Seistan, through this outlying corner of his dominions. Without a railway in this direction, a force, operating from Robat towards the Helmand, would be greatly hampered by the waterless tract of the Tarakhun Desert, for, from the Shelag River, where excavations in its sandy bed give an ample supply of rather abominable water, the country is waterless to the Helmand, a distance of more than 40 miles. A short watercourse ending at Killa Afzal need not be considered, as it would certainly be blocked in time of war.

The only engineering difficulty is a very heavy belt of sand on each side of the Shelag.

This consists in places of moving sandhills, or "Barkans", travelling over fixed sandhills, whose surface has a thin covering of black grit or coarse sand, hence their name Siah Reg. This species of double sandhill from a maintenance point of view is the most objectionable thing of the sort I have ever met with. It is possible that the Siah Reg may prove fairly firm underneath. I noticed a few ancient domes and graveyards on them, which one does not meet as a rule on pure sandhills. A feasible alignment through this belt will be found along the route suggested on the plan. The trouble will rather be in maintenance than construction, owing to the westerly gales that prevail all through the hot weather.

The Shelag is the lowest point on the route to Seistan, being only 1,500 feet above sea level. Once the sand belt is crossed, there are no further difficulties; the Pushkiniki ascent is quite easy, and the Tarakhun Desert (a waste of gravel overlying clay) is just rough enough to require a little bank and cutting here and there.

Gradient.—Three-fourths of the alignment lie between the 2,800 feet and the 3,300 feet contour.

At Ekmach it descends to 2,500 feet or 2,600 feet, but only for a few miles; at Ware Sahib Chah the higher limit is topped for a short distance.

Easy grades are obtainable for more than 300 miles of the 360, though whether the ruling gradient will be nearer 1—150 than 1—200 is a point that can only be decided by more detailed survey. A barometric section is scarcely reliable for flatter gradients than 1—80, more especially when taken, as this one was, in very unsettled weather.

The steepest gradients will occur (1) in descending the Nushki glacis to Baghak, a distance of 9 miles, where I now hope that 1—100 will be found possible; and (2) in the descent from below Saindak to the Afghan frontier.

Note.—In my report on the Quetta-Nushki Railway a year ago I pointed out that, if Nushki is made an engine-changing station, a banking engine will be wanted at Baghak.

If the main line be taken to Robat, it may be desirable to save length, and use 1—80, or steeper, on the branch towards Bund-i-Kamal Khan, instead of descending the glacis gradually as the line shown on the plan does.

Curvature.—Except among the sandhills previously mentioned, where sharp curves will be necessary, the curvature will be the same as in ordinary plain country.

Water-supply.—In one respect the trade route alignment compares unfavourably with the direct line *via* the Helmand, namely, in the matter of water-supply. Judging from the existing wells at the Thanas on the road, a sufficient supply for a *light* traffic will probably be obtained for the first 150 miles from Nushki, say, as far as Ekmach, where there appears to be a good underground flow; and possibly for some 10 miles further, where I noticed some likely looking nulla-beds under the Nuhli Koh. But with the exception of Nushki, Baghak, the sandhill tracts, and Ekmach, even on this portion of the line water will be none too plenty. Dalbandin depends upon a karez so small

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that it dries up every afternoon; yet this is the only running water crossed by the line between Baghak and the Helmand.

The wells at the post houses yield enough for the supply of ordinary caravans, but it is doubtful if many of them would stand the strain of railway requirements. We no longer find the shallow free-flowing water holes of the northern route, while there is no reason to suppose that artesian bores would be successful.

Beyond Ekmach the outlook is much worse. The caravan road, it will be noted, wanders about from spring to spring among the hills, in country quite unsuited for a railway; while the latter is on open glacis or dasht where water is rarely found, except at great depths and in small quantities. In dry weather the springs among the mountains are little better than "Soaks"; still something may be possible in the way of improving and then piping them. We may trust also to an increased knowledge of the country leading to the discovery of unknown or unused sources; but the prominent fact at present is that the whole tract on either side of the alignment is more desolate and waterless than any part of British Baluchistan that I am familiar with. Long pipe lines, too, are open to grave objection on a military railway, since any band of local outlaws or raiders can easily shatter a pipe carrying the supply to an important changing station, and paralyse the traffic of the line.

We should, therefore, be prepared to have to work the traffic over long distances with the help of tank wagons and water trains, as is now done, to some extent, between Jacobabad and Sibi.

The flatness of the gradients render this course less objectionable than it would be on a ghat line. Tanks could be constructed at all stations and fed from wells or water trains for the use of troops in time of war, while in ordinary times the staff would get their drinking water as best they could, from well, spring, or pipe line. The quality of the water is generally bad.

Note.—Our new commercial treaty with Persia, which I saw mentioned in the papers the other day, may mend matters; but treaty agreements can be burked by local officials, and the export of grain from Seistan put under an embargo. Until a more enlightened and progressive Government is established in Seistan, the grain exporting potentialities of the country will never be fully developed.

Traffic Prospects.—Under existing conditions in Seistan, where a rising trade has been suddenly stifled by hostile tariffs, it is difficult to see what traffic prospects the railway possesses, beyond those mentioned in the Helmand route report.

A certain amount of trade still goes on across the border, but it is in camel-loads, not wagon-loads, and there seemed to be a good deal of smuggling connected with it.

Some dates, ghi, and wool would come in from Jalk and Panjgur; wheat from the Afghan Helmand might be expected in fair quantities; but all export from the real granary, Seistan, might be prohibited.

Our own territory is so destitute of inhabitants that the local traffic would be infinitesimal from a railway-man's standpoint.

The country, however, according to Mr. Vredenburg's report, possesses some mineral resources.

Sulphur and earth dyes in the Koh-i-Sultan, a thin seam of lead near Saindak, copper in Ras Koh, and the remains of old copper workings near Robat. Time alone would show whether they were commercially worth anything, but from Mr. Vredenburg's report they scarcely appear promising. In short, the railway (independently of possible extensions westward) has no claim to be regarded as other than a purely political and strategic line, commanding Seistan and the route from Nasratabad to the Persian Gulf. Judged from this aspect, it has several advantages over the Helmand route, *viz.*, it is not only within our own territory, but it offers at the same time—

See Appendix.

(*a*) Better gradients.

(*b*) Greater freedom from sand.

(*c*) Less liability to interruption in time of war, as it is a surface line, and also protected all along its Afghan front by the Registan, the Chageh, and Koh-i-Sultan ranges, and the wide sand belt south of the Gaud-i-Zirreh.

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Its vulnerable points are south of Chageh; at Ekmach, where a track crosses the mountains from Arbu; at Mushki Chah, near which place a caravan road leads to Rudbar; and the portion nearest Robat.

With the assistance of a branch to Bund-i-Kamal Khan a small force could operate very effectively against an army advancing up the Helmand.

Stations.—It would be premature to make any suggestions regarding stations. Probably there will be two watering stations; Dalbandin, a small civil station, and the only bazar on the line; and Kondi, where the junction with the railway to the coast would be.

Neither is very suitable, as the water-supply of both is deficient in quantity and bad in quality.

By purchasing the Dalbandin karez, and piping the water, enough would be obtained for ordinary requirements. The wells at the Kondi Thana are slightly brackish and not very free-flowing.

Ekmach and the sandhill tract, where I believe the supply would be adequate, are badly situated for changing stations.

Materials—Are non-existent except ballast and sand. The latter is not always obtainable.

Bricks could be burnt with coal dust near Baghak.

Estimates.—Taking Bund-i-Seistan as our objective, purely for the purposes of comparison, it will be seen from the report on the Helmand route that the cost of this line is rather less than that of the shorter route *via* the Helmand, but the difference is inappreciable.

		Rs.
(i)	344 miles of surface and light line from Nushki to Afghan frontier, @ Rs. 55,000 per mile	1,89,20,000
	22 miles heavy sand inside ditto, @ Rs. 1,00,000 per mile	22,00,000
	66 miles easy line ditto, @ Rs. 70,000 per mile	46,20,000
		2,57,40,000 or, say, 2½ crores in all.

(ii) From Nushki to Robat, 360 miles, @ Rs. 55,000 per mile: Rs. 1,98,00,000, or, say, 2 crores.

In the foregoing figures provision is made for 62lb rails, steel trough sleepers, a small amount of rolling-stock, with station arrangements and quarters on a modest scale.

Programme for Survey and Construction.—Arrangements would entirely depend upon whether the work had to be pushed or not. Under ordinary conditions, two strong survey parties could stake out the line to the Persian or Afghan frontier in a full working season.

One should start at Nushki and the other at Ekmach. They should be well equipped with transport and pakhals.

If the work were urgent, and construction had to be commenced without delay, three survey parties* would be required. One at Nushki; one at Mull, some thirty miles further on; and the third at the sandhills near Dalbandin. Parties 1 and 2, as they finished their lengths, could either go on construction, or take up new positions ahead, according to the rate plate-laying was progressing, and the start that party No. 3 had of railhead. Plate-laying could be begun within a month of the first party's taking the field.

* Two would be sufficient if a route free from sand is obtained north of the sandhills.

The time occupied in completing the line to the frontier will entirely depend upon the promptness with which permanent-way materials come to hand, and upon the rate of plate-laying. With adequate arrangements Robat could be reached in less than two years, a very moderate estimate.

In making this reconnaissance I was greatly assisted by information kindly given me by Colonel McMahon, Mr. Tate of the Survey of India, and Captain Webb Ware.

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Thanks to their hints as to route, I was able to hit off the correct alignment from the outset, and accomplished the distance at an average rate of 20 miles *per diem*.

W. A. Johns,
Deputy Consulting Engineer for Railways, Bombay.

Foreign Office Press—No. 1153—25-9-03—60.

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Appendix.

Colonel McMahon, whose knowledge of the country is unrivalled, takes a favourable view of its mineral resources. I have just received a letter from him on the subject, parts of which are printed as an Appendix.

W. A. J.

"Your query about mineral resources is a difficult one. My own personal belief is that a railway to Seistan would result in a large production of minerals. The country has never been properly prospected, and, until a railway comes, it never will be, because what pays to work near a railway is useless to touch without a line. We know of old copper workings at Robat, and we know of copper in the Ras Koh hills. We know of lead near Saindak, and there are large quantities of sulphur and earth dyes in the Koh-i-Sultan. The iron we found in the sand, and which we roughly estimated at 2½% of the sand, has been carefully analysed at Calcutta, and proves to be good iron, *i.e.*, 65% of pure iron oxide. A day may come when some simple and cheap form of utilising the wind to work electro magnets to catch the iron out of the wind-driven sand, will make it worth while to work that iron and add to the railway exports".

The following remarks on the Seistan traffic, and the best route for the extension beyond, are contained in the same letter:—

"The more we see of Seistan, and the more we work out the available areas of irrigable land and volume of available water, the more astonishing do the future possible prospects of Seistan appear. I believe, under any circumstances, whether the Seistan canal systems were reorganised or not, that a railway would lead to an enormous grain export, not to mention export of wool and hides in which there are large openings. You will doubtles say that sanguine expectations do not suffice to establish in figures a paying return on this or any other line. I admit this, and realise that it is practically impossible to show that the line will be a paying line for some time, but I adhere to my belief that the time before the line does begin to pay will not be long. However, as the line, to begin with, would be built for purely strategic and political objects, its commercial aspect is not so important as it might be. * * *

Note.—I share this *belief* to some extent, but it requires something more than belief to warrant one in recommending a line as a commercial undertaking.

It can be easily demonstrated by figures that, if the cultivated area of Seistan were doubled, *and the export of grain encouraged by the Persian Government*, a railway would pay working expenses, and 1% or 2% on its capital cost.

If the area were trebled, it would be a paying scheme. But these are hypotheses quite outside our control, and other things besides canals would want reorganisation first.

W. A. J.

"I see no advantage in aiming at Nasratabad. It is a vile hole in every sense. A name, nothing else, except, perhaps, a smell. I would advocate sticking to open ground, and cutting across the southern portion of Seistan, by Sekhowa and Varmab, and getting across the Hamun by a long embankment. It all depends, of course, how your line approaches the country.

"If by Bund-i-Kamal Khan, from the east, it might proceed as above, or *via* Tarakhun to Houzdar, &c., and then either northwards further into Seistan, or straight across the Hamun. The Hamun is much about the same anywhere, so far as obstacle goes, and so it does not seem to matter much where you cross it. *Seistan itself outside the canal area is easy everywhere.*

"If you approach Seistan from south of the Shelag, then the Shelag presents a difficult obstacle,* and it becomes a question whether it is not better to avoid it, and work round the end of the Hamun, and miss Seistan altogether. I myself would advocate taking a line from Bund-i-Kamal Khan on left bank, and bending off in a curve south of the Rud-i-Seistan, and across by Sekhowa to the Hamun. This would tap Afghan territory, and work through or near the richest portion of Persian Seistan".

* *i.e.*, the sandhills already referred to.

W. A. J.

Note.—It seems to me that, for an extension west of the Hamun, the simplest arrangement would be to round the south of the Hamun, and deal with Seistan by a branch *via* Bund-i-Kamal Khan (as shown on the plan) which could penetrate the richest parts of the country; for canal bridges, however numerous, are trifling things for a railway. A 12 feet bank, 20 miles long, tipped from both ends, and pitched all along for a protection against waves, would be very expensive.

W. A. J.

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

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

(83)

Spare copy for reference.

[Confidential.]

Reconnaissance from Kondi on the Seistan Trade Route via Mashkhel-Hamun and Panjgur to—

(*a*) Karachi	... ...	556 miles.
(*b*) Pasni (*via* Nag Kalat)	... ...	424 „
(*c*) Pasni (*via* Kathag Pass)	... ...	404 „

General.—The necessity for a connection between the Nushki-Seistan Railway and the coast may be urged on three grounds, each of sufficient importance to justify a thorough discussion of the subject.

The first is purely a traffic argument, which is that, if circumstances should ever require us to carry on simultaneous campaigns at the Khojak and Seistan, the existing lines to Quetta would be unable to meet the strain. The point need not be discussed here at length; many may differ from this opinion; but it should be remembered in estimating the carrying capacity of our frontier system, that no reliance should be placed on the Sind-Pishin State Railway, and that both it and the Mushkaf-Bolan State Railway will be liable to temporary interruptions of traffic through breaches in pipe lines, and damage to bridges or tunnels, the acts of local malcontents, possibly instigated by our enemies.

We should be unwarrantably sanguine in expecting that the actual performance of these railways in time of war, with the possibility of slips at Mud Gorge, and breaks at any point, would ever be more than a moderate fraction of that shown in a working Time Table, compiled on the hypothesis that everything runs as smoothly in war as in peace.

The second is a strategic argument, and has been mentioned in the report of the Nushki-Seistan Railway, namely, the advantage of a second line of advance and retreat, and of a second base of supplies for an army operating near Seistan. There is scarcely room for a difference of opinion on this point. A reference to the map shows how hazardous (without this stiffener) any large movements would be, say, at Robat, the end of a long unsupported line, parallel throughout its length to a possibly hostile frontier; and how the defence of the railway might, under certain circumstances, consume a large proportion of our forces.

Finally, there is the desirability of defending the Makran frontier against any possibility of invasion from the west, and of strengthening our hold on that country. Though these objects appear different, it will be seen hereafter that they really merge into one another. Speaking from the point of view of a mere traveller, there can be no denying the fact that our status in Western Baluchistan is far from satisfactory. The inhabitants are obsessed by Russia to an almost incredible degree. Every day I heard some new and absurd rumour of her movements. That an army had assembled at Jalk, that three Russian transports had arrived in Karachi, with twelve, eight, and six thousand troops on board, who had disembarked, and were advancing to the conquest of India; and so on. The foundation of fact for the last was probably the arrival in Karachi of a Russian man-of-war. A solitary Russian traveller was somewhere in the neighbourhood of Jalk. Childish as are these rumours, they show that our strength is little known and respected, and that our approaching defeat by Russia is looked on as inevitable.

We no longer keep a British officer in the country as an outward sign of our authority, and were the Russians to post a smart Consul on our Makran frontier, the influence he might obtain over our Baluch tribes would have very serious consequences. Even granting that an invasion in force by way of Makran need scarcely be thought of for many years to come, a very awkward diversion might be made in that quarter, by small forces advancing up the Kech and Panjgur valleys, well supplied with money and rifles for distribution among the tribesmen. A rising thus fomented might assume dangerous proportions, and extend to the tribes near Kalat.

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The foregoing picture may be considered alarmist, but a review of our dealings with Western Baluchistan will show how little cause its inhabitants have for fearing us. A punitive expedition, following some spasmodic outbreak, and bringing an influx of wealth to all owners of transport animals, and perhaps increased pay and position to the offenders, is a very mild deterrent. Will it be surprising then if the population knowing from experience that there is nothing to fear from us, in case of failure, side with our enemies whom they have every reason to dread?

On the other hand, with a railway through Makran, and our rule firmly established there, our influence would naturally extend over all the cognate tribes in South-Eastern Persia.

Assuming, therefore, that we intend to maintain an active policy in Seistan and on the Persian coast (and the whole case for a railway on the alignment now proposed rests on that assumption), the question would rather appear to be what route should the railway follow than whether it is necessary or not. In this connection the first point for decision is the position of the termini, in other words, the best place for the junction with the Quetta-Nushki-Seistan Railway, and the choice of a port on the coast.

Junction with Nushki-Seistan Railway.—A reference to the map will show that Kondi, or somewhere in its vicinity, is the most suitable position for the junction. A nearer approach to the western extremity of the Nushki-Seistan line would be unnecessary and dangerous, while a point appreciably further east would leave too great an unsupported length of railway towards Robat. In short, Kondi is a compromise, the objects in view being that the external sides of the quadrilateral formed by the Quetta-Kondi, Kondi coast, and Karachi to Quetta lines should be reasonably secure, while the "business end" of the railway from the junction towards the Persian frontier, where exposure to attack is greatest, should be as short as is consistent with the safety of the lines leading from the junction to the bases.

The drawback of Kondi as a junction is its presumably bad water-supply (which has been mentioned in a previous report). This is unavoidable, and must be accepted unless the junction be made at Ek Mach, 70 miles nearer Nushki; or the Nushki-Seistan alignment take an enormous detour to the south through the Mashkhel Hamun where water is abundant. Neither of these alternatives is recommended.

Port on coast.—Several ports on the coast have been recommended at various times for the terminus, but the only two that, under existing conditions, need be considered are those in our own or Kalat territory, *viz.*, Karachi and Pasni.

As each may have supporters, I thought it desirable to investigate alignments and prepare estimates for both projects with a view to an examination of their comparative advantages and disadvantages.

N.B.—Both Colonel McMahon and Major Showers agree with me as to Karachi being the better of the two.

Karachi requires no description. It is well known to every one interested in the matter as a first class port, as well as a military and railway base in connection with all the broad gauge systems of India.

Pasni is a small village of 150 mat huts standing on the shores of a crescent-shaped bay facing the east. Its inhabitants gain their livelihood by fishing, and exporting sharks' fins and the inside of a certain fish, which is used, I believe, in the manufacture of Isinglass. The water-supply is said to be abundant, but a visitor would scarcely think it so, to judge from the wells, shallow excavations three or four feet deep, into which the water slowly oozes.

The country immediately in rear is a mass of moving sandhills, one of which threatens already to swallow up the telegraph bungalow. The bay cannot be considered a good natural harbour. While well protected on the north and west, it is so shallow that vessels of moderate draft would have to anchor some miles from the shore, and, unless sheltered by a long breakwater, would be exposed to the force of the south-west monsoon.

The British India Company's Gulf steamers have lately begun to call there, and I fortunately met the second the day I spent at Pasni. The

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ship, which only drew 17 feet, was anchored more than two miles from the shore, and yet had only a foot or two of water under the keel at low tide. The Captain showed me the chart of the coast, dated 1874, and pointed out that, in the meantime, the bay had silted up five feet, or practically a fathom. The accompanying chart, for which I have to thank the British India Company, as there are no chart sellers in Bombay or Karachi, shows very clearly how exposed the five-fathom line (now only the four-fathom) is to the south and south-west, and how expensive it will be to convert the place into a secure anchorage unless the facilities of the port are confined to small coasting steamers. Even they, under present conditions, will be compelled to put to sea, and be unable to land either passengers or cargo, whenever an easterly gale springs up. If further information is required, reference might be made to the British India Company, whose Captains on that run will know after the monsoon what effect the swell has on ships in the bay.

From the preceding description it is obvious that Pasni in its present state is an impossible terminus for any railway at all, but more particularly for a strategic railway where the one desideratum is facility of uninterrupted working under all conditions of weather. It is true, as will be seen from the estimates, that the cost of the bare alignment from Kondi to Pasni is considerably less than that between Kondi and Karachi, but no account has been taken of the enormous outlay, which, it will have been realised, will be required to convert what is now little better than an open shallow roadstead into an important military and railway base. A breakwater, port defences, jetties and their equipment, railway carriage and locomotive shops, quarters, and a number of other items which I am quite unable to estimate for.

The railway terminal works would certainly absorb twenty to thirty lakhs. (The block account of the North-Western Railway at Karachi cannot be less than ½ crore.) A breakwater two miles long would cost more than a crore, while jetties, cranes, sidings, barges, &c., would run to several lakhs if carried out on an adequate scale. There is, therefore, little room for doubt that the saving in the cost of the Pasni alignment would be swallowed up in the works at the port. In a project for a strategic railway, military considerations should, however, be paramount, and too much stress should not be laid on small differences in economy between rival schemes. I should, therefore, state what appear to be decisive objections to Pasni as a terminus :—

Note.—It is difficult to ascertain, even approximately, what similar harbours in India have cost. At Madras, where at any rate there is the advantage of deep water inshore, the expenditure appears to be considerably over a crore. I am endeavouring to get the figures of the Karachi Harbour block account, but it is doubtful if they can be furnished with any degree of accuracy owing to the different agencies that have been at work at various times. If I can get them in sufficient detail hereafter, they can be printed in the appendix. They will give, *ceteris paribus*, some idea of the probable outlay required at Pasni. A breakwater on the east coast of India has recently been estimated at Rs. 1,000 per foot; in a locality where the conditions as regards materials were favourable.

(*a*) In time of war it will be an additional port to protect.

(*b*) It is separated from our Indian railway system by 200 miles of sea, so all troops and supplies will be subjected to the risk and delay of having to be conveyed by transports.

A railway from Karachi to Kondi is free from these drawbacks, and affords speed and security to the work of mobilisation. Karachi is, moreover, the natural terminus of a future Indo-European line (should that ever be built), whether it go by Makran or Herat. Further, the alignment to Karachi, while sacrificing no point of importance, is less exposed to attack than that to Pasni; for the latter, in turning to the west up the Kech valley, is vulnerable from the north owing to the re-entrant angle of the Persian frontier, whereas the former is safer and more compact, as it is retired to the east from the point where the Kech Kolwa valley is entered; while the populous part of Kech, from Turbat westwards, can be protected by a feeder line, with some real commercial prospects, running up the valley as far as Tump, on the same principle as the Kondi-Seistan branch. For it seems that the essential features of a well designed frontier system are that it should radiate towards the frontier from a secure base, run parallel to the frontier only so far as it can with safety, and then return to its original starting point, or to some similar base connected with the first by an interior line of railway. Its most exposed portions on the frontier should be protected

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as far as possible by short branches and roads to points where danger threatens, so that through communications should be as little liable to interruption as the nature of things will permit.

It should not be forgotten, however, that one of the objects of a line through Makran is to control the tribes within our border, and in this connection the Pasni alignment may claim some advantage, as it encloses a larger area of Baluchistan. I may, therefore, state that, with the exception of the Kech valley (undoubtedly the richest part of Makran), which I propose dealing with by a branch, the Karachi alignment embraces every district of importance in the country. Even the Pasni-Turbat line would require a branch about 40 miles long to Tump in order to command the centre of disturbance and to tap the trade of the valley, as Turbat is quite at its eastern extremity. It may be urged that the Karachi alignment is faulty, as it leaves the tract between Kolwa and the sea unguarded; and Alexander the Great's march along the coast may be quoted as showing the possible danger of neglecting this strip. This objection is easily answered. Alexander had command of the sea, and yet his army was only rescued from starvation by opportune supplies from Kandahar or Seistan. I do not think any invader would be so foolish and misguided as to enter that almost waterless waste of ravines and mountain. It would only be to die of starvation and thirst, or to surrender to our forces operating from the railway to the north. A good road direct from Kolwa to Pasni would be sufficient protection for this strip.

General description of country.—The question of the termini having now been disposed of, and my reasons for preferring Karachi stated at length, a brief general description of the country between Kondi and the sea appears desirable, as without it details of the proposed alignment will scarcely be intelligible. Western Baluchistan from Kondi southwards may be divided into two belts of markedly different characteristics; the northern and narrower being plain and glacis, and the southern a series of mountain ranges 150 miles in width. The former, which terminates in a line drawn from the debouchement of the Mashkhel river from the hills, through Palantak and Washuk, is the familiar waste of sand and stones. Its main feature is the Mashkhel Hamun, an ancient lake into which the rainfall of the surrounding country once drained, but whose waters now exist mainly in the imagination of the cartographer. Its level above the sea is only 1,600 feet, and the climate is said to be exceedingly hot in summer. A considerable nomad population of camel-graziers and shepherds centres round the Hamun, and Ladgasht, a village on its borders, has fairly extensive date groves. A little land is cultivated near Rajib with the flood waters of the Mashkhel river.

From Ladgasht caravan roads lead in every direction, to Jalk and Ladis, important centres in Persia, to the Helmund, Dalbandin, Kharan, and Panjgur. The Persian frontier is only a few miles off, and bends here from north-west to north.

From the Hamun we ascend over plain and gradually steepening glacis till we meet the northern limit of the Makran ranges. Thence to the coast three wide ranges intervene, separated by the two narrow valleys of Rakshan-Panjgur and Kech-Kolwa. Their peaks exceed 5,000 feet, and their general elevation above the central valleys is from 2,000 to 3,000 feet.

These mountains form the westerly continuation of the Khwaja Amran range, and jut out from its central axis below Nushki like the head of a hockey stick from its handle. Their geological formation is the same, grey blue slaty shales with bands of calcareous sandstone. The appearance and physical features of this tract are similar to those we are familiar with at the Khojak. The mountains are steep without being precipitous, their slopes are sound and free from slips, the strata are wonderfully contorted, and for the most part set on edge.

Near the higher peaks and in deep gorges the shales have a very pronounced slaty fracture, while the proportion of rock is high. As we near the coast the bands of rock get thinner and softer, and the slaty fracture disappears. The shales degenerate into clays, and the hills, in spite of their grey blue tinge,

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remind one irresistibly of the red clay hills of Nari and Mushkaf. In fact, near Jhau and Pidaruk patches of red clay appear overlying the blue shales. A curious characteristic of these ranges is that their highest peaks, instead of being in the centre of each range, form two continuous lines bordering on the plains, while their interior is a confused series of parallel ridges of lower altitude and softer material than the outer barrier.

A section of the country from north to south is, therefore, something like the sketch.



Owing to the parallelism of these interior ridges, the smaller nullas generally flow from east to west, while here and there a large river bursts through the outer barrier through a long, difficult, and generally tortuous gorge.

It will be easily understood that a railway through a country of this description is an exceedingly formidable work, and that a ruling grade of 1—40 to 1—50 is the best we can hope to obtain.

The population is almost entirely nomad, and, in consequence of the preceding years of drought, exceedingly scanty. I was astonished at the absence of inhabitants. At Nushki I was told, in answer to my enquiries, that they had migrated to Kharan. In Kharan I was told they had gone on to Panjgur. At Panjgur I was told that I should find them all in Kech. At Kech they were said to have gone to Karachi. Such inhabitants as there are, subsist on their flocks of sheep and goats, and, to a certain extent, in Kharan at least, on grass. In south Makran there are large numbers of camels. In the villages donkeys are fairly numerous. Cattle are scarce everywhere. The flora of the country is a curious mixture of the plants of the hot and cold zones of Baluchistan. Thus we find the acacia and madar bush of Sindh growing side by side with the camel scrub of the Quetta plateau.

In good seasons there is abundant pasturage among the hills for camels, sheep, and horses; in the "kaps" (or depressions whence the rain water has no exit) the scrub and grass are really luxuriant. The horses belonging to my party were turned out to graze at every camping ground, and found plenty of grass the whole way from Nushki to Karachi, except between Kech and Pasni, where the mountains (and plains too) are phenomenally barren, and the only grazing is in the nulla beds and "kaps".

The hills are everywhere bare of trees; but tamarisk and acacia are common in the plains, and the nulla beds are covered with the palmetto.

Practically the only settlements in the country are in the Panjgur and Kech-Kolwa valleys, where alone supplies are procurable, even in modest quantities.

(The unimportant villages of Jhau and the comparatively fertile district of Bela lying to the east are, of course, excluded from this general description of the country between Kondi and the coast.)

Panjgur* is the name given to a collection of three villages (the most important of which is Isa Kalat), with a total population perhaps of 3,000 souls. The produce of the valley consists of dates grown along the stony edge of the Rakshan River. Water is obtained partly from the riverbed, where at the time of

* *Vide* Appendix.

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my visit there was a considerable surface flow, but mainly from Karezes in the low hills on each bank. The length of this oasis is about 5 miles, its width from $\frac{1}{8}$ to $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile.

Little patches of wheat, lucerne, and vegetables are grown in openings among the date trees, but some grain also comes from Kolwa, Kharan, and Nushki.

The staple food of the villagers and of the surrounding nomad tribes is dates. There are at most two lakhs of bearing trees in the valley, and their annual produce is approximately a lakh of maunds = 3,700 tons. The bulk of the crop is consumed locally, or bartered with the nomads for ghi and wool, but a small quantity of the better dates is exported to Nushki and Karachi. The primitiveness of the country will be best understood from the fact that there were only five banias in the three villages. Panjgur is the hill station for all the wealthier people of Makran. The climate is remarkably cool for the elevation, 3,000 feet; cooler, I thought, than places of corresponding altitude near Quetta. Further up the valley water is no longer met with in the river, and is only obtainable from springs at the base of the mountains. In places there is a little “barani” cultivation from the streams that descend from the hills on both sides.

One of the two feasible routes for an invader leads from the Persian frontier at Kuhak, four marches off, through Isa Kalat and up the Rakshan to Kalat and Quetta. There is said to be only one severe Kotal on the whole road.

The foregoing description of Panjgur applies equally, *mutatis mutandis*, to Kech. The latter valley is much hotter being at an elevation of only 500 feet or less, and the hills are closer on either hand. Water is plentiful all along the Kech (Kilkaur) River from Turbat, the capital, westwards to Tump, a distance of 40 miles. A dozen fair-sized villages with their fringe of date trees line the edge of the river, and the population is much larger than that of Panjgur, amounting probably to 12,000 inhabitants.

The Nazim of Kech informed me that the Khan of Kalat owns four lakhs of trees in the valley. On the assumption, which is probably within the mark, that one-half of all the trees are his property, the total number would be eight lakhs, and their produce about four lakhs of maunds yearly=15,000 tons. A little rice and lucerne are grown in patches among the date trees, and there are gardens of orange trees and mangoes.

See Appendix.

There are excellent Karezes at Turbat, but lower down, I understood, the water was mainly derived from the river.

I did not go beyond Turbat, and part of this description is from information obtained from the Nazim.

Here too the staple food of the inhabitants is dates. A considerable quantity goes to the ports of Ormara and Gwadur, *en route*, it is said, for Karachi, but the bulk of the crop is consumed locally or bartered with the nomads for ghi and wool. With improved communications there can be no doubt that a large export of dates would spring up, with an import of grain in exchange. The people would very much prefer the latter if it could be got. So sick were they of a perpetual diet of dates, which recent failures of their rain crops had restricted them to, that I found a ration of flour had a much greater attraction for guides and camelmen than a daily wage. As the price of dates in Kech is annas 8 to 12 per maund and in India Rs. 5 to 10 per maund, there would be a wide margin of profit on the transaction.

The climate is hot and unhealthy; fever and cholera being prevalent before the date season (July-August). It is difficult to estimate heat when living in a small tent, but I consider Kech, though cooler than Sibi or Jhansi, is quite as hot as Cawnpore. Some twenty miles east of Turbat, in the same valley, are the two isolated villages of Sami and Sharak, with fifteen or twenty thousand date trees. Their main water-supply is from a Karez, but a little is obtained from the river. Further east again, at Herokh and Oshap, there is a slight surface flow in the river and small patches of rice on its banks. Elsewhere from Turbat eastwards to the Kilkaur Tangi, on the borders of Kolwa, water is only found in large pools in the riverbed, though there is probably a flow through the shingle.

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While Panjgur and Kech are narrow, stony valleys, Kolwa, which commences at the eastern extremity of the latter, is a long, wide, alluvial depression, into which the nullas from the ranges to the north and south empty themselves. Its staples are barley and millet, and the total produce of an ordinary year, in spite of its enormous area and possibilities, does not exceed 600 tons. With a little energy on the part of the cultivators in repairing bunds, &c., now in a lamentable state of ruin, that quantity might be increased ten-fold.

The inhabitants are confined to a few little villages or kalats, and depend upon rather deep and indifferent wells for their drinking supply.

The second route for an invader from Persia runs through this Kech-Kolwa valley, and converges with the Panjgur road to Kalat near the head of the Mashkai River.

With the exception of these two thoroughfares (for we may exclude the roads from Ladgasht through Dalbandin or Kharan as too waterless), no other roads lead east and west along which troops could be moved.

It may be considered that Madak Kalat in Kolwa, where the Karachi alignment enters the plain, is too remote from the frontier to guard this route effectually, without the addition of a branch from Kolwa to Tump. While on political and commercial grounds I am strongly in favour of building a branch to Tump, as it would be very cheaply constructed and would prove a valuable feeder line, and at least pay working expenses from the beginning, besides exerting a powerful political influence in Persian Baluchistan, I don't think it should be considered an integral part of the scheme of defence. For the Madak position *per se* gives every advantage to the defenders. Except after heavy rains where pools are to be met with in fields whose bunds are still intact, the stretch of 30 miles from the Kech River at Kilkaur Tangi to the railway is practically waterless. Even in peace time a force would have to march through Kolwa in detachments; it is difficult then to see how it could make good its advance in the face of troops supported by a railway in rear. It is on political and commercial grounds, rather than strategic, that the Kech valley branch is essential.

Before concluding this general description of Makran, a few words concerning the tract between Kech and the coasts may not be out of place, in explanation of the comparative cheapness of the line from Turbat to Pasni. Though similar in geological formation to the ranges to the north, this third range is much less formidable; the ridges between its outer barriers are lower and further apart, while between the ridges are wide expanses of sloping, stony plain.

The country is unusually sterile, partly because of its greater heat and more scanty rainfall, but mainly, I believe, on account of the change in the strata from hard rock and slaty shales to soft rock and clay shales. The striking features of the country are its wide, deep nulla beds and great stretches of ravines. Both proceed from the same cause,—the absence of rock and the friability of the shales. In places the plain seems to melt away into a series of sugar loaf mounds, like the banks of the Chambal near Dholpur or of the Jumna at Kalpi. These ravines, though impracticable for anyone on foot (at least in the hot weather), are in places not at all difficult for a railway; and the main head of expense in this portion of the line will be in the matter of bridging.

The foregoing general description may serve to convey some idea of Western Baluchistan from a Railway Engineer's standpoint. Before proceeding to give details of the alignments, works, curves, &c., a little further account of the inhabitants may be of interest.

The men of the country from Panjgur south are lusty and well shaped. It was remarkable how much bigger and heavier they were than the grain-eating Baluchis round Nushki and Quetta. There is a large admixture of Negro blood among the inhabitants of the villages, but the nomads are fairly free from the taint. The dominant religion is Muhammadanism, but among the fribes round Kech Zigriism is exceedingly prevalent. Its tenets are a worship to the Mullas, who claim at marriages the rights of a French Seigneur over

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his tenants' daughters; its rites consist of certain secret orgies, during which the worshippers, both men and women, sit round in a circle clapping their hands and shouting till they reach a state of frenzy. The Zigris' Mecca is a sacred hill near Turbat, on which grew the sacred tree in which the book of their religion was first discovered by the founder of their faith. During the late famine some pious Muhammadans, who, of course, regard Zigriism with abhorrence, cut down the tree for fodder.

Owing to frequent persecutions in the past, they will almost invariably deny their religion when first questioned. In other matters too they appeared to me to be the most unblushingly mendacious race I had ever met. But they proved excellent guides. They know the country thoroughly, their intelligence is far beyond that of the half African dwellers of the villages, and they really seem to grasp the sort of country that a railway officer wishes to see. The fact is well worth noting by future railway survey parties; for intelligent guides may save months of work in an unknown, indifferently mapped country.

Details of alignment from "Kondi to Karachi;" important works, grades, curves, &c.

From Kondi, R. L. 2,800, the line runs almost south to Ladgasht, R. L. 1,600, a distance of 72 miles. As far as Gwalishtan, which is about half-way, the country traversed is a barren glacis of fine shingle. At Gwalishtan, in the centre of the Mashkhel Hamun, a good supply of brackish water is obtainable from wells, three or four feet deep, and there is a fairly dense jungle of tamarisk trees.

Between Gwalishtan and Ladgasht are patches of shora, "pat", and sandy plain covered with scrub; in places the surface of the ground is slightly broken by nullas.

From Ladgasht to Palantak, 79 miles, the line runs to the south-east over dasht and glacis covered with grit and shingle. On the left, some two or three miles off, are large sandhills; on the right, the talus of the mountains.

There are no nullas here till the Mashkhel River is reached, where 600′ of waterway will be required. Its banks are well defined, from 15′ to 20′ high, formed of hard shingle and conglomerate. Its catchment area is vast, extending into the mountains 150 miles to east and west but narrow from north to south.

Beyond this crossing the glacis is broken by two large nullas, the Bibi Lori and the Pilin Kaur, which flow in several small channels between outer banks, some 30 ft. high.

N.B.—Kaur = river.

[I should state that I have not ridden over the 150 miles of plain from Kondi to Palantak. It was imperative that I should complete the Seistan reconnaissance to Nushki. Thence to save time I marched straight to Palantak *via* Kharan and Washuk, leaving my surveyor to do the reconnaissance from Kondi to Palantak. He is an excellent man, and his work can be thoroughly relied on.

Owing to information I received, I ordered him to ascend the Mashkhel River from the Hamun, so as to avoid the sandhills which were said to cover the glacis. In doing so he ran into the very difficulty he wished to escape; for these sandhills in places line the river bank on both sides, while the glacis is free from sand. Unfortunately, in obedience to my orders, the barometric section was taken along this route. Being along what has proved to be the wrong alignment, it is not submitted. Afterwards, on finding this route so bad, he investigated the alignment now put forward, but for reasons which need not be explained was unable to complete a continuous section. In such easy country, indeed, it was hardly necessary.]

At Palantak, R. L. 2,200, where there is a small flow of water in the nullah, a hut, and a few young date trees, the Ghat section of the line may be regarded as beginning. Thence the alignment ascends the bank of the river over rather rough ground for six miles till the Palantak Tangi or gorge is reached.

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This gorge is an obligatory point on any railway from Kondi or its neighbourhood to the coast, as it affords the only feasible route through the outer barrier of the Kharan-Panjgur range.

My surveyor examined the Zurrat Tangi, one of the two defiles of the Mashkhel River, and found it impracticable, owing to its lofty precipitous cliffs and rapid windings (*vide* drawing attached).

He reported to the same effect of the Bibi Lori (or Maki) Tangi, a report which I subsequently verified. The river is a series of zig-zags, its banks rise steeply for several hundred feet, the strata are contorted in every direction and crushed by the superincumbent weight of the mass above. The Korkian Tangi to the east is longer and worse than the Palantak.

I may mention that the 4 miles=1″ maps show the nullas about here incorrectly; time did not permit of my correcting them. It may be added indeed that in many important places, the hills and nullas are so sketchily mapped that it is impossible to make the plan agree with the section. In such cases where the report and section speak of a plain, while the line on the plan is drawn through a hill, the latter may be regarded as imaginary.

With the exception of the descent down the Siri Kaur into Bela, and perhaps of the tunnel and approaches at the Madak Pass, which will be described hereafter, the five miles of the Palantak defile is the heaviest section of the line. The grade is fairly; easy otherwise it is a Bolan Pass in miniature, but narrower and more precipitous. Fortunately the river is fairly straight, the strata are hard and vertical, while rock appears all along the bed of the river. Where, therefore, cuttings in the hillside would be costly, long stretches can be built with a low retaining wall on surface foundations—*vide* sketch.



The roadbed will be secure and free from slips whether in cutting or in retaining wall. Possibly water may prove too scarce for anything, but a minimum of masonry, in which case retaining walls would be out of the question, and even the bridges might with advantage be American steel trestles. In ordinary seasons there is generally a trickle through the gorge, but in time of drought the nearest permanent sources of supply are at Palantak, six miles from its northern mouth, and at Palantak Thana at its southern end. The accompanying traverse, on which, merely to fix ideas, a line has been sketched, gives some impression of the character of the works.

It shows nine crossings of the river, four short tunnels, and ½ a mile of retaining wall. It should, however, be clearly understood that the alignment does not purport to be even approximately correct: in fact, it is much too cheap in places for safety.

Beyond the Tangi the alignment continues to follow the Ladgasht-Panjgur caravan road. The first six or seven miles are ordinary medium heavy line in hilly country with considerable bridging in small spans. The ruling grade through the gorge and up to this point is 1—70 to 1—80.

At the 7th mile from Palantak Thana the line crosses a watershed among the hills where a short tunnel and some expensive development in a basin below the Kotal are necessary in order to obtain 1—50. Between this intermediate Kotal and the watershed of the range at Dambodin, R. L. 4,040, the grade is easy, but the earthwork and minor bridging will be heavy.

Dambodim is an awkward Kotal for the Railway Engineer; long flat, and unavoidable. A heavy cutting will be necessary through it, with possibly a short tunnel or cut and cover towards Panjgur, in order to ease the descent of the Sagari Sing nulla down which the alignment runs for 6½ miles.

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The nulla flows in a rather deep bed in a narrow valley between two high ridges. These ridges are too close to permit of much development; the valley is rough and fissured by streams from each side, so the descent is moderately difficult, and the best grade obtainable will probably be little better than the slope of the nulla bed, say, 1—50 to 1—55.

At Sagari Sing, where white quartz reefs among the rocks in the bed of the river give the name to the place, the line leaves the valley and turns sharp to the right. Thenceforth the country opens on either hand, and the work gradually gets lighter till as the Rakshan valley is neared at Panjgur, R. L. 3,100, the last few miles are over the usual easy glacis.

The Rakshan River between the villages of Khodabadan Tasp and Isa Kalat is a wide sprawling torrent without any apparent banks. Its bed is, of coarse shingle, and full of quicksands after floods. When I saw it, the surface flow of water was considerable, quite 50 cubic feet per second, but that was shortly after heavy rain.

The underground flow must be great. The width of the river varies from $\frac{1}{4}$ to $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile, but its waters in flood are shallow. Perhaps the best site for a bridge would be above the uppermost village, Khodabadan, where the channel of the river might be confined.

If the direct route to Isa Kalat be taken, the bridge would be $\frac{1}{4}$ mile long: short spans, on low piers with shallow founds and a drop wall. (Training works are not suited to the conditions here, and might lead to trouble with the owners of the date groves.) The bed of the river slopes sufficiently for tail races to be effective, so the foundations should not be troublesome. I paid very little attention to the choice of a site for this bridge, for, as will be realised when I describe the alternative route *via* the Gorandi Pass, it is not by any means certain from which direction the line will approach Isa Kalat.

Gorandi Pass alternative.—Feeling dissatisfied with the line along the caravan road from Palantak Thana over the Dambodim, I examined two passes to the west leading from Panjgur into a depression or Kap called Dostanzai, and thence to the Palantak defile. One of these, the Ghulam Shah, was barely practicable and calls for no further remark; but the second, the Gorandi, proved much easier than the Dambodim. There is little to choose in actual cost between these two routes, for though the works on the Gorandi are much lighter, and the grades somewhat better than *via* the Dambodim, the length of the line is about 15 miles greater, that is, if we bring the railway to Isa Kalat, as I think we should do (*vide* plan).

It will be observed that the Gorandi Kotal is 500 feet lower than the Dambodim, but that, on the other hand, the alignment over the former has to cross a subsidiary watershed between the Bibi Lori and Palantak Rivers, so that the total rise and fall of the two routes is practically identical. The 12 miles between these two Tangis is over glacis scarred with deepish nullas; in fact, the action of the Tangis on the surrounding country resembles that of two separate sluice gates draining a muddy pond. There will be a good deal of small span bridging along this alignment, but the other works will be light enough except near the Gorandi Kotal. Even there the heavy works only extend for 7 or 8 miles and are not formidable. The descent to Panjgur is much easier than would appear from the barometric section down the Gorandi nulla, as development is comparatively simple (*vide* sketch).



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Two short tunnels will probably be found necessary, and two or three crossings of the nulla.

Before detailed surveys of either alignment are put in hand, a fortnight should be spent in levelling over and examining both routes. In my opinion there is little to choose between the two, and if 1—50 can be obtained *via* the caravan road without prohibitive works below Sorenkik, and no appreciably better grade is obtainable *via* the Gorandi Pass, there will be no need to stake out both lines. I confess to a prejudice in favour of the Gorandi route, but that was probably because I discovered it.

Alignment from Panjgur to Kolwa.—From Panjgur two alignments suggested themselves. One running approximately north and south to Kolwa, and the other following the direct caravan road to Karachi in a south-easterly direction. I adopted the former on several grounds,—political, strategic, and engineering. First, it obviously encloses a greater area of Baluchistan; second, it intersects the Kech-Kolwa route, 50 miles nearer the Persian frontier; third, it is a sound principle in Ghat Railway engineering to cross the mountains by the shortest possible route, regardless, within wide limits, of extra length of line. There are some 80 miles of hilly country on the direct route *via* the Latari Pass, as compared with 50 *via* that adopted. I may add that at Panjgur my surveyor met Mr. Wilson of the Indo-European Telegraphs, who was surveying for a telegraph line from Karachi to Kuhak, and had marched through by the Latari route. He reported it as impracticable for a railway and not even fit for a telegraph line.

From Isa Kalat, therefore, the alignment runs south-west diagonally across the valley to Chib, so as to avoid a range that the caravan road to Shahbaz Kalat and Kolwa crosses. From Chib it turns south-east, and, after continuing in plain up to the 28th mile from Isa Kalat, begins to ascend the northern Kotal of the range between the Rakshan valley and Kolwa.

Near Wash Jaurakin Spring, mile 228 and 33 miles from Isa Kalat, there will be a small tunnel where the alignment joins the caravan road, but possibly this can be avoided by making a wider sweep to the west before beginning the ascent.

The grade and works of the north approach of the Wash Jaurakin Kotal, mile 231, R. L. 3,400, are easy. On the descent the alignment should not follow the caravan road, but take a footpath to the right over the Istirgi Kotal. There is some heavy work among ridges for about five miles even on a 1—50 grade. At mile 237 the main ridges are cleared, and thenceforth, for 25 miles, till the corresponding barrier overlooking Kolwa is reached, the line is frequently on easy stretches of glacis and plain. The route along which the barometric section has been taken is the Panjgur-Madak-Kalat caravan road, and requires very little description. The open country is broken by numerous parallel ridges, many of them lofty and continuous, but negotiable here and there at nulla gorges and low Kotals. At mile 249 near Gumbak the line to Pasni bifurcates to the south-west.

One or two short reverse grades occur where the road crosses from valley to valley, but they are easily dealt with and call for no special remark. With this exception, there is a general fall in the alignment till we reach the Kil Kaur (mile 281, R. L. 2,500), the principal river of the country, at the foot of the ascent to the Madak Pass. The bridge would be of ordinary short spans on open founds in shale and rock. A fairly good crossing about 1,200 feet wide will be got ¾ of a mile below the caravan road.

The works on the Madak Pass, R. L. 3,200, are of an exceedingly formidable nature. From the 265th to the 275th mile the mountains are continuous. The line I suggest follows the Madak River closely, on a 1—45 grade. Development is possible on the north approach in one or two places where the ridges are far enough apart for the railway to turn between them, and certain points dotted on the section indicate where this can be done; but the expense in obtaining a better grade than 1—45 or 1—50 will probably prove prohibitive. I propose to negotiate the summit with a tunnel, 1½ miles long. With a little care

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in aligning it, a good shaft might be got near its centre, dividing it into two ¾-mile tunnels. The rock, hard Khojak shale, is admirably adapted for tunnelling. A good spring exists on the north approach, and one or two small ones in the nulla on the south, so there will be no want of water. On the contrary, springs will probably be tapped in driving the heading.

The descent from the summit tunnel to the Kolwa plain is similar in character to the ascent, only more costly. The cheapest route is to adhere to the slope of the nulla, bridging the stream where necessary. The first three miles will be exceedingly heavy, as the banks are high and steep. Fortunately, the nulla is fairly straight.

An alternative method of negotiating this pass has been suggested by my surveyor. It is to climb as high as possible on the north side, say, to a point 150 feet higher than I propose, and then cross the Kotal with two short tunnels. The descent is accomplished in a similar manner by a series of loops with short tunnels, where necessary, through the ridges. This alternative is certainly worth a trial. I rejected it at first sight on account of a lofty viaduct which would be required at the south tunnel mouth over the ravine below it: for the river at the tunnel entrance forks in both directions, and a viaduct is unavoidable.



It is not likely that this alternative will result in any economy in construction, for the open patches between the ridges are indented with deep nullas, so the bridging and earthwork will be exceedingly heavy; but the great advantage of this method, if it is feasible, is that it avoids that most objectionable feature in an alignment, a tedious un-get-at-able work in the centre of a long railway. For it will be easily understood that a tunnel of the length I propose, on which only a limited number of men can be employed, may bar the opening of through communications for a couple of years after the line on each side is complete. So, if two short tunnels are obtainable instead of one long one, they are much to be preferred, even at a slight increase of cost. Otherwise, the heading of the long tunnel should be started by hand labour as an isolated work in advance, as soon as construction is begun at the termini. By these means the heading will probably be through by the time the rails on either side reach the tunnel.

At the 274th mile, the works begin to get lighter. Between the 275th and 276th miles the river makes a sharp "U" bend, and, in order to avoid a double crossing, it might be diverted through a tunnel (*vide* sketch)



From the 277th mile the line need not follow the caravan road (along which the section was taken in the first instance), but had better continue to descend the river almost to its debouchement on the plain (*vide* plan).

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This will probably prove a cheaper alignment (though it involves two short tunnels and perhaps three crossings of the Madak) than developing among the foot hills, as the alternative along the caravan road would be compelled to do, to obtain the ruling gradient. Both routes should be levelled over and carefully examined before either is definitely settled upon. A comparison between an alignment down a gorge or narrow valley, and one developing on a rough hillside, is very difficult from a mere reconnaissance. The bridging and tunnelling of the former, though short, often prove more expensive than continuous heavy earthwork in bank and cutting. In fact a gorge route, though generally easy to build, and giving the best grade, often turns out much more costly than it looks at first sight.

Another point is that it is impossible from a reconnaissance to localise individual works in a gorge route. For in such cases, when a difficulty arises, the Railway Engineer has three courses open—*viz.*, a bridge over the nullah, a retaining wall in it, or a tunnel; and it is only by detailed surveys that he can ascertain the cheapest method of dealing with the difficulty. The reconnaissance officer can only judge from previous experience, and by a comparison with railways in similar country, whether the route as a whole is feasible or not, and what its probable cost will be.

Before finishing the description of the Madak Pass, I wish to draw attention to an error in the 4 miles =1″ Trigonometrical Survey map in showing the Kotal at least 1,000 feet lower than it really is, thus conveying the impression that there was only 400 feet of fall to the Kolwa plain instead of 1,400.

A mistake of this sort, which could be avoided with a little care in checking the sheet, may cause a lot of trouble and delay. This is not the only place where the levels are incorrect. In the left hand top corner of the same sheet are two equally misleading levels—*viz.*, at Shahbaz Kalat and below the Istirgi Kotal. These mistakes are obvious, once discovered; but they shake one's faith in all Trigonometrical Survey barometric levels.

Alternatives to Madak route.—As the Madak Pass proved so unsatisfactory, an alternative was tried *via* the Wehli nulla and Malar Kalat, but found impracticable.

A second alternative, *via* the Kilkaur at Tang-i-Pusht and Nag Kalat, was the route first selected for the railway to Pasni, and will be described when dealing with that alignment.

Suffice it to say for the present, that, unless the Military Department express a strong preference for the Madak route, lines over both passes should be staked out by separate survey parties.

Alignment from Kolwa to Jhau.—From its debouchement on the Kolwa plain near Madak Kalat (R. L. 1,800 and mile 280), the line is a surface one for 40 miles as far as Mandai Af. Its general bearing is east, and it crosses Kolwa in a diagonal direction *via* Hor Kalat and Regchahi. In the centre of the plain is a long narrow ridge which can either be rounded, or negotiated at one of its numerous openings. A low bank may be necessary through the "Kap" where water appears to stand two or three feet deep after heavy rain.

At Mandai Af, R. L. 2,100, the third range between Kondi and the coast is encountered.

Thence to the crossing of the Nal River near Jhau there extends a continuous stretch of rough hills and ridges about 36 miles in width. The alignment follows the Las Bela caravan road except where otherwise stated. Its most notable feature is that it crosses the main drainage of the country and has consequently a considerable amount of rise and fall in passing from valley to valley, and two good-sized bridges, the Paho (or Mashkai) and Nal.



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The sketch explains the general character of the alignment, ascending and descending the small tributaries of the main rivers, running for the most part parallel to the ridges, but crossing them every here and there.

The works on the whole are not as expensive as might be anticipated, the heaviest bits being (1) at the Garmaf Kotals (R. L. 2,500, mile 322) through two adjacent ridges above Mandai Af where two short tunnels will be required; and (2) the descent of the Masjid nulla from Masjid Ziarat into Jhau, miles 347 to 352.

On the section will be found full details of the nature of the country traversed. It should be specially noted that the line should not follow the caravan road in the descent from the above-mentioned tunnels to the Paho River, mile 332, as that route involves a third Kotal, and is prohibitively steep; but should descend the Garm Af nulla as shown on the section. Again between Masjid Ziarat and Jhau the caravan road is impracticable for a railway, as it ascends an awkward Kotal. The correct alignment is to follow the Masjid nulla either as far as mile 351, and then strike to the left across the foothills; or else to its debouchement on the Jhau glacis a mile or two further on.

The section follows the first alternative, but the second will probably prove better. For four miles below Ziarat, the earthwork will be heavy, and there will be some small span bridging; but the hills on both sides of the nulla are in the main low and of soft material, so, though the stream winds abruptly, it can hardly be called a defile.

The central portion of this tract from the foot of the Garm Af Kotal to Ziarat is not at all difficult. The principal work is the bridge over the Paho River 15×60. The catchment area of this river ranks next in size after the Mashkhel, but its basin is long and narrow, so its floods hardly seem so great as those in the Kil Kaur, whose basin, though smaller, is more compact. The river runs through a wide defile with high rocky banks. Between the banks are fairly stable patches of alluvial soil covered with tall jungle of tamarisk and acacia. Not far from the caravan road, rock (soft sandstone) stretches from side to side, so there should be no trouble in obtaining good foundations.

There is plenty of water in pools in the riverbed, but no surface flow. No doubt, there is a good perennial flow through the shingle.

The ruling grade between Mandaiaf and Jhau will be determined by the grade at the Garm Af Kotal. 1—50 is the best to be expected there. Elsewhere easier gradients could be obtained if there were any advantage in doing so.

Alternative routes between Jhau and Kolwa will suggest themselves to the survey officers staking out the permanent line, *viz.*,—

(*a*) From Jhau up the Seri (or Serd) Pass, and across Nondro to the north-east corner of Kolwa.

(*b*) From Jhau *via* the present alignment as far as the Nondro crossing, mile 340, thence up the Nondro River and into Kolwa *via* (*a*), and avoiding the Garm Af Kotals.

Both these routes are longer than that now under report, and in my opinion not likely to prove so good. My Jemadar of Levy Sowars, a Brahui Sardar, who had accompanied Major Showers over route (*a*) last year, gave a very bad account of the passes on it, more particularly of the Seri, but Major Showers has since assured me that in his opinion they are not impracticable. (*a*) is certainly worth a cursory examination, for it crosses the hilly tract by a much shorter route than mine, though the total length of line is increased. (*b*) is too circuitous for investigation unless some unforeseen difficulty is discovered at the Garm Af Kotal.

Jhau to Las Bela.—After its debouchement on the Jhau glacis the alignment descends to the Nal River, R. L. 1,500, which will require about 800 feet of waterway in 40 feet or 60 feet spans.

There is a short stretch of partially cultivated alluvial plain on each side of the river, and fairly dense jungle of tamarisk and acacia. The banks of the river are of earth, about 30 feet high, and steep. There is a slight perennial flow in its bed.

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I did not find a satisfactory crossing for the bridge, but do not anticipate any trouble in getting good founds in red clay or sandstone, not far below the surface of the shingle. The catchment basin of the river, though long, is narrow, so its floods are not heavy, and 800 feet of waterway is more than ample. From the Nal somewhere near Kuragi, mile 360, the line gradually ascends over a stony plain. The surrounding country for the next 25 miles most probably once formed a lake, into whose former bed various nullas have dug their present channels, leaving scarps and terraces of red clay and conglomerate to show its original level. Two of these scarps are crossed by the alignment, the first about 8 miles from the Nal River, and the second near the Monro. The latter is quite easy: the line would ascend along the face of the bluff in light cutting. The former is much loftier and more troublesome. The alignment there should not follow the Kuragi-Bela caravan road, along which the section was taken, but strike the Panjgur-Damb-Bela road, 4 miles to the north, at the point where it tops the crest of the ridge. The bluff is 100 feet lower here, and the descent by either of the routes shown dotted on plan, is fairly straightforward, though the earthwork for 2 miles will be heavy. I made a section of this alternative, but it is not worth submitting; the correct alignment is so obvious.

The rest of the alignment, as far as the Seetaro ascent (mile 385, R. L. 1,400), is light line over dasht and glacis. Several fair-sized nullas have to be bridged—the Kang, Larendara, Monro, Ara, and Seetaro—but the spans will be short and the piers low. A few isolated ridges of Khojak shales can be avoided.

The Seetaro ascent to the Jhau Lak plateau, though only 300 feet in height, is a more troublesome and expensive bit of development than the barometric section would lead one to suppose. The lower portion is through a confused mass of clay cliffs and ravines, finishing up at the Kotal (R. L. 1,700) with a steep rise of 100 feet The best alignment will be found slightly to the right of the caravan road, where a basin among the hills gives room for development almost up to the top of the Kotal; the last $\frac{1}{4}$ of a mile being on the face of the cliff and crossing to the left of the road.

N.B.—Between Jhau and Las Bela, neither my surveyor's nor my barometer agrees with the levels on the Trigonometrical Survey maps. Our barometers agree fairly *inter se*, and all agree as to the actual height of the Jhau Lak above the Bela plain. Daily dust-storms and atmospheric disturbances all the time we were here caused the discrepancy in reduced level (above the sea). At Monro and Seetaro our R. L. is 200 feet too high, 300 feet at the Goko plain,—mile 398,—and 400 feet at Las Bela.

The next 17 miles across the plateau present no difficulties. The road winds in an open plain among high hills of soft sandstone and clay. There is a good deal of small span bridging and some earthwork, but the correct alignment is fairly obvious. The plain is occasionally earth and gravel, but more often of layers of sandstone on edge, such as may be frequently seen near Sibi.

Lak-descent.—The descent from the plateau, R. L. 1,700, to the Bela plain, R. L. 700, is the most difficult piece of the whole line. The caravan road descends the face of a cliff, known as the Jhau Lak, into a sort of crater of clay shale hills drained by a nulla running to the left under a sheer precipice. No adhesion railway could possibly follow this route. I had been told this beforehand, and so, while I was making the reconnaissance to Pasni, I sent my surveyor here to make a thorough examination of all possible routes. The alignment now proposed was only discovered after a series of failures, when he had almost despaired of success.

Subsequent detailed surveys will no doubt modify and improve it in many ways, but the general route shown on the plan *via* the Sir Kaur Kotal, and down the valley of that river, for at least a considerable part of its course, is, in my opinion, the only feasible route for the descent. Proceeding to details, the barometric section leaves the caravan road at the junction of the Kumbh and Sir Kaur (west) nullas at mile 404, about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the top of the Jhau Lak, and $\frac{3}{4}$ mile below the Kumbh camping ground (these details are intended to assist future survey parties). Thence it turns abruptly to the left up the Sir Kaur for three miles till the Sir Kaur Kotal is reached, where a $\frac{1}{2}$ mile tunnel will be necessary through soft sandstone and clay. The permanent

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line could reach the Kotal by a shorter route than the right-angled bend along which the section was taken.

At the foot of the Kotal, at the point A on the section, is a small plain of sandstone on edge forming a cup among the mountains, and a certain amount of development can be done round the sides of this hollow. At its eastern extremity are the headwaters of the Sir Kaur (east). The section follows the nulla for five miles till further progress is stopped by a lake formed by slips from the ends of a high range of shale hills that crosses the nulla at right angles. Up to this point the alignment, though very expensive, has not been impossible, but the sides of the lake and the slips beyond are quite impracticable. The alignment should, therefore, after following the nulla for 2½ miles, trend to the right and tunnel through the clay ridge with a tunnel probably 1½ miles long. The rest of the descent is easy. The outer range of sandstone, which runs parallel to the clay shale ridge, and about ¼ mile east of it, can be turned at the debouchement of the Sir Kaur into the plain.

An alternative to this would be to tunnel through the clay ridge on the north side of the nulla, but the point is immaterial. 1—45 will be the best gradient that can be expected on this Ghat. 1—40 will be satisfactory.

This bit of reconnaissance was the most trying work, as it had all to be done on foot, and the month was June. So precipitous and smooth is the clay ridge that it was impossible to get any measurement over it, its sides appeared quite unclimbable without some sort of paths; but from opposite ends of the lake a good idea of its width was obtainable, and I believe my estimate of 1½ miles of tunnel is liberal. The Trignometrical Survey maps, which, east of Seetaro, are on a scale of 2 miles = 1″ and on the whole very accurate, support this conclusion. Unfortunately any one unacquainted with the country will hardly be able to distinguish this important clay ridge on the map, possibly owing to its top and sides being a multitude of little cones, and in showing the cones the fact that, in the aggregate they form a range, has been overlooked. It is also shown further from the outer range than is really the case.

I need scarcely say that the detailed surveys from the Kotal downwards will be exceedingly difficult and arduous from the inaccessible nature of the hills. A raft or Berthon boat will be of great assistance on the lake, which is nearly ½ mile long but very narrow. None of us liked swimming it for fear of crocodiles (though there were no signs of them on the bank), and so we had to make a circuit of more than twenty miles to get to the opposite end, for the banks were too steep and friable to clamber along.

[*N. B.*—It will be observed that the large tracing on the scale of 4 miles= 1″ only shows the hills bordering on the proposed alignment from the Sir Kaur to Karachi. The reason is that these few sheets are only published on a scale of 2 miles=1″, and to reduce them to the 4 miles=1″ scale would have taken months. Printed sheets, on the 2 miles=1″ scale, are, however, enclosed for reference.]

The works on this Ghat will undoubtedly be very heavy. At the same time a little consideration will show that Bela is one of the most convenient places on the line for heavy works to be situated. The rails can reach the mouth of the tunnel from Karachi in a single year, bringing tunnelling plant, construction materials, and an ample supply of labour. While the tunnelling works are in progress, the formation can be completed up to Jhau, so that by the time the tunnel is complete there will be an uninterrupted stretch of line ready for the rails as far as the Nal River, while the Jhau-Kolwa Section should also be well in hand. It may be added that the clay shales and soft sandstone on the Ghat are very suitable materials for tunnelling through, and that, with the exception of the slips forming the bund of the lake, (where the cliffs were so sheer and high that slips were bound to occur), there were no genuine slips in the country; nothing but occasional falls from overhanging cliffs.

Alignments from Bela to Karachi.—At the entrance of the Sir Kaur into the Bela plain, 126 miles from Karachi, all difficulties of construction cease. Thence, till we approach the low plateau forming the tail of the Habb Mountains, the line is over alluvial country, once, no doubt, an arm of the sea.

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From the Sir Kaur to the capital Las Bela, a distance of ten miles, the alignment traverses plain and glacis in nearly equal amounts. The only works are two short span bridges over wide but unimportant nullas. Las Bela, the Jam's residence, is a small town of about 3,000 inhabitants, 116 miles from Karachi (R. L. 300, Trigonometrical Survey: R. L. 700, by our barometer). A little garden irrigation is done from wells, but all other cultivation is dependent upon the rain water brought down by nullas from the surrounding hills. The country is populous and well tilled to the extent that this water permits. The bunds are admirably maintained, and the fields are clean. The crops are barley and Juari, and, in particular, a very valuable species of mustard which is grown entirely for export. The inhabitants are no longer idle Baluchis, but hardworking Jats. Their language is Sindhi. Where the land is uncultivated, a dense jungle of grass, tamarisk, acacia, and scrub covers the soil. The country is the paradise of the camel, which exists in great numbers. Cattle are also fairly numerous. There are many small villages and two small towns besides Las Bela.—Uthal, said to be larger than Las Bela, the centre of a considerable trade; and Sonmiani, a small port and fishing village on the coast. A brisk traffic is carried on with Karachi mainly by caravan, and a railway to Las Bela could be very cheaply constructed, and would probably pay working expenses.

N.B.—Wheat is said not to grow either here or in Kolwa. Rust attacks it, perhaps due to the night dews, at any rate in Bela.

The alignment calls for very little description. From Las Bela the line should run to Uthal and not direct to Sonmiani. The first portion is over a cultivated plain where some irrigation openings will be required to pass the flood water from the hills on the east. Thence to near Uthal, where there is another large area of cultivation, the alignment runs along the foot of the glacis of the Pab range.

From Uthal it should follow the caravan road, south of the Siranda lake, to within a mile or two of Sonmiani, where some sandhills intervene which should not be crossed. The port at Sonmiani is silting up, and a new one is being opened a few miles to the north-west. The country from the Sir Kaur to Sonmiani is so flat that I thought it unnecessary to make a barometric section.

From Sonmiani for the first twenty miles, as far as Lak Bedok, the Karachi caravan road traverses a narrow strip of plain between a line of low sandy bluffs and the sea. At Lak Bedok it ascends to the high ground up the face of the cliff. A section of the road over this ascent and thence to Malir Station, North-Western Railway, is submitted for information. The railway should not attempt the Lak Bedok, but should make this climb of 150 feet to 200 feet with a gradual ascent, either *via* Adam Pir Ziarat, or Nakakhari, where there are easy openings in the bluffs (*vide* plan). From Lak Bedok the alignment should follow the caravan road more or less closely almost to Bawani. The country is a rolling, uneven, sandy plain, covered with scrub. Here and there are isolated rocky hills. Near Bawani the section turns to the right down a gently sloping nulla (instead of continuing along the road) with the object of obtaining an easier descent to the Habb River. Possibly this detour was quite unnecessary. At any rate, the direct route along the road might first be tried before adopting that shown on the plan.

The Habb will require 1,000 feet of waterway in 40 feet or 60 feet spans. The banks are fairly low, and the bed of shingle with conglomerate showing in places. There was a little running water in the river when I crossed it, but I believe that is unusual, so the founds should not be troublesome.

From the Habb I marched to Malir Station, North-Western Railway, *via* Magar Pir, so as to avoid entering the plague-infected area of Karachi and a subsequent ten days' quarantine for all my party at Quetta.

The country is similar to that traversed by the North-Western Railway between Malir and Karachi, and needs no description. It is sufficient to state that the works are light, and the grades easy.

A ruling grade of 1—150 will probably be obtainable over the whole upland from Adam Pir Ziarat to the junction with the North-Western Railway outside Karachi.

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It will, of course, be understood that I do not suggest making the junction so far from Karachi as Malir. The actual position of a junction in such an important locality can only be settled after long preliminary investigation and discussion with the officers of the railway concerned; but for the purposes of a reconnaissance a mile or two one way or the other was of no consequence.

My surveyor made an alternative section of the Pabni Chauki route, but it has no advantages over that now described.

Water-supply. At ordinary times water is scarce over the greater part of the alignment.

I travelled through the country after heavy rains when there was running water or pools in every fair-sized stream. It was, therefore, not always easy to ascertain where a perennial supply existed and where the pools were purely temporary. The various permanent springs and pools actually on the alignment are marked on the section. Others will no doubt be discovered during survey and construction, for the list cannot claim to be exhaustive.

At the following places water is obtainable in considerable quantities:—

	(*a*) All round the Mashkhel Hamun, in shallow excavations	Brackish.
	(*b*) Mashkhel River, in large pools near the bridge site	Sweet.
Mile 147	(*c*) Palantak, in the nulla bed for about ¼ mile ...	Do.
„ 195	(*d*) Panjgur, in Karezes and in the Rakshan ...	Do.
„ 261	(*e*) Kil Kaur, at the foot of the Madak north approach	Do.
„ 267	(*f*) Spring in the North Madak River, two miles from proposed tunnel mouth	Do.
„ 316	(*g*) At Mandai Af, in a spring near the camping ground	Do.
„ 332	(*h*) Pools in the Paho River	Do.
„ 360	(*i*) Nal River, at Jhau (running water) ...	Do.
„ 414	(*j*) Sir Kaur, in lake	Do.
„ 428	(*k*) Las Bela, in the river and in wells ...	Do.
„ 464	(*l*) Uthal, in wells	Do.
„ 531	(*m*) Habb River, in pools	Do.

At the following places small perennial pools, springs, or wells exist:—

Kondi has been already mentioned, Wells		...	Brackish.
Mile 159	(*a*) Palantak Thana, at the head of the Tangi	...	Sweet.
„ 173	(*b*) Sorenkik, pool in nulla bed	...	Do.
„ 213	(*c*) Chib well	...	?
„ 228	(*d*) Wash Jaurakin, pool in nulla bed ...	...	Sweet.
„ 240	(*e*) Mantr, pool in nulla bed	...	Do.
„ 249	(*f*) Gumbak, pool in nulla bed... ...	...	Do.
Not on line.	Sahar Kalat, Madak Kalat,	...	?
Mile 289	Hor Kalat — Wells of average depth in Kolwa plain.	...	Fairly sweet.
„ 303	Regchahi — Wells of average depth in Kolwa plain.	...	Varies.
„ 347	Musjid Ziarat, pool in nulla	...	Sweet.
	Kang nulla, pool on Damb-Bela caravan road	...	Do.
„ 378	Monro nulla, pool possibly not perennial ...	...	Do.
„ 395	Mar nulla, pool	...	Do.
„ 405	Kumbh nulla, pool (on caravan road) ...	...	Do.
„ 495	Sonmiani, shallow wells	...	Brackish.
„ 510	Naka Chauki or Khari, well	...	Sweet.
„ 524	Bawani Tombs. Well in nulla to south ...	...	Do.
„ 543	Magar Pir	...	Do.

The quality of the water is almost everywhere remarkably good.

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The following arrangements for engine-changing stations are suggested—

Engine-changing station.	
A	
Karachi, Las Bela, Hor or Madak Kalat, Panjgur	140 miles. (includes run on N.-W. Ry. main line).
Palantak (banking only)	135 „
Mashkhel Hamun (Ladgasht)	100 „
Kondi (running shed only)	120 „
	72 „
or	
B	
Karachi, Las Bela	140 „
Madak Kalat	140 „
Palantak	140 „
Kondi	147 „

Arrangement A would, to a certain extent, obviate the difficulty arising from the badness and shortness of water at Kondi. From my present knowledge of the country it does not appear at all easy to devise a satisfactory arrangement of changing stations between Kondi and Panjgur. With a good water-supply at the former, arrangement B would do very well, though the runs are long. On the other hand, it would be a pity to cut out Panjgur, which is an admirable situation from its climate and surroundings for a railway colony, while Palantak and Mashkhel are quite the reverse.

Traffic prospects.—As previously remarked, a railway to Las Bela would probably pay working expenses. It would certainly open up a large tract of country now without the advantage of railway communication.

A small quantity of ghi, wool, and grain and a few passengers might be expected from the villages in Jhau.

Kolwa has large possibilities. At present its produce is all consumed locally and in Kech and Panjgur; harvesters from the two latter places returning home with their wages in grain.

From Panjgur an export of dates, ghi, and wool would arise, and an import of grain in exchange (*vide* preceding estimate of date crop).

The same remark, but in a lesser degree, applies to Ladgasht.

The bulk of the local traffic, however, would come in from the Kech valley over the light branch suggested. Under present conditions that cannot be estimated at more than four or five wagons daily, but with the stimulus of a railway a large increase might be confidently anticipated.

Without this branch the distance from Turbat to Madak Kalat, 90 miles, is too great for the traffic to be tapped by camel carriage, more particularly as the ports of Pasni and Gwadur are much closer. With regard to the through traffic from Seistan, such traffic as was forthcoming would probably desert the Quetta route, and go straight to the port.

Mineral resources.—I have neither seen nor heard of any mineral resources in Western Baluchistan. The geological formation is unfavourable, I think, but I have no knowledge of mineralogy.

Curvature and gradients.—In the Ghat sections of the line curves of 600 feet or 700 feet would be necessary. The question of probable ruling gradients has already been fully discussed in the detailed description of the alignment. The probable grade at each Kotal is shown on the section.

Materials for construction.—Reference has already been made to the possibility of adopting American steel trestles as a substitute for masonry piers, with a view to obviate the water difficulty which, in many places, will be acute. Bricks could be burnt with dust coal or firewood in Bela and Jhau.

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Some fair stone will be obtainable in many localities; but the difficulty of obtaining stone masons in sufficient numbers will make that class of work impossible on a large scale, except at the Karachi end, where there should be no trouble in getting plenty of Cutchi masons. Concrete blocks and concrete will be found the best building material over the greater part of the line. Ballast is to be had everywhere. Sand or Bajri can generally be obtained by screening shingle. In tunnels where bricks are not at hand, I would suggest a skin of stone backed with concrete rammed *in situ*.

Arrangements for survey and construction.—The survey would require seven parties, five of which would be engaged for two seasons—*vide* attached table. This is a large staff, but the country is so inaccessible that a lot of time would be lost in getting on to the ground.

Table of disposal of survey staff.

(a) Karachi—Sir Kaur	...	One party.	One season	... 126 to 130 miles.
(b) Sir Kaur ghat	...	Do.	Two seasons perhaps	10 miles.
(c) Sir Kaur ghat—Nal River (Jhau) Jhau to Kolwa	}	Do.	Two seasons	... 90 „
(d) Kolwa to Panjgur	...	Two parties	Do.	... 121 „
(e) Panjgur to Palantak glacis	...	One party	Do.	... 60 „
(f) Palantak glacis to Kondi	...	Do.	One season	... 137 „

Construction would be put in hand from both ends, and rails would be laid as rapidly as possible to Bela and Palantak where the serious work begins.

In advance of each railhead a section of 60 miles would always be under construction. Much more could not be attempted owing to difficulties of labour, supplies, and the carriage of cement. A single, isolated work such as the heading of a long tunnel might, of course, be put in hand regardless of its distance from the base of supplies at railhead, but there would be no advantage in spreading operations over a wider area than that mentioned. Labour would only be dissipated and portions in advance completed, while those behind were hung up for want of coolies.

Labour would come from Karachi, Afghanistan, and the Punjab. In order to attract it in sufficient numbers, rates should be fixed rather high, more especially as food-stuffs will be dear, having to be imported from a distance, and then carried from railhead on camels.

Time taken in construction.—In two respects both the Kondi-Karachi and Kondi-Pasni lines compare unfavourably with the Nushki-Seistan: in carrying capacity, and in time taken in construction.

With regard to the latter point, it is clear that the extension from Nushki can be put in hand and completed at the first threatening of danger; it is a card that can be laid on the table at any moment; but the construction of the link to the coast cannot be rushed. The combined Sind-Pishin and old Bolan railways took 8 years to reach Chaman. Another four years elapsed before the completion of the Mushkaf-Bolan chord. The total expenditure on the system, as it now stands, was 8 crores, the mileage 309 miles, and construction went on almost continuously for the whole period of 12 years. It would be sanguine, therefore, to expect that the project under notice could reach the stage of through communications in less than 8 years. It involves an expenditure almost equal to that of the Quetta-Chaman system, its total length is much greater, and its aggregate mileage in mountainous and hilly country not much less, though there are no individual works on it of the same magnitude as the Chappar rift, the Khojak tunnel, and the Bolan Pass.

The staff employed on survey and construction should receive more liberal treatment than the ordinary frontier allowances, to compensate them for the exceptional dreariness of their surroundings, their isolation from civilisation, and the enhanced cost of servants, provisions, &c. From personal experience I can testify that the Sind-Pishin and Mushkaf-Bolan were quite pleasant places to serve in when compared with the country between Kondi and the coast.

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KONDI TO PASNI ROUTE.

Details of Alignment.

Gumbak to Turbat.

It is obvious that between Kondi and Panjgur the Pasni route must coincide with that to Karachi, since the Palantak gorge is an obligatory point for both.

At Panjgur the question naturally arises why should not the alignment to Pasni proceed in a south-westerly direction to Turbat, along the hypoteneuse of the triangle instead of along the two sides, and follow the caravan road *via* Chib, Boleida, and the Garuk nulla. My reasons for rejecting this route were :—

First, that according to the map, the Garuk nulla falls 1,700 feet between Boleida and Kech in a very few miles, so probably 1—25 gradients would be necessary in the descent.

Second, the alignment would traverse mountainous country almost throughout, whereas the alignment, I propose, has a maximum of easy line down the Kech valley, with a minimum of ghat, and so is obviously the cheaper.

It may also be pointed out that the diagonal alignment would be largely a series of zig-zags owing to the parallelism of the ridges, so its length would be little less than that of the route adopted. So far as length is concerned, it is clearly the same thing whether we follow the full line or the dotted (*vide* sketch).



Third, some of the Ghat sections of the Boleida-Garuk route would be undesirably close to the Persian frontier.

Fourth, there were said to be a number of bad Kotals on the Turbat caravan road besides the Garuk.

Proceeding therefore on the assumption that Turbat should be an obligatory point on a railway to Pasni, and consequently putting aside all thought of a direct line to the coast south-west from Oshaf, where there is a practicable looking Kotal east of Mount Janzar, there is little room for doubt that the true geographical route is from a point somewhere near Gumbak, mile 249, on the Karachi alignment, down the Kil Kaur Tangi, or over one of the neighbouring passes, and thence down the Kech valley.

From Gumbak, R. L. 2,800, to Tang-i-Pusht, a distance of 20 miles, the alignment for the first seven miles is diagonally across a series of narrow plains separated from each other by the usual parallel chains of ridges. The works will be light, for the ridges have numerous low Kotals.

At mile 7 there is a short tunnel, and a sudden drop into a nulla down which the line runs for three miles in a rugged, rather narrow valley bounded on both sides by hills. The works will be rather heavy, and a 1—60 grade will be required. The accompanying sketch gives a rough idea of the position.



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At the 10th mile the line emerges upon an open plain, which it crosses to Tang-i-Pusht, at the head of the Kil Kaur Tangi. The only work of importance is the bridge over the river, which in flood spreads over the surface of the plain, and has only a few ill-defined channels.

An alternative to this alignment is to adhere to the Karachi route up to the 261st mile, and then turn to the west down the Kil Kaur to Tang-i-Pusht. The length would be ten miles more, but the cost of construction would not be much greater, for the line should be a very light one, judging from the appearance of the valley. The advantage of this alternative is that it avoids the tunnel and bridges in the little defile mentioned above, which will be very troublesome unless water can be found in the nulla bed. If water can be got handy, I see no necessity for the detour.

On reaching Tang-i-Pusht I found that, owing to a record flood ten days before, the gorge was quite impassable, being a mass of pools and shingly quick sands, so instead of wasting time in possibly fruitless attempts to scramble down it, I left it for future examination by some cold weather survey party, and endeavoured to get an alignment by one of the passes in the neighbourhood.

The unpromising appearance of the first few miles of the Tangi (subsequently confirmed by what I saw of the lower end) decided me on the point. The gorge is about 20 miles long, the hills on both sides rugged, and the amount of cross drainage unusually great. It is a matter of experience that routes down gorges in Baluchistan are invariably costly, *e.g.*, the Chappar rift, the Mushkaf and Nari gorges, and the Kaisar gorge near Nushki, so, although the Kil Kaur Tangi will give a better gradient than either of the alignments I investigated, there is not the smallest prospect of its being any cheaper.

The first route I tried was along a path leading from Tang-i-Pusht to Nag Kalat, and thence to the watershed between Kolwa and Kech.

This obviously gave the minimum of descent down the mountains if a suitable Kotal could be discovered. There was a two-fold object in trying this alignment, as in case the Madak route, which had not then been examined, should prove impracticable, that *via* Nag Kalat would suit a railway either to Karachi or Pasni.

As previously mentioned in treating of the Karachi alignment, the Tang-i-Pusht-Nag Kalat route should certainly be surveyed as an alternative to the Madak; but for a railway to Pasni the route over the Kathag Pass is, in my opinion, the correct one, for reasons that will be explained in describing that alternative (*vide* plan).

The path along which the barometric section was taken follows the river for 2½ miles, and then ascends sharply to the left up a steep side nulla. This 2½ miles turns the flank of the main range which here descends to the river in a series of formidable spurs. At the head of the side nulla a curious glacis is reached, sloping sharply to the south across the line of the railway. It is bounded by the main range on the left and a lower range on the right, through which the nullas find their way to the Kil Kaur. The map shows this portion of the country rather indifferently. The alignment traverses this glacis for 2½ miles on a steady ascent of 1—40 to 1—50 till it gains the watershed of the Kil Kaur and Kolwa catchments, R. L. 2,600, about 450 feet above Tang-i-Pusht.

The objectionable feature of the route up to this point is the steep rise up the nulla. My first intention here was to have 1½ miles of cheap 1—25 double line, for I was alarmed at the impracticable appearance of the country if a direct alignment, with an easier grade, were attempted along the line dotted on the plan.

Seeing, however, how expensive the Madak alignment subsequently proved, I have reconsidered my first scheme and recommend that the dotted line should be tried, as it will probably give a 1—40 or 1—50 grade throughout the ascent. I may here digress by observing that the chief difficulty in a long reconnaissance consists in maintaining a constant standard of practicability and impracticability. There are days when one boggles over a bit of country which on other occasions would be taken in one's stride. One cannot be "compensated" like a barometer against changes in temperature and temperament.

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This will explain the unwarrantably gloomy view I took of the possibility of getting a continuous workable grade *for a single line* over this short length.

The descent from the summit, R. L. 2,600, to Shenzi, R. L. 1,900, is not very difficult on a ruling grade of 1—50. The section follows the Molhar nulla for a couple of miles in fairly easy country where development is possible on both sides. Then, as the valley grew narrower and development no longer appeared possible, I turned to the east along the path to Nag Kalat for three miles, over a narrow glacis between high, parallel ridges. As the path did not fall in the required direction, I turned south-west along another path leading diagonally to the plain on a tolerably easy gradient through a succession of narrow ridges.

N.B.—The Molhar nulla is shown incorrectly on the map, but roughly corrected in red ink.

It will be seen from the section that four miles of this alignment are practically wasted as they are on the level. The correct alignment, instead of leaving the Molhar nulla, and making this four-mile detour, should follow its general direction to its debouchement on the Shenzi plain. The levels where I recrossed the Rod Khan path and the Molhar nulla (*vide* section) prove that the ruling grade would be obtainable by a much shorter route than that I followed.

The alignment from the Shenzi (Kolwa) plain to Turbat. a distance of 70 miles, requires very little description. It should follow the southern bank of the Kil Kaur now called the Kech River, rising and falling over the glacis between the mountains and the river.

The grades would be easy. The fall of the river is not more than 1—200, so 1—125 should easily be obtained by a surface line.

For about eight miles near Rahgiwaran the valley is narrow, and the nullas from the hills have formed rather deep channels, so a good deal of minor bridging will be required. Elsewhere the works will be very light; surface or nearly so.

A peculiarity of this glacis is that it is conglomerate rather than shingle, so foundations will give no trouble. At Herokh a low chain of mounds lines the river as far as Sami. The alignment should be immediately in rear of it.

Sami and Sharak, two fair-sized date groves on the opposite bank, mile 337, are the first villages of Kech. Thence to Turbat the valley is wider and uninhabited, and the line is, if anything, rather easier.

Kathag Pass alternative.—The alternative route over the Kathag Pass is, as has already been stated, the correct route to adopt for a railway to Pasni; for even, should the cost of the works equal those on the Tang-i-Pusht-Nag Kalat route, the difference in length between the two lines, a matter of 19 miles, should decide in favour of the shorter alignment. The section, it will be observed, is taken from Tang-i-Pusht to Sami-ud-din, but the railway would naturally follow the dotted line on the sketch straight from the mouth of the gorge already mentioned, at mile 10 from Gumbak.



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The mountain barrier overlooking Kech is apparently at its minimum of height and width at the Kathag Pass. The ascent to the Kotal from the north is short, and the height from the plain to the proposed tunnel mouth is only 300 feet. There will be some two miles of rather heavy earthwork among some foot hills on the approach.

Through the summit at R. L. 2,600 or 2,650 a tunnel about ¾ mile in length is suggested, so as to clear the main range and some spurs that abut on its southern slope. To shorten the length of the tunnel would entail prohibitively heavy works on the south approach. From the mouth of the tunnel the line would develop at first among the foot hills and afterwards over a broken glacis fissured with deep wide nullas. The glacis gets easier and the ground less broken as the descent is made. After about 4 miles of expensive development the line reaches easy country and descends to Rahgiwaran along the natural slope of the glacis.

The ruling grade will be 1—50.

Two sections are plotted of the south approach of the pass, one running in a south-east north-west direction, and the other in a north-east-south-west direction. The first was hardly necessary, for it is obvious, *ceteris paribus*, that the natural direction of development would be up the valley rather than down it.

At Rahgiwaran the Kil Kaur should be crossed, as it widens enormously lower down. Thenceforward the alignment to Turbat is the same as that already described.

A good site for the bridge exists close to the camping ground where founds on hard conglomerate will most likely be got close to the surface.

The banks are hard shingle and conglomerate 20 to 30 feet high, steep and well defined. The waterway would be about 800 feet in 60 feet spans. There is no surface flow in the river at Rahgiwaran, but there is at Oshaf three miles higher up. From the size of the pools in the bed of the river and from other circumstances I am inclined to think that the founds will require a lot of pumping, for a tail race of ordinary length would hardly reach the rock, and one would naturally expect a strong flow of water through the shingle.

The river when in flood evidently carries an enormous volume of water. Its discharge in the recent floods cannot have been much less than the highest recorded of the Nari, which has a catchment area many times larger. At the road crossing below the Tangi, I noticed that the water had been nearly level with the banks there, 20 feet high and 800 feet apart. At Sami, where it is ½ a mile wide, immense damage was done to the cultivated fringe on its right bank, and the river bed was strewn with date trees.

Turbat to Pasni.—From Turbat two caravan roads lead to Pasni, one *via* Pidark, and the other over the Gok Parosh Kotal, the scene of Major Mayne's victory over the Baluchis in the rising of 1897. I investigated both routes, and the latter is undoubtedly the right one.

Considering the general elevation of the range, the pass is a remarkably easy one. Its summit, R. L. 900, is only 350 feet above Turbat, 150 feet of which takes the form of a gentle rise over a glacis.

The fall on the south side to the plain is only about 170 feet. A ruling grade of 1—80 should be obtainable, but the works will be heavy for some five miles among rough hills on both sides of the pass.

At the foot of the Kotal we are 52 miles from Pasni and only 700 feet above sea level. The road thence runs for six miles in a south-easterly direction over a stony plain intersected with a few shallow but well-defined nullas. It then turns to the south through a short Tangi, and for the next 10 miles the works will be average to heavy along the banks of the Samundari nulla. The country is rugged with the usual chains of ridges.

Near Biloo Bandaf, between miles 28 and 31 from Turbat, the last and worst of these is cleared: the road leaving the nulla and crossing a neck of ravines which form the tail of the ridge.

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From that point till the coast range is approached, the chief features of the country are the width and depth of the nulla beds that scar the intervening plain, and the enormous extent of ravines fringing their banks. The caravan road follows the Samundari (Pidark) nulla which winds through a wide shingle basin, bounded on both sides by ravines, and covered with tamarisk and Jhand, a sign that the channel is fairly permanent.

An alignment along the outer edge of this basin, locally termed a "Bet", would be quite feasible for a railway, and very cheap, but for a few crossings of the stream. I think, however, that a safer line should be sought for on the right, where there is a nice, easy plain fairly free from ravines. The sketch may explain the features of the alignment along the "Bet".



At the 35th mile from Turbat the road ascends the left bank of the river and traverses a plain sloping at 1 in 125 for 5 miles. This is followed by a short stretch among easy ravines ending up with a crossing of the Garuk nulla and a descent on to the Gholamani Bet, a rudely tilled alluvial plain in the basin of the Shadi Kaur.

N.B.—Garuk is a common name for Kotals and nullas in this country. It means stony or bouldery.

The thirty-two miles of country between the foot of the Gok Parosh Kotal and Gholamani Bet offer excellent opportunities to the survey officers for selecting a better alignment than that now described. At the same time a railway along the caravan road would not be an expensive line to construct, the chief item would be major and minor bridging in short spans. Gholamani Bet, R. L. 150, and 20 miles from Pasni is an obligatory point on the route, as the mountains begin to close in on either hand. Thence the line descends the valley of the Shadi Kaur, which, after receiving the drainage of the surrounding country in a number of good-sized streams, breaks through the range between Gholamani Bet and the coast.

The alignment (which at the Bet itself should take the alternative dotted on the plan) follows the caravan road for, the first seven miles. There will be two crossings of the river requiring 500′ of waterway each, and a mile of heavy work through some outlying ravines of the main range; but the greater part of the line is over an easy, open plain between the right bank of the river and the base of the hills.

Eight miles from Gholamani Bet the river enters an alluvial plain about $\frac{3}{4}$ mile wide, down which it meanders to the sea. Numerous spill channels show that it frequently changes its bed. The caravan road crosses it six times.

The railway should bridge the Shadi Kaur on to the left bank at the head of this valley, and thenceforward leave the caravan road and adhere to that bank till it crosses the estuary of the river, three miles above Pasni.

This will involve a slight detour and some heavy earthwork among the foot hills at the 10th mile from Gholamni Bet, where the river hugs some clay cliffs jutting from the main range; but the resulting line will be secure from all vagaries of the river.

From the foot of the Gok Parosh Kotal to Pasni a ruling grade of 1—100 to 1—125 should be obtainable. The critical point will most likely be met with in traversing the foot hills just mentioned.

Curvature and gradients.—Six hundred or seven hundred feet radii will be necessary at Kotals like the Kathag and Gok Parosh and in difficult portions of the line generally. Otherwise, curvature will be easy. The probable ruling gradient at each Kotal is marked on the section, and has already been stated.

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KONDI TO PASNI.

Water-supply.—Between Gumbak, the junction with the Karachi alignment, and Pasni, the following places have a good water-supply :—

(*a*) Mile 21, from Gumbak, Tang-i-Pusht running water in Kil Kaur.

(*b*) Mile 34, Nag Kalat, running water in small nulla.

(*c*) All along Kech (Kil Kaur) River from Kil Kaur Tangi, mile 49½, to Turbat, mile 111, in pools here and there.

N. B.—From Sami to Turbat pools are scarce.

There is running water in the Kech River and a little cultivation at Oshaf, mile 57; Herokh, mile 76; Sami, mile 88. Sami Karez is on the wrong side of the river. A dried up Karez on the left bank of the river here might be re-opened.

(*d*) Turbat, mile 111, Karez.

(*e*) Gholamani Bet to Pasni,—mile 155, to sea. In pools in the Shadi Kaur.

A small supply is obtainable in the following places :—

(*a*) Mile 0 at Gumbak. Pool in bed of stream.

Mile 120, Brinji. } Springs in stream on both sides of Gok Parosh Pass.
Mile 122½, Gok Parosh. } Doubtful if they are perrenial.

Mile 125, Balor Khan. Pool in nulla bed of same name.

Mile 139, Biloo Bandaf. Pool in Pidark or Samundari nulla.

The quality of the water is everywhere good. On the whole, there will be no great difficulty in the matter of water-supply for the open line. The worst stages will be Gholamani Bet to Turbat, 44 miles, with only 3 scanty pools between, and Raghiwaran to Gumbak over the Kathag, where there are only two small springs. Some water will almost certainly be tapped in driving the Kathag tunnel.

Kondi-Pasni traffic prospects.—The traffic prospects of the Pasni line compare unfavourably with those of that to Karachi, quite apart from the situation of the port.

Thus, while with the help of a branch 37 miles long to Tump, it would tap all the local traffic of the Kech valley, that cannot be considered equivalent to what may be expected from the Bela stations to Karachi, not to mention the minor district of Kolwa. Further, it would naturally get less of any through traffic that was forthcoming from Seistan than the direct line to Karachi.

Materials for construction.—Between Pasni and Turbat there is some well-bedded sandstone of a light blue colour, but rather soft. The prevailing stone is a soft, brown sandstone in the south, and a hard calcareous sandstone in the north, both of which might be used to a certain extent, subject to the remarks already made on the subject in my report on the Karachi route, (Materials for construction). Bricks might be burnt with dust coal in the valley of the Shadi Kaur. Firewood would be insufficient for operations on a large scale.

Ballast is abundant, sand is obtainable in places, but the sandhills of Pasni will be the main depôt. In parts of the line it may have to be screened from shingle.

Arrangements for survey and construction.—American steel trestles might be adopted to a great extent for reasons previously mentioned.

Between Panjgur and Pasni the following survey parties would be required :—

(*a*) Pasni to foot of Gok Parosh Kotal, one party, one season.

(*b*) Gok Parosh Kotal, both sides and up Kech valley, one party, one season.

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(*c*) Kathag Pass, one party, one season.

(*d*) Nag Kalat alternative (?), one party, one season.

(*e*) Kathag to Panjgur, two parties, one season, or one party for two seasons.

The first fifty miles of the route from Pasni are well suited for laying a temporary line. By following the caravan road, and avoiding works as far as possible, railhead should reach the south approach of the Gok Parosh Kotal in a year from the commencement of construction. The permanent works could be rapidly and economically built with the assistance of the temporary line.

By the end of another year, or year and-a-half, railhead should be at the foot of the Kathag tunnel, with diversions at bridges and at uncompleted cuttings. Through communication would probably be complete in 5½ or 6 years from the start, on the presumption, of course, that work was carried on from both ends.

For convenience of reference the estimates for both routes have been kept together.

Estimates.

The system on which they have been compiled is as follows:—

The railway has been classified under six heads—

	Rs.	
(1) Surface line, @	50,000 per mile.	
(2) Easy line, @	90,000 „	
(3) Medium hilly line, @	1,25,000 „	
(4) Heavy ghat line, but without much bridging	1,75,000 „	*e.g.*, Nushki ghat.
(5) Heavy ghat line with considerable bridging	2,25,000 „	*e.g.*, Kaisar gorge on Nushki line.
(6) Very expensive gorge line	3,00,000 „	

All important individual works, such as large bridges and long tunnels, have been estimated for at a foot run rate, and added separately.

The foregoing classification has been arrived at by abstracting and analysing the cost under each head of work of portions of lines with which I am familiar, and for which detailed estimates are available. The alignment is then examined in detail, and each length is entered in its appropriate class.

The figures provide for a 62lb rail, wooden sleepers, a small quantity of rolling-stock, stations, &c., on a modest scale. All ghat sections of the line to be up to 1st class standard.

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Kondi to Karachi, (Malir Station, North-Western Railway) via *Panjgur and Las Bela.*

	Surface line at Rs. 50,000 per mile.	Ordinary line at Rs. 90,000 per mile.	Medium line at Rs. 1,25,000 per mile.	Line with heavy earthwork and minor bridges at Rs. 1,75,000 per mile.	Heavy gorge line, *e.g.* (Kaisar gorge), at Rs. 2,25,000 per mile.	Palantak and Madak gorges at Rs. 3,00,000 per mile.	Special works.	Remarks.
							Rs.	
Kondi to Palantak	144	...	3	...	...	...	...	
Add bridge over Mashkhel River, 600 feet ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3,00,000	
Ditto Bibi, Lori, and Pi'in Kaur ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,50,000	
Palantak to Tangi	...	...	6	...	...	...	...	
Tangi Palantak	...	...	...	...	...	5½	...	
Add for retaining wall	...	...	...	...	...	...	5,00,000	
Palantak Thana to Dambodim and Sagari Sing.	...	...	...	...	28½	...	...	
Sagari Sing to Panjgur	9	...	2	...	...	...	...	
Add bridge over Rakshan River, 1,400 feet ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	7,00,000	
Panjgur to mile 225 ...	27	3	...	...	...	...	...	
Add bridge over Goargo River, 250 feet ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,30,000	
Mile 225 to Wash Jaurakin Kotal ...	...	...	3	4	...	...	...	
Tunnel, if necessary	...	...	...	...	...	...	2,00,000	
Wash Jaurakin Kotal to mile 237 ...	...	...	...	6	...	...	...	
Mile 237 to Gumbak, mile 249	...	...	6	6	...	...	...	Junction with Pasni line.
Gumbak to Kil Kaur ...	...	15	...	...	...	...	...	
Add bridge over Kazhmak, 200 feet, @ Rs. 250 per foot.	...	...	...	...	...	...	6,50,000	
Add bridge over Kil Kaur, 1,200 feet, @ Rs. 500 per foot.								
Madak Pass	...	...	...	...	...	12	...	
Add for tunnel, 1½ miles long ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	20,00,000	
275 to 279 down river ...	...	...	4	...	...	...	...	
Mouth of Madak River to Mandai Af ...	43	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Mandai Af to Pahoo River ...	...	...	...	17	...	...	...	
Add for tunnels at Garmaf Kotals ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5,00,000	
Add for bridge over Pahoo River, 1,000 feet ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5,00,000	
Pahoo to Ziarat	...	...	15	...	...	...	...	
Ziarat to mouth of Masjid nulla ...	...	...	...	...	6	...	...	
Add bridge over Nál River, 800 feet ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4,00,000	
Mouth of Masjid nulla to top of scarp ...	16	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Scarp	...	...	...	3	...	...	...	
Kang to Seetaro	...	14	...	...	...	...	...	
Seetaro ghat	...	...	...	...	5	...	...	
Ghat to Sir Kaur	...	...	19	...	...	...	...	
Sir Kaur, descent of Jhau Lak	...	...	...	...	8	...	...	
Add for two tunnels, 2 miles long ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	25,00,000	
Lak to Las Bela	...	5	5	...	...	...	...	
Las Bela to 10 miles beyond Sonmiani ...	77	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Add for extra works	...	...	...	...	...	...	5,00,000	
Adam Pir Ziarat to Malir Station, North-Western Railway.	...	50	...	...	...	...	...	
Add bridge over Habb River, 1,000 feet ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5,00,000	
Minor bridging, heavy for 20 miles ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4,00,000	
Total ...	316	87	63	36	47½	17½	99,30,000	

Abstract.

Mileage.	Rate per mile in Rs.	Total amount in Rs.	Remarks.
316 miles	50,000	1,58,00,000	
87 „	90,000	78,30,000	
63 „	1,25,000	78,75,000	
36 „	1,75,000	63,00,000	
47½ „	2,25,000	1,06,87,500	
17½ „	3,00,000	52,50,000	
Extra works	...	99,30,000	
Total ...	...	6,36,72,500	
Add contingencies	...	31,27,500	Approximate 5 %
567 miles, including development, total Rs. ...	...	6,68,00,000	= 1,18,000 per mile.

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(97)

Kondi to Pasni via Kathag Pass (not via Nag Kalat).

	Surface line at Rs. 50,000 per mile.	Ordinary line at Rs. 90,000 per mile.	Medium line at Rs. 1,25,000 per mile.	Line with heavy earthwork and minor bridges at Rs. 1,75,000 per mile.	Heavy gorge line (*e.g.*, Kaisor gorge), at Rs. 2,25,000 per mile.	Very heavy line in gorge at Rs. 3,00,000 per mile.	Special works.	Remarks.
							Rs.	
Kondi to Gumbak junction as per previous sheet.	180	3	20	16	28½	5½	...	
Special works on same	...	...	...	...	...	...	19,80,000	
Gumbak to defile	...	8	...	...	...	...	...	
Defile, 3 miles	...	...	...	...	3	...	...	
Add for 10 chains, tunnel	...	...	...	...	...	...	2,50,000	
Mouth of defile, mile 10, to foot of Kathag ...	8	7	...	...	...	...	...	
Summit of Kathag	...	...	...	...	...	7½	...	
Add for ¾ mile tunnel	...	...	...	...	...	...	10,00,000	
South slope	...	2	...	4	2	...	...	
Add bridge over Kil Kaur River, 800 feet	...	...	...	...	...	...	4,00,000	
Eight miles easy line with heavy bridges ...	...	...	...	8	...	...	...	
Thence to Turbat	42	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Add for some small bridges	...	...	...	...	...	...	6,00,000	
Turbat to foot of Gok Parosh Kotal ...	¼	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Glacis	...	...	3	...	...	...	...	
Gok Parosh Kotal	...	...	...	...	6	...	...	
Foot of Kotal to short Tangi	...	...	8	...	...	...	...	
Tangi to beyond Biloo Bandaf	...	5	...	11	...	...	...	
Biloo Bandaf to top of Dasht	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	
Add extra works, bridging	...	...	...	...	...	...	4,00,000	
Dasht to Gholamani "Bet"	5	...	2	...	...	...	...	
Add for alternative bridge over Shadi Kaur...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,00,000	
"Gholamani Bet" to Pasni	...	19	...	...	1½	...	...	
Add for two bridges at Gholamani Bet ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	5,00,000	
Add for two bridges, one at head of valley, and one at estuary.	...	...	...	...	...	...	5,00,000	
Add extra earthwork at "Gholamani Bet" along alternative line.	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,00,000	
Add extra earthwork at ravines ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,00,000	
Total ...	239	44	33	40	41	13	59,30,000	

Abstract.

Mileage.	Rates per mile in Rs.	Total amount. in Rs.	Remarks.
239 miles	50,000	1,19,50,000	
44 "	90,000	39,60,000	
33 "	1,25,000	41,25,000	
40 "	1,75,000	70,00,000	
41 "	2,25,000	92,25,000	
13 "	3,00,000	39,00,000	
Extra works	...	59,30,000	
Total ...	...	4,60,90,000	
Add contingencies	...	23,10,000	
410 miles, including development, total Rs. ...	...	4,84,00,000	=1,18,000 per mile.

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It will be seen from the abstract that the total estimated cost of the Kondi-Karachi alignment is Rs. *6,68,00,000*.

The light branch to Tump, 130 miles long, would cost another 80 lakhs, or a grand total of Rs. 7,48,00,000.

The line from Kondi to Pasni is estimated at Rs. *4,84,00,000*, and the branch to Tump (40 miles) at 24 lakhs more, or a grand total of Rs. 5,08,00,000.

N.B.—I have not been over the 40 miles from Turbat to Tump.

A comparison with the cost of the existing frontier system may serve to show what reliance can be placed on the above figures.

Take, for instance, the estimate of the Karachi-Kondi line, Rs. 6,68,00,000 for 567 miles of railway, of this 567 miles, 316 are surface and 87 more are easy line, so the estimated figures for them may be taken as correct. The cost of the balance, 164 miles, of ghat line, is the important subject for enquiry. As has already been stated, the cost of the Quetta Frontier System amounted to Rs. 7,90,00,000. The mileage is 309 miles, of which I reckon 175 as ghat and 134 as easy. The comparison is slightly complicated by a certain amount of both ghat and easy line being double tracked, 41 miles and 22 miles, respectively; but a fair equivalent length of single line may be taken as 156 easy and 204 ghat.

Assuming that the 156 miles of easy line cost 1¼ lakhs per mile, which is not far from the mark, for the works are on rather a lavish scale, and most of them were carried out under great pressure, the 204 miles of ghat line ergo cost Rs. 5,95,00,000, or nearly Rs. 3,00,000 per mile.

It will be seen from the detailed statement of the Karachi-Kondi line that the 403 miles of surface and easy line are estimated to cost—

		Rs.	
		1,58,00,000,	316 miles surface line.
		78,30,000,	87 „ easy surface line.
		26,80,000,	special works.
		2,63,00,000	approximate.
Share of contingencies	...	13,00,000	
TOTAL	...	2,76,00,000	

Deducting this from the total Rs. 6,68,00,000, a balance remains of Rs. 3,92,00,000, representing the estimated cost of 164 miles of ghat railway = Rs. 2,40,000, per mile, as compared with 3 lakhs per mile actuals as above for existing frontier system.

Twenty thousand rupees of this is accounted for by difference in permanent-way. The balance, Rs. 40,000 × 164 miles = Rs. 65,60,000, may be considered the outside limit of error in the foregoing estimate of the Karachi-Kondi mile, or a little less than 10% of the total Rs. 6,58,00,000. Following a similar line of argument the limit of error of the Pasni line would be Rs. 50,80,000 (127 miles × 40,000), or 11% of the total Rs. 4,84,00,000.

For my part I believe that the figures in the estimate are already sufficiently liberal. They have been prepared with considerable care, and with due regard to the difficulties of the situation. But the uncertainties of work on a Frontier Railway are great, and I know how liable one is to under-estimate them. An estimate of a large project is always liable to suspicion unless suppored by figures taken from actual experience. The preceding comparison is therefore useful, as demonstrating to any one familiar with the frontier system that the estimates under notice are very fairly reliable.

In conclusion, I wish to make a few remarks on the subject of another proposed Frontier Railway. Its alignment is to run from Quetta *via* Kalat and Panjgur to Pasni. If my previous conclusions are correct, such a line has no merits as a scheme for Frontier Defence. It throws an additional strain on the carrying capacity of the Bolan-Hurnai system, and it goes to a bad port. Without a link from Panjgur to Kondi it offers no support to the Nushki-Seistan line. With it, it becomes the Kondi-Pasni Railway *plus* a branch, 300 miles long, to Quetta. A branch from Kolwa to Karachi instead would be infinitely better.

W. A. JOHNS.

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Appendix.

On reaching Quetta, as I wished to verify the figures for population and numbers of date trees given me in the course of conversation, by the Nazim of Kech and the Naib of Panjgur, Major Showers kindly addressed the former on the subject. His reply, which I have only lately received, shows how difficult it is to obtain any reliable information from native officials.

For convenience of reference I have arranged the figures as originally given to me and as recently furnished to Major Showers—in parallel columns in the subjoined statement:—

	As stated to me.	As furnished to Major Showers.	Remarks.
Panjgur—Inhabitants ...	3,000	22,450	Evidently the Nazim includes the whole population of the district, and not of the 3 settlements only.
Do.—Date trees ...	200,000	164,300	Practically identical.
Kech—Inhabitants ...	12,000	40,400	See remark against item 1 above. My figure is for the population in the villages of the valley only. I believe it to be correct.
Do.—Date trees ...	400,000 belonging to Khan. 400,000 Independent Sardars.	319,500	Nazim's figures probably correct: I understood him to mean Khan's trees alone were 4 lakhs.

W. A. Johns.

Foreign Office Press—No. 1153—25-9-03—60.

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

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Secret. Note Seistan (99)

~~21~~

~~Submitted with reference to Secretary's order, dated the 23rd September 1904.~~
~~His Excellency the Viceroy may now see.~~

~~J. W. E.,—28-9-04.~~

~~G. W. M.,—28-9-04.~~

~~E. H. S. Clarke,—28-9-04.~~
~~L. W. Dane,—28-9-04.~~
~~A[mpthill],—29-9-04.~~

Public Works Department.

Areas of Afghan and Persian Seistan.

In the annexures to Colonel McMahon's letter No. 909, dated 13th July 1903, page 17, the gross areas are given as follows :—

	Square miles.
Afghan Seistan	4,109
Persian Seistan	2,920
Total ...	7,029

In his later letter No. 2407, dated 25th September 1904, the gross areas are given as follows :—

	Square miles.
Afghan Seistan	4,207
Persian Seistan	2,867
Total ...	7,074

The differences are small in amount, and the latter are probably procured from surveys made lately; however I will use the figures given in the first letter quoted above, because full particulars are given of the areas which are not commanded, and which we may, therefore, ignore, as we would neglect the surrounding desert areas.

2. This file contains a tracing marked Appendix A, which shows tracts irrigated in the past, and at present, from the Helmand River. The tracts coloured green and yellow are far more extensive than the available supply will irrigate, as will be seen from the following remarks :—

It may be assumed—

(*i*) that Mr. Ward's "uncommandable" areas, 749 and 387, in Afghan and Persian Seistan, respectively, may be ignored;

(*ii*) that the culturable area is 80 per cent of the commanded areas;

(*iii*) that a water-supply of one cusec will irrigate 75 and 150 acres in the Kharif and Rabi (hot and cold weather) crops, respectively, as compared with 86 and 173 acres on the Punjab canals, where the works are more complete and the cultivators better disciplined than we can ever hope for in Seistan.

Under these assumptions Mr. Ward's statement A furnishes data on which the following figures are arrived at—

Particulars.	At present watered.	Commanded, but not watered.	Total.
Afghanistan—			
Area in square miles	546	2,814	3,360
Area in acres	349,440	1,800,960	2,150,400
Culturable area, 80 per cent ...	279,552	1,440,768	1,720,320
Annual irrigation, say, 50 per cent ...	139,776	720,384	860,160
Persia—			
Area in square miles	772	1761 (775)*a*	2,533 (1,547)*a*
Area in acres	494,080	1,127,040 (496,000)*a*	1,621,120 (990,080)*a*
Culturable area, 80 per cent ...	395,264	901,632 (396,800)*a*	1,296,896 (792,064)*a*
Annual irrigation, 50 per cent ...	197,632	450,816 (198,400)*a*	648,448 (396,032)*a*
Total annual irrigation at 50 per cent	337,408	1,171,200 (918,714)*a*	1,508,608 (1,256,192)*a*

× No 2 of Seistan Series Part 5, a copy of which is being sent to H.E. Lord Curzon, for information, by the mail tomorrow. JWE 9/11/4

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The totals in column 4 of Mr. Ward's tabular statement A include in the "Commandable but not watered" area in Afghanistan that of the Gaud-i-Zirreh; this is right, if this depression is not to be converted into a lake in lieu of the Hamun-i-Helmand.

In the case of Persia, the present Hamun-i-Helmand lake is shown also as commanded, but not watered. If this depression is to be used as at present, its area, 548 square miles, should, for practical purposes, be shown in the third column of Mr. Wards' tabular statement A. In the foregoing table the entries in brackets, marked (*a*), show what the figures for Persia become when the Hamun-i-Helmand area of 986 square miles is excluded from the commanded area not receiving water. From a military point of view, it is most undesirable to reclaim this lake, and nothing but lack of water to fill it should drive us to reclamation.

The above table shows that, if sufficient water-supply was available, we would aim at irrigating in—

Afghanistan	860,160	acres annually.
Persia, excluding Hamun	396,032	„ „
Total „ „	1,256,192	„ „

Water-supply available.

3. The figures given at page 7 of Colonel McMahon's letter No. 2407, dated 25th September 1904, and at page 10 of the annexures to his No. 909 of 13th July 1903, show that the following supplies will usually be available—

Crop.	Month.	Average supply in cusecs.	Average for crop.
Cold weather (Rabi) ...	October ...	2,435	4,148
	November ...	3,020	
	December ...	3,158	
	January ...	4,050	
	February ...	5,478	
	March ...	6,750	
Hot weather (Kharif) ...	April	4,000	2,777
	May	3,000	
	June	3,000	
	July	2,500	
	August	2,000	
	September ...	2,162	

The supplies available at Kohak are those given above for Bandar-i-Kamal Khan diminished by 294 the supply drawn off by the seven canals detailed in paragraph 49 of Colonel McMahon's Memorandum This will leave 3,854 and 2,438 for the cold and hot weather, respectively. The areas which could be irrigated with these supplies below Band-i-Kamil Khan would be as follows:—

Cold weather crop 3,854 × 150 duty ...	... =	578,100 acres.
Hot „ „ 2,483 × 75 „ ...	... =	186,225 „
Total ...		764,325

The figures given at page 7 of Colonel McMahon's letter No. 2407, dated 25th September 1904, show that the discharge, from 11th to 20th March is 12,100 cusecs: I have ignored this abnormal discharge assuming 6,750 cusecs the supply in the first ten days of the month to prevail throughout the 31 days of March. A sudden flush could not be utilised; moreover, more extended observations may show that this abnormal supply cannot be expected every year.

The sowing time for wheat is stated by Mr. Ward to be from October to January; the supply is then low, which may limit the extent of the areas which can be cropped, and this is a further justification for the low duty of 150 acres per cusec which I have adopted for the Rabi.

As for the Kharif crop, Mr. Ward explains that the Helmand was dry below Chahar Burjak in—

1902 for 70 days—14th July to 22nd September.
1862 „ 40 „
1846 „ 22 „

That is, once in 19 years, it may be expected to run dry for about 1½ months during the hot weather crop. To deprive hot weather crops of water for 1½ months would result in their all

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being dried up. These cases are of such infrequent occurrence that the liability must be faced: in such dry years it is probable supply would be short at sowing time, and, if so, the areas sown would be of small extent. What we are very much concerned with is the number of years in which the supply runs short of the averages reported by Colonel McMahon, and there is no means of knowing this, as observations have only been made for a few years. The supply for the cold weather is apparently very certain, and on the whole conditions are very favourable for a great canal scheme; however, it will be clear that, if this is entered on, water-supply will be in great demand as the system develops, and that we would have the following state of affairs:—

	Acres.
Area requiring annual irrigation	1,256,192
Available supply sufficient only for	764,325

that is, for only about two-thirds of the area.

Effect on Hamun-i-Helmand.

4. In very dry years this lake dries up even under present conditions. If extended irrigation is to be carried out, we must contemplate:—

(*i*) the Hamun being usually dry throughout a great part of each year;

(*ii*) a further demand for canal water for this great reclaimed area which will increase the commanded area, 5,893 square miles, by 986 square miles, that is, by one-sixth;

(*iii*) that the obstacle which the flooded Hamun now forms to a military force from the north-west would be removed, as occasional floods and surplus water would not keep this great depression in an impassable condition, since evaporation over the great expanse must be enormous.

Proposals for canal works.

5. These, as explained by Mr. Ward in paragraph 10 of Appendix E to Colonel McMahon's letter No. 909, dated 13th July 1903, are as follows:—

(*i*) Construction of a weir at Chahar Burjak.

(*ii*) Construction of a canal to gò down past Killa-i-Fath for irrigation of Afghan territory on the right of the Helmand.

(*iii*) Construction of a canal on the right along the deserted river-bed post, Tarakun, to irrigate all the tract on the left bank of the Helmand below Band-i-Kamal Khan and above the Rud-i-Seistan.

(*ir*) Continued supply of water down the existing channel to Band-i-Seistan for the irrigation of Persian Seistan.

(*v*) Construction of a great and costly escape channel from Band-i-Kamal Khan to the Gaud-i-Zirreh depression, which would then take the place of the Hamun-i-Helmand for the reception of surplus water.

6. An alternative to having the weir at Chahar Burjak, is to have it at Band-i-Kamal Khan, as suggested by Mr. Ward in paragraph 13 of Appendix E to the letter just quoted. I am of opinion that this course will be found preferable for the following reasons:—

(i) It may be found possible to dispense with the weir, the river being simply impounded, and a comparatively small masonry head being allowed for the supply needed for Persian Seistan now irrigated.

(ii) The surplus water would still proceed to the Hamun-i-Helmand, which we wish to maintain as an obstacle—at our pleasure—to aggression from the west.

(iii) This would obviate the need of the Gaud-i-Zirreh being used as an escape, which is most desirable, as the cost of a series of falls to pass 70,000 cusecs would be prohibitive—and a task of unparalleled magnitude of the kind.

There is nothing to show what the cost of opening up the old Tarakun channel would be, but the river once went there, and the expenditure will most likely not be prohibitive.

Disposal of the limited supply of water.

7. Since the supply of water available only suffices for about half of the areas coloured green and yellow in Mr. Ward's tracing marked Appendix A, it is clearly unnecessary to contemplate constructing canals to serve more than half of the area and the half selected should be that where the land is of best quality, unless for political reasons some departure is called for from this course. The areas coloured green and now irrigated require first consideration, but these only amounts to about one-fifth of the whole gross area which can be provided for.

My reason for assuming that the area irrigated annually should be 50 per cent of the culturable area is that, in a very dry tract, this is the least proportion which will make the cultivators prosperous. If it is decided that irrigation of 75 per cent should be allowed a

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common percentage in the Chenab Canal Colonies, then one-third of the areas coloured green and yellow on Mr. Ward's tracing would suffice for utilisation of the available supply.

Necessity for a Railway.

8. Unless a railway was provided to carry away the produce, a big canal would not answer, since cultivators would not be induced to take up land and cultivate extensively while they would not have the means to pay water rates. Further, it is no part of our object to create a great untapped granary in Seistan which might be used by an enemy. The railway from Seistan to Karachi would not be longer than it is some parts of the Chenab Canal Colonies to the same port. There would be less traffic than on either of the railways in the Punjab colonies, as there would not be the same amount of passenger traffic due to the colonists making frequent journeys to thier original homes.

Cost of Construction.

9. The canal system for Seistan would be free of all difficulties in construction, and the work would cost rather less than the Jhelum Canal designed to irrigate about the same area and estimated to cost Rs. 18,74,807.

Effect of canal extension on existing irrigation.

10. The irrigators on the existing canal would have to make the water-supply go about three times as far as they now do. Improvements in the canals would have to precede reduction of supply for the new works. With proper canal works, no difficulty would arise in giving the cultivators of the existing irrigated tracts sufficient water for their lands in the terms of the Goldsmid Treaty—provided that a duly qualified canal officer is in charge of distribution.

Execution of works.

To carry out a complete canal system would amount to execution of a project about the scope of the Lower Jhelum Canal, of which the following are some leading particulars.

Gross area	1,530,896 acres.	
Annual irrigation	765,182 „	
	Rs.	
Amount of estimate	1,87,48,074	
Net revenue, including indirect credits ...	29,71,723	
Net revenue, excluding „ „ ...	15,10,061	
Return on capital cost, including „ „ ...	15·8%	
Return on capital cost, excluding „ „ ...	8·05%	

Foreign Department. J. BENTON,—31-10-04.

Foreign Office Press,—No. 27—2-11-04—20.

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The demi-official below may be sent to Colonel McMahon. A copy of the complete file should go with me, and Colonel McMahon's reply, when received, should also be sent on.

L. W. DANE,—2-11-04.

Dated Simla, the 2nd November 1904.

From—L. W. DANE, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—COLONEL A. H. MCMAHON C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission.

I enclose a copy of a note by Mr. Benton, Secretary, Irrigation, Public Works Department, on the Helmand project. You will see that he thinks that the diversion of the Helmand down Johns's nala might be difficult owing to the number of rapids that would be required. He also offers some other very valuable suggestions. Will you kindly consult Ward, and let me have any explanations that you may wish to offer about the points raised? Possibly you thought that, as the Gaud-i-Zirreh filled up, the slope would be lessened, and that, as the country is all desert at present, a certain amount of cutting back would not do much harm. I should like to have a very early answer, as, though my orders are not to mention the Helmand, one does not know what may happen. Perhaps, therefore, you can send me a telegraphic reply.

I am sorry to have deprived you of Maula Bakhsh, but I am sure you will recognise how desirable it is that he should see Kabul to complete his education.

In your estimate of the country irrigable from existing Persian channels, 460,800, acres, I presume you have omitted the Hamuns. Can you explain why so small a portion of this area is actually irrigated, though the Persians have practically all the water at present?

Glad to hear that the Amir has formally agreed to demarcation, though, if the Hashmat is turned out, even this may not mean the release of the Mission.

Foreign Office Press—No. 93—8-11-04—24.

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

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(102)

Dated Camp Khwaja Ahmad, the 16th April 1903.

From—Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission,

To—L. W. Dane Esq., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I write to you these few lines to briefly state the result of our investigations regarding the control of the Helmand, and to put you in possession of earlier information on the subject than would be possible if I waited until my detailed report is ready. The necessary surveys and plans are now being drawn up, and when all is ready I will send in the report.

To understand this letter you should refer to the south-west portion of the 16 mile = 1 inch map of Afghanistan.

To begin with I should remark that, from rough observations I had made in past years, I was led to the conclusion that the Helmand river formerly ran into the Goud-i-Zirreh depression from the east, and that it might be possible to reconduct it there either from some point north-east of the Goud-i-Zirreh, or failing that some point north or north-west of it.

Careful lines of levels run northwards to the Helmand from our boundary to Landi Wali Muhammad, Khwaja Ali and Rodbar proved that the first portion of the above theory was wrong. Westwards, however, we find that the theory is correct, and that the putting of it into actual practice would be attended with less difficulty than was ever anticipated.

The joint work of Ward, Tate and Johns, especially the careful and exhaustive survey of the last named, now proves that—

(1) The existing cultivators' canal dug by the Afghans to Kila-i-Afzal in the direction of Tarakhun will with ordinary extension command a large tract of land.

(2) A new canal on a 10 feet higher level is practicable which would command not only present and previously cultivated tracts in the Tarakhun district, *but* all the huge Dasht-i-Tarakhun and other waste but culturable areas.

(3) That an old bed of the Helmand at one time turned south and south-east from near Kila Afzal into the Goud-i-Zirreh depression, *and* that a cutting of 4 miles with a maximum height of 13 feet would suffice to turn the present cultivators' canal from the Helmand into the old bed.

(4) That by taking off the new canal (2) somewhere below Rodbar, one could, with a weir at that point, turn the *whole* or any required portion of the Helmand into the canal and on to the Tarakhun tract with an escape for excess flood water down the old bed (3).

(5) That all cutting required is in easy clay soil with no rock work anywhere.

(6) That all above results (2, 3 and 4) could also be obtained by a powerful bund at Bund-i-Kamal Khan to hold back and raise the Helmand level 10 feet. This, of course, would be a Cyclopean work, offering no particular advantages. The old historic bund of Rustam is said to have been at this place and to have fulfilled the above objects. Public Works Department labour was, however, cheaper in those days.

Historic records corroborated by the very extensive local investigations which we have been fortunate enough to be able to make, especially on the Afghan side, prove that the Helmand in early times was effectively controlled between Rodbar and Bund-i-Kamal Khan, and was below that point not a river but a system of canals running over what we may call three separate delta tracts. The most important of these was (A) the Tarakhun delta system. This was the Seistan of Alexander's time. As old and perhaps older, and almost as important was (B) the delta which I will call the Killa Fath, Saro Tar and Amiran system. The ~~rivers~~ ruins of Saro Tar run in almost unbroken line from Chaharburjak *via* Killa Fath, Saro Tar, Amiran to near Chakansur, and prove the existence of a vast population and prosperity. This was irrigated by a big canal taken off near Chaharburjak. It is now a desert, but capable of resuscitation.

Then comes (C) present Persian Seistan. This was a delta watered by a canal system taking off at what is now the Rod-i-Seistan. This was the most recently occupied, I believe, and not the most important of the three deltas mentioned.

When that beast Timurlang destroyed Rustam's bund at or near Bund-i-Kamal Khan, he converted A and B into a howling desert, and destroyed the greater portion of C by over-inundation. What are now Hamuns and Naizars were previously inhabited tracts as shown by ruins now submerged. The whole water, sufficient and still sufficient to cultivate three large deltas, was turned into the one delta (C). The main canal (now Rod-i-Seistan) became a river, then split into other rivers and 15 years ago into a new river, the Rod-i-Parian, and destroyed immense tracts of cultivated land. This year the Helmand threatens to inundate all Seistan, and play havoc with the crops. With such a huge volume of water coming into an

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absolutely dead level country there is no means of controlling it. It must be controlled, if at all, higher up the river. Persians and Afghans admit that a proper control of the river higher up would benefit both: the Persians by saving present cultivation, and rendering the Naizars and Hamuns again culturable; the Afghans by reopening the large Saro Tar tract, and not to mention the Tarakhun tract.

Land-owning problems do not enter into one's calculations regarding a canal system in either Afghan or Persian territory. The country on both banks from above Bund-i-Kamal Khan is State land, and as far as I can ascertain, there are practically no rights of private ownership on either the Persian or Afghan side.

I send you this rough hurried note on the subject, as there is no knowing when the information may be of use, and the sooner you get it the better.

The detailed reports will follow as soon as the maps and plans are ready.

P.S.—The Amir ordered the Akhundzada two years ago to bustle up and cultivate Tarakhun. He was going to take the work in hand last year, but their disputes with the Persians in Seistan prevented him. This Mission this year has again delayed the work. The longer, therefore, any large scheme for controlling the river (a work which the Afghans could not carry out themselves) is deferred, the more vested interests there will be in Tarakhun to complicate matters.

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Dated Simla, the 28th April 1903.

From—C. W. Hodson, Esq., Deputy Secretary and Director of Railway Construction in the Public Works Department,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I enclose herewith copies of two letters from Johns, which report what he is doing in the way of railway reconnaissance in the direction of Seistan, in case you may care to see them.

I do not send the maps as these are being traced, and you probably have better general maps than we have, from which you can pick out the general routes. But if you would like the maps, I can send them over.

P.S.—I suppose your Department will arrange to supply him with funds when he reaches Karachi (see end of his second letter).

Dated Camp Saindaki, the 19th March 1903.

From—W. A. Johns, Esq.,

To—C. W. Hodson, Esq., Deputy Secretary and Director of Railway Construction in the Public Works Department.

You may have thought it strange not to hear from me before; but as there was little to say and nothing very important, I thought things would keep till I submitted my formal report.

There are many reasons for my altering this intention, but mainly that the journey before me is still long, and it is not safe to run the risk of my information being delayed in reaching you through delays in the journey, sickness or any other contingency. Please understand that this letter is not a report, but only a general outline of what my report on the route we followed to Seistan will be; and, to begin with, you will be glad to hear that I never was fitter, having taken in my waist belt twice, and can no longer be reproached with fatness.

On the 1st instant, I left the Mission at the Bund-i-Seistan on the borders of Persia, where arbitration business was just going to begin, and there was no longer any need for my staying with the party, as the country was dead flat, and would remain so during the demarcation proceedings. I am returning *via* the trade route, which I struck yesterday from the Helmand valley at Bund-i-Kamal Khan, and am halting here a day to write to you on my reconnaissance from Nushki to the Helmand, and to McMahon about some information I collected for him in the desert, where I did 5 days' halting and exploration *en route*.

From this to Nushki I am examining an alternative route from Persia to that I traversed with the Mission. It follows the general alignment of the trade route, and so far does not appear likely to present much difficulty except, perhaps, sand hills.

From Nushki I have arranged with McMahon to examine a possible alignment (apparently the only possible one) from a point 100 miles south-east of this to Karachi. I hope to find camels and escort ready for me at Nushki; those I have are too done up for further travelling, and will strike my proposed alignment by taking a short cut from Nushki to the spot where the difficult country begins. Meanwhile I am detaching one of my surveyors to carry the line from its junction with the trade route to that point. I hope to reach Karachi by the end of May, if the Nushki Tahsildar is successful in getting me the camels; otherwise I cannot attempt it, as any delay will make the country impossible from the heat later on. There has been so much vague talk about the simplicity of a line from Karachi to Seistan and Herat (whereas I believe the job to be one of the greatest difficulty) that it appeared to McMahon and myself that it was highly desirable that the country should be traversed by a competent person rather than we should continue in this fancied security. I am on the spot, my pay has to be paid somewhere, and the additional cost to Government would be Rs. 1,000 per month for a couple of months. Last year some officer with Showers's force that went to Makran sent in a memorandum very favourably received in the highest quarters, I understand, showing how easy it was to build a line through Makran.

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I have the greatest mistrust of all non-professional reports of this description; probably the officer was a Sapper with Showers's force, and I consider that the railway branch should know all these things at first hand.

For a line direct from Nushki to the *Helmand*, such as I am describing further on, a connection with the coast is hardly necessary, or, if necessary, can be made from Nushki, which is, I believe, admittedly not very difficult. We would meet our enemies end on in Seistan and our line of retreat would be along our railway. But a line direct to the Helmand and then down it to Seistan is almost entirely in Afghan territory. It is, therefore, hardly within the bounds of practical politics, and more a dream of the future. Any extension of the railway from Nushki will more likely take the line of the trade route, and will possess the strategic advantage of being a flanking line to an enemy advancing on India up the Helmand valley from Seistan. It will, however, have the corresponding disadvantage of all flanking lines in liability to being cut by raiding parties across the desert anywhere between the Persian frontier and Nushki, but more particularly near Chageh (Dalbandin). A connection with the coast is, therefore, essential, and the best seems to be from the point above mentioned some 100 miles south-east of this place, Saindak, where I am now encamped—itself 3 marches or 50 miles from the Persian frontier at Robat.

To make any port on the Persian Gulf or Makran coast our objective, which I once thought of, is unwise. The fewer ports we have to protect in time of war the better, and all the Gulf and Makran coastal ports are bad. Karachi is obviously the place to aim for, and the alignment I propose following goes quite as near the Persian frontier as is desirable, rather too near perhaps, but no alternative seems feasible; it will thus possess all the advantages of a line to the Makran coast coupled with the advantage of a decent harbour. Tate, of the Survey of India, who surveyed all that country and knows it very well, has given me a lot of information about routes. As an outcome of this, the alignment I propose examining is through the Mashkel Hamun to Palantak; the gorges of the Mashkel river are quite impracticable from Palantak to Kila Isa, thence to Rod Khan, and up the Punjgur river to Bela and Karachi. The three difficult places are: getting into the Rekshan valley, getting into the Punjgur valley, and the drop at the scarp above Las Bela, a sheer scarp of mud hills 1,000 feet high without a spur. I hope you will not object to this little trip. It *is* of value, and costs nothing. Besides if you mentally disapprove of it, you can wash your hands of the business by remembering that I am under the Foreign Office and have McMahon's approval.

Note on Route from Nushki to the Helmand.

And now to turn to the object of the letter which was to give more account from a railway point of view of the route from Nushki to the Helmand that I traversed with the Mission.

The accompanying plan on the scale of 4 miles = 1″ gives our road and marches, as well as the main physical features of the country. I have a barometric section throughout, but for the present the few heights entered on the plan will be sufficient. To trace the section would mean a halt of two more days, for which there is neither time nor rations for man and beasts (the country is an absolute desert and the Helmand valley quite eaten up, so one has to keep moving).

I should premise by saying that marching with a column as I did through an unknown country it was impossible for me to halt when I wished at difficult places, so as to make a further examination of other possible alternatives. All that was possible was to march the ordinary marches, and see as much of the country on each side as was possible during each day. My report can, therefore, only *suggest* the places where the best alignment will probably be found and state where our route was feasible or the reverse. I have shown by a dotted red line what I consider the best route would be. Ours was entirely guided by the various wells—a consideration which would not prevail in the alignment of a railway.

From Nushki to Kani (which is probably an obligatory point), a distance of 67 miles, our line of march was quite feasible for a railway. Most of it was over hard clay "put" and saline plain, but in the first 22 miles there was a good deal of sand, and one sand kotal 100′ high (which could be avoided).

A better and more direct line could be obtained by going west-north-west from Nushki, and crossing the plain of the Sora at once, thence skirting the edge of the Registan to Zabro and Kani.

From Kani to Galur, 28 miles, the principal difficulties, in fact the only serious difficulties, between Nushki and the Helmand are encountered.

The first is an abrupt Kotal, with a very long gentle dip on the western side, some six miles from Kani.. This can be entirely avoided by either of the routes shown dotted on the plan.

The second is much more serious and consists of a long fairly open gorge through the Chageh hills terminating in an abrupt rise of 300′ on to a plateau.

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The total rise is 6 0′ in 3 miles, or 700′ in 5 miles, but the difficulties are greater than these figures would ordinarily represent. The mountains are very rugged and broken, and a tunnel does not appear feasible, as there is a general rise in the country.



The summit, however, could be easily reached by a 1-20 zig-zag. This range, however, tails out to nothing in a northerly direction and ends in the sand hills of the Registan. Before, therefore, any detailed surveys of the Umbai pass should be attempted, an endeavour should be made to turn the mountains by the route shown on the plan. I am sorry I cannot speak more definitely as to this bit of the alignment, but my guide knew of no path through the sand hills by which I could follow the dotted line and rejoin the camp at Galur. It was all waterless sand hills he said. I investigated the range for about 8 miles north of our line of march, and the further I went the lower grew the mountains and the worse grew the sand. There was nothing formidable in the sand hills from a Railway Engineer's point of view so far as the limits of the reconnaissance took me, and the mountains appeared to tail out entirely. An alternative pass from Gazee Chah to Galur, of which my surveyor took a section, was very much more difficult than the Umbai route.

I don't think much difficulty will be met with in following the general route dotted on the plan round these Chageh outlines.

From Galur we descended to the Helmand in three parties by as many lines of march. I took the longest, as it seemed the least likely to lead me into difficulties with sand hills and the most direct to Seistan.

Mr. Ward, Executive Engineer, Punjab Canals, kindly took a barometric section for me along his route the shortest and most easterly. I could not arrange for a section along the Undille route, but that was of small consequence as it differed in physical features but little from that traversed by Mr. Ward. Neither of the two of which sections were made presented any difficulty to the Railway Engineer. Ours ascended gradually over open stony glacis and dashts from Galur to Manur for 55 miles, and then descended thence to the Helmand for 74 miles on a general falling gradient of from 1-100 to 1-80. With the exception of a few miles of low insignificant sand hills on each side of Jalal Khan's nawar and some low ridges overlooking the Helmand, the country is stony dasht on which the rails could almost be laid direct.

Of course a railway alignment would not follow our line of march (I mean that which I went by, the most westerly) and ascend from Galur to Manur, merely to descend again, but would keep much lower down on the glacis either to the north or south of Asbu hill.

Briefly, Mr. Ward's route to the Helmand after traversing a few miles of low hills emerged on stony dashts broken by steep ridges about 40′ or 50′ high not unlike the banks of some ancient river. The dashts dropped slightly to the Helmand, but the main fall was at these ridges.

The total fall was, however, much less than *via* Manur and only amounted to 1,400′ in 80 miles. From his description of the country, and from Mr. Tate's account of the intermediate line of march which he adopted, I believe the best alignments for a railway would be that shown dotted on the plan. It would probably avoid a rather abrupt rise of 250′ in 4 miles and corresponding fall a few miles further on, which is the one objectionable feature in an alignment directly following Mr. Ward's route. I am told it will follow what appears to be an old wide nulla bed almost throughout. However that may be, it is quite clear that there is no serious difficulty in reaching the Helmand from Galur. Further, I am of opinion that after taking all circumstances into consideration, strategic and commercial, Landi Wali Muhammad situated at the great bend in the river from south to east should be our objective, if a railway from Nushki to Helmand is ever undertaken. It is the shortest route, gets to inhabited country first, traverses the minimum of desert and the maximum of cultivation (though that cultivation is only one-tenth of what it might be) and offers facilities for an extension up the river bank to Girishk, and thence to our future system at Kandahar. At and above Landi Wali Muhammad the inhabitants are Pathans, and the country is well tilled and productive. From Wali Muhammad downwards the railway would probably have to turn the southern flank of the Koh-i-Khan Nashin, with a wide detour to avoid steep gradients, as a line along the northern edge of the mountain would, according to Mr. Ward, be very costly; with deep cuttings and lofty viaducts. From a point near Deshu the line would again enter the valley of the Helmand. Thenceforth to Seistan its course would be through a perfectly level Khadir, the only works would be a few bridges over irrigation channels, and the alignment calls for no further remark.

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The valley of the Helmand from the Koh-i-Khan Nashin to Kala Fath where it begins to expand into a delta, before entering the Hamun or lake, may be briefly described as a narrow alluvial plain about 2 miles wide, bounded on both sides by clay scarps and the desert. These scarped banks vary from 300′, near the Khan Nashin, to 100′ near the delta, and are merely the river's own debris through which it has cut its present channel.

So I believe, but they may be lacustrine deposits.

The existing Khadir is fertile, but thinly inhabited by Baluchis, and only partially cultivated by small irrigation channels leading from the river whose general level is some 20′ or 30′ below that of the tilled land.

I estimate the total production of this strip of the valley in good seasons at about 5,000 tons of wheat and barley and an infinitesimal quantity of pulse and cotton.

My estimate is little better than a guess, but I don't think that it at present produces double that quantity. The larger proportion of this is available for export, and the country is capable of considerable development, but within the limits, it should be remembered, of the cultivable area, which cannot possibly exceed 100 × 2 miles, *i.e.*, 200 square miles, and is not probably half this, or, say, the size of an ordinary Indian tahsil. At the terminus, however, is Seistan and here we have an industrious population and a considerable area of cultivation. Probably 25,000 tons of grain would be available for export yearly, perhaps under the stimulus of a railway all the available land would be devoted to cotton-growing. An excellent class of cotton is grown in Bokhara, and the Russians are introducing its cultivation along the Trans-Caspian Railway. It is in this direction that the land and water at Seistan and the Helmand might be utilised to the fullest advantage. There is land in sufficiency, the soil is good and the climate very similar to that of Central Asia, while the normal minimum discharge of the Helmand is not less than that of the Lower Ganges Canal. Commercially speaking, if the country were ours, a railway to the Helmand and Seistan would rank with that most profitable line, the Wazirabad-Lyallpur Khannewal Branch, as a paying scheme.

(200 square miles is smaller than the ordinary tahsil even in the highly cultivated districts of the United Provinces.)

Say 3,000 to 4,000 c. ft. per second, about the same as the New Jhelum Canal.

Under existing circumstances, it is fruitless to consider the subject in any other light than a possible strategic railway and then for reasons already stated it is possibly a less effectual protection than a flanking railway along the trade route. That point I leave to the military authorities, merely adding that a further obvious consideration is that we can proceed with the latter scheme, which is in our own territory and not with the former.

Bridging.—No bridging worth mentioning except some small flood openings over the Sora which is a series of small spill channels where crossed.

Grades.—Except at the Umlai section, of which I cannot speak definitely, 1-80 could probably be obtained throughout.

Please return me the enclosed tracing after ferrotyping. It is an *original* made from maps of which I have no copies.

If you keep this note and print the important parts, kindly send me a copy of what you print (otherwise I may contradict myself).

If you do not want to print any of it, you might return me this note. It will be useful to me hereafter in writing my report, but if you *do* print any, *kindly* have the proof properly compared with manuscripts. I once saw a similar note of mine printed in your office, and the mistakes made nonsense of the whole matter. I felt very sick of the hash of the thing.

I have no clerk to copy letters, and if I had, the subject is confidential. Nor have I kept any copy or notes of what I have written. Time does not permit, hence my request for a copy and the return of the tracing.

My formal report will presumably go to the Foreign Office.

Dated Nushki, the 16th April 1903.

From—W. A. Johns, Esq.

To—C. W. Hodson, Esq., Deputy Secretary and Director of Railway Construction in the Public Works Department.

I have just got a wire from the Under-Secretary to the effect that you received my short memorandum and plan of a railway from Nushki to Seistan *via* the Helmand. That is the most direct route if Nasratabad or its neighbourhood is our objective, and you will have understood from my report that with the exception of a short length through the fringe of the Registan sands when turning the northern spur of the Chageh mountains, about which I cannot speak confidently, the alignment and construction of a railway from Nushki to the bend of the Helmand at Landi Wali Muhammad is a comparatively simple work, and that the descent of the Helmand thence to Seistan is quite easy, while even the above mentioned short bit through the sands, which I was unable to traverse, appeared from observation to be perfectly feasible.

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The insuperable objection to this route is that it is practically throughout its length in Afghan territory. A minor objection to it is that, though capable hereafter of being linked with Kandahar and the Khojak *via* Girishk, it would require a force at its terminus in Seistan equal to the opposing army operating in that country.

On my return journey from Bund-i-Seistan, therefore, I examined a route which is entirely in British territory till it reaches the common frontier of Afghanistan, Persia and England at Robat.

The railway on this alignment would be a flanking line, and a small force operating along it would make things most unpleasant for an army advancing up the Helmand, the only possible route along which an invading army of any strength could advance (without first building a railway for themselves).

The accompanying tracings show the alignments I reconnoitred. I am sorry that they are so rough. Only one of my surveyors can trace decently, and I detached him at Kondi to do the early portion of the reconnaissance to the coast. With long marches and very few halts it has been impossible to get ready anything better for the present *ad interim* note. The large plan is on a scale of 4 miles=1″, and shows the route followed from near Robat to Yak Mach near Dalbandin. The last 150 miles from near Dalbandin to Nushki are on the $\frac{1}{8}$″=1 mile scale, as I had not got the larger scale maps for this portion.

From an engineering point of view, a general description of the route can be given in a single sentence. From the Afghan-Baluch frontier near Robat the whole alignment with the exception of a mile or two of easy sand hills near Dalbandin is on stony glacis or stony plain throughout, with the same exception the rails could be laid almost directly on the ground, with very little preliminary levelling and dressing. The nullas shown on the plan are hardly traceable a few miles from the base of the hills, and could all be "dipped". In short, it would be difficult to find 350 miles of line in any part of the world along which a light railway could be built more cheaply. I owe it to Tate who surveyed this country some years ago, and told me the route to follow, that I hit off the correct *general* alignment without a check right along as far as Dalbandin. The grades are almost equally satisfactory.

One or two alternatives near Mushki Chah were rejected after reconnaissance.

From the edge of the sand hills at the frontier, R. L. about 1,800′ the line gradually ascends along the glacis below Mintaka and Saindak to R. L. 3,000′ opposite Amlaf, *i.e.*, about 1,200′ in 40 miles

It is impossible to speak with any confidence of *flat* gradients from a barometric section, but I think I am safe in saying that 1-150 will easily be obtainable on this ascent, without an unreasonable amount of curvature, or departing from the character of the railway as a purely surface line. Thence to Nushki the general elevation of the line is about R. L. 3,000, the maximum being R. L. 3,200, near Mushki Chah and at Nushki, and the lowest point at Yak Mach R. L. 2,600.

The weather was so unsettled during my march that any of these levels may be easily 100′ out; the description is a general one, and if understood in that light, cannot mislead any one settling out the permanent alignment. His aim should be to cross the nullas where they cease to have defined channels, and merge in the plain.

From Dalbandin to Nushki one or two alternatives may be mentioned. They are all so easy that it is difficult without a more detailed survey to determine which is the easiest.

I had been warned of a bad belt of sand that running from the Mashkel Hamun to the borders of the Registan crossed the trade route between Karadok and Yadgar a little east of Dalbandin.

Coming from Yak Mach to Dalbandin these sand hills a few miles off on the right appeared very formidable. I therefore crossed them by the Kanian nulla route (shown by a full red line on the plan) which proved perfectly easy, and got on to the northern glacis of the Kambaran and Ras Koh ranges at once. I afterwards discovered that the direct alignment along the road was not nearly so difficult as I had expected, though the road crosses the sand belt on the skew and there is some twenty miles of alternate low sand hill, basin, and sand hill again.

I believe, however, that a little detailed survey will probably prove my alignment to be the better of the two, as it crosses the belt on the square, and is almost free from sand. It is obviously the longer and may, therefore, be dearer to construct, though cheaper to maintain.

The other alternative route runs from Dalbandin to Karadok and thence keeping the sand hills to the south rounds them at the Laghar Koh.

I did not discover this route till I had reached the Laghar Koh, and found that the sands terminated there, or appeared to do so, whereas I had been informed on the best authority that the sand was continuous to Nushki. The only objection to this alignment is that it traverses a long salt marsh into which the drainage of the surrounding hills empties itself. The levy sowars in the neighbouring thanas stated that the route was all plain sailing and free from sand. It is never used, however, as it is waterless, and the salt marsh is bad going.

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Probably this is the shortest and cheapest route for a railway to Dalbandin, and I would recommend that, when the staking out of the permanent alignment from Nushki is commenced, the officer in charge should ride along my route to Dalbandin (called Bund-i-Jehan Khan on the map) and return thence along the dotted line *via* Karadok and Nushki to the Laghar Koh with good guides and a day or two's supply of water.

A point I have omitted is that from Baghak to the present Nushki terminus, a distance of six miles, directly ascending the Kaisar glacis, the grade will be much steeper than on the remaining 350 miles of line.

My pocket book has just been sent off with my camp, so I cannot say accurately what it will work out, but speaking from memory I think it will prove to be about 1-70. For that reason I deprecated last year any premature establishment of a terminal or engine changing station at Nushki till the comparative advantages of Baghak were thoroughly enquired into.

Two other matters may be briefly touched on—

(1) The water-supply.

(2) The traffic prospects.

(1) Judging from the existing kucha wells along the trade route I think there would be little difficulty in getting sufficient water for a light traffic from wells for the first 150 miles from Nushki.

As far as Dalbandin (mile 116) the wells at the Post houses appeared to flow freely, and the water was sweet. How they would stand locomotive requirements is a matter on which any prophesy would be of little value, but with a sufficient number of wells there is every reason to suppose that a considerable amount of water would be obtainable over this section.

At Yak Mach also there are several good wells, and possibly water could be obtainable further on in the nulla beds under the Hubli Koh.

The outlook for the remaining 200 miles is bad. You will observe that the trade route goes dodging about the hills from water-hole to water-hole, along an alignment which is quite unsuited for a railway, whereas the latter is on open sloping glacis where water is rarely found in wells, except at a great depth, and seldom even then. The mountains are volcanic: even allowing for the scantiness of the rainfall, the springs are extraordinarily few and far apart, and I have no grounds for supposing that artesian wells would be successful. The line crosses no running water, between Dalbandin, where there is a very small Karez, and the Afghan frontier.

(2) There are really none worth considering in our own territory. Round Nushki and Baghak there is a good deal of cultivation in favourable seasons, but beyond that the country is purely pastoral or desert.

The traffic would be entirely dependent upon our trade with Jalk (and other centres in Southern Persia), Seistan and the Afghan Helmand; and at the mercy of possibly unfriendly tariffs. The railway would be purely strategical, apart from future extensions westwards, and should be regarded from a strategical aspect only. If we could purchase the Helmand valley and Seistan, an absolutely ridiculous assumption, the direct line down the Helmand valley would undoubtedly be the railway to build. Under existing conditions I think that the Dalbandin-Robat route, which is sheltered from attack by the Registan desert, the Chageh range, the Koh-i-Sultan, and the sands and ranges bordering the Gaud-i-Zirreh is more suited to our requirements. With a connection between, say Kondi, a point midway on this route, and Karachi, it appears to me that an invading army in Seistan would be absolutely paralysed.

Another point. From the Afghan-Baluch frontier where the full red line terminates, I have drawn three dotted lines showing possible extensions either to Persia (and Seistan *via* Robat) or to Bund-i-Seistan, or to Kamal Khan Bund, at the northern elbow of the Helmand.

Barring a 5-mile belt of sand on each side of the Shelag River, through which I have dotted the extension along a perfectly feasible alignment, there is no engineering difficulty. The ascent from the Shelag valley to the stony Tarakun desert, a rise of about 100′, would be on a 1-100 gradient. If it were considered desirable to build an extension to the Helmand, it would seem possible that the Amir might not object to a railway through such an outlying fringe of his dominions.

I am exceedingly fit, and have brought in all my camels and men, the former in much better condition than they left Bund-i-Seistan, though we averaged 20 miles a day for the last 6 marches, and about 17 miles since entering British territory.

My heavy kit I have sent off to Quetta, and start this evening *via* Kharan for the first pass at Palantak on the Kondi-Karachi reconnaissance.

The difficulty along that route appears to be at the Jhow Lak leading down to the Las Bela plain, I hope it will not be insuperable. At any rate, I have much better maps for that portion, 1″=2 miles, than are published on the ¼″ scale for the reconnaissance just finished.

I have been as quick as I expected. From this on I am taking nothing but Jambaz camels, a kind of light baggage-riding-camel, and five ponies for self and escort. Showers

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is very anxious that I should go down *via* Turbat (Kech) to Pasni. I hear he is trying to build a harbour there, so, if I can, I will not disappoint him. June 1st should see me in Karachi, when I shall want some money for pay, and followers camelmen, &c.

I am taking the usual precautions with this. Glad to hear the other got through all right.

My tracings, I know, are dreadful, but get the 4 miles=1″ sheets and 8 miles=1″ sheets from which the tracings have been made. They will explain things.

Dated Simla, the 29th April 1903.

From—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—C. W. Hodson, Esq., Deputy Secretary and Director of Railway Construction in the Public Works Department.

Many thanks for Johns's report. We should like to have copies of his maps when traced. I will see about funds for him at Karachi, but we had heard nothing about his proposed journey to Makran.

The papers,* which have been printed, may be submitted for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy. We cannot make much of Mr. Johns's reports without his maps, which have not yet been received.

* Two letters and enclosures.

E. H. S. Clarke,—6-5-03.

Your Excellency will wish to see these notes by Colonel McMahon and Mr. Johns. They ought to have told us before Mr. Johns started off for Turbat and Karachi, but perhaps it will be as well to have his reconnaissance of a possible railway route to the coast. McMahon shows that, as we anticipated, the prospects of a regular irrigation scheme from the Helmand are excellent, with Rudbar under our control. We dominate the whole position, and could at any time divert the whole of the Helmand into the Gaud-i-Zirreh, and lay Seistan waste. If, on the other hand, we had control of Persian and Afghan Seistan, we could probably irrigate in both harvests an area of 2,000,000 acres with the supply in the Helmand. Mr. Johns puts the normal minimum supply at 3,000 or 4,000† cubic feet per second, which is as good as anything we have as yet got in the Punjab. In his last diary for 21st April, McMahon gives the measured discharge at Band-i-Seistan as 52,000 cubic feet per second, or sufficient to cover 100 square miles, 1 foot deep in 24 hours. We could, therefore, count on over 1,000,000 acres in the Kharif. The potentialities of such a land of Goshen are so vast that at all hazards we ought to try and secure a permanent hold there of some kind. 2,000,000 acres irrigation at Swat canal rates would bring in Rs. 60,00,000 a year canal revenue, excluding land revenue which might be put at another Rs. 20,00,000. We could, therefore, afford to pay the Amir a very high rent if he would lease the area to us. Persian Seistan must follow if we once get control of the river from Landi Wali Muhammad downwards. Possibly an offer to raise his subsidy from the present permanent sum of 6½ lakhs a year to 25 lakhs might induce the Amir to consider the question of a lease, which would obviate the necessity for objectionable boundary disputes between him and the Persians. It is a fascinating prospect, and, if only it could be realised, we should absolutely secure the southern half of the frontier, and at the same time largely reduce in the cost of garrisoning Quetta and Baluchistan, since the cost of feeding the troops there would be greatly reduced. Apparently also at first it would be unnecessary to lay the rails beyond Landi Wali Muhammad, as, with a regulating weir at or near Rudbar, water carriage ought to be sufficient to meet our requirements, and we should give no hostages to fortune in the shape of a permanent railway.

† This should give in a cold climate some 600,000 acres in the Rabi.

L. W. Dane,—8-5-03.

C[urzon],—8-5-03.

Dated Simla, the 9th May 1903.

From—C. W. Hodson, Esq., Deputy Secretary and Director of Railway Construction in the Public Works Department,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Herewith a ferro. of a tracing compiled in this office from Johns's maps and what other information we have.

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Dated Seistan, the 25th May 1903.

From—Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Our telegrams lately have an appearance of being somewhat at cross purposes, but this is hardly avoidable when communications take so long in reaching each other.

I trust that nothing I have telegraphed so far has been interpreted as a wish on my part to hurry out of this country before our work has been completed. I was obliged, however, to look at both aspects of the question, and gave you the means of withdrawing us at an early date at the risk of scamping work here, if such were the wish of Government, or of keeping us here till the work is thoroughly completed. The last portion of my first telegram on the subject (No. 328 of 27th April) would not have been sent, if I had then been in receipt of your telegram (Viceroy's Camp, 21st April). My last telegram, *i.e.*, No. 343 of 23rd May, places, I am afraid, the chances of our early return altogether out of the question.

I say afraid, because although from the first I saw little or no chance of getting away, yet the prospects of a long, severe, and very trying summer in this singularly unpleasant country are far from invigorating. Yes, under existing conditions, it is a very unpleasant country for a summer in camp. Public opinion is divided as to whether the heat, the insects, or the wind is the worst evil. I'm inclined to think the wind, though unpleasant in itself, is a blessing in disguise, for it defeats the first two evils. Whether our tents will stand it remains to be seen. We have also to learn whether the Seistan fly will kill our horses and camels, in the autumn, as the people maintain it will. The Akhundzada says the fly has died out much of late years, and that he only loses a few horses yearly from it, but perhaps this year's floods may resuscitate the beast.

The mosquitoes have already killed one of our camels.

If all had gone on as I had planned, I would have given my award on the boundary line about the 20th of April, and would have proceeded to demarcate necessary portions of the line, after which I would have taken up the water question. Two causes have upset this plan. The first was that I found at the last moment how wrong existing surveys are of the country between Takht-i-Shah and Siah Koh. Takht-i-Shah we had already found to be on a long spit of mainland running northwards into the Naizar, and therefore, in accordance with Goldsmid's definition, in Persian territory. A straight line from there to Siah Koh seemed simple enough, but we discovered an inconvenient long spit of mainland some way to the west of Takht-i-Shah running southwards from the Afghan shore into the Naizar. It was doubtful whether the straight line would cut this spit or not, and to settle this point one had first definitely to verify the position of Siah Koh, which you will have seen I had some difficulty in doing. The straight line will work out all right I think, but the map is not yet quite finished.

The second cause was the unexpected continuation of the rising of the Helmand River. This has put most of the area which especially needs demarcation under water, and made actual demarcation impossible. Moreover, the swollen Helmand has shown signs of fresh vagaries, and it looks as though the Nadali channel and some of the canals on the Afghan side have largely increased in relative size. This may have quite altered pre-existing conditions of water distribution, and a settlement of water questions is hung up until the river drops low enough to let us see what changes have actually occurred.

As soon as the probabilities of a prolongation of our work began to grow into certainties, it became advisable to manœuvre the responsibility for delay as much as possible on to Persian shoulders. This they have blundered into with alacrity, and I am at present waiting for them to get proper instructions.

Whether they have even yet woke up to the prospect of our staying on here indefinitely I can't say, but, in any case, they did not begin to do so until too late to prevent Miller blundering again.

He and the Yamin were so cock-sure that I was just going to finish up here and go on to the Mirjawa border, that Miller has collected camels and announced his intention of starting for a tour southwards and on to Kerman, evidently timed to coincide with our migration to Mirjawa. I am curious to see if he will adhere to his tour if we don't move. I am sorry for Miller, as his leave and, I hear, promotion too, are hung up until the completion of this Mission. Disappointment may lead to more display of temper on his part, for, apart from private pique, our prolonged stay here can't but be a blow to Russian prestige in these parts, for we are very inconveniently *en evidence* here in every way, and not in one part of Seistan only, but all over it and round it. Our officers wander promiscuously about, and have gone as far as Geisha on the Birjand side, and Lash Jowain and Chakansur on the Afghan, while our officials and men are more or less in quiet occupation of all the important Seistan villages, collecting grain, grinding flour, directing labour, controlling firms, and to all outward appearance running the country. The country, too, seems to like it, which must annoy Miller. The Akhundzada asked Mir Shams Shah the other day what had become of the Russian Consul. For the past two years, he said, one heard nothing but Mr. Miller this and Mr. Miller that, while now-a-days no one ever hears his name!

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Of course no one realises more than I do how temporary a check like this must be to Russian influence, however effective it be for the time being, unless we take further and continued action. While the check lasts, however, the effect is pleasing, and goes far to reconcile one to meet wind and mosquitoes.

Much solid work is being done here in other ways, for we are pushing through careful surveys and observations with the scientific object of working out the agricultural and irrigational possibilities of the country. The pitiable system of the present can be ignored, but the perfect system of the past, if renewed, leaves but small room for improvement. The Akhundzada is now letting us thoroughly survey all the large delta tract from Chahar Burjak downwards on the west of the Helmand. This is a very important tract, and must have been the best and richest portion of ancient Seistan. One finds in it remains of old pukka bridges, canals, outlets, and even syphons; in fact, all the paraphernalia of the irrigation system which we now claim as our own! I am doing all I can to excite the Akhundzada's cupidity about it, so as to distract his attention from the Tarakun tract, regarding which he has written much in recent years to Kabul. Every one has curiously enough ignored the western delta up to this, and no one, not even Ferrier, seems to have even visited it.

Taking the Seistan land problem as a whole, the more one works at it the more valuable the country appears. Taking Afghan and Persian Seistan together, we have over 3 million acres of the best possible soil, well commanded by a sufficient supply of the best silt flood water. It is one of the most valuable properties in Asia and at present practically untouched. Not only is the soil extraordinarily good and the water of the most fertilizing kind, but the water can in 27 out of 28 years be depended upon to come down at the very season when it is most wanted. With our methods and management we would get a revenue off it of 5 million rupees rising to anything you like to name. With cultivation and proper irrigation methods, would disappear the floods, the swamps, and the insects that make life now in Seistan such a curse. The word swamp is hardly applicable to Seistan. With us it means a water-logged place which is hard to drain, and generally of sour soil when drained. No amount of flooding seems to spoil Seistan soil. It remains very sweet, and is wonderfully porous even at the bottom of Hamuns and places where water lies long and often. What appears a swamp at one time becomes, when the water dries or flows off it, a stretch of the most perfect culturable soil. I have seen but a very limited area of salt or sour soil in the country, and that is chiefly near the city.

Well, I hope you'll forgive such a lengthy scrawl. It is nice for a time to shut one's eyes to the surrounding landscape of gravel plain, wind, glare, and dust, and try to pretend one is serving a useful, though ephemeral, purpose in staying here, and that this land and its abominations are worth redemption. We are on the highest, healthiest tract in the whole country, which is something, but I'd like to move somewhere or other for the summer just to distract men's minds, and keep them healthy.

P. S.—If I had carried out my original plans and given my award on the boundary line and been able to demarcate, I would have done so whether Persians objected or not, on the pretext that my demarcation was provisional, and subject to modification or ratification hereafter by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at home. Now that delay has occurred it would be a good thing to get my award finally settled before demarcation, provided there is no very great delay in the submission of appeals, if any, and in the Secretary of State's decision thereon, but it may still prove unavoidable to demarcate a provisional line.

Your Excellency will wish to see this very interesting letter. I propose to add as far as × to the notes and to transfer the rest to the other case.*

* Colonel McMahon's Seistan arbitration.

L. W. Dane,—8-6-03.

C[urzon],—8-6-03.

Extract from a demi-official letter from Colonel McMahon, dated the 8th July 1903.

* * * * * * * *

We, however, have two strong cards to play at the present moment, either towards getting the concession† ourselves, or preventing any one else getting it.

† The lease of the Seistan revenues.

* * * * * * * *

The other, a permanent card, is, as you know, the control of the Helmand River, regarding which I need say no more here. My report, delayed by Ward's long absence in camp up the river, is now ready, and will reach you soon. It will show what a very effective weapon for either the prosperity or ruin of Persian Seistan the control of the river affords. It is possible therewith to reduce the revenues of Persian Seistan to *nil*, if desired. The chief

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danger that faces Persia is that the Afghans, unaided, can themselves effect results practically ruining Persian Seistan. To what extent the threat of this possibility would be premature or safe before a necessary understanding is come to with Afghanistan is a matter for careful consideration.

* * * * * * * *

FROM COLONEL A. H. MCMAHON, C.S.I., C.I.E., No. 909 (SECRET), DATED THE 13TH (RECEIVED 27TH) JULY 1903.

Submits, with remarks, a report (with enclosures) on the question of controlling the water of the Helmand and irrigating the whole delta of that river.

FROM COLONEL A. H. MCMAHON, C.S.I., C.I.E., No. 911 (SECRET), DATED THE 15TH (RECEIVED 27TH) JULY 1903.

With reference to the foregoing letter, makes certain remarks on the political aspects of the situation which present themselves in considering the possibility or accomplishment of the control of the Helmand River.

TELEGRAM FROM COLONEL A. H. MCMAHON, C.S.I., C.I.E., No. 399, DATED THE 22ND (RECEIVED 27TH) JULY 1903.

With reference to the foregoing letter, says that the Yamin-i-Nizam has incidentally intimated that Persia contemplates offering assistance to the Afghans in making the Tarakun canal, on certain conditions. Remarks that this contingency was not anticipated by him in the above letter, and that the scheme would not work in practice.

TELEGRAM TO COLONEL A. H. MCMAHON, C.S.I., C.I.E., No. 2177 F., DATED THE 29TH JULY 1903.

Acknowledges receipt of his letters Nos. 909 and 911, with enclosures, including maps and plans (10 in all).

The papers now submitted fully bear out the ideas, which Colonel McMahon was asked to investigate, of the potentialities of irrigation in Seistan from the Helmand, and of ruining Seistan by a diversion of the Helmand into the Gaud-i-Zirreh. The detailed report supports the conclusions at which Colonel McMahon arrived in his demi-official of 16th April. If Your Excellency reads his secret letter No. 911 of 15th July with the tracing of the ⅛ survey map, the case is very clear. My forecast of 2,000,000 acres of irrigated crops in the two harvests is more than borne out. At present only some 75,000 acres of crops are irrigated, of which 50,000 acres are in Persian and 25,000 acres are in Afghan Seistan.

Page 1 of notes.

All that is required is a weir at Band-i-Kamal Khan or somewhere just above this to raise the water level 10 feet at the heads of the proposed canals.

To divert the Helmand into the Gaud-i-Zirreh when the water is most required for sowings is an infinitely simple matter. A temporary dam at this point with a cutting near Kala-i-Afzal, four miles long and from 10 to 20 feet deep in earth, would do all that is required. It is clear that any Power having control of the Helmand at Band-i-Kamal Khan can at will convert Seistan into the granary of Eastern Persia and of Southern Afghanistan and of Baluchistan, or into a howling wilderness. The present population is scanty, and so, as in the case of the Chenab and Swat River Canals, the surplus of grain for export will be enormous and would enable any railway to Quetta to pay handsomely. The Chenab Canal line, I believe, pays over 14 per cent.

Mr. Johns's report on his reconnaissances for a railway to Seistan shows that a direct line from Nushki to the Helmand at Landi Wali Muhammad and thence to Band-i-Seistan, a distance of 335 miles, would cost Rs. 2,63,00,000.

It may not be necessary to make the whole line at once. The Helmand had a minimum depth of 2½ feet when McMahon went down it. River gun-boats are being made with a draught of 2 feet and a speed of 15 knots, and with improvements the Helmand ought to be navigable by suitable boats to the weir and thence into the Gaud-i-Zirreh lake. The length of the railway to Landi Wali Muhammed seems to be 156 miles, which at Rs. 78,500 a mile would cost Rs. 1,22,46,000. For a desert line this estimate seems high.

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The line by the trade route to Band-i-Seistan is 432 miles long and is estimated to cost Rs. 2,57,40,000.

Either line, Mr. Johns says, could easily be constructed in two years or even less, and there are no water difficulties on the Helmand route. All this shows how wrong we were to give up the Durand line here for the more southern boundary actually adopted. Your Excellency has agreed to work being pushed a little on the Nushki line. The Public Works Department have provided an extra 15 lakhs, and the line will now be opened to Nushki in January 1905, instead of January 1906. Fifty-six miles beyond Nushki on Mr. Johns's alignment to Landi Wali Muhammad lie within our border, and could be made at any time.

Your Excellency will, I think, wish to place the potentialities of Seistan as illustrated by these reports very clearly before His Majesty's Government. The late and present Amirs have realised the value of the Tarakun tract to the south of the Helmand, and so has Mr. Miller. He tried, so Mr. Dobbs reported, to make the Hashmat believe that we had arranged with the Afghans to give them most of Seistan if they gave us this. McMahon now reports in his telegram of 22nd July that the Yamin let out that Persia contemplates offering to assist the Amir in making the Tarakun canal in return for water for Ramrud and Hauzdar. I presume that this is the alternative to their first intention of disputing the straight line boundary from Koh-i-Malik Siah to Band-i-Seistan.

It is dangerous and insidious, and must be resisted by all means in our power. With our rail head at Nushki or Kain we shall have at least three years the pull of the Russians in completing railway connection with Seistan, and ought to be able to make our position there impregnable. The Helmand line is absolutely protected by the Dasht-i-Margo and the Registan, south of Girishk, on the north, and by the Baluchistan deserts on the south.

Mr. Johns's reports on lines from Koondi on the trade route to Pasni and to Karachi indicate that the first would cost Rs. 5,08,00,000, and the second at least 7½ crores, and it would take 8 years at a sanguine estimate to build. We may therefore, I think, dismiss these from present consideration, though his report shows that there are potentialities about Kech and Panjgur which may render it desirable to make a road from Pasni or Gwettar Bay to these places and on by Ladgasht to Robat.

I have merely put up his reports for reference here. They will be separated on return from this secret file and dealt with confidentially in Military and Public Works Departments.

If Your Excellency wishes us to treat the Seistan irrigation question at this stage officially, this will be done, but the papers are submitted at once as you may prefer to place your views before His Majesty's Government personally.

L. W. DANE,—29-7-03.

I have read the reports carefully, and concur with Secretary as to the wonderful potentialities which they unfold.

I am writing on the matter to His Majesty's Government.

C[URZON],—3-8-03.

TELEGRAM TO COLONEL A. H. MCMAHON, C.S.I., C.I.E., No. 2721 F.-B., DATED THE 16TH SEPTEMBER 1903.

With reference to his letter No. 911, dated the 15th July 1903, to meet the possibility of His Highness the Amir meeting His Excellency the Viceroy at the end of October 1903, asks him to send a further report, together with his opinion on certain matters in connection with the control of the Helmand, and the extent of country we should lease or acquire up to Landi Wali Muhammad, &c.

Telegram, No. 440, dated Seistan the 3rd (despatched from Dalbandin on 8th) October 1903.

From—COLONEL A. H. MCMAHON, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram No. 2721 F.-B., dated 16th September. My report was despatched by post yesterday, 2nd October.

FROM COLONEL A. H. MCMAHON, C.S.I., C.I.E., No. 1121, DATED THE 1ST (RECEIVED 13TH) OCTOBER 1903.

With reference to Foreign Department telegram No. 2721 F.-B., dated the 16th September 1903, forwards a further report on matters connected with the control of the Helmand River.

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TELEGRAM FROM COLONEL A. H. MCMAHON, C.S.I., C.I.E., No. 445, DATED THE 8TH (RECEIVED 13TH) OCTOBER 1903.

Communicates certain corrections to paragraph 15 of the foregoing report.

FROM COLONEL A. H. MCMAHON, C.S.I., C.I.E., No. 1124, DATED THE 3RD (RECEIVED 14TH) OCTOBER 1903.

Forwards a correction to paragraph 8 of the foregoing report.

Your Excellency will read Colonel McMahon's report. He adheres to his opinion as to the area irrigable in Seistan. He advises an offer of 6½ lakhs a year to the Amir for the whole of the Chakansur district, which extends up to Lat above Rudbar on the Helmand, and from which the Amir derives a gross revenue of some Rs. 65,000 at present. He believes that it will be almost as easy to secure this as the Rudbar tract to the south of the Helmand, for which one lakh might be offered at present, and 2 when the canal is made. The rent in each case is to cover a free right of way *via* Khwaja Ali.

As the Amir derives no revenue from Landi Barechis and Pulalak, and as Khwaja Ali and Khugi are Sinjerani Baluch villages, perhaps he would be willing to include these in a lease which would secure us the right of way necessary and a shorter railway line.

This, however, is a detail. The main question is, will the Amir agree to lease anything? The telegrams* from Sir A Hardinge, dated 10th October, and from McMahon, dated 8th October, show that the Persians are commencing to require that no dams shall be put up between the Band-i-Kohak and Rudbar because they may affect, not present irrigation, but future extensions in the Tarakun tract. As to this the notes of the Conference of 20th September 1902 may be read. The Amir will doubtless be most unwilling to cede territory, as this is forbidden by Muhammadan law We can, however, point out to him that the only way by which we can effectively prevent the Russians pressing him on the west as on the north is by his allowing us to establish ourselves in strength on the lower course of the Helmand, so as to prevent the Russians from occupying Seistan. With a British force there, his troops would be set free to defend Herat and the northern border, and he would have no apprehensions of the Russians taking him in rear by Kandahar or of our being forced to go there to protect our own border. Then we can explain that, if he attempts to dam the Helmand, the Persians will at once invoke our arbitral assistance, whereas we may be able to arrange matters with them, and that at any rate his position would be much stronger if we were directly interested in the case. We can tell him what we have heard by telegraph of the ideas of the Persians.

* Seistan arbitration file.

Secret F., March 1903, Nos. 1-216, page 69 of notes.

We could then broach the subject of a perpetual lease of the whole of the Chakansur district as proposed by McMahon, plus the condition that no new large works are started again above Rudbar on the Helmand. In view of the attitude assumed by Russia in regard to frontier relations, I think we should be justified in speaking very plainly to the Amir through the Agent on this subject. The Agent starts on 20th October from Landi Khana. Mr. Grant knows the case and could give him a note to be read to the Amir and returned, if no other opportunity of addressing the Amir verbally is likely to occur, or preferably could coach him up in what he should say. The Amir is writing about his subsidy account, and we must, of course, point out to him that, if he does not help us to prevent the Russians compelling him to have direct relations with them, he is practically not acting up to his father's agreements with us, and is not entitled to any subsidy at all.

To escape from this dilemma he may be more amenable on the subject of a lease of Chakansur, though, of course, we must not forget that it was Goldsmid's dealings with Seistan that first alienated Sher Ali seriously.

L. W. DANE,—14-10-03.

I will deal with this case on the file containing the Amir's latest letter.

C[URZON],—15-10-03.

Dated Seistan, the 3rd October 1903.

From—COLONEL A. H. MCMAHON, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission,

To—L. W. DANE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I sent off the report you call for on the Helmand question yesterday. I am sorry for the slight delay in doing so, but this was unavoidable.

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I trust it will give you all the information required. I tried to restrict the report to the more important points and avoid filling it with the mass of smaller data we have put together. When one has the details of a case at one's finger's ends, there is sometimes the danger of crediting the reader of one's report with knowledge of essential details which thus get omitted. Unfortunately your call on me came at a moment when I was feeling unusually stale and lacking in the mental vigour with which I should have liked to tackle the subject. This is partly due to the effects of a long and worrying summer, and partly to annoyance at the way in which Tehran has failed to back up efforts to dispose of the Seistan boundary question.

The last two days, however, have brought in the first touch of autumn in the air, and one begins to feel some energy once more.

To return to the Helmand question. I have tried to deal with all the points raised in your telegram (No. 2721 of 15th September 1903), but am doubtful, since despatching my letter, whether perhaps you wanted more from me under the head of "general terms under which we should acquire the lease". If by that you mean the conditions and terms of the lease itself, I have doubtless failed to meet your wishes, but I don't think there is really much for me to say under that head A lease is a lease, and one should secure unrestricted possession and use of the country leased, and (in the case of the left bank) one-third of the Helmand water, for an indefinite period, terminable only by ourselves The fewer words in which this can be expressed and the fewer conditions and promises included in it, the less friction and misunderstanding there will be in future.

You may think my proposal to ask for the whole Chakansur district a bold one, but boldness often pays. I strongly maintain that it is not a wild idea, for I see no difficulty in our running the country with the minimum of trouble and the maximum of profit.

The relative difficulty and cost of getting the whole district, or only the part of it on the left bank of the Helmand, will be found, I think, less than might, *primâ facie*, be imagined. The real difficulty lies, in getting any lease at all, not in the extent (within reasonable limits) of the country concerned.

One useful argument to use to the Afghans in favour of our taking over Chakansur, and which was omitted by an oversight from my letter, is that the Persians under Russian instigation are determined steadily and increasingly to annoy the Afghans (*vide* passport system, &c.) on the Seistan border, and our leasing the country will save the Amir a lot of wearisome, though perhaps petty, trouble.

I would never have suggested acquiring all Chakansur were it not for the fact that this district is so completely isolated from the rest of Afghanistan, and has little or no dealings with neighbouring Afghan districts.

I personally would, perhaps, prefer to see ourselves in possession of Persian Seistan and the Afghan left bank, and to see the Afghans remaining in Chakansur for the reason that the Afghans would profit along with ourselves, and not have cause some day to say we were profiting at their expense. This, however, may come under the head of sentiment, and I don't know that we should let it prevent our making the best of present opportunities. If the thing turned out the success we anticipate, we might then appease Afghan feelings by granting the Amir some share in our profits.

I quite realise the difficulty of contemplated negotiations, but I have a firm belief in the possibility of their success when conducted by the Viceroy and Amir in person. One appalling difficulty will be found in the Amir's own ignorance of outlying parts of his country. Abdur Rahman's own ideas of some portions of the country were of the wildest kind. His anxiety to prevent my laying down a boundary north of the present one, west of Chagai, was in order to retain possession of that miserable hill, the Koh-i-Malik Dokhand, which you will notice lies in the south-east strip of the Chakansur district. He had previously got some alabaster* from there for buildings in Kabul; but although the expirement does not appear to have been repeated, Kabul may still entertain extravagant ideas of the value of that hill. You may find it necessary, if the subject is brought up, to let the Afghans reserve the right to take any alabaster they want from there.

* We call it alabaster. The Afghan's marble (Sang-i-Marmar). It is neither one nor the other, but a pretty, though inferior, rock called Travontine. It is impossible to get large blocks of it, as it is stratified in thin layers.

We should also, in any case, assure the Amir that we will continue his present *muafis* in any revenue-free lands included in the leased territory. These are few in number and importance.

I can't think of any other minor details likely to crop up.

On one important matter connected with these negotiations I feel great anxiety, and that is lest the Amir be given reason for venting wrath on the old Akhundzada. His natural tendency, or rather of his advisers, on finding out that we know so much about the Helmand and the Chakansur district, will be to charge the Akhundzada with giving us, or letting us acquire, all this knowledge, and the results to that old gentleman may be disastrous. I should never forgive myself if this occurred, as it would be a poor return for the way in which he has, out of genuine friendship, let us wander freely about the country.

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It should be made clearly known to the Amir that all information gathered by us has been in the course of obtaining the data necessary to adjudicate upon the pending water and boundary questions in Seistan. It may be found possible to restrict the divulging of our information to general terms.

I sincerely hope that this point will be kept in mind, for, though so friendly to us, the old Akhundzada is a very loyal servant to the Amir, and I do not want to see him share the fate of Sardars Muhammad Umar Khan and Gul Muhammad Khan who were associated with me on the former Boundary Mission.

I have all along been anxious to polish off the demarcation of the Seistan boundary before any further complications intervened. One can now foresee how a lease, or even negotiations for a lease, of territory adjoining Persian-Seistan may complicate matters. It is much easier to arbitrate a line impartially between Persia and Afghanistan than to settle, as an interested party, a boundary dispute direct with Persia.

Sir A. Hardinge's last telegram, now many days old, said that the Persian Ministers had assured him that the Seistan question had been decided, and that the Persian Commissioners had been instructed by telegram to accept my line, but alas! Hardinge omitted to get a copy of those instructions,—*and*—as yet none have arrived here. With a new Persian Prime Minister, and possibly Foreign Minister, although both may be well disposed to us, much valuable time will elapse before they settle themselves down to tackle outside questions.

Please wire for any other information you may want, and which I may have omitted to give.

P. S.—I will answer your last letter later. It was a most welcome and interesting one, and filled me with hopes of a new era in our history.

The file is re-submitted with the case about the Amir's reply to the autograph invitation. Colonel McMahon's demi-official letter of 3rd October is for Your Excellency's perusal.

L. W. DANE,—17-10-03.

C[URZON],—18-10-03.

The file has been examined.

The ferrotype map was received with Mr. Hodson's demi-official letter, dated the 9th May 1903.

Copy placed in H.E.'s file.

The map of Afghanistan, S.-W. Section, 1″=16 miles, was received with Colonel McMahon's letter No. 1121, dated the 1st October 1903.

The maps marked "Appendices A" and "C", and those marked enclosures I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII were received with Colonel McMahon's letter No. 909, dated the 13th July 1903.

Of the above-cited maps only the ferrotype has been reproduced; this was done in the office of the Director of Railway Construction, and is the only copy we possess.*

J. W. E.,—23-4-04.

A. S.,—23-4-04.

* This copy has been placed in the file for H.E. the Viceroy. We will obtain another for ourselves from P. W. D.

27-4-4

* Only the coloured map, App. A. is added to H.E.'s file.

Foreign Office Press—No. 140—26-4-04.

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The secret Helmand papers have been printed up, and a set, with necessary maps, is submitted for H.E. the Viceroy to take W England.

E W Clarke
27-4-4

Please add the set of new maps of Seistan supplied by Col McMahon & then submit with blue label to H.E.

The press have done well in printing up in time & Mr Abbey deserves credit for his reproduction of the maps.

L. Dane
27.4.4

Added.
(Taken from Seistan file wh. was returned by H.E.)
[illegible]
27-4

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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(123)

(Secret.)

No. 909, dated Camp Kuhak, the 13th July 1903.

From—Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission.

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to submit the following report on the question of controlling the water of the Helmand and irrigating the whole delta of that river. To explain this report and its enclosures, a map* is attached, Appendix A.

* This is a tracing of the existing 8-mile=1 inch map. Although incorrect in various details as proved by our recent surveys, it is sufficiently accurate to illustrate this report.
A. H. McMahon.

2. This report should be considered in some respects in the light of a preliminary report, for I consider it advisable to record the result of our investigations and the conclusions based thereon without waiting for the completion of the accurate survey of the country now in hand, or for the more detailed information which our continued investigations are daily accumulating. Our surveys and investigations subsequent to those on which this report is based, only corroborate the conclusions herein arrived at. I propose to submit a further report at some later date, embodying more detailed information on the various points connected with this subject.

3. To irrigate the vast area in Seistan of rich lands now waterless, and to protect from present periodical destruction through floods the lands now cultivated, it is necessary to be able to control the Helmand River at some point above Seistan. The problem to be solved is whether such control is possible, and where.

4. This Mission has carefully examined the Helmand† from Bagat above Khan-i-Nishin downwards. It was at first supposed that in ancient times the Helmand entered the Gaud-i-Zirreh from the east or north. A series of lines of levels run from the mountain ranges south of the Helmand to the river and again between the Helmand and the Gaud-i-Zirreh, has established the fact that no such connection between the Helmand as far down as Band-i-Kamal Khan and the Gaud-i-Zirreh has existed. A reference to the able note by Mr. W. A. Johns, Appendix B, and the explanatory map, Appendix C, will show how this conclusion has been arrived at.

† *i.e.*, a distance to Band-i-Seistan of 165 miles.

5. Near Band-i-Kamal Khan, however, our search was successful, for an ancient river bed was there found running into the Gaud-i-Zirreh, down which the whole or part of the Helmand must have flowed. Here also was found a system of old canals that once irrigated the huge tract of country between Band-i-Kamal Khan, the Gaud-i-Zirreh, and the southern portion of the Helmand Hamun. Mr. Johns's note, Appendix D, shows the results of his investigations in this region, and demonstrates how simple an undertaking it would be to construct a canal to bring this tract again under cultivation, and also to turn the whole or part of the Helmand River again into the Gaud-i-Zirreh.

6. The fact has been established that, at or not far above Band-i-Kamal Khan, a band existed in old days which diverted all the water required for this canal system, and which doubtless also in heavy flood diverted the surplus water of the Helmand down the escape channel to the Gaud-i-Zirreh.

7. Another important fact hitherto unsuspected was then established, *i.e.*, that, from probably this same point, another large canal system was taken off on the right bank of the Helmand, which, from near Killa-i-Fath, spread out and irrigated a vast tract of country east of the Helmand. This country, never before visited by Europeans and now a waterless desert, proves to be full of large, extensive ruins, such as Sar-o-Tar and others, which clearly demonstrate the past existence of rich cultivation and great prosperity.

8. At or near Band-i-Kamal Khan therefore, or, to speak more accurately, at some point between the neighbourhood of Chahar Burjak and Band-i-Kamal Khan, the Helmand in old days was effectively controlled, and is again capable of being similarly controlled. The able note by Mr. T. R. Ward, Appendix E, deals fully with this question, and also with the results obtainable from such control.

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9. Mr. Ward's note speaks for itself, and I will not presume to criticise the opinion or conclusions of an irrigation expert. I would, however, point out that Mr. Ward has based his conclusions on a very modest estimate of the average volume of the Helmand River. The average minimum volume calculated by him, *i.e.*, 2,000 to 3,000 cusecs, is much less than the volume of water we found in the river (4,000 cusecs) when we first met it at the beginning of February, and at a time when local information showed it to be at its normal minimum height. Notwithstanding this care, however, in avoiding an overestimate, it has been shown that, with proper control of the Helmand, an area of over 3,000,000* acres of land† can be commanded, of which a quarter, *i.e.*, 7,50,000 acres, of spring crop and a still larger area of autumn crop can be fully irrigated each year. I am inclined to think that this is, if anything, an underestimate; but, assuming that it is not so, the figures stated suffice to demonstrate the important results which would be obtained by controlling the Helmand River above Seistan. Rough measurements show that only about 75,000 acres of commanded land in Persian and Afghan Seistan are now under spring crop cultivation. As above shown, ten times this area can be made capable of such cultivation.

* More accurate surveys since made prove the commandable area of culturable land to be considerably in excess of this figure.
A. H. McMahon.

† The observations made by Mr. Ward regarding the excellent quality of the land and the rich fertilising quality of the Helmand water deserve notice.
A. H. McMahon.

10. Mr. Ward has shown that the works required to obtain effective control are of a comparatively simple nature. Briefly stated, these works can take one or other of the following forms, *i.e.*,—

(i) A temporary weir of the ordinary local type near Chahar Burjak,‡ 11 miles above Band-i-Kamal Khan, to fill a canal on the left bank to irrigate the Tarakun tract, and a canal on the right bank to irrigate the Killa-i-Fath and Sar-o-Tar tract.

‡ The bed of the the river here is of firm shingle.
A. H. McMahon.

(ii) A permanent weir, with above canals at the same place, to effect the above objects, and also divert, if required, the whole or part of the Helmand River or its flood-water into the Gaud-i-Zirreh, by an escape channel through nulla, which, for want of a local name, we have called "Johns nulla". The cutting required for this escape channel from the point where it would leave the above canal, would be 4 miles in length and of maximum, but not constant, depth of 20 feet.

(iii) A masonry dam at Bandi-i-Kamal Khan to raise the ordinary river level about 11 feet and effect the objects noted in (i), or, with the above escape channel, the objects noted at (ii).

All cutting required would be in easy soil, and the distributary canals offer no difficulty owing to the open level nature of the country.

11. The figures given in statement A of Mr. Ward's note, Appendix E, show the gross§ areas of land in Persian and Afghan Seistan now commanded by existing canals, and those commandable if the river were controlled. Of the gross commandable area in Persian Seistan, only 772, out of 2,533 square miles, are now commanded, and in Afghan limits only 546 square miles out of 3,360. The control of the Helmand would thus enable the irrigation of an additional 1,761 square miles of land in Persian territory, and 2,814 square miles in Afghan territory, of which no less than 8,400‖ square miles are comprised in the desert tract of Sar-o-Tar, &c., east of the Helmand. In other words, the Persian commandable area could be more than quadrupled, and that within Afghan limits increased to over six times its present extent, while at the same time the comparatively small areas already cultivated would be rendered immune from the serious damage and destruction to which they are now liable in years of a high river.

§ To arrive at the culturable areas, deduct 20% as shown in paragraph 4 of Mr. Ward's note.
A. H. McMahon.

‖ Our new surveys show that a much larger figure than 840 square miles might be inserted here. The exact area has not been yet worked out.
A. H. McMahon.

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12. The above paragraph deals only with commanded and commandable areas. Still more startling conclusions are arrived at, if we deal with cultivated and culturable areas. We find by rough measurements that in Persian Seistan at present only some 80 square miles, out of the 772 square miles, of commanded land are under spring crop cultivation. In Afghan Seistan only 40 square miles are so cultivated, out of 546 square miles of commanded land.

13. The important material advantages to be derived by both Persia and Afghanistan from a proper control of the Helmand above Seistan are too obvious to need further description. Unfortunately two important reasons render it impossible for either country to take proper or full advantage of the opportunity afforded by Nature for increasing their prosperity in the above manner:—

1st.—The engineering works involved, although by no means of great magnitude in our eyes, are, from want of requisite knowledge and necessary funds, out of the power of either Persia or Afghanistan to execute.

2nd.—To distribute the water in an economical manner, and to give both Persian and Afghan lands their fair share thereof, would require a trained establishment at the head-works, under a strong and impartial management. Persia and Afghanistan are both incapable of providing this.

The large extension of cultivation which an improved system of irrigation would cause, would of course necessitate a railway line to carry off the surplus produce.

14. In calculating the profits of a canal system in Seistan, one may take as a safe basis the financial results of the big perennial canals of the Punjab, with such modifications as are necessary in view of the following facts, *i.e.*,—

(i) The irrigation works required are of less magnitude, and should not exceed the average initial cost of Punjab canals.

(ii) The absence of heavy rainfall makes the cost of annual repairs less than that of the Punjab canals.

(iii) The general average of the soil of Seistan is superior to that of the perennial Punjab canal tracts. This will be readily admitted when I say that the soil of Seistan is homogeneous and of one quality, being most finely divided delta deposited clay loam.

(iv) The fine silt laden water of the Helmand is more fertilising and enriching than that of the average of Punjab rivers.

(v) Present average prices of agricultural produce in Seistan are low. Wheat and barley can be roughly estimated at Re. 1 to Rs. 1-8 per maund, but a railway would probably raise this rate.

(vi) As against (v) is the fact that, owing to (iii) and (iv), the average yield per acre is high. I calculate it at the very high rate of 20 maunds per acre. On manured lands it is much greater. The present methods of agriculture are very careless and wasteful. Improved methods would result in large yields of produce.

(vii) All Persian and Afghan Seistan is State land. There are no private rights in land or water.

15. It will be seen from the above that a satisfactory solution to the problem stated in paragraph 3 has been found. The profits to be derived from carrying it into practical effect are tempting. Thanks are due to the able exertions of Messrs. Ward, Johns, and Tate in acquiring the information and data required for the solution of this problem.

P. S.—The maps and plans are sent in a separate cover. Please acknowledge by telegram the safe receipt of this report and separate enclosures.

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Appendix "B".

Memorandum on sections taken to ascertain the possibility of a direct connection between the Helmand and the eastern end of the Gaud-i-Zirreh, by W. A. Johns, Esq., Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Railway Branch, dated the 25th February 1903.

As a tradition exists among the nomad Baluch tribes of the Registan desert that twelve hundred years or so ago the Helmand ran in a course far to the south of its present one, and as the northern bluffs of the Gaud-i-Zirreh have the appearance of a river bank rather than of the shores of a lagoon and thus lend some support to the tradition, a series of observations were taken with a view to confirming or disproving the point.

These observations consisted of a number of barometric sections extending from the base of the mountains at Galechah to Kuigi on the Helmand near Khwaja Ali and thence zigzagging across the country as far as Killa Jehan Beg some 53 miles down the valley. For convenience of reference these sections are plotted on the accompanying ¼ inch maps roughly parallel to the route to which they refer.

See Appendix C.

In my opinion they conclusively prove the impossibility of Baluch tradition.

Dealing with them *seriatim*, the first from Galechah to Kuigi shows a steady descent from the base of the mountains at Galechah to the present valley of the Helmand. The fall is considerable, about 2,000′, and the drop regular, about 50′ per mile.

The section may be considered to show the physical impossibility of the river ever having had a more southerly course than its present one within the existing geological period at any point east of Kuigi.

2. As a depression shown on the map south of Khwaja Ali suggested the possibility of the river having diverged to the south between Kuigi and Khwaja Ali, a second section was run along the route followed by the 1884 Boundary Commission for 22 miles. The depression was proved to be purely local and unimportant, entirely caused by the nulla which is shown dotted in the map. At the point where the route crossed its lowest point its level is 220′ above the Helmand. The hypothesis, therefore, of the river having ever broken to the south above Khwaja Ali is clearly untenable.

3. The course of this nulla was afterwards verified and proved to agree with that shown on the map by a section running south-west from Khwaja Ali for 23½ miles till it reached high ground beyond the nulla, and then returning north-west to Rudbar recrossing the nulla a few miles lower down. Even here the depression was still well above the level of the Helmand. No depression exists in the hills between Rudbar and Band-i-Kamal Khan, so the possibility of the Helmand having ever burst through there may be disregarded.

4. To exhaust all possibility of doubt as to the fact that the bed of the Gaud-i-Zirreh was below the level of the Helmand, a fourth section was run south-east from Killa Jehan Beg to the shores of this old lagoon. The levels indicate a gradual rise from the river for about 8 miles, in a series of low ridges, then two miles of gradually falling dasht; the steep scarp of the Gaud-i-Zirreh at the 10th mile and a gradual slope down the talus to a point in the plain 190′ below the valley of the Helmand.

The subsequent discovery of an old channel leading from the Helmand to the Gaud-i-Zirreh, leaving the river at Band-i-Kamal Khan, is not dealt with in this note, which merely relates to the possibility of a connection between the Helmand and the eastern end of the lagoon.

D/A one plan, ¼ inch scale, marked Appendix C.

Note by T. R. J. Ward, Esq., Executive Engineer, Irrigation Officer, on Mr. Johns's note and plan, dated Band-i-Seistan, the 25th February 1903.

I have read this note and accept Mr. Johns's deductions from the information collected as correct.

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I carefully examined the sky line made by the nearly vertical sides of the southern bank of the Helmand gorge from Bagat above Koh-i-Khan Nashin to Band-i-Kamal Khan and found only one break in that line. It was at a point 6 miles below Deshu and was a mile wide and conspicuous. It is just where a study of the shading on the maps would lead one to expect that the old river would have gone. I went up the depression to a distance of 10 miles from the river and found with an Abney's level that it rose about 50 feet a mile and went off in a south-easterly direction and showed no signs of turning towards the Gaud-i-Zirreh. I therefore returned to the river valley to inspect the canals. The aneroid surveys made by Mr. Johns and the surveys by Mr. Tate that were brought into Khwaja Ali also showed that this depression did not go towards the Gaud-i-Zirreh. Messrs. Johns and Tate sent out surveyors to collect more information which I saw as it was brought in, and had opportunity to further investigate had I thought it necessary. Mr. Johns, who went himself across to the Gaud-i-Zirreh, has summed up the information in a very clear note with which I agree and I consider that there is no feasible line for an escape from the Helmand to the Gaud-i-Zirreh above Band-i-Kamal Khan.

Appendix "D".

Note* by Mr. W. A. Johns, Executive Engineer, dated 20th March 1903, on investigations made to ascertain the possibility of irrigating the country round Tarakun from the Helmand River and of diverting the Helmand River into the Gaud-i-Zirreh.

* *Note.*—This is a compilation of 2 separate notes made by Mr. Johns.
A. H. McMahon.

I enclose two sections† taken with the usual dumpy level and a plan‡ with the accompanying explanatory note:—

† Plans Nos. VII and VIII.
‡ Appendix C.

The extraordinarily lucky rains of the 9th and 10th enabled my parties to spend four or five nights in the dasht, so we could do more than ever I expected.

2. Section I commences from the water level of the present cultivators' channel about 2 miles east of Killa Afzal, and runs down the nulla as shown on the plan for some 34 miles terminating on the edge of the Gaud-i-Zirreh.

You will observe that the watershed to the Gaud-i-Zirreh is within a mile of the edge of the bank of this old branch of the Helmand, and that to get the water from the existing channel into the nulla and thence to the Gaud-i-Zirreh requires only a ten-foot cutting some four miles long. I apologise for noticing the obvious corollary that to turn the whole or part of the water of the Helmand down this nulla into the Gaud-i-Zirreh is a remarkably simple§ engineering feat.

§ See paragraph 13 of Appendix E.
T. R. J. Ward.

There can be little doubt that a branch of the Helmand once took this course. The scarp all along the left bank of the nulla is sufficiently clear evidence of this fact.

3. I draw your attention to the information shown on the section that, on the dasht, $\frac{3}{4}$ mile from the old river bank, the section crosses an ancient canal of considerably greater dimensions than those one sees generally on the Helmand. I estimate that it cannot have been smaller than the Meean Meer canal. This is called by the natives the "Tarakun canal". Nearer Killa Afzal all traces‖ of it are lost. It will be seen that the level of the dasht at this point is only 10′ above¶ that of the water channel in the Khadir. The canal bed is now silted up level with the plain. (This bit of country is covered with the remains of smaller canals.) Assuming, as is natural, that this canal was here at its debouchement, some 8 or 10′ deep with 4 or 5′ of water in it, its water level differs but slightly from that of the present small canal in the Khadir.

For a section of this canal see plan No. VI.

‖ The canals not worked since the 15th century are only traceable where the canal cut through a gravel bed. The soil has been washed or blown away. Only the gravel remains. Channels dug by the Kalla-i-Fath Rulers in the 15th century and which flowed up to end of 17th or middle of 18th century are clearly visible even in light soil.
T. R. J. Ward,—7-7-03.

¶ No, not 10′, but only 7′ 6″. 10′ is, however, near enough.

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Observations lead me to believe that a canal 10′ above the latter would command the whole dasht lying between the old bed of the Helmand that runs past Tarakun on the north and the Shelag and Gaud-i-Zirreh on the south, for it seems that this dasht is merely the talus of the branch of the Helmand that escaped from the main river at Band-i-Kamal Khan.

I should explain that this section was carried on much further than was necessary by my surveyor. I told him after I had examined the nulla for twelve miles to carry the section down till it was clear that it (the nulla) entered the Gaud-i-Zirreh and did not terminate in a nawar. I merely regarded the route as one for turning water into that basin. Reports as regards the soil of the Gaud-i-Zirreh are, however, bad. My surveyor marched all along the south-east edge to Gumbaz and reports most of it as salt quagmire. A section from Killa Afzal to Irkaft would have settled the question as to the existence of a hump in the dasht; if there is not, then the whole tract of the Dasht-i-Tarakun could be irrigated by a canal along that alignment, I need scarcely observe that clinometers are quite useless in detecting slopes of three or four feet per mile, more particularly as isolated ridges overlapping each other give the horizon the appearance of being high all round.

The information is most useful. A few miles more would have given some valuable information as to the depth of the Gaud-i-Zirreh.
T. R. J. Ward.

4. Section No. II commences at the end of the Killa Afzal water channel about two miles from Killa Afzal and 8 from Band-i-Kamal Khan and after being carried down the bed of the river to a place called Burri, 7 miles below Tarakun, was carried across country in a south-west direction for 6 miles, till it was perfectly clear that there was no intervening ridge between the point where it terminates and the edge of the dasht where it meets the Shelag "Pat".

It will be noticed that the fall of the river bed, which is exceedingly tortuous, averages $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet per mile, which allows free scope for raising the water onto the plain.

(I might further observe that from Band-i-Kamal Khan to the end of the channel where the section commenced there is probably a fall of 20′* in the eight miles, a further assistance in gaining head.)

* Yes, see section on plan II.
T. R. J. Ward.

† A pity; if the sections were connected and had run a little further into the Gaud-i-Zirreh much valuable information as to depth of lake would have been acquired. But we were lucky to have got what we have got.
T. R. J. Ward.

The two sections, I should say, are not† connected. Both start from water level of the same channel, but in the intervening three miles there is probably 8′ of fall. They are, however, quite independent of each other.

The left bank of the old bed of the Helmand is low, varying from 10′ to 40′ except where isolated bluffs occur. I might, as it appears, have taken No. II section across country from Tarakun or even some miles above that. I have no doubt now that I should have found the water level of an ideal canal from Killa Afzal or Kamal Band well above the level of the plain, anywhere after the twelfth mile, barring isolated bluffs and ridges, but I did not wish to make any bad shots and so lose time. Besides my attention then was more concentrated on obtaining a route for a canal to the Gaud-i-Zirreh *viâ* the Shelag rather than on the levels of a canal to irrigate the whole of the Tarakun Dasht.

5. My investigations lead me to believe it certain that the Dasht-i-Tarakun from Kamal Band east, south and west from the Gaud-i-Zirreh to the Helmand Hamun *viâ* the Shelag, is merely a talus or glacis of this old branch of the Helmand and that by raising the water level of the existing canal by 10′ by a band at Kamal Khan (5 of which could probably be gained in the fall from Band-i-Kamal Khan to Killa Afzal) the whole of this dasht south of the line of the Tarakun branch could be commanded.

See paragraph 13 of Appendix E.
T. R. J. Ward, 8-7-03.

N.B.—I paid no attention to the dasht lying north of this old branch, *i.e.*, between Tarakun and the Helmand at Dik Dela. It all appeared to be much more elevated than the southern tract.

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

Sections Nos. I and II satisfy me that a canal at no higher a level than the present channel at Killa Afzal* would *command* an area of several hundred square miles without including any portion of the Gaud-i-Zirreh, but in the dasht and Shelag alone.

* *i.e.*, at level 200 of Mr. Johns' Section No. I or 105 R. D. 31,000 of the Longitudinal Section, Plan II.

T. R. J. WARD.

† We may take a mean and say that even 5′ higher, *i.e.*, water at a level of 205 at head of Mr. Johns' Section No. I, or at a level of 105 at R. D. 31,000 of section on Plan II, would probably command all the country that it is necessary to command.

T. R. J. WARD,—7-7-03.

(† To be 10′ higher would, however, be an immense advantage, as the soil in the east of the dasht has less salts than that in the west.)

6. Another conclusion arrived at is that the Helmand had once an earlier course than the Tarakun branch and turned sharply to the left round the scarp at Band-i-Kamal and descended to the Gaud-i-Zirreh *viâ* the nulla down which my section No. I is run. The scarps and bluffs on the left of the nulla lead me to believe this must have been the case. A similar branch in all probability turned sharply to the right past Killa-i-Fath and running past Sar-o-Tar went towards the Dasht-i-Margo.

7. I cannot speak decidedly of the soil of the dasht. A layer of an inch of pebbles overlies alluvial clays of the usual description. There is a quantity of salts in the soil in places, but there are some wide open tracts near Gina, Tarakun and Killa Afzal where there is no salt and only a thin layer of stones. The nawars, too, appear fertile, the places where efflorescence is worst being the tops of hummocks.

There can be no doubt from the remains of old canals in the dasht near Killa Afzal, Tarakun, Gina and miles away on the plain, where you will see "ruins" written on my map, that a very large portion of this now stony plain was once tilled and probably not so long ago. From Gina to this place "ruins" a wandering line of nawars runs suggesting a former spill channel. There can be no doubt of the feasibility of irrigating the country. The one question is, will the dasht or a reasonable proportion of it prove culturable. I don't believe that the Gaud-i-Zirreh is all bad land, and I saw a lot of good land in it. You (Mr. Ward) might do a turn thereto.

The ruins in the dasht undoubtedly show that a wide strip of the dasht along the old branch was irrigated within the last two or three hundred years.

There are the ruins of canals at Tarakun; Gina was a largish place; the old ruins south-west of Burri in the dasht, though little is left of them, cover a considerable extent of ground. But Gina, Burri, &c, are, I fancy, much better than Tarakun, and there are still more recent ruins on the bed of the river all along, where small irrigation channels are still in places almost intact. Everything points to the gradual deterioration of the country. Perhaps when Tarakun flourished not merely patches a few miles from the river were cultivated, but the whole dasht was under crop and the marks of these old channels are obliterated by centuries.

8. I forgot to say that when marching from Tarakun to Pashkuniki I put up my level in suitable places and found that the dasht continued to fall to the south and west.

On the map you will notice that I have entered the R. L. of Band-i-Kamal as 1,700. This is a pure assumption based on the 1,920 at Khwaja Ali. Presuming this to be nearly correct the R. L. of the plain where No. II section terminated is about 1,630. This gives about (100) one hundred feet of fall from that point to the Shelag depression which we know is about 1,530. Most of this is in the abrupt declivity from 50′ to 100′ high in which the dasht terminates. Curious‡ a scarp at the end of a talus! Perhaps it is the wind and not water that makes these scarps.

‡ This feature is well shown in the map, Appendix C. It is worthy of study. To me it looks as if the Shelag river had cut out a valley for itself along the toe of Helmand talus. It is also important as it shows that, by making a band 30 or 50 feet high some 12 or 20 miles long near or along the 62 parallel of longitude, we could make a lake in the Gaud-i-Zirreh 4 0 square miles in area and add at least some 30 feet to its depth

T. R. J. WARD.

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The dasht to the north of the Tarakun branch of the Helmand was not examined at all. It appears to be at a much higher elevation than the south bank.

The level books are with me, as I have some railway sections in them.

I won't bother you with calculating imaginary areas, but if only one-third of the dasht and the Shelag "pat" (a strip of alluvial soil 7 miles wide from the scarp of the dasht to the commencement of the sandhills) can be cultivated, we have an area about the same as cultivated Seistan.

This note is accompanied by two sections marked Plans No. VII and No. VIII. The position of these sections is marked on the plan, Appendix C.

Appendix E.

Note by T. R. J. Ward, Esq., Executive Engineer, Irrigation Officer, Seistan Arbitration Commission, on the feasibility of controlling the waters of the Helmand River and constructing canals to irrigate the delta, dated 24th May 1903.

At the present day the large volume of water in the Helmand River commands only a comparatively small area of country in Seistan, a large part of which is submerged by the surplus waters of the river, whilst the area cultivated on the higher lands is liable to serious damage by floods. The object of this note is to show that it is possible to reclaim some of the submerged areas by carrying the water in canals to irrigate plains at present unwatered, and at the same time to construct an escape channel which would carry off the surplus waters not required for irrigation to the Gaud-i-Zirreh depression, a remote and deep portion of the deltaic valley into which the waters of the Helmand tail.

It will be useful to first give some information of the size and nature of the river to be dealt with, and the areas of the land that could be brought under its command, before discussing the schemes to control and utilise the water.

2. The Helmand River above Kala-i-Bist (240 miles above Band-i-Seistan) drains an area of about 56,500* square miles of Afghanistan lying to the south-west of the Kabul River watershed and between the Suleiman range on the east and the Koh-i-Baba range on the north and west. Below Kala-i-Bist, the river flows in a narrow valley or gorge cut through bare gravel strewn deserts. Above Khwaja Ali the valley lies some 200 or 300 feet below the general level of the desert plains bordering the gorge. The bluffs sometimes rise to that height directly over the valley, but usually the height is attained by a series of terraces or old river margins. Below Khwaja Ali, the heights of the bluffs gradually decrease till at Band-i-Kamal Khan, they are seldom more than 50 feet high near the river and about 100 feet high a short distance back from the river. The river twists and turns in the narrow limits of the valley, leaving an agriculturally rich finely divided clay loam soil on either bank, usually on one side or the other, and seldom on both banks at the same place. The general average width of the valley from the Koh-i-Khan Nashin, the highest point of the valley seen by the members of the Mission, to Band-i-Kamal Khan, where the river gorge may be considered to end, is about two miles. The gross area of this valley is very small: from Bhagat above Koh-i-Khan Nashin down to Band-i-Kamal Khan, a distance of 128 miles, the area is not more than 150,000 acres. This length of the valley is irrigated by a system of canals, carrying an ordinary supply of about 200 cusecs, and irrigating about 15,000 acres of wheat and barley, which might be increased to about 60,000 acres, if the present canals were extended and enlarged.

* The catchment area of the Chenab River is 11,400, and of the Jhelum River 14,300 square miles.

3. At the Band-i-Seistan, the river reaches a low-lying rich alluvial plain, through which it flows by a network of channels, both natural and artificial, until the waters not utilised in irrigating land, accumulate in the low-lying lands, known as "Hamun", at the extreme north of the plain forming a shallow lake. As this lake fills, the waters extend to the south round the toe of the deltaic fan and, in years of very high river, eventually reach the Gaud-i-Zirreh depression by the Shelag River. That the waters submerge low-lying

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lands and do not collect in a true lake bottom is shown by the mounds and ruins of cities that existed here when the main river delivered its surplus waters elsewhere. At that time these lands formed a highly-cultivated prosperous tract receiving from the river just so much water as was needed to raise the crops. These lands have probably experienced periods of being submerged and of being cultivated according as the main volume of the river was discharged over them or diverted elsewhere. When the Hamun became abnormally dry in 1902, the ruins of the ancient city of Sabr-i-Shah were laid dry in one of the deeper parts of the submerged area to the north of Bahring.

At the present day the Helmand River turns suddenly to the north at Band-i-Kamal Khan and, flowing due north, the waters are delivered at the extreme north of the basin near the area which receives the surplus waters of the Khash Rud, Farrah Rud, and Hurut Rud. The country thus flooded represents the extreme toe of the talus of the deltaic fans which have been made by the Helmand River. The apex of this fan is at Band-i-Kamal Khan. This will be evident from a study of the topography of this basin shown on the $\frac{1}{4}$" and $\frac{1}{8}$" maps of the Survey of India.

The information given in the notes and maps described in paragraph 12, which was collected during the march of the Mission down the Helmand, shows that the river once discharged itself into the Gaud-i-Zirreh direct by a large channel which passes by the ruins of Tarakun. An important branch of that river runs to the south-east, under the bluffs of the high plain or "dasht", direct to the Gaud-i-Zirreh. The bluffs on the left bank of the Helmand at Band-i-Kamal Khan mark the easternmost point on the left bank of the river where the waters from the narrow gorge at one time escaped over the extended deltaic plain. On the right bank the bluffs at Killa-i-Fath mark the southernmost point on the river, here flowing north, at which the waters escaped. At Killa-i-Fath the plain extends eastwards to the line of bluffs at the Puza-i-Margo and from thence northwards to the deltaic fans at the tail waters of the Farrah Rud and Khash Rud.

4. A tracing (Appendix A) has been prepared from the 8 miles to an inch map which shows the whole plain at one time or another commanded by the tail waters of the Helmand. At the present day these waters are concentrated on the small portion of the plain, coloured green and blue, and are uncontrolled. But the lands coloured yellow on the map are rich alluvial plains covered by the ruins of large canals and prosperous towns, showing that the lands have been commanded by the river in historical times. The portion of the map coloured red represents a bare gravel-strewn plain some 20 to 40 feet higher than the plains coloured yellow. These gravel plains would yield rich crops could the water be lifted on to them, as underlying the thin coating of gravel are rich finely divided clays and loams

In statement A the areas of the different tracts shown by colours on the map are given. These figures are only approximate, and are measured from the existing 8 miles to an inch map. Much more accurate figures will be obtained when the $\frac{1}{4}$ inch survey now in hand under Mr. Tate is finished. The figures from the existing map suffice to indicate the size of the areas under consideration. It will be noticed that when the 1,136 square miles of uncommandable high plain is excluded, there remains a gross commandable area of 5,893 square miles. From this area should be deducted lands unfit for cultivation, such as those that are submerged, those under sandhills, alkali flats, and isolated high tracts. I estimate this area from what I have seen of the country at 20 per cent of the whole area of 5,893 square miles. This means that the culturable commanded area is 4,715* square miles or a little more than three million acres. This is divided 2,026 square miles to Persia and 2,688 to Afghanistan. The soil is a finely divided very fertile cool clay or clay loam. The water is rich in a finely divided fertile silt.

* The culturable area commanded on the Chenab Canal is 2¾ million acres, and on the W. Jumna Canal 2½ million acres. The Helmand River would provide a canal system in its magnitude, and in the nature of its problems, very like that of the W. Jumna Canal.

The important crop is the Rabi. Excellent wheat and barley and some pulses are grown. The Kharif crops are melons, millet, pulses, a little cotton, til, some maize in Afghanistan, but none in Persia. Poppies are grown near

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Nasratabad. No sugar-cane, rice or indigo is grown. The gardens grow grapes, pomegranates, and apples; but the strong wind that blows from the north-west from June to September is against tree culture under the present *régime*.

5. The Helmand River drains a large and extensive valley in Afghanistan which receives its best rainfall in the winter from Persian Gulf storms. Much of this falls as snow which melts and swells the river in the spring. The period of high river, therefore, coincides with the time of greatest demand for water for maturing the wheat and barley crops and sowing the kharif crops, such as melons, millet, maize, and cotton. The fortunate timing of the period of high river greatly enhances the value of the Helmand River for irrigation purposes, and goes far to compensate for the fact that abnormal floods come at the end of April when the crops are ripening.

The river is said to be at its lowest in August, and the supply increases somewhat in September and October, due to storms of rain in Afghanistan.

Present information leads me to think that, from the beginning of October to the end of December, the sowing time of early wheat, the discharge of the river is between 2,500 and 3,000 cusecs. When the winter storms set in over the catchment basin, the discharge rises to above 3,000 cusecs, so that during January, the time for late sown wheat, a good supply can be relied on. In February and March the snow that has fallen in Afghanistan in winter, melts, and the river rises rapidly to about 5,000 or 6,000 cusecs. If heavy rain occurs in Afghanistan at this time, high floods occur. The present has been a year of very exceptional rain, and on 1st May a flood of between 60,000 and 70,000 cusecs was gauged at Band-i-Seistan. Such floods, which were even higher, were experienced about the same time of the year in 1890 and 1885. The early sown wheat is harvested about the middle to the end of May, and the late sown wheat from the beginning to the end of June. By harvest time the river gradually falls, but is seldom so low that there is any need to put in *bands* to give final waterings to wheat or waterings to sow melons, jowar, &c. The discharge in May and June is about 3,000 cusecs. In August and September the river is at its lowest, and the discharge may be as low as 2,000 cusecs in ordinary years. In September the tamarisk *bands* or weirs are put in repair, so as to make sure of a good supply at a sufficient level to sow the important early wheat and barley crops. These bands are maintained and repaired so long as, and whenever, the river falls below the level needed, to fill the canals. They seldom need repair after the first flood comes down early in January, because after that the supply in the river is usually sufficient to work the canals. If it is not, the *bands* are promptly repaired.

The river is liable to dry up. It was dry below Chahar Burjak in 1902 for 70 days, from 14th July to the 22nd September. Thirty years ago (1862) it was dry for 40 days below Killa-i-Fath, and 56 years ago (1846) it was dry for 22 days.

6. It is important to notice the long period over which wheat can be sown: three months for early, and one month for late, sowings. The late crop is nearly as good as the early crop. The soil being cool, the crop can be matured with only three waterings. It is uncommon to give four waterings. The waterings are required when the river is at its highest level. The long period for sowing, coming at a time of the year (October to December) when the supply is often restricted, enables a larger area of crops to be sown than otherwise could be done, because the water could, in a properly constructed and administered canal system, be distributed by turns extending over four months. For instance, if one quarter of the culturable area of three million acres is put under Rabi annually, a daily average supply of 1,600 cusecs only throughout the sowing period is enough to give the area a soaking of four inches deep before sowing. The calculation for this is as follows: since one cubic foot a second will cover one acre two feet deep every twenty-four hours, it will give a watering of six inches in a day to four acres, and to 480 acres in 120 days: so that 1,562 cusecs will irrigate 750,000 acres in four months. Two inches of the six inches should be allowed for wastage in channels, thus leaving a four, inch watering for the land. This is ample for land so level and soil so finely divided and cool. I have no doubt but that this amount of water will be

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available on the average of years at sowing time, whilst at maturing time the river is high and water ample. It would also be easily possible to construct a canal system to do 750,000 acres of wheat and barley annually. The Kharif area in the Helmand delta is said to be as large as the Rabi area, but it is made up of large areas of melons and millet, and very small areas of high class crops, such as maize, cotton, til. But the country is quite undeveloped, and all that can be safely inferred from what can at present be seen is that it is a magnificent wheat-growing soil. Personally I see no reason to fear that a good and useful Kharif area could not be grown. Melons and millet are very valuable foods to the people, and so they devote much attention to them, and I think that, under the stimulus of trade, the proportions of high class crops in the Kharif would rise to much what they are in India. The rough general figures I have given show that the water is sufficient to bring the available land under cultivation, and the land is sufficient fully to utilise the ordinary supply of the river throughout the year; but to enable the cultivation to be carried out with security from flood, the surplus flood-water of the river must be diverted from the lands to be cultivated into areas to be set aside for the purpose until the waters dry up by evaporation and absorption. Such areas already exist, and need only to be used.

Means, however, are not available for storing surplus water for future use. The river gorge is narrow and steep, and it is not probable that any good sites like those on the Nile could be found for storing the water.

It will be useful to notice in this connection that we know very little of the river above the Koh-i-Khan Nishan, and it is perhaps possible to develop irrigation at many places on this large catchment area to such an extent as seriously to reduce the supply to the lands of the delta.

7. The country is one of very light rainfall. This is shown by the state of the sun-dried brick ruins, many of them more than four hundred years old, and some much older. These are built of sun-dried brick, moulded true to shape, made of carefully pugged clay mixed with straw. The walls are made with a similarly made plaster. The walls of sun-dried brick are built on foundations of burnt brick which rise to a height of three or four feet above the ground. The use of such a high plinth of burnt brick indicates, I think, that the soil on which the buildings were erected was very moist and liable to inundations. The sun-dried brick wall, and in some cases the mud plaster, where protected from the sand blast, are in perfect preservation, showing that the rainfall has never been of such a soaking or heavy character as to soften and destroy the wall. The people say that the rainfall this year has been quite extraordinary; a fall of about half or three quarters of an inch was said to have been unknown before. The big flood in this year of exceptional rain only gauged between 60,000 and 70,000 cusecs at Band-i-Seistan. This is a very small discharge to get from a catchment area so large as 58,000* square miles, even remembering that Band-i-Seistan is a long way from the centre of the catchment area (400 miles above the *band*). In an interesting paper on Seistan, published in the Royal Geographical Society's Journal for 1873, Sir Henry Rawlinson gives reasons for believing that in early times (say 1,000 years before Christ) the waters of the Helmand were all used up on the land, and there was no considerable lake or Hamun. It is not easy to see how the ancients disposed of such large floods, 60,000 or 70,000 cusecs, but perhaps the water ran out at the tails of the many big branches that then existed, submerging low lands which, for the time being, were rendered unfit for cultivation, but in ordinary years raised superior though catch crops on the rich silt deposited by the flood-water. It is possible that in those days the catchment area was more heavily wooded and the rain water ran off more gradually, so that the height of floods was less, whilst the ordinary supply of the river available for irrigation was greater.

* 56,500 square miles above Kala-i-Bist.
1,500 „ „ below „ „

8. If the Helmand were again brought under complete control, considerable volumes might be disposed of through the many big branches to convenient depressions; but a large area must of necessity be set aside to hold the water brought by big floods. This note is written before the information to

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be obtained from gauging the river is complete, a rough calculation indicates that the 548 square miles coloured blue in the Gaud-i-Zirreh on the $\frac{1}{8}$ inch map would be submerged to a depth of 4 feet by the surplus waters that could not be used for irrigation in a year like this. Such years of flood come about every 10 or 12 years. It is probable that the Gaud-i-Zirreh area is very low and that a deeper and smaller lake would be found at its eastern end, of capacity sufficient to store such floods. The lands submerged at the north of the Helmand Hamun, when dry, are, to a large extent, sweet and free from alkali, indicating, I think, that the water soaks freely through the soil, carrying the salts with it. But the Gaud-i-Zirreh is described as a brine lake with much salt incrustations on its margin, due probably to the water drying up by evaporation, leaving its salts behind. If this is so, the area will not make so efficient an escape ground for surplus water, as if absorption as well as evaporation acted to dissipate the water.

9. The broad features of the deltaic valley over which the waters of the Helmand have at one time or another emptied themselves, are well shown on the $\frac{1}{8}$ inch map of the Survey Department, Appendix A. They will be still more clearly delineated on the $\frac{1}{4}$ inch surveys now being made by Mr. Tate, but these are not yet finished. The areas obtained from the $\frac{1}{8}$ inch map as abstracted in statement "A", show that the total area of this deltaic valley is 7,029 square miles, of which 1,318 square miles, or 19 per cent, is watered by the river as it is at present; 1,534 square miles or 21 per cent is liable to be submerged; and 3,041 square miles, or 44 per cent, is land that once was commanded by the river, but which is now sterile and waterless owing to the control of the river having been lost; whilst 1,136 square miles, or 16 per cent, are high plains not likely to be ever irrigable.

At Band-i-Kamal Khan where the river Helmand makes the sudden bend to the north, the bluffs forming the southern boundary of the river valley end abruptly, and a clear, well-defined river bed (see Plans Nos. I and II) leaves the present river valley, and with a bed some 25 feet higher than the present river bed, goes due west past Tarakun till it eventually breaks up into many small channels which spread out over a broad deltaic plain terminating at the southern end of the Hamun just above the off-take of the Shela river. This old channel is known as the Tarakun River, or sometimes the Tarakun canal. Its bed at Band-i-Kamal Khan is some 25 feet above that of the present river (Plan No. II). At Kala Afzal, about four miles down the Tarakun channel, a nulla* goes off to the south-east to the Gaud-i-Zirreh. It keeps close under the bluffs. Mr. Johns' section No. I (Plan No. VII) was taken down this old spill channel of the Helmand, which, as Mr. Johns clearly explains in his note, gives an admirable line for an escape channel to the Gaud-i-Zirreh. It is the most eastern boundary of the deltaic plain, which stretches to the west and to the north, and which is bounded on the south by the southern shores of the Gaud-i-Zirreh and the Shela River; on the west by the Shela River and the terrain of the Palan Koh. The area is coloured yellow on the tracing (Appendix A). The easternmost end of this plain has been seen by Mr. Johns, Mr. Tate, and myself, and the western end is crossed by the trade route. It is all being mapped on the $\frac{1}{4}$-inch scale. It is known to be a rich alluvial plain† with occasional high plains on it, covered with ruins of buildings and canals, which show that it was a highly cultivated, prosperous tract, which is now waterless and uninhabited, and which could be restored to prosperity by the construction of a system of canals with a head at or above Chahar Burjak. Between this alluvial plain, coloured yellow, and the Helmand River are areas‡ coloured red, which represent high plains, some 20 to 40 feet above the alluvial plain, and which could not be commanded by flow irrigation, though some parts of them may be conveniently irrigated by lift. These plains are composed of clays and loams covered with a thin coating of gravel, and probably are remnants of the deltaic valley which

* Since named John's nulla.

† In Afghanistan ... ... Square miles. 1,426
In Persia 775
2,201

‡ In Afghanistan ... Square miles. 676
In Persia 387
1,063

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in prehistoric times was at the level of these plains. These plains are still under survey, and more will be known of them when the Mission has completed its work.

Attention may now be directed to the great tract of country coloured yellow to the north of Killa-i-Fath on the east or right bank of the Helmand. There is no break in the bluffs on the right bank of the gorge till Killa-i-Fath is reached. Here the bluffs end suddenly and give way to an extensive plain (913 square miles, all in Afghanistan) covered with ruins of buildings and well conceived canal systems which follow ridges of the country and are provided with masonry bridges, outlets, and syphons. The soil is of very superior quality; the ruins of gardens are seen near buildings of excellent workmanship. The country is now waterless and uninhabited; in many places, the sand dunes have drifted over and covered up much rich land; at others the strong north-west wind has scoured out the soil in deep furrows. It is said that this tract was irrigated and cultivated by a big canal, taking out of the Helmand River above Killa-i-Fath; also by a canal taking out of the Khash near Kadda. This point is still being investigated.

The remaining area of the deltaic plain is the 2,304 square miles over which the present river spills, coloured green and blue on the map. The Hamun area in Afghanistan has not been included in the measurements, as it is probably under the command of the Farrah Rud, Khash Rud, and Hurut Rud. The area omitted is about 500 square miles. No doubt much, if not all, of it might have been included in the Helmand delta, as in most years area would be available to store water from the Helmand River, as well as from the other three.

Square Miles.	
545	in Afghanistan.
772	in Persia culturable land.
986	in Persia submerged lands.
2,304	

10. It is evident that the Helmand delta was once a prosperous province, probably supporting some 20 lakhs of people. This prosperity could be restored by constructing a weir at or near Chahar Burjak, which would divide the water between three big channels; that on the right bank to go down past Killa-i-Fath to irrigate all Afghanistan on the right of the Helmand; that on the left bank to go west along the old river bed past Tarakun to irrigate all the country on the left bank of the present Helmand River below Band-i-Kamal Khan and above the Rud-i-Seistan; the centre channel would follow the course of the present river and supply water to the part of Persian Seistan now watered by the Rud-i-Seistan and the Pariun or left branch of the Helmand. Each of these big canals would have many big branches to distribute the water over the large tracts at their command.

An escape channel to carry off surplus floods would be a very wide channel, perhaps 1,000 feet wide. When the channels emerge from the gorge at Band-i-Kamal Khan on the left and Killa-i-Fath on the right, all difficulties about the cost of the canals end. But the escape channel to the Gaud-i-Zirreh is down a very steep nulla, called Johns's nulla (3·3 feet a mile on the average—see Mr. Johns' section No. I, plan No. VII), which would require an expensive series of rapids to prevent it scouring its bed back to the river. The very large size of this escape channel needed to carry the waters of a river that is liable to a flood of about 70,000 cusecs and the dimensions of a weir to divert and control the floods are thus far the only difficulties I see in the scheme to canalise the Helmand River, as it debouches on to the deltaic plain. The remaining works would, I think, be very simple. The high plains above the bluffs seldom drain to the river, but into local depressions that have no escape to the river. The rainfall is very small: an inch in 24 hours has probably never fallen. The river has a shingle bottom above Chahar Burjak, though it is sand and gravel below that place. The range between ordinary river and high flood river is much smaller than in India, where such a river would have a flood discharge of 200,000 or 300,000 cusecs instead of 70,000 cusecs. The length of main canal, the number and size of drainage works, bridges, and falls would be less than is usual in Northern India.

Skilled labour would no doubt be very much more expensive, as all skilled labour would need to be imported from India, but unskilled labour for

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earthwork would no doubt come in freely from Afghanistan and Persia. Bricks could be manufactured on the spot in flame kilns, as were the burnt bricks used in the ancient ruins, the same kilns and size of bricks and method of of construction being used at the present day at Nasratabad. The stone for the weir works must come from the Koh-i-Malik Siah Mountains, about 70 miles away, but shingle for concrete can be got on the spot. Lime can be made on the spot from limestone pebbles, or from limestone at Koh-i-Malik Siah. On the whole, the cost should not be much greater per acre irrigated than on the big Punjab perennial canals, whilst the profits should be as large, once a railway has been made to remove the produce.

The land, both waste and cultivated, belongs to the State, and is very fertile.

11. It is not evident why the Helmand cut back its bed and left the channels to Tarakun and Sar-o-Tar dry, but it is probable that, when the river spread itself out by many channels as it fanned out over the deltaic plain, the volume in each channel was not such as to cause a scour and consequent retrogression of levels; but when a larger and larger part of the water was allowed to go down the one channel which had the most direct course to the deep part of the valley, the large volume flowed with a much increased velocity, due in part to the larger volume and in part to the greater bed slope. This velocity set up a scour which for a time may have been checked at or above Band-i-Kamal Khan by the weirs referred to in history and the traditional sites of which are still pointed out by the people. Moreover, they probably forced the silt-laden flood waters down the Tarakun channel, thus raising the level of that tract more rapidly than the northern part of the delta to which only water in canals under control went.

It should be noticed that the Tarakun channel is of full size, capable of carrying the whole Helmand River in flood. The river must have left it sudenly. Had the supply been gradually reduced through a long series of years, the channel would have become reduced in size by silting, as we found that the Nadali channel had done. Some 6 miles of old river bed exists at a level of some 15 or 20 feet above present river bed on the left bank of the Helmand between Madar-i-Padshah and Kala Jan Beg. It would seem that in ancient times the Helmand flowed west past Tarakun, and the present river was then a canal, which, through neglect or bad management, developed into the main river.

12. Whilst Mr. Tate and I rode down the old river bed to Tarakun, some sections were taken by Lala Thakur Das, Supervisor, and B. Ghulam Kadir and Hari Singh Bhai at Band-i-Kamal Khan to ascertain the difference of level between the old river, or Tarakun channel, and the present river. The plan is given on a scale of 4 inches to a mile on plan No. I, the longitudinal section is given on plan No. II, and two cross sections of the Tarakun channel on plans Nos. III and IV. A detailed plan of the head of the small Tarakun canal, made by Lala Thakur Das, Supervisor, while on the march down the valley, is given on sheet No. V, whilst sheet No. VI is a detail section made by Lala Thakur Das to show the position of a small canal on the high gravel plain which must have irrigated some part of that plain when the Helmand River flowed down the Tarakun channel.

