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'Report on the Persian Army'

Holding Institution	British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers
Reference	Mss Eur F111/373
Date(s)	1900 (CE, Gregorian)
Written in	English in Latin
Extent and Format	1 volume (83 folios)
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
Report on the Persian Army by Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Philip Picot, Military Attaché and Oriental Secretary, British Legation, Tehran, Persia.

The report is divided into two parts. Part 1 consists of an introductory note, list of works consulted, chapters on general information about Persia and the history of the Persian Army (written by General Albert Houtum-Schindler), and an appendix on military pay, ranks, titles, and decorations. Part 2 consists of eleven chapters on recruitment, infantry, irregular cavalry, regular cavalry (the Cossack Brigade), artillery, miscellaneous irregular bodies, departments of the army, military schools, uniforms and equipment of men, uniform of officers, and decorations, medals, and orders.


The report has a preface written by the author in January 1900 (folio 3).

At the back of the volume is a map of Persia, Afghanistan, and Beluchistan [Baluchistan] (folio 84).

'Report on the Persian Army' [front] (1/170)



'Report on the Persian Army' [front-i] (2/170)



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REPORT

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
PERSIAN ARMY.

BY

LIEUT.-COLONEL H. P. PICOT,

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'Report on the Persian Army' [2v] (4/170)



③

PREFACE.

THIS report is divided into two parts—Part I, Chapter I treating of the political and administrative organisation, and general statistics of Persia, Chapter II, dealing with the history of the Persian army from the beginning of the seventeenth century to the present day; Part II, describing the military organisation of the Persian army in the year 1899.

Part I, Chapters I and II, were written at my special request by General Houtum-Schindler, to whom I am deeply indebted for his co-operation in this branch of the report. Chapter I will be of special moment to those acquainted with modern Persia. They will find much of interest in a perusal of the paragraphs devoted to the Administration, Judiciary, Organisation, Clergy, and Instruction.

Chapter II gives a very able and exhaustive account of the Persian army in the past, and of the reasons which have invariably checked its continuous progress. These reasons still prevail at the present day, and they will in all probability continue to form an insuperable impediment to reform, as long as the civil administration of the country is under the exclusive control of Persian officials.

General Houtum-Schindler in his introductory note is careful to remark that the many favourable and unfavourable opinions of the Persian army, natural characteristics, etc., noted in Part I, Chapter II, are not his, but always those of the writers quoted. The same remark applies with equal force to Part II, in the writing of which General Schindler had no part, and for which I am alone responsible.

H. PICOT, LIEUT.-COLONEL,


*Military Attaché, H.B.M.'s
Legation, Persia.*

TEHERAN, January 1900.

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'Report on the Persian Army' [3v] (6/170)



CONTENTS.

PART I.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTORY NOTE	1
LIST OF WORKS CONSULTED	1
CHAPTER I.—POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATION AND GENERAL STATISTICS OF PERSIA	4
Area and population	4
Government	4
Administrative divisions	5
Judiciary organisation	7
Clergy	8
Instruction	8
Weights, measures, money, and calendar	9
Revenues and finance.....	11
Communications	12
CHAPTER II.—HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN ARMY....	14
APPENDIX.—MILITARY PAYS, RANKS, TITLES, AND DECORATIONS	88

PART II.

MILITARY ORGANISATION OF THE PERSIAN ARMY IN 1899.

CHAPTER I.—RECRUITMENT	95
Feudal system	95
Partial military conscription early part of century	96
Present-day system of recruitment for infantry and artillery	96
Khanewaréh, or home allowance	98
Pedaraneh, or paternal allowance	98
System of recruitment for irregular cavalry	98
Term of service	98
Recruitment of officers	98
CHAPTER II.—INFANTRY	100
Official list, estimates of nominal, effective, and strength under arms	100
Strength under arms, nominal and approximate	106
Composition of a battalion	107
Training	108
Foreign officers	109
Pay of officers and men under arms	109
Pay of officers and men not under arms	111
Arms	111
Ammunition	112
Quality of troops	112
Power of mobilisation of the Persian army	113
Barracks	113