Plans Nos. VII and VIII are Mr. Johns' sections Nos. I and II of his note—Appendix D—replotted to the scales usually employed in the Irrigation Branch so as to be more easily compared with the other sections on plans Nos. II, III, and IV. Mr. Johns's note and sections are a very valuable addition to our knowledge, which would otherwise have been very incomplete. The surface slope of the river was levelled at Khwaja Ali, about 74 miles above Band-i-Kamal Khan, and at Mirabad, about 8 miles below. A great reduction in the steepness of the water slope takes place in this distance. At Khwaja Ali the average surface fall, measured along the edge of the water as the river winds, was 1 in 2,083, or 2,524 feet a mile. The slopes varied between 1 in 3,403 and 1 in 2,098 along short lengths of about 4,000 feet, with rapids about 1,000 feet long at one in 500 between each short length. At Mirabad, below Band-i-Kamal Khan, the slope varied between 1 in 5,391 and 1 in 1,370 and

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the average slope over a length of 12,000 feet was 1 in 3,737 or 0·27 feet per 1,000, or 1·41 feet a mile. At Mashi about 30 miles below Band-i-Kamal Khan, the average slope on a length of 19,000 feet was 1 in 4,145, or 1·27 feet a mile (0·24 per 1,000 feet). The fall per mile measured in a direct line down the valley opposite Band-i-Kamal Khan is about 2·08 feet per mile; and since the fall per mile measured along the windings of the river is 1·41 feet per mile, the ratio of distance measured along the windings of the river to the direct distance is $\frac{2\cdot08}{1\cdot41}=1\cdot75$.

13. On the margin at the end of paragraph 5 of Mr. Johns's note, Appendix D, it is shown that water at the level of 205 at the head of Mr. Johns's section No. 1 (Plan No. VII), which correspond to water at the level of 105 at Reduced Distance 31,000 of the section of the Tarakun River, Plan No. II, would probably command all the country that it is necessary to command from the river at Band-i-Kamal Khan. To give this command, water at a level of 111·2* feet above the ordinary level of the river is needed at Band-i-Kamal Khan. Such a level could only be got by the construction of a very massive dam. The flood level of the river is some 4 to 6 feet above the level of ordinary river, so that even in times of flood the water must be much raised up to force it down the escape to the Gaud-i-Zirreh. The site is not unfavourable for a dam. Local tradition says that the ancient masonry dam on the Helmand was either at Roden or Kala Mir, two old forts near each other a few miles up-stream of Band-i-Kamal Khan. One of the reasons given for believing that the dam was here is that the site is favourable in that the river is restrained on its north bank by a fairly high plateau which extends from the edge of the river towards the cliffs that bound the gorge on the right bank. One of the names for this reach of the river is Dhar Tangi or Tangi, meaning narrow. The river bed, too, is said to be of a very favourable hard clay or soft stone. But the river being unusually high this point could not be satisfactorily investigated. It is said that masonry remains of the dam can be seen at low river; but I doubt this, as I think it is almost certain that the river at that time passed down the Tarakun channel, and, if so, the dam was on a river which flowed at a level of some 20 feet higher than the present river, and the remains, unless entirely destroyed, should be visible in the present cultivated valley. Sir Henry Rawlinson in the paper quoted, paragraph 7, shows that the dam was destroyed before the Muhammadan era. That is now a long time ago.

* Level of water at river. 105 + Distance in feet. 31,000 / 5,000 Fall in canal. = 111·2 feet.

If it were decided to construct a complete irrigation system for the delta of the Helmand, and not to open it until the whole system was finished, it might prove, on detailed investigation, to be best to dam the river entirely at Band-i-Kamal Khan, and divert it down the Tarakun channel. In that case canals taking out above this dam would go north to irrigate the plains north of Band-i-Kamal Khan, the river being carried to escape in the Gaud-i-Zirreh, and the present river channels below Band-i-Kamal Khan abandoned. But it is probable that the irrigation system would be carried out progressively, and as the success of each part was attained, the next would be put in hand. In this case it would be necessary to take out a big canal on the left bank to go west to the Tarakun plains, and one on the right to go north to the plains above Killa-i-Fath. These canals could be worked by a masonry weir at their head, or from a temporary weir built each year, much as is done now at the Band-i-Seistan, and also, I believe, at the head of the Ganges canal. The flood-waters would continue to flow down the present river to the Hamun at the north of the delta. Later on, when the country had so far developed as to require that the floods be controlled and sent to the Gaud-i-Zirreh, an escape channel would be made to carry the flood-waters to the Gaud-i-Zirreh, and the weir enlarged to divert the floods into the escape. In such a scheme it would be necessary to carry the head channels of the right and left bank canals up the river to such a point that the ordinary supply of the river would freely enter the canals: and flowing down them, would at Band-i-Kamal Khan attain a level of 11·2 feet above level of ordinary river that has been shown to be needed there.

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If a fall of 1·0 per mile is assumed for the canal, and since it has been shown in the last paragraph that the river falls 2·08 (say 2·0) a mile, the canal head would be about 11 miles above Band-i-Kamal Khan or near Chahar Burjak. This is about 4 miles above the present small Tarakun canal and about 6 miles above the small canal on the right bank which irrigates the plain around Killa-i-Fath. So that the position of these two little canals shows that a weir at or above Chahar Burjak would be high enough up the river to feed canals which would command the big plains of Tarakun and Killa-i-Fath. On the right bank of the river there is ample room for a big canal between the present river and the toe of the cliffs and the excavation would not be excessive. On the left bank a big canal and a very large escape must be carried along the left bank of the river, which, between Roden and Band-i-Kamal Khan, has a set towards the cliffs on its south bank. At Band-i-Kamal Khan village there is only about ½ a mile between the cliffs and the village. So that it may prove necessary to excavate into the cliffs, which are of similar soil to the valley. This would add to the expense of these channels. The excavation would be deep (50 to 70 feet) wherever the cliffs were cut into, but the length of such cutting is not likely to be long.

14. This note has dealt with the problem of irrigating the deltaic plain on the supposition that all the land and all the water were under the complete control of one authority. This is very far from being the case. The right bank canal would irrigate only in Afghan territory, but the tails of the branches of the left bank canal would end in Persian territory, whilst the middle canal that would follow the present river bed would irrigate both Persian and Afghan territory. The efficient distribution of the water between these interests would be an exceedingly difficult task, only to be achieved by engineers possessed of the most advanced skill in canal engineering, controlled by an administration that was quite impartial. It is easy to see that, if the existing small canals on the right or left bank of the Helmand in Afghanistan were developed by the present population, who are well-skilled in rough and ready methods for leading water out on to the land, all the water of ordinary river could be diverted into the canals, taking out above Chahar Burjak, leaving the present cultivated tract in Seistan without water when most required, and to be flooded at seasons of flood.

The present small canal in the old bed of the Tarakun channel could easily be enlarged and extended to carry a large supply of water. It was originally dug over a hundred years ago, it is said, and irrigated a large tract near Tarakun. It then fell into disuse for a long period, and was re-opened as the present small channel about 1894. Last year it was extended 4 miles by a small water course 2 feet wide by 2 feet deep, which was in many places obliterated by sand when I inspected the canal in February 1903. Although a scientifically designed system would require a large and expensive escape, yet such canals, as the Afghans are accustomed to make and use with skill, could easily be developed by them in this part of the deltaic plain. The water could be forced down the channel by boulder and tamarisk weirs, such as are constructed for the present small canals along the Helmand Valley.

But the administration of canals to obtain the acreage that the water is capable of irrigating needs to be energetic and just as well as highly trained. These qualities can hardly be hoped for from the present administration of the Helmand Valley.

Sufficient has been said to show that the river with the land at its command in the deltaic valley is a very valuable property, which once supported a large population. The experience acquired in India on irrigation works could construct canals which would enable a large population to thrive on these lands.

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15. This note is accompanied by the following plans:—

Tracing showing Helmand Delta, scale 8 miles to an inch (marked Appendix A in Colonel McMahon's letter No. 909, dated 13th July 1903).

Map of head of old Tarakun River, scale 4 inches to a mile ... Plan I.
Longitudinal section of Tarakun River ... ... Plan II.
Cross section of ditto ... ... Plan III.
Ditto ditto ... ... Plan IV.
Plan of Tarakun Canal head by Lala Thakur Dass, Supervisor... Plan V.
Sections of high plain near head Tarakun River by Lala Thakur Dass, Supervisor ... ... Plan VI.

Statement A.

Showing area of land in the deltaic fans of the Helmand River.

	At present watered by the river.	Uncommandable.	Commandable but not watered.	Total.
	Square miles.	Square miles.	Square miles.	Square miles.
AFGHANISTAN.				
Right bank of Helmand.				
Land watered by the river below Band-i-Seistan	546	...	...	...
Uncommanded gravel plains right bank of river north of Band-i-Seistan ...	...	73	...	...
Commanded, but not watered lands, north of Killa-i-Fath	...	...	840	...
Total right bank ...	...	...	...	1,459
Left bank.				
Uncommanded gravel plains north of old Tarakun channel	...	488	...	...
Uncommanded gravel plains south of old Tarakun channel	...	188	...	...
Area, coloured blue, in the Gaud-i-Zirreh Hamun	...	...	548	...
Commanded lands from old Tarakun River	...	...	1,426	...
Total left bank ...	...	...	...	2,650
Total Afghanistan ...	546	749	2,814	4,109
PERSIA.				
Area watered by canals taking out at or below Band-i-Seistan	772	...	...	...
Hamun area coloured blue on map ...	...	...	986	...
Uncommanded gravel plain north of boundary Kohak (Band-i-Seistan) to Koh-i-Malik Siah	...	387	...	...
Commandable from the Tarakun River ...	...	...	775	...
Total Persia ...	772	387	1,761	2,920
GRAND TOTAL ...	1,318	1,136	4,575	7,029

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No. 911, dated Camp Kohak, the 15th July 1903.

From—Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 909, dated 13th June 1903, on the subject of the control of the Helmand River above Seistan, I have the honour to make the following remarks on certain political aspects of the situation which present themselves in considering the possibility or accomplishment of such control.

2. It has been shown in my report, above quoted, that the effective control of the Helmand, if carried out by proper engineering works and made use of by proper irrigation methods, would result in enormous material advantage to both Afghanistan and Persia. It would enable Persia to increase the present commanded area of 772 square miles by 1,761 square miles, and Afghanistan its present commanded area of 546 square miles by 840* square miles on the right bank of the Helmand and 1,974 square miles on the left bank, *i.e.*, by a total of 2,814 square miles. The water available suffices at a very low and safe estimate fully to irrigate 750,000 acres of spring crop and a still larger area of autumn crop yearly.

* Recent surveys show that this figure is an under-estimate.

A. H McMahon.

3. The above results, beneficial to both countries, can only, however, be brought about if the control of the river be in the hands of a third party, neither Afghan nor Persian, possessed of the funds, technical knowledge, and irrigation establishments necessary for the purpose required. In payment for the works constructed and establishments employed, a share of the revenue of irrigated lands could be given, or a tract of land now waterless but capable of irrigation and cultivation when the river is controlled could be allotted. In either manner. a fair profit on capital and recurring expenditure involved could be arranged for.

4. The above would be an ideal arrangement by which all parties concerned would mutually profit.

5. The control of the Helmand above Seistan, either in whole or in part, can, however, be made use of in a manner very detrimental to one of the parties concerned, *i.e.*, Persia.

6. It has been shown that by a work of no very great magnitude the whole Helmand can be diverted from its present course into the Gaud-i-Zirreh. This can, moreover, be done with the greater ease at the time when water is most required, *i e.*, at the late autumn and spring sowings. Failure of water at those seasons would mean the total failure of the summer crop on which the prosperity of the country depends.

7. To divert the whole Helmand into the Gaud-i-Zirreh would, however, entail similarly disastrous results in Afghan Seistan, but the same irrigation work which could be used for thus diverting the whole river can be used for diverting a sufficient portion of it into a canal system on the right bank of the Helmand to irrigate the whole of present cultivated Afghan Seistan and a great deal more in addition. In this case a total failure of crops would also be brought about in Persian Seistan, but with great gain to Afghanistan.

8. Similarly, the whole Helmand at the same point can be divided between the Afghan Seistan on the right bank and the large Tarakun tract of good land within Afghan limits on the left bank of the river. Persian Seistan would again suffer.

9. The full attainment of any of the results sketched above would depend on a complete control of the river by proper irrigation works, but some of these results can be obtained by smaller, rougher works of a temporary nature. Herein lies the danger and difficulty of the situation. The Afghans know, and have known for some years past, the importance of the tract on the left bank of the river. Numerous injunctions have of late years been received from Kabul to push on the canal into the Tarakun tract. A small canal already exists as far as Killa Afzal, and its enlargement and extension have only been delayed by boundary disputes in Seistan and by the coming of this Mission.

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10. Mr. Ward has shown how, by a *band* in the Helmand of the nature of Afghan *bands* elsewhere, the present Tarakun canal can be made into a very important one. Although it could never command the same area of land as the canal system we ourselves could make, still it could, in ordinary years and at the time when water is most urgently needed in Persian Seistan, draw off a large portion of the Helmand River.

11. It will, moreover, not take the Afghans long to learn the importance of the desert tract, once thickly populated, on the right bank of the river. They are beginning to realise it already, and although the construction of a good canal system into that tract is to the Afghans of somewhat greater difficulty, yet by temporary *bands* of the local type they will be able to draw off a large portion of the Helmand River on that bank also.

12. In this manner the volume of water which will pass below Band-i-Kamal Khan and escape the present Afghan *band* above the Band-i-Seistan will, in ordinary years at sowing time, leave little or no water to go down the Rud-i-Seistan and Rud-i-Parian on which the life of Persian Seistan depends. Thus, by means which are quite within Afghan powers, Persian Seistan can be practically ruined. The ill-feeling engendered against the Persians by recent boundary and water disputes will prompt the Afghans, apart from all idea of personal advantage, to make full use of the opportunity thus afforded of injuring the Persians.

13. The danger of the situation is a very real one, and I am afraid that, unless prompt measures are taken, it will be brought to prominent notice within the next year or two. The only remedy appears to be to endeavour to take steps to make the control of the Helmand River a measure mutually profitable to both Afghanistan and Persia, and prevent its being made use of to the advantage, very modified only, of Afghanistan, but to the very serious detriment of Persia. The danger which threatens Persian Seistan is a very serious one, and may easily extend to the absolute ruin of that country. The only danger it involves on the Afghans is that of active hostilities with Persia, whom the threatened ruin of Seistan and presence of outside influence might posibly drive to action. How far this contingency would deter the Afghans is doubtful, but the fear that Persia might receive assistance from Russia might render them amenable to reason.

14. The only remedy, therefore, is to explain to Persia the risk she now runs, and to Afghanistan the material advantages she now loses from the want of a proper and effective control of the Helmand River, and obtain her consent to our taking the necessary steps.

15. Assuming that we enter upon this work on purely business lines and put aside political objects and aims, it would be necessary, in order to repay ourselves for the initial cost and up-keep of required works and establishment, to obtain from Persia and Afghanistan a share of the increased revenue which irrigation extension would produce.

In the case of Afghanistan it is essential to avoid any interference in their revenue or executive management. By increasing their water-supply, Afghanistan could bring under irrigation on the right bank of the river alone an area more than double that of present commanded Afghan Seistan. In return for this advantage Afghanistan might concede, or lease, to us all the deserted and desolate Tarakun tract on the left of the river.

The Persians contemplate leasing to others the land revenues of Seistan. These might be leased to us, for without our assistance in this matter there will soon be no land ravenue at all in Persian Seistan. The lease might safely be taken on very generous terms, for the figures given in my letter No. 909, dated 13th June 1903, show how great an increase of cultivation a proper canal system will cause. Failing a lease of all Seistan land revenues, a grant of all the deserted Ramrud and other waste lands at the tail of the Tarakun canal system might be made to us.

16. As before stated, the Helmand water suffices at a safe estimate fully to irrigate yearly 750,000 acres of spring crop in Seistan. The present area of spring crop cultivation in Afghan Seistan is only about 25,000 acres, and in Persian Seistan about 50,000 acres, *i.e.*, a total of about 75,000 acres in all.

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Assuming that the water at the head works of the proposed canal systems is divided into three equal shares, Afghan Seistan, Persian Seistan, and ourselves would each get sufficient to irrigate 250,000 acres of spring crop. The arrangement would thus enable Persia to increase her spring crop cultivation to five times, and Afghanistan ten times, the present area. Autumn cultivation could be increased in even greater proportions.

17. The above concessions, apart from a lease of Persian revenues, would amply repay the cost of construction and maintenance of an efficient canal system in Seistan. Taking into consideration the area and quality of the land and the fertilising nature of the Helmand water, whatever lands we obtain by grant or lease would soon become a very valuable and paying property. No consideration of cost need deter us from entering upon this project.

18. The political advantages of taking it up are too obvious to need comment. To begin with, delay on our part will not prevent the matter being forced upon us before long, and in a manner which may render it impossible for us then to obtain anything like the same advantages which we can now. A control of the river can be so worked as to obviate any necessity for interfering in the revenues or interior management of Afghan territory beyond such tracts as may be conceded or leased to us. It will give us absolute political control over Persian Seistan and everything connected with it, and will render the present Russian scheme for peaceful possession of the country hopeless and profitless.

19. As the carrying out of the project does not of necessity require a preliminary understanding with Persia, we are not bound to tie our hands by guaranteeing Persian Seistan any fixed proportion of water, and it would be unwise to make any guarantee, unless we obtain to the full the concessions and rights we require in return therefor.

20. The grant or lease of the deserted Ramrud-Hauzdar tract, the lease of the revenues of Persian Seistan, a satisfactory modification of the Customs system as at present worked in Seistan, and railway rights in Seistan and its neighbourhood are among the concessions which the control of the Helmand River would enable us to obtain.

21. The essential importance of obtaining the lease of Seistan revenues, of course, lies in the fact that this prevents others from getting it.

Control of the land revenues in Seistan, where all land is State land, where no private rights exist, and the people live in a state of bondage to the revenue authorities, carries therefore with it supreme administrative, executive, and every other control over Seistan and its people, while the control of revenue grain means practical control of Seistan trade. It will thus be understood how dangerous it would be to allow such control to fall into unfriendly hands, and how fortunate it is that Nature has provided the means outside Seistan of frustrating any scheme for conceding the lease of these revenues to any but ourselves.

22. I have mentioned elsewhere that this lease might profitably be taken on very generous terms. To explain this I would call attention to the following facts :—

(i) The amount which the Persian Government derives from these revenues is far less than the amount they are entitled to even under existing conditions of irrigation and agriculture. This is due to the corrupt methods of the Persian system, whereby the local Governor and Governor-General absorb the larger part of the revenues.

(ii) The Governor himself does not obtain anything approaching the revenues which, even under existing conditions, the country is capable of furnishing. The exactions and tyranny of the subordinate officials have knocked out of the people any desire to cultivate more than is necessary for existence. The rich qualities of soil and water give them a small surplus, notwithstanding their lazy apathy. Out of the 772 square miles of land now commanded by water in Persian Seistan, only some 80 square miles are cultivated under spring crop. With improved manage-

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ment and a little encouragement to the cultivators, cultivation, even with the existing irrigation system, would be very largely increased, and the land revenues accordingly.

(iii) With an improved irrigation system and a share of one-third of the available Helmand water, this cultivation could be increased to five times its present area, and the land revenues increased accordingly.

It would pay handsomely therefore, from a financial point of view only, to give for the lease of Seistan land revenues many times the amount which the Persian Government now derives from them, or which, I expect, is now being offered for them by the Belgian Customs Department and Russian Bank.

23. Enough has, I think, been said to show the enormous advantages which are offered by acquiring the control of the Helmand River above Seistan. As stated above, the question must of necessity arise of itself in the very near future, and it may not then, owing to growth of vested interests, be possible for us to derive the full advantages therefrom, which we can do now by taking the initiative.

24. No special mention has been made of the effect which the regeneration of Seistan would have on the question of railway communications to and in Persia. On the Seistan food-products now depend all the country round from Nushki on the east, Mashkel on the south, Kerman on the west, and Birjand on the north. Increased prosperity in Seistan would mean a paying traffic on any line from Nushki to Seistan and Kerman, and raise it from the position of an expensive and wholly strategic work to that of a profitable commercial undertaking.

Telegram, No. 399, dated Camp, the 22nd (despatched from Dalbandin on 27th) July 1903.

From—Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Please refer to my letter 911 of 15th July. When discussing boundary line between Band-i-Seistan and Koh-i-Malik Siah, Yamin incidentally let out that Persia contemplates offering to Afghans assistance in making the Tarakun canal, on condition that Persia gets water from it for irrigating Ramrud and Hauzdar track. This contingency was not anticipated by me in my letter. This scheme would not work in practice, but possibility of its being proposed should be remembered.

Telegram, No. 2177 F., dated the 29th July 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission.

Your letters 909 and 911, 13th and 15th July, with all enclosures, including maps and plans, were received safely on 27th.

Telegram, No. 2721 F.-B., dated the 16th September 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission.

Please refer to your letter No. 911, dated 15th July 1903. To meet the possibility of the Amir meeting Viceroy at end of October, it is desirable that you should send us, as soon as possible, and before end of September, a further report on the question of a lease of part of Helmand irrigation. In this you should indicate your opinion as to the extent of country we should lease or acquire, *i.e.*, up to Landi Wali Muhammad or to some point further downstream, what promises we should make to Amir about irrigation of country on

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right bank, what rent we should offer, and what increase of revenue on right bank he might expect, and generally on what terms we should acquire the area. You will also state your opinion as to the view which the local Baluch tribes and the people in Chakansur would be likely to take of such a lease. If you have ascertained any further facts about the irrigable area and discharges of the Helmand, please let us have the latest data.

No. 1121 (Secret), dated Camp Kohak, the 1st October 1903.

From—Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With reference to your telegram No. 2721 F.-B., dated the 15th September 1903, I have the honour to make the following further report on the matters connected with the control of the Helmand River.

2. In this report it will suffice to deal only with the points raised in the above telegram. I will hereafter embody the large mass of additional information which our surveys and investigations, topographical and irrigational, have furnished on the general question of the Helmand delta, in a final detailed report. Time does not permit of the preparation of the maps and appendices required for such a report at the present juncture, and, moreover, our enquiries and observations are still continuing.

3. The careful continued investigations made in this country, our detailed surveys and lines of levels, together with regular periodical measurements of water discharges, have added very largely to the information on which my previous report was based. Some of the figures given in that report have thereby, as might be expected, been slightly altered and modified, but these modifications are not of sufficient importance to necessitate my complicating the present report by referring to them in detail. It is sufficient to note that the areas of land previously stated remain approximately the same, and that, as regards water, although we are only now entering upon the critical season of the year, when the volume of the Helmand is at its annual minimum, there is as yet nothing to indicate that our original estimate of that minimum volume was incorrect. Mr. Ward assures me that he is confident that his original estimate of the minimum volume is a safe one. The facts, figures, and estimates recorded in the previous report may, therefore, be accepted. The manner in which they have been verified by further investigations justify our accepting the conclusions previously based thereon with increased confidence.

4. The first question for present consideration is *to what point up the Helmand River we should acquire possession* in order to obtain control of that river for the effective irrigation of its delta, *i.e.*, Afghan and Persian Seistan. For the construction of the irrigation works and canal heads described in my former report, it would suffice to obtain possession of the river up to and including Rudbar.*

* By Rudbar is meant the small tract of country known by that name. Its uppermost hamlet is Lát.
A. H. McMahon.

5. Mr. Ward, since the submission of my previous report, has again very carefully examined the Helmand valley up to Rudbar, and in one respect has found cause to alter an opinion previously recorded by him. He has found that, contrary to original supposition, the valley *does* admit of the formation of several large reservoir areas along its course by the construction of large embankments at various points. These, if carried out, would necessitate possession of the valley up to Landi Wali Muhammad Khan. These works, however, would be of very great magnitude, each one of them far exceeding those required for the purposes defined in my previous report, and at the present stage of irrigation engineering science they might be looked upon by authorities on irrigation engineering as somewhat in advance of the times. It is necessary, however, to mention this point as in future years, when, as is probable, the reservoir system of irrigation becomes more in vogue, omission on our part now to examine the Helmand valley with an eye to its adaptability to such system might be adversely commented on.

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6. Were it as easy to acquire possession of the Helmand valley up to Landi Wali Muhammad Khan as it may be to do so up to Rudbar, we should, of course, endeavour to obtain up to the higher point. If, however, the attempt to obtain the additional stretch of valley above Rudbar imperils the success of endeavours to acquire the river up to that place, we should, I consider, abandon the attempt, and leave the question of extending possession further up the Helmand to some future day when the financial and political effects of more modest irrigation works lower down will have become known, and when the desirability of more ambitious undertakings further up the river may have been established.

7. With the possession of a longer stretch of the Helmand valley would follow the possession of a larger area of desert country south of the river, and bring several routes to the Helmand more completely into our hands. It would, of course, be of great advantage to possess an easy and short route to the Helmand, such as any one of those diverging from Arbo, Galichah, or Robat (near Koh Malik Dokhand). The routes from Jil-i-Jil and Amir Chah to Rudbar are not pleasant ones owing to sand, and the route from Nushki round *via* Tarakun and Band-i-Kamal Khan is very circuitous. It might, perhaps, be possible to find a fairly good practicable route from Sukaluk to Rudbar. It is a question whether it would not be better to put up with such difficulties than raise additional obstacles to the grant of the concession we require. If, however, it is decided that an easy short route is essential, then we should ask for the left bank up to and including Khwaja Ali, *or* obtain the right of free use of the routes leading *via* Khwaja Ali to Rudbar.

8. Looking at the matter from the Afghan point of view, we will find that the surrender by lease or otherwise of the Helmand valley, as far up as Rudbar, presents a very different aspect to that of the valley up to Landi Wali Muhammad Khan. In the copy of the Survey of India printed map of 16 miles=1 inch (Afghanistan S. W. section) attached to this report, I have shown the boundaries of the tribes who occupy the Helmand river and the country immediately south of it. It will be seen that up to and including a village callet Lát* on the map between Rudbar and Landi Barechi the Helmand valley is owned by the Sinjerani Baluchis, and above that point is occupied by Muhammad Hasni Baluchis, and Barech Afghans. I say "occupied", because, as regards cultivated lands, the Muhammad Hasnis are either graziers or cultivators to the Durani and other Afghan Khans to whom, excepting a few villages† owned by Barechis and Sinjeranis, all t e lands along the river above Lát belong. It is the presence of this pure Afghan element in Garmsel which more than anything else would render it so difficult to persuade the Amir to alienate any portion of that tract, especially from Khwaja Ali upwards.

* Lát is the most eastern hamlet of the Rudbar circle.

A. H. McMahon.

† *Note.*—Taking the villages above Rudbar in order, we find Landi Barechi and Pulalak owned revenue-free by Barechis. Next come Khwaja Ali and new Khwaja Ali (called Khugi on the map) owned by Sinjeranis; but not revenue-free. Above that all are owned by Durani and other pure Afghan Khans.

A. H. McMahon.

The line of boundary of the Sinjerani country, as shown on the attached map, is also the dividing line between two separate administrative jurisdictions. Up to Làt the country is included in the Chakansur district. At Lát begins the Bolak, *i.e.*, Tahsil, of Garmsel which extends up the river to Gurgin and is part of the Pusht-i-Rud province of which the head-quarters is at Girishk.

9. It will be seen, therefore, that the extension of possession of the Helmand valley above Rudbar (*i.e.*, Lát) is complicated by considerations of both administrative and ethnological boundaries. The Afghan Government, moreover, would view the surrender of the country on the right bank of the Helmand up to Rudbar in a very different light to that of country above that point. The former has only recently come into Afghan possession, *i.e.*, since the Goldsmid award of 1872. It contains no Afghans proper. The Sinjerani

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Chiefs, who own the cultivated lands between and including Rudbar and Band-i-Kamal Khan, have always been left* to themselves and are in return for tribal levy service exempt from land-revenue. The whole revenue collected by the Hakim of Chakansur from the country on the right bank of the river from Rudbar to Band-i-Seistan is not more than some Rs. 2,000 per annum. The revenue of Garmsel, on the other hand, is greater, amounting to about Rs. 15,000 per annum, and, with the exception of one or two revenue-free villages, is rigidly assessed.

* No outside subordinate officials have jurisdiction in their country. One or other of the Sinjerani Khans, at present Sardar Ata Muhammad Khan of Chahar Burjak and Rudbar, acts as local Hakim under the Governor of Chakansur.
A. H. McMahon.

10. Taking all the above points into consideration, it would seem wiser to limit our demands eastwards to the tract of country on the left bank up to Rudbar (*i.e.*, Lát) only. Southwards and eastwards the line which marks the boundary of Sinjerani territory and the boundary of administrative jurisdiction of the Chakansur Governor would form the most convenient limit of acquisition.

11. I believe it would prove easier to get the Afghans to lease the whole Chakansur district than to part with any portion of Garmsel or any other tract of the Girishk province. Chakansur is a very out-of-the-way district; it has no pure Afghan element in it, and is cut off on all sides from the rest of Afghanistan, except in the narrow Helmand valley, by waterless deserts† or Hamuns. From careful enquiries I calculate that the Amir only gets some Rs. 65,000 per annum gross revenue from the whole district. It is well worth considering whether the opportunity should not be taken of endeavouring to obtain the whole Chakansur district or if not the whole, as far north as the Khash Rud. I will refer to this subject later.

† The road from Chakansur to Lash Juwain, to avoid the Hamun, passes through a waterless country. In flood time the Khash Rud cuts off communication between Chakansur and the country north of it.
A. H. McMahon.

12. The question next arises as to *how our acquisition of the left bank up to Rudbar would be regarded by the people of the country.*

As regards the people actually residing in this tract of country itself, they are so few in numbers that this consideration is not of very great importance. I doubt whether the whole population, nomad or otherwise, at present exceeds 2,000 persons. The land-owners of the little cultivated land there is are a few individuals, some 6 in number, all Sinjeranis, and members of one family, *i.e.*, the same family to which our own Sinjerani Chief of Chagai belongs. They are very friendly and well disposed towards us, and if, as we are bound to do, we confirm their present revenue exemptions, their position would be but little affected by our taking over the country. Sardar Ata Muhammad Khan, Sinjerani, of Chahar Burjak and Rudbar, is at present in subordinate charge of the country for purposes of collecting grazing-tax, and he could easily be recompensed for loss of that appointment by grant of levy service, &c. The cultivators and graziers of the country are of the same race as our own people on our side of the border. They would welcome our arrival in the country, and although we should not interfere with the terms on which the former serve their land-owners, they would benefit largely by increased security of life and property and in other ways.

13. As for the rest of the Chakansur district, I have every reason to anticipate that our acquisition of the country adjoining them would be welcomed. The Governor, *i.e.*, the Akhundzada and his family, who themselves form the principal land-owners from Killa-i-Fath downwards, are genuinely attached to us. The family are by origin Tarins of Khanzai near Pishin (the Pishin near Quetta), and, like the Pishin people, are great traders. The Akhundzada himself indulges much in trade, and our arrival would greatly benefit him. Moreover, tenure of office in Afghanistan is precarious, and I believe the Akhundzada would secretly be relieved in mind to have so close at hand the easy and convenient means of taking refuge in time of stress that our propinquity would afford. I do not think we need anticipate any opposition from him or other Chakansur officials. The common people would openly welcome our coming. They are a poor, down-trodden, heterogeneous lot, almost entirely composed of Baluchis and Brahuis, among whom preponderate Gurgez, Rakhshani, and other tribes of British Baluchistan, who, from time to time,

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have come to Seistan at periods of scarcity at home, and settled here. They are most friendly disposed towards us, and are very anxious to get into our service. There are no real Afghans in the Chakansur district, and I firmly believe that the whole population of the district would rejoice if we took over the entire district. The whole population does not exceed some 12,000 persons, all of a quiet peaceful disposition, and I calculate there are not more than 40 rifles in the whole country.

14. In my previous report it was shown that by controlling the Helmand somewhere between Band-i-Kamal Khan and Chahar Burjak, the minimum volume of water available in the autumn would allow of 750,000 acres of land being brought yearly under spring crop. It was proposed to divide this water into three equal shares, 1 to Afghan territory on the right bank, 1 to that on the left bank, and 1 to Persian Seistan. Each of the above tracts could thus bring 250,000 acres yearly under spring crop, there being more than ample culturable land available in each tract.

It was suggested that in return for the cost of controlling the river, we should acquire by lease or otherwise the Afghan tract of country on the left bank. It now remains to consider *what terms we should offer to His Highness the Amir for this concession*. The question is rendered an extremely difficult one owing to the reluctance, amounting almost to religious scruple, with which Afghans part with land, and the difficulty with which they can be made to consider a business proposal in a reasonable or logical manner. This particularly applies to questions of irrigation, in which they pride themselves on being especially skilled. Another very serious difficulty in negotiations regarding territory with the Afghan ruler is the astonishing ignorance which prevails at Kabul about the outlying and distant portions of Afghanistan.

15. We are in the present case in a position to promise the Amir one-third of the Helmand water for use on the right bank of the river. He may argue that his proper share, as sole owner of the upper river, is more than one-third. and that his people in Seistan can, and do already, use more than one-third of the river. The latter part of this contention would be inaccurate. They never have used anything like a third of the river, and at the most important time of the agricultural year, *i.e.*, the late autumn months, when early sowings should be made, they are seldom* in a position to use any of the water at all. The result is that nearly all the Afghan crops are late sown crops and as such compare very unfavourably with the early sown crops of Persian Seistan. At the present moment, when the Persians are flooding their land for early sowing, the Afghans are allowing their water to pass unused down the river. The Rud-i-Seistan, since the Band-i-Seistan was repaired, is drawing away one-half of the total volume, the Rud-i-Pariun one-third, and the Nadali channel only one-sixth.

* The reason of this is chiefly due to the fact that the construction of the *bands* which are necessary for giving them the water at this time of year leads to so great friction with the Persians.
A. H. McMahon.

16. The value of the one-third that we would give the Afghans lies in the fact that they would get it delivered to them at the most important time of the year and at the highest point of their Seistan lands. This, if properly used, will suffice to irrigate an area of early sown spring crop ten times that of their whole present cultivated area.† This alone represents a revenue at least ten times the amount of present revenue.

† They now cultivate 25,000 acres and could, by the proposed control of the river, cultivate 250,000 acres of spring crop annually.
A. H. McMahon.

17. In addition to this the control of the river would render it possible to protect the Afghan crops from the destruction which so often overtakes them in times of flood. This alone is a very important consideration, as much revenue is lost under present conditions.

18. To use profitably their share of water the Afghans would have to construct a main canal from the canal head we would construct to some distributing point. This would be somewhere near Kila-i-Fath. It would be better if we made this for them, but it is a question whether an offer to do so might not cause suspicion that we wanted, under guise of irrigation, further to

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interfere with Afghan country. We might, however, promise to pay the cost of such main canals as would be necessary to connect our canal head with their present canal system.

19. The above are the material and financial advantages which would accrue to the Amir by allowing us to control the river. Other and important ones can be brought to bear, but some care is necessary in the manner of doing so, to avoid offending the extraordinarily tender susceptibilities which Afghans possess on such points. The chief of these is, of course, the protection which our arrival on the scene affords to the south-west corner of Afghanistan from Russian intrigue and aggression. The Chakansur officials are widely awake now to the sinister designs of Russia in Seistan, and they realise that Russia's object is to obtain a foot-hold there from which to annoy and threaten the weak and ill-protected Afghan provinces of Farrah and Chakansur. It is possible that the Amir holds similar views, but it is also possible that his knowledge of the position of affairs in this corner of his dominions is lamentably vague.

Another argument which might be made use of is the fact that if Afghanistan were by itself to undertake new irrigation reforms in Seistan involving greater consumption of Helmand water, the Persians would again remonstrate and appeal for further arbitration.

20. The very important argument that our arrival in the Helmand valley, and the railway line that would follow us there, would have a very stimulating effect on Afghan trade in the south-west portion of their country, is unfortunately one which would not appeal to an Afghan ruler. It is doubtful, therefore, whether, unless the views of Amir Habibulla Khan on political economy vary materially from those of his father, the use of this argument might not injure our case.

21. As regards *the rent which we should offer for the Afghan tract from Rudbar downwards* on the left bank of the river, it is difficult to give any definite opinion. The present revenue enjoyed by the Amir from this tract is the merely trifling amount of about Rs. 2,000 per annum. He has, it is true, expectations of getting more by making a canal towards Tarakun, but I expect the way in which this project has been hung up for so many years, must have damped any very sanguine expectations that were entertained on the subject in the time of the late Amir. I should mention here that this past year's floods have, by cutting away the banks at the place where an Afghan band would divert water down the Tarakun canal, rendered the feasibility of the scheme from the Afghan point of view a very much more difficult one than what it was at the time of my last report. This, however, in no way affects the feasibility of our scheme.

However small the present income may be, and however modest Afghan expectations of increased income may be from this tract, it will be a matter of some difficulty to prevail upon the Amir to alienate his rights in it. It will doubtless be necessary to offer what may appear a very large sum to overcome these scruples.

22. Basing our calculations on a minimum spring crop in this tract of 250,000 acres, which it will be possible to secure when the irrigation system is fully working, we arrive at very high figures of revenue. The average outturn per acre in Seistan is 20 maunds of grain. A revenue demand of one-fourth,* *i.e.*, five maunds, would represent a total of 12,50,000 maunds, or at Re. 1 per maund, 12½ lakhs of rupees. Adding the autumn harvest and other taxes, we may place the annual gross income at very nearly 20 lakhs. A very much lower figure than this would allow us to be generous in the matter of rent, although the income is at present purely prospective.

* Apart from questions of income, it will be politically necessary to assimilate our revenue demands to those of adjoining Persian and Afghan territory. It may be necessary to demand more than one fourth with this object.

A. H. McMahon.

23. The rent we should offer so entirely depends on the spirit in which the proposal is viewed by the Amir that I am unable to make any definite suggestion, but I venture to think that we cannot well offer, in the first instance, less than one lakh per annum up to the date of opening the canal system, after which the rent might be increased to two lakhs per annum.

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This or any other rent fixed upon should be made to cover the concession of the free use of routes *via* Khwaja Ali to Rubdar, if it is considered necessary to demand this.

24. So repugnant is the idea of parting with any portion, however valueless, of his territory to an Afghan ruler, that the question, apart from all logical and forcible arguments of other kinds that may be brought to bear on the case, resolves itself into a question of money payment on a very generous scale. The amount of money required to overcome the initial reluctance to surrender land will be found to bear no relative proportion to the value or extent of the land itself. In other words, in order to overcome the Amir's disinclination to alienate any Afghan land whatever, it will cost almost as much to lease a small tract as it will to lease a comparatively larger one. In this case it is essentially a question of *le premier pas qui coute*. It is quite possible that nothing under, say, five lakhs per annum will suffice to overcome the Amir's reluctance to alienate the tract of country on the left bank up to Rudbar. It is equally possible, if negotiations commenced with the larger demand, that about the same sum, or only a little more, would effect the lease of the larger and richer tract of the whole Chakansur district, including the smaller tract above stated which forms part of it.

25. It is a question, therefore, worth careful consideration whether we should not take advantage of this state of affairs and commence negotiations by a bold bid for the whole Chakansur district. In this case many of the arguments sketched in paragraphs 15 to 20 above would not be applicable, and we would have to restrict ourselves to the simple statement that Russian intrigues render it necessary for us, in the joint interests of Afghanistan and ourselves, to get nearer Persian Seistan; that we feel confident that large irrigation works would improve Afghan Seistan, and see our way thereby to help both the Amir and ourselves. Will he lease the district to us for ten times its present revenue, say, $6\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of rupees per annum?

At the worst, should the Amir decline to agree to this, no harm is done, for, while objecting to so great a sacrifice, he may the more willingly agree to the smaller one of the tract on the left bank of the river. At the same time the opportunity afforded for contrasting the relative values of the whole and its parts might bring the cost of the smaller part within more reasonable figures.

26. The advantages of acquiring the whole Chakansur district are too obvious to need retailing here. The difficulties of administering the district would be very small. The profits of doing so can in time be made equal to those estimated to accrue from the Tarakun tract, *i.e.*, a gross income of 20 lakhs, while there is the great advantage of the income not all being prospective. Very little temporary improvements of existing irrigation in the Chakansur district would largely multiply the present revenue.

27. In the matter of the pecuniary offers we should make to the Amir, I speak with great diffidence. Political considerations so outweigh ordinary financial ones in the present case, that one cannot argue the matter out on lines of expenditure and income alone. However large the rent to be offered may appear to be in the first instance, there can be no reasonable doubt that it will lead eventually to large net profits and prove a sound financial investment.

28. I have omitted from the above calculations the country above Rudbar to Khwaja Ali. The revenue of Khwaja Ali is about Rs. 7,000 per annum, and does not admit of any great increase by improved irrigation.

29. It is premature at this stage of the proceedings to discuss the effect that would be produced on the present Persian Seistan system of irrigation by diverting two-thirds of the Helmand water above Seistan. The one-third left available would, as explained in the previous report, suffice to cultivate many times the present cultivated area. Many minor difficulties connected with the question would disappear if we were in occupation of Afghan Seistan, and portions of Persian Seistan, notably Miankangi, would largely benefit by the manner in which we could turn surplus water from the Afghan side into that tract. This assistance, needless to remark, the Afghans themselves would never afford.

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30. I append a brief note on the administrative boundaries, and some useful details of the Afghan districts connected with the question above discussed.

NOTE ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES, &c., OF AFGHAN DISTRICTS ON THE HELMAND RIVER.

THE PUSHT-I-RUD DISTRICT.

Boundaries.

North.—From a hillock called Ghundi Khak-i-Chopan* on the Kandahar-Herat Road, along that road to Dilaram on the Khash Rud.

* This is about 2 miles west of the Mis Karez which is shown on the 16 miles=1 inch map of Afghanistan.
A. H. McMAHON.

East.—From Ghundi Khak-i-Chopan southwards crossing the Arghundab at Band-i-Taimur, it runs through Registan to the British boundary, including the Mingal country and excluding Shorawak.

South.—British boundary, as far as Kani, thence to Rudbar (Lát), leaving to the south the Pusht-i-Koh tract as shown on the map, which belongs to Chakansur.

West.—Across the Dasht-i-Margo to Deh Khan near Kadeh on the Khash Rod, thence it follows the Khash Rud to Dilaram.

Sub-divisions.

It is divided into four Tahsils or Bolaks, *i.e.*,—

(1) Helmand or Girishk.
(2) Garmsel.†
(3) Naozad.
(4) Zamindawar.

† Also known as Garmser.

The boundaries of (1) and (2) are shown on attached map.

Administration.

The head-quarters of the district are at Girishk. This district till ten years ago formed part of the Kandahar province, but now the Governor deals direct with Kabul. Each Tahsil except Naozad, which has only one Naib Tahsildar, has one Tahsildar and two Naib Tahsildars. These deal with revenue matters only, and are subordinate to the Revenue Sarishtadar of Girishk, who, although subordinate in status to the Governor, deals direct on revenue matters† with Kabul. Judicial work is done by a Hakim in each Tahsil, who is subordinate to the Governor of Girishk.

† This revenue arrangement has only been in force about three years.
A. H. McMAHON.

Besides above, there are four Tahsildars and four Naib Tahsildars, whose duty is confined to collecting grazing-tax. They have no fixed head-quarters.

Garrison.

The garrison consists of—

1 Battery, Horse Artillery, of 6 guns.
1 Squadron Cavalry.
4 Companies (400) of khassadars.

These are all stationed at Girishk. There are also 700 Khawanin (tribal) sowars scattered over the country in their own homes.

Population.

The population is chiefly Durani Afghan, but in Garmsel there are many Baluch and Brahui nomad graziers.

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Arms.

The district possesses about 3,000 rifles, Martini-Henry and Snider, in private possession.

THE GARMSEL TAHSIL.

Although included in above, it requires a few words of special mention.

The *boundaries* are as shown in the attached map.

Tahsildar.—Khan Muhammad Khan, Ishakzai Durani.

Naib Tahsildars.—Din Muhammad Khan, Barakzai Durani, and Agha Muhammad Khan, Barakzai Durani.

Judicial Hakim.—Taj Muhammad Khan, Kabuli, son of Ali Muhammad Khan, Governor of Girishk.

Revenue.—About Rs. 15,000 per annum.

Population.—Chiefly Brahui and Baluch, but these are graziers or cultivators. The land-owners are Duranis and a few Barechis. From Landi Barechi upwards we find the following villages, *i.e.*, Landi Barechi and Pulalak, owned revenue-free by Barechis;* Khwaja Ali, Upper and Lower, by Sinjeranis. Above that all land-owners are Durani and other Afghans.

* They treated the late Amir hospitably when a refugee, hence this grant.
A. H. McMAHON.

THE CHAKANSUR DISTRICT.

Boundaries.

South.—British territory.

North and East.—From Kani it follows the boundary of the Sinjerani country, and includes the tract known as Pusht-i-Koh or Koh Pusht on the north of the Chagai hills, as shown on the attached map. Thence it crosses the desert and hits the Helmand at Lát, the uppermost hamlet of Rudbar. Thence it crosses the Dasht-i-Margo to Deh Khan on the Khash Rud near Kedah, and runs to a small prominent hill called Takht-i-Rustam on the north bank of the Hamun.

West.—From Takht-i-Rustam it runs across the Hamun to the Persian boundary and along it to the Koh-i-Malik Siah.

Administration.

The district formerly formed part of the Farrah province. Akhundzada Fakir Muhammad Khan is Governor, and exercises sole political, revenue, and judicial authority, and deals direct with Kabul. His revenue accounts, however, are checked annually by the Revenue Sarishtadar of Farrah, to which province his revenue is credited. His brother, Mulla Yar Muhammad Khan, works as his Assistant and manages the district in his absence. The *head-quarters* of the district are at Killa-i-Kang.

Sub-divisions.

There are three sub-districts—

(1) Killa-i-Kang.
(2) Killa-i-Fath.
(3) Left bank of the Helmand.

(1) Killa-i-Kang is managed direct by the Governor of the district. There is sometimes a subordinate Hakim at (2) Killa-i-Fath, but at present this, too, is managed direct by the Akhundzada.

(3) has no distinctive name at present, and hardly merits the status of a sub-district. It has no official in charge of it, as the Sinjeranis are left to themselves. It includes the Koh Pusht tract, which contains a few graziers only. The work of collecting the grazing-tax is entrusted to Sardar Ata Muhammad Khan, Sinjerani, of Chahar Burjak and Rudbar.

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*The Akhundzada once told me in confidence that he pays more in offerings to the small shrines in this tract than he recovers in grazing-tax!
A. H. McMahon.

The amount collected is infinitesimal;* in fact, little or no attempt is made to collect it.

Revenue.

The total annual revenue of the district from all sources does not exceed Rs. 65,000, of which some Rs. 2,000 or less comes from the tract on the left bank of the Helmand.

Garrison.

One company of infantry from the regiment at Farrah is stationed at Killa-i-Kang.

600 khassadars stationed as follows:—

Killa-i-Kang	300
Chakansur	100
Nadali	100
Killa-i-Fath	100

The khassadars are paid at the rate of 7 Kabuli rupees per mensem, if local men; and 8 Kabuli rupees per mensem, if men of other districts. There are also 130 Khawanin sowars scattered about the country in their own homes.

Population.

Except the Akhundzada and his family, numbering some 11 members, who are by origin† Tarins from Khanozai near Quetta, the whole population are Baluch‡ and Brahui. There are no Khans, Chiefs, or headmen among this population, except the few small Sinjerani Khans, and they all of one family, who reside on the Helmand from Band-i-Kamal Khan upwards. The total population does not exceed 12,000 persons.

† They emigrated here 2 or 3 generations ago.
A. H. McMahon.

‡ I do not include a few poor and scattered families of Ghilzais who have resided here for many generations and have become to all appearances, both in character and habits, Baluchis.
A. H. McMahon.

Arms.

There are only about 40 rifles in private possession, and these belong to the Akhundzada's family and Sinjerani Chiefs. Of these, about 10 are Martini-Henry and the rest Snider.

Telegram, No. 445, dated Camp, the 8th (despatched from Dalbandin on 12th) October 1903.

From—Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

At end of paragraph 15 of my letter No. 1121, 1st October, after words "allowing their water", please cancel remainder of paragraph and read "to pass unused down the river". The Rud-i-Seistan, since the Band-i-Seistan was repaired, is drawing away one-half of the total volume, the Rud-i-Pariun one-third, and the Nadali channel only one-sixth.

No. 1124, dated Camp Kohak, the 3rd October 1903.

From—Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward the following correction to a small copying error in my letter No. 1121 of the 1st October 1903, *i.e.*,—

At end of paragraph 8, for words "begins the Bolan Tahsil of Garmsel", please read "begins the Bolak, *i.e.*, Tahsil of Garmsel".

Foreign Office Press—No. 139—26-4-04.

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

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

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

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

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2.

No. 2407, dated Camp Kohak, the 25th September 1904.

From—Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my telegram No. 789, dated 5th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a memorandum on the Seistan water question, together with four draft awards thereon, for your consideration.

(*Secret and Confidential*).

MEMORANDUM ON THE SEISTAN WATER QUESTION.

1. The settlement of the water question between Persia and Afghanistan in Seistan involves other questions of a purely political nature. Success in the effective carrying out of any arbitral award that may be given on this subject largely depends on the pressure which the Government of India may, from time to time, bring to bear on the Afghan Government, or cause to be brought to bear on the Persian Government, to prevent the terms of that award being ignored by either side.

2. It is, therefore, necessary for the arbitrator to refer the matter to the Government of India, in order that his award may not commit that Government to future responsibilities greater than may seem to them desirable or reasonable.

3. To facilitate a proper understanding of the water problems which now await settlement, I have briefly recapitulated, below, all the salient points in the past history of the Helmand river, the disputes which have arisen regarding it, and the results of our local enquiries and observations.

4. I also attach drafts of awards based on conclusions derived from the above. In framing them, I have endeavoured, in each, to meet the fair requirements of Persia and Afghanistan, but at the same time to provide variations in the general scope of the award, so as to enable Government to select that which may appear to them the most suitable.

History of the Helmand river and water disputes connected therewith from 1872 to 1901.

5. Like all rivers when they reach a delta, the course of the Helmand, and its branches in Seistan, has been subject to considerable changes from earliest times, as shown by the traces of numerous old river beds here and there visible throughout the country. Certain points in the earlier history of the river will be referred to later. I will first deal with its history from the year of Sir Fredrick Goldsmid's Arbitration Commission, in 1872, to the present day.

6. It is evident, from observations recorded by Sir Fredrick Goldsmid's Mission during their stay in Seistan, and from careful local investigations now made, that in 1872 the Helmand River had only one important offshoot, *i.e.*, the Rud-i-Seistan. That rud, or canal, as it should more correctly be termed, took off from the Helmand at the Band-i-Kohak (also known as the Band-i-Seistan) which was situated at its present site, and thence followed practically the same course westwards as it does at the present day.

7. The main river, from the Band-i-Seistan northwards, followed its present course to near Shahgul, and, thence, the course of the present Nad Ali and Sikhsar channel into the Naizar and Hamun. The Rud-i-Pariun did not exist, and the result of so large a volume of water following one channel caused heavy annual inundations of the large area of country known as Warshufti* comprising most of Miankangi and Kila-i-Kang tracts.

---

* Warshufti is the name given to alluvial lands. This Warshufti tract was subject to periodical inundations sufficient to cover it with grass and tamarisk jungle, too much to allow of cultivation, but not sufficient for reeds to grow. Lands inundated sufficiently for reeds to grow are known as Naizar.

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8. In his arbitral award, Sir Fredrick Goldsmid, as regards the Helmand and water rights, laid down that :—

"(1) She (Persia) should not possess land on the right of the Helmand. * * * The main bed of the Helmand, therefore, below Kohak should be the eastern boundary of Persian Seistan,

"(2) and the line of frontier from Kohak to the hills, south of the Seistan desert, should be so drawn as to include within the Afghan limits all cultivation on both banks of the river from the band upwards. * * *

"(4) It is, moreover, to be well understood that no works are to be carried out on either side calculated to interfere with the requisite supply of water for irrigation on both banks of the Helmand".

9. In her appeal against this award, Persia contended, *inter alia*, that Persian Seistan could not live without control of the Helmand up to Rudbar (*vide* despatch, dated 27th November 1872, from the Persian Minister in London to Lord Granville) "le Seistan ne peut vivre qu'avec ses frontières naturelles de Roudbar, en remontant le (illegible) ses rives s'élèvent de manière qu'il devient impossible de détourner le fleuve de son lit actuel. Le domination de Seistan doit donc nécessairement le dominer au moins jusqu'à Roudbar. * * * Du côté du Nord nous voulons garder le Naizar et vers le Sud Est conservér le Hermunde jusqu'à Roudbar".

10. These objections, like all others raised by Persia and Afghanistan to the award, were over-ruled on appeal by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who confirmed the award on 7th March 1873, and the award was subsequently ratified by both countries.

11. Afghanistan does not appear, in her appeal, to have raised any objection on the water question in particular, but, subsequent to the confirmation of the Goldsmid award by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Kabul Envoy, deputed to discuss the Goldsmid award with the Government of India, raised the question of the interpretation of clause 4 of that award. He contended that this applied only to new works, and not to (1) canals already in existence and operation, and (2) such old or disused canals as might be put in proper repair.

12. The Government of India, in referring this question to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (despatch No. 74, dated 15th September 1873), after pointing out that the Amir desired to construct new, and repair old, canals, leading from the Helmand, in order to strengthen his frontier and establish an Afghan colony at Tarakun, wrote :—"In our opinion the clause referred to in the award cannot be understood as applying either to existing canals or to such old and disused canals as the Afghan Government may wish to put in proper repair; nor would it interfere with the excavation of new canals, provided the requisite supply of water for irrigation on the Persian side is not diminished. If Her Majesty's Government concur in this view, we would suggest that an explanation may be given which we can communicate to the Amir".

13. Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs accepted the above interpretation and the Amir was duly informed. The above ruling should, therefore, be considered as an integral portion of the Goldsmid award.

14. No water disputes between Afghanistan and Persia are on record for many years after Sir Fredrick Goldsmid's Mission. In the meantime, the Helmand showed an increasing tendency to find outlets to the west, and large portions of its volume appear to have found their way westwards through channels of which the most important were the Shela-i-Shamshiri, a channel now known as Shela-i-Lakshakh, taking off below Burj-i-As, and another channel, Shela-i-Jehanabad, taking off above Burj-i-As. The two latter drew off much water towards Jehanabad, and discharged it into the low lying lands between that place and Jelalabad, whence it escaped northwards, through the

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Ashkin* lands, into the Naizar and Hamun. The main irrigation channel on the east bank of the Helmand, below Kohak, was then the present Shela-i-Charkh near Burj-i-As.

15. The escape westwards of so large a volume of the Helmand relieved much of the Warshufti lands of excessive inundation, and hence we find this tract being gradually brought under cultivation. The village of Deh Dost Muhammad, with its large area of cultivation, came into existence about 1883, and numerous other villages appeared in the Warshufti tract.

16. Water disputes soon arose, and the Persian Government, in October 1883, (despatch, dated 1st October 1883, from the Persian Foreign Minister to the British Minister, Tehran) complained that the Afghans had diverted the Helmand into Afghan territory by constructing the Band-i-Shamshiri. They were unable, when asked, to define the position of this band, and Dr. Bellew (who had accompanied the Goldsmid Mission) was also unable to say where it was.

17. As the Afghan Boundary Commission soon afterwards visited Seistan in 1884, *en route* to the Russian border, Colonel West Ridgeway was instructed to enquire into, and report on, this dispute. He failed (*vide* letter No. 183, dated the 6th November 1884) to define the position of the band, and expressed his inability to indentify the point at which the Goldsmid boundary leaves the Helmand, and could not, therefore, state whether the Band-i-Shamshiri was situated above or below that point, or consequently whether the Afghans were entitled at the site of that band to the whole water of the Helmand.

18. He urged the necessity of an officer being at once deputed with authority to examine and survey the country and, by determining the position of the Goldsmid line, settle these and other questions in dispute. After some correspondence between the Government of India, the British Government, and Persia, the matter seems to have been dropped.

19. From careful local enquiries, we have ascertained that the Band-i-Shamshiri referred to was constructed across the then mouth of the Shela-i-Shamshiri,† which then took off from the main river at a point between Deh Taus‡ and the present village of Deh Lalla. It was constructed to prevent the Shamshiri drawing off too large a volume of the river, and to thus feed the Sikhsar and other Afghan channels. It was first constructed about 1883, and was maintained until 1895. The changes in the river caused by the flood of 1896 rendered it no longer necessary.

20. In 1885, an unusually large flood came down the Helmand, which turned the Shela-i-Lakshakh into the main river, and reduced the Sikhsar, hitherto to the main channel, to a small stream, which, however, continued to be recognised as the boundary, under the name of Shela-i-Sim (boundary stream).

21. When Colonel Yate visited Seistan in the spring of 1894, the Lakshakh channel was still the main channel of the Helmand, but the Shela-i-Jehanabad§ which, when he crossed, was half-way between Milak and Deh Sayad, was but little smaller than the Lakshakh. These two channels, as before described, escaped on to the Ashkin land, and thence into the Hamun. In short, from between Jelalabad and Jehanabad these two channels followed northwards what now forms the northern portion of the Rud-i-Pariun.

§ Also known as the Shela-i-Pokak or Shela-i Chuluki.

A. H. McMahon.

22. In 1896, one of those very important changes occurred to which the Helmand river is subject. The Helmand, in the heavy flood of that year, burst through the protection embankment‖ on the left bank betweeen Shahgul and Milak, and cut out for itself a new main channel now known as the Rud-i-

‖ This embankment had been previously breached by floods in 1885 and 1895, but again repaired.

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* Ashkin or Ashkinak are names given to low lying land subject to inundation. After the floods recede, they become deep in Ashk grass (scirpus maritimus).

† The southern portion of this channel is now better known as the Deh Dost Muhammad canal—*vide* 1-inch = 1 mile map. Shamshiri signifies a water channel with a rapid current or, as the name implies, which flows like a sword flash.

‡ Deh Taus is not shown on the last 1-inch = 1 mile map of Seistan. It is on the right bank of the Sikhsar due east of Deh Lalla.

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Pariun, which, from that time onwards, has taken the main volume of the whole river due northwards, between Jelalabad and Jehanabad, and through the Ashkin lands to the Hamun.

23. Owing to the above changes in the river, it became necessary, in the autumn of 1896, to take measures for keeping up the supply in the Nad Ali channel, and the Persians and Afghans mutually decided to co-operate to build a band across the Pariun. About three-quarters of a mile below the bifurcation, a hard bed was found in the Pariun. This was chosen as the site of the band; but as it was about three-quarters of a mile below the bifurcation, it was thought necessary to dig a leading cut to the Nad Ali channel. Although the band was built in concert, each party dug his own feeding cut, dropping it into the Nad Ali channel near Deh Khoja above the Shela-i-Jehanabad.

24. This arrangement was continued in 1897, but in 1898 the Afghans began work on another cut above the Pariun band; the Persians objected to this as being in their territory, and the Afghan gangs were removed to Afghan territory, and the present Afghan cut (Ju-i-Afghan) was made from the river to the Nad Ali channel to the south, and upstream, of the bifurcation. They also built a band at its head, called the Band-i-Shahgul, which has been made each year since then, except in 1903, when the supply that went down the Nad Ali channel was ample, and no band was required. The Persians began to build a Pariun band, but did not complete it, and never built it again until 1904.

The water disputes of 1901 and 1902.

25. The Governors of Persian and Afghan Seistan seem to have settled amicably any water disputes that arose from time to time, and no disputes of importance arose until 1901, when the Persians extended one of their canals from the Rud-i-Pariun, past Takht-i-Shah, into the Naizar, and the Afghans cut a a small canal to take off the Sikhsar water from near Deh Gul Shah to the west.

26. It is probable that these disputes, like previous ones, would have been mutually settled by the local Governors, but outside influences, which had by that time reached Seistan, prevented this. A Russian Consul had now come to Seistan, and he seized the opportunity to embitter the mutual relations existing between the countries. This and other subsequent water disputes, themselves of a trifling nature, were made to assume fictitous importance, until all hope of local settlement lapsed.

27. The Afghan Government deputed Musa Khan of Herat to Seistan to meet a Persian representative and settle up boundary and water disputes. Musa Khan arrived in Seistan in November 1901, and the Persian representative, the Yamin-i-Nizam, arrived in May 1902.

28. The Russian Consul, Mr. Miller, incited both sides against the other, as admitted freely to me by both, in the hope that, when things reached a crisis, his intervention would be called for.

29. The Yamin-i-Nizam declined to meet the Afghan representative, and the Governor of Chakansur, Akhundzada Fakir Muhammad Khan, abandoning all hope of amicable settlement, occupied Deh Dost Muhammad in Miankangi on 6th July 1902. Persia was reminded by the British Government of her obligations under Article 6 of the Treaty of 1857, and on 24th July 1902, the Persian Government asked for British intervention. His Highness the Amir agreed to a settlement of Seistan disputes by British arbitration, and an arbitrator was duly appointed. Persia, in accepting arbitration, laid down as a condition thereof that both the arbitral award and the final decision of His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should be in accordance with the terms of the Goldsmid award.

30. In the meantime, owing to long continued drought in the catchment area of the Helmand, the river during 1902 was of abnormally small volume, and scarcity of water in Seistan, occurring just at the time when mutual relations were strained, led to irrigation works being carried out on both sides to injure each other.

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31. In view of the importance which was attached by the Persian Government to the trivial incidents of this period, it is perhaps necessary to describe what occurred in some detail.

32. About the beginning of August 1902, the Helmand fell so low that the whole river was absorbed by the canal at Rudbar, and none found its way down the main bed beyond the Rudbar band. Such a thing had never been known before.* The dry river bed presented a most unusual appearance, and Major Benn, on visiting it, reported that the summer wind had banked up high sandhills across the bed, and made it difficult to distinguish it from the surrounding country.

*Twice before the Helmand is said to have dried up as far as Kila-i-Fath, but only for a few days in each case. A. H. McMAHON.

33. Such was the state of affairs until the 22nd September, when a flood down the Helmand reached the Band-i-Seistan. This, by the accumulation of sand on it, had become so staunch that it diverted the whole river into the Rud-i-Seistan, and no water found its way through the band until the 24th, when a crowd of cultivators prepared a way for it onwards through the sandhills formed in the riverbed. The Shahgul band (*i.e.*, the band across the Rud-i-Pariun at the mouth of the Ju-i-Afghan) like the Band-i-Seistan, owing to the sand banked against it, diverted the whole river through the Ju-i-Afghan into the Nad Ali channel, and for many days none found its way through the band into the Rud-i-Pariun.

34. Tamarisk bands, when made in the ordinary way, allow half the volume of a river or canal to percolate through them. Percolation can be further restricted to any extent by strengthening the bands with earth. Bands are made to divert water into a small channel, such as the Nahr-i-Sultani, &c, and do not of course turn off half the whole stream, as the amount they can divert is naturally limited to the capacity of the channel which takes off at that point.

35. The Afghans now demanded that, in accordance with custom, the Band-i-Seistan should not be allowed to divert more than half the volume of the Helmand into the Rud-i-Seistan, but the Persians refused. At the same time, the Persians demanded that the Shahgul Band should only divert half the volume of the river at that place into the Nad Ali channel. This the Afghans refused, and, owing to the ill-feeling existing between them, both sides began a series of retaliatory works.

36. The Afghans opened out an old cutting from the Helmand, at a point about five miles above the Band-i-Seistan, to feed the important Jaroki canal, which had been hitherto taken off at about five miles below the Band-i-Seistan. This cut is now known as the Nahr-i-Sultani.

37. The Persians, in retaliation, turned out a gang of some thousand armed labourers, and hastily excavated a new channel called the Naobar-i-Puza Jang Jah, to outflank the Shahgul Band and turn the river into the Rud-i-Pariun. The Afghans, in their turn, threatened to band the river above the Naobar-i-Puza Jang Jah and turn the water into the Jaroki.

38. The Nahr-i-Sultani and Naobar-i-Puza Jang Jah were each finished in about a month; but before they could be made use of, and before further acts of retaliation could be carried out, an unusually early winter flood came down the Helmand, which, early in December, completely demolished the Band-i-Seistan, the Shahgul Band, and the new bands at the mouths of the Nahr-i-Sultani and Naobar-i-Puza Jang Jah. It filled the Rud-i-Seistan, the Rud-i-Pariun, and the Nad Ali channels, and re-established the normal water conditions of Seistan.

39. During the course of the above disputes, the Persian officials in Seistan represented to His Britannic Majesty's Consul in Seistan that the restrictions laid down, as regards new irrigation works in the Goldsmid award, applied to the whole course of the Helmand River up to its source. The Government of India, on being referred to by Major Benn, replied (their telegram No. 2335, dated 25th August 1902) that "Goldsmid's remarks cannot be held to apply to any part of the Helmand other than that with which he was dealing, *viz.*, the part which forms the boundary".

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History of Helmand in 1903 and 1904.

40. Normal conditions as regards water obtained throughout the country, except in the Hamun area, on the arrival of this Mission in Seistan at the beginning of February 1903. A high river, in the spring of 1903, refilled the Hamun area which had completely dried up in 1902, a thing hitherto unknown in Seistan, and brought it to its normal height.

41. The Band-i-Seistan was reconstructed as usual, in the autumn of 1903, but no necessity was found for reconstructing the Shahgul Band, as the Nad Ali channel was drawing a sufficient volume of water. No water disputes occurred during 1903. The Afghans completed the Nahr-i-Sultani, and so far developed it as to irrigate, by it, the whole cultivated tract on the right bank of the river between the Band-i-Seistan and the Shela-i-Charkh.

42. I strongly advised the Persians to close the Naobar-i-Puza Jang Jah as likely to divert the whole Helmand into it, to their own injury. It was, therefore, closed by substantial bands.

43. In 1904, the Helmand was not so high as the preceding year. The Afghans reconstructed, in July, the Shahgul Band, and made a band, also, across the Helmand at the mouth of the Nahr-i-Sultani.

44. No disputes worth mentioning regarding water arose during the year between Persians and Afghans, but alarming reports were brought through Russian agency to the notice of the Persian Government regarding the band at the Nahr-i-Sultani. The Persian Commissioner was instructed to present to me a formal protest. In doing so, he said the Afghans had no right to make any bands above the Band-i-Kohak. I was able to point out that the Nahr-i-Sultani, even with its band, was only then drawing one-hundredth part of the Helmand, and that the band, therefore, was not in contradiction to the terms of the Goldsmid award.

45. Unless a British officer had been on the spot in this case to give a definite opinion as to the actual facts, I have no doubt that a great deal of fuss would have been made, leading to much correspondence and misunderstanding. If any proof is necessary to show that the Nahr-i-Sultani Band was not depriving Persian Seistan of her requisite supply of water, I may here note that, at the time of their protest, the Persians had not begun their annual reconstruction of the Band-i-Kohak. This was not begun until 1st September, an unusually late date.

Results of observations and enquiries of the Seistan Mission.

46. I come now to the results of the observations and measurements made by this Mission in the matter of Seistan water and land. The measurements of the volume of the Helmand, and its branches, made during 1903 and 1904, show that the relative volumes are fairly constant, the effect of the Band-i-Seistan being to secure for the Rud-i-Seistan very nearly half the water of the Helmand at the band during the earlier and more important part of the sowing time of spring crops, when the river is slowly rising from its minimum. When the winter floods carry away the band, the Rud-i-Seistan and the Nad Ali channel draw much the same proportion of the supply, varying from one-tenth to one-fifth of the whole volume, the balance going down the main, or Pariun, stream. In very high flood, the Nad Ali channel draws more than the Rud-i-Seistan.

47. During the flood season, there is generally too much water everywhere, and questions of water division do not arise. It will suffice, therefore, for the purpose of this enquiry, to deal only with the river during the critical time of the year, when the river is low, and when water is wanted for the sowing of the spring crops. In Seistan this period extends from the 21st September to the 21st March—*vide* paragraph 58 below.

Any division of water arrived at on the basis of spring crop cultivation would apply equally to autumn crop cultivation in abnormal summers, when a low river may make the correct distribution of water a matter of importance.

48. It has been ascertained from observations made that, in normal years, throughout that season of the year (during sowing of the spring crops), the average volume of the Helmand at Bandar-i-Kamal Khan is 4,200 cusecs.

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The following statement of the ten-day averages of the Helmand volume, in a normal year, will show how this figure is arrived at :—

Period.	Average of daily discharges at Bandar-i-Kamal Khan.
September 21st to 30th	... 2,162 cusecs.
October 1st to 10th	2,360 „
„ 11th to 20th	2,502 „
„ 21st to 31st	2,442 „
November 1st to 10th	2,612 „
„ 11th to 20th	2,966 „
„ 21st to 30th	3,481 „
December 1st to 10th	3,161 „
„ 11th to 20th	3,062 „
„ 21st to 31st	3,252 „
January 1st to 10th	3,450 „
„ 11th to 20th	4,420 „
„ 21st to 31st	4,280 „
February 1st to 10th	5,110 „
„ 11th to 20th	5,525 „
„ 21st to 28th	5,800 „
March 1st to 10th	6,750 „
„ 11th to 20th	...*12,100 „
Total	... 75,435 „
Average	... 4,191 „ or roughly 4,200.

49. During the above period, the average volume taken off by the Afghan canals between Bandar-i-Kamal Khan and Kohak, including the Nahr-i-Sultani, is about 294 cusecs, as follows :—

By the Mirabad† canal	27 cusecs.
„ „ Dak-i-dila „	36 „
„ „ Kila-i-Fath „	44 „
„ „ Deh Dost Muhammad canal	27 „
„ „ Mirak canal	27 „
„ „ Khwabgah „	27 „
„ „ Sultani „	106 „
Total	294 „

50. The water which passes down the river below Bandar-i-Kamal Khan at this season is thus appropriated :—

(1) *To the Afghans*—

By canals above Band-i-Seistan as above	7/100 ths.
„ „ on the Nad Ali channel	7/100 ths.
Total ...	14/100 ths.

(2) *To the Persians*—

By the Rud-i-Seistan	48/100 ths.
„ canals from the Rud-i-Pariun	8/100 ths.
„ „ „ „ Nad Ali channel	7/100 ths.
Total ...	63/100 ths.
(3) Flows through the Rud-i-Pariun into the Hamun	23/100 ths.

* This sudden rise may cause comment in a statement of normal volumes, but it must be remembered that a heavy sudden rise always takes place from, or about, the middle of March.

† These canals, though shown in this list, actually take off above Bandar-i-Kamal Khan at Kila-i-Mir, but the lands they irrigate are below Bandar-i-Kamal Khan.

A. H. McMahon.

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We thus see that, from Bandar-i-Kamal Khan downwards to the Band-i-Seistan, the Afghans take off only $\frac{7}{100}$ths of the whole river above the Band-i-Seistan, and an equal amount below it, whereas the Persians at, or below, the Band-i-Seistan take off $\frac{63}{100}$ths of the whole volume of the Helmand which passes Bandar-i-Kamal Khan; and that the Persians are only able to utilise $\frac{8}{100}$ths of the water which goes down the Pariun, the remainder flowing on into the Hamun.

51. As regards the Helmand from Bandar-i-Kamal Khan upwards to Rudbar, we find that there are the following Afghan canals (not included in the above calculations) whose volumes, during the spring crop season, are recorded below :—

Rudbar canal	...	25 cusecs.
Chahar Burjak canal	...	30 „
Bandar-i-Kamal Khan, old canal	...	16 „
Bandar-i-Kamal Khan, new canal	...	12 „
TOTAL	...	83 „

The Rudbar canal actually takes off at Pulalak; the Chahar Burjak canal at Puza Mashi; and the two Bandar-i-Kamal Khan canals opposite Chahar Burjak. It is important to note that the Chahar Burjak and the Bandar-i-Kamal Khan old canals are both capable of very large future extension, which would irrigate lands below Kila-i-Fath and in Tarakun, respectively. The Afghans are not likely to be able, by themselves, to effect anything like the full amount of possible extension; but, even with their present methods, they could draw off a very appreciable portion of the volume of the Helmand at the time of low river, thereby largely affecting the volume available below Bandar-i-Kamal Khan.

If we consider the whole amount of water taken by Persians and Afghans respectively, in the spring crop season, from Rudbar downwards, we find that the volume of the Helmand (calculated at the head of the Rudbar canal at Pulalak) is appropriated as follows :—

By Afghans ...	16/100ths
„ Persians	62/100ths
Flows unused into the Hamun	22/100ths

52. Although the Persians use this large proportion of the volume of the Helmand, it must not be supposed for a moment that they really require so much water for their cultivation. A large portion is wasted * owing to their careless system of irrigation, and, as I will endeavour to prove, a considerably smaller supply of water would amply suffice for their actual requirements.

* This waste by flooding fallowlands does much injury by causing such lands to get salt. It, moreover, causes great inconvenience by the flooding of roads and paths.
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53. Our measurements and observations have clearly proved that the average "duty" of water in Persian Seistan, or, in other words, the amount of land irrigated by a fixed quantity of water, amounts, during the season of spring crops, to 53 acres of land to one cusec of water.

54. The average spring crop duty of the four big Punjab perennial canals for 1901-02 works out at 173 acres of land to one cusec of water. Applying the Punjab scale to Persian Seistan, the 141,000 acres (the normal area) of spring crop cultivation would require only about 815 cusecs, *i.e.*, less than $\frac{1}{5}$th of the volume of the Helmand at Bandar-i-Kamal Khan (4,200 cusecs).

55. It should be remembered, also, that not only does the cool, fine soil of Seistan require less water than Punjab soil, but the cold Seistan winter, with its showers of rain, and occasional snowfall, would enable Seistan to do with less surface watering than would be the case in the Punjab at that season. The "duty" ought, therefore, to be greater than in the Punjab.

56. It is, therefore, reasonable to state that Persian Seistan could amply irrigate considerably more than its present area of cultivation with $\frac{1}{5}$th only of the volume of the Helmand at Bandar-i-Kamal Khan, if husbanded and

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distributed with but ordinary care. One-third of the Helmand, *i.e.*, 1,400 cusecs, would similarly suffice for the irrigation of no less than 242,000 acres.

57. The normal area of spring crop cultivation in Persian Seistan is, now-a-days, 141,000 acres, and admits of large extension. The present cultivated area of Afghan Seistan is only some 22,700 acres. The area capable of irrigation and cultivation on the right bank of the Helmand is, however, about equal to that in Persian Seistan. A vast area of land, once cultivated but now deserted, in the Tarakun and Hauzdar tracts is, moreover, capable of irrigation and cultivation from the Helmand, by construction of irrigation works of no very great magnitude. Much of this tract is situated in Persian territory.

58. The period of sowing for spring crops in Seistan is an unusually long one. It may be said to extend from the autumn equinox, on 21st September, to the spring equinox, on 21st March, *i.e.*, the Naoroz. The Helmand, during this period, is recovering from its annual minimum by a steady gradual rise in volume from the beginning of September to Xmas. From Xmas to Naoroz, the river increases by rapid rises to a very large volume. After 21st March, watering of the later sown spring crops and sowing of autumn crops continue simultaneously without detriment to each other. The unusually long period of sowing in Seistan is a fact to be carefully remembered. In this report, this sowing period is called the "spring crop season".

59. The Helmand reaches its maximum annual volume about the end of April, and is reduced to its annual minimum by about the end of August.

60. The Band-i-Seistan is constructed, annually, towards the end of August. The Shahgul Band is reconstructed, as a rule, a little earlier than this. In normal years both bands are widely breached by the rising river about Xmas time, and then cease to serve their original purpose. All the various canals leading from the Helmand, both those above and those below Bandar-i-Kamal Khan, occasionally necessitate bands across a portion, or even the whole channel, of the Helmand. There is no fixed custom about the time for constructing them. They are only constructed when required or when feasible, and are never constructed on the large scale of the Band-i-Seistan and Shahgul Band.

61. A few remarks are necessary regarding the future possibilities in Persian and Afghan Seistan, respectively, of large extension of cultivation, as preceding remarks apply chiefly to such moderate extensions as can be carried out from existing irrigation works. The simplest method of arriving at a fair understanding of this point is to take the gross areas of land in each country, which are roughly as follows:—

In Afghan Seistan—			
Tarakun tract	2,697	square	miles.
Elsewhere	1,510	„	„
Total	4,207	„	„
In Persian Seistan—			
Hauzdar tract	1,139	„	„
Elsewhere	1,728	„	„
Total	2,867	„	„
GRAND TOTAL ...	7,073	„	„

Afghan exceeds Persian land in the proportion of 4 to 3; but when the proportionately larger area of uncommandable dasht and sandhills in Afghan territory is taken into consideration, we find that the total culturable areas in Afghan and Persian Seistan may be treated as approximately equal.

In one portion of the above, *viz.*, the Tarakun and Hauzdar tract, the Afghan area is double that of the Persian, but the Persian share consists of

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superior land which has been, in old times, richly cultivated, whereas the bulk of the Afghan share has never been cultivated in the past. It is, however, nearer the head of the water-supply.

Taking the above facts into consideration, and allowing for the superior claims of present cultivation to water, the following rough division of water would very fairly meet all possible future requirements:—

⅓rd of the Helmand to Afghan territory on the right bank below Bandar-i-Kamal Khan.

⅓rd „ „ „ Persian „ „ left „ „ Band-i-Seistan.

⅓rd „ „ „ the Tarakun and Hauzdar tracts in the proportion of half to each.

This arrangement would thus give one-half of the whole Helmand to Persia and the other half to Afghanistan.

Result of certain enquiries into the history of Helmand previous to 1872.

62. The above remarks deal with the history of the Helmand from 1872, and its present conditions only. To obtain the necessary data on which to base any reliable conclusions as to what the river is likely to do in the future, and the consequences thereof, it is necessary to extend certain enquiries further back than 1872.

63. These show us, in the first place, that the river, from time immemorial, has been subject to sudden and important changes of its course. Like all silt laden streams in a deltaic region, the courses of its main channel and branches run along the tops of ridges, the height of which is ever increasing, and from which the ground slopes downwards on either side. It takes but little to divert the stream to either side, and we find that the main bed of the Helmand, after entering its delta, has flowed from time to time in many different directions.

64. What it has done in the past it will do again in the future, unless controlled, and we now already know of several points where, at any day during the flood time, the Helmand, either through some ill-advised impediment or outlet, or through natural causes, might divert itself into a totally different channel. It will suffice to point out the principal places where this might happen, and where past warnings indicate that this is likely to happen.

(1) Bandar-i-Kamal Khan. In the flood of 1885 a large portion of the Helmand entered the God-i-Zirreh from here, by an old Helmand bed. It may easily do so again, and revert entirely to its old bed.

(2) From the end of the cliffs which confine the Helmand on the right bank near Kila-i-Fath, to the Band-i-Seistan, there are many places where the river has only to cut through a low natural ridge of alluvial soil to escape into the large low-lying tracts which extend to, and beyond, Sar-o-tar and Amiran. Big floods have on several occasions passed over this ridge, but, so far in modern times, have never seriously breached it. In former times the river once went down to that tract, and may do so again.

(3) Near Shahgul, where the Helmand, in 1903, broke the protection embankments, and a large portion of the river found its way through Khadang. This might easily become the main channel, and leave both the Nad Ali channel and the Rud-i-Pariun dry.

(4) The gradual rise of the level* of the Rud-i-Seistan above the bed of the Helmand justifies the supposition that, some day, no band which the Persians will be capable of making, will draw water into that canal.

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* It must also be remembered that the construction of the Band-i-Seistan, year after year, has caused a natural bar to form across the river, and on this bar the band is now made. The bar is several feet above the natural level of the river bed above or below this point. Failure to erect the band any year, or other cause, might easily cause the river to scour through this bar, and the task of making a band there might become impracticable.

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65. Our enquiries beyond 1872, secondly, establish the fact that, in the past 75 years,* *i.e.*, 1830 to 1904, there have been two years of abnormal floods (1830 and 1885), several years of great floods, very many years of normal flood, and only three years of abnormally low river, when no water at all for a short period in the summer reached the Band-i-Kohak, *viz.*,† 1838, 1871, and 1902. The last one was the worst of the three. Curiously enough in no one of these three years was the subsequent sowing season of spring crops injuriously affected or did the spring crops, on which the welfare of Seistan depends, suffer.

* The figures of the past 35 years, of which we have more detailed information, work out as follows:—

	Years.
Extraordinary flood	2
Great flood	5
High ,, ...	5
Comparatively low river	7
When river dried in summer ...	2
Normal flood	18
	35

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† Exact year not quite certain. It was between 1838 and 1844.

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66. In only three years out of the past thirty-five was water deficient‡ at winter time for spring crop sowing, *viz.*, 1877, 1878, and 1880. This is a fact which must be carefully kept in mind in dealing with the Seistan water question.

‡ This was the natural consequence of a long and widespread cycle of dry years, 1863 to 1877.

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67. Seistan suffers, therefore, more from excess of water than deficiency thereof. For each one of the above three years of deficiency, there have been very many in which crops have suffered largely from floods, not only owing to direct inundation from the rivers, but from the Hamun itself rising and overflowing the protection embankments, on which alone a large area of Persian Seistan depends for safety from inundation. In the two years of abnormal flood in 1830 and 1885, not only all crops, but also all the buried stores of grain from previous harvests were destroyed.

68. In the foregoing remarks it has been necessary to enter somewhat into details. In case these may have obscured any of the more important salient points, it is advisable, even at the risk of a little repetition, to summarise the principal facts and data.

Summary of general conclusions.

69. The data and axioms available for the solution of this problem may be briefly defined as follows:—

(1) No definite disputes can be specifically stated as now requiring individual settlement. The water question is one of broad principles.

(2) The Persian Government vaguely claim that the Afghans have no right to erect bands above the Band-i-Seistan, as these must diminish the present volume of water at that place.

(3) The Afghan Government do not admit that there is any water question in dispute, as their geographical position makes them sole owners of the whole Helmand above the Band-i-Seistan.

(4) The present arbitration is restricted by the condition that the award must be in accordance with the terms of the Goldsmid award.

(5) That award, and the interpretation thereof, as ruled by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1873, which now forms an integral portion of it, are stated in paragraphs 8 to 13 above.

(6) The only thing that appears absolutely necessary to be now done is to define the term "water requisite for irrigation on both banks of the Helmand".

(7) It is reasonable to assume that by irrigation is meant not only present irrigation, but possible future extension of irrigation and cultivation on both banks.

(8) To estimate the requisite supply of water, we must first calculate the culturable areas for which it is required on each bank. It is impossible to get an accurate estimate if we restrict our calculations to only lands on both banks below Band-i-Seistan, the point where the Helmand now happens to reach Persian

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territory. An accurate estimate must include all Afghan and Persian lands in Seistan, and Seistan may be defined as the tract comprising the whole Helmand delta, *i.e.*, lands on both banks of the Helmand from Bandar-i-Kamal Khan, downwards, including the Tarakun and Hauzdar tract.

(9) The requisite supply of water, when estimated, cannot safely be expressed in terms of the volume of the Helmand at Band-i-Seistan, because the Afghans, by irrigation works above that point, can divert more and more of the river, and, thus, very seriously diminish the volume at that point. Moreover, the past history of the Helmand shows that the river has always been subject to sudden and important changes of its course. Natural causes or ill-advised irrigation works might at any time divert the river into a new channel and prevent any water at all reaching the Band-i-Seistan at Kohak.

Any division of the Helmand water representing the "requisite supply" should, therefore, be expressed in terms of the volume of the river above the point where water is first diverted to irrigate Seistan lands. This point, at present, has been fixed at Bandar-i-Kamal Khan.

An award, to be of really permanent value, should provide for the contingency of that point being moved further up the river.

(10) The question of water for irrigation may be said, in Seistan, to need consideration only during the season for spring crops (*vide* paragraph 58 above), *viz.*, 21st September to 21st March, when the river is low. During the rest of the year, except in very low and abnormal years, Seistan suffers from excess, and not deficiency, of water. In such abnormal years, any division of water based on requirements of spring crop cultivation would fully meet the case of autumn crop requirements (*vide* paragraph 47 above).

(11) At present, during the season for spring crops, the Persians take off 63/100ths and the Afghans only 14/100ths of the whole Helmand.* Of the latter amount, the Afghans take off one-half (7/100ths) between Bandar-i-Kamal Khan and Band-i-Seistan (Kohak), and the other half below the Band-i-Seistan.

* As measured at Bandar-i-Kamal Khan, paragraphs 48 and 50 above.

(12) The Persians waste a large portion of the water they take off. It has been ascertained that 1/5th of the water of the Helmand (as measured at Bandar-i-Kamal Khan) would, with proper care, amply suffice to irrigate more than their present area of annual cultivation during the season for spring crops (*vide* paragraphs 51 to 56 above).

(13) Taking into consideration future possible extensions of cultivation in Seistan, it has been ascertained that the following division of the Helmand would meet the requirements of all culturable tracts in Persian and Afghan Seistan :—

one-third to Afghan territory on the right bank of the Helmand ;

one-third to the present inhabited area of Persian Seistan, *i.e.*, the tracts irrigated from and below the Band-i-Seistan (Kohak);

one-third to the Tarakun and Hauzdar tract jointly owned by Persia and Afghanistan.

In other words the Persian and Afghan share of the Helmand might fairly be fixed at one-half of the whole volume for each.

(14) Under the existing conditions of Seistan, where outside influence prevents mutual or amicable settlement of water questions, no award will succeed in obviating future misunderstandings and friction, unless a competent officer of irrigation experience be appointed as a permanent referee, who can give a definite opinion in each case of dispute. He need not necessarily have

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any executive authority, as it would suffice for him to give an opinion in each case, and, when necessary, take the requisite steps to have the facts of any case brought to the notice of the Government concerned. He would, in short, be a permanent arbitrator on water questions.

(15) If any definition of Persian right to water is made in the award in favour of Persia which in any way restricts the general rights to the Helmand which geographical position has otherwise given Afghanistan, it follows that Persia is not necessarily entitled to alienate rights thus given to her, without Afghan consent.

(16) Finally, in framing any water award, the fact must be kept carefully in mind that, if it is to have any chance of future success, the definition of water rights and division of water must be worded in terms which both Afghans and Persians understand, and which involve no new or complicated methods of calculation or distribution. The complicated systems of division so easily carried out by a skilled irrigation staff, elsewhere, are not at present applicable to Seistan. Divisions of shares stated in terms of cusecs would not be understood, and would not be workable. A glance at the statement in paragraph 48 will show the difficulty of this.

The Afghans and Persians of Seistan do, however, thoroughly understand division of water in terms of shares of the total volume of a stream. In their system of bands and canals, they have a very shrewd instinctive knowledge of the proportion of water any channel takes off from the main stream, and of how to alter that proportion.

Consideration of form of water award:

70. It now only remains to consider the form of arbitral award most suited to meet the requirements of the case. This, apart from other reasons, is a matter of extraordinary difficulty owing to the attitude of the countries concerned. Neither are, themselves, fully awake to the dangers which threaten the question of water-supply in Seistan.

71. The local Persians are stolidly indifferent on the subject, as they do not look beyond existing conditions, and the view of Persian officialdom, if left to themselves, is probably very accurately defined in the Shah's own words—"the water has come and the matter is finished" (*vide* despatch from Sir A. Hardinge, Tehran, to the Marquess of Lansdowne, No. 180, dated the 29th December 1902, and enclosures). The Russians, however, have left nothing undone thoroughly to alarm the Persian Government on this subject, and hence the desire of the Persian Government, as expressed through their Persian Commissioner, to get their future water rights clearly and definitely safeguarded in my award. The Russians will undoubtedly continue to alarm the Persian Government in the future. They will closely criticise any award that may be given, and seize any opening it may afford of influencing Persia to appeal against it.

72. The Afghans, on the other hand, contend that no water questions are in dispute. They claim all the Helmand above Kohak, and will resent any attempt to restrict their supposed rights thereto. They understand the advantage which their geographical position gives them, and signs are not wanting that they will, some day, try to score off the Persians by interfering with their present water-supply. They fail to understand how their attempt to do so may endanger their own supply.

73. Two forms of award present themselves: one which merely reiterates the Goldsmid award, with such definitions as may appear necessary, and which leaves matters practically in their present condition; another which boldly attempts to tackle the real difficulties of the question, and, while pointing out future dangers, does its best to provide for them.

The former is only likely to prove of a temporary nature: the latter may have some chance of more permanent duration. Which are we to choose?

74. If existing conditions only are to be considered, then $\frac{1}{3}$rd of the Helmand suffices for present Persian Seistan. If future contingencies are to be provided for, we must allow for the re-cultivation of the Tarakun and

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Hauzdar tracts. If the Afghans irrigate Tarakun, the Persians will undoubtedly claim water for the Hauzdar tract. One-third of the Helmand has been shown sufficient for both these tracts. By giving one-half of that to Persia, she would become entitled to $\frac{1}{3}$rd plus $\frac{1}{6}$th=$\frac{1}{2}$ of the whole river.

The simplest solution of the whole water problem would appear to be to define forthwith the Persian right to one-half of the whole Helmand at the point where it enters Seistan. The decision of this question depends largely on political aspects of the case. In regard to these, the Government of India, on whom the task of enforcing the award will chiefly fall, are the best judges.

Draft Awards.

75. I attach four drafts of water award for consideration. Each consists of two parts, *i.e.*, Preliminary remarks, and the Award itself. Each draft, in succession, exceeds the previous one in general scope.

76. *Draft A.*—The preliminary remarks of this draft form the bases of those in all the other drafts. Paragraphs 1 to 7 are common to all four drafts. Draft A is framed to deal with present conditions only, and does not specifically provide for various future contingencies. All the five Articles of this award are common to the other drafts.

It does little more than add the Secretary of State's ruling, of 1873, to Sir Frederick Goldsmid's award. It leaves things, otherwise, much as they are at present, but provides for future disputes by the appointment of a permanent arbitrator.

77. *Draft B.*—This goes further, and defines the amount of water requisite for Persian requirements, based, however, only on the present inhabited portion of Persian Seistan irrigable from and below the Band-i-Kohak. It allows for extension of present cultivation, and gives Persia the right to $\frac{1}{3}$rd of the Helmand.

78. *Draft C.*—This goes still further, and provides for the possible future irrigation of the Tarakun and Hauzdar tracts. The right of Perisa to a requisite supply of water (*i.e.*, $\frac{1}{6}$th of the Helmand) for her share of those tracts is recognised and provided for, but only in the event of their being hereafter brought under irrigation.

79. *Draft D*—Tackles the whole question boldly as a whole, and gives Persia one-half of the Helmand forthwith, whether the Hauzdar tract is brought under irrigation or not.

80. Great care has been taken to avoid unnecessary details in each draft, and especially those which might create unnecessary suspicions, give rise to needless objections or quibbles, or be unnecessarily distasteful to one or other party.

As an instance of this, it will be observed that in all four drafts no calculation of water is expressed in terms of cusecs [*vide* paragraph 69 (16)]. Nor again are the proportionate shares of the Helmand, now used by either side, stated in the awards. To do so, would only give Persia a pretext for claiming a share of water based on custom, quite ignoring her own condition that the Goldsmid award is not to be departed from.

81. I have fully recognised the fact that, in the ratio that Persian rights are more and more definitely defined in each draft, the Afghans, with their exaggerated ideas of their own rights, will express the greater dissatisfaction. I have tried to reduce the chance of this to a minimum, but the task is not an easy one.

82. Even an Afghan, however, must acknowledge, when it is brought home to him, as it should be, that any settlement which restricts Persian right to water to certain limits is in the present case a distinct gain to Afghanistan who has hitherto taken off only $\frac{16}{100}$ths of the whole river from Rudbar downwards, while the Persians have taken $\frac{62}{100}$ths. Any deferred settlement of the question might have to recognise the Persian right to what custom may have entitled them to, and not, as in the present case, to their requisite supply of water only. This argument will be made the most of in the official communication conveying my formal copy of the award to the Afghan Government.

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83. Persia cannot reasonably grumble at any settlement which defines and safeguards her right to a requisite supply of water, at the threatened loss of which she evinces such alarm.

84. No award will necessarily much affect the actual distribution of water in practice, at any rate, not for a considerable period of time. The Afghans will gradually take off more water; but unless the Helmand is properly controlled above Seistan, or unless from natural causes, or ill-advised or malicious irrigation works, the river is diverted into a new channel, the Persians will always be able to take more water from the Hemand than they want to use without depriving the Afghans of the amount they require.

85. I trust that enough has been said to explain the water problem, and to enable the Government of India to decide which form of solution thereof is most suitable. The details connected with the problem have, I fear, made this memorandum a somewhat lengthy one. I have endeavoured throughout to effect at least one result, *i.e.*, that, whichever award may be selected, it will obviate any future deadlock in Seistan on water questions. Should draft A, for instance, be selected, and the opening of a new canal, hereafter, into Tarakun raise the question of Persian right to water for Hauzdar, the arrangement proposed in Draft C or D could be brought into effect through the medium of the permanent arbitrator, and so on.

A. H. McMahon, *Colonel*,

British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission.

Arbitral Award on the Seistan water question.

Draft A.

Preliminary remarks.

1. General Sir Frederick Goldsmid, as Arbitrator between Persia and Afghanistan, was called upon to settle the question of rights to land and water of Persia and Afghanistan in Seistan. He delivered an arbitral award on both points in 1872, which was confirmed by His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and accepted by the Persian and Afghan Governments in 1873.

2. At the time of the above award, the Helmand River had one main distributary channel in Seistan, *i.e.*, the Rud-i-Seistan, at the mouth of which, in order to divert sufficient water into this Rud, was a tamarisk band known as the Band-i-Kohak or the Band-i-Seistan. The Helmand River from thence, onwards, flowed in one channel past Nad Ali, and along what is now known as the Sikhsar into the Naizar and Hamun. In 1896, a large flood caused the river to burst out for itself a new main channel which left the old one near Shahgul, and is now known as the Rud-i-Pariun.

3. Various disputes regarding water between Persian and Afghan Seistan, which were caused by changes in the course of canals and in the course of the main river, have arisen since 1872. My enquiries show that these have, until recently, always been mutually and amicably settled by the responsible officials concerned on both sides, *i.e.*, the Governors of Seistan and Chakansur. These officials, who thoroughly understood each other's water requirements, have always shown great tact and skill in settling water disputes to the mutual satisfaction of both countries.

4. This satisfactory state of affairs might have continued indefinitely, but during the last few years outside influences have found their way into Seistan which have hindered the independent settlement of disputes; and, by estranging the relations between the peoples concerned, have rendered amicable and mutual settlement of water difficulties no longer possible.

It is a question for consideration whether this clause should stand as it is, be modified, or omitted altogether. It represents the actual facts, but has the defect of calling a spade a spade.
A. H. McMahon.

5. A series of small, and in themselves unimportant, water questions arose between 1900 and 1902 which, by reason of estranged relations, caused misunderstanding and increased ill-feeling, until matters were brought to a crisis by

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further disputes arising from abnormal deficiency of water in the Helmand in 1902. This led to the present reference to the arbitration of the British Government.

6. The condition under which the present arbitration has been agreed to by the Governments of Persia and Afghanistan is that the award should be in accordance with the terms of Sir Frederick Goldsmid's award.

7. In framing my award I am, therefore, restricted by the above condition.

8. Sir Frederick Goldsmid's award on the water question was as follows :— "It is to be clearly understood that no works are to be carried out on either side calculated to interfere with the requisite supply of irrigation on both banks of the Helmand". Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in his capacity of final confirming authority of that award, further laid down, in 1873, that the above clause should not be understood to apply either to existing canals, or to old or disused canals that it may be desired to put in proper repair, nor would it interefere with the excavation of new canals, provided that the requisite supply on both banks is not diminished.

The exact wording of that ruling is not here quoted. In view of Sir F. Goldsmid's definition "requisite supply for *irrigation on both banks* of the Helmand", it appears justifiable to read the Secretary of State's ruling in the same light.
The difficulty of not doing so will be seen by the further explanation of this definition given in paragraph 8 of preliminary remarks of Draft B. If considered preferable, paragraph 8 of Draft B might be used here.
A. H. McMahon.

9. The above award is so definite that it is unnecessary to define it further, and I, therefore, give the following award :—

Award.

1. No irrigation works are to be carried out on either side calculated to interfere with the requisite supply of water for irrigation on both banks of the river, but both sides have the right, within their own territories, to maintain existing canals, to open out old or disused canals, and to make new canals from the Helmand River, provided that the supply of water requisite for irrigation on both sides is not diminished..

2. To enable both sides to satisfy themselves that this award is being complied with, a British officer of irrigation experience should be appointed as permanent arbitrator in Seistan. He will give an opinion, when required by either party, on any case of doubt or dispute over water questions that may arise. He will, when necessary, take steps to bring the real facts of any case to the notice of the Government concerned. He will be able also to call the attention of either party to any important indications of threatening danger to their water supply arising from natural causes or their own irrigation works. To enable this officer to properly fulfil the functions of his office, free access should be given to him, by either side, to the Helmand river and its branches and the heads of canals leading therefrom.

I have here attempted to define his duties and limit his responsibilities.
A. H. McMahon.

It is a question for consideration whether this stipulation should form part of the award, or be settled in subsequent communication with the Afghan and Persian Governments
A. H. McMahon.

3. The maintenance of the Band-i-Kohak is of great importance to the welfare of Persian Seistan. It is possible that the deepening of the river bed at and below the site of the present band may necessitate moving the band a short distance further up the river. Afghanistan should allow Persia to move this band, if necessary, and grant Persia the right to excavate the short canal required from such new band through Afghan territory to the Rud-i-Seistan. Similarly, should it become necessary for Afghanistan to move the present Shahgul Band across the Rud-i-Pariun somewhat lower down that stream, Persia should (as has been done before) allow Afghanistan right of way for a canal through Persian territory from that band to the Nad Ali channel.

4. * It will be noted that the rights to the Helmand water, which her geographical position naturally gives to Afghanistan as owner of the upper Helmand, have been restricted to the extent stated above in favour of Persia in accordance with Sir Frederick

* This clause applies with greater effect to the other draft awards.
A. H. McMahon.

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Goldsmid's award. It follows, therefore, that Persia has no right to alienate to any other Power the water rights thus acquired without the consent of Afghanistan.

5. I cannot close this award without a word of warning to both countries concerned. The past history of the Helmand river in Seistan shows that it has always been subject to sudden and important changes in its course which have, from time to time, diverted the whole river into a new channel, and rendered useless all the then existing canal systems. Such changes are liable to occur in the future, and great care should, therefore, be exercised in the opening out of new canals, or the enlargement of old canals leading from the Helmand. Unless this is done with proper precaution, it may cause the river to divert itself entirely at such points, and cause great loss to both countries. This danger applies equally to Afghanistan and Persia.

Draft B.

Preliminary remarks.

Paragraphs 1 to 7 as in draft A.

8. Sir Frederick Goldsmid's award on the water question was as follows:— "It is to be clearly understood that no works are to be carried out on either side calculated to interfere with the requisite supply of irrigation on both banks of the Helmand". Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in his capacity as the final confirming authority of that award, further laid down in 1873 as follows:—"In our opinion the clause referred to in the award cannot be understood as applying either to existing canals or to such old and disused canals as the Afghan Government may wish to put in proper repair, nor would it interfere with the excavation of new canals, provided the requisite supply of water for irrigation on the Persian side is not diminished".

It is hardly necessary to point out that this ruling of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, while defining certain limits for Afghan works, does not restrict the Afghan right, stated by Sir Frederick Goldsmid, to a requisite supply of water also for Afghan cultivation.

9. The above award is so definite that it is unnecessary to make any attempt to define it further, except on one particular point. This award provides that Persia has a right to a requisite supply of water for irrigation. In order to prevent future misunderstanding, it only remains to define what amount of water fairly represents a requisite supply for Persian requirements.

10. From the careful and exhaustive measurements, observations, and enquiries made by this Mission in Seistan, the following facts have been clearly established:—

(*a*) Seistan suffers more from excess than deficiency of water. Far more loss is caused by damage done to land and crops, year after year, by floods than is caused by want of water for irrigation.

(*b*) In only very few exceptional abnormal years of low river has any question of sufficiency of water arisen in Seistan, and then Afghan Seistan has suffered equally with Persian Seistan. Moreover, questions as to the sufficiency of water only prove serious when the spring crop cultivation is concerned when the river is at its lowest, *i.e.*, between the autumn and spring equinoxes, yet it has been ascertained that only in 3 out of the past 35 years has there been any serious deficiency of water in Seistan during that season. It is necessary, therefore, first to consider water requirements during the season of spring crops. Any settlement based on the requirements of that season will meet the case of the remainder of the year also.

(*c*) After carefully calculating the normal volume of the Helmand river during the period between the autumn equinox and the spring equinox, it has been clearly ascertained that one-third of the water which now reaches Seistan at Bandar-i-Kamal Khan would amply suffice for the proper irrigation of all

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existing cultivation in Persian Seistan, and also allow of a large future extension of that cultivation. This would also leave a requisite supply for all Afghan requirements.

11. I therefore give the following award:—

Award.

1. As in draft A.

2. The amount of water requisite for irrigation of Persian lands irrigable from and below the Band-i-Kohak is one-third of the whole volume of the Helmand river which enters Seistan.

Seistan, to which Sir Frederick Goldsmid's award applies, comprises all lands on both banks of the Helmand from Bandar-i-Kamal Khan downwards.

3. Persia is, therefore, entitled to one-third of the whole Helmand river calculated at the point where water is first taken off from it to irrigate lands on either bank situated at or below Bandar-i-Kamal Khan.

4. Any irrigation works constructed by Afghanistan to divert water into Seistan lands, as above defined, must allow of at least one-third of the volume of the whole river being available for Persian use at Band-i-Kohak.

5. As at 2 in draft A.

6. „ „ 3 „ „ „

7. „ „ 4 „ „ „

8. „ „ 5 „ „ „

DRAFT C.

Preliminary remarks.

Paragraphs 1 to 7 as in draft A.

Paragraphs 8 and 9 as in draft B.

Paragraph 10 (*a*) (*b*) (*c*) as in draft B.

Paragraph 10 (*d*). A large area of land in the Tarakun and Hauzdar tracts was once cultivated. A portion of this area lies within Persian territory. It may at some future time be found possible to irrigate these tracts from the Helmand river, and therefore the right of Persia defined* in Sir Frederick Goldsmid's award would extend to a requisite supply of water for the Persian portion of those lands also.

* The irrigation of Tarakun and Hauzdar from the Helmand would bring those lands within the Goldsmid definition of "both banks of the Helmand". The argument of the Government of India stated in paragraph 39 of my memorandum thus falls through.

A. H. MCMAHON.

It† has been ascertained that water amounting to one-sixth of the whole Helmand would suffice properly to irrigate the portion of those lands belonging to Persia.

† If thought preferable, this paragraph from here onwards could read thus:—"It has been ascertained that water amounting to one-third of the whole Helmand river would suffice to properly irrigate the Tarakun and Hauzdar tracts, of which amount one-half (*i.e.*, one-sixth of the Helmand) would suffice to irrigate the Persian portion of the said tracts.

11. I therefore give the following award;—

Award.

1, 2, 3, 4, as in draft B.

5. Should it be hereafter found possible to irrigate from the Helmand the portion of the Tarakun-Hauzdar tract lying within Persian territory, Persia will be entitled to another one-sixth of the volume of the whole Helmand river for the irrigation of that tract. In this case, it is of course understood that

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Persia will pay her proper share of the cost of construction and annual maintenance of such works as may be necessary to bring the above water into Persian territory.

6. As at 2 in draft A.
7. „ „ 3 „ „ „
8. „ „ 4 „ „ „
9. „ „ 5 „ „ "

Draft D.

Preliminary remarks.

* If it is considered preferable to adhere to the exact wording of the ruling by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, then paragraph 8 of draft B should be inserted instead.
A. H. McMahon.

Paragraphs 1 to 7 as in draft A.
Paragraph 8* „ „

9. The above award is so definite that it is unnecessary to attempt to define it further, except in one particular point only, *i.e.*, the supply requisite for irrigation on both banks of the Helmand.

10. It has been ascertained from the careful and exhaustive measurements and observations made by this Mission that the areas of land capable of cultivation in Persian and Afghan territory in Seistan, including the Tarakun and Hauzdar tracts, are approximately equal in extent. Each country, therefore, requires the same amount of water as the other.

11. Persia now takes off all her water for irrigation at and below the Band-i-Kohak. Afghanistan takes off water for Afghan Seistan partly below and partly above that place. It may become desirable or necessary for Afghanistan to take off more and more of her share of water above the Band-i-Kohak. Division of water should, therefore, be calculated according to the volume of the Helmand river at the point where water is first taken off by one or other side for irrigation of Seistan lands.

12. The Seistan lands, to which Sir Frederick Goldsmid's award applies, comprises the country on both banks of the Helmand river at and below Bandar-i-Kamal Khan, including the Tarakun and Hauzdar tracts. Therefore, any division of water should be calculated according to the volume of the Helmand river at the point where water is first taken off for irrigation of lands situated at or below Bandar-i-Kamal Khan.

13. I therefore give the following award :—

Award.

1. As in draft A.

2. The amount of water requisite for irrigation of lands on both banks in Persian and Afghan territory, respectively, is, in each case, one-half of the Helmand river.

3. This division of water should be calculated on the volume of the Helmand river at the highest point where water is taken off by either side to irrigate lands situated at or below Bandar-i-Kamal Khan, including the Tarakun and Hauzdar tracts.

4. Should it, hereafter, be found possible to irrigate the Tarakun and Hauzdar tracts from the Helmand, Persia should be allowed, on payment of her proper share of the cost of construction and annual maintenance of the necessary irrigation works, to receive as much of her share of one-half of the Helmand River as she may wish, and as may be feasible to divert into the Hauzdar tract.

5. Any irrigation works constructed by Afghanistan, above Band-i-Kohak, for lands in Seistan, including the Tarakun tract, must allow of the full Persian share of the Helmand, or, in the case of part of that share being diverted into

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the Hauzdar tract, the balance of the Persian share of the Helmand being available for use at the Band-i-Kohak.

6. As at 2 in draft A.
7. „ „ 3 „ „ „
8. „ „ 4 „ „ „
9. „ „ 5 „ „ „

Foreign Office Press—No. 1539—12-10-04—80.

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2a

MEMORANDUM.

PERSIA.

The Seistan water question.

Letter from Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission, No. 2407, dated the 25th September 1904.

The paper specified in the margin was transmitted to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 41 M., dated the 13th October 1904.

3

Telegram, No. 812, dated Seistan, the 10th (despatched from Robat on 14th) October 1904.

From—COLONEL A. H. MCMAHON, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Following from Tehran :—*Begins.* Your telegram, 1st September. Persian Government have again complained of band which Afghans are building. Could not work be stopped pending settlement of water question, as they attach importance to matter? *Message ends.*

I have replied to-day as follows :—*Begins.* Your telegram, 5th October. Afghans have not touched small band referred to since last August. The river in its annual winter rise has already breached and overtopped it, so there is no justification whatever for Persian complaint. *Ends.*

4

Extract from the diary of Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission, for the period ending the 24th September 1904.

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* * * * * * *

19th September 1904, Camp Kuhak.

* * * * * * *

The Akhundzada returned from Nad Ali to his camp at Khwabgah. He is exercised in mind about rumours of a big canal Sartip Mir Masum Khan has begun at Chah Nima from the Rud-i-Seistan. He thinks this will cross the boundary line southwards, and wants me to prohibit it. I think this incident can be turned to useful account.

20th September, Camp Kohak.—I sent Khan Bahadur Mir Shams Shah to see the Akhundzada, with instructions what to say if the Chah Nima business is mentioned. Naturally enough it was, and the Akhundzada wants to know whether the Sartip's canal is being extended across the boundary line. He feared that, if it did, the Persians would claim a rectification of the line to meet the case of actual occupation. Mir Shams Shah said the question was one of perfect indifference to me, and that I had declined to take any steps in the matter short of final demarcation with permanent boundary pillars, and, if this be deferred, goodness knows what changes may not take place in the extent of effective occupation by the Persians. The Akhundzada then suggested that I should demarcate the straight line to Koh-i-Malik Siah as agreed upon last week. Mir Shams Shah replied that I was now doubtful of the wisdom of doing this, as it would appear to admit obligation to defer demarcation elsewhere. Why not begin first on the line northwards? This puzzled the old gentleman a bit, and he finally begged that I would begin where I liked, and demarcate where I liked, only for goodness sake, not finish up the whole line, and tell him that it is a *fait accompli* before he gets the necessary authority from Kabul to co-operate. This is one more step gained; but Mir Shams Shah said he had no authority from me to promise anything.

21st September, Camp Kohak.—The Akhundzada came and paid me a long visit. He brought a large party with him; no business was discussed. I

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sent him, however, intimation quietly that, in order to help Afghan interests, I would begin demarcation first of the straight line from Band-i-Kohak southwards, and thus obviate all danger of Persian encroachments. I might at any time, however, commence work on the line northwards. I may remark here that the Afghan fears are absolutely groundless, as the Persians cannot possibly get any water from the Rud-i-Seistan across the line without taking it considerably up hill!

* * * * * * *

22nd September, Camp Kohak.—I fixed, some days ago, the site for the first pillar at the Band-i-Kohak, but the high wind has delayed the work of laying out the straight line from there.

23rd September, Camp Kohak.—I have explained the situation to the Yamin, and informed him that I am commencing demarcation. He showed an inclination to have a voice in fixing boundary pillars, but I have made him clearly understand that this would necessitate the Afghans having a similar right, and I decline to permit any arguments on the subject. I had previously told the Akhundzada the same thing, and he fully acquiesced in the wisdom of it. Either Commissioner can, of course, inspect the line and pillars as much as he likes, and I will always be willing to hear their objections regarding any pillar which either of them can prove not to be on the boundary line defined in my award.

24th September, Camp Kohak.—I fixed the sites of several boundary pillars on the straight line. Building work will commence forthwith. It necessitates considerable arrangements and much camel transport, for there is no water to be found on the whole length of about 90 miles, except at one place, *i. e.*, the Shelagh. All water for building, and for the building camp, will have to be brought from a distance. The task of building pillars has been undertaken by Mr. Ward and his irrigation staff.

* * * * * * *

5

(Received on the 17th October 1904 under cover of a letter from His Britannic Majesty' Minister, Tehran, No. 47, dated the 17th September 1904.)

No. 168. Gulahek,
My Lord, 8th September 1904.

I have the honour to report that on being informed by the Government of India that the Amir of Afghanistan had consented to the demarcation of the Seistan frontier, I sent a message to that effect to the Grand Vizier, who expressed his great satisfaction at the news. I at the same time informed His Highness of the representations which the Government of India had made at Kabul respecting the encroachments at Musabad, of which the Persian Government has of late been again making complaints. The Mushir-ed-Dowleh states that the Afghans have encroached not merely at Musabad, but at a place in its vicinity named " Ayubi ", respecting which I have so far no information.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,
My Lord,
You Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

A. H. Hardinge.

The Marquess of Lansdowne, K.G.,
&c., &c., &c.

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6

Telegram, No. 824, dated Seistan, 30th the October (despatched from Robat on 1st November) 1904.

From—Colonel A. H McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Afghan Commissioner has informed me that he has just received necessary authority from Amir for demarcation.

Addressed to Government of India; repeated to Sir A. Hardinge.

P.T.O.

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

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6a

MEMORANDUM.

The papers specified in the margin were transmitted to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 44 M., dated the 3rd November 1904.

Persia.
Seistan Series, Part 5, Nos. 3 to 6.

7

Telegram, No. 4257 F., dated the 5th November 1904.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,
To—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

Seistan Arbitration. Please refer to Colonel McMahon's letter of 25th September 1904, which was forwarded with Secretary's letter of 13th October. We do not consider it desirable to do anything that may give birth to any idea that the Persians have any claim to extend irrigation by channels to be constructed through Afghan territory. Moreover, the Persian Government insisted that the decision in the present case should be in accordence with General Goldsmid's award, and we prefer to confine the award to this. Award B, therefore, seems the most suitable with the following modifications. Omit paragraph 4 of the preliminary remarks, and prefix to paragraph 5 the following sentence:—*Begins.* Unfortunately of recent years, whatever may have been the cause, and whether that was due to the change in the course of the main stream or to more strained relations, the amicable settlement of water difficulties has been found to be no longer possible. *Ends.* In paragraph 8 before words "further laid down", enter "after consulting General Goldsmid". The rest of clause should run as in Award A.

In paragraph 10 C, instead of Bander-i-Kamal Khan, read Band-i-Kohak. Omit the last section of clause 2 of award from Seistan on, and clauses 3 and 4.

This is proposed, as it is useless to attempt to prevent the diversion by the Afghans of all the water between Bander-i-Kamal Khan and Band-i-Kohak, as they might do this further up-stream at Kala-i-Bist or elsewhere, and it is undesirable to give the Persians any voice in matters outside their own boundary. The difficulty will be to ensure that Persian Seistan receives $\frac{1}{3}$ of supply that at present reaches Band-i-Kohak, and the only way of securing this will be to appoint an expert irrigation officer, as suggested by Colonel McMahon. We trust that his proposals in this respect will be approved.

But it is a great question if Goldsmid's award renders it necessary to give Persia more than enough water for existing irrigation, 141,000 acres, for which less than one fifth of Helmand would be sufficient. As however, owing to change in main channel, most of Helmand water now passes through Persian Seistan, and as area commanded by existing Persian channels amounts to 460,800 acres, of which, on existing system of cultivation whereby half area lies fallow each year, 230,400 acres could be irrigated and cultivated, we think that $\frac{1}{3}$ of the water might be allotted to Persians, but this is the absolute maximum, and should only be given, if award is accepted in its integrity. If you concur, we would inform McMahon that award to this effect would not be open to objection from our point of view, and that he can announce it when demarcation, which Amir has formally authorised, is completed, provided that political *status quo* in Seistan is not threatened, in which case he should refer to us for orders.

8

Telegram, No. 4258 F., dated the 5th November 1904.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission.

Your letter No. 2407, dated 25th September. Following telegram to Secretary of State is repeated for your information:—*Begins.* Seistan Arbitration. * * * * * * should refer to us for orders. *Ends.*

Have you any suggestions to offer? Please reply urgently.

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

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FOREIGN DEPARTMENT NOTES.

PROJECTED RAILWAYS IN PERSIA.

(Received on the 28th December 1903 with Political Secretary's letter No. 52, dated the 11th December 1903.)

MR. SPRING RICE TO THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE, NO. 360, DATED THE 29TH OCTOBER 1903.

Reports that roads which are now being projected or in course of construction in North-West Persia, are to be built in such a way that they can easily and within a short time be converted into railways. Assignment of 1½ million roubles by Russia for construction of a port at Enzeli, on the Caspian.

Copy to the Intelligence Branch and Military Department.

E. L. N.,—2-1-1904.

G. W. M.,—2-1-1904.

His Excellency the Viceroy should see.

E. H. S. CLARKE,—3-1-1904.

L. W. DANE,—4-1-1904.

C[URZON],—5-1-1904.

ENDORSEMENTS TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT AND INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, NOS. 94-95-F.B., DATED THE 8TH JANUARY 1904.

Forwards copy of the foregoing letter.

(Received on the 4th January 1904 with Political Secretary's letter No. 53, dated the 18th December 1903.)

MR. SPRING RICE TO THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE, NO. 396 (SECRET), DATED THE 23RD NOVEMBER 1903 (RECEIVED 4TH JANUARY 1904).

Forwards a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Locker Lampson containing information as to roads, caravan routes, and projected railways in Persia.

The Persia and Arabia Print Section 2, November 30, is very important and Intelligence Branch should see a copy as soon as possible. Perhaps they will kindly trace on a map the routes proposed, with such particulars as to gradients, etc., as are possible, and also Lieutenant Hopkins' route from Bandar Dilam to Seistan, which we got last hot weather from him.

Extract sent to Intelligence Branch with necessary papers.
E. H. S. CLARKE,—10-1-1904.

We have an expert report of Commanders Kemp and Somerville on Chahbar, where we have a small guard, the strength of which and the conditions under which it went there should be noted. There are many points in the print to be checked, *e.g.*, we have not given up our Consulate at Resht.

L. W. DANE,—4-1-1904.

Foreign Secretary,—Please submit separately interesting paper about Railways in Persia.

C[URZON].

I had already directed this action.

L. W. DANE,—6-1-1904.

"The Persia and Arabia Print Section 2, November 30th, is very important and Intelligence Branch should see a copy as soon as possible. Perhaps they will kindly trace on a map the routes proposed, with such particulars as to gradients, etc., as are possible, and also Captain Hopkins' route from Bandar Dilam to Seistan, which we got last hot weather from him."

* * * * *

4143 F. D.

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The preceding extract from Secretary's note and a copy of the print, together with a copy of Lieutenant Hopkins' report, may be sent to the Intelligence Branch.

Secret F., December 1903, No. 37.

E. L. N.,—9-1-1904.

Yes, sending two spare copies also. All three can be retained by the Intelligence Branch, when they return these notes with the map asked for. Lieutenant Hopkins' report need not go, as we sent copies to Intelligence Branch with our No. 3016-F. B., dated the 13th October 1903.

E. H. S. CLARKE,—10-1-1904.

Intelligence Branch.

The report on Chahbar by Commanders Kemp and Somerville is put up.

2. The guard at Chahbar consists of 50 men from one of the Bombay Native Regiments. The men were first sent there in January 1898. Mr. Graves of the Indo-European Telegraph Department was murdered in December 1897 at the Rapch river half-way between Jask and Chahbar, and it was decided to send a detachment of 150 Native Infantry to those places for the protection of the telegraph staff and stations. Later in 1898, when matters quieted down, 50 men were withdrawn, leaving a detachment of 100* men, equally distributed between Jask and Chahbar. The question of the withdrawal of the detachment has from time to time come up. On the last occasion (1901), His Excellency the Viceroy said "both places are important and are likely to become more so. I would provide proper accommodation for the troops, and give an impression of permanent occupation even if we do not intend to effect it."

External B., May 1903, No. 285.
Secret E., August 1898, Nos. 11-237, and Proceedings Nos. 43 and 51.
Secret E, November 1898, Nos. 560-600, v-No. 561.
* And two Native Officers.
External B., April 1902, Nos. 151-152.

3. The statement on page 28 of the printed paper to the effect that His Britannic Majesty's Consulate at Resht has been abolished is not correct. Resht has been reduced to a Vice-Consulate in connection with the scheme for the reorganisation of the consular service in Persia.

E. L. N.,—12-1-1904.

I find that, as we have no mapper and the Intelligence Branch also have no one in Calcutta, who could complete the map as directed in my note of 4th January 1904, the paper has been sent to the Intelligence Branch at Simla. I will ask them by telegram to let us have it as soon as possible and, unless Your Excellency wishes to take immediate action on the case, I think it will be best to await the map and any remarks which Intelligence Branch may have to offer. I have placed a spare copy of the Despatch of Mr. Spring Rice in the file in case you wish to keep it for perusal.

Page 1 of notes.

L. W. DANE,—13-1-1904.

What I fear is that there will be the usual delay that the above references involve: that I shall not get the file till March, when I shall be much too busy to note upon it: and that so the matter will slip out of memory when I have gone, and be forgotten. I think, if this is to be avoided, that Secretary had better keep an eye upon it.

The report of Commanders Kemp and Somerville is really not intelligible without their sketch-plan or chart. Why do we not reproduce these?

They are really indispensable for the understanding of these questions of anchorages.

C[URZON],—23-1-1904.

Extract from the "Madras Mail," dated Madras, the 12th January 1904.

New Russo-Persian Road.

The work of constructing a road between Tabriz (Persia) and the Russian frontier will shortly be carried out. It is hoped that the new road will considerably favour the development of Russo-Persian commercial relations. Russian engineers and technologists, who have been entrusted with the carrying out of the works, will leave the Russian capital in a few days. The realisation of this enterprise, which must meet with great technical obstacles, will not be completed for a long time. The execution of the work will be directed from Tabriz.

Let Foreign Office see.

D. E. MCCRACKEN.

Seen in the Foreign Department.

G. W. M.,—18-1-1904.

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This also may be run into our current file about Russian roads and railway projects in Persia.

E. H. S. CLARKE,—18-1-1904.

Special Branch.

Extract from the "Statesman," dated Calcutta, the 12th January 1904.

According to Russian report, says the Kolnische Zeitung, the Shah of Persia has granted to a Persian merchant a concession for the construction of a railway from Tehran to Shimiran, which is to be completed in a year. The line will have branches to Gulahek and Shah Abad. A start has been made in the work of constructing the road from Mazreh to Kazvin, to the great commercial town of Hamadan on the road from Tehran to Bagdad. In Russian circles it is expected that the new road will facilitate Russia's commercial relations with Persia. The work of constructing the road from the Russian frontier to Tabriz has also been begun. The portion of the road from Quetta to Kirman *viâ* Nushki will be constructed in such a way that it can be used at any time as a railway embankment. In Russian commercial and military circles the greatest importance is attached to this new undertaking.

Let Foreign Office see.

D. E. MCCRACKEN,—15-1-1904.

Seen in the Foreign Department.

This may be run into our file about the Russian railway programme in Persia.

E. H. S. CLARKE,—18-1-1904.

Where are these places ?

L. W. DANE,—18-1-1904.

We have no map showing Mazreh and Shah Abad. The other places mentioned are marked in the map below. Shimran is a small village a few miles north of Tehran.

Gazetteer of Persia, Volume II, page 419.

E. L. N.,—19-1-1904.

E. H. S. CLARKE,—19-1-1904.

It is merely a short tramway. The extract from the Tehran despatch which I marked should be added and the case submitted to His Excellency for information. We could perhaps hardly call this a railway in the north of Persia.

L. W. DANE,—19-1-1904.

Extract from enclosure to despatch from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 194, dated the 7th December 1903.

* * * * *

Road concessions in Persia.

* * * * *

5. *The Shimran Tramway, from Tehran to Shimran.*—Granted in 1895 to Mr. Moral. He offered the concession successively to Messrs. Keppel, Engineers at Berlin, and to M. Poliakoff, of Moscow. Both firms refused it. The concession has now been granted to a Persian merchant named Herati, but no attempt has yet been made to build the tramway.

There is already a similar tramway from Tehran to Shah Abdul Azim about the same distance, south of Tehran, as Shimran is to the north.

C[URZON],—23-1-1904.

A note and map which have been prepared in the Intelligence Branch are forwarded herewith. They were received to-day and are sent on without delay.

J. WOLFE MURRAY,—21-1-1904.

Intelligence Branch Note.

The accompanying map shows, in red, the various Russian proposals for railways in Persia; and, in blue, certain lines which have been suggested at various times as English projects.

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The Russian lines may be divided into two heads :—

A. Lines from Russian territory to Tehran.

B. Lines from Tehran to the sea.

A. Lines from Russian territory to Tehran may again be sub-divided into two main headings :—

(1) Those approaching Tehran *viâ* Tabriz.

(2) A line approaching *viâ* the southern shore of the Caspian and Resht.

Lines approaching Tehran *viâ* Tabriz : there are four alternatives to Tabriz :—

(1) From Kivrag or Shah Takht *viâ* Khoi [Dilman to Tabriz, length 202 miles, estimated cost £1,800,000.

(2) From Kivrag or Shah Takht *viâ* Marand to Tabriz, length 160 miles, estimated cost £2,200,000.

(3) From Julfa *viâ* Marand to Tabriz, length 81 miles, estimated cost £861,000.

(4) From Evlak on the Trans-Caucasian *viâ* Aslanduz and Abar to Tabriz, distance 282 miles, estimated cost £4,600,000.

From Tabriz to Tehran, distance 342 miles, estimated cost £3,222,000.

The line to Tehran from Allat south of Baku *viâ* Saliami, Lenkoran, Resht and Kasvin, distance 450 miles, estimated cost £3,740,000.

B. Lines from Tehran to the sea : here again several lines have been surveyed and are reported on :—

1. Tehran to Bushire *viâ* Kum, Isfahan, Bundamir River, Shiraz, Kara Agach or Mand River to Khor Ziarat, thence along the coast to Bushire. From Kum there are alternatives *viâ* Gulpaigan or *viâ* Kashan. Total distance 994 miles, estimated cost £10,550,000.

2. Tehran to Bunder Abbas as above to Aliabad (south-west of Jahrum), thence *viâ* Lar to Bunder Abbas, total distance 1,020 miles, estimated cost £10,850,000.

3. Tehran to Chahbar *viâ* Kum, Kashan, Nain, Yezd, Kerman, Bam, Regan, Bampur, and Geh to Chahbar, total distance 1,090 miles, estimated cost £11,200,000.

Other projected Russian lines are from Askabad *viâ* Kuchan to Meshed, from Doshak on the Trans-Caspian to Meshed, from Pul-i-Khatun just inside the Persian frontier to Nasratabad and thence to Chahbar *viâ* Sarhad and Bampur.

The railway reconnaissance from Allat to Chahbar Bay was evidently made by a competent and skilled Railway Location Engineer and probably his report may be taken as proof positive of its being a feasible route, much of it with grades and curves not heavier than those used on the plains of India and none greater than those of our ghat lines to Quetta and Chaman, which the heavier work on the Allat-Chahbar line must most resemble.

As to the time necessary to construct the Allat-Chahbar Railway, it is improbable that it could reach the coast under five, and more probably six years; even were it pushed on most expeditiously, for, it must be remembered the line can only be carried forward from the northern end and all materials must come from Russia. The cost of constructing the railway appears considerably underestimated, at £8,500 per verst, which amounts to Rs. 1,91,250 per mile, for on the whole Bolan and Sind-Peshin system we have spent an average of Rs. 2,66,000 per mile.

J. Wolfe Murray,—21-1-1904.

It would, I think, be worth while to show the railway under construction to Nushki and the routes surveyed by Mr. Johns to Seistan and to the sea at Pasni or Karachi with an abstract of the cost of these and of the ruling gradients and curves. We can perhaps do this here. If not, it should go to Public Works Department, but please treat as urgent.

L. W. Dane,—21-1-1904.

We have no mapper in this office, and I am afraid I cannot possibly undertake it myself.

The case may be sent (by Secretary's orders) direct to Mr. Hodson, by name. We should be glad to have the file back on Saturday.

E. H. S. Clarke,—21-1-1904.

Public Works Department.

The Quetta-Nushki Railway under construction has been put on the map in dotted *black* lines. The survey made by Mr. Johns beyond Nushki to Seistan, Robat, and Pasni have been shown in dotted *blue* lines, except where they run into lines already marked in full blue lines. A statement is also put up showing the approximate cost and ruling grade and curvature of the various routes.

F. D. Couchman,—22-1-1904.

E. I. Shadbolt,—22-1-1904.

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[5]

Statement showing approximate cost and ruling grades and curvature of lines to and beyond Nushki.

(*i*) NUSHKI LINE UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

Length 82·5 miles.
Cost Rs. 70,06,338.
Rate per mile Rs. 84,925.
Ruling grade. From Spezand to the top of the Nushki Kotal, mile 72, 1·6 per cent. and from mile 72 to Nushki 2 per cent., both grades being compensated for curvature.
Curvature.—573 ft. radius, all of which occur on the Nushki Ghât between mile 72 and Nushki.

(*ii*) NUSHKI *viâ* THE HELMUND TO BUND-I-SEISTAN (IN AFGHAN TERRITORY).

Length 335 miles.
Cost Rs. 2,63,00,000.
Rate per mile Rs. 78,500.
Ruling grades 1 in 50.
Curvature, easy, except near Galur, 90 miles.

(*iii*) NUSHKI TO ROBAT (IN BRITISH TERRITORY).

Length 360 miles.
Cost Rs. 1,98,00,000.
Rate per mile, Rs. 55,000.
Ruling grade 1 in 100.
Curvature. Same as in ordinary plain country except among sand-hills crossed.

(*iv*) KONDI (ON (*iii*) ABOVE) TO PASNI ON THE SEA COAST.

Length (*a*) 424 miles *viâ* Nag Kalat.
(*b*) 404 „ „ Kathag Pass.
Cost (*a*) Not given.
(*b*) Rs. 4,84,00,000.
Rate per mile (*b*) Rs. 1,18,000.
Ruling grade 1 in 40 to 1 in 50.
Curvature 8° to 9½°.

(*v*) KONDI (ON (*iii*) ABOVE) TO KARACHI.

Length 567 miles.
Cost Rs. 6,68,00,000.
Rate per mile Rs. 1,18,000.
Ruling grade 1 in 40 to 1 in 50.
Curvature 8° to 9½°.

F. D. COUCHMAN,—22-1-1904.

Returned to Foreign Secretary as desired.

C. W. HODSON,—22-1-1904.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER No. 185, DATED THE 10TH DECEMBER 1903, FROM MAJOR P. M. SYKES, C.M.G., HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CONSUL, KERMAN, TO COLONEL KEMBALL, C.I.E., POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

Gives his opinion as to the best alignment for a railway in South-East Persia.

There is a cutting from the *Novoe Vremya* on page 13 of the "Statesman" of January 24th, which should be taken and added to the confidential files about policy in Persia and Railways in Persia.

L. W. DANE,—24-1-1904.

In order to facilitate the consideration in its widest aspect of the question of strategical railways from Russia through Persia towards India, I have had shown on a copy of Curzon's map of Persia, not only the Russian lines mentioned in the papers attached to Mr. Spring Rice's despatch of 23rd November 1903, and the possible lines from Askabad and

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Tejend to Seistan, but also the routes between Nushki and Seistan and between Seistan and Karachi and Pasni, which Mr. Johns examined in the summer of 1903, and the line from the head of the Gulf *viâ* Shiraz and Kerman to Seistan which Lieutenant Hopkins,* R.E., reconnoitred in the same year. I also attach an abstract giving the length, cost of construction, maximum gradients and curves for all of the lines shown, so far as these can be ascertained from the statistics and reports available.

* Secret F., December 1903, No. 37.

The Russian lines from Allat to Resht and from Kivraj, Julfa and Evlak to Tabriz have been fully surveyed and estimated. The first is a very promising line, but fortunately the Russian Government do not propose to take it up because they know that, if they do commence constructing railways in Northern Persia, we are entitled to make lines in Southern Persia up to Tehran under a pledge from the late Shah.

The Russians under the aegis of the Banque d'Escompte and the Road Company are, however, completing the railway to their frontier at Julfa and are making a Chaussée suitable for a railway from that to Tabriz and Kazvin,† and are just starting on a similar Chaussée from Kazvin to Hamadan on the Kermanshah-Khanekin-Baghdad route.

† Proceedings Secret E., May 1903, No. 38.

They have also secured the concession for a similar Chaussée from Kasvin to Tehran (*cf.* Sir A. Hardinge's Despatch No. 2 of 6th January 1903, in which he discusses the possibility of our asking a *quid pro quo* in the South).

Proceedings Secret E., August 1903, Nos. 8-27, Pro. No. 8.

They have also the Chaussées from Resht to Tehran and from Askabad to Kuchan and Meshed. The latter is in part suitable ‡ for rails, though Lieutenant Haslam,§ R.E., in 1902 thought that the existing works on it were not likely to be of much use for a railway.

‡ Secret F., February 1902, Nos. 4-18, *vide* No. 6.
§ Secret F., May 1903, Nos. 2-4.

A sum of £5,20,000 has been entered in the Budget for 1904 for the Alexandropol Erivan Railway to the Persian Frontier.

The Road Company has been allowed to raise a loan of 5,000,000 roubles for the Enzeli harbour and Kazvin Hamadan road.

It may be said therefore that they have actually started on the preliminary work of railway construction in North-Western Persia, and are showing signs of a desire to work down through Western Persia possibly with an idea of making a line *viâ* Burujird and Khorremabad or *viâ* Kermanshah and Dizful to the head of the Gulf as well as towards Baghdad. Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas attaches great importance to the possibility of the last route.

The lines from Kazvin and Tehran to Baghdad are shown as British surveys on the map, but we have no details about them, and from Hamadan to Khanikin the route presents considerable difficulties, while at the Baghdad end a good deal of bridging will be necessary. Intelligence Branch may have particulars.

As far as can be judged from the reports of Rittich and Sakhansky, there are no insuperable difficulties in the way of a line from Tehran to Bunder Abbas *viâ* Ispahan and Shiraz, though the gorge of the Kara Agach, South of Shiraz, may give trouble. The line from Tehran to Chahbar *viâ* Kashan-Yezd-Kerman, Bam, and Bampur is even easier. The cost of these lines is put at about Rs. 1,60,000 and Rs. 1,54,000 ‖ per mile for a line on the standard Russian gauge. The total cost is of course very heavy and the lines would take long to make, but if Russia is checked in Manchuria, she may turn her energies to Persia, where she has only to deal with us, whom they affect to despise in these reports. The possibility of constructing such a line as the latter is explained in Curzon's Persia, Volume I, page 629.

‖ This would be even less to Bampur only as the section from that to Chahbar is very difficult.

Colonel Rittich is strongly in favour of Chahbar as a terminal port in preference to Bunder Abbas, first because it is a better port, and secondly, because it is on the open sea, whereas any port in the Gulf is rendered useless by the control which Britain possesses over the entrance to the Gulf—a control which we hope to perfect shortly. The report of Commanders Kemp and Somerville on Chahbar as a naval base and harbour is put up. It is one of the best of the possible harbours along the Persian coast, though not at all an ideal naval base.

The Russians, however, in addition to the wish to secure a port on the Southern Coast of Persia, have in view the strategical advantages of a line to the south-east from Tehran with a branch to Seistan as a means of facilitating an advance on India. Lieutenant-Colonel Napier's note appended to Mr. Spring Rice's Despatch shows how great these are.

Lieutenant Hopkins, it is true, found ¶ the Rud-i-Mahi rather a serious obstacle to a railway from Bam to Quetta, but there is no necessity to take that route, as the surveys of Gopal Singh and Mr. Moore for a telegraph line and the report of Mr. Dobbs show that a line can perhaps be found direct from Koh-i-Malik Siah *viâ* Baluchab, Nasratabad Ispe, and Gurg, to Bam with only one stretch of 26 miles between Shurgez and Gurg without water. From Robat (Koh-i-Malik Siah) to Nushki Mr. Johns' survey proves that a line can be made in

¶ Secret F., December 1903, No. 37.

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less than two years for Rs. 55,000 a mile. There are no natural difficulties of any consequence. The lines from Kundi on the trade route (Miran Kandi in map) to Pasni and Karachi are much more difficult, and would cost Rs. 1,18,000 a mile and would take 6 to 8 years to build. No surveys by a railway engineer are available further to the west than Tump, up to which Mr. Johns found a good line along the Kej valley. Telegraph officers have, I think, been over the line from Tump to Bampur shown in the map, and Mr. Newcome Wilson, of the Indo-Telegraph Department, reports * that the line from Panjgur (Isai Kalat Isa on the map) to Kuhak is easy except for the Mashkuel and Rakshan crossings. Thence to Bampur is also reported to be fairly open country.

* Page 42 of report on a survey for a route for a telegraph line from Las Bela to Kuhak.

The route from Nushki to Kharan (was surveyed by Captain Mackenzie and is reported † to be fairly easy except at the east near Nushki. From Kharan on we have no details, but the country is probably fairly open but water is scarce. It is certain that none of these lines from east to west are so easy or can be so quickly constructed as Mr. Johns' lines from Nushki by the trade route to Koh-i-Malik Siah or *viâ* the Helmund to Seistan (Kohak).

† Report on a reconnaissance from Karachi to Kharan and thence to Nushki.

Lieutenant Hopkins gives ‡ a good account of a possible metre-gauge line from Bunder Dilam to Shiraz which would he thinks pay 5 per cent. He also apparently believes that a line could be made from Shiraz to Kerman without serious difficulties. The line to Shiraz is much the same as that suggested by General Goldsmid, Curzon's Persia, Volume I, page 636, and therefore deserves attention, especially if it is capable of being carried further to the east.

‡ Secret F., December 1903, No. 37.

From this report of Colonel Rittich and references in the *Novoe Vremya* of late it appears that the Russians are afraid that we may undertake some such line across Persia, though it pleases them to affect that such a line would only assist them in an advance on India. They are, however, avowedly nervous at the prospect of a German line being built to Baghdad, which is a point worth consideration. At any rate it is clearly to our interest to prevent the construction by Russia of any line leading to the south from Tehran; and, if we are prepared to make such lines ourselves we have a great claim to be heard, as we have an autograph pledge given by the late Shah on 16th September 1888 and recognised as binding by the present Shah. The Russian Minister in Persia is aware of the existence of this pledge. This pledge is to this effect that "the priority of the English Government and the company of that Government over others in the construction of a Southern Railway to Tehran continues to hold good, and certainly, whenever railway concessions in the north are given to others, immediately a concession for a railway from Tehran to Shuster or such a one, will be given to the English Company . . . . and positively no Southern railway without consultation with the English Government will be granted to any foreign company."

No. 14 of précis of Persian pledges.
No. 36 *Ibid.*

If pledges are to be disregarded, we still perhaps can effectually contest a Russian advance to the sea or in the direction of India from Persia.

One thing is clear that any railway built to facilitate an advance on India from the west must pass through or close to Seistan, and that is the only place where a self-supporting advanced base, protected on every side, except along the Helmund, by deserts, could be formed. It is equally obvious that with the railway to Nushki opened by June 1905, we are in a position to make a line to Seistan long before the Russians. Our position *qua* Seistan is therefore much more favourable than theirs and, as long as we hold Seistan, they can neither attack India from the west up the Helmund or work down to the Gulf along the Baluchistan border. They did indeed try to secure a promise from the late Shah that, if we made a line to the Persian Frontier, they should be allowed to make one to the south of Persia, but the Shah told the British Minister at Tehran on 14th September 1890 that he had refused to make any such promise, relying upon the written assurance given to him. This assurance was apparently that given by Earl Granville to Malcolm Khan on 16th August 1884 and was to the effect that the integrity of Persia would be respected by England and Russia so long as Persia gave no cause of complaint. An attempt will be made later to show that we can even block an advance to the head of the Gulf with some fair prospect of success.

No. 39 of précis of Persian Pledges.

No. 7 of précis of Persian Pledges.

The question for immediate decision is if any steps should be taken to meet the present action of Russia in constructing railway formations in the guise of roads in Northern Persia, and, if so, what those steps should be.

Nothing seems to be necessary in Seistan, as we know that we can push our line through to that long before a Russian line can be constructed from Askabad or Tejend, as Captain Smythe's and Lieutenant Haslam's reports show that such a railway has to cross some very difficult country. Besides, the construction of our railway to Seistan would be a direct challenge to Russia, which at present it may be undesirable to make.

Secret F., October 1902, No. 8.
Secret F., May 1903, Nos. 2-4.

On the west however our position is less secure and depends largely on the piecrust pledges of a Persian Government, which may not last or be able to fulfil its promises, even if it wished to do so. To meet this difficulty, I venture with great diffidence to make a

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suggestion which, if accepted, may not only check the Russians and secure our hold on the head of the Gulf, but may also assist towards the construction of a through line of railway between Europe and India, largely under British control. The Russians believe that there is no good port in the Gulf, and up till recently this belief was shared by the War Office and Admiralty. From the report of Commanders Kemp and Somerville we now know that Khor Musa is easily capable of development into a splendid landlocked deep water harbour. Their report was fully borne out when His Excellency the Viceroy and His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief visited the Khor on 1st December 1903. The fortunate point about Khor Musa is that it is without doubt a port on the Persian Gulf and is situated within the jurisdiction of the Sheikh of Mohammerah to whom we have given qualified assurances of protection and who, under his agreement with the Persian Government about the customs in Arabistan, has a right to object to customs officers being introduced unless he approves of them. The conditions, therefore, are in every way favourable for developing a port on the Khor under British auspices. We await a report from Major Burton about land communications, but there is no reason to suppose that good roads could not be made from the Khor to Muhammerah, Ahwaz, and Ram Hormuz, and probably to Behbehan. It is of vital importance that this harbour should not fall into foreign hands, as, if the Russians push on the western line *viâ* Hamadan and Dizful, it would give them a splendid port with the shortest line of railway from their European bases. Would it not be possible to induce the Imperial Bank of Persia to ask, as an equivalent to the arragements for a harbour at Enzeli and to the Chaussées now being made by Russian companies and banks, for a concession for a road from Bunder Dilam, *or such other suitable port as we can find or construct* between that and the Shatt-ul-Arab, to Shiraz with branches to the Bakhtiari and Lur roads, in which British companies are already interested. This would enable us to occupy and develop Khor Musa and give us a strong hold over Fars and all South-Eastern Persia.

The northerly route from Seistan *viâ* Kerman Yezd, Ispahan, and Karmanshah to Baghdad would perhaps be better for Persia and, if we could hold our own there, it would also give us a larger voice in the coming dismemberment of Persia. If, however, we cannot hope to hold our own on that line, this seems a possible alternative and gives us a route more easily supported from our bases on the sea and in Seistan and fairly safe against incursion from the north except *viâ* Yezd and Kerman, as on the eastern end it is protected by the Dasht-i-Lut while on the west the Lur tribes may perhaps be able to offer some resistance in their hills and the country is very difficult.

Looking into the future also such a line would give a fairly cool mail and passenger route to India, while it would effectually cut across all possible routes to the sea from the north and secure for us the control of a harbour which, if it fell into foreign hands, would be impregnable and would throw the trade of the whole of Southern Persia into the hands of the holders. Owing to the shifting bar of the Shatt-ul-Arab nothing much can ever be made of the Karun, but with a deep water harbour the country seems to be capable of considerable development, both on the Karun and towards Shiraz. Lieutenant Hopkins reports * the existence of naphtha and coal in the district and calculates on a profit of 5 per cent. on his line to Shiraz. As he is a Railway Engineer now employed on the Nushki Railway, he ought to know something about the matter. The Manager of the Shiraz Branch of the Imperial Bank, Mr. Van Lennep, is said by Lieutenant Hopkins to be favourably disposed to such a scheme, and perhaps we could obtain the concession through the agency of the Bank, which might then make over the Dizful-Khorremabad concession in which it is interested to Messrs. Lynch, who are working at the Bakhtiari route in rather inharmonious concert with the Khans, though I do not see why, if we are to finance the Bank, we should not push both roads through it.

* Secret F., December 1903, No. 37.

Your Excellency will remember that the Secretary of State was in favour of our trying to purchase such a concession, *vide* his telegram of 20th February 1903. On reading over his telegram again I think that perhaps the word "there" was omitted after commercial undertakings, and that the zone in which he contemplated that we should establish our influence was that which I have mentioned above, *i.e.*, the country south of the line Seistan, Kerman, and the head of the Gulf, *viz.*, South-East Persia, and the tracts traversed by the Lur and Bakhtiari routes. Secretary of State therefore might be willing to support the suggestion which I have ventured to put forward.

Proceedings Secret E., March 1903, Nos. 38-57, Pro. No. 52.

Major Sykes in a letter of 10th December 1903 suggests the possibility of a railway from Minab, east of Bunder Abbas, through Rudbar by the Gishu Pass to Narmashir, *i.e.*, Bam or Regan. This, he thinks, would be the best line to the sea. From the Russian point of view, however, it is open to two objections: first, it would not have a good terminal port, and secondly, its terminus would be within the Gulf and so under our control. Still it is worth remembering that such a route is possible, and, if it is an easy line, it obviates the necessity for the very difficult railway from Regan *viâ* Bampur to Chahbar, which Colonel Rittich considers the only serious difficulty between Tehran and the sea. Some idea of the nature of the route and of the port of Minab can be derived from the Report on a journey through Western Baluchistan, etc., by Colonel Jennings, R.E., which has been summarized in the attached list of possible railway routes in Persia. On page 8 he discusses the possibility of a railway from the coast between Bundar Abbas and Chahbar to Seistan.

But the suggestion is obviously made in our interest, not in that of Russia.

C[URZON].

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If a British line from the head of the Gulf *viâ* Shiraz and Kerman is built to Koh-i-Malik Siah and Seistan, this branch to the entrance to the Gulf would form a useful support to that line and strengthen our hold on South-Eastern Persia.

If Your Excellency considers that there is anything in the suggestion, the case as regards estimates of cost, gradients, curvatures, and mean altitudes of the various lines shown might be further worked up in the Public Works Department and Intelligence Branch. It is submitted now as you wished to see the despatch from Mr. Spring Rice as soon as possible, and it may be desirable either to add something about Khor Musa and possible connections therewith to the despatch on British policy in Southern Persia or to send another despatch in continuation of that dealing with Russian strategical railways in Persia and the possibility of counteracting any move in this direction by Russia by railways constructed by British companies.

At any rate, it seems open to question if Russia should be allowed to proceed with the construction of railway formations in the guise of Chaussées in the north while we are contented with camel tracks in the south.

Kemp and Somerville's charts are added, but these are very secret and we have no permission to reproduce them. The general chart of the Gulf gives a sufficiently clear idea of the case.

L. W. Dane,—7-2-1904.

Lines from Russian territory converging by four routes on Tabriz in the direction of Tehran.

(1) From Kivrag.

Length (*a*) 202 miles, *viâ* Khoi and Dilman.
„ (*b*) 160 „ „ Marand.
Cost (*a*) Rs. 2,70,00,000.
„ (*b*) „ 3,30,00,000.
Rate per mile (*a*) Rs. 1,33,663.
„ „ (*b*) „ 2,06,250.
Gradient (*a*) ·015
„ (*b*) Not stated.
Profit. (*a*) 1·58 per cent.

(2) From Julfa to Tabriz.

Length 81 miles, *viâ* Marand.
Cost Rs. 1,29,15,000.
Rate per mile Rs. 1,59,444
Gradient ·028.

(3) From Evlak *viâ* Aslanduz and Ahar to Tabriz.*

Length 282 miles.
Cost Rs. 6,90,00,000.
Rate per mile Rs. 2,44,680.
Any of the above lines can be extended to Tehran from Tabriz.

Tehran is approached by lines from two points (*a*) from Tabriz, (*b*) from Allat south of Baku, *viâ* Saliani, Lenkoran, Resht, and Kazvin.

(A) Tabriz to Tehran.

Length 342 miles.
Cost Rs. 4,83,30,000.
Rate per mile Rs. 1,41,315.

*Is an easy and cheap line for the first 102 miles which lies in Russian territory. The 180 miles in Persian territory presents considerable technical difficulties.

(B)—Allat to Tehran.

Length 450 miles.
Cost Rs. 5,61,00,000.
Rate per mile Rs. 1,24,666.

From Resht to Kazvin Valley through the Elburz the country presents difficulties including a tunnel of 1½ versts and one of 2 versts (pages 13 to 15 of printed report). From Kazvin to Tehran tract is level. Allat to Resht, gradient ·005. Maximum gradient in hill section through Elburz ·028. Least radius 700 yards.

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Lines from Tehran to the Persian Gulf: (1) *Bushire*, (2) *Bunder Abbas*, (3) *Chahbar*.

(1) Tehran to Bushire.

Viâ Kum, Kashan, Kholedabad, Natenz, Isfahan, Shiraz, Kara Agach, Aliabad, thence along coast to Bushire.

Tehran to Bushire.

Length 994 miles.
Cost Rs. 15,82,50,000.
Rate per mile Rs. 1,59,205.

From Kum a route goes *viâ* Gulpaigan and meets above route at Isfahan. This route is longer by 40 miles, but passes through more populous and fertile districts. Gadient ·012.

(2) Tehran to Bundar Abbas.

As above to Aliabad, thence *viâ* Lar to Bundar Abbas.
Length 1,020 miles.
Cost Rs. 16,27,50,000.
Rate per mile 1,59,558.
Gradient ·012.

The valley of the Kara Agach in the above routes presents difficulties.

(3) Tehran to Chahbar *viâ* Kum, Kashan, Nain, Yezd, Kerman, Bam, Regan, Bampur, and Geh.

Length 1,090 miles.
Cost Rs. 16,80,00,000.
Rate per mile Rs. 1,54,128.

From mile 60 to 100 from Kashan the rise is considerable, and the gradient up to ·02. It may be diminished by suitable winding of line near Ardistan. From Bampur to Chahbar the route is extremely difficult.

Bunder Dilam to Shiraz Railway (British).

Shiraz Railway.

Secret E., December 1903, No. 37. Bunder Dilam to Shiraz (Lieutenant Hopkins)

Gauge metre.
Length 210 miles.
Cost Rs. 1,05,00,000.
Rate per mile Rs. 49,995.
Ruling grade 1 in 40.
Curvature not stated.
Profit 5%.

Askabad to Meshed Railway *viâ* Kalta Chinar.

Distance 166 miles.
Follows alignment of cart-road but works on this are not likely to be of much service.
Secret F., May 1903, Nos. 2-4.
Cost unknown.
Difficulties considerable for a railway.

Askabad to Meshed Railway *viâ* Doshak.

Distance 194 miles.
Heavy cuttings and gradients up to $\frac{1}{40}$ and sharp curves, with two tunnels each over 2 miles.
Cost unknown.

Sarakhs to Seistan Railway.

Secret F., October 1902, No. 8. Distance 415 miles.
Cost unknown.
No great engineering difficulties.

From Sarakhs to Tejend on the Trans-Caspian Railway is 56 miles, and there are no difficulties. Total distance Tejend to Seistan 471 miles.

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A line can, Captain Smyth thinks, be taken from Sarakhs to Meshed *viâ* the Mazdaran Pass without much difficulty. The distance from Askabad to Seistan by Meshed would be as follows :—

	Miles.	
Askabad to Meshed	166	difficult.
Meshed to Seistan	501	moderately difficult.
	607	

POSSIBLE RAILWAY ROUTES IN BALUCHISTAN.

DISTANCES.

Miri to Tump and Bampur, distance 205 miles.

Tump to Bampur, distance	160	miles.
Miri to Tump, distance	45	„
Total	205*	„

Isai Kalat to Bampur, distance 249¾ miles.

Isai Kalat to Kuhak, distance	57¾†	miles.
Kuhak to Bampur „	192 ‡	„
Total	249¾	„

Nushki *viâ* Kharan to Bampur, distance 563¾ miles.

Nushki to Kharan, distance	76§	miles.
Kharan to Panjgur, distance	238‖	„
Panjgur to Kuhak „	57¾¶	„
Kuhak to Bampur, distance	192**	„
Total	563¾	„

Bampur to Minab, distance 385¼ miles.

Bampur to Regan *viâ* Zahn, distance	159¼††	miles.
Regan to Minab and sea coast, distance	226‡‡	„
Total	385¼	„

Classification of road from Bampur to Regan.

Report of a journey through Western Baluchistan by Captain R. H. Jennings, R.E., pages 321-337.

First 26 miles from Bampur fairly easy ; occasional sand ridges followed at mile 27 by detour of 17 miles to avoid almost impassable sand ridges succeeded by desert. At mile 51 heavy sand, 130 miles from Regan, road enters Konarnai river, flowing from south-west to north-east, several miles wide and again road crosses a second great branch which is a running stream in the rains. Low hills, highest point about 4,000 feet.

Classification of road from Regan to Minab.

Ibid, pages 236-265.

Road crosses several branches of Kilgar, main branch ¾ mile wide; also 3 broad branches of Konarnai; also Dorampi river, 1 mile wide, with steep banks. Desert liable to inundation after heavy rains; 87 miles out of Regan dense jungle liable in rains to inundation, being depression in desert. Hilly country in parts, highest point crossed by road is 2,172 feet. Gradient 1 in 60.

Minab is a large town, containing 1,000 houses, all inhabited.

The following extract, which is included in Major Jennings' Report, is taken from the Persian Gulf Pilot, 1883 :—

"Khaur Minau, or Minab, is a salt water mangrove creek, the entrance to which is 17 miles east, ¼ south, of Hormuz fort. The bar is nearly dry at low water, and it is visited by boats not exceeding 20 tons burden which come from Kishm and Bunder Abbas. At its head is the port of the large town of Minau (Minab) which carries on a considerable trade with those

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* Based on scale.
† Section IV of Report on a survey for a route for a telegraph line by Mr. Newcome Wilson.
‡ Pages 28 and 29 of Routes in Persia, Section I.
§ Baluchistan Gazetteer, page 197.
‖ *Ibid*, page 196.
¶ Section IV of Report on a survey for a route for a telegraph line by Mr. Newcome Wilson.
** Pages 28 and 29 of Routes in Persia, Section I.
†† Routes in Persia, page XI.
‡‡ „ „ „ „ XI and distance of Minab to sea coast 16 miles is based on scale.

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places. A great many boats, all of the size mentioned above, are employed in the trade; during a Shamal, no boats can enter or leave and some are annually lost on the bar. There are many similar mangrove creeks on both sides of this one, which is recognised by the Arabs by two large mangrove trees close together, a short distance to the southward of it. The creek runs from the bar north-east for about 1½ miles, through sand and mud flats, overflowed at high water; it then enters between banks grown with mangroves, and turns to south-east for 2 miles and then to east north-east for 4 miles more to the head, where boats lie. Its banks are everywhere flooded at high tide, and it decreases in size till it becomes a mere mud ditch at the head. There is a mud building here, called Shahbandar, or custom house, but no other permanent building; the ground around it being occasionally flooded. The merchandise is carried between this place and Minab on camels and asses. At certain seasons as many as 20 boats arrive and leave in a day."

Note—Shahbandar is about 12 miles from Minab fort.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 4143 F. D.—4-3-1904.—54—L. G. G.

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MR. SPRING-RICE TO THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE, No. 415, DATED THE 1ST DECEMBER 1903.

(Received on the 1st February 1904 with Political Secretary's letter No. 3, dated the 15th January 1904.)

Reports the grants for new constructions contained in the Budget for 1904 of the Ministry of Ways and Communications.

TELEGRAM FROM SIR C. SCOTT TO THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE, No. 11, DATED THE 14TH JANUARY 1904.

(Received on the 8th February 1904 with Political Secretary's letter No 4, dated the 22nd January 1904.)

"My despatch No. 396. Russian Road Company authorised to borrow 5,000,000 roubles for construction of port at Enzeli and road from Kasvin to Hamadan".

1. I consider this report of Captain Rittich and the engineers who worked under him by far the best exposition of the best policy to be pursued (from the Russian point of view) by the Russians in Persia that I have so far read.

2. Russia wants to do three things in Persia—

(*a*) to absorb the trade and to control the politics of the country;

(*b*) to get to the sea;

(*c*) to utilise the position which she would obtain by (*a*) and (*b*) to attack, or at least to threaten, India.

3. Hitherto it has been generally assumed that she would adopt one of three lines of geographical advance in order to effect these objects.

4. The first is the western line, from Azerbaijan southwards towards Kermanshah, and from there through the Luristan mountains towards the Karun River and the head of the Gulf. I have never believed in this line of advance, at any rate within a distance of time that it is at present either practicable or necessary to forecast. Russia has not yet quite completed her railway to Julfa, she is not yet in Tabriz, we do not know how the Kurds would welcome her embraces, she would collide with German ambitions were she to cut the Khanikin-Tehran line, a tangle of mountains inhabited by the lawless Lur tribes then ensues, and, finally, when she got down to the plains, she would find us waiting for her on the Karun and at Mohammerah. I think that we may for the present dismiss this line of possible advance.

5. The second is the meridional line from Tehran to the Gulf at Bushire. This is quite possible from the engineering point of view at least as far as Shiraz: from there onwards it would be most difficult. The line has the political drawback that it would be a direct challenge to Great Britain, compelling us to occupy the Gulf Ports or to take some counter step: and it has the strategical drawback that it would terminate in a port (Bushire) which is no port at all, that there is no good port in the neighbourhood, and that, even if there were, it would be at the upper end of the Gulf, where, as long as we command the mouth, it would not serve the full purpose that Russia desires.

6. The third line is that either from Ashkabad *via* Meshed, or up the Tejend River from the Trans-Caspian Railway, and then along the eastern border of Khorasan to Seistan, whence the further movement, either towards Bunder Abbas or down through Persian Baluchistan towards the sea, or may be in an easterly direction towards India, would be decided according to the conditions and demands of the time. We have set ourselves athwart this route by the strong position that we have taken up in Seistan, by the construction of our Quetta-Nushki Railway, enabling us to carry an extension into Seistan between two and three years, if not more, before the Russians could possibly get there with a railway themselves; and, in so far as a possible maritime outlet at Bunder Abbas is concerned, by the steps which we have recently recommended to the Secretary of State as the sequel of my visit to the Gulf.

7. Russian ambitions appear, therefore, to be checked in each of the directions in which she has undoubtedly either contemplated, or been thought to contemplate, an advance. Now appears upon the scene Captain Rittich with his merry men: and they produce a scheme which seems to me to be based upon profound political and strategical insight, and, if realised, to secure for Russia all that she desires with the maximum of advantage to herself, and the maximum of detriment to us.

8. Let me point out the nature of the advantages to Russia, under the two heads, political and strategical—

I. *Political.*—(*i*) Cutting across Persia diagonally from north-west to south-east the projected line would place in Russian hands the whole of the principal cities of Persia from Tabriz to Kerman, including Kazvin, Hamadan (by a branch line Kazvin-Hamadan),

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Tehran, Kum, Kashan, Isfahan (by a branch line Kashan-Isfahan), and Yezd. The whole of the Central Persian plateau would thus fall under Russian control, and from this line she could push her influence southwards—to such places as Sultanabad, Shiraz, and elsewhere as she pleased.

(*ii*) Such a line would not merely firmly establish Russian influence throughout the whole of Central Persia, but it would also effectually destroy British influence in the south, for it would skirt, along its northern flank, the whole of the sphere that we have hitherto been disposed to claim.

(*iii*) The line would be a relatively cheap and easy one to construct, for it would proceed through a generally level country, with few mountain passes; and it would also be cheap and easy to guard, for the tribes along it are of a peaceful character, and would give no trouble.

(*iv*) I do not quite follow Captain Rittich's idea that it would also cut in twain the Indo-African ambitions of Great Britain, because I am not aware that we entertain them: nor, if we did, do I see that they would be effectually injured by this railway.

II. *Strategical.*—The strategical advantages of the line are even more striking.

(*i*) It possesses the supreme merit of enabling the Russians to direct against Southern Persia, or against the Indian frontier on the Seistan-Mekran section, the whole of the troops of the Caucasus, escaping both the Caspian crossing, the precarious transit along the single line of the Trans-Caspian Railway, and the long march southwards from the direction of Meshed.

(*ii*) It possesses the scarcely inferior merit from the Russian standpoint of avoiding the Gulf altogether, with a British fleet patrolling it, with British forces very likely in occupation of its principal ports, and with British warships closing its mouth. It takes Russia right out into the open ocean, and plants her on the sea at Chahbar, a place which by dint of the great expenditure that Russia is never reluctant to undertake, could be converted into a naval base of considerable strength in close proximity to the western borders of British protected territory.

(*iii*) Similarly, if a branch line were constructed from Bam to Seistan, would the railway enable Russia to reinforce her position in Seistan, and to throw a force upon the Afghan frontier, on the Kandahar flank, from the double direction of the Caucasus and the combined position in Trans-Caspia and Turkistan.

(*iv*) The line would be absolutely invulnerable against British attack until it reached the neighbourhood of the British frontier. It would be protected by the great desert on the north, and by mountains on the south. It would be too far from the sea to be cut from that quarter: and it would have achieved its purpose before we could even scratch its extremities.

Finally, the line possesses the physical advantage of running parallel, through its entire length, to the general trend of the Persian mountain system, instead of attempting to cut it: and the commercial advantage of tapping all the principal Persian entrepôts of trade.

9. Now if this statesmanlike and far-seeing scheme be seriously taken in hand, what have we to set against it? We have the promise of the late Shah that any Russian railway concession in the north will be balanced by a corresponding British one in the south, and that no southern railway concession shall be granted to any foreign company* without consultation† with the British Government. We have our position in the Gulf, which is one of no mean strength, and which enables us at any moment to put pressure both upon the Persians and the Russians, in the manner indicated in my recent Despatch to the Home Government. And we have our position and opportunities in Seistan, which we can always develop at a quicker rate than the Russians, and which should place it in our power to exert great pressure in that quarters.

* He did not say Government.
C[URZON].

† A very different thing from consent.
C[URZON].

10. All of these advantages however, if they are to be turned to account, postulate a strong initiative, and a resolute determination on the part of the Home Government, which it would be sanguine to anticipate in all circumstances. It is, indeed, more probable that the demand for the Russian railway would be put forward in such a form and at such a time as might render the British Government reluctant to authorise any very strong measures, and might elicit from them nothing more than the suggestion that we should take some counter steps in the road or railway line to protect our own position.

11. This is just the point at which it is the duty of our Intelligence Department and military authorities to step in and advise. The Russians are beginning to move, so to speak, by two parallels. First come the *chaussées* in the north, which are to carry railroads later on. Then, when these have been finished, rails will be laid upon them, and the full-blown project that I have been discussing in this note will emerge. What steps shall we take to anticipate or guard against it now? What steps should we take to check or to respond to it then?

12. There seem to me to be three aspects of this case—

(i) Is it possible or desirable for us to demand the grant of any corresponding roads or concessions in the south, and would they, if granted, be of the smallest strategical advantage to us in the future?

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(ii) Have we formed any clear idea as to the possibility or desirability of British railways in the south of Persia, and, if so, where and in what direction?

(iii) I call attention to the fact that if the Tehran-Kerman line were to be made, the strategic front, which we should apparently oppose to it and which would bar its ultimate progress, would be the line from Koh-i-Malik Siah to Bunder Abbas, with its centre between Bam and Regan. Major Sykes suggests a railway from Minau, east of Bunder Abbas, to this central point. We shall shortly have our telegraph from it to Koh-i-Malik Siah. What do the strategists think of this as a possible line of opposition?

13. Mr. Dane has put forward a scheme which does not seem to me to be relevant to the situation. He suggests that we should put up the Imperial Bank of Persia to get hold of Khor Musa, make a port there, and roads from it into the interior. As far as I can see, all that this would do would be to earmark Khor Musa (as to which we have repeatedly told the Russian Government that we cannot acquiesce in their having any port on the Gulf), and we should provide an alternative land route to the Karun (which, so far as I know, is not wanted) and, apparently, a route either from Khor Musa or Bunder Dilam to Shiraz. What this route would do, I have not gathered. Apparently in one place Mr. Dane contemplates something much bigger, for he speaks of it as "a route more easily supported from our bases on the sea *and in Seistan*", and he even speaks of a "through line of railway by this route between Europe and India, largely under British control". Who is to build the railway, where the money is to come from, what purpose it would serve, or how it would get to Europe, does not appear. I do not think that this project need be pursued.

14. What we have to bear in mind is (1) that the British Government will not, like the Russian Government, embark State funds on a large scale in railways or other ventures in Persia; (2) that the Indian Government cannot spend money on such objects in a foreign country except for some very obvious Indian gain, and doubtfully even then; (3) that it is not of the slightest use to frame large theoretical or academic schemes of road or railway construction, which never get beyond the white ant stage in the bureaux at Simla. Russia seems likely to threaten our position in Persia, and ultimately in India, by a novel and well designed scheme of attack. What are the practical measures by which we should anticipate or defeat it?

15. I suggest that a careful *resumé* be prepared of the various proposals for British roads or railways in Southern Persia that have been made over a course of many years. Scores of young Indian officers have travelled there and reported. Books like those of Sykes, Whigham, and others, contain abundant references to such schemes.

16. When we have drawn up such a list (I suppose in the Intelligence Department), we might then consider whether to ask our present officers in Persia for their opinions, or whether to send a highly competent party of surveyors—on the Rittich-Sarkhansky model—to Southern Persia to examine all possible schemes. When we were discussing the *quid pro quo* for a loan to Persia last year, a good deal was said about the monopoly of concessions for roads, communications, &c., that we might appropriately demand. But, if we obtained the monopoly, no one was at that time in a position to say what we should do with it, or where we should begin. It seems to me most desirable that we should rectify this deficiency, and that the present is a favourable opportunity for doing so.

C[URZON],—26-2-04.

Foreign Office Press—No. 544—7-3-04—32.

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

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I think that Military Department should see the case when printed, as the paper was removed for action and has not been seen by Hon'ble Members.

L. W. DANE,—4-3-04.

There were two copies of the print received with the India Office letter : one was removed and the other was circulated to Hon'ble Members. The Hon'ble Sir E. Elles asked to see a copy with a map and one was sent to him for perusal. In these circumstances, perhaps this file should be sent on without delay to Intelligence Branch for preparation of the resumé ordered by His Excellency, and not sent to Military Department as directed by Secretary above.

G. W. M.,—8-3-04.

I think the file should first be seen in the Military Department, who, no doubt, will return the case very early for the preparation of the resumé by the Intelligence Branch.

W. M. CUBITT,—8-3-04.

Military Department.

Seen in the Military Department.

E. DEBRATH,—8-3-04.

I do not delay the case to study the question further now.

E. R. E[LLES],—8-3-04.

Foreign Department.

Intelligence Branch.

FROM E. M. GRANT DUFF, ESQ., TO THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE, NO. 10, DATED THE 22ND JANUARY (RECEIVED 14TH MARCH) 1904.

(Received on the 14th March 1904, under cover of a letter from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 4, dated the 6th February 1904.)

Statement by the Mushir-ed-Dowleh that no permission has been granted to Russia to construct wharfs or warehouses at Enzeli, but that the Enzeli-Kazvin Road Company will be allowed to dredge the mouth of the lagoon.

Secretary to see.

* Sent, 30th March 1904.

A copy of the new receipt may be sent* unofficially—very confidentially—to the Intelligence Branch.

W. M. CUBITT,—23-3-04.

E. H. S. CLARKE,—23-3-04.

This is rather amusing. The Road Company may dredge the harbour and build a breakwater, but may not erect wharves, warehouses, etc. This is mere trifling. The important point is that the harbour concession is no longer contingent but actual, and I venture to think this warrants on application for similar concessions in the south if our Road Companies or the Imperial Bank are willing to take them.

L. W. DANE,—23-3-04.

There is no analogy whatever between the two cases.

C[URZON],—25-3-04.

TELEGRAM FROM SIR C. SCOTT TO THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE, NO. 11, DATED THE 14TH JANUARY 1904.

(Received on the 21st March 1904 with Political Secretary's letter, No. 10, dated the 4th March 1904.)

States that authority has been given to the Russian Road Company to raise a loan of 5,000,000 roubles for the construction of a road from Hamadan to Kazvin, and for the construction of a port at Enzeli.

For information. His Excellency to see.

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Mr. Grant Duff, however, reported on the 22nd January, which is later than Sir Charles Scott' telegram, that no permission had been given to construct a port (harbour works) at Enzeli.

The Persian Government's disclaimer was absurd.

L. W. Dane,—30-3-04.

No orders: but copies will be forwarded* unofficially—very confidentially—to the Intelligence Branch.

* Sent, 30th March 1904.

W. M. Cubitt,—28-3-04.

His Excellency the Viceroy in paragraph 15 of his attached note, requests us to prepare a careful resumé of the various proposals for British roads or railways in Southern Persia that have been made over a course of many years. He does not, in the present stage, ask us to select, discuss, or give an opinion as to the value of any strategical line, but merely to draw up a list of proposals, and I therefore, in doing this, refrain from comment.

RAILWAYS.

The various suggestions for railway communication of which we have record comprise the following lines. Resumé of the proposals follow:—

Mohammerah to Tehran.
Mohammerah to Resht.
Shushter to Isfahan.
Shushter to Tehran.
Shushter to Burujird onwards.
Shushter or Ahwaz to Behbehan and thence to Bunder Abbas.
Kermanshah to Baluchistan.
Ahwaz to Dizful and onwards.
Kut Saiyid Ali up the Karun to Ahwaz, and thence to the Kerkha.
Bunder-Dilam to Tehran.
Bunder-Dilam to Shiraz.
Bushire to Tehran.
Bunder Abbas to Tehran.
Bunder Abbas to Seistan.
Minau across Rudbar to Narmashir and Seistan or from Narmashir to Seistan.
Pasni, Gwadur, Chahbar, Bunder Abbas } to Seistan.
Yezd to Niriz and to Mughu Bay.
Nushki to the Helmand, thence to Seistan.
Nushki into Persia.
Nushki to Persia *via* the Rukshan valley to Panjgur, thence *via* Serhad into Seistan.
Quetta to Isfahan.
Quetta to Bam, and thence to Isfahan and Tehran.
Karachi into Persia with branch lines to Pasni, Gwadur, &c.

ROADS.

Although we have several reports on various roads in South Persia made by the many officers who have travelled over them, with suggestions as to how these roads might be improved for military purposes, the records of proposals to construct good roads are few. They comprise the following, of which a resumé follows:—

Mohammerah to Tehran.
Shushter to Kermanshah.
Shushter to Tehran.
Ahwaz to Isfahan.
Bunder Dilam to Isfahan.
Bunder Dilam to Kumishah.
Bushire to Shiraz.
Bushire to Isfahan.
Bushire to Tehran.
Bunder Abbas to Tehran.
Bunder Abbas to Shiraz.
Persian Gulf to Meshed.
Ram Hormuz to Mashur.
Khor Bukhadir to Mohammerah.
Quetta to Birjand *via* Seistan.

There is no other information as to proposals for roads in the Intelligence Branch, but the Route Books afford a large amount of information as to various routes and their condition.

A. B. Lindsay,—26-3-04.

Forwarded.

W. Malleson,—26-3-04.

Foreign Department.

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RESUMÉ OF VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR BRITISE RAILWAYS IN SOUTHERN PERSIA.

1. *Author.*—Sir R. Thomson, 1886.

Considered that the construction of a railway connecting Isfahan with Shushter would be of great value. "The only practicable route for a line between these places would be from the Karun to Burujird, and thence to Isfahan. Were this project realised, the line from Burujird to Isfahan would form eventually part of the through line of railway to India, whilst that from Shushter to Burujird would prove a useful branch, opening communication from the main line to the head of the Gulf".

2. *Author.*—Mr. Mackinnon (Messrs. Gray, Dawes & Co.), 1886—

Submitted to Government a scheme for the construction of a narrow gauge railway from the termination of the water navigation of the Karun to Burujird, with a view to eventual extension to Tehran and the construction of branch lines.

3. *Author.*—Mr. Mackenzie (Gray, Paul & Co.), 1886—

Proposed the formation of a company for the construction of a railway from the terminus of the Karun river steamers to Tehran, the first link of the line to be from Shushter to Burujird (*via* Dizful to Khorremabad), a distance of 182 miles. Burujird being on the plateau, no engineering difficulties would be encountered in extending the subsequent links of the line in any direction.

4. *Author.*—Captain Jennings, R.E., in his "Report of a Journey through Western Baluchistan", 1886—

Reported that, as far as he was able to judge, a railway could be made without great difficulty from Bunder Abbas to Seistan, and also from Bampur.

5. *Author.*—Mr. P. J. C. Robertson, Assistant Political Agent and Consul at Basrah, 1887.

Reported on the proposed railway from Ahwaz on the Karun to Dizful and onwards, and suggested, owing to the reach of the Karun below Ahwaz being studded with islands and shoals, that the line should begin at Kut Saiyid Ali and run up the river to opposite Ahwaz, strike thence in a nearly straight line to Dizful bridge, and on to the Kerkha.

The engineering difficulties so far would be *nil*, the country being quite flat.

This section of the line would, in connection with steamers on the Lower Karun, at once divert to itself the thriving trade carried on between Dizful and Amarah on the Tigris, and, generally, the influence of the railway would quickly effect a transformation and give rise to a prosperity which would benefit alike the English shareholders and the Arab inhabitants.

6. *Author.*—Mr. A. B. Taylor, 1899—

Considered that a line from the Karun *via* Shushter, Dizful, Khorremabad, Burujird onwards would be the best. It might be possible to run direct to Dizful without going to Shushter, which would save distance. The great drawback to the route is the lawlessness of the tribes between Dizful and Burujird. Was of opinion that it would be many years before the scheme could command financial success. The stretch as far as Dizful could be made fairly cheaply.

7. *Author.*—General Brackenbury, Intelligence Department, War Office, in his Memorandum, 1889—

Mentioned the following routes by which the elevated plateau of Persia and Tehran can be reached from the shores of the Gulf :—

(1) Bunder Abbas, Kerman, Yezd, Isfahan, Kum, Tehran—1,029 miles.
(2) Bushire, Shiraz, Isfahan, Tehran—717 miles.
(3) Bunder Dilam, Behbehan, Ardal, Isfahan, Tehran—676 miles.
(4) Mohammerah, Shushter, Bala-rud, Burujird, Kum, Tehran—622 miles.

He considered that a line from Mohammerah to Tehran "as regards length, facility of construction, and commercial advantage, to be the most suitable route for a trunk line to tap the commerce of Persia from the south". As regards the military point of view, General Brackenbury remarked "Mohammerah is the most easily accessible of the ports on the Persian Gulf, as all the others are mere open roadsteads; there is water carriage along the Karun available to Shushter, which might serve to ease the traffic on the railway in part; and as the route followed is the easiest from the Persian Gulf to the interior, the gradients would be lighter than on any other, and thus troops and stores could be more rapidly forwarded by it" .....the lines most important for England, if not to promote, at least to prevent falling under hostile influences, are.....the line from Mohammerah *via* Shushter, Bala-rud, and Burujird to Tehran, and the line Kermanshah-Burujird-Isfahan-Yezd-Kerman.

9. *Author*—Major Sawyer (in "Note on the question of developing communications in Persia"), 1890—

Strongly advocated a Mohammerah-Resht line. "It is from a military point of view unobjectionable, and from a commercial point of view attractive. Looking to the future development of railways in Persia, this line, moreover, contains the promise of being most useful in deciding the eventual Perso-Indian through line. Passing through the heart of

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cultivated Persia, it forms a commercial aorta from which branches into all the productive parts would eventually pulsate" ..... "Such would be westwards from Burujird to Kermanshah, from Sultanabad to Hamadan, and eastwards from Sultanabad *via* Gulpaigan to Isfahan. The natural configuration and the lie of the area to be reached is in harmony with our strategical demands, for it would be to our interest to have all these branches running as much as possible parallel to our base line, the Persian Gulf"..... .. .. "An Isfahan extension gradually extended further to Yezd, then south-eastwards to Saidabad, thence to Bampur, would reach Nushki, well out of Russia's way, without offence to her Central Asian position".

10. *Author.*—Sir F. Goldsmid—(*vide* "Persia", Vol. I, page 636, by Hon'ble G. Curzon, M. P.), 1890—

Proposed two lines "in either case starting from Baghdad, in connection with a Euphrates or Tigris Valley Railway, the line recommended would pass in an easterly direction through Persian territory avoiding the Gulf, by Shushter and Ram Hormuz, or possibly by Hawizeh and Ahwaz to Behbehan, whence an existing caravan route would be followed to Shiraz. From Shiraz two lines of communication are available to the sea; a northerly line by Fasa, Darab, and Forg, or a more southerly line by Lar, both debouching upon Bunder Abbas, thence the railway would be continued along the Mekran coast to Karachi".

11. *Author.*—Lieutenant H. B. Vaughan, in his "Journey through Persia", 1890—

Reported that a line could be built without much difficulty from Yezd to Niriz. The elevations are great, but the gradients are very easy, and the greater part of the line would run over a level plain. Between Niriz and the Persian Gulf to the south, the direct route would probably be Darab, Lar, Mughu Bay.

On the other hand, the best direction to follow from Niriz, would be a line running south-east towards Bunder Abbas. Such a line would run in conformation with the general line of the mountains.

12. *Author.*—Hon'ble G. Curzon, M.P., in his "Persia," Vol. I, 1892—

(*a*) The connection of the Seistan Railway with Kerman and Yezd, eventually to "be succeeded by branches from the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf, the starting points of which might be Pasni, Gwadur, or Chahbar; or, in deference to the existing trade routes, Bunder Abbas. The advantage to British trade of such an opening up of South-East Persia, involving, as it would, more intimate communication with the Central and North-East Provinces, would be as great as would the gain to Persia resulting from the new and more expeditious outlet for her exports in opium, cotton, and dried fruits".

(*b*) Mohammerah or Shuhster northwards "through the Lur country to Khorremabad and Burujird".

(*c*) "If ever a railroad is built in a transverse direction across the breadth of Persia" ...." The true line would seem to be one that shall unite the great agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial centres of Persia, and shall be constructed with reference to Persian as well as to British requirements. Such a line is more likely to be found along the track Baghdad, Kermanshah, Burujird, Isfahan, Yezd, Kerman ..... Connection between Kerman and Seistan, and with points on the coast is mentioned under (*a*)".

13. *Author.*—Colonel Mark Bell (*vide* "Note on the Question of developing Communications with Persia", Intelligence Branch, 1892)—

"A line of railway from the Persian Gulf to Tehran should doubtless approximately follow the Shushter-Burujird-Kum route, for the country is more favourable to railway construction on this line than on any other *confined* to Persian territory".

Colonel Bell points to the important part that the area Kermanshah-Sahna-Burujird-Hamadan is capable of playing in the defence of Persia and the Persian Gulf, and how very necessary it is that ready access should be given to it by the Karun River to Shushter, and thence by rail or road to Burujird and Kermanshah. The country enclosed within the semicircle Sahna, Hamadan, and Burujird is of such strategical importance that it "not only protects the eastern outlets of all the passes across the Kurdistan Hills to Van, but also protects the whole of South-West Persia from Isfahan to the Gulf, and prevents any hostile advance across the Lur, Bakhtiari, and Kashgai Hills".

14. *Author.*—Mr. Preece, Consul at Isfahan, 1895—

Reported that there was nothing, as far as he could judge, to prevent a railway being made from Shushter to Khorremabad, the country being in no way difficult.

Mr. Preece advocated the construction of a light electric railway from Mohammerah to Khorremabad and Burujird, the abundant water-supply along the route facilitating such a scheme. Such a railway, in his opinion, would be the only one likely to pay until the country is more fully developed.

15. Military Report on Persian Seistan, 1902—

Three possible routes for carrying on the Nushki line into Persia are mentioned :—

(*a*) From Nushki to some point on the Helmand, thence down the river into Seistan.

(*b*) *Via* the trade route.

(*c*) *Viâ* the Rukshan valley to Panjgur, thence north *via* Serhad into Seistan.

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(*a*) would be the shorter route, and, passing through a country capable of agricultural development, might be made to pay.

(*b*) is through a desert country, capable of but small development, and when the Persian frontier is struck, there are still some 100 miles of desert before the fertile plains of Seistan are reached. Moreover, an extension to Kerman would necessitate the crossing of the Dasht-i-Lut.

(*c*) would open up British Baluchistan. The line could be extended to Bampur and thence throughout Southern Persia, and could also be connected with the port of Pasni.

Mention is also made of the feasibility of a railway from Karachi through Las Bela, no great engineering difficulties to be met with except from Las Bela across the hills into the Awaran valley, whence an easy track could be obtained right away to Kasarkand. Branch lines could be made to connect Pasni, Gwadur, &c.

16. *Author.*—Messrs. Pollock and Stewart, London, 1902—

Petitioned the Shah when in London for a provisional concession for the construction of a railway from the vicinity of Baghdad, running eastward *via* Isfahan and Yezd, towards Quetta.

17. *Author.*—Major P. M. Sykes, in his "Ten thousand miles in Persia", 1902—

"I would give it as my opinion that the proposed scheme of running a railway along the coast of Southern Persia would end in failure, both because it could not compete with sea-borne commerce, and also because the engineering difficulties would be very great".

"A study of the Geography of Persia, as I understand it, shows most clearly that its railways, with perhaps two exceptions, should run in the same direction as the ranges, *viz*, from north-west to south-east, and few parts of the world can show country so suitable for railway construction as that lying between Tehran and Kerman, while further east the desert is crossed at its narrowest part".

18. *Author.*—H. J. Whigham, in the "Persian Problem", 1903—

While noting the feasibility of a transverse line from Kermanshah *via* Sultanabad or Burujird, Isfahan, Yezd, Kerman, on to Baluchistan, the author does not favour it, apparently owing to the fact that the Baghdad Railway concession has fallen into other hands.

"We must begin where we have a base of supplies, and that brings us at once either to the Karun or the Gulf". Mentioning the general supposition that the Bushire-Shiraz alignment is hopeless, about which the author appears to be somewhat sceptical, he continues "but for the present we must look elsewhere, and Bunder Abbas and Mohammerah are the only starting points that suggest themselves. Of these two, the first to be chosen is Mohammerah, owing to the attractiveness of the Burujird-Tehran route, with branches to Kermanshah and Hamadan on the west side, and to Isfahan and Shiraz on the east . . . This railway, which would be followed as soon as possible by a similar line from the coast, at Bunder Abbas to Kerman and Yezd, and Isfahan or Kashan, would form an advanced base for the ideal line across Persia, which cannot be built until branches are first pushed up from the coast to carry material. It would develop trade in Southern and Western Persia at a rapid rate, and, above all, it would give us a tangible advantage over Russia in the markets of the North".

19. Major P. M. Sykes's letter No. 185, to Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, 1903—

"The best line for a railway in South-East Persia would be from some point on the coast near Minan. It would then be carried across Rudbar to the Gishu Pass and Narmashir. From Narmashir, one branch would run north to Seistan, and the other would follow the alignment of the Central Persian Telegraph line to Bam, Darzin, Neibid, Mahun, and Kerman. In fact, it would run through an ideal country across Central Persia".

20. *Author.*—Lieutenant L. E. Hopkins, R.E., 1903—

Reported the Bushire-Shiraz route as being impracticable, but suggested a "quite feasible" line, starting from Bunder Dilam and following the Fahlian River, which would meet with no great engineering difficulties. A continuous easy ascent, the one pass, distant 30 miles from Shiraz, having an altitude of 7,200 feet. Length of line would be about 210 miles The country passed through is well watered and well timbered. Lieutenant Hopkins calculated that a metre gauge line might be expected to pay 5 per cent, and estimated to £3,333 per mile for cost of construction.

Lieutenant Hopkins also believed that a line could be made from Shiraz to Kerman without serious difficulties.

He also mentioned the Quetta-Kerman route, the one difficulty* apparently being in his opinion, the Rud-i-Mani gorge between Shum and Maizar Ab, "almost one might say impracticable for a railway".

* *N. B.*—But as pointed out by Mr. Dane in his memorandum of 7th February 1904, "there is no necessity to take that route, as the surveys of Gopal Singh and Mr. Moore for a telegraph line and the report of Mr. Dobbs, show that a line can, perhaps, be found direct from Koh-i-Malik Siah *via* Baluchab, Nasratabad-Ispe, and Gurg to Bam, with only one stretch of 26 miles between Shurgez and Gurg without water".

W. E. Black,—24-3-04.

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

RESUMÉ OF PROPOSED ROADS.

Mohammerah to Tehran via Shushter through the Jaidar Pass, Khorremabad, Burujird, Sultanabad, and Kum (Maunsell, 1888)—

"This, Colonel Bell thinks, is the only practicable pass leading from Shushter to Mohammerah, through the Luristan Hills. The commercial and military importance is very great, and it may be considered one of the natural commercial arteries of Persia".

Shushter to Kermanshah (Maunsell, 1888)—

"A shorter route from Shushter to Kermanshah and the surrounding district lies up the Kerkha valley by Zangwan".

Shushter to Tehran via Dizful, Burujird, Sultanabad, and Kum with a branch to Isfahan (Napier, 1900)—

"The Imperial Bank of Persia obtained a concession to make this road many years ago, but nothing was done beyond making a so-called carriage road from Te..ran to Kum at a cost of £80,000".

"Colonel Bell in 1885 stated of the Dizful to Khorremabad portion, with reference to converting it into a cart road, that 57 miles were good, 60 miles fair, 40 miles bad. With reference to converting the Khorremabad-Burujird portion into a cart road, he stated 35 miles might be classed as good, 20 miles as fair, 3 miles as bad".

Ahwaz to Isfahan, known as the Bakhtiari road (Napier, 1900) *via* Mal Amir, Godar-i-Balutak, Pul-i-Amarat, Ardal, Khavarukh—

"In 1897, a concession was granted by the Persian Government to the Bakhtiari Chiefs for the construction and maintenance of a road from Ahwaz to Isfahan and Shushter to Isfahan. The work of construction was entrusted to Messrs. Lynch Brothers, and a good mule road was open for traffic in 1900".

Bunder Dilam to Isfahan, through the Kughelu Hills (Maunsell, 1888)—

Colonel Bell in 1884 said of this route—"Of the 313 miles between Bunder Dilam and Ardal the road may be classed as 146 miles good, 97 fair, and 70 bad, and the cost to convert it into a cart road, Rs. 82,620.

"Of the 102 miles between Ardal and Isfahan, 46 are good, 41 fair, and 15 bad. Total cost of converting this section, Rs. 21,500".

Bunder Dilam to Kumishah on the Shiraz-Isfahan post road (Mr. Preece's Memorandum)—

"This road is 330 miles to Isfahan as against 480 *via* Shiraz from Bushire. A fairly easy road".

Bushire to Shiraz via Firuzabad and Farashband.

Bushire to Shiraz via Kazrun.

Mr. Preece in his memorandum on Persian roads says of these—"By either of these, the Mashilah has first to be encountered. Across this, for at least 8 miles, a causeway would have to be built. This Mashilah is under water at all seasons of the year".

Of the second he says—"From Bushire to Daliki is level; from there onward the road is very difficult". I am, however, of belief that the worst portion of the road can be turned, and that a fairly easy cart road could be made from Bushire to Shiraz at no very great expense.

From Shiraz to Tehran a road or railway would be a work of ease.

Bushire to Isfahan via Firuzabad and Shiraz (Maunsell, 1888)—

"Eighty miles of which require making into a cart road. This is a very rough and difficult road".

Bushire to Tehran via Kazrun, Shiraz, and Isfahan (Maunsell, 1888)—

Captain Wells estimates that 44 miles require to be constructed to make it passable for carts. This is a very rough and difficult track. Sir O. St. John estimates the cost of making this route into a good cart road would be £1,000 a mile, or near £200,000 for the distance, and, "when made," he says, "where are the carts, drivers, bullocks to come from, as none exist in the surrounding country?"

Bunder Abbas to Tehran via Kerman, Yezd, and Kashan (Maunsell, 1888)—

"Nine-hundred and twenty miles. To make it into a cart road Mr. Shindler estimates 120 miles would have to be made at a cost of Rs. 60,000. It is a fairly level route and now (1888) seems to be the best frequented trade route from Isfahan to the sea. The route being a less difficult one than that to Bushire, accounts for this. According to Mr. Preece, there are two routes from Bunder Abbas to Kerman—

(1) *via* Ahmadi and Saidabad,

(2) *via* Deh Bakri,

but he states heavy passes have to be crossed by both, and he does not consider expense on them would be justified."

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Bunder Abbas to Shiraz. Mr. Preece in his memorandum on roads in Persia says that an easy and practicable route would be to Shiraz *via* Forg and Darab.

"Persia" by the Hon'ble G. Curzon, M.P.

Persian Gulf to Meshed—

"The route running northward from Kerman *via* Rahwar, Nahiband, and Tun is the principal caravan route from the Gulf to Meshed, and might be improved".

Quetta to Birjand via *Seistan.* "Persia" by the Hon'ble G. Curzon, M.P.—

"A road from the British possessions in Baluchistan to the Persian border, avoiding Afghan territory and proceeding as above, might be opened up".

Isfahan to Kum.

Shushter to Kum.

(The Middle Eastern Question. V. Chirol)—

"It may be hoped that before long a carriage road from Isfahan to Kashan and Kum, connecting with the Kum-Tehran road, which the Imperial Bank constructed a few years ago, will materially facilitate traffic between the Karun and the capital. The material difficulties to be overcome are certainly not formidable.

'The Persian Trading and Transport Company' has also acquired the right to open up a new road from Shushter on the Karun through the Dizful valley to Khorremabad and Burujird, connecting thence through Sultanabad with the carriage road, for which the Imperial Bank had also acquired a concession from the Persian Government. On this route the difficulties are likely to be greater, as it will have to be carried through the turbulent country of the Lurs".

Ram Hormuz to Mashur.

Khor Bukhadir to Mohammerah.

(Extract from Government of India despatch No. 71 of 1904.)—

"A good road could probably be made from Ram Hormuz on the Bakhtiari route to Mashur, whence communications exist to Nasiri (Ahwaz) and Mohammerah. The distance from Ram Hormuz to Mashur is 59½ as against 72 miles to Ahwaz on the Karun. From the Khor Bukhadir or western branch of the Khor Musa a direct route to Mohammerah is apparently feasible across the highland. Between Mashur and the anchorage at the mouth of the Khor Dorah, it seems likely that the construction of a permanent road would be a work of greater difficulty".

A. B. Lindsay,—26-3-04.

From Lieutenant-Colonel Maunsell, to Sir N. O'Conor, No. 1, dated the 9th January 1904.

(Received on the 28th March 1904 with Political Secretary's letter, No. 11, dated the 11th March 1904.)

With reference to Mr. Spring Rice's despatch No. 396, dated the 23rd November 1903, regarding suggestions made by certain Russian Engineers for railways in Persia, submits his views on the subject, so far as concerns the districts near the Turko-Persian frontier.

From Sir C. Scott, to the Marquess of Lansdowne, No. 18, dated the 15th January 1904.

(Received on the 28th March 1904 with Political Secretary's letter, No. 11, dated the 11th March 1904.)

With reference to Mr. Spring-Rice's despatch No. 396, dated the 23rd November 1903, forwards a translation from the "Official Messenger" of the 30th December 1903, relating to the issue of privileged shares for the construction of a port at Enzeli and of a road from Kazvin to Hamadan.

The Intelligence Branch notes and the two fresh receipts will be read. For the Enzeli harbour works, the Road Company have been authorised to issue privileged shares for 5,481,000 roubles tenable by Russian and Persian subjects only. Lieutenant-Colonel Maunsell, Military Attaché at Constantinople, draws attention to the possibility of making a railway from Dilman by the Lesser Zab Pass to the Tigris valley. The places are marked on Curzon's Map of Persia. I do not know that much has been added to the account of the

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lines, for which we have any data, which has already been given on pages 9, *et seq.*, of the notes. The most direct line for a Russian railway to the Gulf is either that mentioned by Lieutenant-Colonel Maunsell, or the line from Kazvin to Hamadan on which they are starting work, with its extension *via* Burujird, Khorremabad, Dizful, Shushter to Mohammerah or to Mashur and Khor Musa. As to this nearly all authorities are agreed.

Any Russian line from Julfa to Tehran, Isfahan, and Kerman would be twice the length of a British line from the head of the Gulf to the British frontier. It is difficult to see how we are to defeat the Russian design of making railroads in Persia as chaussées, unless we are prepared to go to war with her over the question, or to construct similar countervailing works ourselves. The railway from Orenburg to Tashkend, constructed while the Siberian undertaking was in progress, is a proof of what Russia can accomplish; and once she has made her chaussées to Hamadan and Tehran, the rest is not so difficult.

L. W. DANE,—30-3-04.

This is in the main a military or strategical question. It was with that object that I sent it to the Intelligence Department. What I asked them to do is stated in paragraph 11 of my former note. They have mistaken the nature of the reference, and concluded that I wanted nothing but the series of extracts with which they have provided me. I could easily have found them for myself.

Of course, what I want is the reasoned discussion explained by me with the utmost clearness in paragraphs 11, 12, 13, and 14 of my note. I was in hopes that having sent in my note a month ago, I might have had the reply of the Intelligence Department and the military authorities in time to deal with the case before I leave India. But as a month has been consumed in preliminaries, this seems hardly likely.

I can only remit the papers and suggest the examination which I before asked for, but which has not apparently even been begun.

C[URZON],—30-3-04.

The best way of ensuring that the case is promptly taken up will be to print up here urgently and send a copy of the papers unofficially to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and another to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch. Perhaps, before His Excellency leaves Simla they will be able to let him have their views.

L. W. DANE,– 31-3-04.

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[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated Simla, the 5th April 1904.

From—Major W. C. WALTON, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Intelligence Branch,

To—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I write to say that the subject of railways in south-east Persia and the strategical considerations involved has been receiving attention, and a note has been prepared by Captain Lindsay dealing with the subject.

This will be put up to Malleson immediately on his return as there is not now time to send it to him, and he will no doubt immediately put up the file to the Quarter Master General. Both Mullaly and Malleson are to be in Simla on the 12th instant.

Would you kindly let Mr. Dane know. The case only awaits their return.

EXTRACT FROM REUTER'S TELEGRAM, DATED 3RD (RECEIVED 4TH) APRIL 1904.

Reports that the Russian Minister of Finance has decided to acquire five million roubles of preference shares in the Enzeli-Tehran Railway Company and 11,875,000 roubles of shares in Discount and Loan Bank of Persia.

(RECEIVED ON THE 4TH APRIL 1904, UNDER COVER OF SIR A. HARDINGE'S LETTER NO. 9, DATED THE 5TH MARCH 1904.)

FROM SIR A. HARDINGE, K.C.M.G., C.B., HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, TEHRAN, TO THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE, K.G., NO. 33, DATED 23RD FEBRUARY 1904.

Makes certain observations regarding the scheme respecting the Boital concession for a railway from Tehran to the Persian Gulf.

I have put up with this case Reuter's telegram of 3rd April 1904 about the Russian Finance Minister's decision to acquire five million roubles of preference shares in the Enzeli-Tehran Railway Company. We heard in Sir C. Scott's despatch No. 18, dated the 15th January 1904, to the Marquess of Lansdowne, that the Enzeli-Tehran Road Company had been permitted to issue further privileged shares to a sum of 5,481,000 roubles for improving the Enzeli-Tehran road, and for constructing the port of Enzeli, as well as for making carriage roads to the shore of Enzeli Bay and from Kazvin to Hamadan. The Persian Government profess that the Russians have not been given permission to construct harbour works at Enzeli, but that the Road Company has been authorized to dredge the mouth of the lagoon and to build a break-water. Whatever the truth is, it looks as if the Russian Government had had to take up nearly all the preference shares themselves: or it may be that they have done so without giving the public a chance to purchase them.

Reuter also says that the Russian Minister of Finance has decided to acquire 11,875,000 roubles of shares in the Discount and Loan Bank of Persia. We have known for some time that this Bank is practically a Russian State Bank; this transaction makes it more than ever so.

The second receipt herewith submitted (Sir A. Hardinge's despatch of 23rd February 1904, to the Marquess of Lansdowne) is about the Boital concession for a railway from Tehran to the Persian Gulf. We have not yet been able to trace the earlier despatches referred to by Sir A. Hardinge, but I expect we have them and further search will be made.

16-4-04. E. H. S. CLARKE.

For information only at present.

16-4-04. L. W. DANE.

As soon as the Russians begin to make railways in the North (in which I do not for the present believe) our rights materialize in the South.

16-4-04. C[URZON].

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OFFICE MEMO. TO THE ASSISTANT QUARTER MASTER GENERAL, INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, No. 1586-F. B. (VERY CONFIDENTIAL), DATED THE 20TH APRIL 1904.

Forwards, for information, a copy of the papers cited.

His Excellency inquires what has happened to the case about railways in Persia.

20-4-04. L. W. DANE.

The case is in office. We are awaiting the resumé which the Intelligence Branch is preparing in accordance with His Excellency's order.

A. S.,—20-4-04.

Major Malleson told me two days ago that the Intelligence Branch note was ready, and that they were awaiting the arrival of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief before submitting it.

Plese let Major Malleson know how urgent the case is.
20-4-04. L. W. DANE.

I have written accordingly.
20-4-04. E. H. S. CLARKE.

We have heard nothing from Military Department to whom we sent a separate set of the papers.

20-4-04. E. H. S. CLARKE.

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[SECRET.]

NOTES IN THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH.

Q. M. G.

I regret that there should have been any apparent misunderstanding in this case. We judged from paragraphs 15 and 16 of H. E. the Viceroy's note of 26-2-04 that what was first required from the Intelligence Branch was a *resumé* of all proposals for roads and railways in Persia. This we prepared and submitted, and, in the meanwhile, the strategical aspect of the whole question was being carefully gone into. If there has been any undue delay in the submission of our note on this subject it must be partially attributed to the fact that the whole of the permanent officers of the Persian section of the Intelligence Branch are absent (1) in Afghanistan (2) in England, and (3) with the Russian forces in Manchuria. The late Assistant Quarter-Master General also left at the time the question came to us for consideration.

2. I now submit a note on the subject. I do not propose to consider here the purely commercial possibilities of any proposed line or lines. The specific question which we are asked by His Excellency the Viceroy to answer is how we, as strategists, propose to checkmate the schemes of Colonel Rittich, rightly, I think, described by His Excellency as statesmanlike and far-seeing. The object of the Russians as set forth in this scheme may be said to be (1) to obtain a port on the open ocean, (2) to provide for an eventual line of advance against India which will turn our existing left flank, and (3) to make this line along a comparatively easy route the location of which will render it both reasonably safe from any attack which we could deliver, and at the same time will secure the political and commercial preponderance of Russia in regions which, up to the present, have been regarded by us as exclusively within our sphere of interest.

3. In my opinion our best possible move to checkmate the Russian designs would be the construction of a road, capable of conversion into a railway, or, better still, of a railway itself, from some point at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, such as Bunder Abbas or Minau, to Seistan. Such a line would cut off Russia from obtaining a port on the open sea, would emphasize our preponderance in South-Eastern Persia, would immensely strengthen our position in Seistan, and would, in fact, if resolutely persisted in and carried through, be so deterrent to Russia as to cause her to abandon once and for all Colonel Rittich's scheme for a great trunk line from the north-west to the south-east of Persia.

4. The exact location of such a line must, of course, remain a matter only to be definitely settled by competent surveyors on the spot. But we already possess sufficient evidence to show that, in the opinion of many authorities, it is both feasible and desirable. The opinions of these authorities are set forth in the notes. The line would probably be about 450 miles in length, or less if the seaboard terminus was at Minau. This terminus would depend on the shipping and harbour facilities which could be made at one or the other of these places, as to which our information is not yet final and conclusive. Roughly speaking, however, it would appear from our records that the location of the railway would be approximately as shown by the green line on the accompanying map. From a commercial point of view, and also on strategical grounds, an extension from Regan or Bam to Kerman would appear to be advisable. Such a line might in the future form a link in a through Indo-European system, and would tend to draw to our port in the neighbourhood of Bunder Abbas much, if not all, of the commerce of south-eastern Persia.

5. But, though we are merely asked for an answer to one specific question, it is impossible to consider this problem otherwise than as merely a portion, and that, perhaps, not the most considerable portion, of Russia's schemes for aggrandisement in the Middle East. Presumably, if there is to be any backbone at all in Britian's Asiatic policy, it would be impossible for Russia to elbow us out of Southern Persia in a peaceful fashion. We could not consent to forego

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all our rights and claims there without striking a single blow in defence of our interests, if only for the very excellent and potent reason that such a surrender would entail so fatal a loss of prestige as enormously to weaken our position in Asia and set a limit to the period of our Empire in this continent. If this is so, and we are compelled to fight for our position in Persia and, incidentally, throughout the Orient, it will be evident at once that the war would not be confined to Persian soil. Russia has other and easier means of putting pressure on us and threatening our dominion. From the side of Herat and from the Oxus, as well as from places still further eastwards, she can launch columns against us. In fact it is impossible, in considering a question of this kind, to deal with the matter in mere water-tight compartments. We cannot ignore the possibilities of Russian aggression through Afghanistan, and possibly even from the Pamirs and Chinese Turkistan also. I propose, therefore, briefly to deal with this further aspect of the question and to see how the suggestion of a Bunder Abbas-Seistan railway is affected by the consideration of these broader issues.

6. The main lines of any Russian advance in force against India are (1) from the Oxus, through Kabul on Peshawar, and (2) from Herat through Farah on Kandahar. There may be other and subsidiary lines elsewhere, and it is quite within the bounds of possibility that the second line of advance may be rendered still easier by the construction in the near future of a Russian railway from Askhabad through Meshed and Khorasan in the direction of Seistan. In fact, it may reasonably be assumed that Russia already has her eye on Seistan as a likely base for operating against India and that she would readily avail herself of any chance offered her of strengthening her position in that part of the world. We thus have forced upon us the fact that Seistan is a place of potential great importance, not so much, perhaps, owing to the direct advantages it offers to us as to the value which it would have for Russia. Yet to occupy Seistan in strength is a project which hardly, at first sight, commends itself to one, bearing in mind the very limited number of troops we have at our disposal and the very wide extent of frontier which we already have to defend. Having regard to our available forces and the character of our existing responsibilities, I am doubtful of the wisdom of still further increasing the latter without simultaneously augmenting the former. In fact, one may assume at once, I think, that to take up the very advanced line of defence which Russian schemes point to as necessary for us, is a task which it would be difficult or impossible for us safely to undertake with our present forces. It is as well to bring this point prominently to notice in discussing large questions of this sort.

7. Assuming, however, that we shall have the necessary forces we can admit at once that Seistan is eminently a place for us to hold. Our position there would be of great political and military value to us and would probably put back for some years the final development of Russian designs on India. But if we hold Seistan at all we must do so in strength, or at any rate be in a position rapidly to reinforce the place. Consequently it is absolutely essential that Seistan should be directly connected by rail with India. There are several methods of doing this:—

(1) By Nushki and down the Helmund.

(2) By Nushki and the trade route.

(3) From Karachi *vid* Las Bela, Ladgasht, and Kondi.

(1) appears at present politically impossible, as the Amir has made it quite clear that he would not consent to the construction of railways within Afghan territory, and any attempt on our part to force the matter would probably embroil us with him and throw him into the arms of Russia. Yet this route is of distinct importance as an emergency line in the event of war, or of sudden disturbances in Afghanistan, when time is of every importance, as a railway from Nushki to Khwaja Ali or Bagat on the Helmund, together with river transport onwards to Seistan, would enable us quickly to reinforce and supply our troops in that place. (2) has the advantage of being entirely within our territory from Nushki to Koh-i-Malik Siah, and of being strategically more

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secure than (1). There is nothing to prevent it being taken in hand at once. But I am inclined to think that, on purely strategical grounds, (3) would be preferable to either of the above. We must remember that Russia can bring enormous numbers into the field and that it is quite possible that their sheer weight would drive us out of Seistan eventually, especially if we were straining every nerve to ward off her attacks elsewhere. If we were driven out of Seistan we should have to retreat along our railway line to India. Now it is a fact that the hasty destruction of a railway line during the course of a more or less hurried retreat is a practically impossible operation. At least only slight and temporary damage is inflicted. If we decide to adopt either routes (1) or (2) there would always be a danger that, in case of defeat in Seistan, we should practically be presenting our enemies with an excellent line of advance which, with a little arrangement and some comparatively slight repairs, would conduct them direct to Nushki, what time another Russian force was engaging the remainder of our troops in the southern theatre at Kandahar or on the Khojak. In fact, as Colonel Rittich very rightly observes, anything in the nature of a direct Nushki-Seistan line would have the defect of playing into the hands of Russia. It is here, I think, that, on purely strategical lines, the advantage of a Karachi-Seistan railway becomes apparent. For, even if we were beaten, a contingency which it is always necesary for us to take into consideration, Russia, if she wished to take advantage of the railway, would be compelled to advance along a far lengthier and more difficult line, through a country far better adapted to a series of defensive actions, and, if she succeeded in winning her way in the face of all these obstacles, she would arrive eventually in India at Karachi, with exhausted and attenuated troops, at a point where we could previously have concentrated, by sea and land, a force amply sufficient, in all probability, to crush her.

8. Bearing the foregoing considerations in mind, it appears to me that to insure a reasonable degree of safety against Russian schemes of aggression in and from the side of Persia it is desirable that we should undertake the construction:—

(1) Of a Bunder Abbas-Seistan line as marked in green on the map.

(2) Of a further connection from Seistan to Karachi, preferably, say, by Mr. John's route as marked on the map in parellel red and green lines.

9. How would such railways pan out if submitted to the crucial test of a Russian attack? Such an attack would almost certainly be of a twofold character, (*a*) by a force operating along Col. Rittich's line, which we may assume has been constructed as far as Kerman; (*b*) by a force advancing by a line through Khorasan on Seistan, or through Herat and Farah on the same place. Now in (*a*) the Russian line of communications from their frontier to Kerman would be some 1,057 miles, and there would be a further distance of about 150 miles from Kerman to Bam or Regan, the nearest point on our railway. Given sufficient troops we should be enabled to reinforce our position on this line far more rapidly than the Russians could bring up troops on theirs, for from Bunder Abbas to Regan would be only 277 miles, and Bunder Abbas itself is only 757 miles, or 70 hours steaming from Karachi. Moreover it would also be possible to bring reinforcements to this line by land from Karachi by means of the railway postulated above. Probably, therefore, we should be able seriously to retard the Russian advance. Suppose, however, that we were defeated by the superior numbers of the enemy and that their forces advanced to Regan. What would Russia's next move be? It would be of little use her advancing to the sea, where we were predominant, opposed all the way by our troops. To turn northwards towards Seistan, on the other hand, would compel her to expose her flank and rear to our forces based on the sea, and she could only move in safety on Seistan after first detaching a large force to guard her communications. These, again, would be liable to attack from our troops operating from the Karachi-Seistan railway. In fact, the disadvantages to Russia resulting from our making the lines proposed would, I think, be such as to deter her from carrying out Col. Rittich's scheme.

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

10. Let us now suppose that Russia abandons all idea of an advance in strength against us through South East Persia and contents herself, apart from operations elsewhere, with advancing on Seistan through either Askhabad-Meshed, or through Herat-Farah, or through both. We should then be able to reinforce our troops in Seistan both from the entrance to the Gulf and from Karachi. Moreover, if Russia advanced on Seistan by the Farah line she would be exposing her flank to our troops from Quetta, who would certainly be at, or in advance of, Girishk. Again, if under these circumstances we were defeated and driven out of Seistan, and Russia followed us up along the two lines of railway, they would land her eventually at places most disadvantageous to herself, where we were predominant, and, presumably, almost unassailable on the sea. Even if Russia recognised the futility of coming in strength down these lines, and concentrated her efforts on her soundest course, a direct advance through and beyond Kandahar, the existence of the two railways we are considering would compel her to lock up a very large force in the neighbourhood of Seistan, and would reduce to the same extent the number of troops she would be able to bring into the really vital part of the field against us.

11. It is hardly necessary to pursue these theoretical considerations further. I have attempted to show what should be our answer to the schemes of Col. Rittich, schemes conceived on a gigantic scale and which must necessarily cost almost untold millions. We are instructed that it is useless putting forward academic proposals which may never get beyond the pigeon holes of Simla. But I venture to submit that any answer to the gigantic ideas of Col. Rittich must of necessity itself be framed on a somewhat large scale. I know of no simple and inexpensive specific which will enable us by a stroke of the pen, or by the construction of a chowkidar's hut, to bar the way to Russia. Our answer, if we seriously intend to safeguard our interests and our Empire in Asia, must be a large and expensive one, but neither so large nor so expensive as the design which Russia, apparently, is ready and willing to spend millions on, with a view to recouping herself at our expense later on, when, through our unwillingness to act or to spend money on our defences, she shall have ousted us from our present position. If, therefore, Col. Rittich's plan is likely [seriously to be taken up by Russia, it is necessary that the means to defeat it should be seriously taken in hand by us, and we must make up our minds at once that such counter-plans will cost money. But the cost may be lessened if our action is prompt. I think that a proof of our determination to construct immediately a Bunder Abbas-Seistan line would cause Col. Rittich's scheme to fall to the ground. The checkmate would be so obvious and so overwhelming that the idea would not be persisted in. But if we delay, and thus allow Russia definitely to commit herself to the proposed line, we will almost certainly incur in the end enormously greater expense than would have to be faced in the event of prompt action now.

W. Malleson,—13-4-04.

Your Excellency—

His Excellency, the Viceroy, has asked the military authorities to advise what practical counter-measures would be necessary to anticipate and defeat this latest Russian scheme for a through railway line from north-western Persia to the sea.

The question resolves itself into one of strategy; for if we take up positions which we might have to abandon in the face of superior force, or if we create fresh responsibilities which we cannot defend, we shall render ourselves liable to heavy loss of prestige in the initial stages of a conflict. The first necessary step, therefore, seems to be to examine how this Russian scheme threatens our position in India and to devise means to ensure that we shall hold what we have got, before we launch out into subsidiary programmes. Having secured that object, future developments, in accordance

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with a definite scheme and based on sound strategical principles, can then be carried out as the evolution of events may require.

It has often been said that Russia has advanced—and is still advancing—against India like an army operating against a fortress—making her approaches, then forming her parallels, and consolidating herself for a fresh advance. At the present time her main parallel may roughly be taken as the Central Asian railway from Askabad eastwards, with her outposts at Sheikh Junaid and along the Oxus to the Pamirs. This is militarily defective, as all her troops, stores, etc., have to be brought by the Trans-Caspian railway (with its break at the Caspian and skirting foreign territory), and have to be passed in at one end of the parallel and sent along it to any points which require reinforcement. To remedy this, she is constructing the direct line of approach from Orenburg to the centre of her position, which, in due course, will, no doubt, be advanced to the Oxus, when she will form a fresh parallel—and so on.

Whilst thus making their plans against northern and north-western Afghanistan, slowly but on systematic principles, the Russians, recognising the obstacles they would have to encounter in a direct advance, have naturally turned their attention to the flanks of the positions opposed to them. On our extreme right they established themselves on the Pamirs (and probably, sooner or later, will display activity in Kashgaria), so as to have means to create diversions there—even if they can only be on a small scale; and latterly they have been doing all they can to work round our left flank, which is *en l'air*. For the immediate present we have anticipated them in Seistan. But a small detachment there will not affect the issue in the event of war, as, in such case, it would have to retire as soon as the enemy developed force in the neighbourhood of Farah. And the scheme under consideration, whilst it indicates the great plan of attack which Russia ultimately will develop if we do not prevent it, points also, I think, clearly, to the measures we should adopt to checkmate it.

A glance at the map shows that this scheme—if it could be carried out—would not only make Russia dominant in Persia and bring her on to the Arabian Sea, but from the purely military point of view it would, in combination with the projected Sarakhs-Seistan line, result in her establishing a fresh parallel against India stretching from the Trans-Caspian railway to the sea—connected in the north with her existing parallel directed against northern Afghanistan, and fed by two approaches (*i*) on the left, by the Trans-Caspian line; and (*ii*) in the centre and right, by the great trunk line from Teheran with its branches to Seistan and Chahbar. The strength of such a position and its danger to India, would be enormous. From her base in Europe Russia would have three railway lines of approach:—

(*i*) from Orenburg, bringing the resources of Central Russia directly towards northern Afghanistan,

(*ii*) the Trans-Caspian line, feeding her forces operating through Herat, and

(*iii*) the new Persian trunk line, bringing the Caucasus troops down to Seistan, Baluchistan, and South Eastern Persia.

The whole of her forces in the field would, also, be connected, at their advanced bases, by direct railway communication from Ferghana to Mekran. The new line through Persia would be almost invulnerable against any attack we might be able to make from the sea; the resources of Persia would be at her disposal; and she would be in a position to concentrate in overwhelming force against any point in Afghanistan or Baluchistan she might choose. We should be encircled and thrown back completely on the defensive; and, without firing a shot, she would practically have turned the Kabul-Kandahar alignment which has so often been held to be the true strategical line of defence against her advance on India.

In considering how to anticipate and prevent such a development, it is necessary to pay careful regard to our resources. Even if the fullest use is

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made of the existing army in India, we have no troops to spare for adventures far afield. As greater force is gradually developed against us and we are compelled to take measures to safeguard fresh points of vital importance, it will, no doubt, become necessary to supplement our means to secure such objects. But our existing army would be fully occupied in trying to defend such points as Russia might threaten from her present positions; and this emphasizes the necessity for avoiding unnecessary dissemination of force, and should condemn projects for railway expansion in Persia—such as those suggested from Khor Musa, Bunder Dilam, or Bushire—which are not essential for strategical purposes and which would either have to be abandoned in case of war or require large detached forces, in false military situations, for their defence.

In paragraph 12 (*iii*) of his Note of the 26th February 1904, the Viceroy has drawn attention to what is, I think, the true strategic front which we should oppose to any such move as is here contemplated on the part of Russia through Persia. This front is from Seistan to the sea, with its centre in Narmeshir. From Seistan to Narmeshir the front of this line is covered by the Dasht-i-Lut. Narmeshir itself is an important point in the centre of the line, where many routes converge and which, if held, would deny advance to an enemy on Seistan or Baluchistan from Southern Persia. The left rests on the sea, and is thus secure. The right of this line, however, *viz.*, Seistan, is in the air and is exposed to an advance from the North, from which direction the greatest danger is to be expected. To secure this front, therefore, it would be necessary to have a *place d' armes* in Seistan, supported by railway communication, so that it can be held securely against any force that is likely to be opposed to it.

These are the measures that would appear to be ultimately necessary, from the military point of view, to checkmate this new Russian scheme. They also will probably be forced upon us in time in order to secure our left flank against operations from the direction of Meshed and Herat, irrespective of Captain Rittich's proposals; for with Seistan in Russian hands they would be able to turn our flank, whilst, if held in strength by us, we should be able to operate against their flank in the event of their advancing on Kandahar. The line from Seistan to the sea is, therefore, of great strategical importance—not only to thwart this latest scheme, but also because of the value which Seistan possesses with regard to operations in Afghanistan.

The railway connections must be considered under two heads, *viz.*, (*i*) between Seistan and the sea and (*ii*) between Seistan and India. As regards the first, there is one common route from Seistan to Narmeshir, whence two alternative lines can be constructed to the sea, either (*a*) to Minau and Bander Abbas, or (*b*) to Chahbar. The value of these alternative routes will have to be carefully considered with regard to facilities at the ports, the effect the lines would produce on the defence of the front, cost, etc. For instance, for the defence of Narmeshir against an attack from its north-west and west, the more retired line (to Chahbar) might be preferable, covered as its flank would be for a considerable distance by the Milan-i-Jihun Hamun. A definite opinion as to the relative advantages of these alternative lines for the object in view could only be given, however, after they and the front in question had been more thoroughly examined.

As regards railway communication between India and Seistan there are three alternative routes which may be considered, *viz.*:—

(*i*) from Nushki to the Helmund, and thence down the left bank of that river,

(*ii*) from Nushki, by the trade route, and

(*iii*) from Karachi, through Las Bela, Chib, Palantok, and Kondi to Koh-i-Malik Siah.

The advantage of the last from the military point of view is that, in the event of retirement from Seistan it would be impossible completely to destroy a line, and if the Russians tried to follow this one and repair it, they

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would be drawn down into country well removed from the main theatre of operations and from whence they could only move small forces towards Nushki to turn our flank at Quetta. But this line would cross the watersheds, take a long time to construct, and be very costly. Either of the others would be shorter, cheaper, and more easily constructed. They would also have the advantage of providing more rapid means for transferring our forces from the neighbourhood of Quetta and Kandahar to Seistan, and *vice versa*, whilst being sufficiently protected on the north by the Dasht-i-Margo and Registan desert from attacks from Russian troops operating on the Herat-Kandahar line. But they both have the great disadvantage that in the event of our being forced to give up Seistan, they would give the enemy great assistance in prosecuting a turning movement against our main positions which would be extremely dangerous to us.

In dealing with this part of the question the greatest care must be taken that we do nothing by which we may play into the hands of the Russians at later stages of the game. Captain Rittich's scheme, if seriously undertaken, will take several years to carry out; and if we construct a railway from the sea to Seistan as soon as there are indications that the Russian scheme is being commenced, we should be adopting the best means to minimise its danger—and such action might even cause the Russians to abandon such a costly programme. A railway line from the sea to Seistan would also have great value in enabling us to hold Seistan against Russia. Such a line, therefore, has a double value, and is one which probably we shall have to construct in due course to secure the safety of our left flank. But railway communication between India and Seistan stands on a different plane. At present one of the greatest assets we have to the defence of India is that between us and the Russian frontiers there still remains a wide tract of country without railways, and we should be extremely careful before we bridge the barren country between Nushki and Seistan by means of a railway which would be of assistance to the Russians if we were forced to retire from Seistan.

As previously mentioned, the utmost danger on the side of Persia is to be expected in the form of a Russian move from her Trans-Caspian railway to Seistan. This we should try to prevent, or postpone, as long as possible. But if Russia moves in that direction, we shall have to make up our minds permanently to occupy Seistan unless we intend to let it fall to Russia. If she secures it, she will not only be able to turn our left flank completely, but she will also have obtained a position which will render it extremely difficult for us to maintain any line to oppose her subsequent advance through Teheran and Kerman, as advocated by Captain Rittich. Whilst, therefore, the possession of the line from Bunder Abbas is of great importance to us, the effective retention of this line depends on our possession of Seistan. And if we intend to secure Seistan, we must be prepared to hold it with a force of sufficient strength to maintain its position there, as any retreat of British troops would have a very serious effect on the military position in India. The existing army in India cannot spare the necessary force or afford to have any portion of its strength locked up there, and the troops for that purpose would have to be additional to the present army in this country.

Summarizing the above considerations, it is thought that, whether as a counter to this latest Russian project—if it is seriously commenced—or as a reply to a move on their part from the direction of Meshed towards Seistan, we should construct a railway from the sea to Seistan and securely protect its terminus at Seistan by establishing an adequate force there. We should not throw down the challenge without due cause, or precipitate matters, as it will mean great expenditure and an increase to our forces in this country. But if she tries to anticipate us in this direction we shall have to act promptly to secure the defence of India.

If it be decided that the measures here indicated are those which would be best from the military point of view as a counter to Russian railway extensions towards Baluchistan and the sea, it seems desirable that early steps should be taken to have a thorough examination of the country made by

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railway engineers, so that the route which should be adopted between Seistan and the sea may be definitely decided. This having been done, it would be for consideration whether a concession for the construction of a road on the chosen alignment from the selected port to Narmeshir should be then obtained from the Persian Government as a set off against similar operations in Northern Persia. Later on, when the railway to Seistan has been completed and as events develope, it might be found desirable to push forward branches to Kerman and in Southern Persia. But for the present such railway enterprises in Southern Persia would be inexpedient. The first steps to be taken should be thoroughly to secure our front and flanks for the direct defence of India; and when this is done, further developments may be dealt with as they arise, instead of our being led into false positions which we could not maintian. "Bluff", up to reasonable limits, frequently pays. But we have had an object lesson in Manchuria of the dangers of undue extension which military means cannot support; and it seems necessary that we should be extremely careful that we are not led into spreading ourselves about in Southern Persia without regard to our power of maintaining the positions taken up.

H. Mullaly,—20-4-04.

I agree that a concession for a line from Bunder Abbas to Seistan would probably checkmate Captain Rittich's project. But I think that the main danger to be expected lies in the possibility of Russia in peace time gradually pushing down from Meshed to Seistan—first by a road, which she would subsequently convert into a railway; and I cannot help thinking that the construction, or proposed construction, of a Bunder Abbas-Seistan line by India would greatly increase the probability of her moving in this direction.

The point in my mind of the greatest importance to decide is what place on the eastern frontier of Persia marks the boundary between the so-called spheres of "northern and southern Persia" within which road and railway concessions may be given to the Russians or British respectively. If Russia can claim the southern portion of Khorassan as within her sphere, it seems hopeless to attempt to prevent the Meshed-Seistan extension, except by war. But if a line starting from the Afghan frontier somewhere near Herat, and passing slightly to the north of Birjand and Kerman marked the limit of our respective spheres, we would probably secure Seistan by peaceful means. Seistan is naturally the key of the situation. It is, however, impossible for us to occupy it permanently in peace time unless Russia breaks the agreement under which neither of us are to occupy Persian territory. By posting a garrison on our extreme frontier at Robat we possibly may be able to prevent Russian influence from becoming paramount in Seistan in time of peace, as we should be much nearer than any "jumping off" place which she has to start from at present.

But, unless we have a sphere of influence north of Seistan into which Russia cannot penetrate with her roads and railways, we must either eventually lose it or be compelled to occupy it in force.

Should Russian action become so threatening in Persia that we are forced into an occupation of Seistan I feel convinced that we shall, at the same time, be obliged to occupy Kandahar. I do not consider that the extension of the Nushki line to Seistan is desirable, as, in the event of our occupation, the communication should be from Seistan to Kandahar.

We must not overlook the fact that if Russia is allowed to construct a line from Meshed to Seistan along the western frontier of Afghanistan she will so dominate the whole of the western portion of that State that the Amir and Afghans, threatened alike on the north and west by the minatory advance of Russia, would have no option but to throw in their lot with a Power possessed of such overwhelming means of crushing them, whereas, if the line as far, approximately, as the latitude of Herat were in our sphere, the Afghans would feel that they had our support on their flank as well as in their rear.

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The enormous expenditure that would be entailed in constructing the Bunder Abbas-Seistan line would be almost prohibitive unless it could be shown that, for commercial reasons, this line would pay. We must foresee that, however long we may try to postpone it, a time will come when the connecton between our lines and those of Russia in Central Asia will be made, and we should, in my opinion, endeavour to secure that the lines from Bunder Abbas through Seistan to the neighbourhood of Herat, and from Bunder Abbas through Kerman, should be under British control.

Our position in Persia is naturally fraught with the greatest difficulty owing to the insidious nature of Russian advances in that country during peace. The possible development of such vast railway projects as those of Captain Rittich, which would, if carried out, undoubtedly most seriously change the military situation on our Indian frontier, must lead us to consider carefully the whole field of our military policy; and, in order that this may not be merely an academic discussion, the military resources of India and the Empire must be so organised that the strategical policy that may be decided upon in reply to Russian projects can be backed by forces sufficient to maintain and defend the positions which are necessary for the defence of India.

K[itchener],—23-4-04.

G. M. Press, Simla,—No. 12 Q. M. G., I. B.—23-4-04.—20.

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

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Major Malleson brought to me this morning a printed copy of the notes recorded by the Assistant Quarter Master-General (Intelligence), the Quarter Master-General, and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on this case. I understand that the original notes have been sent to the Hon'ble Member in the Military Department, who has been told of the urgency of the case.

I submit our file, with the printed notes above referred to, as you may wish to study the case to-day.

24.4.04. E. H. S. CLARKE.

I submit this at once in case Your Excellency wishes to mention the matter in Council to-morrow.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the military authorities concur that, if Colonel Rittich's scheme is ever carried out, it will involve serious danger to India, unless it is checkmated by counter moves on our part. These counter moves involve a reorganisation of the military resources of India so that our strategical policy may be backed by sufficient forces. Major Malleson and Colonel Mullaly favour a railway from the mouth of the Gulf or from Chahbar to Seistan, which all concur in regarding as a vital point. They would link Seistan to Karachi. The routes proposed are all marked on the copy of Curzon's map put up.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief points out the enormous expense of such a line as that from the vicinity of Bunder Abbas to Seistan and the improbability of its ever paying. The same argument applies, as Mr. John's reports show, to a line from Karachi to Seistan. The line from Karachi to Kondi on the trade route, about 120 miles from Robat

	Rs.
would cost	6,68,00,000
add for Kondi-Robat section at Rs, 55,000 a mile	66,00,000
Total ...	7,34,00,000

It would take at least eight years to build.

His Excellency rather favours a connection between Kandahar and Seistan as the first move to take. All are opposed to the direct line from Nushki to Seistan on the ground that, if the Russians occupy Seistan, it would give them a good line for advance on India. Possibly this objection would not apply so strongly to the line from Nushki to the Helmand with water carriage on, as the latter could easily be withdrawn or destroyed. Such a line would also work in with His Excellency's proposed railway.

Pages 20 and 30 of Mr. John's report.

The drawback to all these schemes is that they commit us to as great, if not greater, delay in our ultimate advance to Seistan as the Russians, and I venture to think that this is so serious a drawback that, if there is no relaxation in the Russian pressure on Persia and Afghanistan, it might even be better to face the risk involved in the direct line from Nushki to Seistan rather than allow Russia to forestal us there. We know from Colonel McMahon's recent reports that Seistan is well protected on the west, north, and east by the deserts and the Hamun. It would presumably be exceedingly difficult for a Russian force to advance against a British force there in possession and connected with India by rail unless they had occupied the Herat-Kandahar line in advance.

At any rate it is highly improbable that the Persians will give us a concession for a chaussée from Bunder Abbas or Chahbar to Narmeshir. The Atabeg declared to Mr. Griscom in Japan that Russia had already broached the subject of a railway concession from Meshed to Chahbar, and we have heard that some understanding exists as to the cession of the latter port. The road owing to its difficulties would be very costly and unremunerative and it would be difficult to raise the money.

The line from Minab to Narmeshir was included in my scheme, but only as a branch support to a line from the head of the Gulf *via* Shiraz and Kerman to Seistan, which might possibly bring in some return as it would connect important centres with the sea and with the wheat fields of Arabistan and Seistan.

However the military authorities evidently think that our reasources are insufficient to warrant us in trying to retain our influence in southern Persia and to keep Russia out of the Gulf altogether, so they have had to fall back upon a more retired line of defence. Major Sykes proposed that an engineer should accompany the commercial mission to Kerman and south-eastern Persia. This Your Excellency thought was undesirable but you recognised that it might be desirable to send such an officer separately. This might be done next autumn. I regard with regret the contemplated abandonment of our interests in southern Persia, and can only hope that the reorganisation of the Military resources of India coupled with the great financial recuperative power of the country may enable us to take up a bolder

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stand as contemplated in the Secret Frontier Despatch No. 27 of 4th February 1904 to Secretary of State about our position in southern Persia. A comparison has been made with the Russian position in Manchuria but this is hardly parallel. The length of their line was 6,000 miles, and they did not possess the command of the sea or any lateral connections. A railway from the head of the Gulf to Seistan would be about 850 miles long and it would be based on the sea and supported intermediately by a line 385 miles long and similary based. Assuming that our military resources eked out by the local tribes are equal to holding an advanced position in southern Persia, I venture to think that the line from Bam to the head of the Gulf has equal, if not greater, strategic advantages to that from Minab to Seistan alone while its commercial potentialities are superior. At any rate it seems to be accepted by the strategists that Russian railway schemes can only be defeated by British schemes of a similar character. We cannot at present undertake such schemes in Afghanistan so that, if anything is to be done, we are driven back upon the proposition originally put forward by this Department that we must try and obtain concessions in Persia similar to those granted to and now being developed by the Russians in the north.

It is doubtful if British capital would flow to such schemes at all and, if it is to be attracted, strategical considerations must partially yield to commercial, so that the line which is likely to pay best should be taken up first. It may be assumed that Government will not, and indeed could not, construct the works in Persia itself. Still we might try and secure concessions for the necessary chausées on the strategical routes and for a harbour at the head of the Gulf, even if we have to pay a lump sum down or an annual charge for the grant. This would at any rate prevent any other power cutting us out in this direction. The only alternative is to sit still on our naval position at the mouth of the Gulf and our present defensive position on the Western Frontier of India and to abandon the Persian political and commercial field to the Russians. Rather than accept such a position it would surely be advisable to make even greater pecuniary sacrifices to raise the funds in India necessary to enable our strategists to adopt a less cautious attitude or even to assist commercial companies in coming forward for the required concessions.

24-4-04. L. W. Dane.

I am glad to find that the Commander-in-Chief modifies his concurrence with obtaining a concession for a line from Bunder Abbas to Seistan with the words "would *probably* checkmate Captain Rittich's project" because I have serious doubts as to whether it would do so. It may, in the general game of "bluff", stop the project, but supposing it does not and the Russians seriously undertake it, the first move would be the Allat-Resht-Tehran section, which if we are serious should be answered by the Bunder Abbas-Regan section. Should Russia prosecute the project, she would push on to Yezd and then to Kerman. We should reply by continuing the line to Seistan. But with the Russian line completed to Kerman and our own line to Seistan we should have accepted very heavy responsibilities. Our strategic front would extend from Chitral through Kabul and Kandahar to Seistan and on to Bunder Abbas following the line of rail. On the southern line of Russian advance from Tehran, Regan would become the important strategical point and would have to be held in strength, for the loss of Regan would mean the loss of Seistan and our forces thrown back on Bunder Abbas and isolated.

Our main strength lies in the fact that strategically we are on interior lines to Russia and with our small army it is our main object to keep our force concentrated on the smallest front possible, so that we can meet Russia successfully on any one line of advance.

Russia, on the other hand, has unlimited men, and, though she cannot operate with more than a limited number on any one line owing to supply and transport difficulties, she can act on as many lines as present themselves without thinking of the limit of men. Her game then is to make us fritter away our small forces in guarding a number of points while she delivers her main blow on one point. We should then not only extend our front to Seistan, regarding which we already have doubts and recognise that its permanent occupation will entail an increase to the army, but we should have to occupy Regan in strength and the troops on the line Seistan-Regan-Bunder Abbas would be cut off from the rest of our forces. This would distinctly play Russia's game and the note of warning in Colonel Mullaly's memorandum is much to the point Our main difficulty in dealing with this problem is Afghanistan, owing to the attitude of the Amir and his refusal to have railways or to admit our troops into Afghanistan to defend it.

I agree with the Commander-in-Chief that the true answer, if Russia's attitude becomes aggressive in Persia is to occupy Kandahar with a railway down the Helmand to Khwaja Ali and also to occupy Seistan. This line, even without the occupation of Kandahar by us permanently in peace time, would in my opinion be an answer to Russia's Central Persian line and also to any advance of a railway *via* Meshed or Pul-i-Khatun on Seistan. Should this be politically impracticable, I should like to see the Quetta-Nushki line pushed on to Bagat on the Helmand but no further, whence water communication could be established to Seistan. If this is not within the sphere of practical politics, owing to the Amir's attitude, the best line is the Karachi-Kondi-Robat line, but this is about 700 miles in length and would probably cost

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8 or 10 crores. I look upon it that this expenditure would never be agreed to for this absolutely unremunerative line at all events under present conditions.

My view then in regard to Rittich's project is—

(1) To obtain concession for road and railway from Bunder Abbas to Regan as soon as Russia moves.

(2) Should Russia commence a line from Tehran towards Yezd, to reply by commencing the line Bunder Abbas-Regan (about 250 miles) by a road on railway gradients.

(3) But in the meantime endeavour by every means to make the line Chaman-Kandahar-Khwaja Ali or Nushki-Khwaja Ali.

(4) If Russia advance their line from Meshed to Seistan, reply by (3).

(5) For the present maintain a small force at Robat with support north of Chagai. We have now the upper hand and should keep it.

In regard to (2), I would follow Russia's lead and show that we were prepared to push a line to Regan to prevent her doing so. It may be considered that India would be so threatened by an advance of Russia to the Persian Gulf as to warrant expenditure from Indian revenues. The distance is about 250 miles and the cost would be probably 3 crores.

But I would support Seistan from Kandahar and make the line of communication through that place.

The main point to keep in view is that with Afghanistan obstructive our strategical scheme practically falls to the ground.

The question how far Russia's action in Persia should be considered a "casus belli" is one of Imperial policy, but in my opinion any infringement of our sphere of influence in southern Persia or aggressive action towards Seistan should be considered so. If war is inevitable, it is better to have it before Russian schemes for advance are completed than when they have been carried out. I agree with the Commander-in-Chief that the occupation of Seistan would necessitate an increase to our Army chiefly by utilising Baluchis.

I cannot help thinking that we are safe from Captain Rittich's scheme for some time to come for with the effects of the present war to face, Russia is hardly likely to find 20 million sterling for the central Persian line for strategical purposes in the near future.

24-4-04. E. R. E[LLES].

His Excellency the Viceroy.

As your Excellency did not wish to mention the case in Council on 25th I took back the file from Private Secretary to Viceroy and now resubmit it with a note by the Military Member that I have just received.

The final decision about an outpost at Robat and a supporting post somewhere north of Chagai was that the matter should be carefully considered, as, if and when Colonel McMahon withdrew from Seistan, it might be advisable to adopt this action. The route from Nushki to Barabchah, which appears to be the most suitable place for a supporting post as it is situated at an altitude of about 5,600 feet and possess a good supply of water and fodder, will I hope shortly be further investigated. It also commands the best and shortest approaches to the Helmand.

If your Excellency so desires copies of the notes will be printed up and a selection of the papers sent home for your use.

27-4-04. L. W. DANE.

I have now read all the notes, but do not consider it necessary to write further at the present stage. Please have the file printed up and send me half a dozen copies by next mail to London.

28-4-04. C[URZON].

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Assistant Quartermaster-General—This article has been noticed in the "Times," I put up a full translation, as it may interest the Foreign Department.

21-1-04. J. M. Home.

Foreign Department—You may like to see this.

21-1-04. E. W. S. K. Maconchy.

Seen and returned with thanks.

His Excellency may wish to see.

25-1-04. L. Russell.

26-1-04. C. H. A. Hill.

For information. The article will be added to the file about Railways in Persia and to that about policy in southern Persia.

26-1-04. L. W. Dane.

26-1-04. C(urzon).

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C-42 F. D.—3-5-04.—32.

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

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Leading Article in the Novoe Vremya of $\frac{10th}{23rd}$ *December 1903.*

Lord Curzon's Tour in the Persian Gulf has awakened the interest of the Foreign Press in the Shah's Dominions. Of course Persia interests the English most of all, who consider the present political state of affairs favours the realisation of their eternal intention to occupy southern Persia. The question of the necessity of settling the boundaries of British and Russian spheres of interests in Persia, that is, in other words, the division of Persia, has already many times excited the English Press but without any success: on this account English politicians have evolved something quite new; now they talk of a dual Anglo-Russian control over the Persian Government. Reports have been spread abroad that British diplomatists are endeavouring to convince the Shah's Government of the possibility of an agreement being arrived at between England and Russia with regard to the establishment of a dual control in Persia. Russia according to the English was formally against the idea of a dual control, but as the state of affairs in Persia has latterly been getting considerably worse, Russia has recognised that it is necessary to take Persia under the joint control of England and Russia, with a view of preventing disorders in the Middle East; England will take the southern half under her control and Russia the northern half, whilst the general control over the imperial affairs of the whole Empire will be jointly shared by England and Russia.

It can easily be understood that the belief of Indian politicians in the feasibility of carrying out such a plan in the immediate future, leads to considerable perturbation at Tehran. In Tehran they have already ceased for a long time to bow before the power of England. We have a proof of this in the ceremonial reception recently arranged for Lord Curzon on his proposed visit to Bushire and which he considered insufficient for his Viceregal importance. In spite of Lord Curzon's dissatisfaction the Tehran Government did not consider it necessary to change the ceremonial, and therefore Bushire was not visited by the Governor of India. As a matter of fact the time when England could blockade the Gulf Ports and occupy the valley of the Karun River has long since passed away, and Persia has now no fear that England will visit her revenge on her. Persia has a northern neighbour—powerful Russia, who would not tolerate such pressure.

But of course if England comes to an agreement with Russia as to mutual interference in Persian affairs the position of the old Iran Monarchy will be most critical: that is why England is endeavouring to lay her hands on Southern Persia and is striving to frighten the Persian Government into believing in the possibility of such an agreement.

The object of trying to frighten Persia by means of a plan, which as a matter of fact really only exists in the realm of fancy, is apparently to wring from her Government considerable concessions.

If Russia has always energetically opposed every attempt of England to divide Persia into spheres of influence, how much more energetically ought she not to oppose every proposal for a dual control? *We need an independent, powerful and solvent Persia and therefore do not wish to conclude any deal with England*, the object of which is diametrically opposed to our policy, and which would lead to the annexation of Southern Persia by her.

It is impossible to deny that Persia is passing through a serious economic crisis, that great reforms are necessary in the internal administrations of the country, and that an improvement of her communications, without which no commercial development is possible, is absolutely necessary. But Persia can attain this without a Foreign domination, by relying on the benevolent assistance of Russia, who has already shown by her civilising work in the northern Provinces that she has no intention of annexation. We have built and are building carriage roads in northern Persia; we have founded a bank at Tehran, branches of which are opened in the most important commercial centres of the

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northern Provinces, and we have started a transport company; but all these enterprises which have exercised a most beneficial effect on the economic life of the country have not lessened by one iota the independence of Persia; have not harrassed her internal conditions, her creed or her customs.

But England does not wish, nay cannot be contented with the modest rôle of assisting in the economic development of Persia. She requires to ensure the safety of India by the annexation of southern Persia. In Lord Curzon's opinion India's natural western frontier is the Shat-el-Arab. Having annexed southern Persia England will have for ever solved the question of the Persian Gulf, which by the force of circumstances, will have become a British lake. She will run her railway from Seistan through southern Persia and link it up with the Baghdad railway, and so join the Indian railway system with that of Asiatic Turkey, and Russia will thus be cut off from the sea in the whole of the Near East. To participate in such plans is of course not to Russia's interests, who should therefore firmly maintain the independence of Persia and the integrity of her territory, and resolutely reject all overtures made by England tending to lessen the Supreme power of the Shah's authority in his own dominions.

21-1-04. J. M. HOME.

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From the "Statesman" of January 24, 1904.

NEWS BY THE MAIL.

GREAT BRITAIN, RUSSIA, AND PERSIA.

The *Novoe Vremya* in a leading article entitled "England and Persia," criticizes certain rumours to the effect that English diplomatists are proposing an Anglo-Russian *condominium* in Persia under which England shall have control of the south and Russia of the north, while the central administration shall be under the supervision of both Powers. Former English proposals to define the respective spheres of influence of England and Russia in Persia have, says the St. Petersburg journal, had no effect. The influence of England in Persia is steadily on the wane, and the Persian Government, as the incident in connexion with Lord Curzon's recent visit to Bushire shows, has lost its fear of England. Persia has in Russia a powerful neighbour who will not permit of any plotting on the part of England against her independence. The rumours in question, then, can only have their origin in England's desire to secure concessions from Persia in return for her own abandonment of a plan which exists only in fancy. The *Novoe Vremya* admits that the economic situation of Persia is serious, but asserts that Russia is doing a great deal to improve it, and that for Russia it can only be advantageous that Persia should retain her independence. England, on the other hand, is unwilling to content herself with the modest part of a promoter of the economic interests of Persia. It is necessary for her to guarantee the security of India by gaining control of southern Persia. This control once secured, England will build a railway line from Seistan through southern Persia to connect the Indian railways with the railway system of Asia Minor. Russia will then be cut off from the open sea throughout the Near East. Russia, concludes the article, far from helping to bring such plans into realization, will preserve the independence of Persia and the inviolability of her territory.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C-42 F. D.—3-5-04.—51.

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

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(Received on the 28th December 1903 with Political Secretary's letter No. 52, dated the 11th December 1903.)

No. 10.

MR. SPRING-RICE to the MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE.

St. Petersburgh,
29th October 1903.

(No. 360.)

MY LORD,

I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that I hear from a private source that the roads which are now being projected, or in course of construction in North-West Persia, are to be built in such a way that they can easily and within a short time be converted into railways, and that for this purpose rails and other materials are being stored at Erivan, and the rolling-stock on the Caucasian railways.

I also understand that 1,500,000 roubles have already been assigned by the Russian Government for the construction of a port at Enseli, on the Caspian Sea.

I have, etc.,
CECIL SPRING-RICE.

Nos. 94—95-F. B., dated the 8th January 1904 (Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing paper is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Quartermaster-General in India, Intelligence Branch, for information.

Enclosure in Political Secretary's letter No. 52, dated the 11th December 1903, *viz.*, Mr. Spring-Rice to the Marquess of Lansdowne, No. 360, dated the 29th October 1903.

3446 F.D. Exd—R. B.

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

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(Received on the 4th January 1904, with Political Secretary's letter No. 53, dated the 18th December 1903.)

PERSIA AND ARABIA.

[NOVEMBER 30TH]
SECTION 2.

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1.

MR. SPRING-RICE to the MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE.—(Received 30th November).

St. Petersburg,
23rd November 1903.

(Secret).
No. 396.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a Memorandum drawn up by Mr. Locker Lampson containing information as to roads, caravan routes, and projected railways in Persia, mainly based on Russian official documents obtained by him from a confidential source.

The principal sources of the information in question are the Reports drawn up by the engineers dispatched to Persia in 1900, whose mission formed the subject of my despatches from Tehran, No. 38 of the 2nd May, and No. 57 of the 30th May 1900, and of Captain Schneider's Report to your Lordship of the 2nd April 1901, printed in the Confidential Print, Persia, page 3.

I have also the honour to inclose a Memorandum on the same subject by Colonel Napier, Military Attaché to this Embassy, and lately Military Attaché to His Majesty's Embassy at Tehran.

In the year 1900 several missions were dispatched to Persia by the Russian Government in order to obtain surveys and collect information with a view to the eventual construction of railways. The results of their Reports are embodied in the documents obtained by Mr. Lampson—with one important exception. Sir A Hardinge, in his despatch No. 25 of the 12th February 1901, and Sir N. O'Conor, in his despatch No. 95 of the 6th March, mentions the arrival of a Russian party under the direction of a high official, at Karmanshah at which town they stayed on a surveying tour which extended from Tabreez to Bagdad. There is nothing in the Report now before your Lordship to show what was the result of this expedition, which it would be of great interest to know in view of the attention paid to the route in question by the Russian press, and the attitude of the Rusian Government in 1898 towards the so-called Kapnist Concession which seems to show that they regarded the projected branch from Bagdad to Khanikin as a peculiarly Russian interest. On the other hand, the Russian Memorandum, page 11, states that "the English cannot be prevented from building the line from Bagdad to Tehran, and that till their railway has reached Tehran Russia can do nothing."

It is evident, however, that the writer is occupied solely with the task confided to him, namely, railway communication through Persia to the Gulf.

I beg to submit the following remarks on some of the principal points in Mr. Locker Lampson's Memorandum :—

1. The engineer Sarkhansky and other authorities considered that the proper course for Russia to follow in order to open up Persia to Russian trade would be to construct a railway from the Trans-Caucasian line along the southern shore of the Caspian to Resht. To this course the Foreign Office appear to have objected that if Russia built railways in the north, England would build railways in the south, in accordance with the written assurance obtained from the late Shah. It has therefore, it appears, been decided, against the advice of the engineers, to construct a harbour at Enzeli, which

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will be commenced next year. The Atabeg-i-azam appears to have been aware of this decision, and to have mentioned it to Mr. Churchill at Resht. I have been informed that the Grand Duke Alexander Michaelovitch, by whose Department the proposed harbour would be constructed, had the intention of being present himself at the commencement of the works. It is, however, evident that if these harbour works are really decided on, the Astara-Resht Railway will not be constructed, at any rate for some time, and there is a strong probability that the Russian Government has no immediate intention of putting an end to the Agreement under which Persia is debarred from constructing railways.

2. The Railway to Julfa or Shah-Takht, on the frontier of Azerbaijan, will be finished shortly, and the surveys for a railway from the frontier to Tabreez appear to have been completed. The route recommended is *viâ* Khoi, A road from Julfa to Tabreez will be completed in the middle of next year and "is being built in such a way as to be convertible into a railway," the curves and gradients being constructed with that intention.

3. A road is in construction from Kazvin to Hamadan, and a party of engineers have just arrived at Resht with the intention of superintending the work. This road will, of course, be a continuation of the road from Resht to Kasvin, which has been constructed under the superintendence and at the expense of the Russian Government, and will receive its traffic from the proposed harbonr at Enzeli. It will form a direct communication with Hamadan-Kermanshah-Khanikin route.

4. The various routes to the south have been subjected to a close examination. The Russian Report strongly recommends the route *viâ* Yezd Kerman, Bam to Chahbar, outside the Persian Gulf, and given direct access to the ocean. This route is recommended in consequence of the great difficulties attending the construction of a line to Bunder Abbas or Bushire, the naval predominance of England on the Gulf, and the alleged unsuitableness of these ports for a naval station. It is suggested that a branch should be constructed from Bam to Seistan, which "undoubtedly might serve as a *place d'armes* for a movement on Kandahar, and through Nushki to Quetta." The writer adds that "the English have already facilitated our operations in this direction by constructing a caravan road and digging wells."

5. With regard to the question of the construction of a railroad by the English, the writer alludes to the experience gained by Russia in Manchuria, which shows with what ease and celerity a railway once made can be repaired, however complete its destruction. "From a military point of view," he remarks, "it would absolutely play into our hands."

6. Colonel Napier points out that in making an attack upon India the main difficulty which Russia would have to encounter would be transport. If, therefore, Russia has a line through Persia to bring up her troops, as well as the Trans-Caspian and Orenburg-Tashkent lines, the attack would be greatly facilitated.

7. The proposal contemplates the entrance of Persia from two points—Julfa and Enzeli.

As the line to Julfa is practically complete, it would appear simpler to approach Tehran from Tabrez. It will be observed, however, that until the Vladikavkas-Tiflis line is constructed, the Baku-Enzeli route affords the most direct communication with Central Russia. The writer, moreover, points out that a line from Tabreez to Tehran would strengthen the military position of Persia by enabling her to concentrate her forces.

8. With regard to the cost of the line from Trans-Caucasia, *viâ* Resht and Tehran, to Chahbar (Cha-rba), the Russian Report estimates it at 187,000,000 roubles (19,695,000*l.*), allowing 15,000,000 roubles (1,575,000*l.*) for the construction and armament of a port. The distance is given as 2,290 versts (1,500 miles.) The estimate allows 81,000 roubles (8,500*l.*) per verst. It is to be observed that the Siberian Railway cost 117,000 roubles (12,285*l.*) per verst, and the Manchurian 170,000 roubles (17,850*l.*), so that the estimate for the Persian line, which presents much greater difficulties, is obviously inadequate.

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9. Provisions for guarding the line with detachments of Russsian troops are also considered in detail. A force of about 4,000 men is considered sufficient.

10. The cost of the line and port, which even according to the estimate is nearly 20,000,000*l.*, must act is an effectual deterrent for some time to come, and for the present it would appear that the Russian Government will content themselves with the bounty on Russian exports, amounting to about 4,000,000 roubles per annum (420,000), and the construction of trade roads, which latter task has been taken over by the Russian Transport Company.

The construction of a through railway to the Pursian Gulf was a favourite scheme of M. Witte's, and the removal of that Minister from the Treasury, as well as the unfortunate experience gained by Russia in Manchuria, will probably act as deterrents to the commencement of railway enterprise in Persia. The Grand Duke Alexander Michaelovitch, however, is said to be equally an advocate of a forward policy, but his Department being concerned with navigation and harbours, the activity of Russia in Persia is apparently finding a vent in opening trade relations with the Persian Gulf and constructing a port on the Caspian. I am, however, informed that the requirements of His Imperial Highness's Department have been considered excessive, and that some of the demands will have to be cut down.

The general ideas underlying the proposed scheme appear to be two :—

(1) To facilitate an attack upon India ; and

(2) To construct a through route by rail to Indian Ocean.

It is pointed out, however, that in the latter case a line through Persia to the south "will only be profitable on condition that Russia has the right to impose customs duties, as, in the contrary case, this route, while facilitating access for foreign goods, will injure Russian trade, not only in Central but in Northern Persia."

This, of course, implies the practical annexation of Persia.

I have, etc.,

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Memorandum by Mr. LAMPSON, respecting Roads, Caravan Routes, etc., in Persia.

(The following imformation is drawn from three sources, *viz.* : (1) a work on Trade Competition in the East by M. Fedorov ; (2) the original statute of Poliakov's Transport and Insurance Company ; and (3) private information.

Persia may be divided into there regions in respect of its foreign trade—the north, which is entirely within the sphere of Russian influence ; the south, where India and England, as yet, predominate ; and the central zone, with Azerbaijan, where the goods of all competitors meet.

This distribution depends mainly upon ways of communication, which are all the more important as the cost of carriage in Persia is very high. The trade of India, England and other countries of Europe has the benefit of a cheap sea route to the ports of the Persian Gulf, and to Trebizond and the Black Sea ; but further inland there are, for the most part, difficult caravan routes, whilst the means af transport are perpetually varying owing to the mules being constantly removed for field work, and the charges for carriage are so exorbitant and inconstant that it is almost impossible to base any satisfactory calculation on them.

The Bushire-Shiraz Ispahan-Kum-Tehran route.

The southern caravan route goes from Bushire to Shiraz, Ispahan, Kum, and Tehran, a total, of 1,255 kilom. As far as Shiraz, 260 versts, there are two roads, the one longer and with a greater incline through Firuzabad, and the other one shorter, but with very steep inclines, through Kazrun. The Russian Consul, M. Adamov, says that this latter route is the most difficult in Persia as it rises to a height of 7,400 feet above sea level (the pass of the Russian military Georgian road is at an elevation of 7,900, and that of the St. Gothard

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somewhat lower), and then descends, almost perpendicularly, by four passes—in fact this section has been christened the "Ladder of Wells." From Shiraz to Ispahan the distance is 500 versts, after which the road through Kashan and Kum to Tehran, with the exception of one difficult pass through the mountains of Kohrud, is adapted to carts and even to carriages, though presenting great difficulties.

The Mohammerah-Ahwaz-Shuster-Tehran route.

From the port of Mohammerah on the Shat-el-Arab there is a water-way of 280 versts by the river Karun to the cataracts at the town Ahwaz, where goods are unloaded from the steamers and sent on further by railway. After passing the cataracts they are once more put on board steamers and taken by water to Shuster. The transport as far as Ahwaz is carried out by the steamers of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, and beyond the cataracts, in the Upper Karun, by the Persian Steamship Company Nasirie, which owns the horse tramway from the town of Ahwaz. From Ahwaz to Tehran the distance is 750 versts. When the Karun was opened in 1888 to foreign vessels, the English had great hopes of being able to develop their trade in Persia, and under the influence of these expectations the Imperial Bank of Persia undertook the construction of a macadamized road from Shuster to Tehran, with a branch from Burujird to Ispahan, but these hopes were not realized, and having built a road from Tehran to Sultanabad, 250 versts, the Bank not only wholly abandoned the completion of the enterprise on account of the heavy expense of futher construction and its doubtful ultimate advantage, but even stopped working the section of the road from Sultanabad to Kum.

The Bara-Bagdad-Khanakin-Kermanshah-Hamadan-Tehran route.

The third route starts from Basra and proceeds through Bagdad, whence goods enter Persian territory. Ascending the Tigris, they reach Bagdad in four days, and passing into Turkish territory to the frontier town of Khanakin are carried into Persia, through Kermanshah and Hamadan to Tehran. From Bagdad to Tehran the distance is 820 versts, which the caravans cover in twenty-four to thirty-six days, and this route would be preferred by European trade to all other southern routes, if the robberies by Arabs and the difficulties with the Turkish custom-houses did not impede the free movement of caravans. At the present moment a road is in course of construction from Kazvin to Hamadan in the direction of Bagdad, and is to be finished by January 1904.* The work is under the control of the District Loan Bank of Persia, who took over Poliakov's Road Concession in 1901.

The Bunder Abbas-Kerman-Yezd-Nain-Kashan-Tehran route.

The fourth route runs from Bunder Abbas to Kerman and Yezd, a distance of 850 versts and is traversed by caravans in thirty days. From Yezd it goes to Nain, more than 150 versts, where one branch turns westward to Ispahan and the other to Kashan on the Bushire-Tehran caravan road. The whole route to Nain is extremely difficult and dangerous on account of the neighbouring robber tribes of Baluchi. From Kirman the road bends to the north as far as Birjand, through which goods pass to Meshed *viâ* Gumain.

The Quetta-Nushki-Chageh-Nasratabad route into Persia.

The English have long since tried to penetrate into Khorasan, avoiding this dangerous and difficult road, and have latterly succeeded in opening a new and safe route for their Indian goods through British Baluchistan and Seistan in the direction of Quetta, Nushki, Chageh, and Nasratabad. In 1899 goods to the value of 500,000 roubles passed over this road to Persia, and from Seistan to the amount of 100,000 roubles, but it has a more strategical than commercial importance for England on account of the ever-present fear of a Russain attack upon India.

There are also two roads from Bunder Abbas to Shiraz, where goods were carried in the time of the Portuguese, but they have now no importance.

The Trans-Caucasian-Julfa-Tabreez and Shah Takhta-Tabreez routes, and the new road between Julfa and Tabreez.

From Trans Caucasia Russian goods enter Persia through the Shah-Takhta custom-house, a distance of 237 versts, and through the Julfa custom house, or passing the Caspain frontier at Astara. From Julfa to Tabreez the distance is 120 versts, the first 35 of which run over a difficult mountain section. Further on the route improves, and takes the direction of the town of Marand, over a pass to the settlements of Yash and Sofian, and ultimately to Tabreez. After the transfer of Poliakov's road Concession to the Discount

* The "Novoe Vremya" of the 18th November reports that a party of engineers had arrived at Resht to construct the Kazvin-Hamadan road.

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Loan Bank of Persia, the road from Julfa to Tabreez was begun, and is being constructed at the present moment with the greatest haste. It is to be finished as far as Tabreez by July 1904, and is being built in such a way as to be convertible on necessity into a railway, the fall of the road, the curves, bridges, etc., being projected according to the rules of railway construction. A railway is simultaneously being constructed from Erivan to Julfa.

The Astara-Ardabil-Tabreez route.

The road from Astara to Tabreez is very important compared with the other two, as it enters Persia through Ardabil, which occupies the next place after Tabreez in respect of trade; but it is not complete, and the port of Astara is shallow and entirely unprotected from the wind.

Question of a Lenkoran-Tabreez Railway discussed.

For this reason many people have the thought that Lenkoran would be far more suitable as a starting point for this route. Russian engineers even recommend a railway being constructed from Lenkoran to Tabreez, a distance of 240 versts, which would certainly give Russian goods a great advantage, as they would have to pay for a cheap water route by the Volga and Caspian, and not more than 50 copecks from Lenkoran to Tabreez; whereas the carriage of foreign goods through Trebizond from England and the continent now costs about 30 copecks by sea to Trebizond and from 2 r. 50 c. to 3 r. 30 c. per pood by caravan route to Tabreez. But the construction of railways in Persia is unfortunately a political question, and international convenience has to yield to national jealousies. That a Lenkoran-Tabreez Railway, however, is quite practicable from a financial point of view may be seen from the following figures. Thus the cost of construction of 240 versts, taking into account the mountainous character of the locality, and the necessity for improving the port in Lenkoran would have to be calculated at not less than 24,000,000 roubles, or 100,010 roubles a verst. Interest and amortization would amount to 1,200,000 roubles a year, and if the average annual expenditure for working expenses on the Russian Railway system be taken at 7,000 roubles, the working expenses would amount yearly to 1,680,000 roubles, and the whole expenditure on the road to 2,880,000 roubles per annum. To cover these disbursements 6,000,000 poods of goods in transit from Lenkoran to Tabreez at a carrige charge of 50 copecks would be annually required; and since the goods entering Persia at the present time bear a burden five times as great, the above rate is perfectly practicable commercially, and a less quantity of transit goods would be required, if local carriage and passenger traffic covered a part of the expenditure. In any case, these data are by no means merely problematical, and if the selfishness of international politics does not offer an insurmountable obstacle the Lenkoran-Tabreez line may prove profitable even from a financial point of view.

There still remain three routes by which Russian goods enter Persia.

The Enzeli-Tehran route and the question of the construction of a port at Enzeli.

On the southern coast of the Caspian Sea there is only one natural harbour, Gez, through which all goods destined for Khorasan formerly passed, but which since the construction of the Trans-Caspian line has lost the greater part of its importance. The ports of Astara and Enzeli are situated in an exposed position open to the buffets of every wind, and very dengerous to anchor in, and are, moreover, so shallow that sea-going vessels have to remain outside and tranship the goods into flat-bottomed boats, whilst communication with the shore in the event of the least northerly wind is interrupted for several days. Enzeli is at the beginning of the Russian carriage road to Tehran. The concession for constructing this and other roads was given to Poliakov by the Shah in 1893 for seventy-five years. In 1895 operations were begun by the construction of part of it from Enzeli to Kasvin, but serious work was not commenced till May 1897. Poliakov received for the purpose a subsidy of 300,000 roubles from the Russian Government, and the work was carried on under the direction of Glinoetzky, and the whole road was nominally completed in August 1899. But heavy waggons were not allowed to use it for fear of damaging the new surface, and the transport was effected by carts and camels on either side of the road. In 1902, 3,948,000 poods were carried over it in the direction of Tehran, and 2,641,000 poods in that of Enzeli. Its real defect lies in the fact that it does not commence at the port itself, but at the hamlet of Pir Bazar, which is separated from Enzeli by 20 versts of water way, known as the Murdab. In 1901, when Poliakov was in need of the support of the Russian

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Government for his banking operations in Persia, M. Witte assisted him, but among other conditions demanded a transfer of all the shares of the Road Company which were unpaid for to the recently founded Discount Loan Bank. This having been effected, and the Road Company reconstituted under the Bank, a whole series of surveys were made, and in 1903 the reconstitution of the Poliakov road from Enzili so Kasvin was begun. When a safe harbour has been constructed at Enzeli and a regular and prompt despatch of unloaded goods organized to Pir Bazar, the trade route to Tehran will be very satisfactory. The well-known Russian engineer Sakhansky has, however, stated that the construction of the Enzeli port will demand a large expenditure, and that the solution of the question lies in the building of a railway from Baku to Resht, a distance of 345 versts, and not in fruitless endeavours to improve the condition of Enzeli, However, the surveys for the port of Enzeli are already complete and 1,500,000 roubles have been assigned for its construction. The work will be carried on in 1904 under the direction of the Chief Office of Commercial Navigation and Ports, presided over by the Grand Duke Alexander Michaelovitch.

The Meshed-i-Ser-Tehran route.

The Meshed-i-Ser-Tehran route is a very inconvenient one. The distance is 252 versts, and as the road at first passes across swampy ground and then over steep ascents, the Enzeli-Tehran route is preferred.*

The routes between the Trans-Caspian Railway and Khorasan.

Finally, there is communication between the Trans-Caspian Railway and the richest territory of Persia, Khorasan. The chief starting points of the communications between the Russian Trans-Caspian territory and Khorasan are Askabad and Dushak—stations on the railway—on the one side, and Meshed and Sabzawar, the chief trade centres of Khorasan, on the other. The most important of these routes is the road from Askabad to Meshed, which measures 242 versts, and runs the whole way through inhabited districts. Four-wheeled waggons are employed for the carriage of goods, but this methed is expensive, costing as much as 2 roubles a pood, and therefore pack animals are chiefly used. From Dushak to Meshed there are numerous paths through the mountain passes of the Kelat Khannate, the average length of the route being about 100 versts, and the cost of carriage 30 to 35 copecks. Meshed is united to Tehran by a convenient carriage road, 898 versts long, goods taking twenty-four to thirty-six days.

* This is not true of the native muleteers, who appear in the summer to prefer the Meshed-i-Ser route.

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Railways in Persia.

(The following is extracted in literial translation from two confidential Reports by P. A. Rittich, Staff Captain, published by the Scientific Committee of the General Staff at the War Printing Office in St. Petersburgh in 1901. These volumes contain Rittich's Report on his journey to Persia and Persian Baluchistan in 1900, where he was sent by the Russian Government for the purpose of invesigating the proposed lines of railway, and the general, economic, political, and military conditions of the country.)

General Considerations of the Author in the necessity and best direction for a Railway Route through Persia.

From a consideration of the railway explorations given below, carried out in the autumn of 1899 and the spring of 1900, we may draw the following conclusion :—

The most profitable and cheapest direction is the coast line, that is the continuation of the railway from the station of Allat of the Trans-Caspian Railway to the town of Resht. This direction is absolutely the shortest, if it be regarded as the first link in a world's transit route to the Indian Ocean. In a strategic sense it leaves nothing to be desired, as for its whole extent it is under the protection of our fleet, to which, under existing Treaties with Persia, belongs the exclusive right of navigating the Caspian. Chief Engineer V. A. Sakhansky, in his Report on his explorations, estimates the net income from the coast-line at 5½ per cent., using for his calculations only the data of the Customs Department for 1898, not to speak of the fact that the trade of the countries during the last two years, 1899-1900, has increased in the same progression as has been observed during the last decade. Apart from this, the trade is far from serving as an index of our actual mutual exchange with Persia, and according to certain symptoms our trade must be reckoned somewhat greater, and consequently it may be expected that the net income of this link will be considerably greater already in the first year. It seems to me that Sakhansky, in his Report quoted below, has proved with great weight the profitableness of this coast line, and, on the other hand, the complete worthlessness of such an enterprise as the construction of the Enzeli port, for which, on the part of the Ministry of Finance and Ministry for Foreign Affairs, demands and proposals were more than once made.

Such demands were caused by the urgent necessity of helping our Russo-Persian trade, and at the same time it was necessary to be consequent, and having finished our construction of the Resht-Kasvin chaussee, to carry the enterprise to a conclusion—that is, to provide goods with a convenient, free, and permanent means of transport to Russia and back.

In this sense the construction of the Enzeli port seemed the cheapest and simplest solution, as according to the plan of Engineer Sultanov, the construction of a canal and the deepening of a port would cost about 2,000,000 roubles. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs particularly insists on this project, as it does not at all support the idea of a Persian Railway. By his Memorandum on the cost of the Enzeli port, constructions and buildings of a new commercial fleet, connected therewith, Sakhansky finally destroys any importance of the port as regards economy compared with the railway.

There remains only the question of the political importance of the railways on account of which the whole matter is delayed.

The fundamental thesis which is brought forward by our diplomats consists in this : that in their opinion, the construction by us of a railway from the north will immediately cause the construction of a railway by the English from the south, which will paralyse all the advantages of our trade, and cause us detriment in both political and economical respects.

This thesis is radically wrong, and proceeded from the fact that the south of Persia till 1900 was unexplored by us in technical and economical respects. The exploration of Sakhansky to the Persian Gulf, and of our party to the Indian Ocean, proved irrefutably that the English are incapable of doing

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anything in the south in regard to a railway, as the technical conditions for the construction of railways from the south (starting either from the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf) to the north costs not ten, not twenty, but a hundred million roubles or more.

Local freights are not capable of feeding the lines as they are insignificant, and can under no circumstances make the line pay. Of transit for English meridional lines there can be no question, as freights of this nature can only have capital importance for meridional Russian lines.*

The same situation exists in case the English should construct a railway along the parallel from Quetta to Nushka, Kirman, and further to join the German-Bagdad line.

Such projects were invented by English politicians and strategists, but not a single financier uttered a word about them, and it was only last year that Sir Lepel Griffin laughed at these Utopias and called them a chimera. Such a parallel line would cost the English twice as much as a meridional line, and, according to my calculations, over 300,000,000 to 400,000,000 roubles. It would have to intersect all the mountain ranges of Persia, having a direction from north-west to south-east. Local freights would be still fewer than in the case of meridional lines, and Germany alone would make use of transit, to whom such a junction would be of extreme advantage. England in an economic sense would only lose from such a line as her commercial fleet, which up till now preponderates in Oceania, would have to share freights with the Germans. But it would be quite irrational to work for others, and still less advantageous, wherefore there is absotutely no reason to reckon that merchants would embark in such an enterprise.

English financiers will give their money only for one undertaking, namely, for the construction of a railway from Khanakim to Tehran through Hamadan, and this not at once, but subsequently to the completion of the Bagdad Railway, in order to divert a considerable part of the international trade while, moreover, this region is in itself extremely rich and thickly populated.

Consequently, if English captalists will not give their money to any of the other lines, there remains to be considered the question whether the Indian Government will throw 300 or more millions of roubles away on this enterprise. I positively consider that this is impossible.

Strategical advantages are not attained by the construction of parallel and meridional lines. The safety of India is not conditioned thereby, and, on the contrary, all the routes play into our hands and facilitate our operations, seeing that the experiment of the restoration of the damaged Manchurian line shows that in two to three months a line of 2,000 versts may be completely repaired. But to construct such a line is a matter of years.

In political respects the Baluchistan-English road has an undoubted importance: it intersects Persia, and at a matter of fact, divides it into two parts. For England this is necessary in order to realize her dream of creating a world empire, uniting her African possessions with her Indian.

However, it would seem that her last Transvaal war has put England on her proper level, and no one will dispute that England now has to think of preserving the *status quo*, not dreaming of universal empire. But even if she should realize this idea, we can paralyse it at any moment by the construction of a perpendicular meridional line, which for us is inevitable, and presents the natural issue of our power.

Let us finally suppose that the impossible has become possible, and that the Government of London capitalists give 200,000,000 roubles for this chimera: the construction of the Baluchistan line or a meridional line from Bushire to Tehran. All think that Russian trade in Persia would perish—that we should lose our market. No doubt we should be hard pressed in the south, but cannot be entirely ousted; while in the north and centre our trade will still predominate, as the shortness of distances and convenience, with the construction of the line Allat-Resht will remain on our side. It would not be

*i.e., transit trade is forbidden, so that England would not be permitted to ship goods *viâ* Persia to Russia or Western Europe.

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forgotten that our trade with Persia has a political basis, and is supported by Government help.

The annual abolition of duties and refund of excise cost Russia over 4,000,000 roubles. If this is so, it were better to say good-bye to trade and leave it to struggle itself by natural routes, and to put these 4,000,000 roubles every year into the construction of a railway to the ocean.

By so doing we shall afford more substantial assistance to our trade, and, in political respects, effect far more, and at the same time finally reach the open ocean. As you see, the calculations are simple, correct—and to what result do they lead?

Having examined the necessity, advantage, and complete political and real safety of the line Allat-Resht, the conditions which demand that the construction of this first link in a world's route should be at once commenced, we will now examine the question of the further direction of the line. The line from Resht must take the direction to Kasvin, and further to Tehran, there being no variants in this direction, while the total cost of the line Resht-Kasvin and the technical side of this section after Sakhansky's exploration shows that this matter is more than feasible.

From Tehran railway explorations were conducted in the chief ports of the Persian Gulf, and also to the Indian Ocean. These explorations made it plain that there was no sense in carrying the line to the port of Bushire, as, owing to the technical difficulties met with from Shiraz to Bushire, the length of the lines and their cost from Tehran to Bushire and to Abbas came out almost indentical.

Consequently, the question remains with Abbas and Chahbar, the difference in length of the lines being only 100 versts, and in regard to their cost, inclusive of rolling-stock and construction of the port, only 4,000,000 roubles.

There is no doubt that if the zone Tehran-Abbas could serve, if not now then in the near future, as a most remunerative line, the local freights of which might pay the expense of construction and working, in such a case the question must be decided in its favour.

By these considerations I was guided in planning a line to Abbas prior to my journey to Persia.

The investigation of the history of the whole country, and, in particular of all these regions of the Persian Gulf, convinced me that the whole of this zone may be again what it was in far distant times.

In 1900, Chief Engineer Sakhansky himself carried out an exploration of this country—a man who had thoroughly studied local conditions and who is absolutely trustworthy.

He came to the conclusion that local freights cannot pay for the Bunder Abbas line either at the present or in the near future; that, taken together, they are too insignificant to justify the construction of a railway in this direction on their account. Moreover, the port of Bunder Abbas, in his opinion, does not satisfy all requirements. In view of all this, the question remains with the Chahbar line, which was explored by our party.

Of 1,710 versts from Tehran to Kashan, and further to Chahbar, one-third of the route is absolute desert, waterless, and barren, and absolutely unsuited for any cultivation either now or in the future.

Although the remaining two-thirds of the route are inhabited, the population is not continuous, and the oases and all cultivated tracts are disposed in a narrow zone not more than 30 versts broad, limited on either side by mountain ridges and salt deserts.

It is impossible to reckon on local trade. The quantity of goods is too insignificant to feed the line, and therefore, in commercial respects, it is necessary to have in view only the transit of goods and passengers, seeing that this route will undoubtedly have universal importance between Europe and the countries of the East. Finally, this route has a vast political and strategic importance. As far as concerns the port, the Chahbar Bay offers the best natural harbour of the whole Persian southern coast.

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All the ports of the Persian Gulf and the Mekran coast, with the exception of the Chahbar Bay, have perfectly open anchorages and of insufficient depth. Chahbar presents a vast bay, protected from every wind except from the south, with a good anchorage, and a depth fully sufficient to admit vessels of the greatest draught

To calculate the volume of local freights I do not condsider necessary on account of their insignificance, but it is open to any one to do so, on the basis of materials in the statistical description of the regions traversed, forming the second section of the first part of this report.

I have tried to calculate the transit of passengers and goods in my pamphlet, "Railway Route through Persia," the data of which are true even now.

A more detailed calculation of transit goods will form the subject of a special, extensive, and extremely serious investigation which is absolutely necessary, as rough calculations founded on large and valuable freights gave striking results as to the remunerativeness of the line.

The objections which I have heard against goods transit amounted to this: that, on account of possible disorders and unpunctuality, goods would not be delivered in time, and, therefore, foreign senders would prefer to dispatch everything by the old sea route.

It seems to me that such objections cannot be considered as valid, as the old line will not be ready for some ten years, and by that time it must be supposed that the conditions will be somewhat altered. In any case, such want of punctuality and carelessness must not be made a fetish of by stopping a national and world enterprise on its account.

To estimate the passenger transit I obtained from the son of the celebrated constructor of the Suez Canal, Lesseps, a perfectly accurate account of the passenger traffic through the Suez Canal. The general considerations and estimate of the revenue from this item were indicated in the aforesaid pamphlet.

It now only remains to examine the importance of the line in political and military respects.

In political respects the meridional direction possesses vast importance as it places under Russian interests the whole of Persia; and excludes the possibility of the division of Persia by England into two parts, north and south.

This line once carried through by us, southern Persia is lost for England beyond recall, and the idea of an Africa-Indian State incapable of realization.

We shall attain by this line our extreme limit on the south, and shall achieve our world's task—our natural gravitation to the open ocean.

From many I had occasion to hear that for Russia this is entirely unecessary—that we without this would have more land than we know what to do with; that we must concentrate our forces on the internal situation of the State.

Such arguments have constantly excited my surprise. Can it be that our home affairs hinder our historical aims? Surely they may go hand in hand. In this sense our Society presents a remarkable phenomenon—a total incapacity to embrace at once the whole position and to answer all the questions of life.

To fulfil our world tasks simultaneously with internal questions is our duty up to the very moment that we shall be powerful and wealthy, while to cease to think of the historical destinies of Russia and to acknowledge that our cycle is complete, this means to acknowledge that we are weak, that we are fit for nothing, and have finished our part in the work. But surely we have not come to such a position. We have not acknowledged ourselves insolvent and worse even than the English, who, notwithstanding the actual dissolution of their organism, continue to dream of universal domination.

No, I think that such an argument is fit only for weak men, who fear every symptom of complications. Such arrest of our national problems is intelligible, indeed, on the part of people to whom every active movement ahead brings an incredible amount of trouble and cares.

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Some of such have introduced as a justification a new formula—inopportune. Evolution must be allowed to take its own course—an excellent justification, but in this case all these persons forget that in this world nothing happens by itself, and that all questions in the course of time only become more and more entangled.

Persia in this sense has never had any luck, and still has no luck. At the critical moment circumstances become so crystallized that it is impossible to occupy oneself with them, and a new epoch is awaited years after.

Of late years we have made a historical blunder, in moving to the distant south-east—Manchuria—instead of our natural movement to the south. The Manchurian business went too fast and unfavourably, and the Persian question is again put aside for an indefinite time.

The usual justification of this is the desire to avoid a repetition of the case in China. This question, however, is wrongly stated, as neither economically nor socially can the two countries be compared. China has a population of fully 400,000,000, and Persia about 10,000,000. In China the political system is vigorous, and presents a striking example of strength and individuality; while in Persia the whole system rests on verbal contract, and presents a picture of complete dissolution.

The Chinese did not ask for a railway, as it gave them nothing but loss. They opposed in a every way the invasion of the foreigner. The Persians on the other hand, day and night prayed to Allah for the construction of a railway, which will raise their civilzation and introduce justice and prosperity.

In China the whole patriotic mass of the people rose against the Europeans, while in Persia this will never happen as there is no cohesion. There may occur individual onslaughts of bandits, Kashkais or Beluchi, but a rising *en masse* is difficult.

Finally, in political respects the projected line will not cause any partition of Persia. Here there is nothing to divide; with the exception of the Karun and Caspian provinces there are no plums. In the whole of the rest of the territory of Persia Russia alone can find any advantage, and it is her exceptional position which should remove all fear and cause her to push on.

It is a matter of perfect indifference, when the time arrives, for the English to occupy themselves with the irrigation of the Karun, and then build the line from Bagdad to Tehran. This we cannot prevent, as we have not prevented the Germans receiving the Concession from the Sultan. We can only hinder them when the railway is carried to Tehran. Till then Russia can do nothing.

On the whole, examining the Persian question from all sides, we see that here there is no analogy with China, which only people who are quite ignorant of Persia can discern.

It now remains only to examine the Allat-Chahbar direction in strategical respects, and to discusss the degree of safety of this route. The section Allat-Resht, as I have already said, is under the protection of our fleet on the Caspian, and strategically presents a line of great importance, as it allows our troops, if moving on the capital of Persia, to avoid the unfriendly Caspian, which, without a coast railway, may place the troops of the Caucasian military district in a difficult position.

In the case of operations against the town of Tabreez, this line will serve as a triple embracing base in conjuction with the Tiflis-Kars and Tiflis-Baku lines, as, further continued in the direction of Tehran, the line to Kazvin passes through a mountainous district occupied by a nomad Kurd population, whose customs leaving nothing to be desired as regards orderly and peaceful behaviour.

From the town of Kazvin to Tehran there is a purely Iranian population, which will present no danger to the line. In general, the whole line from the station of Allat to the town of Tehran will present no danger comparable to the Manchurian. As a p oof of this may serve the "Chaussée" already built by us. where, if there were destructions of turnpickes (two cases), this occurred exclusively from misunderstandings for which we ourselves were to blame. These cases bore a purely private character, did not involve any loss of life or the use of troops, and where settled by the mere intervention of the Consul.

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From Tehran to Kirman the line passes through settlements and towns with a purely Persian and extremely peaceful population. If robbery or violence is possible there it would have a purely accidental character, and the persons to blame would be nomads such as Kuskar, Arabs, and also Shahsevens as far as Kum. Moreover, a trustworthy guard in all the large towns, Kum, Kashan, Nain, Yezd, Anar, and Kirman (50 to 100 men in each), will completely guarantee security on the sections. A proof of this is the cause of contemporary events in the Yezd Province.

In 1900, simultaneously with our passage, there was appointed in Yezd a new Governor, Jellal-ud-din, who was accompanied by fifty trusty mounted men given him by his father, the celebrated Zil-es-Sultan. The inhabitants greatly rejoiced at this appointment, as, according to them, his trustworthy cavalry (ora), to judge from former years of his Governorship, would completely secure the whole province, and as a consequence the population could be in complete tranquillity for a year. Of course, their words are somewhat exaggerated, but in any case the nomad robbers only take that which is ill-guarded, and I am more than assured that 200 or 300 men would be more than enough for a length of 300 versts, or a man per verst.

Strategically speaking, the whole of this region Tehran-Kirman, is of very great importance, and, as will appear from the second part of the Report it may, even without railways, serve as a field of action for a considerable force. Without doubt, if a line should be laid down, it would play a very serious part, in a collision with England, as the plan of operations on the side of Afghanistan is very difficult and slow.

Although Kirman lies on the same parallel as Seistan, nevertheless a movement from Kirman directly east is very difficult, and the distance is not small.

All caravans from Kirman to Seistan go to Bam, and hence turn off by the great caravan tract to the north-east to Nusratabad, to which, from the town of Bam, the distance is 350 versts. Probably, subsequently, with strategic objects, a branch will be laid down from Bam to Seistan, which undoubtedly may serve as a *place d'armes* for a movement on Candahar and through Nushka to Quetta.

The English have already facilitated our operations in this direction by constructing a caravan road and digging wells.

Our Vice-Consul Miller, in his July Report for 1900, strikes an alarm, and is much horrified for the safety of our trade, saying that the English, it would seem, have already prepared all the materials for a railway from Quetta to Nusratabad.

I doubt the justice of these rumours, but from a military point of view, it would absolutely play into our hands. In case of war, we shall certainly make use of that line, and connect with it the town of Bam, if it should be by that time joined by a continuous railway with Trans-Caucasia.

On the whole, I am of opinion that the Ministry of War should make every effort to construct the line Allat-Tehran-Bam-Chahbar, as I absolutely do not understand how the troops of the Caucasian district can operate actively against India without it. Otherwise the troops will be completely dependent on camels, and the number of troops sent will not depend on the strength of the enemy but on the means of transport available. But an Indian war is not like one with the Turkomans, which even so made itself felt in 1879. Here the question is somewhat more serious. Without a railway through Persia we shall drag out our operations to a great length, and consequently, if we here grudge 100,000,000 roubles for a purpose not only military but national, we shall undoubtedly have to pay for it in time of war.

Of course, one may avoid the building of a strategic line when there is a possibility of carrying on operations otherwise, but when without roads, the carrying on of operations is simply almost impossible or extraordinarily difficult; in such case there is no room for discussion. In these cases, as in the opening of a campaign, a complete credit must be opened in the Treasury with the difference only that, if time permits, the construction may be spread over several years.

But to avoid such construction altogether is in such case impossible.

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Examining the last sections of the line from a military point of view, we see that from Kirman to Rigan it is perfectly safe, as it lies among peaceful nomad Persian tribes. From Rigan to Chahbar the line passes through Beluchistan, and presents greater danger, particularly from Bampur to the ocean—that is, the last 300 versts. But bearing in mind that the total population of Beluchistan is 131,000 to 160,000, and maintaining a certain policy, it is possible to keep on good terms with them; I hold that the route at this point will not offer any special danger. But, of course, the protection here must be stronger—say from 1,500 to 2,000 men for the whole of Beluchistan. The whole of this section from Bam to Chahbar will participate in transit trade, as also in the transport of troops to Chahbar to occupy that point and the coast, and for operations from this sea position against India.

The Bay of Chahbar will hold a very large war fleet, and well-disposed batteries will completely secure it from fire from the sea and the danger of a landing.

Railway Reconnoitering from the Caspian to the Indian Ocean

From Resht the projected lines take the direction of the existing "chaussée" valley of the Persian Province of Gillan to the Settlement of Kudum, where it enters the valley of the Sefid-rud, proceeding along the left bank to the place of junction of the Rivers of Kizyluzen and Shahrud, forming the River Sefid-rud. Hence along the left bank of the Shahrud the line proceeds to the point where the Mulla-Ali falls into the Shahrud (at the Laushum Bridge), along the valley of the latter proceeds to the station of Yuzvashichai. It then turns off into the valley of the Abgar-rud, a territory of the Mulla-Ali, by which it comes out into a spacious hollow, intersected by several small streams composing the River Abgar-rud, and bounded on the south-east by the ridge of Elburz. Making several loops the line enters the great Eliabad Valley, along the right slope of which it proceeds to the pass leading to the Kasvin plateau, cutting through the Elburz range by a tunnel of a verst and a half. Further, winding as it passes from valley to valley, the line descends by a comparatively little intersected and gentle south-east slope of the Elburz range to Kasvin valley near the settlement of Bairam to the town of Kasvin.

In regard to the topographical character of the locality, the line from Resht to the pass through the Elburz Range is divided into five sections. The first lying in the plain, from Resht to the settlement of Sefid-Kitale, 30 versts in extent, with falls amounting to ·002; the second along the valley of the Sefid-rud to the Menjil Bridge, with falls of ·004, 30 versts in length; the third along the valley of the Shakhrud to the mouth of Mulla-Ali, 25 versts in extent, with falls of ·006; the fourth along the valley of the Mulla-Ali, to the station of the Yuzvashichai, 30 versts in extent, with falls of ·02; and the fifth along the valley of the Abgar-rud to the pass through the Elburz ridge, with a fall of ·028.

Between Resht and Sefid-Kitale there is a valley covered with thick virgin forest, intersected by only two rivers, the Pir Bazar, or Gilian-rud, and the Siavash, a tributary of the Pir Bazar. The station of Resht it is proposed to place on the southern side of the town. The line will pass from it in a south-easterly direction, keeping to the existing "chaussée," and as far as the post station of Kudum takes an almost straight course, with falls not exceeding ·005. Further, having on its left the Gilian-rud and on the right mountain spurs gradually approaching this river, with a fall also not exceeding ·005, and curves of not less than 300 sagenes (700 yards) it approaches the Settlement of Imamzade, the entry to the valley of the Sefid-rud.

The left bank of the Sefid-rud from the Settlement of Imamzade-gashim to the Menjil Bridge presents mountain slopes descending to the river, excepting only localities at Rustam-Abad, Gianja, and Rud Bar, where the mountains retiring from the river leave terraces a half to a verst in breadth. As far as Rustam Abad the mountains are covered with forest (azat, walnut, cypress, samshit, karazach, domiragach, etc.), and have for the most part an earth cover 2 to 3 sagenes thick. Further on rocky projections are met with more frequently, and from Rud Bar to the River Kizyl Uzin the slopes present continuous rocks. The rocks are principally of argillaceous slate and limestone. The fall of the valley of the Sefid-rud is on an average ·0025, but the valley in

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parts is very tortuous with steep, rocky projections, and therefore, in tracing the line with a view to economise labour, it will be necessary to make use of the technical conditions adapted to mountain sections. From the settlement of Imamzade-gashim to that of Menjil, the line, without counting narrow and insignificant mountain streams, intersects the Rivers Iskhala, Alizager, Siara, and Giazan. The line crosses the Kizyl Uzin by a bridge of 40 sagenes and enters the valley of the River Shahrud, whose fall is equal on an average to ·006. In the valley of the River Shahrud explorations were conducted along the right bank, keeping to the direction of the "chaussée;" the line, however, will have to be carried by the left bank to the mouth of the Mulla-Ali, as the left bank has gentler contours, and will avoid building a bridge over the Shahrud.

On the last supposition the line will proceed from the mouth of the River Shahrud to the Settlement of Kish Milamir by a river terrace a half to a verst broad, and, further, by the slope of the mountains descending to the river to the entrance to the defile of the Mulla-Ali. The mountains of the left bank of the Shahrud consists of argillaceous slate covered with clay and earth to a thickness of 1 to 3 sagenes, in places bound with vegetation; with the exception of small defiles, the line will only intersect the mountain stream of the Sengar.

The local topographical conditions here, as on the Sefid-rud, will require the application to the line of the technical conditions for mountain sections, the more that the line along the Shahrud must be traced with a view to rising as far as possible above the mouth of the Mulla-Ali. This is carried by the circumstances that the defile of the Mulla-Ali is uniformly narrow with steep slopes, making it almost impossible to wind the line, has a fall on an average of ·02 from the mouth to the station of Yuzbashichai for a total extent of 30 versts, and by raising the line at the entrance to the defile in connection with winding it in the defile itself, it will be possible to reduce to 10 or 15 versts the part of the most difficult mountain section requiring the application of maximum falls of ·015 to ·028.

From the mouth of the Mulla-Ali, for an extent of 10 versts, the slopes are earthy, interrupted here and there by short terraces and short, broad defiles, while farther, to the station of Yuzbashichai for 20 versts, the banks are steep, and almost continuously rocky.

The defile in this part is very narrow, in places 5 sagenes at the bottom and very tortuous; but, nevertheless, it is possible to carry a line along the left bank, only once crossing the river Mulla-Ali by a bridge of 16 sagenes to enter into the valley of the Abgar-rud. Without counting the River Mulla-Ali, the line crosses only in considerable mountain torrents and ravines.

From Yuzbashichai the line enters the valley of the Abgar-rud, whose fall is, on an average, ·03.

Along the valley of the Abgar-rud the mountain slopes are gently contoured, covered with soil; but, as in the valley of the Mulla-Ali, there is no possibility of winding the line from one bank to another. To come out into the wide hollow adjacent to the pass—the Eliabad Valley—it was necessary to wind the line by a tunel loop, to versts in extent.

Further on, leaving the narrow part of the valley of the Abgar-rud, the line reaches the pass with falls of ·0286; the Elburz ridge is cut through by a tunnel of 725 sagenes.

In conducting the exploration the main line was taken for the most part along the "chaussée," Enzeli-Tehran, leaving it only in those places where it obviously left the limits of the belt suitable for tracing the line.

From the pass through the Elburz ridge to the town of Kazvin the line passes through an unwooded valley watered by small rivers and irrigating channels. On account of the general fall of the valley to Kazvin, and the presence of shallow wide valleys, it proved possible to use a maximum fall of ·008. The least radius of curvature here was 300 sagenes. The cost of the proposed line from Resht to Tehran through Kazvin may be roughly determined on the basis of the exact data already obtained, namely, the cost of the lines Allat-Astara-Resht, and the two directions from the station of Kivrag to Tabreez.

The first section of the line from Resht for 35 versts is in the same condition as the line Astara-Resht, and is therefore, estimated at 44,000 roubles per verst.

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The second section, from the 25th to the 85th verst, is comparable in cost with line Kivrag-Khoi-Tabreez, and is estimated at 56,000 roubles per verst

The third and most difficult, from the 85th to the 150th verst, at 80.000 roubles per verst, equating it in cost with the line Kivrag-Marand-Tabreez, and adding for the 1,750 sagenes of tunnels, reckoning 2,500 roubles per sagene.

The fourth section, from the 150th to the 160th verst, is estimated at 56,000 roubles a verst.

The fifth section, from the 160th to the 310th verst, that is, to Tehran, as approaching in coast the line Astara-Resht, is again estimated at 44,000 roubles per verst.

Grouping the above data we obtain the total cost of the line from Resht to Tehran as below:—

				Roubles.	Roubles.
1. The plain section	35	versts	at	44,000	1,540,000
2. The foot-hill section	50	„	„	56,000	2,800,000
3. The mountain section	65	„	„	80,000	5,200,000
Tunnels	1,750	sagenes	„	2,500	4,375,000
4. Foot-hill	10	versts	„	56,000	560,000
5. Plain section	170	„	„	44,000	7,480,000
TOTAL	330	„	„	66,530	21,955,000

From Kazvin to Tehran the road passes through a level tract of country not presenting any obstacles. Two rivers have to be crossed—the Kadan, between the station of Grudi Iman and Gissarek, and the Karej, between the station of Shah Abad and Tehran. Over these rivers are stone bridges with arches, the distance between Pir Bazar and Tehran is 340 versts. In general, the whole of this section from Kazvin to Tehran will offer no difficulties for the construction of a road.

The Iranian plateau slopes to the south and the south-west. The region is cultivated throughout.

The soil is partly loess; the irrigation is derived from Kekhrig mountain streams and rivers. Along the sides of the road are many settlements, but the southern part of the plateau is more populated. Building materials, with the exception of stone, earth, clay, and lime, do not exist, and everything will have to be brought from Russia.

From Tehran to the south the line of railway will have to be directed along the existing road, leaving the settlement of Abdul Azim on the left, to the post station of Kahrizak, and further keeping more to the east in order to turn the heights between versts 360 and 370 and 400 and 420 before the town of Kum. This detour is possible along the valley of the Karej and the shore of Lake Hauz-i Sultan.

From Kum the direction of the road as far as the post station of Pasangan coincides with the existing route. From the station of Pasangan the direction of the road must deviate to the east in order to avoid the heights and come out again on the post road between the station of Sinsin and Kashan.

From Kashan the line must be taken along the existing road to the settlements of Abuzabad and Khaledabad. Here there is a rise to Khaledabad for a distance of 17 versts of 31 sagenes. From Khaledabad to Mokhar the road passes over pebbly soil and then over a dry watercourse, and 11 versts from Mokhar at Ardistan descends slightly, but from the 12th verst the rise begins again, which continues uninterruptedly from the 92nd to the 150th verst from Kashan. The absolute elevation increasing from 463 sagenes to 926, that is, it doubles in the course of 58 versts. In other words, the fall is a $\frac{16}{1000}$. The fall may be diminished by a suitable winding of the line near Ardistan and along the valley between the parallel chain of mountains Ketchu and Haukend. The general inclination of the plateau from Moghar to Ardistan is from west to east. The pass itself is at a distance of 699 versts from Pir Bazar between Gaukend and Neistanek.

The descent from the pass to the town of Nain up to the 743rd verst has a gentler fall, and the valley widens, allowing the possibility of widening the line. From the pass to Nain the locality descends from 926 to 734 sagenes, that is, 192 sagenes, which, over a distance of 44 versts, amounts to $4\frac{3}{4}$ sagenes per

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verst. From Nain to Husein Abad for a distance of 44 versts the descent continues, and the road falls from 734 sagenes to 558, that is, 4 sagenes a verst.

On the section Agda-Yezd (87 verst) the line at first descends slightly for a distance of 40 verst from 539 to 505 sagenes. There then occurs an almost uniform rise up to Yezd, the height of which, according to calculations, is 544 sagenes.

From Yezd the line proceeds along the same valley, having a fall from south-west to north-east between the chains of mountains of Shirkukh and Kharane. At the 5th verst from the caravanserai of Seriyezd begins a very perceptible rise, culminating at the caravanserai of Zeinadin, 697 sagenes. In the course of 26 versts the road rises 67 sagenes, that is, $2\frac{1}{2}$ sagenes per verst.

At the 9th verst from Kirmanshahan the road entered a gloomy ravine, with perpendicular jagged masses of rock. This is a spur of the Darestan ridge, the pass of which is 32 sagenes higher than Kirmanshahan. At the 18th verst the descend from the spur terminates, the total fall in 6 versts being 38 sagenes.

For the whole 106 versts section from Seriyezd to Anar the "etapes" are without water, but it may be brought from the south-west chains.

From Anar the line passes through the village of Koshku, the tour of Bahramabad, the village of Robat and Kirman, through a region presenting no difficulties for the construction of the line. In particular from the 19th verst, at Koshku, begins an uninterrupted rise, which continues for 47 versts almost to Kabutarkhan. The absolute elevation rises from 707 to 837 sagenes or 130, which amounts to almost 3 sagenes per verst. From Kabutarkhan the road descends for 12 versts from 831 to 822 sagenes, and then at the 21st verst from Robat again reaches the height of 831.

From the 1,200th verst, or 24 versts from Robat, the road changes its main direction to south-east, turning to the north-east, and intersecting a spur of the mountains. The ascent continues 5 versts, the road rising from 846 to 882, that is, 36 sagenes, consequently more than 6 sagenes per verst. This ascent can easily be turned from the south. The descent extends for 6 versts, the absolute height falliug from 882 sagenes to the pass to 873 sagenes

From Kirman there are two roads to Bam, forking near the settlement of Mahun, 31 versts from Kirman. The western road to Kerimabad and further to Rain presents very difficult conditions. For the course of 61 versts from Mahun to Rain it rises from 887 to 1,234 sagenes at the pass at the 35th verst, and then descends to 1,008 sagenes at Rain, consequently up to the pass there is a rise of 317 sagenes in 35 versts, that is, almost 10 sagenes per verst, or a rise of $\frac{1}{240,0}$ th. During the descent the fall is $\frac{1}{18,000}$ th. To avoid this obstacle, the line must be directed not to Rain, but over a more easterly road which curves out in the former direction at Khanekatun at the 1,300th verst. Here there is a road marked on the existing maps whose summit is considerably lower, but caravans avoid it on account of its long "étapes," absence of caravanserais, and, most important, lack of water.

From Khanekhatun to Bam the absolute elevation falls from 815 to 506 sagenes. The fall is uniform, and over the whole 65-verst section gives $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 sagenes per verst, that is, a fall of ·01. The line may be zigzagged in order to avoid the fall.

From Bam to Kiakilabad, at the 1,453rd verst the line descends with the same fall, but it will have to be carried north-easterly to the existing caravan route. From Kiakilabad the line proceeds in the direction of Rigan as far as the River Konarchai or the site of Abigiar, at the 1,543rd verst. The ground right up to the 1,520th verst slightly descends, after which there begins a gentle rise. From the Konarchai a descent must be made through the defile of a tributary of that river to reach the pass of Dehizerkhad at the 1,583rd verst. The absolute height of the pass is 496 sagenes.

The existing caravan route rises 37 sagenes to the pass and only descends 11.

The descent from the pass to the site of Khosrin as far as the settlement of Kalanzau has no falls exceeding ·008. An exploration of the route from Bampur to Chahbar, through the town of Kasrkend, showed that to carry the railway in that direction would be extremely difficult. The falls in many places are considerably above the normal. The defiles are narrow; there is no possibility of winding the line. On account of this the line will have to be carried further to the west, beginning at the site of Kalanzan passing Bampur, straight to Gikh along the valley of the River Kair, and hence to the south-east to Paraga and Chahbar.

[Sakhansky's Report ends here.]

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Considerations on the Direction and cost of constructing a Line from Tehran South to the Ports of Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.

Lines from Tehran to Bunder Bushire and Bunder Abbas.

From Tehran to the south the line must take the direction of the existing road, leaving Abdul Azim to the left, to the post station of Kiarizek, and further keeping more to the east to avoid the high ground between the 360th and 370th versts, and between the 4' 0th and 42th verst to the town of Kum. The detour is possible along the valley of the Kerej and the shore of Lake Hauz-i-Sultan.

From Kum the direction of the road to the post station of Pasangan coincides with the existing rate. From Pasangan it is necessary to deviate to the east to avoid elevations and come out again on the post road between the station of Sinsin and Kashan. From Kashan the lines must take the direction not of the Kuhrud Pass, the high point of the route, but easterly to Natenz, and thence to Ispahan.

From Kum to Ispahan another direction may be selected, avoiding Kashan and the Kuhrud Pass more to the west, namely, by the Valley of the Kumchai to Gulpaigan through the Pass of Dugush to Ispahan. The westerly direction, although 60 to 70 versts longer, passes through a populous and well-watered region, while the easterly proceeds from Kum for the most part over desert and ill-irrigated foot-hills. Unfortunately I was not in a position to investigate this route, but I am of opinion that it is necessary to do so before making any final selection.

South of Ispahan the line may keep the direction of the caravan route for a distance of 224 versts to the settlement of Surmek. The falls do not exceed 012, and may be reduced by suitable winding of the line. From the settlement of Surmek the line must deviate to the east, to avoide the ridge projecting to the south-east, and enter the valley of the Pelvar or Khan-i-Kirgan at the settlement of Murgab. Further, the line will go along the valley of this stream to its junction with the Bendemir, which falls into the Lake Niriz. In view of the imposibility of approaching Shiraz from the north keeping to the direction of the road the line must be carried along the valley of the Bendemir towards the settlement of Kushmulla, in order to rise with more gentle ascent to the ridge, and to descend again from it to Shiraz. From Shiraz to Bunder Bushire two routes have been travelled over—one to Kazran, the other to Firuzabad. Both directions are unsuited for the construction of the line, in consequence of topographical conditions. From Shiraz the line can be built without incurring colossal expenditure only along the valley of the Kara Agach or Mund, and along the shore of the Persian Gulf to Bunder Bushire.

This direction is very circuitous, having an extent of 570 versts from Shiraz to Bunder Bushire, but the only possible one, as it will make it possible, following the river, to descend from the height of 5,000 put to the level of the Persian Gulf.

Even with this enormous prolongation the point will be almost ·003.

The valley of the Kara Agach, in many cases cutting through mountains, flows in deep rocky defiles. It is therefore to be presumed that in these sections the line will present difficulties on account of the extensive work in rocky soil and the large number of engineering works. Taking the direction from Shiraz to Bunder Abbas the line must follow the valley of the same river, the Kara Agach, to the caravanserai of Alibad, afterwards, to avoid high ground between the Kara Agach and the town Lar, it will take a more southerly direction, coming out again at Lar in its previous course, which it will maintain to Bunder Abbas, with suitable deviations to diminish falls.

The length of the route from Tehran to Bunder Bushire and Bunder Abbas will be as follows:—

Tehran-Bunder Bushire, 1,490 versts; Tehran–Bunder Abbas, 1,530 versts.

The cost of constructing the lines.

In determining the cost of the line in the three directions indicated to Bunder Bushire, Bunder Abbas, and Chahbar, it must be borne in mind that

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all the lines will be placed in almost indentical conditions in regard to materials and workmen, as they pass through a country with a uniform cultivation, in almost similar climatic and topographical conditions. There are no materials on the spot with the exception of earth, stone, and sand. Everything else will have to be brought from Russia.

Limestone, alabaster, and clay are to be had, but the absence of fuel will greatly increase the cost of lime, gypsum, and brick.

The means of conveyance are only pack animals, and this in insufficient quantity as the inhabitants are poor only keep asses, mules, and horses for their own limited needs. There are nowhere any carriage roads, although the roads in many places are suitable for conveyance by Arbas and carts.

In northern and central Persia unskilled masons are to be had.

In the southern part, particularly along the line to Chahbar, workmen will have to be brought from northern Persia. Feeding the workmen will be a serious question, as along the line to Yezd as far as the Bay of Chahbar the corn for the local population is provided from western Persia.

The soil is everywhere very heavy, mixed with pebble and many stony soils. The formations are mainly slaty.

Over the whole extent there is very little water. There are very few large rivers, and the small streams periodically dry up. Water can only be reckoned on from canals and karezes, underground irrigation canals.

There are few artificial works with the exception of those serving for the passage of irrigation canals. There are seven large rivers in the direction of Bunder Bushire, eight in that of Bunder Abbas, and four in that of Chahbar. Engineering works will be expensive, in consequence of the great cost of conveyance of cement and the lack of water.

To determine the cost we divide the lines into sections with small and large works :—

1. The line Tehran-Isphan-Shiraz-Bunder Bushire from Shiraz by the valley of the Kara Agach Total extent 1,490 versts, of which 740 are with small works and 750 with large works.

2. Line Tehran-Ispahan-Shiraz-Bunder Abbas. Total extent 1,530 versts, of which 740 are with small works and 790 with large works.

3. Line Tehran-Kashan-Yezd-Kirman-Chahbar. Total extent 1,635 versts, of which 1,000 versts with small works and 635 with large.

Thus is assumed on an average—

1. In regard to expropriation, counting 8 desiatines per verst and 200 roubles per desiatine, 1,680 roubles.

2. Regarding the construction of the permenant way, reckoning 1,200 cubic sagenes on easy sections, and 300 cubic sagenes on mountainous sections per verst, and assuming cost of 1 cubic sagene of small works at 4 roubles, and large in various soils at 750, we shall obtain the cost of 1 verst, adding 15 per cent. for construction of earth-works, excepting the permanent way—

(*a*) For the line from Tehran to Bunder Bushire—

$$\frac{740 \times 1{,}200 \times 4 + 7{,}550 \times 3{,}000 \times 7{\cdot}50}{1{,}490} =$$

	Roubles.
	13,710
And adding 15 per cent. we shall have	15,766
In round numbers	15,800

(*b*) For the line from Tehran to Bunder Abbas—

$$\frac{740 \times 1{,}200 \times 4 + 790 \times 3{,}000 \times 7{\cdot}50}{1{,}530} =$$

	13,939
And adding 15 per cent. we shall have	15,979
In round numbers	16,000

(*c*) For the line from Tehran to Chahbar—

$$\frac{1{,}000 \times 1{,}200 \times 4 + 635 \times 3{,}000 \times 7{\cdot}50}{1{,}635} =$$

	11,675
And adding 15 per cent. we shall have	13,425
In round numbers	13,500

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Under the other heads of the specification adopted for all three directions must be assumed :—

3. Construction of engineering works; cost for 1 verst according to the third head of the line Kivrag-Khoi-Tabreez, 16,000 roubles per verst.

4. Under fourth head cost of rails and sleepers will be more on account of the distance of delivery, and the laying down will also be 20 per cent. more—that is, 12,744+2,548=15,292, in round numbers 15,000 roubles.

5. Under Head 5, to be reckoned 300 roubles per verst.

6. Under Head 6, to be reckoned 500 roubles per verst.

7. Under Head 7, increasing the cost by 40 per cent., according to the Kivrag-Khoi-Tabreez specification, we shall have 2,000 roubles.

8. Under Head 8, we shall have 5,900 roubles.

9. Under Head 9, we shall have 2,500 roubles.

10. Under Head 10, we shall have 1,600 roubles.

11. Under Head 11, on account of the remoteness of the locality, 9,000 roubles.

Total per verst of line :—

	Roubles.
(*a*) Tehran-Bunder-Bushire	70,700
(*b*) Line to Bunder Abbas	70,900
(*c*) Line to Chahbar	68,400

Taking these data the cost of the line will be for the direction from Tehran :—

(*a*) To Bushire, total . . 1,490 × 70,000=105,743,000 roubles,
(*b*) To Abbas „ . . 1,530 × 70,900=108,477,000 „
(*c*) To Chahbar „ . . 1,635 × 68,400=111,834,000 „

Exclusive of cost of rolling stock.

Adding consecutively to the above figures cost of rolling stock for four pairs of trains, that is, a sum of 14,900,000 roubles, 15,300,000 roubles, and 16,350,000 roubles, and also the cost of the line with rolling stock from the station of Allat to Resht, 15,358,000 roubles × 3,450,000 roubles, and from Resht to Tehran, 25,100,000 roubles, the total cost of the line with rolling stock from Allat on the Trans-Caspian Railway through Persia will be :—

		Roubles.
1. To Bunder-Bushire, distance 2,145 versts . . .		164,151,250
	Or .	164,000,000
2. To Bunder Abbas, distance 2,185 versts . . .		167,685,250
	Or .	168,000,000
3. To the Bay of Chahbar, distance 2,290 versts . .		172,092,250
	Or .	172,000,000

Adding further to those totals, 15,000,000 roubles for construction of war and commercial ports, the final cost of construction will be expressed as follows :—

	Roubles.
For the line Allat-Resht-Tehran-Bunder Bushire . .	179,000,000
„ Allat-Resht-Tehran-Abbas	183,000,000
„ Allat-Resht-Tehran Chahbar	187,000,000

All the above estimates are made on the supposition that the line is constructed by Government means; in case of the construction with private means it would be necessary to add to the above figures about 30,000,000 roubles, to cover loss on realization of capital and interest during the period of construction.

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Name of line.	Length in Versts.	Cost in Roubles.				Note.*
		Without Rolling Stock.		With Rolling Stock.		
		Total.	Per Verst.	Total.	Per Verst.	
		Roubles.	Roubles.	Roubles.	Roubles.	
1. Kivrag-Shah-Takht-Khoi and Tabreez.	302	17,788,465	58,902	28,808,465	68,902	* In the calculation there are assumed to be four trains reckoning 10,000 per verst of main line.
2. Kivrag-Shah-Takht-Marand and Tabreez.	220	20,227,897	87,947	22,527,897	97,947	
3. Evlakh-Aslanduz Post-Agar and Tabreez.	423	40,592,964	95,964	44,822,964	105,964	
4. Allat-Resht . .	345	15,358,250	44,517	18,808,250	54,157	
5. Resht-Kazvin-Tehran	310	21,800,000	70,323	24,900,000	80,323	
6. Tehran-Bunder-Bushire	1,490	105,743,000	70,700	120,643,000	80,700	
7. Tehran-Bunder Abbas	1,530	108,477,000	70,900	123,777,000	80,900	
8. Tehran-Chahbar .	1,635	111,834,000	68,400	128,184,000	78,400	

The cost of the line from the station of Allat of the Baku Tiflis Railway to the ports of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean will be as follows :—

Name of Line.	Versts.	Cost in Roubles.		Note.
		With Rolling Stock and Port.		
		Total.	Per Verst.	
		Roubles.	Roubles.	
1. Allat-Bunder-Bushire . . .	2,145	179,000,000	83,449	Assuming construction of port at 15,000,000 roubles.
2. Allat-Bunder Abbas . . .	2,185	183,000,000	83,753	
3. Allat-Chahbar	2,290	187,000,000	81,659	

If constructed with private means there must be added 30,000,000 roubles with the following results :—

Name of Line.	Versts.	Cost in Roubles.	
		With Rolling Stock and Port.	
		Total.	Per Verst.
		Roubles.	Roubles.
1. Line Allat-Bunder-Bushire . . .	2,145	209,000,000	97,435
2. Line Allat-Bunder Abbas	2,185	213,000,000	97,483
3. Line Allat-Chahbar	2,290	217,000,000	94,760

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On the Importance for Russian Trade of Railway communications in North Persia.

Comparing the results of the recently completed explorations and investigations in Persia, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the continuation of the network of Russian railways from Trans-Caucasia into Persia has now become both a political and economic necessity.

The investigation of the direction of the future lines has made it clear that these lines must take the direction of the meridian, and by two different routes, each of which has its general and local significance. For the benefit of Russian trade and the political importance of Russia it is necessary to unite the nearest centres of Persia to our borders with the lines of Trans-Caucasia, but not to construct lines connecting above-mentioned ways of communication. All roads not having direct connection with our frontier will serve only for the development of the country, while yielding us no direct advantage in trade. Furthermore, such lines connecting centres like Tehran and Tabreez, may serve for the rapid movement and concentration of troops, which of course is not to be feared as Persia is devoid of military organization. But with them all may change, and the roads become the cause of undesirable complication.

At the present time, with the most primitive exclusively pack-animal roads in Persia, from our frontier to centres like Khoi, Tabreez, Ardabil, Tehran and Resht, Russian trade has succeeded with the aid of measures of encouragement on the part of the Ministry of Finance in wholly ousting certain classes of foreign goods—sugar, kerosine, pottery wares, metals, in northern Persia, and to gain partial possession of the markets of Azerbaijan and Iran. Some of our goods compete with the foreigner even in the centre of Persia, in Ispahan.

With the construction of railways we shall not only gain complete possession of the markets of north Persia, but the markets of western and southern Persia will be open to us, as the roads for pack-animals on the side of the Persian Gulf and Trebizond will in no case bear the competition of modern ways of communication.

However thinly populated be the north and centre of Persia, however, inconsiderable the requirements of her inhabitants, nevertheless a market having 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 consumers possesses great importance for our country's industry, as according to the minimum data for the total trade of Persia (namely, 9,000,000l. or 85,000,000 roubles), if we deduct that of the southern ports (32,000,000 roubles) there will be left to north Persia a trade of 53,000,000 roubles, which, with the exception of a small part belonging to the Trans-Caspian region, will take the direction of the projected lines.

For the trade and industry of Russia Persia has further a specially great importance as a country producing cotton.

The Moscow, Vladimir, and the cotton industry districts receive a third of the cotton they use from Trans-Caucasia and Turkestan, and two-thirds from America and Egypt. The two latter markets may be closed to us, and in case of political complications the vast marority of our mills will be obliged to be closed.

The Persian market immediataly adjacent to our inner sea, the Trans-Caucasian and Trans-Caspian regions, being independent of the political situation in Europe, only awaits the organization of modern ways of communication in order to develop cotton production to become a competitor of Egypt and America, and finally oust these providers of our mills. Already, at the present time, cotton from Gilan, Mazanderan, the Iran table-land, and even from Ispahan is directed to the Caspian Sea for transhipment to Russia. The cost of freight of a pood of cotton from Tehran to Moscow will be 15 per cent, less than from Kokened, as the way from Mascow *viâ* Orenburg, taking the shortest distance, will be 3,600 versts, while that from Tehran to Moscow will be about 3,000 versts.

The cotton growing business is new one in Persia, but it has a great future and it is very important for Russia to aid its development, for which purpose it mainly necessary to construct ways of communication. An example of the influence of communications on the development of cotton growing is to be seen

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in the Turkestan region, where prior to the construction of the railway, but an insignificant quantity of cotton was grown and that of poor quality, for local consumption, while during the last one or two decades the production has increased to such an extent that the exports from the Trans-Caspian region and Turkestan at the present time amount to 6,000,000 poods of cotton and tens of millions roubles, which were hitherto paid to America and Egypt, remain in the country,

In view of the fact that, with the widest development of cotton growing in Central Asian possessions and in Trans-Caucasia, it will be impossible to meet the whole demand of our mills, the import of Persian cottons in exchange for our manufactures, and the development of the cotton business in Persia, is desirable as securing new material to our industrial districts.

Western Direction.

As appears from the explorations that have been made on the western side of Trans-Caucasia, in the direction of the Kars branch, the line most advantageous in all respects is a continuation of the Eriyan branch to the custom-house of Shah Takht, the town of Khoi, the province of Dilman, the shore of Lake Urmia, to Tabreez.

This line embraces the most fertile provinces of Azerbaijan, situated around Lake Urmia, and from a technical point of view is the most convenient for construction and working. The carrying out of the line will finally annihilate the imports of foreign goods into Azerbaijan and south-western Persia from Trebizond, and our industry will not gain complete possession of the market of Azerbaijan, but it will be possible from Tabreez to send goods to the south, and there compete successfully with those coming from the ports of the Persian Gulf.

Having constructed the line to Tabreez, Russia will, *de facto*, place Azerbaijan in the position of Bokhara, with which the local population will be satisfied, as the dream of the whole population of Azerbaijan is that Russia should interefere in the administration of the country and introduce order there.

The length of the line from Kivrag Station, on the Erivan-Julfa line, will be 302 versts, 290 of which are within Persian borders, the maximum fall being ·015.

The cost of the line without rolling-stock will be 17,788,465 roubles, and per verst 58,908 roubles.

Eastern Direction.

On the eastern side of the Trans-Caucasia explorations have been conducted from the station of Allat,* along the shore to the hamlet of Saliany, the district town of Lenkoran, the Customs barrier of Astara, and further along the shore of the sea to the Persian town of Resht.

This line has an enormous importance for Russian trade, as it will unite Persia directly by the shortest route through Petrovsk, Rostov, with the centre of Russia—Mascow. Besides this, this line may have, if it should be prolonged south to the Indian Ocean, universal importance, and become the transit route for valuable goods and passengers travelling to Far East—to India, Africa, and Australia.

The construction of the line to Resht alone will save our trade from vast general expenses in regard to unloading and transhipping goods at Enzeli.

Goods arrive at Enzeli on steamers and sailing vessels, which in the rarest cases are able to approach the wharf, as the bar is only possible in the event of a number of favourable circumstances.

Usually the ships unload into boats, Kirzhims, which carry the goods to Enzeli.

In Enzeli the goods are transhipped again into boats for conveyance through the Murdab Bay to the River Pir Bazar. For the third time the

* Allat is where the Ratoum-Baku line first touches the Caspian, before it turns North to Baku.

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goods are transferred to small boats, and are hauled or rowed along the River Pir Bazar to the landing-stage of the same name, where the Resht-Kazvin "chaussée," begins.

From Pir Bazar all the goods hitherto were sent on pack-animals, and only lately, on the completion of the Resht-Kazvin "chaussée," has carriage communication begun to be established.

With the carrying on through of the railway to Resht all these general expenses will disappear, due delivery of goods will be secured, and our merchandise will become Predominant not only in Tehran, but in the whole of north Persia to Ispahan inclusive.

All the roads for pack-animals from the south, that is, on the side of the Persian Gulf, by which foreign goods reach the centres of north and middle Persia, are so heavy, inconvenient, and dear, of which I had personal experience that upon conveyance being cheapened and speed of delivery increased, all foreign goods will give way to Russian productions.

The length of the line from Allat to Resht was found to be 345 versts, with a very easy profile, and falls not exceeding ·005.

The length of the line in Persia proper, from the custom-house of Astara to the town of Resht, will be 155 versts, and the cost of the whole line without rolling-stock 15,358,250 roubles, or 44,517 roubles per verst.

Assuming that to start with the two lines will require rolling-stock for four pairs of trains, and reckoning its course at 10,000 roubles per verst, of road, the cost of both lines with a length of 302+345=647 versts, will be 17,788,465+15,358,250+647×10,000=39,716,715 roubles.

Assuming that the two lines may be constructed in three years, Russia, with an expenditure of about 13,000,000 roubles annually, will acquire 647 versts of line and acquire a firm footing in Azerbaijan and Iran.

Upon the completion of the line to Resht, that of the line to Teharan, with a length of 310 versts and a cost—as already shown—of 22,000,000 roubles, will be only a question of time.

Holding in her hands the two main life arteries of the country, Russia will obtain a predominating importance in Persia, and will have nothing to fear from trade competition on the part of Europe.

Having in view the acquisition of such an advantageous position, it is necessary, however, to hasten, as, while there is no fear of competition from the side of the Persian Gulf on account of the inaccessbility of the locality, there is yet reason to fear the bringing of English goods to the East from India through Seistan, and of German goods to the West from the side of Asia Minor.

Last year Germany received a Concession for the construction of lines in the valley of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, and the expected economic struggle with the English in the Persian Gulf will compel German capitalists to turn their attention to the Persian market, and try to find a way for their productions from Mesopotamia into western Persia, and even Azerbaijan.

Germany, on account of the high development of her industry at the present time, is a more dangerous competitor than England, and therefore the question of uniting our railway system with the centre of Persia must be decided as quickly as posssble, while the undertaking of the construction of lines by Germany and Turkey has not reached its final stage.

Lines from Tehran to the South.

The prolongation of railway lines south to the ports of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean is possible, but will require the construction of difficult lines from Tehran of the following lengths:—

(1) To Bunder Bushire, 1,490 versts; costing, with port, 179,000,000 roubles.
(2) To Bunder Abbas, 1,530 versts; costing 183,000,000 roubles.

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The commercial importance of the first two lines cannot be great, as the trade of the chief ports of the Bay of Bunder Bushire, namely, Lingeh, Bunder Abbas, and Mohammera, amount to—

	£
Imports	2,091,224
Exports	1,273,770
TOTAL .	3,364,994

Adding the imports of goods by land through Seistan into Khorasan to the amount of 130,282*l.*, we shall obtain a grand total of annual trade 3,495,976*l.*, that is, about 32,000,000 roubles.

It is impossible to reckon on the development of local traffic in the near future, in view of the thinly-populated state of the country, topographical conditions, and political situation.

These lines can have no political importance, as the outlet to the Persian Gulf will not give Russia convenient communication to the ocean: first, because there is not a single good natural harbour in the Persian Gulf; and, secondly, because the English have complete possession of the Gulf, the Straits of Ormuz, and the Muscat shore, having a permanent fleet in these waters and Indian troops at hand.

The outlet to the Indian Ocean at the Bay of Chahbar, the only natural Persian port, has more advantages politically, as it will create direct communication with the ocean.

Local freights with this direction are also not to be reckoned on, even in the most distant future, as the country traversed by the line presents a series of barren, stony, poorly-watered upland valleys, limited on the west and east by mountain ridges and salt deserts.

The revenue of the line in the directions indicated can be secured only by transit traffic of passengers and valuable goods requiring rapid conveyance from Europe to the Far East, India, Africa, Australia, and back.

The question of transit is so complicated that to judge of its profitableness for the line is only possible after careful investigation of contemporary traffic of passengers and goods from Europe and back in the directions indicated.

In conclusion, it is still necessary to add that in general the construction of a line through Persia to the southern ports will be profitable only on condition that Russia has the right to impose customs duties, as, in the contrary case, these routes—while facilitating access to the country for foreign goods—will injure our trade not only in central but in north Persia.

Considerations on the choice of Direction and Calculation of the Working of the Projected Lines.

In accordance with the instructions given by the Railway Construction Office, I have investigated the following directions for connecting the Trans-Caucasian Railways with the Persian towns of Tabreez and Resht, with a view of selecting the most convenient route from Trans-Caucasia into Persia:—

(1) From station Kivrag or Shah Takht of the Erivan-Julfa line through Khoi, Dilman to Tabreez, 302 versts in extent.

(2) From station Kivrag or Shah Takht through Marand to Tabreez, 240 versts.

(3) From the station of Julfa, of the Erivan-Julfa line, 56 versts.

(4) From the station of Evlakh of the Baku-Tiflis line, through the Aslanduz post near the town of Jebrail to the Pesian towns of Agar and Tabreez, 423 versts.

(5) From the station of Allat of the Baku-Tiflis line to Resht, 345 versts long.

Upon a comparison of the above-cited directions, it appeared that to connect the chief town of western Persia (Tabreez) with the system of railways, the most advantageous direction was through Kivrag, Khoi, and Dilman,

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302 versts, and costing 58,902 roubles per verst, as the cheapest route, the easiest in technical respects, with falls not exceeding 0·15 and traversing the most thickly populated and fertile localities of Azerbaijan.

The way from Kivrag to Marand, 230 versts in extent, although 70 versts shorter, costs 87,947 roubles per verst, and is consequently 2,439,432 roubles dearer than the direction to Khoi, and traverses a less cultivated and populous region.

The line from the custom-house of Julfa required already in the first 56 versts the application of falls of ·028 which it proved impossible to reduce, and in its further direction coincided with that of the line Kivrag-Marand; wherefore it was not further elaborated.

The direction from Evlakh, the Aslanduz post near Gebrail, and further to Agar and Tabreez presents within Russian territory for a distance, of 153 versts an easy and cheap line; but further on within the limits of Persia the line, passing along the valley of the Karasu and intersecting mountain ridges, presents such difficulties that its cost with a total extent of 423 versts was found to be 40,592,964 roubles, or 95,964 roubles per verst of way.

In Russia the line traverses the desert western frontier of the Mugan steppe, and within the Persian borders through the lands of the tribe of Shahsevens, who do not recognize any authority; where in consequence of excessive robberies and disorders for an extent of about 100 versts there is hardly any settled population.

In order to connect the Trans-Caucasian lines with the chief town of eastern Persia (Tehran), the route from Allat along the shore of the Caspian through Saliany, Lenkoran, the Astara custom-house, to Resht, offers the sole, natural and most convenient direction.

This route, 345 versts long, will cost with the most favourable technical conditions for traffic, 15,358,250 roubles or 44,517 roubles per verst.

From what has been said above it appears that, in order to unite the Trans-Caucasian lines with Tabreez, one must select the direction of Kivrag, Khoi, Dilman, Tabreez, and in order to connect with Tehran the line Allat-Resht. Both these lines must be examined from the point of view of their profitableness as commercial undertakings. Alike the imports from Persia into Russia and the exports are mainly concentrated in two distributary centres for western Persia in Tabreez, in eastern Tehran.

All goods are despatched either through the custom-houses situated on the Perso-Caucasian frontier or through Astrakhan and Baku by sea to Enzeli and other Persian ports of the Caspian.

Direction to Tabreez, through Kivrag, Khoi, and Dilman.

As a basis of the commercial calculations for the direction of the line Kivrag-Shah Takht-Khoi-Dilman-Tabreez, 302 versts long, and cost 17,778,465 roubles, the data have been taken for the last five years from 1894 to 1898 on the average quantity of goods passing over the Perso-Caucasian land frontier, as also information on the spot during the expedition, and English data for 1898 and 1899, regarding the trade of Tabreez. In regard to imports it is assumed that all the goods amounting to 500,000 poods will go by the newly-projected route, and with regard to exports, 75 per cent of the whole quantity—namely, 2,550,000 × 75=1,912,500 poods.

Furthermore, it must be supposed that with the construction of the line the conveyance of goods through Trebizond will cease, and the imports being increased by 500,000 poods, and the exports by 300,000 local freights to Tabreez which has 150,000 to 200,000 inhabitants, for the local requirements of the rural populations and towns lying to the south of the projected line I propose to put down at not less than 1,000,000 poods. The total amount of goods, imports and exports, will be 3,212,500 poods with a run of 203 versts, and 1,000,000 poods with a run of 150 versts.

The passenger traffic must be taken at not less than 100 persons per day, with a tariff of 1¼ copecks per verst. Bearing in mind that Persia imports

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and exports valuable goods, sugar, cloth goods, dried fruits, carpets, cotton, the Tariff may be fixed at $\frac{1}{75}$th of a copeck, for local freight $\frac{1}{75}$th.

With these Tariff rates the receipts from conveyance of goods and passengers will be expressed as follows :—

	Rouble.
$\frac{3,212,500 \times 302}{15} + \frac{1,000,000 \times 150}{25} =$	706,783
$110 \times 302 \times 1{\cdot}25 \times 365 =$	137,787
Total	844,570

Assuming, keeping to the data, which serve to determine the profitableness of the Alexandropol-Erivan line, the expenditure independent of traffic at 1,500 roubles a verst, and the expenditure dependent on traffic at 5 roubles per train verst, we shall get $302 \times 1{,}500 + 220{,}463 \times 0{\cdot}50 = 563{,}231$ roubles.

The net receipts, 844,570 — 563,231 = 281,339 roubles, or 1·58 per cent. on a capital of 17,788,465 roubles.

Notwithstanding the small profit, the projected line is extremely important for Russia : first, strategically and politically ; secondly, because its yield will undoubtedly exceed that calculated, seeing that the scale of traffic assumed is that which now takes place with exclusively pack-animal roads ; thirdly, because its construction will put an end to the imports of foreign goods from west and south ; and fourthly, because this line will increase the takings of the Kars branch, and in general of the whole Trans-Caucasian Railway.

The Direction from Allat to Resht.

In examining the profitableness of the line from Allat to Resht, 345 versts in length and costing 15,358,250 roubles, we will have in view the quantity of goods brought by sea during the last five years from 1894 to 1898 :—

	Poods.
From Astrakhan—	
Exported to Persia	494,750
Imported from Persia	1,199,600
From Baku—	
Exported to Persia	3,100,600
Imported from Persia	4,882,000

For the purposes of this calculation the figures for the imports and exports of Astrakhan are not taken into consideration at all, bearing in mind that part of the freights will nevertheless go by sea, and from the Baku freights we deduct 298,800 poods, which now pass through the custom-house of Astara and the town of Ardabil to Tabreez.

For conveyance by the projected line there will remain 8,082,600— 298,800 = 7,783,800 poods of goods, at a rate of one-twentieth of a copeck, bearing in mind sea freights, and with a run of 345 versts.

1,500,000 poods of local goods, with a rate of one twenty-fifth of a copeck and a run of 150 versts.

Passenger traffic we shall assume at not less than 100 persons a day, at a rate of 1·25 copecks per verst.

At these rates the line will have the following yield :—

$$\frac{7,783,800 \times 345}{20} + \frac{1,500,000 \times 150}{25} + 345 \times 1{\cdot}25 \times 100 \times 365 = 1,590,111 \text{ roubles.}$$

In accordance with our assumptions, the expenditure independent of the traffic will be 1,500 roubles per verst, and the traffic expenditure 5 roubles per train verst.

Total expenditure :—

$1{,}500 \times 345 \times 251{,}853 \times 0{\cdot}50 =$ 643,426 roubles.

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The net receipts will be :

1,590,111—643,426=946,685 roubles, or 6·16 per cent. per annum, or a capital of 15,358,250 roubles. From the above calculation it appears that the line will be profitable as soon as worked; but, bearing in mind local conditions, it must be supposed that its profitableness will increase from year to year.

The tracts along the sea-shore, according to known symptoms, may improve oil-bearing.

Comparing both lines, and assuming that the expenditure on the construction will come from one source, the receipts on the whole capital, according to the above calculation, will amount to 3·71 per cent; or about 4 per cent. per annum.

Considerations on the Necessity for Building the Allat-Resht line.

The construction of a coast-line from the station of Allat, on the Baku Tiflis Railway to the Persian town of Resht, appears to be a very profitable commercial undertaking, to say nothing of its political importance.

The amount of goods expected is taken at a minimum, which, on account of the unfavourable conditions of sea transport, must considerably increase.

At present the goods sent by sea are taken without liability for damage on the voyage, due delivery, and even unloading in the port of destination—that is, it is supposed that the goods may be unloaded in another port or sent back.

Under such conditions goods from Baku arrive in Tehran, only six or even eight months after their dispatch. At the same time a considerable precentage of the goods get spoilt on account both of the prolonged journey and repeated transhipment.

With the construction of a line from Baku to Resht the goods will reach Tehran in two weeks, assuming two days for the journey to Resht, and twelve days for cartage from Resht.

One of the main causes why foreign goods compete with ours in Tehran consists in the slowness and want of punctual delivery, as many foreign goods are considerably inferior to ours.

High tariff rates are assumed in the calculation of the profitableness of the the line, having in view the whole want of security and punctuality of the sea route, as also the circumstance that valuable goods are imported into Persia and exported into Russia.

All that has been said justifies the supposition that in the near future the line will become still more profitable and the expenditure on its construction will be completely productive in all respects.

Under such conditions the realization of the capital for such a profitable enterprise shall not meet with difficulties, and it is only to the depressed state of the money market that can be ascribed the delay in the construction of a line so necessary for our trade, and fraught with such great political importance.

Foreign capitalists may be frightened at investing their money in such an anarchical, creditless, and little known country as Persia, but for Russia such fears have no place, for following reasons :—

First, our neighbour has been sufficiently investigated by us, and relations with Persia are firmly established.

Secondly, the projected line will run 193 versts over Russian territory, and for only 152 versts within the Persian borders, along the coast of the Caspian which is wholly in our power.

Thirdly, Russian entrepreneurs will meet with complete welcome and sympathy on the part of the local inhabitants, and indeed of all Persians.

The Persian Government regards this enterprise with the same sympathy, having in view the regulation of the collection of customs duties, and increase of trade.

The English and the providers of goods to Persia, although they will suffer losses from the construction of the proposed line, will have no power to take any

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steps, as having abolished their Consulate in Resht, they have finally abandoned the Caspian shore, leaving it exclusively to Russian influence.

The sooner the construction of the line is taken in hand, the sooner our textiles, sugar, naphtha, metals, pottery, etc., will reach Resht without transhipment the more profitable it will be for our trade, and the sooner will our goods occupy an exclusive position in Persia, ousting all foreign rivals.

The immediate commencement of the construction of the line is imperative for the further reasons that at the present time our chief antagonists in Persia—the English—have their hands tied by events in the Transvaal and China.

Considerations on the Construction of Ports and Improvement of Communications with Persia on the Caspian.

The constant and just complaints of Russian trade—of the lack of punctuality and security in the delivery of goods from Russia to the Persian ports of the Caspian—are well-grounded, and may be partly removed by the improvement of the craft sailing in the Caspian, and the construction of ports on the Persian shore.

Final security to trade from all contingencies can only be attained by the construction of railway communication from Baku to Resht, and further to Tehran.

Steam and railway vessels maintaining communication with Persia, as all the craft in the Caspian are of inconsiderable tonnage, and in order to cheapen freights it is desirable that vessels should be of large tonnage, and for safety at the same time possessing good sea-going qualities on account of the violent storms in that sea, whose roughest water is off the southern shore.

Parallel with the improvement of means of transport it is also necessary to construct ports.

The port of Enzeli, most frequented by our vessels, is at present entirely devoid of any proper anchorage or appliances for unloading and storing goods. The last item is extremely important, as the rainfall is enormous, and it is absolutely necessary to warehouse the goods in covered premises.

The steamers anchor a few versts from Enzeli, and goods are conveyed in boats to the port.

Anchoring is only possible in fair weather; when there is a wind blowing the steamers go and wait behind the island of Saru, to the north of Lenkoran, or return to Baku. It often happens that goods travel several times from Baku to the roads of Enzeli and back.

In other ports the anchorage is not better than in Enzeli. The adaptation of the Enzeli port for safe entry and anchorage of vessels will require great expenditure. Besides moles and the breakwater, it will be necessary to carry a road from the quay to Resht, 40 versts long, or to make a channel through Murdab Bay, and construct about 15 versts of road to Resht. All those constructions, with appliances for unloading and warehousing goods, will cost from 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 roubles, while reckoning the cost of the necessary improvement of the shipping, the expenditure required to secure trade by this route will amount to 10,000,000 roubles or more.

This considerable expenditure, however, will not relieve the trade from transhipment or warehousing of goods in Russian ports, and from unloading and warehousing in Enzeli for redelivery to Resht and further. Besides this, no construction of ports will diminish the number of stormy days in the Caspian.

Goods coming to Astrakhan, Petrovsk, or Baku will have to be unloaded and warehoused, again put on board ship and transhipped for the third time in Enzeli. All these transhipments, besides loss of time and general expenses, injures the goods.

From the above examination of the question of improving sea communication it is apparent that even with great expenditure the impediments to our trade cannot be completely removed. In general a sea route can compete with a railway only on condition that the distances are great and the vessels of large tonnage.

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On the Caspian the longest voyage is from Astrakhan to Enzeli Bay, 960 versts. That from Petrovsk to Enzeli town is 660 versts, while the most frequented route from Baku to Enzeli town traversed by about 8,000,000 poods of goods is not more than 300 versts.

With such insignificant distances sea freight cannot compete with land freight, which always has the advantage of punctuality and safety.

The example of the Petrovsk-Baku Railway shows that a sea route does not compete with railway communication, notwithstanding the fact that both Petrovsk and Baku must be regarded as ports sufficiently organized for existing traffic.

Passengers travelling to Persia and back, of course, will prefer the railway to the most perfect sea route, on account of the danger of a voyage and the disinclination to be subjected to sea sickness.

The above considerations apply to passengers in general. Persians, however, the main contingent of the local traffic, entertain an abhorrence of the sea, and will all to a man go by rail. In 1900, at the end of February, a party of Persians, who were going on a steamer to Enzeli, disembarked at Astara in order to avoid the rolling of the vessel, and preferred to make the difficult journey on foot along the coast to Enzeli and Resht.

The whole line from Baku to Resht, inclusive of rolling-stock of four pairs of trains, will cost 18,800,000 roubles.

This line will completely secure trade and military traffic, and communications with Persia will not depend on the state of the weather and Caspian storms.

As has been shown, all the expenditure on the construction of the railway to Resht will be entirely productive, while the expenditure on improvement of sea communication will never completely secure Russo-Persian intercourse.

The second volume of Mr. Rittich's Report contains a description of the march routes of his journey through Persia to Chahbar. These march routes are nine in number, and he summarizes them from a military point of view as follows:—

1. March route from Kashan through Ardistan to Nain:—
   "The route is completely suitable for marching, not only for small reconnoitring parties, but for the passage of a large force—a division, with all three arms, furnished not only with pack-saddle train but also with wheeled train. The route will hardly require any repairs. Local supplies can only be counted on to an inconsiderable degree."

2. March route from Nain through Agda and Meibud to Yezd:—
   "The whole zone described is quite suited for the advance of a large force—a division or corps, with wheeled train. Supplies or provisions from Agda to Yezd may be fully calculated upon."

3. From Yezd to Anar:—
   "On the whole, the movement of an inconsiderable force—two battalions of infantry, with artillery and wheeled train—will meet with hardly any difficulties. The organization for the march of a large number of troops will require echeloning in places, which is caused by the lack of large sites for bivouacking."

4. From Anar through Bahramabad to Kirman:—
   "The caravan route described is quite suited for the advance of a considerable force accompanied by wheeled train. The route will require but little dealings with. In regard to commissariat, the force will be completely provided for."

5. From Kirman through Rain to Bam:—
   "The whole route described is convenient for marching, not only a small but a considerable force, accompanied by mountain artillery and pack-saddle train. A great deal will have to be done to make the route suitable for wheeled traffic."

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6. From Bam to Rigan :—

"The route described is suited to the advance of a force—a regiment, accompanied by mountain artillery and pack-saddle train ; better still, camels."

7. From Rigan to Bampur :—

"The route described is suited for the advance of an inconsiderable force—one battalion, accompanied by mountain artillery and camel train. All the forage and provisions must be taken with the force, according to the number of 'étapes' from Rigan to the site of Noksam."

8. From Bampur to Kasrkend :—

"The path described is quite suitable for the advance of an inconsiderable force—one battalion, accompanied by mountain artillery and camel train. On the passes will be required inconsiderable works for widening the path and easing the ascents and descents."

9. From Kasrkend to Chahbar :—

"The path described is perfectly suited for the advance of a small force—one battalion, with mountain artillery and camel train. There is much work to be done in improving the pass."

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Maps of Rittich's Route and the projected Railway to Chahbar.

[Not printed]

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Napier.

The Report of Colonel Rittich is of great interest as showing the far-reaching nature of Russia's schemes in Persia.

As regards the figures and estimates of the proposed lines, there is not sufficient detail to form a judgment of their value, but the estimates appear low, and the cost per verst of different lines more uniform than one would expect.

Captain Rittich travelled in Persia during or before 1900, and was at the time a subaltern in a guard infantry regiment. He was accompanied, it is believed, by an engineer and staff.

But, whatever the value of the estimate may be, one cannot ignore the possibility of such lines being constructed as are here mentioned, in view of what Russia has already accomplished, and the rapidity with which work once decided upon is carried into effect.

The line from the Trans-Caucasus Railway to Chahbar is the most prejudicial to our interests.

It is satisfactory to note on page 6 of the General Report that the Russian Government is inclined to waste money on endeavouring to improve the very bad harbour of Enzeli, in preference to carrying a line round the south-western shore of the Caspian.

But whether this latter line is made or not, it is probable that before very long Tehran will be joined to the Trans-Caucasian Railway system *viâ* Erivan, and though the line round the Caspian would be more convenient for the direct transport of troops from Europe, its construction is not essential.

If, however, the Russians succeed in making a railway across Persia from Tehran as far as Bam, along the Tehran-Chahbar route, which lies parallel to the general trend of the mountains, and must therefore be quite a feasible line for a railway, they will be able to construct a branch line from Bam to Seistan, and by this means direct and maintain an independent force against a vital point in the defences of India.

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Moreover, the line would traverse a peaceful tract of country sufficiently remote from the sea and from turbulent tribes, such as the Bakhtiaris, as to render its security a comparatively easy matter, or only to be threatened by a costly expeditionary force from the direction of the Persian Gulf.

The existence of a hostile force on a separate line of communication, operating in connection with an army on the Herat line, and a subsidiary column from Meshed, would have an immense effect. Limited as Russia is as to numbers, only by the consideration of how many men she can transport and maintain in the field by her lines of railways, such a line would enable her to bring another 100,000 men into the field, and is thus of more importance even than a line of railway from Meshed to Seistan, which would, like the Kushk branch, be dependent on the capacity of the Trans-Caspian and Orenburg Railways.

The existence of such a plan may well cause some modifications of our general policy in Persia.

If there is still a question of dividing Persia with Russia into spheres of influence, and it is recognized as impracticable for us to keep Russia permanently from obtaining an outlet to the sea by a long land frontier across Persia from west to east, it might be possible to divide Persia by a line north and south, and thus insure her railways remaining at a distance from the western frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan.

In any case, as we now have an agreement with Persia that if and when Russia is granted railway concessions in the north, we shall be given similar concessions in the south, it is advisable that we should, without delay, carry out the necessary surveys, and decide exactly what concessions we require.

Otherwise, we may have to demand a line in haste that we do not know, or find Russia granted a concession right across Persia while we are considering the matter.

(Signed) H. D. NAPIER, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*
Military Attaché.

St. Petersburgh, November 20, 1903.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 3446 F. D.—7-3-04. 00. J. E. F.

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

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Extract from a letter No. 185, dated 10th December 1903, from Major Sykes, His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman, to Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, received with a letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 244 of 1903, dated Bushire, the 31st December 1903.

In conclusion, I would state that, in my opinion, the best line for a railway in South-East Persia would be from some point on the coast near Minab. It would then be carried cross Rudbar to the Gishu Pass and Narmashir. From Narmashir, one branch would run north to Seistan and the other would follow the alignment of the Central Persia Telegraph line to Bam, Darzin, Neibid, Mahun, and Kerman. In fact, it would run through an ideal country across Central Persia.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 3446 F. D.—7-3-04.—00.—R. B.

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

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(Received on the 1st February 1904 with Political Secretary's letter No. 3, dated the 15th January 1904.)

Enclosure in Foreign Office covering letter of 23rd December 1903.

Mr. Spring-Rice to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

No. 415.

St. Petersburgh,
1st December 1903.

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that, according to a statement published in the Press, the Budget for 1904 of the Ministry of Ways and Communications contains the following grants for new constructions :—

Podolsk-Sedlitz Railway (420 miles, to be finished 1st September 1905—total cost 8·4 million sterling), £2,300,000.

Bologoe-Polotsk Railway (303 miles, to be finished 1st January 1906—total cost £5,630,000), £1,030,000.

North section of Orenburg-Tashkent Railway (total cost of section £6,460,000 to be finished 1st July 1905), £1,580,000.

Southern section of Orenburg-Tashkent Railway (550 miles—total cost £6,100,000), £1,580,000.

Commencement of St. Petersburgh-Petrozavodsk Railway (160 miles, to be finished 1st October 1906), £470,000.

Alexandropol-Erivan to Persian frontier (110 miles), £520,000.

Commencement of Perm-Catherinburg-Kurgan Railway (480 miles), £540,000.

I have, &c.,
C. Spring-Rice.

(Received on the 8th February 1904 with Political Secretary's letter No. 4, dated the 22nd January 1904.)

Enclosure in Foreign Office covering letter of 15th January 1904.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

No. 11.
(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburgh,
14th January 1904.

My despatch No. 396.

Russian Road Company authorised to borrow 5,000,000 roubles for construction of port at Enzeli and road from Kazvin to Hamadan.

Foreign Office Press—No. 545—7·3·04—30.

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

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(Received on the 14th March 1904 under cover of a letter from His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran, No. 4, dated the 6th February 1904.)

No. 10.

My Lord, 22nd January 1904.

In obedience to the instructions contained in Your Lordship's despatch No. 107 of 12th November 1903, I addressed a note to the Persian Government, copy of which I have the honour to enclose, asking for particulars as to the conditions attaching to the contingent right stated to have been granted to Russia to construct harbour works at Enzeli.

I have the honour to transmit, herewith, a translation of the reply I have received from the Mushir-ed-Dowleh to the effect that no permission has been granted to Russia to construct wharfs or warehouses at Enzeli, but that the Enzeli-Kazvin Road Company will be allowed to dredge the mouth of the lagoon.

The Mushir-ed-Dowleh also informed me verbally that the same Company would construct a breakwater at Enzeli, in order to render the landing of passengers and goods possible in bad weather.

I have, &c.,
E. M. GRANT DUFF.

The Marquess of Lansdowne, K.G.,
&c., &c., &c.

Tehran
11th December 1903.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have received a despatch from His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, instructing me to make enquiries of the Persian Government as to the conditions attaching to the contingent right stated to have been granted to Russia to construct harbour works at Enzeli.

I should be much obliged if Your Excellency would kindly furnish me with the information desired by His Lordship.

I avail, &c.,
E. M. GRANT DUFF.

His Excellency the Mushir-ed-Dowleh.

(*Translation.*)

Tehran,
21st January 1904.

I have received your note of 11th December, respecting the question asked by His Excellency the British Foreign Secretary as to the rights given to the Russians for the construction of a harbour at Enzeli.

In reply, I have the honour to state that no permission has been given to the Russians by the Persian Government for harbour works at Enzeli, such as wharfs, warehouses, and such buildings, but permission has been granted to the Enzeli-Kazvin Road Company for the dredging of the mouth of the lagoon.

(Seal of the Mushir-ed-Dowleh.)

E. M. Grant Duff, Esq.,
&c., &c., &c.

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(Received on the 21st March 1904, with the Political Secretary's letter No. 10, dated the 4th March 1904.)

No. 1.

Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

No. 11. (Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburgh, 14th January 1904.

Authority has been given to the Russian Road Company to raise a loan of 5,000,000 roubles for the construction of a road from Hamadan to Kazvin, and for the construction of a port at Enzeli.

See my despatch No. 396 of the 23rd November 1903.

(Received on the 28th March 1904, with the Political Secretary's letter No. 11, dated the 11th March 1904.)

No. 1.

Lieutenant-Colonel Maunsell to Sir N. O'Conor.

No. 1.

London, 9th January 1904.

Sir,

Having read Mr. Spring-Rice's despatch No. 396, St. Petersburgh, 23rd November last, with enclosures, giving published extracts of suggestions made by certain Russian engineers for railways in Persia, I should like to be permitted to forward some remarks on this subject so far as concerns the districts near the Turko-Persian frontier.

The proposal for a railway in West Persia, most in favour with these engineers, appears to be that from Shahtakht on the Araxes to Tabreez by Khoi (Hóy) and Dilman, the direct route by Julfa being represented as more difficult.

I have traced this route on the accompanying map,* and it will be noticed that by making a southerly bend through Dilman, it was probably intended to tap the trade of the fertile districts along the western shore of Lake Urmia, if not to make a branch to that town itself.

Connected with this also, it is interesting to note that south of Lake Urmia, along the Lesser Zab Valley lies the easiest route from North-West Persia to the Tigris Valley.

From Urmia the country along the lake shore as far as Sulduz is quite easy for railway construction, and thence a low pass leads into the head of the Lesser Zab Valley. The general direction of this valley can be traversed until the Tigris Plain is reached, when the country lies open either to Baghdad or Mosul.

Along almost the whole length of the Turko-Persian frontier runs a line of lofty intricate mountains across which a railway from Persia into Turkey could only be carried at prohibitive expense. The only feasible point for such a line to cross the frontier is through the break in the long line of hills formed by the Lesser Zab. The continuity of the line of frontier hills is broken here by the two plains of Rania and Pishder, both traversed by the Zab, which extend as a sort of wedge up to the frontier and afford an easy passage for railway construction.

To cross the low range on the actual frontier the valley of the Wazna stream could be utilized, until the wide plain of Lahjan where the Zab has its source, is reached.

* Not printed.

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I was Vice-Consul at Van when those Russian engineers were surveying various routes in West Persia, and they then explored all the country round the head waters of the Lesser Zab in Persia, and no doubt the natural advantages of this route as a line of through traffic from North-West Persia to the Tigris Valley, was apparent to them.

I would suggest, therefore, that the course as the line as drawn to Dilman may mean that there is some ultimate plan of extending it to Urmia, or into the Tigris Valley.

I have also drawn on the accompanying map* the proposed trace of the Baghdad Railway, and in dotted lines shown how a branch line would run up the Lesser Zab Valley to Urmia, and attract the trade of the extremely fertile districts round the lake towards the sea by another route, either westward to the Mediterranean, or southward to the Persian Gulf.

There is no trade route at present along this Zab Valley route from North-West Persia to Baghdad owing to the constant inter-tribal quarrels of the large confederation of Bilbass Kurds who occupy the frontier districts along the river and prevent caravans passing.

Notwithstanding this artificial obstruction it would appear that this route, as an outlet for the trade of West Persia, cannot always remain neglected, and must eventually become of great importance especially in competition with routes leading northwards into Russian territory.

As regards the strategical advantages of such a line, it would entirely depend on who seized the initiative in building it. If the Russians did so, they would gain a great advantage, giving them the foothold they desire in the Tigris Valley on the way to the Persian Gulf.

If the railway were made from the south it would afford a means of checking Russian ambitions in North-West and West Persia, and prevent the absorption by her of this, the most fertile part of Persia.

I have, &c.

F. R. MAUNSELL, *Lieut.-Col.*,
Military Attaché.

(Received on the 28th March 1904, with the Political Secretary's letter No. 11, dated the 11th March 1904.)

No. 1.

Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

No. 18. St. Petersburgh,
My Lord, 15th January 1904.

With reference to Mr. Spring-Rice's despatch No. 396 of the 23rd November 1903, I have the honour to enclose herewith translation from the "Official Messenger" of the 30th December 1903, relating to the issue of privileged shares for the construction of a port at Enzeli on the Caspian Sea and of a road from Kazvin to Hamadan.

I have, &c.,
CHARLES C. SCOTT.

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* Not printed.

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Enclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the “ Official Messenger ” of 30th December 1903.

(Translation.)

Permission granted to the Enzeli-Tehran Road Company to issue an additional series of privileged shares.

For the purpose of improving the Enzeli-Tehran road, and of constructing the port of Enzeli, as well as of making the carriage roads to the shore of Enzeli Bay and from Kazvin to Hamadan, the Enzeli-Tehran Road Company are permitted to issue further privileged shares to a sum of 5,481,000 roubles, which shares are to bear the same privileges and advantages as the first issue of the 5th July 1902. The shares can only be owned by Russian and Persian subjects.

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

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Extract from Reuter, Bombay, dated the 3rd April 1904.

* * * * * * * *

Russian Minister of Finance has decided to acquire five million roubles of preference shares in Enzeli-Tehran Railway Company and 11,875,000 roubles of shares in Discount and Loan Bank of Persia, both amounts nominal.

* * * * * * * *

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

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

(198)

TEHRAN;

February 23rd, 1904.

No. 33.

MY LORD,

I have had the honour to receive Your Lordship's Despatch No. 2 of the 13th ultimo respecting the Boital Concession for a railway from Tehran to the Persian Gulf. With reference to this scheme, I would venture to observe that a copy of the Concession was sent to Your Lordship's predecessor in his Despatch No. 82-Confidential of July 25th, 1900, by Mr. Spring-Rice, and formed the subject of two despatches from myself in the succeeding year, No. 110 of July 12th, and No. 132 of August 28th, 1901. With reference to the statement made in the latter of these despatches, as to the acquisition of a share in the Concession by Baron Kolicher, I may mention that the Baron is, I am informed, on his way back to Persia, in connection with other claims against the Persian Government, and we may therefore before long hear more of the rights which he asserts himself to have acquired from M. Boital.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

(Sd.) A. H. HARDINGE.

The Marquess of Lansdowne, K.G.,

etc., etc., etc.,

Foreign Office.

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

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OFFICE MEMORANDUM (Very Confidential.)

No. 1586-F.B., dated Simla, the 20th April 1904.

From—E. H. S. CLARKE, Esq., C.I.E., Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Assistant Quarter Master General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the papers noted in the accompanying list is forwarded confidentially to the Intelligence Branch for information, in continuation of the endorsement from the Foreign Department No. 95-F.B., (Confidential), dated the 8th January 1904.

Enclosure in Political Secretary's letter No. 53, dated the 18th December 1903, *viz.*, from Mr. Spring-Rice to the Marquess of Lansdowne, No. 396 (Secret), dated the 23rd November 1903 (with enclosures).

Extract from a letter from Major P. M. Sykes, C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman, No. 185, dated the 10th December 1903.

Enclosure in Political Secretary's letter No. 3, dated the 15th January 1904, *viz.*, from Mr. Spring-Rice to the Marquess of Lansdowne, No. 415, dated the 1st December 1903.

Enclosure in letter from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 4, dated the 6th February 1904, *viz.*, from E. M. Grant Duff, Esq., to the Marquess of Lansdowne, No. 10, dated the 22nd January 1904, with enclosure.

Enclosure in Political Secretary's letter No. 10, dated the 4th March 1904, *viz.*, telegram from Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Lansdowne, No. 11, dated the 14th January 1904.

Enclosure in Political Secretary's letter No. 11, dated the 11th March 1904, *viz.*, from Lieutenant-Colonel Maunsell to Sir N. O'Conor, dated the 9th January 1904.

Enclosure in Political Secretary's letter No. 11, dated the 11th March 1904, *viz.*, from Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Lansdowne, No. 18, dated the 15th January 1904, with enclosure.

Extract from Reuter's telegram dated the 3rd April 1904.

Enclosure in letter from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 9, dated the 5th March 1904, *viz.*, from Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne, No. 33, dated the 23rd February 1904.

NOTE.—A printed copy of the above correspondence up to the extract from Reuter's telegram has already been supplied informally to the Intelligence Branch, together with a printed copy of office notes on the subject.

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

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PERSIA AND ARABIA. [July 11.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 15.

No. 1.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 117. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Gulahek, June 21, 1904.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of correspondence which has passed between the Persian Government and myself regarding the alleged arrival of a British detachment and of 400 loaded camels in Seistan by "an unusual route."

I have little doubt that the reference is to Colonel MacMahon's reliefs, plus the Meshed escort, and the Ain-ed-Dowleh, when I mentioned this to him on the 18th instant, admitted that the telegram of the 26th May, on which the Persian Government's note was based, had been sent by the Russian Consul in Seistan.

In discussing the matter with me, both his Highness and the Mushir-ed-Dowleh referred, whilst implying that they did not themselves share it, to the Shah's extreme sensitiveness about Seistan, and to the suspicions respecting our unfriendly designs there, which the Russians never lost an opportunity of instilling into His Majesty's mind.

The Russian Legation lately addressed a Memorandum to the Persian Government, a copy of which I have the honour to inclose, warning it that His Majesty's Government was instigating the Afghans to take advantage of Russia's embarrassments in the Far East in order to occupy Seistan and divide it with them; and the Cossack Colonel told me a few days ago that he had been assured that I was negotiating with the Ain-ed-Dowleh, with a view to securing, in return for a subsidy to Persia, her acquiescence in these arrangements. On my asking whether he really considered it worth his while to report such absurd stories to his Government, Colonel Tchernozouboff observed that such a policy on our part was quite conceivable, and that many Russians thought their Government had been mistaken in not taking advantage of our troubles in South Africa to seize Herat. Some of the Russian Agents here have been wrought up by the incidents of the war to such a nervous and excitable state that they credit any sensational rumour respecting our intentions in the Middle East, and their recent warnings to the Persians spring perhaps as much from a genuine uneasiness on the subject as from a deliberate adherence to their now long-practiced system of exciting Persian suspicions against us.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Note from the Mushir-ed-Dowleh to Sir A. Hardinge, dated June 16, 1904.

(Translation.)

ACCORDING to a telegraphic report, a copy of which is herewith inclosed for your information, and which has been submitted to His Imperial Majesty the Shah, 400 loaded camels, escorted by 100 riflemen, have arrived at the camp of the Commissioners from India by a route on which they were not seen by the Customs authorities. It is clear to your Excellency's enlightened mind that such measures on the part of the English officials, whose desire is the maintenance of peace and order, are matters of great surprise, because, firstly, they must not have entered where there are no customs-houses; secondly, that the entry of 100 armed men without any special permission is against usage, and therefore not permissible; thirdly, that they have not observed the quarantine Regulations, and have violated the Government arrangements.

Being convinced that these proceedings are entirely against your wish, I feel sure that you will send telegraphic orders to let the loads be examined by the local Customs officials, and that if the horsemen have come to relieve the escort of the Commissioner, the men who are to return will return for certain with the knowledge of

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the Persian officials; and you should also send instruction to the proper authorities that in future they should not take such steps, which are inconsistent with the maintenance of peace and order, so that no difficulty may arise.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Telegram from Seistan, dated May 26, 1904.

TWO weeks ago 400 camel loads from India have arrived at the camp of the Britith Commissioner at Khajeh Ahmed, 6 farsakhs from here; about 100 riflemen escorted the loads, and have entered by a route by which the Customs officials did not see them.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh.

Your Excellency, *Gulahek, June 18, 1904.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's note of to-day's date respecting the reported arrival of 400 loaded camels and 100 riflemen from India in Seistan by an unusual route.

I have no information myself on this subject, and I am disposed to regard the report as one of the recurrent sensational rumours, such as the recent one about Afghan reinforcements having been sent to Chakansur and Lash Gavain, which are regularly fabricated in order to alarm the Persian Government and create suspicions and ill-feeling against that of His Majesty the King-Emperor.

As your Excellency is aware, these numerous reports have nearly always proved on inquiry to be pure inventions, and the British Commission has throughout loyally observed the arrangement by which its escort was to remain in the immediate neighbourhood of the frontier, and not to enter Seistan proper.

I have, however, telegraphed to Colonel Macmahon to inquire if he can explain the origin of this latest story, and if there is any foundation for it. I will acquaint you without delay of his reply.

In the meantime, it occurs to me as possible that the men referred to may be the reliefs or treasure-guards for whom I obtained special permission at the end of March from the Persian Government to come to the mission camp by way of Kuhak, instead of by the ordinary but more circuitous route of Kuh-i-malik-i-siah. These men arrived, I believe, a little more than a month ago, so that the date of their arrival coincides with that given in the telegram inclosed in your Excellency's note.

If this be correct, then, as the Yamin-i-Nizam is aware of the facilities given to these escorts, the telegram cannot be from him, and is probably from the Russian Consul in Seistan. Perhaps your Excellency will kindly inform me if this conjecture is correct, and, if not, by whom the telegram of the 26th May was sent.

I note, however, in your Excellency's communication under reply a statement that the riflemen and camelmen in question "have violated the quarantine arrangements," and I would be grateful for further explanations on this point. I have no knowledge of any quarantine arrangements in Seistan against India, and their imposition would indeed be contrary to the provisions of the Venice Convention, to which Persia is a Signatory. I am aware that a Russian force has established itself in Central Khorassan for quarantine purposes, and that its proceedings have been objected to by the Persian and British Governments, and have indeed necessitated the establishment of a British Consular officer and guard at Turbat-i-Haidari; but there can be no question of quarantine in Seistan, and I should wish, in transmitting a copy of your Excellency's last note to the Government of India, to dispel any doubt on this subject.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

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Secret Russo-Persian Agreement (201)
in 1898 or 1899

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

Memorandum addressed by the Russian Legation to the Persian Government about June 16, 1904.

THE Amir of Bokhara and our troops in Turkestan can cope with the Afghans, but the Hashmat-ul-Mulk with two untrained regiments of soldiers and cavalry cannot hold his own against 20,000 well-trained Afghans.

Although the Russian Government has made an undertaking towards the Persian Government to assist them with the necessary number of troops in the event of foreign aggression to protect Persia from invasion by a foe, and at the same time the Persian Government has undertaken to send forty regiments to assist us at whatever point necessary, and although the Russian Government now requires every soldier they possess, yet they do not now require the military assistance of the Persian Government, but, on the contrary, see the necessity of assisting Persia.

We warn the Persian Government seriously, in view of our friendship, that the Ameer of Afghanistan, pushed by the British, is about to advance upon Seistan and to annex Seistan and Baluchistan, and afterwards they will make a division between them. This plan has been in the minds of the British for a long time, but they were unable to carry out their projects on account of the vigilance and power of the Russian Government.

The Hashmat-ul-Mulk, who is with the Sepahsalar, will arrive in Tehran in three or four days, and should be well received by the Government, which should treat both him and his sons well, by showing them marks of favour, in order that they should have confidence in the support of their Government, and he should be sent back to Seistan "Chappari" without delay. For the present the Asef-ed-Dowleh* should be ordered to send as soon as possible twenty regiments and as many sowars of Khorassan, Bujnurd, Kuchan, and Timuri as is possible. Although the movement of troops during the heat of summer is very difficult, the same consideration must be in the mind of the Ameer of Afghanistan. Until the Persian Government has made the necessary arrangements for the dispatch of these troops, the hottest weather will have passed. It is well known that the Hashmat-ul-Mulk is at heart favourable to the British, but he must know that if an enemy encroaches upon Seistan his presence there will no longer be possible; and in view of his own interests, and to protect his own home, he will have to make the most strenuous efforts possible.

If the Persian Government shows any weakness at this juncture, and leaves the frontier unguarded by troops, it will be as if they had voluntarily delivered up Khorassan to their enemies.

If there should be any delay in sending the troops on account of want of money, the Imperial Government will give orders to the Banque d'Escompte to hold the sum of 500,000 roubles (50,000*l.*) at the disposal of the Government; and had the Russian Government not been themselves involved in war, they would have been prepared to pay the whole cost of the dispatch of these troops, and, as it is, the Imperial Legation will do all it can to assist the Persian Government, and with this object last week 1,000 batmans of flour were sent to Meshed from Bakou and Ashkabad from the people of Russia to those of Khorassan to save them from famine.

Regarding the dispatch of troops towards Seistan we will not press the matter more than we have done, since it can be of no particular importance to us. The danger to yourselves may come from two or three places, one of which is Quetta in India, against which you should be on your guard, and this is the last point we wish to make.

We hope to receive your answer within five days.

Note.—This Memorandum has been communicated by a confidential informant in a position of trust under the Persian Government, and having access to secret papers, and its authenticity may, in my opinion, be relied on.

It is of interest as indirectly confirming the impression, which has long existed, that a secret understanding was come to in 1898 or 1899 for mutual assistance in certain contingencies between the Russian and Persian Governments.

A. H. H.

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* Governor-General of Khorassan.

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

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

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REGISTERED No. A. 1.

Persian Trade Jan 21 1905

1905. NO. 13661.

are called strong measures. To M. Waldeck-Rousseau fell the task of restoring the French Army to a sense of its proper relationship to the State and the People; to M. Combes was allotted the even more difficult work of taming the truculence of a priesthood which at several periods of its history had shown as little respect for the authority of the Pope himself as it had displayed animosity of the most virulent type towards the Third Republic and all its works. But the fate of M. Combes proves—as Mr. Gladstone found in regard to the Church of England—that Disestablishment, which had been on the cards in France since 1869 (when Gambetta first mentioned it in his election address of that year) is a weapon as dangerous to those who use it as it may be to those against whom it is directed. M. Combes was accused of priest-baiting, and rather liked to "torment the parsons," but his victims have triumphed over him in the end, although after the recent debates and votes in the Chamber of Deputies it is tolerably certain that the days of the Church Establishment in France are strictly numbered.

THERE HAS BEEN PUBLISHED RECENTLY AT Teheran an official paper which will be read with rather sad eyes by those who realise how easily a great opportunity may be lost, and how quick England's rivals are to take advantage of the openings furnished by her neglect. This document gives the statistics of the commerce of Persia for the financial year ended the 20th March last, and the pith of it may be summarised in the statement that of a total trade in imports and exports amounting to £11,633,000, Russia is credited with £6,186,000. Put in another form the figures are even more striking. The total exports were valued at £4,633,000 and of this but £384,000 was British, whilst the share of Russia equalled no less than £2,827,000. Allowing for the contiguity of frontiers this disparity is remarkable, and prepares us for the preponderance of Russian interests also in the import trade. Out of a total under this head of £7,000,000 for the year, Russia did £3,359,000 and Great Britain only £2,334,000. There is, however, a melancholy satisfaction in the reflection that other nations are miles behind us. Thus the total value of Persian trade with Turkey was £840,000; with France, £746,000; with Austria-Hungary, £220,000; with Afghanistan, £186,000; with Italy, £146,000; with the United States, £128,000; with Germany, £111,000; and with other countries, £352,000. From these results we would appear to be a very good second. Some explanation of the success of Russia is afforded by the report of the British Consul-General at Ispahan who, dealing with the trade of his own district for the last three years, says that cotton goods form the main staple of the import trade and the market in them has been much disturbed by reason of an influx of Russian cottons, which had been imported to Bushire from Odessa and, failing to find a market on the coast, were sent inland and sold for what they would fetch to save re-shipment home. Apart from this, however, the trade of the district in Russian cottons is increasing; and quite recently a firm of soda manufacturers has established an agency in Ispahan and another Russian firm has done the same. "Owing to the assistance they get from the Russian Government," adds the Consul-General "in drawbacks, special railway steamer rates, and money facilities from the Russian Bank, these firms are able to sell their goods here at Moscow prices, and it is not to be wondered at that in light printed cotton and fancy goods they are able to compete with our goods. In the last two years, as far as I can gather from very imperfect information, the Russian imports have increased some eight to ten-fold. The advent of the representatives of these two Russian houses has practically stamped out the small Armenian trader as an importer of Russian cotton good." Yet our authority is not despondent as to the British trade in Manchester goods, for he states that "Russia competes to an appreciable extent in Turkeyred twills and general printed goods, yet with all the assistance given to them, they cannot touch Manchester in heavy white and grey goods, and if we could but develop a quicker and cheaper transport service we should be placed in a position to fight the opposition with fair prospects of success here, and even with hopes of regaining some of our lost trade in the northern markets."

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

2 THE

THE BODO PROBLEM.—A recent copy of the *Athenæum* contained a three-column review of the volumes of the Linguistic Survey dealing with Bihari, Oriya, and the Tibeto-Burmese languages. And the first glance shows us one of the standing difficulties of Indian trans-literation. The reviewer (or the printer) tells us of the "Birā, or Bodo, languages." Now ā is the symbol commonly used to represent the Italian a, and it is plain that a word could not well be Birā and Bodo, unless the phonetic changes of Eastern India are different from those with which we are more familiar. As a matter of fact, Dr. Grierson uses the symbol á (misprinted ā in the *Athenæum*) to represent a sound approaching the au in "pauper," and it was this sound which Brian Hodgson represented by o in the word, first written in European characters by him as Bodo. Perhaps it would have been better to have retained the familiar "Bodo" till M. Passy or some other professor of phonetics had evolved a fairly complete phonetic alphabet. What the reviewer says about Bihari and Oriya is sound enough, being for the most part a rapid summary of Dr. Grierson's conclusions. What Dr. Grierson does not know about Bihari, if there is anything he does not know, is not worth knowing. What he says of Oriya script is described by the reviewer as a way of ingeniously accounting for the fact that the character appears at first sight to be entirely composed of curves. Dr. Grierson would be the first to say that an ancient and obvious explanation of a well-known peculiarity is neither ingenious nor his own. For the rest the archaic features of the Oriya grammar are attributed, in accordance with Dr. Grierson's views, to the historical and geographical isolation of Orissa. Let us cheerfully admit that Oriya has primitive features, and that Orissa, to some extent, was and is isolated. It is possible that the two facts are related as cause and effect. The alleged absence of dialects in Oriya may be due, to suggest an even more plausible explanation, to the fact that the language is not fully known. Our impression is that when an Oriya bearer comes from Puri, his tongue betrays him to one who hails from Balasore. But it is when we come to the critic's account of the Tibeto-Burman volume that we feel that he has missed a real opportunity. He says indeed that "to the philosophical student of human speech these languages will probably be more interesting than those of more advanced and cultivated races." That is putting a problem of singular interest in a very vague and shapeless form, and almost implies that all primitive languages, as such, are more interesting than the developed and articulate speech of civilised races, which is demonstrably untrue. We shall presently attempt to show wherein the true interest of the Tibeto-Burmese language consists. But it must be noted in passing that the manner in which the Tibeto-Burmese volume has been compiled is not very happily described. The reviewer says that "in dealing with this part of his task Dr. Grierson has had to rely" (*dura egestas!*) "on books written and data supplied by local officers and missionaries, to whom he most fully and particularly acknowledges his obligations." As a matter of fact Dr. Grierson edited, and (so far as was possible) collated, contributions which were, in every sense, a labour of love. Under the circumstances, acknowledgment of such contributions could hardly be too hearty or too full. The solitary example of such contributions which is quoted is not a very happy one or very interesting. In Mikir, it seems, the Biblical phrase "a certain man had two sons" runs "one person child-male persons-two were." This is given as part of Sir Charles Lyall's contribution. It reminds one of the familiar jokes about "English as she is spoke." Literal translations have their dangers. They do not adequately represent idioms, they may when applied to languages so close to our own as French and German give a false and absurd impression that the idioms are childish and illogical. Accent, tone, vocal gesture disappear, and these are often more important than the inflexions to which we Europeans attach an exaggerated importance because we were nurtured on Greek and Latin.

But what is the importance and the interest of Dr. Grierson's volume on the Tibeto-Burman languages? The *Athenæum* says that these languages "are principally spoken in the east of India." Now some at least of them are principally spoken in Burma, and their interest lies in the fact that no one yet has solved the question how much further languages of the same type extend into the Further East. Ethnologically, as Logan pointed out fifty years ago, the people who speak these languages in Assam are akin to the Dyaks and Malays. They resemble them in appearance, in costume, and in many customs, such as the habit of taking heads in warfare, which are not Indian customs. In Assam the tribes in question are becoming rapidly Indianised and Hinduised, are losing their national costume (which in many cases consists in a total disuse of dress properly so-called), their language, their religion, if religion it can

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Notes

SEISTAN SERIES.

Part V.

1

EXTRACT FROM THE DIARY OF COLONEL A. H. McMAHON, C.S.I., C.I.E., BRITISH COMMISSIONER, SEISTAN ARBITRATION COMMISSION, FOR THE PERIOD ENDING THE 16TH SEPTEMBER 1904.

Communicates, with remarks, his intention of commencing the demarcation of the straight line to Koh-i-Malik Siah.

Dated Seistan, the 25th September 1904.

From—COLONEL A. H. McMAHON, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission,

To—L. W. DANE, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I send you herewith a memorandum on the Seistan water question and four draft awards.

I trust that one or other will suit the case from the point of view of the Government of India.

In framing an award it is quite as important to know what to omit as what to insert.

If questions arise in the consideration of my drafts which require further explanation or information from me, you might perhaps let me know by telegram, for, as you can understand, I am very anxious to have the award settled up and ready for delivery as soon as demarcation work is finished.

I have commenced pillar building on the straight line to Koh-i-Malik Siah. Want of water makes it a difficult job.

P. S.—If printed, kindly let me have four copies of the memorandum and drafts.

2

FROM COLONEL A. H. McMAHON, C.S.I., C.I.E., BRITISH COMMISSIONER, SEISTAN ARBITRATION COMMISSION, No. 2407, DATED THE 25TH SEPTEMBER (RECEIVED 5TH OCTOBER) 1904.

Forwards a memorandum on the Seistan water question, together with four draft awards thereon, for consideration.

Colonel McMahon has now submitted his long-expected memorandum on the Seistan water question. It is very complete, and admirably calculated to enable the Government of India to form an opinion. The principal papers to be read with it are Colonel McMahon's demi-official letter of the 28th October 1903, Mr. Dane's note of 13th November 1903, Lord Curzon's note of 6th January 1904, and the demi-official reply to Colonel McMahon of 8th January 1904.

Secret F., March 1904, Nos. 3-127, page 14 of notes.
Ibid., pages 19-21 of notes.
Ibid., page 30 of notes.

Colonel McMahon submits four different drafts of the water award for consideration, and leaves the Government of India to decide which is best suited to meet the political aspects of the case. Without giving any lengthy note in support of my view, I venture to vote in the most whole-hearted way for draft D, which seems to me to be a thoroughly fair settlement, and in full accord with the spirit of the Goldsmid award, and the Secretary of State's authoritative ruling of 1873 regarding canals The Government of India have already, in the correspondence cited above, demi-officially approved of Colonel McMahon's proposal to include in his award the necessity for the permanent appointment of a British irrigation officer in Seistan to prevent future disputes. A clause to this effect is accordingly included in each draft: it is the clause which, in my opinion, is most likely to be objected to by both Persia (instigated by Russia) and Afghanistan; it is, however, one to which we attach great importance; and, as we cannot hope to give an award which will be accepted without demur by both sides, I submit that we should not attempt to get through with one which would leave matters practically in their present condition, and is only likely to prove of a temporary nature, but that we should "tackle the real difficulties of the question", and by accepting draft D do our best to meet them.

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For convenience of reference, I have pasted together a copy of draft D complete in itself, which will obviate reference to the other drafts, as is at present necessary from the way in which Colonel McMahon has submitted them in order to avoid repetition of some of the paragraphs which are the same in all.

Against paragraph 4 of the preliminary remarks, Colonel McMahon points out that it represents actual facts, but has the defect of "calling a spade a spade", and he suggests that it may be thought desirable to modify or omit it. I think it will be desirable to define the spade as a shovel, and not to insert in a document which will have to be presented to Persia and Afghanistan, and to appear in a Blue Book, so unmistakeable a reference to Russian intrigue. In place of Colonel McMahon's paragraph 4, preliminary remarks, which I would omit, I would insert the following sentence, running it on to paragraph 5, which would then become paragraph 4 :—

"Unfortunately of recent years, whatever may have been the cause, the amicable and mutual settlement of water difficulties has been found to be no longer possible. A series of small, and in themselves, &c.".

I would say "whether due to the change in the course of the main stream in 1896 or more strained relations".

L. W. Dane,—16-10-04.

Now please read the alternative drafts of paragraph 8, which I have placed one following the other in draft D. I prefer the second alternative paragraph, *i.e.*, the one which Colonel McMahon originally drafted for his award B, but think that the wording may be slightly altered. This draft says that in 1873 the Secretary of State laid down as follows :—"In our opinion, the clause referred to in the award, &c.". The use of the inverted commas suggests that these were the words of the Secretary of State. As a fact, they are the words of the Government of India in their despatch No. 74, dated 15th September 1873 (page 77 of Plowden's Précis). The Secretary of State in his despatch No. 11 of 5th December 1873 merely accepted the Government of India's interpretation. I would therefore let the sentence run —

Secret, April 1874, Nos. 1-6.

"His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in his capacity as the final confirming authority of that award, further laid down in 1873 that the foregoing clause could not be understood as applying either to existing canals or to such old and disused canals as the Afghan Government might wish to put in proper repair, &c."

The alteration is only verbal but it is well to be strictly accurate in a matter of this sort.

I have no further criticisms to offer. The question now arises, how are we to proceed in connection with this draft water award. Should we authorise Colonel McMahon to announce it directly he has finished demarcating, or should we first submit it to the Secretary of State for his views? If the award did not contain the clause about the appointment of a British irrigation officer as permanent arbitrator in Seistan, we need not have hesitated to allow His Britannic Majesty's Commissioner to announce his award right away whenever convenient. But this appointment, which is of the very essence of the award, ought, I think, to be put first to the Secretary of State. (A copy of the whole of Colonel McMahon's letter No. 2407 of 25th September 1904 went to the India Office on the 13th October.) If the Secretary of State approves, we have still to get the concurrence of Persia and Afghanistan, but this would not be until after the award is delivered. As long as no question is raised about the two States bearing the cost of the irrigation officer (see my telegram to Foreign Secretary in camp, dated 19th November 1903), it may be that Persia will not make very much opposition to the award. Opposition must, of course, be looked for from the Amir. If we were, by letter, to send the award to His Highness and invite his acceptance of it, the probabilities are that he would hold out at least a year. It will be remembered that he has not yet sent instructions to his representative in Seistan, which allow of his commencing demarcation. Should we permit our Mission to be detained indefinitely while we await His Highness's pleasure?

Page 22 of notes in Secret F., March 1904, Nos. 3-127.

My suggestion is that we telegraph at once to Secretary of State the main features of the award—this can be done quite briefly—refer to the proposed appointment of the irrigation engineer, and invite concurrence.* This is the only point on which it seems to me necessary to obtain the previous approval of His Majesty's Government. The rest lies in the hands of the arbitrator. If Secretary of State approves, Colonel McMahon can announce his award whenever it suits his convenience to do so, and this, we know, will not be until after demarcation is concluded.

* We should repeat to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

If the Mission comes off this winter, we may hope that, before it starts, Colonel McMahon may be in a position to give the water award. In that event it should be one of the duties of the British Envoy to explain the award to the Amir and obtain his written acceptance. This promises a much more satisfactory result than putting the case before His Highness by letter from India. So important, indeed, do I think it that the British Envoy should be in a position to explain the case to the Amir, that, if Colonel McMahon has not concluded demarcation before the Mission starts, I would instruct him to deliver the water award irrespective of demarcation, even though he has consistently declared his intention not to do so, and then leave the British Envoy to obtain the Amir's concurrence. I do not suggest that the Envoy should explain matters to the Amir until the award has been delivered, as that seems unadvisable.

E. H. S. Clarke,—13-10-04.

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Dated Simla, the 13th October 1904.

From—E. H. S. Clarke, Esq., C.I.E, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C I E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission.

In compliance with the request contained in your demi-official letter, dated the 25th September 1904, I send you, herewith, four printed copies of your official letter No. 2407, dated the 25th September 1904, about the Seistan water question.

2a

Memorandum to the India Office, London, showing that a copy of Colonel McMahon's letter No 2407, dated the 25th September 1904, was forwarded, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of Foreign Secretary's letter No. 41 M., dated the 13th October 1904.

Colonel McMahon's report and the maps of Seistan prepared by him will enable Your Excellency to understand this complicated dispute.

I am afraid, however, that I do not quite agree with his obvious desire to settle questions of future extensions of irrigation, and to placate the Persians. Under Goldsmid's award the only restriction upon the action of the Afghans was that "no works are to be carried out on either side calculated to interfere with the requisite supply of water for irrigation on both banks of the Helmand". The Afghans at once raised a question as to the meaning of this condition which they saw might interfere with their free use of the water up stream, and the Government of India gave the ruling quoted in the draft award. The Secretary of State consulted General Goldsmid, who expressed concurrence in their interpretation of his award, and this interpretation was then accepted by His Majesty's Government. The fact that General Goldsmid was so consulted should certainly be brought out in the award, as I have done on the margin of the draft.

Paragraph 69 of Plowden's Précis.

There is nothing in the award to show that the Afghans were to be required to allow the Persians to construct channels through Afghan territory above the Band-i-Kohak, and I am inclined to think that the award can only be interpreted to mean that, while the Afghans were free to make any works they chose above that point, they must allow a sufficient amount of water to pass down for existing Persian irrigation. This is in accordance with common practice and common sense. An independent State owning both banks of a river owns the water in that river and, though, as in this case, it may be compelled by an arbitral decision under a treaty to respect existing rights of irrigation enjoyed by a down stream riparian State, it can hardly be contended that it is compelled to restrict its use of the water of its river to allow of extensions of irrigation by the down stream State by channels dug through its own territory. Besides, I gather that, from the configuration of the ground, it is not possible for the Persians to extend irrigation by channels taking out below the Band-i-Kohak, unless they drain the Hamuns or swamps. I therefore propose to make further enquiries from Colonel McMahon on the point as in the demi-official telegram submitted for approval.

It is practically certain that the Amir, who is very sore about the boundary award and the giving up of Takht-i-Shah, will never agree to any provisions entitling the Persians to make a channel through Afghan territory to irrigate new lands in Persian Seistan. He does not allow the Russians to do this, and for years we have had a difference with him about an old canal in Kurram, the Liwanai canal in Kharlachi, which he steadily refuses to let us re-open through a small strip of Afghan territory. Lord Curzon's note of 6th January 1904 indicates the view that he was disposed to take on this aspect of the case. It must be remembered also that to allow extensions of irrigation in Persian Seistan is to limit the possibility of fresh canals being taken out of the Helmand higher up above Rudbar and thus to deprive the Afghans of the use of their own river. I am, therefore, disposed to hold that Colonel McMahon should confine his award to giving effect to General Goldsmid's award, as, indeed, the Persian Government stipulated should be done. All that in that case is necessary, is to make arrangements for securing a requisite supply of irrigation to both banks of the Helmand below the Kohak Band. We have now accurate maps showing what the area now irrigated is, and we know how much water is required to irrigate that area. If we are to deal liberally with the Persians, we might allow an extra supply sufficient to irrigate any areas of land at present culturable, and commanded by existing channels, or even future channels, taking out below the Kohak Band. The rest of the water would be at the disposal of the up stream State. We might take Colonel McMahon's rough approximation, and allow $\frac{1}{3}$rd of the total volume of the river to Persian Seistan, but even in that case the amount should be approximately stated in cusecs, as the Afghans might easily start a large canal higher up

Secret F., March 1904, Nos. 3-127—page 30 of notes.

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stream, and take out all the water, as we have done on the Punjab rivers, and there would be no water to divide at the Kohak Band.

To see that the Persians do get the requisite supply for irrigation, whether this is stated as ⅓rd of the total discharge in the cold weather or as a minimum quantity to prevent the risk of the Afghans taking the whole amount, an officer on the spot will be necessary, and we may endorse Colonel McMahon's recommendation to this effect.

I do not here touch upon possible schemes for development, as they are not directly affected by the case. All we have to do is to give effect to General Goldsmid's award, which requires a requisite supply for irrigation to be given to Persian Seistan, and it would, in my opinion, be dangerous to complicate the issue by referring to extensions of irrigation to Tarakun and Hauzdar, or by defining the Seistan lands to which the award applies. I would therefore merely modify award B, as I have done in pencil, omitting the second sentence of clause 2, and clauses 3 and 4, but perhaps adding after the first sentence of clause 2 words to this effect—

"Observations show that between 20th September and 20th February, when the river rapidly rises, the average discharge is cubic feet per second, so that the Persian share of the water during this period is cusecs; and in the event of the present volume being reduced by irrigation works constructed up stream, this amount should, so far as natural causes admit, be secured to Persian Seistan".

However, before pronouncing any opinion, we may perhaps await Colonel McMahon's reply to my telegram, and in the meantime the case might be seen in Public Works Department, who may perhaps be able to offer some suggestions as to the best way of giving effect to General Goldsmid's award.

L. W. Dane,—16-10-04.

The Secretary credited me with more intelligence than I possess when he said that Colonel McMahon's report and the maps would enable me to understand this complicated question. I do not understand it at all, and it is perhaps difficult for any one to understand it who has suddenly to study the whole question from the beginning instead of becoming familiar with it by slow degrees. I have no objection to the issue of the demi-official telegram which will help to elucidate the matter, but I should be obliged if the Secretary would go through the case with me and explain it to me over the maps. Public Works Department may be consulted first if the Secretary thinks fit, or else after I have got a clearer idea of the question.

A[mpthill],—16-10-04.

Issue the telegram and print up. Then send to Public Works Department. Let me know when it is going, and I will speak to Mr. Benton. We need not trouble His Excellency till we get Colonel McMahon's reply.

L. W. Dane,—17-10-04.

3

Telegram from Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S I, C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission, No. 812, dated the 10th (received 14th) October 1904.

Repeats a telegram which he has received from Sir A. Hardinge, Tehran, and his reply thereto, regarding the reported construction by Afghans of a band on the Helmand River (above Kohak).

Colonel McMahon has already informed Sir A. Hardinge that the band, about the building of which, by the Afghans, the Yamin complained to Tehran in August 1904, was only a small temporary one which, at the time of Colonel McMahon's report, was diverting only one-hundredth part of the Helmand water, and was in no way affecting the Persian supply of water at the Kohak Band. Colonel McMahon added that the matter was very trifling: it is still more so now, as he now informs Sir A. Hardinge that the river has risen, and, in doing s , has breached and overtopped the Afghan Band. No orders are necessary.

J. W. E.,—14-10-04.

G. W. M.,—14-10-04.

E. H. S. Clarke,—14-10-04.

Seen.

L. W. Dane,—15-10-04.

Telegram, dated the 17th October 1904.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission.

Demi-official. Your Seistan award. What is the area in Persian Seistan, over and above present cultivated area 141,000 acres, capable of irrigation at present without constructing new channels through Afghan territory? It is undersood that irrigation from Rud-i-Seistan on left

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bank beyond present limits of cultivation is impossible owing to configuration of land. Do levels admit of Hamuns being drained through Shelag into Gaud-i-Zirreh, and what would be approximate cost of any great necessary works? Failing this, extension of irrigation in Persian Seistan by works within Persian territory seems impracticable. Is this the case? It is most improbable, judging from our experience in Kurram, that Amir would ever agree to fresh channel being dug through Afghanistan to irrigate fresh lands in Persia, and it may be necessary to limit award to declaring amount of water required for existing Persian cultivation, and such area as is at present irrigable by channels taking off below the Band-i-Seistan; so we should be glad to know what this is distributed into areas at present irrigated and unirrigated. If you can colour a map to show areas irrigated, areas unirrigated but irrigable, and areas not commanded, it would be of great assistance. Please refer to my demi-official letter of 8th January 1904, which will explain my meaning.

The file, which has been printed up, may now be sent, confidentially, to the Public Works Department. We should be glad of its very early return.

E. H. S. Clarke,—18-10-04.

Public Works Department.

In another file now returned to the Foreign Department, I have dealt with the general question of fully utilising the waters of the Helmand river from a purely irrigation point of view, and reference may be made to the note in that file to show what the estimated areas, water-supply, cost, and possibilities are considered to be.

The question for consideration here is how to give effect to the Goldsmid Award, and I will deal with this only from the administrative point of view of a canal officer called on to give effect to the proposals put forward now.

2. *Water-supply.*—Sub-division of the water will be the chief duty of the canal officer, and it is necessary he should have very clear rules to direct the attention of the State officials to, when dry years occur and difficulties arise in satisfying requirement. The memorandum attached to Colonel McMahon's letter No. 2407, dated 25th September 1904, shows that the following offtakes exist at present.

(i) *East of Pulalak.*—The 1″ to 4-mile map shows three small canals in Afghan territory, which are presumably outside the question now at issue.

(ii) *Pulalak to Bandar-i-Kamal Khan.*—Paragraph 51 of the memorandum under reference shows that there are four canals which usually draw off 83 cusecs.

(*a*) The remark under (i) *supra* applies to the Rudbar canal.

(*b*) The same remark would apply to the Chahar Burjak and the two Bandar-i-Kamal Khan canals, provided these are not very largely extended so as to irrigate below Kila-i-Fath on the north, and in the Tarakun tract on the south side. To obviate future difficulties, it appears very desirable to have some clear understanding or preferably some clear provision which would obviate the Afghans taking off an undue supply from the Helmand before it reaches Bandar-i-Kamal Khan. Canal extension might not only in very dry but in ordinary years lay Persian Seistan dry.

(iii) *Bander-i-Kamal Khan to Kohak.*—In paragraph 49 of the memorandum under reference it is stated that seven canals are taken off, and that these carry, averagely, 294 cusecs between September and March. These are mostly small canals at present on the north side of the river. As in the case of (ii) *supra*, they are apparently capable of great extension beyond Killa-i-Fath, and the same remarks, as above made, apply to this eventuality. The Sultani, the last of the seven canals, has already been used, to a small extent, to convey water past Kohak Band, the present regulating station.

(*iv*) *Below Kohak.*—The first Persian canal offtake is located here. In normal years, the supply reaching Kohak between September and March will be as follows:—

Supply at Bandar-i-Kamal Khan	...	...	4,200 cusecs
Deduct offtakes, *vide* (iii) *supra*	...	...	294 ,,
Reaching Kohak	...	...	3,906 ,,

3. *Regulating Station.*—In the draft award A, it is proposed in paragraph 2 that Persia have one-third of the supply at Kohak, and in paragraph 3 it is stated that the one-third proportion applies to the whole river at Bandar-i-Kamal Khan. Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 are rather confusing to me, as 294 cusecs are taken off between the two places just mentioned.

It would make matters clear if the Foreign Department could draw a line on the map, and have it agreed to *that the proportions of the supply crossing that line are to be so much for Afghanistan and so much for Persia.* In making this suggestion I am aware that pre-existing Afghan rights have to be recognised. If the line is to be the boundary of Seistan, then I would venture to suggest that this may be clearly shown on the map. If this is done, it will not matter where the Afghans take off their canals.

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4. *Proposed amendment of draft Award A.*—The part marked by Foreign Secretary to be omitted should certainly be struck out. With regard to the proposed addition in Foreign Secretary's note, dated 16th October 1904, I would venture to suggest that it would be better not to mention cusecs at all, as the river which ordinarily carries 4,200 cusecs at Bandar-i-Kamal Khan may contain anything between that and nothing at all, since it is sometimes dry. I would suggest that it would be preferable to fix proportions passing a certain line as mentioned above.

5. *Appointment of Arbitrator.*—The appointment of a British canal officer will be essential; his services could be made of great use if the two States were prepared to ask, and act on, his advice regarding canal improvements. It would be advisable, in course of time, to have some canal rules drawn up and agreed to by the two States, which would admit of the Arbitrator and local State officials disposing of a number of simple cases which will be liable to occur, and which can easily be foreseen. This would strengthen the Arbitrator's hands. I fully understand that it may be undesirable to raise questions of this kind now.

Paragraph 3 of Award A.—It is very desirable that this condition should be made.

J. Benton,—31-10-04.

Foreign Department.

Dated Simla, the 1st November 1904.

From—J. Benton, Esq., C.I.E., Secretary and Inspector-General of Irrigation to the Government of India in the Public Works Department,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I am sorry for delay in returning the two Seistan files sent herewith.

I have noted in both files, and most in the one which was not referred to me—and which may be wrong; however, there are two questions—

(i) that relating to the present;

(ii) ,, ,, probable future;

and (i) should fit in, or be such as will fit in, with (ii), which I have dealt with in the file made over to me at your office.

4

Extract from the diary of Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission, for the period ending the 24th September 1904.

Regarding the demarction of his boundary line.

5

Despatch from Sir A. Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, to the Marquess of Lansdowne, No. 168, dated the 8th September 1904.

(Received on the 17th October 1904, under cover of a letter from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No 47, dated the 17th September 1904.)

States that he has communicated the consent of the Amir of Afghanistan to the demarcation of the Seistan frontier to the Grand Vizier, who expressed his great satisfaction at the news.

For information. No orders.

J. W. E.,—25-10-04.

G. W. M.,—25-10-04.

E. H. S. Clarke,—25-10-04.

Telegram, No. 820, dated Robat, the 29th October 1904.

From—Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner for Seistan Arbitration Commission, Seistan,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your demi-official telegram of 17th October. I could not reply sooner owing to absence from main camp.

(1) Area in Persian Seistan capable of irrigation and cultivation from existing Persian canal system after deducting ten *per cent* for village sites, roads, and unprofitable patches, &c.,

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is roughly four lakhs sixty thousand eight hundred acres, of which only about one lakh forty-one thousand acres are annually cultivated with spring crop. Allowing for present system of leaving lands fallow for one year, an area of two lakhs thirty thousand four hundred acres is available for cultivation by spring crop. No need to consider autumn crop, as these in Seistan are sown on lands chosen for next spring crop.

(2) Your supposition regarding extension of irrigation on left bank of Rud-i-Seistan is correct.

(3) Levels do admit of draining Hamuns through Shelagh, by broad shallow cuttings, through the low ridges which now divide Hamuns area into compartments. This question has been long under consideration, and necessary levelling is still in progress. It is useless to risk any estimate at present stage, but we know magnitude of work is beyond power of Persian Administration in Seistan, and I do not think that we need consider it in connection with award. Success and profit of undertaking cannot compare with that of opening up Tarakun system.

(4) Failing drainage of Hamuns, no new extension of irrigation in Persian Seistan is possible by works in Persian territory, but it should be remembered that extension of annual irrigation and cultivation is possible up to limits of whole area of irrigable land as stated in paragraph 1.

(5) As stated in paragraph 1, the area irrigable below Band-i-Seistan is four hundred and sixty thousand eight hundred acres, of which the portion actually irrigated varied in extent and position according to the amount of annual cultivation. As regards possibilities above Band-i-Seistan, I based my opinions on the supposition that if Afghanistan opened up Tarakun canal, the Persians could reasonably claim to enjoy extension of that canal at Persian cost. I fully understand difficulty of mutual arrangement between Persians and Afghans which this would involve without our assistance and supervision.

(6) A map, coloured as requested, will be posted to you to-morrow.

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

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6

TELEGRAM FROM COLONEL A. H. McMAHON, C.S.I., C.I.E., BRITISH COMMISSIONER, SEISTAN ARBITRATION COMMISSION, No. 824, DATED THE 30TH OCTOBER (RECEIVED 1ST NOVEMBER) 1904.

(Repeated to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.)

Reports that the Afghan Commissioner has informed him that he has just received the necessary authority from the Amir to demarcate.

Satisfactory. Copy has been sent to Private Secretary to Viceroy.

E. H. S. CLARKE,—2-11-04.

I have put together a draft telegram to Secretary of State, and shall be obliged if Mr. Clarke will go over it and see if he has any suggestions to make about it.

I am afraid we are bound to try and secure water for at least the existing Persian cultivation; but, for our interests, it would be far better that a big canal should be made at or near Kala-i-Bist, and the whole Helmand below that dried up except when in flood. Seistan would then become a desert, and our defence of India would be made much more simple.

L. W. DANE,—2-11-04.

I have discussed the case with Mr. Clarke, and have added the word "political" before "situation" (*status quo*) in the last sentence of the draft telegram, which is now submitted for Your Excellency's consideration. I will come over to explain the case whenever this may be convenient. A copy of the draft award as proposed is added.

The telegram might be repeated to Colonel McMahon, and his opinion on it invited. If he has any further suggestions to offer, these can be telegraphed to Secretary of State in continuation.

L. W. DANE,—3-11-04.

I have discussed the whole question with Mr. Dane, and approve the draft telegram.

A[MPTHILL],—4-11-04.

6a

MEMORANDUM TO THE INDIA OFFICE, LONDON, SHOWING THAT A COPY OF CERTAIN PAPERS WAS FORWARDED, FOR THE INFORMATION OF HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, UNDER COVER OF FOREIGN SECRETARY'S LETTER No. 44 M., DATED THE 3RD NOVEMBER 1904.

7

TELEGRAM TO HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA No. 4257 F., DATED THE 5TH NOVEMBER 1904.

With reference to Colonel McMahon's letter, dated the 25th September 1904, communicates the views of the Government of India on the Seistan water question and the award which it is considered would be most suitable.

8

TELEGRAM TO COLONEL A. H. McMAHON, C.S.I., C.I.E., BRITISH COMMISSIONER, SEISTAN ARBITRATION COMMISSION, No. 4258 F., DATED THE 5TH NOVEMBER 1904.

Repeats the foregoing telegram, and asks whether he has any suggestions to offer.

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

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

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SIMLA RECORDS—3.

1901.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET—E.

Proceedings, November 1901, Nos. 74–83.

Selection of a British naval base in the Persian Gulf.

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

Previous Proceedings.					Later Proceedings.				
Secret, A, B, or D.	Classification.	Month.	Year.	Nos.	Secret, A, B, or D.	Classification.	Month.	Year.	Nos.
Secret	External . . .	May	1901	10—18	Secret	External	May	1902	1/6
”	” . . .	August	”	34—42	— ” —	— do —	Nov’r	1902	4/21
”	” . . .	July	”	126—155	B	— do —	June	1903	79/80
”	” . . .	”	1892	24—45					
A	” . . .	”	1886	307—311					
”	Political . . .	October	1881	151—154					
”	” . . .	July	”	64—67					
”	” . . .	November	1864	186—189					

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82	To Political Resident, Persian Gulf, No. 1863-E.A., dated the 31st October 1901. Says that pending a further report by Captain Cox regarding the limits of the Sultan of Maskat's authority, no further action should be taken in the matter . .	13
83	Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 180 (Secret-External), dated the 7th November 1901. Forwards, with remarks, copies of the above correspondence	15

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

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

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FOREIGN DEPARTMENT NOTES.

SECRET—E., NOVEMBER 1901.

Nos. 74—83.

SELECTION OF A BRITISH NAVAL BASE IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

SECRET DESPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 15, DATED THE 14TH JUNE (RECEIVED 1ST JULY) 1901. Pro. No. 74.

Requests to be furnished with further information in connection with the selection of a naval base in the Persian Gulf. Commends further to the consideration of the Government of India the question how far measures of preparation could be quietly taken in anticipation of certain contingencies.

Circulated.

H. S. BARNES,—1-7-01.

C[URZON].

A. P. P[ALMER].

C. M. R[IVAZ].

T. R[ALEIGH].

E. F.-G. L[AW].

E. R. E[LLES].

A. T. A[RUNDEL],—3-7-01.

I submit a draft calling for a report from the Resident at Bushire. It might perhaps be advisable to give Colonel Kemball a lead as to the measures of preparation (*e.g.*, the strengthening of our position at Bassidore, and the conclusion of an arrangement with the Kalantar of Kishm, and perhaps with the tribes in the neighbourhood of Khor-ash-Shem), which might be taken in anticipation of a Russian move. His Excellency's orders should be taken on this point. It will be remembered that the Persians recently sent an agent to Bassidore in connection, as Colonel Kemball thought, with the rumour that we were going to strengthen our position in that neighbourhood. It may be extremely difficult to take any action in this direction without exciting Persian suspicions.

Secret E., August 1901, Nos. 34-42.

J. B. WOOD,—13-7-1901.

The draft may be submitted to His Excellency for approval. The Military Department and Intelligence Branch should probably see the case after issue of the reference to Colonel Kemball.

H. DALY,—13-7-1901.

Issue the draft as added to.

I have shown it to His Excellency.

H. S. BARNES,—23-7-1901.

LETTER TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 1233-E. A., DATED THE 25TH JULY 1901. Pro. No. 75.

Forwards copies of despatches to and from the Secretary of State for India, and requests an early report upon the points noticed, with suggestions as to any measures of preparation, in anticipation of the contingencies to which the correspondence refers.

ENCLOSURE IN A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE, No. 31, DATED THE 28TH JUNE (RECEIVED 15TH JULY) 1901. Pro. No. 76.

Collection of information in regard to the ports and islands of the Persian Gulf.

Military Department.

Seen (Section B to see).

F. G. CARDEW,—5-8-1901.

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Seen in Section B. — B. Holloway,—5-8-1901.
W. B. Wilson,—5-8-1901.

For information. — E. DeBrath,—5-8-1901.
E. R. E[lles],—6-8-1901.

Foreign Department.

Intelligence Branch.

Returned with thanks. — G. A. Robertson,—13-8-1901.

Foreign Department.

Pro. No. 77. Letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 148, dated the 16th (received 30th) August 1901.

Forwards, for orders, copy of a letter (with enclosure) from the Political Agent at Maskat, regarding the re-assertion of the Sultan of Maskat's control over Khor Fakan on the Batineh Coast.

This is only an *ad interim* report, and further information will probably be awaited before a reply is sent. I am inclined to think that Captain Cox is not aware of the Agreement of 1892 with the Shargah Chief, which prevents him from leasing or selling any part of his territories to a foreign Power without our consent. If the Shargah Chief really exercises authority over Khor Fakan* and the neighbouring coast (a point on which Colonel Kemball will report later), I see no advantage in its being restored to the control of the Sultan of Maskat. The Sultan finds it sufficiently difficult to maintain his authority within his existing territories, without adding to their extent: and, as there is no International Agreement guaranteeing the independence of the Shargah Chief, we are in a better position for preventing Khor Fakan falling into undesirable hands, if it is regarded as within the territory of that Chief, than if it belonged to the Sultan of Maskat.

We have recently reminded Colonel Kemball of these Agreements, and he will no doubt draw Captain Cox's attention to them.
H. Daly.

* According to Mr. Zwemer, Khor Kalba (Kelbeh) marks the northern and Sib the southern limit of the fertile portion of the Batineh Coast.
H. Daly.

Certainly.
H. Daly.

We await a report from Captain Cox on the subject of the actual extent of Maskat territory in the direction of Cape Mosandim. If it should appear that any part of the coast-line containing a good harbour is inhabited by independent Arab tribes, and is not subject to the control of any of the Chiefs with whom we have Agreements, it will be a matter for consideration whether steps should not be taken to acquire control of this "no man's land" either by simply taking possession of it, or by assisting the Sultan of Maskat or the Chief of Shargah or Ras-ul-Kheimah to extend † their authority over the independent tribes now in possession.

† If there is no local Chief, already possssed of authority, with whom we can make a Protectorate arrangement, the best course would apparently be to extend the authority of one of the Chiefs with whom such arrangements already exist. If any of these harbours can be "annexed without asking the leave either of Maskat or of the Arab tribes" (His Excellency's note at page 4 in Secret E., May 1901, Nos. 10-18), the position is certainly capable of improvement.
H. Daly.

Meanwhile I think that we can only await further information.

J. B. Wood,—11-9-1901.

His Excellency should see.

H. Daly,—11-9-1901.

The matter discussed in this letter from Colonel Kemball is closely connected with that referred to in the 4th paragraph of the Secretary of State's despatch of 14th June, and in our letter to Colonel Kemball of 25th July, *viz.*, the limits of Maskat territory in the direction of Ras Mosandim. In order that we may be able to prevent a foreign Power from seizing any port or tract upon this coast, we should, I think, if possible, endeavour so to arrange that there shall be no gap between Maskat territory and the tracts on the Pirate Coast, which are covered by our Agreements with the Trucial Chiefs of 1892.‡ But it is doubtful whether this is the case at present. We have decided at different times—

‡ Secret E., July 1892, Nos. 24-45.

(i) That the strip of the Batineh sea coast, which extends from Dibba to Khor Kelbeh, a distance of 45 miles, is under the suzerainty and tributary to the Shargah Chief.

Political A, July 1881, paragraphs 4 and 12 of Nos. 64 and 67.

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Political A, October 1881, Nos. 151-154.

(ii) That this tract is subject to the operation of the Maritime Truce.

(iii) That it is presumed the eastern side of Cape Mosandim down to Dibba is on the same footing.

Ibid.

(iv) That aggressive action by the Sultan of Maskat against the strip of coast under the Shargah Chief is highly inadvisable. This strip from Dibba to Khor Kelbeh includes Khor Fakan, about which Capta in Cox is now writing.

External A, July 1886, Nos. 307-311.

But we have no recent information as to the extent of the authority which the Shargah Chief at present exercises over this tract, and there is a good deal of doubt as to who exercises authority over the coast west of Dibba and round Ras Mosandim to Ras-ul-Kheimah.

As Colonel Kemball points out, it is stated in the volume put up that Lima is under Maskat. It is also stated in the same volume that Koomza, a town on the mainland close to the island of Ras Mosandim, is also subject to Maskat, and that the Chief of Khasab, which is situated in the Elphinstone Inlet, acknowledges Maskat authority. I doubt very much whether this is the case at the present time, but, if it is so, there are grounds for the Secretary of State's doubt whether we could occupy the Maklab Isthmus without raising a question under the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862. On the other hand, if Maskat authority is a thing of the past, it would be as well to conclude with the Chief of Khasab an agreement similar to those concluded with the other Chiefs * of this coast in 1892.

Bombay Government Records, XXIV., page 621.

Pages 534-535.

Pages 537-538.

* Abu Dhabi. Debai. Ajman. | Shargah. Ras-ul-Kheimah. Umn-ul-Kowein.

Secret F., July 1892, Nos. 24-45.

I think it would be advisable that Captain Cox should visit this part of the coast and ascertain the actual position of affairs. He is to go to Sur to examine the coal in October, and the man-of-war that takes him there might subsequently take him along the coast to Khasab and back.

I put up a draft for Your Excellency's consideration.

H. S. Barnes,—22-9-1901.

The Bombay Report speaks of a Seikh of Khasab. But this is 50 years ago; and I very much doubt whether there is now such a person in existence. I have, therefore, modified the draft.

C[urzon],—23-9-1901.

Letter to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 1641-E.A., dated the 25th September 1901. **Pro. No. 78.**

Acknowledges receipt of the foregoing letter, and communicates the views of the Government of India thereon.

Letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 166, dated the 10th (received 27th) September 1901. **Pro. No. 79.**

In reply to Foreign Department letter No. 1233-E.A., dated the 25th July 1901, submits a report on the question of the selection of a naval base in the Persian Gulf, together with a photographic reproduction of the Admiralty chart showing the places referred to in Captain Cox's report.

Memorandum of papers forwarded to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, with the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 40-M., dated the 3rd October 1901. **Pro. No. 80.**

His Excellency should see the latest receipt, a copy of which has been sent to the India Office. The best map wherewith to study Captain Cox's report is Colonel Ross's map of Oman which is put up. We have already suggested that Captain Cox should visit the Mosandim coast after he has been to Sur. Pending the result of his observation, I think it would not be advisable to encourage the Sultan to make his influence more apparent in the places where it has sunk into abeyance.

I put up a draft to Colonel Kemball and a draft despatch for approval.

If the above action is approved, we should ask Military (Marine) Department to arrange cor the ship, which is to take Captain Cox to Sur, remaining at his disposal for the tour up the foast.

J. B. Wood,—4-10-01.

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Pro. No. 81. LETTER FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 173, DATED THE 21ST SEPTEMBER (RECEIVED 4TH OCTOBER) 1901.

In continuation of his letter No. 148, dated the 16th August 1901, regarding Khor Fakan, forwards, for information, an extract from a report of proceedings received from Captain Phillipps of H. M.'s ship "Sphinx" containing particulars of his visit to the neighbourhood.

The drafts may be submitted to His Excellency for approval.

H. DALY,—17-10-1901.

Since we wrote the letter of 25th September, we have received Colonel Kemball's letter of the 10th September, and its interesting enclosure, which Your Excellency has not yet seen. We have now to reply to the Secretary of State's despatch of 14th June, and I think the draft despatch below is suitable, and the short draft to Colonel Kemball may also issue.

H. S. BARNES,—24-10-1901.

Please send me a copy of this interesting correspondence.

C[URZON],—27-10-1901.

Pro. No. 82. TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT, PERSIAN GULF, No. 1863-E.A, DATED THE 31ST OCTOBER 1901.

Says that pending a further report by Captain Cox regarding the limits of the Sultan of Maskat's authority, no further steps should be taken on the subject.

Pro. No. 83. DESPATCH TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, No. 180 (SECRET-EXTERNAL), DATED THE 7TH NOVEMBER 1901.

Forwards, with remarks, copies of the correspondence mentioned.

Exd.—H. R.

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

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, NOVEMBER 1901.

Selection of a British naval base in the Persian Gulf. Pro. No. 74

SELECTION OF A BRITISH NAVAL BASE IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

8 E—74-83—Nov.

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

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

(214)

No. 15 (Secret), dated India Office, London, the 14th June 1901.

Pol No 74

From—The Right Hon'ble Lord George F. Hamilton, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council.

I have received your letter No. 66 (Foreign-Secret) of the 2nd May, on the subject of the selection of a naval base in the Persian Gulf in view of certain contingencies.

2. I have communicated a copy of Your Excellency's letter to the Foreign Office, but there are certain points upon which I request that you will furnish me with further information.

3. There appears to be some doubt as to the exact position of the Kalantar in the islands of Kishm and Henjam. He is spoken of in Lieutenant Hunt's report as if he were practically beyond the control of the Naib Governor of Bunder Abbas, of whose district the islands are nominally an appanage. On the other hand, it is stated in your letter that Sheikh Hassan, who was Kalantar when Lieutenant Hunt wrote, "is said" to have since been superseded. It is of importance that the local conditions of the various places should be definitely ascertained, and, in particular, whether the position of the Kalantar is hereditary, and of sufficient practical independence to make an arrangement with him possible and politically advisable, or whether he is merely liable to removal at any time by the Persian Government.

4. As to the isthmus of Maklab, I do not clearly understand whether it forms a part of the undoubted territories of the Sultan of Maskat, or whether the Arab tribes of the locality claim independence. In the former case, the action suggested by Your Excellency's Government might, in some circumstances, raise a question with the French Government under the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862.

5. I commend further to Your Excellency's consideration the question how far measures of preparation could be quietly taken in anticipation of the contingencies to which this correspondence refers.

Pol No 75.

No. 1233 E.-A., dated Simla, the 25th July 1901 (Confidential).

From—The Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

In continuation of my letter No. 690 E.-A., dated the 1st May 1901, I am directed to forward a copy of the marginally noted correspondence, on the subject of the selection of a naval base in the Persian Gulf.

Secret despatch to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 66 (External), dated the 2nd May 1901.
Secret despatch from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 15, dated the 14th June 1901.

2. I am to request that you will furnish an early report upon the points noticed by the Secretary of State, and that you will at the same time favour the Government of India with suggestions as to any measures of preparation which might, in your opinion, be quietly taken in anticipation of the contingencies to which this correspondence refers. Captain Cox should be directed to submit a report as to the actual limits of Maskat territory beyond Sohar in the direction of Cape Mosandim. So far as the Government of India are aware, the Sultan of Maskat has neither exercised nor claimed authority over the isthmus of Maklab and the promontory beyond it, which is understood to be inhabited by aboriginal and independent tribes.

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Pers Int 76

(Received with letter from Secretary, Political Department, India Office, No. 31, dated the 28th June 1901.)

PERSIA AND ARABIA. [June 17].

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.

India Office,
15th June 1901.

(Secret).

Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 10th November 1900, on the subject of the collection of information in regard to the ports and islands of the Persian Gulf, I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to enclose, for Lord Lansdowne's information, a copy of a letter from the Government of India on the subject.

I am to add that a further despatch, of which a copy is enclosed, has been addressed to the Government of India, requesting them to supplement their information in regard to certain points.

I am, &c.,
A. GODLEY.

Pers Int 77

No. 148, dated Bushire, the 16th August 1901 (Confidential).

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. A. KEMBALL, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a report submitted to me by Captain Cox, Political Agent at Maskat, on the subject of a place called Khor Fakan on the Batineh Coast of the Gulf of Oman.

I am at present only in a position to submit an *ad interim* report on the subject, but the matter is one of considerable importance, and it is advisable that the Government of India should know of the reference which has been made to me on the subject.

2. So far as the question of the right of jurisdiction over Khor Fakan is concerned, there can, I think, be no doubt. This place is undoubtedly an appanage of the Joasmee Chief of Shargah, who has certain rights over the strip of the Batineh Coast from Dibba on the north to Khor Kelbeh on the south, Khor Fakan being situated about midway between these two places. I would invite a reference to the correspondence ending with the letter No. 2188 E.P., dated 17th September 1881, from the Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the address of the Resident in the Persian Gulf, in which Colonel Ross's view that the strip of coast above alluded to should be considered subject to the operation of the Maritime Truce, was accepted by the Government of India. I am instituting enquiries with a view to ascertaining the degree of authority which the Joasmee Chief maintains along this stretch of coast, and at present I can only express my opinion that this Chief would certainly not view with equanimity any attempt of the Maskat ruler to assert himself in that quarter; while, on our part, the fact that we have held this strip of the Batineh Coast to be subject to the Maritime Truce and prevented the Joasmee Chief from taking action by sea to assert his authority there would certainly, I think, debar us from giving the Sultan any countenance or support in the matter. Any extension of the Sultan's rule over this part of the coast could only be obtained by means of friendly agreement between His Highness and the Joasmee Chief. If the Sultan desires to bring this region again under Maskat control, he might, if the Government of India approve, be authorised

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to submit proposals through the Political Agent, Maskat, which I could refer to the Shargah Chief for an expression of his views on the subject. Although the acquisition by a foreign Power of Khor Fakan or other places on this coast belonging to the Shargah Chief would not be allowed by us in view of our Agreement of 1892 with this Chief, it might, I think, be more convenient that the whole stretch of coast from Maskat to Mosandim should be subordinate to the Maskat ruler.

The extract from the "Depeche Coloniale" forwarded by Captain Cox is of considerable interest. It will be seen that Dibba (Deba) and Lima are both alluded to as excellent anchorages and apparently as outside the Sultan's dominions. Lima will be found described at page 621 of the Bombay Government Records No. XXIV, new series, and Dibba at page 623. Lima is considered by us to be within the territories of the Sultan of Maskat, but I am not aware what degree of authority he exercises over the portion of the coast line from Dibba north to Khasab. The "Selika", I believe, spent some time at Dibba. It has been very difficult to ascertain what this yacht really came up the Gulf for, and what she did here, but her movements were, I consider, distinctly suspicious. I hear on good authority that she is again to come to the Gulf this winter, but I propose to make this a subject for a special report. Meanwhile, I think it is highly desirable that one of His Majesty's ships should visit the Batineh Coast at an early date, calling in at Khor Fakan, Dibba and Lima. Her Commander may be able to ascertain what the "Selika" did at these places. I have instructed the Political Agent, Maskat, to arrange for this being done on the first suitable opportunity of one of His Majesty's ships visiting Maskat.

Encl., Pre No 77.

No. 285, dated Maskat, the 23rd July 1901 (Confidential).

From—Captain P. Z. Cox, His Britannic Majesty's Consul and Political Agent at Maskat,

To—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to address you in the following connection.

At a recent interview the Sultan informed me that the chief members of the community at Khor Fakan on the Batineh Coast had several times made overtures to him, which they had just lately repeated, with a view to their port being again brought under Maskat jurisdiction, and His Highness asked for an expression of my personal views on the subject, both on its merits and with reference to the possibility of his having our support should the project eventually be taken up. I replied that my files contained something on the subject, and that I should like to look them up, and, if necessary, make a reference to you before giving him a reply. "Support" would presumably mean the presence of one of our men-of-war if required.

2. Khor Fakan, as is doubtless within your knowledge, is a collection of hamlets situated on the shores of a spacious bay of the same name on the northern Batineh Coast, in latitude 25° 21′ 13″ N. and longitude 56° 23′. Broadly speaking, I should say that the territories comprised in the Sultanate of Oman are at present considered to extend from the westerly limits of Dhofar on the south, to Khasab at the extremity of the Roos-el-Jubbal on the north, but the interjacent strip of coast-line lying between the 25th and 26th parallels of latitude has, from the days of the Wahabi incursions at the commencement of the last century, been the scene of frequent strife, in the course of which the ports along its shores have several times changed hands.

As far as the archives of this Agency enable me to state with any degree of accuracy, the following are the chief land-marks of Khor Fakan history

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

during the last 100 years, and I take the liberty of recording them for facility of reference :—

1808.—Saiyid Saeed-bin-Sultan, Imam of Maskat, assisted by his uncle, Kais, besieged and reduced the port which the Joasmees had converted into a rendezvous and depôt in connection with their piratical enterprises in the Gulf.

1808 to 1832.—Khor Fakan ruled by the Joasmee Chief, Sultan-bin-Sakar, in fief for the Imam of Maskat. Captain Brucks, R.N., in his "Memoir of the Navigation of the Gulf", issued in 1827 writes—"It belongs to the Imam of Maskat, whose nominal revenue from it is about 3,000 German crowns".

1832.—Sultan-bin-Sakar, taking advantage of the disturbed state of the Imam, Saeed-bin-Sultan's affairs, assimilated Khor Fakan and other adjacent ports and held them for himself.

1850 to 1851.—After 1832 the Imam and the Joasmee Chief seem to have made up their differences, and the latter returned to his allegiance to Saiyid Saeed's successor, Saiyid Thoweynee (uncle of Saiyid Feysal), for it appears that in 1850, when Kais-bin-Azzan attacked and captured Khor Fakan from Sultan-bin-Sakar, the latter appealed to the Sultan of Maskat, Saiyid Thoweynee-bin-Saeed, for assistance. The Sultan, however, informed his vassal that he was too busily employed elsewhere to make any diversion in his favour, and that he, Sultan-bin-Sakar, must manage the business himself. The Joasmee thereupon determined to try his fortune alone, and was successful in recovering Khor Fakan from Kais. Although Saiyid Thoweynee's inability to come to the Joasmee's assistance in his hour of need became the cause of temporary estrangement between them, they soon became reconciled, but Saiyid Thoweynee did not apparently trouble himself after this with the affairs of the northern Batineh ports, and from that period up to the present they have remained under the domination of the Joasmee Sheikhs.

3. So much for past history. His Highness Saiyid Feysal informed me that he believed that the community now pay no tribute to the Joasmee Sheikh, but it can hardly be that the present Sheikh of Shargah would view with equanimity any attempt on the part of the ruler of Maskat to reassert himself in that quarter, and in view of the decided opinion expressed by Colonel Miles, as Resident, in Residency letter No. 111, dated 6th July 1886, I should not think it necessary to trouble you with a reference, were it not that the general position has been a good deal changed since that correspondence took place by the increased interest taken by foreign Powers in the politics of the Gulf.

4. Under existing conditions, it is theoretically in the interests of British policy that the ruler of Maskat should extend or reassert his effective influence and jurisdiction, as far as he reasonably can, in order that as much of the coast-line of Oman as possible may be brought within the limits of the territory which we can claim, as against France, to be covered by the Declaration of 1862, by which our respective Governments mutually agreed to respect the Sultan's independence. Otherwise there would seem to be nothing to prevent France or any other foreign Power from acting on the presumption that the ports on the strip of coast-line before specified were either communities independent individually or else that they were collectively subject to an independent Joasmee Sheikh. In this connection I have the honour to attach in original, for information, one of a series of letters which appeared some weeks ago in the "Depeche Coloniale", and which are believed to have emanated from Maskat, from a perusal of which it will appear that the locality in question has not escaped the specific attention of our neighbours.

I may mention also that the yacht "Selika" touched both at Khor Fakan and Dibba in the course of her recent sojourn in these waters.

In conclusion, it seems to be a point worthy of consideration whether we could exercise more influence over the locality in question as part of the Maskat Sultanate or as an appanage of the Joasmee Chief. Trusting to be favoured with your views and instructions at an early date, &c.

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V (Suite).

Cela du reste paraît fort exagéré. Que l'on consulte les cartes marines. On y verra que Jessa (ou Jessé, dont on fit Bender Jessé, en y ajoutant un mot persan qui signifie "port"), est le cinquième village de pêcheurs au Sud-Sud-Est de Mascate; que le mouillage y est meilleur, soit sous le rapport du fond, soit parce qu'il est, pour une petite partie, abrité contre les vents directs du large; mais que cette partie est trop exiguë de façon absolue pour constituer un mouillage de quelque importance, et qu'elle l'est même trop, proportionnellement à l'ensemble de l'anse, pour être protégée contre les remous. Il n'est pas impossible de se renseigner ailleurs sur l'eau potable qui y est rare, sur le pays environnant, qui est stérile, sur l'accès vers les terres, qui y est de la plus grande difficulté. Sous ce dernier rapport tout au moins, Jessa n'est ni plus mal, ni mieux partagée que les treize autres localités à la suite, excepté Carial qui, toutefois, n'a pas de port, jusqu'à la ville de Sour, qui est le marché maritime du Jalan et de la Charquiya, mais dont le mouillage, d'autre part, vaut encore moins; et, plus au Sud, exception faite pour l'excellent mouillage de Khawr-Jerama, qui cependant est inhabitable, on ne voit plus que trois autres ports, qui ont, comme Sour, libre accès vers l'intérieur, mais sont encore de plus médiocres abris. Du côté opposé aussi, même absence de bons mouillages, depuis Mascate, largement ouvert au Nord-Nord-Ouest, et Matrah, ouvert au Nord-Nord-Est, avec les vingt-trois localités à la suite, jusqu'à Khour-Fakan, qui vaut un peu mieux, à l'extrémité de la partie du littoral soumise au sultan; et c'est plus loin, à Deba puis Lima, qu'on trouve, mais excellents il est vrai, les deux seuls bons mouillages de tout l'Oman, y compris son rivage du Golfe Persique.

Ce n'était donc guère Jessa qu'il convenait de choisir pour en faire une station navale, à supposer que l'état de nos affaires nous permît pareille manifestation de rivalité à l'égard d'une nation qui s'est habituée à considérer cette partie des mers comme son domaine.

Pour un dépôt de charbon, cela se trouvait à 6 milles (11 kilomètres) de Mascate, c'est-à dire hors de portée, sauf et tout au plus avec un remorqueur, ce qui suppose une installation peu en rapport avec une modeste ligne comme celle-là. D'autant mieux que les Anglais, venus les premiers, avaient, il est vrai, comme de juste, mis leur charbon à la bonne place, qui était la seule disponible dans le port, mais tout à côté de Mascate, dans son faubourg maritime de Matrah qui, lui, est accessible aux routes de terre, qui est la véritable capitale commerciale, deux fois plus peuplée que la capitale politique, la place ne manquait pas, sans compter encore deux petites anses habitées, situées entre les deux villes, et qui convenaient moins, mais valaient encore mieux que Jessa.

Au point de vue technique, il semble donc que l'agent fit un mauvais choix, et qu'après avoir demandé et obtenu plus qu'il n'était chargé de le faire, il avait pris ce qu'on lui donnait, en un lieu qui ne convenait ni à l'objet réellement en question ni à celui qu'il s'était ambitieusement proposé. Le journal le *Temps* mit moins de formes à le condamner, et, simplement pour cause d'excès de zèle, sans aucune étude de la question, mais aussi, semble-t-il, sans spontanéité, il lui mit sur le dos toutes les conséquences de l'affaire. Or, on assure que le vice-consul avait très sagement vu le cas où son appréciation ne serait pas approuvée par les hommes de l'art, spécifiant que la place du dépôt de charbon pourrait être toute autre et quelconque, au choix des intéressés, après examen compétent. Et s'il en est ainsi, aucune raison, aucun prétexte n'existait plus pour blâmer cet ouvrier que l'on avait envoyé au chantier sans outil, qui avait ainsi pris l'habitude d'efforts excessifs, et qui se trouvait seulement, au gré de son patron, avoir trop de besogne. Je chercherai donc ailleurs le véritable coupable de l'humiliation nationale dont cette malheureuse affaire a été la cause.

(*A suivre.*)

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Pol No 78

No. 1641 E.-A., dated Simla, the 25th September 1901 (Confidential).

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—Lieutenant Colonel C. A. Kemball, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 148, dated 16th August, regarding Khor Fakan on the Batineh Coast.

2. The question raised in this letter is connected with that of the actual limits of Maskat authority in the direction of Cape Mosandim, on which you were asked to report in my letter No. 1233 E.-A. of 25th July. In the opinion of the Government of India it is very desirable that along this coast there should be no interval between the territory of Maskat, which as against France is protected from aggression by the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862, and the dominions of the Chiefs of Shargah and Ras-ul-Kheimah, who are bound by Treaty not to cede or sell any part of their territory save to the British Government. It is presumed that there is no doubt as to the reality of Maskat authority as far north as Khor Kelbeh. As regards the tract along the coast from Khor Kelbeh to Dibba, which includes Khor Fakan, the Government of India have at different times decided that this portion of the coast is under the suzerainty of, and tributary to, the Chief of Shargah; that it is subject to the Maritime Truce; and that it is highly inadvisable that the Sultan of Maskat should interfere with it. If the authority of the Shargah Chief in this tract continues to be obvious and real, the Government of India see no reason to modify these views, and the present Sultan should not be encouraged to encroach in this direction beyond his present limits.

No. 1426 E.P., dated the 4th July 1881.
No. 2188 E.P., dated the 17th September 1881.
No. 1696 E., dated the 27th July 1886.

Northward of Dibba and round Cape Mosandim to the territories of Ras-ul-Kheimah, it is improbable that at the present day the Sultan of Maskat retains, if indeed he has ever possessed, any real control. What is the present situation at Lima and at Khasab is also unknown; nor from such information as is possessed by the Government of India does it transpire whether there are Chiefs at either place or anywhere along this strip of coast with whom it may be desirable to make agreements similar to those concluded with the Trucial Chiefs in 1892, so as to ensure the exclusive right of the British Government to occupy any of the inlets on the Ras Mosandim Promontory. There is indeed so much doubt as to the actual position of affairs on this part of the coast that the Government of India agree with you in thinking that it should be visited at an early date by a ship of war. I am to suggest accordingly that Captain Cox should undertake this duty as far north as Khasab in one of His Majesty's ships as soon as he returns from the examination in October of the coal mines at Sur.

Pol No 79

No. 166, dated Bushire, the 10th September 1901 (Confidential).

From—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 1233 E.-A., dated 25th July 1901, on the subject of the selection of a naval base in the Persian Gulf.

2. There can, I believe, be no doubt whatever that, with the exception of the British station at Bassidore, the Persian right of possession over the island of Kishm as also over the islands of Hanjam, Hormuz and Larak is complete and undisputed. I understand that the Arab Sheikh of Kishm, or some member of his family, usually occupies the position of "Kalantar", and, as the succession to the Sheikhship is hereditary, the position of Kalantar may also to a certain degree be considered to be so. The arrangement, however, has apparently been adopted for convenience sake, and could undoubtedly be terminated at any time if the Persian Government saw fit to establish a

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Kalantar in the island independent of the Arab Sheikh. I am of opinion then that the position of Kalantar is not of sufficient practical independence to make an arrangement with him possible or politically advisable. I find that Sheikh Hassan, the Sheikh and Kalantar of Kishm, has not after all been superseded. It was the intention of the Persian Government to reinstate one Sheikh Abdulla, a relative of Sheikh Hassan and a former Kalantar of Kishm, and M. Simais, the Director-General of the Gulf Customs Administration, took Sheikh Abdulla from Lingah to Bunder Abbas in the "Persepolis" for this purpose. The arrangement, however, for some reason or other fell through, and Sheikh Hassan is still Kalantar of Kishm.

3. As to the isthmus of Maklab and the question of the actual limits of Maskat territory beyond Sohar in the direction of Cape Mosandim, I have the honour to forward copy of a report submitted by the Political Agent at Maskat. It will be seen that Captain Cox expresses the opinion that, "as regards the Malcolm and Elphinstone inlets on either side of Maklab and the promontory of Ras Mosandim, the exercise of the Sultan of Maskat's authority thereover is of such a conveniently uncertain character that it would seem possible for His Majesty's Government to treat the question of its existence according to the political exigencies of the moment". In other words, we can claim the isthmus of Maklab to be either a part of the territories of the Sultan of Maskat, or else to be independent of his or any other control.

The Government of India will be aware that in 1864 when our telegraph station was located at Mosandim, the actual spot occupied being on Elphinstone island within the Elphinstone inlet or Khor-ash-Shem, some corresponence ensued regarding the right to jurisdiction over this part, and the Bombay Government, *vide* their Resolution No. 3248, dated 26th October 1864, deprecated "any investigation of the claims of His Highness the Imam on the one hand and of the Chief of Ras-ul-Kheimah on the other to dominion over Cape Mosandim". Since then His Highness the Sultan has established a Wali at Khasab situated on the Elphinstone inlet, and further north the Sultan's authority with regard to Kumzar near Ras Mosandim is now apparently not contested by the Joasmee Chief, as pointed out by Captain Cox in paragraph 4 of his letter. It seems to me, therefore, that from our point of view, as we are hardly likely to require Khor-ash-Shem as a naval base, it will be more convenient to recognise the tract as within the territories of the Sultan of Maskat. It will be perhaps advisable that the Sultan should be induced in the manner indicated by Captain Cox to make his influence more apparent in the locality in question, and I would solicit the orders of the Government of India in the matter.

I attach a photographic reproduction of the Admiralty chart showing the places referred to in Captain Cox's report.

4. I much regret that I am unable to offer any suggestions as to the measures of preparation which might be quietly taken in anticipation of the contingencies referred to in the correspondence now under consideration. It seems to me that we must perforce wait until one or other of the contingencies referred to arises or is seen to be imminent. The occupation of the islands and their maintenance against attack will, in the first instance I presume, have to be undertaken by naval force, and the question appears to be chiefly one for the naval authorities to consider. In my opinion no anticipatory measures are immediately required.

No. 334, dated Maskat, the 28th August 1901 (Confidential).

Encls. 1, Pro No 79

From—Captain P. Z. Cox, His Britannic Majesty's Consul and Political Agent at Maskat,

To—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to submit the report called for in paragraph 2 of Foreign Department letter No. 1233 E.-A., dated 25th July 1901, to your address, on the subject of the selection of a naval base in these waters.

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2. In dealing with the several ports or stretches of coast-line, I will commence with Sohar and proceed northwards.

Sohar.

Sohar is governed by a Wali appointed by the Sultan, and, owing to the extent of its jurisdiction, the Governorship is looked upon as an influential and important one. Treating of the coast-line only, the authority of the Wali extends to

Majis, Shinas and Mureir.

Majis, Shinas and to the coast villages from thence as far as Mureir. At Shinas a Deputy Wali is entertained who is appointed from Maskat, but, for ordinary purposes of administration, is under the immediate orders of the Governor of Sohar. The reason of Shinas being thus selected among other smaller ports in the neighbourhood for the location of a special official is no doubt that there are eight or nine British Indian traders resident there. At the other sea-side villages jurisdiction is exercised through the local tribal Sheikhs, and there are no British subjects north of Shinas. The tract between Mureir and

Khor Kelbeh, Fujaireh and Khor Fakan.

Dibba, including Khor Kelbeh, Fujaireh and Khor Fakan, has for a good many years at all events been subject to Joasmee influence, but this locality was dealt with in detail in my recent letter No. 285 to your address, on the subject of the Sultan's desire to reassert Maskat influence over the last-named port; it seems unnecessary, therefore, for me to do more than refer to that correspondence now.

3. With regard to Dibba, however, it will be advisable to enter into some

Dibba.

detail. As mentioned in this office Political Diary for the week ending 9th July, I called at Dibba in H. M. S. "Assaye" on 5th July, but at that time I had no knowledge of the aspirations of His Highness the Sultan in connection with Khor Fakan or of the possible selection of a naval base by the British Government in those waters: I was merely prompted to visit the place, which is a convenient night's run from Sohar, by a reference to it in the article in the "Depeche Coloniale" which was forwarded to you with my letter No. 285 above mentioned. I found the place occupied by two rival communities whose habitations, as is often the case in Oman, are separated from one another, a broad dry wadi running between them. On the one side are the Joasmee governed by a Negro Wali on behalf of Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Sultan-el-Kasmi, now residing at Shargah or Ras-ul-Kheimah, and paying excise or some form of tribute to him. On the other side live a section of a tribe commonly known as the "Shihooh", though in books and maps I see the name is sometimes written "Shihiyeen". The two forms are merely alternative plurals of the same word "Shiheh". Of the tribe as a whole I shall say further in a subsequent paragraph: suffice it to state at this juncture that the section inhabiting Dibba and the environs pay no tribute either to the Joasmee Sheikh or to the Sultan of Maskat, but pay certain dues to their own local Sheikh, Yasir-bin-Sanan, who, however, is not, strictly speaking, a Shihooh, but a Kumazereh, a tribe which will find mention later in this report.

It was the inhabitants of Dibba who informed me that the "Selika" had visited their port and also Khor Fakan, but I could not ascertain that she had done more than use her dredging or sounding apparatus in the harbour. Including the northern half of Dibba as above set forth, and from thence onwards

Lima, Mosandim and Khasab.

through Lima round the promontory of Mosandim to Khasab, and thence almost to Ras-ul-Kheimah, and embracing all the hinterland north of a line joining Dibba and Ras-ul-Kheimah, the hill country and the ports are believed to be inhabited almost entirely by the Shihooh and a small tribe dependent on them, the Kumazereh, who live on the Mosandim side of the Maklab Isthmus, at

Kumzar.

Kumzar and other hamlets. These Shihooh are a numerically powerful tribe numbering about 14,000 souls and are of Himyarite, *i.e.*, Yemeni origin. As a whole, they are understood to profess allegiance to, and recognise, the sovereignty of

Khasab.

Saiyid Feysal; but Khasab, adjacent to the Maklab Isthmus, is the only one of their

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ports at which they pay His Highness any tribute; here the Sultan has a Wali appointed under the following circumstances:—About 10 years ago the sections of the Shihooh occupying Khasab could not agree among themselves and therefore applied to the Sultan to send them a Wali to maintain peace and order. Saiyid Feysal complied and appointed a Maskat Arab of the Beni Ruwaheh tribe, named Kalij-bin-Sanai, to the post. This individual has remained in the appointment up to the present time, and is allowed to retain the dues which he levies, amounting to 700 or 800 dollars per annum, as his salary.

4. As before mentioned incidentally the Mosandim Peninsula is tenanted, though scantily, by the small tribe of Kumazereh. The origin of this tribe is a matter of a good deal of doubt and interest. They are simply called "Kumazereh", because their chief village is Kumzar. They speak a dialect of their own which is unintelligible to the ordinary Arab, but as it appears to contain a good many words of a semi-Persian or Baluch form, it seems probable that they are immigrants from the opposite shore of the Gulf. As is natural, however, their numbers have proved too insignificant to allow them to maintain their independence and individuality, and they have blended with and practically become absorbed by the Shihooh.

Mosandim.

Kumzar.

It was one of these Kumzar villagers who was the fortunate finder of the valuable pearl which for two years past has been as an apple of discord in the Gulf, and in this connection, as is known to you, the right of His Highness the Sultan, as Sovereign of the soil or of the finder of the gem, to a share of the sale-proceeds was recognised and determined by the Court of Arbitrators.

5. From Khasab to Bokha the country is exclusively Shihooh, and one of the two principal Sheikhs, whose influence predominates over this portion, Ali-bin-Muhammad, divides his time between Bokha, Kada (an offshoot of Khasab) and Maskat. He is well known and respected in Maskat, as he is a man of influence and learning, and is personally known to me.

Bokha.

Between Bokha and Ras-ul-Kheimah come the villages of Fudar, Gamtha, Tibba and Shuam. These are also looked upon as Shihooh villages, but from Bokha southwards and in the hills in the vicinity of Ras-ul-Kheimah itself, owing to the circumstances of their situation, the sections of Shihooh residing there acknowledge the jurisdiction of, and probably pay tribute to, the Sheikh of that port. Sheikh Ali-bin-Muhammad, however, informed me that, whereas circumstances obliged these members of the tribe, with the cognisance of the rest, to bow to the Joasmee, nevertheless in any important matter affecting the common interest they would join the majority, and that the Shihooh were, in fact, a united tribe.

Fudar, Tibba, Gamtha and Shuam.

6. In the foregoing paragraphs I have furnished the most reliable information that I am in a position to obtain, otherwise than from the Sultan or his officials. I think, therefore, that it may be regarded as a fairly correct statement of the situation, but necessarily from a Maskat point of view. Briefly stated, it appears from the foregoing that the Sultan's jurisdiction extends effectively only as far as Mureir; that from Mureir to Dibba (including, however, only half of that port) there is reason to suppose that the Sheikh of Shargah may make good a prescriptive claim to exercise jurisdiction; that over the country from Dibba on to Ras Mosandim and thence round to Khasab and Bokha, the Sultan, if asked, would probably claim rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction; and that from Bokha to Shuam the coast is mainly occupied by sections of the Shihooh who for practical purposes at present recognise the authority of the Sheikh of Ras-ul-Kheimah.

In conclusion, if I may presume to do so, I would respectfully express the opinion that, as regards the Malcolm and Elphinstone Inlets on either side of Maklab and the promontory of Ras Mosandim, the exercise of the Sultan of

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Maskat's authority thereover is of such a conveniently uncertain character that it would seem possible for His Majesty's Government to treat the question of its existence according to the political exigencies of the moment. If we require a base there, it might be possible to explain to the Sultan that his claim to assert his authority there or power to make it effective is of such an unsubstantial nature that His Majesty's Government are unable to recognise it, but regard the Shihooh (including the Kumazereh) as independent tribes.

I think this is in any case a measure with regard to which Saiyid Feysal would not feel very strongly, seeing that he derives no practical or pecuniary benefit from that part of Oman, and that he might be prevailed upon to co-operate with us in it. On the other hand, it seems to me that, in the event of any other Power endeavouring to gain a footing in the neighbourhood, we can adduce sufficient grounds for maintaining the position that the locality in question is part of the Sultanate of Oman. If to this end it should be considered necessary to make Maskat influence more evident there, it could easily be done by arranging with the Sultan to appoint Walis to one or two of the ports—a measure which I do not think *primâ facie* that the Shihooh would resent, provided that the said Wali did not make any serious innovations in the direction of collecting tribute. No doubt the most satisfactory way of ascertaining the leanings of the Shihooh Sheikhs and tribesmen and evidence as to the question of influence and jurisdiction is to make enquiries from the inhabitants themselves on the spot, and in addition to the coast-line from Khor Fakan to Lima, as you suggest, I would propose, with your approval, to take an early opportunity of visiting the whole of the coast between Shinas and Bokha, and quietly making enquiries locally at the various ports.

7. The map which I have used for reference in connection with this report is Admiralty Chart headed "Entrance to the Persian Gulf" and dated 1883.

Pro No 80

MEMORANDUM.

Proposed naval base in the Persian Gulf.

(1) Letter to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 1233 E.-A., dated the 25th July 1901.
(2) Letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 148, dated the 16th August 1901, with enclosure.
(3) Letter to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 1641 E.-A., dated the 25th September 1901.
(4) Letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 166, dated the 10th September 1901, with enclosure.

The papers specified in the margin were transmitted to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 40 M., dated the 3rd October 1901.

Pro No 81

No. 173, dated Bushire, the 21st September 1901 (Confidential).

From—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my confidential letter No. 148, dated 16th August 1901, submitting a report on a place called Khor Fakan on the Batineh Coast, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, an extract from a report of proceedings which I have recently received from Captain Phillipps, R.N., Commanding H. M. S. "Sphinx".

Encl, Pro No 81

Extract from a Report of Proceedings from Captain H. A. Phillipps, R.N., Commanding H. M. S. "Sphinx", to Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 11th September 1901.

* * * * * * *

"6. * * * and so proceeded to Lima, where I arrived at 9 A.M. on the 10th, and also visited Dibba and Khor Fakan the same day.

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

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

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"7. In my opinion, neither of these places would be suitable for a coaling station as they are all open to the northward, and a very heavy sea would run in on the occasion of a shamal blowing. Five miles to the north of Dibba is a very snug little land-locked cove called Duhat Haffa, and, in my opinion, a coaling station could be made there. It would be unsuitable for very long ships, as it is, in parts, rather narrow, but there is anchorage outside in 10 fathoms and protected from the shamal.

"8. Dibba was the only place the "Selika" visited, the Sheikh reporting that her machinery had broken down. The officers of the ship used to land, but he did not see them use any instruments for surveying, &c., nor did he think they ever went to Duhat Haffa".

* * * * * * *

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

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

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[Confidential.]

No. 1863 E.-A.

Pro No 82

FROM

THE UNDER-SECRETARY TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
in the Foreign Department,

To

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. A. KEMBALL,
OFFICIATING POLITICAL RESIDENT
IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

Dated Simla, the 31st October 1901.

SIR,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 166, dated the 10th September 1901, on the subject of the selection of a naval base in the Persian Gulf.

2. It has already been suggested* to you that, in order to ascertain the actual limits of the authority of the Sultan of Maskat in the direction of Cape Mosandim, the Political Agent at Maskat should visit the coast at an early date: and the naval authorities will now be asked to place a vessel at his disposal. Pending a further report from Captain Cox as to the actual political situation at the various places on this coast, the Government of India would prefer that no steps should be taken to extend the authority of the Sultan beyond its present limits.

* *Vide* my letter No. 1641 E.-A., dated the 25th September 1901.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient servant,

J. B. WOOD,
Under-Secretary to the Government of India.

Foreign Office Press—No. 1598—1-11-01—42.

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

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

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No. 180 of 1901.

Pu No. 33

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.
External.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD GEORGE F. HAMILTON,
His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

SIMLA, *the 7th November 1901.*

MY LORD,

With reference to Your Lordship's Secret despatch No. 15, dated the 14th June 1901, we have the honour to forward copies of the correspondence noted in the enclosed list, on the subject of the selection of a naval base in the Persian Gulf in view of certain contingencies.

2. Our Political Resident at Bushire reports that, while there is reason to believe that the office of Kalantar of Kishm is hereditary and may, therefore, be regarded as in some degree free from Persian control, his position is not of sufficient practical independence to make an arrangement with him possible or politically advisable. Colonel Kemball also finds himself unable to make any suggestions as to the measures of preparation which might quietly be taken in anticipation of the contingencies referred to in Your Lordship's Secret despatch No. 30, dated the 23rd November 1900, and he considers that no anticipatory measures are immediately required. We see no reason to differ from either of these conclusions.

3. As regards the isthmus of Maklab, we invite attention to the interesting report* of our Political Agent at Maskat, in which he shows, with as much accuracy as is possible from the sources of information now at his disposal, the actual limits of the authority of the Sultan of Maskat to the north of his capital. It has been suggested by our local officers that the Sultan might be encouraged to make his influence more effective in certain places on this coast, where his authority appears to have fallen into abeyance. Before expressing

* Sub-enclosure to enclosure No. 4.

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our opinion on this suggestion, we propose to await the fuller information which Captain Cox should be able to furnish after visiting the localities in question.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) CURZON.
" A. P. PALMER.
" T. RALEIGH.
" E. F.-G. LAW.
" E. R. ELLES.
" A. T. ARUNDEL.

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

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List of Enclosures in Secret Despatch No. 180 (External), dated the 7th November 1901, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Serial No.	No. and date of paper.	From whom, or to whom.	Subject.
1	Letter No. 1233 E.-A. (Confidential), dated the 25th July 1901.	To the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.	Asks him to furnish a report on certain points connected with the proposed selection of a naval base in the Persian Gulf.
2	Letter No. 148 (Confidential), dated the 16th August 1901, with enclosure.	From ditto ditto ...	Proposed reassertion of the Sultan of Maskat's authority over Khor Fakan on the Batineh Coast.
3	Letter No. 1641 E.-A. (Confidential), dated the 25th September 1901.	To ditto ditto ...	Replies to the foregoing letter.
4	Letter No. 166 (Confidential), dated the 10th September 1901, with enclosure.	From ditto ditto ...	Reports on the subject of the proposed selection of a naval base in the Persian Gulf.
5	Letter No. 1863 E.-A. (Confidential), dated the 31st October 1901.	To ditto ditto ...	Replies to the above letter.

H. DALY,
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.

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

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

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

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(Notes by His Excellency the Viceroy.)

Diaries of the Vice-Consuls at Mohammerah and Ahwaz.

(Secret E., June 1904, Nos. 149—170.)

In a letter dated the 28th February 1904, Major E. B. Burton, Acting Vice-Consul at Mohammerah, forwarded the following Confidential Diary containing a short narrative of Mohammerah.

Confidential Diary.

The Sheikh of Mohammerah is 35 to 37 years old. He has 12 or 13 wives, one of his sons is 12 years old and he has several daughters. He lately married the niece of Ain-ed-Dowleh, and had by her one girl who died. For this Persian princess he built the Kasr, a large house, on the bank of the Basrah river, 4 miles above Mohammerah, where he usually lives: he transacts most of his business at Fajlieh, a mile below the Kasr down-stream. His eldest son is betrothed to the daughter of the Reis-ul-Tujjar; this has given great offence to the Arabs.

The Sheikh is a keen trader and exports large quantities of dates and wheat: transacting his own business and keeping his own accounts. I am told he has a banking business also. He is on very good terms with, and particularly civil to, the Captains of the British India steamers: and his nominee acts as agents for Grey, Mackenzie and Co. at Mohammerah.

He has large properties on the Turkish side of the river, and is said to have registered his son as a Turkish subject. His Turkish business is managed by an Arab, Mirza Hamza, who lives at Basrah. This man is an Arab of Hillah and very popular. He is a very able man: he appears to be about 45 to 50 years old. Though Mirza Hamza lives entirely at Basrah, merely coming down the river to Fajlieh, he is said to manage all the Arab business of the Sheikh: he has a son named Abdul Samad, who is Secretary to the Sheikh and knows Persian and English. Mirza Hamza is supposed to be an enemy of the Reis-ul-Tujjar.

The Reis-ul-Tujjar transacts the whole of the Sheikh's Persian affairs and possesses great influence over him. The Reis is excessively acute and a born diplomatist. He is a Behbahani and has been at Mohammerah over 20 years: he must be 50 years old and is weak and fragile and does not seem likely to last long: he made himself indispensable to the last Sheikh and was implicated in the plot resulting in his murder.

The Reis is a large merchant and has grown very rich. He is very pleasant and plausible, especially to Europeans, but much disliked and distrusted, especially by Arabs, in Arabistan. He has great power and his influence extends to Shuster and Dizful. He is agent for the Moin-ul-Tujjar. He has travelled over the greater part of India, including the Native States of Central India.

His son, Mushir-ul-Tujjar, is about 21 years old; and left last November *viâ* India and Egypt for Mecca: he is to visit England and return by Constantinople and Russia. This young man is a worthy son of his father and his developement is watched with some apprehension. The father has some moments of remorse, the son none. He is agent for the Persian line of steamers at Mohammerah.

The Reis-ul-Tujjar has an interest in the English carrying trade on the Karun in the form of an annual subsidy of 4,0.0 krans: at the expiration of the present agreement, in two years, this may be altered by Messrs. Lynch Brothers to a fee for each package carried by their steamers. It is very necessary that the Reis-ul-Tujjar's great influence with the Sheikh of Mohammerah, and in Arabistan, should be used on our side. It is impossible to say as yet whether his son will take his place.

The Sheikh of Mohammerah has extended his power, in a very marked manner, beyond that of his late brother. There are now few signs of Persian authority south of Band-i-Kir to the border of Fars. The Governor of Arabistan does not appear at Ahwaz, nor is there a Karguzar there, as was the case in 1897, when I was last in the country. The Sheikh now nominates the Governors of Ahwaz and Mashur, and controls the Chaab Arabs at Fellahieh, whose Chief is under surveillance at Mohammerah.

I have not seen enough of the Sheikh to form an opinion as to his real character. But this extension of his authority must have been brought about by the exercise of a fixed purpose and great ability: perhaps this may be looked for in the direction of the Reis-ul-Tujjar, though the negotiations with the Arabs must have been carried out by Mirza Hamza.

The Sheikh's territory stretches, apparently, along the coast as far as Shah Abdul Shah, a few miles west of Dilani: his authority over this coast is of great importance to us. He has also bought Zeitun in conjunction with the Bakhtiari Chiefs. He has intimate relations with these Chiefs and may have come to an understanding with them for mutual defence.

His frontier marches with that of the Bakhtiaris from the latitude of Band-i-Kir to South of Ram Hormuz. I do not know exactly where it lies towards the Kuhgelu tribes, but the whole is remarkably safe owing to their combined authority, and there appears to be now no raiding in that direction.

The Sheikh's authority is not established towards Hawizeh and the Karkhah in the same manner as it is on the left bank of the Karun: but his operations against the Beni Taraf, if ever carried out, may extend his power in that quarter, though the nebulous state of the Turkish and Persian borders will always tend to insecurity.

He has done much for the suppression of piracy on the Shat-el-Arab, and the safety of roads, and the Karun river in Arabistan: with encouragement, and to please the British Government he would do more. He can give us great assistance in matters affecting our Karun trade. The wheat embargo has been lately enforced probably owing to his instigation: he would, I imagine, use his influence against such mediæval restrictions if we ask him to do so. The opening of the roads from Hawizeh to Ahwaz and Mohammerah could also be arranged for by him.

The Sheikh could also oppose the running on the Karun of steamers other than English ones: and seriously hamper any such schemes as the irrigation projects of the Dutch Engineer now deputed from Tehran to the Karun. His ownership of the river banks is of great importance to the above and also with reference to the starting point of the Khuramabad road from Nasiri.

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The Sheikh of Mohammerah has been allowed by the Persian Government to attain more power than is likely to be tolerated much longer: and his position is quite at variance with their policy. If his immunity is due to the weakness of the present Shah it does not at all follow that the Valiahd will not institute quite a different régime on coming to the throne.

We incur no danger of disturbing our relations with Tehran in guaranteeing him against his own Government, so long as we do not appear in the matter till they actually move against him. Such a guarantee will merely give him the confidence he requires to enable him to negotiate or act in certain eventualities, in such a manner as to induce the Persian Government to leave him alone. He could be required to submit his proposed action, and the reasons for it, to us for sanction.

So long as we allow no operations by sea, and the Persian army remains in its present state of decay he can hold his own. But if necessary we could prevent any action against him with an objection to any alteration in the existing state of affairs on the Karun on the pretext of damage to established trade.

Any reorganisation of the Persian army and an increase in the number of men and guns at Mohammerah and Nasiri, or of the Persian vessels available to coerce the Sheikh at Mohammerah, would alter his position of security.

There is, I believe, a general impression that the Sheikh is not open to attack. He is on the contrary accessible from every side.

The Karun and Jerrahi rivers afford an excellent line of advance from both north and south. As the country between those streams is practically waterless, except between Mohammerah and Felahieh, the camps, flocks, and herds of the Arab tribes are concentrated on the river banks and easily accessible.

The centre of the Arab power does not now, as in former times, lie at Hawizeh or Felahjeh, which were comparatively secure: it is at Mohammerah where two Persian steamers are constantly anchored and may be supplemented by steamers of the Belgian Customs administration.

We have at present no one to interfere with any arrangements we may wish to make with the Sheikh of Mohammerah, but we may not be so favourably situated much longer. He has as yet derived no tangible benefit from his relations with us. If the guarantee he asks for is granted him, he might also be given a subsidy for guarding the projected Khuramabad road as far as Susa: and paid for the sowars he now maintains on the Bakhtiari road from Nasiri to the border.

The Sheikh has lately repaid the money he borrowed from Messrs. Lynch Brothers: a favourable opportunity may now occur to lend him money at a lower rate of interest. Though wealthy, he is sometimes in want of money, before the date harvest is sold, as his expenses are very large.

Lord Curzon noted:—

A most useful note. It ought to go to Sir A. Hardinge and the India Office for communication to the Foreign Office at home.

7-3-04. C[URZON].

In letter No. 58, dated the 4th March 1904, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf forwarded a copy of a further Diary received from Major Burton, lately His Britannic Majesty's Acting Vice-Consul at Mohammerah, containing the proceedings of a party of Russians who had recently visited the Karun. The Foreign Secretary noted that the operations of the three Russian botanists in taking soundings down the Bahmeshir to the sea showed that the Russian Government had an eye to the possibilities of the Karun region. The Khor Musa map and another diary received from Major Burton were added. The latter showed that the whole country south of the Karun was capable of irrigation from the Jarahi river. He also alluded to the Belgian Customs employés at Buzia and Mashur and to the possibility of their using the launches which they wished to order from Bombay in these creeks. It was thought that all this indicated the necessity for earmarking Khor Musa as soon as we could. Nothing could be made of the Bahmeshir as it was blocked by the Shatt-el-Arab bar, but Major Burton's Diary proved that boats even now could pass from the Khor Musa into the Karun *viâ* the Khor Dorab and the canal from Janjira to three miles below Salmania, and that this canal could readily be improved. It was suggested that the importance of the position might be explained to His Majesty's Government, that we ought to try and secure harbour rights there as the Russians had done at Enzeli by negotiating for a concession to construct a port somewhere between the Shatt-el-Arab and Bushire with chaussées from that to the Dizful and Bakhtiari roads and to Shiraz, this might block other concessions in the same tract.

Lord Curzon noted:—

Secretary has already made this proposal elsewhere, and I have already said that I do not agree with him.

24-3-04. C[URZON].

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 1783 F. D.—10-9-04.—12.—C. G. DE S.

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[Confidential.] 28

Diary of Major E. B. Burton, His Britannic Majesty's Acting Vice-Consul at Mohammerah.

№ 159

Ram Hormuz to Mohammerah via *Mashur and Fellahieh*.—The plain of Ram Hormuz is irrigated and heavily cultivated: that part adjacent to the town and skirting the foot of the mountains to the south-east is intersected by irrigation canals whose water is drawn from the Rud-i-Zard

One and-a-half miles to the south is the village of Kuhma belonging to the Sipahdar of the Bakhtiaris, who has a house there and has built rows of stables and a serai, and is erecting a fort-like enclosure.

As the Mashur road leaves Kuhma, the plain becomes more open and grassy, and covered with flocks and herds and Arab and Lur camps.

The Rud-i-Zard, here a rapid stream, flows over the plain in several branches, and about 12 miles south of Ram Hormuz effects a junction with the Jerrahi River: which then, skirting through tangled ravines, the western spurs of a rocky range of hills, emerges some 20 miles south of Ram Hormuz into the alluvial plains which stretch to the Karun and the sea. The watershed of a stony slope running west from these hills on the right bank of the river forms at this point, 12 miles south-south-west of Ram Hormuz, the boundary between the Bakhtiaris and the territory of the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

Both banks of the Jerrahi at its debouchure from the hills at Cham Sabeh are occupied by the tents of the Bani Khalid Arabs, with whom we camped. This tribe is well armed: every man appears to carry a Martini rifle or carbine: their appearance was not prepossessing, and they said we would probably be robbed and that they would not be responsible for our safety. I referred them to the Sheikh of Mohammerah for any explanation they might wish to give in the event of that happening, and we were left alone.

At Cham Sabeh are the remains of large canals, and mounds showing signs of former permanent habitations: from this point the waters of the Jerrahi River could be directed in canals over the alluvial plains of the district, the cultivation of which now depends entirely upon the winter rain. From shortly below this to near Fellahieh the stream cuts deep into the soil and irrigation from it is not possible.

To some few miles below its exit from the hills at Cham Sabeh the Jerrahi is a broad and rapid stream, divided by tamarisk covered islands into several arms, and fordable by horsemen at several points except after recent rain.

At Halfabad it assumes the appearance of a canal: its sluggish stream winding between deep cut banks 60 to 70 yards apart: to this point boats, 40 feet long with a beam of 6 to 8 feet and drawing 2 to 3 feet of water, ascend throughout the year.

The villages and camps of the Chaab Arabs stand along the river banks, and their flocks and herds are pastured in its vicinity. There is no water elsewhere in this tract of country: the river receives no affluents after leaving the Ram Hormuz plain and flows in a single diminishing stream towards Mashur, at 10 miles north of which it turns west to Fellahieh. After a year of good harvest much grain and forage are available in the villages: some amount of scrub grows throughout the course of the stream which is said to be fordable at numerous points during the summer. I took soundings at 3 points, which showed a maximum depth of 12 feet in February, four days after rain.

Mashur is situated on a mound, on a salt plain which is liable to be flooded after rain. A spring tide with a south wind brings the sea close to the town. Water is obtained from many small wells inside the town and some reservoirs in the vicinity, and, except after rain, is brackish and unhealthy.

From this port is exported the wool, hides, and harvest produce of the Ram Hormuz and Jerrahi districts: caravans plying mainly during the summer.

The Governor of Mashur is an Arab and a nominee of the Sheikh of Mohammerah: he was visiting the Bani Khalid Arabs, and rode to Mashur, 35 miles, during the night on hearing of our arrival.

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Here, as everywhere else, we were well received and every assistance given us. The authority of the Sheikh of Mohammerah appears to be firmly established in this country, which a few years ago was independent of him. The Arab sowars he had sent with us, who were men of good standing, appeared to be able to get anything they wished done without hesitation.

I was informed that the raids of the Kuhgelu tribes had been entirely stopped for some years by the Sheikh of Mohammerah: apparently some quarrelling still goes on between the Bakhtiaris and Arabs. The Sheikh of Mohammerah is joint owner of Zeitun with the Bakhtiari Khans. The tendency no doubt will be for him and the Bakhtiaris to absorb everything that lies between their respective jurisdictions. And unless the Persian Government is alarmed, the Sheikh of Mohammerah and the Bakhtiaris will acquire the whole of Arabistan outside the towns of Shuster and Dizful and the villages owned by the richer men of those towns in their vicinity.

Mashur was, previous to the arrival of the Belgian Customs administration, the chief place of import for the arms trade in Arabistan, which is now stopped apparently at this point.

The Mashur creek is ascended by small boats to within two miles of the town, and by large sea-going buggalows to within $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles. The drainage of the desert to the head of the creek skirts the west side of the town and crosses the road to the creek south of it, which consequently becomes very heavy after rain. The landing place and approach to it from Mashur can and would have to be improved if used for the disembarkation of troops. I have put a note of this in my description of the route Ram Hormuz to Mashur.

From the Mashur landing place, west to the Dorak canal, the sea is reported to be unapproachable, the shore along the north of the Khor Musa being low and swampy and flooded by tides far inland.

The Jerrahi River from its point of nearest approach to Mashur and the sea, turns west towards Fellahieh, and maintains its canal-like appearance, but its banks gradually diminish in height till the plain becomes capable of irrigation. Some miles east of Fellahieh the river is divided into three main arms or canals which flow to Umusakha, Fellahieh, and Buzia, respectively: this latter only, as the Dorak canal, reaches the sea. From these main streams a multitude of canals of all sizes spread over the plain, and water the fields and the large palm groves in which the chief villages are situated.

The Chaab tribes, if attacked, are accustomed to retreat to Fellahieh and the adjacent district, and, by cutting the canals, to flood the country: their action under these circumstances is well elucidated by Layard. But these tribes could be subjugated by their own methods by seizing the point where the Jerrahi first divides above Janjireh: the water could then be turned in any required direction, and the streams gradually descended, guarded, and controlled. Canals of the largest size are dammed quickly with earth mixed with brushwood: we saw this in operation at several places. After the flooding of the country, moreover, a blockade would inevitably reduce the tribes to submission in a shorter or longer period, according to the season of the year.

From Janjireh we pursued a tortuous course to Buzia, where we took boats to Fellahieh: ordinarily boats should be taken at Janjireh.