'Report on the Persian Army' [4v] (8/170)

vi

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
CHAPTER III.—IRREGULAR CAVALRY	114
Official list, nominal strength, effective or actual approximate strength	114
Distribution by squadrons	118
Remarks on strength of cavalry	118
Remarks on fighting material, Northern and N.W. Persia	118
Fighting material, Southern and Western Persia	119
Training and organisation	120
Shah's body-guard	120
Arms	120
Pay not on service, pay on service	121
Uniforms	122
Notes on certain branches of irregular cavalry, &c.	122
CHAPTER IV.—REGULAR CAVALRY. THE COSSACK BRIGADE	124
Foundation of the brigade	124
Nominal strength	124
Distribution	124
Constitution, cavalry, artillery, infantry	125
Pensioners	126
Arms	126
Armament	126
Training	127
Uniform	127
Pay	127
Barracks	128
Employment of Russian officers and Russian Sous-officers	128
Appointment of Persian officers	128
Recruitment	128
Military qualifications and status of brigade	128
CHAPTER V.—ARTILLERY	130
Official list, nominal strength, effective or actual approximate strength	130
Distribution by taifas or tribes	131
Distribution under arms, nominal and approximate	132
Recruitment	132
Composition of a battery of field artillery	132
Composition of a mountain battery	133
Horsing of the artillery	133
Armament, list of modern guns and their distribution, Krupp and other modern guns, obsolete weapons	134
Ammunition	135
Pay of officers and men under arms, pay of officers and men when not under arms	135
Administration	136
General remarks on instruction and value of artillery	136
European officers	136
CHAPTER VI.—MISCELLANEOUS IRREGULAR BODIES	138
Camel corps or Zamburakchi	138
Local police or militia	138
CHAPTER VII.—DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY	139
War	139
Pay	140
Arsenal and cartridge factory, magazine	141
Clothing	143
Artillery	144
Commissariat and transport	145
Medical	145


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CONTENTS.

vii

	PAGE
CHAPTER VIII.—MILITARY SCHOOLS	147
The military college Darul Fanoun	147
Budget	147
Students and curriculum	147
Present condition of college	148
Foreign instructors	148
The Nasiri College, foundation and general notes	148
CHAPTER IX.—UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT OF MEN	150
Distinctive colours of different branches	150
Articles of uniform of different branches	150
Uniform of infantry	150
Equipment of infantry	151
Uniform of artillery	151
Equipment of artillery	151
Uniform of cavalry	151
Equipment of cavalry	152
Issues of clothing to infantry and artillery	152
Issues to irregular cavalry	152
General remarks on the clothing of the army	152
CHAPTER X.—UNIFORM OF OFFICERS	154
Regulation dress	154
Distinctive marks of rank	154
Articles of uniform and equipment of the infantry officer	155
Articles of uniform and equipment of the artillery officer	155
Description of the various articles of dress and equipment	155
Orders of dress of junior officers, orders of dress of senior officers	156
Uniform of irregular cavalry	156
General note	156
CHAPTER XI.—DECORATIONS, MEDALS AND ORDERS	156

'Report on the Persian Army' [5v] (10/170)



6

PART I.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

TEHERAN, *November 15, 1899.*

FOR the two chapters which I have written as an introduction to Colonel Picot's report on the Persian army, I am much indebted to "Persia and the Persian Question" (London, 1892), by the Hon. George N. Curzon, M.P. (Lord Curzon of Kedleston, now Viceroy of India), and the second chapter is simply an extension of pages 571 to 589 of the first volume of that work, which is my text-book for all things Persian. I have retained Lord Curzon's actual words, convinced that it was impossible to improve upon them, and I hope that I shall be forgiven for having copied whole pages of his work.

The many favourable and unfavourable opinions of the Persian army, national character, etc., in the second chapter are not mine, but always those of the writers I have quoted.

In many instances I have entered into matters which at first sight may not seem to have any connection with military questions, but they were necessary for explaining political events which led to military reforms or disaster.

I have also here and there added short biographical notices of some persons who are mentioned in the text and have helped to make the Persian army, and it is much to be regretted that the material for compiling such notices is so scanty, and that of many brave soldiers, who faithfully served Persia and sacrificed their lives in her service, there is no record whatever.

With the view of collecting as many facts as possible, I have gone through a great number of books on Persia, and have extracted useful notes from many. My personal notes have also been useful.