The Sheikh of Buzia is named Razaij and is a man of very fine appearance and physique: he sent his sons to guard us at night and visited us himself the next morning. He is one of the ruling Sheikhs of the Chaab tribe who guarantee the payment of the yearly revenue: his two brothers were shot, some time back, while in a boat at the point where we embarked for Fellahieh. The houses and groves of Buzia run along two parallel canals, of which the eastern one is bridged and runs to the sea. Near the bridge, to which fair-sized buggalows ascend, is established the Belgian Customs House.

I heard that boats bringing arms deposited them lower down the canal, which is apparently insufficiently watched: the Belgian Customs will, however, when they introduce steam-launches to watch the creeks from Hindian to the Bahmeshir and gradually extend their hold over the coast of Arabistan, largely put a stop to this and other smuggling.

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As we entered Fellahieh we saw on the banks of the canal the ruins of a large house which had belonged to Sheikh Jafar, formerly Chief of the Chaab tribes: he was overthrown by the Sheikh of Mohammerah and is dead: his cousin, Abdulla, is at Mohammerah under surveillance.

The local Sheikhs showed us every civility and sent for boats, which they said we were not to pay for, to take us to Mohammerah.

I saw here a number of carbines, which appeared quite new, marked

Martini / Maskat 

.

A large marsh lies to the west of Fellahieh, and is traversed by the small canal or ditch which is the only connection between the Jerrahi and Karun Rivers: this canal holds sufficient water for the passage of small boats only. We had some difficulty in traversing it, and would probably have found it impracticable, had not the Sheikh of Fellahieh ordered more water to be turned into it.

The clearing of the channel of this canal, and the diverting into it of a larger stream at Fellahieh, would make it practicable for boats of fair size. It is called the Shakha, and enters the Karun 3 or 4 miles below Salmanieh. The last 10 miles of its course is influenced by the tide. Near the Karun the Salmanieh Canal, now almost dry, crosses it at right angles running south-east towards Goban.

I heard that two lions were raiding cattle from the marsh west of Fellahieh which is called Banneh: this is the only place in Arabistan where I heard any rumours of their existence.

E. B. Burton, *Major*,
His Britannic Majesty's Acting
Vice-Consul at Mohammerah.

Foreign Office Press—No. 633—23-3-04—31.

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

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Route Ram Hormuz to Bandar Mashur.

Leave Ram Hormuz proceeding south and crossing small canals by bridges and culverts diverge from the Behbahan road south-south-west through cultivated ground to the village of Kuhma 1½ miles. From this the road traverses a broad and grassy plain, with large flocks and herds and Arab camps, in a south-west direction, and at 5 miles touches the right bank of a branch of the Rud-i-zard here winding in several channels over the plain to the east.

Number of stage.	Name of stage.	Distance.	
		Intermediate.	Total.
1	Cham Sabeh .	24½	24½

The road follows the river bank to 7 miles, where it flows south to the gorge of Kaleh Sheikh, and then diverges west-south-west, ascending a broad slope and becomes hard and stony. At 13½ miles the ridge is topped and the road descends a gradually widening dry ravine from which at 15½ miles it exists over bare plateaux crossed by shallow ravines draining to the west.

At 20 miles pass through a gorge in low mud hills and come in sight of the Jerrahi River which emerges one mile to the south-east from a mass of tangled ravines, beyond which is a range of low rocky mountains; to the west of the road lies a broad valley running down from a rock ridge.

At 24½ miles reach the camp of the Bani Khalid Arabs of 200 tents at Cham Sabeh on the right bank of Jerrahi River. Here is some cultivation, large flocks and herds and a few date palms. The river has a difficult ford one mile to the south. Road good and passable throughout for all arms except about the 20th mile where it requires cutting and widening for wheels. The plain of Ram Hormuz is always heavy and particularly so after rain.

Fuel throughout, and water, grass and Arab camps except in the stretch between the Rud-i-zard and Jerrahi Rivers.

Cross irrigation canals and fields on the right bank of the Jerrahi River and proceed south-west over a plain, level and under wheat cultivation, to the Ziarat of Ali Hadi 3¾ miles, here a road runs from the fords of the Jerrahi towards Nasiri.

Number of stage.	Name of stage.	Distance.	
		Intermediate.	Total.
2	Rehan . .	19	43½

Proceeding south-south-west over the bare level plain, at 9 miles cross a deep ravine which requires ramping for wheels; the village of Halfabad and Arab camps lie 2 to 3 miles to the east on the left bank of the river, up which boats ascend to this point.

At 10¾ miles is the village of Khera Feraya and other hamlets on both banks of the river, which is here touched by the road which follows its right bank over a cultivated plain to Rehan 19 miles.

Here are flocks and herds; some cultivation.

Road throughout good and passable to all arms: water from the river which is never more than 3 miles distant. Flocks, herds and Arab camps on both banks of the river and much wheat after sufficient winter rain. Fuel and forage scarce below Halfabad, except in the villages.

Below Halfabad the Jerrahi River assumes the appearance of a winding canal, the current is slow and the banks cut deep into the alluvial plain and a generally even width of 50 to 60 yards is maintained.

Cross to the left bank of the Jerrahi River, during the winter and spring by boats, during summer and autumn by fording. The river here is 50 yards wide flowing slowly between almost perpendicular banks 15 feet high, greatest depth 13 feet in winter.

Number of stage.	Name of stage.	Distance.	
		Intermediate.	Total.
3	Mashur . .	16	59½

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Proceed south-west near the river bank over alluvial cultivated plain to 4¾ miles: villages are frequent. The road then turns south, at 8 miles the river is 1½ miles to the west and from that point flows west towards Fellahieh.

At 10 miles a bare plain of salt soil is entered which as mashur is approached contains patches of grass and large flocks of sheep. Mashur is reached at 16 miles.

Road throughout good and passable to all arms. Forage scarce, and scanty fuel of scrub on the plain. Water from the river to the 8th mile. Cultivation, after winter of sufficient rain, near the villages, flocks throughout except from 10th to 14th miles.

The road from Mashur to the sea goes south across a bare plain of salt soil, and at one mile crosses the drainage of the desert to the Mashur Creek which would be a very difficult after rain, the right bank of this stream is followed, at 1½ miles is the point to which small boats ascend in ordinary tides, at 2¼ miles that at which sea going buggalows discharge cargo.

The first mile of the road from Mashur is swampy in winter and almost impassable after rain: it then becomes sandy and somewhat firmer, but is said to be very deep in wet weather.

At the point where ships discharge cargo is a firm patch of sand and the creek here turns south-south-west towards the anchorage at the junction of the Khor Dorak.

At this point the width of water at ordinary low tide is 15 feet and depth about 3 feet, the banks are of shelving mud and the water at high tide some 50 feet wide, to facilitate landing from boats or buggalows a pier of 20 yards would be necessary so as to reach the middle of the patch of firm sand, the road from there to Mashur would in wet weather require to be built with brushwood, faggots, etc.: these could be procured from the Jerrahi River: the stream crossed at one mile south of Mashur would have to be traversed by a made causeway of 15 yards in length.

So far as I could learn there is no nearer approach than the point above described to the anchorage near the mouth of Khor Dorak. Animals cannot approach the sea in that direction, a man can go on foot, with difficulty, along the creek towards the sea, the soil is of a Kavir description and renders the going very heavy after rain.

As regards the road to Ram Hormuz—it is largely used by caravans which appear to ply mostly during the summer and autumn after the wheat and rice has been harvested: there does not appear to be much traffic at other times of the year.

The heat from June to September inclusive would make military operations almost impracticable. But for the rest of the year, provided the difficulties of landing can be negotiated, this route would be far the most suitable for an advance on the Bakhtiari mountains.

The amount of fodder available would depend entirely on the amount of rain in the preceding winter, after good winter rain great quantities of bhusa are available at every village and large areas of wheet standing from February to May.

Either bank of the Jerrahi River can be followed, the fords at Halfabad are practicable for laden animals for the greater part of the year except after recent rain.

In winter the river should, if the Halfabad fords are impracticable, be crossed near Maksar at which point boats from Bazia and Fellahieh could be collected. They are of all sizes up to 40′×6′ and drawing up to 3 feet of water.

The Jerrahi is said to be fordable at numerous points throughout the summer. From Halfabad downwards it presents the appearance of a winding canal.

E. B. BURTON.

MOHAMMERAH;
The 14th February 1904.

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Route Mashur to Mohammerah.

Leaving Mashur in a north-west direction the road traverses the barren plain. At 2 miles raviny ground is crossed, this would be deep after rain ; it draws to west of Mashur to the creek. From this point patches of wheat become frequent. Camps occur and grass and scrub increase as the Jerrahi is approached. At 13 miles the road touches the river and turns down its left bank. Passing the village of Khuejia, Saraima situated on both banks of the river is reached at 15 miles.

Number of stage.	Name of stage.	Distance.	
		Intermediate.	Total.
1	Saraima . .	15	15

Road passable to all arms. Fuel and forage and large flocks of sheep as the river is approached. Patches of wheat almost throughout. No water between Mashur and the river.

Follow the left bank of the Jerrahi north-west for 4¼ miles, the road then turns to the west the river pursuing a winding course in the same direction the road touching it at 6¼ and 9¾ miles. Irrigation canals into which the water is raised commence at the 8th mile. At 12 miles a canal 15 feet wide crosses the road, it would have to be ramped and the mouth, 2 miles to the north, could be blocked. A level plain is crossed and Jănjīreh reached at 15 miles.

Number of stage.	Name of stage.	Distance.	
		Intermediate.	Total.
2	Jănjīreh . .	15	30

Road passable throughout to all arms. Water from the river and canals scrub fuel, flocks of sheep : forage from the villages on the river.

At Jănjīreh the Jerrahi River is dispersed into canals its principal streams being directed to Umu Sakha, Buzia and Fellahieh : from these main canals a net work of minor channels spreads in every direction over the palm groves and open fields. The canal running south from Buzia alone reaches the sea : one small channel joining the Karun above Muhammerah.

Number of stage.	Name of stage	Distance.	
		Intermediate.	Total.
3	Fellahieh . (S. W. edge)	13	43

At Jănjīreh therefore it is necessary to take boats of which with sufficient notice and the co-operation of the Sheikhs of Buzia and Fellahieh large numbers could be collected.

From Jănjīreh to Fellahieh the diminished channel of the Jerrahi is followed for some six miles in a south-west direction : here the river practically disappears and a canal is entered Fellahieh being reached at nine miles : continuing down the canal which diminishes as the water is drawn off into the palm groves to either hand the south-west edge of the palms is reached at some 13 miles from Jănjīreh, the canal here becomes a mere ditch 8 feet wide with 1½ to 2 feet of water and the desert is entered.

The canal is descended in a south-west direction for some 15 miles , for some miles extensive marshes lie to either hand, they then gradually merge in a grassy desert which would be largely flooded after rain. The cannal to this point is not more than 6 to 8 feet wide ; it then gradually turns to the west, as the Karun is approached marks of the rise and fall of the tide are seen and it broadens and deepens. The Karun is reached at about 30 miles from the south-west border of the Fellahieh groves at Salmania about 15 miles above Mohammerah.

Number of stage.	Name of stage	Distance.	
		Intermediate.	Total.
4	Karun River .	(?) 30	73
5	Mohammerah	15	88

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To control the canal system of Fellahieh it would be necessary to hold Jänjīreh as from there any part of the country can be flooded or deprived of water by directing the stream up the Jerrahi into the desired canals.

From that point laden animals could, by pursuing winding paths to Buzia and Fellahieh and skirting the marshes west of that place to the south reach the Karun.

A more direct and southerly road from Mashur to Buzia may be taken when the Jerrahi is low and the canals hold less water; and when the marshes reported to be in that direction contract southwards.

MOHAMMERAH, E. B. BURTON.
Dated the 14th February 1904.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 4167 F. D.—4-3-1904.—56.—J. N. S.

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

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

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

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1904.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET—E.

Proceedings, February 1904, Nos. 33–127.

Visit of His Excellency the Viceroy to the Persian Gulf during November—December 1903.

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

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

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

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

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FOREIGN DEPARTMENT NOTES.

SECRET—E., FEBRUARY 1904.

Nos. 33—127.

VISIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY TO THE PERSIAN GULF.

[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated Simla, the 12th August 1903.

From—L. W. DANE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—SIR W. R. LAWRENCE, K.C.I.E., Private Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy.

Will you kindly ask His Excellency if in the letter which he sent me to copy this morning he omitted, of set purpose, Koweit, in the list of places where a revision of arrangements might be required.

Also shall I draft to the Admiral now, or does His Excellency wish to await Kemball's reply first?

It will of course be desirable to let the Admiral have good notice, but we can do this at any time by asking him under the new arrangements to arrange to have as strong a Squadron as possible collected at Karachi by the middle of November.

I did not know that I had omitted Koweit and did not mean to do so. I will write to the Admiral myself.

C[URZON].

Pol. No. 33

LETTER TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 13TH AUGUST 1903.

States that His Excellency the Viceroy proposes to carry out a plan of visiting the Persian Gulf in the approaching winter, and asks him for his views.

Pol. No. 34

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 22ND AUGUST 1903.

Refers to the above letter and asks him to telegraph on receipt if the proposals generally are suitable. States that it would be advisable for him to return to Bushire at an early date, to facilitate arrangements and preliminaries. Adds that a copy of the letter has been sent to Major Cox to save time.

Pol. No. 35

LETTER TO MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., POLITICAL AGENT AT MASKAT, DATED THE 23RD AUGUST 1903.

Sends him a copy of the letter of the 13th August 1903, to the Resident and asks for his views.

Pol. No. 36

TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 23RD AUGUST 1903.

Says that the letter of the 13th August will reach him on the 3rd September. Asks whether it will do if he is back at Bushire by the end of September.

Pol. No. 37

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 26TH AUGUST 1903.

In reply to the above telegram, agrees to his proposal.

Pol. No. 38

TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 31ST AUGUST 1903.

Acknowledges receipt of Foreign Department letter of the 13th August 1903, regarding the Viceroy's tour, and states that the proposals seem generally suitable. Adds that he is suggesting some minor modifications by letter.

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Ref 29 LETTER FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 29TH AUGUST 1903.

Replies to Foreign Department letter of the 13th August 1903, regarding the Viceroy's proposed visit to the Persian Gulf, and makes certain suggestions in connection therewith.

Ref 110 LETTER FROM THE POLITICAL AGENT AT MASKAT, DATED THE 6TH SEPTEMBER 1903.

Replies to Foreign Department letter of the 23rd August 1903, relating to the Viceroy's proposed visit to the Persian Gulf, and states his views thereon.

Colonel Kemball's letter of 29th August and Major Cox's of 6th September show that they both are delighted at Your Excellency's idea of a tour in the Gulf. If their suggestions are adopted, the route would be—

Karachi.	Shargah.
Ras-el-Hadd.	Bassidore.
Maskat.	Lingah.
Bandar Abbas.	Bahrein.
Elphinstone Inlet.	Koweit.

Bushire.

Some little time may be wasted in crossing and recrossing the Gulf and perhaps it might be better to do Bassidore and Lingah after Bandar Abbas and then go over to Shargah, or even to go on from Bassidore to Bushire and Koweit and to take Bahrein, Shargah and the Elphinstone Inlet on our way back so as to get it as cool as possible there and finish up Persia before dealing with our Protectorate. On the way back I venture to hope that Your Excellency will find time to see Gwettar, where Major Sykes and his magnates might perhaps meet Your Excellency, and Pasni and Gwadar, as the question of our position in Mekran will shortly be submitted. This would also break the longish run from Bushire or Shargah to Karachi. Major Showers and the Nazims and Khans could meet us at either place. Major Cox's suggestion about a 1st class cruiser is for Your Excellency's consideration. Colonel Kemball also advocates the collection of as imposing a fleet as possible, and this is clearly desirable.

The weather and climate will probably be all that can be desired, and I presume that we shall be able to wear the ordinary uniform, though it may be well to be prepared for eventualities with white uniform. Presents we shall certainly have to provide on a somewhat extensive scale and we might ask Colonel Kemball by telegraph to submit what he considers a suitable list of recipients and values and class of gifts required.

The Maskat Sultan should certainly visit Your Excellency first. The Admiral might enter first and receive his salute and then Your Excellency's ship would be saluted. The Admiral could pay his visit as usual and then the Sultan should visit Your Excellency and return the Admiral's visit.

I see no objection to, and some advantages in, the declarations suggested by Major Cox, but His Majesty's Government must be consulted.

Your Excellency will perhaps give me orders to-morrow and the case can then go into the office, though I venture to think that no formal announcement of the tour need be made for the present.

L. W. DANE,—14-9-1903.

I drafted a telegram to Colonel Kemball, and gave it to Secretary. I now also enclose a draft of a Secret Despatch to be printed, and sent off by outgoing mail to Secretary of State signed by myself alone.

C[URZON],—15-9-1903.

Ref 111 TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 2190-E. A., DATED THE 15TH SEPTEMBER 1903.

Asks him whether the plans stated in connection with His Excellency the Viceroy's tour in the Persian Gulf are suitable.

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No. 412

SECRET DESPATCH TO HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 148 (EXTERNAL), DATED THE 17TH SEPTEMBER 1903.

Intimates that it is the desire of His Excellency the Viceroy to pay a visit in the forthcoming autumn to Maskat and the Persian Gulf.

No. 413

TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 16TH (RECEIVED 17TH) SEPTEMBER 1903.

In reply to our telegram of the 15th September 1903, states that the plans regarding His Excellency the Viceroy's proposed tour seem suitable. Says he will return to Bushire on the 29th September, and would like to arrange details by the middle of October, with Chiefs of Bahrein, etc. Asks whether he may do so. Adds that he will telegraph about presents. Presumes that he should meet His Excellency at Maskat.

I submit a draft reply for Your Excellency's approval and a telegram to Major Cox.

L. W. DANE,—18-9-1903.

The Secret Despatch from myself to the Secretary of State had nothing to do with Sir A. Hardinge and ought not to have been sent to him.

C[URZON],—18-9-1903.

I regret that the despatch should have been sent, but we might try and stop it by telegram at Karachi or Bushire.
Done separately.
J. SCOTT,—19-9-1903.

L. W. DANE,—19-9-1903.

No. 414

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 19TH SEPTEMBER 1903.

States that he should meet His Excellency the Viceroy at Maskat after arranging details in respect to Chiefs, etc.

No. 415

TELEGRAM TO PHE POLITICAL AGENT AT MASKAT, DATED THE 19TH SEPTEMBER 1903.

Informs him of the date on which His Excellency the Viceroy will arrive at Maskat, etc.

No. 416

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 23RD SEPTEMBER 1903.

Says that it will rest with him to inform the Chiefs of Bahrein and Koweit of His Excellency's visit in such manner as he may consider suitable.

No. 417

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 25TH SEPTEMBER 1903.

States that His Excellency the Viceroy's intention to make a tour in the Persian Gulf has now been published. Adds that the visits to Bassidore, Henjam, Mussendim and, perhaps, Hormuz and Kishm need only be kept secret.

No. 418

TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 1ST (RECEIVED 2ND) OCTOBER 1903.

In connection with His Excellency the Viceroy's tour in the Persian Gulf asks for an extra steamer, and gives a list of presents required. Adds that no Indian decorations are needed except for the Sultan of Maskat.

Repeat this to camp and add "Shall we arrange for presents specified and for steamer. No orders have been received about cable for Kishm, or *Patrick Stewart* might have taken this out. Other matters can await His Excellency's return."

L. W. DANE,—3-10-1903.

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Telegram, dated Simla, the 3rd October 1903.

From—Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The Viceroy's Camp.

Kemball telegraphs 1st October. *Begins*:—Viceroy's Tour. I agree with Cox. *Ends.* Shall we arrange for presents specified and for steamer? No orders have been received about cable for Kishm, or *Patrick Stewart* might have taken this out. Other matters can await His Excellency's return.

Telegram, dated the 7th October 1903.

From—The Viceroy's Camp,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Kemball's telegram of the 1st October. Persian Gulf. I agree about steamer and presents. Durbar will presumably be held on *Argonaut*.

---

1. The memorandum below may issue to the Marine Department.
2. The Registrar may at once arrange to obtain the presents required.
3. Secretary doubtless understands the allusion to the *Argonaut*. The ship is a 1st class cruiser on the China Station. I presume that His Excellency has arranged for her to be placed at his disposal for the tour.

Vide Royal Navy List, April 1903.

L. Russell,—8-10-1903.

The office memorandum to the Marine Department may issue. Action may be taken about the presents. Please let me know what probable cost will be. Ranken & Co. have some sealskin coats which they want to dispose of, but they are very costly and we may be able to get what Colonel Kemball specifies from Hamilton & Co., and the other shops here. I know His Excellency wanted to have a 1st class cruiser and he has probably arranged for the *Argonaut* to stop on her way home from China. If she comes, it would obviously be desirable to hold the Darbar on her if we can get her near enough to the shore.

L. W. Dane,—9-10-1903.

Pw. No 49

Office Memo. to the Military (Marine) Department, No. 2413-E. A., dated the 9th October 1903.

Requests that arrangements may be made for the despatch to Bahrein of an extra vessel for duty in connection with the visit of His Excellency the Viceroy.

Pw. No 50

Letter from the Political Agent at Maskat, dated the 4th (received 10th) October 1903.

States that the British Indian subjects at Maskat are desirous of presenting an address to His Excellency at Maskat.

Pw. No 51

Letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 2nd October 1903.

Reports his return to Bushire and makes certain suggestions in connection with His Excellency's tour in the Persian Gulf.

Pw. No 52

Telegram to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 2503-E.A., dated the 20th October 1903.

Asks him to supply narratives of each Chief and his State for the information of His Excellency.

As to Major Cox's letter of October 4th. Your Excellency will perhaps agree to receive the address of the British subjects at Maskat, a copy of which should be sent to us in advance. The reply to this would be a suitable opportunity to make any declaration of policy which may have been decided.

Yes, but it must be suitably presented. A Viceroy cannot receive a mere roll of paper in a bamboo cylinder.

C[urzon].

I am afraid that there could not be a more unsuitable opportunity. Any public declaration must of course be made at the Durbar, not at a meeting of Bombay and Kutchy traders.

C[urzon].

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We cannot think of anything else for Maskat. The improvement of the coal jetty has been sanctioned and a landing stage is proposed. Your Excellency will doubtless see these and the new Consulate. Major Cox should meet Your Excellency off Ras-el-Hadd or off Sur which you may wish to inspect *en route* to Maskat. We shall have Mr. Lorimer with us as interpreter in case Major Cox is weak in translating publicly, and I think that it would be well to take the Attaché, who was for 14 years at Bassidore, and could point out what was then considered to be our boundary. He would be useful to look after the Sheikhs and could also do the Toshakhana Superintendent's work. There will be three Foreign Office clerks. Major Grey could accompany Your Excellency also throughout if wanted and he should at any rate go as far as his jurisdiction extends, *i.e.*, Lingah.* Colonel Kemball will also meet Your Excellency at Maskat, but he wishes to go on in advance to arrange about the Darbar of Sheikhs at Shargah and this seems a good arrangement. We have written about the spare ship and are arranging for the presents.

Why three? It will be very difficult to accommodate all these persons, and I cannot see what they would have to do.
C[URZON].

* Surely this is enough.
C[URZON].

He proposes in his letter of 2nd October that Your Excellency should, in addition to endorsing the existing arrangements, intimate that aggression by one State or another even by land will not be viewed with approval by the British Government and that the British Resident will always be ready to listen to complaints and arrange a settlement in case of quarrels.

Please send me copies of all these papers with a view to the speeches that I shall have to make.
C[URZON].

There seems to be no harm in this.

Orders are also required on the question of the visits at †Maskat, and the declarations suggested by Major Cox in his letter of 6th September.‡

† The Sultan should visit me sometime in the forenoon after my arrival. I will return the visit in the afternoon. The Darbar will be next day.
C[URZON].

‡ I will consider this later.
C[URZON].

The decoration for the Sultan has also to be considered; perhaps a G. C. I. E. would be suitable. §

§ This depends upon what I am to put elsewhere. Perhaps Kemball should be asked whether G.C.I.E. is necessary, or whether K.C.I.E. is sufficient.
C[URZON].

We can of course arrange for the Consuls' salutes and if the Admiral visits the Sultan with His Excellency, only Your Excellency's salute would be fired. We could if necessary provide for firing this salute if the Sultan cannot.

In the papers tied below a quarantine difficulty is mentioned.

L. W. DANE,—15-10-1903.

Vide my marginal notes.

C[URZON],—15-10-1903.

With Your Excellency's permission the two draft telegrams may be issued.

Colonel Kemball in his telegram of 1st October recommended that no decoration should be given to any one except the Sultan of Maskat. Of the three clerks, one is the man who has been placed on special duty with Mr. Lorimer for Gazetteer work, one is the Superintendent of the External A Branch who knows the Gulf cases, and the third is a shorthand writer and copyist. I do not think we could manage with less and had already cut down the suggestions of the office. Some of them may be sea-sick. As to the Admiral's salute and visit at Maskat, should he go on in advance or should he not visit the Sultan separately on this occasion or at all? Major Cox has raised this question and also that of salutes for Consuls in his letter of 6th September.

L. W. DANE,—18-10-1903.

It is not the Admiral's visit but the Viceroy's and I can see no reason why there should be Admiral's visits or salutes at all. Otherwise we may have the nuisance repeated at each place where we touch.

C[URZON],—20-10-1903.

The telegram may issue. Let me have Sir A. Hardinge's telegram about the Governor of Fars' deputation to meet His Excellency. I presume he is the Ala-ed-Dowleh.

L. W. DANE,—21-10-1903.

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 21ST OCTOBER 1903. Pub. No. 253

Enquires about a decoration for the Sultan of Maskat.

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Rec. No. 454

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL AGENT AT MASKAT, DATED THE 21ST OCTOBER 1903.

Replies to his letter of the 4th October 1903, and says the Viceroy will receive an address from British Indian subjects at Maskat if suitably presented in a casket. Asks for a copy in advance. Gives details of visits, etc.

Rec. No. 535 LETTER FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 8TH OCTOBER 1903.

Gives further details of the programme connected with His Excellency's impending visit to the Persian Gulf.

Extract from a demi-official letter from Major P. Z. Cox, Political Agent, Maskat, to L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated the 12th October 1903.

* * * * * * * *

I am hoping to get some more details of the Viceroy's visit by to-morrow's mail, and wish it was possible to devise more means than I can now think of to do him honour. Short, however, of considerable expenditure on the Sultan's part, it is difficult to think of anything practicable, and in the present state of his finances I do not think that course would be approved.

* * * * * * * *

Rec. No. 457 TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER AT TEHRAN, DATED 19TH (RECEIVED 20TH) OCTOBER 1903.

Refers to his telegrem of the 10th October and says that the Shah has deputed the Governor General of Fars to proceed to the Persian Gulf to welcome the Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty and that he will meet His Excellency at Bunder Abbas. Enquires as to the correct etiquette in respect to official visits and salutes when the Viceroy is in foreign territory. Suggests that some decoration may be conferred on Ala-ed-Dowleh, if His Excellency contemplates any exchange of decorations.

Colonel Kemball's demi-official letter of the 8th October.—As the Governor-General of Fars is to meet His Excellency at Bunder Abbas, there will be no need for the Deputy Governor to be received. The Governor-General of Fars should presumably visit His Excellency the Viceroy, who will perhaps return the visit. (It will be seen that Colonel Kemball is doubtful about the propriety of the Viceroy's returning the visit of a *Governor*.)

Also the proposed site for the Vice-Consulate which is to cost, according to the estimates, Rs. 75,000.

His Excellency may wish to land and inspect the Vice-Consulate.

L. W. DANE.

There will presumably be no objection to the presentation of an address, as at Maskat, provided it is suitably done.

I do not delay to examine the customs matter in detail. A general approval of Colonel Kemball's views may be safely accorded.

The proposals as to Bahrein and Koweit appear to be suitable.

H. DALY.

His Excellency may wish to land at both places.

At Bushire I presume that the Viceroy will receive a visit from the Governor, but will not return it.

Colonel Kemball's suggestion that a reception should be held at the Residency at Bushire is for consideration.

I submit a draft telegram.

2. *Sir Arthur Hardinge's telegram of the 19th October.*—Our official records of the ceremonial observed on the occasion of visits paid by Viceroys to Goa and Pondicherry are meagre. The Military Secretary to the Viceroy may have details. All that appears to be required, however, is that a salute of 31 guns should be fired on His Excellency's arrival, and that the Governor-General should pay the first visit. The question of returning the Governor-General's visit has been mentioned above.

The question of a decoration for the Ala-ed-Dowleh is for consideration.

I put up a draft telegram which can be added to.

L. RUSSELL,—22-10-1903.

H. DALY,—22-10-1903.

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Rec No 57

TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER AT TEHRAN, DATED THE 22ND (RECEIVED 23RD) OCTOBER 1903.

Reports that the Governor-General of Fars cannot reach Bunder Abbas by the 22nd November, and that he has asked for £5,000 to bring large armed escort with him which will greatly delay his movements. Adds that he has told the Persian Government that His Excellency the Viceroy should be received by the Governer-General of Fars at Bunder Abbas and not at Bushire, and that the escort is quite unnecessary for reasons given.

Rec No 58

TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER AT TEHRAN, DATED 22ND (RECEIVED 23RD) OCTOBER 1903.

Proposed programme for His Excellency the Viceroy's reception in Persian ports.

I submit these two telegrams for Your Excellency's information in continuation of the case sent up this morning.

The proposals of Sir A. Hardinge meet most of the points connected with the reception programmes and seem suitable.

We may leave him to deal with the date of arrival of the Governor-General. If an honour is to be conferred on the latter the reception at the Residency before lunch might be a suitable occasion.

L. W. DANE,—23-10-1903.

Please inform Sir A. Hardinge that I am much obliged and entirely approve of proposed arrangements.

C[URZON],—23-10-1903.

Proceedings Secret E., June 1903, No. 240.

There is a reference to the Ala-ed-Dowleh in Sir A. Hardinge's despatch of 30th April 1903.

The question is under consideration if the Sultan of Maskat should receive a K.C.I.E., or a G.C.I.E. Colonel Kemball did not recommend any honours, but I presume that as the Governor-General of Fars is being specially deputed to meet Your Excellency, he should receive an honour of equal value to that given to the Sultan.

Apparently Colonel Kemball has not yet been asked about the latter. The Governor-General of Portuguese India received a K.C.I.E., and this might serve as a precedent. We might perhaps be prepared with C.I.E.'s for the Sheikhs of Koweit and Bahrein, if after discussion with Colonel Kemball the conferment of these honours is considered desirable in view of the attitude of the Sheikhs at the present visit.

A new policy is proposed at Bahrein which seems to be very desirable, but as to which Your Excellency's orders are necessary.

I have made additions to the draft telegrams which are for Your Excellency's consideration.

L. W. DANE,—23-10-1903.

See His Excellency's order of 23rd October 1903 on separate file which disposes of most of this case. I presume Sir A. Hardinge will inform Colonel Kemball, but copies of the telegrams may go to him by post. His Excellency is, I understand, addressing Sir A. Hardinge about the honour for the Ala-ed-Dowleh, but we may ask Colonel Kemball by telegraph: "What honours would you propose for Sultan, Maskat and Ala-ed-Dowleh. Would K.C.I.E. be suitable for both."

His Excellency desires that extracts should be made of all the proposals put forward by local officers for declarations to be made by His Excellency in his speeches at different places. Please recast this file, separate the demi-officials which may be treated as officials from the notes, and put up the extracts required in print as soon as possible.

L. W. DANE,—24-10-1903.

Rec No 59

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, NO. 2542-E. A., DATED THE 25TH OCTOBER 1903.

Asks for his opinion as to the honours to be given to the Sultan of Maskat and the Ala-ed-Dowleh.

Rec No 60

TELEGRAM TO HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER AT TEHRAN, NO. 2543-E.A., DATED THE 25TH OCTOBER 1903.

States that His Excellency the Viceroy is much obliged for his telegram of the 22nd October 1903, and approves of the arrangements proposed.

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Pol. A:61 ENDORSEMENT TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, NO. 2544-E. A., DATED THE 25TH OCTOBER 1903.

Encloses, for information and guidance, copies of telegraphic correspondence with Sir A. Hardinge regarding the approaching visit of His Excellency the Viceroy to the Persian Gulf.

Pol. A:62 TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL AGENT AT MASKAT, DATED THE 26TH OCTOBER 1903.

In reply to our telegram of the 21st October 1903, states that the average temperature on the 18th November next at Maskat will be about 77° and cool enough for ordinary uniform. States that he is sending draft programme by post.

Pol A:63 TELEGRAM FROM SIR A. HARDINGE, HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, TEHRAN, DATED THE 26TH OCTOBER 1903.

Asks whether His Excellency the Viceroy could, for the reasons stated, modify his programme in the manner indicated.

Pol A:64 TELEGRAM FROM SIR A. HARDINGE, HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, TEHRAN, DATED THE 27TH OCTOBER 1903.

Says he is bringing one Secretary, and that Colonel Douglas meets him at Bushire.

Pol. A:65 TELEGRAM TO SIR A. HARDINGE, HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, TEHRAN, DATED THE 27TH OCTOBER 1903.

Replies to the above telegram.

Pol A:66 TELEGRAM TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIAN STATION, DATED THE 28TH OCTOBER 1903.

States that Major Cox proposes that His Excellency the Viceroy should cross from Karachi to near Ras-al-Hadd, and thence cruise up the Oman coast on early morning of 18th November. Asks whether this can be done, and whether it will be convenient to hold Darbars at Maskat and elsewhere on the "Argonaut."

Pol. A:67 TELEGRAM TO SIR A. HARDINGE, HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, TEHRAN, DATED THE 28TH OCTOBER 1903.

In reply to his telegram of the 26th October 1903, says His Excellency the Viceroy is unable to alter his programme for the reasons stated.

[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated Maskat, the 19th October 1903.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Agent at Maskat,

To—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL the HON'BLE E. BARING, Military Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy.

Many thanks for your note received by this mail in reply to mine.

I fear Her Excellency will find things rather primitive here and elsewhere in the Gulf, but I hope that there will be no actual discomfort, and that there may prove to be sufficient objects of interest to compensate for the general sordidness and poverty-stricken appearance of the places visited.

So far I know no details of the Viceroy's programme, except that His Excellency will arrive here on the forenoon of 18th November, and leave sometime on the 19th: and at present the intention is, subject to approval, to have the sea-front illuminated and a display of fireworks from the Sultan's two flanking forts, after dinner on 18th. The night will be dark then and good for the purpose.

On the afternoon of the 18th if this does not interfere with the Viceroy's official arrangements I thought that some Arab and Seedi dancing might be amusing to Her Excellency and Viceregal party. The natives would ordinarily dance as they do on the festive occasions, on vacant plots of ground outside the town gates, but on 18th November in the afternoon there will be a very low tide and the dancing might take place on the broad stretch of sand on the sea front, and Lady Curzon could thus see it without tiring herself from our verandah. When she had seen enough of that Her Excellency might like to walk up and explore one of the old Portuguese Forts close by.

The tide, as I have mentioned above, will be very low on the afternoon of the 18th; lowest at 2-50 P. M., so that the earlier the ladies land the less irksome it will be for them, and my wife hopes that Her Excellency and party will come ashore to the Consulate whenever it suits them and will at all events honour our humble board at lunch and tea. Colonel and Mrs. Kemball, will, we hope, be here at the time.

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The second afternoon if the Viceroy does not leave before dark, Her Excellency might see the other Portugues Fort and afterwards walk or go by rickshaw half a mile to the Wadi and cultivation outside the Town Gates just to see what we can boast of in the way of vegetation.

This afternoon again the tide will be the same as before, and we hope Her Excellency will let us give her lunch and tea as may be convenient. The convenience or otherwise of landing (in fine weather, which no doubt the gods will provide) simply means that when the tide is low boats cannot reach the Consulate steps and passengers have to be carried a little way in a chair, but there is nothing difficult in it.

You must tell me anything that we can do on shore in the catering way. The rooms of the Consulate are so comparatively small that we cannot accommodate more than a dozen at a meal, but when the details of the time-table are worked out, it may prove convenient for His Excellency to take certain meals on shore and we shall of course be only too happy to do what we can in this way.

As regards provisions for the "Hardinge."—I suppose she is fitted with refrigerating apparatus, but if it should be required to any quantity of provisions, *e.g.*, milk and eggs, at Maskat, please give me as early notice as possible—*Rickshaws.* My wife has one rickshaw of sorts which she occasionally uses, and which would be at Her Excellency's disposal; but I think you would find it worth while to bring a couple of rickshaws with you for the ladies or have them sent on ahead to me. They might be useful at other places, besides Maskat.

I would order them without troubling you if I knew any one on whom I could depend to deliver them here in time, but I could not make certain of getting them and they might prove uncomfortable when they arrived.

Rec. No. 68

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL AGENT AT MASKAT, DATED THE 28TH OCTOBER 1903.

Suggests programme for His Excellency's visit to Maskat and asks him to telegraph if approved.

Please fill in date of His Excellency's arrival at Bushire and send off this telegram. If Major Burton at Muhammerah has no code and is not in telegraphic communication send to Resident, Bushire, to forward. Indeed, in any case, this will be best course, so that Colonel Kemball may know what we are doing.

L. W. DANE,—28-10-1903.

Rec. No. 69

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 2586-E. A., DATED THE 28TH OCTOBER 1903.

Proposal that the Sheikh of Muhammerah should go to Bushire to meet His Excellency the Viceroy.

Rec. No. 70

TELEGRAM FROM MR. GRANT DUFF, TEHRAN, TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY, DATED THE 28TH (RECEIVED 29TH) OCTOBER 1903.

His Excellency's reception at Bushire.

Rec. No. 71

TELEGRAM FROM SIR A. HARDINGE, HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, TEHRAN, DATED THE 28TH OCTOBER 1903.

Movements of the Governor-General of Fars, etc.

Rec. No. 72

TELEGRAM FROM SIR A. HARDINGE, HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, TEHRAN, DATED THE 29TH OCTOBER 1903.

Movements of the Governor-General of Fars.

Rec. No. 73

TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL AGENT AT MASKAT, DATED THE 28TH (RECEIVED 29TH) OCTOBER 1903.

Acknowledges receipt of draft programme and asks that his programme, which will reach Simia on the 30th October, may, if possible, be awaited. Offers certain suggestions as to His Excellency's visit.

Two new receipts. No orders seem to be required on Sir A. Hardinge's telegram.

It is addressed to His Excellency who will reply if necessary.

(2) The Maskat draft programme promised by Major Cox may be awaited. It should be here to-day or to-morrow.

(3) Major Cox's telegram of the 26th October is for information.

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(4) Please see the Resident's letter of the 8th October. At Bunder Abbas a deputation of British Indian traders wish to be received by His Excellency, no orders have been passed on this subject yet, *vide* notes at page 6.

H. P. C.,—30-10-1903.

L. Russell,—31-10-1903.

S. M. Fraser,—31-10-1903.

This seems to be much muddled up. Major Cox's programme has been received and should be submitted as soon as possible. There are later telegrams about the Governor-General, Fars.

L. W. Dane,—31-10-1903.

Rec. No. 74 Telegram from Sir A. Hardinge, to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 29th October 1903.

Recommends acceptance by His Excellency of official residence on shore for receiving Governor-General's official call.

Rec. No. 75 Telegram from His Excellency the Viceroy, to Sir A. Hardinge, dated the 29th October 1903.

In reply to the above telegram, accepts the suggestion about the official residence at Bushire. Adds that if the Governor-General finds it impossible to proceed to Bunder Abbas, he (the Viceroy) will act upon the advice of Sir A. Hardinge as to reception there.

Rec. No. 76 Telegram from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 30th (received 31st) October 1903.

Replies to Foreign Department telegrams of the 25th and 28th October 1903 regarding decorations for the Sultan of Maskat, etc., and gives his opinion on the matter.

[Demi-Official.]

Dated 26th October 1903.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Agent at Maskat,
To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Kindly send a copy of the draft programme to Colonal Baring as it differs somewhat from some suggestions I made to him last week in connection with Her Excellency's movements.

Rec. No. 77 Letter from the Political Agent at Maskat, dated the 26th (received 31st) October 1903.

Forwards a draft address given to him by the Native British subjects of Maskat for transmission to Government for approval or amendation.

Rec. No. 78 Letter from the Political Agent at Maskat, dated the 26th (received 31st) October 1903.

Draft programme for Maskat.

The proposals made by Major Cox for the "Mizaj-pursi," the Sultan's visit, the Viceroy's return visit, and the Darbar appear to be suitable and may be approved. He may be informed that the Sultan's son, Timur, and four high officials should wait upon His Excellency to escort him on the occasion of the return visit.

I have made a few additions.
L. W. Dane.

Also question whether Sultan on visiting His Excellency should receive a salute when he arrives as well as when he leaves.
S. M. Fraser.

He should get both.
L. W. Dane.

The remaining points in the programme, including the ceremonial on arrival will doubtless be dealt with by the Military Secretary to the Viceroy to whom a copy of Major Cox's draft programme may be sent with an intimation of the action taken by the Foreign Department.

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3. I put up a draft telegram to Major Cox. We might send to him with a demi-official letter copies of the programmes annexed, with an explanation that they have been drawn upon the lines usual in similar cases, and may be useful to him in settling details. We recognise that in various points they are probably unsuitable, the necessary alterations can be made after personal consultation at Maskat.

As altered by me, I think they willdo and may be sent to him for information. If he has any corrections to suggest, he can telegraph them.
L. W. DANE.

4. If His Excellency is prepared to receive the proposed address, Major Cox may be so informed.

5. Colonel Kemball's telegram of the 30th October regarding decorations is for consideration.

6. The two telegrams of the 29th October from and to Tehran have presumbly been dealt with in the office of the Private Secretary to the Viceroy.

L. RUSSELL,—1-11-1903.

S. M. FRASER,—2-11-1903.

The draft programmes for Maskat, which are based on Major Cox's proposals, are for approval.

The wording of the proposed Maskat address is also for approval.

The Assistant Resident at Bunder Abbas can be told to forward a copy of the address which the British Residents proposed to deliver and which Your Excellency is, I understand, willing to receive if it is properly and suitably presented.

Colonel Kemball's proposals for honour are for consideration, a G.C.I.E. seems a good deal for a man who talks of abdicating and who is a poor creature. Sanction might be obtained to give Koweit, Bahrein and Muhammerah C. I. E.'s if this is considered desirable after consultation with the local officers. A suitable present will be arranged for the Sheikh of Muhammerah.

I do not quite know when the presents will be given, *i.e.*, at or after the Darbars, but perhaps we may leave this to be settled at Maskat.

L. W. DANE,—2-11-1903.

His Excellency's orders taken. The telegram below may issue to Major Cox, ask Captain Grey to submit copy of proposed address at Bunder Abbas which must be suitably presented in a casket.

His Excellency will address His Majesty's Government about honours and will ask for G. C. I. E. for Sultan and for permission to present C. I. E.'s to Sheikhs, Bahrein, Koweit and Muhammerah if this is considered desirable.

Admiral should receive copies of the draft programmes and be asked if he concurs or has any suggestions to offer. He should be asked if he agrees to make the arrangements suggested by A in Major Cox's draft which might be repeated *mutatis mutandis* at the various ports entered.

A copy of the whole programme should be sent to Colonel Baring as modified. I had better see the draft.

L. W. DANE,—3-11-1903.

TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 31ST OCTOBER (RECEIVED THE 2ND NOVEMBER) 1903.

Suggests certain arrangements for the Darbar at Shargah.

I think as modified this telegram will serve as the basis for a programme for the Darbar at Shargah. I do not know if these Chiefs are entitled to a guard-of-honour, I suppose they are as they get salutes. Let Mr. Botelho work out a programme to-day for me to show to His Excellency to-morrow. A list of the Chiefs with their salutes should be added.

L. W. DANE,—2-11-1903.

A revised copy of the Shargah Darbar programme is submitted.

The list of Chiefs has been taken from the paper noted in the margin, in which the Sheikh of Ras-el-Kheima is not included. Perhaps Koweit and Bahrein will not be present as His Excellency proposes to visit their ports. If there be any doubt, the names may be omitted from the programme.

Telegram from Colonel Kemball, dated 1st October 1903.

It is presumed a translation of the address will have to be read.

A guard-of-honour will be present for the Viceroy, but they will not present arms to the Arab Chiefs. Chiefs below those with 11 guns are not entitled to a guard-of-honour. The Arab Chiefs have salutes of only five and three guns.

Army Regulations, India, Volume II, Part A, paragraph 67.
Table of Salutes, page 4.

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These salutes can only be fired at the termination of an official visit; but if at a departure from a Darbar the Viceroy's salute is fired, no other salute is given.

Army Regulations, India, Volume II, Part A, page 88. The Naval Commander-in-Chief is entitled to 11 guns as a Rear-Admiral, with two guns added.

J. W. B.,—2-11-1903.

This programme may be printed off and the draft telegram sent to Colonel Kemball.

L. W. DANE,—3-11-1903.

This programme has been struck off, and a copy was sent yesterday to Political Resident, Bushire, a duplicate copy being sent to-day. A copy is annexed.

J. W. B.,—5-11-03.

Rec. No. 180 TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 2629-E. A., DATED THE 3RD NOVEMBER 1903.

Regarding the Darbar at Shargah.

Please issue the telegrams below to Colonel Kemball unless we have already told him what is proposed.

L. W. DANE,—3-11-1903.

Rec. No. 181 TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 2ND (RECEIVED THE 3RD) NOVEMBER 1903.

Arrangements for His Excellency the Viceroy's tour.

Rec. No. 182 TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 2639-E. A., DATED THE 4TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Replies to the above telegram.

Rec. No. 183 TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL AGENT AT MASKAT, No. 3630-E.A., DATED THE 3RD NOVEMBER 1903.

Arrengements connected with His Excellency's visit to Maskat.

The three drafts below are submitted for approval.

The programmes with spare copies may be taken to Camp as guides to the procedure to be adopted at other ports of call. Details will doubtless be settled with Colonel Kemball.

L. RUSSELL,—5-11-1903.

S. M. FRASER,—5-11-1903.

L. W. DANE,—5-11-1903.

Rec. No. 184 TELEGRAM FROM COLONEL KEMBALL, BUSHIRE, DATED AND RECEIVED THE 5TH NOVEMBER 1903.

States Governor of Bushire's salute is 17 guns. Informs he will tell Governor entertainment of Viceroy unnecessary. Presumes that Viceroy will return visit of Ala-ed-Dowleh.

Rec. No. 185 TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 2647-E. A., DATED THE 5TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Proposed address from the British Indian traders at Bunder Abbas.

[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated the 6th November 1903.

From—C. L. S. RUSSELL, Esq., Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—LIEUT.-COL. the HON'BLE E. BARING, C.V.O., Military Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy.

I send herewith, for information, a complete set of the programmes, connected with the visit of His Excellency to the Persian Gulf and Maskat.

The Admiral has been asked whether he agrees to make the arrangements suggested in lines 4—13 of the draft programme of His Excellency's arrival at Maskat which might be repeated *mutatis mutandis* at the various ports entered.

Rec. No. 186 LETTER TO THE NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIAN STATION, No. 2649-E. A., DATED THE 6TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Sends him a set of the programmes and asks whether he concurs in them. Asks him also whether he agrees to repeat the arrangements suggested at each port.

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[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated Maskat, the 3rd November 1903.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Agent, Maskat,

To—L. W. DANE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Kemball sent me a copy of your telegram of 21st October (or before?) asking for programme and up-to-date narrative, and added that he supposed the latter requirements applied to Maskat too.

The Viceroy's "Persia" and Aitchison give better résumés of Maskat history than I could venture to produce, but I enclose some notes which I have put together which may supplement those.

I must apologise for their being somewhat untidy, but I am working shorthanded and the typewriter is not quite in order, so please excuse clerical shortcomings.

MASKAT NOTES.

Topography.

Maskat lies in Latitude 23° 37′ 55″; Longitude 58° 35′ 58″.

The mass of hills forming the harbour and its background consists of denuded volcanic rock, part of an igneous tract extending from a point 4 miles west of Maskat to a distance of 6 miles south of it, where the denudation ceases and the superstratum of limestone appears again. Seven miles to the north-west the range recedes from the coast and leaves a fertile belt of maritime plain known as the "Batineh from 10 to 15 miles in width and terminated after a stretch of 170 miles by a second junction of the mountain range with the coast line, at Khor Kalbeh. The city of Maskat itself is protected on the land side by a high crenelated wall in which there are two main gates: one leading southwards to the adjoining cove and suburb of Sidab and the other westwards to Matra. These gates are closed at sunset. Maskat itself is unapproachable for baggage animals from the interior owing to its inhospitable girdle of rugged hills, and thus it is that the sister town of Matra, 3 miles away to the west, is the emporium for all caravan traffic between the capital and the interior.

Population.

The population is to some extent a fluctuating one and has never been subjected to any regular census, but the following figures are believed to be a fairly accurate estimate at present:—

Maskat and suburbs	12,000
Matra and suburbs	18,000
Total ...	30,000

Only about half the population are pure Arabs, the remainder being composed of Baluchis and negroes and miscellaneous races. The Arabs are gradually losing their separate identity and becoming blended with the other races, owing to the easy means of slave concubinage and the legitimisation of the resulting offspring by the Mahomedan religion.

Religion.

The national religion of Oman is practically peculiar to and confined to the country and the Omanis are regarded as schismatics by orthodox Mahomedans. They are known as "Ibadhis" or "Biyadhis" from the name of the founder of the sect, one Abdulla bin Ibadh, who flourished in the time of the Caliph Marwan about A. D. 744 to 749. Their chief distinctive doctrines are—

(1) the Imamate should go by selection and the voice of the people and not hereditary claims;

(2) predestination as opposed to free will.

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At the present day they have very few learned exponents of their particular tenets, and except in a few unimportant details of ritual they differ little from orthodox Sunni Mahomedans.

British subjects.

There are about 1,300 British subjects in Maskat and other ports of Oman at the present day, composed of the following races:—

(1)	Hindus, mostly natives of Sind and Khatiawar	650
(2)	Sindi Khojas, a colony originally hailing from Hyderabad, Sind	500
(3)	Hindustani Mahomedans, Goanese, etc.	150
	Total ...	1,300

Banians.

The Hindus are of various castes and trades, but in Oman just as on the African Coast, and other countries outside India, they are commonly all included in the general term "Banian."

Nationality of Khojas.

The history of the Maskat Khojas is interesting. They form a colony of about 1,000 souls inhabiting a quarter in Matra known as the "Khoja Fort." In former times it was what its name implies, but in recent and less turbulent times the walls of the fort have built onto and into and the enclosure has lost its defensive character, as such, 40 years ago, the nationality of the Khojas furnished Government with a difficult problem for solution. Some of the community claimed British protection on the grounds that their ancestors and relations were British Indian subjects; others again claimed to be Maskat subjects as being born and domiciled in Maskat; both when it suited them would ring the changes and play off the Political Agent against the Sultan. The main source of difficulty was that although, generally speaking, the Khojas were a colony migrated bodily from Sind, yet some of them had so migrated before Sind passed to the British Crown and some had followed afterwards. It was eventually decided that protection should be accorded to that portion of the colony which migrated from Sind after it became a part of British India, and this proportion of the community and their descendants have since continued to be regarded as British subjects. The latter now number about 500 persons.

Religion of the Khojas.

Their religious tenets are somewhat peculiar and involved. With the exception of 8 or 10 persons all the males are "Seceders" from the following of His Highness the Agha Khan, whom they do not recognise in any way, but they are not perverts or converts to Sunni Mahomedanism like the Seceders of Bombay. They have adopted Shiism and are staunch adherents of that creed, undertaking their pilgrimages to Kerbela and Nejef and whenever possible sending the corpses of their relatives to the former holy place for interment. But the most curious fact about the community is that, in spite of the secession of the men, almost all their womenkind have remained faithful to Agha Khan and have a separate place of worship. As may be imagined this diversity of creed among members of the same family is the cause of constant strife and litigation among them. There are only about a dozen male Agha Khanis in the community.

In days gone by they were a prosperous class and owned many of the sailing ships which used to ply between Maskat and the further east, but since the elimination of these by the ingress of steam traffic their commercial prosperity has been on the decline, and added to this the race is becoming weedy and degenerate from constant inbreeding and owing to the crowded state of their quarter, so that the future of the community does not offer an encouraging prospect.

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THE RULING FAMILY.

The Sultan of Maskat belongs to the Al-Bu-Saeed clan, an Azdite tribe originally migrated to Oman from Yemen. Their strongholds nowadays are the towns of Manh, Semmed, Izz and Nezwah in Central Oman and they are classed among the Hinawis as opposed to the Ghafiris or Ishmaelite stock originally immigrated from Nejd. The Sultan owes his fragile sceptre to his ancestor Ahmed bin Saeed, a man of humble position, who by pure force of character came to the front at a time of national emergency in 1741, when he brought about the expulsion of the Persian troops of Nadir Shah who were then overrunning Oman, and in recognition of his services was unanimously hailed "Imam".

We see, therefore, that the present dynasty has been in power for upwards of 160 years, and except for a short interval between 1865 and 1871 during which Azzan bin Kais, a member of a near collateral branch of the house of Ahmed bin Saeed, usurped and held the Sultanate, it has never been out of the present Sultan's immediate family.

Seyyid Feisal's forbears were as follows: (Feisal) bin *Turki* bin *Saeed* bin *Sultan* bin *Ahmed*, so that it will be seen that, in spite of the unsettled condition of the country, rulers have been on the whole long lived and long reigned.

The first of the Sultans of Oman to enter into formal political relations with the British Government was the present Sultan's great grandfather Seyyid Sultan, who in 1798 concluded a treaty with the English and two years later a second treaty providing for a British representative to be deputed to reside at his court Assistant Surgeon Bogle was the first British Agent appointed in pursuance of the above requests in 1800.

I note that as early as 1840 when the Egyptian Mahomed Ali sent a force to Bereymee with the intention of overrunning and annexing Oman, the British Government intimated through its Resident in Cairo that it would allow no interference with Oman.

The present Sultan was the second of the three sons of Seyyid Turki and having the strongest position and following on his father's death obtained the Sultanate (1888) and after the lapse of some little time was formally recognised by the British Government (1890).

At the time of his recognition Seyyid Feisal gave an undertaking to the Resident, Colonel Ross, to the effect that he would act up to all the engagements undertaken by his father, and testified to his desire to be guided in all important matters of policy by the advice of the British Government.

Seyyid Feisal is 39 years of age having been born in 1864. His eldest son, Taimoor, is by His Highness's chief wife, Aleyyah, daughter of Seyyid Thoweynee and therefore first cousin of the Sultan. He is 17 years of age.

The Productions and Commerce of Maskat.

Half a century ago Maskat used to be a much more thriving place than it is at the present day. It was in fact the distributing centre for the whole of the trade of the Gulf, and within the memory of inhabitants still living as many as 40 clipper sailing ships have been seen at anchor in Maskat harbour at one time. Many of the owners of these vessels were very wealthy and resided in comparatively palatial buildings in the suburbs of Maskat and Matra which have since crumbled to ruin. From the time that steam vessels began to ply on these waters the prosperity of Maskat has gradually waned.

PRODUCTIONS.

The chief exports are dates, fruit, fish, limes, and pomegranates. In lesser quantities the following fruits are grown:—peaches, apricots, apples, mangoes, oranges, citrons, sweetlimes, grapes, quinces, custard apples, papiyas, and plantains.

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Cereals.—Only in very small quantities for local consumption.

Metals.—Copper, lead, iron ore and coal exist, but so far have not been found in sufficient quantities to repay working.

Industries.—Date packing for export. Fish drying. A little weaving of grass mats and loongies.

TRADE.

The following figures for the past ten years give some idea of the present position of Maskat as regards its commerce :—

Values in dollars.

Year.	Volume.	Imports.	Imports from France.	Imports from America.	Customs farm sold for
1893	3,775,326	2,053,006	Not recorded.	15,780	115,000
1894	3,708,180	2,079,600	Do.	17,200	115,000
1895	3,708,210	2,288,760	Do.	174,700	120,000
1896	4,788,800	2,879,500	50,000	29,000	125,000
1897	5,372,000	3,375,000	100,000	27,000	140,000
1898	4,289,000	2,592,290	60,000	48,000	145,000
1899	4,134,020	2,600,720	61,550	40,000	Administered by the Sultan.
1900	4,725,776	3,365,883	*134,850*	61,960	
1901	4,637,764	2,996,688	*116,700*	47,200	
1902	5,711,950	3,205,435	*182,316*	61,800	

From the above it will be noticed that—

(i) the volume of trade is steady with a tendency to increase ;

(ii) the direct imports from France are rapidly increasing. They consist entirely of arms and ammunition ;

(iii) whereas the customs farm was formerly sold to local merchants for sums varying from 110,000 dollars to 145,000 dollars, the Sultan now conducts the administration of the customs himself and cannot realise much less than 200,000 dollars from it.

There is practically no import from the United Kingdom direct except in arms and ammunition. All other goods come *viâ* Bombay.

RECENT ITEMS OF MASKAT HISTORY.

1895.—Attack on Maskat by rebels under Shaikh Saleh bin Ali, during which damage was done to the property of British subjects to the value of 77,000 dollars for which amount an indemnity was required from the Sultan. Part of it he recovered by a punitive tax on the rebel tribes and the balance was deducted from the arrears of his subsidy which had been suspended.

1899.—In September of this year Maskat was visited by a severe epidemic of cholera which quickly spread to the interior. About 700 persons were carried off in Maskat and Matra and upwards of 120,000 in Oman. No such epidemic had occurred since 1825.

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1900.—Hardly had the cholera subsided when Maskat had a visitation of bubonic plague. Fortunately the epidemic was not a severe one and did not spread to the interior, and both before and since this visitation Maskat has been fortunate in the immunity which it has enjoyed from this disease, considering its close proximity to and constant communication with India.

During this year the Sultan decided to take the Customs Administration into his own hands instead of farming it out as hitherto to local merchants. This measure has resulted in a decided increase of revenue to the Sultan himself and in several improvements in the local arrangements for the safe landing and storage of goods. The Customs Superintendent has a somewhat difficult card to play, because naturally the Banian element, who used to make large profits out of the farm, do not look upon the present regimé with favour, and are not slow to find fault. On the whole the Customs Superintendent, however, seems to me to have done good work, and during the last three years considerable extensions and improvements have taken place in the Wharf and Customs House premises which cannot fail to strike anyone who remembers Maskat a few years ago. The Sultan is anxious to provide still further facilities for the landing and shipping of merchandise by the erection of a jetty running out from the Customs wharf, but this is an expensive undertaking which he is not at present in a position to embark upon unless he can be allowed to recover whole or part of the cost by a small increase in customs duty.

1901.—On the 4th October the Sultan's old and valued servant, the Vazier Seyyid Saeed, died very suddenly from an aneurism of the heart. He was by far the most enlightened man living amongst the Sultan's retainers in regard to all matters of policy and had strong Anglophille feelings which were often useful to the Political Agent. The Sultan has been unable to replace him. His present nominal Vazier is a venerable dotard whom it is impossible for the Sultan or foreign Consuls to do any serious business with.

In November 1901 the telegraph cable was extended from Jask to Maskat and the custom accorded to the telegraph office seems to have more than come up to expectations. In the same year Government authorised the purchase of Shett Ruttonsee Purshotam's premises in order to provide accommodation for the clerks of the Consular and Telegraph offices and a residence for the Agency Surgeon. The site is a desirable one on the sea face and the buildings designed are now in course of erection.

1902.—In January of this year a slaving fleet of 12 Arab dhows was surprised and captured by a Portuguese man-of-war and 725 slaves released. About 150 of the Arab slavers were taken prisoners and all proved to hail from Oman and mostly from Soor. About 20 have died in captivity, and the remainder have been awarded the exemplary sentence of 25 years' confinement on the west coast of Africa.

In December, in response to the invitation of the Government of India, His Highness the Sultan sent his son, Seyyid Taimoor, and two companions, to represent him at the Delhi Durbar, where they were received with distinction by the Government of India and returned after a short tour in India, much impressed with what they had seen.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 1569 F. D.—12-11-03.—44.—H. A. W.

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

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Pol. No. 87

TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 4TH (RECEIVED 5TH) NOVEMBER 1903.

Replies to Foreign Department telegram of the 4th November 1903, and asks whether Hamriyeh is not an independent Trucial Chief. Requests to be informed whether he should arrange for Ahmed-bin-Thani to meet His Excellency at Bahrein.

I find no mention of Hamriyeh in Aitchison or in Lord Curzon's Persia. The office also has no information regarding him.

We might telegraph to Colonel Kemball and say that as Hamriyeh has concluded no treaty, we think, subject to his advise, that this Sheikh should not rank with the Trucial Chiefs. Enquiry may also be made whether the Chief of Ras-el-Kheima should not attend the Darbar and receive presents.

2. As regards Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Thani of Katr, we may ask Colonel Kemball to tell Mr. Gaskin to address him privately as suggested.

I put up draft telegram for consideration.

L. RUSSELL,—6-11-1903.

Taken to Secretary. Issue the telegram as modified.

L. RUSSELL,—6-11-1903.

Pol. No. 88

TELEGRAM TO COLONEL KEMBALL, BUSHIRE, No. 2651-E. A., DATED THE 6TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Replies to his telegram of 4th November.

Pol. No. 89

TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT, PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 6TH (RECEIVED 7TH) NOVEMBER 1903.

States he will arrange that Hamriyeh will not attend Darbar. Asks whether Mr. Gaskin should be directed to write privately to Sheikh Ahmed suggesting his coming over.

The telegram has been repeated to camp and action will doubtless be taken there.

The question of Sheikh Admed's summons to Bahrein has been dealt with in a separate file.

L. RUSSELL,—8-11-1903.

S. M. FRASER,—8-11-1903.

Pol. No. 90

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 8TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Instructions relative to Ahmed-bin-Thani paying his respects to the Viceroy at Bahrein.

Pol. No. 91

FROM THE OFFICER COMMANDING HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP *ARGONAUT*, BOMBAY, DATED THE 3RD NOVEMBER (RECEIVED IN CAMP) 1903.

Makes certain enquiries in regard to the two Darbars to be held on board the Argonaut.

Pol. No. 92

TELEGRAM TO THE OFFICER COMMANDING HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP *ARGONAUT*, DATED THE 8TH NOVEMBER 1903.

States that the Viceroy is much obliged to the Naval Commander-in-Chief for arranging that Darbars should be held on the Argonaut *and asks for certain information.*

Telegram, dated the 8th November 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp,

To—J. G. LORIMER, Esq., C/o Major Bannerman, I.M.S., Bombay.

Demi-official. Will you be prepared to translate and read in Arabic Viceroy's speeches at Maskat, etc. Please find out if local Arabic in Gulf differs widely from language of examination passed.

Telegram, dated the 9th November 1903.

From—J. G. LORIMER, Esq., Parel,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp, Nabha.

Demi-official. Gulf dialect differs largely from Egyptian. Could Commissioner, Sind, bring up intelligent gentlemanly native scholars Arabic Persian for my selection.

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

Telegram, dated the 10th November 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp,
To—The Commissioner in Sind.

Demi-official. Can you kindly arrange to send to Lorimer, Political Department, who reaches Karachi Friday next, two native gentlemen speaking Arabic and Persian dialects of the Gulf to assist in translating Viceroy's speeches.

Telegram, dated the 10th November 1903.

From—Foreign, Viceroy's Camp,
To—The Foreign Department, Simla.

Have you posted to me the note on the trade of Maskat and other ports in the Gulf which His Excellency requires for his speech as soon as possible.

Dated the 3rd November 1903.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., British Consul and Political Agent at Maskat,
To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have not heard finally yet regarding the details of the Maskat programme, meanwhile there are one or two items in the draft under consideration with regard to which I have a few more observations to submit.

I. The Sultan suggested sending his brother, Seyyid Mahomed, his son Seyyid Timur and his Vazier to welcome His Excellency immediately on his arrival.

I think it would be graceful to give Seyyid Mahomed, the senior of the three, a salute on the deputation's departure. If given, it would be 13 guns.

II. Presentation of address by British subjects:—

(1) I suppose about 20 persons selected from the various denominations would form the deputation presenting the address?

(2) Among persons accorded British protection in Maskat are the Goanese and they will participate in the celebration of the Viceroy's visit equally with other British subjects. I gather that there will be no objection as between ourselves and the Portuguese, if their representatives are included in the deputation.

III. How many persons can be accommodated at the Darbar on the *Argonaut*?

IV. It has been suggested to me that at any rate one band will be present either with His Excellency's entourage or with the Admiral; and that it would please the populace much, if a band played, say on the Customs Wharf on the afternoon of the Viceroy's visit to the Sultan.

V. Will His Excellency have any bodyguard with him? People without local knowledge may think it vain to set store upon numerical superiority in regard to funnels or fighting-tops! but no one who has moved among the uncivilised orientals of these parts can fail to realise that such things constitute a factor which is worth considering and at one time or another must be considered. It is not so much, or at all events not only, the actual spectators who are affected by the impression which they derive, their fellow countrymen far and wide receive and assimilate the exaggerated accounts they hear, and as at present no one can compete with us; or provide such a great occasion it seems worth making the most of details.

If His Excellency had a few files of the bodygard with him when he made official visits, at all events at Maskat, and the Pirate Coast and Koweit, it would impress the public I am sure. The usual functionaries macebearer, etc., I suppose he will have in any case; and perhaps the other suggestion may already have been thought of; but I trust there is no harm in my mentioning it.

VI. The French Consul has asked me to arrange, if possible for him, to pay his respects to His Excellency. If that hour will suit the Viceroy, I should think the best time would be on the 18th morning, when the Sultan has returned from the *Hardinge*. Monsieur Laronce will hear the latter's salute and could take that as his cue for going off. He informs me that as he is too young to promote to Consul he still remains Vice-Consul, but is in charge of a consulate and is entitled to receive honours due to a Consul.

VII. Mr. Mackirdy the American Consular representative will no doubt express a similar wish later on. He is in an analogous position to Monsieur Laronce. He has not taken the oath of allegiance to America and so cannot be made "Consul" but is in charge of the consulate, signs himself "Vice and Acting Consul," and is treated by the American Government as Consul.

The above miscellaneous items are all that occur to me at present. If you could wire brief replies to II, III and VI it would be convenient.

I. As the Sultan will be at Maskat himself, I do not quite see how we can fire a salute in honour of his brother.

II. (*a*) Twenty persons may form the deputation of British subjects to present the address.

(*b*) No objection to one or two Goanese being present, but the point need not be specially noticed.

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III. We have asked the Officer Commanding His Majesty's Ship *Argonaut* what the area of the clear deck space is, and on hearing from him can let Political Agent know.

IV. Military Secretary to Viceroy believes that there is a Band on the *Argonaut* and we can arrange about this at Karachi.

V. No men of the Bodyguard are going and there will only be the usual guard of the Marine Battalion on the *Hardinge*. For the Darbar on the *Argonaut* we shall have a guard of marines which ought to be sufficient. For the return visit some marines or blue jackets can perhaps be landed at the customs quay where Your Excellency will arrive.

VI. Major Cox's proposals about the visit of Mr. ~~Larnce~~, the French Consul, who has behaved on the whole well, may be approved. Larnce/

VII. Do. do. as regards the Acting American Consul, though the United States of America Government are not co-operating as cordially as might have been desired about the spirit traffic.

L. W. DANE,—9-11-1903.

His Excellency's verbal orders obtained and the draft telegram may issue.

L. W. DANE,—9-11-1903.

TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL AGENT, MASKAT, DATED AND RECEIVED THE 7TH NOVEMBER 1903. Pur.1-93

States that the Sultan wishes to present an address to the Viceroy at the Darbar at Maskat.

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL AGENT, MASKAT, DATED THE 8TH NOVEMBER 1903. Pur.1-94

Approves of the proposal contained in his telegram above.

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL AGENT, MASKAT, DATED THE 9TH NOVEMBER 1903. Pur.1-95

Communicates certain instructions in connection with His Excellency's visit to Maskat.

Translation of address which the Sultan proposes to make to His Excellency the Viceroy when the latter returns His Highness's visit. Pur.1-96

FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 30TH OCTOBER (RECEIVED 7TH NOVEMBER) 1903. Pur.1-97

Submits short narratives on the status, etc., of Trucial Chiefs.

This may go to Camp.

L. RUSSELL,—10-11-1903.

[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Telegram, dated the 11th November 1903.

From—The Commissioner in Sind, Larkana,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp.

T.-43. Your telegram of tenth about two translators. I have telegraphed to Karachi Collector to find them and to let you know when found.

TELEGRAM FROM MR. GRANT DUFF, TEHRAN, DATED AND RECEIVED THE 11TH NOVEMBER 1903. Pur.1-98

Conveys information regarding the reception of His Excellency the Viceroy by Persian Officials at Bushire.

L. W. DANE,—11-11-1903.

C[URZON],—11-11-1903.

Telegram, dated the 11th November 1903.

From—Foreign, Simla,

To—Foreign with Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp.

Your telegram of 10th. Trade statistics quoted in paragraph 25 of despatch, dated 21st September 1899, have been completed up to 1901, and the statement despatched in charge of Mr. Caston who leaves here to-morrow. As Maskat was not included in statistics of despatch, no statement has been prepared as regards that port, but one is now in hand and will be posted to you to-morrow. I am in the meantime sending by Mr. Caston a copy of a report submitted by Major Cox showing the trade of Maskat.

Telegram, dated the 12th November 1903.

From—Foreign, Simla,

To—Foreign with Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp.

Following telegram received from Admiral, Bombay, of 10th November:—*Begins*—Reference to Gazette, submit that words "Accompanied by Squadron" be substituted for "escorted by East India Squadron." I believe that only His Majesty can order escort—*Ends*.

2622 F. D.

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TELEGRAM FROM HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, DATED THE 10TH (RECEIVED 12TH) NOVEMBER 1903.

Gives the substance of a despatch, dated the 6th November, issued in reply to His Excellency's Secret despatch No. 148, dated the 17th September 1903, regarding the visit to the Persian Gulf.

If this is meant otherwise than in a Parliamentary or Pickwickian sense it is rather disappointing especially about Maskat. Your Excellency will probably not want any note from me.

L. W. DANE,—13-11-1903.

They must say something.

C[URZON],—14-11-1903.

Pub 100

FROM THE REAR ADMIRAL, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIAN STATION, BOMBAY, No. 1171, DATED THE 9TH (RECEIVED 13TH) NOVEMBER 1903.

Enquires whether His Excellency the Viceroy's proposal to arrive at Ras-el-Hadd at daylight has been abandoned. Offers certain suggestions in the matter of salutes, etc., in connection with His Excellency's tour to the Gulf.

Please see the letter below just received from the Admiral. A "clear the line" telegram has been sent asking the Admiral to send duplicate copy to Foreign with Viceroy, and it may reach camp before they leave Karachi. It may be well to issue the telegram below also.

L. RUSSELL,—13-11-1903.

Telegram to issue.

Please answer by separate telegram Admiral's inquiry about number of guns for the Sheikh of Hamriyeh.

S. M. FRASER,—13-11-1903.

Pub 101

TELEGRAM TO THE REAR ADMIRAL, BOMBAY, DATED THE 13TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Requests him to post by to-night's mail train copy of his letter cited to the address of the Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp.

Telegram, dated the 13th November 1903.

From—Foreign, Simla,

To—Foreign, Viceroy's Camp.

Letter No. 1171, dated 9th November just received from Admiral in reply to our letter 6th November regarding ceremonial. Admiral has been requested by telegram to post duplicate to reach you before departure from Karachi. If this does not reach you, copy will doubtless be communicated, and necessary arrangements considered *en route*. After discussing in detail arrangements for arrival, darbar, salutes, etcetra, Admiral concludes :—*Begins*—"Referring to Gazette * * * I have no *orders* from the Admiralty to accompany His Excellency"—*Ends*.

It will be observed from the Table of Salutes accorded to Native Chiefs that the Sheikh of Hamriyeh's name is not included and he is therefore not entitled to a salute. The Admiral may be informed accordingly. Draft telegram put up.

T. P.,—13-11-1903.

J. R. R.,—13-11-1903.

L. RUSSELL,—14-11-1903.

To issue.

S. M. FRASER,—14-11-1903.

Pub 102

TELEGRAM TO THE REAR ADMIRAL, EAST INDIAN STATION, BOMBAY, No. 2712-E. A., DATED THE 14TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Says that the Sheikh of Hamriyeh is not entitled to a salute.

FROM NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, No. 1171, DATED THE 5TH (RECEIVED 9TH) NOVEMBER 1903.

Enquiry whether the cost of coal used by His Majesty's ships employed in connection with the forthcoming cruise of His Excellency the Viceroy in the Persian Gulf will be met for out of Indian funds. Substitution of the "Pomone" for the "Perseus" as a subsidized ship.

We do not know what arrangements have been sanctioned for His Excellency's cruise, but granting that the vessels in the Naval Commander-in-Chief's letter are being employed

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at the request of the Government of India and the service is Indian service, the cost of the coal must be borne by India. The formal concurrence of the Government of India to the subsitution of "Pomone" for the "Perseus" as a subsidized ship may also be communicated to the Admiral.

2. The file may, however, be first sent urgently to the Foreign Department for favour of note whether the assumption in paragraph 1 is correct.

H. W. R. SENIOR,—10-11-1903.

The Honourable Member will probably be aware whether the Naval Commander-in-Chief is correct in saying that the vessels of the East Indian squadron are going to the Persian Gulf at the initial request of the Government of India, if so, then India must pay for the coal. If, however, the movements of the squadron have been prompted by His Majesty's Government and the action taken by the Government of India has been merely to concur in, and to pass on to the Admiral the wishes of the Home Government, it would seem right that the part at least of the cost should be borne by the Admiralty. Presumably the advantages to be gained by the move of squadron to the Persian Gulf are much more than local, and the interest involved could not be described purely Indian.

F. G. CARDEW,—10-11-1903.

I think the cost of the coal should be borne by India. Does my honourable colleague concur?

E. R. E[LLES],—10-11-1903.

Honourable Sir E. Law, K.C.M.G., C.S.I.

I fear that this view ought to be accepted.

ENDORSEMENT FROM THE MARINE DEPARTMENT, No. 860, DATED AND RECEIVED THE 13TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Forwards copy of a letter to the Rear Admiral, Commanding His Majesty's Naval Forces, East Indian Station, intimating that the cost of the coal consumed by the vessels mentioned while employed in connection with the Viceroy's cruise in the Persian Gulf, will be borne by Indian funds.

No orders.

L. RUSSELL,—15-11-1903.

Demi-official, dated the 10th November 1903.

From—Major P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Maskat,

To—L. W. DANE, Esq.

I have waited till the last minute possible in the hope that the in-coming mail bringing the printed programme would reach me before the out-going mail left, but there is no sign of it, so I must go ahead without it.

There are one or two doubtful points to go into.

In your telegram of 3rd November you wired to me "your proposals for Mizaj-pursi, Sultan's visit, Viceroy's return visit and Darbar approved".

I gather from this that His Excellency will lunch here and make the return visit from the Consulate.

Later on in the same telegram you say—

"Presume His Excellency will proceed from Consulate to Barza (Darbar Room *by water*)."

This point is a little difficult to settle satisfactorily. I venture to make the following suggestions for consideration.

His Excellency would land privately at the Consulate steps when he lands for lunch on 18th. This would mean his being carried a little way in a chair made for the purpose,

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the tide will be low. I trust there will be no discomfort however. After lunch he will receive the Deputation of British subjects at the Consulate; and at 3-45 P.M., or as soon as the Marine Guard-of-Honour and any other persons who will accompany His Excellency to the return visit (and who did not accompany him to lunch) have assembled at the Customs House, he will embark again privately from the Consulate steps and proceed to the Pierhead at the Customs wharf where he will land officially and be met by Sayyid Timur and the three high officials.

It is 250 yards walk from the Customs Pierhead to the Darbar Room.

The alternative arrangement to the above would be for the Viceroy to walk the whole way from the Consulate to the Darbar Room, 350 yards.

The street passed through will be clean and good going, but is narrow and it would not be so easy to arrange for the Guard; and so if His Excellency will kindly put up with the trouble of the short water journey from the Consulate to the Pierhead I think that his official landing by that means, just at the hour of the visit, will be the most satisfactory and dignified arrangement.

II. The "Dancing". I am afraid this is a very primitive entertainment in any case but I suggested that it would be better to arrange it for the second afternoon, because it will attract a large crowd of sight-seers, and it would be difficult to keep the place clear and quiet for His Excellency's movements to and from the Darbar Room.

Then again there would be so little time for it between the reception of the address and the return visit and by the time the latter was concluded it would be sunset.

I hope therefore that the alternative to have it on the second afternoon will be approved. That arrangement will at the same time afford a convenient opportunity for the Sultan to take leave of His Excellency, if no other procedure has been decided on.

III. If His Excellency and party find it convenient to lunch at the Consulate on the 2nd day too, we shall of course be only too happy. I may mention that our dining room will accommodate 12 comfortably and 14 at a stretch. There will be 5 of us in the house, 2 Kemballs, 2 Coxes, and Agency Surgeon, so we can provide for 7 or 9 as may be convenient to His Excellency.

IV. Finally I attach three translations of speeches which the Sultan wants to deliver—

(*i*) At the time of Miza-pursi.
(*ii*) At the time of His Excellency's visit to the Sultan.
(*iii*) At the beginning of the Darbar.

The first two contain a good deal of high faluting Arabic which I fear it will be a little tedious for His Excellency to endure. Nevertheless as they are the proper thing in accordance with Arabic ideas I trust the Viceroy will not mind putting up with them.

P.S.—I have said nothing about the Admiral visiting the Sultan understanding that his official position would be merged into that of the Viceroy and that he would find it more satisfactory to exchange visits some other time. The Navy have their own ideas however and if it is desired that the Admiral should exchange visits, he could call on the Sultan at 8-30, or 9 A. M. on 19th, and Sultan could return it after the Darbar.

Pol A 104

TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL AGENT, MASKAT, DATED THE 14TH (RECEIVED 15TH) NOVEMBER 1903.

Says the Sultan is anxious that his brother, Muhammad, who is so much older, should take precedence, for present purposes, over Timur and thus not make jealousy.

No objection? Draft reply put up.
H. P. C.,—15-11-1903.

L. W. DANE,—15-11-1903.

Pol A 105

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL AGENT, MASKAT, DATED THE 15TH NOVEMBER 1903.

In reply to above telegram states that there is no objection.

Pol A 106

TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL AGENT, MASKAT, DATED AND RECEIVED THE 15TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Accommodation at Maskat Darbar.

Pol A 107

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL AGENT, MASKAT, DATED THE 15TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Replies to the above telegram.

Pol A 108

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL AGENT, MASKAT, DATED THE 15TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Ceremonial at Maskat.

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From His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, dated the 13th (received 16th) November 1903.

Desire of the Persian Minister to come to Maskat to meet His Excellency.

Telegram from the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indian Station, Bombay, dated and received the 15th November 1903.

Says that the message regarding the Salute for the Sheikh of Hamriyeh has been forwarded to Karachi.

From Sir A. Hardinge (to the Marquess of Ladsdowne), No. 152, dated the 27th September (received 16th November) 1903, under cover of a letter from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 38, dated the 17th October 1903.

Transmission of a copy of a note addressed to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh on the subject of the Viceroy's visit to the Persian Gulf.

Demi-official, dated 21st November 1903.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With the exception of the Chief of Shargah, whom Mr. Gaskin went to bring off this morning, all the Sheikhs are on board the *Patrick Stewart*, with their attendants. What time will the Darbar be held, and will it in view of the bad weather which may prevent the Viceroy going on board the *Argonaut* be held on board the *Hardinge*? I think 3 P.M. might be a suitable hour.

The following are the Chiefs who will attend the Darbar:—

Chief of Abu Dhabi and two sons;
„ of Shargah and one son (has only one);
„ of Debaye and one son („ „);
„ of Ajman (his son is ill).
Son of Chief of Umr-ul-Kawain (the Chief himself is bed-ridden).

There will be a few attendants in addition, but the total number attending the Darbar will be few. The bad weather will, I fear, prevent British subjects coming from the shore but, if feasible, they will come off.

You now see how useful the *Patrick Stewart* has been to us. In this weather it would have been practically impossible to get all the Chiefs off from the shore. They are all sea-sick, Mr. Gaskin reports!

Demi-official, dated November 1903.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

The Sheikh of Shargah is on his way off and the Darbar can be held at 11-30. Shall I have the Chiefs sent off at 11-15 to the *Argonaut*? I fear it will be very difficult for His Excellency to get across. There is little chance of the sea going down to-day. There will be no refreshments handed round, as Ramzan has begun. Please let me know definite hour and place for Darbar, so that I may send over word to the *Patrick Stewart*. It will of course be out of the question for any people from the shore to be off by 11-30, and in any case in view of the weather I doubt if they will be able to come off.

The presents will be taken off to the *Argonaut* if the Darbar is held there?

These two letters from Colonel Kemball are for Your Excellency's perusal. I have ascertained from Captain Cherry that the Darbar can be got ready by 11-30, but I am afraid it will be rather troublesome getting across in the boats and, as Colonel Kemball says, we cannot hope to get any one from the shore and the Chiefs are sick. Shargah may also be late. The wind seems to be falling, and by 2-30 things may be easier. I am sending over the presents and chuprasies with Mr. Lorimer to get everything ready.

Shall I say 11-30 as the coolest hour or 2-30 as perhaps the calmest?

L. W. Dane,—21-11-1903.

Three or 3-30 whichever preferable.

C[urzon],—21-11-1903.

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Pro No 112

FROM THE NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIAN STATION, No. 1295, DATED THE 21ST (RECEIVED 24TH) NOVEMBER 1903.

Observations on his visit to places in the Mussendim Promontory on the 20th November.

His Excellency has seen.

L. W. DANE,—24-11-1903.

Pro No 113

ENCLOSURE IN A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPARTMENT, No. 43, DATED THE 4TH OCTOBER (RECEIVED 24TH NOVEMBER) 1903.

Arrangements for Sir A. Hardinge to meet His Excellency the Viceroy at Bunder Abbas.

Telegram, dated Maskat, the 23rd November 1903.
From—Viceroy's Camp, Maskat,
To—Foreign, Calcutta.

Should darbar and investiture at Maskat be gazetted? Copy of programmes will be posted from Bunder Abbas, necessary action being taken. Foreign with Viceroy.

The copy of the Maskat darbar and investiture programmes, forwarded from Camp, will be found below.

No. 192 in G. B., February 1903, Nos. 163—193.

We gazette investitures of our Indian Orders, when they are held as independent functions.

We do not gazette darbars;* nor has it been the practice to gazette isolated cases of investiture with the insignia of an Order, when the ceremony is performed in connection with native ceremonial, as was the case when the Nawab of Tonk† and the Khan of Kalat‡ were invested as G. C. I. E.'s, the first at his reception at Ajmer in 1890, and the second at a public darbar at Quetta in 1894.

* This, for example, was not done in the case of the Peshawar inauguration darbar of last year, No. 85 in S. F., June 1902, Nos. 65—88.

† No. 202 in S. I., February 1891, Nos. 173—249.

‡ No. 107 in S. E., April 1895, Nos. 93—111.

The Delhi proceedings of 1902-03, as embodied in a despatch to the Secretary of State, were gazetted as a special case.

Copy of notification put up.

J. W. B.,—3-12-1903.

Practice does not require that the proceedings should be gazetted, and such publication appears unnecessary.

Copy of these notes may be posted to Karachi.

L. RUSSELL,—3-12-1903.

Pro No 114

LETTER TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 47-C., DATED THE 27TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Forwards copy of a note on the private interview between the Viceroy and the Sultan of Maskat on the 19th November 1903.

Pro No 115

MEMO. FROM THE NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIAN STATION, No. 1171, DATED THE 28TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Forwards a programme of a visit to Koweit, Khor Abdulla, and Khor Musa.

Pro No 116

FROM THE BRITISH INDIAN MERCHANTS OF BAHREIN, DATED THE 2ND NOVEMBER 1903.

Address of welcome to His Excellency the Viceroy.

This address was given to me by Colonel Kemball just after Your Excellency left Manama to-day. Neither he nor Mr. Gaskin knew that the local Hindus wished to present such an address until Mr. Gaskin returned from Shargah. It is a very sensible production and Your Excellency may perhaps wish to see it. Some of the Hindu traders are, I understand, coming off with pearls to-morrow, and perhaps Your Excellency might hear what they have to say informally. I gathered that they had not made arrangements for presenting it in due form.

L. W. DANE,—26-11-1903.

It is in consonance with the haphazard character of all the arrangements that the address should have been prepared and presented in this almost clandestine way.

No action need be taken.

C[URZON],—27-11-1903.

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Extract from a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 29th August 1903.

* * * * * *

With regard to the political aspect of the case. I fear I must ask you to let me have time to think over this matter. So far as I can say at present, I do not think that, so far as the Trucial Chiefs * * * * * are concerned, any fresh arrangements in the way of new forms of engagement will be desired.

* * * * * *

Extract from a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated Bushire, the 2nd October 1903.

* * * * * *

Now as to the political aspect of the Darbar. So far as the Trucial Chiefs are concerned, I do not think it is necessary or desirable to enter into any new form of engagement. Our influence with these Chiefs is already predominant, the maritime peace is ensured, intrigues with Foreign Powers provided against, and the trade practically in our hands and, so far as I can foresee, likely to remain so. From our point of view I think we may be fairly content with the *status quo*; whether it would be advisable looking to the future to modify or expand this *status quo* is not very easy to say.

Our time-honoured policy has been, as you know, to maintain the maritime peace and not to interfere in the internal quarrels of the Chiefs. As a matter of fact, the result of our policy has been to prevent aggression by one Chief on another. But this may not always be the case; some of the Chiefs are growing powerful, and others are perhaps getting weaker, and a spirit of aggression may arise. The Chief of Debaye, for instance, might wish to try conclusions with his neighbour at Shargah. Probably the Resident would get sufficient warning of the likelihood of hostilities to enable him to stop the fighting, though this would be contrary to our traditional policy. It really would not matter very much from our point of view, so far as I can see, whether the stronger and wiser ruler at Debaye laid his hands on Shargah or not, but of course a period of unrest would follow, and our trade interests might suffer. It might therefore be advisable to let the Chiefs know that aggression by one independent Chief on another independent Chief would not be viewed with approval by us. Such a warning will, I think, be quite sufficient, and though perhaps not immediately necessary, it might be a useful safeguard for the future peace of the coast. No special engagement to this end would be required. The Viceroy at the Darbar might I venture to suggest, after alluding to the benefits which have resulted to the Chiefs and their country from the peace which has been consequent on their engagements with the British Government, inform them that the Government intends to maintain its interest in them for their own benefit and for the continuance of their independence. His Excellency is pleased to learn that the engagements have, as a rule, been faithfully observed, and he is confident that the same faithful observance will be maintained in the future. The British Government has no desire to interfere in their internal affairs so far as the Chiefs govern their territories with justice and respect the rights of the foreign traders residing therein. All that the British Government desires is that the *status quo* should be maintained, and any aggression by one State on another, even although the operations may be confined to land, will not be viewed with approval by the British Government. In any case of dispute between the Chiefs the British Resident is always ready to listen to complaints and to arrange an amicable settlement satisfactory to both parties.

Such is a brief outline of what in my opinion might be said at the Darbar if the expansion of the *status quo* to this extent is approved.

Whether the Chiefs themselves will desire anything more I cannot say. I do not think so, but I intend to visit the coast shortly, and will be able to let you know if such is the case.

* * * * * *

2504 F. D.

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Secret E., July 1892, Nos. 24-45.
" April 1903, Nos. 195-196.
" August 1903, Nos. 119-124.
" October 1903, Nos. 50-55.

The foregoing extracts containing suggestions for the Viceroy's speech at the forthcoming Darbar at Shargah are submitted, together with the marginally noted proceedings regarding the status of the Trucial Chiefs.

L. RUSSELL,—2-11-1903.

S. M. FRASER,—3-11-1903.

The papers about the Chiefship of El Katr should be added and Colonel Kemball may be asked by telegram if he has anything to add to his letter of 2nd October on this point.

L. W. DANE,—4-11-1903.

Draft put up for approval.

T. P.,—9-11-1903.

J. R. R.,—9-11-1903.

Issue draft.

L. RUSSELL,—9-11-1903.

S. M. FRASER,—9-11-1903.

Pub 116 (a) TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT, PERSIAN GULF, No. 2674-E.A., DATED THE 9TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Asks whether he has anything to add to the suggestions made in his letter of the 2nd October regarding the Trucial Chiefs.

Pub 116 (b) TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT, PERSIAN GULF, DATED AND RECEIVED 10TH NOVEMBER 1903.

In reply to above telegram, says that he has nothing to add to the suggestions made in his letter of the 2nd October on the subject.

* Put up.
T. P.,—11-11-1903.

For information only. The file may be taken to Camp, with copies of the notes * about the Trucial Chiefs sent by Colonel Kemball.

T. P.,—11-11-1903.

J. R. R.,—11-11-1903.

L. RUSSELL,—11-11-1903.

This file also contains the papers about Ahmad bin Thani who may come to see Your Excellency at Bahrein. Colonel Kemball has no further suggestions to offer for Your Excellency's address at Shargah, beyond those made in his letter of 2nd October 1903, of which I think you have a copy.

We cannot, I am afraid, allude to the rights of the Shekhs over the pearl banks, as the legal points involved are very difficult. I have the case out here with the opinion of Legislative Department and will submit it to-day, if possible, in case you may wish to refer to Secretary of State about it.

L. W. DANE,—17-11-1903.

C[URZON],—17-11-1903.

G. I. C. P. O.—No 2504 F. D.—22-12-1903—31.—L. G. O.

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[~~27~~]

HUSSEIN KULI KHAN, NAWAB, C.B.

Born about 1868 (say 35 years of age).

Is son of the late Jaafer Ali Khan who was twin son of Mirza Mohammed Ali Khan. The family emigrated to India many years ago from Shiraz which is their home and where they hold landed property and have interests.

His uncle, the late Hussein Ali Khan, was for many years employed in His Majesty's Legation at Tehran, and another uncle, Hayder Ali Khan, was also in Government service, as Agent at Shiraz, until lately. His brother Abbas Kuli Khan, C.M.G., is at present employed in His Majesty's Legation at Tehran.

Hussein Kuli Khan was educated in England for many years, a First Secretary to the Persian Legation in London, and is now attached to the Persian Foreign Office in Tehran. He returned to Tehran in 1900, and was employed as a confidential Secretary by that Grand Vizier, who promised to appoint him Minister at a Foreign Court, but evaded doing so on the ground that it would offend the Russians. He was also for the same reason forced over for the post of Under Secretary at the Foreign Office when the Mushir-ed-Dowleh was made Minister at Petersburg.

Accompanied the Shah on his European tour in 1902, and acted as His Majesty's Interpreter in England.

Speaks English and French.

A. H. HARDINGE.

November 1903.

His Excellency has not apparently seen this yet?

H. P. C.,—29-11-1903.

Your Excellency has this matter under consideration. I do not think we can give a C.I.E. to Haji Kuli Khan unless we give one to the Governor of the Gulf Ports. I have two badges and perhaps as the Minister attaches so much importance to the grant to the former it will be best to give both, though it is hard upon the order.

L. W. DANE,—29-11-1903.

We will wait to see how the Persians behave.

C[URZON],—29-11-1903.

No decorations were given at Bushire.

L. W. DANE,—4-12-1903.

FROM THE NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIAN STATION, No. 1171, DATED AND RECEIVED THE 2ND DECEMBER 1903.

Instructions to the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "Fox," in connection with the Viceroy's visit to Pasni.

His Excellency's memorandum explains the difficulty which occurred at Bushire and prevented the landing there. Otherwise the arrangements for the visits, etc., given in the amended programmes, copies of which should be added and the incorrect copies removed, were carried out successfully.

The Maskat visit was favoured by excellent weather and was a complete success.

At Shargah the weather was rough and the Chiefs were seasick. Indeed but for Colonel Kemball's foresight in securing the *Patrick Stewart* it would have been very difficult to have held the Darbar at all. There were in consequence very few visitors from the shore and no salute was, I think, fired on shore. At any rate we were so far out that the town was hardly visible. At Bundar Abbas, all went off well and a salute of 31 guns was fired on His Excellency's arrival. The deputation sent to ask when His Excellency could receive the Governor went to the *Argonaut* by mistake as explained by the Governor. The Foreign Secretary and an Aide-de-Camp went with the Minister to return the Governor's visit and were met by the Governor on landing and were received in a tent on the quay which was covered with carpets. A guard-of-honour was drawn up and the Minister's salute was fired.

At Lingah there were no ceremonies on shore as far as His Excellency was concerned, but the Minister went informally to the Deputy Governor's house. The Viceroy entertained the Governor of the Gulf ports at dinner. The Governor was accompanied by his brother the Mujis-es-Sultaneh, Deputy Governor of Lingah.

At Bahrein the deputation and visit went off all right, but owing to the lateness of the hour and the fact that the tide was out, the journey into Manamah occupied 1½ hours and the journey out nearly 2. A salute was fired on His Excellency's arrival, but not on his visit to the town which occurred after sunset. If another visit to Bahrein or Bushire is paid, it will be best to arrange that His Excellency should go into the inner anchorage on a smaller ship.

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It will be well on a future occasion if the Resident is asked to submit a definite and full programme for each place in consultation with the Minister. Colonel Kemball only reached Bushire at the end of September and then had to go round the Gulf. He suggested certain arrangements in his demi-official of 8th October, but these were superseded by Sir A. Hardinge's telegram, dated 22nd October, and we did not apparently issue Major Daly's draft telegram. Colonel Kemball did not repeat his inquiries and so at Bahrein and Bushire there was rather a muddle, for which I am afraid the Minister, the Resident, and we are all partly responsible. However, seeing that everything had to be kept secret to the last moment and no official programmes could be prepared after referring these to the local officers, owing to the time that it takes to get an answer from Bushire, it is not surprising that hitches should have occurred. Indeed it is a matter for congratulation that in the circumstances the arrangements should have worked as well as they did.

L. W. Dane,—5-12-1903.

Pub. No. 118 Despatch from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 34 (Secret), dated the 6th November (received 11th December) 1903.

Acknowledges receipt of Secret Despatch No. 148, dated the 17th September 1903, and conveys the formal approval of His Majesty's Government to His Excellency the Viceroy's visit to Maskat and the Persian Gulf. Communicates certain remarks and suggestions on the subject.

Seen.

C[urzon].
K[itchener].
T. R[aleigh].
E. FG. L[aw].
E. R. E[lles],—17-12-1903.
A. T. A[rundel],—16-12-1903.
Denzil I[bbetson],—16-12-1903.

Pub. No. 119 Despatch to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 196 (Secret—External), dated the 17th December 1903.

Report on the visit of His Excellency the Viceroy to Maskat and the Persian Gulf.

Pub. No. 120 Enclosure in a letter from the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, No. 50, dated the 27th November (received 19th December) 1903.

Copy of a telegram from the Marquess of Lansdowne, to Sir A. Hardinge, regarding the Viceroy's visit to the Persian Gulf.

Pub. No. 121 Enclosure in a letter from His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran, No. 41, dated the 14th November (received 21st December) 1903.

Translation of an article which appeared on 3rd November, in the Tehran Gazette "Iran," on the subject of His Excellency the Viceroy's visit to the Persian Gulf.

Pub. No. 122 Enclosure in a letter from the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, No. 50, dated the 27th November (received 30th December) 1903.

Communication from Lord Lansdowne, to Sir A. H. Hardinge, regarding the Viceroy's visit to the Persian Gulf.

Pub. No. 123 From the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, No. 826, dated the 16th December 1903 (received 4th January 1904).

Forwards a copy of a letter from the British Vice-Consul at Karbala, reporting the rumours current there in connection with His Excellency the Viceroy's recent visit to the Persian Gulf.

Submitted for information. A copy of the letter may be sent to the India Office with Secretary's weekly letter. Memorandum put up.

J. R. R.,—14-1-1904.
H. P. C.,—14-1-1904.

L. Russell,—14-1-1904.
C. H. Hill,—15-1-1904.
L. W. Dane,—15-1-1904.
C[urzon],—15-1-1904.

Pub. No. 124 Memo. of papers forwarded to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, with Secretary's weekly letter No. 3 M., dated the 21st January 1904.

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ENCLOSURE IN A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE, **Pro. No. 125.**
No. 1, DATED THE 1ST (RECEIVED 18TH) JANUARY 1904.

Communication from Sir A. Hardinge to Lord Lansdowne, regarding the former's movements during His Excellency the Viceroy's visit in the Persian Gulf.

ENCLOSURE IN A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE, **Pro. No. 126.**
No. 2, DATED THE 8TH (RECEIVED 25TH) JANUARY 1904.

Copy of a telegram from Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne, regarding the Viceroy's tour in the Persian Gulf.

ENCLOSURE IN A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE, **Pro. No. 127.**
No. 3, DATED THE 15TH JANUARY (RECEIVED 1ST FEBRUARY) 1904.

Orders to H. M. S. Sphinx *to take Sir A. Hardinge from Bushire to Bunder Abbas, on or about the 15th November 1903.*

4120 F. D.—S E—33-127—Feb.

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

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

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APPENDICES TO NOTES.

Viceroy's Visit to the Persian Gulf.

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

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Appendix I of Notes.

RECEIPT AND DESPATCH OF MAILS AND TELEGRAMS DURING VICEROY'S TOUR IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

Monday, 16th November.—Leave Karachi.

Tuesday, 17th.—At sea.

Wednesday, 18th.—Arrive Maskat.

Thursday, 19th.—Leave Maskat. The *Lapwing* will proceed from Maskat, after the departure of the Viceroy, to Jask (133 miles) to pick up telegrams for the Viceroy and Squadron up to noon on 21st November, when she will leave for Bunder Abbas.

Friday, 20th.—At sea.

Saturday, 21st.—Arrive Shargah.

Leave Shargah.

Sunday, 22nd.—Arrive Bunder Abbas. The *Lapwing* will arrive with telegrams from Jask (129 miles) at 7 A.M.

Despatch of His Excellency's English mail (to reach Bombay 28th November) by British India *Kerbela*, also Indian mails and telegrams, which will be trans-shipped to the Inward Mail Steamer *Katoria* at Maskat.

Monday, 23rd.—Leave Bunder Abbas. The *Lapwing* will leave for Jask (129 miles) at 11 A.M.

Tuesday, 24th.—At sea.

Wednesday, 25th.—Arrive Lingah. The *Lapwing* (leaving Jask early on 24th) will arrive at Lingah (180 miles) at noon and will leave in the evening for Bushire (310 miles). Leave Lingah in the evening.

Thursday, 26th.—Arrive Bahrein. The English mail (received at Bombay 21st November) will be delivered by the British India *Kasara* also Indian mails received at Karachi up to 21st November and telegrams received at Maskat up to 24th November.

Despatch of His Excellency's English mail (to proceed from Bombay on 5th December), also Indian mails and telegrams, by British India *Kasara* for trans-shipment to the Inward Mail Steamer *Kola* at Bushire on 28th.

Friday, 27th.—Leave Bahrein.

Saturday, 28th.—Arrive Koweit. The *Lapwing* (leaving Bushire at sunset on the 27th) will arrive at Koweit (153 miles) on the afternoon of the 28th.

Sunday, 29th.—The *Lapwing* will leave Koweit on the 29th.

Monday, 30th.—Khor Abdulla.

Tuesday, 1st December.—Khor Musa.

Wednesday, 2nd.—Arrive Bushire.

Thursday, 3rd.—Stay Bushire, and leave Bushire at midnight.

Friday, 4th.—The English mail (received at Bombay 28th November) will be delivered by British India Mail Steamer, and also Indian mails.

Saturday, 5th.—At sea; call at Jask at 9 A.M. for telegrams.

Sunday, 6th.—Arrive Pasni.

Monday, 7th.—Arrive Karachi. The English mail (received at Bombay 5th December) will be delivered by the British India Mail Steamer *Katoria*, and also Indian mails.

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Appendix II of Notes.

No. 1171 MEMORANDUM.

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India arrives at Karachi at about 2 P.M. on Monday, 16th instant. His Majesty's ships under my orders will dress with masthead flags on His Excellency's arrival.

The R.I.M.S. *Hardinge* will leave Merrewether Pier at 4 P.M. and proceed out of harbour.

The *Fox* will move when the tide serves in the morning and anchor outside between *Argonaut* and *Pomone*.

At about 4 P.M., on the signal being made, the squadron will weigh and form in columns of divisions line ahead, disposed to Port on the Compass course, steam for 13 knots.

As the *Hardinge*, which will also be dressed, passes the Breakwater Light, a salute of 31 guns will be fired by every ship, taking time from the first gun of the flagship.

The *Hardinge* will pass between the lines, ships being manned, guards paraded, and bands playing "God Save the King" as His Excellency passes.

Masthead flags will remain hoisted during daylight at sea and continuously in harbour during daylight hours until sunset.

2. At 10-45 A.M. on Wednesday, the 18th, on approaching Maskat Harbour, the flagship will fire a salute of 21 guns in honour of His Highness the Sultan of Maskat.

On the Sultan proceeding to visit the Viceroy at 12-30 P.M. on the 18th, guards and band will parade, and on His Highness's departure from the *Hardinge*, *Fox* will fire a salute of 21 guns.

When the Viceroy leaves the *Hardinge* at 1-30 P.M. on the 18th, ships will be manned and dressed, guards and bands will parade as His Excellency leaves the *Hardinge*, and a salute of 31 guns will be fired.

The Viceroy will land at the Customs Jetty at 3-50 P.M. and will be received by a guard-of-honour of Marines of 30 men with band.

On His Excellency re-embarking after the visit, the same salute and ceremony will be observed. Ships will undress except masthead flags after His Excellency's return on board.

3. At 11 A.M. on Thursday, the 19th, His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India will hold a "Public Darbar" on board the *Argonaut* at Maskat for the reception of the notables of the place.

At 8 A.M. on that day all ships with flags over all.

On His Excellency leaving the *Hardinge*, a salute of 31 guns will be fired by all ships of the squadron except *Argonaut*.

Ships will be manned, guards paraded, and bands will play the national anthem.

The *Argonaut* will fire a salute of 31 guns on His Excellency's stepping on to her deck.

A guard-of-honour of 100 Royal Marines in red tunics and white trousers under a Captain R. M. will be drawn up on board *Argonaut* to receive the Viceroy.

The same salute and ceremony will be observed on His Excellency's return to the *Hardinge*.

The Commander-in-Chief, accompanied by his staff, will proceed on board the *Argonaut* at 10-40 A.M. with the usual ceremony, a salute of 13 guns being fired by the *Argonaut* on his stepping on board and again on his leaving her.

His Highness the Sultan of Maskat will arrive on board the *Argonaut* at 10-50 A.M. being saluted by her with 21 guns on arrival and departure. Guards and bands will be paraded.

All officers invited to attend the Darbar are to be on board the *Argonaut* by 10-30 A.M. The Commander-in-Chief hopes that a large number from each ship will attend to add to the dignity of the occasion.

4. Should the Sultan visit any other ship of the squadron he is to be received with a guard, band, etc., and a salute of 21 guns is to be fired by the ship on his leaving her. His Highness's flag will be hoisted on his arrival on board, and hauled down after the salute has been fired.

5. On all occasions of ships saluting the Viceroy, they will display His Excellency's flag at the main, if they have been supplied with it.

6. A "Public Darbar" will also be held by His Excellency the Viceroy at Shargah, the same ceremonies being observed as at Maskat, except that the Sultan will not be present.

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7. Dress for officers :—

At the Darbars, Full dress.

When the Viceroy in *Hardinge* passes through the columns, No. 3 or No. 8 with helmets as ordered.

Officers on duty in harbour, No. 3 or No. 8 with helmets as ordered.

GEORGE L. ATKINSON-WILLES,
Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief.

"HYACINTH" AT KARACHI,
Dated 14th November, 1903.

The Captains and Officers Commanding His Majesty's ships *Hyacinth*, *Argonaut*, *Fox*, *Pomone*, *Sphinx*, *Lapwing*, and all others concerned.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

R.I.M.S. *Hardinge*, THE 17TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Arrival of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Maskat.

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General will arrive at Maskat in the R.I.M.S. *Hardinge* at 11 A.M. on the morning of Wednesday, the 18th November 1903, accompanied by the East Indian squadron.

On the men-of-war approaching the front of the harbour opposite the town, the Port will be saluted with 21 guns under the Admiral's orders. His Highness the Sultan's battery will return gun for gun.

At 11-30 A.M. on the same day, a deputation, consisting of the Sultan's brother, his son, and three principal officials of the State, will proceed on board the *Hardinge* to enquire after His Excellency's health. They will be received by the Foreign Secretary, the Military Secretary to the Viceroy, and one of His Excellency's Aides-de-Camp. After they have received a reply to their enquiry, they will take leave.*

Full dress will be worn except by officers in the suite of His Excellency the Viceroy.

J. G. LORIMER,
for *Under-Secretary to the Government of India.*

* NOTE.—On this occasion, at the Sultan's special request, as his brother and son were both on the deputation, a salute of 13 guns was fired on the departure of the deputation, but this is a personal honour and is not to form a precedent.

[Confidential.] FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

R.I.M.S. *Hardinge*, THE 17TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Reception of His Highness the Sultan of Maskat by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General at Maskat.

At 12-30 P.M. on Wednesday, the 18th November 1903, His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General will receive a visit from His Highness the Sultan of Maskat on board the R.I.M.S. *Hardinge*.

The Sultan will be accompanied from his palace by the Political Agent at Maskat, and will be attended by six of the principal officials who are entitled to a seat in Darbar.

Under the orders of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, guards and bands will parade on board His Majesty's ships.

On the arrival of the Sultan, His Highness will be received by the Foreign Secretary and the Private and Military Secretaries to the Viceroy, who will conduct him to His Excellency's presence.

The Viceroy and Governor-General will advance to the door of the Darbar Room to receive His Highness, and will conduct him to a seat on his right hand.

On the right of the Sultan will sit the Political Agent and, beyond him, the Sultan's brother, the heir-apparent and the Sultan's attendants, according to their rank.

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On the left of the Viceroy will be seated the Foreign Secretary, the Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Private and Military Secretaries to the Viceroy, and His Excellency's personal staff.

After a short conversation, the Sultan's brother, the heir-apparent and the Sultan's attendants will be presented to the Viceroy by the Political Agent, coffee and sherbet will be served, and the interview will then terminate.

The ceremonies at the Sultan's departure will be the same as those observed at his arrival.

A guard-of-honour of the 121st Pioneers will be drawn up on deck, and will salute His Highness on arrival and departure.

A salute of 21 guns will be fired by one of the ships on the arrival and departure of the Sultan.

Full dress uniform will be worn except by officers in the suite of His Excellency the Viceroy.

J. G. LORIMER,
for *Under-Secretary to the Government of India.*

Confidential.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

R. I. M. S. HARDINGE, DATED THE 17TH NOVEMBER 1903

Return visit of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General to His Highness the Sultan of Maskat at Maskat.

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General will leave the *Hardinge* at 1-30 P.M. on Wednesday, the 18th of November, under the orders of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, ships will be manned and dressed, guards and bands will parade and a salute of 31 guns will be fired. His Excellency will lunch at His Britannic Majesty's Consulate.

A deputation, consisting of the Sultan's brother, the Heir-Apparent and three principal officials of the Maskat State will wait at the Consulate at 3-30 P.M. to conduct His Excellency to the Sultan's palace.

His Excellency will leave the Consulate at 3-45 P. M. under a salute of 31 guns, and will be attended by the Foreign Secretary, the Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Private and Military Secretaries to the Viceroy, and His Excellency's personal staff. A guard-of-honour of Royal Marines with band will be drawn up on the Customs Jetty.

The Sultan, accompanied by the Political Agent at Maskat, will receive the Viceroy at the Jetty, and will conduct him to the Reception Room in His Highness's palace and to a seat at his right hand.

On the right of the Viceroy will sit the Foreign Secretary, the Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department, the Political Resident, the Private and Military Secretaries to the Viceroy, and His Excellency's personal staff.

On the left of the Sultan will sit the Political Agent and, beyond him, the Sultan's brother, the Heir-Apparent, and such of His Highness's attendants as are entitled to a seat in Darbar, according to their rank.

After a short conversation, the Sultan's attendants who are entitled to the honour, will be introduced by the Political Agent. The Sultan will deliver a suitable address of welcome which the Political Agent will translate. His Excellency will suitably acknowledge the address. Afterwards coffee and sherbet will be served and the interview will terminate.

The ceremonies which attended the Viceroy's arrival will be repeated at His Excellency's departure.

A guard-of-honour of the Sultan's troops will be drawn up at His Highness's palace, and will salute His Excellency on his arrival and departure.

A salute of 31 guns will be fired by His Highness the Sultan's battery on the arrival and departure of His Excellency.

The route to and from the Sultan's palace will be lined by His Highness's askaris.

On the return of His Excellency to the *Hardinge* the ceremonies which accompanied his departure will be repeated.

Full dress uniform will be worn except by officers in the suite of His Excellency the Viceroy.

J. G. LORIMER,
for *Under-Secretary to the Government of India.*

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B

PUBLIC DARBAR AT MASKAT FOR THE RECEPTION BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF HIS HIGHNESS THE SULTAN.

The Notables of the place.

Date and object of Darbar.—At 11 A.M., on Thursday, the 19th November 1903, His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General will hold a Public Darbar, on board H.M.S. *Argonaut*, at Maskat, for the reception of the Notables of the place.

The Darbar will also be attended by his Highness the Sultan of Maskat and His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies; by British officers on duty at Maskat; and by such other persons, European and Native, as may be invited to be present.

Arrivals.—European and Native gentlemen must be seated by 10-30 A.M.

A guard-of-honour of British Marines, Band, will be in attendance.

Note.—The Royal Marines do not carry colours with them.
L. D.

His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief will arrive at 10-40 A.M., under a salute of 13 guns, and will be received by an officer of the Bushire Residency and an Aide-de-Camp to the Viceroy, who will conduct him to his seat.

His Highness the Sultan, accompanied by the Political Agent, and attended by 12 of his principal officials, will arrive at 10-50 A. M., under a salute of 21 guns, and will also be received by the same officers, his attendants following.

Arrangements of seats.—

* *On the Dais*:—
To right of Viceroy His Highness the Sultan of Maskat.
To the left, His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief and Staff and Sir A. Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B. and Staff.
Behind, Private and Military Secretaries and Personal Staff.

On the right front of His Excellency the Viceroy.*—The Political Agent, the Sultan's brother, Sayyid Mahmud, his son Sayyid Timur, the Sultan's attendants, and Native spectators.

On the left front of His Excellency the Viceroy.—Foreign Secretary, the Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department, the Resident in the Gulf, Commanding Officers of H. M. Ships and other officers present.

Arrival of His Excellency the Viceroy.—His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General will arrive at 11 A.M., attended by the Foreign Secretary, the Private and Military Secretaries to the Viceroy, and His Excellency's Personal Staff.

Note.—Foreign Secretary met His Excellency at gangway.
L. D.

On His Excellency leaving the *Hardinge* a salute of 31 guns will be fired by all ships of the squadron, except *Argonaut*.

As His Excellency arrives on board, a Royal Salute of 31 guns will be fired by the guns of H.M.S. *Argonaut*, the guard-of-honour will present arms, and the Band will play the National Anthem.

As the Viceroy enters the Darbar, all present will rise from their seats and remain standing until His Excellency shall have taken seat on the Throne. The Foreign Secretary will then ask leave to declare the Darbar open.

Presentations in Darbar.—The principal Notables will then be introduced one by one to His Excellency the Viceroy by the Political Agent.

The Viceroy's Address.—When the introductions are completed, the Sultan of Maskat will welcome the Viceroy in suitable terms and the Viceroy and Governor-General will deliver an address, a translation of which in Arabic will be read.

The Foreign Secretary will then ask leave to declare the Darbar closed, and to request His Excellency to withdraw to the Robing Room to prepare for the investiture of His Highness the Sultan of Maskat with the insignia of the G.C.I.E.

His Excellency will leave the Darbar in procession and proceed to the Robing Room, the Band playing a march. Thence he will return in procession robed as Grand Master of the Order.

His Excellency will leave H.M.S. *Argonaut*, under a Royal Salute, attended by his suite. The guard-of-honour will present arms, and the Band will play the National Anthem as His Excellency departs.

His Highness the Sultan and His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief will follow successively with the same ceremonies as were observed on their arrival.

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

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ORDER OF THE INDIAN EMPIRE.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

R.I.M.S. *HARDINGE*, THE 17TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Investiture of His Highness the Sultan of Maskat as a Knight Grand Commander of the Order of the Indian Empire.

This ceremony will be performed by His Excellency the Viceroy, as Grand Master of the Order, in the Public Darbar which will be held on board H. M. S. *Argonaut* at Maskat, on Thursday, the 19th November 1903.

His Excellency the Viceroy wearing the Robe of the Grand Master of the Order will enter the Darbar in procession and take his seat on the Throne. The Foreign Secretary, as Secretary of the Order, will then rise and advance to the front of the Daïs, and, addressing the Viceroy (who will come to the Darbar wearing the insignia of the Order of the Indian Empire), say, "Your Excellency is charged by His Majesty the King-Emperor of India to invest His Hyghness Saiyid Feysal-bin-Turki, Sultan of Maskat, here present, with the dignity of a *Knight Grand Commander* of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, of which Your Excellency is Grand Master."

The Secretary of the Order and the Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department * will conduct His Highness the Sultan of Maskat to a table conveniently placed on the left of the Daïs, on which the insignia are laid, (*and there decorate His Highness with the Riband, Badge, and Star of the Order.*)

This done, His Highness the Sultan of Maskat will be conducted by the Secretary to the front of the Daïs and will make his reverence to the Grand Master.

(*The Under-Secretary will take from the table the collar of Knight Grand Commander and will, with due reverence, deliver it to the Grand Master.*)

The Grand Master, remaining seated, will then invest His Highness the Sultan of Maskat (*with the collar*), and will address to him the following admonition :—

"In the name of the King-Emperor of India, and by His Majesty's command, I hereby invest you with the Honourable Insignia of the Order of the Indian Empire, of which Most Eminent Order His Majesty has been graciously pleased to appoint you to be a *Knight Grand Commander.*

A salute of 21 guns will be fired.

When the admonition has been given, the newly-invested (*Knight Grand Commander*) will make his reverence to the Grand Master, and will be conducted by the Secretary to the seat at His Excellency's right hand (*in front of which he will remain standing*).

The Secretary of the Order will proclaim the full title of His Highness the Sultan, that is to say, His Highness Sayyid Feysal-bin-Turki, Sultan of Maskat, Knight Grand Commander of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire.

The guard-of-honour will present arms, the Band will play "God Save the King," and all will resume their seats. The Secretary of the Order will then intimate that there is no further business and His Excellency will leave the Darbar in procession.

The Civil, Military, and Naval Officers of Government and the spectators present are requested not to leave their seats till His Highness the Sultan † and His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief have left the ship, when the Darbar will break up.

Dress.—Full dress uniform will be worn. Morning dress by those not entitled to wear uniform.

J. G. LORIMER,
for *Under-Secretary to Govt. of India.*

* An officer will be detailed to represent the Under-Secretary.

† NOTE.—The Sultan was shown round the ship before leaving.

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FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

.RI M.S. *HARDINGE*, THE 17TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Departure of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General from Maskat.

His Excellency the Viceroy will leave Maskat, by the R.I.M.S. *Hardinge*, at 5 P.M., on Thursday, the 19th November 1903, accompanied by the East Indian Squadron.

His Excellency's departure will be private.

A royal salute will be fired from the shore on His Excellency's departure.

J. G. LORIMER,
for *Under-Secretary to Govt. of India.*

[CONFIDENTIAL.]

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

THE 21ST NOVEMBER 1903.

Visit of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to Shargah.

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General will arrive Shargah by the R.I.M.S. *Hardinge* at 7 A.M., on Saturday, the 21st November 1903, accompanied by the East Indian Squadron.

NOTE.—The Sheikh had no means of returning the salute and the Squadron was anchored about 5 miles off the shore, so no salute was fired.

L. W. DANE,—25-11-1903.

UNDRESS UNIFORM WILL BE WORN.

C. L. S. RUSSELL,
Under Secretary to the Government of India.

Public Darbar at Shargah for the reception by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of the Arab Chiefs of the Persian Gulf.

Date and object of Darbar.—At 3-30 P.M., on Saturday, the 21st November 1903, His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General will hold a Public Darbar, on board H.M.S. *Argonaut*, at Shargah, for the reception of the Arab Chiefs of the Persian Gulf.

The following are the Chiefs who will be present at the Darbar :—

The Sheikh of Abu Thabi (with 2 sons and 3 attendants).
The Sheikh of Shargah (with one son and 3 attendants).
The Sheikh of Debai (with one son and 3 attendants).
The Sheikh of Ajman (with 3 attendants).
The Sheikh of Um-el-Kawain (with 3 attendants). His sons will represent him.

The Darbar will also be attended by His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies; by British Officers on duty at Shargah; and by such other persons, European and Native, as may be invited to be present.

Arrivals.—European and Native gentlemen must be seated by 3 P.M.

A guard-of-honour of British Marines, with Band, will be in attendance.

The Chiefs, accompanied by the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, will arrive together by the *Patrick Stewart* at 3-15 P.M., and will be received on Board the *Argonaut* by the Foreign Secretary and an Aide-de-Camp to the Viceroy, who will conduct them to their seats in the Darbar, their attendants following.

His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, will arrive at 3-20 P.M., under a salute of 13 guns, and will be received by the same Officers.

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Arrangement of seats—

On the right front of His Excellency the Viceroy.

The Political Resident, the Chiefs, the Chiefs' attendants, and the Native spectators.

On the left front of His Excellency the Viceroy.

His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, the Foreign Secretary, Under-Secretary, Foreign Department, the Viceroy's Personal Staff, and the European spectators.

Arrival of His Excellency the Viceroy.—His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General will arrive on board the *Argonaut* at 3-30 P.M., attended by the Private and Military Secretaries to the Viceroy and His Excellency's Personal staff.

As His Excellency arrives on board, a Royal Salute of 31 guns will be fired, the guard-of honour will present arms, and the Band will play the National Anthem.

As the Viceroy enters the Darbar Room, all present will rise from their seats and remain standing until His Excellency shall have taken his seat on the Throne.

The Foreign Secretary will then ask leave to declare the Darbar open.

Presentations in Darbar.—The Chiefs will then be introduced one by one to His Excellency the Viceroy by the Political Resident. When all have resumed their seats, refreshments in accordance with Arab custom will be handed round.

The Viceroy's address.—The Viceroy and Governor-General will then deliver an address, a translation of which in Arabic will be read by the Assistant Political Agent, Bahrein.

The *Khillats* for the Chiefs will then be brought in and announced by the Foreign Secretary, by whom each recipient will be brought forward to make his reverence and to receive his *Khillat* at the hands of His Excellency, after which he will retire to his seat.

The Foreign Secretary will then ask leave to declare the Darbar closed.

His Excellency will leave the *Argonaut*, under a Royal Salute, attended by his *suite*, and will return to the *Hardinge*. The guard-of-honour will present arms and the Band will play the National Anthem as His Excellency departs.

His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief next will leave with the same ceremonies as were observed on his arrival.

The Chiefs will then leave the Darbar.

The Civil, Military, and Naval Officers of Government and the spectators present are requested not to leave their seats till the Chiefs have left the Darbar, when the Darbar will break up.

As each Chief leaves H.M.S. *Argonaut*, his usual salute will be fired.

Dress.—FULL DRESS UNIFORM WILL BE WORN. MORNING DRESS BY THOSE NOT ENTITLED TO WEAR UNIFORM.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,
~~SIMLA~~;
21st *The* ~~21~~ *November 1903.*

C. L. S. RUSSELL,
Under-Secretary to the Govt. of India.

(Confidential.)

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FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

DATED THE 26TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Visit of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to Bahrein.

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General will arrive at Bahrein by the R.I.M.S. *Hardinge* at 11 A.M., on Thursday, the 26th November 1903, accompanied by the East Indian Squadron.

On the Men-of-War approaching the front of the harbour opposite the Town, the Sheikh's batteries will fire a salute of 31 guns.

A deputation consisting of the Sheikh's eldest son, Sheikh Hamed, and the Wazir will come off at 10 A.M., to inquire after His Excellency's health and to ask when His Excellency will be pleased to receive the Sheikh.

At 1-30 P.M., on Friday, the 27th November, His Excellency will receive a visit from the Sheikh of Bahrein on board the *Hardinge*. Guards will be paraded on the *Pomone*, which will accompany the *Hardinge* to the inner anchorage.

The Sheikh will be accompanied by the Assistant Political Agent and attended by his sons, Sheikh Hamed, Sheikh Muhammad, Sheikh Abdullah, his grandson, Sheikh Khalifa, and his Wazir, Abdur Rahman Ibu Abdul Wahab.

He will be met on arrival by Foreign Secretary and an Aide-de-Camp who will conduct him to His Excellency's presence.

His Excellency will receive the Sheikh standing, and show him to a seat at his right hand.

On the right of the Sheikh will sit the Resident in the Gulf, the Assistant Political Agent, and the Sheikh's attendants.

On the left of the Viçeroy will sit the British Minister at Tehran, the Foreign Secretary, the Private and Military Secretaries to the Viceroy, and His Excellency's Personal Staff.

After a short conversation, the Sheikh's son and the officials will be presented, the khillats for the Sheikh and his sons will be presented, and the interview will then terminate.

The Sheikh will leave the *Hardinge* with similar ceremonies to those observed on his arrival. A salute of 5 guns will be fired from the ship on his departure.

At 3-30 P.M., His Excellency the Viceroy, will leave the *Hardinge* under a salute of 31 guns from the *Pomone* and will visit the town. His Excellency will be received at the landing place by the Sheikh, who will personally escort him during his visit, which will include an informal reception of the Sheikh and British Indian subjects at the Agency.

At 10-30 A.M., on 27th November, the Sheikh will pay a private visit to the Viceroy.

His Excellency will leave the port at 12 noon.

UNDRESS UNIFORM WILL BE WORN.

L. W. DANE,

Secretary to the Government of India.

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

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Appendix III of Notes.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

R.I.M.S. *HARDINGE*, THE 28TH NOVEMBER 1903.

Visit of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to Koweit.

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General will arrive at Koweit by the R.I.M.S. *Hardinge* at 10-30 A.M., on Saturday, the 28th of November 1903, accompanied by the East Indian Squadron. On the men-of-war approaching the front of the harbour opposite the town the Sheikh's batteries will fire a salute of 31 guns. A deputation consisting of the Sheikh's eldest son and the Wazir will come off at 11 A.M. to enquire after His Excellency's health and to ask when His Excellency will be pleased to receive the Sheikh. The deputation will be received by the Foreign Secretary.

There was a hitch about this, as the tide did not serve and our arrival was timed for 29th and the Sheikh came off himself with the Resident.
L. W. DANE.

At 3 P.M., on Saturday, the 28th November, His Excellency will receive a visit from the Sheikh of Koweit on board the *Hardinge*. Guards will be paraded on the *Pomone* which will accompany the *Hardinge* to the inner anchorage.

The Sheikh will be accompanied by three of his officials. He will be met on arrival by the Foreign Secretary and the Resident in the Gulf and an Aide-de-Camp, who will conduct him to His Excellency's presence.

He only brought his eldest son.
L. W. DANE.

His Excellency will receive the Sheikh standing and show him to a seat at his right hand.

On the right of the Sheikh will sit the Resident in the Gulf and the Sheikh's attendants.

On the left of the Viceroy will sit the British Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Private and Military Secretaries to the Viceroy, and His Excellency's personal staff.

After a short conversation the Sheikh's son will be presented. The khillats for the Sheikh and his son will be conferred and the interview will then terminate.

The Sheikh will leave the *Hardinge* with similar ceremonies to those observed on his arrival. A salute of 5 guns will be fired from the ship on his departure.

Undress uniform will be worn.

L. W. DANE,
Secretary to the Government of India.

At 10 A.M. on 29th November His Excellency the Viceroy will leave the *Hardinge* under a salute of 31 guns from the *Pomone* and will visit the town. His Excellency will be received at the landing-place by the Sheikh, who will personally escort him during his visit which will include an informal reception at the Sheikh's house, where a salute of 31 guns will be fired on the arrival of His Excellency.

At 3 P.M. on 29th November the Sheikh will pay a private visit to the Viceroy.

His Excellency will leave the port at 10 P.M. on the *Lawrence* on 29th November.

Correct as amended.

L. W. DANE,—4-12-1903.

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

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Appendix IV of Notes.

PROPOSALS OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL KEMBALL, C.I.E., AND MAJOR COX, C.I.E., FOR ANNOUNCEMENTS TO BE MADE BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY IN RESPECT TO MASKAT.

Extract from a letter from LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. A. KEMBALL, *C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 29th August 1903.*

* * * * * * * *

With regard to the political aspect of the case, I fear I must ask you to let me have time to think over this matter. So far as I can say at present, I do not think that, so far as the Trucial Chiefs and the Chief of Bahrein are concerned, any fresh arrangements in the way of new forms of engagement will be desired. Maskat enjoys a different status, and perhaps some modification or expansion of the *status quo* may be desirable, but I would like to consult Cox in this matter. The Chief of Koweit may very possibly desire some more definite agreement.

* * * * * * * *

Extract from a letter from MAJOR P. Z. COX, *C.I.E., Political Agent at Maskat, dated the 6th September 1903.*

* * * * * * * *

If Maskat is to be the first place of call, I do not think the visit of the Viceroy would be a good occasion for pressing upon the Sultan anything in the nature of the request for a concession, such as the lease of the Gwadur Customs. News would fly ahead quickly, and the Pirate Coast Chiefs or others might become apprehensive.

* * * * * * * *

Our Commercial Treaty with Maskat is under consideration with a view to renewal, and apart from this, any new form of engagement which would be compatible with the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862 does not seem to be practicable, but there are two points with regard to which it would seem possible for us to strengthen the Sultan's hands and at the same time increase our own influence, and if there is no inherent objection to the proposals that follow, the Viceroy might feel able to make a statement in Durbar in connection therewith.

1. Having been unmoved spectators of the attack on Maskat in 1895, during which the property of our subjects was looted and destroyed, and the Sultan himself lost everything he had, His Majesty's Government realised that their commercial and political interests in Maskat were such that they could not afford to see the incident repeated. The Sheikhs of Oman were, therefore, informed that in future the British Government would not permit Maskat or Matra to be attacked. That is the present position, and the intimation to the Sheikhs of Oman has proved quite sufficient hitherto so far as Maskat is concerned. Could not the present opportunity be used to inform the Oman public that the above policy will be extended in future to all ports in Oman where there are communities of British traders, and consequently British interests? We have every reasonable ground for assuming such an attitude, as it is in the interests of all peaceable traders alike, whether they be British or native. As a case in point, at the present moment while there is trouble at Rostak, I cannot but be anxious for the safety of our subjects at the ports of the Batineh Coast, and have arranged for a man-of-war to remain here for the present; but if the tribes had been informed in the sense that I now suggest, they would accept the intimation, and the danger of trouble to our subjects would be very much less.

It might even be possible to go beyond the limits of the above intimation, but I am less confident on the latter point, which I will now explain.

You are aware that in former days the Rulers of Oman exercised spiritual as well as temporal powers and were styled "Imam." Since the days of Ahmed-bin-Saeed no successor has been considered to possess the spiritual qualifications necessary to justify that title, and the descendants of Ahmed-bin-Saeed have been known to their subjects simply as "Saiyids," and to us as "Sultans," a term never used by Omanis. Whenever some firebrand arises like the late Saleh-bin-Ali, and now his son Aysa, they can always rouse a certain section of the population by the statement or pretence that they are going to set up an "Imam" to be their spiritual ruler in opposition to the "Saiyid." As a rule, these attempts are abortive and there is no practical result, but this shibboleth, the "making of an Imam," works wonders in the way of unrest and excitement among the ignorant tribesmen of the interior.

Similarly, the present troubles may not have any serious result, but in any case they are causing a good deal of anxiety and are having an injurious effect upon the date export industry, upon which the prosperity of Maskat entirely depends. When the Viceroy visits Maskat, he will thus have ready to hand a fresh case in point, and I believe it would have a sobering

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effect upon the turbulent Bedouin element, and would take the wind out of the sails of such troublesome characters as Aysa-bin-Saleh and Hilal-bin-Amr, if the Viceroy could make a statement to the Durbaris somewhat on the following lines.

After sketching the position which Great Britain has taken for generations in preserving the peace and prosperity of the Gulf, His Excellency would explain—

That the British Government is only interested in what goes on in the interior of Oman in so far as passing events affect British trading interests, which are, however, very considerable. That it is found that mischievous risings against the constituted authority of the Sultan, caused by no acts of oppression on the part of the Ruler, but merely got up with the object of extorting blackmail from him or causing annoyance and unrest, do seriously affect the trade of the ports and the interests of British merchants, and that whereas the stock of Saiyid Turki and his forebears have been on terms of close intimacy and treaty relation with the British Government, and his descendants still are, the British Government thinks that the time has come to make it known to the public of Oman that, as long as the descendants of Saiyid Turki continue to act up to their treaty engagements to that Government and to conduct their administration in a manner compatible with the advancing requirements of civilisation, His Majesty's Government will be prepared, should it see fit, to protect its subjects and interests in Oman and to support the authority of the Sultan in any way that may seem expedient, and to assist him by such means, as may appear called for, to suppress those disloyal and unruly subjects who are the enemies as well of the public weal as of the ruling Sultan.

Such an intimation need not commit us in any way as between ourselves and the Sultan, but would be very generally welcomed by the peaceable portion of the community and would strengthen the Sultan's hands a good deal. I do not see what exception the French could take to it, and I should think they would hardly be inclined to at the present time.

Telegram, dated the 19th September 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Agent, Maskat.

Viceroy will, as at present arranged, arrive, *viâ* Ras-al-Hadd, at Maskat morning 18th November. Stay there till evening 19th, when he leaves for Shargah *via* Mussandim. You can inform Sultan on any suitable occasion after 26th September. Question of ships and of any political pronouncement are under consideration.

Extract from a letter from Major P. Z. Cox, *C.I.E., Political Agent at Maskat, dated the 4th October 1903.*

The British subjects have expressed their desire to present an address to His Excellency during his stay here, and I therefore write to enquire whether the Viceroy will be prepared to receive it, and whether it should be submitted first for approval.

Time is so short that I will ask you kindly to send me a reply by wire.

Secret E., July 1895, Nos. 355-357.
Secret E., April 1896, Nos. 163-182.
Current papers relating to—
(1) the renewal of our Commercial Treaty with the Sultan;
(2) the suggested transfer of Gwadur to the Khan of Kalat.
(3) The disturbances at Rostak, etc.

The foregoing extracts containing suggestions for His Excellency's speech in Durbar at Maskat are put up together with the marginally noted papers.

L. Russell,—2-11-1903.

S. M. Fraser,—3-11-1903.

Until His Majesty's Government declare their policy in regard to Maskat it will be difficult for Your Excellency to say much more than what Major Cox proposes. The differences of the traders at Gwadur with the Sultan's Customs officers have been patched up, and in view of the claim put forward to that port by the Khan of Kalat and to our inquiries about Pasni and Korkalmah, I venture to think that the less said about Gwadur the better. We might, however, tell the Sultan at the private inteview that he must not enhance the 5 per cent., export duty by levying zakat from the British traders if Major Cox has not already settled this question, in which case the matter might be briefly noticed in Your Excellency's reply to the address.

Proceedings No. 32 in External B, September 1903, Nos. 28-34.

The case of the new Commercial Treaty is under separate consideration.

L. W. Dane,—4-11-1903.

Your Excellency has copies of the passages in the letters from Colonel Kemball and Major Cox containing suggestions for Your Excellency's address at Maskat.

I now add—

(1) Some supplementary notes on Maskat by Major Cox, in which he gives some statistics as to trade.

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(2) A statement of Maskat trade taken from the Gulf Trade Reports.
(3) Notes on certain current Maskat files.
(4) Translation of the speeches which the Sultan and his deputation propose to deliver at—
  (i) the Mazaj Parsi at which it is not obligatory for Your Excellency to attend;
  (ii) at the return visit; and
  (iii) at the Durbar;
(5) A copy of the address which the British and Goanese residents of Maskat will read to Your Excellency after lunch at the Consulate on 18th.
(6) Copis of the Maskat programmes as at present arranged.

As His Majesty's Government have not agreed to any announcement of a fresh policy at Maskat, nothing beyond Major Cox's suggested warning to the Sheikhs seems possible, which is a pity.

L. W. Dane,—16-11-1903.

Exd.—L. G. G.

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

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FOREIGN DEPARTMENT NOTES.

Appendix V to Notes
Note on Lingah

I went ashore at Lingah this morning with British Consular Agent Agha Badar-bin-Muhammad Amin, a Persian, and went through the town. The place was, until the introduction of the Belgian Customs Administration, very prosperous as an entrepôt for the trade of the pearling banks and Arabian coast ports. New houses, fine bazars with roofs and coffee houses have sprung up everywhere, and the population according to the Agent exceeded 12,000 men. He has a large bazar and godown himself. Haji Abdulrahman, the French Consular Agent, also owns a fine house and bazar near the Deputy Governor's residence and flies the French flag and also the flag of the Odessa Shipping Company when one of their vessels arrives in port. The last to call was the Trouver about 2½ months ago. She took a cargo of shells, but got nothing else. Since the introduction of the harassing Belgian Customs Administration the trade of the port has greatly decreased, as though nominally only transhipment dues are charged, the goods do not enter the port. The Agent anticipated that the enhanced new tariff would cause a rapid decline in the trade, as goods were now being taken direct to the Arabian coast ports and Bahrein. When the Viceroy was at Sharjah a British steamer was at Debaye.

The British Assistant Surgeon in charge of the quarantine arrangements reported the place to be healthy and said that he was not interfered with. There is no Belgian Customs Officer there at present. The port is safe during north-west winds, but is much exposed to winds from the east and south. There is a small harbour which contained about 20 dhows, which can however only enter and float there at high water.

There are 34 Banians here and 21 Khojas. Of these the men reject and the women accept the *quasi*-divinity of the Agha Khan. If permission were given to the traders to establish themselves at Bassidore, they would probably go there, as Lingah has practically no trade with the interior, but depends on its position as a transhipment port.

L. W. DANE,—25-11-1903.

C[URZON],—25-11-1903.

While at Lingah Sir A. Hardinge secured the punishment of the Persian Colonel and the two soldiers who insulted Muhammad Husain, the Assistant Surgeon. The former was fined 10 tomans and the two latter are to be sent on the *Persepolis* to Bushire to be flogged in the presence of a British Consular representative.

L. W. DANE,—25-11-1903.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 2385 F. D.—17-12-03—31—W. G. B.

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

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

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, FEBRUARY 1904.

Visit of His Excellency the Viceroy to the Persian Gulf. Pro. No. 33

VISIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY TO THE PERSIAN GULF DURING NOVEMBER—DECEMBER 1903.

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

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

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(*Confidential.*)

Dated Simla, the 13th August 1903.

From—L. W. DANE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. A. KEMBALL, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

The Viceroy has desired me to write to you in the strictest confidence about a plan that he proposes to carry into execution in the forthcoming winter.

He proposes to visit the Persian Gulf probably in the *Hardinge*, escorted by the Admiral and a flotilla of men-of-war, in order to inspect the Indian Establishments in the Gulf and to testify to the predominant influence that is already and must continue to be exercised by Great Britain in those waters. This will be a great departure, and will excite much interest and concern. It will probably be warmly welcomed by all those who, like yourself, are engaged in the not always easy task of upholding British prestige in those parts.

There are a number of points upon which the Viceroy desires me to consult you in confidence before his plans are further matured. First as to the places to be visited. His idea is to leave Karachi about the middle of November and to cross straight to Maskat. There he would spend a day or a day and-a-half, and would then round Cape Musandim to the Pirate Coast. His Excellency's idea is to hold a Durbar for all the Trucial Chiefs on that Coast, to which they would be summoned from far and wide. The place selected might be Ras-el-Khermoils or Shargah, or Debai, and your advice is solicited both upon the idea and the locality.

From there, or perhaps, previously to going there, the Viceroy would proceed northwards to Bunder Abbas where he would spend a day, perhaps, also landing at Ormuz. Thence he would proceed to Bassidore and, if thought desirable, to Lingah.

The next point would be Bahrein where one or two days would be spent. Thence the squardon would cross to Bushire for a day or a day and-a-half. And the last port of call would be Koweit. It would probably be unnecessary to ascend the Shat-el-Arab to Mohammerah. The entire duration of the trip to and from Karachi would probably be about three weeks.

You will doubtless give us the benefit of your advice upon the details of this programme. The Viceroy would further like to know what are the climate and weather that may be anticipated at that season and whether landing will, as a rule, be feasible or easy. His Excellency knows that February and March would have been a better time of the year. But he could not come then, and it is accordingly a case of now or never.

Next arises the question of the manner in which this visit is likely to be regarded at the Persian ports that would be visited, by the Persian officials stationed there. No British official of the rank of the Viceroy would ever have appeared at those places, and it would be undesirable that they should fail to recognize the importance of the occasion. It may be that the Persian Government would think fit to send an official from Tehran specially to meet and offer a welcome to His Excellency.

Further, the political aspect of the case must not be overlooked: and indeed this is its more important feature. It may be that the Chiefs of Maskat, the Pirate Coast, Bahrein, and Koweit will expect, when so big a personage as the Viceroy of India appears upon the scene, that some new form of engagement will be concluded with them. They may desire some fresh arrangements of this sort. It may be desirable, or it may be undesirable, in some cases it may be impossible, to grant them. In any case His Majesty's Government would, of course, have to be consulted before anything was finally

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concluded. In this context I am to ask you carefully to think over and review the situation, in reply indicating whether it would be, in your opinion, desirable to modify or expand the *status quo* in any of these cases, what would be the probable expectation of the Chiefs, what would be the best solution for British interests, and what specific ideas are capable of being pursued. It would be a pity to raise expectations only to disappoint them. On the other hand, it would probably be a greater pity to lose so rare an opportunity of fortifying our position and influence.

Any advice that you may offer on these points or on any other that may occur to you will be welcome, and the sooner you can reply, of course, the better, since time is speeding along.

Pur No 34

Telegram, dated the 22nd August 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—Colonel Kemball, Shiraz.

Important letter sent to you on 13th August regarding Viceroy's tour. Please telegraph on receipt if proposals generally suitable. It will be well that you should proceed Bushire at early date to facilitate arrangements and preliminaries. Have sent copy of letter to Cox to save time.

Pur No 35

Dated Simla, the 23rd August 1903.

From—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., His Britannic Majesty's Consul and Political Agent, Maskat.

At Viceroy's request I enclose a copy of a letter which has been sent to Kemball about His Excellency's proposed tour in the Gulf. Kemball is away in Shiraz and, though I have now telegraphed to him, I think it will be well if you will let us have your ideas on the proposals so far as they affect Maskat at a very early date, sending a copy of your letter to Kemball. You will know if it is desirable or not at this stage to sound the Sultan personally, but it is of course desirable that the proposal should not leak out prematurely.

I am sorry that events prevented you from going to Karachi. We are asking Mr. Whitby-Smith to send you the papers that you require.

Kind regards and hope that we shall soon meet.

Pur No 36

Telegram, dated the 23rd August 1903.

From—Colonel Kemball, Shiraz,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram of the 22nd August. Letter referred to will probably reach me 3rd September. Will it do if I am back Bushire end of September?

Pur No 37

Telegram, dated the 26th August 1903

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—Colonel Kemball, Shiraz.

Your telegram of 23rd August. End of September will do.

Pur No 38

Telegram, dated the 31st August 1903.

From—Colonel Kemball, Shiraz,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Confidential. Your telegram of the 22nd instant. Viceroy's tour. Letter received. Proposal seems generally suitable. I have suggested some minor modifications in my letter which should reach you 12th September.

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Dated Shiraz, the 29th August 1903. (Confidential.)

Received Dec 29

From—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have received your confidential letter about the Viceroy's proposed visit to the Persian Gulf. His Excellency's first visit will be paid to Maskat and from Maskat he will either proceed to the Pirate Coast or to Bunder Abbas. I do not think that it matters very much which of these places is taken first, but as I anticipate some little difficulty in getting all the Trucial Chiefs together at one place, it may perhaps be found more suitable to proceed first to Bunder Abbas. These Arab Sheikhs are not like ordinary people, and the Chief of Abu Dhabi may possibly object to come to Shargah, while the Shargah Chief might find it inconvenient to have a gathering of all the Chiefs at his place. I have thought therefore that the most suitable plan may be for me, after meeting His Excellency at Maskat, to send the *Lawrence* round to the Pirate Coast to collect the Chiefs and bring them to, say, Shargah where they would be kept on board until the Viceroy arrives. The Durbar will, I think, be held upon the *Hardinge* and His Excellency would probably not care to land on the Coast where indeed there is nothing of any interest to see. From the Pirate Coast His Excellency might cross over to Bassidore and Lingah which place, I think, it would be a pity to omit. From Lingah to Bahrein is a short run. From Bahrein, I think, it will be more convenient to go to Koweit and to finish up the round at Bushire. I forgot to mention that His Excellency might desire to visit the Elphinstone Inlet which can be taken easily on the way from Bunder Abbas to the Pirate Coast.

Now as to the climate and weather they may be anticipated in the Gulf during the latter half of November. November may generally be taken to be a fine weather month in the Gulf. On the Persian side it will probably be quite cool, though off the Pirate Coast it may be warm. As to weather, it is, I fear, impossible to predict the certainty of fine weather, and according to my experience, I have hardly ever done a trip of ten days duration in the Gulf without some bad weather. At none of the places can landing be called easy and at no place is it feasible if bad weather is on. I have been kept waiting off the Pirate Coast for days at a time before any communication with the shore was possible, and I have been at Bunder Abbas, Bahrein and Koweit when landing was out of the question. I may, I think, safely say that the climate will be pleasant, but as regards weather and landing, the former may or may not be auspicious while the latter, even under the most favourable conditions of weather and tide, is hardly ever easy.

Next as to the manner in which the visit is likely to be regarded, at the Persian ports which will be visited, by the Persian officials stationed there. At Bunder Abbas and Lingah the officials are of very minor importance, being only Deputies of the Governor of Bushire, whose orders they would require as to the reception to be accorded to His Excellency. I think it would be as well that the Minister at Tehran should be asked to notify to the Persian Government that the Viceroy of India proposes to visit the Gulf, and to request that the local officials should be directed to receive His Excellency in a manner befitting his high rank. Perhaps the Persian Government may desire to send an official from Tehran especially to meet and offer a welcome to His Excellency, but I hardly think that this need be suggested, as the Governor of Bushire is a man of good position and will, I am sure, do all that is necessary to receive Lord Curzon in a suitable manner.

With regard to the political aspect of the case. I fear I must ask you to let me have time to think over this matter. So far as I can say at present, I do not think that, so far as the Trucial Chiefs and the Chief of Bahrein are concerned, any fresh arrangements in the way of new forms of engagement will be desired. Maskat enjoys a different status and perhaps some modification or expansion of the *status quo* may be desirable, but I would like to consult Cox in this matter. The Chief of Koweit may very possibly desire some more definite agreement.

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I am leaving Shiraz on the 19th September and shall be back in Bushire by the end of the month, and hope soon after my return to be in a position to reply more definitely on these points.

I can think of nothing more to say at present except that I suppose His Excellency will bring some presents for the various Chiefs and Governors. These latter may perhaps consider it incumbent on them to send off some things to His Excellency, and return presents will be required. On hearing from you, your wishes in this matter, I will, if desired, submit detailed proposals.

I hope you will let me know by telegram as soon as a definite decision has been arrived at regarding the tour, as I would like to give warning as early as possible to the various Arab Chiefs.

In conclusion, may I be permitted to say that His Excellency's visit will be warmly welcomed by myself and by the other officers in the Gulf, and that we will do our best to ensure its success. I hope the Admiral will be able to collect a good number of ships so as to make the visit as impressive as possible.

Bushire 40

Dated Maskat, the 6th September 1903.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., His Britannic Majesty's Consul and Political Agent at Maskat,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I hasten to answer your demi-official letter dated 23rd August, enclosing a copy of your letter to Colonel Kemball on the subject of the Viceroy's proposed tour in the Gulf, which, I need hardly say, has interested me very much indeed. It is a grand scheme and will, I devoutly hope, take shape in due course.

Not so very long ago, with a somewhat complacent Foreign Office and a very ill-informed British public at home, and with the fate of our supremacy in South Africa hanging in the balance, Great Britain's "predominant influence" in these waters had a somewhat uphill struggle for existence, but happily owing to the Viceroy's personality and his keen solicitude for our interests in the Gulf, a partial awakening came to those at home at the eleventh hour and our position now seems secure, at all events for some time to come. His Excellency's proposed visit will be a very stirring and visible sign of the reality and vitality of that influence, and its importance can hardly be overrated whether it be regarded as an imposing ceremonial which will deeply impress the natives of the Persian Gulf and Oman, or as a dignified and significant hint to political rivals that we do not intend to allow our hard-won and honourable position of predominance in these latitudes to be seriously encroached upon or menaced by the ambitions of any other Power.

At present the Sultan is away, and in any case is just now in an exceedingly anxious frame of mind regarding the internal affairs of Oman: it would therefore be better, I think, for me to wait until I hear from you again that the tour is difinitely decided upon before I make any communication to His Highness on the subject.

That he will give the Viceroy a cordial welcome I have not the slightest doubt, but from past experience I know that the first sentiment that will possess him will be the not unnatural fear of his own inability to do justice to so great an occasion. I say this because three years ago when he heard that the Viceroy was about to visit Karachi he at first thought of inviting His Excellency to come on here, but subsequently frightened himself out of the idea by the fear that Maskat and its resources were not meet for the reception of a Viceroy. Such no doubt will be his first feeling on the present occasion, but the knowledge that His Excellency will also visit other unpretentious centres of interest in the Gulf will, at all events, help to dispel it, and I have every hope that Saiyid Feisal will rise to the occasion as far as in him lies.

I beg now to refer to some of the questions of detail that you mention or that occur to me.

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Tide and weather.

For the Gulf of Oman the middle and latter half of November is a very favourable season for touring. The boisterous Shemals or North-West winds, which at certain seasons make landing difficult, have not yet commenced and the weather is pleasantly cool.

Pressing of special measures or requests.

If Maskat is to be the first place of call, I do not think the visit of the Viceroy would be a good occasion for pressing upon the Sultan anything in the nature of the request for a concession, such as the lease of the Gwadur Customs. News would fly ahead quickly and the Pirate Coast Chiefs or others might become apprehensive.

Showing the Flag past Soor and Southern Oman Coast.

It would be a good thing, supposing it could be made to fit in with the "outward" time-table, if the Flotilla could strike the Oman littoral at Ras-el-Had and hug the Coast as much as possible up to Maskat.

An imposing vessel for His Excellency the Viceroy's Flag.

You mention that the Viceroy would probably travel in the *Hardinge* and no doubt, owing to her special accommodation, she would be better adapted for the residence of the Viceroy and his party than an ordinary man-of-war; but from the point of view of the Oriental onlooker a greater impression would certainly be created if the Viceroy, at all events for receiving visitors and holding Durbars, were to fly his Flag over a man-of-war; and that a bigger one than has yet been seen in these waters. The present Flagship, H.M.S. *Hyacinth* is an ordinary 2nd class cruiser of 5,000 odd tons and is not of a showy class by any means. Would it not be possible to obtain the temporary services of a Battleship or a fine 1st class armoured cruiser, such as the *Good Hope* was? It is true that such a ship would have to be at a somewhat greater distance from the shore than the *Hardinge*, but where Steam-Cutters were plentiful ½ a mile or so in distance, would make little difference.

A new form of engagement or the modification of the *status quo*.

Our Commercial Treaty with Maskat is under consideration with a view to renewal, and apart from this any new form of engagement which would be compatible with the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862 does not seem to be practicable, but there are two points with regard to which it would seem possible for us to strengthen the Sultan's hands and at the same time increase our own influence, and if there is no inherent objection to the proposals that follow, the Viceroy might feel able to make a statement in Durbar in connection therewith.

1. Having been unmoved spectators of the attack on Maskat in 1895, during which the property of our subjects was looted and destroyed, and the Sultan himself lost everything he had, His Majesty's Government realised that their commercial and political interest in Maskat were such that they could not afford to see the incident repeated. The Shaikhs of Oman were therefore informed that in future the British Government would not permit Maskat or Matra to be attacked. That is the present position and the intimation to the Shaikhs of Oman has proved quite sufficient hitherto so far as Maskat is concerned. Could not the present opportunity be used to inform the Oman public that the above policy will be extended in future to all ports in Oman where there are communities of British traders, and consequently British interests? We have every reasonable ground for assuming such an attitude as it is in the interests of all peaceable traders alike, whether they be British or native. As a case in point, at the present moment while there is trouble at Rostak, I cannot but be anxious for the safety of our subjects at the ports of the Batineh Coast and have arranged for a man-of-war to remain here for the present; but if the tribes had been informed in the sense that I now suggest, they would accept the intimation and the danger of trouble to our subjects would be very much less.

It might even be possible to go beyond the limits of the above intimation, but I am less confident on the latter point, which I will now explain.

You are aware that in former days the Rulers of Oman exercised spiritual as well as temporal powers and were styled "Imam." Since the days of

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Ahmed-bin-Saeed no successor has been considered to possess the spiritual qualifications necessary to justify that title, and the descendants of Amed-bin-Saeed have been known to their subjects simply as "Saiyids," and to us as "Sultans," a term never used by Omanis. Whenever some firebrand arises like the late Saleh-bin-Ali, and now his son Aysa, they can always rouse a certain section of the population by the statement or pretence that they are going to set up an "Imam" to be their spiritual ruler in opposition to the "Saiyid." As a rule, these attempts are abortive and there is no practical result, but this shibboleth, the "making of an Imam," works wonders in the way of unrest and excitement among the ignorant tribesmen of the interior.

Similarly, the present troubles may not have any serious result, but in any case they are causing a good deal of anxiety and are having an injurious effect upon the date export industry, upon which the prosperity of Maskat entirely depends. When the Viceroy visits Maskat he will thus have ready to hand a fresh case in point, and I believe it would have a sobering effect upon the turbulent Bedouin element and would take the wind out of the sails of such troublesome characters as Aysa-bin-Saleh and Hilal-bin-Amr, if the Viceroy could make a statement to the Durbaris somewhat on the following lines.

After sketching the position which Great Britain has taken for generations in preserving the peace and prosperity of the Gulf, His Excellency would explain—

That the British Government is only interested in what goes on in the interior of Oman in so far as passing events affect British trading interests, which are however very considerable. That it is found that mischievous risings against the constituted authority of the Sultan, caused by no acts of oppression on the part of the Ruler, but merely got up with the object of extorting blackmail from him or causing annoyance and unrest, do seriously affect the trade of the ports and the interests of British merchants, and that whereas the stock of Saiyid Turki and his forefathers have been on terms of close intimacy and treaty relation with the British Government, and his descendants still are, the British Government thinks that the time has come to make it known to the public of Oman that as long as the descendants of Saiyid Turki continue to act up to their treaty engagements to that Government and to conduct their administration in a manner compatible with the advancing requirements of civilisation, His Majesty's Government will be prepared, should it see fit, to protect its subjects and interests in Oman and to support the authority of the Sultan in any way that may seem expedient, and to assist him by such means as may appear called for, to suppress those disloyal and unruly subjects who are the enemies as well of the public weal as of the ruling Sultan.

Such an intimation need not commit us in any way as between ourselves and the Sultan, but would be very generally welcomed by the peaceable portion of the community and would strengthen the Sultan's hands a good deal. I do not see what exception the French could take to it, and I should think they would hardly be inclined to at the present time.

A decoration for the Sultan.

Three years ago when the Viceroy was at Karachi, when speaking to me about Maskat affairs, he said that if the Sultan continued to behave satisfactorily, he would be prepared, before he left India, to consider the question of a decoration for him. Since then Saiyid Feisal has, I think, on the whole, been giving little trouble and in one or two matters has behaved distinctly well. The present occasion is likely to be such a unique one and affords such an excellent opportunity for giving it him with ceremony *éclat* that I venture to commend the question to His Excellency's consideration. It may be said that the Sultan has already received sufficiently numerous marks of the Government of India's favour and generosity, and what has he done to deserve a further one? To this I would reply that he has perhaps done nothing positively or specifically, but his general attitude has been satisfactory and, speaking negatively, he has done nothing not to deserve it. But, as a matter of fact, taking for granted that he is not egregiously undeserving, I would not ask that the question be looked at so much from the point of view of intrinsic merit, but rather as a means of "hall-marking" him as it were for ourselves and of further committing him to us.

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Generally speaking, it would seem to be our best policy, for the present and within limits, to keep Saiyid Feisal under obligations to us for favours received as much as we possibly can. If we see him safely through the Hague Arbitration and if, as I would fain hope, the verdict is given in his favour, the French, unless their trade increases very much, should cease to be a source of any anxiety to us, and they would have little scope for intrigue. Then we can, if necessary, tighten our hold and put on pressure where we wish. Till then it seems to me that the "velvet glove" should remain in use.

The foregoing paragraphs comprise my humble ideas regarding the political possibilities of the visit; there remain one or two matters of detail, which as time is so short may well be mentioned now.

Ceremonial visits and salutes.

Hitherto no one of higher rank than an Admiral has visited Maskat and Admirals have called first on the Sultan. What are the Viceroy's views on this point?

In the case of the visit to the Sultan, how would the Viceroy's and Admiral's salutes be fired?

Foreign Consular Officials will no doubt wish to pay their respects to His Excellency by writing their names in his Visitor's Book. They would have to be saluted.

Time of arrival.

If the Viceroy arrived in the morning or forenoon and if the approximate hour was known beforehand, one visit might be got over very shortly after arrival and the return visit in the afternoon.

The first night perhaps the foreshore and part of the Harbour could be illuminated and some fireworks might take place, and the next day, in the forenoon, the Viceroy might wish to invite the Sultan and selected subjects of his and ours to a Durbar on his Flagship and would make any enunciation of policy that might by that time have been decided on.

The evening of the first day, after sundown, and the early morning of the second day would be free for the inspection of parts of Maskat which His Excellency might wish to visit.

I would propose to suggest to the Sultan that he should invite his leading Bedouin Sheikhs into Maskat for the occasion: but as regards this and the illuminations, you will understand that I am at present reckoning without my host.

I fear the above is a somewhat untidy letter, but if I type it again, I shall miss the mail, so I trust the shortcomings will be overlooked. I am sending a copy to Colonel Kemball.

Telegram, No. 2190 E. A., dated the 15th September 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—Colonel Kemball, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Shiraz.

Viceroy will be accompanied to Gulf by Admiral and at least four ships of Squadron. Sir A. Hardinge is coming down to accompany His Excellency on cruise, but as we do not propose to touch at Jask or Chahbar, he will probably join party at Bunder Abbas. Leaving Karachi November 16th, Viceroy would arrive Maskat morning of 18th. Stay there 18th and 19th, leaving evening of 19th. On 20th visit harbours of Mussandim. On 21st hold Durbar on *Hardinge* at Shargah. Arrive Bunder Abbas early 22nd. Stay there 22nd and 23rd, visiting Hormuz and Kishm. Visit Henjam and Bassidore on 24th and Lingah on 25th. Arrive Bahrein afternoon of 26th. Stay there 27th and 28th. Arrive Koweit afternoon of 29th. Stay there 30th and 1st. Arrive Bushire on 2nd. Stay there 2nd and 3rd. Leave Bushire on return to Karachi 3rd or 4th. Are these plans suitable? Bushire could be taken before Koweit, if desirable. Please keep all details confidential except Bunder Abbas, Lingah, and Bushire. Hardinge is informing Persian Government. Please submit by telegram suitable list of recipients of presents and value and class of gifts required; also whether Indian decorations would be desirable for Chiefs of Maskat, Bahrein, Koweit, or for Governor, Bushire.

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No. 148 of 1903.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

External.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD GEORGE F. HAMILTON, G.C.S.I.,
His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

SIMLA, *the 17th September 1903.*

MY LORD,

I have already had the honour to inform Your Lordship that it is my desire to pay a visit in the forthcoming autumn to Maskat and the Persian Gulf, in order to inspect the Indian establishments that are maintained in those parts, to visit the Arab Sheikhs who are in Treaty relations with the British Government, and to testify to the paramount political and commercial ascendency that is exercised by Great Britain in those waters. Though I have reason to believe that His Majesty's Government are not opposed to this suggestion, I desire to submit it to Your Lordship for official approval.

2. I propose to leave India in the middle of November in a vessel of the Royal Indian Marine, and I have been informed by the Admiral of the East Indian Squadron that it is his intention to escort me upon the journey.

3. I have learned by telegram from Your Lordship that Sir A. Hardinge, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, is also contemplating a visit to the Persian Gulf at the same time: and I hope that he may be able to join me in my visits to the principal Persian Ports.

4. In Persian territory I shall not be called upon to do more than exchange civilities with the Persian officials, and consult with the officers of the Indian Government who are stationed at the principal ports, concerning the due maintenance of British and Indian interests and trade in those regions.

5. On the opposite or Arabian shore of the Gulf, it does not seem likely that any fresh arrangements will be required with the Trucial Chiefs or with the Sheikh of Bahrein who are already under engagements with us that practically constitute a British Protectorate. It is not impossible that the Sheikh of Koweit may desire some more definite agreement than that which has so far been concluded with him. On the other hand, the status of the Sultan of Maskat is determined by international treaties and does not appear at present to be susceptible of modification.

6. In none of these cases would it be right or proper that I should anticipate the consent of His Majesty's Government to any new arrangements or undertakings; and it may well be that at no point of my journey will any but conventional declarations or assurances be required. These are matters upon which I shall not be in a position authoritatively to advise Your Lordship until I have heard from the Resident in the Persian Gulf.

7. In the meantime, however, I address this letter to Your Lordship, in case His Majesty's Government should desire to favour me with any instructions as to the subjects which I should examine, or the manner in which I should proceed.

I have the honour to be,
MY LORD,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,
(Signed) CURZON.

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Telegram, dated the 16th September 1903.

From—Colonel Kemball, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Shiraz,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram of the 15th instant. Viceroy's tour. Plan seems to be suitable. I reach Bushire 29th September and I would like, if possible, by the middle of October to arrange details with Chiefs of Arabian Coast, Bahrein and Koweit. Please let me know if I may do so. Matter will be kept as confidential as possible. I will telegraph about presents *et cetera* from Bushire. I presume that I should meet His Excellency, Maskat.

Telegram, dated the 19th September 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—Colonel Kemball, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Shiraz.

You should meet His Excellency at Maskat, having arranged for collection of Trucial Chiefs. You can arrange details with all Chiefs concerned by middle of October, and we should be glad to receive your ideas as to programmes of meetings and reception of Chiefs at early date. Public announcement of His Excellency's visit will be made before close of present month.

Telegram, dated the 19th September 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Agent at Maskat.

Viceroy will, as at present arranged, arrive, *viâ* Ras-al-Hadd, at Maskat morning 18th November. Stay there till evening 19th, when he leaves for Shargah *viâ* Mussandim. You can inform Sultan on any suitable occasion after 26th September. Question of ships and of any political pronouncement are under consideration.

Telegram, dated the 23rd September 1903.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla,
To—Colonel Kemball, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Shiraz.

Please remember it rests with you to inform Chiefs of Bahrein and Koweit of Viceroy's visit in such manner as you may consider suitable.

Telegram, dated the 25th September 1903.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla,
To—Colonel Kemball, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Intention of Viceroy to make tour in Gulf published to-day. Only visits to Bassidore, Henjam, Mussendim and perhaps Hormuz and Kishm need be kept secret.

Telegram, dated the 1st October 1903.

From—Colonel Kemball, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Viceroy's tour. It will greatly facilitate arrangements for the Durbar at Shargah, if I can be given services of extra steamer, say *Patrick Stewart*, to collect Chiefs and have them ready to meet His Excellency at Shargah. Owing to distance various Chiefs live apart, and also to distance *Hardinge* will have to lie off the shore, and other reasons, it will be impossible to make satisfactory arrangements without a special ship. I should require ship to call

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at Bahrein not later than 14th November to take up Gaskin, who will arrange for collection of Chiefs at Shargah. After the Durbar, ship will be required to take Chiefs back to their respective homes, and then proceed to Bahrein to land Gaskin. Her services will be dispensed with about the 25th of November. I propose to restrict the attendance (at) Durbar to three persons for each Chief. I am writing fully about the programme of the Durbar. Regarding the presents, I suggest the following Chiefs: Abu Dhabi, handsome gold mounted sword, gold hunting watch, Martini-Henry rifle, with five hundred cartridges and telescopic binocular glasses. One son, Martini-Henry rifle, with two hundred cartridges. Chiefs of Shargah, Debai and Umel-Kawain, same as Chief of Abu Dhabi, less binocular glasses. For one son of each, Martini-Henry rifle with two hundred cartridges. Chiefs of Ajman and Hamriyeh, gold hunting watches and Martini-Henry rifles. Chief of Bahrein, gold mounted sword, gold repeater watch, rifle with one thousand cartridges and telescopic binocular glasses. One brother of Chief and his eldest son, gold repeater watches and rifles with two hundred cartridges. Two other sons, rifles with two hundred cartridges. Vizier, gold hunting watch. Two bazaar-masters, cash each Rs. 100. Chief of Koweit, same as Bahrein, and his eldest son, gold repeater watch and rifle. Two other sons, rifle each. Munshi, gold hunting watch. All watches should have heavy good chains, and rifle should be single barrel, light sporting Martini-Henry rifles with detached stocks and *do more* (sic) implements in cases, best quality obtainable. Governor of Bushire, handsome Durbar clock, value Rs. 1,000. Deputy Governor, gold repeater watch. Munshi, handsome writing desk. Commander of Troops gold repeater watch. Commander of Artillery, gold hunting watch. Deputy Governor of Lingah, gold repeater; and Bunder Abbas, gold hunting watch. Cash presents for servants and others will also be required, and a few minor articles, such as cheap gold watches and binocular glasses, might be brought. I do not recommend grant of Indian decorations to any except the Sultan of Maskat. Regarding the nobility, I agree with Cox.

Par No 49

Memo. No. 2413-E. A., dated Simla, the 9th October 1903.

From—C. L. S. Russell, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Military (Marine) Department.

In forwarding the annexed extract from a telegram received from the Resident in the Persian Gulf, the undersigned is directed to say that the Foreign Department will be glad if the Marine Department will arrange to place a vessel at the disposal of the Resident for the purpose mentioned.

As the matter is urgent, the Foreign Department would be glad to be informed as early as possible of the orders issued in the matter by the Marine Department, in order that the Resident may be informed by telegram.

Par No 50

Dated the 4th October 1903.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Agent at Maskat,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

The British subjects have expressed their desire to present an address to His Excellency during his stay here, and I therefore write to inquire whether the Viceroy will be prepared to receive it and whether it should be submitted first for appoval.

Time is so short that I will ask you kindly to send me a reply by wire.

I have communicated the news of the Viceroy's visit to the Sultan. He was very gracious about it and anxious to do anything he could to honour the occasion.

He only requires to be told what is fitting, and I hope if His Excellency has any special wishes or you have any suggestions which may tend to make the visit pass off well, you will send me an early line.

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Dated Bushire, the 2nd October 1903.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I returned here on the 29th September and sent you yesterday a telegram about the Viceroy's tour so far as regards the Durbar on the Arab Coast and the distribution of presents. I now write in amplification of this telegram.

From Maskat to Mussendim is roughly 200 miles and on to Shargah is 80 miles. The *Hardinge's* departure from Maskat must therefore be timed so as to reach Mussendim by daylight on the 21st. There will be no difficulty about this, I think. The *Hardinge* is a fast ship and should be able to reach Shargah by 3 P.M. on the 21st. I would like to arrive at Shargah before the Viceroy so as to see that all is ready for the Durbar which might be held at 4 P. M. on the 21st. The *Lawrence* is slow and I shall therefore have to leave Maskat in advance of His Excellency and proceed straight te Shargah. I think perhaps it will not be necessary for me to accompany His Excellency to the Elphinstone Inlet, as, if I do so, I cannot arrive in advance at Shargah. I hope my suggestion to have an extra ship placed at my disposal for the purpose of collecting the various Trucial Chiefs and having them ready at Shargah will be feasible.

Abu Dhabi is over 80 miles from Shargah and Um-el-Kowein is also some little distance, and as the days are short in November, I am sure the most satisfactory plan will be to have all the Chiefs ready on board a ship near the spot where the *Hardinge* will anchor. I know by experience how difficult it is to communicate between the shore and ships on this unprotected Coast, and if the Chiefs have to put off from the shore as soon as the *Hardinge* is sighted, it is quite possible that delay and inconvenience will be occasioned. I am of course very anxious that no hitch should occur, and an extra ship at my disposal will facilitate my arrangement and make us independent of adverse winds and bad weather. If it cannot be arranged, I shall have to act on my former suggestion and send the *Lawrence* round from Maskat on the 18th to collect the Chiefs and have them ready. In this case I imagine I can be given a passage from Maskat in a man-of-war, but I should prefer the extra ship arrangement, as it will make me more independent and I shall be able to arrange for the more distant Chiefs to get back to their homes without difficulty.

Now as to the political aspect of the Durbar. So far as the Trucial Chiefs are concerned, I do not think it is necessary or desirable to enter into any new form of engagement. Our influence with these Chiefs is already predominant, the maritime peace is ensured, intrigues with Foreign Powers provided against, and the trade practically in our hands and, so far as I can foresee, likely to remain so. From our point of view I think we may be fairly content with the *status quo*; whether it would be advisable looking to the future to modify or expand this *status quo* is not very easy to say.

Our time-honoured policy has been as you know to maintain the maritime peace and not to interfere in the internal quarrels of the Chiefs. As a matter of fact, the result of our policy has been to prevent aggression by one Chief on another. But this may not always be the case; some of the Chiefs are growing powerful and others are perhaps getting weaker and a spirit of aggression may arise. The Chief of Debaye, for instance, might wish to try conclusions with his neighbour at Shargah. Probably the Resident would get sufficient warning of the likelihood of hostilities to enable him to stop the fighting, though this would be contrary to our traditional policy. It really would not matter very much from our point of view, so far as I can see, whether the stronger and wiser ruler at Debaye laid his hands on Shargah or not, but of course a period of unrest would follow and our trade interests might suffer. It might therefore be advisable to let the Chiefs know that aggression by one independent Chief on another independent Chief would not be viewed with approval by us. Such a warning will, I think, be quite sufficient, and, though perhaps not immediately necessary, it might be a useful safeguard for the future peace of the Coast. No special engagement to this end would be required. The Viceroy at the Durbar might I venture to

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suggest, after alluding to the benefits which have resulted to the Chiefs and their country from the peace which has been consequent on their engagements with the British Government, inform them that the Government intends to maintain its interest in them for their own benefit and for the continuance of their independence. His Excellency is pleased to learn that the engagements have, as a rule, been faithfully observed, and he is confident that the same faithful observance will be maintained in the future. The British Government has no desire to interfere in their internal affairs so far as the Chiefs govern their territories with justice and respect the rights of the foreign traders residing therein. All that the British Government desires is that the *status quo* should be maintained and any aggression by one State on another even although the operations may be confined to land, will not be viewed with approval by the British Government. In any case of dispute between the Chiefs the British Resident is always ready to listen to complaints and to arrange an amicable settlement satisfactory to both parties.

Such is a brief outline of what in my opinion might be said at the Durbar if the expansion of the *status quo* to this extent is approved.

Whether the Chiefs themselves will desire anything more I cannot say. I do not think so, but I intend to visit the Coast shortly and will be able to let you know if such is the case.

I am unable to write any more by this mail, as I have to close my post. Next week I will write about the other portions of the tour.

I hope my suggestions as to presents are not considered extravagant. The Viceroy's visit is such an important and unique occasion and the Viceroy's personality is so great that presents, if given at all, must be on a lavish scale. Amongst these ignorant folk the rank of a donor is judged by the class of his gifts.

Pso No 52

Telegram No. 2503-E.-A., dated the 20th October 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The Political Resident, Bushire.

Please send very urgently programme of Durbar at Shargah and programmes of interviews with Sultan of Maskat. Also short up to date narrative of each Chief and his state for Viceroy's information.

Pso No 53

Telegram, dated the 21st October 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The Political Resident, Bushire.

Grey should accompany Viceroy from Bunder Abbas to Lingah. Will a G.C.I.E. for Sultan of Masket be necessary, or will K.C.I.E. be sufficient ?

Pso No 54

Telegram, dated the 21st October 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The Political Agent, Maskat.

Your letter 4th October. Viceroy will receive address of British subjects, but it must be suitably presented in casket. Copy should be sent to us in advance. Sultan should visit Viceroy in forenoon after His Excellency's arrival, the return visit being made in the afternoon. Durbar will be held next day. Admiral's formal visit will perhaps not be necessary on this occasion. If Consular's representations call, the usual arrangements will be made. We have no other suggestions. Will weather be suitable for ordinary uniform or should white uniform be worn.

Pso No 55

Dated Bushire, the 8th October 1903.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter of last week on the subject of the Viceroy's tour, I now write dealing with the remainder of the programme. His Excel-

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lency will, I presume, leave Shargah during the night of the 21st and Bunder Abbas will be made by daylight on the 22nd.

The Deputy Governor of Bunder Abbas is a person of no importance. He is merely a servant of the Bushire Governor, but he is the representative of the Persian Government, and I presume will be received by the Viceroy on board the *Hardinge*. His visit will have to be returned, but not by the Viceroy, who will depute an officer to return the call on his behalf.

I do not know if His Excellency will land to see the town or the Vice Consulate at Naband which is two miles from the town. This latter place is close to the shore and can be visited by boat from the ship. I presume I shall receive instructions on this point. I would also like to know if a deputation from the British Indian traders at Bunder Abbas should be received by His Excellency.

Regarding the visits to the islands near Bunder Abbas I do not think that I need say anything. The visit to Bassidore may perhaps have to be made in the *Lawrence*, as I am doubtful if a ship of the *Hardinge's* size can get in there safely, but this is a matter for the consideration of the naval people. The visit to Lingah does not require any comment by me.

From Lingah to Bahrein is 240 miles, and if Lingah is left at 4 P.M. on the 25th, Bahrein will easily be made in the afternoon of the 26th. Possibly it may be more convenient to His Excellency that the reception should be held on the following morning. If so, I would suggest that the Chief's eldest son should be deputed by his father to visit the *Hardinge* on arrival in company with the Assistant Political Agent to inquire after His Excellency's health and find out what time will suit His Excellency to receive the Chief's visit. A launch should be sent from one of the ships to bring off the deputation to inquire after the Viceroy's health. If it suits His Excellency the Chief's visit might be arranged for the morning of the 27th at any hour convenient to His Excellency. The Chief's visit could be returned the following morning on shore at the Agency by an officer deputed by the Viceroy. I do not know if His Excellency will wish to land at Bahrein, but I presume you will let me know if such is the case. At Bahrein itself there is really nothing worth seeing, the landing is always inconvenient, and the only sights of the place are the wells some 3 miles inland and the mounds at Ali about 7 miles from the town. Neither of these places are particularly interesting.

Now as to the political aspect of the visit to Bahrein, the status of Bahrein is well known to the Government of India, and it is not necessary for me to enter into the datails of it now. The Chief of Bahrein will, I feel sure, have no desire for any new form of engagement to be concluded with him. All that he wants is to be left alone and to be allowed to end his days in peace. Any expansion or modification of the *status quo*, which would tend to curtail the Chief's authority in any way and make our protectorate more apparent, would, I feel sure, be against the Sheikh's wishes. He has now all he wants. He is protected against attack; his son's succession has been assured, and, so far as the internal administration of his inlands are concerned, he is virtually independent, subject of course to the benevolent supervision of the Assistant Political Agent. I am inclined, however, to think that the time has now come when the expansion of the *status quo* is desirable from our point of view, however much such an expansion may be distasteful to the Chief. Bahrein of recent years seem to have attracted more attention on the part of the foreigners, and I consider that we should take some steps to make our protectorate more apparent. The most suitable way of doing this will be, in my opinion, to put the customs question on a more satisfactory footing. We have, I consider, ample grounds for taking such a step. The maintenance of the Chief's independence is solely due to us, and now that we have promised to recognise the succession of his eldest son we have become to a certain extent the guardian of the interests of this son and are, I consider, fully justified in trying to secure for this son, as far as possible, a prosperous and unembarrassed succession. The present Chief's affairs are in anything but a satisfactory condition, and are bound, so far as I can see, to go from bad to worse. He has many people dependent on him for support, and the number of these will gradually increase: moreover he has the usual extravagant ideas of hospitality of which full advantage is taken. The

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consequence is that he is generally hard put to it to provide himself with funds, and as you are aware, he has had to farm his customs for some years ahead in order to provide himself with money from his current expense. The Hindu Customs farmers have of course taken full advantage of the position and are reaping large profits, which, if the Chief were a sensible man, ought to go into his own pockets. It is useless to argue with him in this matter: he is satisfied with matters as they are, and the fact that his son will succeed to an embarrassed property does not trouble him in any way; "after me the deluge" is his motto; all he wants is to be left in peace for the remaining years of his life and he trusts to fate and the British Government to arrange matters after his death. This, in my opinion, is fair to no one, and I think that the Chief should now be told that the system of farming his customs does not commend itself to the Government of India and must be changed. There is no desire to curtail the Chief's independence in any way; all we want to see is that the Chief himself should be relieved from his difficulties, and that the affairs of his state should not be embarrassed when his son succeeds him. We have no desire to take over the management of his customs: this will remain in the Chief's hand as heretofore. All that is desired is that the Customs should be efficiently managed in the interests of the Chief himself and of trade generally. As the Chief has no one who is sufficiently conversant with customs matters, we desire to lend him the services of a trained Customs officer, who will recognize the Department for him and be under his orders generally so far as the management of the Department is concerned.

This is not the place to enter into details of the scheme which will of course have to be dealt with officially and which will, I feel confident, present no insuperable difficulties, if the Chief's sentimental objection that his independence is being aimed at is disregarded, as it may, in my opinion, very fairly be. Sooner or later the change must be made, and although, from motives of personal regard for the Chief, I would prefer that his inclinations should not be so directly opposed and that the change should come after his death, still for all we know he is good for another twenty years of life, and I am satisfied that early steps in the matter should be taken both from considerations of the political situations at Bahrein and of the future welfare of the islands. With the customs virtually in our hands, that is to say, managed by us for the Chief's benefit, we should be able to remove various inconveniences, such as, for instance, the high transhipment fees, we should gain more knowledge of the trade situation and we should make our protectorate clear to the Turks and to the world at large. It is possible that it may not be deemed necessary or advisable that this matter should be brought forward during the Viceroy's visit. I have, however, considered it necessary to place my views before you, as you have asked me to indicate whether any modification or expansion of the *status quo* is desirable. A clear direction to the Chief in this matter and the consequent change in the management of the customs is, of course, a very distinct modification of the *status quo* as being a direct interference by us in the municipal affairs of the islands, but it is at the same time, I feel sure, the best solution for British interests and for the matter of that for the interests of Bahrein as well. Probably the Chief, if he is permitted to do so, will wish to mention certain matters to the Viceroy, such as the murder of his relative Sheikh Selam bin Diaij, his desire to arm a boat to pursue pirates, and the succession of his eldest son. If he brings forward this latter matter, the opportunity may perhaps be taken to renew the promise which has been made regarding his son's succession and to inform the Chief that, in view of this and past favours shown to the Chief by the British Government, the Chief on his part is expected not to be remiss in accepting the advice which is offered to him in matters which are really for his own benefit. The Viceroy is aware that the Chief's finances are not as satisfactory as they might be, and that these might readily be ameliorated by an improvement in the customs management which would secure for the Chief's own requirements and for the needs of his Government. His Excellency therefore trusts that the Chief will listen to such advice as the Resident may be instructed to give him in this connection.

Koweit, the next place on the programme, is 246 miles from Bahrein and will be reached on the afternoon of the 29th November. The Chief's visit to His Excellency might be paid on the morning of the 30th, the Chief having

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sent off his son on the arrival of the ships to enquire after the Viceroy's health and ascertain his wishes. I do not know if the Chief's visit will be returned by Lord Curzon, but I presume not, and that the procedure adopted at Bahrein will be followed. His Excellency will, I presume, wish to land at Koweit and will be taken round by the Chief.

The political situation at Koweit is well known, and I find it difficult to make any suggestions as to the modification or expansion of the *status quo* which will not be, I believe, under the circumstances feasible. At any rate, I take it that it will be useless for the Sheikh to make any request for the expansion of the protectorate which is probably what he would like to see.

Bushire will be reached on the early morning of the 2nd December. The *Hardinge* and the Squadron will have to anchor in the outer roads at a distance of 7 miles from the landing place. I presume that the first ceremony here will be the Governor's visit to His Excellency the Viceroy on board the *Hardinge*. I do not know what time will be convenient for this visit, but I think as early an hour as possible might be fixed, as the weather in the morning is generally calmer than later on in the day. A launch will have to be sent in to bring the Governor off and my First Assistant will accompany him. Koweit to Bushire is 180 miles, so there should be no difficulty about the Squadron reaching Bushire and anchoring at 7 A.M. A launch could be sent off on arrival in time to leave Bunder at 9 A.M. so as to reach the *Hardinge* at 10.

Whether the Viceroy would return the Governor's visit, I cannot say. There is no precedent to go by, and I am somewhat doubtful about it. Perhaps as the visit need not be returned until the following morning, His Excellency will decide this matter after consultation with Sir Arthur Hardinge. I would also like to know His Excellency's wishes regarding his stay at Bushire, whether he will visit the Residency and will hold a reception of the European community. I should be greatly obliged if you could let me hear about this as soon as possible. I am leaving Bushire probably about the 18th of this month to visit Koweit, Bahrein, and the Arab Coast for the purpose of arranging details, and I shall be back in Bushire before the end of the month. I leave again on the 12th November to meet His Excellency at Maskat.

I have now dealt, as far as I can, with all the places in the Gulf which will be visited. I must ask you to pardon me if my suggestions are not sufficiently precise; but as you will understand, there are no precedents to go on, and I myself have had no experience in the way of making arrangements for a Viceroy's visit. The smooth working of the programme will depend to a great extent upon the weather, and I trust that we shall be favoured in this respect during His Excellency's tour.

You will observe that I have said nothing about Maskat. Cox's suggestions made in his letter to you appear to be suitable, and I can think of nothing to add.

Persia 58

Telegram, dated the 19th October 1903.

From—Sir A. Hardinge, Tehran,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.

Please see my telegram of the 10th October. The Shah has deputed the Governor-General of Fars to proceed to the Persian Gulf to welcome Your Excellency on behalf of His Majesty. His Excellency will meet you at Bunder Abbas. What is the correct etiquette as to official visits and salutes when His Excellency the Viceroy is in foreign territory, for example, at Pondicherry or Goa, for which there are precedents, I suppose? Does Your Excellency contemplate any exchange of decorations? It might not be a bad thing to give one to the Ala-ed-Dowleh, who is a possible future Grand Vizier. He has been rather sore at getting no recognition from us for the support he gave us some years ago when Governor of Arabistan. I start on the 27th of October. Please let me know about this before then.

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Pol no 57

Telegram, dated the 22nd October 1903.

From—Sir A. Hardinge, Tehran,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.

Please refer to my telegram of to-day's. I hear that the Governor-General of Fars says he cannot reach Bunder Abbas by the 22nd November, and that he is asking for £5,000 to enable him to bring a large armed escort with him, which will greatly delay his movements. I have told the Persian Government that I attach importance to his receiving Your Lordship at Bunder Abbas and not at Bushire, and that, as the local garrisons can line the streets, the proposed huge escort is quite unnecessary.

Pol no 58

Telegram, dated the 22nd October 1903.

From—Sir A. Hardinge, Tehran,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.

I am proposing, subject to Your Excellency's approval, following programme for your reception in Persian Ports:—

Bunder Abbas.—On your arrival, Governor of Persian Gulf will come on board and accompany you ashore under salute. Governor-General of Fars will receive you at landing place, accompany you to British Consulate, and pay you first official visit. Your Excellency will return his visit at Government House, and dine with him in evening. He will lunch with you on board next day, and after your departure proceed to Bushire to prepare for your arrival there.

Lingah.—If you put in here Governor of Gulf Ports will visit you on board and I will return his visit on your behalf. No dinners.

Bushire.—On your arrival, Governor of Gulf will come on board and present Karguzar, etc. Governor-General of Fars will dine with you in evening and entertain you at lunch or dinner on shore next day, but separate official visits will not be re-exchanged, these having taken place at Bunder Abbas. Foreign Consuls-General will call on you at Residency or on board, and I will return their visits on your behalf and leave your cards on them. On second day after your arrival I propose reception by you of British Colony at Residency, after which Resident will give lunch in your honour to Governor-General of Fars, who will subsequently accompany you to landing place, Governor of Gulf going with you on board ship. Governor-General of Fars is entitled to 21 guns, as he is senior of three Governors, Kerman and Khorassan being other two who have Viceregal rank, and title of Viceroy instead of Vali.

I think it best that I should have short informal interview with you at Maskat before our official meeting at Bunder Abbas. *Sphinx* conveys me there from Bushire on November 15th.

Pol no 59

Telegram No. 2542-E. A., dated the 25th October 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The Political Resident, Bushire.

Your telegram 1st October. Viceroy's tour. What honours would you propose for Sultan, Maskat, and for Ala-ud-Dowleh who is being deputed to welcome Viceroy? Would K.C.I.E. be suitable for both?

Please expedite narratives asked for in my telegram of 20th October. They have to be printed.

Pol no 60

Telegram No. 2543-E. A., dated the 25th October 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The British Minister, Tehran.

Viceroy is much obliged to you for your telegram to him of 22nd October regarding visit, and entirely approves of proposed arrangements.

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No. 2544-E. A., dated the 25th October 1903.

Endorsement by the Government of India, Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing telegram, with a copy of the telegram to which it is a reply, is forwarded to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf for information and guidance.

Telegram, dated the 26th October 1903.

From—The Political Agent at Maskat, Maskat,

To – The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram demi-official 21st October. Average maximum temperature 18th November next about 77 and cool enough for ordinary uniform. Draft programme by post.

Telegram, dated the 26th October 1903.

From—Sir A. Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.

Governor-General of Fars who is travelling with a large retinue has asked for more time to make his preparations and to reach the coast. Could your Excellency so modify your programme as to visit Bunder Abbas on your way back and go straight from the Arab Coast to Bushire arriving there about two or three days before December 2nd. Governor-General would then take leave of you at Bunder Abbas instead of at Bushire. We shall have to substitute evening for midday entertainments as far as Persians are concerned as your visit will be Ramazan. A representative of Persain Foreign Office has been attached to Viceroy of Fars and leaves Tehran in few days' time.

Telegram, dated the 27th October 1903.

From—Sir A. Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.

Your telegram of yesterday. I am bringing one Secretary Churchhill. Douglas meets me at Bushire. Would you like to see him?

Persian Government wish Your Excellency to be their guest in Persian Ports and are providing residence for you at Bushire and Bunder Abbas. I have thanked them for this civility which you cannot, without hurting their feelings, refuse.

Telegram, dated the 27th October 1903.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,

To—Sir A. Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

With reference to your telegram of 27th October, I shall be glad to see Douglas at Bushire. Wtih reference to the courteous offer of the Persian Government of residences at Bunder Abbas and Bushire, could you explain confidentially that Lady Curzon, who is accompanying me, is not in very strong state of health, and cannot leave the ship, and accordingly I must not leave her? Moreover, I hope on some occasions to have the pleasure of entertaining Persian authorities on board at night, and I could hardly go ashore afterwards.

Telegram, dated the 28th October 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Bombay.

Political Agent, Maskat, proposes that His Excellency the Viceroy should cross from Karachi to near Ras-al-Hadd, and thence cruise up Oman Coast on early morning of 18th November. Can this be arranged? It is also proposed to hold the Darbars at Maskat and elsewhere on *Argonaut*. Will this be convenient?

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Pol No 67

Telegram, dated the 28th October 1903.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,
To—Sir A. Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

I have been carefully through programme and regret it is impossible to alter it, because I have to be back at Karachi on given date in order to proceed to Rajputana to install an Indian Prince also on fixed date. This can only be done by return at full speed from Bushire to India. If journey is broken up in manner proposed these arrangements will be impracticable. Please express my sincere regrets to the Persian Government, and my desire, subject to above, to meet convenience of Governor-General of Fars in every possible way.

Pol No 68

Telegram, dated the 28th October 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The Political Agent at Maskat, Maskat.

The following is suggested as programme for Viceroy's visit. Please telegraph if approved.

November 18th arrive *via* Oman Coast at 11 A. M.

Sultan's visit at 12 noon. Viceroy and small party will lunch at Residency at 2 P. M. View dances on beach and receive address from British residents after lunch. Return visit 4 P. M. Dinner on board at 8 P. M. Fireworks on shore after dinner.

November 19th.—Darbar on *Argonaut* at 10 or 11 A. M. as most convenient to you.

Pol No 69

Telegram, No. 2586-E. A., dated the 28th October 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The Political Resident, Bushire.

Please communicate following to Burton. *Begins*:—Viceroy would like to make acquaintance of Sheikh of Muhammerah during forthcoming visit to Gulf. Regrets that he is unable to proceed himself to Muhammerah, but has suggested to Sir A. Hardinge who agrees that Sheikh might be invited to meet him at Bushire. Viceroy will arrive there on 2nd December. Please communicate this invitation to Sheikh and bring him with you. *Ends.* What present would you recommend for Sheikh and if C.I.Es. are given to Koweit and Bahrein should he receive same?

Pol No 70

Telegram, dated the 28th October 1903.

From—Mr. Grant Duff, Tehran,
To—His Excellency the Viceroy.

Shah quite understands that, owing to reasons given in your telegram of 27th October, Viceroy will not be able to stay at the residence which His Majesty has provided at Bushire. The Persian Government, however, hope that Viceroy will consider house provided as his official residence, where he will receive visitors on land. This will enable Governor-General of Fars to pay Viceroy first visit. If Viceroy has not an official residence provided by Persian Government, the latter wish following change to be made in programme:—

Governor-General of Fars to receive Viceroy at landing place, and to proceed together to Persian Government House, where former will receive Viceroy.

Persian Government expect immediate answer. Repeated to Minister at Ispahan.

Pol No 71

Telegram, dated the 28th October 1903.

From—Sir A. Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
To—His Excellency the Viceroy.

Mr. Grant Duff, who acts for me, while absent in Tehran, has communicated explanations in your two telegrams of yesterday to Persian Government.

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Telegram, dated the 29th October 1903.

From—Sir A. Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.

Pol 1072

I have just received the following telegram from Tehran. *Begins:*—Mushir states that the Governor-General of Fars is unable to reach Bunder Abbas in time to meet His Excellency the Viceroy, and hopes the latter will come straight to Bushire. If this arrangement is inconvenient, the Governor of the Gulf Ports will meet the Viceroy at Bunder Abbas.—*Ends.* I have told my *locum tenens* at Tehran to explain to Mushir that Your Excellency cannot alter your programme, and I fear, therefore, that we shall have to content ourselves with only having the Governor of the Gulf Ports at Bunder Abbas, and reserve the grand official reception for Bushire. I have only a slight knowledge of your ideas as I have not yet got your letter of the 24th September. Though I have no proof of it, I suspect that there is a hitch between the authorities at Tehran and the Governor-General of Fars about the expenses of his mission, and that he is evading starting until he can obtain a guarantee that these will be paid by the Central Government. It is probable that he has got a promise, but wants hard cash which at present is short here.

Pol 1073

Telegram, dated the 28th October 1903.

From—The Political Agent at Maskat, Maskat,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your draft programme received to-day. If possible await and compare my draft which will reach you Friday. It would be better to have Viceroy's visit to Sultan and dancing on different afternoons, if possible, but arrangement for His Excellency to lunch on shore and receive address before visit is good.

Pol 1074

Telegram, dated the 29th October 1903.

From—Sir A. Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy.

Mushir-ed-Dowleh accepted programme approved by you, and should not, I think, alter it now; but it will probably save discussion if at Bushire at least you accept *pro formâ* official residence on shore for receiving Governor-General's official call.

Pol 1075

Telegram, dated the 29th October 1903.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy,

To—Sir A. Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I gladly accept suggestion for acceptance of official residence at Bushire for reception of Governor-General, and agree to proposals about accompanying Governor-General to Persian Government House, Bushire. If Governor-General finds it impossible to proceed Bunder Abbas, I will act upon your advice as to reception there. Repeated British Legation, Tehran.

Pol 1076

Telegram, dated the 30th October 1903.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Your telegram of the 25th and 28th October. Viceroy's tour. I strongly advocate the G.C.I.E. for the Sultan of Maskat. His father was given a G.C.S.I., and grant of only K.C.I.E. to present Sultan would afford an opportunity of disparaging comment. K.C.I.E would, I think, be suitable for Ala-ed-Dowleh, if he comes to Bushire; but from what he says to me, it seems to be doubtful whether he is coming. I hardly think that the C.I.E. will be sufficient for Sheikh, Muhammerah, and I am inclined to think that it will be better to give him no decoration but only present on the same scale as the Chief of Koweit. I would suggest that Sir A. Hardinge should be consulted on this point. Narratives are being despatched by to-day's mail.

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Dated Maskat, the 26th October 1903.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Agent at Maskat,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I forward herewith copy of a draft address given me by the Native British subjects for transmission to Government for approval or amendation.

The words which I have underlined in red pencil might, I suggest, be left out if anything is likely to come of the Sultan's suggestion of abdication, as it might hurt his feelings a little when he sees it afterwards in the newspaper.

If, on the other hand, no action in the near future is possible on his proposal for protection, then it might stand. There is some truth in it, though the Sultan, in my opinion, does what he can. The fact is that the bunnias lend money and give long credit recklessly to Arabs of the interior and expect a miracle to be performed to get it back.

Kindly send me a telegram as to whether the form is approved or not as it has to go to Karachi to be engrossed or printed. It will be properly presented in a casket.

Draft of Address which British Indian subjects desired to present to His Excellency the Viceroy.

To His Excellency the Right Hon'ble Baron Curzon of Kedleston,

Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

May it please Your Excellency,

We, the entire community of British subjects, both Hindu and Muhammadan, and other British protected persons, settled in the towns of Maskat and Muttra, most respectfully beg, on behalf of ourselves and our fellow-subjects residing in other parts of His Highness the Sultan's dominions, to offer Your Excellencies a most heartfelt welcome on the occasion of your visit to Maskat.

In doing so, we venture to congratulate Your Excellency with much respect, on being the first Viceroy and Governor-General of India since the passing of the destinies of the Indian Continent to the British Crown, to visit these distant shores, and to have thus inaugurated a new and vigorous political departure in a sphere where so many Indian interests are involved, and it has been a source of enhanced gratification to us to know, that since Your Excellency's happy decision to accept an extension of your term of office (a decision which has been received by all classes of His Majesty the King-Emperor's subjects with lively satisfaction) the first great act of policywhich Your Excellency has undertaken, has been this most auspicious tour in the Gulfs of Oman and Persia.

Accustomed, as the races peopling these shores are, to take impressions from outward appearances, we cannot but feel confident that this happy undertaking will prove to be an epoch-making event in the progress and enhancement of British prestige and influence. It will serve, too, as an abiding demonstration to the inhabitants of the littoral that the preponderating influence of Great Britain in these waters is no shadowy or remote force, but a lively and dignified reality, and that the Viceroy of the King Emperor who holds benevolent sway, over the millions of the vast continent of British India, watches with no less zeal and keen interest the welfare of His Most Gracious Majesty's subjects, scattered all over the Gulf.

Except to give Your Excellencies a respectful and hearty welcome and to give expression to our loyalty and devotion to the Great Government whose subjects we are, we have little cause to trespass on Your Excellency's time, and so far as our own local and particular needs and circumstances are concerned have an encouraging tale to tell.

We enjoy in Maskat the rights and privileges of the most favoured nation, our interests are carefully guarded by our Consular authorities, and we experience complete toleration in matters of religion. There is an absence of unnecessary litigation amongst us British subjects, and justice is readily and promptly obtainable in the Agency Court.

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In matters connected with our dealings with the natives of Oman, while we are accustomed to receive a courteous hearing from His Highness, nevertheless we often experience difficulty in obtaining relief, and this is partly owing no doubt to the unsettled state of the interior. In this latter connection we make bold to explain to Your Excellency that whereas considering the degree of enlightenment among the Bedouin Arabs inter-tribal strife and turbulence is within the nature of things, and when it is limited to the interior of the country does not immediately affect our welfare any more than that of other peaceable members of the community, nevertheless, when as is sometimes the case, the scene of the strife is transferred to the coast ports, or their immediate neighbourhood, our commercial interests do immediately suffer, and we are put to anxiety for the safety of the lives and properties of our fellow-subjects. For, as Your Excellency is aware, in many or the coast towns of Oman (often far removed from the capital) small communities of British Indian subjects reside, in whose hands all the local trade is centered, and who, in however humble a capacity, are the pioneers of British Indian commerce in these waters. Thanks to the vigilant activity of successive Political Agents, and Men-of-War, at seasons of unrest, there is perhaps little actual danger to the lives and properties of these our fellow-subjects, but the detriment to their trading operations and ours is great, and we venture to hope that Your Excellency's Government will see its way, either by strengthening the hands of the Ruler, or by active interference on the coast, where necessary for the preservation of British interests, to take measures which will deter the unruly tribesmen of Oman from disturbing the commerce of the country by their dissensions.

In matters of commerce generally we continue to prosper, and though during the last few years signs have not been wanting of Foreign competition, Indian imports rule the market.

There is one depressing factor, however, of comparatively recent growth to which we make bold to draw Your Excellency's benevolent attention, and that is the demoralising fluctuations in the silver exchange.

Since the closing of the Indian mints in 1893, and the consequent fall in the price of silver, the local Dollar exchange has not ceased to exhibit remarkable fluctuations, which greatly prejudice and impede the local import trade, from the fact that the currency value of the rupee is fixed, and that of the Maskat Dollar is not. We therefore humbly commend the matter to Your Excellency's wise consideration in the hope that in co-operation with the Local Government, some means may be devised of bringing about a better state of things.

In conclusion, we beg to reiterate our welcome and to assure you, that this visit of Your Excellency and your gifted consort will be a landmark in the history of Maskat, and will live green in our memories, and it is our earnest prayer before the Supreme Being, in whose hands the destinies of us all lie, to vouchsafe to Your Excellency a continuance of bodily health and strength to enable you to render further great services to the Empire, and to bind fresh laurels on your brow.

Dated Maskat, the 26th October 1903.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Agent at Maskat,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Owing to the Sultan's indisposition I have not been able to see him about the draft programme until this morning. Working against time I am just able to catch the mail with a copy of it for approval or amendation.

Please excuse the crude form of it, but time did not admit of one person typing or writing the whole of it.

His Excellency the Viceroy's Tour.

Suggested Programme for Maskat, for approval.

November 18th, 11 P.M.—His Excellency the Viceroy will arrive at 11 A.M.

A { On the Men-of-War approaching the front of the harbour opposite the town the port will be saluted with 21 guns under the Admiral's orders.

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His Highness the Sultan's Battery will return gun for gun.

As soon as all the ships have taken up their billet and dropped anchor the Admiral will have the signal "Dress ship" hoisted and upon this all the British ships, the Sultan's "Noor-el-Bahr" and his forts and the British Consulate will "Dress" simultaneously and at the same moment the Sultan's Battery will fire a salute of 31 guns as a welcome to His Excellency the Viceroy. The "Dress" will be maintained during the hours of daylight throughout His Excellency's visit. } A

November 18th, 11-30 A.M.—The Sultan will send a deputation consisting of his brother Seyyid Mahomed-bin-Turki, his eldest son Seyyid Taimoor and his Vazier, on board the Viceroy's Flagship for "Mizaj-Pursi," to welcome His Excellency, and to inquire what will be a convenient hour for him to receive the Sultan.

(In the meanwhile the Resident and the Political Agent will have reported themselves to the Foreign Secretary.)

November 18th, 12-30 P.M.—His Highness the Sultan accompanied by about 6 of his suite will call officially on the Viceroy, the Admiral arranging to send a steam-launch and cutter with a Naval Officer and an Attaché of the Foreign Department (?) to the steps of the palace or the customs wharf to bring the party off to the *Hardinge* (?). The Sultan on reaching the *Hardinge* will be received by a guard-of-honour and a salute of 21 guns will be fired. Only formal and friendly greetings will be exchanged. After a few minutes' conversation refreshments in the shape of black coffee and sherbet (or iced water) will be handed round, and after partaking and a little more conversation the Sultan will take leave, receiving similar honours as on his arrival. During the visit his flag will be hoisted by all His Majesty's ships.

His Highness will be accompanied to the shore by a Naval Officer and Foreign Office Attaché as before.

November 18th, 1-30 to 2-30 P.M.—Luncheon hour. His Excellency will lunch at the Consulate and will be accompanied by Lady Curzon and a small staff.

2-45 P.M.—His Excellency the Viceroy will receive an address from a deputation of British Indian subjects.

4 P.M.—His Excellency the Viceroy will return the Sultan's visit.

Notes.—(Should any one on behalf of the Sultan wait on him on board to bring him off?) He will be accompanied by His Excellency the Admiral and Staff (?)

(The Sultan will want to know how many persons to have seats for.)

He will land at the customs wharf, at or near which he will be met by His Highness the Sultan and conducted by him to the Barza (Durbar Room), 100 yards away.

After the usual greetings, His Highness will deliver or have read a short Arabic address of welcome. His Excellency will acknowledge the compliment.

After coffee and sherbet have been handed round, the visit will conclude and His Highness will conduct His Excellency to the landing stage. The route will be lined with the Sultan's Askaris.

His Excellency will be saluted with 31 guns going and coming.

The tide will be very low on both afternoons, but it is understood that a wooden landing stage will be thrown out from the customs wharf in order to expedite the landing of the Viceroy and party, otherwise chairs would be employed. It would in any case be advisable for all persons who will accompany His Excellency to land by 3-30. They will while waiting for the Viceroy be accommodated with chairs in the hall of the Customs House. His Excellency would then land only with the official or officials whom he might desire to have with him in his boat.

5 P.M.—If the visit is over in time, His Excellency might care to come ashore again and take a walk through the town or inspect one of the forts with Her Excellency.

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9-30 or 10 P.M.—One gun will be fired as a signal and thereupon the sea front will be illuminated and a display of fireworks commence.

His Excellency might care to invite the Sultan and his elder sons and brother unofficially to view the fireworks from the *Hardinge*, in which case a boat might be sent to fetch them after dinner.

Thursday, 19th.—In the early morning His Excellency might care to walk abroad, look at the coal depôt, Consulate and Telegraph Buildings, or visit one of the forts.

11 A.M.—His Excellency will hold a Durbar on board the *Argonaut*?

This will be attended by His Highness and suite, the principal tribal Sheikhs present in Maskat, and the principal British subjects, who will be restricted in numbers as may be necessary, or admitted by ticket.

Durbaris, except the Sultan and suite, should be in their places half an hour before the time.

His Excellency will deliver an address to the Durbaris.

If the address which His Highness proposes to give the Viceroy appears on receipt of draft to be fitted for delivery in the Durbar instead of at the return visit of His Excellency, I suggest that it should be delivered here at the Durbar in Arabic.

His Highness would be saluted on leaving.

5 P.M.—Dancing on the strand outside Consulate which Their Excellencies might see from the Consulate.

The Sultan would also come over in a private capacity and join us at tea.

When Their Excellencies had tired of this, and it was time to leave, they would be escorted to the landing stage by His Highness, who would there say good-bye.

A salute of 31 guns would be fired on the ships getting under weigh.

For a private interview between His Excellency and the Sultan, the best thing would seem to be for the Sultan to stay behind after the Durbar on 19th or, if His Excellency prefers, during the fireworks while the Sultan is on board.

Will an Arabic Interpreter accompany the party, and will he have a translation of His Excellency's speech, or will it require to be made here?

P. Z. COX, *Major*.

26th October 1903.

Telegram, dated 31st October 1903.

From—COLONEL KEMBALL, Bushire,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Suggest for your consideration following arrangements for the Durbar at Shargah.

Immediately after ship anchors, Chiefs, who will be on board *Patrick Stewart*, will be brought on board *Hardinge* (*Argonaut*) and shown into the Durbar room where they will be received by the Foreign Secretary. When they have taken their seats and all is ready, Viceroy (will arrive under a salute and be received by a Guard of Honour) will enter Durbar room and will be received by all standing. Chiefs will then be severally introduced by the Resident to His Excellency and after this, and all are again seated, refreshments in accordance with Arab custom will be handed round. Viceroy will then address Chiefs, (and) (who) will, on conclusion of Durbar, take leave of (the Chiefs) His Excellency and (will) return on board *Patrick-Stewart* (*Hardinge*, with the same formalities as on his arrival). After the Durbar, the Chiefs might (will) be shown over the largest man-of-war (*Argonaut*) present. Chiefs will all arrive together on board *Hardinge*, (*Argonaut*,and will be received by a Guard of Honour, but no salute will be fired) but should, if possible, leave separately, so that salutes of each may be fired. Necessary details might (will) be arranged by me (Resident) with Admiral.

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Pw no 80

Telegram, No. 2629-E.A., dated the 3rd November 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—Colonel Kemball, Bushire.

Your telegram of 31st October. Shargah Durbar. Presume Hamriyeh is same as Ras-al-Khaimah. Should not Viceroy see Ahmad bin Thani here or at Bahrein. Programme for Durbar approved and copies posted by this mail.

Pw no 81

Telegram, dated the 2nd November 1903.

From—Colonel Kemball, Bushire,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Viceroy's tour. Governor of Bushire informs me that he has received orders proceed to Bander Abbas to meet Viceroy. He will leave Bushire shortly in the *Persepolis* and will await Lord Curzon's arrival at Bander Abbas, and will be in attendance as far as Lingah whence he will return to Bushire. He is anxious to know what salute he should fire in His Excellency's honour and whether he will land at Bander Abbas, and, if so, whether he will visit Government house. As regards salute, I think flag-ship will salute ports on arrival with 21 guns which will be returned by the *Persepolis*. If Viceroy lands, he will be saluted by flag-ship with 31 guns which will be returned by *Persepolis*. Governor should, immediately on Viceroy's arrival, send on board to ask when his visit will be received. Please let me know what I am to tell Governor. Ala-ed-Dowleh is, I am told, leaving Shiraz shortly to receive Viceroy at Bushire and the Governor tells me that it is intended to give dinner in Lord Curzon's honour at the house which is to be occupied by the Ala-ed-Dowleh 5 miles outside the town. Owing to distance from ship's anchorage, from the shore, it will not be possible to accept this invitation unless His Excellency stays on shore. I have seen Governor to-day, and have told him that I hardly thought Viceroy could, in the circumstances, accept invitation. What am I to say to Governor, as, he is anxious to know? If the Viceroy comes ashore at Bushire, I do not think that he will care to go outside the town and if he returns visit of Ala-ed-Dowleh, he will do so in town. What time 2nd December will it be suitable for Viceroy receive visit of Ala-ed-Dowleh?

Pw no 82

Telegram, No. 2639-E.-A., dated the 4th November 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—Colonel Kemball, Bushire.

Your telegram of 2nd November. Your proposals for salutes at Bander Abbas are approved. What salute, if any, does Governor receive. His Excellency will land at Bander Abbas and visit proposed Vice-Consulate. Governor can proceed direct to Lingah. It would be extremely inconvenient for Viceroy to accept invitation of Ala-ed-Dowleh at such a distance outside Bushire. If entertainment is desirable, could it not be given at one of official residences in Bushire. Otherwise Viceroy is quite willing to take will for deed and to dispense with compliment. Time for visit of Ala-ed-Dowleh might be settled at Maskat, but probably 11 A.M. on 2nd would be suitable.

Pw no 83

Telegram No. 3630-E.-A., dated the 3rd November 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The Political Agent, Maskat.

Your proposals for Mizaj-Pursi, Sultan's visit, Viceroy's return visit, and Durbar approved. Timur and three high officials should escort Viceroy to return visit. Presume His Excellency will proceed from Consulate to Barza by water. Lady Curzon will not land and His Excellency will not visit Forts or land on morning of 19th, so dance should be on 18th after lunch or evening 19th. Other proposals stand. Viceroy accepts language of address as it stands. Lorimer will read translation of His Excellency's address at the Durbar. Copy of programme posted to you.

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Telegram, dated the 5th November 1903.

From—Colonel Kemball, Bushire,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram of the 4th November. Viceroy's tour. Governor gets 17 guns. I will tell Governor, entertainment of the Viceroy unnecessary, making suitable explanation. I presume that Viceroy will return the visit of the Ala-ed-Dowleh, and this will be at the Charburj or Government House, close to the landing place. Perhaps you will tell me about this at Maskat.

Telegram No. 2647-E.A., dated the 5th November 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The Political Resident, Bushire.

Your letter 8th October. Viceroy will receive Bunder Abbas address if suitably presented in casket. Ask Grey to submit copy to me addressed Viceroy's Camp for His Excellency's approval.

No. 2649-E.A., dated Simla, the 6th November 1903.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,
To—His Excellency Rear Admiral G. L. Atkinson Willes, Commanding His Majesty's Naval Forces, East Indian Station, Bombay.

I am directed to forward a set of programmes connected with the visit of His Excellency the Viceroy to the Persian Gulf and Maskat, and to enquire whether Your Excellency concurs in them or has any suggestions to offer.

2. I am also to ask whether Your Excellency agrees to make the arrangements suggested in lines 4–13 of the draft programme of His Excellency the Viceroy's arrival at Maskat which might be repeated, *mutatis mutandis*, at the various ports entered.

Telegram, dated the 4th November 1903.

From—Colonel Kemball, Bushire,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram of the 3rd November. Viceroy's tour. Hamriyeh. Is it not independent trucial? He is supposed to be subject to Shargah but he is quasi-independent. I did not know the Viceroy wished to see Ahmed-bin-Thani. Please telegraph as early as possible if this is desired, so that I may arrange for him to come to Bahrein which will be best place. It is not possible however this will raise hopes which may not be realised. Perhaps best plan will be for Gaskin (to) write friendly private letter to Sheikh Ahmed telling him (of) Viceroy's approaching visit and suggesting that he might like to be at Bahrein at the same time.

Telegram No. 2651-E.A., dated the 6th November 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—Colonel Kemball, Bushire.

Your telegram 4th November. Hamriyeh has concluded no treaty and subject to your advice should not, we think, rank with Trucial Chiefs. Should not Ras-al-Kheima, who has concluded treaties, receive presents and attend Darbar? Please let Gaskin ascertain quietly if Sheikh Ahmed would come to Bahrein if invited.

Telegram, dated the 6th November 1903.

From—Colonel Kemball, Bushire,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram of the 6th instant. I intend Hamriyeh to come as part of Shargah's retinue, but it may be as well that he should not attend the Darbar,

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and I will arrange accordingly. There is now no separate Chief of Ras-al-Kheima, which is under Shargah. There is hardly time now to do as you direct about Sheikh Ahmed, unless Gaskin can ascertain from the man's friends in Bahrein. May I tell him, in this case, to invite him over, otherwise to write privately and suggest his coming? Please telegraph reply immediately as I must send a letter to Bahrein at once. Addressed Foreign with Viceroy, repeated Simla.

Patiala 90

Telegram, dated the 8th November 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Camp Patiala,

To—Colonel Kemball, Bushire.

Please send word as from yourself to Ahmed-bin-Thani, that as Viceroy is coming to Bahrein you advise him to take any opportunity of paying his respects and stating his views which may occur while His Excellency is there. Repeated Foreign, Simla.

Pers 91

Dated Bombay, the 3rd November 1903.

From—The Officer Commanding H.M.S. *Argonaut*,

To—The Private Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

I having been informed by the Naval Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies Station that it is intended to hold two Durbars on board this ship during the approaching visit to the Persian Gulf, I have the honour to request that you will be good enough to inform me as to the member of His Excellency's suite who is responsible for the Durbar arrangements, and whether he will acquaint me of the arrangements which His Excellency desires to be made for the above.

Pers 92

Telegram, dated the 8th November 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp,

To—The Officer Commanding H.M.S. *Argonaut*, Bombay.

Viceroy is much obliged to Naval Commander-in-Chief for arranging that Durbars at Maskat and Shargah should be held on *Argonaut*. I will explain at Karachi what arrangements are necessary. Please let me know measurements of clear space available on deck suitable for purpose, and if an awning can be erected over this.

Pers 93

Telegram, dated the 7th November 1903.

From—The Political Agent, Mascat,

To—The Foreign Secretary with Viceroy.

In addition to formal welcome at return visit, Sultan is anxious to make short address to His Excellency at the beginning of Durbar on man-of-war, in which he will publicly testify to obligations of self and ancestors to the British Government, and express determination of self and children to be ever mindful of the obligations and loyalty, strong and ancient ties which bind them to us. Translation by post. I hope His Excellency will approve this proposal, as the language is appropriate and will also give His Excellency convenient opening for what he may have to say. Please telegraph whether proposal provisionally acceptable or not. Addressed to Foreign with Viceroy, and repeated to Foreign, Simla.

Pers 94

Telegram, dated the 8th November 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp,

To—The Political Agent, Maskat.

Proposal contained in your telegram of 7th regarding Sultan's address is approved. Addressed to Cox, Maskat, repeated Foreign, Simla.

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Telegram, dated the 9th November 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp,
To—The Political Agent, Maskat.

Your letter of November 3rd. As Sultan will be at Maskat we cannot well fire salute in honour of deputation. Twenty persons may join in presenting address and if some of these are Goanese there will be no objection provided that stress is not laid on point. I will telegraph area on *Argonaut* available for Durbar, but should say 200 persons in all could be accommodated. We believe there is band on *Argonaut* and will ask for use of it. No men of body-guard going, but at Durbar marines will form guard, and we hope they will be landed for Viceroy's return visit. His Excellency will receive French and American Consular representatives as proposed. Addressed to Political Agent, Maskat, and repeated Foreign, Simla.

Translation of Address which the Sultan proposes to make to His Excellency the Viceroy when the latter returns His Highness's visit.

I wish to state publicly from the depths of my heart and with sentiments of the most sincere friendship that I feel exceedingly honoured and favoured by the coming of this distinguished nobleman of exalted rank, His Excellency Lord Curzon, and in the privilege of greeting his own august person at this assembly of happy Oman over which gather the incense of felicity and the symbols of honour and glory, by reason of the auspicious presence of this great personage, our noble friend.

The soil of Oman has been lit up by the sunrise of his personality and her hopes have burst into being at the rising of the moon of his great qualities and in truth well they may for is he not the representative of the potent King and Emperor Edward VII of happy mention; may God make his Kingdom endure to be a jewel in the forehead of passing days and nights and may he perpetuate his transcendent greatness in the realms of honour and fame. His Excellency is the first Governor General to give rein to his energy for a tour in these latitudes and has conferred on us a favour by his distinguished presence here as the Vicar of the Government of Great Britain.

It is indeed a signal favour; a great and memorable event by which the pages of the History of Oman will be for ever adorned and which will remain a byeword with us for all time.

And I declare by my troth that the Government of Great Britain has never ceased to more than fulfil the obligations of her union with the State of Maskat and has ever devoted her energies for the preservation of the ancient ties which bind us by affording us assistance on many critical occasions, and now I see before her Viceroy and it seems to me as if it were Great Britain herself which is shedding the light of her countenance upon me; and so I address myself to her and make known to all the completeness of the union and the reality of the friendship which exists between us.

And when my son Taimoor had the honour of visiting Your Excellency at the Delhi Durbar, he experienced with gratitude your gracious kindness and distinguished courtesy and thereby the ties between us have been strengthened and you have filled me with a sense of gratitude. I have consequently been all the more eager for the meeting with Your Excellency since the auspicious news of your intended visit reached me and have not ceased to enjoy the pleasing prospect of the keeping of the tryst until this moment when God has vouchsafed to us the consummation of it and has on this auspicious day permitted me to meet your distinguished self in person.

In conclusion I pray Almighty God to prosper and uphold Great Britain the scions of her race and to perpetuate her dignity and sovereignty so that her fame and prosperity may endure for all time. I pray further that He will see fit ever to promote and increase the bond of union which now exists between Great Britain and the State of Oman and I thank Your most excellent Lordship from the bottom of my heart for the favour which you have conferred upon us by your visit to this country.

May Your Excellency be preserved and prosper at all times and in all places.

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

Translation of Poetical Arabic Greeting which will be offered to His Excellency the Viceroy on behalf of the Sultan by the deputation which will wait on His Excellency the Viceroy for Misaj Pursi.

The welcome and auspicious tidings have reached me and I have been cheered with deep and complete happiness at the arrival of His Exalted and Noble Excellency Lord Curzon.

At his coming the suns of joy and gladness have risen and the moons of happiness and good cheer have shed their light.

All honour be to him of exalted rank and dignity who comes in this great State.

To this end I have deputed my brother and my son that they may both be honoured by meeting His Excellency in my behalf and that they may pay respect to his august person and celebrate his auspicious arrival; and also as a mark of our joy at his coming and a sign of our exceeding gratification at his noble presence.

May he never cease to live in honour and splendour, high repute and prosperity as long as the days and nights continue.

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

[~~Demi-official.~~]

~~No. 2049-P. G.~~, dated Bushire, the 30th October 1903.

Pol. Enc. 97.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., I.C.S., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Your telegram of the 20th instant reached me just as I was embarking on the "Lawrence" for Koweit, Bahrein and the Arab Coast and I was unable, therefore, to despatch the short narratives which you ask for, until my return to Bushire this morning.

I hope the narratives which I now submit will do. Few events of political importance have occurred on this coast for many years past; the numerous petty intertribal squabbles which have occurred would require space and could hardly be included in a short narrative. It is almost impossible to form an accurate estimate of the populations of the various places. The various estimates on record are very discrepant. My estimates are based on a recent report from our Agent at Shargah corrected in accordance with such information as I have been able to collect on the spot.

ABU DHABI.

The Chief of this place is Sheikh Zaid bin Khalifa of the Beniyas tribe. This tribe originally came from Nejd and was a Bedouin tribe.

The town of Abu Dhabi was founded about 1761 A. D. Some members of the Beniyas tribe, which after its migration from Nejd had its habitation in the country between Biddah and Brymee, being reduced to poverty by the loss of their cattle took up their abode on the Coast between Debaye and the spot where Abu Dhabi now stands. Water, the existence of which in this part was not previously known, being found, the first establishment which consisted of 20 houses took place, and in two years time the place had increased to 200 houses.

The first Chief, who appears to have established his authority over the whole of the Beniyas tribe, was Zheab bin Isa who did so by putting to death his uncle Zaid bin Mahomed Sheikh Zheab was murdered in 1793 by his cousin Huza bin Zaid and was succeeded by Shakboot. Sheikh Shakboot bin Zheab held the Chiefship until 1816, when he was deposed by his son Mohamed. In 1818, Mohamed was deposed by his younger brother Tahnoon, who ruled as Chief until 1833, when he was murdered by his brothers Khaleefa and Sultan. Sheikh Khaleefa succeeded and being murdered in 1845 was succeeded by his nephew Syeed bin Tahnoon. Sheikh Syeed bin Tahnoon was killed in fight by his cousin Sheikh Zaid bin* Khaleefa who is the present Chief. He was born about 1836 and has eight sons living.

* See postcript.

Sheikh Zaid's personal influence is great throughout the countryside and his authority is greater and his position more important than that of the other Trucial Chiefs. He receives a salute of 5 guns, none of the other Chiefs receiving more than 3 guns, and his visit alone is returned by the Resident. He is of a somewhat ambitious and intriguing nature but it cannot be said that he gives any especial trouble to the Political authorities in the Persian Gulf. He is a wise and experienced Chief and I have generally found him amenable to reason.

Our first connection with the Beniyas tribe was in 1820, when they were admitted members of the general Treaty concluded with the maritime tribes in 1820. The Chief of the Beniyas was a subscriber to the Perpetual Treaty of Peace of 1853. In 1847 he entered into an engagement in common with the other Trucial Chiefs, having for its object the abolition of the African Slave Trade. In 1892, Sheikh Zaid bin Khaleefa became a party to the Agreement by which the Trucial Chiefs engaged on no account to correspond with or make Agreements with other Powers, to receive no Agent of any other Government and on no account to cede, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of their territories save to the British Government.

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It is difficult to say what the population of Abu Dhabi is, but the town itself may have a fluctuating population of not less than 4,000. The Chief's territories extend inland almost as far as Brymee, and his subjects and dependents including the townsfolk of Abu Dhabi may amount to between five and six thousand. Besides this he may have some 5,000 Bedouins who owe him allegiance but pay no tribute. There are some 50 Hindu traders living at Abu Dhabi. Most of the inhabitants of Abu Dhabi live by pearl fishing, date growing and camel transport.

The only recent event of any importance in the history of Abu Dhabi is the intrigue which was got up in 1899 between the Darya Begi, the Persian Governor of Bushire, and Sheikh Zaid bin Khaleefa, having for its apparent object the separation of the Abu Dhabi Chief from the other Trucial Chiefs. The outward signs of this intrigue were the adoption of a special flag by the Chief of Abu Dhabi and a firman and presents from the Shah and Darya Begi. The Chief was made to revert to his former flag and his apology in regard to the other matter was accepted. Since then nothing of any particular importance has occurred as regards the Chief of Abu Dhabi.

C. A. KEMBALL, *Lieut.-Col.*,

Offg. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

P. S.—I have not been able to ascertain from my records the exact date of Shaikh Zaid's succession. It appears that it was in 1855 that he ousted Shaikh Syeed bin Tahnoon. My records do not show that Shaikh Syeed was killed by Shaikh Zaid but I was informed by the Chief of Bahrein who is well up in all matters pertaining to the Chiefs on the Arab Coast that this was the case.

DEBAYE.

The present Chief is Sheikh Makhtoom bin Hashar of Al bu Falasah tribe. This tribe is a branch of the Beniyas and seceded from Abu Dhabi in 1834. Sheikh Makhtoom bin Hashar succeeded his uncle Rashid bin Makhtoom on the latter's death in 1894. The succession was brought about peaceably though Rashid bin Makhtoom had six sons, three of whom were of age.

Nothing of any particular importance has occurred at Debaye of recent years. The Chief, Sheikh Makhtoom bin Hashar, appears to be the most intelligent of the Trucial Chiefs and his town is fast increasing in importance and will soon, it is believed, be the most important place, from a trade point of view, on the coast. Steamers of the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company call there regularly and it is gradually supplanting Lingah as the entrepôt for goods for the Arab Coast.

The town may have some 3,000 or 4,000 inhabitants. There are between 50 and 60 British Indian subjects, Hindus and Khojahs, living in the place. The people are almost entirely engaged in pearl fishing. The present Chief's authority extends only a short way inland from Debaye, but in case of need he might be able to command the services of some of the Bedouins of the interior. The Chief is ambitious and somewhat given to intrigue.

The Chief of the Falasah tribe subscribed to the Perpetual Treaty of Peace of 1853 and to the engagements of 1847 relative to the slave trade and of 1892 with regard to relations with other powers.

C. A. KEMBALL, *Lieut.-Col.*,

Offg. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

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Shargah and Ras ul Kheima.

These two places are now united under the Chief of Shargah, the head of the well known Joasmi tribe. The present Chief is Sheikh Suggar bin Khalid. It is unnecessary, I think, to enter into a full account of the history of these two places showing how they became separated under different rulers. Suffice it to say that after the death of the well known Sheikh Sultan bin Suggar in 1866 at the age of 115, his son Ibrahim took charge of Ras ul Kheima, while his son Khalid was given Shargah. As a result of the fighting which broke out immediately Ibrahim was ousted by Khalid who however was killed in 1868 in single combat by the Chief of Abu Dhabi who had joined the coalition of the various Arab tribes for the purpose of reinstating Ibrahim.

Khalid was succeeded by his younger brother Salim while Humeid bin Abdulla bin Sultan nephew to Khalid and his deputy at Ras ul Kheima was elected Chief of the latter place in preference to Ibrahim who was not acceptable to the inhabitants Humeid was strong enough to throw off his allegiance to Shargah and Ras ul Kheima remained independent until Humeid's death in 1900, when Sheikh Suggar bin Khalid who had ousted his uncle Salim and became Chief of Shargah in 1883, seized Ras ul Kheima without any serious opposition. Sheikh Suggar's son Khalid is now in charge at Ras ul Kheima.

The territories of the Joasmi Chief are fairly extensive and include the strip along the Batineh Coast. The population of Shargah may be about 4,000 and of Ras ul Kheima about 1,500. There are some 70 British subjects, Hindus and Khojahs, residing at Shargah and at Ras ul Kheima some 9 or 10 Hyderabadis. Pearl diving is the principal occupation.

Sheikh Suggar is about 40 years of age. He appears to be generally unpopular amongst the other Trucial Chiefs and is not apparently a wise ruler. There is nothing especial to record with regard to Joasmi affairs of recent years beyond the trouble which the Chief is now having with his feudatory at Fujeirah on the Batineh Coast. The Joasmi Chief is of course a subscriber to the Perpetual Treaty of Peace of 1853 and to the other engagements with the British Government. Sheikh Suggar gets a salute of 3 guns.

C. A. KEMBALL, *Lieut.-Col.,*

Offg. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Ajman.

Chief, Abdul Aziz bin Humeid of the Al bu Ali tribe, who seized Ajman in 1900 deposing his nephew Humeid bin Rashid bin Humeid in 1900. The late Chief Humeid died, it is said, of wounds received in the encounter with his uncle who however is suspected of having put him to death after the fight. The place is of no particular importance and the tribe is a small one. The town may contain as many as 1,500 inhabitants during the pearling season. Four Bunniahs live there. Nothing of importance has occurred of recent years with regard to this Chief.

The Chief of Ajman subscribed to the Perpetual Treaty of Peace and to the other engagements concluded with the Trucial Chiefs. He gets a salute of 3 guns.

C. A. KEMBALL, *Lieut.-Col.,*

Offg. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Umm al Kowein.

Chief, Ahmed bin Abdulla of the Al bu Ali tribe. He has been Chief of Umm al Kowein for many years and is now over 70 years of age and in very feeble health. His son, Rashid bin Abdulla, does most of the work for his father.

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

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There are about 1,000 tribesmen living in Umm al Kowein and in the pearling season the population of the place is probably larger. Some 10 Bunniahs live there. The Chief is a party to the Perpetual Treaty of Peace and to the other engagements concluded with the British Government. He gets a salute of 3 guns. Nothing of importance has occurred so far as this Chief is concerned of recent years, though in 1892 he showed signs of indifference to his engagements but acknowledged them after a message from the Resident.

C. A. KEMBALL, *Lieut.-Col.*,

Offg. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

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G. C. Press, Simla. No. 1540 F., D.—9-11-03. 40.—H. C. G.

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Telegram, dated the 11th November 1903.

From—Mr. Grant Duff, Tehran,
To—The Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp.

Persian Government informs me officially that Ala-ed-Dowleh will receive Viceroy, Bushire, December 2nd. Salar Moazzam, Governor of Gulf Ports, will receive Viceroy, November 22nd at Bunder Abbas. Hussein Kuli Khan Nawab will represent Persian Foreign Office and ranks with but after Governor of Gulf Ports.

Telegram, dated the 10th November 1903.

From—The Secretary of State, London,
To—The Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp.

Your Secret Despatch No. 148, dated September 17th, visit to Persian Gulf. Following summary of despatch dated November 6th:—

Paragraph 1.—Formal approval.

2. Accepts description of objects of visit, notes statement that possibly only conventional declarations may be required, but that should modification of existing arrangements appear necessary you will refer proposals to me.

3. His Majesty's Government agree visit will strengthen British interests in Gulf, but feel sure you appreciate disadvantages resulting from any impression that tour indicates intention on their part to alter *status quo*.

4. Position at Maskat and Koweit is (? specially) difficult. At Maskat any modification of Sultan's status could require consent of other Powers. Koweit Sheikh will inevitably press for further assurances, but international considerations govern situation. You are referred to telegram of 26th August in regard to permanent Resident, and are reminded of necessity to bear in mind in communications with Sheikh obligations imposed by our repeated admissions that Koweit is within Turkish Empire. See despatch to British Ambassador, Constantinople, 234 of August 20th.

5. Expresses confidence in Your Excellency's thorough appreciation of force of these considerations.

No. 1171, "Hyacinth" at Bombay, the 9th November 1903.

From—Rear-Admiral George Atkinson Willes, Commander-in-Chief, East Indian Station,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In reply to your letter of November 6th, I have the honour to offer the following remarks for the consideration of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governer-General of India:

"Arrival of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General at Maskat at 11 A.M." May I be informed if His Excellency's proposal to arrive at Ras-el Hadd at daylight has been abandoned, because the ships would not steam the 83 miles in less than 7 hours which would bring them off Maskat at 1 P.M.

On the Squadron approaching the Harbour a salute of 21 guns will be fired by the Flagship. If the ships immediately dress on anchoring I submit to His Excellency that the compliment will be taken to belong to the Sultan, and therefore I would suggest that Dressing Ship shall mark every movement from the ship to the shore of His Excellency, and also the occasions on which the Viceroy holds a Durbar. At other times Masthead flags only should be displayed or the dignity of Dressing Ship for His Excellency will be lost.

Naval Officers will wear full Dress on the occasions of the Durbars. At other times in harbour, they will wear Frock coat and epaulettes and cocked hats with swords in cool weather, and its equivalent in weather which necessitates the white clothing being worn. Naval Full Dress is reserved for occasions of great State.

On the Sultan of Maskat visiting the Viceroy,—all ships will parade a Guard and the *Hyacinth* and *Argonaut* their bands. Each ship visited will fire a salute of 21 guns on His Highness leaving that ship. One of the Squadron will

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be detailed to do this on his leaving *Hardinge*. The Sultan's Flag is to be hoisted by the ship saluting. It has been customary for His Majesty's ships to hoist the Sultan's Flag on his arrival on board and keep it flying till His Highness leaves.

On the occasion of His Highness's visit, it is noted that the Naval Commander-in-Chief is not expected to attend nor upon the occasion of His Excellency the Viceroy's return visit to the Sultan. This will necessitate the Naval Commander-in-Chief calling on the Sultan and the Sultan returning his visit separately.

I beg to bring to the notice of His Excellency that the *Argonaut's* Cabins are not large enough to hold a Durbar in, and that the Upper Deck lends itself better as a place to hold it. If His Excellency approves a platform will be erected across the after part of the Quarter Deck, which will be suitably decorated with Flags. The Darbar chairs and carpets, which it is presumed, will be lent to *Argonaut*, will be placed on the Daïs, under the guidance of one of His Excellency's Staff. It is very necessary that the Master of the ceremonies should visit the *Argonaut* and advise the Captain.

All Naval Officers invited to be present will wear Full Dress.

As His Excellency leaves the *Hardinge* all ships of the squadron fire a salute of 31 guns, the *Argonaut* repeating it as his Excellency steps on board. The same salute to be fired by all ships on His Excellency leaving the *Argonaut*.

Shargah.—The following Chiefs will be saluted on leaving *Argonaut* :—

	Guns.
Sheikh of Abu Thabi	5
Sheikh of Shargah	8
Sheikh of Debai	3
Sheikh of Ajman	3
Sheikh of Um-al-Kawain	3

Sheikh of Hamriyeh is not on our Saluting List, please state number of guns.

Otherwise, salutes and ceremonies as at Maskat.

No salutes are ever fired by H. M. Ships unless there is a battery on shore to return the salute. In the Persian Gulf the only places that can return a salute are Maskat, Bunder Abbas, Lingah, and Bushire.

I submit that in the allocation of positions at the Durbars, the Post Captains and Commanders of ships may be considered, and that the other officers whom it is my intention to order to attend, may be so placed as to add to the brilliancy and numbers of His Excellency's entourage. I presume that may staff, consisting of the Flag Captain, Flag Lieutenant, and Secretary, will be placed near me.

I request that an opportunity will be given to me to present Officers Commanding ships to His Excellency, and also my staff. The dress would be frock coat, epaulettes, cocked hat, and sword.

Referring to Gazette I beg to point out that "Escorted by the East Indian Squadron" is not the correct way to describe the movements of the ships under my Command.

I have been invited by His Excellency to accompany him in my Flagship, accompanied by as many vessels of my squadron as I can muster.

If it is to be called an escort permission must be obtained from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to so describe it. I have no *orders* from the Admiralty to accompany His Excellency.

Sea Sec 101

Telegram, dated the 13th November 1903.

From—Foreign, Simla,

To—The Admiral, Bombay.

Clear the line. Please post by to-night's mail train copy of your letter 1171, November 9th, about ceremony, et cetera, connected with Viceroy's tour, to address of Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp.

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

(280)

Telegram No. 2712-E.-A., dated the 14th November 1903.

From—Foreign, Simla,
To—The Admiral, Bombay.

Paper 102

No. 2712-E. A. Your letter No. 1171, November 9th. Ceremonial in connection with Viceroy's tour. Sheikh of Hamriyeh not entitled to salute.

No. 860, dated Simla, the 13th November 1903.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military (Marine) Department,
To—His Excellency Rear Admiral George L. Atkinson Willes, Commanding His Majesty's Naval Forces, East Indian Station.

His Majesty's ships *Hyacinth, Argonaut, Fox' Pomone.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of Your Fxcellency's letter No. 1171, dated 9th November 1903, stating that at the request of the Government of India the ships named on the margin will accompany the Viceroy on His Excellency's forthcoming cruise in the Persian Gulf, and enquiring whether the coal used by these ships between the dates of leaving Karachi for the Persian Gulf, and finally leaving the Gulf will be paid for out of Indian funds. The concurrence of the Government of India is also requested to the substitution of His Majesty's *Pomone* for His Majesty's ship *Perseus* as a subsidised vessel during the cruise.

2. In reply I am to say that the cost of the coal consumed by the vessels named while employed in connection with His Excellency the Viceroy's cruise will be borne by Indian funds. The Government of India also accept the charge for the collier which it has been found necessary to order to the Gulf.

3. I am to add that the Government of India also agree to the proposed substitution of the *Pomone* for the *Perseus* as a subsidised vessel for the period of the cruise.

Memo. by Officiating Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Marine Department.

Paper 103

Copy of the above forwarded to—
The Foreign Department,
The Finance Department,
Director, Royal Indian Marine, Examiner of Marine Accounts, Accountant-General, Military Department, in continuation of Marine Department telegram No. 859, dated the 12th November 1903.

Telegram, dated the 14th November 1903.

Paper 104

From—The Political Agent, Maskat,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp.

Sultan is anxious that his brother, Muhammad, being so much older should take precedence for present purposes over Taimur, so as not to make jealousy. Addressed Foreign with Viceroy, repeated Simla.

Telegram, dated the 15th November 1903.

Paper 105

From—The Foreign with Viceroy, Karachi,
To—The Political Agent, Maskat.

Your telegram 14th November. No objection to Sultan's brother taking precedence over Taimur.

Addressed Political Agent, Maskat, repeated Foreign; Simla.

Telegram, dated the 15th November 1903.

Paper 106

From—The Political Agent, Maskat,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp.

If possible, please provide for 200 persons at Durbar from Maskat itself. Addressed to Foreign with Viceroy, repeated to Simla.

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Persia 107

Telegram, dated the 15th November 1903.

From—Foreign with Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp,
To—The Political Agent at Maskat.

Your telegram 15th November. Cannot seat nearly 200 persons, but can perhaps arrange standing room. Please say how many require seats and arrange to issue tickets to these with numbers of seats after we arrive and have discussed matter.

Persia 108

Telegram, dated the 15th November 1903.

From—Foreign with Viceroy, Camp,
To—The Political Agent at Maskat.

Admiral will send guard of 30 marines and band ashore to customs jetty when Viceroy visits Sultan. I presume there is no objection to this. Please have *mizaz pursi* deputation waiting to come off as ship arrives, as we may be a little late. Deputation will be received by Foreign and Military Secretaries. Owing to time being so much occupied, Admiral will not visit Sultan officially on this occasion and so Sultan need not call on him, but it should be explained that this is special occasion and will not form precedent. Viceroy will go by boat from Consulate to jetty. Dancing should be on afternoon of 19th. Viceroy will lunch on board that day.

Persia 109

No. 1171.

Hyacinth at Karachi,
13th November 1903.

SIR,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the following telegram received to-day from the Senior Naval Officer at Bushire (Commander Kemp, H.M.S. *Sphinx*) :—

"Persian Minister telegraphs expressing wish to meet Viceroy unofficially at Maskat before receiving him officially at Bunder Abbas: propose arriving at Maskat in the evening 18th November or in the morning 19th November. Resident left to-day."

I have telegraphed approving Commander Kemp's proposal.

I have the honour to be,
SIR,
Your obedient servant,
GEORGE ATKINSON WILLES, *Rear-Admiral*,
Commander-in-Chief.

The Secretary
to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.

Persia 110

Telegram, dated the 15th November 1903.

From—The Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indian Station, Bombay,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram to Admiral with reference to saluting Sheikh of Hamriyeh has been forwarded to Karachi.

Pers Dec 111

(*Received, on the 16th November 1903, under cover of a letter from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 38, dated the 17th October 1903.*)

Gulahek,
27th September 1903.

No. 152.

MY LORD.

I have the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 90 of the 24th instant, a copy of a note which I have addressed to

To Mushir-ed-Dowleh, 26th September.

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

(281)

the Mushir-ed-Dowleh on the subject of the Viceroy of India's approaching visit to the Persian Gulf.

I have not yet been able to see His Excellency, who is full of business connected with the formation of the new Government, on this subject, but shall do so and report the result of my interview with him as soon as possible.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

A. H. HARDINGE.

The Marquess of Lansdowne, K.G.,
etc., etc., etc.

Enclo
Seistan

Gulahek,
26th September 1903.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that His Excellency, the Viceroy of India, proposes, under orders from the Government of His Majesty the King-Emperor, to pay, in the course of November next, an official visit to the Persian Gulf. He will be accompanied by a British Naval Squadron.

The Viceroy's primary object is to visit the various Arab States on the southern shore of the Persian Gulf, whose Chiefs are, as Your Excellency is aware, in special relations with the Government of India, and to inspect the British Consulates and Political Agencies maintained by it in that part of Asia. But His Excellency is anxious also, as a matter of courtesy to the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shah, not to omit, during the course of his tour in the Gulf, a visit to the principal Persian ports on the northern shore of that sea, in which, moreover, the Government of India has important political and commercial interests.

I feel sure that the Persian Government will desire to mark its friendly relations with that of His Imperial Majesty the King-Emperor by affording on this occasion, at Bushire and other Persian ports at which the Viceregal squadron will call, special evidences of respect and good-will to His Excellency the Viceroy, who is His Majesty's most exalted representative on the Asiatic Continent. It will indeed, I believe, see in the visit which His Excellency is paying, by His Majesty's commands, to the shores of the Persian Gulf, a fresh proof of the determination of the British Government to maintain its rights and interests, which are in harmony with those of His Majesty the Shah, in that region, and to consolidate the good understanding which has for so many years happily existed between the two neighbouring Empires.

I shall take an early occasion of discussing with Your Excellency the details of the reception to be accorded on behalf of His Majesty the Shah to His Excellency the Viceroy of India at Bushire and such other Persian ports as he may visit.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your Excellency's most obedient, humble servant,

A. H. HARDINGE.

His Excellency
Mushir-ed-Dowleh,
His Imperial Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs,
etc., etc., etc.

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Hyacinth at Sharga,
21st November 1903.

No. 1295.

SIR,

I have the honour to make the following observations for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council after my visit to places in the Mussenden Promontory yesterday.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your obedient servant,

GEORGE ATKINSON WILLES, *Rear-Admiral*,
Commander-in-Chief.

The Secretary to the
Government of India,
Foreign Department.

(*Confidential.*)

Memorandum on the Mussenden Promontory, visited 20th November 1903.

Khor Kawi, on the north-western extremity of the Maklab Peninsula, is a good and well protected harbour. The northern entrance to the Strait has a natural break-water running out about two cables in an easterly direction from the Island of Jezirat Al Ghanam, which prevents any swell rolling in. This approach is subject to strong tide rips and currents, but is otherwise very easy; it is necessary to carry plenty of way on entering the Strait. When inside there is anchorage in from 15 to 19 fathoms of water for $1\frac{3}{4}$ miles in length, and from 3 to 5 cables in breadth, with deep water up to the shore. The southern entrance is quite landlocked, and is very much easier to approach than the northern, since the tides there are not so strong. A fleet of eight battleships could lie comfortably at single anchor in single line in the Strait, quite secure from all winds; and there would be room to place smaller vessels in shore of them close to the Island, and more vessels could be accommodated if moored.

This is by far the best anchorage to suit naval purposes which I have yet seen in the Gulf, and it has the advantage of being open to some breeze, as the land is not high. The difference of temperature between Khor Kawi and the Elphinstone Inlet was very marked on the same afternoon, the latter being several degrees hotter and closer.

As a coaling station, this would appear to be just the thing we require; it can be easily defended, and ships inside are well out of sight. It would require to be connected by cable with the Indian Government Telegraph system, to get over its present isolation.

At the lower or southern end of the Strait is a cove on the mainland, called Gharum, in which were several small dhows and fishing craft, and as palm trees were growing on the land surrounding it, it is evident that fresh water exists there.

As soon as the *Sphinx* is at liberty, Commander Kemp and his officers will make a careful survey of this harbour, which will be forwarded to the Admiralty. Until this is done a definite decision cannot be arrived at.

Apparently Khor Kawi has been overlooked of late years, because in the sailing ship days it was not used owing to the difficulty of getting out of it under sail, which steam has now overcome.

As a Naval station for guarding the entrance to the Gulf, its position is unique, and, unless I am mistaken, will be found better than any of the other places which have been suggested by officers of His Majesty's Navy in their various reports upon the subject.

The Island of Henjam on the opposite side of the entrance to the Gulf is eminently a war signal station; here a Cruiser can come into the Strait between the Island and Kishm, drop his anchor, communicate by telegraph,

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and proceed at any time of the day or night. In this respect it is in every way superior as a telegraph station to Basidhu, which is difficult of approach.

Although Kubbat Gazira (Malcolm Inlet) and Khor Ash Shem (Elphinstone Inlet) are both large, deep water inlets, capable of sheltering a fleet, they are quite unsuitable for our purposes. Yet they must not fall into the hands of any other country.

With Kishm, Bunder Abbas, and Henjam in telegraphic communication with Khor Kawi, the suggested naval station, the entrance of the Gulf would be in a strong strategic position.

GEORGE ATKINSON WILLES,
Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief.

Pub No 113

(*Received with letter from Secretary, Political and Secret Department, No. 43, dated the 4th October 1903.*)

[Enclosure in Foreign Office covering letter of 7th October 1903.]

From Sir A. Hardinge, Tehran, to the Foreign Office.

Telegraphic. 6th October 1903.

No. 128.

Viceroy wishes me to meet him at Bunder Abbas on November 22nd and I can easily do this. Only difficulty is that Resident at Bushire, who has to proceed before meeting His Excellency to the Arab coast and Maskat to make arrangements for his reception, wants the *Lawrence* for this purpose.

He suggests that the *Sphinx* might take me from Bushire about November 15th or November 16th and convey me to Bunder Abbas independently of him. Could you arrange this or something like it with Admiralty?

I addressed Persian Government on receipt of your telegram No. 90, respecting Viceroy's tour, but said nothing inconsistent with your telegram.

Pub No 114

No. 47-C., dated Viceroy's Camp, the 27th November 1903 (Confidential).

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I am directed to forward, for record and communication to the Political Agent at Maskat, a copy of a note on the private interview which was granted by His Excellency the Viceroy to His Highness the Sultan of Maskat on the 19th November 1903.

Pub No 115

No. 1171, dated *Hyacinth* at Koweit, the 28th November 1903 (Confidential).

From—Rear-Admiral George Atkinson Willes, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Forwarded for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

PROGRAMME.

Arrive.	*Place.*	*Leave.*
	Koweit . . .	. 10 P.M., Sunday, 29th November.
6 A.M., Monday, 30th November.	Entrance Khor Abdulla	. 6 A.M., Monday, 30th November.
11-30 A.M.	Am Kasr . . .	. 1 P.M.
Midnight	. Off Khor Musa.	
	Entrance Khor Musa	6 A.M., Tuesday, 1st December.
11 A.M. Tuesday, 1st December.	Anchorage No. 1 .	. Noon, Tuesday, 1st December.
About 6 P.M. . .	{ Rendezvous — Latitude 29°48′N. Longitude 49° 8′E. }	

GEORGE ATKINSON WILLES, *Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.*

The 28th November 1903.

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Enclosure 116

To His Excellency the Right Hon'ble George Nathaniel Baron Curzon of Kedleston, M.A., P.C., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

We the undersigned British Indian Merchants, residing at Bahrein, have pleasure in taking advantage of Your Lordship's visit to these Pearl Islands of the Gulf, to extend to you a most hearty welcome in the name of our Community.

We hope you have had a pleasant passage on your way up the Gulf, that your short stay here will be agreeable to Your Lordship, and that your return voyage will be accomplished in safety and comfort. We consider ourselves especially fortunate in having this opportunity of meeting Your Excellency, as the Gulf was never honoured with a visit from a Viceroy of India, and as we know that Your Lordship takes keen interest in questions affecting the Persian Gulf and the East in General, we sincerely hope and trust that this visit will be an harbinger of prosperity, felicity, and peace in the Gulf.

We beg to acknowledge the manifold blessings we have derived from the just and kind British rule. May it be known to Your Lordship that we came up to the Persian Gulf about two hundred years ago, when no steamers visited the Gulf, and all business had to be done by means of sailing boats under very trying and disadvantageous circumstances. But now the times are changed and British Protection has brought with it its usual blessings—peace, safety, and prosperity—which reflect great credit on the British enterprise and civilization in the Gulf.

We have no desire on this occasion to trespass unduly on Your Excellency's precious time, but humbly venture to lay before you one or two questions of vital importance and considerable interest to Bahrein trade. This port is naturally placed in a very favourable situation for trade and is a commercial centre for Al Hassa, Ojaar, Katif, Katr, and their hinterlands; and to accelerate the trade of this port a pier at Manama is absolutely necessary to enable lighters to ply at all times and tides to give the steamers a speedy despatch. We most respectfully beg to put this want before your kind consideration.

In 1864 we opened trade relations with Katif and did large business there. We generally command respect and enjoy some prestige in the Gulf, but through misgovernment at Katif, we were not only ignored but we sustained heavy losses and were exposed to insults. In 1895 one of us was attacked by pirates, and his right hand was severed and pearls worth Rs. 40,000 were plundered from him. Our unprotected condition placed us at a great disadvantage there, and we had finally to retire from Katif. Since Bahrein enjoyed unexceptional tranquillity and great advantages for trade, both Arab and Persian traders have come and settled down here. The keen competition now prevailing here, has made it necessary for us to seek new fields and we are anxious to share in the growing trade of Katif and Katr, and pray Your Excellency to appoint officers at those unrepresented ports, or if it be impracticable to extend the authority of the Bahrein Political Agency over them.

In conclusion, we offer our prayers to the Almighty to bless and prolong the life of His Most Gracious Majesty the King-Emperor, under whose benign rule we are able to live here in peace and contentment, and we sincerely wish Your Lordship a happy sojourn, prosperous career and long life.

We have the honour to be,
Your Excellency,
Your most obedient Servants,
On behalf of our Community,

VERSIMAL EHELLARAM.
GANGARAM TIKAMDAS & CO.
LAKHMIDAS THAVERDAS & CO.
RATANCHAND SHEVAKRAM & CO.
PERSRAM DAMODERDAS & CO.

TOOLSIDAS PERSRAM.
OCOKAMAL PITAMBERDAS.
TOOLSIDAS SWAMIDAS.
METHARAM CHANDOOMAL.
TEKCHAND DWARKADAS.

Bahrein, 2nd November 1903.

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Telegram No. 2674-E.A., dated the 9th November 1903.

Pro. No. 116 (a)

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—Colonel Kemball, Bushire.

Your letter October 2nd. Trucial Chiefs. Have you anything to add to suggestions made therein.

Telegram, dated the 10th November 1903.

Pro. No. 116 (b)

From—The Resident, Bushire,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram of 9th November. Trucial Chiefs. Nothing to add. Addressed Foreign with Viceroy; repeated Simla. Kemball.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 2504 F. D.—22-12-1903.—54.—W. G. B.

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

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

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Memo. No. 1171, dated Hyacinth at Bushire, the 2nd December 1903.

From—The Commander-in-Chief, East Indies,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Forwarded for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Memo. No. 1171, dated Bushire, the 2nd December 1903.

From—The Commander-in-Chief, East Indies,

To—The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. *Fox*.

Being in all respects ready, you will leave this port this evening in H. M. ship under your command and proceed to Pasni, so as to arrive there by daylight on 6th December.

2. Your mail due at Bushire on 4th December will be sent to you by the *Hardinge*.

3. On the arrival of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Pasni in the *Hardinge*, you will fire a salute of 31 guns, and you will dress ship and man ship on His Excellency's arrival and departure.

4. You are to fire any salutes for Native Chiefs, and at the Durbar, that the Viceroy may request.

5. On the departure of the *Hardinge* with His Excellency on board, you are to proceed to Bombay.

India Office, London,
6th November 1903.

Secret,
No. 34.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord,

Proposed visit of His Excellency the Viceroy to Maskat and the Persian Gulf.

I have received Your Excellency's letter (Secret), No. 148, of the 17th September, on the subject of the visit which you are undertaking to Maskat and the Persian Gulf. Your intention to make this tour was known to His Majesty's Government, and I have now to convey to Your Excellency the formal approval for which you ask.

2. The object of your visit is to inspect the Indian establishments that are maintained in those parts, to visit the Arab Sheikhs who are in treaty relations with the British Government, and to show by your presence the intention of His Majesty's Government to maintain a political and commercial ascendency in the Persian Gulf. You state that it is possible that at no point of your journey will any but conventional declarations or assurances be required, but that, if it should appear to you in any instance that a modification of the existing arrangements and undertakings is necessary, you will refer your proposals to me after consulting with the Resident in the Persian Gulf.

3. His Majesty's Government have no doubt that the effect of your visit to the Persian Gulf will be to strengthen British interests in that quarter. At the same time they feel assured that Your Excellency will recognise the disadvantages which might result from any impression that it indicates an intention on the part of His Majesty's Government to alter the *status quo* in the Gulf and at Maskat, as defined by international engagements.

4. Your Excellency's position, both at Maskat and Koweit, will undoubtedly be one of special difficulty. At Maskat, as you state, the status of the Sultan is so defined by treaty that any modification of it depends on the consent of the other Powers concerned in His Highness's country. At Koweit it appears to me inevitable that the Sheikh will be anxious to receive from Your

1950 F. D.

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

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Excellency assurances of support in excess of those already given him. But here again the situation is governed by international considerations. You were informed, by my predecessor's telegram of the 26th August last, that the appointment of a British officer to reside permanently at Koweit could not be considered otherwise than as a departure from the *status quo* on which His Majesty's Government had laid such stress in their discussions with the Porte; and it will be necessary for Your Excellency to bear in mind, in your communications with the Sheikh, the obligations imposed on our policy by the admissions which, as stated in a recent Despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, have repeatedly been made by His Majesty's Government that Koweit is within the Turkish Empire.

No. 234, dated 20th August 1903.

5. I have no doubt that Your Excellency thoroughly appreciates the force of these considerations.

I have the honour to be,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servant,

ST. JOHN BRODRICK.

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No. 196 of 1903.

Pro. No. 119

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.
External.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE ST. JOHN BRODRICK,
His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Dated FORT WILLIAM, *the 17th December 1903.*

SIR,

While in the Persian Gulf I received your letter (Secret) No. 34 of 6th November, on the subject of the tour upon which I was at that time engaged. Accounts of the proceedings have appeared in the European and Indian Press, and it will not be necessary for me to repeat what has already been published. There were several incidents and experiences, however, of my tour which for obvious reasons could not be made public property: and His Majesty's Government may, perhaps, be sufficiently interested in these to justify me in submitting a brief report. In an appendix to this letter are enclosed copies of the various speeches which I was called upon to make in the course of my journey, and which will be referred to in their several contexts.

2. My main object in undertaking a visit to the Persian Gulf was, as I informed Lord George Hamilton in my letter (Secret) No. 148 of 17th September, to visit the Arab Sheikhs who are in Treaty relations with the British Government, and to show by my presence the intention of His Majesty's Government to maintain their political and commercial ascendency in those waters. But I was fortunate in being able to carry out a separate and perhaps even more important task. Accompanied as I was by Rear-Admiral G. Atkinson-Willes and the vessels of the East Indian Squadron, from whom I received a courtesy and assistance for which I desire to express my warmest acknowledgments to the Board of Admiralty—I was enabled, in conjunction with the Admiral, to make a close study on the spot of the question of naval ports, bases, coaling stations, telegraph stations, and anchorages in the Persian Gulf, which has been so much under official discussion in recent years; and to arrive at conclusions which will be separately reported to you, and in which I was fortunate in finding myself in complete agreement with the Naval Commander-in-Chief. Simultaneously the presence of Sir Arthur Hardinge, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, who joined me at Maskat and accompanied me through the greater part of my cruise, afforded me the opportunity of discussing with him many matters of importance concerning our policy and position in Persia, and of arriving at an understanding on several disputed points. The results of these discussions will also be separately reported.

3. Arriving at Karachi on 16th November, I was received there by the Admiral, and sailed on the same afternoon in the R. I. M. S. "Hardinge," accompanied by His Excellency in his flagship the "Hyacinth," and by the following ships of the East Indian Squadron, *viz.*, the "Fox" and "Pomone" and by H. M. S. "Argonaut," which by the courtesy of the First Lord of the Admiralty had been ordered to join the fleet, while on its way home from the China Station. During our cruise we also had at our disposal for shorter

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expeditions or for postal and telegraphic purposes H. M. S. "Sphinx," H. M. S. "Lapwing," the R. I. M. S. "Lawrence," and the Indo-European Telegraph ship "Patrick Stewart."

4. Early on the morning of 18th November we arrived at Maskat, and stayed there until the following evening. During this time official visits were exchanged with the Sultan, I received an address from the Indian traders in Maskat territory, and I held a Darbar on board the "Argonaut," followed by the investiture of the Sultan with the G.C.I.E. Copies of my speeches to the British Indian subjects and at the Darbar are included among the enclosures to this letter. It was not necessary to say in them anything beyond what has been said before; although the circumstances in which the statements and assurances were now repeated, no doubt invested them with a new and special significance. His Highness the Sultan on all these occasions conducted himself with simplicity and dignity, his demeanour was that of a loyal feudatory of the British Crown rather than of an independent sovereign, and it is clear that he trusts implicitly to the British Power for spport and protection. He did not plead for any further engagements, nor did he seek to extract any fresh pledge. The situation and its surroundings were evidently sufficient in his eyes to confirm him in reliance upon our friendship, and in an attitude of deference to our wishes, which is not only of good omen for the future, but which reflects the greatest credit upon Major Cox, the Political Agent whom I appointed to Maskat in 1899, and who in little more than four years has converted the ruler from feelings of suspicion, if not of direct hostility, to those of confidence and regard. On the other hand, in proportion as the desire of the Sultan to range himself, so to speak, alongside of the Indian Princes in their relations to the British Crown was made manifest, so did the incongruity of his international position become more apparent: while the contradiction between the actual state of affairs—with a ruler, a people, and a trade almost entirely dependent upon ourselves—and the theoretical status, under which France, represented only by a Consul, with no subjects, and next to no trade, enjoys a treaty equality with Great Britain—was such as to emphasize the desirability of terminating with as little delay as possible a situation so anomalous and it might almost be said so grotesque. On the concluding afternoon of my stay at Maskat I invited His Highness the Sultan to a private interview at which I asked him to say anything that was in his mind. Before conferring upon him the insignia of the G.C.I.E., by order of His Majesty the King-Emperor, on the morning of the same day, I had stipulated that His Highness should place himself entirely in the hands of the Government of India and should act upon their advice in respect of his desire to abdicate, previously reported by me to you. This subject accordingly was not mentioned during the private conversation. The Sultan raised two small points about which it is unnecessary for me to trouble you in this letter, and I spoke to him about the management of his Customs, which is not altogether satisfactory. He expressed anxiety to know when the flag question between himself and the French would come before the Hague Tribunal, to which I could return no more satisfactory reply than that that Court had a good deal of work on its hands which might occupy some time. The Sultan evidently feels keenly on the matter, as he very reasonably may; and it is one in which I would press upon His Majesty's Government the desirability of accelerating progress as much as possible.

Enclosure No. 1.
Ditto No. II.

5. After leaving Maskat I spent an entire day in making, in company with the Admiral, a most careful inspection of all the harbours and inlets on both the Eastern and Western Coasts of the rocky and deeply indented promontory commonly known, from its extreme point, as Ras Musandim. The upshot of these investigations will be separately dealt with.

6. On 21st November I arrived at Shargah upon the so-called Pirate Coast, which had been selected as a central point at which the Arab Sheikhs, who are in close Treaty relations with the British Government, and who are commonly known as the Trucial Chiefs, should be brought together to meet me in the ceremony of a Darbar. The Chiefs of Abu Dhati Shargah, Debai and Ajman, with their sons, and the eldest son of the old Chief of Um-el-Kawain, had been collected in the "Patrick Stewart" from different parts of the Coast; and the

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Darbar held, as at Maskat, upon the "Argonaut," was a ceremony that can hardly fail to have left upon them a great impression. I enclose a copy of the address that I delivered at this Darbar, which may be described as an epitome of British history in the Arab waters of the Gulf during the past century.

Enclosure No. III.

7. From Shargah I crossed to the Persian coast at Bunder Abbas, where I arrived on 22nd November, and was received on behalf of the Shah by His Excellency the Salar-i-Moazzam, Governor of the Gulf Ports. The Ala-ud-Dowleh, Governor-General of Fars, was originally to have met me at Bunder Abbas, and in view of subsequent events, it is to be regretted that this part of the programme was departed from at the instance of the Persian Government. Courtesies were exchanged between the Salar-i-Moazzam and myself: and I also received an address from the Indian traders, my reply to which will be found in the Appendix. While at Bunder Abbas I landed upon the islands of Hormuz and Kishm, and discussed with the Admiral the question of Naval defence and strategy at the mouth of the Gulf.

Enclosure No. IV.

8. After leaving Bunder Abbas the "Hardinge" skirted the southern shore of the island of Kishm and halted in the Straits at Henjam, in order to enable the Admiral and myself to form an opinion upon the question of re-opening the telegraph station at that place. We formed a very definite conclusion in its favour, in preference to Bassiduh; and this will form the subject of an independent communication. A visit was next paid to the British possession of Basiduh or Bassidore at the western extremity of Kishm, where the British flag is kept flying and where a small Arab and Persian population has formed a colony under its protection. The possession of this territory is invaluable because of the hold that it gives to us over Kishm: but owing to the tortuous and shallow nature of the channels, it does not seem likely that we shall again require to use it as a naval station, or that it could advantageously be turned into a naval base. While anchored off the neighbouring Persian port of Lingah, I entertained the Salar-i-Moazzam to a dinner on board the "Hardinge," and the remarks which I made in proposing the health of his sovereign are among the enclosures to this letter. Nothing could exceed the cordiality of the relations that prevailed.

Enclosure No. V.

9. From Lingah I again crossed to the Arab Coast of the Gulf, where I spent two days in the harbour of Bahrein. The Chief of these islands, who has now ruled for a period of 36 years, owes his position, his immunity from attack and from the warfare and bloodshed of earlier days, and the increasing prosperity of Bahrein (which appears to be capable of very considerable further development) exclusively to the British Protectorate. The latter has on many occasions been asserted by His Majesty's Government and admits of no dispute. It is the main, if not the sole, guarantee for the commercial expansion of which the place seems to be undoubtedly susceptible. It has been further emphasized in recent years by the recognition in 1899 by the Government of India, with the sanction of your predecessor, of the Sheik's eldest son, Sheikh Hamed, as his successor-designate to the Chiefship of the State. The Sheikh himself is of a conservative disposition, and he would gladly see no changes made in anything in his time, and be left to die in peace. In the private interview which I accorded to him, one or two local subjects were discussed, and in pursuance of the authority more than once given to me by the Secretary of State. I then pressed upon the Sheikh an improvement in the administration of his Customs. If this be not undertaken before long, the State will become seriously embarrassed by the personal indebtedness of its head. I intimated to the Sheikh that the reform which was entirely in the interests of himself and his son could not be permanently postponed: and that I should expect proposals to be submitted to me by the Resident in consultation with him.

10. While at Bahrein I thought it likely that I might receive a visit from Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Thani of El Katr, about whom I had been in correspondence with you. Had I met him I should have acted in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of 18th November. The Sheikh, however, did not receive Colonel Kemball's invitation in time to attend.

11. On the 28th November, the squadron arrived at Koweit, and I spent two days at this interesting place. Sheikh Mubarak was unaffectedly flattered and

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rejoiced at my visit, and he exerted himself to receive me with all the limited resources of which his people and town were capable. My entry into Koweit in a carriage with the Sheikh (the only vehicle in the place) surrounded by a galloping and shouting cavalcade of Arab horsemen and camelmen, between lines of thousands of the inhabitants, and groups of women uttering shrill cries, was one of the most picturesque incidents of the tour.

12. In your letter of 6th November you expressed the opinion that it was inevitable that the Sheikh should be anxious to receive from me assurances of support in excess of those already given to him. I had myself entertained some such apprehension. But here, as at Maskat, I found that the visit itself, quite apart from any fresh promises or engagements, was regarded by the ruler as finally binding him to our cause, and as setting the seal upon the protection and overlordship of the British Power. I was accordingly relieved from the position, anticipated by you as one of special difficulty, of either having to listen to embarrassing questions or to give embarrassing answers. It is true that in his private conversation with me the Sheikh after stating explicitly that he had severed all connection with the Turks, and that he repudiated relations with any other Power than the British, asked that he might receive from us a title or decoration and an allowance. But these favours were evidently sought as ratification of a relationship regarded by the Sheikh as already in existence rather than as the initial steps in a new and more defined *régime*: and they were merely the corollary of his action at the official reception at the previous day, when, upon receiving a sword at my hands as his *khilat* or gift, he asked for a belt with which to gird it on, as he had now become "a military officer of the British Empire." I instructed Colonel Kemball to report to me upon the exact nature and application of the Sheikh's requests: but I expressly warned the latter that it might not be found possible to grant them. In accordance with a telegram received from you on the morning of my arrival at Koweit, I further warned the Sheikh against entanglements in the interior in which he could neither expect nor receive our support, and he promised implicit compliance with my advice. This should be the more easy if, as reported by him, the Wahabi candidate for the Chiefship of Nejd, Abdur Rahmam-bin-Feysal, who is his ally, has been generally successful, and has vanquished his opponent Ibn Rashid.

13. I may add that Sheikh Mubarak, though now an elderly man, is by far the most masculine and vigorous personality whom I encountered in the Gulf. He seemed to me to possess a very acute intelligence, and a character which justified his general reputation for cunning, and explained the fratricidal steps by which he had attained to his present position. His protestations of loyalty and friendship were, however, in my opinion, sincere: and I further learned that he shows to the officers of all British ships, and to English travellers arriving at Koweit, exceptional hospitality and consideration.

14. The question of the Baghdad Railway has called special attention in recent years to the ports or harbours at the upper end of the Persian Gulf: and I accordingly ultilised my visit to Koweit to inspect these in company with the Admiral. While lying off Koweit, we made an examination of Kadhama Bay to the west of the town. Leaving the fleet, we then made a tour of two days in the *Lawrence*, piloted by Commander Kemp in the *Sphinx*, in the course of which we fully explored Khor Abdulla (the probable maritime terminus of a railway from Baghdad) up to the Turkish post recently planted at Um Kasr. Passing to the Persian shores of the Gulf, beyond the estuary of the Shat-el-Arab, we then similarly explored Khor Musa, the very considerable inlet, leading to excellent and well-protected anchorages, which might some day be made the port of a railway descending from the interior of Persia to the Sea. The results of these investigations will form the subject of a separate despatch.

15. On the morning of 2nd December the squadron arrived at Bushire. I was unable to land there owing to difficulties, the nature of which I have fully explained in my letter No. 118-C., of 10th December; but in the course of the two days which I spent at anchor off the town, I recieved a deputation of the British merchants and subjects residing there, and replied to them in the speech which is forwarded herewith.

Enclosure No. VI.

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16. Here I parted with Sir A. Hardinge, who had shown the warmest desire to co-operate in the objects of my cruise, and who was equally vexed with myself at the contretemps that had occurred at the sole spot where it had been proposed that I should land upon Persian soil. During our many conversations we discussed the subjects of British and Indian interests in Seistan, the Seistan boundary demarcation, the proposed removal of the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, the attitude of the Belgian Customs officers, the Russo-Belgo-Persian policy on the Baluch frontier, the extension of the Indian and Indo-European telegraphs to Seistan, the channels of correspondence between our Consul in Seistan and the British Legation at Tehran, the appointment of Russian telegraph-signallers in Central Persia, and the extension of Russian telegraphs in the north, the Règlement Douanier, the recent loan to the Persian Government and the question of the Southern Customs, the maintenance of the British quarantine officers in the Gulf, the raising of Bakhtiari and Lur levies or road-guards, the location and functions of British Consular officers, whether appointed from the Levant Service or from India, in Southern Persia and the Gulf, and the political and strategical defence of the interests of Great Britain in her legitimate sphere of influence by land and by sea. The results of these discussions and the recommendations of the Government of India will in many cases form the subject of later representations to His Majesty's Government.

17. The question had been raised whether I should make an attempt to see the Sheikh of Mohammerah. As, however, I did not propose to ascend the Shat-el-Arab, as an invitation to the Sheikh to meet me elsewhere than in his own territory might, in view of his peculiar and rather delicate relations with the Persian Government, have given offence to the latter, and as Sir A. Hardinge himself intended to visit him a little later, it seemed to me that the idea had better not be pursued. The Sheikh sent me a very courteous letter by the hand of Major Burton, our Vice-Consul at Ahwaz, and to this I replied in a similar tone.

18. At Bushire my tour of the Gulf was really at an end: the squadron dispersed: and, touching, only at Jask for telegraphic messages on my return journey, the "Hardinge" carried me back into Indian waters. On the way I halted for a day at Pasni, a small port, with a possible future before it, on the coast of British Makran.

The opportunity was taken to hold a Darbar for the Chiefs and Sardars of Western and Southern Baluchistan. Colonel Yate had come for the purpose from Quetta, and the Sardars attended in force from as far as Las Bela on the east, Kharan on the north, and the Persian border on the west, having in some cases been marching for weeks in order to be present. No Governor-General had ever previously visited Makran. It is a part of the Indian Empire, which has been somewhat neglected, but which, as soon as peace has been thoroughly established on the Persian frontier, will acquire some importance and admit of a not inconsiderable expansion. The speech which I made at the Darbar will be found among the enclosures.

Enclosure No. VII.

19. On 7th December I arrived again at Karachi, after an absence of exactly three weeks. The programme had been carried out, with one exception, in every particular: and the utmost good fortune had attended us throughout. The weather had been extraordinarily favourable: and all the officers concerned had laboured hard to make the proceedings a success. It cannot, I think, be doubted that they will have left upon the rulers and peoples of the Gulf a powerful and lasting impression of the incontestable predominance of British interests in those regions, and of the resolute intention of the British and Indian Governments to maintain them.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

(Signed) CURZON.

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

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Pro. No. 119.

~~Enclosure 1.~~

Reply of His Excellency the Viceroy to an Address of Welcome presented to him at Maskat on the 18th November 1903 by a deputation of Hindu, Muhammadan, Parsi, and other protected British subjects settled in the towns of Maskat and Matra.

Gentlemen,—It is with much pleasure that I have received the loyal and well-composed address which has just been read, and that, on crossing the sea from India to the shores of another country, I find a large and prosperous community of the subjects of His Majesty the King-Emperor existing and plying their trade here in conditions of security and contentment. I have made some attempt to ascertain the numbers of British Indian subjects who are thus to be found in Maskat and the other ports of Oman, and I find that they amount to no fewer than 1,300 persons, the majority of whom came originally, or come now, from the opposite shores of Sind and Kathiawar. The fact that these two coasts face each other at so inconsiderable a distance, and the well-known aptitudes of the particular communities that you represent, sufficiently explain the close mercantile connections that have grown up during the last century between Maskat and India, and leave one in no surprise at the commercial predominance of Great Britain in the trade and shipping of this State.

Gentlemen, the political stake of one country in another is sometimes measured by its commercial interests, but does not always lend itself readily to precise or mathematical definition. On the other hand, the commercial stake is more easily reduced to figures and calculations the effect of which is not open to dispute. I will take for instance the time in which I have been connected with the Government of India, namely, the last five years. When I find that during that period the British proportion of trade with the port of Maskat has averaged 84 per cent., and that of the total number of steamers that have entered and cleared from this port in the same time the average British percentage in each year has been 97, I am satisfied that the predominance of Great Britain in the mercantile interests of the State is supreme and incontestable, and I realise that in addressing you I am receiving a body of gentlemen who represent a not unimportant outpost of British commercial enterprise in the East, and whose labours have contributed, and still contribute, in no small degree, to the material welfare of Oman.

I am glad to hear from you that in the pursuit of these peaceful avocations your interests are safeguarded by the successive Political Agents—and by none, I am sure, more diligently than by Major Cox—who have been sent here to represent the Government of India; that you obtain justice; that you abstain from litigation; and that you enjoy complete religious tolerance. These conditions are all favourable to the success of your operations, and they leave you with little ground for complaint.

In one paragraph of your address you have spoken of the disturbances that sometimes spring up in the interior, and which occasionally travel down to the coast ports and affect the security of the places in which you reside. The British Government have never embroiled themselves in this internal strife, which appears to be a hereditary legacy in Oman. But undoubtedly, if it were to reach a point that seriously menaced the interests or imperilled the lives and property of British subjects lawfully trading upon the coast, we should feel called upon to intervene for their protection, and by no one, I am sure, would such intervention be more loyally welcomed, or more cordially assisted, than by His Highness.

You have referred in your address to the depreciation in the local exchange. This is a matter which I will take into consideration.

Gentlemen, I am obliged for the kind words in which you have welcomed me to Maskat. I understand that among those who present the address are representatives of other communities, such as the Portuguese of Goa, who enjoy British protection in this State. To all of you I wish a continuance of the conditions under which your trade exists and flourishes in Oman, and I rejoice

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

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that there has been presented to me the opportunity, while I am head of the Government of India, of testifying the interest which I feel in this outlying colony of Indian influence and trade.

It only remains for me to thank you for presenting your address in a specimen of silver work so characteristic of the tastes and customs of the locality. It will always be a memento to me of this agreeable meeting on the occasion of my present visit to Maskat.

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~~Enclosure II.~~

Address by His Excellency the Viceroy at a Public Durbar held on board H. M. S. "Argonaut" at Muscat on the 19th November 1903, for His Highness the Sultan and the notables of Muscat.

Your Highness, Your Excellency, and Gentlemen,— Your Highness has already addressed me yesterday in terms of warm welcome to your Capital and State; and to-day you have anticipated much of what I desired to say in the speech which you have just spontaneously delivered, and in which you have spoken in feeling language of the historic connection between the British Government and the State of Oman.

It was Your Highness's own great grandfather with whom the first Treaty was concluded with the East India Company 105 years ago. As you have further reminded me, for more than a century has a British representative been stationed at Muscat; and during that time the friendly intercourse between the two Governments has been demonstrated by a series of Treaties or Conventions of which I can trace no fewer than nine, and which have provided for the closest political and commercial relations, as well as for the suppression of the slave trade and of piracy, and for the extension of the electric telegraph. This series of agreements sufficiently testifies to the connections that have grown up between the two Governments, and that have linked the State of Oman to the British Government by quite exceptional ties. But they have also been strengthened, as Your Highness has pointed out, by the support which has been given on critical occasions by the British Government to successive rulers of Oman; while a further and natural bond of union is supplied by the fact that Muscat lies just opposite to the shores of India, that its trade is not only for the most part with India, but is largely in Indian hands, that a large number of British Indian subjects reside here, and that the prosperity of the State is mainly dependent on these conditions. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Government of India should feel a particular interest in this place, or that a Viceroy of India should desire to visit it and to make the acquaintance of its ruler. His pleasure in doing so is greatly enhanced when he learns from Your Highness's own lips that you and your children will ever be mindful of these strong and ancient obligations, and that to them you and they will always remain loyal. These are words which I shall cherish in friendly recollection not only on my own behalf, but on behalf of the Government which I represent.

Your Highness has now ruled your State for fifteen years. I had the pleasure of visiting it when you had only just succeeded fourteen years ago; and I am glad to congratulate Your Highness on the progress that has since been made. The volume of your trade is steadily increasing; the wise step which the Government of India so strongly urged on Your Highness a few years ago, of taking over the Customs of your State in preference to farming them to others, has been attended with largely increased profits; and it gave me much satisfaction two years ago, with Your Highness's permission, to bring your Capital into still closer connection with the outer world by laying a telegraphic cable from Jask to Muscat. I also personally selected Major Cox, as an officer in whose discretion and ability I had perfect confidence, to represent the Government of India at your Capital; and Your Highness has already assured me that you have found in him a prudent counsellor and friend.

At Delhi in January last, though Your Highness was unable yourself to accept my invitation to the great ceremony that we held there to celebrate the Coronation of His Majesty the King-Emperor, I had the pleasure of welcoming your son, Taimur, and of conversing with him about the condition and welfare of Oman.

I have referred to the fact that the British Government have extended a peculiar measure of protection in the past to the State of Oman and its rulers. They have, on more than one occasion, intervened to save it from rebellion or disruption. Your Highness may rest assured that this policy will not be departed from. So long as the rulers of Oman continue to observe their Treaty engagements to the Government of India, and to administer this State with

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

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enlightenment and justice, they will continue to receive the support of the British Government, which is interested in preserving the peace of the country and the security of its trade. We cannot regard with satisfaction the attempts of discontented classes or persons among Your Highness's subjects to disturb the tranquillity of your State, because in so doing not only do they contest Your Highness's authority, but they are apt to injure the interests of British subjects also. These interests we are bound to protect for our own sake as well as for yours. We hope that Your Highness will continue to triumph over all such adversaries in the future as you have done in the past.

I trust that this important occasion, when for the first time a ruler of Oman and the representative in India of the illustrious British Sovereign exchange greetings in the waters of Muscat, may be a landmark in the history of the ever widening and deepening connection between our two States; that the firm friendship between them may continue to grow, and that Your Highness may be blessed with health and long life to rule over a pacified and loyal people.

I have still one agreeable function to perform. Only yesterday I received the gracious permission of His Majesty the King-Emperor to confer upon Your Highness the high honour of the Grand Cross of the Order of the Indian Empire. This distinction will be a proof to Your Highness of the sincere sentiments of friendship which are entertained towards you by the British Government; and it is also a recognition of the loyalty to which Your Highness has given such fervent expression on more than one occasion in the course of yesterday and to-day. It will now be my pleasing duty, as Grand Master of the Order, to proceed to the due and solemn investiture of Your Highness.

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~~Enclosure III.~~

Address by His Excellency the Viceroy at a Public Durbar held on board H. M. S. "Argonaut" on the 21st November 1903 at Shargah for the Arab Chiefs of the littoral.

Chiefs of the Arab Coast who are in Treaty relations with the British Government,—I have come here as the representative in the great Empire of India of the British authority which you and your fathers and fore-fathers have known and dealt with for more than a hundred years; and my object is to show you, that though you live at some distance from the shores of India, you are not forgotten by the Government, but that they adhere to the policy of guardianship and protection which has given you peace and guaranteed your rights for the best part of a century; and that the first Viceroy of India who has ever visited these waters does not quit them without seeking the opportunity of meeting you in person and of renewing the assurances and engagements by which we have been so long united.

Chiefs, your fathers and grandfathers before you have doubtless told you of the history of the past. You know that a hundred years ago there were constant trouble and fighting in the Gulf; almost every man was a marauder or a pirate; kidnapping and slave-trading flourished; fighting and bloodshed went on without stint or respite; no ship could put out to sea without fear of attack; the pearl fishery was a scene of annual conflict; and security of trade or peace there was none. Then it was that the British Government intervened and said that, in the interests of its own subjects and traders, and of its legitimate influence in the seas that wash the Indian coasts, this state of affairs must not continue. British flotillas appeared in these waters. British forces occupied the ports and towns on the coast that we see from this deck. The struggle was severe while it lasted but it was not long sustained. In 1820 the first general Treaty was signed between the British Government and the Chiefs; and of these or similar agreements there have been in all no fewer than eight. In 1839 the Maritime Truce was concluded, and was renewed from time to time until the year 1853, when it was succeeded by the Treaty of Perpetual Peace that has lasted ever since. Under that Treaty it was provided that there should be a complete cessation of hostilities at sea between the subjects of the signatory Chiefs, and a "perfect maritime truce"—to use the words that were employed—"for evermore;" that in the event of aggressions on anyone by sea, the injured parties should not retaliate, but should refer the matter to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and that the British Government should watch over the peace of the Gulf and ensure, at all times, the observance of the Treaty. Chiefs, that Treaty has not, of course, prevented occasional trouble and conflict; it has sometimes been neglected or infringed; but on the whole it has well deserved its name; and under it has grown up a condition of affairs so peaceful and secure that the oldest among you can only remember as a dim story the events of the past, while the younger have never seen warfare or bloodshed on the seas. It is now eleven years since the last disturbance of the peace occurred.

Chiefs, out of the relations that were thus created, and which by your own consent constituted the British Government the guardian of inter-tribal peace, there grew up political ties between the Government of India and yourselves, whereby the British Government became your overlords and protectors, and you have relations with no other Power. Every one of the States known as the Trucial States has bound itself, as you know, not to enter into any agreement or correspondence with any other Power, not to admit the agent of any other Government, and not to part with any portion of its territories. These engagements are binding on every one of you, and you have faithfully adhered to them. They are also binding in their reciprocal effect upon the British Government, and as long as they are faithfully observed by the Chiefs there is no fear that anyone else will be allowed to tamper with your rights or liberties.

Sometimes I think that the record of the past is in danger of being forgotten, and there are persons who ask why should Great Britain continue to exercise these powers? The history of your States and of your families, and the present

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condition of the Gulf, are the answer. We were here before any other Power, in modern times, had shown its face in these waters. We found strife and we have created order. It was our commerce as well as your security that was threatened and called for protection. At every port along these coasts the subjects of the King of England still reside and trade. The great Empire of India, which it is our duty to defend, lies almost at your gates. We saved you from extinction at the hands of your neighbours. We opened these seas to the ships of all nations, and enabled their flags to fly in peace. We have not seized or held your territory. We have not destroyed your independence but have preserved it. We are not now going to throw away this century of costly and triumphant enterprise; we shall not wipe out the most unselfish page in history. The peace of these waters must still be maintained; your independence will continue to be upheld; and the influence of the British Government must remain supreme.

There is one respect in which the Chiefs themselves can avert any renewal of trouble in the future. The British Government have no desire to interfere, and have never interfered, in your internal affairs, provided that the Chiefs govern their territories with justice, and respect the rights of the foreign traders residing therein. If any internal disputes occur, you will always find a friend in the British Resident, who will use his influence, as he has frequently done in the past, to prevent these dissensions from coming to a head, and to maintain the *status quo*; for we could not approve of one independent Chief attacking another Chief by land, simply because he was not permitted to do it by sea, and thus evading the spirit of his Treaty obligations. I will mention a case that seems to lend itself to friendly settlement of the character that I have described. You are all of you aware that the strip of coast known as the Batineh Coast, on the opposite side of the Oman Peninsula, is under the authority of the Chief of the Jowasmis. Nevertheless his authority is contested in some quarters. It is desirable that these disputes should cease, and that the peace should remain undisturbed.

Chiefs, these are the relations that subsist between the British Government and yourselves. The Sovereign of the British Empire lives so far away that none of you has ever seen or will ever see his face; but his orders are carried out everywhere throughout his vast dominions by the officers of his Government, and it is as his representative in India who is responsible to him for your welfare that I am here to-day to exchange greetings with you, to renew old assurances, and to wish you prosperity in the future.

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Encl: 4,
Pro. No. 119.

~~Enclosure~~ IV.

Reply of His Excellency the Viceroy to an Address of Welcome presented to him at Bunder Abbas on 22nd November 1903, on board the R. I. M. S. "Hardinge", by a deputation of the British Indian subjects and traders residing there.

Gentlemen,—In thanking you for your address, let me express my pleasure at meeting here a community of British Indian subjects of His Majesty the King-Emperor, enjoying the hospitality of a foreign and friendly land, and engaged in a trade which is equally beneficial to this country and to yourselves. I am glad that Persia returns the compliment by sending a large number of her own gifted and intelligent subjects to trade in the ports of British India; for these relations are merely the continuance in modern times of a connection between Iran and India that has lasted for centuries, and that is based not merely upon geographical proximity, but upon original affinities of civilisation, language, and race. Bunder Abbas, both under its present name and under its former title of Gombrun, has also been intimately bound up with the history of British mercantile enterprise in Persia and the Persian Gulf, and I suppose that there is hardly a scene in the world that has witnessed more struggles for commercial supremacy, or has experienced more startling vicissitudes of political fortune, than the waters and islands that we can see from this very spot.

Should any one enquire why the Viceroy of India, while in the discharge of the duties of his office, should visit this place, the answer may be found in the facts which I have already mentioned, namely, in the uninterrupted historical connection which has existed between this locality and India for hundreds of years, and in the residence here of a flourishing colony of British Indian traders and trade. But the explanation goes much further than that, both in its local and in its general application; for here we are at the mouth of a sea which has been one of the main and most beneficent areas of British exertion in the continent of Asia. The great maritime highway of the Persian Gulf has never failed to attract those nations who held, or aspired to hold, the ports of India; and having embarked upon the Indian enterprise in which they ultimately out-distanced all other competitors, it fell naturally to the British to pursue their successful activity in this direction, and thus gradually to acquire an ascendency of trade and interest in the Persian Gulf which has never wavered until the present day, and which has been so far from selfish in its operation that it has brought wealth and security to the States and communities that are to be found upon these shores, has smoothed the path of every ship that navigates these waters, and has won for us the friendship and gratitude of the principal Governments, such as that of His Majesty the Shah, with whom we have been brought in contact.

The ascendancy of which I have spoken is demonstrated by the fact that out of a total value of trade in the Gulf—including under that designation the ports on the Arab as well as on the Persian coast, and embracing Mohammera in the latter, but not including Busra—amounting to nearly 6½ millions sterling in the last recorded year, 1901, close upon 5 millions of which was external trade, that is, trade with ports outside the Gulf, the British percentage of this external trade was 77, and the corresponding percentage of British steamers leaving and entering the Gulf ports was 97. If we restrict our observations to the Persian ports alone, we find that the total volume of trade in 1901 was close upon 4½ millions sterling, of which £4,232,000 was external, and that of the latter the British proportion was 66 per cent., and of the shipping by which it was carried 97 per cent. These figures show that, even in the much more acute competition that now prevails, the commercial superiority so long enjoyed by Great Britain in these seas still exists, if not unchallenged, at least unimpaired. On the other hand there are circumstances in the trade and position of Bunder Abbas which shew that the keenest efforts will be required to retain for this port the advantages which it has hitherto enjoyed.

3101 F. D.

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

You have called attention to other symptoms of Indian interest in Bunder Abbas. My Government is represented here by an officer, appointed for the first time since I came to India, to safeguard the interests of British Indian trade in this place, and I am glad to learn from you that his arrival has been followed by an extension in certain aspects of your business, and that you have already derived benefit from his labours. It is to be remembered that Bunder Abbas though it has been shorn of much of its ancient fame, is the starting point from which almost immemorial caravan routes penetrate far into the interior, carrying what are for the most part British and Indian goods to the great towns of Central Persia on the north and west, and to the bazars of Khorasan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia on the north-east and east. This is a very important outpost, therefore, of Indian trade.

Again, let it be remembered that India is no remote country which is here busying itself at a great distance from its base. On the contrary, we are the nearest neighbours of Persia along her entire eastern frontier, firstly in the territories of Baluchistan, and next in those of the Afghan ruler, whose foreign relations are in our hands. Countries and Powers which are thus placed in relation to each other can hardly fail to develop, and ought to encourage, the closest connections; and the more that those who are responsible for their administration see of each other and learn of each other's views and needs, the better must it be for both.

I think that I have said enough, therefore, to show that if it is a novel thing, it is yet no unnatural thing, that the Viceroy of India should come here to pay you a visit, and to see how Indian interests and Indian subjects are faring in this allied and adjacent country. Perhaps in my own case the justification is not weakened by the fact that I have for many years taken a deep interest in Persia, and have always entertained the warmest desire that the ancient friendship between the British Government and the illustrious Sovereign of this country should be strengthened and deepened as time goes on.

Gentlemen, I concur with you in thinking that it would be a great advantage to you to be connected by telegraph with the outer world; and nothing would give me greater pleasure than to be instrumental, with the good offices of the Persian Government, in bringing about such a consummation.

In conclusion let me offer you my best wishes for your continued and increasing prosperity in the future.

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~~Enclosure V.~~

Speech by the Viceroy in proposing the health of His Majesty the Shah of Persia at a dinner given by His Excellency on board the R. I. M. S. "Hardinge" to the Salar-i-Moazzam, Governor of the Gulf Ports, at Lingah, on the 24th November 1903.

Enclo: 5, Pro. No. 119.

I rise to propose the health of His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia. Two days ago, when we touched at the first port in His Majesty's dominions, I had the honour of being received by our guests of this evening, the Salar-i-Moazzam, Governor of the Gulf Ports, who had been specially deputed by his royal master to greet me, and to whom it is my pleasant privilege to return the compliment this evening. A few days hence, when we arrive at Bushire, I understand that I am further to be welcomed by one of the most distinguished of Persian statesmen, the Ala-ed-Dowlah, Governor-General of Fars, who has been specially commissioned by the Shah for that purpose. I desire to return my sincere thanks for the compliment thus conveyed to me and to the Government which I represent by His Imperial Majesty. There is not one of us who does not feel a peculiar pleasure in touching upon Persian soil. For many centuries the British and Persian peoples have been connected together by the closest ties of friendship and esteem. Between India and Persia in particular there exist very intimate relations of politics, mutual interest, and trade. We hope that the friendship that has thus endured for so long may continue to grow, and that nothing may ever happen to disturb it. We entertain the warmest wishes for the integrity and welfare of His Majesty's dominions, and for the health and long rule of their illustrious Sovereign. It is with the utmost pleasure that I entertain his representative this evening, and that I now ask the present company to drink to the health of His Imperial Majesty the Shah.

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

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~~Enclosure VI.~~

Reply of His Excellency the Viceroy to an Address of Welcome presented to him on the 3rd December 1903 on board the R. I. M. S. "Hardinge" by a deputation of the British subjects and residents of Bushire.

Encl. 6
Pro. No 119.

Gentlemen,—I am very glad to see you here, and to receive your friendly address. I am sorry to have been prevented from receiving you on shore, when I might have been introduced to an even larger number of British residents and merchants at this important place.

A Viceroy of India coming to Bushire in the year 1903, though he be the first occupant of that position to visit these waters during his term of office, is irresistibly reminded of his precursors a century gone by. He is, indeed, the logical as well as the historical successor of Sir John Malcolm, who came here more than once just a hundred years ago; and he is the latest link in an unbroken sequence of Political officers who have been deputed from India to represent British and Indian political interests, and to protect their corresponding commercial interests in this neighbourhood since the appointment of the first Political Agent as far back as 1812. Even then British interests had been represented here for as much as half a century; since it was in 1763 that the East India Company first opened a factory at Bushire. At that time one vessel a year from India was sufficient to accommodate the whole of British trade. In 1902, 136 steamers entered this port, and of these 133 were British. In the last twenty years the imports have increased from 135 lakhs, of which 117½ were from Great Britain and India, to 201¾ lakhs in 1901, of which 152½ lakhs were British and Indian. In the same period the imports of tea from India have risen from a value of R65,000 to a value of close upon 10 lakhs. These figures do not leave much doubt as to where the preponderance of trade lies.

This history of 140 years is without a parallel in the connection of any other foreign nation with these coasts. Under it have grown up connections with the Local Governments and peoples of close friendship and confidence; it is a chapter of history upon which we have every right to look back with pride; and it imposes upon us obligations which it is impossible that we should overlook, and which no Government, either of Great Britain or India, is likely to ignore.

Bushire is the headquarters of this longstanding connection. From here the British Resident exerts that mild control over the waters of the Gulf, and over the tribes upon its opposite shore, the results of which I have enjoyed so many opportunities of observing during my present cruise. From this place the principal caravan route strikes into the interior of Persia, tapping its chief cities in succession, and ultimately reaching the capital; here the wires of the Indo-European telegraph, which in their earlier stages have brought Persia into connection with Europe, which have done so much to strengthen the authority of the Shah in his own dominions, and which carry the vast majority of the messages from India to England, dip into the sea; here is the residence of the Persian official who is charged with the Governorship of the Persian Gulf ports by his Government, and with whom our relations are invariably those of the friendliest nature; and under these combined auspices—the British bringing the bulk of the trade, and policing the maritime highway, and the Persians gradually consolidating an authority which, though once precarious, is now assured—this place has grown from a small fishing village into a flourishing town of 20,000 inhabitants; it has become the residence of foreign Consuls and Consular officers; the leading mercantile communities who trade in Southern Persia and Turkey have their offices and representatives here; there is seldom a day in which steamers are not lying off the port; and Bushire has acquired a name which it is safe to say is known in every part of the world.

This development is the more remarkable because, as you have pointed out, no one could contend that trade is conducted here under favourable conditions; on the contrary there are few, if any, of the conditions that naturally mark out a place as an emporium or channel of commerce. Bushire can hardly be said, even by the wildest stretch of imagination, to possess a harbour. Landing is

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

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difficult and often impracticable. The trade route that penetrates into the interior is one of the most difficult in Asia; and inland you do not find a people enjoying great wealth or a high standard of comfort or civilisation, but instead you encounter tribes leading a nomadic form of existence; and even when you come to the settled parts of the country and the larger cities, the purchasing power of the people does not appear to be great. The fact that a large and flourishing trade has grown up in spite of these drawbacks is an irrefutable proof of the dependence of Persia upon outside supply for many of the necessities and most of the luxuries of life. Since I first visited Bushire fourteen years ago I have always indulged the hope that, as time passed on, progress would be made in all these directions, and I agree with you in thinking that the Persian Government could embark upon no more remunerative form of expenditure than the improvement both of the maritime and the inland approaches to this place.

During the time in which I have filled my present office in India I have done my best to facilitate the progress of trade, and to ensure the adequate protection of British interests in the Gulf and in the adjoining provinces and territories. His Majesty's Government at home have also been warmly interested in the matter. The result of these efforts has been that we have gradually developed the Nushki-Seistan trade-route, which is now a recognised channel of commerce to Eastern Persia. We have appointed a Consul in Seistan, and are about to extend the telegraph thither. We now have Indian officers residing as Consul at Kerman, and as Vice-Consul at Bunder Abbas, where we are about to build a Consular residence; we have connected Muscat by cable with Jask, and we hope for further telegraphic extensions in the interests of trade. We have established a Political Agent at Bahrein; and we now have a Consul at Mohammera and a Vice-Consul at Ahwaz. The Karun trade-route has made substantial progress, and has been supplemented by the newly-opened road, with caravanserais and bridges, through the Bakhtiari country to Ispahan. A British Consul has also been appointed to Shiraz. We have improved and accelerated the mail service to all the Gulf ports. British India steamers now call at Koweit as well. During the same period British medical officers have been lent by us to the Persian Government to conduct the quarantine arrangements in the Gulf. Simultaneously British interests have found a most vigilant spokesman at Teheran in His Majesty's Minister, Sir Arthur Hardinge, who has been good enough to accompany me throughout my present journey, and with whom I have enjoyed many opportunities of discussing the common interests of the Home and Indian Governments in Persia. I hope that our discussions may be fraught with advantage to the interests that we jointly represent.

Altogether, Gentlemen, I think it may be said that in Bushire you receive an amount of attention that is not always extended in similar measure to places so remote from headquarters, while the fact that a British Resident lives in your midst and is able personally to look after your concerns, which I am glad to learn from your address that he does entirely to your satisfaction, is a further guarantee for their protection. I hope that the position which British interests thus enjoy, and which is neither artificial in origin nor recent in growth, since it is the result of nearly a century and a half of patient and laborious effort both by Government and by private enterprise, may long be maintained, and that Bushire may continue in the future, as it has done in the past, to be the centre from which this benign and peaceful influence radiates throughout Southern Persia and the Persian Gulf.

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~~Enclosure VII~~.

Address by His Excellency the Viceroy at a Public Durbar held on board the R. I. M. S. "Hardinge" at Pasni on the 6th December 1903, for the principal Sirdars and leading men of Mekran.

Encl. 7.
Pro. No. 119

Sirdars,—I have already met some of your number at Quetta when I held a Durbar there in April 1900, and again at the Delhi Durbar nearly a year ago. But I have halted here at this little known port of Pasni, on my way back from the Persian Gulf, in order to see you in the neighbourhood of your own country and to learn how matters are progressing in this distant part of the Indian Empire. No Viceroy has ever before been to Mekran, and it will perhaps be a long time before another has the opportunity of coming again. This was one of the main reasons that made me anxious to stop here for a day on my return journey by the sea; for I think that meetings between the representative of the King-Emperor and the principal Chiefs or Sirdars who acknowledge the latter's authority in the outlying parts of his dominions are of benefit to both parties,—to him because he is able to learn of their condition and fortunes at first hand; to them because they realise that they are not forgotten by the Government but that its eye is upon them, to reward good services when these are rendered, to encourage further efforts, or to give friendly advice if it is required.

The British connection with Mekran is one of long standing. The British telegraph was first brought to this coast 40 years ago and has been maintained ever since. Subsidies are still paid to the headmen of the territories through which it passes; we have had more than one British Boundary Commission on the Perso-Baluch Border; and since Sir Robert Sandeman paid his first visit to these parts in 1884, we have taken a continued interest in the affairs of Panjgur and Kej. It is true that Baluchistan and Mekran are parts of the Indian Empire which have not advanced so far on the path towards final settlement and cultivation as we should wish or as they will do later on. Their resources are undeveloped; their people are poor, and the peace, particularly in the neighbourhood of the frontier, is not infrequently disturbed. But you may rest assured of one thing. From the north of the country where is the Afghan border, to the south where is the sea by which I have come, and from the boundaries of Sind on the east to the Persian frontier on the west, no other authority can or will be allowed to prevail, and no other paramount influence will be admitted but that of the British Raj. We support the authority of the Khan of Kalat and of the various Sirdars who administer these territories in subordination to him, or as members of the Baluch confederacy. But to the Indian Empire they belong and within it they will abide. We shall protect this country from any external trouble or danger, and as time passes on I have little doubt that we shall give to it absolute contentment and peace. During the last five years the Nazim, Mir Mehrulla Khan, whom I selected for his present post, and upon whom I have just had the pleasure of conferring the insignia of the C.I.E. granted to him in January last, has administered this part of the country as the Deputy of the Khan with ability and success, and I congratulate him on the good work that he has accomplished. There has, as I have said, been a good deal of trouble on the frontier. But when turbulent spirits, like Mahomed Umar Naushirwani, have disturbed the peace we have not been slow to intervene for the restoration of order and the expulsion of the evil doers; and you all know the story of the two expeditions of Major Showers, conducted in alliance with the Persians, which culminated in the gallant capture of Nodiz Fort. We are not of course responsible for what goes on across the border, and I am sorry to hear from the address that has been read, that the Persians are not fulfilling their part of the bargain that was made. I will address their Government on the subject. For our own territory, however, I can say this that, when the troubles spread to this side, or if they originate here, they will be repressed with a firm hand. I am glad to think that the great majority of the Sirdars have themselves behaved with loyalty and prudence, so that the task of preserving order in British Mekran has been facilitated.

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I think that we shall have to take measures to more actively secure the peace of the frontier in the future, and to make the authority of the Khan and the Nazim, acting on his behalf, respected without question through all these territories.

When peace has been thoroughly secured, then I hope that we shall have provided the conditions for a greater development of communications and trade. It is too early yet to say whether Pasni has the future before it that the Nazim has spoken of in his speech. However, we have made a good beginning. The British Indian steamers call here; a post and telegraph station has been opened; I saw many evidences of increasing business when I went on shore this morning; and the two addresses which have been handed to me by Indian traders residing here show that the members of that industrious and enterprising community are taking advantage of the opportunities that have already been created. I hope that the improvement will also extend inland. Better roads can be made in many parts of the country, and it should be possible very greatly to increase the cultivation. But the chiefs and inhabitants cannot expect the Government to do all this for them while they look on. They will have it in their power, and it will be their duty, to co-operate by the improvement of irrigation, and by the encouragement of commerce, and I feel certain that, in this way as time passes by, we can add greatly both to their security and resources.

Sirdars, I desire to thank you for having come in so many cases from great distances to meet me at this Durbar. I am glad to see here the Jam of Lus Beyla, who has journeyed for 21 days from the east, and I also welcome the presence of Sirdar Sir Nauroz Khan, Naushirwani of Kharan, Sirdar Sir Ghaus Baksh Reisani, and of the various Sirdars of Panjgur and Kej.

My own Agent, Colonel Yate, who has shown such great interest in Mekran has also travelled here expressly for the purpose from Quetta; and in the Political Agent at Kalat, Major Showers, I have an officer who is well known to all of you, and who deservedly possesses your confidence. Probably it will never fall to my lot to see any of you again, for Viceroys of India go back after a time to their homes in England, just as Agents to the Governor-General and Political Officers also come and go. But though they succeed each other quickly, and you see first one and then another, there is something unchanging and permanent behind that having come does not go but remains, and that is, the dominion of the British Sovereign whom they one and all represent, and whom they are proud to serve. I daresay it sometimes strikes you as a strange thing that this foreign Power should have come from so great a distance across the ocean to rule these distant and different peoples. I agree that it is very strange. But it must have been arranged by the God who is above us all, and even in this out-of-the-way place I do not suppose that there is a single man whom I am addressing who does not know that it has been for good. I have confidence, therefore, in your loyalty and sincerity; I trust to you to assist the government in the task of pacification and development, and shall have pleasure in writing that I have been here to meet and converse with you to His Majesty the King.

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

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(*Received on 18th December 1903, with Political Secretary's letter No. 50, dated 27th November 1903.*) Seaha 120

PERSIA AND ARABIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.

[SEPTEMBER 24TH.]
SECTION 3.

The MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE to SIR A. HARDINGE.

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office,
September 24th, 1903.

Viceroy's intended visit to Gulf.

In reply to your telegram No. 123 of 22nd September, you should inform the Persian Government.

3542 F. D.

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

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(Received on the 21st December 1903, under cover of a letter from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 41, dated the 14th November 1903.)

No. 181.

Tehran,
10th November 1903.

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit herewith the translation of an article which recently appeared in the Tehran Newspaper "*Iran*" on the subject of the approaching visit of the Viceroy of India to the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

A. H. HARDINGE.

The Marquess of Lansdowne, K.G.,
etc., etc., etc.

Translation of Article which appeared on November 3rd in the Tehran Gazette "*Iran.*"

As His Excellency the Viceroy of India is visiting the Persian Gulf and the Persian Ports, Sir A. Hardinge, the British Minister, who is going to meet His Excellency, had a farewell audience of His Majesty the Shah on Sunday, October 24th.

His Excellency the Ala-ed-Dowleh, Governor-General of Fars, will proceed to Bushire and make preparations for the reception. Some high officials, such as Hussein Kuli Khan Nawab, have also gone from Tehran to be ready on the frontier of Fars for the reception of the Viceroy.

The English press is attaching much importance to the Viceroy's visit to the Persian Gulf and his meeting with the British Minister.

We also hope that this great event will increase and consolidate the political and commercial relations between Persia, England, and India.

We congratulate the Viceroy on the part of the Persian nation on his arrival on our frontier, we expect good results from his visit, and we pray The Almighty for the continuation and consolidation of friendship and union between Persia and her old friend Great Britain, who rules to-day over millions of our co-religionists in the East whose prosperity and welfare we desire.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 2722 F. D.—4-1-1904.—30.—J. N. S.

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

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PERSIA AND ARABIA. [OCTOBER 19TH.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

The MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE to SIR A. HARDINGE.

(No. 102.) Foreign Office,
October 19th, 1903.

SIR,

I have received your despatch No. 152, of the 27th ultimo, relative to the visit which the Viceroy of India will shortly pay to the Persian Gulf.

I approve the terms of the note which you have addressed to the Persian Government on this subject.

I am, etc.,
LANSDOWNE.

Pub 123

No. 826, dated Baghdad, the 16th December 1903 (Confidential).

From—CAPTAIN W. H. COX, I.M.S., D.S.O., for Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Baghdad,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 818, dated the 14th instant, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter dated 12th idem, from the British Vice-Consul at Karbala reporting the rumours current there in connection with His Excellency the Viceroy's recent visit to the Persian Gulf.

British Vice-Consulate,
Karbala, 12th December 1903.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SIR,

In continuation of my confidential letter dated 28th ultimo, I beg to inform you that His Excellency the Viceroy's visit to the Persian Gulf has created a very perplexing anxiety amongst the chief authorities here in general.

The visit is believed to be exclusively based on political purposes which will end entirely unsatisfactorily to them. Rumours are heard everywhere that the Viceroy is accompanied by seven men-of-war and forty lakhs of rupees with which he intends to build a fort at Koweit. This news has greatly added to the distraction of the Government whose chief solicitude is now to find out how far His Excellency is determined to come. Is it as far as Basrah? A question which has often been asked from me.

They have also *secretly telegraphed to the Persian Government* and have asked them to be on the alert for their shores and boundaries during the visit of Lord Curzon, and the latter has in reply informed them that they need not be anxious about them as they have already been engaged in undertaking what is necessary and that it is only for them to be watchful and protect themselves. This communication has been carried out very confidentially between the two Governments, and it has not as yet become publicly known.

Sayad Hassan Hakim Zada has lately been asked by the Vali of Baghdad to come to Baghdad and pay him a visit. This invitation appears to me something unusual and others believed that there is something extraordinary at the bottom of it. Some state that the Baghdad Vilayet has been informed that certain persons at Karbala and Nejef are holding private negotiations with *the foreigners against Turkey*, and that, if they continue in the same manner

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for some time, there will be a very great disturbance in the country. The Vali of Baghdad asked the Mutassarif to send him a full report on this question, but the Mutassarif declared that he did not know these rioters, and that Hakim Zada is the only man who could give them the desired information. The Vali thereupon telegraphed to the Mutassarif to direct Hakim Zada to come to Baghdad. This is the story given by some but I cannot say whether it is true or false. Hakim Zada is not at Karbala now. He is either at Baghdad or Hillah. If I happen to hear anything further about this question, I will report it to your honour later on.

I have the honour, etc.,

MUHAMMAD HASSAN MOHSIN.

To the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Baghdad.

Pro ho 124

MEMORANDUM.

Persian Gulf.

Rumours current at Karbala in connection with His Excellency the Viceroy's recent visit to the Persian Gulf.

Letter from the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, No. 826, dated the 16th December 1903, with enclosure.

The papers specified in the margin were transmitted to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 3-M., dated the 21st January 1904.

G. I. C, P. O. No. 3542 F. D.—4-2-1904.—6.—P. M. M.

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(Received on 18th January, with Political Secretary's letter No. 1, dated the 1st January 1904.) Pro. No. 125.

PERSIA AND ARABIA. [21st December.]

CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received 21st December.)

(No. 4. Persian Gulf.) Bahrein,

My Lord, 26th November 1903.

I have the honour to report that I left Tehran on the 27th ultimo, and arrived at Bushire on the 15th instant, stopping for two days on the way at Isfahan, and for two and a-half days at Shiraz. I embarked the same day on His Majesty's ship *Sphinx* for Maskat, where I arrived on the 18th instant; met His Excellency the Viceroy, and settled with him the arrangements to be made for his reception in Persian waters. On the evening of the following day, the 19th instant, after attending the Durbar for the investiture as a Grand Commander of the Order of the Indian Empire of His Highness Seyed Feysul-bin-Turki, to whom I had the honour of being presented after the ceremoney, I proceeded in His Majesty's ship *Sphinx* to Bunder Abbas, where I landed on the 21st instant, twenty-four hours before the arrival of the Viceregal squadron.

The latter entered the port of Bunder Abbas at 8 A.M. on the morning of the 22nd instant, and I immediately went on board the Royal Indian Marine ship *Hardinge*, and presented to the Viceroy, Major Douglas, Military Attaché, and Mr. Churchill, Acting Oriental Secretary to His Majesty's Legation, by whom I was accompanied. At 11 A.M. the Governor of the Gulf ports, His Excellency the Salar Moazzam, came on board to welcome His Excellency the Vicerey to Persian waters on behalf of His Majesty the Shah, and an hour later I returned the visit with Mr. Dane, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, on behalf of the Viceroy, who did not himself land. The landing-place and Government buildings were decorated and the town illuminated, but the display of fireworks originally arranged for was countermanded both at Bunder Abbas and afterwards at Lingah in consequence of the death of Her Royal Highness the Enteram-es-Sultaneh, daughter of His Majesty the Shah. I then joined the Royal Indian Marine ship *Hardinge*, and accompanied the Viceroy to Lingah, visiting Hormuz, Kishm, Henjam, and Bassidore on the way. At Lingah, where we arrived on the evening of the 24th instant, His Excellency did not go ashore, but entertained the Governor of the Gulf ports at an official dinner, at which he proposed the health of His Majesty the Shah, and the Salar Moazzam that of the King-Emperor. The squadron left yesterday afternoon for Bahrein, where we have just arrived.

The Persian Government has deputed His Excellency the Ala-ed-Dowleh, Governor-General of Fars, to proceed to Bushire (it was impossible for him to arrive in time at Bunder Abbas, and the dates of the Viceroy's arrival could not be altered) to welcome His Excellency Lord Curzon on behalf of the Shah. He will be accompanied by the Nawab Hussein Kuli Khan, C.B., as a special representative of the Persian Foreign Office.

On the 25th ultimo, at a farewell audience which I had the honour of having with His Majesty the Shah, His Majesty was pleased to charge me to convey to the Viceroy the assurances of his warm esteem for him and pleasure at his revisiting his dominions. The Persian Government were anxious to place an official residence on shore, both at Bushire and at Bunder Abbas, at the Viceroy's disposal, but it was explained to them that His Excellency only meant to land for a few hours at Bushire.

I have, etc.,

ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

4120 F. D.—S E—33-127—Feb.

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Pro. No. 126 Visit of His Excellency the Viceroy to the Persian Gulf.

Pro. No. 126. *(Received on 25th January 1904, with Political Secretary's letter No. 2, dated 8th January 1904.)*

PERSIA AND ARABIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.

[22ND SEPTEMBER.]
SECTION 4.

SIR A. HARDINGE to the MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE.—(Received 22nd September.)

No. 123. Gulahek,

(Telegraphic) P. 22nd September 1903.

Viceroy's tour in Persian Gulf.

I have just received a letter from His Excellency informing me of his intended visit, and suggesting that I should inform the Persian Government.

Am I authorized to comply with this suggestion ?

Pro. No. 127. *(Received on 1st February, with Political Secretary's letter No. 3, dated the 15th January 1904.)*

PERSIA AND ARABIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.

[16TH OCTOBER.]
SECTION 3.

The MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE to SIR A. HARDINGE.

(No. 93.) Foreign Office,

(Telegraphic) P. 16th October 1903.

I have received your telegram No. 128 of the 6th October.

Orders have been sent to His Majesty's ship *Sphinx* to take you on or about the 15th November to Bunder Abbas from Bushire.

End.—L. G. G.

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

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

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Appendix II.

Materials for Persian Gulf Gazetteer.

The authorities already at hand or easily available are :—

1. Bombay Secretariat Letters, 1630-1786 (65 volumes).
2. Surat Factory Diaries, 1660-1809 (48 volumes).
3. Bombay Public Department Diaries, 1720-1855 (28 volumes).
4. Bombay Political Department Diaries, 1755-1820 (497 volumes).
5. Bombay Government Records, 1821-1872 (640 volumes).
6. Bushire Records, 1763 to present day.
7. Government of India Despatches, Records, Administration Reports, Précis, &c., down to present time.
8. Aitchison's "Treaties".
9. Chesney's "Euphrates Expedition".
10. Selection from Bombay Records, XXIV, 1856.
11. Pelly's "Report on the Tribes, &c., of the Persian Gulf".
12. Ross's "Annals of Oman".
13. Povah's "Gazetteer of Arabia", 1887.
14. Forrest's "Selections from Bombay State Papers", 1887.
15. Gazetteer of Baghdad, 1889.
16. Curzon's "Persia", 1892.
17. Gazetteer of Persia.
18. Douglas's "Journey from India to the Mediterranean", 1897.
19. Persian Gulf Pilot, 1898.
20. Napier's "Military Report on Southern Persia", 1900.
21. Dowding's "Koweit", 1903.
22. Annual Administration Reports.
23. Periodical Diaries and monthly summaries for past ten years.

Below in tabular form are given the remaining authorities on the Gulf, so far as I have been able to discover them, in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries. As the Gazetteer is to be for the use of political officers, not of antiquarians, I have omitted authorities of the 17th and earlier centuries with only one exception, No. 53 of the table. A number of the works might perhaps be struck out as not likely to repay the trouble of obtaining them: some apparently of this sort I have indicated by an X in the column of remarks. A good many of the books should be in the Foreign Office Library, and those cited in "Koweit", "Military Report on Southern Persia", "Gazetteer of Arabia", and "Gazetteer of Baghdad", ought to be found in the Library of the Intelligence Branch where these official works were compiled. The rest will have to be ordered from England, I presume, through the India Office.

The names of a large number of modern writers on Persia generally (without the titles of their works) are given on pages 17 and 18 of Vol. I of Curzon's "Persia", but I take it that only those *again* referred to in the notes to the Gulf Chapter in Vol. II will help with the present Gazetteer. It will have to be ascertained whether there are not other works by Fraser and Buckingham, besides Nos. 50, 41, and 77 in the table below.

The Intelligence Branch and Survey Department should be asked about diaries and reports of their officers—especially any of recent date—which are not mentioned in the following table.

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Where mentioned.	Serial No.	Author.	Date.	Work.	No. of Vols.	Remarks.
Dowding's "Koweit"	1	Palgrave ...	1862-63	Narrative of a journey through Central and Eastern Arabia.	2	
Ditto ...	2	Doughty ...	1876-77	Travels in Arabia Deserta ...	2	
Ditto ...	3	Pelly ...	...	Report of a journey to the Wahabi capital of Riyadh.	...	Same as No. 88?
Napier's "Military Report on Southern Persia".	4	Mark Bell ...	1885	Military Report on South-West Persia.		
Ditto ...	5	Ditto ...	1889	An account of the British Wars with Persia.		
Ditto ...	6	Brazier-Creagh ...	1895	A Reconnaissance through Persian Baluchistan and Eastern Persia.		
Ditto ...	7	Galindo ...	1890	A record of two years' wanderings in Eastern Persia and Baluchistan.		
Ditto ...	8	Gerard ...	1886	Report on routes in Western and Southern Persia.		
Ditto ...	9	Jennings ...	1886	Report of a journey through Western Baluchistan, Eastern Persia, Sarhad, and Seistan.		
Ditto ...	10	Malcolm ...	1815	History of Persia.		
Ditto ...	11	Markham ...	1874	A general sketch of the history of Persia.		
Ditto ...	12	Massy and Medley ...	1893	Report of a journey through the Bashakard country.		
Ditto ...	13	Maunsell ...	1889	Reconnaissances in Mesopotamia, Kurdistan, North-West Persia, and Luristan.		
Ditto ...	14	Sawyer ...	1891	A reconnaissance in the Bakhtiari country, South-West Persia.		
Ditto ...	15	Stanford ...	1896	Compendium of Geography, Asia, Volume II.		
Ditto ...	16	Sykes	1894	Routes and notes of a third journey in Persia.		
Ditto ...	17	Vaughan ...	1890 & 1892	Reconnaissances in Persia.		
Ditto ...	18	Intelligence Branch...	1898	Routes in Persia and Appendices.		
Povah's "Gazetteer of Arabia", 1887.	19	Wellsted ...	1838	Travels in Arabia	2	Same as No. 44?
Ditto ...	20	Burckhardt ...	...	Arab Tribes	...	Same as No. 83?
Gazetteer of Baghdad, 1889.	21	Menzies ...	...	Turkey, Old and New... ...	2	
Ditto ...	22	Upton	...	Gleanings from the Desert of Arabia.		
Ditto ...	23	Farley	...	Egypt, Cyprus, and Asiatic Turkey.		
Ditto ...	24	McCoan ...	...	Our New Protectorate.		
Ditto ...	25	Loftus	...	Travels in Chaldæa and Susiana.		
Ditto ...	26	MacGregor ...	...	Central Asia, Part V.		
Ditto ...	27	Gerard	...	A journey through Kurdistan.		

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Where mentioned.	Serial No.	Author.	Date.	Work.	No. of Vols.	Remarks.
Gazetteer of Baghdad, 1889.	28	Hyslop ...	...	Memoir on the climate and diseases of Southern Turkish Arabia.	...	X
Ditto ...	29	Probyn	...	Report.		
Ditto ...	30	Barlow	...	Index.		
Ditto ...	31	Blunt	...	Bedouins of the Euphrates.		
Ditto ...	32	Thielmann ...	...	Caucasus, Persia, and Turkey ...	...	X
Ditto ...	33	Plowden ...	...	Report on the journey to Kermanshah and Mausil.		
Ditto ...	34	Chermside ...	...	Report on the Kurds.		
Ditto ...	35	Geary	...	Through Asiatic Turkey.		
Ditto ...	36	Forbes	...	Empires and Cities of Asia ...	...	X
Ditto ...	37	Blunt, Lady A. ...	1879	Pilgrimage to Nejd	2	
Ditto ...	38	Jones	...	Memoirs on Baghdad.		
Ditto ...	39	Buckingham ...	...	Travels in Mesopotamia ...	...	Same as No. 73?
Ditto ...	40	Kinneir ...	...	Persian Empire.		
Ditto ...	41	.....	...	Consular Reports, Baghdad.		
Ditto ...	42	Layard	...	Nineveh and Babylon.		
Ditto ...	43	Colville ...	...	Report on the plague in Mesopotamia.	...	X
Ditto ...	44	Wellstead ..	...	Travels to the City of the Caliphs ...	...	Same as No. 19?
Ditto ...	45	.....	...	Description de Baghdad ...	...	X
Ditto ...	46	Kiepert ...	1884	Nouvelle Carte Générale des Provinces Asiatiques de l'Empire Ottoman.		
Ditto ...	47	Powell	...	Voyage on the Euphrates.		
Ditto ...	48	Fraser	...	Travels in Kurdistan.		
Ditto ...	49	Ross	...	Journey from Baghdad to the ruins of Al Hadr (in Royal Geographical Journal).		
Ditto ...	50	Ormsby ...	...	Journey across the Syrian Desert.		
Curzon's "Persia", 1892.	51	.....	...	Calendar of State Papers (East Indies Series), Vols. i—iv (1513-1629).		
Ditto ...	52	Wilson	...	Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, Vol. III.		
Ditto ...	53	Kempthorne ...	...	Ditto, Vol. V.		
Ditto ...	54	Pelly ...	...	Ditto, Vol. XXXIV.		
Ditto ...	55	Pelly ...	...	Proceedings of Royal Geographical Society, Vol. VIII.		
Ditto ...	56	Whitelock ...	...	Ditto.		
Ditto ...	57	Niebuhr ...	1792	Travels through Arabia ...	2	
Ditto ...	58	Ives ...	c. 1758	Voyage from England to India.		
Ditto ...	59	Niebuhr ...	1784	Description de l'Arabie (Heron's translation).		
Ditto ...	60	Price ...	...	Free Merchants' Letters.		
Ditto ...	61	Olivier ...	...	Voyage dans l'Empire Othoman ...	5 or more.	

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Where mentioned.	Serial No.	Author.	Date.	Work.	No. of Vols.	Remarks.
Curzon's "Persia", 1892.	62	Floyer ...	...	Unexplored Baluchistan.		
Ditto ...	63	Stiffe ...	April 1874	Geographical Magazine.		
Ditto ...	64	Vicenzo ...	1819	History of Seyd Said of Maskat, &c. (translated by Sheikh Mansur).		
Ditto ...	65	Price ...	1824	History of Arabia.		
Ditto ...	66	Crichton ...	1830	History of Arabia	2	
Ditto ...	67	Cole	1847	Journal of Bombay Geographical Society.		
Ditto ...	68	Forster ...	1844	Historical Geography of Arabia ...	2	
Ditto ...	69	Caussin de Perceval...	1847-48	Essai Sur l'Histoire des Arabes ...	3	
Ditto ...	70	Salil Ibu Razik ...	1870	History of the Imams and Seyids of Oman translated by Badger (Hakluyt Society).		
Ditto ...	71	Sprenger ...	1875	Die alte Geographie Arabiens ...	...	X
Ditto ...	72	Stocqueler ...	c. 1831	.....		
Ditto ...	73	Buckingham ...	...	Travels in Assyria	2 or more.	Same as No. 39?
Ditto ...	74	Mignan ...	...	Winter's Journey	2 or more.	
Ditto ...	75	Whish	1859	Memoir on Bahrein.		
Ditto ...	76	Wustenfeld ...	...	Bahrein and Jemama.		
Ditto ...	77	De Goeje ...	1863	Mémoire sur les Carmathes de Bahrein.		
Ditto ...	78	Durand and Rawlinson	1879	Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.		
Ditto ...	79	Frédé	1887	La Pêche aux Perles en Perse et à Ceylan.		
Ditto ...	80	.....	1890	Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society (new series), Vol. XII.		
Ditto ...	81	Corançez ...	1810	Histoire des Wahabis.		
Ditto ...	82	Sadleir ...	1819	Diary of a journey across Arabia.		
Ditto ...	83	Burckhardt ...	1830	Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabis	...	Same as No. 20?
Ditto ...	84	Brydges ...	1834	History of the Wahauby.		
Ditto ...	85	Ritter ...	1846-47	Die Erdkunde von Asien Arabien ...	2	X
Ditto ...	86	Wallin ...	1848	Notes of a journey in Northern Arabia in 1848.		
Ditto ...	87	Guarmani ...	1864	Bulletin de la Soc. de Géog., September 1865.		
Ditto ...	88	Pelly ...	1866	Report of a visit to Nejd ...	...	Same as No. 3?
Ditto ...	89	Zehme ...	1875	Arabien und die Araber seit hundert Jahren.		
Ditto ...	90	Huber ...	1878-82	Bulletin de la Soc. de Géog., 1884-85		

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Where mentioned.	Serial No.	Author.	Date.	Work.	No. of Vols.	Remarks.
Curzon's "Persia", 1892.	95	Dupré ...	...	.....	...	
Ditto ...	96	Morier ...	...	.....	...	The titles of these writers' books that have to do with the Gulf are not given in the notes in the Gulf Chapter in Vol. II of "Persia".
Ditto ...	97	Ouseley ...	...	.....	...	
Ditto ...	98	Alexander ...	...	.....	...	
Ditto ...	99	Binning ...	...	.....	...	
Ditto ...	100	Goldsmid ...	...	.....	...	
Ditto ...	101	Stack ...	...	.....	...	
His Excellency's note of 1st March 1904.	102	Zwemer ...	...	Cradle of Islam.		
Ditto ...	103	Whigham.				
Ditto ...	104	Sykes ...	...	.....	...	Already quoted.
Ditto ...	105	Chirol ...	...	Middle Eastern Question.		
Ditto ...	106	Baron von Nolde.				

Foreign Office Press—No. 186—6-5-04—76.

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

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

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CALCUTTA RECORDS—2.

1904.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET—E.

Proceedings, June 1904, Nos. 300—388.

Establishment of telegraphic communication with Henjam. Question of the selection of a naval base in the Persian Gulf. Aggressive action of the Persians at Tamb and Abu Musa; their claims to the Islands.

G. C. Press, Simla,—No. 854 F. D.—22-6-04.—G.—C. G. P. S.

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

Previous Proceedings.					Later Proceedings.				
Secret A, B, or E.	Classification.	Month.	Year	Nos.	Secret A, B, or E.	Classification.	Month.	Year.	Nos.
					Sec.	External	July	04	420 / 432.

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Progs. No.	Letters, etc., and subjects.	Page
300	Telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran, No. 90, dated 26th June 1903, giving his views regarding the opening of the telegraphic station at Henjam, with a connection to Bunder Abbas.	1
301	Enclosure in a letter from the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, No. 26, dated the 12th June 1903, regarding the proposed establishment of telegraphic communication with Bunder Abbas.	1
302	Letter to H. Whitby Smith, Esq., Director of Persian Gulf Telegraphs, Karachi, No. 1494-E., dated the 6th July 1903, asking him how long it will take to make up the necessary cables at Manora for the connection with Henjam and Bunder Abbas, in the event of it being decided to obtain the material for their construction from England.	2
303	Letter from the Director, Persian Gulf Section, Indo-European Telegraph Department, Karachi, No. 903, dated the 9th July 1903, giving the information required in respect to the time needed to make up the cables.	2
304	Letter from His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran, No. 22 (Secret), dated the 27th June 1903, forwarding a copy of a despatch which he has addressed to Lord Lansdowne, regarding the proposed re-opening of the telegraph station at Henjam and its connection with Bunder Abbas.	2
305	Letter from the Naval Commander-in-Chief, No 872, dated the 2nd July 1903, regarding the tracing of a survey of the anchorage between Henjam and Kishm and the report on the island of Henjam.	4
306	Telegram to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 1767-E., dated the 4th August 1903, suggesting that Bassidore might be preferable to Henjam as site for telegraph station, the cable running thence *vid* Clarence Straits to Bunder Abbas.	5
307	Letter to His Excellency Rear-Admiral G. Atkinson-Willes, Naval Commander-in-Chief on the East India Station, No. 1848-E., dated the 12th August 1903, asking for a complete copy of the report, by Commanders Kemp and Somerville, regarding the survey of the anchorage between Henjam and Kishm, together with an expression of his views as to its bearing on the question of improving telegraphic communications in the Persian Gulf.	5
308	Enclosures to a letter from the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, No. 35, dated the 14th August 1903, regarding the proposed establishment of telegraphic communication with Bunder Abbas.	6
309—310	Enclosure in a letter from the India Office, No. 37, dated the 28th August 1903, regarding the proposed establishment of telegraphic communication with Bunder Abbas.	9—10
311	Telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, dated the 21st September 1903, repeating a telegram to the Foreign Office, stating that he has not been able to trace among the records of the Legation the original Persian of the Shah's authorities of 1868, and that unless further search is successful, the procedure suggested in this Secret Despatch No. 97, dated the 26th June, must, under these circumstances, be modified.	11
312	From Rear Admiral G. Atkinson-Willes, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, No. 872, dated the 6th September 1903, forwarding, with remarks, the report of Commanders T. W. Kemp and H. B. T. Somerville on their recent survey of Henjam and Kishm.	11

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317	Telegram from the Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, dated the 19th October 1903, stating it is impossible to do work now, and gives reasons.	19
318	Enclosure in a letter from the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, No. 41, dated the 25th September 1903, despatch from the Senior Naval Officer on the Persian Gulf relating to his proceedings in the Gulf. Hydrographical remarks on Bahrein Island by Lieutenant C. M. Gibson of H. M. S. *Lapwing*.	20
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322	Letter to His Excellency Rear-Admiral G. Atkinson-Willes, Naval Commander-in-Chief, East India Station, No. 73-C., dated the 2nd December 1903, asking him whether he has any suggestions or observations to make on the subject of cable stations and naval bases in the Persian Gulf, as the result of his visit to the Gulf.	25
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332	Secret despatch to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 50, dated the 3rd March 1904, forwarding copy of a report on Khor Kawi by the Naval Commander-in-Chief, and recommending that steps be taken to secure the Khor for our own purposes by planting a flag-staff on Sheep Island enclosing the Khor on the west.	43
333	Telegram to His Majesty's Secretary of State, No. 721-E.A., dated the 3rd March 1904, enquiring whether we may expect a reply soon to our Secret despatch No. 16 (External), dated the 21st January 1904.	44
334	Telegram from His Majesty's Secretary of State, dated the 8th March 1904, stating that Sir A. Hardinge proposes to inform the Persian Government of our intention to re-establish a telegraph station at Henjam and to ask for permission for an extension to Bunder Abbas. Adding that the Foreign Office and the Admiralty are considering the question of the naval base.	44
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351	Telegram to the Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, No. 1026-E.A., dated the 31st March 1904, replying to the above.	50

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359	Telegram from the Commissioner in Sind, Karachi, dated the 8th April 1904, stating that the Director replies that the *Patrick Stewart* leaves at noon on the 9th April, and that the Commander has been instructed in accordance with orders.	51
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374	Telegram to the Secretary of State for India, No. 1265-E. A., dated the 21st April 1904, reporting telegraphic communication was established with Henjam on the 19th April 1904.	58
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378	Telegram to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 1305-E. A., dated the 23rd April 1904, requesting him to forward to Tehran copies of certain correspondence regarding Tamb and Abu Musa.	59
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

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

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FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

NOTES.

SECRET E., JUNE 1904.

Nos. 300-388.

ESTABLISHMENT OF TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION WITH HENJAM. QUESTION OF THE SELECTION OF A NAVAL BASE IN THE PERSIAN GULF. AGGRESSIVE ACTION OF THE PERSIANS AT TAMB AND ABU MUSA; THEIR CLAIMS TO THE ISLANDS.

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

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TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER AT TEHRAN, No. 90, DATED AND RECEIVED 26TH JUNE 1903. P.o. no. 300

Gives his views regarding the opening of the telegraphic station at Henjam, with a connection to Bunder Abbas.

Submitted for perusal. No orders.

L. RUSSELL,—29-6-03.

Sir A. Hardinge contemplates our re-opening the station at Henjam and presenting the Persian Government with the *fait accompli*. We may await a communication from Secretary of State, but might, perhaps, in the meantime ask the Director of Persian Gulf Telegraphs how long it would take to make up the cables required at Manora. I am afraid we shall have to pay the extra cost and get them out from England (paragraph 2 of Director's letter No. 476, dated the 14th April 1903).

L. W. DANE,—30-6-03.

C[URZON],—1-7-03.

ENCLOSURE IN A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE, No. 26, DATED THE 12TH (RECEIVED 30TH) JUNE 1903. P.o. no 301

Proposed establishment of telegraphic communication with Bunder Abbas.

LETTER TO H. WHITBY SMITH, ESQ., DIRECTOR OF PERSIAN GULF TELEGRAPHS, KARACHI, No. 1494 E., DATED THE 6TH JULY 1903. P.o. no. 302

Asks him how long it will take to make up the necessary cables at Manora for the connection with Henjam and Bunder Abbas, in the event of it being decided to obtain the material for their construction from England.

FROM THE DIRECTOR, PERSIAN GULF SECTION, INDO-EUROPEAN TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT, KARACHI, No. 903, DATED THE 9TH (RECEIVED 13TH) JULY 1903. P.o. no. 303

In reply to Foreign Department letter No. 1494 E., dated the 6th July 1903, gives the information required in respect to the time needed to make up the cables.

FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER AT TEHRAN, No. 22 (SECRET), DATED THE 27TH JUNE (RECEIVED 25TH JULY) 1903. P.o. no. 304

With reference to Foreign Department letter No. 930 E., dated the 11th May 1903, forwards a copy of a despatch which he has addressed to Lord Lansdowne, regarding the proposed re-opening of the telegraph station at Henjam and its connection with Bunder Abbas.

This despatch should be considered at once in connection with my suggestion that, in consequence of the information obtained from Captain Kemp, we should ask for permission to land the cable at Bassidore instead of Henjam. In telegraphing to Secretary of State we can refer to the difficulties anticipated by Sir A. Hardinge which the landing at Bassidore would obviate.

L. W. DANE,—25-7-03.

(Notes in the Marine Department.)

FROM REAR-ADMIRAL SIR CHARLES DRURY, K.C.S.I., NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIAN STATION, No. 872, DATED THE 2ND (RECEIVED 28TH) JULY 1903. P.o. no. 305

(1) Tracing of a survey of the anchorage between Henjam and Kishm.

(2) Report on the island of Henjam.

Presumably this is for the Foreign Department; as the telegram of 29th April 1903, referred to by the Naval Commander-in-Chief, does not appear to have been issued from this Department, Foreign Department may be consulted unofficially, and we may ask that Department to retain the letter if it is for them.

T. R.,—29-7-03.

H. H. F. TURNER,—30-7-03.

Foreign Department.

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Extract from a note by Commander Kemp, R.N.

Would suggest that a telegraph station should not be established on Henjam. Would suggest that the cable should go to Bassidore, and from there through Clarence Straits to Bunder Abbas.

Captain Kemp tells me that he and Captain Somerville have submitted to the Admiral their report on their recent hydrographic survey of the Gulf. He has promised to send us a copy direct as soon as he returns to Karachi. I understand that he considers the anchorage in the Clarence Straits to be the only one worth considering in the south of the Gulf.

L. Russell.

We can easily substitute Bassidore as a landing station for Henjam, and I do not think that we should permit Persia to question our full rights there.

L. W. Dane,—26-7-03.

2. As far as I know, there is at present no effective occupation of Bassidore. We have a native agent there, who has been there for many years, and who keeps a flag flying on a flagstaff. Bassidore was formerly used as a naval base, and I would suggest that were a few naval stores landed there, and our ships ordered to take them as convenient from time to time, such a course would tend to make our present occupation more effective. I would suggest that drums of oil would be most convenient for this purpose, the oil being in charge either of the Vice-Consul at Bunder Abbas, or in charge of H. M. S. "Sphinx". The question of Custom dues to be paid or not on such stores would indicate the attitude of the Persian Government with regard to the claim to the place.

I submit, for consideration, draft telegrams to the Secretary of State and to the Admiral.

L. Russell,—3-8-03.

The depth of water at Henjam is apparently all that could be desired, but the other naval objections will probably be insuperable. I understood that the shallow water in the northern entry to Clarence Straits was a serious disadvantage. Captain Kemp now thinks that it is an advantage. It was always in contemplation that we might have to run a land line to Bassidore for Lingah, and if it suits naval requirements best, it is certainly more convenient for us to land the cable at Bassidore.

Your Excellency's telegram of 18th March 1899 states the status of Bassidore, and we should doubtless insist on our full right to land the cable there.

Proceedings Secret E., May 1899, Nos. 160-165 (No. 161).

The limits of our occupation there are discussed in Proceedings Secret E., January 1902, Nos. 29-38, which also contains a chart of the port.

With Your Excellency's permission, the telegrams may issue.

L. W. Dane,—3-8-03.

I have amended telegram to Secretary of State and asked a question on the other.

C[urzon],—3-8-03.

Admiral Drury is, I think, still at Aden, where he makes over charge to the new Commander-in-Chief. The telegram should be addressed there to Naval Commander-in-Chief.

L. W. Dane,—4-8-03.

Pro. No. 306 Telegram to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 1767 E., dated the 4th August 1903.

Suggests that Bassidore might be preferable to Henjam as site for telegraph station, the cable running thence via *Clarence Straits to Bunder Abbas.*

Pro. No. 307 Letter to His Excellency Rear-Admiral G. L. Atkinson-Willes, Naval Commander-in-Chief on the East Indian Station, No. 1848 E., dated the 12th August 1903.

Asks for a complete copy of the report, by Commanders Kemp and Somerville, regarding the survey of the anchorage between Henjam and Kishm, together with an expression of his views as to its bearing on the question of improving telegraphic communications in the Persian Gulf.

Foreign Office Press—No. 903 –22-8-03—25.

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Captain Grey came to say good-bye. I have told him that it is now proposed, mainly for naval considerations, to land the cable at Bassidore instead of Henjam, and have asked him to tell the Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs at Karachi, this, so that he may be prepared, if necessary, to arrange to lay the cable at short notice.

Captain Grey says that his jurisdiction at present only extends to Bunder Abbas, Larak, and Hormuz. I have asked him to discuss the question with Major Cox and Colonel Kemball. I understand that, in Your Excellency's opinion, it is desirable to show that Ras Mussandim, Elphinstone Inlet, and the Hinterland outside the Trucial Chiefs' territories are not under Maskat, and the best way of doing this would, perhaps, be to place the promontory under the Assistant Resident at Bunder Abbas, who could also be put in charge of Abu Musa and Tanb. His Consular jurisdiction might well be extended to include all the Persian islands in the east end of the Gulf with Lingah and, perhaps, Jask. One of the three gun-boats to be stationed in the Gulf ought to have its head-quarters at Bassidore, and the Assistant Resident and Vice-Consul could visit his jurisdiction in her.

This point will be looked up.

If we are to land a cable at Bassidore, we ought to have some more responsible person than a Native Agent there to meet possible moves on the part of the Persian Government.

Captain Grey has heard from a native correspondent that a Russian Vice-Consul is coming to Bunder Abbas, and from the Belgian Customs officer, with whom he is on friendly terms, that the quarantine arrangements there have been made over to him. This latter piece of intelligence might be telegraphed to London and Tehran. The file will be separately submitted.

Yes.
C[URZON].

I have also asked Captain Grey to point out to the Commander of the gun-boat that an officer of the Royal Indian Marine reported a deep channel to Bassidore running up the south-west coast of Kishm, and that this ought to be carefully examined. I submit this note for information and approval to Your Excellency. Captain Grey leaves shortly for Bunder Abbas, and now wishes to remain in the Political Department.

L. W. DANE,—8-8-03.

I agree generally.

C[URZON],—8-8-03.

Foreign Office Press—No. 1100—17·9·03—30.

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

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[DEMI-OFFICIAL]

Dated Karachi, the 1st August 1903.

From—COMMANDER T. W. KEMP, H. M.'s ship "Sphinx",

To—C. L. S. RUSSELL, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I enclose herewith copies of the report on the service recently undertaken by Commander Somerville and myself. I fear you will have some trouble to understand them owing to the lack of the various charts and plans which should accompany them, but of which I have no copies left. These reports have as yet received no official approval or sanction, and should therefore be used with caution. We leave for Maskat on the 3rd of August. Should I be Senior Naval Officer on arriving in the Gulf I intend, as I told you, to write to Colonel Kemball for information on the following points with regard to the arms traffic.

I think you will agree these are reasonable questions to raise and I dare say there are many more which have not occurred to me. The matter is not on all fours with the slave question which is the outcome of special treaties and regulations, with copies of which we are supplied for our general guidance. With regard to the arms all we know is that certain countries have agreed not to allow arms to be landed on their coasts, moreover trade will be much more seriously interfered with by searching for arms than by searching for slaves who cannot well be hidden among the cargo. It is reported in the papers that the "*Lapwing*" and "*Redbreast*" are to be fitted up exclusively for service in the gulf and have lascar crews; if so it goes far to explain the document we could not understand in your office with reference to these two ships. It certainly would be a step in the right direction. Should you ever wish to write to me about the Gulf I should be very happy to give you any information in my power, looking upon such communication of course as friendly and confidential. I hope Grey's affair will be settled satisfactorily.

1. Have His Majesty's ships the right to search any dhows for arms except those under French or Turkish colours?

2. Have they the right to search on the high seas as well as within the territorial waters of Persia, Trucial Chiefs and Koweit?

3. Have they the right to search within the territorial waters of the Sultan of Maskat?

4. Assuming the right to search conceded within the above limits, should dhows be searched indiscriminately or only when some definite information is obtained from the Political Officers or from some other reliable source?

5. What course should be persued on making a seizure having regard to the place where the seizure is made and the place to which the seized dhow belongs?

[CONFIDENTIAL.]

CHAHBAR.

In accordance with instructions conveyed in your letter of June 8th, 1903, and in reply to the question therein concerning Chahbar numbered (1), (2), (3), (4), we have the honour to report as follows:—

1. Deep water nowhere approaches the shore at a position suitable for the construction of basins. We are of opinion that the part of the beach off Chahbar village, between A and B on the attached plan would be the best place for the purpose if dredging operations were undertaken; this part of the bay being the only one satisfactorily sheltered from the monsoon swell; but even here the 3 fathoms line is at a distance of 1,500 yards from the beach. Throughout the west of the bay, the swell breaks heavily at some distance off the shore, and the 5 fathoms line, which appears to be correctly shown on the plan of Chahbar bay (on chart 38, Maskat to Karachi) extends so far off the shore as to preclude anchorage for any large ship near the land when the swell is setting in.

There is no beach fronting the small bay between Ras Kuhlah and the cliffs to the north of it, which rise sheer and nearly perpendicular from the sea.

2. The nature of the bottom throughout the area confined in the attached plan is sand of various degrees of fineness, with broken shell occasionally. Eight borings to a depth of 8 feet were made at positions one foot below low water mark at a time of *low* low water between the positions marked A and B on the plan, soft sand only being encountered on each occasion. The range of tide is about 10 feet; and the depth therefore represents about 19 feet below high water mark at this locality.

Two sectional drawings, illustrating the slope of the beach on its southern and eastern faces respectively are given on the plan of the anchorage.

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3. From Chahbar point to the position marked C on the plan is a sandy beach, backed by a sandy plain, which extends from the foot of the hills to the outside sea coast, and is about 2 miles wide, keeping this width for 4 or 5 miles along the coast to the east. It is about 30 feet high with slight irregularities in the form of sand hillocks. The extreme end of Chahbar point and the whole outside coast line is fronted with rocks.

From position C to Tiss point the hills come down very steeply to the beach, Tiss point itself being a perpendicular cliff about 150 feet high. The hills at the back of Chahbar village rise in a series of steps and plateaux as shown on the attached plan. At the spot marked D the height by aneroid was 310 feet. The top plateau behind D is about 100 feet higher. All the plateaux slope gradually down to Tiss point, but to the east run nearly level. To the north of Tiss point the hills trend away to the east, with apparently a valley dividing the plateau before mentioned from the hills to the north of it. Beyond Tiss the remaining shore of the bay is flat and sandy for a long distance inland, with a height in places of about 60 feet, until met by the steep cliffs adjoining Ras-Kuhlab. These attain a height of about 200′ and are generally speaking flat topped. There are several plateaux on the hills to the north-east of the village as here described, which would serve to command any basin or establishment on the land side. They would also serve to protect from attack by sea from the west, and south-west, and to a limited degree from the south, but owing to the distance, batteries would probably have to be erected from Chahbar point to the eastward. Batteries on Ras Kuhlab could also assist in the defence of the place.

There are no natural advantages to protecting ships lying in the roadstead from torpedo attack.

4. The south-west monsoon, as we have experienced it, (June 27th to July 2nd) and also as we have been given to understand from living persons living here to be usual, reaches Chahbar as a fresh S. S. E., breeze during the day, dying away at night. A heavy swell sets into the bay which is little felt opposite Chahbar village, but breaks heavily elsewhere round the entire circuit of the bay. We found landing at Chahbar easy in small boats at all times.

With regard to the wind blowing strongly to the south-east, that is the shamal, this has not been experienced by us, but we have been informed that the form of the bay gives but little protection, and that the swell runs in from the west part Kuhlab point causing inconvenience at Chahbar, but in the event of a shamal good shelter may be found on the opposite side of the bay. Shamals are fairly frequent during the winter months.

5. *Additional remarks.*—Water supply at Chahbar village, is entirely from wells which would give a fairly good supply to a small establishment.

The normal rainfall is 5 to 6 inches, but this cannot be depended on. During the past 3 years there has been very little rain. For a large establishment distilling plant would probably be necessary.

6. On account of the S. S. E. breeze during the monsoon months, the climate in the summer is much more temperate and fitted for Europeans than in the vicinity of Bunder Abbas.

7. Tidal streams are scarcely felt in the bay.

8. We are of opinion that Chahbar bay is not naturally fitted for the purpose of a large naval establishment, but by means of extensive engineering works, dredging, etc., basins and dock might possibly be constructed on the site as suggested in the foregoing part of this report, and a protecting breakwater run out from Chahbar point.

9. A tracing is forwarded giving additional line of soundings in Chahbar bay; which it will be seen agrees in most cases with those given on the admiralty plan.

[Confidential.]

Dated H. M. S. "Sphinx", Karachi, the 31st July 1903.

From—Commanders Kemp and Somerville,

To—H. E. the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indian Station.

In accordance with the orders conveyed in your letter of April 6th, 1903, and telegram of May 19th, we have the honour to report as follows :—

1. A running survey on a $\frac{1}{4}$″ scale to one mile has been made of the Persian coast line, from Bu Seif to the eastern end of Kishm island, in order to check the correctness of that given in admiralty charts 2837 *a* and *b*, with the result that we find no material difference in detail, depths of bays, etc., and also that the published charts appear to represent the coast line with more accuracy than that of the cancelled sheets referred to in the Hydrographic Instructions.

2. Tracings of the coast line and soundings as determined by us are sent herewith, by which such differences as exist may be seen, and thus render further written description unnecessary.

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3. We consider that the following places of those specially mentioned in our orders for examination, are the only ones suitable for the purposes mentioned therein, namely, Khor Musa and the anchorage off Loft Point Clarence Straits, and of less adaptability, though still possibly available the anchorage off Chiru.

In our opinion there are besides these, no other bays or places on the coast not specifically mentioned in the orders, which are suitable.

KHOR MUSA.

4. The following is a description of Khor Musa and its branches.

The "Sphinx" was anchored in three different parts of the Khor, which for convenience are here termed anchorages (1), (2), (3), : these positions will be seen on reference to the accompanying plan.

The character of the Khor as given in the published chart from the sea up to anchorage (1) is substantially correct. The lowest water at the entrance appears to be 3 fathoms at low-water springs, thus available for large ships at high water, the spring rise being about 10 feet. The bottom is soft mud and could easily be dredged if necessary: while from the similarity of the soundings in the Khor obtained by us to those given on the published chart, the channel does not appear to vary periodically as in the case of the Shatt-al-Arab. At the entrance Bu Seif, and Daria island, being very low, are only just visible in clear weather. On proceeding up the Khor however, the banks on both sides become more visible and part of those on the eastern side become at low-water, then rendering the channel easy for navigation. A rocky shoal called Kasari-bin-Sirwan lies in the middle of the fairway, but was easily visible on both occasions of our passing it, though probably it never uncovers.

5. The "Sphinx" was anchored at the head of navigation as given on the published chart (anchorage (1)), and a rough plan of the anchorage is forwarded herewith, which shows fairly clearly its main features.

6. Khor Musa continues from this spot for 20 miles in a north-easterly direction. It is navigable for the largest vessels and is not tortuous, but owing to the extreme lowness of the land on each side of the Khor which is flooded over for a long distance at half tide, it is very difficult to find the channel except at low-water when the banks become visible.

7. The "Sphinx" was anchored at the distance up the channel mentioned above (anchorage (2)), which is at the head of navigation for ships: and from this spot, boats visited and carried running surveys up the creek leading to Mashur and Beziya as shown in the accompanying plan.

8. Mashur is a small village of little importance; dhows can only get within 2 miles of it.

9. As Khor Damak, which leads to Beziyais ascended, the water (which in the Khor Musa has a density of 18, that of ordinary sea water being 10) gradually becomes fresher, and the nature of the land on either bank changes with it from salt swamp to cultivated and pasture land.

At about 13 miles from anchorage (2), or roughly 12 miles below Beziya the water is quite fresh, and from tests applied appears to be practically of the same good quality as the Karun river water. This fresh water comes from the Jerahi river which rises in the mountains at some distance and spends itself in the desert, Khor Damak being one of the places where it does so.

The main stream of the Jerahi is about 2 miles from Beziya and we did not visit it. It would thus be easy to bring a good water supply from it down to any spot in the Khor Musa, the land being everywhere flat and easily worked. Beziya is the head of dhow navigation, and is a small village otherwise unimportant. The tidal range is about 6 feet at this place. There is no town of Damak, which is the name only of this district, the chief town of which is Felahiah on the Jerahi river, but we could not ascertain its precise position. Having descended Khor Musa to anchorage (1), the "Sphinx" next proceeded up Khor Bukhadir, the channel leading to the north-west, as far as anchorage (3). This Khor is navigable to this position for any draught ship, but would be too narrow for turning long ships in. At anchorage (3) and nearly all the way up this Khur the bank is steep to high water mark on either side, and near the head as shown on the plan the water is nearly fresh owing to various small streams that run into it, but the country around is quite uninhabited. This Khor is probably in connection with what is known as the "Blind Karun".

11. Were a basin dredged and cut at about the position of anchorage (3) the harbour thus formed would possess all the advantages required by this report, especially as the banks here being higher and drier, wharfage could easily be made on either bank for any number of ships. The channel is here about 400 yards wide between the drying edges and there is 4 fathoms within 20 yards of them on either side deepening rapidly to 5½ fathoms in the centre.

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12. All three of these anchorages in the Khor Musa and Bukhadir possess the following advantages:—

Complete protection from all winds.

Easily defended from attack by sea either by bombardment or torpedo attack.

Excellent possibility of connection by rail with the interior.

Unlimited fresh water supply within easy distance.

Better climate than in more southern parts of the Gulf.

Proximity to the Euphrates and Karun river valleys.

13. The disadvantages may be summarized as follows. The 3 fathom bar at the sea entrance of Khor Musa would require dredging to allow passage of ships at any state of tide.

Anchorages (1) and (2) somewhat restricted in area, but of the two we consider (1) the better.

Dry land at (1) is about ¾ miles from deep water, at (2) about ½ a mile.

At anchorage (3) considerable dredging and cutting operations would be necessary to make a basin sufficiently wide for turning ships easily. At all these anchorages there is a tidal stream of not less than 2 knots at high water springs :—

Anchorage (1)	... Lat. 30° 19′ 22″ N.	...	... Long. 48° 53′ 46″ E.
Anchorage (2)	... Lat. 30° 27′ 46″ N.	...	... Long. 49° 7′ 26″ E.
Anchorage (3)	... Lat. 30° 19′ 8″ N.	...	... Long. 48° 47′ 00″ E.
Beziya ...	... Lat. 30° 43′ N.	...	... Long. 48° 48′ E.

14. We consider the following places in order down the coast from Khor Musa, namely, anchorage off Batuna, Naband Bay, Bay at Naktula, Bay at Duan are all unsuitable for the purposes required, each place being unsheltered from the Shamal, and Batuna and Duan from the south-east winter gales as well; but with extensive engineering works no doubt harbour could be constructed at any of these places.

15. The anchorage at Chiru offers good protection from the Shamal, but it is quite open to the south-east wind on account of which artificial protection for shipping would be required from this direction. The shore is flat sand, and the water deep close to the beach, little or no tidal stream is felt in the anchorage. The place could be adequately protected by fortification both at Chiru and Hindurabi Island (which would practically cover the harbour). There are steep hills at the back of the village, and by construction of reservoirs a good rain water supply could be obtained in winter. Five such reservoirs exist at the present time and amply supply this village. The place, however, is too restricted for any but a small naval establishment.

16. *Henjam Island.*—We do not consider this at all a suitable place for a defended establishment. The amount of anchorage protected from the prevailing winds is very limited, and the holding ground bad. The tidal streams are said to run 3 knots at springs. It is open to attack on two sides. To improve the harbour by means of engineering works would be difficult, and in our opinion not worth the labour and expense.

17. The anchorage off Loft Point in the Clarence Straits forms a good harbour for the largest ships, and is thoroughly well protected from all winds. It could be easily defended against bombardment or torpedo attack.

The water is too deep and the bottom too hard for convenient anchorage east of a line joining Loft Point with the southern point of the opposite shore, where there is a tomb as shown on the accompanying plan. There are wide drying banks, part soft mud and part hard mud and sand off the northern shore, except at the tomb point mentioned above, where it is rocky for a short distance with the drying edge only 30 or 40 yards from high water mark and with deep water close up to it. The land at the back on the northern shore is quite flat up to the foot of some high hills, a distance of about 3 miles. A good water supply might possibly be obtained from these hills by building reservoirs.

On the southern side (Kishm Island) the water is fairly deep close to Loft Point, and we consider that this would be the better side for a naval establishment, with railway communication to the rocky point mentioned above on the northern shore. At Loft Point the land slopes generally upwards to a height of about 60 feet; and well water might be obtained in the vicinity.

The bottom in the anchorage space shown on the plan is fine sand and shell, and seems to be good holding ground.

The tidal streams run through both the main channels and that leading to the south past Loft Point, at a rate of about 2 knots at springs.

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18. The advantages of this place may be summarized as follows :—

Good existing anchorage for a large number of ships which could be improved by dredging.

Complete shelter from all winds.

No necessity for expensive engineering works.

Water supply probably easily obtainable.

The disadvantages are :—

Three approaches to be defended.

Rapidity of tidal streams.

Excessive heat in summer.

20. We are not in a position to judge of the facilities for railway connection with the interior, but it would certainly have to be brought through mountainous and probably barren country.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 1010 F. D.—26-8-03—41.—S. N. B.

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

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From—Captain W. G. Grey, Vice-Consul, Bunder Abbas,
To—The Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I send this on as it is. Mr. Dane asked me to enquire early into the matter.

* * * * * * *

Dated Karachi, the 15th August 1903.

From—H. Whitbey Smith, Esq., Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs,
To—Captain W. G. Grey, Vice-Consul, Bunder Abbas.

I send you some figures about the cost of connecting to Bassiduh:—They are the best I can give, and I believe them to be nearly correct, but as the "Patrick Stewart" is away, I cannot get all the information I want, and so I must ask you to consider my figures as approximate only. If, however, any important alteration is needed, I will inform you later.

	Rs.
(*a*) Estimated cost of diverting one of the existing cables into Bassiduh: length of cable required and cost—	
Shore end type of cable, 10 knots, at Rs. 3,062 ...	30,620
Deep sea type of cable, 58 knots, at Rs. 2,260 ...	1,31,080
Total cost of cable ...	1,61,700
Cost of laying cable. Cost of coal only, say 200 tons, at Rs. 21	4,200
Total cost of cable and laying ...	1,65,900
Deduct value of cable expected to be recovered ...	8,000
Net cost of cable and laying ...	1,57,900
or say ...	1,58,000
(*b*) Estimated cost of building an office and fitting it up at Bassiduh, including cost of cable house	9,000
(*c*) Annual cost of up-keep of station at Bassiduh ...	9,000

2. You will see that the amount of cable estimated to be required is 68 knots. I have sufficient cable and cable material in stock here to lay this if one month's notice is given—that is to say, provided that in the meantime no interruption occur and I have no repairs to make, but I should require an equal amount (68 knots) of cable material to be ordered out and despatched *at once* to recoup my stock.

Foreign Office Press—No. 982—4-9-03—20.

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

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ENCLOSURES TO A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE, No. 35, DATED THE 14TH AUGUST (RECEIVED 2ND SEPTEMBER) 1903. Pro. No. 308

Correspondence regarding the proposed establishment of telegraphic communication with Bunder Abbas.

The advance copy of the joint report by Commanders Kemp and Somerville on pp. 4-8 is submitted for perusal.

(We have asked the Admiral to send us a copy of it officially, and hope then to receive the charts which will make the position at Khor Musa more clear.)

L. RUSSELL,—5-9-03.

Your Excellency will read Mr. Whitby-Smith's letter of 15th August in which he gives the cost of laying a cable to Bassiduh at Rs. 1,58,000 or £10,533. It can be laid in one month which might be very convenient. If Your Excellency approves, we might remind Secretary of State, and I submit a draft telegram for consideration.

Page 9 of the notes.

L. W. DANE,—7-9-03.

There is evidently no use in our telegraphing home until the Home Government have received and considered the Kemp-Somerville report; for as recently as 3rd August Lord Lansdowne said that he proposed to await its arrival.

Now considering that the report has not yet been officially submitted to us, and that we have not even seen the plans and charts which are required to make it intelligible, it would seem to me decidedly premature either to pin our faith to Bassidore (as to which I am not as yet at all convinced) or to ask by telegram for an assent which, in the circumstances above described, could not conceivably be given.

C[URZON],—7-9-03.

I have spoken to His Excellency who does not think that we need even send home the information supplied by Mr. Whitby-Smith. When we get the Hydrographical report and charts officially, we can then address Secretary of State, and suggest that the final settlement of the question where the cable should be landed should be left over for settlement by authorities on the spot.

L. W. DANE,—8-9-03.

Foreign Office Press—No. 1089—16-9-03—28.

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

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[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated Bunder Abbas, the 2nd September 1903.

Under/

From—CAPTAIN W. G. GREY, Vice-Consul, Bunder Abbas,

To—C. L. S. RUSSELL, Esq., ~~Assistant~~ Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I send this on—*vide* my last letter on the subject.

[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated Karachi, the 22nd August 1903.

From—H. WHITBY-SMITH, Esq., Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs,

To—CAPTAIN W. G. GREY, Vice-Consul, Bunder Abbas.

In continuation of my letter of the 15th August 1903. Now that the Patrick Stewart has returned, I find I have to amend my estimate somewhat.

We consider that about 84 knots of cable would be wanted, instead of 68, as I said. This would increase the cost of the cable and laying by about Rs. 36,160, and the value of cable which might be recovered would be about Rs. 15,000, instead of Rs. 8,000, as first given. Thus the estimate becomes as follows :—

	Rs.
Cost of cable and laying	2,02,060
Deduct value of cable expected to be recovered	15,000
Net cost of cable and laying ...	1,87,060

It is possible that some of the old cable picked up may be fit to relay, and in this case the above estimate would be considerably reduced ; but it is all old and we cannot reasonably expect to find much if any of it fit to be used again.

I have not enough cable in stock to lay this increased length, though possibly, if urgently required, I could make a temporary connection after one month's notice. I should, however, require to have 84 knots of cable material ordered out and despatched *at once* to recoup my stock.

ENCLOSURE IN A LETTER FROM THE INDIA OFFICE, No. 37, DATED THE 28TH AUGUST (RECEIVED 14TH SEPTEMBER) 1903. Pro. no: 309 310

Proposed establishment of telegraphic communication with Bunder Abbas.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, TEHRAN, DATED THE 21ST (RECEIVED 22ND) SEPTEMBER 1903. Pro. no: 311

Repeats a telegram to the Foreign Office, stating that he has not been able to trace among the records of the Legation the original Persian of the Shah's authorities of 1868, and that unless further search is successful, the procedure suggested in his Secret Despatch No. 97, dated the 26th June, must, under these circumstances, be modified.

No orders appear necessary on this. (Even if the original document be not forthcoming, there must surely be sufficient evidence among the records at Tehran of the grant of the permission.)

23-9 03. L. RUSSELL.

It is all the better that there should be no record if we have to occupy Henjam, as then we base our possession on the permission of all possible claimants, the Shah and the Sultan of Maskat, and the fact that we were there from 1869-1880 in undisputed possession. Await Secretary of State's reply.

24-9-03. L. W. DANE.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 1299 F. D.—5-10-03.—31.—J. D.

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

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FROM REAR-ADMIRAL G. ATKINSON WILLES, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIES STATION, No. 872, DATED THE 6TH (RECEIVED 29TH) SEPTEMBER 1903. Pro. No. 312

Forwards, with remarks, the report of Commanders T. W. Kemp and H. B. T. Somerville on their recent survey of Heniam and Kishm.

The Admiral has only sent an extract from the report by Commanders Kemp and Somerville and no charts.

The telegram below may issue.

7-10-03. L. RUSSELL.

7-10-03. L. W. DANE.

TELEGRAM TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIAN STATION, DATED THE 7TH OCTOBER 1903. Pro. No. 313

Asks him to send a complete copy of Commanders Kemp and Somerville's report with charts appended.

FROM HIS EXCELLENCY THE NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIAN STATION, No. 872, DATED THE 16TH (RECEIVED 27TH) OCTOBER 1903. Pro. No. 314

With reference to the above telegram forwards, with remarks, copies of the reports and of the Admiralty orders under which Commanders Kemp and Somerville carried out certain surveys in the Persian Gulf.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE, DATED THE 28TH (RECEIVED 29TH) OCTOBER 1903. Pro. No. 315

With reference to the Viceroy's telegram of the 4th August, reports that the Admiralty agree that Bassidore would be preferable to Henjam, and that the British Treasury suggest share of cost. Enquires whether His Excellency still desires to proceed with the project in whole or in part.

TELEGRAM TO THE DIRECTOR, GULF SECTION, INDO-TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT, DATED THE 29TH OCTOBER 1903. Pro. No. 316

Asks if there is still time to ship cable for the Bassidore link before the Patrick Stewart *leaves for the Gulf and how long it would take to lay this Section.*

TELEGRAM FROM THE DIRECTOR, PERSIAN GULF TELEGRAPHS, DATED THE 19TH (RECEIVED 29TH) OCTOBER 1903. Pro. No. 317

States it is impossible to do work now, and gives reasons.

The main enclosure of the Admiral's letter of the 16th October has already been received, *vide* pages 4—8 of these notes. A telegram acknowledging the receipt of the letter has been sent for issue.

2. The telegram of the 28th October contained a mistake in cyphering, and a repetition had to be obtained. The message has now been corrected. No reply will presumably be sent until the question has been discussed in the Gulf.

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

3. The telegram from the Director-General of Telegraphs, dated the 29th October, is for perusal.

2-11-03. L. RUSSELL.

3-11-03. S. M. FRASER.

I have mentioned the case to His Excellency. The papers should come out into Camp. If copies of the report have gone to Military or Intelligence Branch, the Admiral's warning should be communicated, and it must also be noted in our office, and the papers kept secret.

3-11-03. L. W. DANE.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 1527 F. D.—4-11-03.—31.—E. A. D'S.

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In a despatch, * dated the 7th May 1903, we addressed the Secretary of State on a scheme for improving telegraphic arrangements in the Persian Gulf, and for facilitating communication with Bunder Abbas. It was proposed to re-occupy Henjam—where a station of the Indo-European Telegraph Department was located from 1869 to 1881—land one of the Gulf cables on the island, establish a Telegraph Office, and connect thence with Bunder Abbas. The estimate for the most costly of three schemes suggested was £18,539. His Majesty's Government were asked to share the expenditure.

* Secret E., July 1903, Nos. 192-214 (No. 210).

In a despatch† No. 97 (Secret), dated the 27th June 1903, Sir Arthur Hardinge suggested that the Persian Government might possibly object to the re-occupation of Henjam: and from a report,‡ dated the 1st July 1903, by Commanders Kemp and Somerville, it appeared that Henjam had a bad anchorage, and was an unsuitable place for a defended establishment. On the 4th August, therefore, the Viceroy telegraphed§ to the Secretary of State, suggesting that Bassidore, where our rights were incontestable, might be preferable as a site for a telegraph station, a cable running thence *viâ* Clarence Straits to Bunder Abbas.

† Enclosure to No. 5.

‡ Enclosure 5 to No. 14.

§ No. 7.

On the 28th October the Secretary of State telegraphed ‖ that the Admiralty agreed that Bassidore was preferable to Henjam. The Treasury declined, however, to share the cost; and Mr. Brodrick enquired whether the Government of India still desired to proceed with the project in whole or part.

‖ No. 15.

L. Russell,—9-11-03.

S. M. Fraser,—9-11-03.

Enclosure in a letter from the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, No. 41, dated the 25th September (received 21st October) 1903. (Pro. No. 318.)

Despatch from the Senior Naval Officer on the Persian Gulf relative to his proceedings in the Gulf. Hydrographical remarks on Bahrein Island by Lieutenant C. M. Gibson of H. M. S. "Lapwing".

Enclosures in a letter from the India Office, No. 42, dated the 2nd October (received 24th November) 1903. (Pro. No. 319.)

Copy of a letter from the Admiralty to the India Office, forwarding a copy of a report by Commanders Kemp and Somerville on the hydrographic conditions of certain places on the seaboard of the Persian Gulf.

Enclosures in a letter from the India Office, No. 44,, dated the 16th October (received 24th November) 1903. (Pro. No. 320.)

Communication from the Admiralty to the India Office concurring in the view that Bassidore would be preferable to Henjam as a landing place for the cable, whence the connection with Bunder Abbas might be made.

Telegram to His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, No. 2624-E. A., dated the 3rd November 1903. (Pro. No. 321.)

Acknowledges receipt of his letter No. 872, dated the 16th October 1903.

NOTE ON A VISIT TO HENJAM ON 23rd NOVEMBER 1903.

We arrived off Henjam at dawn, 6-10 A.M., and dropped anchor in 8 fathoms 4 cables (800 yards) from shore opposite the old telegraph station. Water deep close in to the shore, where there is a sandy beach and good landing-place for boats. The shore is fringed with a broken reef.

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We found 8 baglas here which had run in for shelter from a heavy shammal and had been here for four days. They were carrying dates from Basrah to Shargah, but could not land there. The Nakhuda, Musubhih, a Joasmi from Lingah, said that this was the safest port in this end of the Gulf and much better than Lingah or Bassidore. There was perfect protection from all winds and good holding ground to the north-west of the point where the *Lawrence*, R. I. M. S., anchored. We landed and found an Arab diver, who had been here for years. He showed us the old telegraph station, of which the well built masonry plinth is still in existence. The trench along which the cable ran is also plainly visible. There are the remains of four large-roofed cisterns here, which seem to be in a fair state of preservation. He said that the Munim (Malik ?)-ut-Tujjar some ten years ago put up a flagstaff on the plinth of the telegraph station, but no flag is hoisted.

Below the bluff on which the telegraph station stood is a considerable plain of arable land, on which there are the bunds of old cultivation and several old wells, of which two hold potable water which is said to be permanent. The baglas had watered here and said that the water was good and sweet. These fields have not been cultivated at any rate since the telegraph station was removed in 1881, but before that there were palms here. About 200 acres could be cultivated here. The island contains the same red oxide of iron as at Hormuz, and was the salt depôt for Kishm, but ships do not call here now.

The Arab diver said that it used to belong to the Saiyid of Maskat, but that he did not know who owned it now, though he thought the Sheikh of Debai had some connection with it. He enquired when the fight with the Russians was to take place.

Musubhih, the Lingah bagla Nakhuda, a more intelligent witness, who was interrogated later separately, said that the flagstaff was put up 12 years ago by the Malik-ut-Tujjar, Governor of Bushire. He tried first to put it up at the village on the south coast of the island, but the Albu Falasah (Banniyas), who have a village of 400 houses there, would not allow him. Their Sheikh is Ahmad-bin-Obeid, a nephew of Sheikh Muktum-bin-Hashm of Debai, who visits here occasionally and decides serious cases. He had come here for the marriage of his nephew, two years ago. These men pay no dues to any one and are independent. They live by pearl-diving and work on the banks off Abu Dhabi. Permission has to be obtained at Kishm to dig salt at Kishm caves, but no permission is required or dues paid for landing it here or removing it when landed. Musubhih had never seen the Persian flag hoisted here. The last steamer that took away salt from the depôt here came some 2½ years ago. As far as we could ascertion no salt is now worked on the island, though there were said to be some deposits of salt on the other side.

L. W. Dane.

Henjam, 23rd November 1903.

C. A. Kemball.

Captain Russell of the R. I. M. S *Hardinge* said that the port seemed to be well protected from all possible winds. A fresh north-easterly wind was blowing for most of the time that we were there, but none of the ships dragged their anchors apparently. Four cruisers and the *Sphinx* were also at anchor here. There is a spit running out just west of the ruined mosque which affords perfect protection for boats landing.

23-11-03. L. W. Dane.

Secretary is unaware that our Foreign Department papers record that in 1901 the island was leased to the Moin-ut-Tajar for its salt deposits: that 5,000—1,000 tons were then reported as being shipped annually to Calcutta—the labour being supplied by the Sheikh of Kishm.

25-11-03. C[urzon].

Your Excellency may wish to see this report on our visit to Henjam. The fact that there is potable water with some old fields near the Telegraph Station was not on record before.* Wind motor pumps should work well here, and some cultivation of palms and gardens would reduce the barren character of the place which, even as it is, is better than Bunder Abbas. The cook-house of the Telegraph Station is still standing in ruins. The fact that the only inhabitants at present are protected Arabs is worth noting, especially as they are apparently well able to look after themselves and were strong enough to refuse to allow the Persians to put up a flagstaff near them.

* Yes, it was. I have it in my notes taken from a Foreign Department paper of 1901. C[urzon].

I have no confidence that this is true. C[urzon].

If we could secure that no dues should be imposed here, it may develop a considerable importance as an *entrepot* for supplies for the pearling boats and as a place whence the pearls could be despatched.

23-11-03. L. W. Dane.

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Please see my note at the end of Secretary's note. I think that he has exaggerated the evidences of independence on the strength of a conversation with two stray witnesses, one not a native of the place.

25-11-03. C[URZON].

Your Excellency probably refers to the report by Lieutenant Hunt, which was forwarded with Colonel Kemball's letter of 1st February 1901. He only visited Kishm and did not visit Henjam at all. His report is not complete, as he does not refer to the wells or to the old cultivation. We made special enquiries about the salt works with reference to his report, as we wished to visit them, but we were assured that the deposits, if any existed, were not worked. I think his reference really applies to the salt works on Kishm at Namakdan from which the salt was brought to Henjam and shipped from that place. As to the question of ownership, Captain Grey put the questions. The men were interrogated at different places. Colonel Kemball could not believe the diver's story about the Sheikh of Debai's interest, but was convinced by the statement of the Lingah bagla owner, who was the spokesman of some 15 men and an independent and very intelligent witness. I do not pretend to say what the real facts are, but recorded the statements of the only people whom we met at the port. There was certainly no Persian representative or Persian there at all, and we were ashore for about three hours. The fact is that our Vice-Consul at Bunder Abbas only has a jolly boat and cannot ordinarily reach Henjam at all. This and imperfect information perhaps explain the defects and omissions in Lieutenant (now Captain) Hunt's report.

Proceedings Secret E., May 1901, Nos. 10-18.
Enclosure to Proceeding No. 16.

25-11-03. L. W. DANE.

I think Secretary had better ask Captain Hunt if we see him at Bushire.

25-11-03. C[URZON].

Done by demi-official letter.

3-12-03. L. W. DANE.

The Admiral wished me to invite his opinion upon the question of a cable station at Henjam or Bassidore. I submit a draft to him for Your Excellency's approval.

30-11-03. L. W. DANE.

I have amplified.

30-11-03. C[URZON].

LETTER TO HIS EXCELLENCY REAR-ADMIRAL G. ATKINSON-WILLES, NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIA STATION, NO. 73-C., DATED THE 2ND DECEMBER 1903. Pro. No. 322.

Asks him whether he has any suggestions or observations to make on the subject of cable stations and naval bases in the Persian Gulf, as the result of his visit to the Gulf.

LETTER FROM HIS EXCELLENCY REAR-ADMIRAL ATKINSON-WILLES, NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIA STATION, NO. 1295, DATED AND RECEIVED 3RD DECEMBER 1903. Pro. No. 323.

Replies to our letter No. 73-C., dated the 2nd December 1903, and gives his opinion on the subject of naval bases and coaling and telegraph stations in the Persian Gulf.

The Admiral will send a copy of this letter to the Admiralty direct. Your Excellency will, perhaps, decide if we should address Secretary of State by telegram on the subject of a cable station at Henjam, or if it will be sufficient to send home the correspondence with the Admiral by despatch. I understand that the Minister's final opinion was that we ought to let the Persian Government know that we intended to re-occupy Henjam before actually taking this step. As there is a flagstaff put up by the Persians on the plinth of the telegraph station, it would be a serious step to remove this without giving notice, even though the Persians had no right to erect this on the site of our building without informing us of their intention.

The question of the suitability of Khor Kawi as a naval coaling station might be deferred until we receive the detailed report which Commander Kemp is to submit. He goes there in a few days. Otherwise I believe that Your Excellency is in accord with the views of the

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Naval Commander-in-Chief which might be endorsed, only that a flagstaff on Maklab and a lighthouse on Mussandim might be added. It was considered as not quite friendly to the Persians to open a free port at their doors at Bassidore, but perhaps circumstances may render this desirable, and there is little doubt that such a port would rapidly spring up if settlement by outsiders was allowed.

At Henjam, though there is no levy of customs at present, and, as far as we no know, there was none when our telegraph station was in existence, we should probably have to accept the inevitable Belgian Customs officer unless the Al Bu Falisa Arabs on the island are strong enough to keep the Persian officials out and prevent the establishment of customs. In that event Henjam would probably develop, as there is water there and the anchorage is suitable for country craft and all coasting steamers, while it is in the fair way up the Gulf. It would also be suitable for a quarantine station if we are compelled to accept this arrangement.

The whole question has been rather complicated by the attitude of the Shah and the Persians at Bushire, and the action in this case may depend somewhat on the course adopted in regard to the Bushire incident, which might justify a re-occupation of Henjam on the old lines without previous reference coupled with a refusal to admit our liability to customs there based on the previous and existing practices.

L. W. DANE.

4.12.03.

It will be sufficient to write a despatch to the Secretary of State, when we return to Calcutta. By that time the situation will have somewhat developed : and we shall know how to treat the Persians with regard to Henjam.

C[URZON].

4-12-03.

Pro. No. 324.

ENCLOSURE IN A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE, No. 46, DATED THE 30TH OCTOBER (RECEIVED 9TH DECEMBER) 1903.

Copy of a communication from the Foreign Office to the India Office regarding the question of the incidence of cost of the scheme for the proposed establishment of telegraphic communication with Bunder Abbas.

NOTE ON BASSIDORE.

To-day His Excellency proceeded from an anchorage off Namakdan on the south coast of Kishm to Bassidore by the south-west channel. Rear-Admiral Atkinson-Willes accompanied him in the *Sphinx*. Soundings were taken by the *Sphinx* and *Lawrence*, and showed a good channel with over 4 fathoms throughout at low tide. The soundings obtained on R. I. M. S. *Lawrence* are shown on the chart with Colonel Kemball's letter No. 171, dated 21st September 1901.

Progs. Secret E., January 1902, Nos. 29-38 (Prog. No. 33).

There is nothing special to note about Bassidore, except that now that this deep channel has been proved, it is accessible for all ships drawing less than 28 feet. Some 50 people were living there, mainly runaway slaves or their descendants. The last runaways came from the Arabian Coast about 2½ years ago. There was a good deal of water in the cisterns near the jetty and several wells of potable water. The cemetery, mosque, and travellers' rest-house were in good repair. The bungalows are now in ruins. The jetty is in good order and the Beacon on Beacon Shoal is standing. Abdul Rahim Hakim, Attaché, Foreign Department, who was for 14 years at Bassidore and left 20 years ago, pointed out the boundary observed in his time, which follows the edge of the highland to the east and so includes Lingah, but excludes Kila Haji Karim and Nakhlistan. The question of the place where the telegraph cable should be landed will be settled by His Excellency with the Admiral who has also made a note about the place.

L. W. DANE.

24-11-03.

BASSIDORE ON THE ISLAND OF KISHM.

H. M. S. "Sphinx", Tuesday, 24th November 1903.

The Coal Agent came on board at 12-45, and stated as follows to the Commander-in-Chief :—

The extent of new Bassidore, including Singoa, is 8,665 square yards.

Old Bassidore is not British.

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The Agent flies the British flag, obtaining a new one when the old one is worn out from the British Resident in the Gulf, or from one of His Majesty's ships.

He receives the following allowances from the Indian Government :—

Rs. 30 a month as Agent,

„ 12 „ for hoisting British flag.

„ 7 „ for taking mails to and from Lingah.

An application has been made by some Arabs of the "Religion of Sumaitt Tribe", now at Lingah, and some people living 60 miles off in Kishm, for permission to reside in Bassidore, to get away from the Persians and Belgians.

Also Abdulla, the new Sheikh of Kishm, asks permission to buy a piece of land in Bassidore, and to build houses on it. He has been informed that the authority of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf is necessary.

Hassan, the hereditary Kalanter of Kishm, has retired to Maskat.

V. H. T. Weekes.

NOTE ON VISIT TO KHOR MUSA ON 1st DECEMBER 1903.

H.M.S. *Sphinx* and R.I.M.S. *Lawrence*, with His Excellency the Viceroy on board, anchored off the mouth of the Khor at 11-30 P.M. on 30th November. Anchor was weighed at 6-30 A.M. The tide was nearly full, and it was difficult to detect the island on the east marked as Daria on the map and ordinary chart, but as Bu Saif on Commander Kemp's chart or the headland shown as Bu Saif on the west. The bar is about 2 miles south of Bu Saif, and the channel is about 4 miles east of the point of this spit. Some delay occurred before the channel was found. The lowest depth over the bar going up was 4 fathoms, and descending 4½ fathoms.* After crossing the bar the channel was easy for 22 nautical miles up to the anchorage at the junction of Khor Bukhadir with Khor Musa, with 12 fathoms at the anchorage. The ships ran up the Bukhadir to 2½ miles short of 3rd anchorage on chart and a party landed on left bank, which is fairly firm soil, but at this point apparently liable to be covered at spring tides. There was a good deal of lána growing over these flats, and the ground on the right bank three miles up was much higher. Four dhows passed us going down the Khor.

* This depth was really obtained in the bay outside the Khor.

1-12-03. L. W. Dane.

Major Burton, Consul at Mohammerah, was shown Commander Kemp's chart and report, and was asked to make a tour over the locality so as to ascertain what the country is like between the highest point to which ocean-going ships can go, and Ahwaz and Ram Hormaz on the east and Mohammerah on the west. He was given a copy of sheet 4 of the map of Persian in 6 sheets.

3-12-03. L. W. Dane.

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

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NOTE ON THE ISLAND OF KISHM.

General.—Kishm or the Jazirat Tavila (long island) is about 80* miles long, average breadth 7 miles. The total number of inhabitants is about 15,000, of these about 5,000 live in the town of Kishm at the east end of the island, and the remainder in small villages most of which are situated at intervals along the coast. The population is almost entirely Arab, but there are a few Persian merchants connected with Bunder Abbas. There are but two British subjects at present—Hindus, goldsmiths by trade. The majority of the inhabitants are either fishermen, weavers, or boatmen.

* This is wrong. It is 60 miles long.
C[URZON].

Imports and Exports.—Necessary articles of food and clothing are imported from Bombay direct or *via* Bunder Abbas by sailing vessels. Since the Belgians took over the Customs management, there has been a branch at Kishm, the present Director is a Shirazi; he is subordinate to the Director at Bunder Abbas. The institution of Customs has caused intense dissatisfaction among the inhabitants, some of whom asked me point blank when the English were going to take the island. Salt is the only export of importance; the caves are about 50† miles from the town to the north-north-west, about 20,000 is exported annually, most of it to Indian ports by sailing vessels. The salt is removed to Henjam by boats and there transferred to the larger vessels. The monopoly is in the hands of the Moin-ut-Tujjar, but I hear that this year he has made arrangements to sub-let it to various persons.

† Wrong.
C[URZON].

Water.—There are several wells in and about the town, but only one provides potable water, this is situated about 1 mile west of the fort, with which it is connected by an underground passage said to have been constructed when the fort was built by the Portuguese.

There is said to be potable water in all the villages.

Cultivation.—Little or none in the town, but the soil appears to be somewhat better than that of the mainland.

Earthquakes.—Earthquakes are frequent, occurring on an average about once a month more or less severe. The people have not repaired the buildings destroyed by the great earthquake of a few years ago, and live in preference in temporary wooden structures. I am told that no one ever sleeps in a stone house.

The natives greatly complain of the apathy of the Persian Government towards their sufferings on this account.

Government.—The present Governor is one Sheikh Abdulla, an Arab, who was placed in office through the good offices of Haji Husain Gilladari, the head of the Sunni community of Bunder Abbas, who interceded on his behalf through the Salar-i-Moazzam with the Moin-ut-Tujjar. Sheikh Abdulla received me with the greatest possible kindness and hospitality. He declined positively to allow me to provide either my own food or that of my servants. On hearing of my arrival he came instantly to meet me, cleared out the best room in one of his houses for my reception, furnished and positively declined payment. He is a very gentlemanly man of about 60 years of age, very intelligent, and a strong anglophile, and spoke to me very plainly regarding the hope, which he shares with the common people, that the island will eventually come under British rule. The Sheikh expressed his hope that some of His Excellency the Viceroy's party would land and enable him to do anything he could for them. He made me promise to pay him frequent visits. His extreme reluctance to allow me to eat any of my own provisions while with him was very striking. He is in my opinion a man as thoroughly to be trusted as any oriental can be.

W. G. GREY, *Captain.*

Your Excellency may wish to read this note by Captain Grey on Kishm.

L. W. DANE,—23-11-03.

C[URZON],—25-11-03.

Foreign Office Press—No. 115—18-12-03—30.

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

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Mr. Whitby Smith told me yesterday that it would take less cable to connect Henjam than Bassidore. He had 60 knots available which might be sufficient, and expected 30 knots more from England. If he was to do the work, he would like to order out the cable required to complete his reserve at once. The works at Manora can turn out 1½ knots a day of cable. The length of old cable which they would take up can probably be employed after repair for the lengths of cable wanted between Henjam and Bunder Abbas. He would like, if possible, to get the work finished before the end of April.

L. W. DANE,—7-12-03.

No doubt. But we have to procure first the assent of the Home Government and then of the Persian Government.

C[URZON],—7-12-03.

Foreign Office Press—No. 111—18-12-03—30.

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

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FROM THE NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIAN STATION, No. 1171, DATED THE 9TH (RECEIVED 15TH) DECEMBER 1903.

Forwards, for information, a copy of a letter which he has addresssd to the Secretary of the Admiralty, giving a short description of places visited by His Excellency the Viceroy and himself during the recent cruise in the Persian Gulf.

The Admiral's letter is submitted for perusal.

I understand that no communication should be addressed to His Majesty's Government regarding the re-occupation of Henjam as a telegraph station, pending further developments in regard to the Bushire incident. In the meanwhile it will be well to send to the India Office, by Secretary's weekly letter, copies of the latest correspondence* on the subject with the Admiral, in case occasion should arise for reference to them in telegraphic correspondence. (The Admiral has sent copies to the Admiralty, but it may be convenient that the India Office should have direct from here.)

* To the Admiral, No. 73 C., dated the 2nd December 1903.
From the Admiral, No. 1295, dated the 3rd December 1903.
From the Admiral, No. 1171, dated the 9th December 1903.

C. L. S. RUSSELL,—25-12-03.
C. H. A. HILL,—26-12-03.

The case is submitted to Your Excellency for perusal of the Admiral's note on the places visited in the Gulf, and for orders if we should now address His Majesty's Government about Henjam. The matter was held over for consideration here by Your Excellency's orders of 4th December 1903.

Page 15 of notes.

L. W. DANE,—27-12-03.

Dated Bushire, the 15th December 1903.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. A. KEMBALL, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—L. W. DANE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Your letter of the 3rd instant about Henjam. Hunt informs me that he did not visit Henjam, and that the information which he gave was given to him by Sheikh Hassan, then Sheikh of Kishm. He says that he took notes at the time of what Sheikh Hassan told him, but it is possible that some misunderstanding may have occurred, and that the Sheikh was referring to the mines on Kishm.

I have always been under the impression that salt was worked on Henjam. Perhaps, I got the idea from Lord Curzon's Persia (Vol. II, page 413), where the salt caves are alluded to. I will write to Bunder Abbas to make sure.

C. L. S. RUSSELL,—29-12-03.
C. H. A. HILL,—30-12-03.

Colonel Kemball's demi-official of 15th December does not entirely clear up the question of the salt works on Henjam. Captain Hunt, as I thought, never saw the place. We could not hear of any such works there, though we landed specially to see them. There were the places for the salt from Kishm which were pointed out to us.

Note above.

Your Excellency told me verbally that we need not wait any longer before addressing Secretary of State about Henjam and our naval position at the entrance to the Gulf. I am not quite sure what line you propose to take about Henjam, but gathered that, owing to the present very unfriendly attitude of the Persian Government, you rather inclined to the stronger action of re-establishing the station first and then reporting. I therefore submit in proof, for approval, a draft despatch to Secretary of State which deals with the cable station there, the action proposed at Mussandim, and the suggestion for a light-house at the entrance to the Gulf. About the last, we must address the Marine Department, and perhaps consult the British India Steam Navigation Company confidentially. It seems certain that we shall have to land the cable at Henjam or Bassidore, so perhaps Your Excellency will authorise me to request the Director, Gulf Section, to get out cable or material to replenish his obligatory reserve, so that he may be able to lay the cable without further delay on receipt of orders.

Page 15 of notes.

This should be done as soon as possible.

L. W. DANE.

Page 19 of notes.

L. W. DANE.

Very well.

C[URZON].

Do this at once.

L. W. DANE,—7-1-04.

This would not do.

C[URZON].

It might, perhaps, be as well to telegraph to Secretary of State what the decision about the cable station is.

Finance Department must see the draft.

L. W. DANE,—1-1-04.

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

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DRAFT.

During the tour of His Excellency the Viceroy in the Persian Gulf, the question of a naval strategic position at the entrance to the Gulf was discussed by him with the Naval Commander-in-Chief, and incidentally the position for a cable station for naval and general purposes in those waters was considered. In your telegram of 28th October 1903, intimation was conveyed to us that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty agreed that Bassidore would be preferable to Henjam for this purpose. We now forward, for your information, copies of the attached correspondence between us and the Naval Commander-in-Chief, which show that after a full consideration of the subject on the spot, Rear-Admiral Atkinson-Willes had no hesitation in saying that, for the cogent reasons mentioned in his letter, Henjam is more suitable than Bassidore as a telegraph and signal station.

2. In this opinion we fully concur, indeed it was mainly to meet the wishes of the naval authorities that in the Viceroy's telegram, dated 4th August 1903, we made a suggestion in the alternative for the landing of the cable at Bassidore. We, therefore, consider that for naval purposes a cable station should be re-established at Henjam without further delay, and we trust that on a review of the circumstances His Majesty's Government will consent to bear at least half of the cost of the arrangements as detailed in our Secret despatch No. 56 (External), dated 7th May 1903.

3. The question arises if we should first address the Persian Government and obtain fresh permission, or if, as proposed by Sir A. Hardinge in his despatch No. 97 (Secret), dated 27th June 1903, we should simply send the telegraph ship there with a gun-boat and restore the station, and then inform the Persian Government and request permission to carry the line on to Bunder Abbas.

It is true that on 21st September 1903 Sir A. Hardinge telegraphed to the Foreign Office that he was unable to discover in the archives of the Legation at Tehran the original permission to occupy Henjam, of which a copy was forwarded with our Secret despatch No. 56 (External) of 7th May 1903, and he intimated that the procedure ought to be modified.

We are unable to follow his argument. There is no doubt that from 1869 to 1881 there was a British telegraph station on the island. Indeed, the well-made plinth of the station with a cook-house in ruins is still in existence, and the trench in which the cable was laid is visible. If the Persian Government have not got a copy of the permission granted, which was a very informal document, so much the better for our purposes, as we then resume an occupation which, while undisputed, was not definitely defined by the Persian Government.

4. A suitable opportunity for asserting our interests there may, perhaps, be afforded by the fact, which came to notice during the Viceroy's recent visit, that some 12 years ago the Malik-ut-Tujjar, who held a lease of the mines on Kishm, erected a flagstaff on the plinth of the building. There are now no representatives of the Persian Government at the place, and no one had ever seen a flag hoisted there, but the act, even if done on behalf of the Persian Government, was not quite justifiable without some reference to us. The recent attitude of the Persian Government has been so unfriendly that we are disposed to think that the simplest way of restoring the station would be to act on Sir A. Hardinge's first advice, explaining to the Persian Government that we have no intention to do more than to restore on the original terms, which included freedom from Customs interference, our old telegraph station that we now require for naval and general purposes. If this course is approved, the necessary action can be taken during the present cool season. Failing this we would suggest that an early reference might be made to the Persian Government with a view to the re-establishment of the station and the extension of telegraphic communication to Bunder Abbas, but we are afraid that in the present temper of that Government such a request is not likely to be favourably received, and it rather prejudices our claim to re-occupy the place without further sanction.

5. Though we have not yet received the further report of the Naval Commander-in-Chief on the survey of Khor Kawi, it will be convenient to

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indicate our views on the naval position at the entrance to the Gulf. It is clear that with a cable station at Henjam in direct communication with Bushire, Bunder Abbas, Jask, and Maskat, and possibly with a station at Mussandim or Khor Kawi, our strategic position here would be very strong, and nothing could well enter or leave without our knowledge. A report on the harbours on the Mussandim promontory has been submitted by the Naval Commander-in-Chief to the Admiralty, which shows how necessary it is that this strategical point should not pass into the hands of any other Power, and we consider that it is desirable to strengthen our own hold upon this vital point, to which we believe that the tribes under our sole protection have the best right. The plinth of the telegraph station on the island in Elphinstone Inlet is still in existence. We, therefore, propose to avail ourselves of the permission accorded to us in Lord George Hamilton's despatch No. 4 (Secret), dated the 27th February 1903, and to erect a flagstaff there and another on the point where the cable crossed the Maklab Isthmus, with possibly a third at Khor Kawi as suggested by the Admiral. We believe that we shall have no difficulty in arranging with the local tribes to take care of the flagstaffs, and even to hoist a flag when wanted. The posts will be put up without any special display, and the action is not likely to attract attention.

Proceedings, Secret E., July 1903, Nos. 192-214 (Proceedings No. 196).

6. As a further measure of precaution, and also in order to supply a want which is much felt owing to the increase in the numbers and speed of the steamers visiting the Gulf, we propose to establish a light-house at the entrance. We understand that for nautical purposes this would, perhaps, be most useful if placed on the Quoins off Cape Mussandim, but that a light on the cape itself, where politically it would be desirable to place it, would be of great service. As to this we will consult the authorities interested, and will address you again in a subsequent despatch.

7. If these measures are taken, we believe that our position at the entrance of the Gulf will be secured, but we are of opinion that in view of the frequent visits paid by French and Russian ships of war, and of the reported intention of the Russian Government to station a gun-boat permanently in the Gulf, it is necessary to take the necessary action at once. We would, in any case, invite early orders on our proposals regarding a cable station at Henjam.

We must have a better draft. The case is one of first rate importance, and requires a more detailed argument. I have, therefore, written a fresh draft which can be printed and sent without delay to Finance.

Secretary has omitted to notice paragraph 51 in the Admiral's letter to the Admiralty which is hopelessly wrong, and which it is important that we should disavow.

I did notice this, but intended, as marked on another copy of the letter, to deal with it in the Bubiyan case.
L. W. DANE.

C[URZON],—6-1-04.

Foreign Office Press—No. 421—12-2-04—30.

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

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Finance Department.

This case reached the Accounts Branch at 5-25 P. M. There is nothing for the office to note, and as it is marked urgent it is submitted without delay.

Finance Department is concerned with only paragraph 13 of the draft despatch. It is doubtful whether it is correct to say that the bulk of the expenditure on the shores of the Gulf is already borne by Indian Revenues. The principle of equal division has been accepted by the Home Government for all future charges, and as regards the charges existing at the time of the Welby Commission, a settlement was arrived by India contributing a lump sum of £6,000. It may, however, be stated that the cost of the Indo-European Telegraph Department falls entirely on India.

Despatch No. 107 (Political), dated 15th November 1901.

We may perhaps lay emphasis on the fact that the Welby Commission* also recommended an equal division of all charges in Persia; and instead of saying "the bulk of the charges" we may perhaps say "a considerable portion of the charges."

*No copy is available as the Library is closed.

P. K. M.,—9-1-1904.

I think Finance Department may agree to the despatch as it stands.

E. N. BAKER,—10-1-1904.

E. FG. L[AW],—10-1-1904.

Foreign Department.

The Despatch, in which the Finance Department concurs, is submitted in proof. I had intended to suggest that the request in paragraph 3 of the draft to delete Rear-Admiral Atkinson Willes' remarks about the Sheikh of Koweit might be made in the despatch about Rubiyan, which is under submission. I had noticed the point on the margin of the Admiral's letter on which I noted some other points for verification. Your Excellency probably read the copy of the letter attached to the draft despatch.

Marked. Paper under consideration.

The question of a treaty right to link up Jask with Bunder Abbas raised in my note of 18th April 1903, and Your Excellency's order was passed on 23rd April 1903.

Proceedings, S. E., July 1903, Nos. 192—214, pages 18—19 of notes.
Aitchison, Volume X, page 80.

The Convention is dated 2nd April 1868, and is in force up to 31st January 1905. Article I runs:—

"In order to provide against any possible accident to the Persian Gulf cable, it is agreed between the high contracting Governments of England and Persia, that the British Government shall make arrangements with regard to the construction and efficient working of a line of telegraph between Guadur and a point between Jask and Bunder Abbas."

We were to pay 3,000 tomans a year for leave to lay down the line of telegraph from the date on which the work of laying down the wires was commenced.

We tried in May last to see why this Convention was made and why the land wire stopped at Jask, but without result. As it is apparently the authority for our land line from Gwadur to Jask, some arrangements should be made for extending it, if this has not been done already in connection with the New Telegraph Convention, 1872, which, according to Aitchison, also expires on 31st January 1905. I will look this up.

Aitchison, Volume X, page 93.

In the meantime paragraph 12 of the draft will require some modification under the Convention of 1868, which was made when the cable was being curved to Henjam from Mussaudim: we can extend our land line to a point between Jask and Bunder Abbas. It was apparently intended to lay a cable from Henjam to Kuhislah or the nearest convenient point of the mainland to link this up with Jask by a land line.

Perhaps the wording might be—

A { "Should they do so, they might opportunely be reminded that under the Convention of April 2nd, 1868, we possess the right to continue our land line from Jask to some point between that place and Bunder Abbas, a phrase which might be enterpreted as applicable to any spot, short of Bunder Abbas itself, such as the British Consulate at Laband four miles on the Jask side of the town."

Indeed a land line round the northern shore of the entrance of the Gulf might be very useful, and in that case one cable to Jask could be taken up and relaid between Henjam and Bunder Abbas, with a land line on from that to Jask, as practically contemplated by the Convention. Perhaps the Indo-European Telegraph authorities might be asked to consider this possibility. We know that they have plenty of material for a land line at Bunder Abbas, as they were collecting it there for the Central

We had better wait to see what comes of Henjam.
[CURZON].

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Persia line. It would be a very cheap solution of the difficulty and give us a further old on Bunder Abbas.

I am sorry to start a fresh hare, but as Your Excellency now wishes to consider our treaty rights in the matter, I have thought it best to put the idea before you for what it is worth.

L. W. DANE,—12-1-1904.

I also was not sure and proposed to have the point examined. Aitchison is silent on the question. Look up this at once.

L. W. DANE,—13-1-1904.

Surely in one respect Secretary is mistaken. I have always been under the impression that the Telegraph Convention was extended quite 12 years ago from 1905 to 1925.

The only alteration required in the draft is the substitution of A in Secretary's note (as amended) for the concluding sentence of paragraph 12 in the draft despatch.

When the Despatch is circulated for signature, the file should accompany it, and Honourable Members should be given time, since they may like to give careful perusal to a most important subject.

C[URZON],—12-1-1904.

L. W. DANE,—13-1-1904.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 3058 F. D.—15-1-1904.—4—W. S. D. R.

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By an agreement concluded in 1892, it was arranged that the Convention of the 2nd April 1868 should be extended so as to remain in force until 1925.

Secret E., May 1892, Nos. 119-126.

L. Russell,—16-1-1904.

Despatch to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 16 (Secret / External), dated the 21st January 1904. P.20.20.326

Communicates the views of the Government of India on the question of the selection of naval positions in the Persian Gulf.

Dated Bushire, the 4th January 1904.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—L. W. Dane, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my demi-official, dated 15th ultimo, about Henjam. Grey writes from Bunder Abbas that there are no salt mines on Henjam, which island appears to be a transhipment depôt for the salt brought from the caves on Kishm.

L. Russell,—26-1-1904.

C. H. Hill,—27-1-1904.

For information.

L. W. Dane,—28-1-1904.

Will Secretary please look up E. A. Floyer's "Unexplored Baluchistan," page 123-126?

C[urzon],—28-1-1904.

The book mentioned by His Excellency has been obtained from the Imperial Library and is put up. Mr. Floyer writes at page 124 that "The huge salt caves are very wonderful. It may be that they are not now worked.

H. P. C.,—30-1-1904.

L. Russell,—30-1-1904.

C. H. Hill,—30-1-1904.

Resident and Captain Grey might be referred to the passage, apparently even then in 1876 the salt on the island was not worked to any extent. The three wells near the north end of the island were only about 30 feet deep and one had a good deal of water. The appearance of the hill as described is very like the hill in which the salt caves at Kishm are, and there is also a great deal of iron ore there also.

L. W. Dane,—1-2-1904.

Dated Bombay, the 25th January 1904.

From—Captain Kemp, H.M.S. *Sphinx*, Bombay,
To—L. W. Dane, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I am writing to you privately about a certain thing. When I was passing through Aden about 2 years ago I came across a fellow named Bury. He used to live as an Arab, etc., and I was much struck and interested in him, but my knowledge of him personally is necessarily slight. Since I have been here, I have conversed with Naval officers who have recently left the Aden Division. They know Bury well and say he has great abilities and think he is all right for courage and fidelity. Would it not be well to secure his services in the Persian Gulf? particularly as the *status quo* does not admit of our keeping an *official* representative in Koweit. I know that in making such a suggestion I am going outside my business as a Naval officer, but I do not think you will mind that. I have seen Bury's name in the newspapers in connection with the troubles in Aden, and you possibly know more about him than anyone else. I hope you got the paper about Khor Kawi. I do not think the question of climate matters much, as Englishmen can live and work in any climate when necessary. I shall visit the place again in the height of the summer and see what it is like. If war comes however between Russia and Japan, I may apply for Intelligence duties in China. Please remember me kindly to Russell.

Add Commander Kemp's letter of January 25th, His Excellency may like to see it.

L. W. Dane,—10-2-1904.

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

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With reference to Secretary's note of the 1st instant a draft to the Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, is submitted for approval, asking him to arrange to get out material to lay the cable to Henjam or Bassidore, pending the orders of the Secretary of State.

J. R. R.,—18-1-1904.

H. P. C.,—22-1-1904.

The Public Works Department (Telegraphs) may see the draft below before issue.

L. Russell,—22-1-1904.

C. H. Hill,—23-1-1904.

Public Works Department.

Director-General, Telegraphs, may see.

E. G. Stanley,—25-1-1904.

S. Preston,—25-1-1904.

I have no remarks to offer on the subject, which concerns the Indo-European Telegraph Department and not this Department.

G. Hutchinson,—26-1-1904.

E. G. Stanley,—26-1-1904.

Foreign Department.

Issue draft.

C. H. Hill,—27-1-1904.

L. Russell,—28-1-1904.

P.20.no.327 Letter to the Director-General, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, No. 318-E.A., dated the 29th January 1904.

States that the Government of India have addressed His Majesty's Secretary of State on the question of landing the cable either at Henjam or Bassidore, and requests that the necessary arrangements may at once be made, so as to avoid delay in laying the cable when the orders of the Secretary of State are received.

P.20.no.328 From the Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, No. 130, dated the 2nd (received 6th) February 1904.

With reference to the above letter states that he has asked the Director in Chief in London, by wire, to arrange for the early supply of the cable required.

No orders. Await further information.

J. R. R.,—12-2-1904.

H. P. C.,—12-2-1904.

L. Russell,—12-2-1904.

Secretary may like to see.

C. H. Hill,—13-2-1904.

L. W. Dane,—13-2-1904.

P.20.no.329 From the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indian Station, No. 1171, dated the 19th (received 27th) January 1904.

With reference to his letter of the 8th December 1903, forwards a report of the survey of Khor Kawi by H.M.S. Sphinx, *with plan. States that the report confirms his opinion that Khor Kawi will make a valuable flying base and coaling station.*

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ENCLOSURE IN A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE, No. 3, DATED THE 15TH JANUARY (RECEIVED 3RD FEBRUARY) 1904. Pro. no. 330

Memorandum from the India Office to the Foreign Office forwarding a copy of a telegram from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy, of the 28th October 1903, relative to the extension of Persian Gulf telegraphs.

(1) The Admiral's letter, with enclosure, regarding Khor Kawi, is for orders. Please see our Secret despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 16 (External), dated the 21st January 1904. A copy of the present letter may be sent either by despatch, or with the Secretary's weekly letter, to the Secretary of State. The latter will, perhaps, be sufficient.

(2) The draft to the Resident about the Henjam salt caves is for approval.

H. P. C.,—8-2-1904.

The Admiral's communication with the enclosed report by Captain Kemp may be forwarded to the Secretary of State with a brief covering despatch. I put up a draft for approval. It would be well for an advance copy to go to the India Office by this week's mail, in order that the consideration of the despatch of the 21st January 1904 may not be delayed for want of confirmatory evidence regarding Khor Kawi.

L. RUSSELL,—9-2-1904.

Draft may be approved, but I agree that a copy of this report should go by this mail.

C. H. HILL,—9-2-1904.

It is not quite satisfactory that Captain Kemp should have mentioned the Sultan of Maskat's Wali at Kamzar, though he was bound to do this. Let me have the chart of the Persian Gulf showing Kamzar and any further information we have about it. We knew that there was a Wali at Khasab. A copy of Captain Kemp's letter can go home to-morrow with Secretary's letter. Probably the Admiralty have already got it. If necessary we can telegraph about Kamzar.

L. W. DANE,—10-2-1904.

MEMORANDUM SHOWING THAT A COPY OF THE ADMIRAL'S LETTER No. 1171, DATED THE 19TH JANUARY 1904, WITH ENCLOSURES WAS TRANSMITTED WITH SECRETARY'S WEEKLY LETTER, No. 6-M., DATED THE 11TH FEBRUARY 1904, TO THE INDIA OFFICE. Pro. no. 331

Secretary's note overleaf.

The chart of the Persian Gulf showing Kamzar is placed in the file.

* Secret E., November 1902, Nos. 7-21.

Information received previously about Kamzar is contained in paragraph 10 of Major Cox's report* of the 2nd July 1902.

J. R. R.,—11-2-1904.

H. P. C.,—11-2-1904.

L. RUSSELL,—11-2-1904.

C. H. HILL,—12-2-1904.

It is clear from Captain Kemp's report that Khor Kawi will make an excellent flying base. The Sultan of Maskat's claims on Kamzar are very shadowy, and Kamzar itself is some distance off and round the corner from Khor Kawi. I submit a draft despatch for approval.

L. W. DANE,—13-2-1904.

C[URZON],—20-2-1904.

Dated Calcutta, the 29th February 1904.

From—L. W. DANE, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. A. KEMBALL, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Please refer to the demi-official correspondence ending with your letter of the 4th January 1904 about Henjam.

I forward herewith an extract from Mr. E. A. Floyer's book "Unexplored Baluchistan," published in 1882, in which he speaks of salt caves at Henjam.

Apparently even in 1876 the salt on the island was not worked to any extent.

Will you kindly mention this to Trevor and send me his report after he has made further enquiries to verify what are the real facts of the case? He can probably find out if salt was worked on Henjam and when the workings were dropped.

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Extract, pages 124 to 126, from Mr. E. A. Floyer's work "Unexplored Baluchistan."

* * * * *

* * * * But the geology and mineralogy of Henjam are unique and interesting to the last degree.

The huge salt-caves are very wonderful. There is one especially fine near the centre of the island. Externally it is a tolerably lofty hill, of a rich deep crimson. But as you approach the eastern side you see it cut down the middle, and you face a straight wall of rock-salt, flecked out with boulders of crimson and yellow limestone.

As you climb up to the opening you scramble over masses of iron pyrites specular iron ore, large bright green stones, yellow stones, and debris of all colours. The blocks of specular iron ore are very heavy, and used by the pearl-divers as sinkers. Forcing a way down the narrow and tortuous cavern, which winds away under the hill, one cannot help feeling that this may have been one of the originals of the beautiful Arabian Nights caverns.

Iron pyrites, in the dull light of a lamp, looks very like gold, and the jet-like iron ore like splendid jewels.

At the end of 200 feet or so is a beautiful cave, where are not only huge stalactites of rock-salt, but all the roof and walls are covered with a beautiful salt efflorescence like the softest, purest snow.

Two officers of one of Her Majesty's ship once accompanied me down to this grotto, and on their return spoke so highly of its beauties that two more men were fired with zeal, and went off with their lanterns to make the descent. They had, however, a mistaken idea of the grotto's size, and almost suffocated themselves in the attempt to let off a blue light in it.

Except at the pearl-fishing village, there are only three wells in the island, very deep and rarely holding more than a bucketful of brackish water at a time. One on the south-west coast is rather a curiosity. Its water is strongly flavoured with bitumen, and its mouth extremely narrow, and yet, when your eyes become accustomed to the darkness, and you peer down the 120 feet to the bottom, you are astonished to find it full of pigeons.

I only discovered this well just before leaving, or should have thoroughly explored it. It is probably connected with the cliff of the sea, about 200 yards hence, by a fissure, through which the pigeons find access.

It would not be right to leave Henjam without mention of the curious phenomenon generally called "the petrified date trees." In some banks of salt calcarious earth are a forest of curious natural pillars of very hard and heavy mud. It was long before I realised that they could not really be petrified trees. I quarried up one "tree" and sent it to the Political Agent of Maskat, but we remain in the dark to this day as to its origin.

* * * * *

Pro. No 332 DESPATCH TO HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 50, DATED THE 3RD MARCH 1904.

Forwards copy of a report on Khor Kawi by the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, and recommends that early steps should be taken to secure the Khor for our own purposes by planting a flag staff on Sheep Island, which encloses the Khor on the west.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 4250 F. D.—10-3-1904.—41.—L. G. G.

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Telephonic message, dated the 2nd March 1904.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Calcutta,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

A telegraphic reminder about the Henjam despatch should be sent to Secretary of State.

L. W. DANE,—2-3-04.

TELEGRAM TO HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE, NO. 721-E. A., DATED THE 3RD MARCH 1904. P.Z.O. no. 333

Enquires whether we may expect a reply soon to our Secret despatch No. 16 (External), dated the 21st January 1904.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE, DATED THE 8TH (RECEIVED 9TH) MARCH 1904. P.Z.O. no. 334

States that Sir A. Hardinge proposes to inform the Persian Government of our intention to re-establish a telegraph station at Henjam and to ask for permission for an extension to Bunder Abbas. Adds that the Foreign Office and the Admiralty are considering the question of the naval base.

We should confidentially warn Mr. Whitby Smith to be ready to send off the materials at very short notice.

L. W. DANE,—9-3-04.

With the Secretary of State's telegram may be read the telegram from Sir A. Hardinge of the 8th instant. We may shortly expect to hear from Tehran about Henjam.

Draft letter to the Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, submitted for approval. (We cannot telegraph in cypher as the Director has no code which we use.)

J. R. R.,—11-3-1904.

H. P. C.,—11-3-1904.

C. L. S. RUSSELL,—11-3-1904.

C. H. A. HILL,—12-3-1904.

For approval.

L. W. DANE,—12-3-1904.

C[URZON],—13-3-1904.

LETTER TO H. WHITLEY SMITH, ESQ., DIRECTOR, PERSIAN GULF TELEGRAPHS, NO. 855-E.A., DATED THE 14TH MARCH 1904. P.Z.O. no. 335

Asking that preparations should be made to send off the staff and material for the telegraphic connection with Henjam.

4511 F. D.—P. K. B.

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

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EXTRACT FROM A TELEGRAM FROM SIR A. HARDINGE, TEHRAN, No. 49, DATED THE 17TH (RECEIVED 18TH) MARCH 1904. Pro. No. 336

Repeats a telegram to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, reporting that the Persian Prime Minister, whom he had sounded about the Bunder Abbas line, said he would gladly discuss the question. Promises further information in a few days' time, and adds that meanwhile a ship should be ready at a moment's notice to start.

TELEGRAM FROM SIR A. HARDINGE, TEHRAN, No. 51, DATED (AND RECEIVED) 21ST MARCH 1904. Pro. No. 337

States that his note about Henjam is ready for presentation, and will be delivered as soon as he hears from us that a ship has actually started from Karachi.

We may telegraph in continuation of our letter of the 14th March directing Mr. Whitby Smith—

(1) to ship the requisite material and staff and hold them in readiness to start immediately on receipt of further orders. Care should be taken that every arrangement is made in advance to reduce to a minimum the actual period which will be required for the operation of laying the cable and erecting the station;

(2) to telegraph to-day on what date he expects to have the ship ready to sail, how long it will take to reach Henjam, and how long to carry out the work;

(3) to telegraph again when the vessel is actually ready to start from Karachi. Mr. Whitby Smith has no code, so it will be necessary to send instructions through the Commissioner in Sind.

I put up a draft telegram for approval.

22-3-04. L. RUSSELL.

May issue.

22-3-04. C. H. HILL.

22-3-04. L. W. DANE.

His Excellency's verbal orders taken. The telegram for Mr. Whitby Smith may be issued. We should also telegraph to Naval Commander-in-Chief—

"With sanction of His Majesty's Government we are now arranging to land cable at Henjam. To prevent possible local interference it would be well that a gun-boat should proceed at once to Bunder Abbas to be at hand if required Captain, "Patrick Stewart" will be directed to communicate with Commanding Officer, gun-boat in case of necessity. Please let us know what action is taken."

22-3-04. L. W. DANE.

TELEGRAM TO REAR-ADMIRAL ATKINSON WILLES, No. 947-E. A., DATED THE 22ND MARCH 1904. Pro. No. 338

Suggests that a gun boat should proceed to Bunder Abbas to prevent interference in landing a cable at Henjam.

TELEGRAM TO THE COMMISSIONER IN SIND, KARACHI, No. 948-E. A., DATED THE 22ND MARCH 1904. Pro. No. 339

Requests him to communicate certain instructions to the Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, regarding the Henjam telegraph.

[ENCLOSURE IN A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE, No. 10, DATED THE 4TH (RECEIVED 23RD) MARCH 1904.] Pro. No. 340

Copy of a telegram from the Foreign Office to Sir A. Hardinge regarding the establishment of a telegraph station at Henjam.

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Pro. no. 341 TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 957-E. A., DATED THE 23RD MARCH 1904.

States that instructions have been issued for a gun-boat to proceed to Bunder Abbas to be at hand if required and that Persian Government will only be informed after the boat has started.

Pro. no. 342 FROM THE DIRECTOR, PERSIAN GULF TELEGRAPHS, KARACHI, No. 271, DATED THE 19TH (RECEIVED 23RD) MARCH 1904.

Refers to Foreign Department letter No. 855-E. A., dated the 19th March 1904, and explains the difficulties in establishing telegraphic communication at very short notice with Henjam as desired.

Pro. no. 343 TELEGRAM FROM THE COMMISSIONER IN SIND, DATED THE 23RD (RECEIVED 24TH) MARCH 1904.

Repeats a message from the Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, stating that it is impossible, at present, to lay the cable, and that the material which was asked for by telegraph has not yet been shipped from England. Adds that until it is received, his stock of cable is insufficient to make the connection with Henjam.

Two new receipts are submitted for orders. It appears to have been understood that Mr. Whitby Smith had the cable ready, and that all he had to do was to order cable from England to complete his *reserve*. He was asked on the 29th January 1904, to do this. There seems to be no help for it now but to wait until the materials are received from England. In the meantime Sir A. Hardinge should be informed of the position of affairs. He will have to withhold his note to the Persian Government. The Admiral also must be informed, with reference to our telegram of the 23rd March, that a gun-boat will not at present be required.

2. As regards the telegraph building, please see the collection marked on the margin, and page 9 of the current notes. A suitable building is estimated to cost about Rs. 8,500. But, in the circumstances, can the house be erected first without the cable being first connected to Henjam? We may, however, obtain Financial sanction if Public Works Department agree.

Secret E., July 1903, 192-214 (No. 203).

H. P. C.,—24-3-04.

The record of the case of this cable is as follows :—

On *15th August* Mr. Whitby Smith reported that (to connect Bassidore) 68 knots were required and "I have sufficient cable and material in stock here to lay this if one month's notice is given."

On *22nd August* that 84 knots required and that possibly if urgently required I could make a temporary connection after one month's notice."

On *6th December* he told Secretary that it would take less cable to connect Henjam than Bassidore. He had sixty knots which might suffice and expected thirty more from England.

I put up a draft to Mr. Whitby Smith as you desired.

Pending my reply to draft there is no need to reply to Sir A. Hardinge or report to Secretary of State.

I have ascertained that Director-General, Telegraph Department, has *no* deep sea cable.

C. H. HILL.

24-3-04. C. H. HILL.

Issue the telegram and then let Finance Department see as expenditure is involved. It is not yet settled if His Majesty's Government bear half.

25-3-04. L. W. DANE.

Pro. no. 344 TELEGRAM TO THE COMMISSIONER IN SIND, KARACHI, No. 981 E. A., DATED THE 25TH MARCH 1904.

Requests him to inform the Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, that the question of laying the cable to Henjam is of serious political importance and that arrangements are in progress in reliance on his previous estimates.

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Secretary has ordered that this file should go to Finance Department to see. Send at once.

(I note for Secretary's information that Director-General, Telegraphs, has enquired from Penang how many knots of deep sea cable they have available immediately and that we shall probably know as soon as the file returns from Finance. It would take 3 weeks to get the Penang material to Karachi, allowing for delays in starting.)

26-3-04. C. H. HILL.

Finance Department.

Seen in the Finance Department.

(The file appears to have been referred to us in connection with the erection of a telegraph station at Henjam, paragraph 2 of last letter on file.)

W. G. D.,—29-3-04.

S. K. C.,—29-3-04.

30-3-04. H. J. McINTOSH.

Foreign Department.

[ENCLOSURE IN A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE, No. 9, DATED 26TH FEBRUARY (RECEIVED 18TH MARCH) 1904.] Pro. nos 345 346

Question of the incidence of the cost regarding the establishment of a telegraph station at Henjam.

TELEGRAM FROM THE COMMISSIONER IN SIND, KARACHI, DATED THE 27TH (RECEIVED 28TH) MARCH 1904. Pro. no. 347

States that the Director-General, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, reports that his previous statements have been made on the assumption that no cable would be required for repairing and that he has expended nearly one hundred knots. Adds that if it is immaterial where the cable is landed and the office located, as a temporary measure, that short emergency connection might be made on the south side of the Henjam island, but as to building, work cannot be begun until landing is effected.

FROM THE DIRECTOR, PERSIAN TELEGRAPHS, No. 278, DATED THE 23RD (RECEIVED 28TH) MARCH 1904. Pro. no. 348

Reports that the material necessary for the manufacture of the cable required has not yet been shipped, but that it will be shipped as early as possible. Communicates his views in the matter.

As the matter is urgent I submit the case at once though the main file is in the Finance Department. On 29th January 1904 we asked Mr. Whitby Smith to replenish his stock without delay so that the cable could be laid as soon as orders were received from Secretary of State. He replied on 2nd February that he had asked the Director-in-Chief in London by telegram to send the cable required. On 12th March I warned him to be ready to start at short notice. He sent no answer at once but apparently wrote a letter on 19th, which I have not seen. When we heard that Sir A. Hardinge wished to start at once we enquired by telegram when the "Patrick Stewart" could start. He replied on 23rd March that he had no cable. The other papers are on the file and our telegram of 25th March explains the history of the case. We did all that we could to ensure that there should be no hitch and on 7th December I told him that it was pretty sure that the cable would be laid at short notice in the spring. If he was forced to execute repairs he might have let us know.

The question for your Exellency's orders is if we should land the cable as a temporary arrangement on the south side of the island, where the settlement of the Albu Falasch Arabs is. It is not so good an anchorage but has some advantages—one being that the Persians may not be

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so ready to interfere there, and with the good offices of the Sheikh of Debai we ought to be able to arrange that the Arabs should not oppose the landing. It is also possible, I suppose, that they could fish up the cable and carry it to the island and so shorten the length of line required. They have two cables and will soon have another through line *via* Nushki and Nasratabad Ispe, so that they need not hesitate about fishing up and, if possible, moving one cable.

The other alternative is to defer proceedings and push on the Seistan case, which also has some advantages. On the whole however the first course seems to be preferable as the political position at home may not be so satisfactory.

29-3-04. L. W. DANE.

This is now superseded by later information.

29-3-04. C[URZON].

Director-General of Telegraphs has telegraphed to me to say that he has ascertained that the Eastern Extension Company can let us have at once at Perim 60 knots deep sea, 10 knots intermediate and the usual amount of shore end cable if we can send a ship. We can of course send the "Patrick Stewart" there and might ask Director, Gulf Section, if there is any objection and how much he will actually require to make a permanent connection at Henjam. Draft telegram is submitted.

29-3-04. L. W. DANE.

29-3-04. C[URZON].

Pro. No. 349 TELEGRAM TO THE DIRECTOR, PERSIAN GULF TELEGRAPHS, No. 1008-E.A., DATED THE 29TH MARCH 1904.

States that Eastern Extension Company can provide 60 knots deep sea, 10 knots intermediate, and usual shore end cable. Asks whether there is any objection to taking cable from them.

Pro. No. 350 TELEGRAM FROM THE DIRECTOR, PERSIAN TELEGRAPHS, KARACHI, DATED THE 30TH (RECEIVED 31ST) MARCH 1904.

With reference to Foreign Department telegram No. 1008-E.A., dated the 29th March 1904, enquires where the cable which the Eastern Extension Company can supply now is. Recommends a connection to the south end of the Henjam Island.

Reply urgent—"Cable is at Perim. Does this alter your view?"

31-3-04. L. W. DANE.

Pro. No. 351 TELEGRAM TO THE DIRECTOR, PERSIAN GULF TELEGRAPHS, No. 1026-E. A., DATED THE 31ST MARCH 1904.

Replies as in note above.

Pro. No. 352 TELEGRAM FROM THE DIRECTOR, PERSIAN GULF TELEGRAPHS, DATED (AND RECEIVED) 1ST APRIL 1904.

Communicates certain proposals in connection with the laying of the telegraph cable to Henjam.

TELEGRAM TO THE COMMISSIONER IN SIND, DATED THE 1ST APRIL 1904.

Pro. No. 353 *Requests him to convey the orders of the Viceroy on the subject to Mr. Whitby Smith.*

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TELEGRAM FROM THE COMMISSIONER IN SIND, DATED THE 4TH (RECEIVED 5TH) APRIL 1904. P.Co.No.354

Repeats the reply of the Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs.

This telegram should be repeated to Viceroy's Camp.

It should also, probably, be repeated to Tehran at once: but I would suggest telegraphing to Mr. Whitby Smith (through Commissioner in Sind) that he should wire when "Patrick Stewart" actually sails, and that in telegraphing to Sir A. Hardinge we should tell him that the actual date of sailing will be communicated to him.

5-4-04. C. H. HILL.

The file is not in Camp. I had to work there with only the last two telegrams as the file was said to have been sent up here. What I require is the antecedent telegrams, especially Sir A. Hardinge's messages about the action to be taken to enable him to present his note to the Shah. Please see if we have not got spare copies here. Every time we move there is a bungle of this kind. We do not get papers at Calcutta because they have been sent to Simla and on arrival here they are said to be in Camp or at Calcutta or somewhere else.

5-4-04. L. W. DANE.

The file has arrived from Calcutta. Please see last communication from Sir A. Hardinge, in which he asks us to let him know *when the ship has left Karachi*.

We should *now* telegraph—

(*a*) To Director-General, Persian Gulf Telegraph, asking him to wire when the ship is actually about to weigh anchor.

(*b*) To Political Resident, Persian Gulf, repeating Director's reply of 4th.

(*c*) To Admiral Atkinson Willes advising him of the date of departure of the "Patrick Stewart."

In (*a*) we should ask that the Commander of the "Patrick Stewart" be directed to communicate with officer commanding gun-boat if this is necessary.

After we get a reply to (*a*) we must telegraph to Sir A Hardinge.

Drafts below.

6-4-04. C. H. HILL.

Issue the telegram to Viceroy's Camp and put the others, including that to Tehran, into cypher so that they may issue as soon as we receive His Excellency's orders.

6-4-04. L. W. DANE.

Telegram, dated the 6th April 1904.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—Foreign with Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp.

Director, Gulf Section, telegraphs "Patrick Stewart" will start about 8th instant, reaching Henjam on 12th. Connection can be made in about three days. I propose to inform Hardinge accordingly and to issue necessary instructions to Admiral and Kemball. Exact date and hour of starting will also be telegraphed to Tehran. Does Viceroy approve?

Telegram, dated the 7th April 1904.

From—Foreign with Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp, Panbari,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram 6th April. Henjam cable. Viceroy approves.

TELEGRAM TO THE COMMISSIONER IN SIND, No. 1054-E. A., DATED THE 7TH APRIL 1904.

Directs him to instruct the Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, to telegraph the exact date and hour of starting of the "Patrick Stewart." P.Co.No.355

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Pro.no.356 TELEGRAM TO REAR-ADMIRAL ATKINSON WILLES, No. 1055-E.A., DATED THE 7TH APRIL 1904.

Repeats telegram from the Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, and communicates orders.

Pro.no.357 TELEGRAM TO RESIDENT, BUSHIRE, No. 1056-E. A., DATED THE 7TH APRIL 1904.

Repeats telegram from Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs.

Pro.no.358 TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTER AT TEHRAN, No. 1057-E. A., DATED THE 7TH APRIL 1904.

Gives particulars and adds that the time of starting of the "Patrick Stewart" will be telegraphed to him.

Pro.no.359 TELEGRAM FROM THE COMMISSIONER IN SIND, KARACHI, DATED (AND RECEIVED) 8TH APRIL 1904.

With reference to Foreign Department telegram No. 1054-E.A., dated the 7th instant, states that the Director replies that the "Patrick Stewart" leaves at noon on the 9th April and that the Commander has been instructed in accordance with orders.

Issue the telegram below.

8-4-04. L. W. DANE.

Pro.no.360 TELEGRAM TO HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, TEHRAN, No. 1071-E. A., DATED THE 8TH APRIL 1904.

Communicates the above information.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 44 F. D.—15-4-04.—31.—C. P.

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

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TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, TEHRAN, No. 62, DATED 10TH (RECEIVED 11TH) APRIL 1904. P.o.no. 361

Repeats a telegram to the Foreign Office, London, stating that on receiving intimation from the Government of India that the telegraph ship had left Karachi, he had addressed a note to the Persian Government, a copy of which accompanied his despatch No. 62, dated the 30th March 1904.

Repeat to Viceroy's Camp.

11-4-04. C. L. S. RUSSELL.

Telegram, dated 11th April 1904.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—Foreign with Viceroy, Camp.

Following telegram from Hardinge, dated 10th April :—*Begins.* The Government of India having * * * Addressed to the Foreign Office, London. *Ends.*

This case is submitted for information in connection with the Bir Musa-Sanb incident. The *Patrick Stewart* should reach Henjam on 13th.

12-4-04. L. W. DANE.

12-4-04. C[URZON].

ENCLOSURES IN A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE, No. 12, DATED THE 18TH MARCH (RECEIVED 11TH APRIL) 1904. P.o.no. 362 365

Forwards copies of correspondence regarding the proposed telegraph station at Henjam.

For information. No orders.

G. L. T.,—16-4-04.

C. H. C.,—16-4-04.

17-4-04. C. L. S. RUSSELL.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 131 F. D.—19-4-04.—37.

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

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FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

NOTES.

AGGRESSIVE ACTION OF THE PERSIANS AT TAMB AND ABU MUSA.
HOISTING OF PERSIAN FLAG ON THE ISLAND OF TAMB.

TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 10TH (RECEIVED 11TH APRIL) 1904.

Pol. No. 366

States that the Persian flag has been hoisted on the island of Tamb, where two Persian Tufangchis have been appointed as guards, and that information has also been received of the appointment of guards at Abu Musa.

Telegram, dated the 11th April 1904.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The Private Secretary to the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp.

Kemball telegraphs 10th April as follows:—*Begins.* "Having received information * * * * * * * * not repeated this telegram to Tehran. *Ends.*

Telegram from—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The Private Secretary to the Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp.

In continuation of repetition of Kemball's telegram the following draft to Secretary of State is suggested for Viceroy's consideration :—*Begins* :

Following from Kemball :—*Begins.* Having received information * * * Arab flag being reinstated. *Ends.* The flag of Sheikh of Shargah was formally hoisted in summer of 1903 on Abu Musa and Tamb with approval of Government of India, *vide* papers forwarded with Secretary's letter 18th June 1903. We propose to request Admiral to send gunboat with representative of Sheikh to haul down Persian flag and replace Arab colours and to remove Persian guard to Persian territory. Please telegraph if you approve. This unwarranted infringement of rights of British-protected Chief may prove useful in event of Persian remonstrance regarding removal of flagstaff standing on plinth of old telegraph station at Henjam, mentioned in paragraph 9 of our Despatch No. 16, Secret External, dated the 21st January 1904.

Addressed Secretary of State for India; repeated to Tehran and to Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station. *Ends.*

Papers about Abu Musa posted to-day.

Nothing could have occurred more opportunely than this act of Persian aggression on Abu Musa and Tamb. I have always felt a little apprehension as to how our action in removing the pole, which the Moin-et-Tajar put up 12 years ago on the plinth of the old Telegraph Office at Henjam, would be viewed. As the Persians have not hesitated to haul down the flags of our protected Trucial Chiefs on these islands, without any reference to us, we need not have any scruples about removing a pole, on which apparently no flag has been flown, from the plinth of our building.

Immediate action will be necessary, and it will probably be desirable to secure the issue of orders to the Commander of the *Sphinx* to proceed to Abu Musa and Tamb with a representative of the Sheikh of Shargah and restore the trucial flags and remove the customs guards before or after proceeding to Henjam. We should draft a telegram explaining how and when the trucial flags were hoisted on Abu Musa and Tamb. We were only just in time and suggesting for His Excellency's consideration some such action as that noted above to be taken with the concurrence of Secretary of State.

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I am in hopes that this aggression of the Persians may enable us to take up a very firm attitude at Henjam where we ought to resist all attempts of the Persian Government to alter the *status quo* of 1868-80 as far as customs, etc., are concerned.

I think we ought also to send a telegram to Jask for the Captain of the *Patrick Stewart*. warning him to proceed very warily and after communication with the gunboat lest we have the *Mozaffari* turning him off.

The militant performances of the Belgian Customs officers in the gulf are also of interest.

L. W. Dane.

11-4-04.

Secretary's orders are to issue the draft telegram below to the Viceroy's Camp.

In view of the fact that the *Mozaffari* is reported to have returned from Abu Musa and Tamb to Bushire, no communication need be sent to meet the *Patrick Stewart* at Jask, *unless* it is possible to telegraph in some cypher to the Officer Commanding the detatchment at Jask. Enquiry has already been made by telephone from the Military Department on this point. Please put up reply immediately on receipt.

The secret collection of July 1903, Nos. 4-8, should be posted to His Excellency at once.

L. Russell.

11-4-04.

The case is submitted to Your Excellency for information with the Henjam file. The précis of correspondence (Proceedings External A., September 1888, Nos. 102-104, Proceedings No. 104) merits perusal. It will be too late now to telegraph to Jask, as the *Patrick Stewart* should reach Henjam on 13th.

It is a question if preliminary intimation of our action should be sent to the Persian Government, but, as they have hauled down the flags of our protected Chief without reference to us, it seems that we should be warranted in following their example, though it would perhaps be desirable, after their flag has been removed, to require an apology for their aggressive action.

L. W. Dane.

12-4-04.

If the Persians make a row, it may be necessary to take up the question of Sirri also I approved yesterday the issue of telegram to Secretary of State.

C[urzon].

12-4-04.

Telegram to the Secretary of State, No. 1135-E. A., dated the 13th April 1904.

Pro. no. 367

Repeats telegram from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 10th instant, and proposes to send a gunboat to haul down the Persian flag and remove the Persian guard to Persian territory.

Pro. no. 368 Telegram from Rear Admiral Atkinson-Willes, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, Aden, dated the 14th (received 15th) April 1904.

With reference to our telegram of the 13th instant sends copy of telegraphic instructions issued by him to the senior naval officer in connection with the Abu Musa and Tamb incident.

I think it will be well to inform Colonel Kemball of our recommendation to the Secretary of State and of the instructions issued by the Admiral, and to tell him that no action should be taken pending the receipt of further orders. I put up draft.

15-4-04. L. Russell.

Yes. This should issue at once.

15-4-04. C. H. Hill.

15-4-04. L. W. Dane.

Pro. no. 369 Telegram to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 1178-E. A., dated the 15th April 1904.

States that his telegram of the 10th April was repeated to the Secretary of State with the proposal to haul down the Persian flag and to remove Persian guard to Persian territory. Requests that pending receipt of further communication no action should be taken.

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TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER AT TEHRAN, No. 69, DATED (AND RECEIVED) 16TH APRIL 1904. Pro. no. 370

States that if the removal of the flagstaff from the plinth at Henjam is necessary, it should be effected with every mark of respect.

TELEGRAM FROM THE COMMANDER OF THE *Sphinx*, HENJAM, DATED (AND RECEIVED) 18TH APRIL 1904. Pro. no. 371

States that he has telegraphed to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, and to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf that the Island Ahmed-bin-Obeid belongs to the Sheikh of Debai, who says that he will resist any attempts of the Persian Government to enforce their authority on the island. Also suggests removal of the flagstaff.

Seeing that the Shah's sovereignty over Henjam is being admitted by a communication to the Persian Government regarding the re-opening of the telegraph station at Henjam, it seems advisible to do as Sir Arthur Hardinge suggests in regard to the flagstaff.

Presumably, as soon as the connection has been effected, we shall hear direct from Henjam, and it might then be possible to convey instructions on the point to the officer engaged in the re-erection of the station. But perhaps the best plan would be to telegraph to the Political Agent at Maskat as in the draft below.

18-4-04. L. RUSSELL.

I think it will be better not to import the Political Agent, Maskat—unless through the Resident—into this matter at all. He knows nothing about it at present. I put up a further telegram from the Commander of the *Sphinx*, and I submit a draft to Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

In regard to the last receipt, I think we cannot now admit any other sovereignty than that of Persia. The Sheikh of Debai no doubt regards this as an excellent opportunity for asserting his independence: and as it is more than probable that Persia has not for years interfered in the island, he has doubtless a fairly presentable case. However, though we are estopped on the present occasion from disputing Persia's sovereignty, the Sheikh's attitude may prove a useful asset in subsequent negotiations connected with Abu Musa, etc.

Deputy Secretaryi I presume, means his right to the island. He is independent.
L. W. DANE.

I do not think the Commander's telegram requires a reply at present; but it might be safer to inform him that for the moment we cannot question the Shah's sovereignty, and that, though this need not be overtly explained to the Sheikh, our action must proceed on the assumption of Persia's sovereignty, and that nothing should be done or said to lend colour to the notion that we were supporting the Sheikh's contention.

19-4-04. C. H. HILL.

The information obtained by the *Sphinx* is to the same effect as the story told to Colonel Kemball and myself by the Lingah Bagha owners whom we found in the anchorage at the north side of the island on 23rd November 1903.

Ahmed-bin-Obeid is the nephew of the Debai Sheikh, who is a very progressive Sheikh, and is not at all unlikely to urge his rights whatever they may be.

Why Sir A. Hardinge should say flag when we said flagstaff I do not know. There is and apparently never has been any flag, and at any rate it would be quite impossible for the local headman to erect it elsewhere, as there is no local headman except the Arab Sheikh and he certainly will not do this.

The fact seems to be that the Arab settlement is now sufficiently strong to hold its own, and I sincerely trust that our landing the cable at Henjam may not be the cause of the Persians coercing them with our assent and imposing customs and other taxation on them which hitherto they have not paid. I venture to hope that we shall try and maintain the *status quo* of 1868-80 and resist at any rate diplomatically any attempt of the Persian Government to exercise a more active authority in the island than they have hitherto done. I should add that the cultivation below the telegraph station was worked, if not created, by the tele-

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

graph officers, and as it covers all the area adjoining the anchorage, it will be important to revive our interests in it as soon as possible. Also I do not see why we should re-erect the pole which was put up without reference to us on our building. With deference I submit an alternative draft telegram for Your Excellency's consideration.

No orders have yet come about Abu Musa and Tamb, but Your Excellency is in correspondence with Secretary of State.

19-4-04. L. W. DANE.

The telegram to Sir A. Hardinge may issue as amended.

19-4-04. C[URZON].

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 148 F. D.—21-4-1904.—38.

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ENCLOSURE IN A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE, No. 14, DATED THE 31ST MARCH (RECEIVED 18TH APRIL) 1904. Pro. no. 372

Letter from the India Office to the Admiralty regarding the choice of Henjam as a cable station.

TELEGRAM FROM THE DIRECTOR, PERSIAN GULF TELEGRAPHS, DATED (AND RECEIVED) THE 19TH APRIL 1904. Pro. no. 373

Reports telegraphic communication with Henjam was established on the morning of the 19th April.

We may report this to the Secretary of State, Sir A. Hardinge and Colonel Kemball.

The Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, may also be informed with reference to our telegram of 22nd March, suggesting that a gun-boat should be sent to Bunder Abbas.

Drafts for approval.

G. L. T.,—20-4-04.

C. H. C.,—20-4-04.

20-4-04.	L. RUSSELL.
20-4-04.	C. H. HILL.
20-4-02.	L. W. DANE.
20-4-04.	C[URZON].

TELEGRAM TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 1265-E.A., DATED THE 21ST APRIL 1904. Pro. no. 374

Reports telegraphic communication was established with Henjam on the 19th April 1904.

TELEGRAM TO HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, TEHRAN, No. 1266-E.A., DATED THE 21ST APRIL 1904; REPEATED TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIES STATION, ADEN.) Pro. no. 375

Reports telegraphic communication with Henjam was established on 19th April 1904.

TELEGRAM TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 1324-E.A., DATED THE 25TH APRIL 1904.

Regarding the Persian claims to the Island of Tamb.

TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED (AND RECEIVED) THE 25TH APRIL 1904.

States it would be convenient if he could receive further instructions before he leaves Maskat.

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

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

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TELEGRAM TO HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER AT TEHRAN, No. 1236-E.A., DATED THE 20TH APRIL 1904. P.20. no. 376

With reference to his telegram No. 69, dated the 16th April, states that there apparently has never been any Persian flag on Henjam, and that the pole, which will be quietly removed, need not be re-erected.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER AT TEHRAN, No. 74, DATED THE 20TH (RECEIVED 21ST) APRIL 1904. P.20. no. 377

Repeats his telegram addressed to the Foreign Office, London, suggesting that before hauling down the Persian flag it would be courteous to give the Persians a chance of removing it themselves.

It may be well to telegraph to the Resident at Bushire to send to Sir Arthur Hardinge copies of the correspondence of 1903, regarding Abu Musa and Tamb, forwarded to India Office with Secretary's letter of the 18th June 1903; also to let Sir Arthur Hardinge know that we have done this, and to invite his attention to some of the principal communications addressed from Bushire to Tehran on the subject of the status of these islands, which resembles that of Sirri prior to the Persian seizure in 1887, *e.g.*—

No. 8, Secret E., July 1903, Nos. 4-8.

No. 103, External A, September 1888, Nos. 102-104. From Colonel Ross to Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, dated the 19th August 1888;

No. 80, Secret E., November 1895, Nos. 79-85. From Colonel Wilson to Sir Mortimer Durand, dated the May 1895; and

No. 369, Secret E., July 1899, Nos. 368-369. From Colonel Meade to Sir Mortimer Durand, dated the 13th December 1898.

I submit two draft messages for consideration.

21-4-04. C. L. S. RUSSELL.

The results of acquiescence and remonstrance—the policy pursued in the case* of Sirri in 1887-88—do not encourage acceptance of the proposal to invite the Persian Government to haul down their flag themselves; and they would probably be more ready to acquiesce in our doing it than in themselves, under pressure, climbing down.

* External A, September 1888, Nos. 102-104.

Sir A. Hardinge's telegram was to the Foreign Office. I think our reply ought to be repeated to Secretary of State. I have added to the draft, which is for approval.

22-4-04. C. H. HILL.

I am not certain if the addition proposed by Deputy Secretary is necessary.

22-4-04. L. W. DANE.

I think that Deputy Secretary's draft as amended is all right.

22-4-04. C[URZON].

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 1305-E. A., DATED THE 23RD APRIL 1904. P.20. no. 378

Requests him to forward to Tehran copies of certain correspondence regarding Tamb and Abu Musa.

TELEGRAM TO HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER AT TEHRAN, No. 1306-E. A., DATED THE 23RD APRIL 1904. P.20. no. 379.

States that the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf has been requested to forward to him copies of the correspondence referred to in his telegram of the 20th April to the Secretary of State relative to Tamb and Abu Musa.

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

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Pro. No: 380 TELEGRAM FROM HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, DATED THE 22ND (RECEIVED 23RD) APRIL 1904.

Enquires whether we have any other information as to the invalidity of the Persian claims to the islands.

Pro. No: 381 FROM THE OFFICIATING POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 107, DATED THE 15TH (RECEIVED 23RD) APRIL 1904.

In continuation of his telegram of the 10th April, intimates that the Persian flag has also been hoisted on Abu Musa. Forwards copies of correspondence on the same subject.

Two receipts—

(1) The entire question of the Persian claim to the islands in question has been explained in Proceedings No. 104 of External A., September 1888, Nos. 102-104, and there are no papers previous to those referred to therein.

We may reply to the Secretary of State as in the draft below.

(2) In his letter Colonel Kemball informs us that the Persian flag has been hoisted on Abu Musa as well. This calls for some action in addition to that already proposed with regard to Abu Musa when it was originally reported that guards only have been placed there.

P. C.,—23-4-04.

C. H. C.,—23-4-04.

The Secretary of State may be referred to the papers cited in our telegram of to-day to Tehran. These seem conclusively to disprove the Persian claim. It will be well also to add mention of the appeal made by the Chief of Shargah (*vide* Colonel Kemball's letter of the 15th April just received) and of the details reported by the Commander of the *Lawrence* of what took place at Abu Musa.

I submit a draft for consideration.

14-4-04. C. L. S. RUSSELL.

I agree. Draft is for approval. Copies of the papers received with Colonel Kemball's letter should go home by next mail.

24-4-04. C. H. HILL.

The letter has arrived very opportunely. The draft telegram is for Your Excellency's approval.

24-4-04. L. W. DANE.

24-4-04. C[URZON].

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 225 F. D.—26-4-04.—86.

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(Pro. No 382.)

TELEGRAM TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 1324-E.A., DATED THE 25TH APRIL 1904.

Regarding the Persian claims to the Island of Tamb.

(Pro. No. 383.)

TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED AND RECEIVED THE 25TH APRIL 1904.

States it would be convenient if he could receive further instructions before he leaves Maskat.

Orders from the Secretary of State have not yet been received, and it is not likely that we will be in a position to issue definite instructions before Colonel Kemball's departure from Maskat.

C. H. C.,—26-4-04.

No orders.

26-4-04. L. RUSSELL.

26-4-04. C. H. A. HILL.

Submitted for information. We could not I am afraid remind Secretary of State.

26-4-04. L. W. DANE.

27-4-04. C[URZON].

ENCLOSURE IN A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE, No. 15, DATED THE 8TH (RECEIVED 25TH) APRIL 1904. (Pro. No 384.)

Copy of a telegram from the Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge, regarding the telegraph cable at Henjam. (Pro. No 385.)

TELEGRAM FROM HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, DATED THE 27TH (RECEIVED 28TH) APRIL 1904.

Requests supply of copies of certain correspondence, referred to in our telegram of the 25th April, which are not traceable in the London Foreign Office.

We may send copies of the correspondence required, with Secretary's weekly letter by next mail, and wire accordingly to the Secretary of State.

Memorandum to India Office and draft telegram submitted for approval.

C. H. C.,—28-4-04.

28-4-04. L. RUSSELL.

29-4-04. C. H. A. HILL.

Were not the proceedings containing the letters sent home? If they were, we ought to give references to the proceedings also in the telegram which can issue.

29-4-04. L. W. DANE.

The letters in question are contained in Secret proceedings which are not sent home to the Secretary of State.

C. H. C.,—29-4-04.

The telegram may issue as drafted.

29-4-04. L. RUSSELL.

TELEGRAM TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 1388-E. A., DATED THE 29TH APRIL 1904. (Pro. No 386.)

Advises despatch of papers called for.

Memorandum of papers forwarded to the India Office with Foreign Secretary's letter No. 18-M., dated the 5th May 1904. (Pro. No 387.)

Memorandum of papers forwarded to the India Office with Foreign Secretary's weekly letter No. 18-M., dated the 5th May 1904. (Pro. No 388.)

G. C. Press, Simla—No. 340 F. D.—7-5-04.—E. A. D'S.

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

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

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, SECRET E, JUNE 1904.

Establishment of Telegraphic communication with Henjam.

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

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

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Pro. No. 300

Telegram, No. 90, dated the 26th June 1903.

From—His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Please see your despatch of the 7th May to the India Office, Henjam.

It would be simpler, simultaneously with the re-opening of the station, to announce to the Persian Government that difficulties of communication with our Consulate at Bunder Abbas had led us to avail ourselves once more of the Shah's permission which was given to us in 1868, there being, we hoped, no doubt (?) that the Persian Government would authorise a further extension of the line for 50 miles from Henjam to Bunder Abbas itself. The Persians will not, I imagine, dispute our right once we confront them with an accomplished fact; but if we notified our intention beforehand, they might create difficulties, as their suspicion would certainly be aroused. The chief of the Indo-European Department thinks that, unless there is urgent reason for immediate action, the re-opening of the station had better be deferred till September at the earliest on account of the heat.

A despatch on the subject follows by mail.

Repeated to the Foreign Office, London.

(Received with letter from the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, No. 26, dated the 12th June 1903.)

India Office,
10th June 1903.

Sir,

Pro. No. 301

With reference to your letter of the 16th August 1900, relative to the proposal of the Government of India for the establishment of telegraphic communication with Maskat and with Bunder Abbas, I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to enclose, for Lord Lansdowne's information, a copy of a letter from the Government of India, No. 56, dated 7th May, and enclosures, with regard to the latter project.

As Lord Lansdowne is aware, the construction of a cable to Maskat was carried out at the cost of Indian revenues, and the line opened for traffic in November 1901.

The Government of India now propose that the establishment of telegraphic communication with Bunder Abbas should be undertaken, and submit estimates for effecting this object by diverting the existing cable to the island of Henjam, and extending it thence to Bunder Abbas, either by a cable or by a land line over Kishm, at a cost varying from £18,539 to £11,835.

The scheme, in either of the forms proposed, may raise the question whether the permission granted by the Persian Government to the Government of India in 1868 to occupy Henjam for telegraphic purposes still holds good. A copy of their letter has been furnished by the Government of India to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, whose views will no doubt be reported to Lord Lansdowne in due course.

With regard to the question of incidence of cost, Lord George Hamilton gathers from your letter above referred to that the proposal that the cost of this project (should it be decided upon) should be divided between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers in equal shares, will not be considered unreasonable in view of the fact that the Maskat cable has been paid for wholly out of Indian revenues.

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Lord George Hamilton will be glad to be placed in possession of Lord Lansdowne's views as soon as Sir Arthur Hardinge has reported upon the subject.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
A. GODLEY.

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

P.20.20.302

No. 1494 E., dated Simla, the 6th July 1903 (Confidential).

From—The Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,
To—H. WHITBY SMITH, Esq., Director of Persian Gulf Telegraphs.

I am directed to refer to your confidential letter No. 476, dated the 14th April 1903, regarding telegraphic connection with Henjam and Bunder Abbas.

2. I am to enquire, with reference to paragraph 2 of your letter, how long it would take (approximately) to make up the necessary cables at Manora, in the event of it being decided to obtain the material for their construction from England.

P.20.20.303

No. 903, dated Karachi, the 9th July 1903 (Confidential).

From—H. WHITBY SMITH, Esq., Director of Persian Gulf Telegraphs,
To—The Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With reference to your No. 1494 E. of the 6th July 1903, I have the honour to say that we can make up at Manora about one knot of cable a day.

2. At this rate of working the time required for each alternative scheme would be as given below :—

Estimate A, Scheme I, in conjunction with Estimate C (I)—107 knots of cable	...	...	107 days.
Estimate A, Scheme I, in conjunction with Estimate C (II)—76 knots of cable	...	...	76 „
Estimate A, Scheme II, in conjunction with Estimate C (I)—82 knots of cable	...	...	82 „
Estimate A, Scheme II, in conjunction with Estimate C (II)—51 knots of cable	...	...	51 „

P.20.20.304

No. 22, dated Gulahek, the 27th June 1903 (Secret).

From—SIR ARTHUR HARDINGE, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 930 E. of 11th May, enclosing one from the Government of India to Lord George Hamilton of 7th May, on the subject of Henjam.

In accordance with the wish expressed in paragraph 5 of the latter despatch, I have to-day sent a telegram to the Government of India on this subject,

To Foreign Office, No. 97 (Secret).

which I have repeated to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

I have the honour to transmit herewith a despatch which I am addressing to His Lordship, but which, as my monthly courier to England has left two days ago, I shall not be able, unless a safe opportunity for sending it should arise in the interval, to transmit till the 2nd proximo.

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

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No. 97.

(Secret.)

Gulahek, Enc. No. 304
27th June 1903.

My Lord,

I had the honour to receive, too late however to act on it in time for my last courier, a despatch, dated the 11th ultimo, from the Government of India on the subject of Henjam.

It enclosed one dated May, the 7th, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, calling attention to the expediency of (1) re-opening the Indo-European Telegraph Department station on that island, and (2) connecting it by cable with Bunder Abbas, and suggesting that I should lay my views on these proposals before Your Lordship at the earliest possible date.

After conferring yesterday with Mr. Barker, the Director of the Persian Section of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, I addressed to Your Lordship my telegram No. 84 of 26th June, and I have the honour to offer in additon thereto the following observations.

If it is desired—and I personally agree that it is desirable—to strengthen our position at the entrance of the Persian Gulf by re-opening the station at Henjam and connecting it with Bunder Abbas, it would, I think, be a mistake to discuss the question with the Persian Government beforehand. Your Lordship is aware of the exaggerated suspicions which that Government, and especially the Shah, entertain of our designs on the Persian Gulf—suspicions which are constantly being fostered by Russia, and of which we had an illustration only two months ago when His Imperial Majesty made difficulties about securing the advance of 4th April on the revenues of the Customs of the Gulf Ports. An announcement of our intention to re-occupy Henjam would probably be met by a request which we could not well consistently with courtesy refuse, to defer its execution for the present, and in the meantime the Persian Government might discover that circumstances had changed since 1868, that they could not revive the permission then granted without giving some equivalent to other Powers, which they were unwilling to do, that it would be unfriendly of us to place them in so embarrassing a position and so forth.

The simplest plan would seem to be, when we decide upon re-opening the station to send a telegraph ship from Karachi to Henjam with the materials for erecting the buildings authorised by the Persian Government in 1868, and the necessary staff, which would land on the island and proceed to take possession of a site, previously selected after careful examination. It would be better that the buildings should at first be readymade wooden or tin houses, which could easily be put together by workmen from India, so that they should already be partially complete by the time news of our action reached Tehran. Should any petty local or Customs authority of Kishm oppose, as he might do, their erection, pending orders from Tehran, it would probably be sufficient to exhibit to him a certified copy of the authorisation given in 1868 by the Persian Government, but it would be desirable that a gun-boat should join the telegraph ship to lend weight to this argument, if necessary. I believe that it is quite usual for one or other of His Majesty's ships in the Persian Gulf to be for purposes of musketry practice at Bassidore, so that its presence at or off Henjam simultaneously with the arrival of the telegraph ship would not of itself arouse any comment.

As soon as the occupation was sufficiently complete, I should, on receipt of a telegram to that effect, address a note to the Persian Government in some such terms as these. "The absence of telegraphic communication between Tehran, Bushire, and Bunder Abbas has, since the establishment of a British Vice-Consulate at the latter port, been a great source of inconvenience to the British and Indian Governments. They have, in order to bring the Legation at Tehran and the Residency at Bushire into closer and more frequent communication with the British Vice-Consulate at Bunder Abbas, decided to avail themselves of the permission given them by the Persian Government in 1868, and to re-establish the telegraph station at Henjam, whose erection the Persian Government then authorised. But the re-opening of this station, though it considerably increases the facilities of telegraphic communication with Bunder

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

Abbas, and is of value for other departmental and technical reasons, does not fulfil all the requirements of the case, and we therefore ask permission of the Persian Government to link it at our own expense, if necessary, across the island of Kishm with the port of Bunder Abbas, distant 40 to 50 miles to the north, an arrangement which would be of great benefit to Persian as well as British interests".

It is possible that the Persian Government may express surprise at our having, after so long an interval, re-opened a station in their territory without previous consultation with them. It will not, however, be difficult to dispose of any arguments which they may use to this effect. Whether they will consent to the extension to Bunder Abbas or not, I cannot hazard a definite opinion, but I should think they could probably be persuaded to do so, if they see us already in possession at Henjam. They would, of course, much prefer that there should be no telegraph station at either place, but the existence of one at Henjam would, I think, rather weaken their objection to the extension of the cable for so short a distance as 40 miles to Bunder Abbas.

Mr. Barker is of opinion that the re-opening of the station at Henjam should, if possible, be deferred till the end of the hot weather, *i.e.*, till the latter part of September or beginning of October.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

The Marquess of Lansdowne, K.G.,
&c., &c., &c.

Pro. no. 305

No. 872, dated Colombo, the 2nd July 1903 (Confidential).

From—HIS EXCELLENCY REAR-ADMIRAL SIR CHARLES DRURY, K.C.I.E., Commander-in-Chief, East Indian Station,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Military (Marine) Department.

With reference to your telegram of 29th April last, I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council, a tracing of a survey of the anchorage between Henjam and Kishm.

2. Commanders Thomas W. Kemp and Boyle T. Somerville state in their report:—

"* * * We do not consider Henjam Island a suitable place for a defended establishment. The amount of anchorage protected from the prevailing winds is very small, and the holding ground bad. The tidal streams are said to run 3 knots at springs. It is open to attack on two sides.

"To improve the harbour by means of engineering works would be difficult, and, in our opinion, not worth the labour and expense".

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

Tracing from Admiralty Chart 2837-a.

PLAN OF HENJAM ISLAND

Showing in red additional soundings etc.
H. M. S. “SPHINX”
June 1903.

No. 3,088-L., 1904.

I. B., Topo. Dy. No. 5,156.
Rkd. W. P., June 1904

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

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

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Telegram, No. 1767 E., dated the 4th August 1903.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,

To—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

Please refer to our despatch, dated the 7th May. Admiral Drury has informed us that Commanders Somerville and Kemp regard Henjam as bad anchorage, and as unsuitable place for defended establishment. They consider Clarence Straits best naval station at east end of Gulf. In these circumstances, Bassidore might be preferable to Henjam as site for telegraph station, cable running thence *via* Clarence Straits to Bunder Abbas. This would also minimise Persian objections anticipated in Hardinge's despatch of 27th June, since our rights to do as we please at Bassidore are incontestable. Sanction to land at Henjam or at Bassidore, as preferred by Admiralty, might be communicated, in the event of our views as to the necessity for a cable station being approved.

No. 1848 E., dated Simla, the 12th August 1903.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—His Excellency Rear-Admiral G. L. Atkinson-Willes, Naval Commander-in-Chief on the East Indian Station, C/o the Senior Naval Officer, Bombay.

I am directed to refer to Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Drury's letter No. 872, dated the 2nd July 1903, to the address of the Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department, regarding the survey of the anchorage between Henjam and Kishm.

2. The Government of India will be glad to receive a complete copy of the report on the subject by Commanders Kemp and Somerville, together with an expression of Your Excellency's views as to its bearing on the question of improving telegraphic communications in the Persian Gulf, referred to in the letter from Your Excellency's predecessor marked on the margin.

No. 980, dated the 22nd May 1903.

Foreign Office Press—No. 904—22-8-03—40.

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

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(Received on the 2nd September 1902, with letter from the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, No. 35, dated the 14th August 1903.)

Admiralty to India Office.

M. 0827. 24th July 1903. Pol. no. 308

SIR,

I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for India in Council, copy of a letter which was addressed to the Foreign Office on the 21st instant and of its enclosures, relative to the proposed establishment of telegraphic communication with Bunder Abbas.

I am, etc.,
(Sd.) C. I. THOMAS.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.

M. 0827. 21st July 1903. Encl. no: 308

SIR,

My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having had under their consideration your letters of the 23rd ultimo and 6th instant, relative to the proposal to establish telegraphic communication with Henjam and Bunder Abbas, desire me to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, a copy of a letter, dated 22nd May last, No. 312-980, which has been received on the subject from the late Commander-in-Chief on the East Indies Station.

2. My Lords concur in Sir C. Drury's view that so far as Naval interests are concerned, communication by telegraph with Henjam is of more importance than communication with Bunder Abbas; and they are also in agreement with him in his suggestion that the question of the choice of site should be deferred and considered in relation to the report on the hydrographic conditions of the Gulf which may shortly be expected to be rendered by Commander H. B. T. Somerville, R. N. (*vide* Admy. letter M. of 11th March last, and subsequent correspondence).

3. As regard the suggestion of the Director General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence that the necessary communication might be established by means of wireless telegraphy, I am to state that this Department has no information which would enable it to say whether a wireless telegraph installation (and especially the batteries) would or would not be adversely affected by the climatic conditions in the Persian Gulf. The initial cost of three wireless telegraph stations at Henjam, Kishm and Bunder Abbas, would be approximately £4,000, but this estimate is exclusive of the charges for the transport and erection of the apparatus, and also of the charges for the erection of any buildings which might be required. The cost of up-keep and maintenance cannot be stated, as sufficient experience has not yet been gained to allow of an estimate being given; but for such a short line, the cost would probably be more than that incidental to the up-keep of a cable line. It would also be necessary to pay the operators at a higher rate than that offered to ordinary telegraphists.

4. In any case, wireless telegraphy could not be regarded as a sure means of communication in its present undeveloped state; and as it is impossible to send messages in both directions at the same time as in the case of a cable or land line, the rate of telegraphing would be necessarily slow.

6. For these reasons Their Lordships are inclined to the opinion that the extension of communication in the Gulf by means of wireless telegraphy could not be depended on to yield satisfactory results.

I am, etc.,
(Sd.) C. I. THOMAS.

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

Rear-Admiral Sir C. Drury to Admiralty.

No. 312-980.

Sub Enc. 1
Enc. No. 308

"Highflyer" at Trincomali,

22nd May 1903.

(*Already received* vide *Enclosure to Pro. No. 214 in S. E., July 1903, Nos. 192-214.*)

Foreign Office to India Office.

3rd August 1903.

SIR,

With reference to your letter of the 10th June, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, copies of letters from the Intelligence Division of the War Office and the Admiralty * containing their observations on the proposed establishment of telegraphic communication with Henjam, Kishm, and Bunder Abbas.

* Admiralty, dated 21st July.

It will be observed that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty concur with the Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies Station in attaching greater importance to the establishment of telegraphic communication with Henjam than with Bunder Abbas, and in thinking that the question of a choice of site should be deferred and considered in relation to a report on the hydrographic conditions of the Persian Gulf which is shortly expected.

Lord Lansdowne is awaiting a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran which, as appears from Sir A. Hardinge's telegram No. 84 of June 26th, will probably be received at an early date, and, upon its receipt, a further communication will be addressed to you.

I am, etc.,
(Sd.) T. H. SANDERSON.

Intelligence Division, War Office, to Foreign Office.

Sub Enc 2
Enc No. 308

Winchester House, St. James' Square,

July 1, 1903.

The Director of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and in reply to his note of the 23rd ultimo forwarding correspondence received from the India Office on the subject of the establishment of telegraphic communication with Bunder Abbas, begs to observe that, on the general question of the desirability of establishing such communication he has little to add to the views expressed by Sir J. Ardagh in his letter of July 30, 1900.

The three years that have since elapsed have witnessed no diminution in the general activity displayed by Russia in Persia, whilst it may be said that every day the necessity grows more manifest for upholding our own interests at the Gulf Ports.

Moreover, it will be remembered that the conference on the Persian question held at the Foreign Office, on November 19th, 1902, recommended that Indian troops should occupy Bunder Abbas and the adjoining islands of Kishm, Henjam, and Ormuz (*a*) in the event of war, or (*b*) in the event or anticipation of disorders occurring in Persia, which might lead to a Russian occupation of the Northern districts of that country.

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

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For these reasons Sir W. Nicholson is in favour of the (?) proposed by the Government of India and considers that, as in either of the contingencies above referred to it would be of considerable military advantage to have direct telegraphic communication between Henjam, Kishm and Bunder Abbas, one of the Jask-Bushire cables should be landed at Henjam, and communication should be established thence with Bunder Abbas across the island of Kishm.

He would suggest, however, that the Admiralty should be asked to state whether communication could be effectively ensured by the installation of wireless telegraphy stations on the islands of Henjam, Kishm and at Bunder Abbas, and if so, whether the adoption of this system would be more economical than the laying of a land line across the islands and of intermediate cables.

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G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 1176 F. D.—12-9-03.—44.—S. C. M.

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

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

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Received with letter from the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, No. 37, dated the 28th August (received 14th September) 1903.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Pers. no. 309

17th August 1903.

SIR,

With reference to your letter of the 10th June last, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, containing his recommendations with regard to the proposed establishment of telegraphic communication with Bunder Abbas.

I am to request that you will lay this despatch before the Secretary of State for India, and that you will inform him that Lord Lansdowne is prepared to approve the mode of procedure suggested by Sir A. Hardinge.

I am, etc.,

(Sd.) CHARLES HARDINGE.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Foreign Office.

Enc. no. 309

No. 97.

GULAHEK;

Secret.

26th June 1903.

(Received before.)

INDIA OFFICE;

26th August 1903.