The works laid under contribution are enumerated in the following list :—

1. "Voyages en Turquie, en Perse, etc." Paris, 1729.
Supposed to be by Père Villotte, who travelled in Persia 1688-1709.
2. Du Cerceau, "History of the Revolution of Persia."
Dublin, 1729.
3. J. Fraser, "History of Nadir Shah." London, 1742.

'Report on the Persian Army' [6v] (12/170)

2

4. "Histoire de Thamas Kouli Khan." Paris, 1742.
5. W. Jones, "History of the Life of Nadir Shah." London, 1773.
6. Ferrières-Sauveboeuf (Comte de), "Mémoires historiques." Paris, 1790.
7. Forster (George), "A Journey from Bengal to England." London, 1798.
8. Olivier (Dr. G. A.), "Voyage dans l'Empire Othoman, en Perse, etc." Paris, 1801-7.
9. Scott-Waring, "A Tour to Shiraz." London, 1807.
10. Gardane (Ange de), "Journal d'un Voyage." Paris, 1809.
11. Morier (James), "A Journey through Persia." London, 1812.
12. Malcolm (Sir John), "History of Persia." London, 1815.
13. Tancoigne, "Lettres sur la Perse." Paris, 1816.
14. Treygang (W. von), "Briefe." Hamburg, 1817.
15. Morier (James), "A Second Journey through Persia." London, 1818.
16. Johnson (Lieut.-Col.), "A Journey from India to England." London, 1818.
17. Kotzebue (Moritz von), "Reise nach Persien." Weimar, 1819.
18. Jaubert (Amédée), "Voyage en Arménie et en Perse." Paris, 1821.
19. Drouville (Gaspard), "Voyage en Perse." Paris, 1825.
20. Fraser (Dr. J. B.), "Narrative of a Journey in Khorasan." London, 1825.
21. R. C. M. (Money), "Journal of a Tour in Persia." London, 1828.
22. Stocqueler (J. H.), "Fifteen Months' Pilgrimage." London, 1832.
23. Eichwald (Dr. E.), "Reise auf dem Caspischen Meere und in dem Caucasus." Stuttgart, 1834.
24. Mignan (Capt. R.), "Journal of a Tour." London, 1834.
25. Keppel (Hon. G.), "Narrative of a Journey." London, 1834.
26. Fraser (Dr. J. B.), "A Winter's Journey." London, 1838.
27. Conolly (Arthur), "Journey to the North of India." London, 1838.
28. Fowler (George), "Three Years in Persia." London, 1841-2.
29. Blaramberg (Lieut.-Col.), "Statistical Review of Persia, in Volume VIII of the Journal of the Petersburg Geographical Society." St. Petersburg, 1841.
30. Sheil (Lady), "Glimpses of the Life and Manners in Persia." London, 1850.

'Report on the Persian Army' [7r] (13/170)

7

3

31. Flandin (Eugène), "Voyage en Perse." Paris, 1851.
32. Wagner (Moritz), "Reise nach Persien." Leipzig, 1852.
33. Colombari (Col.), "Les Zemboureks; Spectateur Militaire." Paris, 1853.
34. Stuart (Lieut.-Col.), "Journal of a Residence in the North of Persia." London, 1854.
35. Ferrier (J. P.), "Caravan Journeys." London, 1856.
36. Binning (R. B. M.), "Journal of Two Years' Travel." London, 1857.
37. Wolff (Rev. Dr. Joseph), "Travels and Adventures." London, 1861.
38. Duhousset (E.), "Études sur les Populations de la Perse." Paris, 1863.
39. Polak (Dr.), "Persien, das Land und seine Bewohner." Leipzig, 1865.
40. Gardane (Alfred de), "Mission du Général Gardane." Paris, 1865.
41. Watson (Robert Grant), "A History of Persia." London, 1866.
42. Vambéry (A.), "Wanderungen und Erlebnisse in Persien." Pesth, 1867.
43. Mitford (E. L.), "A Land March . . . Forty Years ago." London, 1884.
44. "International Revue." Vienna, Vol. V, 1885.
45. Jehangir Mirza, "Tarikh i No." Persian Manuscript.
46. Itemad es-Saltaneh, "Persian Annals," 1800-1890.

CHAPTER I.

POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATION AND GENERAL STATISTICS OF PERSIA.

(a.) Area and Population.