SIR,

I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Hardinge's letter of the 17th August, forwarding a copy of Sir A. Hardinge's despatch No. 97 of the 27th June last, relative to the proposed establishment of telegraphic communication with Bunder Abbas.

Lord George Hamilton has communicated to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty a copy of the Viceroy's telegram of the 4th August, in which it is suggested that Bassidore might be preferred by the Admiralty to Henjam as a site for a telegraph station; and has asked to be favoured with the opinion of the Lords Commissioners.

In the meantime, I am to request, with reference to the 5th paragraph of Sir A. Godley's letter of the 10th June last, that Lord George Hamilton may be favoured with Lord Lansdowne's views upon the question of the incidence of the cost of the scheme.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient servant,

(Sd.) H. WALPOLE.

The Under Secretary of State,

Foreign Office.

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

10

Pol. no. 310

INDIA OFFICE;
26th August 1903.

SIR,

With reference to Mr. Thomas' letter of the 24th July last, relative to the proposed establishment of telegraphic communication with Bunder Abbas, I am directed by Lord George Hamilton to enclose a copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, in which a suggestion is made that, in view of the unsuitability of Henjam as an anchorage, reported by Commanders Kemp and Somerville, Bassidore might be considered to be a preferable site for a telegraph station, whence the connection with Bunder Abbas might be made.

Lord George Hamilton will be glad to be favoured with the opinion of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty upon the subject.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient servant,

(Sd.) H. WALPOLE.

The Secretary,
Admiralty.

Pol. no. 311

Telegram, dated the 21st September 1903.

From—SIR A. HARDINGE, Tehran,

To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

I have sent the following telegram to the Foreign Office:—Henjam No. 127. We have not been able to trace among our records the original Persian of Shah's authorities of 1868. Unless further search is successful, the procedure suggested in my Secret Despatch No. 97, June 26th, must, under these circumstances, be modified, I think.

Sent to India.

2

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 1299 F. D.—5-10-03.—40.—J. D.

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P.20.No.312

No. 872, dated 6th September 1903.

From—His Excellency Rear Admiral George Atkinson Willes, Commander-in-Chief, East Indian Station,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In reply to your letter of 12th ultimo, No. 1848-E., referring to my Predecessor's letter of 2nd July last addressed to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department, I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of His Excellency the Governor General of India in Council, that the report by Commanders Thomas W. Kemp and H. Boyle T. Somerville on their recent survey of Henjam and Kishm is as follows :—

"We do not consider Henjam Island a suitable place for a defended establishment. The amount of anchorage protected from the prevailing winds is very small, and the holding ground bad. The tidal streams are said to run 3 knots at springs. It is open to attack on two sides. To improve the harbour by means of engineering works would be difficult and, in our opinion, not worth the labour and expense.

The anchorage off Laft Point in the Clarence Straits forms a good harbour for the largest ships, and is thoroughly well protected from all winds.

East of a line joining Laft Point with the southern * point of the opposite shore, the water is too deep and the bottom too hard for convenient anchorage.

There are wide drying banks of mud and sand off the northern shore, except at the southern point before mentioned (see *) where it is rocky for a short distance, with the drying edge only 30 or 40 yards from High Water mark, and with deep water close to. The land at the back on the northern side is quite flat up to the foot of some high hills about 3 miles back. A good rain-water supply could probably be obtained from these hills by building reservoirs.

On the southern side (Kishm Island), the water is fairly deep close to Laft Point, and we consider that this would be the better side for a naval establishment. The land slopes gently upwards to a height of 60 feet and probably good well water could be obtained in the vicinity.

The bottom in the anchorage space is fine sand and shells, and seems to be good holding ground. The tidal streams run through both the main channels, and that leading to the south past Laft Point at a rate of about 2 knots at springs.

The advantages of this place may be summarised as follows :—

Good existing anchorage for a large number of ships, (which could be increased by dredging).

Complete shelter from all winds.

Deep water close to the shore on both sides at certain places.

Easily defended from attack either by bombardment or torpedo.

No necessity for extensive engineering works.

Water supply probably easily obtainable.

The disadvantages are :—

Three approaches to be defended.

Rapidity of tidal streams.

Excessive heat in summer.

1

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

/2

We are not in a position to judge of the facility for railway connection with the interior, but it would certainly have to be brought through mountainous and probably barren country."

2. Commander Kemp, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, recommends that "instead of establishing a telegraph station at Henjam and thence across Kishm Island to Bunder-Abbas, it would be better to loop up Basidu and take the cable from thence, through Clarence Straits, to Bunder-Abbas." If Basidu were looped up to the existing cable, it could be connected to Bunder-Abbas by sea through Clarence Straits, or by land by the Island of Kishm, but for the expense the former is much to be preferred.

Telegram, dated Simla, the 7th October 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

P. No. 3/3

To—His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, East Indian Station (Care of Senior Naval Officer, Bombay).

Your 872, dated 6th September; would you kindly send complete copy of Kemp Somerville report with charts appended.

2

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 1364 F. D.—19-10-03.—44.—H. N. B.

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

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13

Confidential.

Pers. No. 314

No. 872, dated the 16th October 1903.

From—George Atkinson Willes, Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief, East Indian Station,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

With reference to your telegram of the 8th instant addressed to Bombay, asking for a complete copy of the Kemp-Somerville report on anchorages in the Persian Gulf, with charts appended, I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of His Excellency the Governor-General of India in Council, copies of the reports in question and of the Admiralty orders under which Commanders Kemp and Somerville carried out the surveys.

2. A copy of the tracings will be handed to the Director of the Royal Indian Marine on my arrival at Bombay, as they are too confidential to send by post.

3. The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty instruct me to say that the information on Khor Musa is especially confidential, and should not be reproduced or shewn on any published map.

P. S.—Will you be good enough to acknowledge the receipt of this letter by telegraph.

Schedule of documents forwarded as enclosures in East Indies letter (confidential) No. 872 of the 16th October 1903, to the Secretary of the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Fox at Sea.
Latitude ... ... 6° 5′ N.
Longitude ... ... 94° 44′ E.
16th October 1903.

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1. Admiralty Hydrographic Instructions to Commander Somerville, dated the 18th March 1903.

2. Report on Survey by Commanders Kemp and Somerville, dated the 20th June 1903.

3. Additional Admiralty Hydrographic Instructions to Commander Somerville, dated the 8th May 1903.

4. Report on Charbar by Commanders Kemp and Somerville, dated the 1st July 1903.

Enclosure to Admiralty letter M-0360 of the 18th March 1903, to the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.

Encl. to No. 314

Forwarded to *Sphinx* in Commander-in-Chief's Memorandum of 6th April 1903, No. 872.

Hydrographic Instructions for Commander H. B. T. Somerville.

This has been received before, *vide* page 35 of correspondence in Secret E., July 1903, Nos. 192—214.

H. M. S *Sphinx*, at Sea,
20th June 1903.

In accordance with the orders conveyed in your letter of the 6th April 1903 and telegram of May 19th, 1903, we have the honour to report as follows.

1

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2. A running survey on a scale of $\frac{1}{4}$ inch to one mile has been made of the Persian Coast line, from Bu Seif to the east and of Kishm Island in order to check the correctness of that given in Admiralty charts 2837 (*a*) and (*b*), with the result that we find no material differences in detail, depths of bays, etc., and also that the published charts appear to represent the coast line with more accuracy than that of the cancelled sheets referred to in the Hydrographic Instructions.

Tracings of the coast line and soundings as determined by us are sent herewith, by which such differences as exist may be seen, and thus render further written description unnecessary.

3. We consider that the following places of those specially mentioned in our orders for examination are the only ones suitable for the purposes mentioned therein, namely.

Khor Musa and anchorage of Laft Point, Clarence Straits and of less adaptability though still possibly available the anchorage of Chiru.

In our opinion there are besides these bays and places, no others on the coast (not specifically mentioned in the orders) which are suitable.

4. The following is a description of Khor Musa and its branches.

The *Sphinx* was anchored in three different parts of the Khor, which for convenience are here termed anchorages (1), (2), (3); these positions will be seen on reference to the accompanying plans.

The character of the Khor, as given in the published chart, from the sea up to anchorage (1) is substantially correct. The lowest water at the entrance of the Khor appears to be three fathoms at L. W. springs, thus being available for large ships at H. W., the spring rise here being about 10 feet. The bottom is mud and could be easily dredged if necessary, while from the similarity of the soundings here and in the Khor obtained by us to those given on the published chart, the channel does not appear to vary periodically as in the case of the Shat-al-Arab bar.

At the entrance, Bu Seif and Daira Island being very low are only just visible in clear weather. On proceeding up the Khor, the banks on both sides become more visible, and parts of those on the eastern side uncover at L. W., thus rendering the channel easier for navigation. A rocky shoal, named Kasar-bin-Siswan, lies in the middle of the fairway, but was easily visible on both occasions of our passing it, though probably it never uncovers.

5. The *Sphinx* was anchored at the head of navigation as given on the published charts [anchorage (1)], and a rough plan of this anchorage is forwarded herewith which shows fairly clearly its main features.

6. Khor Musa continues from this spit in a north-easterly direction for 20 miles It is here navigable for the largest vessels and is not tortuous, but owing to the extreme lowness of the land on each side of the Khor, which is flooded over for a long distance at half tide, it is very difficult to find the channel except at low water, when the banks become visible.

7. The *Sphinx* was anchored at anchorage (2), which is at the head of navigation for ships, boats visited and carried running surveys up the creeks leading to Mashur and Beziza, as shown in the accompanying plan.

8. Mashur is a small village of little importance, dhows get within two miles of it.

9. As Khor Dorak, which leads to Beziza, is ascended, the water (which in the Khor Musa has a density of 18, that of ordinary sea water being 10) gradually becomes fresher, and the nature of the land on either bank changes with it from salt swamps to cultivated and pasture lands. At about 13 miles from anchorage (2), or roughly 12 miles below Beziza the water is quite fresh, and from tests applied on board ship seems to be practically of the same good quality of the Karum river water. This fresh water comes from the Jerahi river

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which rises in the mountains at some distance and expends itself in the desert, Khor Dorab being one of the places where it does so. The main stream of the Jerahi is about two miles from Beziza. We did not visit it. It would thus be easy to bring a good water-supply from the Jerahi river down to any spot in the Khor Musa, the land being everywhere flat and easily worked.

Beziza is the head of dhow navigation, and is a small village otherwise unimportant. The tidal range is about six feet at this place

There is no town of Dorak, which is the name given to the whole of this district, the chief town of which is Fellahiga, situated on the Jerahi, but the precise position of which we could not ascertain.

10. Having descended Khor Musa to anchorage (1), the *Sphinx* next proceed up Khor Bukhader, the channel leading to the north-west, as far as anchorage (3).

This Khor is navigable to this position for any draught ships, but would be too narrow for turning long ships in.

At anchorage (3) and nearly all the way up this Khor the bank is steep to, to H. W. mark, on each side, and near the head as shown on the plan the water is nearly fresh, owing to various small streams that run into it, but the country around is quite uninhabited. This Khor is probably in connection with what is known as the "Blind Karum."

Were a basin cut and dredged at anchorage (3), the harbour thus formed would possess all the advantages required by this report. As the banks here are higher and dryer, wharfage could easily be made on either bank for any number of ships. The channel here is about 400 yards wide between drying edges, and there is four fathoms within 20 yards of them, deepening rapidly to $5\frac{1}{2}$ in the middle.

12. All three of these anchorages in the Khor Musa and Bukhader possess the following advantages:—

Complete protection from all winds.

Easily defended from attack by sea, either by bombardment or torpedo attack.

Excellent possibility of connection by rail with the interior.

Unlimited fresh water-supply within easy distance.

Far better climate than in more southern parts of the Gulf.

Proximity to Euphrates and Karum river valleys.

13. The disadvantages may be summarised as follows:—

The three-fathom bar at the entrance of Khor Musa would require dredging to allow passage for ships at any state of tide.

Anchorages (1) and (2) somewhat restricted in area, but of the two we consider anchorage (1) the better. At anchorage (1) dry land is about $\frac{3}{4}$ mile from deep water and at anchorage (2) about $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile.

At anchorage (3) considerable dredging and cutting operations would be necessary to make a basin sufficiently large for turning ships in.

At all these places there is a tidal stream of not less than two knots at springs.

14. We consider that the following places in order down the coast from Khor Musa, namely—

Anchorage off Batuna,

Naband Bay,

Bay at Nakilu,

Bay at Duan,

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are all unsuitable for the purpose required, each of them being unsheltered from the Shamal, and Batuna and Duan from the south-east winter gales as well, but with extensive engineering works no doubt harbours could be made at all these places.

15. The anchorage at Chiru offers good protection from the Shamal, but it is quite open to the south-east wind on account of which artificial protection for shipping woul be required from this direction.

The land is flat sand, and the water deep close to the beach, little or no tidal stream is felt in the harbour. The place could be adequately defended by fortifications. There are steep hills at the back of the village and by construction of reservoirs a good rain water-supply could be obtained in winter. Five such reservoirs exist at present and amply supply the village. The place is too restricted for any but a small naval establishment.

* * * * * *

We have, etc.,

(Sd.) T. W. KEMP,

Commander.

(Sd.) BOYLE T. SOMERVILLE,

Commander.

Encl. No. 2
Pro. No. 314

To

Rear-Admiral
Sir C. C. Drury, K.C.S.I.,
Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.

Confidential.

Enclosure to Admiralty letter No. M-0582 of the 8th May 1903, to the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, forwarded to *Sphinx* in Memorandum No. 872 of the 8th June 1903.

Additional Hydrographic Instructions for Commander Boyle Somerville.

It is desired that a report on Chahbar Bay with reference to its capabilities for the construction of a Naval Port may be made in addition to those on places in the Gulf.

Additional soundings should be obtained and amendments to the plan made should it be found possible to do so without raising suspicions or difficulties.

Commander Kemp has already visited and reported on this Bay, but it is necessary especially to know :—

(1) Whether the deep water anywhere approaches the shore in a position which would facilitate the construction of basins.

(2) What is the nature of the bottom and whether in the shallow water it could probably be easily dredged to get the sufficient depth for large ships in basins at high water. An improvised boring rod might afford information.

(3) What is the nature of the land round the bay and inland, and how far would the tableland shown upon the chart north-east of the town, or any other elevated land serve, either to command basins or establishments from the land side, or to protect them from attack either from land or sea.

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(4) It is understood that the south-west monsoon rarely reaches Chahbar. It is desirable to ascertain whether it has ever been known to blow so far west, and also whether when it is blowing strong to the south-east, the swell occasions any inconvenience at Chahbar.

(Sd.) W. J. L. WHARTON,
Hydrographer.

8th May 1903.

Confidential.

Encl. No. 3

H.M.S. *Sphinx*, at Charbar,

July 1st, 1903.

Pers. No. 314

SIR,

In accordance with the instructions contained in your letter of June 8th, 1903, and in reply to the questions therein concerning Charbar, numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, we have the honour to report as follows.

1. Deep water no where approached the shore at a place suitable for the construction of basins. We are of the opinion that the part of the beach off Charbar village, between A and B on the attached plan, would be the best place for this purpose, if dredging operations were undertaken; this is the only part of the bay sufficiently sheltered from the monsoon swell. The three-fathom line is here at a distance of 1,500 yards from the beach Throughout the rest of the bay, the swell breaks heavily at some distance off shore, and the five-fathom line (which appears to be correctly shown on the plan of Charbar Bay Chart 50*a* Maskat to Karachi), extends so far off the shore as to preclude anchorage for any large ship near the land when the swell is setting in.

There is no beach fronting the small bay formed between Ras Kuhlab and the cliffs to the northward of it, which rise sheer and nearly perpendicular from the sea.

2. The nature of the bottom throughout the area comprised in the attached plan is sand of various degrees of fineness, with broken shells occasionally.

Between the positions marked A and B on the plan, eight borings to a depth of eight feet were made at positions of one foot below low water at a time of low low-water.

Soft sand only was found on each occasion.

The range of tide is about 10 feet, and this depth therefore represents about nineteen feet below high-water mark at this locality.

Two sectional drawings illustrating the slope of the beach at its southern and eastern faces are given on the plan of the anchorage.

3. From Charbar point to the position marked C on the plan is a sandy beach, backed by a sandy plain, which extends from the foot of the hills to the outside sea coast, and is about two miles wide, keeping this width for four or five miles along the coast to the eastward.

It is about 30 feet high with slight irregularities in the form of sand hillocks. The extreme end of Charbar point and the whole outside coast line is fronted with rock.

From position C to Tis point the hills come down very steeply to the beach. Tis point itself being a perpendicular cliff about 150 feet high.

The hills at the back of Charbar rise in a series of steps and plateaux as shown on the plan. At the spot marked D, the height by aneroid was 310 feet. The top plateau behind D is about 100 feet higher.

All the plateaux slope gradually down to Tis point, but to the eastward run nearly level.

5

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To the northward of Tis point the hills trend away to the eastward, with apparently a valley dividing the plateaux before mentioned from the hills to the north of it.

Beyond Tis the remaining shores of the bay are flat and sandy for a long distance inland, with a height in places of about 60 feet, until met by the steep cliffs adjoining Ras Kuhlab. These attain a height of about 200 feet and are generally speaking flat-topped.

There are several plateaux on the hills to the north-east of Charbar village as here described, which would serve to command any basins or establishment from the land side.

They would also serve to protect from attack by sea from the westward and south-westward, and to a limited degree from the southward, but owing to the distance batteries would probably also have to be erected along the coast from Charbar point to the eastward. Batteries on Ras Kuhlab could also assist in the defence of the port.

There are no natural advantages for protecting ships lying in the roadstead from torpedo attack.

4. The south-west monsoon as we have experienced it (June 27th—July 2nd), and as we have been given to understand from persons living here to be usual, reaches Charbar as a fresh south-south-east breeze during the day, dying away at night.

A heavy swell sets into the bay, which is little felt opposite the village of Charbar, but breaks heavily elsewhere round its entire circuit. We found landing at Charbar easy in small boats at all times.

With regard to the wind blowing strongly to the south-east, that is the Shamal, this has not been experienced by us, but we have been informed that the form of the bay gives but little protection, and that the swell runs in from the westward past Kuhlab point, causing inconvenience at Charbar, but in the event of a Shamal good shelter could be found on the opposite side of the bay. Shamals are fairly frequent in the winter.

Additional remarks.

5. The water supply at Charbar village is entirely from wells which would give a fairly good supply to a limited establishment. The normal rainfall is 5 to 6 inches, but this cannot be depended on. During the past three years there has been very little rain. For a large establishment distilling plant would probably be necessary.

6 On account of the south-south-east breeze during the monsoon the climate in summer is much more temperate, and fitted for Europeans than in the vicinity of Burder Abbas.

7. Tidal streams are scarcely felt in the bay.

8. We are of opinion that Charbar Bay is not naturally fitted for the purpose of a large Naval establishment, but by means of extensive engineering works, dredging, etc., basins and docks might possibly be constructed on the site as suggested in the foregoing part of this report, and a protecting breakwater run out from Charbar point.

9. A tracing is forwarded giving additional lines of soundings in Charbar Bay, which it will be seen agree in most cases with those given on the Admiralty plan.

We have, etc.,

(Sd.) T. W. KEMP,
Commander.

(Sd.) BOYLE T. SOMERVILLE,
Commander.

To Rear-Admiral
Sir Charles C. Drury, K.C.S.I.,
Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.

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

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Pro. no. 315

Telegram, dated the 28th October 1903.

From—The Secretary of State, London,

To—The Viceroy, Simla.

Persian Gulf Telegraph. Please see your telegram of the 4th August. Admiralty agree that Bassidore would be preferable to Henjam. British Treasury, however, decline to share the cost. Please report whether, in these circumstances, you still desire to proceed in whole or in part with the proposals for the construction of the line.

Telegram, dated Simla, the 29th October 1903.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The Director, Gulf Section, Indo-Telegraph Department, Karachi.

Pro. no. 316

Is there still time to ship cable for Bassidore link before *Patrick Stewart* leaves for Gulf, and how long would it take to lay this section ?

Telegram, dated Karachi, the 19th October 1903.

Pro. no. 317

From—The Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Impossible to do work now: eighty-four knots required, and, owing to recent extensive repairs, I have not so much in stock. It would take about a week to lay this section after arrival of ship on spot as preliminary survey of route has first to be made.

7

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 1527 F. D.—4-11-03.—54.—E. A. D'S.

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

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

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(*Received with letter from the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, No. 41, dated the 25th October 1903.*)

Pro. No. 318

Admiralty to India Office.

7th July 1903.

M-0796.

Sir,

I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you herewith, for the information of Lord George Hamilton, copy of a despatch from the Senior Naval Officer on the Persian Gulf, dated 20th May last, relative to his proceedings in the Gulf, and forwarding hydrographical remarks on Bahrein Island by Lieutenant C. M. Gibson of H.M.S. *Lapwing*.

2. A copy has also been sent to the Foreign Office.

I am, etc.,

(Sd.) C. I. THOMAS.

Commander Kemp to Admiral Drury.

H.M.S. *Sphinx* at Bushire,

20th May 1903. Enc. No. 318

Sir,

I have the honour to report that I left Maskat on the 26th April and arrived in the vicinity of the Outer Bar Buoy in the Shattal Arab on 30th April and on the next day anchored in the mouth of the Khor Musa.

On 2nd May I proceeded up the Khor Musa, anchoring the same day at the head of the Khor as shown on the chart.

From this day to 16th May I was engaged in surveying the various Khors and channels running inland, a detailed description of which, together with charts and drawings, will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.

The following are the geographical positions reached by the ship and boats :—

On 2nd May ship reached	...	...	30·19′ 22″ N	48·53′ 46″ E.
On 7th „ „ „	...	..	30·27′ 46″	49·07′ 26″
On 13th „ „ „	...	...	30·19′ 8″	48·47′ 00″
On 9th boats reached	...	...	30·35′ 00″	49·12′ 00″
On 11th „ „	...	...	30·43′ 25″	48·43′ 40″
On 14th „ „ ...	...	...	30·23′ 41″	48·30′ 00″

2. On 16th May I proceeded down Khor Musa, anchoring outside, and next day proceeded to Dilam. I visited Dilam next day and saw the Mudir who is in charge. There is a population of about 1,000 ; a considerable amount of grain is grown on the slopes of the Behbiham mountains, which is exported from Dilam to various places in the Gulf. The place is in telegraphic communication with Bushire by overland wire.

3. On 17th May I left Dilam and steamed down the three-fathom line of the coast, anchoring the same night off Rasash-Shatt.

On 18th May I arrived at Bushire where I found the *Lapwing*.

4. The movements of H.M.S. *Lapwing* have been as follows :—

She arrived at Bushire from Bahrein on 26th April having visited Ojair during her stay at Bahrein. I enclose a copy of the observations made by her with regard to this place and the channel between it and Bahrein.

1

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On 1st May she left for Koweit in accordance with a request from the Political Resident who desired to communicate with the Sheikh.

She returned to Bushire on 4th May and left for Bahrein the same day to ascertain the state of affairs in Katr.

She left Bahrein 7th May with news that the Turkish Mudir had left Bahrein for Al Bidda and had gone to Wakra. She arrived at Bushire on 8th May.

She left for Koweit 19th May at the request of the Political Resident to carry letter and get answer from the Sheikh and will arrive back here 21st May.

In the event of the Wakra affair being ended shortly, I am ordering Lieutenant Commander Oldham to ask your permission for the *Lapwing* to go to Karachi.

5. The Political Resident informs me that there is no doubt that Yusuf Beg, the new Turkish Mudir of Al Wakra, is now at that place.

The Political Resident has been informed by the Indian Governmeut that the Porte has telegraphed to the Wali of Bussorah, ordering him to have this Mudir withdrawn.

As the order has probably to go to Al Hassa, it may be some time before it is carried out.

There is no further news about Mudirs having been sent to Zubara or Odaid.

6. Bubonic plague has broken out at Bahrein, there being from ten to fifteen deaths a day from this cause.

7. I intend leaving here on the 23rd May to continue the survey of the coast, and will communicate with you next from Jask, at which place I hope to be by the end of June.

8. The health of the ship's company and that of the *Lapwing* is very good.

I have, etc.,

(Sd.) T. W. KEMP,

Commander and Senior Naval Officer,
Persian Gulf.

Sub Enc. 1
Enc.
No. 318

(*Confidential.*)

Remarks on directions for entering Deep Bay between Bahrein Island and Mainland, etc.

H.M.S. *Lapwing*,
17th April 1903.

Admiralty. Persian Gulf General Sheet 2, No. 2837 (*b*).

Charts. Bahrein Harbour, No. 20.

Confidential Chart No. 0·1, Bahrein to Ojair.

Sailng directions. Persian Gulf Pilot, 4th edition, 1898, pages 127-128, 140-141, Hydrographical Notice (Persian Gulf) No. 2 of 1902, pages 5, 6, 12-15.

The narrow passage between Khor Fasht and Marwadi, etc. In steering for the narrow passage between Khor Fasht and Marwadi a a line of Bahrein to Kaseifa Islet placed on chart would be useful, as the marks for fixing positions on chart are not good.

These two shoals do not show at high water in the middle of the day.

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The tower at Shereiba is useless as a mark until it bears N. 80 E.

No tide was perceptible between Khor Fasht and Marwadi, one hour after 4-W. at Bahrein, but one hour before 4-W. at Bahrein. The tide sets considerable over to the westward while to the northward of Um Nasan Island.

Passing through the narrows to the westward of Um Nasan Island no difficulty ought to be experienced if the ship's position is constantly checked by station pointer, as the marks are so good.

Entering the narrows from the southward Sandy Islet shows up well just in time to get a good fix.

Proceeding to Ojair.

On page 14 of Hydrographic Notice No. 2, line 19, from bottom "S. E. by S.," seems to be a misprint.

After leaving the "narrows" a course was shaped S. 44° W. (Mag.), 10·6 ins., and then altered S. 16 E. (Mag.), 2·5 ins., when a sounding of 19 feet (reduced) was obtained in the following position :—

Jebel Dukhan [N. 67½ E. (T)] to Jebel Tharim ... ... 81° 40′
Jebel Tharim to Hamadiya [N. 69 W. (T)] ... ... 55° 30′

Approximate position, Lat. 25·55′ 35″ N., Long. 50° 14′ 0″ E.

This shoal appears to be about one mile long by one mile broad.

Ras Seiha.

Ras Seiha does not apparently extend so far eastward as shown on confidential chart 0·1.

A peculiar flat-topped hill rises, apparently in line with Ras Seiha, bearing south.

Ras Seiha apparently bore S. 7° E. (T) from the following :—

Ojar Fort, S. 29 W. (T) ... ...
△ (°) N. 56½ W. (T) ... ... } Shoal water extending beyond the land.

Ras Seiha apparently bore S. 0½ W. (T) from the following position :—

Ojar Fort and Ojar Tower in line to △ (°) ... ... 87° 3′

Sounding in approach to Ojar.

A sounding ½ fm. was obtained from the following positions :—

Ojar Fort, S. 64 W. (T).
△ (°) N. 42½ W. (T). Ship steering S. 32 E. (Mag)

Position in which ship anchored.

At Ojar ship anchored in 16 feet S. and sh. on the following :—

Ojar Fort, S. 79½ W. (T) ... ... Ras Seiha apparently.
△ (°) N. 40½ W. (T) ... ... Bearing 26½ W. (T).

By mast-head angles at Fort ship was found to be 4 miles distant.

For landing in boat from anchorage.

A course was steered S. by W. for 3½ miles, passing a pole beacon with a kerosine tin on top about 2½ miles from ship. The course was then altered up Khor W. W. ¾ N. by boat's compass.

At point of turning some rough angles were taken as follows :—

Lapwing's main mast to Fort ... ... 69° 35′
Lapwing's main mast to Geyt. Zakhunnia ... ... 100° 16′

Lapwing's main mast bearing by boat's compass N. N. E.

Distance of *Lapwing's* main mast by angles on and off are 3½ miles.

Angles taken from ship at anchor—

Fort to Beacon ... ... 67° 57′
Beacon to Zakhunnia ... ... 33° 2′
Bearing of Beacon ... ... S. 12 W. (T).

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The Khor. At the entrance to the Khor is a shoal with from 4 to 6 feet on it, about ¾ mile across; there is said to be a 10-foot channel deep enough for large dhows further south, but the existence of this is doubtful.

There are at least 6 or 7 fathoms all over Khor till nearing Fort when the water shoals.

The Fort. There is a rise and fall of about 2 feet at Fort. The Fort is a well built low structure with an old caravanserai, with 4 irregular towers adjacent.

There are two or three rusty guns in the Fort. There is a well built jetty running into the Khor from the Fort for about 150 yards, with 2 or 3 feet off the end.

The Turkish soldiers in the Fort, numbering about 100, under a Madia, obtain fairly good water from a well at the Tower and other supplies either by camel from Al Hassa or by Bungalow from Bahrein.

The Fort is visible from the northward about 9 miles, but not easy to distinguish at that distance.

Ojair to entrance to “Narrows.” A course was shaped N. 7° E. (Mag.) towards the entrance to “Narrows” direct from anchorage off Ojair.

Sounding of from 3 to 4 fathoms being obtained for the first mile, then 4½ to 5 fathoms for 2 miles, after which sounding from 6 fathoms to 1/10 fathoms were obtained till Jebel Dukhan bore N. 56 E. (T) and Hamadiya N. 72 W. (T), except in approximate Lat. 25° 48½′ N., Long. 50° 18½′ E., where a cast of 5 fathoms was obtained.

On sighting Um Nacan Peak the dead reckoning was found to be correct.

(Sd.) C. M. GIBSON,
Lieutenant.

C. C. P. ess, Simla.—No. 1453 F. D.—30-10-03.—30.—J. D.

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

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

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

Pro. no. 319

(*Received with letter from the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, No. 42, dated the 2nd October 1903.*)

Confidential.

Admiralty to India Office.

M. 0914.

7th August 1903.

SIR,

I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a report, dated 20th June last, furnished by Commanders T. W. Kemp and B. T Somerville, R.N., in accordance with the instructions given them by this Department to visit and test the hydrographic conditions of certain places on the Seaboard of the Persian Gulf, where it is possible that a foreign naval station might be established and of which hitherto only imperfect surveys have been made.

A similar letter has been sent to the Foreign Office and War Office.

I am, etc.,

C. I. THOMAS.

Copy of Joint Report on Persian Coast and Harbours sent to Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, by Commanders Kemp and Somerville, 20th June 1903.

(Received before.)

Pro. no. 320

(*Received with letter from the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, No. 44, dated the 16th October 1903.*)

Admiralty to India Office.

M. 01022.

6th October 1903.

SIR,

With reference to your letter of the 26th August last, on the subject of the proposed telegraphic communication with Bunder Abbas, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that they concur in the view that Bassidore would be preferable to Henjam as a landing place for the cable whence the connection with Bunder Abbas might be made.

I am to add that a communication has been addressed to the Foreign Office in this sense.

I am, etc.,

EVAN MACGREGOR.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 2088 F. D.—30-11-1903 -30—R. B.

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

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Establishment of Telegraphic communication with Henjam.

Telegram, No. 2624-E. A., dated the 3rd November 1903. **Pro. No. 321.**

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—His Excellency Rear-Admiral G. Atkinson-Willes, Bombay.

Your letter No. 872, October 16th, forwarding Kemp-Somerville report, received.

No. 73-C., dated Viceroy's Camp, the 2nd December 1903. **Pro. No. 322.**

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—His Excellency Rear-Admiral G. Atkinson-Willes, Naval Commander-in-Chief, East India Station.

I am desired to refer to your letters No. 872, dated 6th September 1903, and No. 872 (*sic*), dated 16th October 1903, on the subject of the recent surveys of possible ports on the Persian Coast of the Gulf and of an additional cable station in those waters.

2. As you are aware, the desirability of establishing such a cable station for naval purposes has been accepted by all parties; and the sole question that remains for decision appears to be whether it should be located as originally proposed by the Government of India at Henjam, where we had such a station from 1869 to 1881, or at Bassidore, which is a British possession and was considered to be more suitable by the Admiralty. It would appear from the correspondence that has been forwarded to us, that the question has been regarded by the Naval officers in the Gulf, whose reports we have seen, and also by the Admiralty at home, in relation to the selection of a defended naval port in the Gulf, rather than of a station for purposes of telegraphic communication. These considerations may coincide, but, on the other hand, they may be widely different. The place that is most suitable for a naval anchorage and establishment may be unsuitable for a cable station, and *vice versâ*. It is, however, the latter and not the former contingency that is mainly involved in the present case: and it is with this object in view that I am directed especially to solicit your advice.

3. At the same time the question of naval bases, ports of call, or coaling stations in the Gulf is one of supreme importance to British interests; and I am also to enquire whether you have any observations or recommendations to make upon this subject to the Government of India as the result of your present cruise in the Gulf.

No. 1295, dated *Hyacinth* at Bushire, the 3rd December 1903 (Confidential). **Pro. No. 323.**

From—His Excellency Rear-Admiral G. Atkinson-Willes, Naval Commander-in-Chief, East India Station,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In reply to your letter of yesterday's date, No. 73-C., upon the subject of the suitability of ports in the Persian Gulf as naval bases, coaling and telegraph stations, be pleased to bring the following remarks to the notice of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council.

2. After visiting Henjam and Bassidore, I have no hesitation in saying that the former is the more suitable for a telegraph and signal station. It is easy of approach from either side of the strait, and although not a place which could be transformed into a naval station, it is well fitted for a war signal

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

station, in certain contingencies. A temporary sheltered anchorage can always be found to leeward of the island.

3. Bassidore is not suitable for the following reasons: there are two passages to it, one from Henjam through a channel close to the Island of Kishm, which has four fathoms of water in it, and the other from Lingah, where there is a depth of $3\frac{1}{4}$ fathoms.

Neither of these channels, both of which I have personally visited, have a sufficient depth of water to enable a 2nd class cruiser to communicate at any time with a telegraph station at Bassidore.

As for this British possession on the north-west corner of Kishm Island, it is of no practical value for naval purposes, but it is invaluable in giving us a claim, so that no other Foreign Power shall in the future obtain a footing on the island.

In mentioning the approaches to Bassidore, I have neglected to note the one through Clarence Strait, because it is not likely that we could find time to navigate such a difficult strait for the sake of communicating with a telegraph station in a critical time.

4. In the event of a Foreign Power making a fortified port in the Persian Gulf, it will probably be necessary to have a fortified coaling station at the entrance to the Gulf, and to seize certain strategic positions so as to command the entrance to the Persian Gulf.

The islands of Kishm, Hormuz, Larak, and Henjam should then be held; the two former cover Bunder Abbas, and their occupation would make the holding of that place by a hostile country an impossibility.

5. Whilst visiting the Maklab Promontory in company with His Excellency the Viceroy, both Malcolm and Elphinstone Inlets were visited. Both these places are capable of sheltering large fleets, but they are not suitable for our purposes; at the same time they should not be allowed to fall into the hands of any other Power.

6. Khor Kawi, which was visited on the same occasion, appeared to me a most suitable place for a naval coaling station. It is easy of approach from the south, and not difficult from the north, although at that entrance the tides are strong. A spur of rock shaped like a pier runs out at right angles to the north extreme of Jezirat-al-Ghanam, forming a natural breakwater, which will keep any swell from rolling into the harbour. The harbour is $1\frac{3}{4}$ miles long and from half a mile to one mile broad, having, as shown in the chart, from 15 to 19 fathoms of water. It is quite sheltered from all winds, and vessels inside are completely out of sight.

The southern entrance of the Khor is land-locked, owing to the conformation of the land of the Maklab Peninsula.

The *Sphinx* will make a survey of this Khor as soon as an opportunity offers, and, if the bottom has fair holding ground, I think it will, at some future time, prove a valuable position.

Should we require a coaling and look-out station in the Gulf, its tactical position for such a purpose is excellent, and it could then be easily connected by cable with Henjam, which is only about 31 miles distant.

7. In conclusion, I would suggest that the means by which we have acquired our right to Bassidore be followed in dealing with Malcolm and Elphinstone Inlets, and Khor Kawi; at present none of these places have any very defined owners, except a nomad tribe of Arabs.

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, SECRET E., JUNE 1904.

Establishment of Telegraphic communication with Henjam.

The flagstaff should be placed on Jezirat-al-Ghanam, in Khor Kawi.

(*Received with letter from the Secretary, Political Department, India office, No. 46, dated the 30th October 1903.*) Pro. No. 324.

Foreign Office to India Office.

15th October 1903.

SIR,

I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 26th of August last, relative to the proposed establishment of telegraphic communication with Bunder Abbas, and requesting His Lordship's views upon the question of the incidence of the coast of the scheme.

In reply, I am to refer you to the Treasury letter of 23rd February 1901, transmitted to you in a letter from this office of 4th March of that year, in which the Lords Commissioners state that they are unable to sanction the proposed expenditure from British funds for the purpose of establishing such communication.

In view of the explicit refusal to participate in the cost of the scheme then expressed by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, Lord Lansdowne is of opinion that it would be useless to approach Their Lordships again in the matter.

I am, etc.,

(Sd.) CHARLES HARDINGE.

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

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No. 1171, dated *Hyacinth* at Bombay, the 9th December 1903 (Confidential).

From—Rear-Admiral George L. Atkinson-Willes, Commander-in-Chief,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Pro. no. 325

I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, a copy of a letter I have addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty, giving, for Their Lordships' information, a short description of places visited by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and myself during the recent cruise in the Persian Gulf.

No. 209—1171, dated *Hyacinth* at sea, the 8th December 1903 (Confidential).

From—Rear-Admiral George L. Atkinson-Willes, Commander-in-Chief,
To—The Secretary to the Admiralty.

Enc. no. 325

I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a short description of places visited by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and myself during the cruise in November in the Persian Gulf.

(*Confidential*).

I.—Maskat.

The cove is small for modern vessels, although it has a good depth of water, and when a northerly wind blows it becomes rough inside, even opposite the coaling sheds in Makalla Bay.

2. The *Hyacinth*, *Argonaut*, and *Fox* were anchored off the mouth of the harbour, *Pomone* just inside, the R. I. M. S. *Hardinge* inside of her, and *Sphinx*, *Lapwing*, and the R. I. M. S. *Lawrence* inside of the *Hardinge*.

3. The new vessel belonging to the Sultan of Maskat was there. She is small, more like a yacht than a ship of war, and has not any fighting value, except against dhows.

4. The army and the forts are of no use except against the neighbouring Arabs, and are not worth taking into account.

II.—Musadan Promontory.

(*a*) *Kubbat Ghazira* (*Malcolm Inlet*).

5. Is a fine large harbour, with a great depth of water. There are two coves on the north-east side, which would serve as anchorages, the better of the two appearing to be the one with the village of Filam at its head.

From the westerly cove it is easy to climb the ridge of the Maklab Isthmus, and look down upon Elphinstone Inlet.

6. Malcolm Inlet would shelter a large fleet, but it is not suitable as a coaling station, as it would not be easy to defend. Vessels could safely coal in it from colliers, and it would serve as a good temporary anchorage.

(*b*) *Kubbat Shabus.*

7. Is small, but would afford shelter to small craft.
I did not go inside it.

(*c*) *Dubat Shisa* (*Combermere Cove*).

8. Is a large bay open to the eastward. There is a sheltered anchorage inside Red Islands for one or two vessels, but it is not of any value except as a temporary shelter from north-westerly winds.

(*d*) *Fak-al-Assad Strait.*

9. Is quite easy to pass through. The tides are strong and a good speed should be maintained. It is quite 3 cables across, the rocks drop so perpendicularly that they look like door-posts.

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

(e) *The Bays on the northern part of the Promontory.*

10. Are all exposed to the north, as the chart shews.

(f) *Khor Kawi.*

11. Is a fine sheltered anchorage. It is 3 cables wide at the northern entrance, and about 6 to 7 cables wide most of its length; the depth of water is from 15 to 19 fathoms according to the chart.

12. It is formed by the island of Jezirat al Ghanam (Sheep Island) and the mainland. The island is about 100 feet high at its lowest saddle, and from its northern end a rocky point juts out about 2 cables and looks like a pier. In the angle thus formed is a ledge of rock which appears to have about 3 feet of water on it, and to cover about an acre. This rocky point makes the harbour secure against any swell rolling in from the northward.

13. To the southward of the point is a Bay formed by an indentation in the island.

14. The Khor appears capable of sheltering several large cruisers at single anchor, and more if moored, besides a number of small craft.

15. Owing to the tides, the northern entrance is more difficult than the southern to enter. The latter is land locked, owing to the conformation of the Musandam Promontory, but for a steam-ship both are quite easy of approach.

16. Khor Kawi may, on further examination, turn out to be very suitable for a coaling station; a survey will shortly be undertaken. Its strategical position is excellent, and in conjunction with the Islands of Kishm, Henjam, Larak, and Hormuz, it will form a strong position for the control of the entrance to the Gulf.

17. The danger of ships being taken by surprise can be averted by forming a signal station on the high hill on Sheep Island, from which a long range of vision can be obtained, and warning given in sufficient time of the approach of any vessel.

18. The bay at the south-east corner of the southern entrance will also be examined to ascertain its capabilities as a torpedo station.

(g) *Khor ash Shem (Elphinstone Inlet).*

19. Is a magnificent piece of water, 7 miles long. It has anchorages all over it, and many coves. The usual anchorage is near Telegraph Island, which is about the hottest part of it.

20. Surrounded by high mountains and barren rocky hills, no breeze can reach Telegraph Island, or the middle of the Khor, consequently the air must be still and the radiation great. In fact the heat is too great for Europeans to bear, and even the Arab nomads who fish there, move in the hot weather. At 3 P.M. on 20th November (when I visited it) the thermometer stood at 86 ° F. If this is the winter temperature, what must it be in summer?

21. By landing and climbing the ridge in the Maklab Isthmus, about 200 feet high, one can look down on Malcolm Inlet, and have a fine view of it (except the cove with Filam at its head) and of Elphinstone Inlet. The ridge is about equidistant from both inlets.

22. To defend Elphinstone Inlet it would be necessary to hold the ridge of the Maklab Isthmus, as well as the entrance, but owing to the heat it could not be occupied from July to October, and therefore as a naval station it is not of much value.

III.—SHARGAH.

23. This place is quite open to the northward, and with a northerly wind a nasty swell rolls into the roadstead.

24. The Jowashmi Sheikh of Shargah resides here and it is the centre of the pearling fishery, but otherwise it is not of any importance The Sheikh is acknowledged as the most important of the Trucial Chiefs.

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IV.—Bunder Abbas.

25. This town is situated on the mainland of Persia opposite the town of Kishm in the Island of Kism, from which it is distant about 13 miles.

26. The water is shallow, and ships lie a good 4 miles from the shore, although the *Sphinx* can go in to about 1½ miles from the town.

Ten and a quarter miles from it is Hormuz Island, and almost due south, about 18 miles, is Larak Island.

27. Between the town of Kishm and Bunder Abbas and to the westward is a good roadstead at the entrance of the Clarence Strait. This strait would be navigable by large ships, if it were buoyed, as far as Bassidu, which is nearly 65 miles to the westward by this channel.

28. A good anchorage is reported off Laft point, but this is 32 miles from Kishm, and too much out of the way for war purposes.

29. This entrance to the Clarence Strait was, and might be again, the rendezvous of a large expeditionary force operating in Southern Persia.

V.—Henjam Strait.

30. There is a temporary anchorage off Henjam Island in the strait between that Island and Kishm, and at this point a telegraph station formerly existed. It is about to be resumed by the Government of India, and could be used as a war signal station, if required, as it is easy of approach from either the east or west.

31. It is not of any use as a permanent anchorage or depôt.

As it is only 31 miles from Khor Kawi it could easily be connected with it by cable when found necessary, should that place become a coaling station.

VI.—Bassidu.

32. As a deep water channel was said to exist to the southward of Kishm Island, I examined it in H. M. S. *Sphinx*, followed later by the R. I. M. S. *Lawrence*.

33. A 4 to 4½ fathom channel was found, a tracing of which will be sent to the Hydrographer, but it is not easy to find, except in fine weather and by use of the lead.

It is not at any time suitable for a second class cruiser, but she might use it with care in clear weather.

34. Bassidu was used in the old days by small craft belonging to the Indian Navy. There is deep and good anchorage off it, but it is a small craft place. On going to Lingah from it in the *Sphinx* we passed over a long bank with 3¼ fathoms on it—this being the only passage.

35. The pier is in fairly good order, but most of the old buildings are in ruins. A heap of old coal, probably about 5 tons, lies in the open. There is a flagstaff on which the British flag is hoisted, and an old Arab (the British Agent) receives Rs. 12 a year for doing so (in addition to Rs. 30 as agent, and Rs. 7 for taking mails to and from Lingah). He is a Briton of the British.

36. According to a plan the area of British territory is roughly 600 acres.

37. The Agent confirmed the statement that Singao is British, but that old Bassidu is not.

He stated that the Russian Consul at Bunder Abbas visited Bassidu last spring with a Persian official.

38. Some of the Arabs living at Lingah and in other parts of Kishm are very anxious to settle at Bassidu under the British, and thus escape the heavy Customs dues, but they have not hitherto been encouraged to do so.

It would probably soon absorb the trade from Lingah and the adjacent ports if it became a free port under the protection of the Government of India.

39. Bassidu was granted to the British in 1820 by the Iman of Maskat, who at that time had a lease of the island of Kishm. When the Persians

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forcibly resumed the island no challenge to our rights was ever made, and we have thus kept a footing there.

VII.—Lingah.

40. This is an important town, owing to it being a trading centre, and the fact that, unlike most Gulf ports, large vessels can lie within a mile or so of the shore.

The anchorage is exposed to the south-west, but sheltered from most winds.

41. Several of the domed cisterns mentioned in N. I. D. Report No. 694 were empty when I was at Lingah and others had only a little dirty water in them. They appeared to have a capacity of about 60,000 gallons each.

VIII.—Bahrein.

42. I visited this place in the *Sphinx*.

A second class cruiser drawing not more than 22 feet 6 inches could enter Bahrein harbour one hour before high tide, and anchor 5 miles from the town and about 4 miles from Muharrak.

43. Bahrein is not of any value as a base for war purposes.

44. I notice that in the N. I. D. Report No. 694, Bar al Katr is said to be under Turkish control. This is not the case. The British support the independence of the Sheikhs, and have lately objected to a Turkish Mudir being appointed for the district.

IX.—Koweit.

45. The importance of the Bay of Koweit has been somewhat over-rated, and that of Khor Abdullah lost sight of until it is too late, the Turks having now established themselves at Umkasr, and on the island of Bubiyan.

46. A large vessel could lie in the anchorage in any weather, but a collier could not lie alongside her in a Shamal. Vessels lie about 2 miles from the shore.

47. During the stay of the squadron many small caravans were observed to enter and leave the town, showing that there is probably a considerable trade overland.

48. I proceeded up the Bay in the *Sphinx*. A second class cruiser can go up to within $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles of the shore near Jehara, which town is over half a mile inland. It is a fine bay, but the shallowness of the water near the shore detracts from its value. The head of the bay is, however, of course more sheltered than the part of it near Koweit.

X.—Khor Abdullah.

49. Leaving Koweit with my flag in the *Sphinx* at 10 P.M., followed by the *Lawrence*, I proceeded to Khor Abdullah, and entered it at daylight on the following day, passing Ras al Geit, the Turkish post on the south-east of Bubiyan Island, where the Turkish flag was flying. This post cannot be approached to within about 3 miles by water, owing to the mud flats off it.

We arrived at the bar between Warba Island and the mainland, and found 2 fathoms at low water.

Passing over it into deep water we entered the Khor leading to Umkasr, navigation being quite easy, except for the bar.

Arriving near Umkasr, which is a Turkish fort with no village, we anchored, and, after looking round, proceeded out of the Khor.

50. Our observation led us to the conclusion that the proposed railway will probably come to a point on the mainland opposite the north-west corner of Bubiyan Island, where there is a sheet of water, with plenty of depth and room for an anchorage. It can also be approached easily at any time of tide.

51. Bubiyan Island and the shore on the mainland opposite are claimed by the Sheikh of Koweit. He has now been formally taken under British

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protection by the Indian Government, and has been directed to establish two posts, one on the north side of Bubiyan island and the other on the north-west corner, and the Turks will be warned by him to leave the island.

52. On proceeding out of the Khor Abdullah I noticed a flat with 4 fathoms on it, at about 1½ hours' flood. The Khor requires a careful survey.

XI.—Khor Musa.

53. Having anchored off Khor Musa at 11-30 P.M. in the *Sphinx* with the *Lawrence* in company, we proceeded up the Khor at daylight on the following day.

When once we were sure that we had struck the entrance, navigation was quite easy. This is ascertained by seeing Bu Saif, a low point with a few trees on it, and the islet of Aitch Shaham. From this the Khor is a splendid sheet of water, ending at anchorage No. 1, where a large fleet could anchor. Here it branches into the inlet leading to No. 2, which we did not enter, and to No. 3 anchorage.

We went up to within about 1½ miles of No. 3, and anchored in 36 feet, whilst a party landed to test the mud flats. It was thought that at high water springs the flats would be covered.

The landing at No. 1 will be a difficulty, no doubt, for the banks appear to be no more than mud flats, which may be covered at high water springs under some circumstances.

XII.—The Khors Generally.

54. Until a railway is brought from the interior to either Khor Abdullah or Khor Musa, they are not of value to a country strong on land, so that their development belongs rather to the future than the present.

I suppose in time Russia will connect her railway system with Khor Musa, and Germany will connect her Bagdad Railway system with Khor Abdullah.

It is incumbent on us, therefore, to prepare to hold the entrance to the Gulf, unless we can keep those Powers away from it altogether, which should be our constant aim.

XIII.—Conclusion.

55. The *Hyacinth* and *Hardinge* having been given a rendezvous 9 miles south-south-east of Khor Musa, His Excellency the Viceroy re-embarked in the *Hardinge* and I returned to the *Hyacinth* at 7 P.M., and we proceeded to Bushire, where the squadron anchored next morning 5½ miles from the shore, and 8½ miles by water from Bushire town.

GEORGE L. ATKINSON-WILLES, *Rear-Admiral,*
Commander-in-Chief.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 2383 F. D.—22-12-1903—54—W. G. B.

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

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

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Pro. No. 326

No. 16 of 1904.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.
External.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE ST. JOHN BRODRICK,
His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

FORT WILLIAM, *the 21st January 1904.*

SIR,

During the recent tour of His Excellency the Viceroy in the Persian Gulf, in the company of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Rear-Admiral Atkinson-Willes, the question of the selection of naval positions in the Gulf, which has greatly occupied the attention both of His Majesty's Government and of the Government of India in recent years, was carefully considered by Their Excellencies. In company they visited and examined all the principal ports, harbours, or anchorages in those waters, and arrived at conclusions respecting them, which the Naval Commander-in-Chief has already reported to the Admiralty in a letter, dated 8th December, copy of which was sent to us and is forwarded herewith. The enclosures to this despatch also contain a correspondence that passed between the Government of India and the Admiral on the same subject, while the squadron was still in the Persian Gulf.

2. From this correspondence it will be seen that the subjects under examination fell under three heads—

(i) The selection of suitable naval bases or coaling stations at the entrance to the Gulf.

(ii) The choice of a telegraph station either at Henjam or Bassidore (Basiduh).

(iii) The features and potentialities of the various khors or maritime inlets at the upper end of the Gulf, to which it seems likely that trans-Turkish or trans-Persian Railways may be taken at some future date.

3. We propose to address you in the present despatch on the first two of these subjects. We will reserve the third for a further communication, only mentioning on the present occasion that, in paragraph 51 of his letter to the Admiralty, Rear-Admiral Atkinson-Willes has been under a misapprehension. No fresh steps in the nature of establishing a protectorate over the Sheikh of Koweit have been taken by the Government of India, and no directions of the character named have been issued to him. The subject is one that we shall discuss in the further despatch that has been promised. But it would seem desirable to delete the paragraph in question from the Admiral's letter, since it ascribes to the Government of India steps which have not been taken.

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4. The question of the position to be assumed by Great Britain at the entrance to the Persian Gulf either in the event of hostilities with a foreign Power, or—which is perhaps even more important—with a view to preventing the acquisition of coaling stations or harbours by such Powers in time of peace, resolves itself into a decision as to the best stations to be occupied on the northern and southern sides of the entrance. Stations outside the Gulf, or inside it at any distance from the mouth, will not enable a fleet to operate with nearly so much rapidity or advantage: while the configuration of the entrance, the two sides of which are in sight of each other, is such as to give to a naval Power, suitably established on either coast, a command of the interior waters so absolute as to enable it to dispense with stations further up the Gulf, and to exercise a commanding control over the movements of a Power possessing any such bases. For this purpose the anchorage at the eastern end of Kishm Island, which is formed by the islands of Kishm, Larak, and Hormuz, being enclosed between them and the mainland, on which stands the port of Bunder Abbas, appears to afford an almost ideal position on the northern side. The anchorage extends far up the channel between Kishm and the mainland, which is known as Clarence Straits. It is well screened from the sea; it would accommodate the largest fleet; it commands an important Persian trading port and trade route; and there has been for a long time past a consensus of expert naval opinion that this is the first position that should be occupied by Great Britain, together with the adjoining islands, in the event of such action being required. The anchorage in question is not one where a coaling station would probably be established, or which would call for defence. But as a place of rendezvous for a fleet that desired to command the entry to the Gulf, and to prevent the acquisition of Bunder Abbas or the neighbouring islands by a foreign Power, it would appear to be admirably adapted for the purpose.

5. The investigation conducted by the Viceroy and the Admiral on the opposite shores of the mouth of the Gulf, where they explored the various harbours, inlets, and fiords of the curiously indented promontory commonly known as Cape Musandim, led to equally clear conclusions. It will be seen from the report of the Naval Commander-in-Chief that he advocates establishing a lien as a coaling station upon the anchorage of Khor Kawi on the western side of the peninsula, presuming that further surveys, which he ordered, but the results of which we have not yet learned, confirm its desirability as an anchorage. At the same time it would be necessary to take steps to prevent the occupation by foreign Powers of the fine harbours of Kubbat Ghazira (Malcolm Inlet) and Khor-ash-Shem (Elphinstone Inlet), which pierce the peninsula at its narrowest point, and are only prevented from mingling their waters by a narrow isthmus or tongue of land a few hundred yards in width. These harbours are not required by us, because there are superior positions elsewhere, and because of their torrid and insupportable climate in the summer. At the same time it is undesirable that any foreign flag should be planted in either of them, or that any question, save of British ownership, should arise. Fortunately this question is one that admits of easy solution. Elphinstone Inlet has already once been in British occupation. The plinth of the former Telegraph Station on a small island in the interior of the Khor is still standing: and the cable itself was taken in former days from Malcolm Inlet across the narrow isthmus that we have described. In Lord George Hamilton's despatch No. 4 (Secret), dated 27th February 1903, we received permission to re-occupy the old Telegraph Station at a suitable opportunity. It seems to us that the best way of effecting this re-occupation and of preventing the contingency of foreign rivalry would be to erect a flagstaff on the isthmus that commands the two harbours, and also on Telegraph Island. The posts will be put up unobtrusively, and the action is likely not only not to attract attention, but in all probability to remain undiscovered for a long time, so rarely are these waters visited by any but British vessels and so infrequently even by these. We believe that we should have no difficulty in arranging with the local tribes—who consist only of a few miserable communities of fishermen, occupying tiny villages in the inner recesses of the coves, and acknowledging no Chief or master—to take care of the flagstaffs, and occasionally, or when required, to hoist a flag upon them. We would propose, as recommended by the Admiral

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in his letter to us, to take similar action in planting a flagstaff on Sheep Island, which constitutes the outer protection of Khor Kawi.

6. In their tour of the Musandim Promontory, the Viceroy and the Naval Commander-in-Chief further considered the desirability of placing a light-house on some suitable site at the extremity of the peninsula, both in the interests of navigation, which is compelled to avoid the neighbouring channels except by daylight, and in order still further to emphasise our hold over the Musandim harbours and islands. This light might be placed either on the rocky point of Cape Musandim or on one of the three islands, called the Quoins, that are situated at a little distance from it in the open sea. We believe that, for nautical purposes, the latter might be slightly the superior position: but the political advantages of placing the light upon a point of the Musandim Peninsula are deserving of serious consideration, and will probably incline us to select this locality. The matter is one upon which we are about to consult the authorities interested, and we will address you again upon it. In the event of a light-house being built, we think that the cost might properly be charged to Indian revenues.

7. We now pass to a discussion of the second question to which we have referred, *viz.*, that of the re-opening of a British telegraph station at Henjam or Bassidore. We need not recapitulate the arguments which we have employed on a previous occasion, in favour of such a measure; for they have already obtained the approval of His Majesty's Government. The only question at issue is the choice between the two sites; and it was this question that His Excellency the Viceroy and the Admiral charged themselves more particularly with the endeavour to decide.

8. The arguments in favour of Henjam appeared to them to be so conclusive, and are so clearly stated in the Admiral's two letters, that it is unnecessary to recapitulate them here. The earlier discussions on the matter, particularly by the naval authorities, appear to have rested on some misapprehension of the object which it is sought to secure. We did not propose the re-institution of our former cable station at Henjam in order to create a naval port or station there (for, as we have shown, there are superior positions nearer to the mouth of the Gulf), but in order to provide for our ships a place of telegraphic call and signal station at no great distance from the entrance, and to strengthen our hold upon the island of Kishm, where we already possess a British settlement at the western extremity, and to which the smaller island of Henjam physically belongs. For these purposes there can be no doubt that Henjam is a greatly superior locality to Bassidore. It possesses the further advantages that, while Bassidore is rather out of the way and difficult of access except to small vessels, ships of any size can anchor temporarily off Henjam. Moreover, it would be easy to connect the latter by cable with Khor Kawi at a time of emergency, should the Khor ever be utilised as a coaling station.

9. There remains the question of the method by which, if His Majesty's Government approve of the suggestions now made, we should proceed. Three alternatives appear to be practicable. Either we may address the Persian Government, and solicit their permission to re-establish our former Telegraph Station at Henjam, a request which, in their present temper, it is more than likely that they would refuse; or we may inform them that we propose to take this step in the exercise of rights of possession, which, though not utilised for years, have never been surrendered; or as suggested by Sir A. Hardinge in his despatch No. 97 (Secret), dated 27th June 1903, we may simply send a telegraph ship there, with the materials and the necessary staff, and may resume possession of the former site, informing the Persian Government of the accomplished fact, and explaining that we have decided to restore our old station on the original terms, which included freedom from Customs interference, for the convenience of our ships and Commanders in the Gulf. We may add that the site is quite unmistakable. The plinth upon which the British Telegraph Station stood from 1869 to 1881 is still in a good state at a little distance from the straits on the northern shore of the island, and the trench in which the cable was laid to the sea is clearly visible. The Malik-ut-Tajar, who held a lease of the Kishm salt-mines, erected a flag-pole

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

on this foundation some 12 years ago; but it does not appear that a flag was ever hoisted upon it, nor are there any representatives of the Persian Government now upon the island. In fact, so far as the Viceroy was able to ascertain, connections are maintained by the inhabitants with the opposite or Arab Coast of the Gulf that might almost entitle Henjam to be described as a derelict, upon which no trace of Persian sovereignty is now in existence.

10. On 21st September 1903, Sir A. Hardinge addressed a telegram to the Foreign Office in which he said that his original proposal which we have just described must, he thought, be modified because of his inability to trace among the records in the Tehran Legation the original Persian of the Shah's authorisation of 1868, a copy of which was forwarded to your predecessor with our Secret despatch No. 56 (External) of 7th May 1903. We do not appreciate the force of this argument. The absence or the loss of the Persian original cannot possibly alter the facts that the concession was granted; that it was acted upon for 12 years; and that incontestable traces of occupation still survive on the spot. It appears to us, therefore, to be open to His Majesty's Government to adopt whichever method of procedure they may prefer.

11. The choice may be expected in part to turn upon the present attitude of the Persian Government and the policy that it is desired to pursue towards them. The experience of His Excellency the Viceroy during his recent visit to Bushire, the subsequent behaviour of the Persian Government with regard to that incident, and the general tone of unfriendliness that has characterised their recent communications, undoubtedly justify the adoption of a firm attitude, and will probably not have predisposed His Majesty's Government to any unnecessary display of courtesy. In these circumstances, it may be thought desirable to act upon Sir A. Hardinge's advice, and to restore the telegraph station without more ado. We should be grateful for early instructions on the subject, in order that the cable may be laid and the necessary buildings re-erected during the present cool season. Failing the adoption of this plan, we think that the second alternative would be preferable to the first, although it is to be feared, as anticipated by Sir A. Hardinge in his letter to the Marquess of Lansdowne of 27th June 1903, that any procedure that might open the door for discussion or protest, could not fail to be attended by considerable delay.

12. In either case the Persian Government might be conciliated by the proposal to carry on the telegraph wire either by land or by sea from Henjam to Bunder Abbas. When the Viceroy was at the latter place, he was earnestly pressed both by the local traders and also by the Salar-i-Moazzam, Governor of the Gulf Ports, to lend his assistance to the connection of Bunder Abbas by telegraph with the outer world; and it is scarcely credible that the Persian Government, unless they mean to be deliberately unpleasant, should not welcome an extension which will be both of political and of commercial advantage to them. Should they do so, they might opportunely be reminded that, under the Convention of 2nd April 1868, we possess the right to continue our land line from Jask to some point between that place and Bunder Abbas, a phrase which might be interpreted as applicable to any spot short of Bunder Abbas itself, such as the British Consulate at Naband, four miles on the Jask side of the town.

13. In the event of His Majesty's Government accepting our proposals for the immediate re-institution of a cable station at Henjam, we trust that they will, upon reconsideration, consent to bear at least one half of the cost of the arrangements as requested in our Secret despatch No. 56 (External), dated the 7th May 1903. The telegraph is asked for in the main in the interests of the naval squadron which is maintained in the Persian Gulf by His Majesty's Government: and also on political grounds, which are divided in even proportions between the Imperial Government and the Government of India. The larger part of the expenditure on the shores of the Gulf is already borne by Indian revenues: and it does not seem fair that any fresh measures that may be required to sustain our influence on the sea—the charge of which has hitherto been assumed by the Home Government (with substantial contributions from ourselves) should be debited exclusively to Indian funds.

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

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14. We have now detailed at some length the proposals which we recommend for the protection of our paramount naval, strategical, and political interests in the Persian Gulf. It seems to us most desirable that the opportunity of acting while action is still easy, and before we can be forestalled, should not be sacrificed: and we trust to receive early permission (in the case of Henjam, which has already been accepted in principle, if possible by telegraph) to proceed in the manner described.

We have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) CURZON.

" KITCHENER.

" T. RALEIGH.

" E. F.-G. LAW.

" E. R. ELLES.

" A. T. ARUNDEL.

" DENZIL IBBETSON.

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

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

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Enc. No. 326

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List of Enclosures in Secret despatch No. 16 (External), dated the 21st January 1904, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Serial No.	No. and date of paper.	From whom, or to whom.	Subject.
1	Letter No. 73 C., dated the 2nd December 1903.	From the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indian Station.	Establishment of an additional cable station in the Persian Gulf.
2	Letter No. 1295, dated the 3rd December 1903.	From the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indian Station, to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.	
3	Letter No. 1171, dated the 9th December 1903.	Ditto ditto ...	

C. H. A. HILL,
Offg. Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.

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

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

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Pro. no. 327

No. 318-E.A., dated Fort William, the 29th January 1904 (Confidential).

From—The Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—H. Whitby Smith, Esq., Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, Karachi.

I am directed to refer to the correspondence ending with your telegram of the 19th October 1903, relative to the proposed establishment of telegraphic communication with Bunder Abbas.

2. The Government of India have addressed His Majesty's Secretary of State on the question of landing the cable either at Henjam or Bassidore, and I am accordingly to request that you will, meanwhile, kindly arrange to get out cable or material to replenish your obligatory reserve, so that you may be able to lay the cable without further delay, as soon as orders are received from the Secretary of State.

Pro. no. 328

No. 130, dated Karachi, the 2nd February 1904 (Confidential).

From—H. Whitby Smith, Esq., Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, Karachi,

To—The Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your No. 318-E.A., of the 29th January last, and to say that I have asked the Director-in-Chief of this Department, by wire to London, to arrange for the early supply of the cable required.

(~~*Received on 1st February with Political Secretary's letter No. 3, dated 15th*~~ *January 1904.*)

PERSIA AND ARABIA. [30th October.]

CONFIDENTIAL. Section 2.

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office,—(Received October 30th.)

India Office,
30th October 1903.

The Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 28th October, relative to the extension of Persian Gulf telegraphs.

MEMORANDUM.

The papers specified in the margin were transmitted to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter, No. 6-M., dated the 11th February 1904.

Persian Gulf.
Khor Kawi.

Letter from His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indian Station, No. 1171, dated the 19th January 1904, with enclosures.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 4250 F. D.—10-3-1904.—54.—L. G. G.

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

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No. 1171, dated "Hyacinth" at Bombay, the 19th January 1904 (Confidential). Pro. No. 329

From—His Excellency Rear-Admiral G. L. Atkinson-Willes, Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indian Station,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With reference to my letter of the 8th ultimo, No. 1171, relative to my recent cruise in the Persian Gulf, I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council, a report of the survey of Khor Kawi by H. M. S. "Sphinx", with plan.

2. The report confirms my opinion expressed therein that Khor Kawi will make a valuable flying base and coaling station.

Dated H. M. S. "Sphinx" at Basrah, the 31st December 1903 (Confidential). Enc. No. 329

From—Commander W. Kemp, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf,

To—His Excellency Rear-Admiral G. L. Atkinson-Willes, Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indian Station.

I have the honour to forward the following description of Khor Kawi:—

Anchorage.—The anchorage is well-sheltered, safe, and commodious. As far as the depth of water goes, nature of bottom, &c., I consider the whole anchorage to be equally good, but preference should be given to an anchorage north of position shown on chart as anchorage (2). South of this the ebb tide runs strongly and with so many eddies as to make a ship surge about her anchors, this is not sufficient to render anchorage in this part of the harbour unsafe, but only uncomfortable.

Nature of the bottom.—I consider the bottom over the whole anchorage to be sufficiently good holding ground. It consists of sand and gravel, and soft and broken coral, I do not think there is anywhere hard rock. The cliffs ashore are of a soft and slaty nature, and are much worn by the sea at their bases.

Hidden dangers.—I am of opinion there are no hidden dangers, the soundings shown are only those which could be conveniently put on the plan, many more were taken, which cannot be put in on account of space. Native fishermen also reported that none exist.

Tides.—H.W. F.C. 10-15. The ebb tide running to the north-west is much stronger than the flood the opposite way. The greatest ebb tide we experienced was $1\frac{3}{4}$ knots, this may sometimes be increased to 2 knots. The flood never ran more than $\frac{3}{4}$ knots. The ebb and flood streams begin to make about three hours after low and high water by the shore. Towards the southern entrance the ebb runs with many eddies, but steadies down into a steady stream as the harbour broadens.

Water.—Ships using this harbour would have to depend on themselves for water. Some would probably be obtained by sinking wells at Seedie Bay. There are six wells in south-east cove, the water is good for this part of the coast, but the amount is limited. There are also three or four wells in south cove, water slightly brackish.

Population.—The principal village in the vicinity is at Kamzar, where there are about 500 people. The head man of the place, who is the Sultan of Maskat's Wali, lives here. He visited the ship and told me that the place is considered by all the inhabitants to be under the Sultan of Maskat. Two or three families of fishermen live in south-east cove, where they have a few date trees, and a few more families come in the spring to south cove for fishing; otherwise the harbour is uninhabited.

Observation spot.—Marked by a cairn of stones in Seedie Bay. Position by artificial horizon—latitude, 26-21-20; longitude, 56-25-55.

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

The roadstead south of the harbour in which are south-east and south coves is free from danger, but open to the *Shamal* and therefore not a good anchorage. South cove is protected from sea-ward and would afford anchorage for torpedo boat destroyers, &c., but is too limited for larger vessels. At both these coves there is level ground for about 150 yards to the foot of the cliffs.

2. I would respectfully submit that this harbour is excellently fitted for a flying naval base in the event of naval operations in the Persian Gulf. In addition to its natural advantages as an anchorage given above, it also appears to me to possess the following from a tactical point of view:—

(1) The great advantage for a flying base of possessing two entrances easily navigable by day or night.

(2) Good look-out and signal stations from the neighbouring hills.

(3) Protected by high land all round from gun fire, except immediately opposite the entrance.

(4) Easily defended against attack by land, though such an operation would not presumably be undertaken against a flying base.

(5) Sufficient level ground in Seedie Bay for the erection of temporary hospitals, store-places, or workshops.

(6) Easily capable of a hasty defence. With regard to this, heavy guns could be landed and mounted on pier point which would cover the whole of the northern entrance. The defence of the southern entrance would be more difficult. The best place for improvised batteries would, in my opinion, be south-east cove where there is a level space for a sufficient number of heavy guns; at all other points the cliffs and hills are too steep and high for heavy (4″ and above) guns to be mounted without great difficulty. Light guns could be put anywhere. Guns could not be mounted on the hills facing and commanding the south entrance of the harbour without great difficulty and the work carried on without interruption. Guns could be mounted in south cove, but would only command the extreme western side of the harbour. In my opinion the harbour could be defended with observation mines, good stations for which, perfectly concealed, could be made in the various gullies running into the hills.

Foreign Office Press—No. 373—4·2·04—44.

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Establishment of Telegraphic communication with Henjam.

(*Received on 1st February with Political Secretary's letter No. 3, dated 15th January 1903.*) Pro. No 330.

PERSIA AND ARABIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[30TH OCTOBER.]

SECTION 2.

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 30th.)

INDIA OFFICE,
30th October 1903.

The Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 28th October, relative to the extension of Persian Gulf Telegraphs.

MEMORANDUM. Pro. No. 331.

The papers specified in the margin were transmitted to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter, No. 6-M., dated the 11th February 1904.

PERSIAN GULF.
Khor Kawi.

Letter from His Excellency the Naval Commander-in Chief, East India Station, No. 1171, dated the 19th January 1904, with enclosures.

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

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

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No. 50 of 1904.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. Pro. no. 332

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

External.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE ST. JOHN BRODRICK,

His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

FORT WILLIAM, *the 3rd March 1904.*

SIR,

In continuation of our Secret despatch No. 16 (External), dated the 21st January 1904, we have the honour to forward, for your information, a copy of the marginally noted communication from the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, forwarding a copy of a report on Khor Kawi. The information now furnished confirms the view expressed in paragraph 5 of our despatch of the 21st January.

No. 1171, dated the 19th January 1904, with enclosure.

2. With reference to Commander Kemp's remark, about the presence of a Wali of the Sultan of Maskat in Kamzar, we would invite attention to the account, which is given of this place and of the nature of its connection with Maskat, in Major Cox's letter No. 290, dated 2nd July 1902, which formed an enclosure of our Secret despatch No. 192 (External) of 23rd October 1902. Then, as now, there was apparently no regular Wali, but the elders acknowledged the sovereignty of the Sultan of Maskat, though they paid no dues, and the Sultan's authority was so shadowy and ineffective that both Colonel Kemball and Major Cox considered that it might be ignored, and in this view we concurred. At any rate, our present proposals do not involve any interference with the *status quo* at Kamzar, which is situated on the northern face of the Mussandim promontory and at some distance from Khor Kawi.

3. It appears from Commander Kemp's report that the Khor is admirably suited for a flying naval base, and we have no hesitation in endorsing our former recommendation that early steps should be taken to secure this base for our own purposes by planting a flagstaff on Sheep Island which encloses the Khor on the west.

We have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) CURZON.
" KITCHENER
" T. RALEIGH.
" E. F.-G. LAW.
" E. R. ELLES.
" A. T. ARUNDEL.
" DENZIL IBBETSON.

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

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

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Telegram No. 721-E.-A., dated the 3rd March 1904.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Calcutta,
To—The Secretary of State for India, London.

Pro. no. 333

May we expect a reply soon to our Secret despatch 16 (External), dated 21st January 1904, regarding naval bases and telegraphs in the Persian Gulf.

Telegram, dated the 8th March 1904.

From—The Secretary of State for India, London,
To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Calcutta.

Please refer to your telegram, dated the 3rd March. The Foreign Office are in communication with Tehran. Sir A. Hardinge now proposes in the first instance to inform the Persian Government of our intention to re-establish Henjam station and to ask for permission to extend to Bandar Abbas. He will then communicate with you as to the despatch of necessary officers and material to Henjam. I have agreed to leave the matter to his discretion. The Foreign Office and the Admiralty are considering the question of the naval base.

Pro. no. 334

No. 855-E. A., dated Fort William, the 14th March 1904 (Confidential).

From—C. L. S. Russell, Esq., Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,
To—H. Whitby Smith, Esq., Director of the Persian Gulf Telegraphs, Karachi.

Pro. no. 335

With reference to the correspondence ending with your letter, No. 130, dated the 2nd February 1904, I am directed to ask that preparations may be made to render it possible to send off at very short notice the staff and material required to re-establish telegraphic connection with Henjam and to erect an office on the island.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 4571 F. D.—22-3-04.—54.—P. K. B.

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

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Telegram No. 49, dated the 17th March 1904.

From—Sir A. Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Pro. no. 336

Following sent to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

* * * * * * *

The Prime Minister, whom I sounded about Bunder Abbas line without mentioning Henjam, said he would gladly discuss the question. I shall send in my note in a few day's time, letting Viceroy know exactly when I do so. Ship should meanwhile be ready at a moment's notice to start.

Telegram No. 51, dated the 21st March 1904.

From—Sir A. Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Pro. no. 337

Henjam. As soon as I hear from you that the ship has actually started from Karachi, my note, which is ready for presentation, will be delivered.

Telegram No. 947-E. A., dated the 22nd March 1904.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,

To—Rear-Admiral Atkinson Willes, Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indian Squadron.

Pro. no. 338

With sanction of His Majesty's Government we are now arranging to land cable at Henjam. To prevent possible local interference it would be well that a gun-boat should proceed at once to Bunder Abbas to be at hand if required. Captain, "Patrick Stewart," will be directed to communicate with commanding officer gun-boat in case of necessity. Please let us know what action is taken.

Telegram No. 948-E. A., dated the 22nd March 1904.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,

To—The Commissioner in Sind, Karachi.

Pro. no. 339

Please communicate following message to Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, Karachi. *Begins*:—My letter No. 855-E. A., dated the 14th March 1904, regarding Henjam telegraph. Please proceed without delay as follows:—(1) ship the requisite staff and materials and hold them in readiness to start immediately on receipt of further orders. Care should be taken that every arrangement is made in advance to reduce to a minimum the period which will be required for the operation of laying the cable and erecting the station, (2) inform me today by telegraph on what date you expect to have the ship ready to sail, how long she will take to reach Henjam, and how long to complete the work, (3) telegraph again when the vessel is actually ready to leave Karachi. *Ends.*

(*Enclosure in Foreign Office covering letter of March 2, 1904.*)

Foreign Office,
March 2, 1904.

Cypher to Sir A. Hardinge.

Pro. no. 340

Telegram No. 19.

Your telegram No. 121 (of September 21, 1903).

Government of India are now of opinion that Henjam is preferable to Bassidore as station in Persian Gulf, and they desire to take advantage of present cool season in order to immediately establish station there.

1

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Government of India approve course of action proposed in your despatch No. 97 of June 26th last and consider that the fact that the authorization of 1868, (translation of which will be found in Government of India's letter of May 7th last), was acted upon for 12 years, is sufficient evidence of its having existed.

Please telegraph your views on this point and also as to course which would be most likely to enable wishes of Government of India to be carried out.

Telegram, No. 957-E. A., dated the 23rd March 1904.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,

Pro.No.341 To—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Telegraph cable will shortly be landed at Henjam by "Patrick Stewart." Admiral asked to send gun-boat to Bunder Abbas to be at hand if required. Please let Trevor know. Persian Government will only be informed when boat has started, so matter must be kept confidential.

Addressed Bushire, repeated Maskat.

Pro.No.342 No 271, dated Karachi, the 19th March 1904.

From—The Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs,

To—The Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

With reference to your No. 855-E. A., of the 14th instant, I have the honour to say that no material has yet been received from England and that even after its receipt it will take a considerable time, as I have already reported, to make up the cable necessary for making a connection with Henjam.

2. I may also point out that Henjam is a desolate island with hardly any inhabitants, there are no buildings there of any sort and a telegraph station will have to be built before an office can be opened there. At this season of the year, when the hot weather is just coming on, it would be impossible for the staff at Henjam to live in tents.

3. I have telegraphed the contents of your letter to the Director-in-Chief of the Department in London, so that the despatch of material required may be expedited, but I should like it to be understood that there are many difficulties in the way of establishing telegraphic communication at very short notice with Henjam as desired.

Telegram, dated the 23rd March 1904.

Pro.No.343 From—The Commissioner in Sind, Karachi,

To—The Under Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department.

Your telegram of yesterday. The Director, Persian Gulf Telegraph Department, replies as follows:—*Begins.* It is impossible to lay the cable at present. Material was at once asked for by telegraph on receipt of No. 318-E. A., of the 29th January, but it has not yet been shipped from England. Until it is received, my stock of cable is insufficient to make the connection. *Ends.*

Pro.No.344 Telegram, No. 981-E. A., dated the 25th March 1904.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,

To—The Commissioner in Sind, Karachi.

Your telegram of 23rd. Please communicate following to Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs. *Begins.* On August 10th you reported that with one month's notice you would have enough cable, and cable material, to lay 68

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miles cable and on 6th December you told me 60 knots might suffice and that you had 60 knots cable and expected 30 more. Have you not enough in stock to lay as an emergency, relying on restocking with what you ordered from England in January Can you arrange for Telegraph house as estimated in your letter No. 476 of 14th April 1903. Matter is of serious political importance as arrangements are in progress in reliance on your previous estimates. *Ends.*

India Office,
24th February 1904.

SIR,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to request that you will lay before the Marquess of Lansdowne the enclosed copy of a letter from the Government of India, reporting the conclusions arrived at by the Viceroy and the Naval Commander-in-Chief on the East Indian Station upon the questions of (1) the selection of suitable naval bases or coaling stations at the entrance to the Persian Gulf; and (2) the choice of a landing place for the proposed telegraph cable, which formed the subject of correspondence ending with your letter of the 15th October last.

No. 16 Secret, dated 21st January 1904.

P.Z.O. no. 345

The first question will no doubt be considered by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to whom a copy of the letter from the Government of India is being sent. No immediate action appears to be required, except the erection of certain flagstaffs, and this has already in principle been approved by Lord Lansdowne in your letter of the 17th February 1903, and by Lord George Hamilton's despatch No. 4 of the 27th February 1903.

With regard to the second question, Lord Lansdowne will see that the Government of India are now of opinion that Henjam is preferable to Bassidore as a telegraph station for the purposes of His Majesty's ships in the Persian Gulf.

It will be remembered that Sir A. Hardinge* considered that the best course to pursue would be to establish the telegraph station at Henjam, under the protection of a gun-boat to guard against local opposition; and when the occupation has been completed, to inform the Persian Government of the fact with an explanation to the effect that His Majesty's Government have decided again to take advantage of the permission granted to them by the late Shah on the 29th March 1868. In Mr. Hardinge's letter of the 17th August last Lord Lansdowne expressed his willingness to approve this course. Subsequently (21 September last) Sir A. Hardinge telegraphed that the original Persian authorisation could not be found; and that this might make it necessary to modify the proposed course of action. Mr. Brodrick, however, is inclined to agree with the Government of India that the fact that the authorisation (of which a translation will be found in the margin of the Government of India letter No. 56 of the 7th May last) was acted upon for 12 years, is sufficient evidence of its having existed.

* No. 97, dated 26th June 1903.

Mr. Brodrick would suggest that Sir A. Hardinge might again be consulted as to the course which would be most likely to enable the wishes of the Government of India to be carried out. Lord Lansdowne will note that the Government of India ask for early instructions, in order to take advantage of the present cool season.

There remains the question of the incidence of the cost. Mr. Brodrick is aware that Lord Lansdowne has expressed the opinion that it would be useless again to approach the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury on the subject. He desires me, however, to point out that the circumstances have changed since the 23rd February 1901, when their Lordships declined to contribute a share of the cost of the projects then in contemplation.

The proposal at that time was to construct two separate telegraph lines, one a cable from Jask to Muscat, the other either a cable or a land line from Jask to Bunder Abbas.

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The former line has already been constructed at the sole expense of the Government of India. The present proposal is primarily for a cable from Jask to Henjam, mainly in the interests of the naval squadron in the Persian Gulf; and, if the contemplated extension to Bunder Abbas should be carried out, the political advantages which may be expected to result are admittedly of joint concern to the Imperial and the Indian Governments. Mr. Brodrick, therefore, hopes that Lord Lansdowne will see his way to support the claim of the Indian Government to a division of the cost of the present proposal between the Imperial and the Indian Exchequers.

I am to add that it will be seen from the 6th paragraph of the enclosed letter that the Indian Government are about to submit, for political reasons as well as in the interests of navigation, a proposal to build a lighthouse at Cape Musandin.

I have, etc.,

(Sd.) A. GODLEY.

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

INDIA OFFICE,

24th February 1904.

Pro. no. 346

SIR,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to enclose for the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty a copy of a letter* from the Government of India and of a letter† to the Foreign Office on the subject of (1) the selection of suitable naval bases at the entrance to the Persian Gulf; and (2) the choice of a landing place for the proposed telegraph cable, which formed the subject of correspondence between this office and the Admiralty, ending with your letter of the 6th October last.

*No. 16 Secret.
†Dated 24th February 1904.

Their Lordships will note that Indian Government, after consultation with the Naval Commander-in-Chief, have decided upon Henjam as the most convenient station for the purposes of His Majesty's ships; and Mr. Brodrick hopes that the Lords Commissioners will see their way to support the claim of the Government of India that the whole cost of this proposal should not be borne by Indian revenues.

In conclusion I am to request that you will draw the special attention of the Lords Commissioners to the 3rd paragraph of the Government of India letter with a view to the correction of the passage in Rear-Admiral Atkinson Willes' letter, to which it refers.

I have, etc.,

(Sd.) A. GODLEY.

The Secretary,
Admiralty.

Pro. no. 347

Telegram, dated the 27th March 1904.

From—The Commissioner in Sind, Karachi,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Your telegram of the 25th instant. Director replies: "My previous statements have been made on the assumption that no cable would be required for repairing. As a matter of fact I have expended nearly one hundred knots, and

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thirty knots expected have not arrived. I have assumed that the cable would be landed at or near the point where the 1864 cable was landed, ship* anchoring on north of the island. If it is immaterial where the cable is landed and the office located, as a temporary measure, I believe that short emergency connection might be made on south side of island. The ship leaves here in ten days. As to building, work cannot be begun until landing is effected. In the meantime staff must be located in tents, with any extra protection which may be possible." *Ends.*

* This is conjectural.

No. 278 (Confl.), dated Karachi, the 23rd March 1904.

From—The Director, Persian Gulf Section,

To—The Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 271 of the 19th instant, I have the honour to say that the Director-in-Chief of this Department telegraphs from London that the material necessary for the manufacture of the cable required has not yet been shipped but that it will be shipped as early as possible. Pro. no. 348

2. After the arrival of the material here it will take about six weeks to manufacture the cable if the shorter of the two routes, *vide* my No. 476 of the 14th April 1903, is found to be practicable, and about ten weeks if the longer has to be followed. There must therefore be some months' delay before the cable can be got ready.

3. Then there is the question of the erection of an office and quarters for the staff. From a communication I received in June 1903 from the Director of this Department in Tehran, I gather that the Minister there does not consider that any preliminary steps should be taken which may draw attention to the proposal to reoccupy Henjam until the occupation can be actually carried out. In the first instance, therefore, the office and the staff would have to be accommodated in tents.

4. Now supposing the material for the cable required is shipped from England by the end of the next month (I very much doubt whether it can be shipped earlier or even so soon), it will not reach here till about the end of May, and it cannot be made up into cable until about the end of July or the middle of August next. At that time of year, owing to excessive heat, it is not usual, unless absolutely necessary, to carry out cabling operations in the Persian Gulf and I consider it would be dangerous to establish the staff in tents at Henjam.

5. For the above reasons I would suggest therefore that, as it is unlikely that telegraphic connection can be re-established with Henjam for some months, possibly not until about the beginning or end of August next, the project may, if possible, be deferred until about October next, when the weather in the Persian Gulf begins to become more moderate.

Telegram, No. 1008-E. A., dated the 29th March 1904.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,

To—The Director, Gulf Section, Karachi.

Have ascertained that Eastern Extension Company can provide 60 knots deep sea, 10 knots intermediate and usual shore end cable. Do you object to taking cable from them? If not, how much do you require and when can you send "Patrick Stewart" for it. Pro. no. 349

5

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Pro. no. 350

Telegram, dated the 30th March 1904.

From—The Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, Karachi,
To—Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Your 1008-E. Please say where the cable which the Eastern Extension can supply now is. "Patrick Stewart" can only make about seven knots an hour and if she has far to go for cable there will be much delay. As I have said through Commissioner I can make at once a connection to south end island and that is what I would recommend.

Telegram, No. 1026-E. A., dated the 31st March 1904.

Pro. no. 351

From—Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,
To—Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, Karachi.

Your telegram 30th instant. Cable is at Perim. Does this alter your view?

Telegram, dated the 1st April 1904.

Pro. no. 352

From—The Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, Karachi,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Your 1026-E. A. The Commander of "Patrick Stewart" says journey to Perim and back would take twenty-eight days. It is not advisable that ship should be away so long. I think connection should be made to south-east end of island, if office required to be at north end and a land line of few miles only will be needed. I believe however south end of island is better than north, and would suggest having office there at any rate until permanent building is built.

Telegram, dated the 1st April 1904.

Pro. no. 353

From—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,
To—The Commissioner in Sind, Karachi.

Please communicate following to Whitby Smith:—*Begins.*—Viceroy is very much annoyed at your inability to carry out plans after you have had many months' notice. It is important that Henjam connection should be made forthwith. It cannot be made on southern or south-eastern coast of island because we only have right to old site given us by Persian Government on north. This accordingly must be reoccupied, and connection established with it without further delay. Viceroy expects this to be done, and will be glad to hear date when you propose to do it.

Dates on which ships will start and reach Henjam should be stated.

Reply to Foreign with Viceroy, and repeat to Foreign, Simla. *Ends.*

Telegram, dated the 4th April 1904.

Pro. no. 354

From—Commissioner in Sind, Karachi,
To—Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram of the 2nd instant. Director's reply. *Begins.* Ship will leave about the 8th instant and reach Henjam about the 12th. I cannot say exactly how long it will take to make the connection, but probably not more than three days. *Ends.*

Telegram, No. 1054-E. A., dated the 7th April 1904.

Pro. no. 355

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Commissioner in Sind.

Your telegram dated 4th. Please instruct Director-General, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, to telegraph exact date and hour of starting "Patrick Stewart." He should instruct Commander of "Patrick Stewart" to communicate if necessary with Commanding Officer of gun-boat which he will probably find near Henjam or Bunder Abbas.

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Telegram, No. 1055-E. A., dated the 7th April 1904.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department,
To—Rear-Admiral Atkinson Willes, c/o Senior Naval Officer, Bombay. Pro. no. 356

My telegram 947-E. A., dated 22nd March. Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, wires. *Begins.* Ship will.....not more than three days. *Ends.* Commander has been directed if necessary to place himself in communication with Commander of gun-boat.

Telegram No. 1056-E. A., dated the 7th April 1904.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department,
To—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire. Pro. no. 357

Your telegram 957-E. A., dated 23rd March. Whitby Smith telegraphs. *Begins.* Ship will.....not more than three days. *Ends.* Admiral has been informed.

Telegram, No. 1057-E. A., dated the 7th April 1904.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department,
To—Sir A. Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran. Pro. no. 358

Please refer to your telegram No. 51, dated the 21st March 1904. The "Partrick Stewart" will leave Karachi with cable about the 8th April, reaching Henjam on the 12th. The connection will take about three days to make. Exact time of starting will be telegraphed to you.

Telegram, dated the 8th April 1904.

From—The Hon'ble Mr. J. W. P. Muir-Mackenzie, M.R.A.C., Commissioner in Sind, Karachi Camp,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department. Pro. no. 359

Your Secret telegram 1054-E. A. Director replies "Patrick Stewart" leaves at noon, 9th April, to-morrow. Commander has been instructed in accordance with orders.

Telegram No. 1071-E. A., dated the 8th April 1904.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department,
To—Sir A. Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran. Pro. no. 360

"Patrick Stewart" leaves to-morrow, the 9th April, at noon.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 44 F. D.—15-4-04.—54.—C. P.

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

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Telegram No. 62, dated the 10th April 1904.

From—Sir A. Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Pro no 361

The Government of India having notified to me that the telegraph ship has left Karachi, I have sent a note to the Persian Government, a copy of which should reach you shortly under cover of my despatch No. 62, dated the 30th March 1904.

Addressed to the Foreign Office, London.

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

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(Received on 11th April with Political Secretary's letter No. 12, dated the 18th March 1904.)

Foreign Office to India Office.

Pers. no. 362

5th March 1904.

SIR,

With reference to your letter of the 24th ultimo, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran relative to the proposed telegraph station at Henjam.

Sir A. Hardinge considers that, in the circumstances, it would be better that he should inform the Persian Government of the intention of His Majesty's Government to re-establish the station at Henjam, stating that this decision is based to a great extent on the representations made to the Viceroy of India during his recent visit to the Persian Gulf by the British Indian community at Bunder Abbas and inviting the Persian Government to permit the telegraphic connection of that place with Henjam.

Lord Lansdowne is disposed to approve the course now proposed by Sir A. Hardinge, but he would be glad to be favoured with any observations which the Secretary of State for India may desire to offer on the subject.

I am, &c.,

(Sd.) CHARLES HARDINGE.

Telegram from Sir A. Hardinge, Tehran, to the Foreign Office.

Tehr. no. 362

Dated 4th March 1904.

No. 25.

Your telegram 19th, Henjam.

I think under the circumstances I had better inform the Persian Government of our intention to re-establish station at Henjam, basing decision to a great extent on representations made to Viceroy during recent tour by Indian community at Bunder Abbas and inviting the Persian Government to let us connect the latter place with Henjam.

In view of the absurd suspicions which the Persian Government entertain of Indian designs, proposed simultaneous extension of Indian telegraph lines to Seistan and Bunder Abbas may somewhat disturb Shah's mind and we may have opposition to the Seistan line, but I think that we ought to be able to carry matter through as regards Henjam.

As soon as I have made my communication I will telegraph to India, and would suggest that necessary officers and material should start for Henjam.

INDIA OFFICE,

9th March 1904.

Pers. no. 363

SIR,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Hardinge's letter of the 5th instant relative to the proposed telegraph station at Henjam.

1

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In reply I am to say that the question of the best means of securing the acquiescence of the Persian Government in the reoccupation of the disused telegraph station at Henjam depends so much upon the disposition of the Persian Government at the moment, that it appears to Mr. Brodrick to be desirable to leave to His Majesty's Minister a wide discretion in the matter. He, therefore, concurs in Lord Lansdowne's proposal to approve the course indicated in Sir A. Hardinge's telegram No. 25 of the 4th instant.

I have, etc.,

(Sd.) A. GODLEY.

The Under Secretary of State,

Foreign Office.

[Enclosure in Foreign Office covering letter of March 7, 1904.]

FOREIGN OFFICE,

March 4th, 1904.

P 20.20.364

SIR,

With reference to the letter from this Department of December 31st, 1900, I am directed by the Marquis of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, copy of a letter from the India Office relative to the proposed establishment of telegraphic communication between Jask and Henjam, urging that the cost of this project should be equally divided between the Imperial and the Indian Exchequers.

Lord Lansdowne is aware that on February 23rd, 1901, in connection with a proposal for joining Maskat and Bunder Abbas with the Indo-European telegraph system at Jask, the Lords Commissioners stated that the interests of this country in the proposed cables were not, in their opinion, sufficient to justify them in assenting to an arrangement whereby one half the cost should be charged upon the British Exchequer. As, however, their Lordships will observe, the India Office point out that circumstances have changed since the date of that communication.

The proposal then put forward was to construct two separate telegraph lines, one a cable from Jask to Maskat, the other either a cable or a land line from Jask to Bunder Abbas. The former line has already been constructed at the sole expense of the Government of India. The present proposal is primarily for a cable from Jask to Henjam, mainly in the interests of the naval squadron in the Persian Gulf; and, if the contemplated extension to Bunder Abbas should be carried out, both the Imperial and the Indian Governments may be expected to benefit by the political advantages resulting therefrom.

Lord Lansdowne concurs in the views expressed by the Secretary of State for India on this subject, and I am to enquire whether, in the circumstances, the Lords Commissioners may not now be disposed to modify the decision communicated in their letter of February 23rd, 1901.

The Secretary to the Treasury.

Admiralty to India Office.

P 20.20.365

M. 0307.

11th March 1904.

SIR,

My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have had before them your letter of the 24th ultimo, in which you forward a copy of a letter from the

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Government of India and of a letter to the Foreign Office, on the subject of (i) the selection of suitable naval bases and coaling stations at the entrance to the Persian Gulf, and (ii) the choice of a landing place for the proposed telegraph cable.

2. In reply, I am to request you will inform the Secretary of State for India in Council that they concur in the opinion that the position of Henjam offers advantages for the establishment of a telegraph station superior to those possessed by Bassidore.

Their Lordships are, however, unable to support the suggestion of the Indian Government that the cost of establishing this station should be partly met by a contribution from Imperial Funds. Such a proposal is apparently based on the supposition that the cable will be chiefly useful for naval purposes; but unless some Foreign Power were to establish a regular naval base in the Persian Gulf from which to threaten the whole of the seaborne trade passing across the Indian Ocean, this Department would have no requirements in the Gulf except such as relate closely to the protection of Indian interests; and for this reason it is considered that no part of the cost of the station could properly be made a charge to Naval Funds.

3. I am to add that the attention of the Commander-in-Chief on the East Indies Station will be specially drawn to the 3rd paragraph of the Government of India letter and the passage in the Rear Admiral's Report, dated 8th December last, to which it refers, has been corrected accordingly.

I am, etc.,

(Sd.) C. I. THOMAS.

[Enclosure in Foreign Office covering letter of 15th March 1904.]

Cypher to Sir A. Hardinge.

FOREIGN OFFICE,
March 15th, 1904.

Tel. No. 25.

Your telegram No. 25 (of March 4) Henjam.

I approve course you suggest.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 131 F. D.—19-4-04.44.—deS.—44.

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

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

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Telegram, dated the 10th April 1904.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Pro. no. 366

Having received information that Persian Government ship *Mozaffari* which was on tour of Gulf with the Director-General of Customs, intending to place customs guards upon the island of Tamb, I sent *Lawernce* to visit island. She returned to-day and Commander reported that he found new flagstaff erected on the island with Persian flag flying, the old flagstaff with Arab flag which had been flying there having been forcibly removed. Two Persian Tufangchis were there, who showed papers, dated 31st March, signed by Director-General, appointing them guards on the island. They said that guards had also been posted on Bumusa. *Lawrence* did not visit this island, but I have received confirmation from somebody on board the *Mozaffari* which returned to Bushire after the *Lawrence* had left. Persian flag is said to have been hoisted on Bumusa. It is very important that these guards should be removed at once and that Persian flag should be taken down, Arab flag being reinstated. *Sphinx* is at Maskat. I have not repeated this telegram (to) Tehran.

Telegram No. 1135-E. A., dated the 13th April 1904.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,

To—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

Pro. no. 367

Following from Kemball :—*Begins*. Having received information* * * * * * Arab flag being reinstated. *Ends*. With the approval of the Government of India the flag of the Sheikh of Shargah was formally hoisted in the summer of 1903 on Abu Musa and Tamb, *vide* papers forwarded with Secretary's letter of the 18th June 1903. We propose to request the Naval Commander-in-Chief to send a gunboat with representative of the Sheikh of Shargah to haul down the Persian flag and replace the Arab colours and, moreover, to remove the Persian guard to Persian territory. If you approve of these measures, please telegraph. The rights of British-protected Chiefs being thus unwarrantably infringed may prove useful in the event of Persian remonstrance regarding the removal of the flagstaff standing on the plinth of the old telegraph station at Henjam, mentioned in paragraph 9 of our Despatch No. 16, Secret External, dated the 21st January 1904.

Repeated to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, and to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Stations, Aden.

Telegram, dated the 14th April 1904.

From—Rear Admiral Atkinson-Willes, Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, Aden,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Pro. no. 368

Refer to your telegram of 13th April. Following telegram has been sent to Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf at Bunder Abbas, through Political Agent, Maskat :—*Begins*. Proceed to Jask, place yourself in telegraphic communication with Political Resident, Bushire, and carry out wishes of Indian Government as regards (Jeriya Tamb) (*sic*) and Abu Musa and dispose of *Lapwing* as most desirable. *Ends*.

Telegram No. 1178-E. A., dated the 15th April 1904.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Pro. no. 369

Your telegram 10th April was repeated to the Secretary of State and it was added :—*Begins*. We propose to request Naval Commander-in-Chief to send gunboat to haul down Persian flag, replace Arab colours, and remove the

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Persian guard to Persian territory. If you approve of these measures, please telegraph. *Ends.* This message was repeated to Hardinge and to Naval Commander-in-Chief. The latter now telegraphs that he has instructed the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, to proceed to Jask and place himself in telegraphic communication with you and to carry out the wishes of the Government of India. Please take no action, pending receipt of further communication which will be sent on receipt of Secretary of State's orders.

Telegram No. 69, dated the 16th April 1904.

From—Sir A. Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,

Pro. no. 370

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Please refer to your telegram of the 13th April. Without obtruding any advice about Tamb and Abu Musa, I would suggest that if the removal of the Persian flag from the plinth at Henjam is necessary, it should be effected with every mark of respect if possible by local headman, who should be asked to re-erect it in another spot. It would be a pity that resumption of our rights at Henjam should be represented to this vain and sensitive Court as having been accompanied by an affront to the symbol of Persian sovereignty, and giving rise to an unpleasant incident. Moreover, Persian pride will be offended the more by an analogy between the Shah's flag and that of the Chief of Shargah. Repeated to Bushire.

Telegram, dated the 18th April 1904.

Pro. no. 371

From—The Commander of the *Sphinx*, Henjam,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.

I have telegraphed following to Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, and to the Political Resident at Bushire. According to positive statements made by the Sheikh of Henjam, Ahmed-bin-Obeid island belongs to the Sheikh of Debai, and that no authority whatever over the island is possessed by the Persian Government. Should the Persian Government attempt to enforce their authority in the island, he states that he should, as far as possible, resist such an attempt. The Sheikh stated that in the time of his father, about twenty years ago, the Persian Government erected a flagstaff and hoisted a Persian flag, but I cannot get a definite statement as to the arrangements arrived at ultimately. Should the Indian Government not admit the claim of the Persian Government, I would suggest the removal of the flagstaff.

The Sheikh stated that no fresh slaves are being imported, but that he would like an assurance that the possession of those now in the island might not be interfered with.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 148 F. D.—20-4-04—59.

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Establishment of Telegraphic communication with Henjam.

(*Received on 18th April with Political Secretary's letter No. 14, dated the 31st March 1904.*) **Pro. No. 372.**

INDIA OFFICE;
23rd March 1904.

SIR,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Thomas' letter of the 11th March, expressing the concurrence of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty in the choice of Henjam as the landing place of the proposed telegraph cable.

With regard to the incidence of the cost, Mr. Brodrick regrets the view taken by the Lords Commissioners and would call attention to the letter of the Government of India which shows that they have not based their proposal upon the inadequacy of the existing arrangements in the Persian Gulf for the ordinary protection of Indian interests in those waters, but that the projected establishment of a telegraph station at Henjam forms a portion of a scheme which they have submitted, after consultation with the Naval Commander-in-Chief, for the consideration of His Majesty's Government, with a view to providing against the contingency of the seizure by a Foreign Power of a port in the Persian Gulf; and the special object of the Henjam station would be by timely measures to facilitate prompt action by the Naval authorities in the event of this contingency arising, in which case, indeed, such a telegraph station would be indispensable.

Mr. Brodrick therefore adheres to the view that the whole of the cost of the project should not be borne by Indian revenues.

I have the honour to be,
SIR,
Your obedient servant,
(Sd.) A. GODLEY.

The Secretary, Admiralty.

Telegram, dated the 11th April 1904. **Pro. No. 373.**

From—The Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Telegraphic communication Henjam established this morning.

Telegram, No. 1265-E. A., dated the 21st April 1904. **Pro. No. 374.**

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,
To—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

With reference to your telegram of March 8th, telegraphic communication with Henjam was established on the 19th April 1904.

Telegram, No. 1266-E. A., dated the 21st April 1904. **Pro. No. 375.**

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—SIR A. HARDINGE, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

Please refer to your telegram of April 10th. Telegraphic communication with Henjam was established on the 19th April 1904.

(Addressed to Sir A. Hardinge, Tehran; repeated to Colonel Kemball, Bushire; and to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, Aden.)

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

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59.

Telegram No. 1236-E.A., dated the 20th April 1904.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,

To—Sir A. Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

Please refer to your telegram No. 69, dated the 16th April 1904. There is not, and apparently there never has been, on Henjam any Persian flag, but only a pole on the plinth of the British telegraph station. This was put up by Malik-ut-Tujar some years ago, after an unsuccessful attempt to erect it at a village on the south coast of the island. This was resisted by the local Arabs on the ground that the island belongs to the Sheikh of Debai, whose nephew resides as Sheikh in the aforenamed village. The pole will be quietly removed, but as it was erected on a British building without reference to the British Government, there seems no need to re-erect it. We have no desire to repudiate the Shah's authority for occupation of the station and the surrounding area held from 1868 to 1880, but our resumption of the site ought not to be made an excuse for disturbing the *status quo* or for introducing officials of the Persian Government or for levying taxes on the island, where there are no symbols of Persian authority at present, and where the Arabs are now unmolested. Pro no 376

Repeated to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Political Agent at Maskat.

Telegram, No. 74, dated the 20th April 1904.

From—Sir A. Hardinge, K.G.M.G., C.B. His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Tamb and Abu Musa. Please see your telegram No. 34. We do not appear to have received a copy of the despatch from the Government of India, dated the 18th June 1903, but I presume that it establishes absolute invalidity of Persian claim to these isles, which are, however, coloured Persian in the Viceroy's own unofficial map of 1892 as well as in the Indian survey map of 1897. It is clear that, on this assumption, we must support the rights acquired by the Sheikh of Shargah, but before hauling down the Persian flag it would be courteous to give the Persians a chance of removing it themselves. If they refused we could say that we had shown them more consideration than they had for the Sheikh of Shargah, and could carry out the proposal of the Government of India. I might induce Monsieur Naus to remove his guards and flag; and Arab flag could, after a convenient interval, then be unostentatiously rehoisted. I would like to avoid any suggestion that we were acting in a high-handed or unfriendly fashion, or any violent incident of a nature likely to offend Persian pride. Pro no 377

Addressed to Foreign Office, London.

Telegram, No. 1305-E. A., dated the 23rd April 1904.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla,

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire. Pro no 378

I am directed to request that copies of Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball's letters dated the 12th January and 30th April 1903, and of my letters dated the 10th March and the 15th June 1903, regarding Abu Musa and Tamb, may be forwarded to Sir A. Hardinge at Tehran.

Telegram, No. 1306-E. A., dated the 23rd April 1904.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla,

To—Sir A. Hardinge, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran. Pro no 379.

Please refer to your telegram dated the 20th April 1904. Instructions

1

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have been sent to the Resident at Bushire to forward to you copies of the correspondence of 1903 which was transmitted to the India Office with my letter dated the 18th June 1903. The status of Abu Musa and Tamb is similar to that of Sirri prior to the Persian seizure in 1887. In this connection please see *inter alia* the letters from Colonel Ross to Sir Drummond Woff, dated the 19th August 1888, from Colonel Wilson to Sir Mortimer Durand dated May 1895, and from Colonel Meade to Sir Mortimer Durand, dated the 13th December 1898. The Government of India are of opinion that the results of the policy of remonstrance in 1887 do not encourage the adoption of similar action on this occasion, and that the controversy now might revive the question of ownership of Siri also. Repeated to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Telegram dated the 22nd April 1904.

From—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.

Pro no 380

Please refer to your telegram dated the 13th April 1904, and Sir A. Hardinge's telegram dated the 20th April 1904 regarding Tamb and Abu Musa. Please inform me whether you have any information as to the invalidity of the Persian claims and the rights of the Sheikh of Shargah, beyond that contained in Foreign Secretary's letter dated the 18th June 1903 and the correspondence in the Foreign Department Proceedings, External A., September 1883, Nos. 102-104.

No. 107, dated Bushire, the 15th April 1904.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Pro no 381

I have the honour to refer to my telegram dated the 10th instant regarding the hoisting of the Persian flag on the islands of Tamb and Bu Moosa, and the posting of Persian Customs House guards on these islands.

2. The facts of the case are as follows:—

Having, towards the end of last month, received a report from the Residency Agent at Lingah that the Director-General of Customs at Bushire, who was on tour in the Gulf in the Persian Government ship *Mozafferi*, intended to post Customs House guards on the island of Tamb, I sent the *Lawrence* to visit this island to ascertain if the report was true. Commander Rowsell's report to me on his return to Bushire is submitted herewith.

3. The *Mozafferi* returned to Bushire after the *Lawrence* had left, and I then heard that the Persian flag had been hoisted also on the island of Bu Moosa and that four Customs House tufangchis had been posted there, and that three men had been posted on the island of Sirri, where, as the Government of India is aware, the Persian flag was already flying. There is, I believe, no doubt that this information is correct.

Dated 9th April 1904, with enclosure.

4. I have now received a letter dated 5th April from the Chief of Shargah, in which he says that he had just heard from Ras-el-Kheimah people that a Persian Government steamer had called at the island of Tamb, hauled down the Joasmi flag which was flying there and hoisted the Persian flag in its stead. The Chief says that he cannot tolerate this action of the Persians; that the British Goverament are aware of the fact that the islands of Tamb, Bu Moosa and Sir (meaning the island of Sir Abu Nair) belong to him; and that as he is one of those enjoying enjoying Treaty relations with the British Government, he hopes they will be so good as to take the necessary steps to prevent such interference with his territory.

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61.

The Chief does not mention anything about the Bu Moosa Island, but probably the information regarding the Persian action here had not reached him when he wrote to me.

5. I think it as well to forward for the information of the Government of India translated copy of a letter No. 9, dated the 4th April 1904, from the Residency Agent to my address on this subject. Without attaching much importance to the report of the words used by the Customs officials, the letter is useful as showing the views held by the people of Lingah in the matter.

6. The Government of India will remember that last year I brought to notice the possibility of the Persians attempting to take possession of the island of Bu Moosa—*vide* my letter No. 3, dated the 12th January 1903. In view of this letter and the correspondence which followed, it is not necessary for me to say anything more now regarding the undoubted rights of the Joasmis to the ownership of these islands.

It is possible that when the Chief of Shargah comes to hear of the action at Bu Moosa he may take his own measures to assert his rights, though I think it is more probable that he will appeal to us for redress. It is in my opinion of urgent importance that steps should at once be taken to remove the Persian signs of ownership from the islands of Tamb and Bu Moosa.

[Confidential.]

Dated Bushire, the 9th April 1904.

From—Commander C. R. Rowsell, R.I.M., Commanding R. I. M. S. *Lawrence*,

To—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enc No 1
Pro No 381.

In compliance with the request contained in your No. 314 of 1904, dated Bushire, 1st April 1904, I have the honor to report that I landed on the island of Tamb on the 8th instant and found that a new flagstaff had been erected there and that the Persian flag was flying on it. The Persian Customs guards were there. They produced a letter, in French and Persian, copy of which is herewith forwarded, as their authority. They informed me that they had been placed there on or about the 31st March by the *Mozafferi*, and that Customs guards had also been posted on the island of Abu Musa, by the same vessel. I gathered the following information from Arabs resident on the island.

That Muhammad Said was in charge of the Joasmi flag, which was hoisted on the island at the time of the *Mozafferi's* arrival. He was one of the Sheikh of Debai's men and he had with him two of the Sheikh's servants who were in charge of horses and donkeys which the Sheikh had placed there. The *Mozafferi's* people pulled down the flag and flagstaff, and threw the flag aside, and told the Sheikh's men to leave the island, which they did, taking with them the Sheikh's horses. They left in a buggalow a few days ago.

I personally inspected the old flagstaff, which was lying on the ground, and considerable force must have been used to pull it down as it was planted in a firm cement foundation.

The residents appeared very anxious that the Customs guard should be removed, and the latter themselves said they were quite willing that I should take them away from the island.

Translation.

Dated Tamb, 31st March 1904.

His Excellency the Director of all Persian Customs in the Persian Gulf has appointed Ali and his companion (Afra) as guards at the Island (Tamb).

They should be recognised as the Customs officials.

It is by order of His Majesty Mozaffer-ud Din, the Shah of Persia.

C. DAMBRAIN.

3

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Tamb, 31st March 1904.

Le Directeur Général des douanes Imperiales Persanes du Golfe Persique, sous-signé, désigne, comme surveillants des douanes dans l'île de Tamb le nommé Ali et son adjoint Afra.

Les autorités et autres personnes sont tenues de les reconnaître en cette qualité et de leur prêter aide et assistance.

(Sd.) C. DAMBRAIN.

Enc. No 2
Pro. No. 381

Translation of a letter No 9, dated 4th April 1904, from the Residency Agent at Lingah to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

After compliments,—

On the night of the 2nd April 1904, M. Dambrain, Director of Customs, Bushire, arrived at Lingah in the steamer *Mozafferi*.

I have heard that after leaving Bunder Abbas, he visited the island of Salama* and thence went to the island of Boo Moosa, where he hoisted the Persian flag and stationed 4 tufangchis. He then visited the island of Tamb and Nabiu (the smaller Tamb), where he also hoisted the Persian flag and placed 2 tufangchis. The island of Sirri was also visited and 2 tufangchis were placed there.

* The Quoins.

C. A. KEMBALL.

It is reported that when some merchants of Lingah visited the Customs Mudir of Lingah and M. Dambrain they told them that the island of Bu Moosa, on which they had hoisted the Persian flag, belonged to the Joasmi tribe and was under the Chief of Shargah; that the Chiefs of the Arab Coast would, on hearing this, send men and remove the flag which they had hoisted. They (M. Dambrain and Mudir) replied that if the Chiefs did so, they would despatch the *Persepolis* to punish them. The merchants replied that as the Arab Coast was under the protection of the British Government the latter would of course take steps in the matter. They replied "we will place the Russian Government to confront them." It is stated that M. Dambrain was specially authorized to hoist flags and place tufangchis on the said islands.

The proceedings of M. Dambrain have caused the inhabitants of Lingah to form conjectures, but they say that the British Government are not at all likely to remain silent in this matter and that they will take the necessary action for the restoration of the rights of the Chiefs of the Arab Coast. Such talks are now current at Lingah.

As it is the duty of this Agency to report all the information which it can obtain, I report this for your information.

4

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 225 F. D.—26-4-04. 00.

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

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Telegram No. 1324-E.A., dated the 25th April 1904.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,

To—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

With reference to your telegram, dated the 22nd April 1904, please see the papers cited in my telegram, dated the 23rd April, to Sir A. Hardinge. These conclusively disprove Persian claims. We have since heard that a letter has been received from the Chief of Shargah by Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball regarding Tamb. The Chief says that the Persian action cannot be tolerated by him, and appeals to the British Government to take the necessary steps to prevent such interference with his territory, as he enjoys treaty relations with us. The Chief does not mention the Abu Musa incident of which apparently he had not then heard. The Commander of the *Lawrence* reports that at Tamb three retainers of the Sheikh of Debai were in charge of the Joasmi flag which was flying at time of *Muzaffir's* visit. The Persians hauled down the flag, forcibly up-rooted the flagstaff from the firm cement foundation, and told the Sheikh's men to leave the island. They obeyed the order and took with them the horses belonging to the Sheikh placed in their charge there.

Repeated to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

P. No. 382

Telegram, dated the 25th April 1904.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Maskat,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Please refer to your telegram, dated the 15th April 1904. It would be convenient if, before I leave Maskat to-morrow evening, I could receive further instructions.

P. No. 383.

~~(Received on 25th April with Political Secretary's letter No. 15, dated 8th April 1904.)~~

PERSIA AND ARABIA. [March 15.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 25.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March, 15, 1904.*

TELEGRAPHIC communication in the Persian Gulf.

I approve the course with regard to telegraph cable at Henjam suggested in your telegram No. 25 of the 4th March.

Copy of a letter from the Foreign Office to the India Office, dated the 18th March 1904.

(Received on the 25th April 1904 with Political Secretary's letter No. 15, dated the 8th April 1904.)

I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit to you, for the observations of the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copy* of a telegram relating to the proposed extension of the Seistan telegraph line, and to the establishment of a telegraph station at Bunder Abbas.

* Sir A. Hardinge, No. 30, dated 17th March 1904, sent direct to India.

I am, etc.,

(Sd.) Charles Hardinge.

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Pro. No 384. *Extract from a letter from the India Office to the Foreign Office, dated the 29th March 1904.*

(Received on the 25th April 1904 with Political Secretary's letter No. 15, dated the 8th April 1904.)

With regard to the Henjam line, the Director-in-Chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department has reported that a temporary connection of short length might possibly be made at once on the south of the island, but that it will be some months before the necessary material would be ready for laying a permanent cable to the north side, where the former cable was landed, which is the only route at present known suitable for a permanent cable. Steps could also be taken without delay to construct the necessary buildings at Henjam.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 308 F. D.—5-5-04.—44.

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

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Telegram, dated the 27th April 1904.

From—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London,
To—His Excellency the Viceroy (Foreign Department), Simla.

Pho No 385

With reference to your telegram of 25th April regarding the island of Tamb, please send me Colonel Wilson's letter of May 1895 and Colonel Meade's of the 13th December 1898. They are not traceable in the London Foreign Office.

Telegram No. 1388-E.A., dated the 29th April 1904.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,
To—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

Pho No 386

With reference to the request contained in your telegram, dated the 27th April 1904, regarding the islands of Abu Musa and Tamb, I am sending by next mail copies of Colonel Wilson's and Colonel Meade's letters of May 1895 and 13th December 1898, respectively.

MEMORANDUM.

Pho No 387

The papers specified in the margin were transmitted to the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter, No. 18-M., dated the 5th May 1904.

PERSIAN GULF.
Tamb and Abu Musa Incident.

Letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 107, dated the 15th April 1904, with enclosures.

MEMORANDUM.

Pho No 388

The papers specified in the margin were transmitted to the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter, No. 18-M., dated the 5th May 1904.

PERSIAN GULF.
Tamb and Abu Musa.

(1) Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel M. J. Meade, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Teheran (demi-official), dated the 13th December 1898.
(2) Letter from Colonel F. A. Wilson, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Teheran, dated May 1895, and enclosure.

G. C. Press, Simla,—No. 340 F. D.—7-5-04.—00.—E. A. D'S.

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

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

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

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

SIMLA RECORDS— 5

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1905.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET—E.

Proceedings, June 1905, Nos. 45—111.

Reports of the Commercial Mission to Persia.

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

Previous Proceedings.					Later Proceedings.				
Secret, A, B, or D.	Classification.	Month.	Year.	Nos.	Secret, A, B, or D.	Classification.	Month.	Year.	Nos.
Secret	External . . .	November	1904	118—126	Secret	External	June	1905	383/92
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A	,, . . .	October	,,	49—177	— B —	— do —	— " —	1905	300 180 181
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Secret	,, . . .	March	,,	247—250					
,,	,, . . .	April	1903	173—176					

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

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

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

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FOREIGN DEPARTMENT NOTES.

SECRET—E., JUNE 1905.

Nos. 45—111.

REPORTS OF THE COMMERCIAL MISSION TO PERSIA.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CONSUL, KERMAN, DATED THE 15TH (RECEIVED 16TH) SEPTEMBER 1904.

Foreign. 45

States that the estimate for the Mission, for three delegates, without pay of Indians, totals to Rs. 7,562.

For information.

G. M. C.,—17-9-04.

17-9-04. L. RUSSELL.

Major Sykes considers a first advance of Rs. 2,000 to each member of the Mission sufficient for travelling expenses; a further advance if necessary can be arranged from the Bank at Kerman.

Vide External A. Proceedings, October 1904, Nos. 49-177 Foreign 100

2. The file may now be sent unofficially to the Finance Department who may be asked, if they agree, to wire necessary instructions to the Bombay and Cawnpore Treasuries.

3 On return of the file we might wire to the Bombay and Upper India Chambers of Commerce, the two Chambers that are sending delegates with the Mission, sanctioning an advance of Rs. 2,000 to each of the three delegates, Messrs Kapadia and Massani, Bombay, and Mr. Arthur Gleadowe-Newcomen, Cawnpore, a copy of our sanction being sent to the Bombay Government and the Government of the United Provinces.

4. In the meantime the date of the first steamer in October which sails direct from Bombay to Bunder Abbas, *viâ* Karachi, will be looked up.

Please do this early.
L. RUSSELL.
S. M. FRASER.

5. Mr. Maclean's report, the Anglo-Persian Convention, and the Convention Tariff are being printed up.

We should send copies of these direct from this Department as soon as ready.
L. RUSSELL.

Finance Department will be supplied with 100 copies of the Report.

6. The portion of the file returned from the Finance Department has been amalgamated with the main file and a complete spare copy of the current papers, including those already recorded, may be sent to the Finance Department with their papers.

Yes, send them a copy of all the papers.
L. RUSSELL.

G. M. C.,—9-9-04.

C. H. C.,—9-9-04.

I do not think that we should offer to any of the delegates any advance until they ask for it. We have told them that we are prepared to grant them each a sum to be agreed upon as representing actual travelling expenses. If we start doling out handsome advances, unasked, we may have the delegates forming unduly extravagant ideas.

On the other hand we may any day have the delegates asking us for some indication of the amount which we are prepared to give, and to enable us to reply to such an enquiry, I would suggest that we should telegraph to Major Sykes, as proposed in my note of 31st August 1904, asking for an estimate of what he considers will be the total actual travelling expenses for each member (from debarkation at Bunder Abbas to embarkation at Gwadur).

At the same time we may ask the Finance Department to agree to grant advances of the sums mentioned by Major Sykes, if and when we consider this necessary.

9-9-04. L. RUSSELL.

I agree in the above, and the draft telegram to Major Sykes may issue, but he will be able to give only an approximate estimate and we shall have, I think, to stipulate that the

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advances made should be adjusted when the Mission returns to India and actual bills are submitted, and unless the Chambers agree to accept a lump sum down for each delegate and run the risk of the total being exceeded.

9-9-04. S. M. FRASER.

The slow steamer from Karachi, which, I think, is the one that goes to Bunder Abbas, leaves on Saturday, and so the first steamer in October by which the Commission could leave sails on 1st October. It ought not to have taken the office weeks to find this out, as it is in every newspaper.

The telegram to Major Sykes may issue and the other action proposed can be taken.

9-9-04. L. W. DANE.

* * * * * * * * *

2. Major Sykes states that a very rough estimate of the Commission tour is Rs. 13,280, or Rs. 3,320 per member. In this connection a copy of the papers printed up to date has been sent to the Finance Department to complete their file.

We must ask Finance Department (on a spare file) for a grant to meet the expense of the Mission.

16-9-04. L. RUSSELL.
17-9-04. S. M. FRASER.

Finance Dept. No 80 in E.A. Aug 04 Nos 68-107

Please see the Foreign Department's letter Nos. 2583-4-E. A.,* dated 28th October 1903, and the notes at page 4 of the proceedings marginally noted. The intention clearly was that we should not undertake the† audit of the travelling expenses of the commercial representatives, but that they should receive a lump sum *to be agreed upon* as representing actual travelling expenses. When, therefore, the Foreign Department receive a reply to their telegram of 10th September to Major Sykes, the lump sum to be advanced should be settled in communication with the Chamber of Commerce, it being understood that the sum is intended to cover all travelling charges. We may agree to the Foreign Department sanctioning advances on the basis of Major Sykes' recommendations. They should inform us, when conveying sanction, of the amount of the advances, and the persons to whom, and treasuries from which, the payments are to be made, in order that we may issue the necessary instructions to the Treasury Officers.

* External A, August 1904, Nos. 68-107.

† See marked portion of Mr. Fraser's note at page 6 of these notes.

2. There is no budget provision for the expenditure on account of this Mission. The Foreign Department may be asked to indicate how it is proposed to meet it, when they are in possession of complete estimates of cost—*vide* their telegram to Major Sykes, dated 2nd September 1904.

Yes.

16-9-04. J. CAMPBELL.

G. S.,—14-9-04.

J. D.,—14-9-04.

‡ They have just come in.

(This case was held back by me, until a copy of the notes at slip L could be obtained.)‡

We may agree to the grant of any advances which the Foreign Department may consider necessary. If they inform this Department of the amount, the Treasuries at which the advances are to be made, and the persons to whom they are payable, telegraphic instructions to the Treasury Officers concerned will be issued.

2. The question of audit is connected with the question discussed in the recent notes in this Department. We shall pay actual travelling expenses, provide transport, and provide also tents, camp furniture, etc. It will be better to let each representative send in this bill, I think; it is too late now to attempt to settle a definite sum for each delegate, and I question very much whether that would be possible, in any case. The Chambers would doubtless approach the question from the same point of view as Mr. Newcomen. He pointed out that he knew nothing of the expenses incurred in travelling in Persia; and added that there was no source of information readily accessible to him. That is true enough; and it is difficult to see how the Chambers could determine a suitable sum to ask for in respect of each delegate.

3. The audit need not be a technical one; it will be sufficient if the bills are examined in this and in the Foreign Department. In effect, we are putting the representatives of the Chamber on their honour; and I personally think we are quite safe in doing so. It is the procedure which a commercial man would adopt himself in such a case; and it seems to me the only practical method.

16-9-04. J. CAMPBELL.
16-9-04. W. S. MEYER.
Foreign Department.

Frono 45

FROM THE UPPER INDIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CAWNPORE, DATED THE 19TH (RECEIVED 21ST) SEPTEMBER 1904.

Regarding the Commercial Mission to Persia.

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FROM MAJOR P. MOLESWORTH SYKES, C.M.G., HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CONSUL AT KERMAN, No. 266, DATED THE 5TH (RECEIVED 10TH) OCTOBER 1904.

Forwards a rough approximate estimate of cost of transport, etc., for the Commercial Mission for four months.

FROM THE UPPER INDIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, DATED THE 8TH (RECEIVED 11TH) OCTOBER 1904.

Forwards a revised statement of travelling expenses, etc., of the Upper India Chamber's delegate and staff in connection with the Commercial Mission.

Please see Finance Department notes on page 2, and the three new receipts.

The Upper India Chamber have submitted two estimates for their delegates' journey, etc., to and from Bunder§ Abbas. The latter of these they ask us to accept.

† It is, however, intended that the return journey will be made *vid* Pasni, which will reduce the estimate.

Major Sykes in his No. 266 contemplates a return through Bunder Abbas.

L. RUSSELL.

After deducting the cost of the horses, which the former did not include, there is comparatively little difference between the two (Rs. 546-6-0) and in view of the fact that the Chamber have until now made no trouble over the extent to which Government assistance would be given, we need not, it is thought, draw a hard and fast line as to what constitutes "travelling expenses and camp equipage", within reasonable bounds.

2. Major Sykes' estimate for the period the Mission will be in Persia is, he states, rough and incomplete, and allows for four months only. It will, however, give us something to go on. The statement below shows the whole in a concise form.

The following points now remain for consideration:—

(*a*) whether any advances to the delegates are considered necessary, if so, to what extent,

(*b*) how the actual travelling and other expenditure is to be audited, and

(*c*) how the expenditure on account of the Mission is to be met, there being no Budget provision.

With regard to (*a*), the Mission will be well *en route* to Bunder Abbas before arrangements to remit money could be concluded, and it will then be impossible for any to reach them before they arrive at Kerman. No representation has as yet been made in the matter by the Chamber and it may therefore be presumed that Mr. Newcomen carries sufficient funds with him to meet immediate wants.

4. It seems that the first thing to do is to ask the Finance Department to sanction a *special* grant to the extent of the estimates‖ received, and then let the Chamber make their own arrangements for keeping Mr. Newcomen supplied with funds. On completion of the journey, the accounts could be audited as suggested by Finance Department on page 3, and any excess of the original grant made good to the Chamber by a subsequent grant under the same head, when the extent of the excess is known.

§ Rs. 15,067-9-0.

The Chamber may be consulted as to the course they would prefer.
19-10-04.

S. M. FRASER.

C. B. P.,—13-10-04.

C. H. C.,—17-10-04.

Statement of estimated expenditure in connection with the Commercial Mission to Persia.

(I)—*For the journey from Cawnpore to Bunder Abbas and back.*

	Rs.	A.	P.
First class fare from Cawnpore to Bombay and back by Great Indian Peninsula	104	14	0
2 second class fares from Cawnpore to Bombay and back by Great Indian Peninsula	105	0	0
Third class fares from Cawnpore to Bombay and back by Great Indian Peninsula	157	8	0
3 First class fares from Bombay to Bunder Abbas and back	780	0	0
Steerage (servants) ditto	165	0	0
5 days' expenses in Bombay	300	0	0
Freight on 50 mds. of luggage and camp equipage, Cawnpore to Bombay and back	13	12	0
Freight on 70 mds. of luggage from Bombay to Bunder Abbas and back ...	100	0	0
Total ...	1,726	2	0

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(II)—*For Ashgar Ali and escort, from Kerman to Bunder Abbas.*

	Krans.
4 mules for Ashgar Ali (at 5 Krans per diem)	600
4 Ditto for Hospital Assistant	600
12 Ditto for use of Mission	1,800
Escort of 6 Persian soldiers, at 7 Krans per diem, for 30 days	210
Escort of 6 mounted men from Sirjan to coast, at 26 Krans per diem, for 20 days	520
Guides, etc.	100
Total ...	3,830

(III)—*Waiting at Bunder Abbas, no estimate possible, but allow for 10 days.*

Hire of mules	1,000
Pay of soldiers	70
Pay of sowars	260
Total ...	1,330

(IV)—*Mission from Bunder Abbas to Kerman (Time 45 days).*

Engagement of 6 tent pitchers, at 60 Krans per month, for 1½ months ...	540
Hire of 60 camels for transport tents, forage, water, etc., at 3 Krans per diem	8,100
Mules as per section II for 45 days	4,500
Soldiers	315
Sowars	1,170
Guides, etc.	200
Total ...	14,825

(V)—*Kerman to Bunder Abbas*, via *Bam.*

Estimate roughly equivalent to Section (IV) 14,825

(VI)—*Incidental expenditure.*

	Rs.	A.	P.
Cost of tentage and camp equipage	1,227	11	0
Contingencies	300	0	0
Saddlery	172	2	0
Trunks	49	0	0
1 Aneroid	35	0	0
1 Magnetic Sundial	10	8	0
1 Gunmetal ditto	20	0	0
1 Camp bed	36	0	0
1 Camp bath	20	8	0
1 Waterproof sheet	12	0	0
4 Arab horses, clothing and food	2,258	10	0
Total ...	4,141	7	0

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		Totals.	Rs.	A.	P.
Section I.	... ...		1,726	2	0
		Krans.			
„ II.	...	3,830			
„ III	...	1,330			
„ IV	...	1,4825			
„ V	...	14,825			
	34,810, at 390 Krans per Rs. 100 (approximate)		9,200	0	0
„ VI	... ...		4,141	7	0
	Total ...		15,067	9	0

If the Finance Department agree we may inform the Upper India Chamber that their estimate of Rs. 5,868 is accepted provisionally. No offer of payment need be made until they ask for an advance or for settlement in full.

2. It is impossible to criticise Major Sykes' estimate. I see that it includes provision for mules for Ashgar Ali and the Hospital Assistant who are Government servants. I am not sure if Finance Department will prefer that these officials should simply enjoy the usual allowances and concessions admissible under the Civil Service Regulations. That will probably be the best arrangement. Subject to such orders as may be passed on this point, Major Sykes may be authorised to incur expenditure on the lines indicated in his letter No. 266 up to the limit of Rs. 9,200. He may be told to submit a revised estimate as early as possible, should there be reason to believe that further expenditure will be necessary.

3. The Finance Department may be asked to make a special grant for the Mission. The amount might be fixed at Rs. 20,000 to allow a margin for the further unforeseen charges which may certainly be expected.

18-10-04. L. Russell.

I agree in the above but the Chamber expect to be reimbursed the amount of the estimate already submitted (see their letter of 19th September), and I think we should agree to remit them this amount, unless they prefer to submit a complete account at the close of the Mission. They have behaved well in contrast with the Bombay Chamber and we should meet their convenience as far as possible.

19-10-04. S. M. Fraser.

19-10-04. L. W. Dane.

Finance Department.

As regards the travelling allowance of servants of Government who are accompanying the Mission, this Department would prefer that it should be regulated by the rules in the Civil Service Regulations.

26-10-04. H. Heseltine.

We may agree to the special grant asked for. When the Foreign Department ascertain the Chamber's wishes in respect of the payments to be made to them, we can issue orders. Probably it would be most convenient to all parties if we authorised the Treasury Officer, Cawnpore, to advance the amount of the estimate at once to the Secretary to the Upper India Chamber, leaving him to make his own arrangements for financing Mr. Newcomen. The final bills should be submitted to the Foreign Department.

Leave this to the Chamber.
E. N. Baker.

26-10-04. J. Campbell.

27-10-04. E. N. Baker.

Foreign Department.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 2836 F. D.—1-11-04—33.—C. G. de S.

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

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FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CONSUL, KERMAN, No 270, DATED 15TH SEPTEMBER (RECEIVED 20TH OCTOBER) 1904. Nos 45

Submits a revised estimate of expenditure in connexion with the itinerary of the Commercial Mission.

FROM THE UPPER INDIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CAWNPORE. DATED 21ST OCTOBER (RECEIVED 25TH OCTOBER) 1904. Nos. 50

Enquire if Government can see their way to paying a portion of the estimate of expenditure incurred in connexion with the Commercial Mission, submitted with their letter of the 8th instant.

Please see Finance Department notes on page 5 *ante*.

Major Sykes has submitted a revised estimate of expenditure in connexion with the Mission to Persia amounting in all to Rs. 10,793 or Rs. 1,593 more than his former estimate. I would point out though that the pay and travelling allowances of Khan Bahadur Asghar Ali and of Hospital Assistant Tafazul Husain have not been entered, nor has the pay of three sowars been shown.

2. It is understood that the travelling allowances of Asghar Ali and of the Hospital Assistant are to be governed by the Civil Service Regulations, and that as these men are Government servants the expenditure incurred in connexion with their pay and travelling allowances, while on deputation with the Mission, will not be a charge against the sanctioned grant of Rs. 20,000.

3. In Section I of the estimate submitted by Major Sykes an amount of Krs. 375, (Rs. 96) is shown for three Indian sowars (with one extra mule for rations) from Kerman to Bunder Abbas, and in Section VI we have Krs. 1,500, (Rs. 385) for the forage and rations of three Indian sowars, throughout for 120 days. To this will have to be added the pay and travelling allowances of three Indian sowars from Bunder Abbas to Kerman and from Kerman to Pasni. The relieved sowars will probably embark for India from Pasni. It is for consideration whether the total expenditure in connexion with the relieved sowars accompanying the Mission from Bunder Abbas—these sowars are seconded while absent from their regiment—should be borne by the Mission, or whether, if the Military Department * agree, these men could not be considered as on duty at Kerman during the period they will be acting as an escort to the Mission, and their pay and travelling allowances for that period be a charge against Civil.

4. Pending the decision on this point Major Sykes may perhaps † be authorised to expend any sum, say, up to a limit of Rs. 10,800 or even Rs. 11,000. If Finance Department agree to this Major Sykes will be informed that this amount has been placed at his disposal.

*It is understood that the Military Department have agreed to the three men (relieved sowars), remaining with the Mission to the end.

† If the charge is to be against the Mission it will come out of the special grant. If it is to be a charge against Civil, the concurrence of the Finance Department is required. His Majesty's Government would have to pay half, *vide* Financial Department note of 16th September 1904.

A. F. F.

E. L. N.,—5-11-1904.

I would debit the charge for escort in the same manner as the Consul's escort (of which it forms a part) is ordinarily debited.

L. RUSSELL.,—7-18-1904.

5. In regard to the request of the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, it would be as well perhaps if an advance of the whole amount of their estimate (Rs. 5,867-9) were made to them as proposed by the Finance Department, the final bills being submitted to this Department.

Finance Department to see for the issue of necessary orders, after which we shall inform the Upper India Chamber of Commerce of the action taken.

G. M. C.,—3-11-1904.

E. L. N.,—5-11-1904.

A. FREMANTLE,—7-11-1904.

Please put up drafts.

L. RUSSELL,—7-11-1904.

Drafts added. Finance Department should see before issue.

G. M. C.,—8-9-1904.

E. L. N.,—9-11-1904.

A. FREMANTLE,—10-11-04.

L. RUSSELL,—10-11-1904.

Finance Department.

We may agree that the salary and travelling allowances of Khan Bahadur Ashghar Ali, and Hospital Assistant Tafazul Husain, and of the sowars should be debited to the ordinary heads of account. Any other extra expenditure connected with their deputation should be charged to the account of the Mission. A precedent for such a decision will be found in the

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orders issued in our Resolution No. 4071 A, dated the 10th August 1900. The point may be made clear in the draft to Major Sykes.

2. A draft to the Comptroller, India Treasuries, asking him to arrange for the immediate payment of Rs. 5,867-9-0 to the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, is also submitted for approval.

H. D. G.,—19-7-1904.

J. CAMPBELL,—21-1-1904.

E. N. BAKER,—21-11-1904.

Foreign Department.

FROM THE FINANCE AND COMMERCE DEPARTMENT, DATED 24TH NOVEMBER 1904.

Forwards copy of a letter No. 7332 A, dated the 24th November 1904, to the Comptroller, India Treasuries, requesting him to arrange for the payment, to the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, of the sum of Rs. 5,867-9-0.

Please see Finance Department notes from page ~~10,~~ *ante*. The two drafts below to the Upper India Chamber of Commerce and Major Sykes' may now issue with a slight alteration.

G. M. C.,—26-11-1904.

F. S. H.,—26-11-1904.

A. FREMANTLE,—28-11-1904.

L. RUSSELL,—29-11-1904.

LETTER TO A. SHAKESPEAR, ESQ., ACTING SECRETARY, UPPER INDIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CAWNPORE, No. 4055 E. A., DATED THE 3RD DECEMBER 1904.

Informs him that the Treasury Officer, Cawnpore, has been authorised to advance him the whole estimated amount on account of the travelling allowances for the delegate and staff in connection with the Commercial Mission to Persia.

LETTER TO MAJOR P. M. SYKES, C. M. G., HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CONSUL, KERMAN, No. 4056 E. A., DATED THE 3RD DECEMBER 1904.

Authorises him to incur expenditure on the lines indicated in his letter under reply up to a certain limit.

ENDORSEMENT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, No. 4057 E. A., DATED THE 3RD DECEMBER 1904.

Forwards for information and necessary action a copy of the foregoing letters.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 2666 F. D.—10-12-1904.—33—J. A.

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

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[9]

FROM THE SECRETARY, UPPER INDIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CAWNPORE, DATED THE 17TH (RECEIVED 21ST) NOVEMBER 1904.

Forwards copy of Mr. Newcomen's first report in connexion with the Commercial Mission to South-East Persia.

FROM THE SECRETARY, UPPER INDIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CAWNPORE, DATED THE 26TH NOVEMBER (RECEIVED 1ST DECEMBER) 1904.

Forwards copy of a letter addressed by Mr. Newcomen to the Indian Tea Cess Committee referred to in his report, dated the 1st November 1904.

Two receipts submitted.

In our letter No. 1774-E. A.,* dated the 2nd June 1904, will be found the proposed itinerary to be followed by the Commercial Mission to Persia. After visiting the various trade centres *en route* to the valley of the Bampur River, the return journey, if time permitted, was to be performed *viâ* Magas, Kuhak, and the Kej valley to Gwadur or Pasni. Mr. Newcomen has discovered on his arrival in Persia that this latter portion of the route to be followed would be absolutely profitless. Further, that if this 'route be adhered to, the Mission, on leaving Persian territory, will require to be provided with an escort to replace the Persian Guard, and special transport arrangements will have to be concluded.'

* No. 104 of External A, August 1904, Nos. 68-107.

2. As an alternative Mr. Newcomen proposes making Kerman his head-quarters, from there the Mission could visit Yezd returning *viâ* Shiraz to Bushire or proceeding from Kerman to the coast *viâ* Narmashir or Bampur passing through the Rodhar District to Jask.

3. In view of what Mr. Newcomen says, perhaps, there will be no objection to the Mission taking either of the proposed alternative routes. A telegram to Major Sykes to this effect is placed below.

4. In regard to the expenses of the Mission on transport and escort, etc., orders are issuing to Major Sykes placing at his disposal Rs. 11,000 for expenditure in this connexion. Major Sykes might be informed of this. The amount of Rs. 1,500 for presents, to which Mr. Newcomen refers, if actually expended, should, perhaps, be met from the same source.

5. With reference to the Chamber's claim upon Government for travelling expenses, etc., of the delegates, the Comptroller of India Treasuries has been asked to make arrangements to place the sum of Rs. 5,867-9-0 at the disposal of the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, and the Chamber are being informed that this has been done.

6. As to Mr. Newcomen's request about filling in the requisition for the return passages, we are as much in the dark as to what is required as the Chamber are themselves. In the statement of travelling expenses submitted by the Chamber with their letter, dated the 8th October 1904, three first class fares, steerage for servants, etc., have been included from Bombay to Bunder Abbas and back. If the Mission embark from Bushire the excess fare can easily be adjusted on the return of the Mission, when the final bills are to be submitted for settlement. It would appear that no action is necessary in this connexion at present. The Chamber may be told how the matter stands.

Draft below.

7. It is for consideration whether extracts of portions of Mr. Newcomen's report should be placed with the various files to which they may refer.

Finance Department should see after issue.

G. M. C.,—2-12-1904.

R. W. S.,—3-12-1904.

1. The first question is that of change of itinerary. Mr. Newcomen has "discovered" that much of the country through which the route lies is "practically a desert," etc., in fact apparently, this route was suggested in rather a light-hearted way; had those responsible for it possessed the experience which comes from a few days' stay in Bunder Abbas, they would have suggested something different.

2. I think we cannot admit ignorance of the fact that Bushire is a somewhat more important trading port than, say, Pasni. The Mission is a mission to South-Eastern Persia, deliberately undertaken because Mr. Maclean did not cover that ground.† I venture to think we should hold the Chamber, and through them Mr. Newcomen, to this. I would be strongly against his going to Shiraz or Bushire, and even, I think, Yezd. If he objects to crossing into British territory we might give way, but I doubt whether there is real force in his objections regarding the difficulties as to the escort and transport arrangements to Gwadur or Pasni.

† Please see Major Sykes' letter No. 68 of External A Proceedings, August 1904, Nos. 68-107.

I put up a draft telegram for consideration on those lines. He should consult with Major Sykes, the author of the scheme. Letter to Chamber may also issue. I would not explain matters in detail at present.

A. FREMANTLE,—3-12-1904.

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I agree in the proposed draft telegram to Major Sykes. Please telegraph to Foreign with Viceroy as follows:—

Upper India Chamber of Commerce write that after enquiry in Bombay and on arrival in Persia Newcomen proposes that Mission instead of following previously proposed itinerary through scantily populated country from Bampur *viâ* Magas and Kuhak to Gwadur, should visit Yezd, and return thence either (1) *viâ* Shiraz and Bushire or (2) *viâ* Narmeshir or Bampur through Rudbar District to Jask. They request issue of telegraphic orders to Newcomen, care of Consul at Kerman. We propose to telegraph to Sykes as follows:—*Begins.* Please inform Mr. Newcomen with reference to his proposed change of itinerary that object of Mission is to examine Kerman Province and South-Eastern Persia. Government have no objection to modification of original itinerary decided by him after consultation with you—provided it covers that ground. Proposal to visit Shiraz or Bushire is contrary to original idea. *Ends.*

2. Then please speak as to the remaining points referred to in the Chamber's letter.

L. Russell,—3-12-1904.

Telegram, dated the 3rd December 1904.

From—Foreign, Calcutta,

To—The Foreign with Viceroy, Viceroy's Camp.

Upper India Chamber of Commerce write that after enquiry in Bombay and on arrival in Persia Newcomen proposes that Mission, instead of following previously proposed itinerary through scantily populated country from Bampur *viâ* Magas and Kuhak to Gwadur, should visit Yezd, and return thence either (1) *viâ* Shiraz and Bushire or (2) *viâ* Narmeshir or Bampur through Rudbar District to Jask. They request issue of telegraphic orders to Newcomen, care of Consul at Kerman. We propose to telegraph to Sykes as follows:—*Begins*:—

Please inform Mr. Newcomen with reference to his proposed change of itinerary that object of Mission is to examine Kerman Province and South-Eastern Persia. Government have no objection to modification of original itinerary decided by him after consultation with you—provided it covers that ground. Proposal to visit Shiraz or Bushire is contrary to original idea. *Ends.*

As this is a Commercial Mission, I think we should allow them to vary their route, if they think that a change will promote their object, provided that—

(*a*) The change is compatible with the aid promised by Government in the way of protection, which involves that

(*b*) The consent of the Persian Government is given to furnishing the same escort.

Major Cox may be consulted on these two points. The telegram may be repeated to Major Cox, down to the word "Karman," and then proceed:—

"We see no objection provided, first, change of route involves no serious difficulty to Government of India in affording the same facilities for protection and transport; secondly, Persian Government consent and furnish similar escort throughout. Please give your opinion after consulting Sykes." If Major Cox agrees we shall then have to gain the concurrence of the Persian Government through the Legation, Tehran.

S. M. Fraser,—4-12-1904.

I agree.

A[mpthill],—4-12-1904.

His Excellency has agreed to the following addition being made to the above telegram. After the words "we have no objection" insert "provided firstly that it is borne in mind that primary object of tour is to explore commercially South-East Persia. Visit to Yezd would be useful, but visit to Shiraz or Bushire seems inconsistent with this object."

The other two conditions will be introduced as "secondly" and "thirdly."

S. M. Fraser,—6-12-1904.

Telegram to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 4082-E. A., dated the 6th December 1904.

Agrees to the proposed plans of the Upper India Chamber of Commerce on certain conditions and ask for his opinion after consulting Major Sykes.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 3100 F. D.—23-12-1904.—33—R. S. W.

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TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 1ST (RECEIVED 2ND) JANUARY 1905. Gram 58

Reports the proposed revised itinerary of the Commercial Mission with his views and those of Major Sykes thereon.

Please see pages 8 and 9 of foregoing notes. The proposed change might be concurred in. Major Cox has not definitely stated whether the difference in the estimated expenditure will be greater, but it will perhaps be only a comparatively small amount, which the results of the change may repay. It will perhaps be the quickest way to repeat to Tehran the revised route with request that arrangements may be made with the Persian Government regarding the escort, Major Cox being informed. The draft telegrams below may perhaps issue [after Finance Department have seen].

[ ] Perhaps unnecessary now. Copy will be sent to them. Finance Department know that a change of route is under consideration.

C. B. P.,—4-1-05.
E. L. N.,—4-1-05.

TELEGRAM FROM THE PRESIDENT, COMMERCIAL MISSION TO PERSIA, DATED AND RECEIVED 5TH JANUARY 1905. Gram 57

Solicits sanction to Major Sykes accompanying the Mission to Yezd.

Please see the foregoing receipt. The reply to the above depends partly on whether we agree to the proposed revised route.

2. We previously told* the Bengal Chamber, in reply to their request* for a Political Officer to accompany the Mission, that we could not allow this. The knowledge Major Sykes possesses of that part of the country will doubtless be of great assistance to Mr. Newcomen; and on this account, if the revised itinerary is approved of by us, we might agree to his accompanying him to Yezd. Sir A. Hardinge and Major Cox will have to be consulted.

* Pro. Nos. 149 and 154 in External A., October 1904, Nos. 49-177.

Yes, I think so.
A. F. FREMANTLE,—6-1-05.

C. B. P.,—5-1-05.

Please see notes, pages 8 and 9. We need not object to the change of route now that Major Sykes recommends it. He made the original proposal, and he now advocates the change.

Pro. Nos. 68 and 92 (enclosure 1) of External A., August 1904, Nos. 68-107.

But Finance Department should see, with reference to both the change of route and the possible increase of cost.

A. F. FREMANTLE,—6-1-05.
C. L. S. RUSSELL,—6-1-05.

Finance Department.

This Department may agree.

J. CAMPBELL,—8-1-05.
E. N. B[AKER],—9-1-05.

Foreign Department.

The two draft telegrams and the endorsement added may issue?

E. L. N.,—10-1-05.

A. F. FREMANTLE,—10-1-05.
C. L. S. RUSSELL,—10-1-05.

Issue. His Excellency should see this when the main file is available.

S. M. FRASER,—11-1-05.

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, NO. 154 E.-A., DATED THE 12TH JANUARY 1905. Gram 60

States that the Resident's telegram of 1st January 1905, regarding itinerary of Commercial Mission to Persia, has been repeated to Tehran with certain additions. Further states that, in connection with Mr. Newcomen's request that Major Sykes may accompany the Mission to Yezd, the Government of India have no objection, if the Resident has none, and Sir A. Hardinge agrees.

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Pro no. 61

TELEGRAM TO SIR A. HARDINGE, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., TEHRAN, No. 155 E.-A., DATED THE 12TH JANUARY 1905.

Repeats Major Cox's telegram of the 1st January 1905, regarding the change of the itinerary of the Commercial Mission to Persia, and adds that the Government of India have no objection to the proposal, if Sir A. Hardinge has none, and if he can arrange with the Persian Government.

I submit this file as directed. The main file is with Finance Department, but the position is explained in the notes on page 9 *ante* ending with Lord Ampthill's note of 4th December 1904.

S. M. FRASER,—14-1-05.

x no. 61

What I want to know is who authorised the telegram of 12th January. "The Government of India have no objection to the proposed change". The only explanation offered is a reference to a note in which Lord Ampthill said that he did object. As I had been back in India for a month when this telegram issued, I cannot understand why the matter was not referred to me.

Please explain.

C[URZON],—15-1-05.

x no. 61

The issue of the telegram to Tehran, without previous submission to Your Excellency, was an error for which I express my regret.

The necessity for submitting to Your Excellency the main file, when it became available, was present to my mind, but the immediate point arose on a spare copy, and in sanctioning the issue of the telegram, my idea was that it merely carried out a policy which had already been agreed upon, *viz.*, that the route of the Commercial Mission might be changed, if Major Cox and Major Sykes recommended it (as they have done), and if Sir A. Hardinge and the Persian Government had no objection.

From personal discussion with Lord Ampthill, I was aware that he attached little importance to the addition to the telegram, mentioned in my note of 6th December 1904, which the Department suggested to remind the Resident and Major Sykes of the primary object of the tour.

2. The case, however, should of course have gone to Your Excellency, and I mention the above merely to explain the train of thought which was in my mind.

S. M. FRASER,—16-1-05.

C[URZON],—16-1-05.

Pro no. 62

TELEGRAM FROM SIR A. HARDINGE, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, TEHRAN, No. 8, DATED THE 14TH (RECEIVED 15TH) JANUARY 1905.

States that he has no objection to the proposed change in the itinerary of the Commercial Mission. At the request of Major Sykes, application for escorts, via *Yezd and Shiraz, has already been made to the Persian Government*

Pro no. 63

TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CONSUL, KERMAN, DATED AND RECEIVED 19TH JANUARY 1905.

States the President of the Mission is much pleased with the result of the visit to Bam, which place the party leave on the 21st for Narmashir and Jiruft. Until their return to Kerman in about a month, no communication will be possible except by weekly messenger.

For information. No orders.

G. M. C.,—19-1-05.

A. F. FREMANTLE,—21-1-05.
C. L. S. RUSSELL,—22-1-05.
S. M. FRASER,—23-1-05.

Foreign Office Press—No. 910—4-2-05—33.

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TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 9TH (RECEIVED 10TH) DECEMBER 1904. 6 no 64

Repeats a telegram from Major Sykes, stating that certain advances have been made to the Mission, and asking how these are to be met. Resident enquires whether he can repay these and subsequent advances debiting amounts in the accounts of his treasury which are to be adjusted in India on return of the Mission.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CONSUL, KERMAN, DATED THE 9TH (RECEIVED 10TH) DECEMBER 1904. 6 no 65

States that the Mission arrived at Sirjan safely on the 25th November last.

Our letter No. 4056-E. A., dated the 3rd December 1904, has not had time to reach Kerman yet.

In the letter referred to we have placed a sum of Rs. 11,000 at Major Syke's disposal, these advances can be met from this grant.

The draft below to the Resident may issue.

G. M. C.,—10-12-1904.

The telegram may issue.

I also put up a draft to the Chamber. I do not think it is necessary to take any notice of points in Mr. Newcomen's letter which have not been pressed on us by the Chamber, *e.g.*, that about the Toshakhana. Nor need we take any extracts from the file for other files, such as Henjam-Bunder Abbas extension.

A. FREMANTLE,—12-12-1904.

L. RUSSELL,—12-12-1904.

Issue.

S. M. FRASER,—12-12-1904.

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF AT BUSHIRE, No. 4166-E. A., DATED THE 12TH DECEMBER 1904. 6 no 66

Informs him that Rs. 11,000 has been placed at the disposal of Major Sykes for expenses Advances should be met therefrom.

LETTER TO W. SHAKESPEAR, ESQ., ACTING SECRETARY, UPPER INDIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CAWNPORE, No. 4193-E. A., DATED THE 14TH DECEMBER 1904. 6 no 67

Acknowledges, with remarks, Mr. Newcomen's first report.

The Finance Department may perhaps be supplied with a copy of the present correspondence.

Draft below.

G. M. C.,—15-12-1904.

R. W. S.,—15-12-1904.

A. FREMANTLE,—16-12-1904.

L. RUSSELL,—17-12-1904.

TELEGRAM FROM MR. A. GLEADOWE NEWCOMER, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL MISSION, TO PERSIA, DATED THE 17TH (RECEIVED 19TH) DECEMBER 1904. 6 no 68

States that the Mission has arrived at Kerman. Thanks Major Sykes for arrangements.

For information. No orders. This may be included in the endorsement in which we are sending copies to Finance Department.

G. M. C.,—19-12-1904.

R. W. S.,—19-12-1904.

A. FREMANTLE,—19-12-1904.

L. RUSSELL,—20-12-1904.

ENDORSEMENT TO THE FINANCE AND COMMERCE DEPARTMENT, No. 4311-E. A., DATED THE 22ND DECEMBER 1904. 6 no 69

Forwards, for information, a copy of the foregoing correspondence.

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From M. H. Ounq, Esq., Comptroller, India Treasuries, No. B.-K. 285, dated the 19th (received 20th) December 1904.

Calls for an estimate of expenditure expected to be incurred in the current and ensuing financial years in connection with the Commercial Mission to Persia.

Up to the present we have sanctioned, from the special grant of Rs. 20,000, the following advances :—

	Rs.	A.	P.
For expenditure out of Persia	5,867	9	0
" " in "	11,000	0	0

2. The "usual form" alluded to by the Comptroller is presumably that in Article 110, Volume I of the Civil Account Code, with which the peculiar circumstances* of this case do not tally. In any case the figures which we should be able to give him would, since the itinerary is still unsettled, be approximate only, and in the form we have received them from the Chamber and Major Sykes.

* The Mission is not a political one.

3. The file may perhaps be referred to the Comptroller to kindly say in what form the estimate should be prepared in this case.

C. B. P.,—30-12-1904.

R. W. S.,—

From the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, Telegram, dated the 29th (received 30th) December 1904.

Asks for authority to remit Rs. 1,000 to Major Sykes' bankers at Bombay.

We need not object ? Major Sykes had to make preliminary disbursements on his own personal security. Draft telegram† for approval. Please see previous note.

† Finance Department should see, for concurrence, before issue

C. B. P.,—30-12-1904.

A. Fremantle,—31-12-1904.

L. Russell,—31-12-1904.

Finance Department.

In Foreign Department letter No. 4056-E. A., dated the 3rd December 1904, Major Sykes was authorised to incur expenditure up to Rs. 11,000, on account of the Commercial Mission. He has now wired to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf asking the latter to remit that amount to his (Major Sykes') bankers at Bombay : and the Resident asks for authority to comply with this request.

2. Ordinarily, it would be irregular for an officer at whose credit money is placed for expenditure on some public purpose to draw out the money and keep it in his private account, *vide* footnote to Article 315, Civil Account Code. But it will be seen from the Assistant Political Resident's telegram of 9th December last that Gray Paul's Agent at Bunder Abbas has advanced to the Mission 1,000 *tomans* on Major Sykes' personal security, and that the latter has also himself advanced 1,000 *tomans*, the 2,000 *tomans* being equivalent to some Rs. 10,000.† In the special circumstances of the case, this Department need not perhaps object to the payment of Rs. 11,000 being made to Major Sykes' bankers at Bombay as proposed. But instead of the Resident arranging for the remittance of funds to those bankers, we may issue orders to the Accountant General to make the payment direct. This may be done when the Foreign Department has ascertained by telegram the name of the bankers to whom Major Sykes wishes the payment to be made.

† A *toman* = 6*s.* 7½*d.*
(Page 970 of the Statesman's year Book 1904.)
This will introduce further complications and it would be better to let the Resident make his own arrangements.
J. D.,—4-1-1905.
I think the course proposed in the office note is preferable.
J. Campbell,—4-1-1905.

3. In respect of any further expenditure‡ which may be incurred by the Mission, the Foreign Department may perhaps instruct the Political Resident that arrangements should be made beforehand by the Bushire Treasury to place the amount that may be authorised by the Government of India in this behalf, in a lump sum direct to the credit of Major Sykes, who may incur expenditure out of it as required.

‡ i.e., over and above the Rs. 11,000, in question and the Rs. 5,867-9-0 paid to the Upper India Chamber of Commerce.
The most convenient procedure depends upon conditions in Persia of which we have no knowledge. Comptroller, India Treasuries, might advise Foreign Department later.
H. D. G.,—4-1-1905.
Yes
J. Campbell,—4-1-1905.

4521 F. D.

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4. The Comptroller, India Treasuries, may perhaps see un-officially for any remarks; after issue of a reply to the Resident's telegram the Foreign Department wish to consult him.

J. D.,—4-1-1905.

J. CAMPBELL,—4-1-1905.

E. N. BAKER,—5-1-1905.

Foreign Department.

The draft telegram below, which has been revised to accord with paragraph 2 of the preceding Finance Department note, may issue. The file may then be sent to the Comptroller with reference to office note of the 30th December 1904, and the point raised in paragraph 3 of Finance Department note, dated the 4th January 1905.

C. B. P.,—6-1-1905.

E. L. N.,—6-1-1905.

A. FREMANTLE,—6-1-1905.

L. RUSSELL,—6-1-1905.

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 103-E. A., DATED THE 7TH JANUARY 1905.

States that proposal to remit the funds for Commercial Mission to Major Sykes sanctioned, but the amount will be credited direct on receiving the name of the firm at Bombay.

Comptroller, India Treasuries.

The estimate of the Commercial Mission will be required in the usual details of salaries, establishment allowances, supplies and services and contingencies. A sample form is placed in the file.

2. Although money is forthcoming at Bushire, which is a surplus treasury, it may not be convenient to remit cash to Major Sykes for the requirements of the Commercial Mission, owing to distance and difficulties of communication in Persia. I think it would be best if Accountant General, Bombay, is instructed to pay to Messrs. King, King & Co., who are the bankers of Major Sykes, the amounts which may be sanctioned from time to time for the expenditure of the Mission, if Major Sykes is to finance the Mission throughout. The instruction of the Resident, Persian Gulf, will not be necessary in that case.

Foreign

~~Finance~~ Department.

M. H. OUNG,—13-1-1905.

~~[NOTES IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.]~~

TELEGRAM FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT, PERSIAN GULF, DATED THE 11TH (RECEIVED 12TH) JANUARY 1905.

States that Major Sykes' bankers at Bombay are Messrs. King, King & Co.

This is in connection with Major Sykes' request for the Rs. 11,000, sanctioned in connection with Commercial Mission expenditure, to be transferred to his Bombay bankers. After telegraphing sanction to Major Cox the file was passed on to Comptroller, India Treasuries. Finance Department agreed to do the needful when they had received this information, and Comptroller may be asked to add this to the file now with him and pass it on urgently to Finance Department.

C. B. P.,—12-1-1905.

E. L. N.,—12-1-1905.

A. FREMANTLE,—12-1-1905.

L. RUSSELL,—12-1-1905.

Comptroller, India Treasuries.

Passed on to Finance Department with the linked file. Perhaps Finance Department will now issue the necessary instructions to Accountant General, Bombay, to pay Rs. 11,000 to Messrs. King, King & Co., for credit to Major Sykes' account.

M. H. OUNG,—13-1-1905.

Finance Department.

The draft telegram to the Accountant-General, Bombay, put up may issue.

2. Paragraph 2 of the Comptroller, India Treasuries' note of the 13th instant is for further consideration in the Foreign Department before any instructions are issued to the Accountant General.

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Issue. The Comptroller, India Treasuries' suggestion is for the consideration of the Foreign Department. Personally, I do not think we can assume that Major Sykes is to finance the Mission; and I do not think we could fairly ask him to do so.

J. CAMPBELL,—14-1-1905.

Foreign Department.

ENDORSEMENT BY THE FINANCE DEPARTMENT, No. 291-A., DATED THE 14TH (RECEIVED 16TH) JANUARY 1905.

Forwards copy of a telegram to Accountant-General, Bombay, No. 290-A., dated the 14th January 1905, authorizing him to pay Rs. 11,000 to Messrs. King, King & Co., Bankers, to be placed to the credit of Major Sykes' account, the Comptroller, India Treasuries, being debited for the amount.

The Accountant-General, Bombay, has been authorized by the Finance Department to place Rs. 11,000 to the credit of Major Sykes' account with Messrs. King, King & Co., Bombay.

2. In regard to the question of financing the Commercial Mission while in Persia, it might be noted that Major Sykes was asked in the beginning * to submit an estimate of expenditure likely to be incurred on travelling expenses, etc., of the delegates of the Mission. In response he submitted a very rough estimate with his letter† No. 266, dated the 5th September 1904, followed up with a revised estimate received under cover of his letter No. 270, dated the 15th September 1904. Working on this estimate we placed Rs. 11,000 at Major Sykes' disposal to be expended on the lines of his estimate—*vide* our letter† No. 4056-E. A., dated the 3rd December 1904; we also asked that a revised estimate should be submitted if further expenditure was likely to be incurred.

A glance at the estimate submitted with the letter above referred to will show that Major Sykes has embraced the expenses of the Mission during the whole tour.

3. In view of the above, should further expenditure be found necessary, it would appear that the action suggested by the Comptroller, India Treasuries, in the latter portion of paragraph 2 of his note, dated the 13th January 1905, would best meet the case.

Yes, I think. We hope there will not be much further expenditure, and we are asking Major Sykes to do very little compared with what he has already done.

A. FREMANTLE.

4. With reference to paragraph 1 of the Comptroller, India Treasuries' note above referred to, it might be pointed out that the delegates † of the Mission are not Government servants nor are their salaries paid by Government. All we undertook ‡ was to pay the actual travelling expenses of the delegates, including the cost of locomotion for the individual and a reasonable amount of baggage and camp equipage.

5. We have an estimate of the travelling expenses, etc., of the delegates of the Mission from Cawnpore to Bunder Abbas and back, in detail. This is all we are in a position to supply the Comptroller, India Treasuries, with at present.

Major Sykes' account will not be submitted until the return of the Mission.

It will be impossible in any case to prepare an estimate on the lines of the estimate of the Tibet Frontier Commission for 1903-1904, for instance.

6. Finance Department might perhaps be asked unofficially to advise us how it would be best to prepare an estimate for submission to the Comptroller, India Treasuries, in the peculiar circumstances of this case.

Yes.

A. FREMANTLE.

G. M. C.,—18-1-1905.

E. L. N.,—

A. FREMANTLE,—19-1-1905.

Paragraph 3 of the office note.—I do not think we should continue to rely on Major Sykes to finance the Mission, especially as they are now probably about to return to India *viâ* Shiraz, Bushire, and Bunder Abbas. We should proceed as indicated in the third paragraph of the Finance Department office note of the 4th January 1904.

2. I agree generally with paragraphs 4—6 of the office note. The Comptroller, India Treasuries, possibly did not realise when he addressed us in his letter of the 19th December

* Pros. No. 90 in External A Proceedings, October 1904, Nos. 49-177.

† It has been decided that the deputation of Khan Bahadur Asghar Ali and of the Hospital Assistant is to be governed by the Civil Service Regulations and the expenditure incurred in connection with their pay, etc., is not to be a charge against the Mission.

The pay, etc., of the three Indian sowars is also to be excluded from the charges on account of the Mission.

‡ Pros. No. 80 in External A Proceedings, August 1904, Nos. 68-107.

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(to be read with Mr. Oung's note of 13th January 1905 on page 14 of these notes) that the Mission is mainly composed of non-officials, such officials as are accompanying it being members of the Kerman Consular staff not specially placed on deputation. In the above circumstances, the Finance Department will perhaps agree to dispense with a formal detailed estimate accepting instead a lump estimate of Rs. 20,000, the amount of the grant to which they have already agreed. The present intention is that the Mission should return to India in March. The bulk of the expenditure will therefore fall within the current financial year, though a small amount may remain to be adjusted in 1905-06.

Vide Mr. Campbell's note, 26th October 1904, on page 5 of these notes.

L. Russell,—19-1-1905.

S. M. Fraser,—19-1-1905.

Finance Department.

The views expressed in Mr. Russell's note of the 19th instant will perhaps be agreed to. But the Comptroller, India Treasuries, may first see unofficially for any remarks.

H. D. G.,—23-1-1905.

J. Campbell,—24-1-1905.

Comptroller, India Treasuries.

Seen and noted. Rupees 20,000 will be taken for the Revised Estimate and nothing for the Budget.

M. H. Oung,—25-1-1905.

Finance Department.

The file may now be returned to the Foreign Department.

H. D. G.,—27-1-1905.

J. Campbell,—28-1-1905.

Foreign Department.

From the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 25th (received 30th) January 1905.

Forwards copy of Mr. Gleadowe Newcomen's second report in connection with the Commercial Mission to South East Persia, and copies of letters, dated 30th November and 2nd December 1904, in connection therewith.

For information. The draft below to the Upper India Chamber of Commerce may issue.

2. Please also see previous notes by the Finance Department and the Comptroller, India Treasuries.

The Comptroller, India Treasuries, has accepted* Rs. 20,000 for the revised estimate, and no further action is necessary in connection with his letter No. 285-B. K., dated the 19th December 1904.

* *Vide* his note dated the 25th January 1905.

3. As it has been decided that Major Sykes is not to continue to finance the Mission, it would appear to be premature to issue any instructions to Major Cox at Bushire, in this respect at this stage. The Mission will be returning to India next month, and should it be found necessary to provide them with further funds for expenditure while in Persia, the question could be taken up at the time of sanctioning such further expenditure.

If they require more money they will have to send a statement of how the Rs. 11,000 they have already had has been spent, and a revised estimate.

A. Fremantle.

G. M. C.,—2-2-1905.

E. L. N.,—2-2-1905.

1. The draft to the Chamber may issue.

2. Mr. Newcomen's letters are interesting. The route to Kerman *vid* Saidabad by which he travelled (paragraph 59 of route book) is apparently the "winter route" mentioned in his letter of 1st November. The "main kafila route" of the route book (page 68) goes due north *vid* Daulatabad and Baft over rather higher country.

3. Why Government should plant a Consular Agent at Saidabad with its 600 houses and exiguous trade is not apparent. Saidabad is important principally as the capital of Sirjan and the point where the road to Yezd leaves that to Kerman; this route from Bunder Abbas strikes the Kerman-Yezd route at Bahramabad.

A. Fremantle,—3-2-1905.

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

Please add drafts sending the more important papers to the India Office and to Tehran, and communicating all the correspondence with which they are concerned to Major Cox, Captain Shakespear, and Major Sykes.

Copies of the Chamber's letter of the 25th January should also go to Finance Department.

L. Russell,—4-2-1905.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 4521 F. D.—9-2-1905.—33.—N. N. B.

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

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[18]

FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 60, DATED THE 29TH JANUARY (RECEIVED 7TH FEBRUARY) 1905. Enclosure 76

Forwards copy of a letter addressed by Mr. Newcomen, President, Commercial Mission to Persia, to His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman, together with copy of a despatch, No. 6, dated the 29th January 1905, addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, in connexion therewith.

FROM THE UPPER INDIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CAWNPORE, DATED THE 2ND (RECEIVED 4TH) FEBRUARY 1905. Enclosure 77

Forwards copy of Mr. Gleadowe-Newcomen's third report in connexion with the Commercial Mission to South-East Persia, and copies of letters, dated 2nd, 6th, and 12th December 1904, in connexion therewith.

Two fresh receipts added. For information.

* *Vide* Deputy Secretary's note, dated the 4th February 1905.

The six * drafts put up may issue.

G. M. C.,—13-2-1905.

Some of Mr. Newcomen's route reports would be of interest to the Intelligence Branch and they may be supplied with copies.

E. L. N.,—15-2-1905.

Issue the draft to the Chamber of Commerce at once.

A. F. FREMANTLE,—16-2-1905.

LETTER TO A. SHAKESPEAR, ESQ., UPPER INDIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, No. 689-E.A., DATED THE 16TH FEBRUARY 1905. Enclosure 78

Acknowledges receipt of his two letters dated the 25th January and 2nd February, respectively, forwarding Mr. Newcomen's second and third reports on the Commercial Mission to Persia. States that on the advice of Mr. Newcomen the itinerary of the Commercial Mission has been changed.

The remaining five drafts may issue.

G. M. C.,—17-2-1905.

E. L. N.

A. F. FREMANTLE,—18-2-1905.

L. RUSSELL,—18-2-1905.

S. M. FRASER,—23-2-1905.

5697 F. D.

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

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

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Demi-official, dated Bushire, the 3rd (received 14th) February 1905.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—S. M. Fraser, Esq., C.I.E., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In connection with my official covering letter No. 62 of this day's date, and enclosure, on the subject of the revised itinerary of the Commercial Mission, I beg to forward, for the information of Government, a copy of a "Private" letter just received by me from the President of the Mission, Mr. Gleadowe-Newcomen, and of the note to Sir Arthur Hardinge with which I have forwarded a copy of it to Tehran.

I have merely made it demi-official because Mr. Newcomen heads his letter "Private," but you will decide as to whether it should be considered official, and if it is considered to call for any action on the part of the Government of India, I trust that I may be informed thereof at an early date.

Demi-official, dated the 2nd February 1905.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—His Excellency Sir Arthur Hardinge, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

I am addressing you an official communication by this post in regard to the tour of the Commercial Mission, and venture at the same time to send you a copy of a letter from its President which the last Kerman post has brought me.

Mr. Newcomen heads it "Private," but as he mentions at the end that he has sent copies to his Chambers of Commerce, there can be no objection to my communicating it to your Excellency and the Government of India.

The question of the status of the Mission is one with which I personally have had nothing to do, but if anything in Mr. Newcomen's affects the character of the reception to be accorded to the party at Shiraz or at Bushire, I trust your Excellency will deal with the point when replying to my official letter which this accompanies.

Un-official, dated Kerman, the 29th December 1904.

From—A. Gleadowe-Newcomen, Esq., President of the Commercial Mission,

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Though I have never had the pleasure of meeting you, I have often heard of you officially and privately.

Doubtless you are aware that I am President of the Commercial Mission at present in South-East Persia.

As the portion of the country over which the Mission will tour is under your jurisdiction I am most desirous of meeting you before my return to India, and, if possible, of visiting Bunder Abbas with you if it can be so arranged.

There is much to be done if the resources of this part of the country are to be developed by us, before Russian competition attempts to oust, or succeeds in ousting, us from our own field of influence.

Of Russian activity, political and commercial, there are signs in plenty, and to my mind it is a case of "he who hath ears to hear let him hear," or we may wake up suddenly and find that we slept while we thought we were awake.

As an instance of mistaken policy, I may bring to your notice, although I am fully aware that you are not responsible for the situation, that it has been sought to divest this Mission of all political significance and official status; very weakly, it seems to me, for the simple reason that such a position is absolutely illogical. A Mission such as ours, must have both a political significance and official status.

Commerce and its development have long been acknowledged by Russia, Germany, the United States and other powers as being inseparable from politics. Without commercial interests, and these words are very comprehensive, politics would have little meaning. The development of commercial interest means the increase of political importance and responsibilities.

Again, the desire to impress on officials and the world in general that this Misson has neither political nor official status is more than I can clearly understand. For reasons I have already mentioned, I fail to see how this contention can be urged in the face of the fact that the Indian Government are paying nearly all our expenses, that they have given us a guard of regular cavalry, that they have attached a Government Consular official to us, that they have obtained officially from the Persian Government a guard of infantry and cavalry to look after us, and that the Persian Government have sent a Sartip Mamoor from Tehran to accompany us. All this does not seem to me to show that the Mission, of which I have the honour to be President, was originally regarded in an unofficial light.

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

Lastly, there are the official orders concerning us, issued to the Bunder Abbas Government. Neither the Indian Government nor that of Persia can perform any but official acts. They are not private individuals or companies.

Is it to be argued that the increase of British influence in Persia is not a political matter? Or that the official nature of the Mission has not enabled, and will not enable, it to do much more in this line than if it had been a mere bagman's tour through the country, trying to dispose of a few tomans worth of goods.

The most important and constant part of our work consists in the meeting of headmen of villages and of nomad tribes and of officials as well as the principal merchants and traders, explaining to them the great interest shown in their welfare by the Government of India, thereby of Britain; in having gone to such great expense in sending out a Mission to enquire into their needs and troubles and to suggest remedies and to encourage the growth of favourable international commerce; thus pointing out clearly the vast difference between our policy and that favoured by Russia, whose "grab-all" game, played through the Belgian Customs, is clearly seen and distinctly resented by the Persians.

I trust that you will forgive me for my somewhat lengthy note. I am, however, so constantly having the non-official position of this Mission and its members impressed upon me, that I think it is only fair to let you know how matters stand and, if you deem fit, higher authority.

We might, at least, have been let alone instead of having our arrival, as with the Governor-General of Kerman, heralded by disclaimers. In consequence of which the Governor-General was polite enough neither to return my call nor personally to take any notice of it.

Luckily no harm has been done, as owing to the very strong position held by Major Sykes, it has resulted in the Governor-General doing all that, in the face of his orders, he could do to render us honour. Had we not had this backing, our Mission would have been damned to a great extent, and its utility negatived for the rest of our tour, if not for the whole. News travels fast in the East, and all we have said in the past would have been looked upon as empty vapouring and vain words, a state of affairs hardly calculated to raise British prestige.

I hope Government will find their way to approve of the altered itinerary suggested by me, and I beg that Major Sykes may be permitted to accompany the Mission to Yezd, which important trade centre seems to have been somewhat overlooked by my predecessors.

I am sending a copy of this letter to my Chambers for their information.

Hoping to see you on my way through Bushire.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 4862 F. D.—20-2-04.—38.—B. B. B.

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FROM THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 62, DATED THE 3RD (RECEIVED 14TH) FEBRUARY 1905.

Forwards copy of a letter addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 8, dated the 3rd February 1905, on the subject of the itinerary of the Commercial Mission to Persia.

The demi-official correspondence may also be read.

When the idea of an Engineer was given up the Mission became *ipso facto* commercial and Lord Ampthill himself inserted words in our letter of 2nd June 1904 to the Chambers to make this clear.* The position was further explained in Pro. No. 64, External A, October 1904, Nos. 49-177, where Mr. Shakespear was told:—"The Mission will not have any political status or significance, but the British Consular Officers at Bunder Abbas, Kerman, and Bam would endeavour to enlist the sympathies of the local Persian officials on behalf of the Mission."

The position taken up was objected to by both the Bombay† and Bengal‡ Chambers, but we refused to send an official president§ or political officer.‖ The object of conciliating the susceptibilities of the Persian Government and allaying the apprehensions of those who see militarism in everything does not seem to have been attained. We might now do what we can for the prestige of the Mission after leaving Major Sykes' district. I put up a telegram to Sir A. Hardinge for approval. The Mission will not reach Yezd till about 22nd March.¶

A. F. FREMANTLE,—24-2-1905.

L. RUSSELL,—24-2-1905.

Mr. Gleadowe-Newcomen condemns our policy in divesting the Mission of political significance and official status, but his own letter shows, I think, that the decision was fully justified, and that he has had all the practical support in his work which our political influence could bring to bear, while we have escaped the suspicion (except in the Russian and English Radical press) which an avowedly Political Mission would have aroused. Beyond the omission of the Governor-General of Kerman to return his call (which Mr. Newcomen admits did no harm) he fails to point out any respect in which he was hampered by the lack of official status, and one cannot help suspecting that his views are not altogether unconnected with the subject of personal dignity.

Indeed, it is fortunate that the Mission was called a strictly commercial one, when we find its President explaining to headmen and merchants that he was sent out by the Government of India "to enquire into their needs and troubles and to suggest remedies."

I have slightly added to the draft telegram, which is for Your Excellency's approval.

S. M. FRASER,—25-2-1905.

I have rarely read a more foolish letter than that from Mr. Newcomen. Had the Mission been a political one, we might easily, with Mr. Newcomen as its President, have had serious trouble.

I only hope that the Chambers will not be so indiscreet as to publish his explosion.

C[URZON],—26-2-1905.

TELEGRAM TO HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, TEHRAN, No. 842-E.A., DATED THE 27TH FEBRUARY 1905.

States that it would be very satisfactory if Mr. Graham could do anything towards accompanying or assisting the Mission, which, however, should retain its commercial character.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CONSUL, KERMAN, DATED AND RECEIVED 20TH FEBRUARY 1905.

Reports the return of the Commercial Mission to Kerman on the 20th instant after a most successful tour to Bam, Narmashir, Jiruft, and Rain. Gives approximate future dates, and states that the party is in excellent health.

* Page 16, notes, External A, August 1904, Nos. 68-107.

† Pro. No. 130, External A, October 1904, Nos. 49-177.

‡ Pro. No. 149, External A, October 1904, Nos 49-177.

§ Pro. No. 142, External A, October 1904, Nos. 49-177.

‖ Pro. No. 154, External A, October 1904, Nos. 49-177.

I should say that the object had been attained with the Persian Government, who have shown no suspicion of the Mission.

S. M. FRASER,—25-2-1905.

¶ Major Sykes' telegram of 20th February.

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

For information. No orders.

G. M. C.,—21-2-1905.

E. L. N.

A. F. Fremantle,—21-2-1905.

L. Russell,—23-2-1905.

A short Press communiqué might issue, giving recent information about the movements of the Mission.

S. M. Fraser,—24-2-1905.

Enclosure 82 Extract from a telegram from Major P. M. Sykes, C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman, dated the 25th (received 27th) February 1905.

States that the President, Commercial Mission, has suggested his cancelling his journey to Yezd, and requests permission to do so.

The circumstances under which Major Sykes makes his present request were quite unlooked for.

2. He has been selected to act for Lieutenant-Colonel Minchin at Meshed, as the latter is about to proceed on eight months' leave.

Under the circumstances we might agree to his not accompanying the Mission to Yezd. The President is prepared to do without him.

The telegram below may issue.

Please see appendix to notes in External A Proceedings, October 1904, Nos. 49-177.

* This seems unnecessary. It is a statement of facts and there is no controversial matter.

E. L. N.

Quite.

A. F. Fremantle,– 2-3-1905.

G. M. C.,—2-3-1905.

E. L. N.,—2-3-1905.

3. Please see Secretary's note dated the 24th February. A Press communiqué is put up for approval.

Finance Department should see * before issue.

The telegram and communiqué may issue.

A. F. Fremantle,—2-3-1905.

L. Russell,—2-3-1905.

Issue.

S. M. Fraser,—2-3-1905.

Enclosure 83 Memorandum to the Political Secretary, India Office, No. 9-M., dated the 2nd March 1905.

Forwards copies of papers cited for the information of the Secretary of State for India.

Enclosure 84 Endorsement to
(1) Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
(2) The Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor-General and Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan,
(3) His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman,
(4) Government of Bombay, Political Department,
No. 891-E.A. (Confidential), dated the 2nd March 1905.

Forwards copies of papers cited for information.

Enclosure 85 Endorsement to His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Bunder Abbas, No. 892-E.A., dated the 2nd March 1905.

Forwards copy of papers cited for information.

Enclosure 86 Letter to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 893-E.A., dated the 2nd March 1905.

Forwards copies of papers cited for information.

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

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[23]

ENDORSEMENT TO THE FINANCE AND COMMERCE DEPARTMENT, No. 894-E.A., DATED THE 2ND MARCH 1905.

Forwards copies of papers cited for information and the issue of further orders.

TELEGRAM TO HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CONSUL AT KERMAN, No. 901-E.A., DATED THE 2ND MARCH 1905.

Cancels his journey to Yezd, and requests that he should inform His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf of the fact.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, TEHRAN, No. 38, DATED THE 1ST (RECEIVED 2ND) MARCH 1905.

States that His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Shiraz has been authorised to meet the Commercial Mission on its way to Shiraz.

For information. No orders. Bushire and Kerman have no doubt been informed by Sir A. Hardinge.

G. M. C.,—2-3-1905.

E. L. N.

A. F. FREMANTLE,—3-3-1905.

L. RUSSELL,—3-3-1905.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 5697 F. D.—18-3-1905.—43.—W. G. B.

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

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

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FROM THE UPPER INDIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CAWNPORE, DATED THE 28TH FEBRUARY (RECEIVED 3RD MARCH) 1905.

From 90

Forwards copy of a letter addressed by Mr. Newcomen to the Private Secretary to the Viceroy on the subject of the Commercial Mission to Persia, and enquires whether this has been received. Requests to be informed of the wishes of Government as to the disposal of the Government property in the possession of the Commercial Mission.

The communication referred to by the Chamber has been received by the Private Secretary to the Viceroy. The Chamber may be informed accordingly.

2. With reference to the question of the disposal of the Government property in possession of Mr. Newcomen, it may be noted that, in addition to the Maps* and Books, etc., supplied to him, which he has been asked to return, Mr. Newcomen has with him the following, which Government have paid for :—

* External A, Proceedings, November 1904, Nos. 96-120.

(1) Tentage and camp equipage to the value† of Rs. 1,227-11.
(2) Saddlery to the value† of Rs. 172-2.
(3) Trunks to the value* of Rs. 49.
(4) One aneroid, (cost Rs. 35).
(5) One magnetic sundial, (cost Rs. 10-8).
(6) One Gunmetal sundial, (cost Rs. 20).

† We have not been furnished with details.

The tents had perhaps better be left at Bushire to replace worn out ones.

They would also be useful at Ahwaz where there is no accommodation for the escort.

E. L. N.

(7) One camp bed (cost Rs. 36).
(8) One camp bath, (cost Rs. 20-8).
(9) One waterproof sheet, (cost Rs. 12).

10. Four Arab‡ horses, (cost with clothing and food Rs. 2,258-10).

‡These might be sold in Persia to save transport. Two of them might be presented if good animals to the Zilee Sultan. This would save the Rs. 2,000 recently sanctioned for the two Arabs as presents to the Zil.

E. L. N.

The above might perhaps be auctioned on the return of the mission to India, and the sale proceeds placed to the credit of Government. The amount realised would be a set off against any further expenditure likely to be incurred at the time of finally settling up accounts. But before orders are given to this effect to the Chamber, they may be asked to furnish a detailed statement of the Government property in Mr. Newcomen's possession.

Draft put up.

G. M. C.,—16-3-05.

E. L. N.,—17-3-05.

I agree in the above except that I am inclined to think the saddlery should also be left at Bushire with the tents, the sundials and aneroid treated in the same way (unless handed over to the survey department) and the bed bath and sheet presented to Mr. Newcomen.

Draft may issue.

18-3-05.

A. F. FREMANTLE.

I think the simplest plan will be to telegraph to the Chamber that it will be most convenient if Mr. Newcomen hands over the Government property§ in his possession to the Resident at Bushire before leaving that port on his return journey.

§ Excepting only books, maps, etc., received direct from Government of India. These should be returned to the Foreign Department.

A copy of the correspondence should go the Resident with instructions to sell the horses and to dispose of the remainder in such manner as he may think most suitable.

Draft telegram submitted.

Yes.

S. M. FRASER.

The letter to the Chamber may also issue, after Private Secretary to the Viceroy has seen.

18-3-05.

L. RUSSELL.

I agree with Deputy Secretary, and the draft telegram may issue with Your Excellency's approval. The Chamber show sense in declining to associate themselves with Mr. Newcomen's views.

20-3-05.

S. M. FRASER.

22-3-05.

C[URZON].

[C15 FD]

B

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Frons. 91 TELEGRAM TO THE SECRETARY, UPPER INDIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, No. 1227-E. A., DATED THE 23RD MARCH 1905.

Says that it would be very convenient if Mr. Newcomen made over all Government property to the Resident at Bushire before leaving for India. Books and maps should be returned to the Foreign Department, Simla.

Frons. 92 LETTER TO THE SECRETARY, UPPER INDIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, No. 1241-E. A., DATED THE 25TH MARCH 1905.

States that his letter forwarding an extract from a telegram from Mr. Newcomen has been received by the Private Secretary to the Viceroy and has been replied to.

(Received on the 14th March 1905, under cover of a letter from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 9, dated the 4th February 1905).

Frons. 93 SIR A. H. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE, No. 7, COMMERCIAL, DATED THE 2ND FEBRUARY (RECEIVED 14TH MARCH) 1905.

Regarding the proceedings of the Commercial Misssion to Persia.

For information. No orders.

G. M. C.,—18-3-05.

E. L. N.,—18-3-05.

20-3-05. A. F. FREMANTLE.

20-3-05. L. RUSSELL.

20-3-05. S. M. FRASER.

Frons. 94 TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CONSUL, KERMAN, DATED (AND RECEIVED) THE 18TH MARCH 1905.

Reports that Mr. Newcomen has broken his ankle at Yezd, where the mission arrived on the 16th. Mr. Newcomen has made other arrangements for a successor who can be met by Ali Jan at Bunder Abbas.

Frons. 95 TELEGRAM FROM MR. NEWCOMEN, PRESIDENT, COMMERCIAL MISSION TO PERSIA, YEZD, DATED TEH 18TH (RECEIVED 20TH) MARCH 1905.

States that he has broken his ankle, and that he expects to be delayed a fortnight.

From Major Sykes' telegram it would appear as though a successor to Mr. Newcomen were going out from India, though Mr. Newcomen makes no mention of any new arrangement in his telegram.

It is unfortunate that he should have met with an accident. The telegram below may perhaps issue to Major Sykes.

G. M. C.,—20-3-05.

21-3-05. R. E. HOLLAND.

I do not understood the latter part of Major Sykes' telegram. Possibly it refers to arrangements for meeting his own (Major Sykes') successor. I have asked for further explanation in the draft which is for approval.

21-3-05. L. RUSSELL.

Issue.

22-3-05. S. M. FRASER.

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TELEGRAM TO HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CONSUL, KERMAN, No. 1220-E. A., DATED THE 23RD MARCH 1905. Enc 96

Regrets to hear of the accident to Mr. Newcomen. With regard to the latter part of his telegram asks to be informed whose successor is meant and who Ali Jan is.

TELEGRAM FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CONSUL, KERMAN, DATED THE 24TH (RECEIVED 25TH) MARCH 1905. Enc 97

Cancels his telegram of the 18th March.

For information. No orders required.* Presumably Major Cox will make arrangements for accompanying the Mission when it starts afresh, since Major Sykes is to leave for Meshed at once.

* General Branch to see.
W. M.,—27-3-05.

C. B. P.,—25-3-05.
E. L. N.,—25-3-05.
27-3-05.
28-3-05.

R. E. HOLLAND.
E. H. S. CLARKE.

[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated Bombay, the 13th March 1905.

From—C. H. HILL, Esq., C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department,
To—S. M. FRASER, Esq., C.I.E., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Please see Foreign Department memorandum No. 891-E.A., dated the 2nd March 1905, forwarding copy of a correspondence relating to the Commercial Mission to Persia.

Is there any objection to a copy of these papers being supplied to the Chamber of Commerce, Bombay.

With the endorsement quoted above the following were forwarded to the Bombay Government:—

(1) Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 17th November 1904, with enclosures.
(2) Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 26th November 1904, with enclosures.
(3) Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 25th January 1905, with enclosures.
(4) Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 2nd February 1905, with enclosures.
(5) Letter to the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, No. 689-E.A., dated the 16th February 1905.

2. It will be seen that the above includes all Mr. Newcomen's reports, and, as the Bombay Chamber saw fit to withdraw † their delegates on the pretext that their liabilities were indefinite, and that Government were unable to undertake the responsibility of and do all the catering for the members of the Mission, it is hardly reasonable that they should be supplied with such correspondence as would enable them to reap the fruits of the result of the labours of others.

† Pro. No 156 in External A., October 1904, Nos. 49-177.

3. In reply the Bombay Government may be informed that the Government of India would prefer that the correspondence should not be communicated to the Bombay Chamber.

Draft put up.

G. M. C.,—17-3-05.

E. L. N.,—18-3-05.

I am inclined to think the Upper India Chamber should be consulted the matter being left perfectly open to them. I mean that they should not be merely formally asked if they have any objection.

20-3-05. A. F. FREMANTLE.

I think that the draft put up by the office might issue at once saying that the Government of India would prefer that these papers should not be communicated to the Chamber. (If hereafter we get from Mr. Gleadowe Newcomen a consolidated report of his proceedings, in a form suitable for publication, copies of this could be sent to the Bombay Chamber as to other public bodies.)

20-3-05. L. RUSSELL

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(The notes may be read. I agree and would add to the draft demi-official, with your Excellency's approval, the following :—

The general results of the Mission will doubtless be published for the benefit of the commercial community, in whose interests the Government of India have incurred this expenditure, but the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, having held aloof from the Mission, are not entitled to receive from Government the special reports of the representation, whom the Upper India Chamber had the enterprise to send.

23-3-05. S. M. FRASER.

23-3-05. C[URZON].

[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated Fort William, the 1st April 1905.

From—S. M. FRASER, Esq., C. I. E., Offg., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—C. H. A HILL, Esq., C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department.

In reply to your demi-official letter dated the 13th March 1905, I am directed to say that the Government of India would prefer that the correspondence forwarded to you under Foreign Department endorsement No. 891-E. A., dated the 2nd March 1905, relating to the Commercial Mission to Persia, should not be communicated to the Bombay Chamber of Commerce.

The general results of the mission will doubtless be published for the benefit of the Commercial community, in whose interests the Government of India have incurred this expenditure, but the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, having held aloof from the Mission, are not entitled to receive from Government the special reports of the representative whom the Upper India Chamber had the enterprise to send.

From 98

FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE UPPER INDIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CAWNPORE, DATED 27TH (RECEIVED 30TH) MARCH 1905.

Acknowledges receipt of our telegram of the 23rd March, the substance of which has been communicated to Mr. Newcomen.*

* *By cablegram on 25th March at Kerman.*

For information. No orders.

F. S. H.,—5-4-05.

5-4-05. R. E. HOLLAND.

From 99

FROM A. SHAKESPEARE, ESQ., SECRETARY, UPPER INDIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CAWNPORE, DATED THE 20TH (RECEIVED 22ND) MARCH 1905.

Forwards copy of Mr. A. Gleadowe Newcomen's fourth report in connexion with the Commercial Mission to South-East Persia, and also copy of a letter dated the 27th December 1904, addressed to the Indian Tea Cess Committee.

For information. A copy of each of Mr. Newcomen's reports may now be sent to the Intelligence Branch. Draft put up.

G. M. C.,—11-4-05.

† 1. Letter from the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, No. 62, dated the 3rd February 1905, with enclosure.
2. Telegram to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 842-E. A., dated the 27th February 1905.
3. Telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 38, dated the 1st March 1905.
4. Letter from the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, dated the 28th February 1905, with enclosures.
5. Letter to the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, No. 1241-E. A., dated the 25th March 1905.
6. Letter from the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, dated the 20th March 1905, with enclosures.

E. L. N.,—12-4-05.

A copy of this report and of the marginally † noted correspondence may be sent to the India Office in continuation. Memorandum put up.

A copy of the report should also be sent to Bombay, Baluchistan, Bunder Abbas, Bushire and Kerman and to the Department of Commerce and Industry. Endorsements put up.

The Resident, Bushire, has also yet to be instructed regarding the sale of horses and the disposal of the remainder of the property as ordered by Deputy Secretary on the 18th March 1905. Draft put up. Finance Department may see after issue.

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

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1. Draft to Political Resident. I am not sure whether Deputy Secretary, in his note of 18th March 1905, intended that copies of the whole of the letter from the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, dated the 28th February 1905, with enclosure, and our telegram to the Chamber, No. 1227-E. A., dated the 23rd March 1905, should be sent to the Resident. It would perhaps suffice if the last paragraph of the former and the whole of the latter were sent.

L. RUSSELL.

* I think they have asked to see all papers about the Mission, and it will be well to send

L. RUSSELL.

2. The other drafts may issue, though I doubt if copies of the reports would be of much use or interest to the Intelligence * Branch.

13-4-05.

R. E. HOLLAND.

13-4-05.

L. RUSSELL.

The necessary alteration has been made in the draft to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf. All the drafts may now issue ?

E. L. N.,—14-4-05.

14-4-05.

R. E. HOLLAND.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM TO THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, No. 1471-E. A., DATED THE 18TH APRIL 1905. From 100

Forwards a copy of the papers cited for information.

ENDORSEMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT / HON'BLE THE AGENT TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN BALUCHISTAN / POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF / HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CONSUL, KERMAN / HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CONSUL, BUNDER ABBAS, No. 1472-E. A., DATED THE 18TH APRIL 1905. From 101

Forwards a copy the foregoing letter for information.

ENDORSEMENT TO THE COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT, No. 1473-E. A., DATED THE 18TH APRIL 1905. From 102

Forwards a copy of the foregoing letter for information.

LETTER TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 1474-E. A., DATED THE 18TH APRIL 1805. From 103

Forwards a copy of the papers cited, regarding the disposal of the property in possession of Mr. Newcomen, President of the Commercial Mission to Persia.

MEMORANDUM TO THE POLITICAL SECRETARY, INDIA OFFICE, No. 16-M., DATED THE 20TH APRIL 1905. From 104

Forwards copies of papers cited for the information of the Secretary of State for India.

FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, TEHRAN, No. 19, DATED THE 7TH MARCH (RECEIVED 10TH APRIL) 1905. From 105

With reference to Major Cox' Despatch No. 6, dated the 29th January 1905, forwards copy of his reply thereto respecting the treatment of the Commercial Mission to Persia.

For informtion. No orders.

G. M. C.,—17-4-05.

E. L. N.,—19-4-05.

20-4-05.

R. E. HOLLAND.

FROM A. SHAKESPEARE, ESQ., SECRETARY, UPPER INDIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CAWNPORE, DATED THE 12TH (RECEIVED 14TH) APRIL 1905. From 106

Forwards copy of Mr. A. Gleadowe Newcomen's fifth report in connexion with the Commercial Mission to South-East Persia, and also copy of a letter, dated Bam, the 20th January 1905, addressed to the Indian Tea Cess Committee.

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

For information. A copy of this report may be sent to the Intelligence Branch. Draft put up.

2. A copy* of Sir A. Hardinge's letter No. 19, dated the 7th March 1905, with enclosures, also a copy of this report may be sent to the India Office in continuation. Memorandum put up.

* No need to send copy of this to India Office.
L Russell.

3. A copy of the report should also be sent to Bombay, Baluchistan, Bunder Abbas, Bushire and Kerman, and to the Department of Commerce and Industry. The Director General of Commerce and Industry is also to get a copy.

Endorsement put up.

4. A copy of the marginally† noted letters, and of the present report may also be sent to Tehran in continuation. Draft put up.

† Letter from the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, datad the 28th February 1905, with enclosures.
2. Letter to the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, No. 1241-E.-A. dated the 25th March 1905.
3. Letter from the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 20th March 1905.

After issue the Finance Department may see the file with reference to the orders issued regarding the disposal of Government property in possession of Mr. Newcomen.

G. M. C.,—27-4-05.

E. L. N.,—28-4-05.

2-5-05. C. Somers Cocks.

3-5-05. L. Russell.

The last receipt, Mr. G. Newcomen's report from Bam (which is rather interesting) is for Your Excellency's information. There is evidently scope for useful commercial work for our new Consular Agent Khan Bahadur Aeghar Ali.

4-5-05. S. M. Fraser.

5-5-05. C[urzon].

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 151 F. D.—18-5-05.—33.—

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

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OFFICE MEMORANDUM TO THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, No. 1753 E.-A., DATED THE 9TH MAY 1905. From 107

Forwards a copy of the foregoing letter, for information.

ENDORSEMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, THE HON'BLE THE AGENT TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN BALUCHISTAN, THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CONSUL, KERMAN, AND HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CONSUL, BUNDER ABBAS, No. 1754 E.-A., DATED THE 9TH MAY 1905. From 108

Forwards a copy of the foregoing letter, for information.

ENDORSEMENT TO THE COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT, No. 1755 E.-A., DATED THE 9TH MAY 1905. From 109

Forwards a copy of the foregoing letter, for information, and a copy of Mr. Newcomen's fifth report for favour of transmission to the Director of Commerce and Industry.

LETTER TO HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, TEHRAN, No. 1756 E.-A., DATED THE 9TH MAY 1905. From 110

Forwards a copy of the cited correspondence, regarding the Commercial Mission to Persia, for information.

MEMORANDUM FORWARDING COPIES OF PAPERS TO THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE, LONDON, WITH THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S LETTER No. 19 M., DATED THE 11th MAY 1905. From 111

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* All necessary action has been taken on it, I presume.
C. SOMERS COCKS.
Yes.
E. L. N.,—23-5-05.

The file may now be seen by the Finance Department, and after that the papers may be recorded.*

G. M. C.,—13-5-05.

E. L. N.,—13-5-05.

C. SOMERS COCKS,—13-5-05.

Finance Department.

The file is sent to this Department to see the orders which have been issued with regard to the disposal of the Government property in possession of Mr. Newcomen. A list of the property will be found at page 25 of the notes.

No remarks appear to be called for.

G. S.,—19-5-05.

J. D.,—21-5-05.

H. F. HOWARD,—22-5-05.

Foreign Department.

No orders.

E. L. N.,—23-5-05.

C. SOMERS COCKS,—24-5-05.

Seen.

C. L. S. RUSSELL,—24-5-05.

Foreign Office Press—No. 343—26-5-05—33.

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

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

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Appendix to Notes

PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ.

COMMERCIAL MISSION TO PERSIA.

The Commercial Mission arrived at Bunder Abbas on the evening of the 21st October, and left for Sirjan on the morning of the 7th November, arriving there on the 25th. Major Sykes, His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman, joined the party at Saüdabad, the principal place of Sirjan, on the 27th.

2. After visiting Pariz, Gaud-i-Ahmar, Oraf, Bahramabad and Shahabad, the party arrived safely at Kerman on the 17th December.

3. From Kerman a visit was paid to Bam, Narmashir, Jiruft, and Rain, the party returning to Kerman on the 20th February after a successful tour.

4. The return journey, instead of taking a line *via* Magas, Kuhak, and the Kej valley to Gwadur or Pasni, will now be performed *via* Yezd, Shiraz, and Bushire, which places will be visited approximately on the 22nd March, the 5th and the 20th April, respectively.

CALCUTTA,
The 4th March 1905.

J. SCOTT,
Registrar,
Foreign Department.

Foreign Office Press—No. 1179—13-3-05—40.

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

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

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, JUNE 1905.

Reports of the Commercial Mission to Persia. Pro. No. 45

REPORTS OF THE COMMERCIAL MISSION TO PERSIA.

822 F. D.—S E—45·111—June.

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

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Telegram, dated the 15th September 1904.

From—Major P. M. Sykes, C.M. G., His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman,

To—The Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Fstimate for Commission, three, without pay Indians, totals Rs. 7,562.

Dated Cawnpore, the 19th September 1904.

From—A. Shakespear, Esq., Acting Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce,

To—The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am directed to confirm the following telegrams which have been exchanged on the above subject since my letter of 15th instant :—

To Chamber.—" 3088 E. A. Your telegram of 12th instant, Commercial Mission. Arrangements are being made for transport in Persia at Government expense. Government will also pay travelling expenses of delegates to and from Bunder Abbas and cost of suitable outfit of tents necessary and camp furniture, horses, etc. Mr. Newcomen might perhaps secure tentage at Cawnpore for all, reporting proposals and cost. Delegates are expected to defray the cost of their food and purely personal expenditure. Please make arrangements on understanding that Mission will start by steamer leaving Bombay 11th October at latest. Addressed Bombay Chamber; repeated Upper India Chamber, and Bombay Political ".

To Chamber.—" 3089-E. A. Your telegram of 12th September. It was understood that one gentleman would fill the two posts and this would be preferred, but if it is necessary to send two, no further objections will be raised; telegraph reply ".

From Chamber.—" Your Nos. 3088 and 3089. Am communicating with Bombay Chamber regarding their tentage and camp furniture requirements which I will arrange to purchase here. Sailing date fixed will suit our delegate. Mr. Newcomen did not find it possible to combine appointments assistant delegate and Secretary. Mr. B. E. Luffman will accompany him as assistant delegate, Mr. P. Ryan as Secretary ".

The Committee learn with much satisfaction that Government has been pleased to contribute to the expenses of the members of the Mission on a more liberal scale than this Chamber was led to understand when the project was first proposed, and I am now to hand you the accompanying estimate of Mr. Newcomen's expenses so far as it has been possible to calculate figures at present.

The estimate does not include horses, as until receipt of your message under acknowledgment I was not certain that Government would defray this item of expenditure.

Mr. Newcomen has already placed the order for the tentage and camp equipage for himself and his staff and I shall be glad to know whether I am to submit the account for the cost of the articles to you, or whether you will arrange to place me in funds to cover the whole amount of the accompanying estimate.

I am desired to refer you to my letter of 1st instant, asking to be furnished with certain maps, etc., for the use of the Chamber's delegate and to express a hope that these may be forwarded to me with the least possible delay.

If your Department have any spare copies of Mr. H. W. Maclean's Report on Persia, I will be much obliged if you could supply me with one for Mr. Newcomen.

1

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Enclo. Enclo 46

Estimated travelling expenses, &c., of the Upper India Chamber's delegate and staff in connection with the Commercial Mission to Persia.

	Rs.	A.	P.
1st class fare Cawnpore to Bombay and back by Great Indian Peninsula Railway	104	14	0
2nd class fare Cawnpore to Bombay and back by Great Indian Peninsula Railway for assistant delegate and Secretary	105	0	0
3rd Class fare Cawnpore to Bombay and back by Great Indian Peninsula Railway for servants	157	8	0
1st Class fare from Bombay to Bunder Abbas and back Delegate ... ... Assistant Delegate ... ... Secretary	780	0	0
Steerage (servants) from Bombay to Bunder Abbas and back	165	0	0
5 days' expenses in Bombay	300	0	0
Freight on 50 maunds of luggage and camp equipage, Cawnpore to Bombay and back	13	12	0
Freight on 70 maunds of luggage from Bombay to Bunder Abbas and back	100	0	0
Cost of tentage and Camp equipage	1,016	0	0
Contingencies	300	0	0
Total ...	3,042	2	0

A. SHAKESPEAR,

Dated 19th September 1904. *Acting Secretary.*

Enclo. No. 47

No. 266, dated Kerman, the 5th September 1904.

From—Major P. Molesworth Sykes, C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty' Consul, Kerman,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

With reference to your instructions that I should post an estimate, showing travelling expenses of the Commercial Commission, I would venture to point out both that I have no precedent to guide me and also that I do not know the number, composition or scale of the Mission. Consequently my estimate will I fear be incomplete, more especially as I do not know the present rates prevailing at Bunder Abbas.

As however no mules are procurable there, I propose to send down twenty for the use of the Mission.

It will thus be able to send off the advance camp on camels at night and the light camp can follow by day.

Rough and incomplete estimate of transport, etc., for four months of Commercial Mission.

Section I.

	Krs.	Krs.
Kerman to Bunder Abbas—		
4 mules, K. B. Asghar Ali at 5 Krans per diem ...	600	
4 mules Hospital Assistant	600	
12 mules for use of Mission	1,800	
Escort of 6 Persian soldiers at 7 Krans per diem for 30 days	210	
Escort of 6 mounted men from Sirjan to coast at 26 Krans per day for 20 days	520	
Guides, etc.	100	
		3,830

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SECTION II.

Waiting at Bunder Abbas, no estimate possible, but allow for 10 days—

	Krs.	Krs.
Hire of mules	1,000	
Pay of soldiers	70	
Pay of sowars	260	
		1,330

SECTION III.

Bunder Abbas to Kerman, time 45 days—

	Ks.	Rs.
Engagement of 6 tent-pitchers at 60 Krans per month, for 1½ months	540	
Hire of 60 camels for transport tents, forage, water, etc., at 3 Krans per diem	8,100	
Mules as per Section I for 45 days	4,500	
Soldiers	315	
Sowars	1,170	
Guides, etc., ...	200	
		14,825

SECTION IV.

Kerman to Bunder Abbas *viâ* Bam—

	Krs.	Krs.
Estimate roughly equivalent to Section III ...	14,825	
Totals—		
Section I		3,830
„ II		1,330
„ III		14,825
„ IV		14,825
		34,810

At 390 Krans per 100 Rs. = (approximate) Rs. 9,200.

Dated Cawnpore, the 8th October 1904.

From—A. SHAKESPEAR, Esq., Acting Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce,

To—The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am directed to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of 8th instant to the following effect :—

"3382-E.A. Your telegram 6th instant. MacLean's report, etc., have been sent on to Mr. Newcomen, Bombay, direct, as also the Gazetteers of Baluchishtan and Persia".

I am to hand you in modification of my estimate, dated the 19th September last, the accompanying statement which I trust the Government of India may be pleased to pass.

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

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It will be noticed that certain items have been included which can scarcely be considered as covered by the terms "travelling expenses and camp equipage," and my Committee have been emboldened to appeal for this additional expenditure as the expenses of Mr. Newcomen and his staff are calculated to considerably exceed the funds this Chamber have been able to collect, trusting it may be recognized that this Chamber's endeavours to support to the full extent of their abilities the enterprise which Government is carrying out for the advancement of Indian trade may entitle it to be treated on as liberal a scale as may be possible. I am to assure you that the interests which this Chamber represents are probably concerned in this Mission in a much smaller degree than any other of its sister Associations and that the industries of Cawnpore have equipped the Chamber's delegate at no inconsiderable sacrifice. It is most repugnant to my Committee to have to frame an appeal to the Government of India in such a matter in view of the very substantial support which has been already given to the Chamber's delegate in the matter of the supply of horses and tentage, etc., but if there should be any surplus from the grant which has been made in connection with the Mission, it is hoped that Government may see their way to assisting the Chamber with further funds.

UPPER INDIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.

CAWNPORE, 8TH OCTOBER 1904.

Modified statement of travelling expenses, etc., of the Upper India Chamber's delegate and staff in connection with the Commercial Mission to Persia.

	Rs.	A.	P.
First class fare from Cawnpore to Bombay and back by Great Indian Peninsula	104	14	0
Second class fare from Cawnpore to Bombay and back by Great Indian Peninsula, for Assistant Secretary and Delegate	105	0	0
Third class fare from Cawnpore to Bombay and back by Great Indian Peninsula	157	8	0
First class fare from Bombay to Bunder Abbas and back ... Delegate ... ... Assistant Delegate ... ... Secretary	780	0	0
Steerage (servants) from Bombay to Bunder Abbas and back	165	0	0
5 days' expenses in Bombay	300	0	0
Freight on 50 maunds of luggage and camp equipage, Cawnpore to Bombay and back	13	12	0
Freight on 70 maunds of luggage from Bombay to Bunder Abbas and back	100	0	0
Cost of tentage and camp equipage	1,227	11	0
Contingencies	300	0	0
Saddlery	172	2	0
Trunks	49	0	0
1 Aneroid	35	0	0
1 Magnetic Sundial	10	8	0
1 Gunmetal „	20	0	0
1 Camp bed	36	0	0
1 Camp bath	20	8	0
1 Waterproof sheet	12	0	0
4 Arab horses, clothing and food	2,258	10	0
Total ...	5,867	9	0

A. SHAKESPEAR,

Acting Secretary.

4

G. C. Press Simla.—No. 2836 F. D. 1-11-04.—53.—C. G. DaS.

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

(408)

No. 270, dated Kerman, the 15th September (received 20th October) 1904.

From—Major P. M. Sykes, C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Kerman,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my No. 266 of 1904, and in reply to your telegram giving details of constitution and itinerary of Commercial Mission, I have the honour to attach an estimate which should cancel former ones.

If the personal baggage of the Mission be reasonable in amount, this estimate should cover all expenses.

Section I.

Kerman to Bunder Abbas.

	Krs.
Khan Bahadur Asghar Ali, 4 mules at 5 krans per day, for 25 days	500
Hospital Assistant, 4 mules, ditto, ditto ...	500
Medicines, &c., 2 mules	250
Sowars (Indian), 3 (1 extra mule for rations)	375
Escort of 4 Persian soldiers, at 5 krans per day	125
4 mules for ditto	500
4 Persian sowars, at 18 krans per day	450
3 farrashes' outfit, krans 50 each	150
Pay of ditto, at 2 krans per day	150
3 mules for farrashes	375
Guides, &c.	100
	3,475

Section II.

Halt at Bunder Abbas.

(No exact estimate possible, but allow for 10 days.)

	Krs.
Hire of 20 mules, for 10 days	1,000
Pay of 4 soldiers, at 5 krans per day	50
Pay of 4 soldiers, at 18 krans per day	180
Pay of 3 farrashes, at 6 krans per day	60
Outfit of 3 more farrashes to complete total of six, at 50 krs. ...	150
Pay ditto about 5 days	30
Cost of transport of gear from beach to quarantine camp and other minor expenses	200
	1,670

Section III.

Bunder Abbas to Kerman.

(Time 45 days.)

	Krs.
Pay of 6 farrashes, at 12 krans per day	540
Hire of 40 camels for transport, tents, forage, water, &c., at 3 krans per day	5,400
20 mules, at 100 krans per day	4,500
4 soldiers, at 5 krans per day	225
4 sowars (Persian), at 18 krans per day	810
Guides, &c.	200
	11,675

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SECTION IV.

Halt at Kerman.

(No estimate possible, but allow 20 days.)

	Krs.
Pay of 6 farrashes, at 12 krans per day	240
Pay of 4 soldiers (Persian), at 5 krans per day	100
Hire of house	300
Minor expenses	200
	840

SECTION V.

From Kerman to Pasni.

(Time 50 days.)

	Krs.
Pay of 6 farrashes, at 12 krans per day	600
20 mules, at 100 krans per day	5,000
40 camels, at 120 krans per day	6,000
4 soldiers, at 5 krans per day...	250
4 sowars (Persian), at 18 krans per day	900
Guides, &c.	400
Minor expenses	400
10 camels for carrying water for 10 days across, but at krans 40 per day	400
	13,950

SECTION VI.

Return of camels and mules.

(As no loads are likely to be procured, a lump sum will have to be paid for camels and mules probably hire for 25 days.)

	Krs.
Mule hire	2,500
Camel hire	3,000
6 farrashes, 12 krans, for ditto	300
4 sarbaz, 5 krans, for ditto	125
4 sowars (Persian), at 18 krans	450
Forage and rations of 3 Indian sowars, throughout for 120 days...	1,500
Return of Hospital Assistant and medical stores, probably *via* Bunder Abbas	1,500
Return of Khan Bahadur Ashgar Ali	1,200
...	10,575

GRAND TOTAL.

	Krs.
Section I	3,475
Do. II	1,670
Do. III	11,675
Do. IV	840
Do. V	13,950
Do. VI	10,575
	42,185=Rs. 10,817

Remarks.—In the above estimate, the pay and travelling allowances of Khan Bahadur Asghar Ali and of Hospital Assistant, Tafazul Husain, have not been entered, nor has the pay of three sowars been shown.

P. M. SYKES, *Major,*
His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman.

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

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7

Dated Cawnpore the 21st October 1904.

From—A. SHAKESPEAR, Acting Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce,

To—The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I am directed to refer to my letter of 8th instant, and to enquire if you can see your way to making payment for, at any rate, a portion of the estimate submitted therewith as I have been called upon to settle the cost of the tentage and horses supplied to Mr. Newcomen.

No. 7332 A., dated Calcutta, the 24th November 1904.

From—J. CAMPBELL, Esq., Under-Secretary to the Government of India,
FINANCE AND COMMERCE DEPARTMENT,

To—The Comptroller, India Treasuries.

I am directed to request that you will arrange for the immediate payment to the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, of the sum of Rs. 5,867-9-0 (rupees five thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven and annas nine only) on account of the travelling and other expenses of the delegate of the Upper India Chamber of Commerce and his staff in connection with the Commercial Mission to Persia.

Endorsement by the Finance & Commerce dept.
Copy forwarded to the Foreign dept.

No. 4055 E. A., dated Fort William, the 3rd December 1904.

From—L. RUSSELL, Esq., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—A. SHAKESPEAR, Esq., Acting Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore.

I am directed to refer to the correspondence ending with your letter dated the 21st October 1904, regarding the travelling and other expenses of the Upper India Chamber's delegate and staff in connexion with the Commercial Mission to Persia.

2. In reply, I am to inform you that the Treasury Officer, Cawnpore, has been authorised to advance to you the whole amount of the estimate (*i.e.*, Rs. 5,867-9-0.

3. The final bills should be submitted to this Department.

No. 4056 E. A., dated Fort William, the 3rd December 1904.

From—L. RUSSELL, Esq., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—Major P. M. SYKES, C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 270, dated the 15th September 1904, forwarding a revised estimate of expenditure of travelling expenses, etc., of the Commercial Mission.

2. In reply, I am to inform you that you are authorised to incur expenditure, on the lines indicated in your letter above referred to, up to a limit of Rs. 11,000. Should there be reason to anticipate that further expenditure will be incurred, a revised estimate should be submitted at an early date.

3. The travelling allowances of Khan Bahadur Asghar Ali and of the Hospital Assistant will be governed by the Civil Service Regulations, and as these men are Government servants the expenditure incurred in connexion with their pay and travelling allowances while on deputation with the Mission will not be a charge against the special grant sanctioned on account of the Mission.

4. I am to ask you to exclude the pay and travelling expenses of the three Indian sowars from the charges on account of the Mission and to treat them, for account purposes, as a part of the Kerman Consular Escort.

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

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No. 4057 E. A., dated Fort William, the 3rd December 1904.

Endorsed by the Foreign Department.

Letter to the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, No. 4055 E. A., dated the 3rd December 1904.

Letter to Major P. M. Sykes, C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman, No. 4056, dated the 3rd December 1904.

A copy of the foregoing papers is forwarded to the Department of Finance and Commerce for information, and the issue of such further orders as may be necessary.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 2666 F. D.—9-12-1904.—60—J. A.

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

(410)

Dated Cawnpore, the 17th November 1904.

From—A. SHAKSPEAR, Esq., Acting Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce,

To—The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I am directed to hand you a copy of Mr. Gleadowe Newcomen's first report, dated Bunder Abbas, the 1st November 1904.

While in Bombay Mr. Newcomen received advice from well informed sources that, from a commercial standpoint, an investigation of the country through which that section of the route laid down to be followed by the Mission from Bampur to Magas, Kuhak, and thence through Baluchistan to Gwadur would be absolutely profitless, as the country is practically a desert and the population scanty and not inclined to trading pursuits. Since Mr. Newcomen entered Persia this information has been confirmed, and he now requests that the Government of India may be pleased to sanction his making such alterations in the itinerary of the Mission, in consultation with the officials on the spot, as may seem best calculated to serve the purposes of the undertaking on which he is engaged.

Mr. Newcomen points out in this connection that, should the original route be adhered to, the Mission, on leaving Persian territory, will require to be provided with an escort to replace the Persian guard and special transport arrangements will have to be concluded.

Mr. Newcomen appears to be in favor of making Kerman his headquarters, and from this place the Mission could visit Yezd, which I understand is one of the most important trade centres in that part of the country; from this place Mr. Newcomen suggests returning *viâ* Shiraj to Bushire or proceeding from Kerman to the coast *viâ* Narmashir or Bampur passing through the Rodbar District to Jask.

Mr. Newcomen has asked that directions in this matter may be communicated to him by telegraph, and I am, therefore, to solicit that I may be informed with the least possible delay of the Government of India's decision on Mr. Newcomen's suggestions, which I may mention appear to my Committee to be worthy of consideration.

I also beg to give you the following extract of a letter received from Mr. Newcomen and would be grateful for advice as to what action the Chamber should take on his request, as my Committee do not perfectly understand what is required:—

> "Before leaving India I forgot to make arrangements through you with the Government of India for a requisition for our return passages, our baggage and servants, etc.; as our point of departure is not certain this ought to be left blank, all the rest ought to be filled in. I append the list—
>
> | | |
> |---|---|
> | 4 Horses. | 4 Personal servants. |
> | 4 Syces. | 3 First class passages. |
>
> Baggage."

Mr. Newcomen states that he had been obliged to meet from his own funds the entire current expenses of the Mission since he started, including the payment of transport and escort, expenses which my Committee understood would be borne by Government as no funds had been provided for this purpose; such expenditure was not taken into consideration when arranging Mr. Newcomen's finances, and he apprehends that his funds may run short before long. I am, therefore, to ask that you may be good enough to make arrangements to place adequate funds at Mr. Newcomen's disposal with the least possible delay.

Mr. Newcomen advises me that communications intended for him should be directed to His Majesty's Consul at Kerman.

2665 F. D.

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

10

I am desired to refer to my letter of 8th ultimo, and to ask that the Government of India may be good enough to sanction the payment to me of a sufficient sum to cover the account which accompanied my communication as I have been called upon to settle for the horses and tentage, etc.

Dated Bunder Abbas, the 1st November 1904.

From—A. Gleadowe Newcomen, Esq., President, Commercial Mission to Persia,

To—The Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce.

I have the honour to intimate that the Mission arrived at Bunder Abbas on the evening of the 21st ultimo and had to proceed direct from the ship to quarantine, together with all our belongings. We remained in quarantine till the evening of the 25th, and during this time we were unable to do any business or to make any enquiries, being cut off from communication with the outer world. The greater part of the day that brought us liberty was occupied in shifting and pitching camp, and on Wednesday we got things ship-shape, and in the evening received the Madhat-ul-Vizara, the Persian Representative for Foreign Affairs, in Durbar. On Thursday morning Mirza Ismail Khan, Deputy Governor of Bunder Abbas, paid an official visit and was received in Durbar, a guard of honour being stationed before the tent. In the evening representatives of the European firms trading in Bunder Abbas, together with the Hajji Amin, or chief of the merchant's guild arrived at Naiband were introduced, interviewed and entertained. The morning of the next day was spent in futile attempts to persuade the Belgic Director of Customs that we were not smuggling goods into the country, nor were we a caravan of traders carrying arms, ammunition and such like forbidden things for sale or barter. The official proved very pig-headed. He seemed to understand neither Persian nor English, and spoke but indifferent French, the consequence of this being that numerous telegrams had to be despatched to the authorities in India and Persia. Our difficulties were also intimated to your Chamber by wire. It was only two days ago that the matter of passing our goods was finally settled, and we were allowed the free access to our stores as well as our arms and ammunition; for the arms we have had to deposit a guarantee of Rs. 350 and for the ammunition have had to pay a duty of Rs. 155 or Rs. 5 per every 6½ lbs. The money deposited as security for our guns we shall, however, receive back when we leave the country.

In the evening a deputation of Hindu merchants was received, but not much useful information was elicited. Friday morning was spent in looking up statistics at the Consulate and Donane, also much information was given by the very obliging agent of the British Indian Steam Navigation Company Mr. deMello, representing Messrs. Gray Paul & Co. at this place. In the evening several Khojas or Mohammadan Sindhi merchants waited on the Mission as well as four of the Agents of the chief Persian tea traders, and much useful information was, I am glad to say, gathered. On Saturday some more information was gathered and we visited the shops of the traders in the Bazaar, and in the evening I was able to negotiate for the loan of a room over Messrs. Gray Paul's office. Sunday being mail day no investigation or business could be conducted. On Monday our office was opened, and the samples that we had brought with us were laid out on view, and the traders of Bunder Abbas were given an opportunity of seeing for themselves what Cawnpore can produce in the way of yarns, and woollen and cotton textiles, etc., as well as of looking at and tasting the samples of tea sent by the Indian Tea Cess Committee.

I now begin a short report on the results of our investigations into trade so far.

During our short stay at Maskat I was able to elicit the fact that there is an opening for a trade in yarn of a coarse nature and in tea; but the people are extremely poor, and every thing, whether cloth, yarn or tea must be of the very cheapest kind: as regards tea there is at present little or no trade with India, and with few exceptions the Native merchants are petty traders. The exceptions comprise those traders who import rice and export dates. There is,

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however, one firm of European traders, Messrs. Towel & Co., who do a very extensive import and export business. They are the local Agents for the British India Steam Navigation Company, and their senior partner, Mr. MacCurdy, is the United States Consul at Maskat. I think it would be well worth the consideration of the Cawnpore Mills and of the Indian Tea Cess Committee to approach this firm with a view to its taking up agencies, and pushing Indian trade.

At Jask there are only two traders and, except for the importation of rice and the exportation of dates and carpets, the latter of which come from the town of Buskard, about 30 miles north-west of Jask, the place has practically no trade, and I was able to do nothing there.

I have hopes of the trade through Bunder Abbas to the interior of the country. The Government of India will, however, first have to bestir itself and practically make Bunder Abbas.

To this end the approaches of the town, from seaward and landward, its telegraphic and postal services, and its water-supply, must be improved. The Consular arrangements also require alteration. The present water-supply of the town is bad. There is guinea worm in the reservoirs, which are fed from the surface drainage of a very dirty country, and for the rest, the townspeople have to buy their water from the owners of a little group of sweet water wells near Naiband. There is however, I am informed, an ample supply of good water obtainable from a spring, distant about 12 or 15 miles, which could be brought into the town at small expense.

The port is very badly off in the matter of communications. Taking first the approach from the sea. Owing to the shoal waters steamers have to be out from 3 to 4 miles from shore, and owing to the pier being in a semi-ruinous condition, and to its not extending far enough into the sea, lighters have the greatest difficulty in coming alongside, and the transhipment of goods is attended with the greatest inconvenience. The tracks leading into the interior are in a bad state and quite impossible for anything but camel or mule transport. There are, properly speaking, but four routes from Bunder Abbas to the interior:—

(1) To Kirman, winter and summer routes.
(2) To Yezd direct, this route passing well to the westward of Kirman.
(3) To Seistan and Khorassan, through Naimashur, through Kirman to Khorassan.
(4) To Lar.

Some of the routes, however, bifurcate inland, caravans taking whichever happens to be safest or best at the time. These tracks, besides being rough and bad, are at times unsafe, owing to the presence of bandits, who haunt certain parts.

The Postal Service needs improvement. It is slow and it is uncertain. The mails are often robbed.

It is in the matter of telegraphic communication, however, that there is the greatest possibility, if not the greatest necessity, for improvement. At present the nearest telegraphic station is that opened recently on the Island of Hinjam, some 30 odd miles distant round the shoulder of Kishen. The delays that arise in the sending of telegraphic messages may be gathered from the fact that recently a telegram addressed to me took four days coming from Hinjam here. In really bad weather, or when contrary winds and currents prevail, the boats carrying despatches between Bunder Abbas and Hinjam are often unable to make the ports for which they aim, and messages are delayed weeks at a time. It would be a very easy, and not an expensive matter, to link up Bunder Abbas with the telegraph system of the world by way of Hinjam. Two short lengths of cable and a few miles of land line would be required; one cable length of ½ a mile joining Hinjam and Kishen and one of 12 miles linking Kishen to Bunder Abbas. The importance of such direct cable communication cannot be over-emphasised, for Bunder Abbas is a very important port, inasmuch as it is the natural point for the entrance and exit of the trade of Central, Southern and Eastern Persia.

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Of the Consular arrangements the best that can be said is that they are highly unsatisfactory. In the first place there ought to be at Bunder Abbas a British Consulate, officered by an experienced and weighty officer and not a Vice-Consulate, officered by inexperienced and powerless young gentlemen, who are constantly being changed. It is necessary, too, to have a man who is conversant with customs operations, and who is empowered to correspond directly with Tehran and India if British trade is to be successfully defended against the Russo-Belgic combination, represented here by a Belgian Director of Customs who increases his power daily, and who has extended it from customs and ports to practically every department of the Local Government. For the most part of the time, however, Bunder Abbas seems to be left without even a Vice-Consul, and the defence of British trading and political interests—though in this place the political situation is of very slight importance compared with trade—together with the enhancement of British prestige is left to the care of a poor, insignificant Goanese clerk, who is not even a good specimen of his class. This man, of course, possesses no authority, no experience and no weight; he also possesses no backbone and is held in little respect by the people or the authorities, yet this man is supposed to hold his own against the Persian officials, against the customs administration, and against the Russian Political Agent, a Persian, who, it is rumoured, is to be replaced next year by a Russian Vice-Consul.

I have no hesitation in asking you to induce Government to make a special appointment to the Consulate of Bunder Abbas, making the possession, on the part of the officer appointed, of a knowledge of business of more importance than political experience, which, as I have already said, is of secondary importance here.

It is true that in the past Government has not found it an easy matter to get officers to fill the post of Vice-Consul at Bunder Abbas. All things considered this is, perhaps, not surprising.

The objections arising from the discomfort and unhealthiness of Bunder Abbas in the summer, which too is the slack business season, could be got over by building a Consulate in the Kuh-i-Gino, a range of hills about 23 miles away from the port where there is a good climate, and where a plentiful supply of good water is to be found at the Chashin-i-Kadamgah. The Consulate could be connected with the Consular Office at the port and with the outer world by a line of telephone or telegraph. In the cold season Bunder Abbas is a very comfortable place to live in. In this way and in this way alone will it be possible to meet effectively the action of Russo-Belgic combination here and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf ports.

Before proceeding to outline the work done in the investigation of the trade of the port, I would like to mention a few particulars concerning the arrangements made for the Mission:—

(1) On my arrival here I received a letter from Major Sykes, Consul at Kirman, in which he informed me that it would be necessary for me to carry at least Rs. 1,500 worth of presents, such as watches, telescopes, phonographs, etc., for presentation to the various Persian Officials who would be attached to the Mission or whom we might meet with during our tour. I wired him at once that I could not purchase anything in Bunder Abbas, and that nothing of this matter had been told me before leaving India, asking him at the same time if he would wire to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, telling them to make the necessary purchases, and despatch them to Kirman by special Consular express. I am distinctly of the opinion that the charge of this *toshakhana* ought not to be borne by me or by the Chamber, as I consider that we have been "let in" for it by not having received proper intimation before my departure.

(2) No arrangements had been made by India in the way of advances for the payment of the transport expenses and our Persian escort, another matter which occasioned telegraphic correspondence. Ultimately Khan Bahadur Ashgar Ali, on the personal security of Major Sykes, borrowed money for this purpose from Messrs. Gray Paul & Co. at this place.

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(3) It seems that it is the custom for Missions of a nature such as ours—whether British, Russian, or other—to have their baggage passed into the country duty free: no arrangements had been made regarding this either by India or by Teheran, though I had wired on the subject from Karachi to Major Sykes at Kirman. This caused much delay, trouble and expense.

(4) Khan Bahadur Ashgar Ali whenever he accompanies Major Sykes on tour does so as his guest, and dines at his table, as is the custom of the country, and this custom I shall have to follow.

(5) Another custom regarding which no information was given me or the Chamber is that everything apparently has to be done in Durbar, after much solemn talk, and the formal consumption of tea, coffee, sherbut and cigarettes. In every case with us the officials and traders must make the first step towards friendship.

However, one lives and learns, and we are now fairly *au fait* with the niceties of the customs of this ceremonial-ridden country.

I am glad to be able to report that the members of the Mission are in excellent health, and to bring to your notice the great assistance that Khan Bahadur Ashgar Ali has rendered us, as also Mr. P. de Mello, of Messrs. Gray Paul & Co., the obliging agent here of the B. I. S. N. Co., who has done every thing in his power to help me in every way, especially as regards meetings with traders.

Before proceeding to remark on the trade in cotton, wool, hides, tea and indigo, I may remark *à propos* of Mr. MacLean's observations regarding the Bunder Abbas customs godowns, where he says that they are commodious, that he is not quite correct. There are godowns in plenty, but they are so badly arranged in every respect as to be almost impossible of access: goods, no matter what their nature, are in consequence often left lying in the court-yards. The godowns are also ill-ventilated and so infested with vermin, as to make it dangerous to store perishable articles in them. Loads of grain have, after a month's storage, been found to have lost from 70 per cent. to 80 per cent. in weight. Yet the charges for godown storage are excessively high. Lately, however, the "other tenants" of whose presence in the Customs House—the Old Dutch Factory—Mr. MacLean complained, as leading to pilfering, have been evicted, and under this head the Belgians have brought about some improvement.

The objections found by Mr. MacLean in the methods pursued by the Customs in the excising and clearing of cargo still exist. The Tally Clerks, and the Hamal Bashi, who gets his post by purchase, are still able to work their own sweet will with merchandise and shippers and it is still "difficult to fix the fault", when claims for shortage or damage arise. The Hamal Bashi, too, here at Bunder Abbas, seems to be the real Director of Customs. He has enormous influence over M. Catersell, the Director, and his influence is not exerted for the good of the trade or traders of the port.

It is certain that most of the trouble that we have experienced, and that the traders of Bunder Abbas constantly experience, arises not from the Director so much as from the Hamal Bashi's bad and interested advice. The present Hamal Bashi was at one time a wardroom waiter on Board H. M. S. *Lapwing*, a position he had to resign in a hurry. It may be imagined, therefore, that a better man than he is might have been found to fill the place he now holds.

The following are some details regarding the local trade in wool, etc.

Wool.

There is only a very small trade in woollen fabrics in Bunder Abbas. The heat all the year round is far too great to permit of the people wearing anything warm, and indeed they are generally so poor that even if it were cold they could not afford to buy much clothing.

A Shikkarpur firm, Messrs. Assaram Subraj, have an agency here, under the management of Mr. Gobindram, who acts as the spokesman of the community of Hindu traders of Bunder Abbas. He has written to the Woollen Mills, Cawnpore, asking for a full range of samples of their materials and has also placed with the same firm a small order for black *lohis* as an experiment.

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He has also declared himself willing to barter raw wool for woollen goods if he sees his way to doing a trade anywhere, and has written to this effect to the Managiag Director of the Woollen Mills.

There is a considerable trade done in raw wool, and I am sending you samples.

There are two descriptions of wool brought down to Bunder Abbas from the interior, a fine and a coarse. The samples of fine I have marked "A", the other "B".

The prices are "A" (Coorg) at Bunder Abbas Rs. 22 per Delhi maund, f. o. b.; Bombay, Rs. 28 per Delhi maund, f. o. b.; "B" (Pashm) at Bunder Abbas, Rs. 14 per Delhi maund, f. o. b.; Bombay, Rs. 19 per Delhi maund, f. o. b.

The wool seasons extend from October to January, and from April to June.

Herati and Afghan wool comes down by Kaffila more irregularly and generally arrives here in December or January.

The opening of the Nushki-Seistan trade route has considerably reduced the wool trade of Bunder Abbas of late years from what it once was, but there are no export duties, and trade being free, may, if the demand increases, increase very considerably.

Hides and Leather.

The hides exported from this port, or procurable in the neighbourhood are of a quality so poor as to be unfit for the uses of the Cawnpore tanneries. The quantity is also small.

The people are too poor here to be able to afford such luxuries as Cawnpore leather goods, saddlery, etc.: so far as boots are concerned, the Persians are like the Japanese and prefer straw and cotton to articles made of leather.

Sugar.

In this commodity there is a very large trade, chiefly in loaf sugar. I am sending you a range of samples of loaf and other sugars which find ready sale here, together with their prices, in the hope that the Cawnpore sugar works and the refineries at Shahjehanpur and Cossipur may be able to enter into successful competition.

Indigo.

There is a considerable demand for indigo of the cheaper varieties, which come mostly from the Punjab and Madras, comparatively little Bengal indigo finding its way here.

I send you samples and prices. I think your friends of the Indigo Planters' Association may find it well worth their while to study this market for the placing of their lower grade stuff. Aniline dyes and synthetic indigo are contraband and their importation forbidden now.

Cotton, Raw.

I would invite the attention of the Chamber and of those interested in raw cotton, to the remarks made by Mr. MacLean in his Report, on pages 5 and 34. I note that he is of opinion that Persian cotton is not of sufficiently good quality for the Indian market, and that in the south of Persia it can hardly be grown at a remunerative rate for export.

I am rather doubtful as to the correctness of this statement, as there is no doubt about it that both at Sirjan and Rafsinjan cotton is and can be grown profitably.

From Sirjan and Rafsinjan cotton is exported both cleaned and uncleaned. The clean cotton is made up in bundles and packed in bags unpressed. The uncleaned cotton comes down in half pressed bales measuring 3′ 6″ × 2′ on the average, and weighing from 2 to 3 maunds (Delhi). The freightage on cleaned cotton from this port to Bombay is about Rs. 4 per bale, and on uncleaned Rs. 3. The cleaned cotton costs here about Rs. 27 per

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Delhi maund and the uncleaned cotton Rs. 18, making the average cost for each variety in Bombay Rs. 31 and Rs. 21, so I am informed, but I have no figures to check or to verify this statement.

I am sending you samples of the raw cotton I can obtain here, together with prices. Both specimens come from Rafsingjan.

Formerly there used to be a large export trade in cotton through this port from the interior, but this has of late years been diverted northward through the Caspian ports to Russia, where a strong demand had grown up. The comparatively greater ease and security of the northward route through Shahroad to the Caspian ports had also done much to assist in this diversion of trade. Lately, however, owing to the war and to internal depression, the Russian demand has fallen off, and if a strong Indian demand arises the southward trade to this port is certain to revive.

I certainly think it would be well worth the while of those interested in cotton in Cawnpore entering into correspondence with Messrs. Gray, Paul & Co. of Bunder Abbas, with a view of trying a few small shipments of Kirman, Sirjan and Rafsinjan cotton, especially as the demand for Indian cotton, which is already expensive, is certain to increase, whilst the Russian demand on the other hand will decrease still more than it has done.

Cotton, Manufactured.

Mr. Govind Ram, of Messrs. Assaram & Co., of Shikkarpur, has written to the Muir Mills for a range of their samples of twills and waterproof and other canvases as well as their celebrated brand of zoological khaki drills. He has also placed a small order for twills as an experiment.

I am sending you samples of the cotton materials and yarns chiefly in demand in these ports. These are marked with the prices at which they met with ready sale here.

Yarns.

There is a considerable market in yarns which chiefly come from Bombay, and most of the yarns I have seen have been spun at the Sassoon Mills, I send samples with prices.

Banking.

Trade is considerably hampered for want of banking and financing facilities. Some months ago a representative of the Imperial Bank of Persia visited Bunder Abbas with a view to opening a branch here, but nothing came of it. There is undoubtedly an opening for a branch of an Exchange Bank, but I presume that before such a Bank could be opened, the sanction of the Persian Government would have to be obtained. The Financial Department can doubtless give you full information on this point. The premises would have to be rented, as foreign subjects are not allowed to buy land or own property in Persia. The presence of the British Consul here would be a sufficient guarantee for safety and immunity from harassment.

Agencies.

I would strongly recommend to the consideration of the Members of the Chamber the desirability of utilising as agents the leading firms already represented in the Persian Gulf not only for the forwarding of goods but for the purchase of wool and cotton. The item of risk would be greatly reduced, they would have the services of men already known to all the traders who import or export goods, of men who understand the Persian language and are acquainted with the status and character of each and every trader.

The British India Steam Navigation Agents, Messrs. Mackinnon, Mackenzie & Co., are well known to all, and they have agencies at Maskat, Bunder Abbas, Bushire, Bussirah and Muhammera. The employment of this firm, and through them of their agents, would lead eventually to the development of considerable business, I am sure.

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EGYPTIAN SUGAR.

There is a point regarding the sugar trade which I would like to bring to your notice, and to the attention of Indian producers. Till very recently Egyptian sugar was unknown in Persia. It is now coming in quantity and meets with a good sale. This information came to hand since writing my note on sugar.

ENCLOSURES.

The Enclosure A will give you information on certain miscellaneous subjects. I also enclose two customs house forms, and a copy of my letter to the Indian Cess Committee for your perusal (under separate cover). We have experienced great difficulty in extracting satisfactory information from the Consulate, and the Customs, where the records are short and badly kept, and specially in getting anything out of the native merchants whether Persian or Hindu. All information has had to be sifted most carefully.

We leave on Sunday morning for Sirjan and reach Saidabad in three weeks, from there I will send you a second letter.

Subench Encl. Gross 55

ENCLOSURE A.

SUGAR.

Egyptian Loaf, price Rs. 12-8 per cwt., landed with duty paid at Bunder Abbas.
Marseilles Loaf, price Rs. 12-12 per cwt. ditto ditto.
German Loaf, price Rs. 12-6 per cwt. ditto ditto.
Austrian, No. 1 Crystals, price Rs. 9 to Rs. 12, landed with duty paid at Bunder Abbas.
Java, No. 2, price Rs. 8 to Rs. 11-4, landed with duty paid at Bunder Abbas.
Russian, No. 3, price Rs. 8 to Rs. 8-4, ditto ditto.

YARNS.

Turkey red, 26 Krans, per bundle of 10 lbs.
Blue, 20 Krans, ditto.
Indigo blue, 28 Krans, ditto.
White, 24 Krans, ditto.

WOOL.

"A" (Coorg), fine, f. o. b. Bombay, Rs. 28 per Delhi maund.
"B" (Pashm), coarse, f. o. b. Bombay, Rs. 19 per Delhi maund.

COTTON.

Uncleaned from Rafsinjan, Rs. 18 per Delhi maund at Bunder Abbas, and Rs. 21 per Delhi maund, f. o. b., at Bombay.
Clean from Rafsinjan, Rs. 27 per Delhi maund at Bunder Abbas, and Rs. 31 per Delhi maund, f. o. b., at Bombay.

COTTON GOODS.

No. 1, Manchester, Rs. 3-11 to Rs. 4-10, C. F. F., Bunder Abbas, per piece of 24 yards.
No. 2, Manchester, Rs. 3-12 to Rs. 4-10, ditto ditto.
No. 3, Manchester, Rs. 7 to Rs. 8-2, ditto per piece of 40 yards.
No. 4, Bombay Chudder, cost in Bombay 12 annas per piece of 4½ yards in length.
No. 5, Kashim hand-wooven Chudder, price at Bunder Abbas, Re. 1.
No. 6, Kashim ditto ditto 12 annas.
No. 7, Russian chitz, price 3 annas per yard at Bunder Abbas.
No. 8, Manchester chintz, price 3 annas per yard at Bunder Abbas.
No. 9, ditto ditto ditto.

INDIGO.

No. 1, Madras, price Rs. 140 per Indian maund.
No. 2, Kharipur, price Rs. 95 ditto.

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

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Dated Cawnpore, the 26th November 1904.

From—A. SHAKESPEAR, Esq., Acting Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce,
To—The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of the Chamber's letter of the 17th instant, I am directed to hand you copy of the letter addressed by Mr. A. Gleadowe Newcomen to the Indian Tea Cess Committee made reference to in his report, dated 1st November 1904, a copy of which accompanied my letter of the 17th idem.

Dated Bunder Abbas, the 4th November 1904.

From—A. GLEADOWE NEWCOMEN, Esq.,
To—The Secretary, Indian Tea Cess Committee, Calcutta.

I have the honour to report my arrival at Bunder Abbas and to submit the result of my enquiries in connection with the tea trade so far.

Tea is in universal demand throughout Persia and is probably drunk by fourth-fifths of the population, the remaining one-fifth drinking coffee, the price of which is on an average 8 annas per lb.

Imports of tea.—India, Batavia, China, and Ceylon teas are solely imported, the relative figures for the past half-year, as ascertained from the Customs House Books, are—

White Teas—China (Foochow)	. . . .	1,900	Batman.
Batavia (Java)	. . . . .	1,300	„
Black Teas—India	. . . . .	55,000	„
Batavia (Java)	. . . . .	5,039	
Ceylon	. . . . .	637	
China	. . . . .	612	

A batman is the same as the Tabriz maund, and is equal to 6·5 lbs. avardupois.

China teas are not in use in these parts, and there has been a great falling off in the trade. Formerly there used to be a large trade through Bombay, and direct, *viâ* this port, to Tehran, Askabad, Hamaden, Kazvin, Tabreez, Resht, and Bokhara, but the imposition of a heavy import duty on all teas imported through Persia was levied by Russia, and this drove the trade round by sea *viâ* Batoum through Russian territory. Then again the trade to Tehran, Hamaden, Kazvin, Tabreez, and Resht has been diverted *viâ* Bagdad by opening up steamer connection, and for these places it is much more convenient as the road is shorter and safer.

A few consignments of China white and green teas go to Lar, Karman, Meshed and Yezd, *viâ* this port.

Batavia teas are much in demand as they are cheaper than China white tea and give a nice pale flavouring liquor in cup, with little or no body and even when infused for a long time, do not develop that rough bitter taste that Indian teas do. The white tea is a very fine silver tipped flowery Pekoe. Lamsar is in three qualities, 1, 2 and 3, and, as its name implies, is a mixed tea, partly white tea and partly black somewhat like an orange Pekoe, but as a rule more flowery.

Indian and Ceylon teas are too well known to you to need any remarks.

China teas shown under the heading of black teas are ordinary green tea; but there is now next to no trade in this, although formerly some 50,000 chests per annum passed through this port *viâ* the Turkoman country to Bokhara, Askabad, Samarkand, and Tashkand.

Packing.—A few remarks as to how some of the competing teas are packed for the Persian market may be of interest.

White tea or appar is generally packed in wooden chests, containing 50 to 60 lbs., but sometimes in small wooden boxes, containing 10 lbs. each; the former are sewn up in matting and the latter are packed together in lots of 4 to 8 boxes and then sewn up in matting. The value of white tea at port is from Rs. 1-0-0 to Rs. 1-8-0 per lb.

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

Batavia teas are packed in boxes of 10 to 5 lbs. each, lined with lead. These are again made into packages of 4 to 8 sewn in matting. No. 3 Lamsar, however, is packed in 1 lb. tins and 40 of these are put into a wooden case and then sewn up in matting. The value of these teas at Bunder Abbas ranges from 15 annas to Rs. 1-3-0 per tin, sometimes No. 3 Lamsar is packed in 10 lbs. wooden boxes, and is sold at 11 annas to 13 annas per lb. at Bunder Abbas.

Customs duties.—These are charged on actual weight of tea in all cases except Lamsar, and these are weighed together with their lead covering, except Lamsar No. 3, which is in 1 lb. tin, where tin and all is weighed for purposes of duty. There are two rates of duty 10 krans per Tabreez maund on yellow (white) teas and a differentiated duty on Lamsars, *i.e.*, the proportion of white tea is refracted from a small quantity of black and the proportion of white tea to the whole is taken at 10 krans, the balance of black tea being taken at 6 krans per Tabreez maund. The proportion of the weight of lead covering is taken at the same ratio. Lamsars No. 3, when packed in 10 lbs. boxes is taxed on weight of lead and tea only, not on gross weight of package, hence sells cheaper. Indian, Ceylon, China, green, and Batavia black teas are all classed under one heading. "Black teas," for purposes of levying duty, which is charged in all clasess (except those coming under the note below tea classification on page 39 of Customs Tariff) on the net weight of the tea, so that they have this advantage over Batavia Lamsars.

Samples.—I am getting what samples of teas I can procure and putting prices at which they are sold, but I am afraid I shall not succeed in getting a very wide range, but I am doing my best. A list will be shown as enclosure "B."

Indian teas.—The chief demand is for fairly good looking leafy teas with light liquor and flavoury as the Persian palate has got so accustomed to this class of tea that it does not appreciate any tea with lots of body, dust or broken teas are not saleable by themselves. A leafy tea ranging from 4 to 5 annas per lb. in Calcutta will find a ready sale, but if by judicious mixing the price could be reduced a bit, all the better, as the people are very poor and I fear under the present system of Government are not likely to grow richer. Indian teas are sent into the interior almost entirely, the traders in Bunder Abbas acting chiefly as agents for the buyers intend at Kerman, Lar, Meshed, and Yezd, which are the principal distributing centres in this part of Persia. Faiz Muhammad at Meshed imports his own tea *viâ* Quetta and Seistan, though he used to get it through Bunder Abbas. It might be worth while to find out that class of tea he imports and sells, and the sale of these cannot be introduced on this side. Khan Bahadur Ashgar Ali met Mr. Foley and took various samples of tea, which he distributed at several places in his political agencies and also in Kerman. Nothing came of it, the universal complaint being that the teas were too sharp in liquor and bitter. Cannot this be got over by judicious mixing as is done by traders here and in Bombay, who mix Indian and Batavian teas and get a sale?

Trade.—The tea trade *viâ* Bunder Abbas has been greatly reduced of late years through many causes, the chief of which I will endeavour to explain:—

(1) The heavy Russian duties on teas imported to Bokhara, etc., through Persia drove this trade round *viâ* Batoum.

(2) Opening and improving of communications between Bagdad Tehran, etc., bringing these places into closer proximity to a port, and better roads as well as shorter and safer road journey.

(3) Land carriage, owing to the mountaneous nature of the interland between Bunder Abbas and trading centres being so slow, expensive and unsafe, forced traders to seek other routes.

(4) Customs regulations and treatment of merchandise coming through Russian territories being under more favourable conditions than at ports and posts under the management of the Belgic-Russo combination.

(5) The presence of Banks or branches at Batoum and Askabad who advance money on bills of lading and clear goods through customs also give every facility to traders such as advancing

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money against consignments, enabling consignees to clear their goods and sell in small lots, *i.e*, if a man had 1,000 cases and had not the money to clear the lot, the Bank would do it and let him clear say 200 cases, and when they were sold take more.

(6) The imposition of the present tariff (which demands cash payments and allows no credit) bears unduly heavily on low priced teas, those for which the poorer classes had a demand. It will be seen that although Indian teas classed under "the most favoured nation" clause, to be put on the same basis as Russia, still the incidence of taxation on teas costing 4 annas per lb. comes to about 100 per cent. The consequence is that where a poor man could afford to use a pound of tea, he can now use only ½ lb. at the same cost. This must react on the trade and the question before you now is whether or not you can get round this by shipping a cheaper tea, of a mixed nature, which would suit the pockets of the people. The effect of the tariff with its accompaniment of vexatious delays black-mailing and other evils (that must exist under the system in which the customs are run here) was not apparent at first, as buyers bought largely prior to the introduction of the tariff and were holding large stocks, which are only now being exhausted. It remains to be seen how many traders will follow the example of Hajji Amin Gillendhari and refuse to trade at any price.

(7) Then again petty traders are finding that owing to the increase in customs duties and the enforcement of cash payments for dues coupled with all sorts of charges, they require more than double their capital to carry on with. This they cannot afford, especially as it has to be coupled with the long credit system demanded by their customers, cash payments cannot be avoided as goods have to be removed within a limited period.

(8) The want of a telegraph station and the slow as well as uncertain postal system are also a great drawback to the development of trade which is also hindered by the absence of roads and insecurity from robbery *en route*.

The manner in which the tea trade is carried out generally and financed between the buyers in Persia and the sellers in India is a perfectly straightforward one. Buyers purchase in India through agents in Calcutta or Bombay, who either pay cash by Hundi or against documents. The goods are then shipped to Bunder Abbas cleared and forwarded by their agents here to the distributing centres, where the head-quarters of the buyers are. The entire risk of carriage by caravan and loss is taken by the buyers and does not affect the transaction between agents and sellers in India.

I have shown the traders, agents, etc., in Bundar Abbas the list of European and other firms interested in the Persian tea trade and hung a copy up in Messrs. Gray, Paul & Co.'s office for their ready reference. I enclose (enclosure A) a list of traders interested in the tea trade at Bunder Abbas and trust it may be of use to your Committee and the tea trade. The Indian traders are buyers and sellers as well as agents. The others except Golam Ali Khorasani, the agent of Arbab Jamshied Bahman of Tehran, are forwarding agents. Golam Ali represents one of the biggest merchants in Persia, who has branches in every city of importance throughout the country.

Means of transit.—Camels are used for the transport of tea inland entirely and are more unsatisfactory, their load is about 360 lbs. and the cost of carriage between this and Kerman, for instance, varies from 8 to 20 tomans per 650 lbs. according to season. The distance is 300 miles by caravan route and takes from 20 to 30 days, if all goes well.

Communications.—These are of the crudest. There are no roads in Southern Persia, nor is any wheeled traffic possible. Waterways there are none in this part of Persia, nor can I ascertain that there is any chance of making artificial water connection.

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

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Development of trade.—Until there are roads fit for wheeled traffic to the interior, or railways, things are not likely to improve much, as the bandit and nature will still remain kings of the way and enemies of trade. That there are openings for the development of the tea trade there can be no doubt, of as this is a country of tea drinkers, but you will have to supply tea suited to their palates and the price of which is within the reach Agencies could be easily opened at Bunder Abbas, Bushire, and Buserah, where there are European firms who could push Indian tea if it was made worth their while. The want of a wider system of telegraphic communication Banks at trade centres and ports roads, railways, and the existence of an imperfect postal system, coupled with the want of security in transit are all serious obstacles to trade, and it is hard to see how much headway can be made in land until these are removed to some extent.

We want better consular arrangements at Bunder Abbas, an inexperienced Vice-Consul, with virtually no powers, is not the man to cope with the Russo-Belgic customs combination or to uphold the dignity and prestige of our trade.

The Belgic rides rampant in Bunder Abbas and the poor little Goanese clerk who is in charge of our Vice-Consulate is of as much use as a dead plea. We need a man with greater powers than our rivals, and with greater experience is what is required, not a young officer who knows nothing and has no power. The man here should be in a position to deal direct with the Foreign Department in India and the President at Tehran.

Remember Bunder Abbas is the mouth of the Southern Persia and if the latter is to be developed we must not allow the mouth to be closed. Bunder Abbas wants making and it can be made, but never will be by the Persian Government, as the Belgic-Russo interests are not in this direction. India must do the needful.

A perusal of Mr. MacLean's report on the tea trade will be most interesting to members of the Tea Cess Committee, but most of his remarks do not apply to that portion of Persia over which the Mission will travel. I am afraid I connot agree with Mr. MacLean in his optimistic views or rather those of Persian traders on page 30. It seems to me that unless the material prosperity of the country is greatly improved, increased consumption cannot be expected, or even the *status quo* upheld, with the price on an article doubled, before people can afford to consume the same amount of an article at double its former price, they must have a balance at their disposal and not be living from hand to mouth. Mr. MacLean's remarks on the relative consumption of China and Batavian teas do not apply to this part of Persia. The relative proportion might roughly be taken as China 1 anna, Batavia 3 annas, India 12 annas; these refer to consumption in these ports, not to importation *viâ* Bunder Abbas.

The steamer from Bombay has just arrived and I note that she has brought a consignment of tea, consisting of 276 chests, shipped by S. S. *Wardha* from Calcutta. Most of the tea is Pekoe No. 1, Pekoe No. 2, and Pekoe Souchang from Cachar gardens, prices ranging from 4 annas to 5 annas or a little over.

Messrs. Finlay Muir are the shippers on behalf of Messrs. McMeekin of London and the goods are consigned to Messrs. Zeigler & Co., Teheran, *viâ* Bunder Abbas and Yezd.

I presume they have not gone *viâ* Bagdad as Zeiglers have no agent on that route, but it would be interesting to find out from Messrs. Finlay Muir.

I am informed that this is the first lot of tea consigned to Zeigler & Co. This is a hopeful sign, as it simplifies the problem of development if goods can be profitably shipped on consignment to reliable firms. Messrs. Finlay Muir may be able to give some valuable information.

We leave Bunder Abbas on Sunday the 6th for Sirjan which we hope to reach in there weeks' time.

The health of the Mission is good.

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ENCLOSURE A.

Names of Indian Tea Traders, Bunder Abbas.

Lillaram Bhawanidas.
Lillaram Madowdas.
Mohindas Midraj.
Hokmatrai Mohindas.
Assanand Sobraj.
Tharoomall Ramdass.
Tharoomall Ghirdaridas.

Persian Traders.

Golam Ali Khorasani, agent for Jamshied Bahman, acts as forwarding agent and buys tea on his own account direct from Batavia and Calcutta.

Haji Amin Gellandhari.

Haji Sheikh Ahmed Gellandhari.

Bahman and Kai Khosru, Agents for Zeigler & Co. and Ardeshir Mirwan of Bombay.

Telegram No. 4082-E. A., dated the 6th December 1904.

From—Foreign, Calcutta,

To—Resident, Bushire.

Upper India Chamber of Commerce write that after enquiry in Bombay and on arrival in Persia, Newcomen proposes that Mission instead of following previously proposed intinerary through scantily populated country from Bampur *viâ* Magas and Kuhak to Gwadur should visit Yezd and return thence either (1) *viâ* Shiraz and Bushire or (2) *viâ* Narmeshir or Bampur through Rudbar district to Jask. They request issue of telegraphic orders to Newcomen, care of Consul at Kerman. We see no objection provided firstly that it is borne in mind that primary object of tour is to explore commercially South-East Persia. Visit to Yezd would be useful, but visit to Shiraz or Bushire seems inconsistent with this object. Secondly change of route involves no serious difficulty to Government of India in affording the same facilities for protection and transport. Thirdly, Persian Government consent and furnish similar escort throughout. Please give your opinion after consulting Sykes.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 2673 F. D.—8-12-1904.—61.—L. G. G.

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

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

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Telegram, dated the 1st January 1905.

From—The Political Resident, Persian Gulf,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Your telegram of 7th December, regarding itinerary of Commercial Mission. On being asked for his views, Sykes replied that, in view of present prevalence cholera at Kerman, he and Newcomen both recommended that Mission should now visit Khabis, Bam, and Jiruft, and then return to Kerman to complete enquiries there. From thence Mission desired to proceed Yezd, and return home *via* Shiraz and Bushire, where Newcomen desires to discuss important Bunder Abbas questions with me. In reply to the above, I asked Sykes if some route, less familiar than Shiraz-Bushire road, would not be more profitable for return journey. He replies to-day as follows:—*Begins.* I advocate Shiraz route, because President desires to compare trade conditions and communications with those depending on Bunder Abbas; he has also induced merchants at each centre to open up relations with Indian firms, thus producing actual results, while country in itinerary recommended includes practically every important trade centre in South-East Persia; and after hearing President's reasons, I fully recommend it. *Ends.* Under these circumstances, I hope Government of India will acquiesce. There is not likely to be difficulty with Persian Government or in other ways; and on receipt of your reply, I will commuicate with Mission and Sykes as regards details.

Telegram, dated the 5th January 1905.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Gleadowe Newcomen, President, Commercial Mission to Persia, Kerman,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Solicit sanction Major Sykes accompanying Mission, Yezd.

Telegram, No. 154 E.-A., dated the 12th January 1905.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have repeated your telegram of the 1st January 1905 to Sir A. Hardinge with the following addition:—*Begins.* The Government of India * * * Major Cox. *Ends.* Mr. Newcomen asks that Major Sykes may accompany the Mission to Yezd. We have no objection. If you see none and Sir A. Hardinge agrees, please settle and reply to Mr. Newcomen on behalf of the Government of India.

Telegram, No. 155 E.-A., dated the 12th January 1905.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,
To—His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

I have received the following telegram from Major Cox:—*Begins.* Your telegram * * * * details. *Ends.* The Government of India have no objection to the proposed change, provided you see none and can arrange with the Persian Government. When the matter is settled, please communicate with Major Cox.

Telegram, No. 8, dated the 14th January 1905.

From—His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Please refer to your telegram, dated the 12th January 1905. I have no objection. At the request of Major Sykes, application for escorts, *via* Yezd and Shiraz, has already been made by me to the Persian Government.

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

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Foreo. 63

Telegram, dated the 19th January 1905.

From—His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Kerman, Bam,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

President, Mission, much pleased with result visit Bam, which we leave 21st for Narmashir and Jiruft. Until return Kerman in about one month, no communication possible except by weekly messenger.

Foreign Office Press—No. 909—4-2-05—61.

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

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Telegram, dated the 9th (received10th) December 1904.

From—Captain A. P. Trevor, Assistant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department.

I have received following from Sykes:—*Begins*, "Gray Paul's Agent Bunder Abbas advanced Mission thousand *tomans* new coin on my personal security, can you arrange to repay this direct? I have also advanced another thousand and shall have to disburse much more. Kindly instruct me how to recover. Mission reached Sirjan 25th, where I joined it, and is due Rafsinjan about 6th December." *Ends*. May I repay these advances and subsequent advances, and debit amounts in the accounts of this treasury to be adjusted in India on return of Mission.

Telegram, dated the 9th (received 10th) December 1904.

From—Major P. M. Sykes, C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Mission arrived Sirjan safely 25th November. Repeated Tehran.

Telegram No. 4166-E. A., dated and received the 12th December 1904.

From—Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,

To—Resident, Bushire.

Your telegram 9th. Commercial Mission. Rs. 11,000 placed at disposal of Sykes for expenses. Advances should be met therefrom.

No. 4193-E.A., dated Fort William, the 14th December 1904.

From—The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—W. Shakespear, Esq., Acting Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters, dated the 17th and 26th November 1904, forwarding, respectively, Mr. Newcomen's first report, dated the 1st November and his letter of the 4th November 1904.

2. A telegraphic reference has been made to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf regarding Mr. Newcomen's proposed change of route. A further communication will be made to you on the receipt of his reply.

3. I am to point out, with reference to Mr. Newcomen's remarks as to the arrangement for his return passage, that he appears to be under a misapprehension. The estimate of Rs. 5,867-9-0 received with your letter of the 8th October includes return fares from Bunder Abbas. Should any alteration be made in the route, this point can be adjusted subsequently. You were informed in my letter No. 4055-E. A., dated the 3rd December 1904, that the Treasury Officer, Cawnpore, had been authorized to advance to you the whole amount of the estimate. In my letter No. 4056-E. A. of the same date, the Consul at Kerman was authorized to incur further expenditure up to Rs. 11,000, being the amount of that officer's estimate on account of the travelling expenses of the Mission after its arrival in Persia.

Telegram dated the 17th (received 19th) December 1904.

From—Mr. A. Gleadowe Newcomen, President of the Commercial Mission to Persia, Kerman,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Mission arrived Kerman. Tender grateful thanks Sykes arrangements.

4521 F D

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

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No. 4311-E. A., dated the 22nd December 1904.

Endorsed by the Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing correspondence is forwarded to the Department of the Finance and Commerce, for information, in continuation of Foreign Department endorsement No. 4057-E. A., dated the 3rd December 1904:—

List of papers forwarded.

(1) Letter from the acting Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 17th November 1904 (with enclosure).

(2) Letter from the acting Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 26th November 1904 (with enclosure).

(3) Telegram to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 4082-E. A., dated the 6th December 1904.

(4) Telegram from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 9th December 1904.

(5) Telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman, dated the 9th December 1904.

(6) Telegram to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 4166-E. A., dated the 12th December 1904.

(7) Letter to the acting Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, No. 4193-E. A., dated the 14th December 1904.

(8) Telegram from the President of the Commercial Mission to Persia, dated the 17th December 1904.

No. B. K.-285, dated the 19th (received 20th) December 1904.

From—M. H. Oung, Esq., Comptroller, India Treasuries,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to invite a reference to Foreign Department letter No. 4055-E. A., dated 3rd December 1904, to the Secretary to the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, received under Financial Department endorsement No. 7712-S. R., dated 8th December 1904, and to request that I may be furnished with an estimate in the usual form of the expenditure expected to be incurred in the current and ensuing financial years in connection with the Commercial Mission to Persia.

The estimate is required for inclusion in the General Estimates of the Government of India now under compilation in this office.

Telegram dated the 29th (received 30th) December 1904.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Your telegram of 13th. Funds for Commercial Mission. Sykes asks me to remit Rs. 11,000 to his bankers at Bombay to enable him to meet expenditure. Please wire authority to comply.

Telegram No. 103-E. A., dated and received the 7th January 1905.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,

To—The Political Resident, Bushire.

Your telegram of 29th December. Proposal to remit funds Sykes' bankers, Bombay, sanctioned. Amount will be credited direct from here on your informing us name of the firm.

Telegram, dated the 11th (received 12th) January 1905.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Your telegram of 7th instant, Sykes' bankers King, King & Co.

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

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3

Telegram No. 290-A., dated the 14th January 1905.

From—The Finance Secretary, Calcutta,
To—The Accountant General, Bombay.

Please pay Rs. 11,000 to King, King & Co. to credit of account Major Sykes, Consul, Kerman. Debit Comptroller, India Treasuries.

No. 291-A.

Copy forwarded to the Foreign Department for information. Copy also forwarded to the Comptroller, India Treasuries.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 4521 F. D.—9-2-1905—61—N. N. B.

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

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

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(Rec. 30th)

Dated Cawnpore, the 25th January 1905.

From—A. SHAKESPEAR, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Upper India Chamber of Commerce,

To—The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Commercial Mission to Persia.

I am directed to hand you copy of the second report, dated 29th November 1904, received from Mr. A. G. Newcomen, and copies of letters, dated 30th November and 2nd December 1904, in connection therewith.

Dated Camp Saiidabad, the 29th November 1904.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL A. GLEADOWE NEWCOMEN, President, Commercial Mission,

To—A. SHAKESPEAR, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Upper India Chamber of Commerce.

I beg to report our arrival at Saiidabad, the capital of Sirjan, one of the 18 divisions of the province of Kerman.

We arrived here on the evening of the 25th, having been delayed five days on the road by having to stop to collect supplies, when our route lay for days across uninhabited wastes, and also by sickness, fever for the most part, amongst the Mission staff, escort, and camp-followers, and lameness amongst the horses, due to the abominable tracks along which we had to come. I regret to state that Mr. Ryan has been down with fever. This sickness, caused by the bad climate and water at the foot of the hills, as well as by the extreme changes of temperature that occur between day and night, will, I hope, cease now that we have reached the higher altitude of the table land.

We have received every assistance possible from the Persian officials on our way up, and have had a safe journey.

On the 25th we were met near Kala-i-Sang, the ancient but now abandoned capital of the province, situated about 8 or 9 miles from here, by Sartip Mirza Riza Khan, who has come down from Tehran to meet us. As we neared Saiidabad, we were met on the road by the Governor's *istikbal*, and conducted to our camp in great pomp by a troop of mounted servants with led horses, and attended by an escort of over 200 armed men. It was bitterly cold, with driving sleet, and the slow pace at which we were forced to move did not add to our comfort, however much the escort may have added to our importance.

On the 27th Major Skyes, His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Kerman, came into Saiidabad, and we went to meet him three miles out, with an escort. The same evening the Governor of Sirjan, with other officials, paid us a visit of ceremony, which visit we returned yesterday evening.

Yesterday attempts were made to get information regarding the commerce and manufactures of Sirjan. Our efforts, so far as the Kalantes or Mayor was concerned, were rather futile, that official evidently looking upon some of the questions with suspicion. Khan Bahadur Ashgar Ali, however, to whom a copy of the questions had been given to put into Persian, induced the Governor to give directions for the collection of the necessary information, and this afternoon, fate and the Ramazan permitting, we hope to interview the leading local traders and collect some useful information.

We move on in a couple of days to Paris and Rafsinjan, whence we will proceed to Kerman.

The weather is extremely cold, but has brightened again, and no more snow is expected for some time.

The cholera at Kerman has abated, and the Persian officials and the Russian Consul, who bolted, are now returning.

Route.—Enclosed you will find (enclosure A) our itinerary from Bunder Abbas, whence I last wrote you. For the first four stages out from Bunder

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Abbas, the road is, at present, unpassable for wheeled traffic, but a road could be made without much difficulty. From the Dahana-i-Tang-i-Zindan, the mouth of the pass, till the table land is reached, half way between Sir-i-Sikh and Aihemedi, a matter of some 40 miles, there is absolutely no road, the way lying along the beds of torrents full of tumbled boulders and over a very steepness. The Tang itself is a very dangerous spot in rainy weather. Floods come down with fearful force and suddenness and kafilas are frequently caught and destroyed in what has been well named the Narrow Prison. Once the table land is reached, one could almost drive a motor car for over a thousand miles, whilst the Indian bullock cart would find working over the whole of the upland country an easy matter. Between Aihemedi and Saiidabad there is only one difficult pass, the Tang-i-Deh-Sheikh. This pass could, however, be avoided by going round through the open valley, whilst the building of an embankment would protect this road against floods where it crosses the swamp.

Had we had an Engineer with us, we would have been able to furnish much more valuable information regarding routes and the possibility of road buildings than we now can. We have felt the want of such an officer seriously.

No work has been possible yesterday or to-day, as, owing to festival, all shops are closed.

(*Enclosure A*).

Bunder Abbas to Baghu.—14 miles, sandy track, date grove, and a few huts at Baghu. Water plentiful, but salt; supplies available in fair quantity.

Baghu to Ziarat.—22 miles, track over boulder strewn slopes and river-beds; small village and a tomb. Water plentiful but very salt. Good water available from well 6 miles away. Date groves and some cultivaiton. Supplies good at Ziarat.

Ziarat to Kushku.—14 miles. Here supplies are taken by caravans for the three days' tracks through the uninhabited region lying between Kushku and Aihemedi road over stone strewn slopes. Cultivation more extensive. Many date groves. Water still bad.

Kushku to Dahana-i-Tang.—15 miles. Road getting worse, lying first east along the slopes of the foot hills, then turning north and west up the river-bed. Water in river salt. One small spring of fairish water at the camping place. No supplies.

Dahana to Sir-i-Sikh.—24 miles. Along the main ravine west and north-west for 10 miles, then turning north up a narrower tang, difficult for mules and horses, impossible for guns, and over the crest of the pass, 3,800 feet, the last part of the road lying along a ledge till it gains and then crosses the brow. At camping place water scanty and bad; no supplies.

Sir-i-Sikh to Aihemedi.—25 miles. The track drops down the ravine from the watershed till it again enters the Tang-i-Zindan, going west by north for six miles, then corkscrews up north till the table land is gained at an elevation of 3,000 feet. Road to Aihemedi and onward mere track, but lying over fairly level and fairly clear land. A few bad places where river-beds and ravine heads are crossed. The passes mostly low and easy. At Aihemedi water of a slightly brackish quality and supplies plentiful. Extensive date plantations, vegetable, and flowers also raised. Good sheep, fowls, and eggs.

Aihemedi to Nisa.—25 miles. Road still fair, leading generally north-west through an easy and wide pass. Lardh-i-Aihemedi, or "the open place of Aihemedi", over a watershed, 3,900 feet high in the middle of a very wide plain ringed by hills, whence four considerable ravine systems—one running south-east, one east, one north and one west—have their rise to Nisa. This place is only approximately marked on the map, and the road from Aihemedi to Sultanabad, near Dasht-i-Bar, has not been properly surveyed. Mr. Ryan made a route sketch and measured the road, and from this the track, as marked on the map, will be corrected. At Nisa the water is not good, though plentiful. Supplies scanty. A fort and a village of 10 houses, with a small date grove and many acres of camel thorn. Elevation 3,300 feet.

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Nisa Dehsheikh.—26 miles. Fairish track, winding over table land, where many ravines have their beginning. General water bad, north-west and north-east. The Tang-i-Dehsheikh is a little more than half-way between Nisa and Dehsheikh. A narrow corkscrew pass, some 4 miles long, amidst crumbling hills of argillaceous state and mart. The dangerous and difficult pass, a favourite haunt of bandits, can, however, be avoided by going round by the open river valley. A swamp makes this road unpassable in wet weather, but the building of a not very extensive embankment would enable a really good road to be made at small cost. A fort and a village of 20 houses at Dehsheikh, with scanty date groves. Fair water to be had at a spring near a Ziarat, 1½ miles from the village. No supplies.

Dehsheikh to Dasht-i-Bar.—21 miles. The road climbs easily into the plain of Urzu, 3,700 feet, and villages and plantations become more numerous. The plain is scored with lines of Kanats and a plentiful supply of slightly brackish water is to be had everywhere in the plain. Sultanabad is 11½ miles from Dehsheikh, and Dasht-i-Bar 9½ miles west from Sultanabad road; track over level. Supplies plentiful. Here extra supplies are taken for the march through the wilderness to Saiidabad, the water-supply regulating the marches.

Dasht-i-Bar to Shakr-Ab (Lat-i-Kanat).—10 miles. No supplies. Water plentiful.

Shakr-Ab to Mubarik Hussein.—22 miles. Fair road; N. N. W. over shoulder of long slope. Camp in river-bed near well. Water very scanty and bad. No supplies. Fair grazing for camels.

Mubarik Hussein to Nankand.—24 miles. Road fair; pass of Chashm-i-Suffeid easy (crest 5,800 feet). This pass lying between districts, is a favourite haunt for bandits. Dropped into the great central valley running 500 miles N. W. & S. E. at an elevation of 5,300 feet away to Isfahan. In this valley lies the great *Kavir* or salt marsh and quicksand, 300 miles long, 30 miles broad. Rest of the valley fairly futile. Climate splendid. Going level and good. Water generally plentiful and fairly sweet. At Nankand, however, the water is very brackish. Akabad 24 miles, Akabad to Saiidabad

Nankand to Saiidabad.—Sixteen miles good road. Saiidabad consists of some 600 houses and a bazar of some 180 shops. It is a large-walled village. Supplies plentiful; water fair, got from the Kanat. It is a large-walled village, with about 9,000 inhabitants, including suburbs.

Encl 2, Para 75

Dated Camp Saiidabad, the 30th November 1904.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel A. Gleadowe Newcomen, President of the Commercial Mission, Persia,

To—A. Shakespear, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Upper India Chember of Commerce, Cawnpore.

I wish to make certain addenda and corrigenda to my official letter to the Chamber of Commerce, No. 1, dated 1st November.

Official letter:—

Paragraph 5.—For "town of Buskard", read "District of Bashakird".

Paragraph 8.—Major Sykes has now very kindly arranged for the necessary presents being sent through the President, Bushire, to those officials in the Bunder Abbas district who rendered us official help or showed us courtesy.

With regard to the same class of people in the Kerman district, he is sending presents to them direct, with the exception of three, to whom I have given presents myself.

Major Sykes looks upon the Mission not only from a commercial point of view, but also from a political one, constituted as we are; and considering the work which we are called upon to do, I agree with him that it is impossible to look upon the Mission from any other stand point.

Paragraph 9.—Khan Bahadur Ashgar Ali has greatly improved on acquaintance; and after a little waking up, I have found him very useful, while the mere fact of his feeding with us has been of great importance to the interests of the Mission. Consequently, I consider that any money that may

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have been, or that will be, spent on his entertainment as a good investment on our behalf.

Paragraph 19.—Synthetic Indigo. On further enquiry I find that, for some extraordinary reason or other, Synthetic Indigo is not excluded in the prohibition applied to aneline dyes, which strikes me as looking somewhat like a job worked by our German friends, and I think it would be well worth while for the Indigo Planters' Association, or the Chamber of Commerce, taking the matter up with the Legation at Tehran, confidentially, and have the dye brought under the prohibition.

Encl. 3, Enc. 75–

Dated Camp Saiidabad, the 2nd December 1904.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel A. Gleadowe Newcomen, President, of the Commercial Mission, Persia,

To—A. Shakespear, Esq., Secretary to the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore.

In continuation of my letter of the 29th, I have the honour to inform you that, owing to stormy weather, we have been detained here three days longer than we intended. We hope, though the weather looks threatening still, to move to-morrow morning on the road to Pariz, which we reach the day after.

I have been employing our time in interviewing the merchants, showing them samples, and generally trying to get them interested on the subject of trade with India. I have also secured specimens of the goods mostly in demand here, and am sending them to you duly marked with the cost prices at Saiidabad. I have also included specimens of almonds, pistachios, gum tragacanth, as it is possible that some of the Indian merchants in Cawnpore may see a field for the opening up of a trade in these articles.

The prospects of trade in Saiidabad would doubtless improve if Government could be persuaded to place a Consular Agent here—a move which, I hear, is contemplated.

The principal merchant here, Mir Rais-ul-Tajar, Aga Gulam Abbas, sending a small trial order to the Muir and Woollen Mills, Cawnpore, and I trust this may be the prelude to a considerable trade in the future.

Before entering into details of trade, there are a few hints I would give to those firms who intend to try and push trade in Persia, and a few remarks I would make on some special points.

A telegraph code.—It would be well if firms trading with Persia were to create a telegraphic code word, with its English translation, and then the sentence which this code word is intended to represent in Persian and English. The adoption of such a code would enable merchants to use either the Persian, or the English (Indo-Persian) Telegraph system, as the case might be, and would, I am sure, facilitate business considerably.

The telegraph systems.—A considerable drawback to trading facilities in this country is the dual system of telegraphs. There is the Persian system, on which messages are transmitted in the vernacular, and it is rare, indeed, to meet a signaller of the Persian telegraphs who understands anything but his own language.

Goods and samples.—Firms trading with Persia ought to take care to have all samples marked clearly with the price in Persian, and their distinctive names, quality, width, length, &c., also marked clearly in that language. Prices may be shown in rupees.

It would be advisable to have all goods marked, or labelled with the Shah's head, with his name and titles in Persian, or with the national emblem, the lion and the rising sun. The lion armed with a saunter, marchant, regardant, the sun behind him. This is now being done by German and Russian firms, and by the Bombay Parsees. I hope to send you a specimen label or two, later.

Customs.—It has come to my notice that the rules and regulations as to the Customs duties are as follows. Decisions regarding charges on items not mentioned specifically in the tariff and other special instructions issued from Tehran or Bushire from time to time are not thereafter posted up for public

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

information outside the Customs House at Bunder Abbas, nor ciculated to merchants, with the consequence that traders do not no where they are.

Also as regards Customs duties, &c., at present the regulations, &c., are in French, no Persian or English translations being generally or easily available, and it certainly seems necessary that traders should be given copies in both these languages whenever they want them.

Dakaiti.—Highway robbery at present very common in Persia; would be very generally curtailed, if not put a stop to, I think, were there more small telegraph offices all through the country, or, at all events, at the head-quarters of all Governors. This would enable head-quarters to be quickly advised of any crime which took place. This now taken weeks to do; and with the increase in the length of time lost, the chance of capturing the criminals decreases. A proper system of patrolling the roads, worked through the *Kalanters* or Mayors of sub-divisions, would also greatly assist in suppressing dakaiti, together with the proper fixing of responsibility on Governors. At present the great game seems to be for each Governor to deny that the dakaiti took place in his district, and try and shift the responsibility on to his neighbour. The consequence is that, while the authorities delay and dispute, so much time elapses that the chances are all in favour of the robber.

If any special cess were necessary for road insurance, the small amount might be included in the Customs or made a terminal charge at the port, and would, I expect, not be objected to by merchants.

One means of obviating dakaiti would be the establishment of a Government transport train, worked under British supervision. British subjects are, as a rule, left alone by dakaits. This is in a great measure due to the energy of Major Sykes. Whenever a case occurs, such a thorough investigation is made and the culprits brought to book, or the Governor made responsible, that it has become distinctly a game that does not pay.

Another method which presents itself to me is that whenever goods from India are being despatched up-country from parts, that the Consular officials at those parts should advise the Consular officials in the districts of destination, and through which they are to pass, and these officers would then arrange for the necessary precautions being taken.

I now proceed to analyse the trade of Sirjan.

Cotton.—Sirjan district produces some 2,000 maunds (Indian) a year. All this is consumed locally, either in the manufacture of a coarse, thin cloth, of which about 100,000 zar are used a year, or for the woof for carpets. There are no prospects of increasing the cultivation of cotton, as the water-supply is limited and food-crops have to be raised. The staple, too, is short, too short, I think, for use in our Indian mills. I send you specimens however.

Wool.—The entire produce of the district, which is very small, is used in manufacture of carpets, and there is none available for export.

Leather.—There is no trade in this commodity, nor in hides. What few hides are available are tanned locally and used by the *Khans*. The tanning is done with the bark of the wild almond and the leaves of the wild pistachio tree. The leather produced is of a very pale almond colour and inferior in quality. It seems to meet the local requirements however. The shoes worn here are made, both uppers and soles, of cotton.

Fabrics, cotton.—Cotton materials are in universal use. Of the stuffs commonly used, samples have been sent you in the natural undyed state, with prices (cost) attached. The dye most in use is indigo, of a poor quality.

Fabrics, woollen.—As far as I have been able to observe or ascertain through the researches of my staff, hardly anybody seems to wear woollen clothes. The blankets, such as they are, are locally woven out of camels' hair.

Sugar.—There is a very considerable demand for an import trade in this, especially Marseilles loaf and of crystal sugar from Mauritius and Russia.

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This latter, however, is in great disrepute, as its sweetening properties are small compared with other sugars. If India could supply a suitable article at a low price, a good trade might be done by bartering sugar for almonds, pistachios, gum, and carpets.

I have sent you no samples, as those I sent from Bunder Abbas are identical with the goods in use here.

Tea.—Indian tea seems hardly to be known here. Some 6,000lb per annum of tea are used, entirely Java. A report on this subject has been sent to the Indian Tea Cess Committee, of which I enclose a copy (to be sent later).

Enclosures.—"A" will give you some important figures, and enable you to form an idea of the trade of this place. Figures are only approximate and are not reliable, as there are no official records to go by.

"B" gives you the names of the leading merchants.

I have the pleasure of reporting a clean bill-of-health amongst the staff, escort, and transport.

Wishing you the complements of the season.

Enclosure "A".

Imports (approximately), Saiidabad, mostly from Bombay *via* Bunder Abbas.

Recently, however, increasing quantities of merchandise have been coming down from the North (Russia) *via* Tehran and Yezd.

Sugar.—Crystals, No. 1 and 2, at 4 Krs. and 3¾ Krs. per Batman (6·5lb). Annual consumption stated to be about 50,000 Batmans. Marseilles loaf, 4 to 5 Krs. per Batman. Annual consumption also put at 50,000 Batmans.

Tea.—Lamsars, Nos. 2 and 3, at 50 Krs. and 40 Krs. per box of 10lb. Annual consumption 6,000lb. No Indian tea.

Candles.—35 Krs. per box of 30lb. 500 boxes.

Kerosine Oil.—50 Krs. per case. 500 cases.

Matches.—20 Krs. per case. 500 cases.

Grey Shirting, No. 1.—40 Krs. per piece of 42 yards.
Grey Shirting, thin.—25 Krs. per piece of 42 yards. } 10,000 pieces.

Manchester cotton twill.—22 Krs., piece of 24 yards.
Manchester cotton twill.—18 Krs., piece of 24 yards. } 6,000 to 10,000.

Muslin.—8 Shais a yard, 1,000 pieces of 42 yards.

Turkey, red.—45 Krs. per piece of 50 yards. 200 pieces.

Yarns.— {30 hanks / 20 hanks} per 10 lb. {24 Krs. / 20 Krs.} 10,000 lb.

Indigo.—Khairpur, at 35 Krs. per Batman.

Also imports cinnamon, turmeric, ginger, coffee, cardamoms, copper and iron sheets, steel, solder, salamonial, sugarcandy, kopra dates, and salt.

Enclosure "B".

The chief merchants of Saiidabad-Sirjan district of Kerman.

Aga Ghulam Abbas-dari—Rais-ul-Tajar.
Haji Khoja Hasan.
Aga Seiid Hina.
Aga Ali Asghar.
Haji Sadik-dari.
Haji Ghulam Riza.
Aga Abul Hasan-dari.
Haji Mirza Ali Asghar.

Foreign Office Press—No. 884—1-2-05—60.

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

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No. 60, dated Bushire, the 29th (received 7th February) January 1905.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter addressed by Mr. Newcomen of the Commercial Mission, to His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Kerman, together with a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, in connection therewith, No. 6, dated the 29th January 1905.

Dated the 9th December 1904.

From—A. Gleadow Newcomen, Esq., President, Commercial Mission to Persia,
To—His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman.

I wish to express through you my thanks to His Majesty's Legation for the assistance rendered and the kindness shown to my Mission. The orders issued to the various Governors for our safe conduct and the arrangement of our supplies have done much to increase our comfort. The Sartip who has been deputed from Tehran to accompany the Mission on its tour will too, I am sure, prove of great assistance.

Everywhere the Persian officials have been most obliging, and their conduct has been such as to prove them anxious to carry out not only the letter, but the spirit, of the orders they have received from Tehran. There has been one exception however. This exception I think it only right to bring to your notice, not in a complaining spirit, but in the public interest.

The Director of Customs at Bandar Abbas, M. Cattersell, showed himself in all his dealings with us possessed of a spirit of unreasonable obstructiveness. Seeing the way in which he treated myself and my Mission, it is within the bounds of possibility that he might treat even less reasonably persons less fortunately placed as to position and special facilities.

I beg to place on record my complaints against this official, who may, it is possible, have sinned more through ignorance than through malice:—

(1) He had received explicit orders to admit free all the baggage of the Mission. This he refused to do till he had received repeated, and, I believe, detailed orders from head-quarters. This unreasonable obstructiveness naturally caused us annoyance.

(2) Knowing well that there were no arrangements made at the quarantine station for food, or for cooking the same, he yet tried to insist on our sending all our stores, cooking utensils, and camp equipage to the Customs House, which is situated three miles from the camp, at the quarantine station, ignoring this fact and general usage, whilst in quarantine we were virtually in the position of not having landed, and, segregated as we were, we were as much cut off from intercourse with the outer world as we would have been aboardship.

(3) Not content with disobeying his orders, through misapprehension, or other causes, he sent an armed guard to keep watch and ward over us. He also annoyed and insulted me by sending verbal and peremptory messages demanding the instant surrender of our goods and chattels through his *Hamal Bashi*, this despite the fact that our arms and ammunition had been lodged in the Customs House in accordance with the law. Though he had two distinct orders in his hand at the time, he threatened us with all sorts of pains and penalties, even when, as a compromise, we sent our stores to be shut up in one of the Consulate godowns for safe custody.

(4) M. Cattersell's action was equally obstructive with regard to the ammunition belonging to our guard and the Consulate guard. Orders had originally come from Tehran to admit this ammunition. The Director of Customs, however, it is reported, sent an

4795 F. D.

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

absurd message to head-quarters, in consequence of which the original order was cancelled. It was only after the greatest trouble and annoyance that the ammunition was allowed to be taken with us.

(5) Even worse was his action with regard to the complimentary guard supplied to us by the Governor of the district. When these men arrived in the town from the district, the Director of Customs at once disarmed them. By so doing he flouted the orders that had been sent from Tehran; he insulted the Governor who had supplied the guard; and did his utmost to lower the dignity of the Mission.

(6) It has also come to my notice that the Director threatened the Quarantine Doctor, Muhammad Azim, with dismissal for an alleged interference on our behalf with the Customs House prerogatives, an allegation absolutely without foundation.

All these things the Director did despite the fact that I and the member of my staff had repeated interviews with him; that we showed him letters and telegrams necessary to convince him of our *boná fides*; and that we did all that in our power lay to meet him where he did not make it impossible for us to do so.

I should like also to make a few remarks here regarding the existing quarantine arrangements in Bandar Abbas. These are far from satisfactory. There is at the quarantine station only one room. There is no privacy, nor are there any means of segregation in the event of male and female passengers being detained at the station. There is only one common W. C. Its appearance is not inviting, but any body who does desire to pay it a visit is obliged to walk in the open part of the native quarters. There are no cooking utensils. There is no cook. There are no stores, and the distance from town makes it very difficult to procure supplies. There is no crockery or glass. Indeed, there is nothing beyond water of very indefinite quality. It appears also that the Director of Customs exercises or claims authority over the Medical Officer in charge of the quarantine station. This seems to me, whether rightly or wrongly I cannot say, an anomalous state of affairs, and one that might result in possible complications.

In conclusion I cannot help stating that I was very unfavourably impressed as an Englishman with the state of affairs at Bandar Abbas, which compares very much indifferently with what I have experienced since coming into the District of Kerman.

Enclo. 2, Prono 76

No. 6, dated the 29th January 1905.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—Sir Arthur Hardinge, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed by Mr. A. Gleadow Newcomen, President of the Commercial Mission now in Persia, to His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Kerman on 9th December drawing attention to the treatment of the Mission and the state of affairs at Bandar Abbas.

I understand from Major Sykes that he has forwarded a copy to Your Excellency as he has to me.

2. Mr. Newcomen's strictures upon Monsieur Cattersell's behaviour seem to be quite justified, but His Majesty's Legation is, I think, fully aware of the obstructive attitude assumed by the Customs official in question towards the Mission, and I may therefore dismiss that topic after mentioning that I learn from the Director-General at Bushire that Monsieur Cattersell is to be relieved by Monsieur Stass who is of a more conciliatory temperament.

3. The President's observations regarding quarantine arrangements and our position generally at Bandar Abbas call for some comment.

For the favourable comparison of the conditions holding at Kerman with those of Bandar Abbas, there are no doubt ample grounds, but it must be remembered that Mr. Newcomen's impressions are those of the bird of passage, and that he was unfortunate in passing through Bandar Abbas at a time when the exigencies of the service had necessitated the port being left for

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some months previously without the presence of a British Consular officer. Had the latter been there Mr. Newcomen's party would have suffered less discomfort. Moreover, he has made his comparisons in mid-winter when climatic conditions at both places more nearly resemble one another. Had he alighted at Bandar Abbas in the hot weather, where none but the dregs of the Gulf who can escape nowhere else, will stay there if they can help it, he would have better realised why the general aspect of affairs at Kerman compares so favourably with that of Bandar Abbas.

4. Referring to the arrangements existing for the convenience of 1st class passengers in quarantine, it goes without saying that they are of a very meagre description, but here again it must be borne in mind that the number of European passengers passing through Bandar Abbas during the year is exceedingly small, averaging probably not more than three or four, and that there as at Bussorah the British Consul generally comes to the aid of sufferers and has their needs supplied as far as he can from his own resources.

In the extremely rare cases where ladies have passed through always in the cold weather, he has, I believe, placed his own house at their disposal and considered it in quarantine.

5. That this is not as it should be goes without saying, but the improvement of these conditions entails some expenditure and rests with the Persian Government, and Your Excellency is aware where the shoe pinches.

This Residency has for years been endeavouring through your kind mediation to obtain sanction for improvements at Lingah which requires them more urgently at present, but hitherto our united efforts have not resulted in any practical steps being taken by the Persian Government, and the Sadr Azam's sanction to improvements at Lingah is now awaited, *vide* your despatch No. 30, dated 5th September 1904, to which I beg reference.

6. The amelioration of the arrangements for the comfort of passengers—especially first class passengers—at all Persian ports is a very much to be desired end, and I have instructed the Residency Surgeon to call upon each of his subordinates at the Gulf ports to furnish a list and probable cost of articles, the supply of which is urgent or desirable for the comfort of passengers in quarantine, and if necessary I will ask Your Excellency's further good offices in obtaining sanction to the expenditure.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 4795 F. D.—16-2-1905—6 0.—R. W. S.

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

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

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Dated Cawnpore, the 2nd (received 4th) February 1905.

From—A. SHAKESPEAR, Esq., Acting Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce,

To—The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Commercial Mission to Persia.

I am directed to hand you a copy of the third report received from Mr. Newcomen, dated Kerman, the 20th December 1904, dated 2nd, 6th, and 12th December 1904.

Dated Kerman, the 20th December 1904.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL A. GLEADOWE NEWCOMEN, President, Commercial Mission to Persia,

To—The Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore.

Owing to our short stay at Bahramabad, I was unable to write to you from thence, and beg to submit my report now as follows:—

Our journey from Saiiadabad, whence I last wrote to you, to Bahramabad, the capital of Rafsinjan, was a very trying one owing to heavy rain and intense cold. On the journey we were twice caught in deluges of rain, ourselves and our baggage being drenched. During our passage over the mountains, dividing the valley of the Guat Kavir from the Rafsinjan valley, some of our camels and mules died, owing rather to the trying weather than to the difficulties of the road. We also lost some of our camel-drivers and muleteers, chiefly from pneumonia, whilst there has been much sickness amongst my staff, servants, and escort. The cold at night has been intense since the heavy rain, the thermometer falling to 8°F., indicating 24 degrees of frost.

At Bharamabad, where we arrived on the evening of the 9th, we were received with great ceremony, the Governor Rafut-ud-Dowla Khan, a cousin of the Shah, sending out a big peshwag, and coming himself to call upon us next day.

Through Major Sykes's foresight and kindness we found a comfortable house, situated in a garden about a mile outside the town, awaiting us with cheerful fires lighted, and it was here that we received our visitors, including the Governor, who dined with us one evening.

We stopped at Bahramabad till the morning of the 13th, and collected such information, as was available, regarding the commerce and manufactures of Rafsinjan, and introduced the merchants to India and its manufactures by showing samples to them. The leading Parsi merchant of the place, Mulla Gudarz, a partner in the firm of Kai Khusru Shahjihan of Bahramabad, Yezd, Shiraj, and Tehran, has sent samples and letters to the various branches of his firm, and seems keen on business.

I send a range of samples, with prices, of the principal products of the Rafsinjan district, and of the principal imports, on which I will make a few remarks. I also append two enclosures, of which A will give you our itinerary from Saiiadabad to Kerman, and B the names of the leading merchants in Rafsinjan.

The population of the Rafsinjan district is put down at about 60,000, that of Bahramabad, the capital, being about 9,000, some say 12,000, but there are no records to go on.

Transport.—Almost all carriers' work is done by camels or donkeys, donkeys doing the journey from Bunder Abbas to Rafsinjan on an average of 25 days, camels taking about 40 days.

The cost of carriage per kharwar, or 100 Tabriz maunds, varies greatly, ranging from 6½ to 12 tomans for the journey between Bunder Abbas and Rafsinjan according to season and demand.

PRODUCTS AND EXPORTS.

Cotton, raw.—Three thousand kharwars are produced, of which 500 are used at home, the rest being exported mainly north, through Shahrud to Russia.

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

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The proportion of the cotton sent north as compared with that going to India *via* Bunder Abbas, has for many years been as 9 to 1, and this, notwithstanding the greater cost of carriage to Shahrud (13 to 20 tomans per kharwar) as compared with that to Bunder Abbas (6½ to 12 tomans per kharwar). This difference in the cost of carriage is due, apart from the greater length of the Shahrud journey, to the fact that camels going to Shahrud have mostly to return empty, whilst those going to Bunder Abbas can always find cargoes to carry back. The prices offering in the north have not been much more enticing than those offering in the south. Seventy to 90 tomans per kharwar at Shahrud as compared with 60 to 80 tomans at Bunder Abbas, whilst the rates of carriage to the north are, of course, very much greater. There has so far been a strong demand in the north, whilst demand was weak in the south. This northern demand was always more or less artificial (see MacLean's report, page 34, paragraph 54), and the war has caused a slump, which has ruined many of the smaller merchants. Northern caravans are now returning with last year's cotton. Consequently it is anticipated that much of this will be sent down to Bunder Abbas.

The cotton is short stapled, but an improvement, I think, on the cotton of Sirjan. There is, it is declared, a possibility of the cultivation being increased, should demand increase (see separate note, *P. S.*).

The cotton season extends, as in Sirjan, from April to October, and the methods of cultivation are the same in both places. Attempts have been made to introduce a long stapled cotton, but these have failed so far owing, it is stated, to the summer being too short (American and Egyptian). There are at present some four cotton presses in Bahramabad, but there is no room for the establishment of a ginning mill. An American ginning machine has been tried, but turned out a failure, as it broke the staple and made the cotton almost useless. Hence cotton is hand-cleaned as in parts of India, but the exported cotton is mostly sent out in a half cleaned condition.

Ten maunds of cotton pods yield about 3 maunds of Maluj (half cleaned cotton) and those 3 maunds yield about 2½ maunds of finest cleaned. The local cost of the Maluj is from 35 to 38 tomans per kharwar.

For export this is packed in sacks and half pressed bales for convenience of carriage. Camels take from 50 to 70, and donkeys from 24 to 34 maunds, Tabriz, "accordingly as the merchants quaintly put it to the pleasure of the Charvaidars".

Wool, raw.—All the wool produced is used locally for carpets, none being available for export. The wool is mostly obtained from the nomad tribes.

The other chief products are:—

Gum, Tragacinth.—100,000 maunds produced. All sent to London. Price, first quality, krans 8 to 10 per maund.

Opium.—500 to 600 maunds. All used locally. Price 12 tomans per maund.

Assafœtida.—About 100,000 maunds produced. Nearly all goes to India.

Madder.—30,000 maunds produced. Half exported, mostly to Russia, half used locally. Price 9 tomans per kharwar (100 maunds).

Pistachios.—A better quality than at Sirjan. 50,000 maunds produced. All exported to Bunder Abbas. Price 4 to 4½ krans per maund.

Almonds.—The merchants handle some 105,000 maunds per annum for export. Price 2 krans per maund.

Leather.—As in Sirjan, there is a certain amount of inferior leather made locally. All sheepskins are retained mostly for turning into postheins, &c. Goatskins to the number of between 5,000 to 6,000 are sent down to Bunder Abbas, whence they find their way to the Arab coast.

Imports.—The chief imports of Rafsinjan are —

Cotton fabrics and prints.—Of which I send you a range of samples with prices attached. The imports of grey goods and shirtings average, as far as could be ascertained, 20,000 pieces.

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Woolen fabrics.—There seems to be small demand for woolen fabrics. All such are little worn, and the specimens of imported woollen goods I saw were of low grade.

Tea.—Almost entirely Lamsars. 15,000 to 20,000 lb annually.

No. 2, 35 krans
„ 3, 30 „
„ 4, 27 „
} per batman.

Sugar.—Loaf, some 50,000 batmans yearly, at 4¼ to 5¼ krans per batman.
Crystal, about 40,000 batmans yearly, at 3½ to 4 krans per batman.

Kerosine oil.—500 to 600 cases, at 35 krans per case.

Candles.—About the same amount, at 35 krans per box of 30 lb.

Silks.—(Persian), Glassware (Austrian), China (Persian and English), enamelledware (Russian), spices (Indina), iron, copper, and tin sheets (English), cutlery (English and Belgian), umbrellas (Indian), and cheap flash ornaments (mostly Austrian and German), are imported also in quantity to fill the stalls of a fairly large bazar.

No samples of these last, or of tea, sugar, candles, kerosine oil, &c., are being sent.

In conclusion, I would suggest that any firm wishing to correspond with merchants at Bahramabad should do so, in the first instance, through His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Kerman, who knows them all intimately, and I am sure he will be only too pleased to do all he can to encourage trade with India.

(*Enclosure A.*)

ROUTE FROM SAIIADABAD TO KERMAN.

Saiiadabad to Zaidabad.—16 miles, N. W. by N., over rolling country. Good road, water plentiful. Supplies obtainable at Zaidabad, a village of 2,000 inhabitants. Good caravanserai.

Zaidabad to Pariz.—25 miles, N. E. by E. Road good, first over steadily rising ground, and then into the hills to Pariz, 8,000 feet. At Pariz water-supplies plentiful. The village of about 800 inhabitants is well situated and surrounded by trees. So great centre for the collection of Manna.

Pariz to Gaud-i-Aihmer.—24 miles, N. E. by N., over a high pass, the Gaudar-i-Surakh, over 10,000 feet, then down the reverse slope to a tiny hamlet and garden situate in the Gaud-i-Aihmer, the Red valley.

Gaud-i-Aihmer to Oraf.—16 miles, N. by N. W. Fair road through ravines Oraf is a very tiny place, a few huts clustering round some ponds and an old fort. Scant supplies, water ample.

Oraf to Bahramabad.—16 miles W., down into Rafsinjan valley. Good road. Bahramabad is the biggest of a group of villages, and contains the residence of the Governor. Supplies and water plentiful.

Bahramabad to Kabutar Khan.—28 miles E. Good road along valley. At Kabtar Khan supplies scant, water plentiful.

Kabutar Khan to Baghim.—32 miles. Good road. E. along valley. Water and supplies good at Baghim. At Robat, a village half-way between these two places, there are also plentiful supplies and a particularly fine caravanserai.

Baghim to Shahabad.—10 miles. Good road, small supplies, fair water The soil here changes from the stone strewn clay of the Rafsinjan valley to the sand of the Kerman valley.

Shahabad to Kerman.—9 miles. Road good, supplies of all kinds plentiful at Kerman, which is a city with a population fixed variously at from 9,000 to 10,000, and the residence of the Governor-General and of the British and Russian Consuls; also the head-quarters of Director of Customs as well as the Church Mission Society. There is a branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia under the Yezd office.

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ENCLOSURE B.

The principal merchants of Rafsinjan—

Muhammadan.

Aga Muhammad Ismail, Moataiid-ul-Tajar, Agent of a Persian Company, known as the "Sherket Umumir".
Aga Muhammad Jaffir, Amin-ul-Tajar.
Aga Muhammad Ali.
Aga Saiud Abdul Razak.
Aga Ali Akbar Muhammad Hussein.
Aga Muhammad Kasim-Yezdi.
Aga Mirza Muhammad Ali.

Parsees.

Mulla Gudarz-Parther in Kai Khusru Shahjehan Bros. of Rafsinjan, Yezd, Shiraz, and Tehran.
Mulla Rahim Shahar Yar.
Mulla Shahar Yar, Agent of Arab Jamsheid of Tehran.

A. G. N.

P. S.—A propos of irrigation and cultivation in Rafsinjan, Major Sykes gives me some interesting information It seems that some 15 miles north of Bahramabad is an opening into an underground river, the Chah-i-Daria. It consists of a circular hole, 90′ in diameter, and a steep incline leads down to a smaller crater-like opening, oval in shape, measuring 20′ by 10′ 15 or 20 feet below the surface. From the surface big stones take 5 seconds to reach the water, which must be deep and run strongly, as camels which are constantly straying into the Chah are swept away. This hole is on the skirt of the range, and the water ought to be easily tapped.

Had we been accompanied by an Engineer, we could have gone thoroughly into the question of how far the water could have been utilised for increasing the cultivable area of the Rafsinjan. As it is, all I can do is to lay the information before you and leave the matter in the womb of the future.

A. G. N.

Encl. 2, Desp. 77

Dated Camp Pariz, the 6th December 1904.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL A. GLEADOWE NEWCOMEN, President, Persian Commercial Mission,

To—The Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore.

In the route report sent you from Saidabad on the 29th ultimo, please make the following correction, an error having crept in transferring from diary.

Instead of Nankand-Saidabad, 16 miles, read "Nankand-Allahabad 24 miles", and then "Allahabad-Saidabad 16 miles". From Nankand to Saidabad the road lies along the valley, over flat moor-like lands, in which are frequent patches of cultivation. At Allahabad water and supplies are good and plentiful. There is a good caravanserai and a village of some 80 houses.

Encl. 3, Desp. 77

Dated Bahramabad, the 12th December 1904.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL A. GLEADOWE NEWCOMEN, President, Persian Commercial Mission,

To—The Secretary to the Indian Tea Cess Committee, Calcutta.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 2nd December, I have the honour to report the arrival of the Mission here: we arrived on the 10th after a most unpleasant and somewhat hazardous journey owing to unprecedented rain.

Here, as at Saidabad, Indian tea is unknown, and I had the greatest difficulty in persuading the merchants to drink some as trial, the result of which I am glad to say was satisfactory, and general approval of the tea was expressed.

The tea in question was one of the canisters sent to me for distribution, as presents to tea merchants, and I have left a canister with the principal

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merchant by name Aga Muhammad Ismail, whose title is Moatamid-ul-Tajar, and he is Agent for a big Persian Company called "Shirket Umumi".

I have also left samples sent by Messrs. Carritt Moraneloy with the above named and a Parsee partner in the firm of Khusru Shahjehan Bros. of this place, Yezd, Shiraj, and Tehran, these gentlemen have promised to show them round, and anticipate being able to place orders.

The numbers of the sample tins were as follows:—

No. 13 @ Rs. 0-8-6 per lb.
" 14 " " 0-5-0 " "
" 15 " " 0-4-6 " "
" 10 " " 0-7-6 " "
" 5 " " 0-5-6 " "

Enclosure A will give you the names of the principal merchants interested in tea at this centre, the annual consumption in this district is between 15,000 and 20,000 lbs. the whole of it being Lausar, which is chiefly imported direct from Bombay and sells as under:—

No. 2 @ 35 krans per maund (Tabriz).
" 3 @ 30 " " " "
" 4 @ 27 " " " "

All tea brought from Bombay is paid for in cash, but tea brought by petty dealers is purchased on ½ cash and ½ credit at Bunder Abbas as at Saidabad.

Enclosure B will give you our itinerary from Saidabad to Bahramabad. Although there is one high pass to cross, there are no engineering or other difficulties of great moment to take it all round, the road is a fair one except under the very exceptional circumstances which we encountered, no such rain having been encountered for 50 years. As a rule, kafilas can travel with fair safety between Saidabad and this.

P.S.—I left the names of tea firms written in Persian with the Aga who is the headman here.

ENCLOSURE A.

The principal merchants in Rafsinjan—

Mahammadans.

Aga Muhammad Ismail, Moatamid-ul-Tajar, Agent of the Shirket Umumi Co.
Aga Muhammad Ali.
Aga Muhammad Jaffir-Anna-ul-Tajar.
Aga Saiud Abdul Razak.
Aga Ali Akbar Muhammad Hussein.
Aga Muhammad Kasin Yezdi.
Aga Nur Muhammad Ali.

Parsees.

Mulla Gudarz, Partner Khusser Shahjehan Bros., Rafsinjan, Yezd, Shiraz, and Tehran.
Mulla Rahim Shakrajar.
*Mulla Shakryar, Agent, Arab Jamshid of Tehran.

ENCLOSURE B.

Route.

From Saidabad to Zaidabad.—16 miles N. W. by N. over rolling country, road good, water plentiful; supplies obtainable at Zaidabad which is a village of a couple of thousand inhabitants. Good caravanserai.

* A most important man.

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

Zaidabad to Pariz.—N. E. by E. Road good; first over steadily rising ground, and then into the hills to Pariz; 8,000 feet at Pariz water and supplies plentiful. The village of about 800 inhabitants, is well situated surrounded by trees and is the great centre for the collection of manna. 25 miles from Zaidabad.

Pariz to Gaud-i-Aihmer.—24 miles N. E. by N. over a high pass, the Gaud-i-Surakh over 10,000 feet and then down the reverse slope of the hills to Gaud-i-Aihmer, the Red valley, a very small hamlet near the ruins of an old garden, supplies obtainable in small quantities. Water good and plentiful.

Gaud-i-Aihmer to Uraf.—16 miles N. by N. W. Fair road through ravines. Uraf is a very tiny place, a few huts clustering round the ruins of an old fort. Water plentiful, supplies small.

Uraf to Bahramabad.—16 miles W. down the long slope into the Rafsinjan valley. Good road near Bahramabad which is a town of about 8,000 inhabitants. The biggest of a group of villages and contains the residence of the Governor. Water and supplies plentiful.

A. G. N.

Encl. 4, Para. 77

Dated Camp Saidabad, the 2nd December 1904.

From—Lieutenant-Colonel A. Gleadowe Newcomen, President, Commercial Mission to Persia,

To—The Secretary, Indian Tea Cess Committee, Calcutta.

I have the honour to report arrival of the Mission at Saidabad, the capital of Sirjan, one of the 18 divisions of the province of Kerman.

Under a separate enclosure (enclosure A*) I beg to append our intinerary from Bunder Abbas to Saidabad, as doubtless this information will be of value to those interested in the tea trade with this portion of Persia. I have endeavoured to make everything as clear as possible.

* Enclosure A., not in this letter, as it has already been sent to the Chamber under cover of my letter of date, being our intinerary.

Between Saidabad and Bunder Abbas, a distance of 282 miles, there are no towns or any places where there is the slightest hope of developing trade. There are small fortified villages, but most of the inhabitants are nomads living in tents, chiefly employed in more or less unlawful means of earning their livelihood, all supplies being obtained from Bunder Abbas, Kerman, and to a lesser degree from Saidabad.

After passing Sir-i-Sikh and before reaching Aihmedi, one emerges from the fever-stricken belt to a plateau, which rises rapidly but not abruptly to from 3,000 to 5,370 feet above sea-level, in many places resembling the plateau of the range River Colony and Transvaal with its deceptive undulations and surrounding Kopjis, behind which again mighty mountains raise their heads into the blue sky, some of them covered with snow.

On the plateau water supplies improve, and as one gets further inland sweet water becomes the rule and not the exception.

Only Lamsars teas (2 and 3) are imported into this district, and merchants did not seem to know that Indian tea existed. I have left two sample canisters and have been promised a report, which will be sent to us at Kerman; but judging from the result of the tea party, I gave to certain of the chief Persian merchants and two Persian princes, I do not anticipate much. Indian tea must be faked to meet the Persian palate. It is too bitter and full of theine or tannin, as they will leave the tea in pot on the fire to stew, sometimes for hours, drawing off what is required from time to time and no Indian tea will stand this. Cannot this be obviated by some alteration or innovation in the process of manufacturing or by blending?

There are no reliable statistics here, but through official sources I am informed that the consumption of tea (Lamsar) in this district amounts to some 6,000 lbs. per annum imported through Bunder Abbas and sold at—

No. 2 at 5 tomans per 10 lbs.
„ 3 „ 4 „ „ „

As far as one can ascertain, the system in vogue for financing tea operations here is—a man goes to Bunder Abbas and gives a receipt on behalf of his

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principles payable at 4—6 or 8 months' sight for half the amount, the balance being paid for in cash.

Beyond transit charges, which vary from Rs. 15 to 25 per 11 Indian maunds, there are no road, octroi, or other charges. All tea is carried on camels and 60 Tabreez or $4\frac{3}{41}$ Indian maunds is a camel-load.

Owing to the terrific heat the route between Bunder Abbas and places inland is only open during the cold weather months, which unfortunately are also the rainy ones. It takes from 20 to 25 days in transit between Bunder Abbas and Saidabad, and I am told that a kafila of tea is less open to looting than other merchandise, as there is trouble in disposing of the goods. Between Bunder Abbas and Saidabad and indeed Kerman (to which place the road bifurcates at a point some 6 miles after leaving Sir-i-Sikh and emerging from the Tang-i-zindan), there are no great engineering difficulties, and a road suitable for wheeled traffic could, I have no doubt, be made with considerable advantage to trade, in spite of the opposite opinion expressed by Mr. MacLean on page 10 of his report, because the tractive power of goods, conveyed on wheels, is 7 times that when carried as loads, and the distance over which any point of heavy gradient could come into question is small and draft animals fairly plentiful.

Enclosure B gives a list of the principal merchants interested in the tea trade at Saidabad, and I have given them a copy in Persian of the list of firms in Calcutta in the hopes that some trade may result.

It has struck me that there is a very easy way of overcoming the extra duty leviable upon small packages of tea in tin or lead foil, and whilst meeting the demand for tea packed in parcels of 1 or 2 lbs. in ornate boxes, securing the lower grade of duty too (see enclosure C).

As I have already shown in a former letter, the import duty on tea, packed in 1 or 2 lbs. packages is charged at 10 krans on the gross weight of the package, and the duty on tea in bulk is 6 krans on nett.

Now to secure the lower grade of duty and transit dues obviously the thing to do is to import in bulk (say, to Kerman, the great distributing centre of these parts).

Kerosine oil is used all over the country and this comes in tins, on which duty has been paid and no further duty is chargeable.

I propose that these tins should be deodorised and made up into boxes for tea and these sold at 1 or 2 lbs. packages.

The advantages are perhaps too obvious to need amplification, but, on the other hand, it may be as well to show them—

(1) Lower duty on nett weight of tea.
(2) No duty on tin package or box.
(3) Cost of tin nominal as it is more or less a waste product of the kerosine oil trade, and it is available on the spot.

With these very real advantages in its favour, surely Indian tea would be put beyond competition with Java, China, Ceylon, or even Indian tea, brought *via* Batoum, and if we mean to really compete the trade must be enterprising.

I have in my possession certain samples of tea sent from Ceylon to the Vice-Consul at Bunder Abbas, and I beg to send you half of each for your inspection and any action you may deem fit. These independent attempts at pushing trade appear to me unwise; combination is the great thing.

Telegrams or letters sent to me care of His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Kerman will always reach me, and I would like to hear from the Committee.

We have had considerable hardships to contend with in the shape of climate and water, which caused a good deal of fever, also horses going lame, through the shocking tracks over which we had to travel, but now we have a clean bill of health.

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

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ENCLOSURE B.

The chief merchants of Saidabad are :—

Aga Gulam Abbas, Lari-Rais-ul-Tajar.
Hajji Khoja Hassan.
Aga Saiud Hena.
Aga Alli Ashgar.
Hajji Sadik Lari.
Hajji Gulam Rasa.
Aga Abu-ul-Hassan Lari.
Hajji Mirza-Alli-Ashgar.

ENCLOSURE C.

On reference to the Customs tariff I find that—

The duty on cardboard is 5 shahis per Batman.

The duty on fancy boxes is 15 per cent *ad valorem*.

Tin plates in sheets, 6 krans per Batman.

Thin sheets of tin or lead foil come under the heading of manufactures from tin or lead and are charged 1 kran per Batman. For above please see new Customs tariff, pages 42, 47, 49.

It will be seen that it would pay to import boxes or material, and manufacture the boxes in Persia for small packages of tea.

Foreign Office Press—No. 986—11-2-05—114.

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

(429)

No. 689 E.-A., dated Fort William, the 16th February 1905.

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—A. SHAKESPEAR, Esq., Acting Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters, dated the 25th January and 2nd February 1905, forwarding Mr. Newcomen's second and third reports on the Commercial Mission to Persia, dated the 29th November 1904, and copies of letters, dated the 30th November and 2nd, 6th, and 12th December 1904, in connection therewith.

2. I am to take the present opportunity to mention, for your information, that, on the advice of Mr. Newcomen and of the local Consular officials, it has been decided to change the itinerary of the Mission, and that it is now intended that, after visiting Khabis, Bam, and Jiruft, the party should return to Kerman. From thence they propose to proceed to Yezd, and return home *via* Shiraz and Bushire.

Foreign Office Press—No. 1116—24-2-05—114.

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

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

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No. 62, dated Bushire, the 3rd (received 14th) February 1905.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With reference to Foreign Department telegram No. 154-E. A., dated 12th January 1905, I have the honour to forward a copy of a letter marginally noted which I have addressed to His Majesty's Minister on the subject of the itinerary of the Commercial Mission now travelling in Southern Persia.

No. 8 of 3rd February.

No. 8, dated Bushire, the 3rd February 1905.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, Khuzistan, etc.,

To—His Excellency Sir Arthur Hardinge, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Persia, Tehran.

I have the honour to address you regarding the movements of the Commercial Mission now touring in Southern Persia.

2. I note from Foreign Department telegram No. 154-E. A. of 12th January that my telegram to the Government of India of 1st January on the subject of the proposed change of programme was reported to Your Excellency, and I further understand from your telegram No. 10 of 23rd January, to my address, that you approve the altered itinerary, which will bring the Mission onwards from Kerman *viâ* Yezd and Abarguh to Shiraz and thence to Bushire, and that you also acquiesce in Major Sykes accompanying the Mission as far as the frontiers of Yezd.

3. I now venture to trouble Your Excellency to consider certain details in connection with the execution of the programme as above modified.

The Mission expects to be back again at Kerman the last week in February, and would, I suppose, reach Yezd about a month later. Major Sykes suggests that his Kerman sowars should accompany the Mission (including himself), during their visit to Yezd, and afterwards as far as the Fars boundary on the Yezd-Abarguh-Shiraz route; and that Mr. Grahame should arrange the remainder of the tour.

For the Mission to continue their progress on the same lines would involve Mr. Grahame meeting the party at the frontier stage with his sowars and piloting them to Shiraz and afterwards to the Fars frontier on the Bushire side, where I would arrange for them to be met.

I am sending this letter under flying seal to Mr. Grahame in order that he may have an opportunity of adding his own comments on the above proposals, and if, after consideration of them, Your Excellency will favour me with your views by telegram, I shall be very much obliged.

4. For the next three weeks Major Sykes will be cut off from telegraphic communication, and it is not quite clear to me from his last message whether he proposes to arrange with Your Excellency direct regarding Persian escort as far as the frontier of Yezd, or whether he expects me to.

Presumably the same Persian escort would be able to remain with the Mission all through to Bushire, but as the Government of India will require to know whether the safety of the party has been assured over the new route, I request the favour of your taking this point into consideration also.

5. Lastly, Your Excellency is better informed than I am as to the attitude of the Persian Government towards the Mission, and as to how far with propriety we can make much of them. I shall therefore be glad to be favoured with your views and instructions on this head as regards Bushire, and I have no doubt Mr. Grahame will be anxious to have the same knowledge in respect of their prospective reception at Shiraz.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 4863—F. D.—61.

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

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Telegram No. 842-E.A., dated the 27th February 1905.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Calcutta,

To—Sir A. Hardinge, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

With reference to Major Cox's letter dated the 3rd February 1905, we shall be glad if Mr. Graham can do anything towards assisting or accompanying the Mission which should, however, retain its purely commercial character.

Addressed to Sir A. Hardinge and repeated to Major Cox.

Telegram, dated and received 20th February 1905.

From—Major P. M. Sykes, C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Calcutta.

Beg report return Mission Kerman 20th. After most successful tour Bam, Narmashir, Jiruft, and Rain. Approximate future dates are Yezd 22nd March, Shiraz 5th April, and Bushire 20th April. Entire party in excellent health.

Extract from a telegram from Major P. M. Sykes, C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman, dated the 25th (received 27th) February 1905.

* * * * * * President suggests my cancelling journey Yezd, and with your permission I will do so.

MEMORANDUM.

Commercial Mission to Persia.

The papers specified below were transmitted to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 9-M., dated the 2nd March 1905:—

(*a*) Telegram from the Government of Bombay, dated the 2nd October 1904.
(*b*) Telegram from the Government of Bombay, dated the 3rd October 1904.
(*c*) Telegram from the Government of Bombay, dated the 4th October 1904.
(*d*) Telegram to the Government of Bombay, No. 3348-E.A., dated the 6th October 1904.

Vide Pro. Nos. 161, 162, 164 and 165 in External A, October 1904, Nos. 49-177.

(1) Telegram* to the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, No. 3399-E.A., dated the 8th October 1904. * Pro. No. 170, *ibid.*

(2) Telegram† from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 165, dated the 13th October 1904. † Pro. No. 172, *ibid.*

(3) Telegram‡ to Mr. E. Grant-Duff, Tehran, No. 3498-E.A., dated the 15th October 1904. ‡ Pro. No. 173, *ibid.*

(4) Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 19th September 1904.

(5) Letter from His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman, No. 266, dated the 5th September 1904, with enclosure.

(6) Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 8th October 1904, with enclosure.

(7) Letter from His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman, No. 270, dated the 15th September 1904, with enclosure.

(8) Letter to the Comptroller, India Treasuries, No. 7332-A., dated the 24th November 1904.

(9) Letter to the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, No. 4055-E.A., dated the 3rd December 1904.

(10) Letter to His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman, No. 4056-E.A., dated the 3rd December 1904.

(11) Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 17th November 1904, with enclosures.

5697 F. D.

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(12) Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 26th November 1904, with enclosures.
(13) Telegram to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 4082-E.A., dated the 6th December 1904.
(14) Telegram from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 1st January 1905.
(15) Telegram from Mr. A. G. Newcomen, President, Commercial Mission to Persia, Kerman, dated the 5th January 1905.
(16) Telegram to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 154-E.A., dated the 12th January 1905.
(17) Telegram to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 155-E.A., dated the 12th January 1905.
(18) Telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 8, dated the 14th January 1905.
(19) Telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman, dated the 19th January 1905.
(20) Telegram from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 9th December 1904.
(21) Telegram to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 4166-E.A., dated the 12th December 1904.
(22) Letter to the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, No. 4193-E.A., dated the 14th December 1904.
(23) Telegram from President, Commercial Mission to Persia, dated the 17th December 1904.
(24) Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 25th January 1905, with enclosures.
(25) Letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 60, dated the 29th January 1905, with enclosures.
(26) Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 2nd February 1905, with enclosures.
(27) Letter to the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, No. 689-E.A., dated the 16th February 1905.

Gov. 86 No. 891-E.A., dated Fort William, the 2nd March 1905 (Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the correspondence shown in the accompanying list is forwarded to—

(1) the Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor-General and Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan,
(2) * the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
(3) * His Britannic Majesty's Consul,
(4) the Government of Bombay, Political Department,

for information, in continuation of Government of India, Foreign Department, endorsement No. 3415-E.A., * dated the 10th October 1904.

*Pro. No. 166 in External A Proceedings, October 1904, Nos. 49-177.

(1) Nos. (11), (12), (24), (26), (27) on list attached to memorandum to India Office.
(2) Nos. (1) to (12), (18)–(24), (26), (27) on list attached to memorandum to India Office.
(3) Nos. (1) to (4), (6), (8), (9), (11) to (18) (24) to (26) on list attached to memorandum to India Office.
(4) Nos. 11), (12), (24), (26), (27) on list attached to memorandum to India Office.

Gov. 88 No. 892-E.A., dated Fort William, the 2nd March 1905 (Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

(1) Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 17th November 1904, with enclosures.
(2) Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 26th November 1904, with enclosures.
(3) Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 25th January 1905, with enclosures.
(4) Letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 60, dated the 29th January 1905, with enclosures.
(5) Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 2nd February 1905, with enclosures.

A copy of the correspondence shown in the accompanying list is forwarded to Lieutenant W. H. I. Shakespear, His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Bandar Abbas, for information.

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No. 893-E.A., dated Fort William, the 2nd March 1905 (Confidential). Gov 86

From—The Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—Sir Arthur Hardinge, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

With reference to the correspondence ending with Government of India, Foreign Department, letter* No. 3416-E.A., dated the 10th October 1904, I am directed to forward, for your information, a copy of the correspondence shown in the accompanying list † relative to the Commercial Mission to Persia.

*Pro. No. 167 in External A Proceedings, October 1904, Nos. 49-177.

†Nos. (a) to (d), (1), (4) to (15), (19) to (24), (26) of list‡ attached.

‡ To memorandum to India Office.

No. 894-E.A., dated Fort William, the 2nd March 1905 (Confidential). Gov 87

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing papers is forwarded to the Department of Finance and Commerce for information and the issue of such further orders as may be necessary, in continuation of the endorsement from the Foreign Department, No. 4311-E.A., dated the 22nd December 1904.

Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 26, 27 of list § attached.

Telegram from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 29th December 1904.

Telegram to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 103-E.A., dated the 7th January 1905.

§ To memorandum to India Office.

Telegram No. 901-E.A., dated the 2nd March 1905.

From—Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,

To—His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman *vid* Robat.

Gov 82 No. 901-E.A. Your telegram 25th February. Journey to Yezd may be cancelled. Gov 88

Please inform Tehran and Bushire.

Telegram No. 38, dated the 1st (received 2nd March) 1905.

From—Sir A. Hardinge, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran, Gov 89

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Calcutta.

Gov 80 Please refer to your telegram dated the 27th February 1905. I have authorised His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Shiraz to meet the Commercial Mission on its way to Shiraz.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 5697 F. D.—18-3-1905.—71.—W. G. E.

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

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Dated Cawnpore, the 28th February (Rd. 3rd March) 1905.

From—A. SHAKESPEAR, Esq., Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce,
To—The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I am directed to hand you extract of a telegram received from Mr. Newcomen, dated Kerman, the 26th instant, and with reference to the communication addressed to the Private Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy to which he makes reference, a copy of which I have now the pleasure to hand you, I am to state that my Committee will be grateful for advice as to whether this has been received.

I am at the same time to inform you that Mr. Newcomen in addressing His Excellency direct is considered by my Committee to have exceeded the authority with which he has been invested and my Committee do not feel justified in associating themselves with the representations contained in Mr. Newcomen's communication.

Mr. Necowmen in a recent communication mentions the possibility of Major Sykes being transferred from his present appointment, and my Committee, while feeling confident that everything possible is being done to support and further British trade interests in Persia, cannot but receive with feelings of great regret the news that it is contemplated to deprive such an important trade centre as Kerman of the valuable experience of such an officer as Major Sykes at a time when it is understood foreign influences are particularly active.

In a recent communication Mr. Newcomen mentions that he has not yet received any instructions as to the disposal of the Government property in his possession; and I shall be obliged for early intimation of what the wishes of Government are in this respect.

Extract of telegram received from Mr. A. GLEADOWE NEWCOMEN, dated 26th February 1905.

Please ascertain at once and telegraph if Viceroy's Secretary has received letter regarding presentation gold medal; copy with Chamber; awaiting Secretary's wire.

Dated Kerman, the 29th December 1904.

From—Mr. A. GLEADOWE NEWCOMEN, President, Commercial Mission, Kerman,
To—The Private Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy.

It is with sincere pleasure that I have learned of the return of His Excellency Lord Curzon to India, as not only does it mean that the health of Lady Curzon has improved, but that we shall have the benefit of His Lordship's interest in the work of the Commercial Mission to Persia.

We, as well as the whole commercial community of India, regretted His Lordship's absence during the period that the pros and cons of the Mission were under consideration and also the unfortunate cause of the same.

Knowing what a deep interest His Lordship takes in Persian affairs, it has struck me that perhaps a few words regarding this Mission might be acceptable.

We have to thank the Government of India for the excellent arrangements made through Major P. Molesworth Sykes for our transport escort and reception at various places, also for the liberal supply of camp equipage and horses, without which we should have had some serious inconveniences to face.

Our first experience of Persia after landing at Bunder Abbas were not cheering and we were struck by the apparent want of British influence; in fact it was conspicuous by its absence, for reasons that must be well known to the Foreign Department.

En route from Bunder Abbas to the high plateau, upon entering the District of Kerman, we were much taken by the increased friendship of those we met—a friendship that was spontaneous and cheery and meted out to us because we were Britishers and because our presence as well as the objects of our Mission were looked on by them as denoting a kindly interest in their welfare by the Government of India.

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As we progressed deeper into the Province of Kerman, this feeling showed itself more and more clearly, and we were received by Persian officials as friends and treated with every honour. On all sides were friendly (not official) enquiries made about and messages sent to Major Sykes. This official seems to have a great hold on the respect and affections of the officials and people, not only in the towns, but, what is to my mind much more important, amongst the Khans and Nomad tribes.

Everywhere have we heard expressions of loyalty and sympathy for the British Raj, and I believe that Persian Baluchistan and the powerful Nomad tribes would be with us to a man should necessity arise for us to take over this part of Persia—an action that would constitute a most welcome change to its inhabitants.

The people are poverty-stricken and oppressed, whilst those in power are to a great extent debauched by opium and other vices. The system of Government is rotten to the core and must remain so as long as appointments from the highest to the lowest are sold as speculations to the buyers. To bring prosperity back, a good deal can be done short of changing the Government. Improvements in roads and their safety, telegraphs (linking up and rates), post (extension and improvement in speed), engineering works, such as building of dams, utilising subterranean rivers, improvements in the kavat system, and last but not least, the making of Bunder Abbas (the natural port of South-East Persia) and the placing there of a strong British Consul, with special knowledge of customs and with business experience; such an official should also be a good French and Persian scholar.

I venture to hope that all I have suggested above is within the bounds of ordinary possibility and achievement, and if my Mission does anything to forward these improvements it will have justified its existence somewhat and I shall have been honoured in however small a degree in having furthered His Lordship's desire to increase British influence in our legitimate sphere in Persia.

Knowing and seeing daily the importance of retaining and increasing British influence, I have offered to present a gold medal annually to the Parsee Anjuman of Kerman; the medal to be presented by His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Kerman to the boy, who shall have made the most progress in English. The boy should also bear a good character. The medal could only be won once, thus preventing one boy farming it for years.

As I wish this medal not only to be a memento of the first Commercial Mission to South-East Persia, but to remind the community of the interest taken by His Excellency the Viceroy in Persia, as evidenced by our presence here, I beg to solicit the honour of being allowed to have His Lordship's effigy stamped on the face of the medal, and if His Lordship will grant me this favour, I would beg that a wire intimating his consent may be sent to me here, so that at the opening of new Anjuman buildings in February I may be able to announce the fact to the Parsee community, both here and later on at Yezd.

A scheme is also on foot to educate a certain number of Parsee boys in Bombay of which doubtless His Lordship is well aware, and I hope to take the first batch of boys to Bombay as protegées of the Mission, thus, as it were, forging one more link in a scheme for increasing British influence in Persia. I believe this scheme of Sir Dinshaw Petit's will meet with the approval of His Excellency.

À *propos* of the Parsee community, the Khans and the Persian officials in these districts, the following may be instructive and amusing. When the Parsee Anjuman held their annual meeting shortly after the advent of the Imperial Russian Consul he was not invited, and this with the approval of the Persian officials.

As to the general political situation, the Khans of importance in many cases refused to call on the Imperial Russian Consul, giving as a reason that they were not going to do anything that might possibly be worked to the detriment of their old friendship with the British Consul and our Government.

Lastly, I have noticed the careful omission of the Imperial Russian Consul to all entertainments given to our Mission by Persian officials from the Governor downwards, and this in the face of other foreigners having been invited.

The Mission hopes to conclude its tour in Persia by April and to arrive in India by May, when we shall submit our report.

Government of India Central Printing Office.—No. 5566 F. D.—15-3-1905.—71.—G. R.

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

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Telegram, No. 1227-E.A, dated the 23rd March 1905.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,

To—A. SHAKESPEARE, Esq., Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore.

Your letter 28th February. It will be most convenient if Mr. Newcomen hands over to Resident at Bushire before leaving that port on return journey all Government property except books, maps, etc., received from Government of India. The latter should please be returned to Foreign Department, Simla.

No. 1241-E.A., dated Fort William, the 25th March 1905.

From—R. E. HOLLAND, Esq., I.C.S., Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—A. SHAKESPEARE, Esq., Secretary, Upper India, Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 28th February 1905, forwarding an extract from a telegram from Mr. Newcomen, dated the 26th February last, also copy of a letter, dated the 29th December 1904, addressed by him to the Private Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy, and enquiring whether this latter communication had been received.

2. In reply, I am to say that the communication referred to above was duly received by the Private Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy and has been acknowledged.

3. You have already been addressed by telegraph regarding the question of the disposal of the Government property in Mr. Newcomen's possession.

[C151FD]

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

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

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(*Received on the 14th March 1905, under cover of a letter from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 9, dated the 4th February 1905.*)

Tehran,
February 2nd, 1905.

No. 7, Commercial.

My Lord,

I have received several reports from His Majesty's Consul at Kerman respecting the proceedings of the Commercial Mission under the Presidency of Mr. Newcomen which is now visiting South-East Persia on behalf of the Indian Chambers of Commerce. It has everywhere been courteously and even cordially received by the Persian authorities, the only exception being the Belgian Chief of Customs at Bunder Abbas, M. Cattersel, who, in defiance of orders sent by his superiors at Tehran, behaved to it with extreme incivility. Captain Grey informed me when I was at Bunder Abbas last year that M. Cattersel was a very objectionable individual, and a violent Anglophobe, and I therefore mentioned his conduct to M. Naus, pointing out the deplorable impression which it would create in India. His Excellency has recalled him from Bunder Abbas and appointed him provisionally an Assistant in the Customs Department at Bushire. He has named as Chief of Customs at Bunder Abbas a M. Stass, formerly Assistant at Bushire, with whom I am personally acquainted and who is a sensible man and has always been on good terms with our officials.

The Russians have done their best to represent this Mission to the Persians as a political one, having all sorts of sinister designs, and the Mushir-ed-Dowleh actually sent one of his officials to me with a secret report from Kerman, no doubt inspired by M. Miller, which stated that its members were making maps, and taking photographs, besides instituting enquiries into the strength of the various garrisons in Persian Baluchistan, and that some of them were believed to be military officers. As these stories, though hardly likely to impose on the Persian Ministers, were calculated to have an influence on the Shah, I addressed an official note to the Persian Government on the 11th ultimo, pointing out their gross and palpable absurdity.

The Mission, which has visited Kerman and Bam (Baluchistan), returns *viâ* Shiraz and Bushire in six weeks' or two months' time.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,
A. H. HARDINGE.

The Marquess of Lansdowne, K.G.,
etc., etc., etc.,
Foreign Office.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 5925 F. D.—21-3-1905.—61.—W. D'C.

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

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Telegram, dated the 18th March 1905.

From—Major P. M. Sykes, C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Calcutta.

Regret report Newcomen has broken ankle at Yezd, where Mission arrived 16th. Has made other arrangements for successor who can be met by Ali Jan at Bunder Abbas.

Telegram, dated 18th March 1905.

From—A. G. Newcomen, Esq., President, Commercial Mission to Persia, Yezd,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Broken right ankle. Expect delayed fortnight.

Telegram, No. 1220-E.A., dated the 23rd March 1905.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,

To—His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman *viâ* Robat.

Your telegram 18th. Regret to hear of accident to Newcomen.

Latter part of telegram regarding successor being met by Ali Jan at Bunder Abbas not understood. Whose successor do you mean ? and who is Ali Jan ?

Telegram, dated the 24th March 1905.

From—Major Sykes, Karman,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Your 1220-E.A. Instructions contained in your 596 cancel telegram of mine referred to by you.

Dated Cawnpore, the 27th March 1905.

From—A. Shakespeare, Esq., Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Dapartment.

I am directed to acknowledge receipt of your telegram dated the 23rd instant, reading as follows, the substance of which has been communicated to Mr. Newcomen, by cablegram on the 25th instant at Kerman :—

"1227-E A. Your letter 23th February, it will be most convenient if Mr. Newcomen hands over to Resident at Bushire before leaving that port on return journey all Government property except books, maps, etc., received from Government of India. The latter should please be returned to Foreign Department, Simla."

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

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Pol no 99

Dated Cawnpore, the 20th March 1905.

From—A. SHAKESPEARE, Esq., Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce,
To—The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Commercial Mission to Persia.

I am directed to hand you a copy of the fourth report received from Mr. Newcomen, dated Kerman, the 1st January 1905, as also copy of a letter, dated Kerman, 27th December 1904, addressed to the Indian Tea Cess Committee by Mr. Newcomen.

Dated Kerman, the 1st January 1905.

Enclosure
Pol no 99

From—A. GLEADOWE NEWCOMEN, Esq., President, Commercial Mission,
To—The Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce.

I have already reported my arrival at Kerman, but I regret having to add that both Messrs. Luffman and Ryan have been very ill since we came here. The former was laid up for over a week with fever and the latter is still so unwell that I am compelled to leave him behind in charge of Dr. Dadson, as I cannot delay my departure any longer.

I had originally intended stopping here till the 29th and then moving on *viâ* Khabis to Bam and Narmashir returning *viâ* the Jeruft valley, a tour which will occupy about six or seven weeks. For the above and other reasons I decided however to remain in Kerman till the morning of Monday, the 2nd.

By this you will doubtless know of our changed itinerary and that instead of finding material for a report on the trade prospects of uninhabited wastes in Baluchistan, we shall, after returning for a time to Kerman from Jeruft, move on to Yezd and Shiraz, thus completing our tour of "places that really matter"—of places that are really trade centres in Southern and Eastern Persia,—and return to India *viâ* Bushire, where I shall be able to interview the Resident, paying on my way back a second visit to Bunder Abbas, *vide* copy of my demi-official letter to Major Cox, British Resident at Bushire. This visit will enable me to meet the Vice-Consul and see if anything has come of my first visit.

Before proceeding to talk of business and of Kerman itself as a trading district and linking centre, there is one matter to which I should like to call your attention, because it is a matter, wherein the curious action of Government, or rather of the British Foreign Office, is calculated to interfere with the utility of the Mission in which you are much interested. You are aware how trade and politics are nearly one in this country and how much official position, title and power count for. You know this and so do the Russians. They neglect no opportunity of acting on the fact, giving their support and countenance to all men, establishing Consulates and Vice-Consulates in places, containing as in Kerman, not more than one or two Russian subjects, working politics through trade and trade through politics, so as to derive a double benefit each way. You know this. The Russians know this. Many people in India even in Government circles realise it. But our politicals, it would seem for reasons unknown to me, have gone out of their way to inform Tehran that they know nothing of our existence, that they certainly had no official knowledge of us, and were apparently not going to consider us entitled to any official recognition.

This information I gathered to my astonishment and annoyance in Kerman, where I learned that the Governor-General, though he had gone out of his way to give us a great welcome, had refused to return the courtesy of my call on him, giving as his reason orders from Tehran, based on information of our absolutely unofficial position, I presume.

Now I contend that a Mission such as this is, and organised in the manner in which this Mission was, must be official, however, unpolitical it may be. We never pretended to be politicals. Though for that matter the Russians do not abruptly disassociate commerce and politics in this land, but rather to their advantage, confuse them.

I insist however that we came to Persia with a distinct official position without which we could and can expect to do little, a contention borne out by the arrangements made by Government and their control of the conduct of the Mission. Mr. Maclean was treated on quite another footing. I do not

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desire to make an official complaint but merely to lay before you certain facts I have done before Major Cox, in order that you may both know how matters are.

To pass however to matters that concern us more nearly.

In Kerman I have had more difficulty than almost anywhere else in meeting and extracting information from the traders. This is in great part due to the cholera scare from which the people of Kerman, from the Governor-General to the seller of water, have not yet recovered. There is, it is true, a certain amount of information which the Consulate have gathered, but it is far from complete or accurate, as indeed how could it be, there being no records to go by nor European firms to assist from a business point of view. Then the sickness amongst my staff has not improved matters.

However, apart from the wearisome and useless official visits I have been compelled to pay all round, we have had interviews with the merchants and representatives of the Parsees, the Hindu and the Mussalman communities. The most useful as well as the brightest-minded man we have found here is Mirza Ali, a Hindu of Sind, who has turned Mohammedan and who has traded in this part of Persia for over 20 years and who has promised to accompany me on my return to India to see what he can do to open up trade. From all these people we have got a certain amount of information which strained and sifted is not absolutely unsatisfactory, so far as India is concerned, for while indicating difficulties it suggests ways to improvements.

There is a large import in grey prints and chintzes of different kinds, 90,000 to 100,000 pieces being the yearly import, about a fifth of which come from Russia. There is also a considerable demand, supplied, it seems, mostly by England and Bombay, for cotton yarns, mostly blues, whites and reds. The annual importation supplemented by home manufacturers of woollen goods, which are mostly flimsy, comes to about 1,600 pieces. The prices of all samples are marked on them.

The merchants, in particular the Parsees and Persians, were greatly taken with the samples of woollens shown them, and it seems to me that we could do a considerable trade in woollens of a suitable quality at popular prices. The prices must be moderate, however, as this is a poor land, and the steady increase in opium consumption that has taken place among the Mohammedans will not help to enrich them.

I have sent you two telegrams, copies enclosed, which I now beg to confirm, asking you to send a full range of Muir and Woollen Mills samples as soon as possible, with prices in rupees, to the Mutazid Dewan, Kerman, the Treasurer to the Governor-General, who is also a partner in the firm of "Shirket Umumi," most important people. Quotations should always be in Rupees C. I. F. Bunder Abbas, discounts being shown separately and all written in Persian clearly.

There is no trade here in raw cotton or wool, no cotton being produced and all the wool being consumed in the manufacture of carpets.

The export trade consists in :—

Caraway seed (green)	.	2 Krans per Tabreez maund,	1,000 maunds	exported.
Caraway seed (black)	.	3½ ditto.	5,000	ditto.
Madder	.	1½ ditto.	10,000	ditto.
Pistachios	.	5 „ per maund,	10,000	ditto.
Almonds	.	3 „ ditto.	5,000	ditto.
Saffron	.	80 cents per ⅛th oz. 200 lbs. exported.		
Opium	.	220 Krans per maund, 200 maunds exported to Bunder Abbas.		
Leather	.	All hides (not many) are used locally, but 10,000 goat skins are sent to Bombay. Price paid here, 18 krans per bundle of 20 skins. From enquiries made I think there is a fair opening for N. W. T. goods in Kerman. I told the people that a sample consignment might be sent out and they were delighted, specially regarding boots or shoes I. M. O. or semi-military saddles. In these it is all a question of low price and good useful stuff.		
Gum Tragacanth	.	5 to 15 Krans per maund, according to quality. The production varies very greatly with the years but averages 1,000 maunds, which is all exported.		

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I am sending you a copy of the list of imports made out by Major Sykes together with numbered and named samples.

Kerman trade has undoubtedly fallen off in the last few years, but it is still considerable. The chief demand being evidently for the cheaper and more gaudy kind of article in every line of trade.

Kerman is a distributing centre for the towns in the 18 districts of the Province, but the larger of these towns do not depend for their supplies only on Kerman, indenting as do Saiidabad, Bahramabad and Bam on Bunder Abbas and Bombay direct. Besides forming a distributing centre Kerman also serves as a transmission depôt to Yezd and to the towns of Khorassan. These Khorassan towns are also fed by Afgan Kaffilas which work through Minab from Bunder Abbas, through to the eastward of Bam, by which routes also the returning Kaffilas bring down wool, etc., to the port.

I hope I shall be able to say more concerning Kerman and its trade when I get back, for so far the town is still moribund with the cholera scare. I enclose a list of merchants of the place, and I have already sent you under cover of the copy of my letter to the Indian Tea Cess Committee our itinerary.

The Agent of the Imperial Bank of Persia will be glad to help any firms in India wishing to trade by affording any information in his power. A most hopeful sign is the interest shown in the development of trade by the Governor-General, cousin of the Shah, Governor and Persian Consul in charge of foreign affairs.

I was having lunch with the Governor and they spontaneously expressed a desire to come and see the samples of Indian products that are with me and asked me to give them some tea to try. It is of great importance in Persia to get high officials interested in anything as the people follow them like sheep, so if we can get the Governor or some such high officials to try Indian goods it will be a great thing.

I have invited these two gentlemen, the Shah's nephew, Governor of Jeruft, and the Governor-General's Private Secretary, to tea this evening after polo when I shall present each with a canister of tea and show them the skilled manufactures of the Woollen and Muir Mills, which unfortunately are the only samples I have.

The merchants here are a very poor class, wanting in enterprise, and I fear the prospects of pushing trade are small, unless agencies are established, as the Agent of the Bank remarked to me " they will buy if things are on the spot for sale, but they won't take the trouble to send to India for things preferring to go on in their old ways to trying pastures new."

Apart from this apathy there is the old drawback of having to correspond in a foreign language, a difficulty got over by Russians by appointing a Persian agent here, who keeps them advised at Yezd of the state of stocks and the Kerman market, using the wire freely I am told.

Small stocks of likely goods are also held in reserve here so as to meet demands when stocks are out. These are then sold at high prices as there being only a very-round-about way of getting at Bunder Abbas (and a very expensive one too), by wire coupled with length and uncertainty of transit considerable delays in ordering and difficulties in replenishing stocks occur, and here the Russians step in as the very good friend in need.

I am pleased to be able to inform you that there is a very likelihood of a special Vice-Consul being appointed under Major Sykes, whose duty it will be to see to the safety of the roads and take up cases in connection with traders' complaints.

The Persian Government are also at last awakening to the fact that unless steps are taken to improve the safety of transit, trade will die as it has already fallen off greatly and M. Cesari (a Corsican), Customs Officer, is here now on special duty in this connection.

A branch of the Persian Imperial Bank is, I hope, to be shortly opened under a Government subsidy at Bunder Abbas if they can get a man to go there. I am in constant touch with the Manager here and have done my best to shew him the way to go about the matter.

If the Chamber could only move the Government to make Kerman the headquarters of a Consul General (which geographically and commercially it ought to be) with Vice-Consuls at Yezd and Bam and a special Consul with experience of customs working and business at Bunder Abbas, then we in India could reasonably hope to open up South East Persia and make trade.

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A factor so often overlooked in the appointment of men to consular posts is that in Persia unless a man is a fluent speaker in French and Persian he is virtually useless and as an interpreter is hopeless.

Then again the *foup et origo* of consular appointments is so often overlooked in the desire of aspirants to consular and political fame, *i.e.*, trade and matters connected therewith are their first duty, and I think it is time that they were reminded of this. A reference to suitable authority will, I believe, bear me out.

Wishing you all a happy and prosperous New Year.

ENCLOSURE A.

The leading tea and general merchants in Kerman.

Mohamedans.

Aga Ali.—Bombay Agent, Mirza Mohammed Bakar Afshar. B. Abbas Agent, Haji Mohammed Hussain Gilidari Amin-ul-Tajar.

Haji Aga Bazurg.—Bombay Agent, Saiid Mohammed Kuladar. B. Abbas Agent, Abdul Gaffur.

Saiid Yah Yah Isfathani—B. Abbas agent only. Haji Mohammed Hussain Gilidari.

Aga Rahim Turk.—Bombay Agent, Haji Hossain Ali. Bunder Abbas Agent, Gilidari.

Aga Mendi.—Owns carpet factories. Is also local Manager of the Persian Company known as the "Shirket Umumi," which has its head-quarters at Tehran and a branch in Bombay.

Mirza Ali (a converted Hindu)—Agent in Bombay M. M. Bakar Afshar, has also a Hindu Agent, Telu Mal Chamandas at Shikarpur and Karachi.

Leading traders of Kerman.

Hindus. Nearly all agents of partners of Shikarpur mahajan houses. They have the cream of Kerman trade in their hands, but are humbly slow and conservative. Mostly deal in tea, sugar, cotton and indigo.

Bhoj Raj of Telu Mal Chamandas.
Bada Mal of Radha Kishen Das.
Ganga Ram of Hond Raj.
Tharoo Mall of Assanand Jitanand
Sunder Das of Sunder Das Ishar Das.
Pars Ram of the firm of Subraj.
Teo Mal of Ganga Ram Topan Das.
Hut Chand of the firm of Chobar Mal.
Also petty dealers "Khorda Farosh" working here for their own hands,
Hem Raj, Khera Mal, Narain Das, } The chief.

LEADING TRADERS OF KERMAN, PARSEESS MOSTLY TRADE IN TEA AND WOOLLENS.

Aebab Shahariar.
Mirza Sarushiar.
Rustum Khusru.
Gustash Kaikhusru of Rustum, Kai Khusru and Sons, of Yezd and Kerman.
Ardeshir Khusru.
Khodadad Kai Khushru.
Hoashang Behruz.
Sohrat Rustam.
Kaikhusru Meherban.

Copy of telegram sent to Chamber.

No. 1.

DELPHOS PRICES SAURICIS PARSEE MUIR ANJUMAN WOOLLEN KERMAN RUPEE

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No. 2.

SAUMON TO MOTAZIT DEWAN
KERMAN PEJINAS PELZART IN
PERSIAN BUNDER ABBAS DESANOJAR WIGHERS.

List of Cloth.

Name in English.	Name in Persian.	Rate.	Amount. Krans.	Amount. Cents.	Country of origin.	Approximate annual consumption.
Chintz	Shella	1 yard	0	90	England	1,000 pieces (Thans).
	Dabit		1	0	„	300 „ „
	Janaghi		1	75	„	Unknown.
	Reps		1	0	„	200 pieces.
	Uashur		0	60	„	10,000 „
	Chit		0	90	Russia	5,000 „
	Mithal		0	80	England	30,000 „
	Chilwari No. 7		0	90	„	10,000 „
	„		0	50	„	2,000 „
	Malmal		0	75	„	2,000 „
	Mitkal		0	80	„	Sasoons 10,000 pieces.
	Chit		0	70	„	2,000 pieces.
	„ Lala		0	55	„	4,000 „
	„ Mishki		0	55	„	500 „
	„ Hashia		1	0	„	500 „
	„ Ariz		0	55	„	500 „
	„ Guli		0	80	„	500 „
	„ „		0	85	„	Unknown.
	„ Tarah		0	55	„	500 pieces.
	„ Farishta Malaika		1	20	„	300 „
	„ Astri		0	60	„	500 „
	Atlasi		1	0	„	200 „
	Annah		0	95	„	500 „
	Trah Khakain		0	55	„	200 „
	„ Gabri		0	90	„	200 „
	„ No Zahm		0	95	„	
	„ Aga Lapuri		0	80	„	
	Agha Bana		0	60	„	200 „
	Guli		0	80	„	
	Atlasi		1	20	„	
	Trah		0	90	„	
	Laili Majnun		0	55	„	100 „
	Madar Shah		0	65	„	Unknown.
	Trah Mashka		0	80	„	„
	„ „		0	80	„	„
	Sibi		0	65	„	„
	Maharamat		0	80	„	200 pieces.
	Dasti Dibbas		0	80	„	100 „
	Telegraphi		0	60	„	100 „
	Unah		0	80	„	Unknown.
	Makhmal		12	0	„	40 pieces.
	Dabit		14	0	„	200 „
	Kashmira		9	0	„	300 „
	Pashmin		3	0	„	50 „
	Makhmal Gali		8	0	„	50 „
	„ „		10	0	„	50 „
	Mahut		14	0	France	100 „
	Kashmira		14	0	England	100 „
	Mahut		12	0	Russia	50 „
	„		17	0	France	50 „
	Refs		1	25	England or India	50 „
	„		1	25	„ „	50 „
	Farmata		3	0	„ „	200 „
	Shila Mishki		1	50	„ „	500 „
	„ „		1	50	„ „	200 „
	Refs Guli		1	0	„ „	50 „
	Shila Miski		1	25	„ „	50 „
	Refs Sabz		1	50	„ „	20 „
	„ Guli		1	25	„ „	20 „
	„ Kirmiz		1	50	„ „	20 „
	„ Zard		1	25	„ „	20 „
	Khara		1	75	„ „	20 „
	Kha Kani		0	75	„ „	50 „
	Parcha Pirahani		0	70	„ „	20 „
	„ Khakani		0	90	„ „	
	„ „		0	90	„ „	50 „
	„ „		0	90	„ „	
	Agha Bana		1	0	„ „	200 „
	„ Khakani		0	80	„ „	40 „
	„ Banu		0	90	„ „	50 „
	Chintz Lapuri		0	70	„ „	500 „
	„ Nozahur		0	80	„ „	200 „
	„ „		0	90	„ „	200 „
	„ „		0	90	„ „	200 „
	„ „		1	80	„ „	50 „
	„ „		0	90	„ „	50 „
	Khakani		0	90	„ „	50 „

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General Imports.

Name in English.	Name in Persian.	Per maund (Tabreez). Krans.	Cents.	Country of origin.	Approximate yearly Consumption.
Loaf Sugar	Kand	4	45	France	5,000 boxes (19 Mds. Tab-
,, ,,	,,	4	50	Germany	5,000 ,, reez = 1 box).
,, ,,	,,	4	75	Russia	10,000 ,,
Sugar	Shakar	3	65	England	10,000 ,,
,,	,,	3	50	India	
Black pepper	Tilfil Siah	14	0	,,	600 bags (1 Md. Indian).
	Dar Chini	14	0	,,	200 boxes (1 Md. each).
Coffee	Kahwa	17	0	,,	500 bags (13 to 17 Mds. Tabreez).
Turmini	Zard Chub	4	0	,,	500 ,, ,,
Ginger	Zangfil	8	0	,,	300 ,, ,,
	Mikhak	11	0	,,	Unknown.
Cloves	Hill No. I	40	0	,,	10 ,, ,,
,,	,, ,, II	30	0	,,	10 ,, ,,
,,	,, Bad	16	50	,,	10 ,, ,,
Alum, White	Zagh Sufed	3	45	,,	1,000 Mds. (Tabreez).
,, Black	,, Siah	4	0	,,	10 ,,
Copra	Narjil	5	0	,,	500 ,,
Indigo	Nil	58	0	,, (Multan)	500 ,,
,,	,,	90	0	,, (Madras)	5 boxes (1 Md. Indian).
Camphor	Jadwa	8	0	,,	5 mds.
Pan roots	Kisha Jouz	6	20	,,	20 ,,
Nutung	Jouz	22	0	,,	5 ,,
	Kandur	9	0	,,	Unknown.
Preserve	Minabha Zangbill	1	50	,,	1 tin.
Limes	Limu	7	00	Muscat	200 mds.
Copper	Mis	16	0	London	1,000 ,,
Iron	Ahan Thakta	2	45	,,	8,000 ,,
,,	,, Sikh	3	0	,,	2,000 ,,
,,	,, ,,	3	0	,,	2,000 ,, Tabreez.
,,	Foolad No. 1	4	50	,,	100 ,, ,,
,,	,, ,, 2	3	15	,,	50 ,, ,,
Solder	Kalai	29	0	,,	100 ,, ,,
Brass	Bunj Thahta	16	0	,,	600 ,, ,,
,,	,, ,,	14	0	,,	
,,	Sima	50	0	,,	Unknown.
Tin	Halbi	55	0	,,	50 boxes (1 box=11 Mds. T.)
Candles	Sham No. I	35	0	,,	4,000 boxes.
,,	,, ,, II	31	0	Belgium	2,000 ,,
Cochineal	Kirmiz	42	0	France	200 Mds. (Indian).
	Arak Gugard	100	0		400 boxes (1 box=1T. Md.)
Matches	Kabrit	107	0	Sweden	1 box=50 gross 1,000 boxes.
,,	,,	125	0	Japan	500 ,,
	Nusadar	10	0		30 Mds.
Oxide of iron	Suranj	4	0	India	10 barrels (11 mds. Tabreez =1 barrel).
Kerosine oil	Naft	3	15	Russia	5,000 boxes (1 box=17½ Mds. Tabreez).
,, ,,	,,	3	10	,,	81 boxes=5 Mds.
	Kafur	50	0	India	5 Mds.
Yarn	Riss Claf	30	0	,,	100 packages, 3,000 bundles.
,,	,, ,,	29	0	England	3,000 bundles.
,,	,, Bist	22	50	,,	2,000 ,,
,,	,, Guli	26	0	India	500 ,,
,,	,, ,,	24	50	,,	2,000 ,,
,,	,,	30	0	England	3,000 ,,
,,	,,	20	0	India	40,000 ,,
Tea pot	Gauri No. 1	7	0	Russia.	
,, ,,	,, ,, 2	5	50	,,	
,, ,,	,, ,, 3	4	50	,,	
,, ,,	,, ,, 4	4	0	,,	
,, ,,	,, ,, 5	3	0	,,	
,, ,,	,, ,, 6	3	0	,,	
,, ,,	,, ,, 7	2	50	,,	
,, ,,	,, ,, 8	1	50	,,	
Samovar	Samaver			,,	
	Biruj No. 1	7	0	,,	
	,, ,, 2	6	0	,,	
Tray	Sini Biruj	35 Krans per pair.			
	,, Kuchak	38 ,, ,, ,,			
	Tasht Biruj	37 ,, ,, ,,			
Lamp	Lamp	From 3 Krans to 100 Krans.			
Cups	Istakan	,, 35 ,, ,, 70 ,, per 100.			
	Tinjan Kahwa	,, 5 ,, ,, 12 ,,			
Salt Cellar	Namak Dan	,, 3 ,, ,, 50 ,,			
Candlestick	Lala Paia Buland	2 for 45 Krans.			
Hookah	Kahan Bulin	20 to 30 ,,			
	,, Nazuk	3 to 4 ,,			
Sugar basin	Kandan Balur	1 Kran 50 cents to 5 Krans.			

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

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Dated Kerman, the 27th December 1904.

Enclo 2
Bro no 99

From—A. Gleadowe Newcomen, Resident Commercial Mission,
To—The Secretary, Indian Tea Cess Committee.

In continuation of my last letter to you dated Bahramabad, 12th instant, I have the honour to report the arrival of the Mission here. We entered Kerman on the morning of the 16th, after a very cold journey in the course of which the thermometer marked, at night, an average of 24 degrees of frost. We were extremely well received by the Governor-General, who sent a very big Peishwas some miles out to meet us and to conduct us through the city to the British Consulate, which stands about two miles out of Kerman to the East.

Kerman is a rather large and well built town with a population computed at from 60,000 by Major Sykes to between 90,000 and 100,000 by the Persian authorities. It forms a distributing centre to most of the large towns in the 18 districts of the province of Kerman and a transport depôt to Yezd, Bam and the Khorassan province.

We have unfortunately found the gathering of satisfactory information difficult, in fact almost impossible, work.

In Kerman and in the whole of South East Persia Indian tea seems at a discount, very little indeed being used, except by the poorer classes, for blending with Lamsars, though very great quantities are imported through Bunder Abbas and along the Quetta-Nushki route for consumption in Khorassan and the North, some of this transit trade passing through Kerman. Locally, however, Indian teas, quite apart from the fact of their being too strong and harsh for the palate of the people, are unfashionble.

One of the leading merchants here, Mirza Ali, informed me that about 1 pie in the rupee was used of Indian tea in Kerman; and that only by very poor people, and then he went on to say that some time back a firm from India had sent some tea for distribution and to try and introduce it to the people and that the saying goes that all who drank it got ill. The popular idea seems to be that Indian tea is not suited to the requirement of the place because of the dryness of the climate, its consumption causing intense nervousness. How far there is any truth in this I cannot say. In Khorassan and up North, where it is extremely cold and damp, Indian tea of the Souchong type is in request.

During my interview with the Parsee Anjuman I was told that Major Phillot, Acting Consul here, had given them samples of tea, resembling the tea in canisters given me for presentation by the Tea Cess Committee, and that they had tried the tea and found it good, but had not been able to bring it into favour, owing to the fact that it was not thought fashionable. I cannot help repeating, however, that if India could produce, or doctor teas suitable to the tastes of Southern Persia, teas that would be light in colour no matter how long they were infused, free from the presence of any pronounced bitterness more of the nature of the old highly (artificially I believe) flavoured China teas and packed after the style of Java pekoes in small chests and boxes they would probably take. If the tea trade in South-East Persia, where Russia can hardly be said at present to be a competitor (though she may easily become one *viâ* Meshed, having a railway running along the Frontier) is to be pushed, now that the field is open to us. Agents at Sirjan, Rafsinjan, Kerman and Bam, Khojas for choice are necessary. Teas might be imported in October through Bunder Abbas. Suitable Indian blacks and flowery pekoes in bulk, for the saving of customs dues. Blending and repacking would be done after the Customs had been passed in packages of 5 and 10 lbs. also of 1 and 2 lbs. A proportion of the more expensive sort might be packed in fancy tins with locks and also packets of lower class teas for poor people valued at say 1 or 2 krans each.

The possession of Khoja agents, who would correspond in Hindustani, would do away with the trouble of carrying on correspondence in the Persian language. Another satisfactory way of working might be found by the Committee entering into correspondence with the "Sherket Umumi," a rather important Persian Trading Company, whose headquarters are at Tehran and which has agencies everywhere in Persia as well as in Bombay. These people might be inclined to take up an agency for Indian teas or work in with the Indian Tea Cess Committee in pushing Indian teas. Enquiries will satisfy you as to the status of these people.

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There is no doubt that speaking generally, the tea trade of Persia is on the increase. Opium smoking is increasing and every opium smoker drinks quantities of tea. The Parsees who never drank tea in former times, now all drink it, but all want a light flavoury tea with lots of aroma as milk is never used.

The importation of Java teas into Persia cannot be looked on perhaps as altogether an alien trade. It is a trade with India as all Java teas are imported from Bombay, China tea to a less extent in the same way. The opening up of the Batoum route, enabling Russian provinces, such as Bokhara, to avoid the Customs duty has of course hit the Gulf trade, but is likely to improve trade in tea by giving it greater facilities. I send you all the samples of all the teas found in Kerman, all of which are imported through Bombay, with Enclosure A, giving details of approximate yearly consumption, cost landed here, cost of carriage and length of time occupied in transit from Bunder Abbas, etc., also Enclosures B and C, giving the names of merchants and the route from Bahramabad to Kerman. A list in English and Persian of the tea firms in Calcutta has been presented to the head men of each of the trading communities here, as also a canister of tea.

P. S.—Since writing the above I have to report that the Deputy Governor of Kerman and Jernft, also the Persian Consul of Kerman, have asked to come and see samples of Indian tea as well as to be presented with some for trial; of course I have made all arrangements for their reception and presentation of a canister of tea each.

I may mention that the above is an unprecedented course of action for these officials to have taken, and I only trust it may foreshadow an interest in Indian trade.

I worked the thing when lunching with the Governor yesterday.

Enclosure A.

There are seven varieties of tea imported into Kerman. Lamsars of four sorts, green tea, Appar and Indian black tea of one variety. The Customs authorities however recognise only three varieties, and green tea, of which the import is very small, is reckoned as being black, all teas being bought in and manifested from Bombay, the Customs officials say that they often have considerable difficulty in determining the country of origin, and are afraid the China teas—Appar and green—often get listed as India.

All tea is purchased in Bombay, payment being made by agents in cash or by cheque against documents. It is imported through Bunder Abbas. The time occupied in transit from the port to Kerman is about 30 days. The cost of carriage varies from 1 Kran to 1¾ Krans per batman or Tabreez maund. The approximate cost landed in Persia is :—

Lamsars No. 1, ₹52-8-0 per box of 40 lbs.
" No. 2, ₹14 to 45 "
" No. 3, ₹37-8-0 "
" No. 4, ₹35-0-0 "
Green tea ₹ 4 to ₹6-4 per Tabreez maund.
Appar tea ₹62 to ₹63 per box of 40 lbs.
Black tea at 8 annas per lb in Bombay at ₹5 per Tabraez maund.

Approximate yearly demand.

Java, Lamsar, No. 1, ₹1,300 boxes (of 40 lbs).
" No. 2, ₹1,200 " "
" No. 3, ₹800 " "
" No. 4, ₹800 " "
China green 4 Indian maunds yearly imported in bags covered with matting and then wrapped in leather.
China Appar, 20 boxes of 40 lbs.
Indian black, 300 boxes of 80 lbs.

No. 4 Lamsar is packed in 40 lb. boxes containing some time four boxes of 5 and 10 lbs. There is no Lamsar imported in fancy tin boxes.

The Indian black tea is only used for mixing to meet the demands of the poorer classes.

So far as we can ascertain no tea is imported through Russian sources to Kerman.

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Enclosure B.

Hindu traders in Kerman, nearly all agents or partners of Shikarpur houses, hold the cream of the Kerman trade. General merchants attending chiefly to tea, sugar, cottons and indigo.—

Also petty dealers working here for their own hands. "Khorda Farosh."

Bhoj Raj of Telu Mal Chamandas.
Bada Mul of Rada Kishendas.
Ganga Ram of Hond Raj
Tharoo Mull of Asanad Jitanand.
Sunhar Das of Sunder Das, Istar Das.
Pais Ram of the firm of Sobraj.
Teo Mal of Ganga Ram, Topan Dass.
Hut Chand of Chohar Mul.

Hem Raj.
Khera Mal.
Narain Das.
} The chief.

Muhammedan tea and general merchants with their Agents.

Aga Ali.—Bombay Agent, Mirza Muhammed Bakar Afshar, Bunder Abbas Agent, Hajji Mind Hussain Gilidari, Amin-ul-Tajar.

Hajji Aga Bazurg, Bombay Agent, Saiid Muhammed Kuladar, Agent in Bunder Abbas, Abdul Gaffur.

Saiid Yah Yah, Isfahani.—Agent in Bunder Abbas, Hajji Muhammed Hussain Gilidari Saiid Yah Yah, Yezdi—Bombay Agent, Mir Muhammed Bakar Afshar, Agent in Bunder Abbas, H. M. H. Gilidari.

Aga Rahim Tink.—Bombay Agent Hajji Hussain Ali, Agent in Bunder Abbas, H. M. H. Gilidari.

Aga Mehndi, Local Manager of the Persian Company, known as the "Sherket Umumi," which has a branch in Bombay, with head quarters in Teheran.

Mirza Ali, Bombay Agent M. M. Baker Afshar; has also Hindu Agent, Telu Mul Chamandas, at Shikarpur and Karachi.

Parsee merchants mostly trade in tea and woollens :—

Arbab Shahariar.
Mirza Sarushiar.
Rushim Khushru.
Gustash Kai Khushru.
Ardeshir Khushru.
Khodadad Kai Khushru.
Hoashurg Behruz.
Shohrab Rustum.
Kai Khushru Meheraban.

Enclosure C.

Route from Bahramabad, chief town of Rafsiajan to Kerman.—The road between these two towns is level and offers no difficulties, except during wet weather, when a piece of swampy ground, about 20 miles wide, known as the Duk becomes impossible.

Bahramabad to Kabuter Khan, 28 miles east, good road along valley at K. K., supplies scant, water plentiful.

Kabuter Khan to Baghim, 32 miles, good road eastward along valley. Water and supplies good at Baghim. At Robat, a village half-way between K.K. and Baghim, supplies are also plentiful and there is a particularly fine caravanserai.

Baghim to Satabad.—10 miles, good road small supplies, fair water. The soil at Satabad changes from the strewn clay of the Rafsinjan valley to the sand of the Kerman valley.

Satabad to Kerman. 9 miles, road good, supplies plentiful at Kerman. A city with a population computed from 50,000 to 60,000 by Major Sykes to 90,000 to 100,000 by the Persians. It is the head quarters of the Governor-General, the British and Russian Consuls, the Director of Customs, the C.M.S., and there is a branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia and a British Telegraph (Indo-European) office.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 6037 F. D.—6-4-1905.—81.—B. N. D.

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

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No. 1471-E.A., dated Simla, the 18th April 1905.

Endorsed by the Government of India, Foreign Department.

1. Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 17th November 1904, with enclosures.
2. Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 26th November 1904, with enclosures.
3. Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 25th January 1905, with enclosures.
4. Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 2nd February 1905, with enclosures.
5. Letter from the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 20th March 1905, with enclosures.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded to Assistant Quarter Master General, Intelligence Branch, confidentially for information.

No. 1472-E.A., dated Simla, the 18th April 1905.

Endorsed by the Government of India, Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing letter is forwarded to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, / Honourable the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, / Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, / His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman, / His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Bunder Abbas,

Letter from the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, dated the 20th March 1905, with enclosure.

for information, in continuation of the endorsement from the Government of India in the Foreign Department No. 891/892-E. A. (Confidential), dated 2nd March 1905.

No. 1473-E.A., dated Simla, the 18th April 1905.

Endorsed by the Government of India, Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing letter is forwarded to the Department of Commerce and Industry for information, in continuation of the endorsement from the Foreign Department, No. 894-E. A. (Confidential), dated the 2nd March 1905.

Letter from the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, dated the 20th March 1905, with enclosure.

No. 1474-E.A., dated Simla, the 18th April 1905.

From—R. E. Holland, Esq., I.C.S., Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

With reference to the correspondence ending with the endorsement from the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, No. 891-E.A. (Confidential), dated the 2nd March 1905, I am directed to forward, for your information, a copy of the papers cited on the margin regarding the disposal of Government property in possession of Mr. Gleadowe Newcomen, President of the Commercial Mission to Persia.

Extract from letter from the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, dated the 28th February 1905.
Telegram to the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, No. 1227-E.A., dated the 23rd March 1905.

2. I am to request that you will sell the horses, crediting the proceeds to Government and that you will dispose of the remainder of the articles in such manner as you may consider most suitable.

MEMORANDUM.

The papers specified in the margin were transmitted to the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 16-M., dated the 20th April 1905.

Commercial Mission to Persia.
Letter from the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, No. 62, dated the 3rd February 1905, with enclosure.
Telegram to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 842-E.A., dated the 27th February 1905.
Telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 38, dated the 1st March 1905.
Letter from the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, dated the 28th February 1905, with enclosures.
Letter to the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, No. 1241-E.A., dated the 25th March 1905.
Letter from the Secretary, India Chamber of Commerce, dated 20th March 1905, with enclosures.

G. C. Press, Simla,—No. C151 F. D.—19-5-05.—00.

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

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No. 19.

TEHRAN,

7th March 1905.—(Received 10th April 1905.)

Sir,

With reference to Major Cox's Despatch to me No. 6 of January 29th, copy of which has been sent to you, I have the honour to transmit herewith my reply, respecting the treatment of the Commercial Mission at Bunder Abbas.

To Bushire No. 9, 7th March.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

A. H. HARDINGE.

The Secretary to the Government of India

in the Foreign Department,

Calcutta.

No. 9

TEHRAN,

7th March 1905.

Sir,

I have received your despatch No. 6 of January 29th respecting the treatment of the Indian Commercial Mission at Bunder Abbas and the state of affairs there.

On receiving the report therein referred to by Major Sykes I complained officially to M. Naus and received an assurance that M. Cattersel of whose objectionable character I had been informed by Captain Grey when at Bunder Abbas and who was the only Belgian official in all the Persian cities I have visited not to call on me, should be transferred from his post as Director of Customs at that port. I understand that this has been done, and that M. Cattersel has actually left Bunder Abbas to assume the position of assistant at Bushire. I enclose an extract from my letter on the subject to M. Naus.

I am again reminding the Persian Government of the matter of the Lingah quarantine arrangements which is stated to be under the jurisdiction of the Grand Vizir.

I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

A. H. HARDINGE.

Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E.,

Bushire.

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

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TEHRAN,

29th December 1904.

M. le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de transmettre sous ce pli à titre officieux, n'ayant point encore reçu les ordres du Gouvernement des Indes, d'en saisir V. E. officiellement copie en langue anglaise d'une lettre adressée à notre Consul à Kirman par le Président de la Mission Commerciale envoyée par les Chambres de Commerce Indiennes avec l'appui et sous la protection du Gouvernement Viceroyal dans les provinces du sud est da la Perse.

V. E. partagera sas doubte le regret que j'ai éprouvé en constatant que le seul fonctionnaire du Gouvernement Persan qui ait manqué de courtoisie vis à vis de la Mission ait été le représentant à Bender Abbas du Ministère Impérial des Douanes, M. Cattersel, qui aurait cependant reçu des ordres spéciaux de Téhéran de la recevoir avec tous les égards possible.

V. E. s'est plainte à plusieurs reprises d'articles dans la Presse Anglo-Indienne attribuant aux fonctionnaires du service qu'elle préside un parti pris contre les intérêts commerciaux et les ressortissants de l'Empire Indien, et j'ai fait mon possible de mon côté pour dissiper chez les autorités indiennes aussi bien que dans les sphères commercialles, des appréciations que je reconnaissais être dépourvues de justesse. Aussi ne puis-je que déplorer l'effet qui ne manquera point d'être produit aux Indes par le récit du Président de la Mission Commerciale de son accueil par le Chef de la Douane de Bende Abbas, récit qui ne pourra que fortifier les impressions regrettables que je me suis toujours efforcé de combattere. Je serai heureux de pouvoir assurer le Gouvernement Viceroyal le plutôt possible et avant que je ne recoive l'ordre d'entretenir V. E. officiellement de ces incidents, que le Ministère des Douanes a spontanément aussitôt qu'il les a connus, adressé à son représentant à Bender Abbas le rappel à l'ordre que comporte sa conduite.

* * * * (Signe) A. H. HARDINGE.

C. G. Press, Simla.—C 33 F. D.—19-4-05.—55.—E. A. D'S.

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Dated Cawnpore, the 12th (received 14th) April 1905.

Pro no 106

From—A. SHAKESPEAR, Esq., Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Commercial Mission to Persia.

I am directed to hand you a copy of the fifth report received from Mr. Newcomen, dated Bam, the 20th January 1905, as also copy of a letter, dated Bam the 20th January 1905, addressed to the Indian Tea Cess Committee, Calcutta, by Mr. Newcomen.

Dated Bam, the 20th January 1905.

Enclo

From—A. GLEADOWE-NEWCOMEN, Esq., President, Commercial Mission,

Pro no 106

To—The Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore.

We arrived in Bam on the evening of the 14th instant, all well, having crossed the mountains from Khabis by way of Andujird and Gok, emerging into the open valley of Tehrud on the 11th, getting into Bam on the evening of the third day after. At Darzin, one stage before Bam, Mr. Ryan joined us from Kerman, having travelled by the main caravan route *viâ* Naibid.

We were rather disappointed in Khabis an important trading centre, we found a pleasing village set in the midst of wide-stretching orange groves and date palm plantations. The population of the place, which is an oasis on the edge of the great desert of the Lut, numbers about 5,000 in towns and 10,000 in district. Its chief trade is in the exportation of henna and dates. Of the former between 30,000 and 40,000 go to Khorasan and 270,000 to Yezd; of the latter 1,110,000 lbs. are produced annually in the district and 810,000 lbs. exported to Afghanistan, Khorasan and Yezd. The trade is conducted on barter principles, grain being taken in exchange (none being raised locally) when grain is dear in the district, but cheap in Khorasan. If however grain is dear in Khorasan, and cheap in Khabis, money changes hands. There are no merchants in Khabis, only petty shopkeepers, who get their stocks from Kerman, and who remain in Khabis 8 months.

Goods intended for Khorasan and Afghanistan go *viâ* Birjand, where they are transhipped and sent on to Meshed and Herat. The cost of transport is 60 krs per kharvar to Birjand. The trade is direct to Seistan *viâ* Neh to Nazirabad. Cost 10 tomans per kharvar. The roads bifurcate in the centre of the Lut at Gudar Bant. It would be possible with the expenditure of a little money and a little engineering skill to make the present road between Khabis and Kerman, which is unpassable for camels and very difficult for mules, easy and much shorter, and thus also to gain a direct caravan route between Kerman and Khorasan.

Some details regarding the date palm, whose fruit forms the staple product of Khabis, and also of Baluchistan, may not be without interest. The life of a date palm is 150 years, and it bears 180 lbs. fruit per annum. The fruit is sold at about 1*d.* per lb. In winter the soil round the trees is turned over by deep hoeing and the trees are watered once a fortnight. In summer the watering is done once every 7 or 8 days.

Gok, where we stopped a day in our difficult journey through the mountains from Khabis to Bam, is a fertile spot in a barren waste of hills. It supplies Kerman and Bam with quantities of raisins. The average annual produce of the district is 800,000 lbs. Of this 150,000 lbs. go to Bam and thence to Bunder Abbas, and 184,000 to Kerman whence much is sent on to Yezd. The balance of the 800,000 lbs. is consumed locally. There is also a considerable trade in pomegranates and tobacco with Kerman. There are no traders of any kind and no bazaar. In spite of the intense cold at this elevated spot, the people wear no woollen garments, heaping on more and more cotton things as the cold increases.

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Bam is the most fertile and flourishing place that we have yet come across in Persia and the few merchants there and here seem intelligent and not averse to progress, the Parsees especially being in this respect a great improvement on the Kerman folk.

With a view to expediting our enquiries, we sent on certain questions through the British Consulate to the Governor of Bam and Narmashir requesting him to obtain the information sought for from the merchants here. The result was not satisfactory. I enclose the questions with their replies, as they are a very good example of the difficulties attending our enquiries.

The big Tehran firm of Arab Jamshird has just established a branch here, and the Agent, Arab Ardishir, is particularly go ahead. He has lost no time in trying to develop local trade in every direction, and has opened up direct trade with Bunder Abbas, in place of, as has hitherto been the case, getting goods by a round-about road through Kerman.

Jamshird's firm is just at present unfortunately pushing Russian manufactures. I send you samples of their stuff furnished by Arab Ardishir. They are therefore just now competitors of ours, but it seems that it would not be difficult to convert them into allies Ardishir, after a very careful examination of the samples, both woollen and cotton, and prices furnished me, an examination he renewed three times, gave it as his opinion that Indian goods were cheaper and better than Russian, and that, especially if India could imitate certain favourite Russian lines at an advantage, that he could do a trading in Bam-Narmashir alone of Rs. 5,000 a month. He added that if the Cawnpore firms would enter into correspondence with the head of the firm at Tehran it would in all probability lead to the closing of the Russian communication and the enlargement of Indian trade.

I enclose a list of samples (Enclosure "A") and send you on the samples I have secured from the merchants and *Kalanter*. Enclosure B gives you the names of the merchants of Bam. For our itinerary please see our copy of the Indian Tea Cess letter.

Bam, as I have said, is, for Persia, a very fertile place, what is more cultivation, and particularly the cultivation of cotton, could by a little engineering skill in the collection of water, erection of dams, and distribution, be greatly increased and the quality of cotton improved by the importation of good Egyptian or Bombay seed; it is much warmer here than in Narmashir and at Jiruft, and the summer is longer than at Sirjan and Rafsinjan, both of which circumstances are in favour of this district as a cotton growing one. As henna being a more valuable crop has gradually absorbed nearly to the extinction of grain, cotton, &c., the present available cultivable area, owing to a somewhat limited water supply, but this supply is capable of being increased.

From all this region the cost of sending produce to the port would be small as compared with Rafsinjan, for the distance is considerably less and the roads easier.

The people of this region, notwithstanding the exactions of their Governors, are very much better off than those of other parts of Kerman, thanks to the large profits made from the collection and sale of henna, and Major Sykes declares that any Bami Khan has five times as much money as any Khan of Kerman.

Derzin too, our last camp before getting into Bam, was the centre of a well cultivated and thickly peopled region in the 12th century. It stands now in the midst of a deserted and dreary waste of sand and stones

There is however no reason why given decent administration and skilful irrigation engineering this state of prosperity should not return.

In my opinion the question of irrigation is the most serious problem before us. Persia is, slowly but surely, drying up. Everywhere can be seen remains of cities which would not have existed, situated as they were, unless they have

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cultivation round them. These are to be met with even in the terrible "Lut" cultivation, with Persia's small rain fall, could not have existed without irrigation, and apparently what has happened has been that owing to raids or internal strife, *kanats* became neglected and silted up. The people having no time to clean them had the choice of dying of thirst or of emigrating elsewhere to a place of greater safety and more easily accessible water supply, so the desert grew. I have never ceased regretting the absence of an engineer on the Mission, as a layman I can see the immense possibilities for irrigation and road making but also I am not sufficiently *au fait* with the technicalities of the question to lay before you any scheme. Major Sykes showed his wisdom and knowledge of the wants of the country when he asked for, or rather suggested, that an engineer should accompany; when one travels through hundreds of square miles of mountains, all absolutely devoid of vegetation of any kind, and realises the enormous amount of water that must rush down their precipitous sides, going no one knows, or apparently cares whither, when one marches through dreary miles of river beds, most dry, some carrying a fair supply of water and emerges on to the plain strewn with black broken stones, or with loose rocksand cobbles a sand and dreary desert, one cannot help but exclaim "water is the key stone of the problem." In a land that is nearly all desert, wherever there is water the desert, as in Egypt changes its aspect and becomes a smiling garden. I must crave your forgiveness for having wandered from purely business subjects, but when one thinks that water means cultivation, which means population, which again means trade, I am sure you will agree with me regarding the importance of what I have written.

These bare mountains and sandy deserts mean an enormous amount of silt which chokes up the peoples kanats, and all I can say is, that if with their faulty levels and crude methods they can cultivate as much as they do, with skilled irrigation they could do infinitely more.

The country is now free from Afghan and Baluch raids, the Nomads no longer burn slay and loot as they used to, so that if we could give Persia increased cultivation through improved irrigation I think we may safely hope for the rest to follow.

Since our arrival in Bam we have had several interviews with local notables, including the Governor, Adal-u-Dowla, who also dined with us, and with the merchants. These last are as I have remarked, a distinct improvement on the Kermanis in intelligence and energy. From them I was able to extract some useful and interesting information.

The population of the town of Bam is from ten thousand to twelve thousand that of Bam district being about 50,000. Geographically Bam is of great importance as it is the natural distributing centre for the whole of Persian Baluchistan as well as being the last town of importance between Kerman and India, the next being Quetta 700 miles to the East. For further information regarding Bam, its trade, and the British Consular Agent lately appointed to it, Khan Bahadur Ashgar Ali, I would refer you to my letter of date to the Indian Tea Cess Committee, a copy of which is being sent to you. I look upon the appointment of the Khan Bahadur to Bam as of great importance to Indian trade and would suggest full range of samples clearly marked in Persian, being placed at his disposal. He will be at Bam by the end of May and parcels sent care of Consul Kerman will be forwarded to him.

Caravan Routes.

Bam is served by three main caravan tracks :—

One runs from Bunder Abbas *viâ* Jiruft, a good road but troubled at times, mostly in the spring, by Bashikirdi Arab nomads. Caravans using this road take from 15 to 20 days for the journey, the cost of carriage ranging from 7 to 12 tomans per Kharvar of 100 maunds, Tabreez (6½ lbs).

The other two roads run from Kerman to Bam, one *viâ* Naibid, the other *viâ* Rain. These roads bifurcate a day's march out of Kerman and reunite a day's march out of Bam. The telegraph has been laid along the Naibid road,

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which is the shorter by some 15 miles and it is used by the post and the majority of Kaffilas. The road is quite a good one for Persia. There are some wide river ends to cross, which would be very awkward in time of flood, and at times water is scarce, at others salt, but there are no narrow defiles or high passes. Robberies some times take place. Last week the post messenger was tied up near Naibid for a day, but having no parcels was not robbed. A short time previously, also near Naibid, in the Rudkhana-i-Duzdi or "Thieves River," a caravan belonging to a high Persian official was looted.

The cost of carriage between Kerman and Bam, about 140 miles, varies from 3 to 5 tomans, and caravans take from 7 to 8 days to do the journey.

There are other tracks connecting Bam and various villages in the hills and desert, but they are not much used and need no comment here.

Khorasan-Seistan and Bunder Abbas Routes.

The great caravan track from Herat, Khorasan and Seistan to Bunder Abbas passes however within three day's march to the eastward of Bam.

Through the Lut, or desert, there is but one caravan route, that running through Farhaj and Nusratabad. Originally however when starting from Bunder Abbas the tracts are two. One of the main road, runs through Minab and then through the Rudbar District to Rigan, this bounded north. The other lies west and north of this, going by way of a defile known as the Rudkhana-i-Duzdi—there are several such in Persia—through western Rudhar and unites with the main road near Mil-i-Farhad, to the south of Rigan. The choice of tracks is determined partly by the water-supplies and partly by the likelihood of meeting brigands.

From Bunder Abbas caravans take :—

To Seistan 40 days.

To Meshed 60 „

Cost of carriage :—

Seistan 15 tomans per Kharvar.

Meshed 20 to 30 tomans per Kharvar.

Products.

Cotton, Raw, sown March—April, picked October—November. Crop 100,000 maunds, Tab. yielding 30,000 maunds cleaned cotton. Price spot 37 to 38 tomans per Kharvar cleaned. This has so far been all used at home. This year however Arab Ardeshir sent a trial shipment of 3,000 maunds to Bombay.

Cotton Manufactured.—A course cloth called "Garah" is manufactured and sold at ½ a kr. a yard. Some 800,000 yards of this are produced a year, about 3,000 women being employed for 6 months in spinning and weaving.

Wool, Raw.—About 10,000 maunds (Tab.) half of which is fine wool, or coork, are produced in the Bam District yearly, and handled by the merchants, who buy in small quantities from the herdsmen and farmers, some lots of the best being however, sent in by Khans from their estates. This wool is all exported to Kerman, Yezd, Kum and Isfahan, where it realises from 8 to 14 krs. a maund for fine, and from 4 to 8 for coarse. The wool is nearly all used in the manufacture of carpets and none is exported to India, no samples procurable just now, I am told however that the quality is very good, am making enquiries as to chance of starting trade with India.

Henna.—This is the chief product of the district which produces some 500,000 maunds annually, about ⅘ of this goes to Yezd, where it is ground at the rate of 1½ krs. per maund and distributed to the chief towns in Persia. The remaining ⅕ is treated locally, part being used locally and part finding its way into Baluchistan and Afghanistan.

Price spot, unground 2 to 2½ krs. per maund.

Do. ground 3 to 3½ ditto.

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I would strongly recommend Messrs. Gavin Jones and Co. making a cheap mill suitable for manual, donkey or bullock power for grounding henna, and to enable them to cater for this trade, I am sending samples of ground and unground henna. If the people here could grind the henna cheaply and well it would mean a saving of 20 per cent. in freight to Yezd.

Indigo.—The plant grown here is smaller and has finer leaves than the varieties grown in Behar and the United Provinces. It is locally known by the name "Prang" few calling it *nil*. It is practically never treated for the extraction of the dye, but is ground in the same manner as henna and is mixed with it to form a paste for the dyeing of beards and hair, where black is preferred to red. 30,000 maunds of leaf are produced, and nearly all is sent to Yezd. Spot price 1½ to 3 krs. per maund.

Lintels.—(Moong) Annual production 30,000 maunds, 20,000 maunds sent to Kerman and Baluchistan. 2 Tomans per Kharvar.

Barley and Oats.—Production of both 3,000,000 maunds, about 50,000 maunds go to Bunder Abbas; 600,000 to Kerman and other places. Price Barley 4 Tomans per Kharvar, Oats 2 tomans per Kharvar.

Dates.—50,000 maunds a year, about 3,000 maunds of the best go to Kerman, spot price 1 Kr. for from 1½ to 2 maunds. The people live largely on dates and the local production is supplemented by about 15,000 maunds brought in from Baluchistan.

Rice.—40,000 maunds produced; 10,000 maunds go to Kerman. Price 2 to 3 Krs. per maund.

Carraway Seed.—5000 maunds, all goes to Bunder Abbas for the Bombay Market.

Gum Tragacinth.—There is plenty of this in the district, but nothing is done with it. The plant producing it grows wild all over the hills and is in appearance like furze.

Minerals.—Lead, zinc and other minerals are found but are not worked in the hills near Abarik, and there are rumours of low grade diamond being found in a valley in the range north of Bam.

Imports.

Tea.—The imports of tea amount to from 400 to 500 boxes of 10 lbs. each of Lamsar annually, and about 100 to 150 lbs. of Indian tea, practically all of which is got through Kerman. The Lamsar is nearly all 3rd quality and the local price is from 5 to 6 tomans per 10 lb. box. Indian tea sells at an average of 2 Tomans per maund of 6½ lbs.

Sugar.—Marseilles loaf 10,000 boxes at 4½ to 5½ Krs. a maund. Crystal 6000 maunds at 4¼ to 4½ Krs. If India can only produce the quality of sugar in demand in Persia there seems to be a great opening for trade in this commodity.

Spices.—Small quantities of all sorts are imported mostly through Kerman.

Cloth.—Specimens and list accompanying all cloth used to come from Kerman, including British and Russian prints. The Russian goods are sent from large depôts or on indent from Russia, from Tehran and Meshed to Yezd, where a depot is maintained. From there it is forwarded to Kerman and other towns. This year however Arab Jamshird has entered into an arrangement with certain Russian firms for the distribution of Russian goods not as an agent but simply as a merchant working for his own profit, and direct shipments are being made to Bunder Abbas for South Persia.

Trade Methods.

In foreign trade here as elsewhere in South Persia business is, generally speaking, conducted by merchants and agents by the payment of cash against documents. The Russian houses give a heavy discount and though they do

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not give long credits, Persian traders dealing with Russia are able to get all the credit they want and also to get an advantage where the customs are concerned, by dealing through the Russian Bank at Tehran, which acts as a clearing agency and Bonded warehouse, taking over a merchants goods on part payment and note of hand, paying customs dues and charges; and letting the trader have a portion of the goods he has ordered, a fourth or a half as the case may be to trade with and make enough money to release the remainder when he wants.

It seems to me that some such arrangement might be made with the Imperial Bank of Persia on behalf of British and Indian trade.

For goods purchased in Persia from Kerman or Yezd, there is no special rule, goods being paid for sometimes in cash and cerdit mostly half credit being some times given for periods varying from 5 months to a year.

Agriculture.

The lands around Bam, and in the District, are mostly in the hands of a few Khans who have very extensive holdings, which they look after themselves, the villagers being their labourers for the most part. There are however certain Government or *Khalsa* lands mostly used for rice growing and a small amount of *raiatwari*. Small tenant farmers or peasant proprietors are the exception in Persia, even the wild Baluch villages being owned entirely by *Khans* or *Maliks*.

The Bam region is well watered, drawing its supplies from both open irrigation channels and from Kanats. In dry years when the winter rains and snows have been scanty, the streams often fail, but the Kanat supplies may be depended on, so long as the tunnels are kept clean.

Agricultural implements are primitive. A very light and weak plough, something like the plough used in the Kumaon Himalayas, and a very long handled narrow spade, are the chief. These are supplemented by a wooden harrow and an instrument for loosening the spade worked soil, resembling a quaint dining fork, also made of wood.

Russian Activity.

The Russian Consul in Kerman, M. Miller has been showing signs of activity recently. Shortly after we left Kerman he induced the English speaking Master of the Parsee Anjuman school, one Mirza Kaikhusru, to leave his post and take Russian service as an agent for the pushing of Russian trade in these parts of Persia, sending him to Odessa to receive certain orders from and give certain information to the authorities there. Another Agent he sent *viâ* Bunder Abbas, round up the gulf through Asiatic Turkey to Constantinople, presumably for a similar purpose. This is evidently meant as a counterblast to the Mission.

He also tried to plant an agent in Bam, trying to induce the leading Mohammedan merchant here, Saiid Abbas, to take up the post, pending the receipt of official sanction from Tehran. The man considered the matter for a while, but has now I am told, finally refused, declaring that he does not wish to be in opposition to the English and to the Khan Bahadur, with whom he has always been friends.

Indian Trade Advertisement.

It seems to me that a very good way of advertising Indian trade and bringing Persia into touch with India and its manufactures, would be to move the Government of India to purchase for consular *toshakhana purposes* instead of German gimcracks, as much as possible, articles produced and manufactured in India. It would have no difficulty in finding suitable articles.

Cawnpore alone could supply suitable leather, woollen and cotton goods, and other things could be got in other places. Our saddlery suit cases, leather mule trunks, boots, tents and samples of woollen materials have been the subject of universal comment admiration and surprise, the invariable

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remark being "Is it possible that such things can be made in India? Are they not from London?" In this connection please see my suggestions to the Tea Cess Committee.

I would also suggest that at each Consulate, Vice Consulate or Consular Agency, there should be an Indian sample room, properly fitted up with show cases.

2. A local merchant should be appointed to the charge of this show room and the samples.

3. A small retaining fee from 20 to 50 per mensem (according to the commercial importance of the place) ought to be paid. A small fee might be charged to firms utilising the show room, so as to cover actual expenses. This seems to be a cheap and efficient way for Government and the Commercial Community to advertise Indian goods.

The man in charge of the room ought to be styled "Consular Commercial Agent" and in addition to his duties in connection with the exhibition of samples, and the registration of orders and the effecting of sales for which he would get a small commission, he could be employed as a commercial intelligence attached to the Consulate.

I have discussed these matters with Major Sykes and he cordially agrees with me and is writing to Government on the subject.

The following information gathered by the Mission has been given to Major Sykes for incorporation in his annual consular report and I trust that my action may meet with your approval:—prices of cotton and production at various places also particulars of cost of carriage, length of transit, etc.

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 7th December 1904 enclosing copy of extract from the Minutes of a meeting of the Upper India Chamber of Commerce held on the 9th November 1904, and containing copies of correspondence with the *Pioneer* and *Indian Daily Telegraph*.

We move on for Narmashir tomorrow.

Enclosure A.

List of samples with prices.

No. 1. Woollen Sprigged-Russian—2 K. 15 Shais per gaz (1 yd. 2 in.) 50 pieces of 40 yards.

No. 2. "Fastani" union (Wool & Cotton) Russian 7 krs. gaz 100 Thans, both kinds.

No. 3. "Fastani" (Wool) Russian 12 Krs.

No. 4. Cotton cloth Russian 1 K. 4 shais gaz. 110 pieces.

No. 5. Cotton cloth Russian 1 K. 18 shais gaz. 50 pieces.

No. 6. Cotton flowered chintzs. Russian 14 shais. 400 to 500 pieces.

No. 7. Muslins Embroidered, Swiss No. 1 4 Krs. No. 2 5½ Krs. per yd. 30 pieces of 40 yards.

No. 8. Chintzs. Russian 12 shais yd. 200 pieces of 40 yards.

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No. 9. Sateens. English. 2 Krs. 15 shais yd. 100 pieces of 40 yards.
No. 10. Saloos Russian 15 shais yd. 200 pieces.
No. 11. Marmos. Russian 1 Kr. 15 shais. 50 pieces of 20 yards.
No. 12. Velveteens Russian. 7 K. 5 shais yd. 50 pieces of 20 yards.
No. 13. Chintzs German. 16 shais per yd. 200 pieces of 40 yards.
No. 14. Henna Leaf.
No. 15. Henna ground.
No. 16. Cleaned cotton.
No. 17. Indigo Leaf.
No. 18. Indigo ground.
No. 19. Gum Tragacinth.
No. 20. Coarse cotton cloth.

Enclosure B.

CHIEF TRADERS OF BAM.

Parsee—

Arab Ardeshir, Agent for Arab Jamshird of Tehran.
Behram Rustim—Yezdi.
Behram Mehrab.
Khodarahim Jehan Baksh.

Mohammedans—

Saiid Abbas. Yezdi, Head Merchant.
Aga Mohammed Hussain, Yezdi.
Aga Mohammed Ali. } Only trade in Henna and Indigo.
Aga Mohammed Sadik. }

Dated Bam, the 20th January 1905.

From—A. GLEADOWE NEWCOMEN, President, Commercial Mission,

To—The Secretary, Indian Tea Cess Committee.

I have the honour to advise you of our arrival in Bam from Kerman, by way of Khabir, which is on the edge of the Lut, the great desert of Persia.

Khabis is a small town, depending entirely for its supplies of tea and merchandise on Kerman. There are no traders there but only petty shop-keepers, who only stay 8 months in the year and for the other 4 go to Kerman. Bam, which includes Narmashir is comparatively speaking, a very rich and fertile place and is distinctly capable of improvement and develop-ment. There is more money amongst the Bam Khans than among any other people in the Kerman province and the merchants, especially the Parsees and in particular Arab Jamshird's Agent, are considerably more keen witted and energetic than the Kerman traders. Were the road from Bunder Abbas to Bam through Jiruft, properly secured against the Bashikard brigands, who raid periodically, a lot of the Bunder Abbas Kerman traffic would come round by this way. As it is Bam has hitherto been supplied through Kerman. Bam is nearer to Bunder Abbas than Kerman, the road on the whole is easier and it is the natural centre of trade for Persian Baluchistan and even Seistan

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it being the only town of any importance until Quetta is reached, some seven hundred miles away. Jamshird's Agent has however lately been carrying on a direct trade with the Port.

The tea consumption figures given me here are as follows :—

Lamsar No. 3, 400 to 500 boxes of ten lbs. each, price at from 5 to 6 tomans a box Indian tea 100 lbs. Costs 2 tomans per maund Tabreez.

There is one thing which has just come to my notice and which I should like to call your attention to as it explains in some measure the failure of Indian tea in these parts of Persia. It also shows the necessity that exists for Indian merchants in fact all merchants interested in any particular trade having trustworthy agents, or supervising agents, of their own in Persia.

In the beginning traders in Indian teas saw their way to big profits and quick returns. Taking advantage of the increasing favour in which Indian teas were being received, owing to their good quality, certain traders imported the cheapest and lowest grade tea they could find in Bombay and Calcutta, dirt and sweepings mostly, stuff that cost them landed in Kerman 4 to 5 annas a pound. This they palmed off on the Persians as Indian tea at 12 annas or 1 rupee more. It is small wonder that Indian tea fell into disrepute and that the Persians showed a preference for clean Lamsar in sealed boxes.

Enclosure A will give you the names of the chief local traders

A list of Calcutta firms interested in Tea has been given to the heads of the Mohammedan and Parsee merchants both in English and in Persian.

It will be interesting to note that Khan Bahadur who is at present attached to this Mission, is on the completion of our tour to be appointed British Political Agent here and I have great hopes that he will be able to do a good deal towards developing trade with India. He is an Indian himself and knowing that his superior, Major Sykes, Consul at Kerman, is very keenly interested in the matter of trade development, he will naturally do more than if he were a Persian or if he had not personal interests to serve.

I fancy Khan Bahadur will be here in May sometime and it would be good policy to open up correspondence with him. He understands Urdu and Persian well and also a little English.

I have presented the Major of Bam and the heads of the Parsee and Mohammedan merchants with a canister of tea each and done my best to interest them in matters Indian.

P. S.—A good way of pushing and advertising Indian tea would be for the Indian Tea Cess Committee to ask the Government of India to include in its *toshakhana* a certain number of ¼ lb. and ½ lb. chests of good flavoury Indian teas, small silver tea pots fitted with moveable silver infusers so as to reduce the chances of over infusion if the pot were put on the Samovar to keep warm. Every Consulate, Vice Consulate, and Political or Consular Agency has a Government toshakhana so that our request could easily be complied with by Government instructions how to make tea with best results, written in Persian or better still engraved on the tea pots would also be a great help.

Enclosure A.

Parsees.

Arab Ardeshir, Agent of Arab Jamshird of Tehran.
Beharam Rustum—Yezdi.
Behram Mahrab.
Khudarahim Jehanbaksh.

Mohammedans.

Saiid Abbas, Yezdi.
Aga Mohammed Hussain, Yezdi.

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Enclosure B.

Itinerary of Mission.

Kerman.—Dung Min (in the district of Darakht Anjun) 21 miles. Road fair first four miles from Kerman over plain, after which defile through foot hills of the Kuh Pia is entered, leading up for 15 miles to the water-shed at Kurgaz. Darakht Anjun is the name for a collection of villages in a valley. Water ample and good, food supplies and wood available in small quantities, fodder fairly plentiful.

Darakht-Anjun.—Char Farsakh or Faizabad. 25 miles. Road bad, impossible for camels, barely possible for ridden horses, over two steep kotals, one the "Angir Pass, 6,950 feet, with a rise of 2,500 feet in less than a mile. For this reason all the Kerman Khabis traffic is carried on by mules and donkeys. At Faizabad fuel scarce, small food supplies, ample water.

Faizabad-Khabis.—10 miles, good road down a quiet slope. At Khabis supplies are very plentiful as also water and forage and fire wood.

Khabis-Andujird.—15 miles south-east and easy and fair road. The village is one of 50 houses, supplies, wood and water fair.

Anjurid-Gok.—South 28 miles very difficult road for the first half, the last half being very fair. Supplies, water, grazing and fuel available at Gok.

Gok-Tehrud.—South-east 38 miles. Fair road, water very scarce along the route, at Tehrud water bad very salt, a good supply of sweet water is to be had three miles below the Serai at Khani-Khatoon, at the lower end of the valley, supplies scarce except fodder.

Teherud-Darzin.—30 miles east. Fair road but stony. Good water on road at Abarik, 10 miles from Tehrud. At Darzin supplies, forage, water plentiful. Fuel scarce.

Darzin-Bam.—18 miles east. Road fair and level. At Bam all supplies plentiful and water plentiful and good.

G. C. Press Simla.—No. 89 F.D.—30-4-05.—101.—E. A. D.S.

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Office Memo., No. 1753 E.-A., dated Simla, the 9th May 1905 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—The Assistant Quarter-Master-General, Intelligence Branch.

Letter from the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 12th April 1905, with enclosures.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Intelligence Branch, for information, in continuation of the office memorandum from the Foreign Department, No. 1471 E.-A., dated the 18th April 1905.

No. 1754 E.-A., dated Simla, the 9th May 1905.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

Letter from the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 12th April 1905, with enclosures.

A copy of the foregoing letter is forwarded to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, the Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Kerman, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Bunder Abbas, for information, in continuation of the endorsement from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 1472 E.-A. (Confidential), dated the 18th April 1905.

No. 1755 E.-A., dated Simla, the 9th May 1905 (Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

Letter from the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 12th April 1905, with enclosures.

A copy of the foregoing letter is forwarded to the Department of Commerce and Industry, for information, in continuation of the endorsement from the Foreign Department, No. 1473 E.-A. (Confidential), dated the 18th April 1905.

2. A copy of Mr. Newcomen's fifth report is also forwarded, herewith, for favour of transmission to the Director-General of Commerce and Industry.

No. 1756 E.-A., dated Simla, the 9th May 1905 (Confidential).

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—Sir Arthur Hardinge, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

(1) Letter from the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 28th February 1905, with enclosures.
(2) Letter to the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, No. 1241 E.-A., dated the 25th March 1905.
(3) Letter from the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 20th March 1905, with enclosures.
(4) Letter from the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 12th April 1905, with enclosures.

With reference to the correspondence ending with the letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 893 E.-A., dated the 2nd March 1905, I am directed to forward, for your information, a copy of the marginally noted correspondence, relative to the Commercial Mission to Persia.

MEMORANDUM.

Commercial Mission to Persia.
Letter from the Secretary, Upper India Chamber of Commerce, Cawnpore, dated the 12th April 1905, with enclosures.

The papers specified in the margin were transmitted to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 19 M., dated the 11th May 1905.

Foreign Office Press—No. 342—26-5-05—40.

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

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

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

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1905.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET—E.

Proceedings, August 1905, Nos. 288—307.

Question of retaining the flagstaffs erected in the neighbourhood of the Musandim Promontory.

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Previous Proceedings.					Later Proceedings.				
Secret, A, B, or D.	Classification.	Month.	Year.	Nos.	Secret, A, B, or D.	Classification.	Month.	Year.	Nos.
Secret	External . . .	May	1905	170—287					
,,	,, . . .	March	,,	707—794					

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289	Telegram to His Majesty's Secretary of State, No. 1213-E.B., dated the 22nd March 1905, enquiring whether the opinion of the Government of India was desired on the Admiralty letter to the India Office, of the 11th February 1905, regarding flagstaffs on Musandim	2
290	Endorsement to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 1224-E.B., dated the 23rd March 1905, forwarding, for information, a copy of the Admiralty letter to the India Office .	2
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292	Endorsement to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 1363-E.B., dated the 10th April 1905, forwarding a copy of the foregoing communications for information . . .	5—7
293	Telegram from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated the 5th (received 6th) May 1905, in view of the declaration made respecting the territorial limits of the Maskat Sultanate asking for the views of the Government of India as to the policy to be pursued as regards the flagstaff on Telegraph Island, as well as regards Sheep Island and the Maklab Isthmus	9
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297	From His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 16-(Secret), dated the 19th May (received 5th June) 1905, communicating the views of His Majesty's Government with respect to the question of hoisting the British flag at Cape Musandim, and the proposed action in connection with the flagstaffs erected on the isthmus between Malcolm and Elphinstone Inlets, on Telegraph Island, and on Sheep Island	17
298	Telegram to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 2241-E.B., dated the 12th June 1905, requesting him to await the receipt of a copy of the fresh despatch received from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India respecting the erection of flagstaffs at, and in the neighbourhood of, the Musandim Promontory	18

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300	Telegram to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 2612-E.B., dated the 9th July 1905, enquiring when his report may be expected about the flagstaffs erected in the neighbourhood of the Musandim Promontory	23
301	Telegram from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 9th (received 10th) July 1905, reporting that he awaits a reference from the Political Agent at Maskat in respect to the flagstaffs on Musandim, and on its receipt will telegraph his views	23
302	From the Political Secretary, India Office, No. 23, dated the 9th (received 26th) June 1905. Communication from the India Office to the Foreign Office, dated the 24th May 1905, forwarding, for information, copy of his despatch to the Government of India, dated 19th idem	23
303	Telegram from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 14th (received 15th) July 1905, intimating his opinion and that of Major Grey in regard to the re-occupation of the Telegraph Island	23
304	Telegram to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 2843-E.B., dated the 22nd July 1905, intimating that it is proposed to defer until declaration of Maskat Arbitration Award actual removal of staffs on Isthmus and Sheep Island, and suggests that question of retention of Telegraph Island flagstaff might be discussed with Sultan after award is given . . .	24
305	Extract from the *Al Ahram*, dated the 21st June 1905, regarding Musandim flagstaffs and Bahrein affairs	25
306	Endorsement to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 3060-E.B., dated the 9th August 1905, forwarding copy of an extract from the *Al Ahram*, dated the 21st June 1905 .	26
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FOREIGN DEPARTMENT NOTES.

SECRET—E., AUGUST 1905.

Nos. 288—307.

QUESTION OF RETAINING THE FLAGSTAFFS ERECTED IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF THE MUSANDIM PROMONTORY.

Pronc 288

FROM THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE, No. 8, DATED THE 24TH FEBRUARY (RECEIVED 13TH MARCH) 1905.

Communication from the Admiralty to the India Office, dated 11th February 1905, on the subject of the flags proposed to be hoisted in the neighbourhood of Cape Musandim.

[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated Maskat, the 8th March 1905.

From—CAPTAIN A. GREY, British Consul and Political Agent, Maskat,

To—S. M. FRASER, ESQ., C.I.E., Offg. Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Referring to the matter of the flagstaffs on Musandim peninsula, there appear to me to be two courses, either of which might be adopted should it be decided not to claim the sites as British territory. One is that we should induce the Sultan of Maskat, who claims the ground, to give the sites to us, and the other is that we should cause him to erect his own flags on the staffs already standing.

Either of these would prevent foreign occupation, and I am sure that the Sultan would agree to the second plan at least.

Subsequently we could easily obtain his permission to make what use we wished of the neighbourhood, and he is as you know pledged not to give or lease territory to other powers.

I thought you would not mind my suggesting these alternatives.

C. SOMERS COCKS.

As proposed. 19-3-05.

A copy of the India Office print may be forwarded to Major Cox for information and further developments awaited. Draft below.

2. As regards the suggestion that the northern extremity of the Musandim promontory be acquired by gift we have a precedent in the case of the Kurria Murria islands. But these islands were ceded in 1854 * before the conclusion of the Anglo-French declaration, and in connection with the proposals submitted† to the Secretary of State in 1902, in respect to the re-occupation of the old telegraph buildings at Elphinstone Inlet, His Excellency Lord Curzon enquired‡ about the lines on which we objected to the grant of Bunder Jisseh to the French in 1899 by the Sultan of Maskat. It was then explained that the objection§ was based both upon the Declaration of 1862,‖ and the agreement of 1891,¶ and it was further mentioned§ that the “French Government accepted** our reading of the Treaty of 1862 *that neither State might accept any cession or lease of Maskat territory.*

* See Deed of Cession at page 71, Aitchison’s Treaties, Volume XI, 1892.
† Pro. 21 in Secret E., November 1902, Nos. 7-21.
‡ Page 4 of notes, *ibid.*
§ *Ibid.*
‖ See Nos. 200 and 210 in Secret E., March 1899, Nos. 104-212.
¶ A copy of this Agreement(*a*) was sent by the Sultan of Maskat to the French Consul. See No. 182 in Secret E., March 1899, Nos. 104-212.
(*a*) For Agreement of 1891 see No. 396 in Secret E., July 1891, Nos. 395-398.
** No. 281 in Secret E., June 1899, Nos. 194-345. Also see answer to question asked in the House of Commons on the 9th March 1899 (No. 332, *ibid.*).

2. The first suggestion of Captain Grey would, therefore, seem to be one that is likely to re-open old discussions, while the second will mean a change in the policy so far pursued as to include the territory in question in the charge of the Consul†† at Bunder Abbas. The matter might well be left in the hands of His Majesty’s Government until the Defence Committee have been able to give an opinion. ‡‡

††See Nos. 173 and 177 in Secret E., August 1904, Nos. 172-179.
‡‡See page 28 of notes in Secret E., March 1905, Nos. 707-779.

C. O’H. T.,—16-3-05.

H. P. C.,—16-3-05.

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See marginal remark on page 1.

I agree that no action need be taken at present. Both the courses suggested by Major Grey involve recognition of Maskat sovereignty over the peninsula, the reasons against which policy are summed up in His Excellency's Minute of October 6th, 1902 (paragraph 4). Nothing has since occurred to alter the force of His Excellency's observations.

See Pros., Secret E., November 1902, Nos. 7-21.

17-3-05. C. SOMERS COCKS.

17-3-05. L. RUSSELL.

The letter of the Admiralty to the India Office, dated 11th February 1905, is for information.

The question of the flags, if any, to be flown on the flagstaffs recently erected in the neighbourhood of Cape Musandim, will depend largely upon the decision of the point, to be raised in connection with the Maskat Arbitration case, whether Cape Musandim and the Maklab peninsula are included within the territory of the Sultan of Maskat or not. In view of the fact that the French will challenge our position that this area is independent, it is unfortunate that at any rate the reoccupation of the old telegraph buildings in Elphinstone Inlet has not already been effected.

20-3-05. S. M. FRASER.

Please telegraph to the Secretary of State :—

Prom 288 "Admiralty letter to India Office of 11th February 1903. Flagstaffs on Musandim. Do you wish for our opinions either now or at a later stage?"

21-3-05. C[URZON].

Prom 289 TELEGRAM TO HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE, NO. 1213-E.B, DATED 22ND MARCH 1905.

Enquiring whether the opinion of the Government of India was desired on the Admiralty letter to the India Office, of the 11th February 1905, regarding flagstaffs on Musandim.

Prom 290 ENDORSEMENT TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, NO 1224-E.B., DATED THE 23RD MARCH 1905.

Forwarding for information a copy of the Admiralty letter to the India Office.

Prom 291 TELEGRAM FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

Makes certain comments with regard to the custody of the flagstaffs on Musandim. States that a despatch on the subject will follow by mail.

Pending the receipt of the regular despatch a copy of the present reference may go, by post, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf. Two of the flagstaffs are to be abandoned. This presumably does not mean that they are to be removed: the point is sure to be made clear in the despatch, and the receipt of same may be awaited before any definite orders in the matter are issued.

2. As for Lord Lansdowne's statement, to which reference is made, please see pages 87-88 of Mr. Fraser's "Persian pledges." The statement in question was subsequently referred* to by the Russian Ambassador in a conversation which he had with Lord Lansdowne. The statement† itself has not been traced on any recorded collection of this Department nor has it been found that the papers† were communicated to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

* See No. 287 in Secret E., July 1903, Nos. 286-287.

† Copies may now go to Major Cox for ready reference. The statement itself might be reproduced and brought on to this file for ready reference?
C. O'H. T.,—5-4-05.
Yes.
5-4-05. C. SOMERS COCKS.

Draft below.
C. O'H. T.,—5-4-05.

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We may await the despatch. Meanwhile it will be enough to send a copy to Major Cox for information.

5-4-05. C. SOMERS COCKS.

As proposed.

5-4-05. S. M. FRASER.

ENDORSEMENT TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 1363-E.B., DATED THE 10TH APRIL 1905. Prom 292

Forwarding a copy of the foregoing communications for information.

This file may now be submitted to His Excellency for information.

H. P. C.,—12-4-05.

12-4-05. C. SOMERS COCKS.

There was not the slightest necessity to send a copy of the telegram to Major Cox. The despatch should have been awaited.

15-4-05. C[URZON].

TELEGRAM FROM HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, DATED THE 5TH (RECEIVED 6TH) MAY 1905. Prom 293

In view of the declaration made respecting the territorial limits of the Maskat Sultanate asks for the views of the Government of India as to the policy to be pursued as regards the flagstaff on Telegraph Island, as well as regards Sheep Island and the Maklab Isthmus.

The reasons for erecting the flagstaffs on the sites mentioned were explained in paragraph 5 of our Secret Despatch* No. 16, External, dated the 21st January 1904, which were further augmented by the recommendations made in the subsequent Secret Despatch † No. 24, External, dated the 4th February 1904, providing for the inclusion of the tract of country concerned in the Consular District of Bunder Abbas. The fresh information brought to bear on the point by the note ‡ recorded by Mr. Lorimer, on the 22nd March 1905, has rendered a fresh examination of the issue about the flagstaffs necessary, and practically means a return to the original proposal, relative to the re-occupation ‡ of the old telegraph buildings at Elphinstone Inlet: discussed in our Secret Despatch § No. 192, External, dated the 23rd October 1902, and approved ‖ by His Majesty's Government.

× S. E. Majos- No. 170-287

* See No. 323 in Secret E., June 1904, Nos. 300-388.

† See No. 173 in Secret E, August 1904, Nos. 172-179.

Also please see pages 23 and 25 of notes in Secret E., March 1905, Nos. 707-794: and pages 2-8 of the current notes.

‡ *Vide* telegram from His Majesty's Secretary of State, dated 31st March 1905.

§ See No. 21 in Secret E., November 1902, Nos. 7-21.

‖ See No. 193 in Secret E., July 1903, Nos. 192-214.

2. Major Cox may be asked for his views, in consultation with Major Grey, the message being repeated to the former officer for this purpose.

For orders.

C. O'H. T.,—6-5-05.

H. P. C.,—6-5-05.

The lines on which the reply to the Secretary of State should be drawn up are laid down in His Excellency's note of 25th March 1905. It would appear that the views and statements contained in the last two sentences of the Secretary of State's telegram of April 1st no longer necessarily hold good.

× S. E. Majos- No. 170-287

A draft telegram is put up. It is perhaps unnecessary to consult Major Cox on a point of general policy like the present one, but when a reply comes from the Secretary of State, he might be asked whether he is in favour of removing the flagstaff on Sheep Island or of handing it over.

† Prom 291

8-5-05. C. SOMERS COCKS.

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

Prono 291 In his telegram of the 31st March the Secretary of State informed us that a despatch on the subject of these flagstaffs was following by mail. This document was presumably to acquaint the Government of India with the views of the Defence Committee regarding the question, and I think it will be well to telegraph that it is proposed to await its arrival before replying to the message of the 5th May.

Prono 293 (It may be that the despatch has not issued and never will. But we need not assume this.)

Draft submitted.

In the meanwhile we may post the papers to Major Cox for an expression of his views.

9-5-05. L. RUSSELL.

I agree.

9-5-05. S. M. FRASER.

10-5-05. C[URZON].

Prono 294 TELEGRAM TO HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 1804-E. B., DATED THE 11TH MAY 1905.

Intimating that the Government of India propose to await the receipt of the despatch promised in his telegram, dated the 31st March 1905 respecting the flagstaffs erected in the neighbourhood of Musandim.

May the endorsement below to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf issue.

C. O'H. T.,—11-5-05.

12-5-05. C. SOMERS COCKS.

Prono 295 ENDORSEMENT TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 1813-E. B., DATED THE 12TH MAY 1905.

Forwards copy of the foregoing communications for information and report.

Prono 296 FROM THE SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE, No. 17, DATED THE 28TH APRIL (RECEIVED 15TH) MAY 1905.

Letter from the India Office to the Foreign Office, dated the 3rd April 1905, relative to the Musandim flagstaffs.

For information. No orders.

C. O'H. T.,—18-5-05.

19-5-05. C. SOMERS COCKS.

G. C. Press Simla.—No. 280 F. D.—24-5-05.—35.—E. A. D'S.

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FROM HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, No. 16-SECRET, DATED THE 19TH MAY (RECEIVED 5TH JUNE) 1905. Prono 297

Communicates the views of His Majesty's Government with respect to the question of hoisting the British flag at Cape Musandim, and the proposed action in connection with the flagstaffs erected on the isthmus between Malcolm and Elphinstone Inlets, on Telegraph Island, and on Sheep Island.

6-6-05.	C[URZON].
9-6-05.	K[ITCHENER].
9-6-05.	E. R. E[LLES].
9-6-05.	A. T. A[RUNDEL].
9-6-05.	H. E. R[ICHARDS].
10-6-05.	J. P. H[EWETT].
10-6-05.	E. N. B[AKER].
10-6-05	C. L. T[UPPER].

For information. Major Cox has been asked for his views, and he may now be furnished with a copy of this despatch, and any connected papers* which have not been previously sent him. To provide against his answering our former call before he gets the despatch he may be apprised, of its having been sent, by telegram. x Prono 295

* Including Mr. Lorimer's note which might be brought on to the correspondence portion of this file.

Drafts submitted.

C. O'H. T.,—7-6-05.

As proposed.

8-6-05.	C. SOMERS COCKS.
9-6-05.	L. RUSSELL.
11-6-05.	S. M. FRASER.

TELEGRAM TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 2241-E.B., DATED THE 12TH JUNE 1905. Prono 298

Requesting him to await the receipt of a copy of the fresh despatch received from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India respecting the erection of flagstaffs at, and in the neighbourhood of, the Musandim Promontory.

ENDORSEMENT TO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, No. 2309-E.B., DATED THE 16TH JUNE 1905. Prono 299

Forwarding a copy of the foregoing secret despatch and of the connected papers not previously sent.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 449 F. D—30-6-05.—35.—J. D.

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

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Please see preceding notes. Major Cox's views are still awaited to allow of a reply being sent to the secret despatch from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 16, dated 19th May 1905. A draft telegram is submitted for approval enquiring from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf when his report is likely to be received. x Prono 297

C. O'H. T.,—7-7-05.

It might issue.

8-7-05. C. Somers Cocks.

8-7-05. L. Russell.

Telegram to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 2612-E.B., dated the 9th July 1905. Prono 300

Enquiring when his report may be expected about the flagstaffs erected in the neighbourhood of the Musandim promontory.

Telegram from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated 9th (received the 10th) July 1905. Prono 301

Reports that he awaits a reference from the Political Agent at Maskat in respect to the flagstaffs on Musandim, and on its receipt will telegraph his views.

For information. May await further communication promised.

C. O'H. T.,—10-7-05.

11-7-05. C. Somers Cocks.

11-7-05. L. Russell.

From the Political Secretary, India Office, No. 23, dated 9th (received the 26th) June 1905. Prono 302

Communication from the India Office to the Foreign Office, dated the 24th May 1905, forwarding for information copy of his despatch to the Government of India, dated 19th idem.

Telegram from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated 14th (received the 15th) July 1905. Prono 303

Intimates his opinion and that of Major Grey in regard to the re-occupation of the Telegraph Island.

We have now to consider what reply should be sent to the Secretary of State's Despatch of 19th May last. Major Cox's views coincide with the conclusion arrived at by His Excellency in his Minute of 6th October 1902 and as pointed out by Assistant Secretary (E), nothing has since occurred to alter the force of His Excellency's observations. x Prono 297 x S.E. Nov. 02 No. 7-21

It is admitted that the only hindrance to our re-occupation of the Island is the Anglo-French Agreement of 1862. It was just a year and a half ago that we pressed for the abrogation of this Treaty (*vide* His Excellency's note of 26th* February 1904.) And again in asking for our opinion on the proposal of the French Ambassador to substitute for the pending Arbitration a draft Agreement, one of the clauses of which proposed the renewal of the Engagement of 1862, we strongly deprecated its renewal (*vide* telegram of 13th† April 1904). The question then for consideration is, with a favourable decision from The Hague Tribunal on the Dhow Arbitration Case, might not we again move for the removal of this barrier to our policy in Maskat and the Gulf of Oman? If such a course is feasible we might wellhold over the present question which apparently does not call for an immediate decision, and await the results of The Hague Tribunal, a decision from whom is expected within the course of the next month, *i.e.*, not later than the 24th August 1905.

* Page 13 of Notes in Secret E., May 1904, Nos. 75-121.

† Pro. 239 in Secret E., October 1902, Nos. 224-263.

H. A. G.,—15-7-05.

C. O'H. T.,—15-7-05.

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The position is summed up in the Secretary of State's despatch.

[It may be added that the *three* flagstaffs are still up.]

It is true that the western side of the promontory cannot be considered anywhere but in the Persian Gulf; the same, however, cannot be said of the eastern side: and therefore Telegraph Island (and possibly the staff on the isthmus) is not protected by Lord Lansdowne's statement of May 5th, 1903.

But Telegraph Island lies in the Elphinstone Inlet which is on the western side of the promontory.
L. Russell

Vide sketch map in Secret E., March 1905, Nos. 707-794.

His Excellency, in his note of 25th March 1905, contemplated the removal of the Sheep Island flag staff, but wished the other two flagstaffs to be retained and explanations furnished to the Sultan pointing to our action being a matter of telegraph routine. The condition on which this was to be done was that we were "driven to take the line that the Musandim promontory belongs to the Sultan" This condition has now been fulfilled (see paragraph 2 of page 23 of British counter-case) and it is now for orders whether action should be taken on His Excellency's notes.

Secret E., Progs., May 1905, Nos. 170-287.

I venture to draw attention to the following points:

(*a*) Whatever definition of Omani territory *is* contained (and it is couched in rather vague terms) in the British counter-case might be held not to affect the islands off the promontory and therefore it might be argued that we have still not recognized the Sultan's sovereignty over Telegraph Island.* Such an argument would perhaps savour of disingenuousness.

* This argument would of course include Sheep Island; but that flag staff is not of such importance.
C.S Somers Cocks.

(*b*) The presence of the flagstaffs on the Isthmus and on Sheep Island has hitherto attracted the notice neither of the Sultan nor of the French, and their consignment to the former or their removal now might result in the Arbitration Tribunal's attention being drawn to our previous action.

(*c*) We shall not know our bearings until the Arbitration award*. It is possible they may (quite unjustifiably) take on themselves to define the limits of Oman territory and exclude Musandim (this is however improbable) and in any case until their pronouncement it seems highly desirable to keep the hands of Government quite free for the adoption of any policy that may seem suitable.

* Due on August 24th, *i.e.*, the Tribunal meets on July 25th, and the decision must be within 30 days after by Article IV of the Anglo-French agreement of October 13th, 1904.
(Secret E, Progs. May 1905, Nos. 170-287, and Mr. Mounsey's No. 105 of June 3rd.

I venture therefore to suggest that no action should be taken now to furnish His Majesty's Government with the matured views of the Government of India, but that we should telegraph an *ad interim* reply proposing that no action be taken till the declaration of the award.

Draft telegram submitted for approval. A copy might go by post, etc., to Major Cox.

17-7-05 C. Somers Cocks.

19-7-05. L. Russell.

In the altered circumstances produced by the recognition of the Sultan's sovereignty over the Musandim Peninsula, I venture to think that we shall gain nothing by maintaining a flagstaff on Telegraph Island and that like those on Sheep Island and the isthmus between Elphinstone and Malcolm Inlets, it had better be removed.

2. In the first place, however, it should be recognised that we have the right to have the flagstaff on Telegraph Island without, as Major Cox imagines, exposing ourselves to the charge of creating a parallel to the Bunder Gisseh incident. The occupation of a telegraph station on the island in question could be represented as no more inconsistent with the sovereignty of the Sultan of Maskat than is the presence of our flag at Jask and at Henjam a violation of the sovereign rights of the Shah of Persia. The Henjam case would, in fact, supply an exact precedent for the reoccupation of an abandoned telegraph station with the consent of the territorial ruler concerned.

Pros. 242 and 251 in Secret E., June 1899, Nos. 194-346.

3. But, assuming our right to reoccupy Telegraph Island, the question is what advantage we should get out of it. Were we really intending to use the place for telegraph purposes, the matter would be different, but we have no such intention at present, and should we ever entertain it in the future, there is nothing, as Major Cox points out, to prevent us from reviving our rights when needed. Our real aims, as has frequently been recognized, are two:

(1) to deter, except at risk of war, any power contemplating a landing in that neighbourhood.

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(2) to utilize Elphinstone Inlet for naval or strategical purposes.

For neither of these purposes, it seems to me, would the very limited action which alone we are now able to take (in time of peace) be necessary or effective. As regards warning off other powers, this will not be the result of our flagstaff on the island, for as Admiral Atkinson-Willes has pointed out, if a foreign ship goes into Khor Kawi, or Malcolm or Elphinstone Inlets, and finds a blue ensign flying, he will respect the enclosure within which it is flying, but there is nothing to prevent him from hoisting a like ensign of his own country near it, and claiming his enclosure as sacred to his country. Our real safeguard lies in Lord Lansdowne's declaration of May 5th, 1903,) by which, it is satisfactory to see, His Majesty's Government mean to abide) and that declaration, it may safely be assumed, would be interpreted to debar the establishment of a port on either side of the narrow peninsula.

Pros No. 734 in Pros. Secret E., March 1905, Nos. 707-794.

For naval purposes, again, the occupation of a tiny spot like Telegraph Island alone would, I imagine, be no practical advantage, and from making any more extended use of Elphinstone Inlet and its shores we are debarred by the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862. On the other hand any attempt to reoccupy even this island would arouse suspicion and irritation with France, who, whether she wins or loses in The Hague arbitration will be keenly alive to her rights in Maskat in future, and although we could, no doubt, establish our case for reoccupying the telegraph station on the Henjam precedent (though the fact that we could not show any intention to use it for telegraph purposes would lay our motives open to obvious comment), it would only be after creating an amount of friction disproportionate to the value of the object.

(Pros. No. 734 in Pros. March 1905, Nos. 707-794).

4. In my opinion, therefore, we may make up our minds to withdraw all three flagstaffs, but I agree with Mr. Somers Cocks that for the reasons given by him it will be wise not to take action until after the award is published next month.

If, however, the conclusion to withdraw be arrived at, it would seem advisable to communicate it forth with to His Majesty's Government in order to prevent possible misapprehension on their part as to our intentions.

I have amended the draft telegram which is for Your Excellency's consideration.

21-7-05. S. M. Fraser.

I do not attach very much importance to the point. But my views are not those of Secretary, and I think it a pity anywhere to abandon evidences of an uncontested claim. If the French found out, as they will one day do, that we had put up and subsequently taken down a flag staff on Telegraph Island they would point to this as a final abandonment of any British claim.

In my view it would be a pity to let this claim be altogether extinguished. Some day it it may again be useful.

I think it quite likely that His Majesty's Government under the domination of the Defence Committee may reject this view and order the removal of all three flagstaffs. But as my view is different, I have stated it in the telegram.

21-7-05. C[urzon].

Telegram to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 2848-E.B., dated the 22nd July 1905.

Intimating that it is proposed to defer until declaration of Maskat Arbitration Award actual removal of staffs on Isthmus and Sheep Island, and suggests that question of retention of Telegraph Island flagstaff might be discussed with Sultan after award is given.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 632 F. D.—29-7-05.—25.—C. G. de S.

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

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EXTRACT FROM THE *AL AHRAM*, DATED THE 21ST JUNE 1905.

Pro. No. 305.

Regarding Musandim flagstaff and Bahrein affairs.

A copy of the translation may go to Major Cox for information. The writer is undoubtedly one who is conversant with the French and English case about Maskat, and is presumably Mons. Goguyer. His object is apparently to draw attention to the erection of the flagstaffs in the neighbourhood of the Musandim Promontory. It might even be of some use to send the translation of the article to the India Office by weekly letter.

C. O'H. T.,—21-7-1905.

It is strange that the article should speak of Maklab and Musandim as independent. The article is full of inaccuracies as to elementary facts. It might go home as a probable further specimen of Mons. Goguyer's methods.

C. SOMERS COCKS,—25-7-1905.

The article shows that knowledge of the erection of flagstaffs on the Musandim Promontory is common property. It is unfortunate, therefore, that in the telegram * of the 22nd July the statement should have been made that the presence of the flagstaffs had not attracted the notice either of the French or of the Sultan.

* Pro. No. 304.

Yes.

S. M. FRASER. A copy may go home by mail as proposed.

L. RUSSELL,—2-8-1905.

This must be the hand of Mons. Goguyer.

The impression created by the withdrawal of Captain Knox from Koweit is just what we expected.

2. We shall be fortunate if the flagstaff incident is not used against Great Britain in the Hague proceedings, and I think it would be worth while to telegraph to the India Office informing them that the existence of the flagstaffs is no longer a secret, so that our Counsel may not be taken by surprise. The line to be taken to justify our action, namely, the Henjam precedent, is sufficiently indicated in our telegram of 22nd July.† I submit a draft telegram for Your Excellency's approval.

† Pro. No. 304.

S. M. FRASER,—3-8-1905.

Extract from Reuter's Government and Press telegram, dated the 3rd August 1905.

London, 3rd. Proceedings before Hague Tribunal in connection with arbitration in Anglo-French difference relative to Maskat affair have terminated and the award is now awaited.

* * * * * *

Reuter having announced that the Proceedings before the Hague Tribunal have terminated, there is now no need to telegraph, and it will be sufficient if the extract goes home by weekly letter.

S. M. FRASER,—4-8-1905.

C[URZON],—4-8-1905.

May drafts below issue, including an endorsement to Major Cox.

C. O'H. T.,—7-8-1905.

Yes.

C. SOMERS COCKS,—7-8-1905.

Extract from Reuter's Government and Press telegram, dated the 4th August 1905.

London, 4th. In the debate in Commons last night on Foreign Office estimates Earl Percy said Government adhered to the view‡ announced in 1903, in reference to any encroachment by a Foreign Power in Persian Gulf.

‡ After Pro. No. 291.

* * * * * *

1711 F. D.

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

For information. Will be placed in file on return of papers from Press.

H. A. G.,—8-8-1905.

C. O'H. T.,—8-8-1905.

C. Somers Cocks,—9-8-1905.

Pro. No. 306. Endorsement to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 3060-E.B., dated the 9th August 1905.

Forwarding a copy of an extract from the Al Ahram, *dated the 21st June 1905.*

Pro. No. 307. Memorandum of papers forwarded to the India Office, with Foreign Secretary's weekly letter No. 32-M., dated the 10th August 1905.

Exd.—J. N. S.

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

(459)

PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, AUGUST 1905.

Flagstaffs of Musandim Promontory. Pro. No. 288

QUESTION OF RETAINING THE FLAGSTAFFS ERECTED IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF THE MUSANDIM PROMONTORY.

1711 F. D.—S E—288-307—Aug.

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

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(460)

(*Received on 13th March 1905 with Political Secretary's letter No. 8, dated 24th February 1905.*)

No. M-024.

Confidential.

ADMIRALTY TO INDIA OFFICE.

11th February 1905.

SIR,

My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having had before them your letter* of the 7th ultimo on the subject of the flags proposed to be hoisted in the neighbourhood of Cape Musandim, desire me to request you will represent to Mr. Secretary Brodrick that the question of acquiring Naval Bases and Telegraph Stations on either side of the entrance to the Persian Gulf came to the fore in February 1900,† when the method of meeting possible Russian aggression in those waters came under the consideration of His Majesty's Government.

* See Secret E. Proceedings, March 1905, Nos. 707-779.

† See Secret E. Proceedings, May 1901, Nos. 10-18.

2. As regards the harbours on the Musandim promontory the means by which they were to be prevented falling into the hands of other European Powers occupied considerable correspondence ‡ in 1900-01-02. It had long been the policy to regard the territory as being under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Maskat, but the establishment of a rival influence by the French at Maskat, made it questionable whether it would not be expedient to treat the territory as independent, the very shadowy authority possessed by the Sultan over the district rendering it feasible either to support or ignore his rights, as might seem most advantageous.

‡ See No. 513 in Secret E., July 1902, Nos. 513-518.

3. In the Secret letter § of the 23rd October 1902 to which you refer, the Government of India, while not recommending any alteration in the native territorial conditions, proposed that the old telegraph buildings in Elphinstone Inlet should be re-occupied by a Native Agent in charge of a British Flag, and that the strip of coast between Khor Kalba and Dibba should be recognised as part of the territory of the Chief of Shargah. To this proposal, which was referred to the Admiralty in a ‖ letter from the Foreign Office dated 29th November 1902, My Lords replied they had no ¶ objection. To that arrangement, and to the method of carrying it out, they still adhere.

§ See No. 21 in Secret E., November 1902, Nos. 7-21.

‖ No. 193 in Secret E., July 1903, Nos. 192-214.

¶ See enclosure 3 to Proceeding No. 196, *ibid.*

4. Much correspondence followed in reference to the selection of suitable Naval Bases, Coaling Stations, and Telegraph Stations, at the entrance to the Gulf, and on the 25th February 1904 a ** letter was received from your Department enclosing copy of a Secret ** letter from the Government of India dated 21st January 1904, in which these subjects were discussed, and in which at paragraph 5 a suggestion was made that the best way to effect the already authorised re-occupation of the old Telegraph Station in Elphinstone Inlet would be by erecting a Flagstaff on the isthmus dividng Elphinstone and Malcolm Inlets, as well as upon Telegraph Island.

** See Nos. 326 and 346 in Secret E., June 1904, Nos. 300-388.

5. While, however, in the covering letter from your Department dated †† 24th February 1904, the enclosure above mentioned is forwarded for the consideration of their Lordships on the subject of—

†† No. 346, *ibid.*

(*i*) the selection of suitable Naval Bases at the entrance to the Persian Gulf; and

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(*ii*) the choice of a landing place for the proposed telegraph cable ;

the only point of the letter on which their Lordships' views were requested, appears to be contained in the latter part of the second paragraph, in which Mr. Brodrick hopes that the Admiralty will see their way to support the claim of the Government of India that the whole cost of the proposal to re-establish a British Telegraph Station should not be borne by Indian Revenues. It was in this sense that the letter was taken, and replied* to.

* See. No. 365 in Secret E., June 1904, Nos. 300-388.

6. The letter† of the 8th of August 1904 from the India Office was the first categorical intimation received by My Lords of any contemplated extension of the original plan of re-occupying Telegraph Island, by erecting Flagstaffs on the Maklab isthmus and on Sheep Island, but this letter merely enclosed a copy of a letter which had been addressed to the Foreign Office asking Lord Lansdowne's opinion whether there was any objection to authority being given to the Government of India to erect the Flagstaffs.

†See Secret E. Proceedings, March 1905, Nos. 707-779.

7. My Lords cannot admit the fact of their having offered no objection to the proposal to re-occupy Telegraph Island by placing there a Native Agent in charge of a British Flag, can be held to cover their unsolicited acquiescence in the proposed further distribution of Flagstaffs in the District, one being on the mainland.

8. The original proposal on which they were directly consulted was simply a case of reverting to a state of things which had previously existed without question; to the renewal of which there was a reasonable answer in the event of objections being raised by European Powers, and in which there could be no question of territorial expansion as the so-called island is nothing but a rock. As regards the other flagstaffs, it is a very different matter, and My Lords, when appealed to by your Department at the instance of the Foreign Office, as to the flags to be flown, felt, as already stated in Admiralty letter‡ (M-01705) of the 23rd December 1904, that if the flag was not intended to denote British territorial expansion, it not only meant nothing but was a possible source of international complication.

‡*Ibid.*

That My Lords did not take an earlier opportunity of bringing these considerations to Mr. Brodrick's notice is because they had never been directly consulted on the political aspect of the question.

The matter is one which is only likely to affect His Majesty's Navy in certain contingencies, and they assumed that the hoisting of the flags was the result of a policy already decided on between the Foreign Office, India Office and the Government of India, and that had their views on the subject been required they would have been asked for them definitely.

I am, etc.,

(Sd.) C. I. THOMAS.

Pers no 289

Telegram, No. 1213-E.B., dated the 22nd March 1905.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Calcutta,

To—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

X No 288

Do you wish for our opinions either now or at a later stage on the Admiralty letter to the India Office of the 11th February 1905 regarding flagstaff on Musandim?

Pers no 290

No. 1224-E. B., dated the Fort William, the 23rd March 1905.

Endorsed by the Government of India, Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing communication is forwarded to the Political Resident in the Persian gulf for information in continuation of the endorsement from the Government of India in the Foreign Department No. 639-E. B., dated 14th February 1905.

Communication from the Admiralty to the India Office, dated 11th February 1905.

Secret E., March 1905, Nos. 707 779.

X No 292 in 28 March 05 Nos 707-795

(Received with letter No. 8, dated the 24th February 1905, from the Secretary, Political Department, India Office.)

2

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

(461)

3

Telegram, dated the 31st March (received 1st April, in camp) 1905. Pros 291

From—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.

Musandim flagstaffs. Please refer to your telegram dated the 22nd March 1905. No further discussion with the Admiralty is considered necessary. After consideration of the subject by the Defence Committee His Majesty's Government have decided to rely for the protection of our interests in the Persian Gulf on Lord Lansdowne's statement in the House of Lords on the 5th May 1903 to the effect that we will resist with all available means the establishment by any Foreign Power of a Naval base in the Persian Gulf. It will therefore suffice to maintain the flagstaff on Telegraph Island as a sign of our continued occupation, no action, however, being taken until the Hague Tribunal has given its award on the Maskat case. The other two flagstaffs should be abandoned. A despatch on the subject follows by mail.

x No 289

x Pages 87-89 of Mr Fraser's Persian Gledge

3

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

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

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5

No. 1363-E. B., dated Simla, the 10th April 1905. Prons 292

Endorsed by the Government of India, Foreign Department.

(1) Speech * made by the Marquess of Lansdowne in the House of Lords on the 5th May 1903.

* Pages 87-89 of Mr. Fraser's "Persian pledges."

(2) Despatch † from the Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Scott, No. 112, dated the 6th May 1903.

† No. 287 in Secret E., July 1903, Nos. 286-287.

(3) Telegram to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 1213-E. B., dated the 22nd March 1905.

(4) Telegram from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 1213-E. B., dated the 31st March 1905.

March 1905.

A copy of each of the foregoing communications is forwarded to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf for information in continuation of the endorsement from the × No. 289 Government of India in the Foreign De- † No. 291 partment, No. 1224-E. B., dated the 23rd ‡ No. 290

4

[280FD]

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

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

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Enclo Prov 292

On 5th May 1903, the Marquis of Lansdowne in the House of Lords made the following speech, dealing with British interests in the Persian Gulf (*vide* the *Times* of 6th May 1903) :—

* * * * * * *

"I now pass to the closely-connected subject of the Persian Gulf. I feel sure that the noble lord's interest in the Baghdad railway scheme was because he felt it did closely affect our interest in the Persian Gulf. I do not yield to the noble lord in the interest which I take in the Persian Gulf, or in the feeling that this country stands with regard to the navigation of the Persian Gulf in a position different from that of any other power. The noble lord told your lordships with absolute truth it was owing to British enterprise, to the expenditure of British lives and money, that the Persian Gulf is at this moment open to the navigation of the world. It was our ships that cleared those waters of pirates ; it was we who put down the slave trade ; it was we who buoyed and beaconed those intricate waters. Well, at this moment, out of a total trade in the Gulf ports of £3,600,000—the figures are those for 1901 ; we have none later—£2,300,000 represents the commerce of this country ; so that it is clear that, up to the present, at all events, we have succeeded in preserving a liberal share of that commerce. But there is no doubt that in the Gulf, as in other parts of Persia, we are feeling very keenly the competition of other powers. That, I am afraid, is our fate not only in Persian waters ; nor can we expect, because we have been in the development of commerce throughout the world the pioneers of that form of civilization, that we shall always be able to maintain the position of superiority which we at first enjoyed. The noble lord asked me for a statement of our policy with regard to the Persian Gulf. I think I can give him one in a few simple words. It seems to me that our policy should be directed, in the first place, to protect and promote British trade in those waters. In the next place, I do not think that he suggests, or that we should suggest, that those efforts should be directed towards the exclusion of the legitimate trade of other powers. (Hear, hear.) In the third place—I say it without hesitation—we should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal. (Cheers.) I say that in no minatory spirit, because, so far as I am aware, no proposals are on foot for the establishment of a foreign naval base in the Persian Gulf. I at least have heard of none ; and I cannot help thinking that the noble lord waxed almost unnecessarily warm at the idea of such a foreign intrusion, with which, so far as as I am aware, we are not at present threatened. Well, the noble lord then touched upon a series of points connected with our commercial interests in the Gulf.

"I will take the navigation of the Karun river. That was opened in 1888. I was in India at the time, and I well remember the satisfaction with which Sir Drummond Wolff's achievement on that occasion in procuring the opening of the river to navigation was regarded both in India and at home. The trade of the Karun, although it has not increased perhaps as much as might have been anticipated, has increased considerably ; and the lion's share of it is ours. I see that in 1897 the trade was only £26,000, whereas in 1900 it had risen to over £1,000,000. The noble lord (Lamington) spoke of the difficulties encountered by our traders owing to the customs arrangements on the Karun. I do not know whether I quite followed what he said on the subject, but, I may tell your lordships, that the position is this. We were originally led by the Persian Government to expect that three custom-houses would be maintained on the Karun, one at Mohammerah, the second at Ahwaz, and the third at Shuster. It appears that lately the Persian customs authorities determined to do away with inland custom-houses, and consequently two of these were threatened with suppression. Well, persons interested in foreign trade naturally protested. It was a great inconvenience to them that goods destined for one of the upper ports should have to be taken out of the ship's hold at Mohammerah and there examined. Representations were made to the Persian Government ; and I am glad to say that the result has been that temporary arrangements have been made, or are about to be made, under which our traders will be given customs facilities at these three ports as was originally intended".

* * * * * * *

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

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

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9

Telegram, dated London, the 5th (received 6th) May 1905.

Pro no. 293

From—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London,

To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.

Please see Mr. Fraser's demi-official of 30th March regarding the Maskat arbitration. I will send by next mail the British counter case, as presented to the Hague tribunal. Following is substance of the statement it contains as to limits of Maskat territory :—

x S.E. Mayos. No. 170-287

The coast from Kalba to Dibba is claimed by Shargah and has been regarded for many years as a feudatory of the Sheikh and as subject to maritime truce. This territory has never been under the sovereignty of Maskat and page 36 of the French case admits the territory to be under the Government of the Sheikh of Joasim residing at Ras-el-Kheima. The Sultan of Maskat, who claims the coast from Dibba to Tibba, has certainly before and since 1864 exercised authority by his Vali and otherwise, and His Highness's rights there are recognised by the Sheikhs of Shargah and Joasim. In these circumstances Musandim being admitted to be Maskat territory, please let me know your views as to policy to be pursued as regards flag* on Telegraph Island as well as regards Sheep Island and the Maklab Isthmus.

*Sub-enclosure to Enclosure of 772 in Secret E., March 1905, Nos. 707—794.

6

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

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

(465)

11

Telegram, No. 1804-E.B., dated the 11th May 1905. Pro no 294

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,

To—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

Musandim. We propose to await receipt of the despatch referred to in your telegram of 31st March before replying to your message of 5th May. ⊗ no. 291 × no. 293

8

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

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

(466)

No. 1813-E.B, dated Simla, the 12th May 1905.

Endorsed by the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Pro no. 295

A copy of the foregoing communications is forwarded to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf for information and report in continuation of the endorsement from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 1363-E.B., dated the 10th April 1905.

× (1) Telegram from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 5th May 1905. × No. 293

† (2) Telegram to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 1804-E.B, dated 11th May 1905. † No. 294

‡ No. 292

10

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

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

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15

(*Received on 15th May 1905 with Political Secretary's Letter No. 17, dated 28th April 1905.*) Pro no 296

ARABIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[April 3.]

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received April 3.*)

The Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State; copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 31st March, relative to the Musandim flagstaffs. Pro no 291

India Office, April 3, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, March 31st, 1905.*

(*Not printed.*)

See Pro no 291

12

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 280 F. D.—24-5-05.—00.—E. A. D'S.

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

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

(468)

17

India Office, London,
19th May 1905.

Pro. no 297

Secret, No. 16.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram* of the 30th December last, I have to inform your Excellency that the question of hoisting the British flag at Cape Musandim has been fully considered in all its bearings by His Majesty's Government.

* No. 779 in Secret E, March 1905, Nos 707-794. Persian Gulf: question of hoisting the British flag at Cape Musandim, etc.

2. The object which the Government of India desire to attain, as stated in their Secret letters† in the Foreign Department of the 23rd October 1902, No. 192,† and the 21st January 1904, No. 16,‡ is to prevent any Foreign Power establishing a commanding position at the entrance of the Persian Gulf. His Majesty's Government are in entire agreement with your Excellency as to the necessity of preventing any such action on the part of a Foreign Power, the first result of which would be to entail an increase of naval expenditure and a re-arrangement of our naval dispositions. It only remains, therefore, to consider the best means of securing this object.

† No. 21 in Secret E., November 1902, Nos. 7-21.

‡ No. 326 in Secret E., June 1904, Nos. 300-388.

3. The method which the Government of India have desired to adopt, *viz.*, to hoist the British flag at certain points in the immediate vicinity of Cape Musandim, is open to the objection that it would not confer upon us any special rights in the places selected, unless it were accompanied by a specific proclamation of protectorate or annexation. On the other hand, an open assertion of our claims to these places might excite the jealousy of other Powers, and give rise to political complications.

4. The alternative method would be to make it clear that His Majesty's Government would not tolerate the occupation by any Foreign Power of any port or territory in the Persian Gulf. It will be within your Excellency's recollection that on the 3th May 1903 Lord Lansdowne stated in the House of Lords that "we should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very great menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal."

Pap 87-89, Mr Fraser's Persian Pledge and also see Enclo. Pro 292, ante

To this declaration His Majesty's Government adhere, and it is their intention to rely upon it for the protection of their interests.

5. These considerations have led His Majesty's Government, as I stated in my telegram of the 31st March last, to modify the orders contained in my telegram‖ of the 4th¶ August 1904. They arrived at the conclusion that the flagstaffs on Sheep Island and the isthmus between Malcolm and Elphinstone Inlets should be abandoned, and that it would be sufficient for the purposes of the policy laid down in the preceding paragraph to maintain the flagstaff upon Telegraph Island as a sign of the continuance of our occupation of that spot which first took place in connection with the operations of the Eastern Telegraph Company in 1869.

‖ No. 709 in Secret E, March 1905, Nos. 707-794.
¶ (24th ?)

6. The opinion of His Majesty's Government with regard to the flagstaff on Telegraph Island was based on the conclusion, formulated in the Secret letter from your Excellency's Government, No. 192,** of the 23rd October 1902, that the jurisdiction of the Sultan of Maskat over the Makhlab Isthmus and Musandim Promontory was of so uncertain and ineffective a character that it would be open to His Majesty's Government to ignore it.

** No 21 in Secret E., November 1902, Nos. 7-21.

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

7. The position has, however, been materially altered by Mr. Lorimer's enquiries, the result of which is reported in his note of the 22nd March last; and I gather from Your Excellency's telegrams of the 27th* March and 15th† April last that the Government of India are no longer prepared to ignore the fact of the Sultan's sovereignty over Musandim.

* Secret E., May 1905, Nos 170-287.
† *Ibid.*

8. In the changed circumstances, having regard to the considerations stated above (paragraph 3), and in view of the grounds upon which Her late Majesty's Government protested to the French Government against the cession to them by the Sultan of Bunder Gisseh in 1898,‡ I request that your Excellency's Government will again take into your consideration the question of the maintenance of the flagstaff on Telegraph Island, in the light of the further information now in your possession, and inform me of your views. In the meantime nothing should be done in anticipation of the final decision of His Majesty's Government.

‡ Lord Salisbury to (*a*) Sir E. Monson, Nos. 48 and 58, dated 15th and 22nd February 1899. (Copy to India with Political Secretary's letter No. 9, dated 3rd March 1899.)
(*a*) Nos. 242 and 251 in Secret E., June 1899, Nos. 191-346.

I have the honour to be,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servant,

ST. JOHN BRODRICK.

Pro no 298

Telegram No. 2241-E.B., dated the 12th June 1905.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—MAJOR P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

x No. 295 Please await receipt of copy of a fresh despatch from His Majesty's Secretary of State, which is being posted to you, before submitting the report called for in Foreign Department endorsement No. 1813-E.B., dated 12th May 1905, regarding flagstaffs on Musandim.

NOTE ON THE LIMITS OF THE SULTANATE OF MASKAT.

Enclo Pro no 299.

1. I have been asked for an opinion as to the limits of the Sultan of Maskat's territory and as to the desirability of defining them by means of a map.

2. As the Maskat frontier has not been formally demarcated on any side, I can do no more than adduce reasons for considering that certain places are within and others without the Sultan's jurisdiction.

3. In regard to each doubtful locality we must enquire, firstly, whether the Sultan claims the sovereignty; secondly, whether the actual inhabitants admit it; and, thirdly, whether any neighbouring authority maintains a rival claim. The best proof of sovereign rights is, of course, their exercise, as by dispensing justice or collecting taxes.

4. The French view§ seems to be that the Sultanate of Maskat extends from the Peninsula of Katar in the north to the western extremity of Dhofār in the south, and that nowhere between these points is there any breach in the continuity of the Sultan's authority. At the same time it is indicated that there is a doubt regarding his title to one place, namely, Sūr.‖ Gwadur¶ is mentioned as belonging to the Sultan, and a vague hint thrown out that part of the Persian coast and certain Persian islands are his also.**

§ See page 15 of their "Mémoire." "Limites du Sultanat de Mascate."
‖ Page 18. "Situation spéciale de la ville de Sour."
¶ Page 15.
** Page 15.

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5. Gwadur incontestably pertains to Maskat and need not be referred to again.

6. The Foreign Office can hardly desire any remarks from me regarding the French claim on behalf of the Sultan to the whole territory of the Trucial Chiefs and to the portions of Persia mentioned above. The means of combating it are historical, not geographical. Geographically the claim is an absurdity.

7. The question is thus narrowed down to one of the continuity of the Sultan's possessions between the boundary of Shārga—which I concur with Major Cox* in placing between the villages of Sha'am (Shuam) and Tībāt (Tibba)—and the westernmost point in the Sultan's province of Dhofār—which is a village called Rakhyūt. Three sections of this long stretch of coast are in controversy, or liable to become so. They are *Sūr*, a tentative claim to independence on behalf of which is now being advanced by the French; the littoral from *Diba*† *to Khor Kalba* inclusive, the title to which of the Shārga Shaikh has been recognised by the British Government; and the coast *from* (*and including*) *Tībāt to* (*but not including*) *Diba*, which the Government of India was at one time inclined to treat as independent territory belonging to the Shihhiyīn.‡ I will take these sections in order.

* See his letter No 29 of 2nd July 1902, paragraph 12 (Pros. Secret E., November 1902, Nos. 7-21).

† Diba in this note means only Diba proper, that is, Hisn Diba or Southern Diba. The place sometimes called Northern Diba has a distinctive name, Bai'a, as well. Kalba or Shālla must not be confounded with Khor Kalba.

‡ Government of India's despatch to Secretary of State, No. 192, Secret E. of 23rd October 1902.

8. The case for the independence of Sūr is a weak one, unless we ourselves strengthen it by creating an unfortunate analogy. The French admit there is a Wali at Sūr and my inquiries show that the Sultan maintains two forts and four smaller posts there, namely, Hisn As Saiyid (60 men), Sanaisala (30 men), 'Īs (10 men), Jināh (5 men), Sakaikara (10 men) and Shāmih (10 men). Major Grey has promised me an estimate of the Sultan's revenues, which will no doubt show what he derives from Sūr; meanwhile I am able to state that in 1895 and 1896 the Sultan collected a special export tax at Sūr which yielded $650: this was an undeniable act of sovereignty.§ The French assertion that "the tribes of Sūr have never ceased to proclaim their independence of the ruler of Oman" is unintelligible to us unless it refers to certan tribes of the inland Sharkīya province, whose port is Sūr and who have been in a chronic state of rebellion for years. But how can the behaviour of these inaccessible tribes affect the political status of Sūr? There have, it is true, been partial rebellions and a good deal of insubordination at Sūr in recent years.

§ The Sultan could no doubt produce numerous other instances, both old and recent.

9. The claim of the Shaikh of Shārga to the strip between Diba and Khor Kalba was fully considered before being admitted by us. Less than a month ago, in a crowded assembly at Sohār which included the Sultan's acting Wali of that place, I asked which villages belonged to Shārga. The reply was given, without a dissenting voice, that all the coast villages from Khor Kalba to Diba, inclusive, were under Shārga.‖ There seems no reason to recede from our decision about this strip of coast, especially as we find that in 1886 the Sultan of Maskat abstained from an attempt to annex Kalba, Khor Fakkan, and Diba, the Resident having counselled him against it. The French might ascribe his not pressing his claim to fear of us, but they cannot get over the facts that Shārga has held possession for 50 years, and is generally regarded as the owner.

‖ There is no need to notice the dispute between Shārga and Fujaira. Fūjaira at the most is a mere enclave, Shārga coming down to the coast on both north and south of it.

10. In regard to the coast between Tībāt (Tibba) and Diba, exclusive of the latter, I have several new facts to being forward. Let us apply the

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threefold test suggested in paragraph 3 above—

(*a*) In 1864 Colonel Disbrowe, Agent at Maskat, invited Thowaini, the Sultan of the day, to state "for the purposes of official record" whether the isthmus of Maklab and the villages of Habalain and Mukāka belonged to him or not. The Sultan replied "they are all my country and my dependants; no one has any concern with them." In 1902 Major Cox reported that "the Sultan would doubtless, if asked the direct question, claim jurisdiction over the Maklab Isthmus, and the Ras Musandim Promontory." In other words, it is clear that Maskat claims the district.

(*b*) In 1902 Major Cox reported that the Shaikh of Līma in the abstract recognised his subordination to Saiyid Faisal and said that Saiyid Faisal's wishes were law to him. The Dhahūriyīn (Zahooriyeen) of the Malcolm Inlet seemed to recognise the Sultan of Maskat in a patriarchal way and said that if any momentous dispute arose amongst them they would appeal to him. The people of Kumzār unequivocally and unhesitatingly acknowledged the sovereignty of the Sultan of Maskat, not over themselves only but over the whole Shihhi tribe, with the exception of a few subject to Ras Al Khaima. The Shihhiyīn of the villages between Elphinstone Inlet and the Ras Al Khaima frontier expressed friendly and loyal sentiments towards the Sultan of Maskat, and their Shaikh was in the habit of paying complimentary visits to Saiyid Faisal at Maskat. I have intentionally omitted statements and facts which in Major Cox's opinion detracted from the value of these admissions; but do not these admissions prove, whatever may be adduced on the other side, that these Shihhiyīn, rightly or wrongly, regard themselves as Maskat subjects?

(*c*) I am able to add the opinion of the people of Shārga. It was the Jawāsim Chief who was supposed in 1864 to have a competing claim to the Maklab Isthmus.* I held a gathering at Shārga a few days ago in the house of the British Agent, at which the Chief himself, the British Agent, an intelligent Shihhi, and various other knowledgable men were present. The meeting unanimously stated that the places between their own frontier at Sha'am (Shuam) and Diba belonged to Maskat, and several they mentioned by name as belonging to Maskat, among them Khasab, Kumzār and Shīsa.

* Major Cox told me recently, in conversation, that, even now-a-days, Shārga could not be suspected of any bias in favour of Maskat.

I am obliged to contest Major Cox's statement† that the Waliship of Khasab is an institution of only 13 (now 16) years' standing. We find on the contrary that there was already a Wali in 1864, who took part in discussions about the ownership of Maklab and claimed the village of Habalain for his master.‡ In 1887 there must have been still a Wali of Khasab, for one of his men was murdered and the Sultan recovered a fine of $1,000 from the people of the place.§ In 1888 again the Sultan performed an unquestionable act of sovereignty by sending a ship to Khasab to stop fighting between the Kumāzira and Beni Hadīya tribes there. Four Shaikhs of the Kumāzira and three men of the Beni Hadīya were brought prisoners to Maskat and interned in Fort Jalāli.‖

† Paragraph 11 of his letter No. 290 of 2nd July 1902, Pros. Secret E., November 1902, Nos. 7-21.
‡ Paragraph 2 of Colonel Disbrowe's letter No. 35 of 22nd February 1864, Pros. Political A., May 1864, Nos. 149-150.
§ Political Agent, Maskat's letter No. 330 of 10th October 1887, Pros. External A., Nos. 67-71.
‖ Paragraph 6 of Political Agent, Maskat's letter No. 246 of 26th August 1888 in Pros. External A., October 1888, Nos. 34-38, and paragraph 4 of his letter No. 259 of 9th September 1888 in Pros. External A., October 1888, Nos. 52-55.

11. This evidence in favour of the Maskat claim is by no means despicable. We shall be placed in an unfortunate position if, while posing as the Sultan's friend and representative before the Hague Tribunal, we deny his claim to

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this territory which the French are apparently ready to admit. Again, if we say that the presence of a Wali on the part of the Sultan at Khasab proves nothing, we shall make it much easier for the French to contend that Sūr also is independent.

12. The Sultan's only inland posts, so far as I have been able to ascertain, are these :—

In the province of Dhahira.— 'Arākī, in the Wādī Kabīr, which runs from the summit of the Hajar hills towards Ibri. 'Arākī is said to lie at a distance of 14 hours on foot from the watershed, upon the side further from the sea. The Sultan has a Wali here.

In the Hajar hills behind the Bāʾina.—Haiyadh, in Wādī Haltī at a distance of 13 hours on foot from the sea. There is a post and revenue is collected.

Burūj Ash Shijairi, in Wādī Jizi, at a distance of perhaps 9 hours on foot from the sea.

'Awābī, about 11 hours on foot from the sea, in Wādī Beni Kbarūs.

Nakhl, about six hours from the sea, in Wādī Hammām, a tributary of Wādi Ma'āwal.

All these places are on the seaward slopes of the Hajar range. Nakhl is the only one of them which possesses a Wali.

In the Samāyil valley.—Bidbid and Samāyil situated respectively 11 and 20 hours on foot from the sea. These have no Wali at present.

In the province of 'Omān proper.—Izki or Ziki, one hour's ride on the further side from the sea of the watershed at which Wādī Samāyil rises.

Nizwa, about 23 miles west of Izki.

Manah, about 15 miles south-south-east of Nizwa.

These three lie in the elevated central basin or "jauf" of 'Omān; Izki and Nizwa have each a Wali, but Manah has none.

13. It is impossible to say how far the Sultan's authority or influence radiates from these inland posts.

In any case we must note that the whole valley of Rostāk, also called Wādī Fara', from Hazam, inclusive upwards, comprising about 30 villages, is in possession of the Sultan's relation Saiyid Sa'id bin Ibrāhīm bin Kais bin 'Azzān. The Sultan has married his sister and pays him a subsidy, but the Saiyid is practically independent. Again the Sultan has no posts in the inland province of Sharkīya, and it is entirely beyond his control. It is doubtful whether any number of the inhabitants of Sharkīya own even a nominal allegiance to Maskat.

14. If I may offer an opinion on such a point, the French have no right to raise the general question of the Sultan's boundaries on the present reference. It is open to them to prove, if they can, that Sūr, where most of their flags are held, is outside the Sultan's dominions. If, however, the British representative is required to state what the British Government consider to be the Sultan's limits, he might accompany his statement with a rough map like that attached, the names of the Sultan's inland posts being omitted.

J. G. LORIMER.

22nd March 1905.

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

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Pro no 299.

No. 2309-E.B., dated Simla, the 16th June 1905.

Endorsed by the Government of India, Foreign Department.

A copy of the following communications is forwarded to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf for information and early report in continuation of the endorsement from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 1813-E.B., dated the 12th May 1905 :—

xNo 295

(a) Communication* from Lord Salisbury to Sir E. Monson, No. 48, dated the 15th February 1899.

(b) Communication* from Lord Salisbury to Sir E. Monson, No. 58, dated the 22nd February 1899.

* Nos. 242 and 251 in Secret E., June 1899, Nos. 194-346.

(c) Note by Mr. Lorimer, C.I.E., dated the 22nd March 1905.

(d) Telegram No. 1247-E.B., dated the 27th March 1905, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

† Secret E., May 1905, Nos. 178-287.

xNo 297

(e) Secret despatch from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No 16, dated the 19th May 1905.

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G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 449 F. D.—30-6-05.—32.—J. D.

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Telegram No. 2612-E.B., dated the 9th July 1905. Pro. no. 300.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla,

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

When may we expect a reply to our endorsement No. 2309-E.B., dated the 16th June 1905, regarding flagstaffs on Musandim Island. x ref. no. 299

Telegram dated Bushire, the 9th (received the 10th) July 1905. Pro. no. 301

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

Flagstaffs on Musandim. Your telegram No. 2312-E.B. of to-day. I am awaiting Major Grey's views which will reach me on the 12th instant, and I will then telegraph to you on the subject. x ref. no. 300.

(Received on 26th June 1905, with Political Secretary's letter No. 23, dated 9th June 1905.) Pro. no. 302

ARABIA, [May 25]

(MUSCAT.) SECTION 1.

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office—(Received May 25).

The Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a Secret despatch to the Government of India, dated the 19th May, relative to the question of hoisting the British flag at Cape Musandim. x ref. no. 297

Copies have been sent to the Admiralty and the Defence Committee.

India Office, May 24, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 1. Pro. no. 303.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Secret.) [Not printed.]

See ref. no. 297 *India Office, May 19, 1905.*

Telegram dated the 14th (received the 15th) July 1905.

From—Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

Flagstaff on Telegraph Island. Major Grey writes to say that under the circumstances he sees no advantage in maintaining a flagstaff and considers that it might be abandoned with the other two, but that if for any reason it is thought necessary to retain it, he could arrange it with the Sultan. *Ends.* It appears to me that if Henjam is turned into a sanitary station we shall want some other place at the entrance to the Persian Gulf for a war signal station, and Elphinstone Inlet might have been useful for this purpose instead Khor Kawi, but if the reoccupation of Telegraph Island would constitute a parallel to the Bunder Gisseh incident,* I see no alternative but to abandon the flagstaff for the present and trust to seizing the locality when necessity for it actually arises.

*Pros. 242 and 25, in Secret E., June 1899, Nos. 194-346.

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

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Our claim to the island on telegraph grounds would be as good ten years hence as they are at the present moment.

Telegram No. 2843-E.B., dated the 22nd July 1905.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,

To— His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

Musandim flagstaffs. Please refer to your Secret despatch dated the 19th May.

We propose to defer until declaration of Arbitration Award actual removal of staffs on Isthmus and Sheep Island. Their presence has hitherto attracted notice neither of French nor of Sultan, and their removal now are their consignment to Sultan's care might result in Tribunal's attention being drawn to our previous action.

There may be some advantage in retention of Telegraph Island flagstaff as evidence that our right to reoccupy is not affected by assertion of Sultan's sovereignty subsequent to original occupation. But we think that this question might be discussed after award with Sultan.

There does not seem to be any parallel between possible revival of British claim to Telegraph Island and Bunder Gisseh incident. Former would resemble revival of claim to the station at Henjam.

G. C. Press Simla.—No. 632 F. D.,—29-7-05.—44.—C. G. DES.

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I find the following article in *Al Ahram*, dated the 21st June 1905. Pro. No. 305.

ARAB COUNTRY.

From a correspondent at Maskat.

The English have now turned their covetous eyes to these parts; every day they create innovations and daily they appropriate some of their rights, and strike a blow with every concession. To-day I am going to tell you about a fresh act which they have committed while they are placing Maskat under the obligation of their protecting her rights, independence and territories.

They have since some time past planted their flagstaff on the Island of Ghanam, close to the port of Kumzar, and at the entrance of the Persian Gulf. The Shohu tribesmen who are the owners of the Island and are independent protested, and broke the flagstaff, and demanded a redress for this violence of their rights from the Imam of Maskat, but we do not know what the result will be. The English are at present all powerful and we do not know how they claim that they are protecting the rights of this country and adhering to the agreements while they are acting in this way.

What would the French say to this, who have submitted their dispute with the English in regard to the Persian Gulf to the International Arbitration Conference?

If the result of the friendly understanding between the French and the English is to leave the field open to the latter to do what they like on account of their mutual friendship then what an evil understanding it is and what an injury to the interests of the French and their friends! Why does the French Foreign Minister at Paris allow the Government of India to continue to act in this way and daily appropriate other people's rights and swallow them up? But it is very strange that the English are disputing the right of the French to protect some of the Arabs, who fly the French flag on their vessels and are referring their dispute to the Arbitration Conference, and before the decision is issued and a second time it is notified that Maskat and Oman are independent, they make encroachments upon the country which they claim to protect. They are trying to create for themselves a second Gibraltar in the Persian Gulf, *i.e.*, they want to take possession of both the coasts of the Persian Gulf. He who observes these proceedings of the English, while the dispute is before the Arbitration Conference, can understand that English know that the French Foreign Minister is ignorant of their doings, or that he knows about them, but keeps quiet. As regards the matter of protection of the Arab vessels (by the French) they produce the Treaty of 1862 and argue that the protection is contrary to its terms, while they by occupying the Island of Ghanam, are violating the terms of the same treaty!

I now remember and the Paris papers are before me which confirm what I do remember, *viz.*, that M. Del Casse, the French Foreign Minister, said before a meeting of the Deputies on the 11th March 1903, that he did not find anything in the proceedings of the English Government in the Persian Gulf, which would require the French to be on their guard to see that the English Government did not violate the treaty concluded between the French and the English in 1862 about the independence of Maskat, Oman and the Persian Gulf.

If the high officials of the Government at Simla were to see this statement made by the Foreign Minister of France, they would heartily laugh and say to themselves how good was M. Del Casse in what he said, and what good opinion he entertained of their friend the English?

Some days ago the English Consul-General at Bushire arrived at Maskat. He is styled the Political Resident, and has a special Man-of-War for his use.

1711 F. D.—S E—288-307—Aug.

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He is accompanied by the British Consul, Bunder Abbas, and the British Agent at Koweit. The last is a Political Officer who has taken up his residence at Koweit without any just reason or Government right, since the last nine months. But the Consul-General, Bushire, is a well known person for his judiciousness and mild temper, contrary to Major Cox, the British Consul at Maskat; he is high-handed, and wants to treat the people harshly and roughly and oppressively. He does not treat people after the manner of politicians but he uses force. The readers of papers will remember what I told before about his high-handed proceedings at Bahrein, and attack on it, and plunder of Amir Ali, a brother of Amir Esau, the Shaikh of the Island; and his causing to be sold the plundered property at Maskat, Koweit, and Bushire. Major Cox has notified to-day that Amir Ali who fled from Bahrein after having assaulted a German merchant, has taken refuge at el Katar, and is living with the Naim tribesmen, who are a branch of the Beni Atba, who are to be found scattered all over the Persian Gulf. The Shaikhs of Bahrein belong to that tribe. They are Sunnis, while the natives of Bahrein are Shias. This is the reason why these Shias are hostile to the Shaikhs, and the latter have on this account accepted British protection, but they soon found out that they were subjected to oppression.

Major Cox says that Amir Ali has written to him asking for pardon, and that he has sent his petition to the British Government with his recommendation, and it is expected that Amir Ali will soon return to Bahrein.

I have no doubt that will be the end of this sad occurrence, as the Shaikhs of Bahrein are inclined for peace.

But as for the British Consul at Koweit, he is a Consul although he is not called so. He has left for Karachi, it is said, for a change of air, as his health is not good.

Perhaps the British Government have removed him from Koweit owing to the protest of the Turkish Government, because he had occupied there an official position, which is not recognised in the agreement of the powers.

The English had obliged Mubarak to accept British protection although the Turkish Government had authority over him; and Mubarak accepted this protection for a long time, when he found that he had become subjected to the authority of the English; that the English issued orders and the Shaikh had to obey them. When he saw this state of things, he did not hesitate to return to his allegiance to his lawful master, *i.e.*, His Majesty the Sultan. In this way the Koweit incident, I think, has been closed.

Koweit is an excellent port in the Persian Gulf; it gives access to the Arab cities and towns as far as Mecca and its neighbourhood, and also to the tract of the country lying between the two rivers and Diarbakar. The English now understand that they have suffered a loss and their hopes have not been realised; and thus they have recalled their official. But this circumstance does not prevent their influence being greater than any other over the Persian Gulf. It is enough for the English to adhere to their policy of keeping safe what they have already in their hand of the country.

A. HAKIM.

The 18th July 1905.

Pro. No. 306.

No. 3060-E.B., dated Simla, the 9th August 1905.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

Translation of an extract from the *Al Ahram*, dated the 21st June 1905.

A copy of the foregoing translation is forwarded to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf for information.

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, AUGUST 1905.

Flagstaffs of Musandim Promontory. Pro. No. 307

MEMORANDUM.

Pro. No. 307.

The papers specified in the margin were transmitted to the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 32-M., dated the 10th August 1905.

PERSIAN GULF.
Musandim flagstaffs and Bahrein affairs.

Extract from the *Al Ahram*, dated the 21st June 1905.

Ed.—J. N. S.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Confidential.

Persia.

Statement showing the pronouncements as to intention or policy which have been made by responsible British Ministers, and the assurances which have been given to Great Britain by the Persian Government in regard to the following subjects :—

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(1) The integrity of Persia ...	1— 22
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

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1834.

(1) Integrity of Persia.

The first declaration of British policy in Persia was made in 1834 on the occasion of the nomination of a successor to the Persian throne, when an "understanding" was come to between the British and Russian Governments to respect the integrity and independence of Persia. No formal treaty was concluded on the subject, but this understanding has since been frequently confirmed.

2. Abbas Mirza, eldest son of Fath Ali Shah, who had been nominated by his father, under Article VII of the Treaty of Turcomanchai, as heir to the throne, died in 1833. The East India Company's Envoy at Tehran, in reporting the death of Abbas Mirza, who had been the mainstay of Persian independence, directed attention to the aggressive designs of Russia, and advised that assistance should be given to Persia if she were to be maintained as a barrier State between India and Russia. The opportune arrival of a despatch from the Honourable Mr. Bligh, British Minister at St. Petersburg, in which he stated that Count Nesselrode was apprehensive lest Persia should become the scene of discord upon the death of the Shah, and was anxious that the two powers should come to a "good understanding" respecting that country, "where he considers that our interests are so very similar," afforded an opportunity to Lord Palmerston to seek an interchange of views with Prince Lieven upon the affairs of Persia. His Lordship dwelt on the importance to both Russia and England of maintaining the tranquillity of Persia and offered to recommend the Shah to settle the crown upon his grandson, Muhammad Mirza, whose pretensions the Russian Government were known to favour. Prince Lieven reported the conversation to his Government. The Russian Minister heard with great satisfaction the unanimity of opinion of the two Governments, and said that orders would be sent to the Russian Ambassador in Persia to co-operate in this affair with the British Resident, with the result that the Shah nominated Muhammad Mirza as successor to the throne. Finally the "understanding" between the two Governments was recorded in a despatch addressed by Viscount Palmerston to Her Majesty's Ambassador in St. Petersburg on the 5th September 1834, which ran as follows:—

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON TO MR. BLIGH.

Foreign Office, September 5, 1834.

"In acknowledging the receipt of your despatch of the 6th August,* I have to instruct you

Hertslet's (Persian) Treaties, page 210.

* Respecting the affairs of Persia and Afghanistan.

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to take an opportunity of expressing to the Russian Government the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government at the decision which has been taken by the Shah of Persia to nominate Muhammad Mirza as the successor to his throne; an event which, it is to be hoped, will avert the danger of civil war in Persia on the next demise of the crown; and you will also say that His Majesty's Government are gratified to find that the Governments of Great Britain and Russia are acting, with regard to the affairs of Persia, in the same spirit, and are equally animated by a sincere desire to maintain, not only the internal tranquillity, but also the independence and integrity of Persia.

"His Majesty's Government will, at all times, find a real pleasure in co-operating with that of Russia for such purposes; and instructions have been sent to the British Resident at Tehran, to communicate confidentially with the Russian representative, in furtherance of the common views of the two Governments."

1838.

3. Thus matters stood until 1838, when the East India Company became apprehensive on account of an expedition which the Shah had undertaken to conquer Herat, instigated, as it was believed, by the Russian Minister at Tehran, as a first step towards menacing the British possessions in India. England, having vainly attempted to induce the Shah to suspend hostilities, was compelled to occupy the island of Kharak, and the Shah made an appeal to the Emperor. Meanwhile Lord Palmerston called the attention of Count Pozzo di Borgo, Russian Ambassador in London, to affairs in Persia and referred to the understanding of 1834. In reply to the note addressed to St. Petersburg, Count Nesselrode maintained that the Russian Government had done all in its power to dissuade the Shah from undertaking the military expedition complained of, alluded to the "happy agreement of views and of actions" which the two Governments had so much at heart to form in 1834, and forwarded to the Russian Ambassador in London a copy of Lord Palmerston's despatch of 1834, in order that he might show it to Lord Palmerston with an assurance that the same desire which then influenced the Russian Government to have a friendly understanding with England upon the affairs of Persia still existed, and an expression of regret on the part of Russia that the good understanding which had existed between the Court of London and that of Tehran was disturbed for the time. Lord Palmerston expressed his entire satisfaction at receiving this declaration that the Russian policy with regard to Persia remained unchanged, and that it was the same which the two Powers had agreed to adopt in 1834. The following extracts

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are from the correspondence which passed in 1838 :—

Hertslet's (Persian) Treaties, page 211.

COUNT NESSELRODE TO COUNT POZZO DI BORGO.

St. Petersburg, October 20 (November 1), 1838.

(Extract).

"It will not be without advantage, M. le Comte, to place again before Lord Palmerston at the present time the despatch, which at that period he addressed to the Minister of England at St. Petersburg, and which the latter was then directed to communicate to us.

"Your Excellency will find a copy of it annexed. With this document in your hand, you will have the goodness, M. l'Ambassadeur, to make known to Lord Palmerston that the same sentiments which guided us in 1834, and which led us at the time to desire a friendly understanding with England upon the affairs of Persia, are now also the motive of the present step, and inspire us with the full confidence of seeing it lead to results fully as satisfactory as that which preceded it.

* * * * *

"Assuredly, it will rest with that Government alone to re-establish, between the missions of Russia and of Great Britain at Tehran, that happy agreement of views and of actions which we had so much at heart to form in 1834, and which had at that time been attended with consequences so beneficial for the consolidation of the internal tranquillity of the Persian monarchy."

Ibid. page 211.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON TO COUNT POZZO DI BORGO.

Foreign Office, December 20, 1838.

(Extract).

"The despatch from Count Nesselrode, which Your Excellency has communicated to me, contains upon these points assurances the most full and complete ; and Her Majesty's Government accept as entirely satisfactory the declarations of the Imperial Cabinet that it does not harbour any designs hostile to the interests of Great Britain in India ; that its own policy with respect to Persia remains unchanged, and is the same which in 1834 the two powers agreed to adopt."

1839.

4. Again in 1839 the understanding of 1834 was alluded to in the following Russian despatch :—

COUNT NESSELRODE TO COUNT POZZO DI BORGO.

St. Petersburg, January 29, 1839.

(Extract)

Ibid, page 212.

"The Government of Her Britannic Majesty has received from us the formal assurance that it in no wise enters into the views of our cabinet to desire to direct the slightest hostile combination against the security of the English possessions in India ; and that, far from that our policy, in respect to Persia, has invariably remained the same as it was in 1834, at the time when a perfect understanding was so happily established on this matter between Russia and England.

"In return for this clear and precise declaration, we consider that, on our part, we may rely upon the intention and upon the desire which the British Cabinet has, on its part, expressed, to the effect of replacing the order of things in Persia on its ancient footing, by re-establishing its relations of friendship and good understanding with that country."

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5. No further declaration is traceable until 1873, when the continued advance of Russia in Central Asia led to an interchange of views with respect to that region between the British and Russian Governments. It was reported in London and credited at Tehran that the solution of the question between England and Russia included a declaration by the latter recognizing the integrity of Persia; and the Shah's Government endeavoured to obtain through the British Government a formal pronouncement on the subject from Russia, with a view to communicating it to other powers as an additional guarantee for her integrity. The Sadr Azam, then in London with the Shah, begged Lord Granville to inform him officially as to what had passed between the two powers affecting his country. Thereupon Lord Granville addressed the Sadr Azam in the following terms:—

Secret Proceedings, April 1874, Nos. 116-146, Proceeding No. 141.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SADR AZAM.

Ibid, No. 144.

Foreign Office, July 2, 1873.

"Your Highness, in your letter of the 30th June, has expressed a wish to be made acquainted officially with what may have passed between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the maintenance of the integrity of Persia. I have the honour, in reply, to state to Your Highness that, although no formal treaty or agreement exists by which the two countries mutually agree to respect the integrity of Persia, yet that, in the year 1834, an understanding was arrived at between the two Governments on the occasion of the nomination of Muhammad Mirza as successor to the throne of Persia. That understanding was based on the sincere desire of the two Governments to maintain, not only the internal tranquillity, but also the independence and integrity of Persia, and in the year 1838 Count Nesselrode adverted to the agreement entered into by the two Governments as still subsisting in full force, as it was also acknowledged to do by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

"Her Majesty's Government, as they recognize for themselves the principles which guided the general policy of Great Britain and Russia in favour of the independence and integrity of Persia in the year 1834, have reason to believe, from information which they have received from Lord Loftus, Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that the Russian Government refer with satisfaction to the mutual assurances which were made on this subject in 1834 and 1838. Her Majesty's Government consider that the best mode of confirming both powers in those sentiments is, that Persia, while steadily maintaining her rights as an independent power, should studiously fulfil in all respects her treaty engagements with each, and so insure the continuance of the friendship which both powers, even for their own interests, should desire to maintain with her."

Count Brunnow also was told of the communication which had been made to the Persian Government at which he expressed his satisfaction, as will be seen

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from the following extract from a despatch addressed by Earl Granville to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg on 10th July 1873:—

EARL GRANVILLE TO LORD A. LOFTUS.

Foreign Office, July 10, 1873.

(Extract.)

Hertslet's (Persian) Treatics, page 213.

"I also informed Count de Brunnow, as he had broached the subject of the Shah's visit, that the Persians had inquired as to the nature of the engagements which subsisted between Great Britain and Russia as to the integrity of the Persian territory, and that I had told the Grand Vizier that, although no formal treaty or agreement existed by which the two countries mutually agreed to respect the integrity of Persia, yet that in the year 1834 an understanding was arrived at between the two Governments on the occasion of the nomination of Muhammad Mirza as successor to the throne of Persia; that that understanding was based on the sincere desire of the two Governments to maintain, not only the internal tranquillity, but also the independence and integrity, of Persia; that in the year 1838 Count Nesselrode adverted to the agreement entered into by the two Governments as still subsisting in full force, as it was also acknowledged to do by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and that Her Majesty's Government, as they recognized for themselves the principles which guided the general policy of Great Britain and Russia in favour of the independence and integrity of Persia in the year 1834, had reason to believe, from information which they had received from Lord A. Loftus, Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that the Russian Government referred with satisfaction to the mutual assurances which were made on this subject in 1834 and in 1838; and that Her Majesty's Government considered that the best mode of confirming both powers in those sentiments was that Persia, while steadily maintaining her rights as an independent Power, should studiously fulfil in all respects her treaty engagements with each, and so insure the continuance of the friendship which both powers, even for their own interests, should desire to maintain with her.

"Count de Brunnow expressed satisfaction."

1874.

Ibid, page 214.

6. On 23rd December 1874, M. de Westmann, the Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, again assured Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg that he fully admitted the continued existence of the understanding arrived at in 1834 and 1838.

1884.

7. But the policy of Russian frontier officials does not always correspond to the pacific professions of the Central Government, and Russian advances continued until the summer of 1884, when the probable occupation of old Sarakhs, which was claimed by Persia, caused the Shah considerable alarm, and led him to question the value of the assurances given to him in 1873 and to enquire whether Her Majesty's Government would support his remonstrances and a formal protest if made at St. Petersburg.

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The Persian Government were informed that "it would probably be for their advantage that they should exhaust every means of arriving at an understanding with Russia before appealing to Her Majesty's Government for support, but that if, notwithstanding the Shah's remonstrances, the Russian Government insist on appropriating territory, which can be shown to have been under Persian rule at a recent date, Her Majesty's Government will be ready to consider any application which His Majesty may make for their good offices at St. Petersburg." This announcement was received by the Shah with surprise and disappointment, and the Persian Minister was directed to remind Lord Granville of the assurance about the integrity of Persia which had been given to the Shah when visiting England in 1873.

Secret E., August 1884, Nos. 125-147, Proceeding No. 142.

Earl Granville replied in the following terms :—

EARL GRANVILLE TO MALCOLM KHAN.

Foreign Office, August 16, 1884.

"On the 17th ultimo you did me the honour to inform me that the Shah had desired you to remind me that, when His Majesty was in England, I had given an assurance that the integrity of Persia would be respected by England and Russia, and that as long as Persia gave no cause of complaint, that engagement would hold good; but that now, although Persia had given no cause of complaint, Russia was by force taking possession of the greater part of Sarakhs; and you asked whether if Russia were to take possession by force of Astrabad, of all Khorasan, of the provinces on the shore of the Caspian, Ashurada and Azerbaijan, the same answer would be given as that which was recently telegraphed to Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

Secret F., September 1884, Nos. 608-10, Proceeding No. 610.

"Her Majesty's Government have given their careful consideration to your representations, and I have now to state to you that they consider that the declaration made to the Shah on the occasion to which you refer still holds good, excepting as to certain concessions of territory to Russia which have since been agreed to by Persia.

"Her Majesty's Government are prepared to make representations in this sense to the Russian Government, if such a course appears desirable to the Shah, at the time that may be considered the most judicious."

Further it was clearly stated that the amount of support which Great Britain could give to Persia depended largely upon the amount of sympathy which the British nation felt towards that country. In order to promote such a feeling and at the same time to increase the revenues and prosperity of his country, His Majesty the Shah was advised to remove the obstacles which existed to commerce with the southern provinces of Persia by opening

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February 1888.

the Karun river to trade and navigation and by constructing good and safe roads from the interior to the Persian Gulf.

8. The advice then given with regard to the Karun river was followed in 1888, but in January of that year the Amin-es-Sultan on behalf of the Shah once again strongly pressed Her Majesty's Government to state distinctly what course they intended to pursue in the event of encroachment by Russia on Persian territory. The circumstances which alarmed the Shah were the persistent pressure of Russia on the Khorasan frontier, the delay of the Russians in demarcating the boundary, their claims as regards the Turkomans, and their domineering attitude at Tehran; and His Majesty intimated that he did not want merely general assurances, but a categorical statement from Her Majesty's Government whether they would afford him support or not in resisting pressure. The Marquis of Salisbury replied on 8th February 1888 as follows :—

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO HER MAJESTY'S CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT TEHRAN.

Foreign Office, London, February 8, 1888.

Secret E., May 1888, Nos. 155-172, Proceeding No. 171.

(Extract.)

No. 6.

(Secret.)

"You should explain that it would be difficult for any Government, and impossible for the Government of a country with Parliamentary institutions, such as those of Great Britain, to pledge itself, in eventualities which cannot be even vaguely foreseen, to undertake a war with a great European and Asiatic power. But you may assure the Shah that the maintenance of the integrity of Persia is a material part of the policy of England in the East, and that His Majesty may rest assured that she will use her best efforts to secure it."

Secret E., August 1888, Nos. 134-151, Proceeding No. 137.

This despatch was followed up on 21st February 1888 by a telegram from Lord Salisbury to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran in which His Lordship said that as the Russians had not made any specific demands, the most practical way of helping the Shah seemed to be to exercise our influence at St. Petersburg to induce the Russian Government to treat pending questions in a moderate and conciliatory spirit, and on the same day, February 21st, two despatches, Nos. 51 and 52 (Secret), were sent to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, in the second of which it was directed that efforts should be made to get some satisfactory assurances of the Emperor's friendly disposition, in such a form as to be available for communication at Tehran, but without giving any indication of an

Secret E., August 1888, Nos. 128-133, Proceeding No. 131.
Secret E., September 1889, Nos. 157-185, Proceeding No. 172.

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appeal having been received from the Persian Government. The fact of Sir H. Wolff's approaching departure for Tehran was made the ground for the overtures to the Russian Government; and in his other despatch No. 51 of the same date, the Marquis of Salisbury addressed to Sir Robert Morier the following important communication in which he expounded to M. de Giers the views of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the future relations of the two countries in developing the resources of Persia, and invited Russia to accomplish at an early date the complete demarcation of the Russo-Persian frontier, and to give an assurance of her desire to respect the just rights of Persia in this as in other questions, for the satisfaction of both the Shah and Her Majesty's Government:—

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, TO SIR R. MORIER.

Foreign Office, London, February 21, 1888.

(No. 51.)

Secret E., September 1889, Nos. 157-85, Proceeding No. 172.

"I have noticed in the extracts from the Russian press which you have forwarded to this office that there is a tendency to attach importance to Sir H. Drummond Wolff's appointment as Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran, and to look upon it as evidence of an endeavour on the part of Her Majesty's Government to obtain predominant influence in Persia to the detriment of Russia.

"I should wish you to take an early opportunity of speaking to M. de Giers on the subject, and of stating that Her Majesty's Government entertain no such designs. I am aware of no reasons why the policy of Russia and that of England in Persia should be antagonistic, and I should be glad that the mission of Sir H. Wolff should, on the contrary, be significant of the desire of the two Governments to supplement the agreement happily arrived at in regard to the frontier of Afghanistan by harmonious and friendly action in Persia.

"Sir H. Wolff will be instructed to maintain the most cordial and frank relations with his Russian colleague at Tehran, and if M. de Giers considers that it is likely to be of use, I shall be happy to request him to call upon the Russian Ambassador here before his departure, and to discuss with him any questions connected with Persia in which the two Governments are mutually interested.

"He will be authorised to give the Shah the strongest assurances of the continued desire of Her Majesty's Government to respect and promote the integrity and independence of Persia, and it would be satisfactory if he could be enabled to state that Her Majesty's Government had ascertained, by an exchange of views with that of Russia, that the agreement arrived at on this subject in 1834 and 1838, and renewed by mutual assurances on several subsequent occasions, remains in full force.

"In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government there are equal advantages to be derived by Great

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Britain and Russia from the gradual progress of Persia and the development of her resources, and a sufficient field in this respect is afforded for the private enterprise of both countries without their rivalry assuming the nature of a conflict. Either party may, no doubt, do much to hinder the other, though its efforts in this direction would almost inevitably re-act upon itself. But Her Majesty's Government are firmly convinced that a policy which should aim at the exclusion of either Russia or England from their legitimate share in the markets of Persia is, in the long run, an impossible one. The channels of access and the regions which depend on them are too distinctly marked out by the great natural features and conditions of the country to be permanently overridden by political expedients. Our efforts, as is natural, have been principally directed to the promotion of commerce in the southern provinces, and the improvement of their communications with the Persian Gulf. For this purpose we have advocated, but hitherto without success, the opening of the Karun river to steam navigation, and the construction of a railway which should give access to the more fertile districts which lie at some distance from the coast. But in accordance with the well-known principles of English commercial policy, we have not sought, or wished to obtain, any exclusive privileges in this respect. Nor do we desire to obstruct or oppose any plans which Russia may wish to bring forward for the advancement of commercial intercourse in the north of Persia with the Russian possessions. The Russian Government may easily satisfy themselves of the great engineering difficulties which would prevent the proposed railway in the south from being extended in a manner to become a formidable competitor with Russian enterprises in the north. It is, moreover, highly improbable that in any case British capital will be forthcoming to an amount which would enable the scheme to assume formidable proportions.

"Another question in which Her Majesty's Government are, at all events indirectly, interested, and on which I believe that the Shah and his ministers at times feel considerable anxiety, is that of the frontier of Khorasan, which still remains unsettled.

"You are aware that in 1882 Her Majesty's Government proposed that this frontier should be laid down by a joint commission, in which Russia, England, and Persia should be represented. The proposal was not carried into effect at the time, and the circumstances under which it was proposed have since that time materially changed. But measures for accomplishing at an early date the complete demarcation of the Russo-Persian frontier, accompanied by an assurance of the Emperor's desire to treat the Persian Government with equitable consideration, and scrupulously to respect the just rights of Persia in this as in other questions, would be very satisfactory to the Shah, as they would be to Her Majesty's Government.

"You are at liberty to read this despatch to M. de Giers, and to give him a copy of it if His Excellency should desire it. As Sir H. Wolff is now making his preparations to start for his new post, I shall be glad to receive from you an early intimation of the views of the Russian Government."

A telegraphic communication on the subject of this despatch was made by the

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Russian Government to their Ambassador in London, M. de Staal, who on 3rd* March 1888, having invited Sir H. Drummond Wolff to call, read it to him. With regard to the first point in Lord Salisbury's despatch, the desirability of a renewal of the assurance that Russia would, as well as England, respect the integrity of the Persian Empire, M. de Giers declared that his Government was of the same opinion. On the second point, Russia generally agreed in the inexpediency of constant rivalry between Her Majesty's Government and that of Russia, in the development of the commerce of Persia, but considered that the question of railways should be treated with the Shah. On the last point —the delimitation of the Russo-Persian frontier—M. de Giers considered that it was one to be dealt with between Russia and Persia alone, and without the intervention of a third power. The formal reply of the Russian Government is recorded in the following despatch :—

* Secret F., May 1888, Nos. 56-276, Proceeding No. 276.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO SIR R. MORIER.

Foreign Office, March 12, 1889.

(Extract.)

Secret E., August 1888, Nos. 134-151, Proceeding No. 148.

"M. de Staal called here this afternoon and read to me a despatch from M. de Giers. His Excellency was not authorised to leave a copy of it.

"The despatch was written in very friendly terms.

"After briefly recapitulating the interview which he had with your Excellency, and in which he had stated that he would convey through M. de Staal the definitive conclusions of the Russian Government on the several points touched on in the despatch, M. de Giers went on to mention and discuss those points.

"In the first place, as regards our desire for an assurance that the engagement between the two Governments to respect and promote the integrity and independence of Persia is considered by the Russian Government as remaining in full force, M. de Giers states that, although, in their opinion, there are no present grounds for apprehending any danger to Persia, and although they have received no communication on the subject from Tehran, yet the Russian Government have no objection to placing again on record that their views on this point are in no way altered. The Persian Government, His Excellency adds, have on more than one occasion had tangible proof of this ; and he alludes to a military demonstration made at the request of the Shah in 1880 on the Caucasian frontier, when a portion of the province of Azerbaijan was suffering from the incursions of bands of Kurds.

* * * * * * *

"I have expressed to M. de Staal, and I request your Excellency to offer M. de Giers my best thanks for this frank and courteous communication of the views of the Russian Government. It has been highly satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government to learn that those views are so much in accordance with their own ; and they owe their acknowledgments to M. de Giers for enabling Sir H. D. Wolff to inaugurate his mission by an

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October

1888.

Anglo-Persian Assurance.

Secret E., January 1889, Nos. 22-24-A., Proceeding No. 23.

Secret E., January 1889, Nos. 25-29, Proceeding No. 25.

assurance to the Shah that the engagements between Great Britain and Russia to respect and promote the integrity and independence of the Persian kingdom have again been renewed and confirmed."

Thus were renewed and confirmed in 1888 the engagements between Great Britain and Russia as to the integrity of Persia and these assurances were communicated to the Shah.

9. In the Autumn of 1888 the Shah, alarmed at suspected Russian designs on Meshed, was endeavouring to obtain direct and separate assurances of protection from both Her Majesty's Government and that of Russia. On the one hand, he addressed an autograph letter to the Emperor, asking for an autograph renewal of the assurances given by his father and grandfather of the independence and integrity of Persia, and on the other, he proposed to Sir H. D. Wolff that a formal secret treaty should be concluded between Her Majesty's Government and the Shah, by which England should undertake to protect Persia from attacks on the part of Russia, if unprovoked, or where England thought Persia was not in the wrong.

Sir H. D. Wolff was of opinion that this overture on the part of the Shah should not be summarily rejected. So long as His Majesty was deterred by fear of Russia from granting concessions (and the Russian Legation had just informed the Shah that a concession for railways granted to a foreigner of any nationality whatever would be looked upon as a blow given to Russia and would entail reprisals) our position in Persia must be secondary and the development of the country would remain at a standstill. But if such an assurance could be given to the Shah as would encourage him actually to grant a concession to British subjects, Russia could not openly make of it a pretext for aggression.

The concession being a *fait accompli*, we should have established our hold on the country, and Russia would be compelled either to acquiesce in it or come to some understanding with us. In exchange for the assurance asked for by the Shah, Sir H. D. Wolff recommended that the British Government should demand the opening of the Karun river. The views of the British Minister were apparently approved of by Lord Salisbury, and on 18th September 1888, Sir H. D. Wolff formally called the attention of the Persian Government to the assurances and promises made at different times by His Majesty the Shah to Her Majesty's Government that the navigation of the Karun would be

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opened to the trade of the world, and enquired when it was the intention of the Persian Government to carry them out. Further, on 30th September 1888, he informed the Amin-es-Sultan that he was now authorized to state that he was fully empowered to give the Shah a solemn assurance in writing that Her Majesty's Government would make strong representations at St. Petersburg, in case the opening of the Karun to foreign trade should entail on His Majesty any unfriendly act on the part of Russia. Some delay ensued, and in explanation of the difficulties which he felt in complying with the demand about the Karun river, the Shah showed to Sir H. D. Wolff the Secret and Confidential Memorandum of 18th September 1887, given to Prince Dolgorouki, and asked his opinion whether the opening of the Karun would not be a breach of his promise to Russia. To this the British Minister replied that the opening of the river to the commerce of all the world was not an act like a concession to a company to which the Russians had any right to object.

Secret E, January 1889, Nos. 45-90, Proceeding No. 70.

Quoted on page 24.

The Shah yielded to these arguments, on condition that he was given two steamers and an assurance, which he proposed should run as follows:—

"In the event of the Russian Government taking pretexts to annoy or act in an unfriendly manner towards Persia, or attempting to interfere with Persian rights or to take possession of Persian territory, Her Majesty's Government will take strong measures to make Russians desist from such acts."

Ibid, Proceeding No. 84.

This was communicated to Lord Salisbury on 4th October 1888, and Sir H. D. Wolff asked for an answer by telegram as to what the form of the engagement should be. On 24th October 1888, he delivered to the Amin-es-Sultan the following assurance:—

"In the event of any Power making an attack without just cause or provocation on Persia, or attempting to take possession of Persian territory against the will of the Persian Government, Her Majesty's Government engage to make earnest representations against such proceedings, and to take such steps as may in their judgment be best calculated to prevent any infringement of the integrity of Persia."

Secret E., July 1889, Nos. 270-328, Proceeding No. 276.

"It is understood that in order to enable Her Majesty's Government to carry out this engagement, the Persian Government will give Her Majesty's Government immediate notice of any demand threatening to the integrity of Persia which may be made upon them by any foreign Power."

TEHRAN; *The 24th October 1888.* (Sd.) H. D. WOLFF.

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In reporting his action to the Marquis of Salisbury, Sir H. D. Wolff referred to this assurance as "authorized by Your Lordship's telegram No. 78," but search in our records has failed to discover the telegram in question, and no other mention of the assurance is traceable in any despatch from Her Majesty's Government.

The assurance, however, was again referred to in 1890 in the following Memorandum which was given by Sir H. D. Wolff to the Grand Vizier to strengthen his hands in the matter of a Railway in Khorasan, which the Russians were at that time proposing.

Accompaniment to Sir H. D. Wolff's Despatch No. 249, dated 27th July 1890.

Memorandum by Sir H. Drummond Wolff, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Her Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

Secret E., May 1892, Nos 284-398, Proceeding No. 295.

"In the event of Russia attempting to force upon Persia a railway in Khorassan, it must be remembered that any line made by Russia in that province is one which would give to her an overwhelming strategical position menacing to the authority of the Shah throughout his dominions. It is therefore not one of mutual advantage, and His Majesty is prevented from granting it by the terms of his engagement to Russia.

"In case any threat or strong language is used by Russia on this account, it would be advisable for the Shah to answer that as England and Russia have jointly assured the integrity and independence of Persia, His Majesty thinks that on a question of such importance both Governments should be consulted.

"Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg is of opinion that if Russian pressure is firmly but courteously resisted, such an attitude will be successful. The Shah can always rely on the fidelity of Her Majesty's Government to their engagements, more especially to those given on the 24th October 1888, which I am authorized, if necessary, to renew."

1901.

10. The agreement relating to the integrity of Persia was again mentioned between England and Russia in 1901, when Count Lamsdorff pronounced himself to be ready then or at any time to subscribe to it. The circumstances in which the discussion arose are explained by the following telegraphic correspondence:—

The Marquis of Lansdowne to the Hon'ble Mr. C. Hardinge.

Foreign Office, 28th October 1901.

(No. 173.)

Telegraphic.

Secret E., March 1902, Nos. 377-521, Proceeding No. 483.

"His Majesty's Government have learnt upon good authority that the Persian Government, who are in urgent need of financial assistance, are endeavouring to obtain a further loan from Russia. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, it is preferable that they should discuss the situation frankly with the Russian Government, rather than that the two countries should carry on independent

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negotiations with Persia, who, doubtless, would play off one against the other. His Majesty's Government consider that the situation in Persia is governed by the Anglo-Russian understanding of 1834, which was subsequently in 1888 reaffirmed and emphasized. By this understanding both powers are bound to maintain not only the integrity, but the independence of Persia. Any arrangement under which Persia would pass under the financial tutelage of either power would be incompatible with the maintenance of such independence. In 1888 M. de Giers expressed the view that there should be no antagonism between British and Russian commercial interests in Persia. His Majesty's Government adhere to that view. They have always recognized the preponderating interest of Russia in Northern Persia, while in Southern Persia, on the other hand, more especially in the Gulf ports and also in Seistan, Great Britain has interests which she cannot allow to be ignored.

"I request that you will speak to Count Lamsdorff in the above sense. You should add that His Majesty's Government are ready to discuss in the most friendly spirit with the Russian Government the possibility of concerting some arrangement by which both powers might make a simultaneous advance to Persia. The two Governments might accept as their respective security for the advance Persian revenues derived from sources falling within the two spheres already indicated."

THE HON'BLE MR. C. HARDINGE.

St. Petersburg, 29th October 1901.

(No. 110.)

Telegraphic.

"I spoke to Count Lamsdorff this afternoon in the sense of your telegram No. 173 respecting the possibility of arranging by friendly discussion for a simultaneous advance of money to Persia, by Great Britain and Russia, upon the security of the revenues derived from their respective spheres of influence in that country.

Secret E., March 1902, Nos. 377-521, Proceeding No. 409.

"Count Lamsdorff adhered to his statement that he himself knew nothing of any negotiations for a new Persian loan, but as it was possible that M. de Witte might have received proposals for such negotiations, he would make enquiries from him on his return to St. Petersburg the day after tomorrow, and would let me know the result as far as he was able. He said that he welcomed the frank discussion between the two Governments of all such questions as the only means of avoiding distrust between them, and he asked me to call again in two or three days for reply.

"At his request I have given him a French paraphrase of your telegram (No. 173) for convenience of reference."

THE HON'BLE MR. C. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE.

St. Petersburg, 2nd November 1901.

(No. 114.)

Telegraphic.

"Persian loan negotiations.

"Count Lamsdorff informed me this afternoon that M. de Witte had told him that the Persian Government, in desperate straits for money, had applied some time ago for a loan to M. de Witte, and that he had complied, granting them quite a small sum, or, as he called it, advance. Count

Ibid, Proceeding No. 488.

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Lamsdorff had searched in the archives for the agreements referred to by Your Lordship, and though he had been unable to trace that of 1834, he had found that of 1888, and would be ready now, or at any other time, to subscribe to it. He himself was most anxious to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia. He stated that no such thing existed in Persia as financial tutelage, and he adduced as proof of this the fact that the Persian Government was able of its own free will, when in need of money, to apply for a loan to Russia. I contested the justice of this argument, maintaining that it was compromising to the independence of Persia to wring from her Government, when under the pressure of financial difficulties, concessions injurious to her own interests and to those of foreign powers, and I cited as an example in point the recent tariff negotiations. Count Lamsdorff admitted the correctness, of my arguments, but in spite of my emphatic statements, disputed the accuracy of my facts, stating that already before he went abroad the negotiations for the tariff revision had been concluded.

* * * * *

11. The same opinion with regard to the continued validity of the Anglo-Russian understanding was shortly afterwards expressed by the Russian Ambassador in London:—

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR C. SCOTT.

Foreign Office, 3rd December 1901.

Secret E., March 1902, Nos. 377-521, Proceeding No. 498.

"The Russian Ambassador, who has been in delicate health and is about to leave England for some time, called upon me to-day..... .....M. de Staal then referred in a somewhat vague manner to the Anglo-Russian understanding of 1834—renewed in 1888—as to the integrity of Persia, which His Excellency regarded as still in force."

1902.

12. In 1902 the refusal of the Persian Government to accept British financial assistance, and the peculiar circumstances under which that refusal took place, led the Marquis of Lansdowne to recapitulate the salient features of England's policy towards Persia, in a despatch to Sir A. Hardinge, which the latter was to place before the Persian Government. The following passages relate to general policy and the integrity of Persia:—

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR A. HARDINGE.

Foreign Office, 6th January 1902.

* * * * * *

Ibid, Proceeding No. 502.

"The Persian Government must be well aware, from the experience of 100 years, that Great Britain has no designs upon the sovereignty of the Shah or the independence of his State. It has, on the contrary, been one of our principal objects to encourage and strengthen the States lying outside the frontier of our Indian Empire, with the hope that we should find in them an intervening zone sufficient to prevent direct contact between the dominions of Great Britain and those of other great military powers. We could not, however, maintain this policy if in any particular instance we should find that one of these intervening States was being

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crushed out of national existence, and falling practically under the complete domination of another power. It would be necessary in that case, before the intervening State had virtually disappeared, to consider what alternative course our interests might demand now that the object to which our efforts had hitherto been directed was no longer attainable.

"Applying these principles to Persia, we have long recognized the superior interests of Russia in the northern portion of the Shah's dominions, which must naturally result from the long extent of her conterminous frontier. Whatever steps we may have taken to maintain our position in Northern Persia have therefore been taken as much in the interests of Persia herself and of her national independence as in our own, which are not directly threatened by Persian superiority in these regions, except in so far as it might affect the Persian capital and seat of Government.

"In the south, on the other hand, for fully a century our efforts have been successfully devoted to building up a substantial and pre-eminent mercantile position, with the result that we have acquired an altogether exceptional interest in that part of Persia.

* * * * * *

"In all these matters, His Majesty's Government have consistently sought to maintain the continued national existence and the territorial integrity of Persia, and to develop her resources. Their policy in this respect is in strict accordance with the understanding arrived at between Great Britain and Russia in 1834, which was reaffirmed by an exchange of assurances in 1888, pledging the two Governments to respect and promote the integrity and independence of Persia. So long as the Persian Government will work with us cordially upon the lines indicated in this despatch, they will find His Majesty's Government ready to support them in the promotion and protection of what are, in fact, common objects, to the advantage of both countries alike.

"If, on the other hand, in face of our warnings the Persian Government should elect to encourage the advance of Russian political influence and intervention in these regions in any of the forms which I have indicated above, His Majesty's Government would necessarily have to reconsider their policy; and they would regard themselves as justified in taking such measures as might appear to them best calculated to protect the interests so endangered, even though in the adoption of such measures it might no longer be possible to make the integrity and independence of Persia their first object as hitherto."

A copy of this despatch was given by Sir A. Hardinge unofficially to the Atabeg-i-Azam, who similarly communicated a memorandum composed by the Shah himself in reply. This document, with much that was irrelevant, contained His Majesty's declaration that his Government will never come to an understanding with any foreign power against Great Britain, does not intend alienating any portion of Persian territory to a foreign power for a military station, will not pledge any of

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its internal revenues to any one, will continue to do its best to encourage British trade and will not consent to differential treatment of the trade of other countries to the detriment of Great Britain. An official imprimatur was subsequently imparted to the Shah's assurances as to the policy of the Persian Government towards Great Britain. The document ran as follows:—

Secret E., July 1902, Nos. 244-306, Proceeding No. 305.

Ibid, Enclosure to Proceeding No. 279.

SHAH'S AUTOGRAPH LETTER TO GRAND VIZIER.

February 13th, 1902.

(TRANSLATION).

"I have read carefully the translation of the despatch addressed to His Excellency the British Minister by the British Minister for Foreign Affairs. You may communicate the following verbally to the British representative for communication to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Firstly, that we, and our Ministers who carry out our policy have always unhesitatingly respected and highly appreciated the friendly relations which have happily existed between the Governments of Persia and Great Britain, and we always do our best to preserve the balance of friendship between that Government and other powers and to maintain and continue the policy which we have inherited from our late august father.

Secondly, with regard to the statement of the British Government that in view of its own policy, that Government is doing its utmost to maintain our independence, there is no doubt as to this, and it must be so, and it is also our own desire, because, if the independence of Persia is not maintained, the English Government will not obtain the results which it has in view from the independence of this country. The Persian Government has never had the intention of giving any of its sovereign rights to any other power. In the same way that the English Government gives us advice, so too the Persian Government on its part specially requests the British Government not to consent to any diminution of the sovereign rights of Persia, because if the Persian Government were to overlook or acquiesce in a small matter proposed by one party and which might be inconsistent with its own independence, the other party would at once demand and the Persian Government have to make to it concessions several times more extensive.

In order to establish a financial equilibrium, the Persian Government, like other Governments, desires to increase its resources and to put the different administrations of the country, such as customs, etc., on a proper footing, but in doing this it does not wish to give differential treatment to the trade of foreign powers. The English Government, according to its own statement and for the maintenance of the friendship and the integrity of Persia, ought to give its assistance in the matter and not to prevent such measures or ask that an exception should be made from the general rule. It has never been, nor is it now the intention of the Persian Government to pledge the revenues of any part of the country to any one, but this must be by the will of the Persian Government itself and not at the bidding of any foreign power.

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Impérial considère que les dispositions prises par le Gouvernement des Indes constituent une violation du territoire Persan, ce qui est en contradiction avec les assurances du Cabinet de St. James faites en 1888 et réitérées l'automne dernier, concernant le maintien de l'intégrité et de l'independence de la Perse.

Ayant été averti de deux protestations faites par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Shah au sujet de la violation du territoire Persan, le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie se fait un devoir de soutenir auprès du Cabinet de St. James les réclamations de la Perse."

In making further enquiries on the subject on 29th February 1902, Baron de Graevenitz told Lord Lansdowne that he had been instructed to call attention to these occurrences in defence of the integrity of Persia. Lord Lansdowne's reply was as follows :—

"I replied that both the British and Russian Government were bound by international obligations to respect the integrity and also the independence of Persia, and that I was glad to gather from his statement that we were at one as to this."

Secret F., June 1902, Nos. 118-162, Proceeding No. 141.

15. During the Shah's visit to England the Marquis of Lansdowne on 18th August 1902 had a conversation with the Atabeg-i-Azam at Marlborough House, in the course of which he held the following language as reported in his despatch, No. 76-Confidential of the same date to Mr. des Graz :—

"I told His Highness that the disposition of this country towards Persia was certainly friendly, and that we had again and again committed ourselves to the policy of upholding the independence and integrity of Persia. On the other hand, there were considerable risks of misunderstanding. We were essentially a commercial people, and commercial interests were largely represented in our Parliament. Much apprehension had been created by the prospect of impending changes in the Persian Customs Tariff, and I had, therefore, heard with the greatest satisfaction of the assurances which His Highness had been able to give to Sir A. Hardinge on the occasion of their recent meeting at Carlsbad."

Secret E., March 1903, Nos. 261-328, Proceeding No. 285.

16. On 21st August 1902 during an interview between Lord Lansdowne and the Shah himself the question of the integrity of Persia was again mentioned. In his despatch to M. des Graz, No. 77-Confidential, dated Foreign Office, August 21st, 1902, His Lordship wrote as follows :—

"His Imperial Majesty then asked me whether he was to understand that His Majesty's Government desired to recognize the independence of Persia. I said that the recognition of the independence of Persia had always been a cardinal point in our policy. We adhered as strongly as ever to that policy, which we had repeatedly affirmed. Our special concern was, of course, with the southern part of Persia and with the Persian Gulf, and

Secret E., March 1903, Nos. 261-328, Proceeding No. 286.

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Marquis of Lansdowne on February 22nd, 1903.

* * "le maintien de l'intégrité et de l'indépendence de la Perse a été reconnu sans conteste comme base de la politique de la Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne à l'égard de ce pays."

Enclosure 1, Proceeding No. 175 in Secret F., June 1903, Nos. 1-199.

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(2) Railways, Tramways, Roads and Telegraphs.

Railways.

1889.

Secret E., June 1889, Nos. 112-114, Proceeding No. 112.

On 20th March 1889, Sir H. Drummond Wolff forwarded to the Marquis of Salisbury the following important engagement given to him by the Shah with respect to railways in Persia and with special relation to those in the south :—

Translation of autograph from the Shah addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 16th September 1888.

"*His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs*—Of His Excellency Wolff, the British Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary's communications information has been received, and it has caused much astonishment. Convey these commands to His Excellency the Minister Plenipotentiary, even give him this very autograph, in order that he may keep it and be satisfied that our former promise with regard to priority of the English Government and the company of that Government over others in the construction of a Southern Railway to Tehran continues to hold good, and certainly whenever railway concessions in the north are given to others immediately a concession for a railway from Tehran to Shuster, or such a one, will be given to the English Company ; and of course then the clauses and conditions will also be examined in order that it be to our advantage and interest, and for the benefit of the commerce of both parties ; and positively no Southern Railway, without consultation with the English Government, will be granted to any foreign company.

"*P.S.*—And it is clear that in Persia nobody will be granted permission to construct railways except it be solely commercial ones. We say so now that they may know it."

The exact circumstances which led up to this autograph letter are not clear from our most imperfect records, but appear to have been as follows :—

Secret E., August 1887, Nos. 277-408, Proceeding No. 318.

During 1887 the British Minister, Sir A. Nicolson, had been pressing the Persian Government to grant an English company the concession for a railway from Ahwaz to Tehran, and negotiations were still on foot early in 1888, though without much expectation of success, as is evident from the following telegram, dated 1st May 1888, from the Marquess of Salisbury to Sir H. Drummond Wolff :—"As we cannot offer a guarantee, and British capitalists hesitate to come forward without one, it will not do to press for our scheme too strongly."

Secret E., July 1888, Nos. 150-158, Proceeding No. 155.

The rejection of the concession had, however, been previously determined upon by the Shah, who had been forced on 18th September 1887 by Prince Dolgorouki, the Russian Minister, to sign the following memorandum, under a threat that the grant of any concession without

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previous consultation with Russia would entail the withdrawal of the Emperor as a guarantor of Persian independence :—

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM.

"Whereas it is our sincere inclination to further demonstrate our confidence and trust in His Majesty the Emperor, who has always and on every occasion proved his sincere inclination and affection towards us, and inasmuch as it is our inclination to be always in entire affection and friendship with His Majesty the Emperor, we have decided not to give orders or permission to construct railways and waterways to companies of foreign nations before consulting with His Majesty the Emperor, and his advice and consultation will meet with our consideration, inasmuch as should those concessions contain an article or clause detrimental to Persian interests, we can utilize the Emperor's consultation and advice in order to avoid it and protect ourselves against that detriment."

Secret E., January 1889, Nos. 45-90, Proceeding No. 76-A.

The Ahwaz-Tehran railway concession accordingly fell through, but in September 1888, the Shah found himself under the necessity of seeking definite support from Great Britain,* as an indirect but strong intimation had been made that Russia intended to take under her protection the Yamuts, the only Turcomans still under Persia, and this meant the occupation of their lands and pastures by Russia. In a despatch, dated 5th September 1888, to the Marquis of Salisbury, Sir H. Drummond Wolff reported that the Amin-es-Sultan had made to him in the name of the Shah proposals for a formal secret treaty to be concluded between Her Majesty's Government and the Shah by which England should undertake to protect Persia from attacks on the part of Russia. The occasion being, therefore, a favourable one for reopening the question, on 18th September 1888, Sir H. D. Wolff left a note with the Amin-es-Sultan, saying that he had been instructed by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to call the attention of the Persian Government to the circumstance that the assurances and promises made at different times by the Shah that the navigation of the Karun would be opened to the trade of the world had not yet been carried out, and an official answer was required as to when the Persian Government intended to do so. Discussions ensued, and in explanation of the difficulties which he felt, the Shah communicated to the British Minister the Secret and Confidential Memorandum, dated 18th September 1887, which he had given to Russia. Sir H. D. Wolff was able to reassure His Majesty that the opening of the Karun river to the commerce of all the world was not an act like a concession

For the rumoured renewal of this Agreement see page 34.

* See page 7.

Secret E., January 1889, Nos. 25-29, Proceeding No. 25.

Secret E., January 1889, Nos. 45 90, Proceeding No. 68.

Ibid, Proceeding No. 75.

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Page 12.

Hertslet's (Persian) Treaties, page 58.

Secret E., May 1889, Nos. 548-552, Proceeding No. 549.

Secret E., June 1889, Nos. 112-114, Proceeding No. 113.

Secret E., May 1889, Nos. 548-52, Proceeding No. 550.

Secret E., May 1889, Nos. 586-592, Proceeding No. 587.

to a company to which the Russians had any right to object, and the Shah gave way, on receiving a definite assurance of British support.

The proclamation opening the navigation of the Karun river as far as Ahwaz appeared on 30th October 1888, and was strongly resented by Russia, whose Minister was at once instructed to press for compensation for this measure, which was regarded as an injury done to Russia in favour of England, and to demand "an undertaking by Persia that during five years no concession is to be given by her for railways, as within that period Russia will decide what railways she will herself be prepared to make or advise to be made in the country; at the end of five years Persia is to be free to give concessions for the lines not taken up by Russia." With regard to this required undertaking, Sir H. D. Wolff advised the Persian Government that if an appeal were made to the secret engagement, or if this period of five years were insisted upon by Russia, they should reply that as the independence and integrity of Persia were assured both by England and Russia, she could not secretly yield to the one what she might then be obliged to refuse to the other. This advice the Shah did not follow, and having decided to yield to Prince Dolgorouki, whose language was reported on 10th March to be most threatening and warlike, he appears to have proposed giving the autograph letter, which was based upon conditions laid down by Sir H. D. Wolff, as a compensating concession to British interests.

With this reference to previous events, the following telegram, dated 9th March 1889, from Sir H. D. Wolff to the Viceroy, in which the autograph letter is alluded to, becomes intelligible:—

"Following sent home. Very secret. Saw Amin-es-Sultan last night. His Excellency says that Shah is so anxious to terminate arrangement with Prince Dolgorouki that he fears His Majesty may, as on a former occasion, send free autograph assurance direct or through Yahia Khan. Prince Dologorouki accepts the one railway, provided its course be not defined, and on being told that promises have been given to us in the south, says that they do not concern him. Amin-es-Sultan proposes to give the one line undefined and the five years' offering, stating that we have priorities in the south, and undertaking to deliver to us an autograph assurance by the Shah antedated, confirming the line from south to Mr. Nicolson, and saying that no lines will be granted south except after a consultation with us. Also that no line will be conceded in Persia except for

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commercial purposes. I think it best to limit our rights to the south as avoiding antagonism in view of caution contained in Your Lordship's telegram No. 45."

Thus, it will be noted, the autograph letter, though purporting to be dated 16th September 1888, was really given in March 1889.

Secret E., May 1892, Nos. 284-398, Proceeding No. 331.

A copy of this letter was communicated by the Amin-es-Sultan in October 1890 to the Russian Minister, M. de Butzow, who doubted the accuracy of the date.

A translation of the Railway agreement between the Russian and Persian Governments is given below :—

Agreement between Russian and Persian Governments.

Secret E., July 1889, Nos. 174—191, Proceeding No. 178.

(Translation.)

(Confidential.)

Seeing our sincere friendship to the Russian Government, we are prepared to accept the following matters in order to facilitate and develop commerce between Persia and Russia :

1. The Murdab (Lagoon) at Enzeli, and the rivers which flow into the Murdab off Enzeli, shall be free to the navigation of the steam and sailing ships and boats of Russian subjects; and with a view of removing danger to vessels and boats, the mouth of the Lagoon at Enzeli, the mouth of the Meshedser River, and the mouth of the Peri Bazar River, known as the Siahrudbar River, shall be dredged and repaired. The rights and conditions of the free navigation will be arranged for separately, and notice of them given to the subjects of the Russian Government.

2. All the rivers flowing into the Caspian Sea, the navigation by ships and boats of which is possible, are freed to the passage of the ships and boats of Russian subjects, and this freedom of the navigation is in accordance with the aforesaid rights and conditions mentioned in Article 1.

3. The necessary commercial depôts and wharves, &c., shall be constructed by the Persian Government or its subjects, and shall be hired at a just rate by the subjects of Russia; and from the date when they shall be specified and announced to the Persian authorities, on the part of the Russian merchants, to the completion of a term of one year. Should the Persian Government or its subjects not construct them, then the Russian merchants shall have the right, according to Treaty, to construct them, and Russian merchants have the right, for the loading and unloading purposes, to take the necessary labour from amongst Persian or Russian subjects.

4. The Persian Government accepts the construction of a "route-chaussée" from Peri Bazar

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or Mobarekabad to Tehran, the Russian Government to form the Company, on conditions profitable to the commerce of both Governments, and Persian subjects shall have the right of association in that Company; and the conditions of this "route-chaussée" Concession between the Persian Government and the aforesaid Company shall be settled and arranged to the mutual satisfaction of both parties; and when the conditions of this Company are being discussed, the Concessions granted to the Azerbaijan Road Company will be brought forward in order that like privileges be accorded to this Company.

5. The Azerbaijan Road Company will be ordered to complete the cart-road from Tabriz to Julfa* and from Tabriz to Avachej [?] at the same time, and the same Company shall be commanded to speedily repair and facilitate the Astara-Ardebil road.

*Julfa is in Russian territory north of Araxes on road from Tabriz to Erivan.

6. The Persian Government accepts that it should grant to a Russian Company the construction in Persia of railways to anywhere which it may be advantageous to the commercial interests of both Governments, and the conditions of the Act of Concession are to be suitable and to the satisfaction of both parties, and for the discussion of this question the aforesaid Company is granted five years' grace, within which period of five years no other Company shall be granted permission to construct railways. After the expiration of this term, or the signature of the Concession, the Persian Government is at liberty to grant permission to any Company to construct railways in any direction. If during these five years Russian Companies do not wish to construct railways, the Persian Government is entirely freed from this its promise and agreement.

In view of the acceptance of the aforesaid matters, the promise and agreement given to His Majesty the Emperor on the 14th Jin Hijjih, 1304, concerning waters and railways, is cancelled (literally, "loses its credit").

Signed on the Rejeb, 1306, the year of the

Given to His Excellency Prince Dolgorouki, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Russian Government.

(Shah's signature.)

It is correct.

(Signed) THE SULTAN NASSIR-UD-DIN SHAH KAJAH.

1890.

Secret E., June 1890, Nos. 7-17, Proceeding No. 14.

2. In January 1890 two Russian contractors applied for a railway concession in Persia, and the Shah communicated the fact secretly to Sir H. Drummond Wolff

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who was instructed as follows by Lord Salisbury:—

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

(No. 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 1, 1890.

"You are authorized to protest against any scheme which would give the monopoly of railways in Persia to Russian contractors. Such a concession would be fatal to Persian independence, and would be a breach of faith on the part of Persia towards Her Majesty's Government."

Thereupon the British Minister left the following note with the Amin-es-Sultan recalling the Shah's promise, dated September 1888:—

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE AMIN-ES-SULTAN.

Secret E., June 1890, Nos. 18-31, Proceeding No. 29.

Tehran, February 1, 1890.

"M. le Ministre,

As it is generally reported that applications are being addressed by foreign contractors to His Majesty the Shah for concessions of railways in Persia, I venture to recall to the recollection of your Excellency the gracious promise contained in the autography of His Majesty the Shah dated the 10th March*. By this document His Majesty was pleased to convey to me the solemn assurance—

* 10th March 1889.

(1) that whenever a railway concession may be given anywhere in Persia, a similar concession shall be granted to an English company for a line from Tehran to the Persian Gulf;

(2) that no concession of any kind will be given for a railway from Tehran to the south except in agreement with this Legation.

"Her Majesty's Government have charged me to remind your Excellency of these engagements merely with the view of avoiding the possibility of any conflict of interests which may be caused by the applications at present submitted to His Majesty by others."

Meanwhile the Shah had the previous day himself rejected the demands of the Russian contractors on account of the exorbitant conditions asked for, which would have practically given them the complete and unlimited control of the kingdom. The Russian Legation disclaimed all connection with the concession, but it was believed by the Amin-es-Sultan that the draft was drawn up with the knowledge of the Russian Government. His Excellency therefore read the Shah's answer to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires and in his presence explained to the two contractors that the engagement given to Russia was

Secret E., June 1890, Nos. 7-17, Proceeding No. 15.

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for the construction of such railways as would be beneficial to Persia; furthermore the Shah had bound himself to England not to give any railway in the south except in agreement with her.

3. The policy of the Russians with regard to railways, however, was not to encourage their construction by companies of their own, but to block their being constructed by any one at all, and during 1890 the Russian Minister pressed for the prolongation of the period during which Russia had the priority in the construction of railways in Persia.

An attempt was made in September to effect the prolongation for ten years with a condition attached that in the event of England making a railway to the Persian frontier, Russia should have the right to construct one to the south of Persia. His Majesty accepted the ten years' prolongation, but not the attached condition which apparently originated in the alarm felt by the Russians at a rumoured extension of the British railway from Baluchistan to the frontier of Persia.

Secret E., May 1892, Nos. 284-398, Proceeding No. 299.

Ibid, Proceeding No. 315.

The Russian Minister then put forward a protocol containing a clause which provided that at the expiration of ten years the question of prolonging that period or of granting the construction of railways either to foreigners or natives should be dependent upon the consent of Persia and Russia alone. This was strenuously opposed by the British Minister, but the Shah was only too anxious to get rid of the question of railways altogether, and in November 1890 signed the following Russian Agreement which contains the obnoxious condition in the words which limit the discussion of the renewal of the prolongation after the expiration of the ten years to the two parties, *viz.*, Russia and Persia :—

Ibid, Proceeding No. 390.

* *(Enclosed in Mr. Kennedy's despatch dated 10th November 1890.)*

Translation of draft Russian Railway Agreement, communicated to Mr. Kennedy by Amin-es-Sultan.*

"As the Ministers of the Government of His Most Sacred Majesty the Shah stated that there are difficulties in their way in carrying out their engagement of Rajab 1306, (March 1889) regarding the construction of railways by the Russian Company in Persian territory, therefore the Ministers of the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Provinces of Russia have agreed to alter the above-mentioned engagement in the following manner; and His Excellency M. Butzow, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of His Imperial Majesty the Most Great Emperor of all the Provinces of Russia, and His Highness the Amin-es-Sultan, the Grand Vizier of the Government of the Most Sacred, Sublime and Absolute Shah of all the Provinces of Persia, empowered by their respective Governments have drawn up the detailed condition.

"The Persian Government engages for the space of ten years, beginning from the date of signature

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of this Agreement, neither to construct a railway in Persian territory, nor to permit nor grant a concession for the construction of railways to a company or other persons; and after the expiration of the ten years the renewal of the prolongation shall be immediately discussed between the two parties.

"By railway lines is to be understood all lines upon which steam or any other motive power is used, and all such lines are included in this agreement.

"Tramway lines which are drawn by horses, and which are situated in towns or in places near towns are not included in this Agreement.

"A railway line from Tehran to Shumran, where are situated the summer residences of His Most Sacred, Sublime Majesty, the most distant of which is two farsakhs from Tehran, is excluded from this Agreement and engagement.

"After the signature of this Agreement as much of the document of the month of Rajab 1306 (March 1889) as concerns railways becomes null and void.

"This Agreement, in duplicate, has been sealed and signed in Tehran, 27th of the month of Rabbi-ul-evvel 1308." (11th November 1890.)

4. The history of this transaction, ending in the Shah's renewed assurance that the right to construct railways in the south of Persia was reserved to Great Britain, is sufficiently given in the following telegraphic correspondence between the Marquis of Salisbury and the British Legation at Tehran :—

MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO MR. R. J. KENNEDY.

October 27th, 1890.

(No. 107.)

(Telegram.)

"Information has reached Her Majesty's Government from an indirect source that Russian Government are about to demand from Persian Government surrender of Shah's sovereign rights in regard to the construction of railways. Demand audience of His Majesty, and request, in the name of Her Majesty's Government, to be informed whether this is the case. Warn Shah that Her Majesty's Government cannot, and will not, recognise any agreement that places Her Majesty's Government in a position of inferiority to that enjoyed by any other State, and that by abdicating his rights he is exposing himself and his country to serious risks. Her Majesty's Government have no intention of pressing for the construction of railways in opposition to His Majesty's wishes, but they consider that in the interest both of himself and his allies, he should not pledge his freedom of action beyond a limited period."

Secret E., May 1892, Nos. 284-398, Proceeding No. 318.

MR. R. J. KENNEDY TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.

29th October 1890.

No. 259 (Secret).

Telegram.

(Extract.)

"Your telegram 107.

"Yesterday I saw Amin and found that Russian Minister had arranged to [sign* (?)] Protocol that evening. I read Your Lordship's telegram textually and spoke in the strongest manner on the subject, warning His Highness that it was the first step towards reducing Persia to the level of

* Group omitted.

Secret E., May 1892, Nos. 284-398, Proceeding No. 320.

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Bokhara, and that it was useless to sign agreement in its present form, as Her Majesty's Government would regard it as waste paper, and Persia would find herself in the position of having to side with Russia in order to force us to respect it. I insisted on my right to see the Shah, and the Amin finally begged me to make the application through the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which I agreed to do on receiving a distinct assurance that nothing should be signed until I had seen His Majesty. This morning at an audience, which lasted more than an hour, I held similar language to His Majesty, warning him that he was sacrificing his sovereign rights, and adding that Her Majesty's Government had no wish to force railways upon him against his will. The Shah promised that nothing should be signed for the present, but asked what he should now say to Russian Minister, to which I replied that His Majesty might throw the whole responsibility upon England, and that Russian Minister could, if he saw fit, cause representations to be made to Your Lordship by the Russian Government."

MR. R. J. KENNEDY TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.

11th November 1890.

Ibid, Proceeding No. 347.

No. 267 (Secret).

Telegram.

Your telegram No. 113 of yesterday.

I have just learnt that the Shah has signed Russian Agreement.

(Sent to St. Petersburg.)

I will telegraph details later.

MR. R. J. KENNEDY TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.

11th November 1890.

No. 268.

Telegram.

"My previous telegram.

Ibid, Proceeding No. 348.

"Amin, who has just called, states that after my interview on Sunday with His Highness, the Shah angrily declared that he would be thwarted no longer; that, as Sovereign of Persia, he knew best how to act in defence of his country's interests, and he peremptorily ordered His Highness to make immediate arrangements for signing the last Russian proposal, which His Majesty countersigned yesterday. The Shah has sent me a message saying that he hopes Your Lordship will not misinterpret his action, and that he is ready to sign any agreement which Your Lordship may think necessary for the protection of British commercial interests in Persia, in spite of the significant warnings of the Russian legation; His Majesty thanks Your Lordship for intervening to save his sovereign rights, which he considers has been done by the rejection of the first Russian proposal, and by the omission in the present one, after much difficulty, of the words: 'between the two parties.' I told Amin I thought Your Lordship would take a very serious view of this transaction, and I feared the Shah had plunged himself into a sea of difficulties by his want of confidence in our support, and that too at the very moment when we were taking active steps on his behalf. Amin agreed, but said it was unbearable to struggle any longer against the will of a capricious despot, who had weeks ago seriously committed himself in conversation with Russian Minister, and whose love of ease and natural timidity have been so successfully worked upon."

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5. The message from the Shah to Mr. Kennedy referred to above is alluded to in the following note written by the Amin to the Shah on the night of the same day, informing His Majesty that the royal message had been delivered. The Shah's assurances to us were written in his own hand across the Amin's letter.

Translation of Amin's note to His Majesty the Shah, written on the night of the 11th November 1890.

"*After compliments,*—I have seen Kennedy and have conveyed to him all your instructions. I told him that the affair is settled, and that it was signed and exchanged yesterday, and I told him that Your Majesty says that it was advisable that this business should have been settled in this way, and I said that this has caused no loss either to Persia or England, and that Your Majesty wishes Mr. Kennedy to explain this to Lord Salisbury, and that you are ready to give him perfect assurances with regard to the south, and further that nothing secret has been done.

"I explained all Your Majesty's instructions, and Mr. Kennedy promised to telegraph to Lord Salisbury to-night."

Secret, May 1892, Nos. 284-398, Proceeding No. 394.

Translation of Shah's reply on the top of the Amin's note.

"Very good. I will write and assure him of the non-existence of a secret engagement regarding railways in any way or manner he wishes. The southern part is, of course, their right (*i.e.*), in case a company other than an English one gets (a concession) for a railway from us (in the north)."

Ibid, Proceeding No. 395.

6. The assurance given by both the Shah and the Amin-es-Sultan that the words "between the two parties" had been omitted, proved to be false, for the signed protocol was seen by Mr. Kennedy himself, who observed that the words in question were inserted in the document. The explanation obtained by Mr. Kennedy, from the Amin-es-Sultan is an interesting record of the Shah's weakness and duplicity.

Secret E., May 1892, Nos. 284-398, Proceeding No. 392.

Ibid, Proceeding No. 397.

Tramways.

7. The question of a compensating advantage to be asked from Persia was then raised by the Marquis of Salisbury, and the opening of the Upper Karun, or a general concession for the making of roads and tramways was suggested. Finally preferential tramway rights in the south and the immediate construction of the Ahwaz tramway were demanded by the Marquis of Salisbury and were conceded by the Shah.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO MR. R. J. KENNEDY.

20th November 1890.

Telegram.

"Your telegrams Nos. 268 and 273 [of 11th and 14th instant].

"Point out to Persian Government that recent agreement with Russia is most injurious to British interests, and wholly at variance with professions we have received from the Shah and

Secret E., May 1892, Nos. 284-398, Proceeding No. 359.

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his Government for the last few years. If our influence and support are to be of any further use in maintaining the independence of Persia, it is essential that something should be done to show that the Shah is not altogether regardless of the friendship of England, and that his rejection of her advice is not to be taken as a complete withdrawal from the relations of confidence and amity which have lately existed between the two Governments. The assurances given by the Shah respecting the prior rights of England as regards railways in the south are so clear that they could hardly be strengthened by repetition. Concessions for roads appear to have been already granted in the districts where they are required; but a preferential right to the construction of tramways other than railways in the neighbourhood of towns, including a tramway at Ahwaz, might be accepted as some proof that the Shah still attaches importance to the goodwill of England. Report to me before making any communication in the above sense whether you think it likely to have any result, or whether you have any suggestion to offer."

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO MR. R. J. KENNEDY.

2nd December 1890.

No. 122.

Telegram.

Secret E., May 1892, Nos. 284-398, Proceeding No. 377.

"Your telegram No. 282 of yesterday. You may accept written engagement to give us preferential tramway rights in the south and immediate construction of Ahwaz tramway as satisfactory proof of maintenance of the Shah's friendship towards England. His Majesty's promise shall be kept secret."

MR. R. J. KENNEDY TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.

8th December 1890.

No. 285 (Very Secret).

Telegram.

Ibid, Proceeding No. 380.

"The Shah offers to sign after several alterations and considerable hesitation following engagement:—"His Majesty the Shah being desirous of giving a proof of his sincere friendship for England engages not to give any concession for the construction of tramways south of Tehran without first informing Her Majesty's Government, who have a preferential right for tramways in South Persia. If Her Majesty's Government refuse, the Persian Government is then able to give the concession to others. His Majesty further promises that a tramway, as has already been arranged, shall be immediately constructed from one side of the Ahwaz dam to the other side of the same dam. Shah again impresses importance of secrecy, so that Russia may not have an excuse to 'trample' upon him. Will this draft be accepted by Your Lordship?"

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO MR. R. J. KENNEDY.

9th December 1890.

No. 124.

Telegram.

Secret E., May 1892, Nos. 284-398, Proceeding No. 381.

"Please inform Shah that Her Majesty's Government accept with much pleasure this renewed proof of his friendship for England. The engagement will be treated most confidentially."

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MR. R. J. KENNEDY TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.

11th December 1890.

No. 286 (Very Secret).

Telegram.

"My telegram, 285. Engagement has been signed by the Shah and Amin-es-Sultan."

8. In his despatch No. 48, dated 16th May 1899, Sir M. Durand informed the Marquis of Salisbury of a conversation he had had with the Sadr-i-Azam, in which the latter admitted that the secret undertaking* given by the late Shah to Prince Dolgorouki had been renewed at intervals of five years and was still in force, with the net result that the Persians are practically bound in perpetuity to consult the Emperor of Russia before granting to any foreign company a concession for a railroad or waterway.

Ibid, Proceeding No. 382.

1899.

But on 30th May Sir M. Durand telegraphed that he doubted whether the agreement existed and was inclined to think that the Persian Government had simply renewed the ten years' convention.

Secret E., September 1899, Nos. 13-17, Proceeding No. 13.

* See page 24.

9. About the same time, it appears, rumours of the proposed construction of a Russian railway in Northern Persia led to a question in the House of Commons which gave occasion to the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg to elicit the intentions of the Russian Government:—

SIR C. SCOTT TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.

St. Petersburg, 17th May 1899.

(No. 144.)

"In reply to Your Lordship's despatch No. 101 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to report that I drew Count Mouravieff's attention, in conversation to-day, to the question asked in Parliament by Mr. Drage respecting the report of a proposed construction of a Russian railway in North Persia, and to the reply given by the Under-Secretary of State.

Secret E., September 1899, Nos. 13-17, Proceeding No. 15.

"Count Mouravieff said that the report was quite unfounded; the Russian Government, he assured me, had no intention of authorizing the extension of the Russian line into Persia, or of altering their present engagement with the Persian Government which precluded the grant of any concession to Russia of railways through Persian territory. He said that all rumours to the contrary might safely be contradicted."

10. In 1900 it was reported from Tehran that a large party of Russian engineers had arrived and were about to proceed in detachments to Kerman, Yezd, Bunder Abbas, Bushire, and Ispahan for the purpose of making railway surveys in the south of Persia, in which work they were to be joined by another party of engineers and surveyors expected in the Gulf on a Russian gunboat. The Persian Government professed to regard the party as belonging to some scientific body and engaged upon scientific work which it was

1900.

Secret E., August 1900, Nos. 27-60, Proceeding No. 45.

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equally open to the English to undertake if they wished. On 4th April the Marquis of Salisbury instructed the British Chargé d'Affaires as follows :—

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO MR. SPRING-RICE.

Foreign Office, 4th April 1900.

No. 35 (Confidential).

(Telegraphic.)

"Your telegrams Nos. 48 and 49.

Secret E., August 1900, Nos. 27-65, Proceeding No. 36.

"Refer to Sir H. Wolff's telegram No. 76 of the 10th March 1889, and his despatch No. 62 of the 20th March, which contain a distinct promise from the late Shah that Great Britain shall have priority in the construction of a southern railway to Tehran, that if concessions for railways are given to others in the north, a similar concession shall be granted to an English company in the south, and that no southern railway concession shall be granted to any foreign company without consultation with Her Majesty's Government. You should remind the Persian Government of this engagement, as to the continued validity of which there can be no doubt, and make sure that the Shah is aware of its existence."

Mr. Spring-Rice took special precautions that this communication should reach the Shah and the clear recognition by His Imperial Majesty of the continued and binding force of the document given by his father is shown in the following extracts :—

MR. SPRING-RICE TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

11th April 1900.

No. 58.

(Telegraphic.)

Ibid, Proceeding No. 40.

"Sadr Azam told me rescript had been laid before Shah, who regarded it as of binding force. For the next ten years owing to Russian railway agreement, the question of concessions would not arise. If the Russians raised it, His Majesty would produce his father's promise to us.

"Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this was the answer to my written note. The Russian Minister is aware of autograph, but says there is no question of Russian railway construction."

MR. SPRING-RICE TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

11th April 1900.

(Telegraphic.)

(No. 60.)

(Secret.)

Secret E., August 1900, Nos. 27-65, Proceeding No. 41.

"Shah has just sent me privately following message :—'My policy has not changed and will not change. I am and will remain the friend of England.'"

MR. SPRING-RICE TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

26th April 1900.

(Extract.)

(Secret.)

Ibid, Proceeding No. 47.

"The Sadr Azam accompanied me to the door and said to me—'His Majesty has seen your communication and his father's autograph. His Majesty said that it was a binding document, but that there could be no question of any railway concession either in north or south for ten years. If the others take any measures we will show them this autograph. Rest assured that there is no cause now.'"

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11. This pledge has been subsequently referred to. In his despatch of 6th January 1902 Lord Lansdowne recapitulated the salient features of British policy towards Persia for communication to the Shah's Government and with regard to railways said :—

"As regards railways, I may remind you that in March 1889 the late Shah of Persia gave a distinct promise in writing that Great Britain should have priority in the construction of a southern railway to Tehran ; that if concessions for railways were given to others in the north a similar concession should be granted to an English company in the south ; and that no southern railway concession should be granted to any foreign company without consultation with the British Government. This pledge was brought to the notice of the present Shah in April 1900, and was acknowledged by His Majesty to be of continued and binding validity."

Secret E., March 1902, Nos. 377-521, Proceeding No. 602.

12. In August 1902 the following conversation took place between the Marquis of Lansdowne and the Grand Vizier during the Shah's visit to London :—

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO MR. DES GRAZ.
No. 76 (Confidential).
(Extract.)

Foreign Office, 18th August 1902.

"I called on the Atabeg-i-Azam at Marlborough House this afternoon and had a conversation of some length with His Highness" * * (who) "reminded me that it was owing to his influence, exercised in the face of much opposition, that we had been given a pledge that if railways were ever constructed in Persia, we should be allowed the priority in respect to all southern lines. I said that I was fully aware of this pledge, which I regarded as one of signal importance and which His Majesty's Government would certainly not forget."

Secret E., March 1903, Nos. 261-328, Proceeding No. 285.

On the 6th of May 1903, the day after Lord Lansdowne delivered a speech in the House of Lords in the course of which His Lordship asserted the special interests of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf, the south ports and also in Seistan, the following conversation took place regarding railways between Lord Lansdowne and the Russian Ambassador as recorded in the following extract.

See page 89.

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR C. SCOTT.
No. 112.

Foreign Office, 6th May 1903.

(Extract.)

The Russian Ambassador observed to me today that he had read with interest the statement which I made in the House of Lords last night on the subject of British interests in Persia. * *

Secret E., July 1903, Nos. 286-287, Proceeding No. 287.

"We in this country recognized the preponderance of Russia in North Persia. On the other hand, we had special interest in the Gulf, in the south ports, and also in Seistan. With regard to the latter, I said that we should certainly regard with serious apprehension any attempt on the part of Russia to construct a railway from the north, so as to threaten the frontiers of India on the Baluchistan side.

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1902.

Road concession in Southern Persia.

Secret E., March 1903, Nos. 261-328, Proceeding No. 287.

"His Excellency said that he fully understood our feelings on these subjects, and that he would be glad to discuss them with me unofficially whenever I liked. In the meanwhile, he expressed the opinion that it was most unlikely that railway schemes of the kind which I had described would be undertaken by the Russian Government.

After this conversation the Marquis of Lansdowne sent a note to the Atabeg-i-Azam on August 22nd, 1902, recording some of the principal points which had been discussed, and with regard to the road concession in Southern Persia and the Company's preferential rights to railway construction wrote:—

"As regards the road concession, you stated that you were prepared to meet in principle the views of the new English company which has acquired it, and although you considered the term of ten years was an unnecessarily long one, you were willing to agree that that period should be given for the company to complete the work, provided that you were satisfied that it was seriously undertaken and that a beginning would be made without delay. With this object a draft concession was to be prepared for your consideration. I suggested that, should there be hereafter any question of railway construction in the region traversed by these roads, the company might not unreasonably expect to be given a preference; but it was understood by us both that any arrangement of the kind should not be embodied in the public agreement."

Ibid, Proceeding No. 293.

The reply of the Atabeg-i-Azam was as follows:—

"Je suis d'accord pour répéter que le Gouvernement Persan consent en principe à favoriser autant qu'il le pourra les entreprises de la nouvelle compagnie Anglaise, qui a repris la concession de la route d'Ahwaz à Téhéran par Sultanabad et Koum. C'est dans cette ordre d'idées que j'ai déjà accordé le délai supplémentaire de dix années, demandé par la compagnie pour l'achèvement de la route. Mais d'autre part, j'espère que les travaux seront entamés sans délai et poursuivis activement. Toutefois en ce que concerne la question éventuelle d'une concession de chemin de fer à laisser espérer à la même compagnie je ne puis que rappeler les réserves que j'ai formulées en répétant encore qu'en ce moment il serait prématuré d'envisager n'importe quelle solution à cette question."

Secret E., July 1901, Nos. 62-67, Proceeding No. 62.
Secret E., April 1902, Nos. 170-173, Proceeding No. 171.
Secret E., January 1904, Nos. 249-54, Proceeding No. 250.

The concession referred to in the above correspondence is the Kum-Sultanabad-Ahwaz road, which was originally held by the Imperial Bank of Persia and purchased from them by the Persian Transport Company Limited under a promise of a subsidy from the British Government of £2,000 a year for ten years. The company is empowered to make a branch from Burujird to Ispahan.

1903.

13. On February 18th, 1903, Viscount Cranborne, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the course of a speech on British interests in Persia, said:—

"It was true that the Russians had certain rights in respect of railway construction in Persia; so had this country. We had the right when

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railways were constructed in the north of Persia to construct a railway in the south."

Secret E., March 1903, Nos. 38-57, Proceeding No. 52.

14. In February 1903, the Secretary of State for India informed the Viceroy that Persia had bound herself to Russia not to allow any railway construction till 1910 by a treaty which possibly may be renewed for a further decennial period.

15. On 5th May 1903, the Marquis of Lansdowne in the House of Lords made the following reference to British rights in regard to the construction of railways, roads and telegraphs in Persia :—

"The noble lord said a few words with regard to railways in Persia. I believe it is an open secret that a few years ago Persia undertook to defer the construction of any railways at all for a term of years. We were not parties to that arrangement, nor did we contract any obligations under it. The position in which we stand is this—that, whenever railway construction takes place in Persia, we have a right to construct, or procure the construction of railways in the southern part of that country. Persia will then be opened not only to the capital and enterprise of other countries, but to the capital and enterprise of this country as well; and, though that arrangement may not be recorded in any very formal manner, we are satisfied that it is a binding engagement on the part of the Persian Government, and we should certainly maintain that that is its character. Closely connected with the subject of railways is the subject of roads. As to that there is a road between Tehran and Sultanabad which was built by the Imperial Bank of Persia—a British institution. There is also a caravan road between Ispahan and Ahwaz, which was built by Messrs. Lynch, a firm who have an honourable reputation for the enterprise they have exhibited in developing trade in Persia. Besides that, there are concessions for the extension of the Tehran-Sultanabad road to the Karun river, and also for joining Kum with Ispahan, and at this moment negotiations are in progress for the speedy construction of one of those two roads. This is a matter of considerable importance, because it will give road communication from the capital to a point on the Karun river, thus bringing Tehran into communication with the Karun navigation. In the matter of telegraphs, there is a convention which was entered into last year, under which a British line is being constructed from Tehran to the frontiers of India by the staff of the Indo-European Telegraph Department under the Government of India. The line will be leased by the Persian Government to the Indo-European Telegraph Department, it will be maintained by the British Director and staff, and 140 miles of it have already been constructed under the conditions I have described."

16. The terms of the Telegraph Convention of 1901, referred to by Lord Lansdowne, will be found in Secret E., February 1903, Nos. 308-330.

A list of foreign road concessions will be found in a despatch from His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 194, dated the 7th December 1903.

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(3) The Customs of Southern Persia.

1892.

The question of the alienation of the customs revenue of the southern ports of Persia first arose in 1892 in connection with a proposed Russian loan to enable the Persian Government to meet the compensation due to the Persia Tobacco Concession. Lord Salisbury instructed the British Minister at Tehran as follows:—

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO SIR F. LASCELLES.

(Telegram) *22nd April 1892.*

Secret E., June 1892, Nos. 244-252, Proceeding No. 252.

"You should inform the Amin-es-Sultan that any act by which the Shah hands over to a foreign Government his control over the customs revenue of the southern ports of Persia would be an alienation of his sovereign rights, to which Her Majesty's Government would be justified in objecting. You should state that it will be your duty formally to protest against the validity of any such act."

October 1897.

2. The same view was held by His Lordship in 1897, when it was rumoured that the Persian Government were negotiating a loan with Messrs. Oppenheim's Branch Bank at the Hague, and the Hon'ble Mr. C. Hardinge, then Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, was instructed to represent to the Shah that it would be a grave error of policy to pledge to foreign financiers the customs revenues of the Southern Persian ports. Accordingly, in a note to which a memorandum was annexed, he requested an assurance from the Persian Government that, under no circumstances whatever, would the control of the customs of Southern Persia be ceded to a foreign power. The memorandum was as follows, but it may be noted that the expression "control over the customs revenue of the southern ports" was altered in the Persian text of the memorandum to "control over the revenues of the customs of Southern Persia."

THE HON'BLE MR. C. HARDINGE TO THE AMIN-ED-DOWLEH.

Tehran, 16th October 1897.

Secret E., February 1898, Nos. 1-23, Proceeding No. 14.

"I had the honour to communicate to Her Majesty's Government the information given to me by His Excellency the Mushir-ed-Dowleh respecting the foreign loan which the Persian Government are at present negotiating.

"I have now been instructed by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to represent to His Imperial Majesty the Shah and His Imperial Majesty's Minister that it would be a grave error of policy to pledge to foreign financiers the customs revenues of the Southern Persian ports. Any default in payment of interest would be likely to result in a claim by the Government to which such financiers belong to interfere in the administration and control of the customs.

"I am also to state that, in such an eventuality, it would be the duty of Her Majesty's representative to protest against the validity of any act by

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which His Imperial Majesty the Shah alienated to a foreign power his control over the customs revenue of his southern ports. It would be an alienation of His Imperial Majesty's sovereign right to which Her Majesty's Government are entitled to object."

The Mushir-ed-Dowleh on October 23rd, 1897, replied to this note in a communication of which the English translation in the archives of the Legation runs as follows :—

"You have written that there was a rumour that the customs of Southern Persia would be placed under foreign supervision and control as guarantee for a loan. I therefore take this occasion of informing the Legation that this rumour is without foundation, and that they will never be placed under foreign supervision and control."

Secret E., February 1898, Nos. 1-23, Proceeding No. 12.

This assurance Mr. Hardinge regarded as satisfactory. The actual Persian text, however, which is the only one which the Persian Government would regard as binding on itself, is a little less lacking in precision and translated literally it runs :—

"This that you had written it has been rumoured that *some* (or '*certain*') South Persian customs are being placed under foreign supervision and control against the amount of a foreign loan has been brought to notice, and it has been deemed necessary to bring to the notice of the respected Legation that the rumour is completely without foundation, and under foreign supervision and control" [they (this pronoun is understood, but does not actually figure in the text)] "never will be placed."

Despatch No. 69, dated Tehran, 14th May 1903, from Sir A. Hardinge to Lord Lansdowne.
Secret E., July 1903, Nos. 173-187, Enclosure 1, Proceeding No. 180.

The difference is material, for, if now the Persian Government are driven to a precise definition of the expression "Fars and Persian Gulf," the customs of which have been given as security for the British loan of 1903, it has been suggested that they might lay stress upon the fact that the pledge of 1897 had reference to some or certain in contradistinction to all of the South Persian customs ; and thus argue that Mohammerah, for instance, is excluded from the security of the British loan and included in that of the Russian loan.

3. A month later—November 1897—Mr. Hardinge reported that the Persian Ministers were negotiating a Dutch loan on the security of the southern customs, and intended to reconcile their action with the above assurance by a declaration that, as their payment would never be in arrears, the control and supervision which they had promised us not to part with would never become effective ; in other words, that they were free to pledge the southern customs so long as they did not actually cede them.

November 1897.

Secret E., February 1898, Nos. 1-23, Proceeding No. 18.

This is a contention which might possibly be revived to meet the objection

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that the term of the Russian loans conflict with the pledge given to Great Britain in 1897.

The proposed Dutch loan fell through, but Mr. Hardinge explained to the Dutch Chargé d'Affaires the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject of foreign control of the customs of Southern Persia, and showed him the assurance received from that Government, which in this way became known to foreign Governments through their Legations. At this period, too, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires expressed similar views in connection with the control of the customs on the Perso-Russian frontier.

Secret E., February 1898, Nos. 1-23, Proceeding No. 20.

March 1899.

Secret E., July 1899, Nos. 255-275.

4. On 19th March 1899 Sir M. Durand reported to Lord Salisbury that the Persian Government were considering among other proposals a project for a French loan with Russian support, and that the security to be given was the general customs revenue of the country with the right of appointing controllers in case of default.

He was of opinion that we should not permit the customs of the south, including Kermanshah, to be given as a guarantee for a foreign loan, with or without immediate control and referred to Mr. Hardinge's despatch* No. 140 of the 24th October 1897. Kermanshah he considered an especially important point and suggested that we should require to see the terms of the proposed loan before its conclusion.

*See accompaniment to this despatch, paragraph 2, p. 39.

On 21st March Lord Salisbury replied as follows :—

Secret E., Nos. 255-275, July 1899, Proceeding No. 257.

No. 1.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO SIR M. DURAND.

Foreign Office, 21st March 1899.

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic) P.

"With reference to your telegram No. 15 of the 19th instant, I think that you should repeat the warning to the Sadr Azam, which has already been given formally on more than one occasion, that any arrangement which would tend to place the control of the customs of the southern ports of Persia in the hands of a foreign power would be resisted by Her Majesty's Government.

"You should also inform His Highness that after their efforts to assist the Persian Government to obtain a loan, Her Majesty's Government expect that the terms of any arrangement with others will be communicated to them before it is concluded."

The phraseology of the communications which passed deserves attention. Lord Salisbury here uses the expression "customs of the southern ports of Persia," which, though not so wide as the words "customs of Southern Persia" employed

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in the written assurance of October 23rd, 1897, is still wide enough to include Mohammerah.

Sir M. Durand replied—

SIR M. DURAND TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.

Secret E., July 1899, Nos. 255-275, Proceeding No. 260.

Tehran, 31st March 1899.

(No. 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

"I communicated to the Sadr Azam personally in writing substance of Your Lordship's telegram No. 8 of March 21st. He said that he would submit matter to the Shah. He has now given me the Shah's answer, and asks me to transmit it to Your Lordship. It is as follows :—

"It is not hidden from Lord Salisbury that Persia wants a loan. In answer to a question from Lord Salisbury the Ala-es-Sultaneh replied that such was the case, and His Lordship knows better than I do that this is true. We have been thinking of this matter for several years.

"Twice or three times I asked for a loan from another power; the conditions, however, were hard, and I did not accept the same.

"Latterly I applied to the Imperial Bank of Persia. Their offer was inadequate in amount and, as the conditions were unfavourable, this also I rejected.

"You ask to see the terms of the loan I am now making. This is not possible, as the question is still under negotiation. However, I now let you know that I will accept no proposal except the conditions are more favourable than those the Imperial Bank of Persia proposed. Further let it be known to you that the business will be purely a financial one. It is not one of politics.

"Now as regards your resisting any arrangement which would tend to place the customs of Southern Persia in the hands of a foreign power.

"I understand this to mean that since the proceeds of the customs are pledged as guarantee to the Regie Loan you have made this statement. I now positively state to you that this fact will be taken into consideration."

It is clear that in communicating the substance of Lord Salisbury's telegram of 21st March, Sir M. Durand used the broader term "customs of southern Persia," for this is the phrase which is repeated by the Shah in his reply—"Now as regards your resisting any arrangement which would tend to place the customs of Southern Persia in the hands of a foreign power," and the same words are found in the version of the British Minister's message which was telegraphed by the Sadr Azam to the Persian Minister in London, as follows :—

No. 1.

Ibid, No. 269

TELEGRAM FROM THE SADR-AZAM TO THE PERSIAN MINISTER IN LONDON.

(*Communicated 31st March 1899.*)

"The night before last the British Minister came

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to see me, and he read to me the following telegram from the Marquis of Salisbury:—

"Tell the Sadr-Azam that in view of our endeavours to assist the Persian Government to obtain a loan we expect of her to inform us of the conditions which she may make with others for the purposes of a loan before any arrangement is definitely concluded; and you are also desired to renew the plain warning which has been formally given more than once to the effect that we shall resist any arrangement for intrusting to a foreign Government the control of the customs of the south of Persia."

This telegram, and another the Persian Minister in London communicated to Lord Salisbury on 31st March as appears from the following:—

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO SIR M. DURAND.

Foreign Office, 7th April 1899.

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram No. 18.

Secret E., July 1899, Nos. 255-75, Proceeding No. 262.

"Persian Minister called at Foreign Office 31st March, and communicated two telegrams from Sadr-Azam, which were to the same effect as the message through you, though the refusal to communicate conditions of the loan is less positively expressed.

"I have replied to the following effect:—

"We much regret that it is not in our power to aid Persia more effectively in the matter of the loan, for everything that concerns the prosperity of Persia is a matter of great interest to us.

"But we have also our own political interests to look to; and those interests are not compatible with the exercise of any control or jurisdiction by a European Power over the ports on the Persian Gulf. We renew to the Persian Government this intimation which we have more than once given before; and we shall communicate it to any persons who may be disposed to rely on a control over these ports as a financial security."

Sir M. Durand replied:—

SIR M. DURAND TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.

Tehran, 8th April 1899.

Ibid, Proceeding No. 263.

(No. 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Your Lordship's telegram No. 10.

"Presuming that omission of reference to Kermanshah is intentional, I have communicated Your Lordship's reply to Sadr-Azam."

Sir M. Durand's actual communication to the Persian Government is not on our records.

It will be observed that the phrase used by Lord Salisbury, and presumably repeated by the British Minister in communicating His Lordship's message to the Persian Government, was "the ports on the Persian Gulf," a new variation which obviously might be interpreted in a much narrower sense than "Southern Persia" or "the

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southern ports of Persia," the terms hitherto employed in this connection. But the exact context of the conversation with the Persian Minister in which Lord Salisbury used these words is not recorded, and it is clear that His Lordship used them, not with the intention of making any departure from our former requirements, but under the impression that he was repeating merely the same thing in other words. This is shewn by what immediately follows :—"We renew to the Persian Government this intimation which we have more than once given before, etc." Nor is there any reason to hold that the Persian Government in view of the language used by Sir M. Durand and the whole circumstances of the communication would be justified in supposing that Lord Salisbury's message operated to lessen the effect of the pledges we had insisted upon with regard to the ports of Southern Persia. The reply of the Shah's Government was as follows :—

SIR M. DURAND TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.

Tehran, 17th April 1899.

(No. 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

"I communicated to Sadr-Azam Your Lordship's telegram of April 7th. Following is Shah's reply which I am asked to communicate to Your Lordship.

"His Majesty is grateful for the friendly advice of the British Government. At the same time His Majesty has been surprised, for it is that the Persian Government will not admit, in the Gulf ports or elsewhere in Persia, anything which may be incompatible with the sovereign independence of the country, nor would they take any steps which might be dangerous to the independence of Persia."

5. In 1900 when a loan was obtained by the Persian Government from the Russian Banque d'Escompte, after failure of the negotiations for a joint Anglo-Russian loan, the Persians intimated to Russia that they had promised us not to place their southern customs under foreign control, and as Russian control was a contingent condition of the loan, their exclusion had to be provided for. Accordingly the security given was described in the contract as "les revenues de toutes les douanes de Perse à l'exception de celles de Fars et des ports du Golfe Persique." The question of the exact scope of the phrase "Fars and the Persian Gulf" is one of considerable importance, but at the time when the Russian loan contract was first published on January 30th, 1900, with the clause excluding only the customs of "Fars and the Persian Gulf," His Majesty's Government made

1900.

Secret E., June 1900, Nos. 1-27, Proceeding No. 25.

Enclosure 1 in Secret E., July 1903, Nos. 173-187, Proceeding No 180.

Enclosure No. 2 in Secret E., March 1902, Nos. 377-521, Proceeding No. 494. Article 4.

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no formal reservation or protest with regard to this particular point, either to Russia or Persia, on the strength of the engagement of 1897. Sir Charles Scott, indeed, made a general allusion verbally to the existence of this prior engagement in the course of a conversation with M. de Witte on 10th March 1900, who said that it was in order not to interfere with any British interests that he had expressly had the revenues from the Persian Gulf ports and the Province of Fars excluded, but he did not call attention to the distinction between "Southern Persia" and "Fars and the Persian Gulf."

Secret E., June 1900, Nos. 1-27, Proceeding No. 25.

Secret E., June 1900, Nos. 1 to 27, Proceeding No. 25.

It must, at the same time, be noted that the extent of British interests in Persia was referred to by the British Government in connection with the wording of the Russian loan, for in a memorandum by Sir C. Scott to Count Mouravieff, dated 19th February 1900, we find the following:—

* * * *

Enclosure to Proceeding No. 19 in Secret E., June 1900, Nos. 1-27.

"Her Majesty's Government observe that in the statement of the conditions of the new loan, it is mentioned that the customs revenues of the Persian Gulf ports and of the Province of Fars are not included in those assigned as security of the loan, but the interests of Her Majesty's Government in Persia cannot be considered as restricted to the coast of the Persian Gulf or to the Province of Fars, and it would seem desirable, in order to avoid the risk of that antagonism which both Governments are agreed to deprecate, that Her Majesty's Government should have the opportunity of learning exactly what are the conditions of the new loan, and of discussing them frankly with the Russian Government for the purpose of arriving at a friendly and confidential understanding. The Marquis of Salisbury has instructed Sir C. Scott to speak to Count Mouravieff in the above sense."

But it must be pointed out that although no protest was made at once when the Russian loan contract was published, it may well at that moment have appeared inconceivable to Her Majesty's Government that the terms of the Russian loan could conflict with the 1897 guarantee, in view of the fact that this document was brought prominently to the notice of the Sadr-i-Azam on 11th December 1899, when the Persian Government were in the midst of the Russian loan negotiations. The circumstances were as follows:—On 10th December 1899, the Sadr-i-Azam in the course of a conversation with Mr. Spring-Rice and Colonel Picot about the circumstances of the loan then under discussion in St. Petersburg, asked whether the Legation was in possession of a document signed by the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, late Minister for Foreign Affairs, by which his Government engaged themselves not to give the control of the customs of the Persian Gulf (*sic*) to a foreign Power as guarantee for a loan, as his attention had

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been called to this document by the Persian Minister at St. Petersburg.

Accordingly the next day, 12th December, a copy was furnished him by the Legation of the 1897 guarantee, on perusing which the Minister will have seen that it was the customs of Southern Persia and not of the Persian Gulf that were excluded from foreign control. The Sadr-i-Azam seemed much concerned on the subject of this guarantee, and said he would be glad to possess a copy, as neither His Majesty nor any of the Ministers appeared to have any knowledge of the correspondence.

Enclosure 2 to Proceeding No. 36 in Secret E., June 1900, Nos. 35-69.

This is the occasion in December 1899 when the Persian Government were reminded of the 1897 engagement which is alluded to in the next following telegram from the Marquis of Salisbury.

6. Within two months of the terms of the 1900 loan being published, the Persian Government were reminded that Her Majesty's Government must hold them to the strict observance of the 1897 agreement, the occasion arising in connection with the proposal to place Mohammerah under the Belgian customs, when Lord Salisbury telegraphed to Mr. Spring-Rice to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that no change in the administration of the customs there should be made without our consent. The following correspondence passed between Lord Salisbury and Mr. Spring-Rice :—

Secret E., June 1900, Nos. 35-69, Proceeding No. 61.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO MR. SPRING-RICE.

Tehran, 20th March 1900.

(No. 31.)

(Confidential.)

"Your telegrams 38 and 39.

"It will be best that you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs courteously but distinctly, as a message from me, that in view of our interest in trade of Mohammerah and in navigation of the Karun, we must insist that there shall be no change in the administration of the customs or attempt to interfere forcibly with the position of the Sheikh without our previous consent.

Ibid, Proceeding No. 61.

"You will remind His Excellency of the written promise given by Persian Government on 23rd October 1897 that the customs of Southern Persia shall never be placed under foreign supervision and control, and you will state that Her Majesty's Government must hold the Persian Government to the strict observance of this engagement, of which they were reminded in December last.

"Endeavour to ascertain whether the Mohammerah Customs are included by name in the guarantee of the Russian loan, or whether they are considered to be included on account of absence of proviso that they are to be excluded.

"Report result of your interview by telegraph.

"You are authorized to use same language of Sadr-i-Azam."

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Pro-memoriâ.

(PERSIAN TRANSLATION READ AND COMMUNICATED TO THE MUSHIR-ED-DOWLEH.)

(Undated. Probable date seems to be 22nd March 1900. Enclosed in Mr. Spring-Rice's despatch No. 17, dated the 27th March 1900.)

Secret E., June 1900, Nos. 35-69, Enclosure Proceeding No. 67.

"Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire has recently called Lord Salisbury's attention to the state of affairs at Mohammerah. As you are aware, Lord Salisbury offered his assistance for arriving at a settlement, which, as he has been informed, will be postponed till after the Shah's return from Europe.

"Lord Salisbury thinks it due to the friendship existing between the Governments of Persia and Great Britain that there should be a clear understanding of his views as to the ports of Mohammerah, Bushire, Bundar Abbas, and other ports of the Persian Gulf. This is the best way to avoid difficulties in the future.

"It is not necessary to remind the Persian Government of the circumstances which make it impossible for Her Majesty's Government to regard with indifference what happens in the ports above named.

"As this Legation has recently stated, the control of these ports by a foreign power might lead to a state of things which Her Majesty's Government, in the interests of the Indian Empire, would be bound to resist. And this has been recognized by the Persian Government, who, on the 23rd October 1897, gave a written promise that the customs of Southern Persia should never be placed under foreign control and supervision.

The Persian Government did not fail to bear this promise in mind during the recent negotiations, and, as the Sadr-i-Azam has informed Her Majesty's Legation, the customs revenues of the above-mentioned ports were specially excepted from those which formed the guarantee of the Russian loan.

"I am to state that Her Majesty's Government must hold the Persian Government to the strict observance of this engagement.

"There is another aspect of this question to which I should draw your attention. As the Persian Government is aware, far the larger part of the trade of the above-mentioned ports is British. This trade (which is the common interest of Persia and Great Britain) imposes certain duties on Her Majesty's Government, and they cannot pass without notice any measure likely to affect its position and prospects.

And it is from this point of view that I am to inform the Persian Government, as a message from Lord Salisbury, that in view of our interest in the trade of Mohammerah and in the navigation of the Karun, Her Majesty's Government must insist that they have the right to be consulted before any change is made in the administration of the customs, or in the position of the Sheikh."

Pro-memoriâ.

(PERSIAN TRANSLATION READ AND COMMUNICATED TO THE MUSHIR-ED-DOWLEH.)

(Undated. Probable date 22nd March 1900. Enclosed in Mr. Spring-Rice's despatch No. 17, dated the 27th March 1900.)

Enclosure 2 in Secret E., June 1900, Nos. 35-69, Proceeding No. 67.

"I have received a telegram from Lord Salisbury which I hasten to transmit to Your Excellency.

"Your Excellency will see that Lord Salisbury is anxious that he may be informed beforehand of any steps which the Persian Government may

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desire to take in the south which may affect British interests. I am afraid that if some sudden action, affecting the interests and trade of Great Britain in the south of Persia, is announced without previous information being given to Her Majesty's Government, the effect on public opinion in England is likely to be bad. * * To avoid misunderstanding * * Lord Salisbury has clearly and plainly laid down what is the point of view of our Government."

MR. SPRING-RICE, TEHRAN, DATED THE 4TH APRIL 1900.

No. 50. Your Lordship's telegram No. 31, Mohammerah.

Secret E., June 1900, Nos. 35-69, Proceeding No. 69.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said to-day that the expression used in Loan Contract is "except Fars and the Gulf of Fars" and that if Mohammerah is included in this list, it is excluded from guarantee. He was sure control would not be necessary, if, however, the [more (*sic*)] day came (? for it) Persian Government would then decide to what ports (it) would apply. He deprecated a written discussion, and asked that he might consider your telegram only communicated verbally, as a written note would imply a derogation of the Shah's authority, and a partition of Persia into spheres of interests.

"Belgian Director assures me positively that as sea-going vessels go up to Mohammerah, it must be considered as a Gulf port."

MR. SPRING-RICE TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.

Tehran, 5th April 1900.

Secret E., June 1900, Nos. 35-69, Proceeding No. 68.

"This morning the Foreign Minister asked me to call on him, and after many professions of friendship to England, informed me that as regards the guarantee of the Russian Loan the phrase in the Loan Contract was: 'except Fars and the ports of the Gulf of Fars.' If this expression included Mohammerah, it was excluded from the operation of the contract; if, on the other hand, Mohammerah was not a port on the Persian Gulf, it was one of the ports forming the guarantee of the loan.

"With regard to the question of consulting Her Majesty's Government before taking action which would affect British interests in the south, His Excellency said that "not only in Mohammerah, but in every part of Persia where British interests were concerned, the Persian Government, before taking any steps of importance, would consult the British Government, but Persia could not give a definite agreement with regard to a special point of her territory, as such an agreement might appear to others like a consent to partition."

"I said I would inform Your Lordship of this reply. He asked me if I would consent to take back the written communication which I had made. I said I would agree that what had passed should be regarded as a *viva voce* communication.

But it might be as well to place it on record that we do not regard Mohammerah as being one of the ports which can be or has been made subject to the eventual control of a foreign power, especially as Count Mouravieff and the Sadr Azam have given assurances that the exception in the Loan Contract was made in deference to our wishes."

It will thus be seen that the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs deprecated a

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written discussion and asked that Mr. Spring-Rice's note enclosing Lord Salisbury's telegram might be regarded as a verbal communication only.

7. But, as to what the real understanding in the mind of the Persian Government was as to Mohammerah the following telegram shows:—

Secret E., June 1900, Nos. 35-69, Proceeding No. 62.

MR. SPRING-RICE TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

19th March 1900.

Persian Loan.

"Having been warned that Mohammerah was included in the Russian guarantee, I sounded the Minister for Foreign Affairs who admitted that such is the case."

Ibid, Proceeding No. 65.

Although in a conversation on the 27th March the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he would take care that the words now in the contract (except Fars and Gulf of Fars) were interpreted not to include Mohammerah in the Russian guarantee.

January 1902.

Secret E., March 1902, Nos. 377-521, Proceeding No. 502.

8. The general assurances which recognized our special interests in Southern Persia were referred to by Lord Lansdowne in his despatch of 6th January 1902, when in consequence of Persia's refusal to accept British financial aid, he found it necessary to recapitulate to the Persian Government the salient features of British policy:—

"Nor, again, could His Majesty's Government acquiesce in the concession to Russia of any preferential political rights or advantages, or any commercial monopoly or exclusive privilege in the southern or south-eastern districts of Persia, including Seistan. British interests must inevitably suffer by such concessions, and the Persian Government have themselves recognized and acquiesced in this view on more than one occasion. They gave, in October 1897, a written promise to Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran that the customs of Southern Persia should never be placed under foreign control and supervision. When, in 1900, the customs revenues were pledged as security for the loan obtained from the Russian Banque des Prêts, a special exception was made of the revenues and ports of Southern Persia, and when Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in April 1900 called the attention of the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the interest which the British Government had in the ports of Mohammerah, Bushire, Bunder Abbas, and other ports of the Persian Gulf, and insisted on the right of Her Majesty's Government to be consulted before any change was made in the administration of the customs at Mohammerah or in the position of the Sheikh, His Excellency replied that 'not only in Mohammerah, but in every part of Persia where British interests were concerned, the Persian Government, before taking any steps of importance, would consult the British Government.' His Majesty's Government have taken note of this assurance with satisfaction, and have only to add that a hypothecation of the internal revenues of any of

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the southern or south-eastern provinces of Persia as security for a foreign loan would be even more detrimental to Persian interests, and not less objectionable from a British point of view than that of the customs of the southern ports."

9. So matters remained, we claiming in the abstract that the term "Fars and the ports of the Persian Gulf" must, in view of the engagement of 1897, include Mohammerah, but without saying how much more it included, and the Persian Government evading an official expression of opinion on the point, till, when in 1902, the second loan was concluded on the same lines as the first, Sir A. Hardinge was authorised to place on formal record that no pledge in either of the Russian loan contracts could affect the earlier promise made to us by the Persian Government that the customs not merely of "Fars and the Gulf" but of "Southern Persia" would never be placed under foreign control.

May 1902.

cf. Sir A. Hardinge's Despatch No. 69, dated the 14th May 1903 (Enclosure 1, Proceeding No. 180 in Secret E., July 1903, Nos. 173-187).

SIR A. HARDINGE TO THE ATABEG-I-AZAM.

Tehran, the 10th May 1902.

Enclosure 2 in Secret E., August 1902, Nos. 201-220, Proceeding No. 214.

"As the text of the new Russian Loan Contract has not yet been received by the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, I have requested His Excellency to communicate it on its arrival to Mr. des Graz, who will act, after my departure on leave next week, as His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires.

"In the meantime, and pending your reply to my note of the 6th April last, I have communicated to His Majesty's Government the verbal assurances, which Your Highness was good enough to give me before your departure, that no conditions, direct or indirect, other than the Azerbaijan Road Concession, which was negotiated separately, are attached to the new Russian Loan Contract.

"I am, however, directed by the Marquis of Lansdowne again to remind the Persian Government of the pledge given by it to that of Her late Majesty, that the customs of Southern Persia would never be placed as the guarantee for a foreign loan under foreign supervision and control, a pledge to which His Lordship adverted in the despatch from him of the 2nd January, communicated by me to Your Highness, and which gives us a special right to assure ourselves that nothing inconsistent with it is contained in the new contract with the Russian Bank.

"I am, of course, aware that the customs of a large part of Southern Persia, *viz.*, Fars and the ports on the Persian Gulf, are explicitly excluded from the securities assigned for the second, as well as for the first Russian loan, and that there is happily no immediate prospect that this security will prove insufficient for the service of both loans. At the same time it must be remembered that Fars and the Gulf ports are only a portion of 'Southern Persia'; that the amount of Persia's total debt to Russia has just been increased by £1,000,000; and that the conditions of the first,

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and Telegraphs, the security had been restricted to the Customs of Fars and the Persian Gulf. The amount advanced on these terms was £200,000 and before the balance of £100,000 was applied for, the Government of India insisted that the matter should be cleared up and that no further loan should be made unless the phrase "Fars and the Persian Gulf" were recognised as including all the southern ports. On 24th May 1903 Sir A. Hardinge directly raised the question with the Mushir-ed-Dowleh in the following letter:—

Sub-Enclosure 1, Enclosure 1, Proceeding No. 183 in Secret E., July 1903, Nos. 173-187.

SIR A. HARDINGE TO MUSHIR-ED-DOWLEH.

24th May 1903.

"His Majesty's Resident at Bushire reported early this year to the Government of India and to His Majesty's Legation at Tehran that the customs administration of Arabistan had been separated from that of Southern Persia, and the remaining ports of Southern Persia, which are under the "Direction Générale" of Bushire, and had been constituted into a separate division with a Director-General of its own at Mohammerah.

"The Government of India has called the attention of His Majesty's Government to this new arrangement, and I am now instructed by the Marquis of Lansdowne to address Your Excellency respecting it.

"His Lordship anticipates that the separation of Mohammerah for customs purposes from the other ports of the Persian Gulf might, in the absence of a clear declaration to the contrary, give rise to an impression that the customs revenues of Arabistan were excluded from the term "customs of Fars and of the Persian Gulf" used in the Russian Loan Contracts of 1900 and 1902, and were, therefore, pledged to the service of the loans created by those two agreements.

"It will be within Your Excellency's recollection that in March 1900, just after the conclusion of the first Russian loan, Mr. Spring-Rice was instructed by Lord Salisbury to point out to Your Excellency, in connection with customs charges at Mohammerah, that the customs of that port could not, in view of the engagement given us by the Persian Government in 1897, be included in the guarantee for the Russian loan. In May 1902, after the conclusion of the second Russian loan, I had the honour, in obedience to an instruction from Lord Lansdowne, to remind the Persian Government of the above engagement and to state that, being anterior to both the Russian loan agreements, it could not in our view be affected by any of their provisions whatever the construction placed on them.

"I am personally convinced that the Persian Government, in separating the customs administration of Mohammerah and its dependent stations on the Karun from that of the rest of the Persian Gulf, was guided exclusively by considerations of administrative convenience, and I reported as much to Lord Lansdowne on the strength of a statement made to me to that effect in an unofficial conversation by Mons. Naus. But His Lordship would deem it more satisfactory if I could send

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him an official assurance from Your Excellency that the above was the only reason for the change, and that Mohammerah and its dependencies, including all the ports of Arabistan, are still comprised with the remaining southern custom-houses in the term "Fars and the ports of the Persian Gulf" employed in the loan contracts above mentioned."

The Mushir-ed-Dowleh returned an evasive reply, which was forwarded by Sir A. Hardinge with the following despatch to Lord Lansdowne :—

GULAHEK,

21st June 1903.

No. 91.

(Confidential.)

"I have the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 83 of to-day's date, a translation of the reply received by me yesterday from the Persian Government to the note, a copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 80 of the 27th ultimo, respecting the customs of Fars, Arabistan, and the Gulf.

"I showed this reply to the Atabeg-i-Azam, and observed that it did not clearly answer the question I had been instructed by Your Lordship to elucidate. The term "Fars and the Gulf of Fars," or "Persian Gulf" (for the Persian equivalent of the term Persian Gulf is Gulf of Fars, or "Khalij-i-Fars") might be construed either in its geographical sense, in which case it would include Mohammerah and the ports of the province of Arabistan situated on the sea known to geographers as the "Persian Gulf," or in its administrative sense, in which case the customs of those ports, as being outside the province of Fars, the district of Bushire, and the customs division, of which Bushire was the head-quarters, would be pledged to the service of the Russian loans in violation of the promise of 1897. What Your Lordship wanted to know was in which of those two senses the expression was understood by the Persian Government as a party to the two Russian loan agreements.

"The Grand Vizier said that the Persian Government deprecated a discussion of the subject as likely to involve them in possible controversies on an abstract question both with us and with Russia. If the latter ever claimed to take possession of the customs of Mohammerah, we could then raise it with her, but what good object could be served by doing so now? We had been informed three years ago that the customs of Fars and of the Gulf had been excluded from those pledged to the Russian loan, and had not then pressed for a definition. I reminded His Highness of the representations made by Mr. Spring-Rice in March 1900—which he professed to have forgotten—and I observed that, although we had no wish to place the Persian Government in an embarrassing position, we could not let the formal separation, for customs purposes, of Arabistan from the remainder of the coast of the Persian Gulf pass unnoticed, as by doing so we might seem to have tacitly admitted an interpretation of the expression "Fars and the Gulf," which was inconsistent with our view of the effect of the pledge of 1897. I would, however, I said, for the present, confine

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

myself to reporting the Persian Government's reply to Your Lordship for such further directions as you might give me.

* * * * *

FROM THE MUSHIR-ED-DOWLEH TO SIR A. HARDINGE.

FOREIGN OFFICE;
17th June 1903.

(Translation.)

"I have received Your Excellency's note regarding the question asked by Lord Lansdowne as to the separation of the customs of Mohammerah in Arabistan from the General Customs Administration of the Persian Gulf. Of course Your Excellency is aware that the customs of Mohammerah and of Karun have always been in the hands of the Governors of Arabistan and have never been included in the customs of Fars and the Persian Gulf, which were often farmed out to the Governors. Moreover, the customs of the Persian Gulf and of Fars have been under the administration of the Persian customs authorities for over 20 years, whereas those of Mohammerah have not been under the authorities of the Persian customs for more than ten months. As during this period the members and officials of the administration of the customs of the Karun river and Mohammerah in Arabistan were ready in Bushire, it was only for this reason that those officials temporarily administered these customs under the supervision of the General Administration of Customs at Bushire. No importance is, therefore, to be attached to this circumstance, nor need it be the subject of enquiries. In fact the customs of the Karun which have to collect the duties on the Turkish frontiers of Arabistan and Luristan provinces were included in the Bushire customs contrary to the administrative system. It has only been in order to maintain the system already existing for some time that the Ministry of Customs has made Mohammerah a special department under the central administration; consequently the steps taken in this direction were in view of departmental requirements.

"But with regard to the question as to whether Mohammerah is in the Persian Gulf or not; in the first place, Arabistan and Fars are two separate provinces, and have, from ancient times, been completely separated one from the other, and have had separate Governors. Secondly, this is a question the solution of which depends on geography in general and not on the Persian Government that it should be able to give an opinion on the subject. The geography of (word illegible) and the English official maps show that Mohammerah is nothing but a river port on a stream that joins the Karun river to the Shat-el-Arab which fall into the Persian Gulf. According to the rules of geography Mohammerah is a port on a river which flows 60 kilometres to the north of the Persian Gulf.

"But as to the customs of Mohammerah being included in the bank loans of the years 1900 and 1902 or not, it is necessary in this respect to state that some time ago His Excellency Sir Mortimer Durand, British Minister, expressed himself to the Foreign Office to this effect that, if at any time the Government of Persia wished

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to make undertakings with any foreign Government for a new loan and pledge its customs, the British Government cannot in this case consent that the customs of the ports of Fars should be included. Although from the beginning of the loan agreement of 1900 the British Government was aware that the customs of Fars and the ports of the Persian Gulf were excluded from the guarantee of the loan, His Excellency Sir Mortimer Durand sent a reminder and negotiated on the subject while the Persian Government expressed its agreement in the matter.

"In conclusion, this well-wisher gives this answer that, if enquiries are made from Your Excellency regarding its locality and Government, Mohammerah and the ports of Arabistan are included in the Governorship of Arabistan, and that their revenue, military administration, and their other affairs without exception have been and are now included in the Governorship of Arabistan, and if enquiries are made as to the customs of those places, the customs of the whole of Persia are, for the present, under one administration, the central office of which is in Tehran, the capital."

His Majesty's Government decided to complete the loan without requiring for the present any further definition from the Persian Government of the doubtful expression, but intended thereafter to lay down the interpretation they place on the engagements undertaken by the Persian Government towards them which should be communicated to Persia with an intimation that in the event of any attempt to ignore such engagements, steps would be taken to secure our rights. At the beginning of 1904 it appeared unlikely that Persia would now ask for the balance of £100,000, and the Government of India suggested that the question of the interpretation of the phrase "Fars and the Persian Gulf" should be taken up in connection with the "Règlement Douanier."

This was done, and on 4th March 1904 Sir A. Hardinge telegraphed that the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs took up the line that the expression "Southern Persia" as a distinct term was suggested by Sir M. Durand in a note addressed to the Sadr Azam, embodying a message No.* 10 of 7th April 1899 from Lord Salisbury about the loan.

This is the message in which the narrower term "ports of the Persian Gulf" was first used, and the British Minister added that we must be prepared for the Persian Government requiring that their earlier engagement should be construed in the light of this subsequent declaration on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

This view was combated by the Government of India, who on 12th March replied

* See page 43.

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to the following effect. Our contention had consistently been that our interests in Persia could not be restricted to the coast of the Persian Gulf and the province of Fars, as stated in Sir C. Scott's memorandum* to Count Mouravieff, dated 19th February 1900. If the Persian Government tried to argue this on the strength of the note by Sir M. Durand of April 1899, we should fall back on the pro-memoria by Mr. Spring-Rice of 22nd March 1900, in which the Minister for Foreign Affairs was informed that His Majesty's Government would hold the Persian Government to the strict observance of the pledge of 23rd October 1897.

* See page 45.

Although Mr. Spring-Rice agreed to treat this pro-memoria as a verbal communication only, a Persian translation of the note was given to the Minister, and Lord Salisbury's warning was expressly communicated to General Schindler and M. Naus, and was fully discussed with the Sadr-i-Azam so that the Persian Government could not repudiate all knowledge of it. That discussion was also useful as proving that Mohammerah was always claimed by us as a Gulf Port with the concurrence of M. Naus.

This renewal of the pledge of October 1897 was mentioned by Lord Lansdowne on 18th August 1902 to the Atabeg-i-Azam, who admitted that the assurance existed in writing. It would be a pity if the discussion of the case were to degenerate into a verbal quibble. Our contention was that we were entitled to rely, as we had always done, on the pledge of 23rd October 1897, which was antecedent to all Russian engagements, and the Government of India thought that, as stated in 1900 by Lord Salisbury, the Persian Government should be held to the strict observance of that pledge.

See page 51, paragraph 10.

On 31st March 1904 Sir A. Hardinge telegraphed that he had seen M. Naus' draft of a reply to the British Minister's recent note on the subject. The substance appeared to be that the expression "customs of Fars and Gulf" was used in the Russian loan contracts because Sir M. Durand in a note of January 19th, 1900, employed the words "Ports of Fars" to indicate the exclusion which the British Government intended, and that the Persian Government (understanding from the context of Sir M. Durand's note that the phrase was used by him in opposition to the expression "Ports of the South,") shared the same intention in making the reservation excluding the customs of Fars and the Persian Gulf. No explanations had as

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yet been exchanged on this subject between the Persian Government and the Russian Bank, so that this question might eventually give rise to objections by the latter of a geographical nature, which it would not depend on the Persian Government to settle in one or other sense. Sir A. Hardinge proposed that the word "exclusively" should be inserted after "depend." He understood the meaning of M. Naus' reply to be that the Persian Government intended, as we did, under the words "Fars and the Gulf" to exclude customs of Southern Persia, but would not answer for the view of the expression which Russia might take. In conversation M. Naus had observed that in the event of this question assuming a practical form, it would be settled between us and Russia without Persia having much say in it. All that Persia could do was to state her own intention, which was to adhere to the declaration of 1897.

It remains to be seen whether the Persian Government will officially adopt M. Naus' draft.

It may be mentioned that neither the note of April 1899, referred to by Sir A. Hardinge in his telegram of 4th March, nor that of January 19th, 1900, (alluded to by M. Naus), from Sir M. Durand to the Persian Government, is among our records; so it is not possible to say how far they justify the interpretation thus put upon them. The whole history of the events, however, would make it *primâ facie* very doubtful whether they can be fairly construed to mean that Sir M. Durand used the expression "Ports of Fars" in opposition to the expression "Ports of the South" with any intention of narrowing the wide guarantee which was given in October 1897.

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

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1890.
Customs stations at Mohammerah, Ahwaz and Shuster.

1. In 1890, when Messrs. Lynch & Co. presented His Imperial Majesty the Shah with the S. S. *Shusan*, the Amin-es-Sultan made certain verbal promises regarding the running of the steamer, including the promise "that customs shall be collected at Mohammerah, Ahwaz and Shuster, according to the destination of the goods." These promises were recorded in a memorandum prepared by Sir H. Drummond Wolff.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.

(No. 50.)

Tehran, February 15, 1890.

Secret E., June 1890, Nos. 221-225, Proceeding No. 222.

"I now have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship a translation of the note given me by the Amin-es-Sultan, by which the Shah accepts the steamer offered him by Messrs. Lynch.

"I also inclose a copy of the Memorandum I delivered at the same time to the Amin-es-Sultan, recording the verbal promises he has made me as to the running of the steamer."

THE AMIN-ES-SULTAN TO SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

February 14, 1890.

(Translation.)

Ibid, Proceeding No 223.

"His Imperial Majesty (may his sovereignty be everlasting) under this document is pleased to accept the *Shushan* vessel which the Association for the steam navigation of the Euphrates and Tigris present and offer for the transport of passengers and merchandise between Ahwaz and Shuster and Dizful, and His Imperial Majesty (may his sovereignty be everlasting) gives the aforesaid Association assurance that the above-mentioned vessel shall work continuously and in connection with the steamers of the aforesaid Association which navigate the Karun from Mohammerah to the Ahwaz dam, unless prevented by extraordinary celestial events."

(Sealed on back by Amin-es-Sultan.)

(Autograph approval of the Shah.)

MEMORANDUM.

Ibid, Proceeding No. 224.

"The following are the promises verbally given by His Highness the Amin-es-Sultan simultaneously with the delivery of the document accepting Mr. Lynch's steamer :—

1. That the local authorities shall consult the representatives of Mr. Lynch as to the appointment of the captain and engineer.

2. That the hour of departure of the steamer and the cost of freight shall also be arranged by the local authorities in concert with the representatives of Mr. Lynch.

3. That customs shall be collected at Mohammerah, Ahwaz and Shuster, according to the destination of the goods."

February 14, 1890.

1902.

Enclosure 5, Proceeding No. 122 in Secret E., December 1902, Nos. 120-130.

2. In 1902 the Belgian Administration took over the Arabistan Customs and demanded that duty on all cargo should be paid at Mohammerah. Messrs. Lynch & Co. objected on the ground that this arrangement would vitiate all through

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traffic arrangements and appealed to the memorandum quoted above and "the Amin-es-Sultan's acceptance of the memorandum confirmed by His Imperial Majesty the Shah the same day."

No such acceptance appears on our records; but the Grand Vizier admitted on 31st October 1902 having given the assurance, although he argued that the arrangement then come to was a purely temporary one to suit the conditions then existing which had since entirely changed.

Secret E., June 1903, Nos. 337-356, Proceeding No. 339.

3. The memorandum of February 14th 1890 was appealed to, however, by Mr. des Graz in his letter to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh of 14th October 1902 supporting the protest of Messrs. Lynch & Co., and he also called attention to the following telegram which was sent on 29th May 1891 by His Highness the Amin-es-Sultan to the Governor of Arabistan :—

Enclosure 4 in Secret E., December 1902, Nos. 120-130, Proceeding No. 122.

"Issue instructions that the ships of Lynch carrying goods belonging to foreigners and natives shall pay customs dues at destination, either at Mohammerah, Ahwaz or Shuster. The custom-house officials must act accordingly and levy dues on arrival at destination."

After considerable correspondence M. Naus restored the old Customs Houses both at Shuster and Ahwaz.

Secret E., June 1903, Nos. 337-356, Proceeding No. 356. See also page 93.

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(4) Seistan.

1894.

The subject of Seistan appears to have been mentioned to the Persian Government for the first time in 1894 during a conversation between the Shah and the British Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran.

No. 128 (Confl.), dated Tehran, the 28th May 1894.

C. GREEN, ESQ., TO THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY.

Secret E., September 1894, Proceedings Nos. 22-23.

"I had a private audience of the Shah to-day. * * * * The conversation then turned upon the question of Seistan, and His Majesty assured me that he was fully alive to the importance of preserving the integrity of that province and of Kain, and told me that he had despatched quite lately a confidential Agent to the brother Chiefs to arrange the differences between them, and see what could be done to strengthen their hands."

The Earl of Kimberley approved of the language which was held to His Majesty on the occasion of this audience.

1901.

2. On 28th April 1901 His Excellency the Viceroy telegraphed to the Secretary of State that there were rumours of Russia's contemplating either the purchase of Seistan or the farming of Seistan revenues from Persia. It was pointed out that any such action would be fatal to our rapidly expanding trade, and would constitute a grave ulterior menace to Baluchistan, and the suggestion was made that an intimation to the Persian Government of the interest that we take in Seistan, and of our inability to acquiesce in its extinction might forestall any such move if contemplated. On 6th May Lord Lansdowne in communicating the substance of the Viceroy's telegram to Sir A. Hardinge concluded with the words: "We cannot, of course, tolerate any tampering with Seistan by Russia." On 31st May the Viceroy deprecated a proposal which had been made to advance money to Hashmat-ul-Mulk, the Governor of Seistan, for the purchase of the Crown lands, as a secret arrangement with him would give us no control in Seistan, what was required being a recognition by the Persian Government of our predominant interest in that country. At the same time we might, he held, if necessary, so far befriend Hashmat-ul-Mulk as to intimate that his removal from the Governorship would be viewed by us with most serious disfavour. On 23rd June 1901 Lord Lansdowne instructed Sir A. Hardinge as follows:—

Secret F., June 1901, Nos. 5-31, Proceeding No. 8.

Ibid, No. 25.

Telegram No. 22, dated the 23rd June 1901.

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR A. HARDINGE.

"In speaking to Sadr Azam, you should dwell on the importance of our commercial interests in

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Seistan, which we cannot afford to neglect. We strongly deprecate any action on part of Persian Government which might occasion disturbances in Seistan, and thereby compel us to take measures for the protection of these interests."

Secret F., June 1901, Nos. 5-31, Proceeding No. 22.

In his despatch No. 98, dated 26th June 1901, Sir A. Hardinge reported having communicated the above message to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, who consented to suspend the adoption of any measures which could disturb the *status quo* in Seistan until the Minister could see the Atabeg-i-Azam. On 30th June Sir A. Hardinge saw the Grand Vizier himself and an important conversation ensued which is reported in the following despatch :—

Secret F., September 1901, Nos. 120-156, Proceeding No. 146.

No. 103 (Confl.), dated Gulahek, the 30th June 1901.

SIR A. HARDINGE, TO THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE.

Ibid, No. 151.

"I have the honour to report, in confirmation of my telegram No. 33 of today's date, that the Grand Vizier being now convalescent, I had an interview with His Highness to-day, at which I stated that I was instructed by Your Lordship to make a communication to him on the subject of Seistan.

"I spoke much as I had done (as reported in my despatch No. 98 of the 26th instant) to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, dwelling chiefly on the great and growing importance of our commercial interests in Seistan, and on the natural concern which we should feel at any political changes there of a nature to imperil or even exercise an unfavourable influence on them. Bearing in mind the telegram from His Excellency the Viceroy of India of the 1st instant, I said that whatever views might be held as to the respective interests of Great Britain and Russia in other parts of Persia, it was clear that in Seistan on the very borders of our Indian Empire British interests must be recognised as predominant in comparison with those of any other country, and that, whilst repudiating all intention of interference in the internal administration of the country, Your Lordship could not be indifferent to the interpretations which might be placed there on the attitude of the Persian Government in connection with those interests towards the local authorities or chiefs. The Russian Vice-Consulate had given out, or was said to have done so, that the Hashmat-ul-Mulk was being summoned to Tehran and had got into trouble with His Highness because he had cultivated good relations with Colonel Trench and Major Benn, and although to any one who was aware like myself of the friendly sentiments entertained by His Highness towards His Majesty's Government such a story was too absurd to deserve contradiction, it might nevertheless have a regrettable effect upon credulous and ill-informed persons in Seistan itself if its circulation coincided with any symptoms of diminished confidence in the Hashmat on the part of the Central Government. I was careful in speaking to His Highness not to praise the Hashmat too much : I said that in many small matters we had found him obstructive, but that on the whole he had kept the balance evenly in commercial and other current questions between the English

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and Russian Vice-Consulates, and that we should, therefore, regret his removal. As His Highness knew, our political interests in Seistan were identical with those of Persia, and if the Hashmat was now and then, as in the matter of the Indian shops, a little too disposed to do nothing to assist us without positive orders from Tehran, I must not be understood as in any way complaining of his action as a Persian official whose first duty was naturally to his own Government.

* * * *

"For the present it looks as if the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, having settled with the summons from Meshed, will be left alone, but my exchange of views with the Atabeg-i-Azam has, I venture to think, afforded a convenient opportunity, should Your Lordship be disposed to take it, of placing on record in a formal communication which I might make to the Persian Government, the opinions of that of His Majesty with respect to Seistan, so that no further misapprehension can exist on the subject in the minds of the Persian Ministers. Such a communication might intimate our willingness to include the revenues of Seistan, as well as those of the Gulf ports, as security for any future financial assistance which Persia needed, as well as our inability to acquiesce in their possible alienation, whether directly or indirectly, to a foreign power. I do not, of course, presume to suggest to Your Lordship the language which should be held on the subject. I merely venture most respectfully to submit, for your consideration, that the discussions which I have had with the Persian Government as regards Seistan may, perhaps, afford an occasion for formulating in an unmistakeable manner the views held on the subject by His Majesty's Government. Your Lordship will, I trust, approve of my having abstained for the present from hinting at the action which you might be obliged to take in the event of contingencies in Seistan which have not yet arisen, or become imminent."

On 9th July 1901 Lord Lansdowne addressed the following despatch to Sir A. Hardinge containing the views of His Majesty's Government in respect to Seistan :—

No. 47, dated the 9th July 1901.

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR A. HARDINGE.

(Extract.)

Secret F., September 1901, Nos. 120-156, Proceeding No. 148.

"In the course of the last few months rumours have reached His Majesty's Government from various quarters of projects to introduce the influence and authority of a foreign power in Seistan. His Majesty's Government have received no confirmation of these reports, and are unwilling to attach credence to them ; but they think it desirable to place on record their views with regard to their interests in Seistan, in order that the Persian Government may clearly understand the serious light in which they would regard any proposal to change the existing situation in that country.

"The Persian Government must be well aware of the political and commercial importance which attaches to Seistan from its proximity to the frontiers of India, and of the desire which His Majesty's Government have always shown for the

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maintenance of an exclusively Persian authority in that district. The interest of India in the country has indeed been recognised by the Persian Government on various occasions, and especially by their agreement in the year 1870 to refer to the arbitration of a British officer the question which had then arisen with regard to the frontiers of Seistan and Afghanistan. This interest has recently been much increased owing to the successful establishment of the trade-route from Quetta *vid* Nushki to Seistan, and the rapidly expanding commerce which has consequently sprung up between the two countries.

"In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government regard it as of the utmost importance that Seistan should remain as heretofore under the exclusive control of Persia, and they could not tolerate or acquiesce in any project which would result in the alienation of its revenues to any other power, or the intrusion of any foreign authority there.

"I request that you will take an early opportunity of speaking to the Atabeg-i-Azam in this sense.

"You should dwell upon the importance of the commercial interests of India in Seistan, which His Majesty's Government cannot afford to neglect, and upon the advantage to the Persian Government, upholding its own administrative control; and you should state that His Majesty's Government strongly deprecate any action on the part of the Persian Government which might raise disturbances in the country, and thereby compel His Majesty's Government to take measures for the protection of British interests.

"You should add that His Majesty's Government hope that the rumour that there is an intention to punish the Hashmat-ul-Mulk on account of his friendly attitude to Great Britain is untrue, as such a proceeding would make a very unfavourable impression, and might precipitate the results which His Majesty's Government so earnestly desire to avoid."

The contents of this despatch were communicated to the Grand Vizier, and a translation was left with him unofficially. No official reply from His Highness was considered necessary, but the conversation which took place is thus reported :—

No. 133, dated Gulahek, the 29th August 1901.

SIR A. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE.

"His Highness expressed some surprise at the reports to which the despatch alluded, affecting to treat them as hardly serious. He said he had already discussed with me on more than one occasion the attitude of the Persian Government towards affairs in Seistan, and that I must know there was no foundation whatever for such stories. He could not conceive where or how they had originated.

* * * *

"His Highness would observe that Your Lordship in referring to these reports was careful to state that His Majesty's Government was unwilling to attach credence to them, and I thought that your main object in directing me to mention them to him was to place clearly before the Persian Government, in such a manner as to preclude all possibility of misunderstanding, your views on

Secret F., February 1902, Nos. 22-24, Proceeding No. 24.

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the subject of Seistan and of our vital interests in that important frontier province. I had already informed you, and my despatch had probably crossed yours, of the assurances he had given with regard to the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, and I felt sure that those assurances would be believed and appreciated in London. His Highness asked whether I supposed he was expected to afford any further explanations or to reply to Your Lordship's despatch. I said I had no reason to think so: my instructions were merely to inform him, as the Shah's Prime Minister, of the position taken up by His Majesty's Government respecting Seistan, and I trusted that, after the satisfactory language he had already held to me on the subject, it would be unnecessary for us to discuss it further."

3. In October 1901 the prospect of Persia obtaining a further loan from Russia led His Majesty's Government to invite a frank discussion of the position with the latter country. The British representative at St. Petersburg was instructed to point out to Count Lamsdorff the inconveniences of independent negotiations by the powers with Persia, to recall the various understandings arrived at and to state that Great Britain adhered to M. de Gier's view that there should be no antagonism between British and Russian commercial interests in Persia. The interest of Great Britain in Seistan were specifically mentioned :—

For the whole telegraphic despatch, see pages 13 and 14.

"His Majesty's Government have always recognised the preponderating interest of Russia in Northern Persia, while in Southern Persia, on the other hand, more especially in the Gulf ports and also in Seistan, Great Britain has interests which she cannot allow to be ignored."

The proposed joint action was refused by Russia, and negotiations for a British loan having fallen through, Persia was compelled again to accept the financial aid of Russia. In order to prevent the impression that our interests had lapsed or suffered from the lapse of the loan negotiations, Sir Arthur Hardinge addressed the following note to the Grand Vizier, in which he adverts to the new Persian Tariff, and British trade in the Persian Gulf, as well as to British interests in Seistan.

SIR A. HARDINGE TO GRAND VIZIER.

21st November 1901.

(Extract.)

Enclosure 2, Secret E., March 1902, Nos. 377-521, Proceedings No. 493.

"Your Highness was good enough to inform me that these negotiations were practically concluded, and that M. Goluboff was leaving for St. Petersburg with a draft of the new Persian Tariff for the final approval of the Russian Government.

"I am directed by my Government, in connection with this matter, to remind the Persian Government of the great importance of the trade of the British Empire with Persia, more especially with the ports of the Persian Gulf, in which

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the foreign trade of Persia is almost exclusively British. It is unnecessary for me to trouble Your Highness with statistics in support of this well-known fact, and I will merely observe that, in view of it, my Government cannot regard with passive indifference a revision of the commercial relations between Persia and foreign powers. Its latest treaty with Persia gives it, it is true, merely a most-favoured-nation treatment clause, which every other Treaty Power, including countries so remote and unconcerned with the trade of Persia as Spain and Denmark, enjoy, but it is obvious that its moral claim to a careful consideration of its commercial interests is, in view of their importance and of the political relations between England and Persia, of a very different character, and entitle His Majesty's Government to demand that a complete change in the system of duties to which its trade is subject should be negotiated with them as well as with Russia, and should not be effected without any reference to their views. It is conceivable that a re-arrangement of that system in which the interests of Russia and Persia were alone considered, might, without any appearance of differential treatment, be distinctly prejudicial to our trade.

"A tariff, for example, under which petroleum (from whatever country) was admitted at a low duty, and tea (from whatever country) was charged with a very high one, would benefit Russian trade and injure British without infringing our strict treaty rights. I am therefore charged to make the request that before the new tariff is irrevocably settled, the Persian Government will, having regard to the commercial interests and friendly relations referred to above, communicate it (of course, confidentially) to the British Government so as to enable the latter to obtain modifications, while there is still time, of any proposed changes which may be injurious to British interests. I am also in this connection again to remind Your Highness of the special interests, both commercial and political, of Great Britain in the ports of the Persian Gulf and Southern Persia generally, as well as in the province of Seistan, in which, from their respective proximity to the Indian Ocean and to British India, our trade is predominant, and indeed almost exclusive, and to request an undertaking that in those portions of Persia advantages should be conceded to His Majesty's Government not less than those which have been, or may hereafter be, accorded to any other foreign power or its subjects in other portions of His Majesty the Shah's dominions.

"This is, I think Your Highness will admit, a very moderate and reasonable request.

"With reference to Seistan, His Majesty's Government have taken note with satisfaction of the assurance, which Your Highnes was good enough to give me in the course of our recent conversations about the Russian loan, that it was not the intention of the Persian Government to pledge the revenues of that province, as security for a loan, or otherwise, to any foreign power or its subjects. They would be glad if this assurance could be placed on formal record in a written communication from the Persian Government."

With regard to the above demand about Seistan, the Grand Vizier read out to Sir

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A. Hardinge the following note which he had written down by the Shah's orders :—

"(c) *Seistan.*—The Shah would never alienate to a foreign power the inland revenues of this or any other Persian province, but considered a formal stipulation to this effect unnecessary and inconsistent with his dignity as an independent sovereign. Why, added the Grand Vizier, did Your Lordship require these guarantees? The Russians had never asked for a pledge that the Shah would not alienate the revenues of Enzelli."

Secret E., March 1902, Nos. 377-521, Proceeding No. 493.

(See despatch No. 184 from Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquis of Lansdowne, dated Tehran, the 29th November 1901.)

Secret E., July 1902, Nos. 244-306, Proceeding No. 275.

A formal reply was given to the British Minister on 5th December 1901 to the same effect, but more carefully worded as is explained in the following despatch :—

SIR A. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE.

Tehran, January 13th, 1902.

No. 9 (Confidential).

"I have the honour to transmit herewith, in continuation of my despatch No. 7 of the 8th instant, a translation of the Grand Vizier's reply to my note of November 20th, respecting the tariff, our interests in the south and Seistan.

"As already reported, the receipt of this reply was delayed by an alteration which I had pressed for in the final passage about Seistan.

"In its original form this passage ran : 'Your Excellency has written that the Persian Government should guarantee that the internal revenues of Seistan will not be pledged to any other Government. His Imperial Majesty was much astonished at this request since the Persian Government had never had any such intention, and considers it 'against its independence to agree to give such a guarantee.'

"I asked His Highness to add to the words 'or any other Government' the words 'or its subjects' and to substitute for the concluding sentence 'His Imperial Majesty was much astonished at this request since the Persian Government never has had and has not any such intention, and is of opinion that any formal documentary guarantee to this effect is unnecessary, and inconsistent with his dignity as an independent sovereign.'

"The Atabeg-i-Azam accepted the amendment, merely substituting the words 'the dignity of an independent sovereign' for those quoted above.

"The effect of the amendment besides the insertion of the important words 'or its subjects,' is I think somewhat to strengthen the force, such as it is, of the assurance which the Persian Government, albeit only rather indirectly, gives us, and I therefore deemed it worth my while to press for it.

"I have at the same time the honour to enclose herewith copies of the notes* in which I have acknowledged the receipt of the Atabeg-i-Azam's replies to my communications of November 20th."

*(For these, *vide* enclosures 12 and 13 of Proceedings No. 275, Secret E., July 1902, Nos. 244-306.)

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ATABEG-I-AZAM TO SIR A. HARDINGE.

December 5th, 1901.

"In answer to the memorandum dated November 21st, 1901, I have the honour to inform you that I have submitted the contents of it to my August Master who has been graciously pleased to order me to answer them in the following terms :—

(1) With regard to the tariff, the Persian Government, in view of its commercial and financial interests, had deemed it necessary to change its tariff, and on account of the priority of the Turcomanchai Treaty, the negotiation in connection with this matter was to be carried out first with Russia. As soon as the new tariff is complete a copy of it will be communicated to you.

(2) You had stated that the Persian Government must, in Southern Persia and especially in the Persian Gulf, give to that of Great Britain advantages which have been given to other powers. This statement not being clear, I have to point out that should such advantages be in conformity with the independence of Persia, there will be no objection to them as usual, but if they are inconsistent with the independence of the Persian monarchy, they will not be given to the British Government in the same way that they have not been given to any one in any part of Persia.

(3) Your Excellency has written that the Persian Government should guarantee that internal revenues of Seistan will not be pledged to any other Government or its subjects. His Imperial Majesty was much astonished at this request, since the Persian Government has never had and has not any such intention, and is of opinion that any formal documentary guarantee to this effect is unnecessary, and inconsistent with the dignity of an independent sovereign."

This note was acknowledged on 5th January 1902 by Sir A. Hardinge in the following terms :—

"I note with satisfaction Your Highness' declaration that the Persian Government will not alienate and has never contemplated the alienation of the internal revenues of Seistan to any foreign Government or its subjects, and I trust that His Majesty's Government will regard this assurance as sufficient."

Enclosure No. 2, Secret E., July 1902, Nos. 244-306, Proceeding No. 275.

4. In January 1902, the refusal of Persia to accept British financial assistance led the Marquis of Lansdowne to recapitulate the salient features of British policy towards Persia in a statement which was to be placed before the Government of the Shah. (Despatch No. 2, dated Foreign Office, 6th January 1902, from the Marquis of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.)

1902.

See *ante* pages 15, 16 and 49-50.

The subject of Seistan is thus referred to :

"As regards Seistan, I have quite recently, in my despatch of the 9th* July 1901, directed you to call the attention of the Persian Government to the interest which this district has for Great Britain on account of its proximity to India and its position on an important trade-route between India and Persia, and to state that we regard it as of

* See *ante* page 62.

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the utmost importance that it should remain free from the intrusion of foreign authority in any shape."

On February 15th, 1902, the Atabeg-i-Azam left with Sir A. Hardinge (*vide* his despatch to the Marquis of Lansdowne, No. 26, dated Tehran, February 16th, 1902) a memorandum* by the Shah, composed by His Majesty on receiving Lord Lansdowne's communication of 6th January 1902. The memorandum, which subsequently received the imprimatur of an official document, contained the following passage which refers to Seistan :—

Secret E., July 1903, Nos. 244-306, Proceeding No. 279.

* See page 17 above.

Enclosure in Secret E., July 1902, Nos. 244-306, Proceeding No. 279.

"It has never been, nor is it now, the intention of the Persian Government to pledge the revenues of any part of the country to any one, but this must be by the will of the Persian Government itself and not at the bidding of any foreign power."

1903.

Question of the sale of Seistan revenue grain to the Russian Bank.

5. Towards the end of 1903 numerous reports were received that the sale of the Seistan revenue grain was being negotiated by the Vizier of the Governor-General of Meshed, through the Rais-ut-Tajjar on behalf of the Russian Bank, a measure which, if carried out, would secure to the Russian Bank practically the monopoly of trade with the large area dependent on Seistan grain for its annual food-supply and would give it an important share in the management of the country.

During October the truth of the reports became certain, and the Hashmat-ul-Mulk was told that unless he paid the Government's share of the produce at a rate higher than that at which it had hitherto been accepted, the whole quantity, 1,500 Tabriz Kharwars (the Tabriz Kharwar = 650 lbs.), would be sold to the Bank.

On 28th October 1903, Mr. Grant Duff, acting on instructions from Lord Lansdowne, addressed the following note to the Persian Government asking that orders might be sent to the authorities at Meshed forbidding the sale of the revenue grain of Seistan to the Russian Bank.

This declaration of the views of His Majesty's Government forms a valuable complement to the existing pledges exacted by them against the alienation of the revenues of Seistan.

MR. GRANT DUFF, TO THE MUSHIR-ED-DOWLEH.

29th October 1903.

* * * * *

"A report has reached His Majesty's Legation that the authorities at Meshed have threatened to sell the revenue grain of Seistan to the Russian

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Bank. Such a proceeding would, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, give the Russian Bank a share in the administration of the revenue of Seistan, and would disturb the commercial and political *status quo* prevailing in that province, which it is equally the interest of the British and Persian Governments to maintain.

"His Majesty's Government have instructed me strongly to urge on Your Excellency the desirability of sending stringent orders to the Governor-General of Khorasan to prohibit the sale of the Seistan revenue grain to the Russian Bank, and I shall be much obliged if Your Excellency would, as soon as possible, place me in a position to reassure Lord Lansdowne with regard to the matter."

The Mushir-ed-Dowleh denied the truth of the report.

What really was taking place it was not easy to ascertain. On the one hand, the Persian Government asserted positively that there never had been any question of the sale to the Bank, and issued stringent orders that the grain was not to be disposed of, directly or indirectly, while the Governor-General of Khorasan denied emphatically that any communication had taken place with the Hashmat-ul-Mulk on the subject. On the other hand, private letters sent to the Hashmat-ul-Mulk from Meshed came into the hands of Colonel McMahon, proving that the sale was actually being negotiated on behalf of the Russian Bank by the Governor-General's Vizier through the Rais-ul-Tujjar.

In January 1904, an Agent of the Muavvin-ul-Tujjar passed through Turbat on his way to Seistan to take over the grain, but the Prime Minister persisted in his assertion that no wheat had been sold to the Bank, although he admitted they had been given permission the previous summer to export some 150 or 200 kharwars of barley—an explanation, which, though quite inadequate to account for what was now going on, was of interest in view of the rigid prohibition of exports in the case of travellers for India by the Nushki trade route.

Meanwhile evidence continued to accumulate that the sale had actually been carried out, and that delivery would be taken unless peremptory orders were received from Tehran prohibiting it; and on 21st March one Abdul Karim, an Agent of the Muavvin-ul-Tujjar arrived at Nasratabad where he was met by the Manager of the Seistan Branch of the Russian Bank, and housed in the residence of a Peshkhidmat of the Russian Consul.

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On 25th March, Sir A. Hardinge telegraphed that peremptory orders had been sent to the Acting Governor of Seistan, prohibiting the sale of the grain to Abdul Karim, or any other representative of the Russian Bank.

Direct interchange of views about Seistan between England and Russia.

See also paragraph 3 *ante*.

6. The question of British interests in Seistan was raised also between Great Britain and Russia direct in consequence of the Perso-Afghan boundary dispute and the appointment, at the request of Persia in January 1903, of Colonel A. H. McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E., as British Commissioner to adjust the matter in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of 1857 between Great Britain and Persia. The interchange of views which took place is summarised in the following memorandum communicated to the Persian Minister on 3rd September 1902:—

Memorandum communicated to the Persian Minister, 3rd September 1902.

FOREIGN OFFICE, SEPTEMBER 1902.

Enclosure in Secret F., March 1903, Nos. 1-216, Proceeding No. 122.

"The Russian Ambassador informed Lord Lansdowne on the 22nd July that the Russian Government had learned that an Afghan Chief (the Akhunzada) had collected a considerable body of troops and was threatening the Persian frontier in the neighbourhood of Nasratabad. The Russian Government could not regard the prospect of such an incursion with indifference and he was to say that they hoped that His Majesty's Government would do their best to prevent a breach of the peace.

"Lord Lansdowne replied that rumours of the kind to which His Excellency had referred had reached His Majesty's Government; and that they were making enquiries with regard to the facts. They were not less anxious than the Russian Government that there should be no collision in these regions.

"On the 25th July Lord Lansdowne, in a note to M. de Staal, explained to him the nature of the frontier difficulty which had arisen between Persia and Afghanistan, and stated that His Majesty's Government learnt that the Persian Government, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of 1857, between Great Britain and Persia, intended to submit the matter to the British Government for friendly adjustment, and that His Majesty's Government had already intimated their readiness to bring about a settlement in accordance with the duty which belonged to them under the treaty cited.

"Lord Lansdowne added that, on reference to the map, M. de Staal would observe that this dispute (which was one of a purely local character) had arisen at a spot no less than 330 miles from the Russian frontier. The matter was, therefore, one which need not cause the Russian Government any pre-occupations.

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"On the evening of the 26th July, when Lord Lansdowne was absent from London, the Russian Ambassador came to the Foreign Office to make a further communication on the part of the Russian Government in regard to the territory in dispute in Seistan.

"M. de Staal stated that he had telegraphed the substance of Lord Lansdowne's note of the 25th instant to his Government, but before he had telegraphed he had received a telegram from the Russian Government to the effect that the disturbances on the frontier were taking alarming proportions, and that the Afghan Chief had declared a zone of the disputed territory to be annexed to Afghanistan, the zone being on the left bank of the Helmand. His Excellency went on to say that the Chief was reported to be receiving reinforcements.

"In these circumstances M. de Staal's instructions were to call the attention of His Majesty's Government to the state of affairs which he had described, which, if prolonged, might spread and necessitate energetic measures on the part of Russia in order to prevent more serious complications.

"Mr. Bertie, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, who received M. de Staal, told His Excellency that a telegram had reached the Foreign Office stating that the difference had been arranged locally pending a settlement under the provisions of the Treaty of 1857 between Great Britain and Persia. Mr. Bertie reminded M. de Staal that, as had been pointed out to him in Lord Lansdowne's note of the 25th instant, the site of the dispute was over 300 miles from the Russian frontier, and it was difficult to understand why energetic measures by the Russian Government should be requisite.

"His Excellency said that the disturbances might spread, and that Russia bordered on Afghanistan.

"Mr. Bertie further reminded the Ambassador that a settlement of such a dispute as had occurred was provided for by the Treaty of 1857. Persia had made an appeal to His Majesty's Government under that treaty and pending result of that appeal the matter had been locally and temporarily arranged. It was a question which, His Majesty's Government considered, regarded England and Persia.

"On the 26th August the Russian Chargé d'Affaires communicated to the Foreign Office a memorandum calling attention to the unsatisfactory state of things existing in Seistan, where in consequence, it stated, of the interference of the Afghans with the Helmand, the inhabitants on the Persian side, including the Russian Consular officials were threatened with a water famine. The memorandum stated that the Russian Government had made representations at Tehran with a view to the speedy settlement of the frontier question, and that they hoped that His Majesty's Government would do all they could in the same direction.

"The Persian Minister is aware that the Government of India are communicating with the Amir of Afghanistan with a view to a friendly settlement of the frontier difficulty with Persia."

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Secret F., June 1903, Nos. 1-199, Proceeding No. 46.

On 31st December 1902 the Russian Chargé d'Affaires stated to Lord Lansdowne that the Russian Government were uneasy at the size of the body of troops which was to accompany the British Commission and hoped that His Majesty's Government would reduce the escort and might even decide upon abandoning the Commission in view of the recent good rainfall in Seistan.

Lord Lansdowne replied that for the reason he gave he could hold out no hopes whatever of reduction in the strength of the troops, nor was it likely that the Commission would be given up.

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR A. HARDINGE.

FOREIGN OFFICE;
31st December 1902.

(No. 332.)

* * * * * * *

Secret F., June 1903, Nos. 1-199, Proceeding No. 46.

"Having made these observations I told Baron Graevenitz that I was quite unable to admit that the Russian Government had any interest in the matter, nor any right to question the arrangements which we are making for the settlement of the dispute. We were taking action in accordance with the terms of a treaty which imposed upon us the duty of arbitration in such cases, and we could not admit that Russia had any right of intervening with regard to them. What, I asked him, would the Russian Government say if we were to arrogate to ourselves a similar right of intervention in the case of the adjustment of a difficulty upon the Russo-Persian frontier?

"Baron Graevenitz replied that both powers had interest in Persia, and that neither of us could be indifferent to any occurrences likely to lead to serious disturbances within Persian territory.

"I said that it was quite true that we were both under obligations to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, but that I could not for a moment admit that our action in regard to the Helmand dispute could be interpreted as threatening either the integrity or the independence of Persia. We were, on the contrary, acting with the concurrence of the Persian Government and for their interests, and I had, therefore, felt bound to tell him distinctly that his remonstrance seemed to me quite out of order."

1903.

7. The subsequent discussion with the Russian Ambassador is detailed in the following despatches of 21st and 25th February 1903 to Sir C. Scott, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg:—

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR C. SCOTT.

FOREIGN OFFICE;
21st February 1903.

(No. 39.)

Ibid, Proceeding No. 128.

"The Russian Ambassador to-day recurred to the subject of the frontier delimitation now impending in Seistan. He told me that the Russian Government had been much re-assured by the statement which I had made to him with regard to the strength of Colonel McMahon's escort. They earnestly trusted that there would be no

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breach of the peace. They had quite recently been somewhat alarmed by hearing that a considerable Afghan force had been concentrated at a point not far distant from the Persian frontier, and His Excellency told me that he had been instructed to say that the Russian Government 'ne saurait se prêter à une modification de la ligne de frontière combinée avec l'Angleterre en 1872.'

"I gathered from his answer to a question which I put him, that the line to which he referred was that laid down by General Goldsmid about the time referred to.

"I told His Excellency that we too had heard of the alleged Afghan concentration, and that the Government of India has taken steps to discourage it. I could not, however, see that the matter in any way concerned Russia. The delimitation of the frontier to which His Excellency had referred was made under the provisions of the Treaty of 1857 between Great Britain and Persia, and, so far as I was aware, Russia was not in any way a party to the arrangement.

"Count Benckendorff asked me whether there was not a despatch of Lord Granville's upon which probably the Russian Government relied; but he was quite unable to supply me with particulars of the despatch in question.

"I said that I was quite unaware of such a despatch, and I could not help remarking that these manifestations of the desire of Russia to intervene one day in Tibet and the next in Seistan were of a nature to afford us serious food for reflection. What, I asked, did they signify, were we to assume that Russia claimed throughout the Asiatic continent a kind of "over-lordship," in virtue of which she thought herself called upon to raise these points in regions remote from her own possessions and in which she had apparently no concern?

"Count Benckendorff ridiculed the idea that Russia had any such pretensions, and told me that he would make further enquiries as to the grounds upon which the Russian Government conceived that they had an interest in this particular question.

"I said that, in my humble opinion, they had no *locus standi* whatever, but that I would too make it my business to ascertain whether there was in the archives of the Foreign Office any evidence which could be held to support His Excellency's contention. Later in the afternoon I addressed to His Excellency a note running as follows:—

"I cannot find in our archives any documents which can be regarded as giving the Russian Government a right of intervention in the matter of the arbitration now proceeding in Seistan as to the claims of the Persians and Afghans to the use of the waters of the River Helmand.

"The British and Russian Governments have, it is true, on more than one occasion agreed to respect the integrity of Persia, and there is a despatch from Lord Granville to Lord Augustus Loftus of the 10th July 1873, in which he records a conversation with Count Brunnow on this point.

"It can, however, scarcely be contended that an arbitration for the purpose of settling a local dispute as to water rights can be regarded as affecting the general principle of the integrity of Persia, or that such assurances as those given by Lord Granville in any way derogate from the right of

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this country to act as arbitrator in accordance with the Treaty of 1857.'

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR C. SCOTT.

FOREIGN OFFICE;
25th February 1903.

No. 46.

Secret F., June 1903, Nos. 1-199, Proceeding No. 175.

"I received from the Russian Ambassador a private note, dated the 22nd instant, recurring to the question of the Perso-Afghan frontier in Seistan, respecting which His Excellency had spoken to me on the previous day, as recorded in my despatch No. 39 of that date.

"Count Benckendorff forwarded in this letter a short unofficial memorandum, of which a copy is enclosed herewith, setting forth the grounds on which the Russian Government considered that they could not dissociate themselves from the question. His Excellency explained that the communication which he had made to me was due to the apprehensions of the Russian Government that the *status quo* established in 1872 might be endangered by a collision between the Persians and Afghans, the result of which might easily exceed the limits of a local dispute, over the use of the waters of the Helmand, and thus affect the integrity of Persia to an extent not easy to foresee. He thought that, from this point of view, there could be no objection to a friendly and natural explanation on the subject.

"Count Benckendorff added that he had just received a telegram from St. Petersburg, stating that there was fresh agitation in Seistan, that a concentration of Afghan forces was reported, and that there were rumours of a threatened occupation of the Helmand district, and of Afghan propaganda, that the Russian Consul found difficulty in obtaining supplies and that the works for the telegraph line from Meshed to Seistan were obstructed. He had been instructed to call the attention of His Majesty's Government to this alarming news. He had, for the moment, confined himself to telegraphing, in reply, that His Majesty's Government had received the news of agitation among the Afghans, and had taken measures to calm it.

"I saw His Excellency this afternoon, and again discussed with him the bearing of the correspondence to which he had referred me upon the question which we had been considering.

"I pointed out that Lord Granville's despatch of the 17th October 1872 dealt with Afghanistan, and mentioned specifically those portions of the Afghan frontiers in which Russia might be considered to be interested, beginning with Badakshan on the north-east, and ending with the western frontier between the dependencies of Herat and those of the Persian frontier of Khorasan, which were described as 'well known.'

"No mention whatever was made of Seistan, or of the arbitral award of Sir F. Goldsmid which had been pronounced two months before, but in which it was not considered that Russia had any interest.

"Prince Gortchakow, in his reply of the 7th December, made no allusion whatever to the Persian-Afghan frontier, nor was it, in the ensuing negotiations, discussed between the two Governments.

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"I thought, therefore, that I was justified in contending that Lord Granville's despatch was not susceptible of the construction which His Excellency had placed upon it, and might, consequently, be put aside so far as the Helmand arbitration now in progress was concerned.

"I could not, however, I said, refrain from calling his attention to another despatch which seemed to me to have an important bearing upon the subject.

"In February 1888 Sir R. Morier was instructed to call the attention of the Russian Government to the anxiety of the Persian Government for an early and equitable settlement of the Russo-Persian frontier of Khorasan. M. de Giers replied by a telegram communicated to Lord Salisbury by M. de Staal on the 8th March following, which contained the following statement:—
"With regard to the general tendency of Russian policy, M. de Giers stated that the Russian Government continued to attach the greatest value to the integrity of Persia.

* * * * *

"As to the delimitation of the frontier between Khorasan and the territory under Russian control, the Russian Government considered that this was a matter for Russia and Persia alone, and could not recognise a right of interposition on the part of any other power. But they had every intention of treating Persia equitably in the settlement of this question."

"These words *mutatis mutandis*, seemed to me exactly applicable to the case we were now discussing. Just as the Russian Government had contended in 1888 that a delimitation of the Russo-Persian frontier was a matter for Russia and Persia alone, so we now contended that a delimitation of the Perso-Afghan frontier concerned Persia and Afghanistan, and we could not recognise the right of another power to intervene.

"Count Benckendorff did not deny the force of the argument which I had used. He begged me, however, again to bear in mind that His Majesty's Government were pledged to avoid any interference with the integrity of Persia, and that it was, therefore, not unnatural that the Russian Government should regard with anxiety a readjustment of the frontier which might possibly have the effect of impairing that integrity.

"I ventured to say that the solicitude displayed by the Russian Government was, at any rate, premature, and that, unless they imputed bad faith to us, they might well assume that the arbitration in which we were engaged would be carried out in an equitable manner. It would surely be time for them to remonstrate or make representations, if, when the arbitration was over, they found that it really affected the integrity of Persia.

"His Excellency assured me that there was no imputation of bad faith, but the Russian Government earnestly desired to avoid a collision between Persia and Afghanistan.

"I said that it was because we desired to avoid such a collision that we had undertaken to act as arbitrators. If we had refused to do so, a collision would, in all probability, have taken place.

"I afterwards sent His Excellency a memorandum, of which a copy is enclosed in this despatch."

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No. 1.

MEMORANDUM COMMUNICATED BY COUNT BENCKENDORFF.

22nd February 1903.

"Lorsque la Russie, pour établir son autorité dans ses possessions d'Asie Centrale, a dû graduellement étendre ses frontières, elle en faisait l'objet de pourparlers avec le Gouvernement Britannique. Ces pourparlers, entamés en 1869, lors de l'entrevue du Prince Gortchacow avec Lord Clarendon à Heidelberg, ont été repris par M. D. Forsyth, autorisé par le Vice-roi des Indes Lord Mayo, de se rendre à Saint Petersbourg, et ont abouti à la définition d'un commun accord des frontières de l'Afghanistan, la Russie ayant donné son adhesion pleine et entière à la ligne de demarcation telle qu'elle était indiquée dans la dépêche de Lord Granville à Lord Augustus Loftus, en date du 17 Octobre, 1872.

D'un autre côté, le maintien de l'intégrité et de l'indépendence de la Perse a été reconnu sans conteste comme base de la politique de la Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne à l'égard de ce pays.

Il paraît donc naturel qu'actuellement quelque modification notable dans le statu quo sur la frontière Perso-Afghane ne saurait s'operer au cas où l'une des Grandes Puissances croirait devoir s'y opposer.

No 1.

MEMORANDUM COMMUNICATED TO COUNT BENCKENDORFF.

FOREIGN OFFICE,

2nd March 1903.

"The unofficial memorandum received from the Russian Ambassador refers to the agreements which have been arrived at between Great Britain and Russia on two points :—

(1) the frontier of Afghanistan in so far as they adjoin territory belonging to Russia or to States under Russian protection;

(2) the engagement to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia.

These subjects have always hitherto been treated as distinct from one another.

"The despatch from Lord Granville of the 17th October 1872, to which the memorandum refers, dealt with Afghanistan, and mentioned those portions of the Afghan frontiers in which Russia might be considered to be interested, beginning with Badakshan on the north-east and ending with the western frontier between the dependencies of Herat and those of the Persian frontier of Khorasan, which were described as 'well known.'

"No mention was made of Seistan, or of the arbitral award of Sir F. Goldsmid, which had been pronounced two months before, but in which it was not considered that Russia had any interest.

"Prince Gortchakow, in his reply of the 7th December, made no allusion to the Perso-Afghan frontier, nor was it in the ensuing negotiations discussed between the two Governments.

"On the other hand, the Russian Government while professing their continued adhesion to the principle of maintaining the integrity of Persia, have contended that the delimitation of the frontier between Persia and Russia was a matter for Russia and Persia alone, in which they could not recognise a right of interposition on the part of any other power.

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"Thus when, in February 1888, Sir R. Morier was instructed to call the attention of the Russian Government to the anxiety of the Persian Government for an early and equitable settlement of the Russo-Persian frontier of Khorasan, M. de Giers replied by a telegram which was communicated to Lord Salisbury by M. de Staal on the 8th March following, and which contained the following statements:—

"With regard to the general tendency of Russian policy, M. de Giers stated that the Russian Government continued to attach the greatest value to the integrity of Persia.

* * * * *

"As to the delimitation of the frontier between Khorasan and the territory under Russian control, the Russian Government considered that this was a matter for Russia and Persia alone and could not recognise the right of interposition on the part of any other power. But they had every intention of treating Persia equitably in the settlement of this question."

"It seems to His Majesty's Government that they are entitled to maintain, with regard to frontier questions concerning Persia and Afghanistan, an attitude corresponding to that assumed by the Russian Government in regard to the Russo-Persian frontier."

8. On 4th March 1903 the Marquis of Lansdowne told the Persian Minister that His Majesty's Government altogether refused to admit that the Russian Government had any concern in the arbitration, and trusted that His Excellency would impress upon the Persian Government the serious view which they took of the case (Marquis of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge, No. 31, dated 4th March 1903).

Secret F., June 1903, Nos. 1—199, Proceeding No. 176.

9. In November 1903 the Russian Government showed a desire to remove all sources of misunderstanding between Russia and Great Britain, and Count Benckendorff was instructed to discuss frankly with Lord Lansdowne the various questions outstanding between the two countries, with the object of arriving at an agreement as to the manner in which they should be dealt with. A conversation accordingly took place on 25th November 1903 in which Lord Lansdowne, on this particular point, said that we should expect the Russian Government to abstain from interfering with trade routes leading through Seistan and to recognize the Province as entirely under British influence.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Spring-Rice, No. 307, dated 7th November 1903. (Diary No. 756 Afgh.)

The discussion was resumed on 3rd December, when Count Benckendorff "said a few words on the subject of Persia, and particularly as to Seistan, which I again said would clearly fall within the British sphere. In reply to a question from His Excellency, I said that I imagined that there would be no difficulty in determining the limits of the Province."

Telegram from Secretary of State for India, dated 3rd December 1903 (confidential).

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Spring-Rice, No. 346, dated 3rd December 1903. (Diary No. 973-Persia.)

Position of the Hashmat-ul-Mulk.

10. Lord Lansdowne's Despatch* of 9th July 1901 had intimated to the Persian Government that any intention on their part to punish the Hashmat-ul-Mulk on account of his friendly attitude to Great

* Page 62 above.

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Britain would create a very unfavourable impression, but since that date the Russians had been using increasing pressure at Tehran to secure his removal, and the Mushir-ed-Dowleh himself informed Mr. Grant Duff that it was the intention of the Persian Government to deprive him of the Governorship of Seistan as soon as Colonel McMahon's mission left the country.

His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Seistan and Colonel McMahon repeatedly urged that British influence should be exerted to prevent his dismissal, which directly following the departure of the mission would be an unquestioned Russian victory and regarded as a symptom of immediate reaction. The Government of India concurred in this view and Mr. E. M. Grant Duff, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, was directed by Lord Lansdowne to bring the matter to the notice of the Mushir-ed-Dowleh. This he did as reported by him in the following telegram :—

E. M. Grant Duff, Esq., Tehran, to Foreign, Simla.

19th November 1903.

(Telegram No. 152.)

"Hashmat-ul-Mulk. Please refer to your telegram No. 106, dated the 16th November. I saw the Mushir-ed-Dowleh to-day, and informed him that His Majesty's Government had recently gone to great expense to arrange the Persian difficulties with the Afghans in Seistan, and were entitled to special consideration in that district, in view of a position which is shared by no other power; that His Majesty's Government could not acquiesce in the dismissal of Hashmat; and that, until an assurance was given that the *status quo* would be maintained, His Majesty's Government would find it difficult to withdraw the Commission. I added that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, so violent a disturbance of the *status quo*, as the removal of the hereditary Governor of Seistan, would require a justification which does not exist at present.

"The Mushir-ed-Dowleh said that he could not give a verbal message to the above effect to the Shah, and that if His Majesty's Government insist on their views coming to the knowledge of His Majesty, a formal note must be addressed to him. As a friend, and speaking unofficially, he earnestly hoped that His Majesty's Government would reconsider the matter. The Shah was already suspicious of the movements of the British in Seistan, and would be confirmed in his suspicions. His Excellency presumed that His Majesty's Government wished for order in Seistan, and he regretted they should wish to hamper His Majesty in the selection of Governors in his own kingdom. If Hashmat was retained, the Shah would be suspicious of his loyalty, and would deprive him of power by supporting subordinate officials in Seistan."

On receipt of this telegram the Viceroy and Sir A. Hardinge concurred in thinking that the representations of His Majesty's Government should certainly be put in writing and communicated to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh. Instructions accordingly were

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issued by the Foreign Office to Mr. E. M. Grant Duff, who communicated the result in the following telegram :—

E. M. GRANT DUFF, ESQ., TEHRAN, TO FOREIGN OFFICE, LONDON (REPEATED TO FOREIGN, CALCUTTA).

3rd December 1903.

(Telegram No. 158.)

"Hashmat-ul-Mulk. Please see your telegram No. 151. The reply to my note from the Mushir-ed-Dowleh is as follows :—

'Your note was submitted to His Majesty the Shah, who expressed his surprise and regret that the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should concern himself in the question of the Governorship of Seistan, as it is clear that the Persian Government will take requisite steps to preserve their own interests and to keep order in that province. The Persian Government do not consider that a change of Governors concerns foreign politicians. If any steps are required for the protection of British interests, application should be made to the Persian Government, who, in view of friendship between the two Governments, would take necessary action. The Persian Government do not consider that, in conformity with courtesy, such a representation should have been made by the British Government."

Thereupon Mr. Grant Duff was instructed by Lord Lansdowne to reply to the following effect. After disclaiming lack of courtesy in the communication to the Persian Government which was framed in Persia's best interests to promote peace and order on the frontier, he was to end as follows :—"It will be the duty of His Majesty's Government to consider carefully what steps will become necessary for the protection of British interests in Seistan, having regard to the unfriendly character of the message of the Minister for Foreign Affairs." The rejoinder of the Persian Government is reported in the following telegram:—

E. M. GRANT DUFF, ESQ., TEHRAN, TO FOREIGN, CALCUTTA.

26th December 1903.

(Telegram No. 167.)

"Hashmat-ul-Mulk. Please see your telegram No. 111, dated 5th December. I have addressed a note to the Persian Government in the sense of the instructions received from Your Lordship. The following is an abstract of the note which I received in reply :—I am much surprised to learn that my note was considered unfriendly, because I wished simply to give assurance that whatever change may be made in the administration of Seistan, it will have no political significance, or affect friendship between the two Governments. Changes in administration of Seistan or other provinces are not based on political grounds which may affect British interests. 'The note ends by requesting that the foregoing may be brought to Your Lordship's knowledge, in order to dispel any doubts which may exist on the subject'

"Addressed to the London Foreign Office; repeated to Foreign, Calcutta."

Telegram No. 111, dated the 5th December 1903.
Received with Political Secretary's letter No. 52, dated 11th March 1903.

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(5) British interests in the Persian Gulf.

Apart from the special question of the customs of Southern Persia, British interests in the Persian Gulf generally have formed the subject of numerous communications between the Governments of Great Britain and Persia.

1899.

2. In April 1899 when the first Russian loan was under negotiation, the Marquis of Salisbury laid it down in a conversation with the Persian Minister that our political interests "are not compatible with the exercise of any control or jurisdiction by a European power over the ports of the Persian Gulf" (despatch No. 10-Telegraphic from the Marquis of Salisbury to Sir M. Durand, dated 7th April 1899). The Shah replied* that the Persian Government would not admit in the Gulf ports, or elsewhere in Persia, anything which might be incompatible with the sovereign independence of the country.

Quoted at page 43 above.

* See page 44.

1900.

3. In 1900 after the completion of the Russian loan, the question arose whether Mohammerah was included in the security for that loan, and in the course of the communications which passed between the British and Persian Governments, Lord Salisbury included a reference to the wider question of the duties which were imposed on Her Majesty's Government by the magnitude of British trade in the Persian Gulf.

See page 46.

Pro-memorid.

PERSIAN TRANSLATION READ AND COMMUNICATED TO THE MUSHIR-ED-DOWLEH.

(Undated. Probable date seems to be 22nd March 1900. Enclosed in Mr. Spring-Rice's despatch No. 17, dated the 27th March 1900.)

Secret E., June 1900, Nos. 35-69, Enclosure No. 1, Proceeding No. 67.

"Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire has recently called Lord Salisbury's attention to the state of affairs at Mohammerah. As you are aware, Lord Salisbury offered his assistance for arriving at a settlement, which, as he has been informed, will be postponed till after the Shah's return from Europe.

"Lord Salisbury thinks it due to the friendship existing between the Governments of Persia and Great Britain that there should be a clear understanding of his views as to the ports of Mohammerah, Bushire, Bundar Abbas, and other ports of the Persian Gulf. This is the best way to avoid difficulties in the future.

"It is not necessary to remind the Persian Government of the circumstances which make it impossible for Her Majesty's Government to regard with indifference what happens in the ports above-named.

"As this Legation has recently stated, the control of these ports by a foreign power might lead to a state of things which Her Majesty's Government, in the interests of the Indian Empire,

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would be bound to resist. And this has been recognized by the Persian Government, who, on the 23rd October 1897,* gave a written promise that the customs of Southern Persia should never be placed under foreign control and supervision.

"The Persian Government did not fail to bear this promise in mind during the recent negotiations, and, as the Sadr-i-Azam has informed Her Majesty's Legation, the customs revenues of the above-mentioned ports were specially excepted from those which formed the guarantee of the Russian loan.

"I am to state that Her Majesty's Government must hold the Persian Government to the strict observance of this engagement.

"There is another aspect of this question to which I should draw your attention. As the Persian Government is aware, far the larger part of the trade of the above mentioned ports is British. This trade (which is the common interest of Persia and Great Britain) imposes certain duties on Her Majesty's Government, and they cannot pass without notice any measure likely to affect its position and prospects.

"And it is from this point of view that I am to inform the Persian Government, as a message from Lord Salisbury, that in view of our interest in the trade of Mohammerah and in the navigation of the Karun, Her Majesty's Government must insist that they have the right to be consulted before any change is made in the administration of the customs, or in the position of the Sheikh."

* See page 40.

The Foreign Minister's reply was that "not only in Mohammerah, but in every part of Persia where British interests were concerned, the Persian Government, before taking any steps of importance, would consult the British Government."

Quoted at page 48 above.

1901.

4. In October 1901 the report that Persia was endeavouring to obtain a further loan from Russia led the Marquis of Lansdowne to propose to Russia that both powers might make a simultaneous advance to Persia. In his instructions to the Hon'ble Mr. C. Hardinge, Lord Lansdowne directed him to speak to Count Lamsdorff in the following sense:—

"His Majesty's Government consider that the situation in Persia is governed by the Anglo-Russian understanding of 1834, which was subsequently in 1888 reaffirmed and emphasized.* By this understanding both powers are bound to maintain not only the integrity, but the independence of Persia. Any arrangement under which Persia would pass under the financial tutelage of either power would be incompatible with the maintenance of such independence.

"In 1888 M. de Giers expressed the view that there should be no antagonism between British and Russian commercial interests in Persia. His Majesty's Government adhere to that view. They have always recognized the preponderating interest of Russia in Northern Persia, while in Southern Persia, on the other hand, more especially in the Gulf ports and also in Seistan, Great Britain has interests which she cannot allow to be ignored.

Secret E., March 1902, Nos. 377-521, Proceeding No. 483.

* See page 14 above.

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"I request that you will speak to Count Lamsdorff in the above sense.

"You should add that His Majesty's Government are ready to discuss in the most friendly spirit with the Russian Government the possibility of concerting some arrangement by which both powers might make a simultaneous advance to Persia. The two Governments might accept as their respective security for the advance Persian revenues derived from sources falling within the two spheres already indicated."

The Russian reply contained no reference to this particular assertion of British claims.

5. In November 1901 the new Russo-Persian Tariff negotiations which ignored Great Britain were practically concluded, and it being thought advisable to call renewed attention to various British interests, Sir A. Hardinge addressed the Grand Vizier on 21st November 1901 in the following terms:—

SIR A. HARDINGE TO GRAND VIZIER.

21st November 1901.

(*Extract.*)

Enclosure No. 2 in Secret E., March 1902, Nos. 377-521, Proceeding No. 493.

"Your Highness was good enough to inform me that these negotiations were practically concluded, and that M. Goluboff was leaving for St. Petersburg with a draft of the new Persian Tariff for the final approval of the Russian Government.

"I am directed by my Government, in connection with this matter, to remind the Persian Government of the great importance of the trade of the British Empire with Persia, more especially with the ports of the Persian Gulf, in which the foreign trade of Persia is almost exclusively British. It is unnecessary for me to trouble Your Highness with statistics in support of this well-known fact, and I will merely observe that, in view of it, my Government cannot regard with passive indifference a revision of the commercial relations between Persia and foreign powers. Its latest treaty with Persia gives it, it is true, merely a most-favoured-nation treatment clause, which every other Treaty Power, including countries so remote and unconcerned with the trade of Persia as Spain and Denmark, enjoy, but it is obvious that its moral claim to a careful consideration of its commercial interests is, in view of their importance, and of the political relations between England and Persia, of a very different character, and entitle His Majesty's Government to demand that a complete change in the system of duties to which its trade is subject should be negotiated with them as well as with Russia, and should not be effected without any reference to their views. It is conceivable that a rearrangement of that system in which the interests of Russia and Persia were alone considered, might, without any appearance of differential treatment, be distinctly prejudicial to our trade.

"A tariff, for example, under which petroleum (from whatever country) was admitted at a low duty, and tea (from whatever country) was charged with a very high one, would benefit Russian trade and injure British without infringing our strict treaty rights. I am therefore

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charged to make the request that before the new tariff is irrevocably settled, the Persian Government will, having regard to the commercial interests and friendly relations referred to above, communicate it (of course, confidentially) to the British Government, so as to enable the latter to obtain modifications, while there is still time, of any proposed changes which may be injurious to British interests. I am also in this connection again to remind Your Highness of the special interests, both commercial and political, of Great Britain in the ports of the Persian Gulf and Southern Persia generally, as well as in the province of Seistan, in which, from their respective proximity to the Indian Ocean and to British India, our trade is predominant, and indeed almost exclusive, and to request an undertaking that in those portions of Persia advantages should be conceded to His Majesty's Government not less than those which have been, or may hereafter be, accorded to any other foreign power or its subjects in other portions of His Majesty the Shah's dominions. This is, I think, Your Highness will admit, a very moderate and reasonable request."

With reference to the above demands, the Atabeg-i-Azam read out to Sir A. Hardinge a note which he had written down by the Shah's orders:—

"(*a*) *Tariff.*—The Persian Government could not undertake to submit the new Russian-Persian Convention to us before it was settled with the Russians, but would communicate a copy of it as soon as it was. The question of negotiation with us was thus evaded, but in reply to an inquiry as to whether, if we were dissatisfied with the new tariff, he would be willing to negotiate a fresh one as between the British and Persian Governments, he replied that he was prepared to consider this proposal. He believed, however, that the new tariff would prove highly satisfactory to us, as our commercial interests had been carefully considered by the Persian negotiators in its framing.

"(*b*) *Our special interests in the south.*—The Persian Government did not quite understand the meaning of our proposal, but was prepared, both in the north and south, to give to us, as it always had done in the past, every right and advantage accorded to any other foreign power."

(See despatch No. 184 from Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquis of Lansdowne, dated Tehran, 29th November 1901.)

Secret E., March 1902, Nos. 377-521, Proceeding No. 493.

A formal reply was given the British Minister on 5th December 1901 in the following terms:—

"With regard to the tariff, the Persian Government, in view of its commercial and financial interests, had deemed it necessary to change its tariff, and on account of the priority of the Turcomanchai Treaty, the negotiation in connection with this matter was to be carried out first with Russia. As soon as the new tariff is complete, a copy of it will be communicated to you.

"(2) You had stated that the Persian Government must, in Southern Persia and especially in the Persian Gulf, give to that of Great Britain advantages which have been given to other

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powers. This statement not being clear I have to point out that should such advantages be in conformity with the independence of Persia, there will be no objection to them as usual, but if they are inconsistent with the independence of the Persian monarchy, they will not be given to the British Government in the same way, that they have not been given to any one in any part of Persia."

Secret E., July 1902, Nos. 244-306, Proceeding No. 275.

[See despatch No. 9 (Confidential) from Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquis of Lansdowne, dated Tehran, January 13th, 1902.]

Sir A. Hardinge sent the following rejoinder :—

Ibid, Enclosure No. 2.

"I regret that the Persian Government has not seen its way to negotiate the proposed revision of the tariff with Great Britain as well as with Russia before actually concluding an arrangement with the latter power, which, if it should prove in any way detrimental to British interests or directly or indirectly conflict with article 9 of the Anglo-Persian Treaty, may occasion embarrassing discussions. I note, however, the promise to communicate the tariff to us as soon as it is complete.

"As regards the security for our interests in those parts of Persia which are contiguous to our frontier or in which our trade predominates, I have already endeavoured to explain verbally to Your Highness what I believe to be the meaning of my Government, but, in order to prevent all possibility of doubt or misunderstanding, I am prepared, should Your Highness desire it, to refer the point again to London in the despatch in which I forward your reply. I must, however, respectfully demur to the suggestion that demands likely to be made by His Majesty's Government could be inconsistent with the independence of the Persian monarchy, the maintenance of which has for so many years been a fundamental principle of British policy."

1902.

6. The refusal of the Persian Government to avail itself of British financial aid, and the peculiar circumstances under which that refusal took place, led Lord Lansdowne in January 1902 to explain to the Shah's Government the considerations by which the conduct of Great Britain towards Persia has been influenced.

The whole of the following extract has bearing on British interests in Southern Persia :—

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR A. HARDINGE,—No. 2, dated the 6th January 1902.

* * * * * * *

Secret E., March 1902, Nos. 377-521, Proceeding No. 502.

"The policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to the various Persian questions which most interest this country has from time to time been clearly indicated on the occasions when those questions have come under discussion. It may, however, be useful to recapitulate the salient features of that policy in a statement, which you may at your discretion place before the Grand Vizier and other Ministers of the Shah, or even before His Majesty himself, if a suitable opportunity should present itself.

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"The Persian Government must be well aware, from the experience of 100 years, that Great Britain has no designs upon the sovereignty of the Shah or the independence of his State. It has, on the contrary, been one of our principal objects to encourage and strengthen the States lying outside the frontier of our Indian Empire, with the hope that we should find in them an intervening zone sufficient to prevent direct contact between the dominions of Great Britain and those of other great military powers. We could not, however, maintain this policy if in any particular instance we should find that one of these intervening States was being crushed out of national existence, and falling practically under the complete domination of another power. It would be necessary in that case, before the intervening State had virtually disappeared, to consider what alternative course our interests might demand now that the object to which our efforts had hitherto been directed was no longer attainable.

"Applying these principles to Persia, we have long recognized the superior interests of Russia in the northern portion of the Shah's dominions, which must naturally result from the long extent of her conterminous frontier. Whatever steps we may have taken to maintain our position in Northern Persia have therefore been taken as much in the interests of Persia herself and of her national independence as in our own, which are not directly threatened by Persian superiority in those regions, except in so far as it might affect the Persian capital and seat of Government.

"In the south, on the other hand, for fully a century our efforts have been successfully devoted to building up a substantial and pre-eminent mercantile position, with the result that we have acquired an altogether exceptional interest in that part of Persia.

"Persia herself has benefited immensely by these labours. We have cleared the waters adjoining her coasts of pirates, and have kept them constantly policed. It may be stated without exaggeration that the development of the whole southern trade of Persia is due to British enterprise, and that it is by this agency that Bushire and Bundar Abbas have been converted into flourishing ports.

"The system of telegraphs which has been introduced by the British Indian Telegraph Administration, with the permission and assistance of the Persian Government, has tended, not merely to industrial and commercial progress, but also in a remarkable degree to the consolidation of the Shah's authority over the centre and south of the country.

"It cannot reasonably be supposed that Great Britain would abandon a position attained by so many years of constant effort, or would acquiesce in attempts on the part of other powers to acquire political predominance in the south of Persia. Although, therefore, His Majesty's Government have no desire to obstruct in any way the efforts of Russia to find a commercial entrance for her trade in the Persian Gulf, or to oppose any obstacle to the passage of her commerce from the north for export from Persian ports, they could not admit that such commercial facilities should form the pretext for the occupation by Russia of points possessing strategical importance or for the establishment of such an ascendancy in the south as she already enjoys in the north.

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"The Persian Government should therefore distinctly understand and bear in mind that Great Britain could not consent to the acquisition by Russia of a military or naval station in the Persian Gulf, for the reason that such a station must be regarded as a challenge to Great Britain and a menace to her Indian Empire.

"If the Persian Government were at any time to make such a concession to Russia, it would be necessary for His Majesty's Government to take in the Persian Gulf such measures as they might consider necessary for the protection of British interest: measures which, in view of their naval strength in those waters, would be attended with no serious difficulty.

"Nor, again, could His Majesty's Government acquiesce in the concession to Russia of any preferential political rights or advantages, or any commercial monopoly or exclusive privilege in the southern or south-eastern districts of Persia, including Seistan. British interests must inevitably suffer by such concessions, and the Persian Government have themselves recognized and acquiesced in this view on more than one occasion. They gave in October 1897 a written promise to Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran that the customs of Southern Persia should never be placed under foreign control and supervision. When in 1900 the customs revenues were pledged as security for the loan obtained from the Russian Banque des Prêts, a special exception was made of the revenues and ports of Southern Persia, and when Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in April 1900 called the attention of the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the interest which the British Government had in the ports of Mohammerah, Bushire, Bundar Abbas, and other ports of the Persian Gulf, and insisted on the right of Her Majesty's Government to be consulted before any change was made in the administration of the customs at Mohammerah or in the position of the Sheikh, His Excellency replied that 'not only in Mohammerah, but in every part of Persia where British interests were concerned, the Persian Government, before taking any steps of importance, would consult the British Government.' His Majesty's Government have taken note of this assurance with satisfaction, and have only to add that a hypothecation of the integral revenues of any of the southern or south-eastern provinces of Persia as security for a foreign loan would be even more detrimental to Persian interests, and not less objectionable from a British point of view than that of the customs of the southern ports."

The Shah's autograph reply,* which was subsequently embodied as an official document, contained a general assurance that his Government would never come to an understanding with any foreign power against Great Britain, did not intend alienating any portion of Persian territory to a foreign power for a military station, and would not pledge any of its internal revenues.

7. On 17th January 1902, in the House of Commons, Viscount Cranborne, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said:—

* * * * *

* See pages 17 and 18 above.
Secret E, July 1902, Nos. 244-306, Enclosure, Proceeding No. 279.

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(6) The Sheikh of Mohammerah.

For the assertion of special British interests in the trade of the port of Mohammerah and the navigation of the Karun river, reference may be made to pages 9, 11-12, 24-25, 45-47, above.

But Mohammerah, apart from its trade, is of importance as the seat of a local Governor, to whom assurances of support have been given by the British Government in order to safeguard British interests at the mouth of the Karun from foreign competition and intrigue, and about whom the intentions of British policy have been clearly explained to the Persian Government.

1902.

2. Up to the year 1902 the Arab Sheikh of Mohammerah enjoyed practically complete local autonomy and the right to collect his own customs dues. In 1902 the Russian Legation addressed a protest to the Persian Government against the irregularities at present existing in the collection of customs at Mohammerah and demanded, in the interests of uniformity and with a view to fair and equal treatment of importers of all nations, that a proper customs administration should be established without further delay at that port. The Sheikh sent an envoy to Tehran to effect a settlement, and consulted the British Minister about the objection he entertained to accepting a Belgian customs official at Mohammerah, in whom he very naturally saw a tool of Russia and the thin end of the wedge for the destruction of Arab autonomy. Finally, in May 1902, the Sheikh's Agent arranged an agreement with the Persian Government which bound him to accept a Persian custom-house at Mohammerah, with a Belgian assistant, but recognized the Sheikh as head of the customs. This written agreement was seen in the original by Mr. Grahame at the British Legation, but its existence was denied by the Grand Vizier in December 1902. The Agent continued to urge that His Majesty's Government should give the Sheikh an assurance of protection similar to that accorded to the Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit, explaining that he was not afraid of the Persian Government, but that he wished, in view of the possible break-up of Persia at no distant date, to feel that the position of the Mohammerah Arabs was secured.

Secret E., May 1902, Nos. 53-55, Proceeding No. 54.

Secret E., August 1902, Nos. 91-94, Proceeding No. 93.

Enclosure 4 in Secret E., December 1902, Nos. 120-130, Proceeding No. 121.

Secret E., June 1903, Nos. 337-356, Proceeding No. 340.

Enclosure 1 in Secret E., December 1902, Nos. 120-130, Proceeding No. 121.

On 17th September 1902, Mr. des Graz, acting on instructions from Lord

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Lansdowne, addressed the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, saying that His Majesty's Government had heard of an agreement having been concluded between the Persian Government and the Sheikh of Mohammerah respecting the establishment of customs, and after reminding him of the various promises made by the Persian Government about the exclusion of the customs of Southern Persia from foreign control, and of the Shah's pledge not to take any steps of importance, where British interests were concerned, before consulting the British Government, he ended by asking to be officially informed of the exact conditions of the agreement in question.

In his reply on 7th October 1902, the Mushir-ed-Dowleh took exception to the word "agreement" being applied to the relations between the Persian Government, and one of its officials, like Sheikh Khazal Khan of Mohammerah. Mr. des Graz's question remained unanswered.

Secret E., December 1902, Nos. 120-130, Enclosure No. 1, Proceeding No. 123.

On 23rd November 1902, Sir A. Hardinge telegraphed to Lord Lansdowne, saying that unless we could give the Sheikh real confidence in our strength and resolution, Russian influence would very shortly be supreme and active at Mohammerah. The recent appointment of a Russian Consul there, he added, there being absolutely no pretence of Russian trade, had an unmistakeable significance.

Ibid, Proceeding No. 125.

Sir A. Hardinge's general position was strongly supported by the Viceroy, who in telegraphing to the Secretary of State on 26th November 1902 said: "Our weakness in Persia arises largely from failure to support those Chiefs and officials who incline to our side. If there is a Chief entitled to such support, it is the Sheikh of Mohammerah, and if there is a part of Southern Persia where British interests specially demand protection against foreign competition or intrigue, it is the mouth of the Karun."

On 26th November 1902, Lord Lansdowne telegraphed to Sir A. Hardinge that there were obvious objections to a personal guarantee that the British Government would prevent the Persian Government from diminishing the Sheikh's authority or otherwise causing him trouble, and that it was not desirable to place him in the position of being able to call upon us to support him both by land and sea in the event of a threat from Persia with Russia behind her.

Secret E., June 1903, Nos. 337-356, Enclosure No. 1, Proceeding No. 341.

On 26th November 1902, Sir A. Hardinge telegraphed to the Marquis of Lansdowne that the Sheikh's Agent had again

Ibid, Enclosure No. 9, Proceeding No. 345.

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pressed hard that we should give a secret written assurance that so long as the Sheikh and his Arabs followed our advice we should prohibit a further curtailment of their rights. Sir A. Hardinge was in favour of giving some such intimation both to the Persians and the Arabs, at the start of the Russo-Belgian Customs régime at Mohammerah, as the best security against any attempts to cajole or bully the Sheikh into accepting a veiled Russian Protectorate. Finally an assurance was given to the Sheikh, which is summarized in the following :—

SIR A. HARDINGE, TEHRAN TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY, CALCUTTA.

Telegram, December 4, 1902.

"To-day the following telegram has been sent to Foreign Office :—

Your telegram No. 3.

Secret E., December 1902, Nos. 120-30, Proceeding No. 129.

My draft letter to Sheikh, after urging maintenance of good relations with Shah's Government, recapitulates his Agent's enquiries last May as to our readiness to protect him against only danger he really feared, *viz.*, attempt by ships of foreign power, either at war with, or acting as pretended friend of, Persia, to depose him and deprive Arabs of their ancient rights ; and my reply that "both contingencies were very unlikely ; but that if either arose, we should, in my belief, interfere, provided he had acted in accordance with our advice ; and that our naval power, which was strongest in Gulf, would be employed to prevent forcible action against him." I propose now to add following sentence embodying Your Lordship's own words : "I stated, however, that I should have to refer these questions to the Foreign Minister of the British Government ; and he has now authorised me to say that we shall protect Mohammerah against naval attack, by a foreign power, whatever pretext for such attack may be alleged ; and also, so long as you remain faithful to the Shah and act in accordance with our advice, will continue to give you our good offices and support."

I spoke to the Grand Vizier on the subject last Monday. He made no remarks worth telegraphing, but I think my words had good effect.

3. From the following despatch it is clear that Sir A. Hardinge verbally explained to the Grand Vizier the full scope of the promise which he had given to the Sheikh, and the reasons which had led to such action being taken :—

SIR A. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE.

Tehran, December 5, 1902.

Secret E., June 1903, Nos. 337-356, Proceeding No. 340.

(*Extract.*)

(No. 167.)

"I spoke to the Grand Vizier on the first instant about Mohammerah and referred to the

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two notes which Mr. des Graz had addressed on the subject to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, and the last of which had not yet been answered.

"His Highness then endeavoured to argue that our interests were not affected by any changes in the position of the Sheikh, who was a local Governor like any other. I said I hoped he would allow me to be frank with him on the subject. I had no wish to call in question the Shah's sovereignty over the Chief or people of Mohammerah, which His Majesty's Government had always recognised.

"Our experience in Seistan had however been a lesson in the effects on our interests which a Russian Consul and Belgian customs officials, who were not always judicious, could produce at the residence of a remote and ill-informed Persian Governor. On the Karun, as in Seistan, the Russians had no *bonâ fide* commercial interests and their recent appointment of a Consul could have only political objects. We were determined not to have, if we could help it, another Seistan in Mohammerah, and to let Sheikh Khazal therefore understand that if Russian agents attempted to intimidate him, or insinuate that they could bring pressure to bear on him owing to the influence which they exercised at Tehran, we on our side were ready to support him. It was because threats of this kind had been used by Prince Dabija, Russian Consul at Ispahan, when he visited Mohammerah, that I had felt obliged to intimate to the Sheikh that our naval forces in the Gulf were more powerful than those of Russia and that they might be employed in certain eventualities for the purpose of maintaining the *status quo* in which he and we were alike interested."

SIR A. HARDINGE TO THE MUSHIR-ED-DOWLEH.

December 5, 1902.

"No answer having been received by this Legation from Your Excellency to the note dated October 11, which Mr. des Graz had the honour to address to you respecting customs changes at Mohammerah, and Your Excellency having in your reply to a previous communication on the subject said that the matter might have to be referred to His Majesty the Shah and the Atabeg-i-Azam, I had some conversation respecting it with His Highness on the 1st instant.

"The Atabeg i-Azam observed that he had shared Your Excellency's surprise at the employment by Mr. des Graz of the word "Karardad," to describe the progress by which the Persian Government had effected certain administrative changes in a district whose ruler was its subject. His Highness however recognised that these changes as affecting British commerce were a matter of legitimate interest to His Majesty's Government, and whilst declining to admit that the instruction given by him some years ago that Lynch Brothers should be allowed to pay customs duties at Ahwaz and Shuster, was a pledge perpetually binding the Persian Government, had directed M. Naus to discuss this question with me with a view to the conclusion of a *modus vivendi*.

"I observed on my side that, while deprecating in the strongest manner any suggestion that the use of the word "agreement" could be construed as implying on our part a doubt as to the

Enclosure 1, Proceeding No. 340. Secret E., June 1903, Nos 337-56.

NOTE.—This is the draft letter submitted to Lord Lansdowne, for approval, in Sir A. Hardinge's despatch of 5th December 1902. Lord Lansdowne in his telegram No. 71 of 31st December 1902 (not traceable in Foreign Department records) directed some alterations to be made. The modified note appears to have been sent to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh on the 6th January 1903, *vide* Pro. No. 139, Secret E., August 1903.

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sovereignty of Persia over the Sheikh and people of Mohammerah, which His Majesty's Government had always recognised, we yet felt that the adoption of certain measures towards the Arabs, such as the transfer to Europeans of functions hitherto enjoyed by the Sheikh, might, by causing dissatisfaction and local disturbances, very seriously affect our interests. It was for this reason that we considered that the friendly relations existing between the Persian and British Governments and the assurances which the former had repeatedly given us, justified us in asking for the fullest information as to the exact nature of the changes proposed. His Highness assured me of his readiness to meet our views in this respect, and when, a day or so later, I asked him through Abbas Kuli Khan for the text of the arrangements with the Sheikh of Mohammerah which I understood had been or were about to be concluded, he replied that no written arrangements had been made with the Sheikh, but that he was to have the titular rank of Head of the Customs and to receive an increase of salary amounting to 12,000 tomans a year for the maintenance of his Arab kinsmen. Some of his relations had moreover been already taken into the public service. The Persian Government, His Highness added, had every confidence in that of His Majesty the King of Great Britain and hoped that this feeling was reciprocated.

"I communicated the account of what had passed between His Highness and myself to Lord Lansdowne, who has now instructed me to make the following declaration to Your Excellency for the information of the Persian Government and with a view of making our position in this matter perfectly clear:

"(1) The British Government has never doubted the absolute character of the Shah's sovereignty over the territory, ruler and people of Mohammerah. Any suspicion which the Persian Government may have been led to entertain that we sought to establish any analogy between the position of the Sheikh of Mohammerah and that of the Sheikhs of Bahrein or Koweit or to distinguish between it and that of other Persian Governors, such for instance, to cite Your Excellency's own illustration in conversation with Mr. des Graz, as the Chief of Kuchan, can only have been suggested by persons desirous of sowing distrust between the two friendly States. We recognise in the fullest manner that His Excellency the Sirdar Arfa is a Persian subject and a servant of His Imperial Majesty the Shah.

"(2) At the same time the important interests which Great Britain possesses in the south of Persia preclude us from viewing with indifference any changes in the system of Government in the province of Arabistan, which by causing trouble among the Arab tribes may endanger our trade and the security of foreign subjects, or afford occasion for interference by other powers and thus oblige us, on our side, to take active steps for the protection of British rights. It is notorious that when it was first announced that the customs of Arabistan were to be placed under Belgian control, there was a certain ferment among the Arabs, and that some of them went so far as to forcibly oppose the landing of the Karguzar of Bushire at Mohammerah. The misconceptions which had occasioned this ferment were happily dispelled, but had the Persian Government not pursued so wise and tactful a policy it might easily have assumed a dangerous character

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and produced grave and far-reaching effects. The British Government takes note with satisfaction of the announcement which His Highness the Atabeg-i-Azam has enabled me to make to it, that although no written arrangements modifying the customs system on the Karun have been made between the Persian Government and the Sheikh of Mohammerah, as its principal local representative, yet the Sheikh will be retained as the titular Head of the Customs, with an increased salary and employment for his relations, and it has every hope that the new Customs Administration, whose establishment it has always regarded with sympathy, will prove of benefit to all parties concerned. It also learns with pleasure that the Persian Government is willing to maintain the existing Custom-house at Ahwaz, the retention of which is deemed important to the commercial interests of the British merchants engaged in the trade and navigation of the Karun. But it must again reserve its right, in the event of further changes which it could not view with equal approbation, to make friendly representations with regard to them to the Persian Government, and if need be, take such other ulterior steps as it may deem requisite for the protection of British interests, both political and commercial, should these in its opinion be threatened. It is glad however to take the opportunity of expressing its confidence in the friendly assurances which His Highness the Atabeg has renewed to it and which on its side it is happy to reciprocate.

"I trust that this frank and explicit statement of the views entertained on the subject by His Majesty's Government may remove all possibility of doubt or misunderstanding on the part of the Persian Government."

SIR A. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE.

(No. 19-A.)

Tehran, 1st February 1903.

Secret E., August 1903, Pro. No. 139.

"I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the reply of the Mushir-ed-Dowleh to the note respecting the customs and status of the Sheikh of Mohammerah which I addressed, by Your Lordship's directions, to His Excellency, as reported in my despatch No. 1 of the 6th ultimo.

"This note, as Your Lordship will observe, takes no exception to any of the reservations made in mine, and is couched in very friendly language."

MUSHIR-ED-DOWLEH TO SIR A. HARDINGE.

13th January 1903.

(Translation.)

"I have had the pleasure of receiving Your Excellency's letter of the 9th* January last, and have with satisfaction made myself acquainted with the contents which signify the sincere friendship between the two Governments, and I would now express my own heartfelt satisfaction at the friendly assurances exchanged between the two powers, and I trust that the harmony and sincerity which has for so long existed between the two powers may be still further strengthened, and that the friendly feelings between the authorities of both powers may as always tend to an increased amity."

* ? 6th January.

The written communications, however, do not appear to have informed the Persian Government how far we were prepared to support the Sheikh by force of arms

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in certain contingencies, and the statement can perhaps hardly be termed sufficiently "frank and explicit" to "remove all possibility of doubt or misunderstanding on the part of the Persian Government."

Secret E., February 1904, Nos. 24-32, Proceeding No. 24.

4. On 10th December 1903, Sir A. Hardinge telegraphed to the Foreign Office and to the Viceroy that the Mohammerah question was again likely to become acute. The Sheikh complained that the Persian Government was endeavouring to evade the agreement made in 1902, and, in contravention of it, was attempting to impose duties on him and to introduce additional Belgian Customs officials and generally to undermine his authority. He wanted to know definitely if we would support him in resisting these encroachments, if necessary, by forbidding the Persian Government to employ force against him should he on his part repudiate the arrangement unless the Persians kept to it. Sir A. Hardinge was personally in favour of our doing so, and thought that the unsatisfactory answer given by the Persian Government to the question as to the inclusion of Mohammerah in the Russian loan security would justify our being rather stiff in any matter relating to that port. We ought not to lose the opportunity of recovering our complete influence over the Sheikh. The Russian Government were bidding for him and were sending him a high Russian decoration. Sir A. Hardinge advised telling him that we would support him in insisting on the execution of his agreement with the Persian Government regarding customs and in forcibly resisting, if necessary, any attempt which the Persians might make (though they were not likely to try it) to coerce him.

Ibid, Proceeding No. 27.

The Viceroy was quite in accord with the British Minister's proposal about the Sheikh of Mohammerah, provided it could be shown that the Persians were proposing to depart from their recent agreement with him; and after discussing the matter with Sir A. Hardinge during the Persian Gulf tour, His Excellency on 21st December 1903 telegraphed to the Secretary of State that in his opinion it would be wise to support the Sheikh, if the Persians proposed to depart from their agreement with him. It seemed to the Viceroy unfortunate that the Belgians were ever let into Mohammerah, and it would certainly be desirable to recover lost ground.

On 23rd December 1903, the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy the

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following summary of a telegram sent to Sir A. Hardinge on 11th December :—

"His Majesty's Government assume that the Persian Government are really attempting to evade engagements. In that case you are authorised to inform the Sheikh that His Majesty's Government consider him justified in resisting attempt of the Persian Government to deprive him of rights under the agreement of 1902, the necessity of respecting which you should strongly impress on the Persian Government. The Sheikh should be reminded of the assurances given by his Majesty's Government in December 1902. These contemplated possibilities of a naval attack by a Foreign Power, which was a danger then apprehended by the Sheikh, who expressed himself confident of his own ability to resist Persian encroachments. The Sheikh may rest assured that we shall afford him our good offices and support, so long as he fulfils his obligations under the agreement."

Secret E., February 1904, Nos. 24-32, Proceeding No. 29.

In accordance with these instructions Sir A. Hardinge addressed the following letter to the Sheikh :—

BAGHDAD,
24th December 1903.

(Confidential.)

"Your Excellency,

I have received a telegram in reply to the one which I sent to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from Mohammerah after my first interview with Your Excellency.

Ibid, Sub-enclosure, Enclosure, Proceeding No. 32.

Lord Lansdowne says that if, as he presumes is the case from my account of Your Excellency's statement to me, the Persian Government is really attempting to repudiate the arrangement made with you last year, I am authorised to say that you are in his opinion justified in opposing such attempt. He instructs me to remind you of the message which he sent you last year and to add that you may rest assured of the support of the British Government so long as you on your side observe the conditions of the arrangement made between the Persian Government and yourself.

He has authorised me to point out to that Government the necessity for respecting the conditions of the arrangement on their side, but I do not propose to do so until I hear further from you, as I think it will be better in the interests of good relations between the Persian authorities and yourself that our intervention should not be invoked until all other means of adjusting matters between them and you have been exhausted. Meanwhile, I should be obliged if you would send me to Tehran, through His Majesty's Resident at Bushire, a copy of the note from M. Naus, promising not to take duty on your personal imports and any further information on this question."

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(7) New Persian Tariff.

Since 1828 the trade relations of Persia with foreign countries, except Turkey, were governed by the treaty of Turkmanchai, which provided for a 5 per cent. *ad valorem* duty on Russian imports, and every western country, including Great Britain, had been content to stipulate for the insertion in its treaties with Persia of a most-favoured-nation clause under which it could claim the same commercial treatment which had been granted to Russia. The hold over Persia, which the conditions of the loan of 1900 had conferred upon Russia, gave the latter an opportunity for obtaining an absolute control of the fiscal policy of Persia with regard to foreign trade, and in view of the certainty of requiring further financial assistance from the same quarter, the Shah in 1900 consented to consider the revision of article 3 of the Separate Compact referred to in article X of the Treaty of Turkmanchai. On several occasions from July 1900 onwards His Majesty's Government expressed their strong objection to the proposed increase of duty on tea, and intimated to the Shah that they expected in view of our great commercial interests in Persia that the new tariff would not be arranged with Russia without their being consulted. The new Russo-Persian Commercial Convention, which the Russian Government made a condition precedent to the grant of the second loan asked for by the Shah, was signed at Tehran as early as 9th November 1901, but the ratifications were not exchanged till December 13th, 1902, when February 14th, 1903, was fixed as the date for the new tariff to come into force, and His Majesty's Government were deliberately deluded into the idea that the matter remained unconcluded and that there was still time for weight to be given to their representations.

Sub-enclosure 3, Enclosure, Proceeding No. 251, in Secret E., August 1903, Nos. 280-312.

1901.

2. In November 1901, when the negotiations with Russia for a revision of the Persian Tariff were practically completed, Sir A. Hardinge addressed the Grand Vizier, requesting that before the new tariff was irrevocably settled, the Persian Government would communicate it to the British Government so as to enable the latter to obtain modifications of proposed changes injurious to British interests :—

SIR A. HARDINGE TO GRAND VIZIER.

21st November 1901.

Enclosure 2 in Secret E., March 1902, Nos. 377-521, Proceeding No. 493.

"I am directed by my Government, in connection with this matter, to remind the Persian Government of the great importance of the trade of

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the British Empire with Persia, more especially with the ports of the Persian Gulf, in which the foreign trade of Persia is almost exclusively British. It is unnecessary for me to trouble Your Highness with statistics in support of this well-known fact, and I will merely observe that, in view of it, my Government cannot regard with passive indifference a revision of the commercial relations between Persia and foreign powers. Its latest treaty with Persia gives it, it is true, merely a most-favoured-nation treatment clause, which every other Treaty Power, including countries so remote and unconcerned with the trade of Persia, as Spain and Denmark, enjoy, but it is obvious that its moral claim to a careful consideration of its commercial interests is, in view of their importance, and of the political relations between England and Persia, of a very different character, and entitle His Majesty's Government to demand that a complete change in the system of duties to which its trade is subject should be negotiated with them as well as with Russia, and should not be effected without any reference to their views. It is conceivable that a rearrangement of that system in which the interests of Russia and Persia were alone considered might, without any appearance of differential treatment, be distinctly prejudicial to our trade.

"A tariff, for example, under which petroleum (from whatever country) was admitted at a low duty, and tea (from whatever country) was charged with a very high one, would benefit Russian trade and injure British without infringing our strict treaty rights. I am therefore charged to make the request that before the new tariff is irrevocably settled, the Persian Government will, having regard to the commercial interests and friendly relations referred to above, communicate it (of course, confidentially) to the British Government, so as to enable the latter to obtain modifications, while there is still time, of any proposed changes which may be injurious to British interests."

In a conversation with reference to the above demand, the Grand Vizier on 28th November 1901 read out a note written down by the Shah's orders to the effect that the Persian Government could not undertake to submit the new Russian-Persian Convention to us before it was settled with the Russians, but would communicate a copy as soon as it was completed.* In reply to an inquiry as to whether, if we were dissatisfied with the new tariff, he would be willing to negotiate a fresh one as between the British and Persian Governments, he replied that he was prepared to consider the proposal.

(Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquis of Lansdowne, No. 184, dated 29th November 1901.)

The formal reply, dated 5th December 1901, was as follows :—

"With regard to the tariff, the Persian Government, in view of its commercial and financial interests, had deemed it necessary to change its

*The Convention had been already signed on 9th November 1901. (October 27 O. S.).

Enclosure 1 in Secret E., July 1902, Nos. 244-306, Proceeding No. 275.

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tariff, and on account of the priority of the Turcomanchai Treaty, the negotiation in connection with this matter was to be carried out first with Russia. As soon as the new tariff is complete, a copy of it will be communicated to you."

1902.

3. In 1902 the following conversation took place in London between the Marquis of Lansdowne and the Grand Vizier, when the latter gave Lord Lansdowne to understand that the British Government would be afforded an opportunity of explaining how the revised tariff would affect their interests before it was finally settled :—

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO MR. DES GRAZ.

Foreign Office, August 18, 1902.

No. 76.

(Confidential.)

Secret E., March 1903, Nos. 261-328, Proceeding No. 285.

"I told His Highness that the disposition of this country towards Persia was certainly friendly, and that we had again and again committed ourselves to the policy of upholding the independence and integrity of Persia. On the other hand, there were considerable risks of misunderstanding. We were essentially a commercial people, and commercial interests were largely represented in our Parliament. Much apprehension had been created by the prospect of impending changes in the Persian Customs Tariff, and I had, therefore, heard with the greatest satisfaction of the assurances which His Highness had been able to give to Sir A. Hardinge on the occasion of their recent meeting at Carlsbad. His Highness replied that he had much pleasure in reiterating these assurances. He wished us to understand that it was absolutely necessary for Persia to increase her revenues. The customs duties had, therefore, to be raised, and, in his belief, the burden was one which would fall upon the consumer rather than the producer. I replied that this theory was by no means accepted here, but that I would not press the point, as we did not contend that we had any right to complain of the Persian Government merely because it raised its tariff. All we asked was that the duties should operate evenly upon the countries affected, and should not in effect discriminate in favour of our competitors. The Grand Vizier observed that they would affect all countries alike. I replied that this was not quite the case, and I pointed out how easily it might come to pass that a tariff imposed upon all countries alike might in effect discriminate in favour of one country against another. I cited the case of cotton goods exported from this country to Persia, which, owing to their weight, would have to pay a much higher percentage *ad valorem* than those imported by Persia from Russia. I mentioned to His Highness the influential deputation from Manchester which had called my attention to this subject, and told him that, although I had dissuaded the Manchester merchants, pending the result of my discussion with him, from carrying on an agitation in support of their views, the question had attracted a good deal of attention in the newspapers and in Parliament. I promised to send the report published in the leading papers of my reception of the deputation. I went on to say that I did not desire to inflict upon His Highness a discussion as to the details of this

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somewhat technical question, but that I thought it must be important that we should have the fullest opportunity of explaining our case to the Persian Government, and showing, by means of expert evidence, the manner in which the revised tariff would affect our interests. His Highness replied that the Persian Government were fully disposed to consider our representations, and to do what was necessary to prevent the new scale of duties from affecting us injuriously as compared with other countries. He suggested that the matter was one which could best be discussed at Tehran. I asked whether I was to understand that such a discussion might take place before the new tariff was finally settled. His Highness replied in the affirmative."

4. On August 22nd, 1902, Lord Lansdowne addressed the following to the Atabeg-i-Azam :—

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO THE ATABEG-I-AZAM.

August 22, 1902.

Secret E., March 1903, Nos. 261-328, Proceeding No. 287.

"I have thought it might be convenient that I should put down on paper, so as not to forget them, some of the principal points in our conversation of yesterday :—

1. As regards the tariff, you were good enough to repeat that you would not definitely conclude it without first enabling His Majesty's Government to call your attention to any provisions which might be calculated to inflict special injury upon British trade. With this object you would afford us, unofficially, the means of forming a judgment on this question. You assured me also that it was the intention of the Persian Government that the tariff should fall equally upon all countries trading with Persia."

The reply of the Grand Vizier, however, in which he points out that, owing to their conversation having been conducted through the medium of an interpreter, His Lordship's version of what passed was not quite precise, does not endorse the interpretation which Lord Lansdowne had put upon his language, and while engaging to give us the means of forming a judgment about the equal incidence of the tariff upon all countries trading with Persia, does not promise to enable the British Government to call attention to any provisions calculated to inflict special injury upon British trade.

Secret E., March 1903, Nos. 261-328, Proceeding No. 293.

"En ce qui concerne le Tarif j'ai répété et je confirme encore qu'avant la mise en vigueur des nouvelles dispositions projetées je mettrai le Représentant de sa Majesté Britannique à Téhéran à même de se convaincre que le nouveau régime maintiendra entièrement l'egalité de traitement, qui a toujours existé et qui doit continuer à exister entre les importations de provenance Britannique et celles de provenance Russe. Les provenances Britanniques jouiront en Perse, comme auparavant, du traitement de la nation la plus favorisée, et j'ajouterai que, même les importations effectuées par les sujets Persans, seront soumises aux mêmes droits d'entrée que celles effectuées par les sujets Anglais."

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Secret E., March 1903, Nos. 261-328, Proceeding No. 286.

At an interview with the Shah three days later Lord Lansdowne expressed to His Imperial Majesty his satisfaction at the assurance which had been given him on 18th August 1902 by the Atabeg-i-Azam, that before the revised duties were finally approved the British Government would be given a full opportunity of discussing with the Persian Government the manner in which the new tariff would affect our commerce.

Secret E., March 1903, Nos. 261-328, Proceeding No. 286.

(Marquis of Lansdowne to Mr. des Graz, No. 77, dated August 21st, 1902.)

The assurance given by the Grand Vizier was practically repeated by the Shah on August 25th, 1902, just before His Majesty left England.

Ibid, Proceeding No. 288.

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO MR. DES GRAZ.

Foreign Office, August 25, 1902.

(No. 78-A.)

"During the journey to Dover to-day, the Shah desired me to enter his carriage, and spoke to me for some time upon various subjects. The Atabeg-i-Azam was present and occasionally intervened.

* * * * *

"His Majesty then spoke of the tariff and repeated his statement that his desire was that all nations should be treated alike, and that nothing was further from his intention than to take any action hostile to our interests. He hoped we would explain to his Government the objections, which we entertained to the new scale of duties. I said that an account in Persian of my discussion with the deputation of merchants which had addressed me on this subject had been prepared for the Atabeg, and I would see that Sir A. Hardinge was fully supplied with information on all the necessary points. His Majesty expressed a hope that we would lose no time in putting the case before his Government. I inferred that he contemplated a settlement of the question soon after his return to Tehran. I again laid stress upon the importance of not coming to any settlement before we had an opportunity of stating our case."

No opportunity was ever given to the British Government to suggest modifications in the new tariff, which was brought into operation on February 14th, 1903.

5. On 5th May 1903 the Marquis of Lansdowne in a speech in the House of Lords, thus referred to the unsatisfactory position of Great Britain and the necessity for making arrangements of our own to ensure British interests being specially considered whenever Persia again attempts to touch her tariff :—

"The whole question of our commercial relations with Persia is at this moment engaging our most attentive consideration, and particularly that question of the customs tariff upon which the noble lord laid so much stress. The customs tariff

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was, as your lordships will recollect, lately revised; and I think the noble lord is justified in saying that that revision was not to the interest of British commerce. But I am inclined to think that the apprehensions which were felt on this point were somewhat exaggerated. I was relieved when I read the other day an account of the annual meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce, at which a member of Parliament, Mr. Emmott, made the following statement:—'The new tariff in regard to cotton goods had been carefully examined by Manchester merchants, who did not think it injured them. It was not preferential as regards Russia, and they did not believe the tariff would turn out to be any higher than previously.' That may be a sanguine estimate; but it shows, at any rate, that some of the alarm felt was greater than the circumstances justified. The particular commodity which is most seriously affected by the new tariff is tea, and your lordships probably know that there is a large trade in tea between India and Persia. But here, again, I find that the Persian tea duties, when examined, are not very much larger than those which are imposed on tea in this country; and, therefore, I am not sure that we can protest very loudly on that point. Where, I think, the noble lord has most right to complain upon this question is as to this point. As matters now stand, all we can demand at the hands of the Persian Government is most-favoured-nation treatment; and that, of course, we have got under the revised tariff. But we all know it is not very difficult so to adjust a tariff that, while it is in appearance equal in its operation with regard to all the powers concerned, it really in effect discriminates against some of them. And, therefore, I for one am not satisfied that this country should have to be content merely with most-favoured-nation treatment at the hands of Persia. That matter is the subject of negotiation at this moment; and I have every hope that we shall be able to bring about an arrangement under which, instead of accepting tariff arrangements made between Persia and other powers without reference to the effect of those arrangements upon us, we should be in a position to have arrangements of our own which will give us the right of insisting that whenever Persia again attempts to touch her tariff, British interests shall be specially considered."

The arrangements of our own thus alluded to took the form of a Commercial Convention with Persia, on lines similar to the Russo-Persian Convention which protects our trade against any further increase of duties without our consent. It was signed on February 9th, 1903, four days before the Russo-Persian tariff came into force, having been hurriedly put through by Sir A. Hardinge when in December 1902 he learnt that the Commercial Convention with Russia was concluded.

Secret F., January 1904, Nos. 6-19, and Secret E., August 1903, Nos. 280-321.

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(8) Acquisition by Russia of a Naval Station on the Persian Gulf.

In March 1899 the British Ambassador at Constantinople reported to London a rumour that Russia intended to take possession of Kishm at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, and enquiries* were made by the Secretary of State from the Viceroy as to British rights in Kishm and Bassadore. The result of the reference which was made to the Russian Government on the subject of the rumour is shown in the following:—

*Secret E., May 1899, Nos. 160-165, Proceeding No. 160.

Telegram, dated the 2nd May 1899.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE, LONDON, TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY.

Ibid, Proceeding No. 162.

"Please refer to your telegram dated the 18th March 1899. Mouravieff contradicts reports about Kesso, declaring that Russia does not intend to add to her burthen of outlying stations or ports."

SIR C. SCOTT TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

St. Petersburg, 18th April 1899.

No. 116 (Confidential).

Deposit E., June 1899, Proceeding No. 51.

In reply to your Lordship's despatch No. 87-Confidential of the 12th instant, I have the honour to report that there is no truth whatever in the statement contained in the "Servet" newspaper that the Russian Government had announced its intention of taking possession of the port Kesso at the entrance of the Persian Gulf.

Count Mouravieff, to whom in conversation I incidentally mentioned this report, said that I might safely contradict it in the most positive terms, as there was absolutely no intention on the part of the Russian Government to add to the burthen of their existing responsibilities by acquiring outlying ports or stations which would require naval defence in time of war.

That the same matter was brought to the notice of the Persian Government appears from the following:—

Telegram, dated the 13th May 1899.

SIR H. M. DURAND, TEHRAN, TO THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, SIMLA.

Secret E., May 1899, Nos. 160-165, Proceeding No. 165.

"Indian papers are discussing alleged secret treaty ceding port in Persian Gulf to Russia. Sadr Azam in interview with Colonel Picot two (days?) ago denied existence of any such treaty and said report of cession was absolutely unfounded."

2. Early in 1900 the Russian cruiser "Gilyak" visited the Persian Gulf, and the action of her commander in landing some surplus coal at Bunder Abbas gave rise to reports that negotiations were being pursued for the acquisition by Russia of a coaling station in the Gulf.

The following assurance on the subject was given to the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg by Count Mouravieff.

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SIR C. SCOTT TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.

No. 24.

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, 21st February 1900.

"Your telegram No. 16.

"I am positively assured by Count Mouravieff that Russian Government has not the slightest desire or int-ntion to acquire any coaling or other station at Bundar Abbas or elsewhere in the Persian Gulf, and that Commander of Russian gunboat sent there received the most positive instructions in this sense, and distinct orders not to entertain any such idea."

Secret E., June 1900, Nos. 113 214, Proceeding No. 160.

1902.

3. In his despatch* of 6th January 1902, in which the salient features of British policy towards Persia were recapitulated, Lord Lansdowne wrote as follows:—

*See pages 84-86.

"The Persian Government should therefore distinctly understand and bear in mind that Great Britain could not consent to the acquisition by Russia of a military or naval station in the Persian Gulf, for the reason that such a station must be regarded as a challenge to Great Britain and a menace to her Indian Empire.

"If the Persian Government were at any time to make such a concession to Russia, it would be necessary for His Majesty's Government to take in the Persian Gulf such measures as they might consider necessary for the protection of British interest: measures which, in view of their naval strength in those waters, would be attended with no serious difficulty."

The Shah's reply declared that his Government would never come to an understanding with any foreign power against Great Britain, and did not intend alienating any portion of Persian territory to a foreign power for a military station.

See page 18.

1903.

4. On 5th May 1903 the Marquis of Lansdowne in the House of Lords said:—

"The noble lord asked me for a statement of our policy with regard to the Persian Gulf. I think I can give him one in a few simple words. It seems to me that our policy should be directed, in the first place, to protect and promote British trade in those waters. In the next place, I do not think that he suggests, or that we should suggest, that those efforts should be directed towards the exclusion of the legitimate trade of other powers. (Hear, hear.) In the third place—I say it without hesitation—we should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal. (Cheers.) I say that in no minatory spirit, because, so far as I am aware, no proposals are on foot for the establishment of a foreign naval base in the Persian Gulf."

With reference to the above speech the following conversation† took place on 6th May 1903 between Lord Lansdowne and the Russian Ambassador, in which the latter said that Russia had no idea of

†Quoted *in extenso* page 89.

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acquiring a naval base in the Persian Gulf:—

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR C. SCOTT.

No. 112.

Foreign Office, 6th May 1903.

Secret E., July 1903, Nos. 286-287, Proceeding No. 287.

"The Russian Ambassador observed to me to-day that he had read with interest the statement which I had made in the House of Lords last night on the subject of British interests in Persia. He saw nothing in that statement to which exception could be taken. His Excellency said that I had not mentioned Russia, although I probably had Russia in my mind: that power, however, had no idea of establishing a naval base in the Persian Gulf.

"I replied that I was under the impression that my speech did not contain much that was new, and that I had merely reaffirmed propositions which had on previous occasions been made or implied on behalf of the British Government. I had certainly never heard that Russia or any other power contemplated the acquisition of a naval base in the Gulf, but, as His Excellency was aware, there were many people who could not be persuaded that she had not such designs."

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. C-1 F. D.—18-5-04—2.—K. P. M.

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

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

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

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