ACCORDING to the most trustworthy estimates the country contains an area of 628,000 square miles. A vast portion of this area, estimated by some at four-fifths of the whole, is desert and steppe, and the population is so scanty as not to exceed, on an average, fourteen inhabitants per square mile. The population is estimated at about nine millions, which may, roughly, be divided into :—

Urban	2,500,000
Rural	4,300,000
Nomads	2,200,000
	9,000,000

Of the nomads about 850,000 are *Turks*, 800,000 *Kurds* and *Leks*, 300,000 *Arabs*, 230,000 *Lurs*, and 20,000 *Baluchis* and *Gypsies*.

Dividing the population according to religious beliefs there would be about 8,000,000 *Shi'ahs*, 890,000 *Sunnis*, 76,000 *Christians*, 35,000 *Jews*, and 9,000 *Zoroastrians* or *Gebrs*.

(b.) Government.

The form of government in Persia is an absolute monarchy, in its most important features similar to that of the Ottoman Empire, the monarch, however, not being the religious head of the community. The power of the monarch is absolute, but only in so far as it is not opposed to the accepted doctrines of the Muhammadan religion as laid down in the Koran, the sacred book of the Prophet, his oral commentaries and sayings, and the interpretation of the same by his successors and the high priesthood.

The religious laws form a great restraint upon the sovereign powers, while regard for established usage and political expediency, and in recent times foreign opinion, act as other practical restraints.

The monarch has the title of *Shah* (king), or *Shahân-Shah** (king of kings), and the reigning Shah (since 1st May, 1896) is Muzaffar-ed-din, the fifth of the Kajar dynasty.

The Shah is assisted in the task of government by a cabinet of ministers with portfolios, the various departments being

* This is now generally written *Shahin-Shah*.

distinguished and named on European lines, though an accumulation of several offices with not the slightest connection between their functions in the hands of a single person is not unusual, and a grand council (*Dar ush-Shora i Kubra*) composed of the ministers with portfolios and a number of other persons nominated by himself.

The Grand Council, sometimes called Senate, and originally instituted on the lines of the Imperial Council in Russia, has not been convoked for many years. The cabinet is presided by the Grand Vizir (*Sadr Azam*), who, however, is not exclusively its president in the sense accepted in Europe, but is more a representative of the sovereign, taking in this capacity a direct action in all administrative affairs, and lessening thereby the responsibility of the ministers.

At present there are the following ministries (*Vizarât*) :--

1. Foreign Affairs, *Umûr i Khâraje*h.
2. War, *Jang*.
3. Finance, *Malieh va istifa*.
4. Interior, *Dakheleh*.
5. Treasury, *Khazâne*h.
6. Court, *Darbar*.
7. Justice, *Adlieh*.
8. Commerce, *Tajârat*.
9. Sciences, *Ulm*.
10. Customs, *Gumrukat*.
11. Telegraphs.
12. Posts.
13. Agriculture, *Falâhat*.
14. Crown Domains, *Khalissajat*.
15. Public Works, *Favayid*.
16. Religious Endowments and Pensions, *Okaf va vazâyif*.
17. Press, *Intabaat*.
18. Crown Buildings, *Banâ i doleti*.
19. Ceremonies, *Tashrifat*.
20. Army Accounts, *Lashkar*.
21. Arsenals, *Kur Khaneh*.
22. Shah's Cabinet, *Khelvet*.
23. Mines and Industry, *M'a âdan va Sanâye*h.
24. Mint, *Zarrah Khaneh*.

Of the twenty-four departments, some, like Nos. 4, 5, and 10, are in the hands of the Grand Vizir, others exist only in name, arsenals and army accounts are subordinate to the Minister of War, some ministers are rarely consulted, and, finally, there remain only five or six ministers who can be said to occupy themselves with affairs of State.

(c.) *Administrative Divisions.*

For administrative purposes Persia is divided into a number of provinces or governments, which are governed by governors, who are directly responsible to the Central Government, and can nominate lieutenant-governors or deputies to govern the

'Report on the Persian Army' [8v] (16/170)

districts comprised in their governments. The number of governments frequently changes, as several provinces are joined into one, under one governor.

The provinces are called *Valâyat* or *Ayâlat*, and are subdivided into districts and sub-districts, called *Mahâl*, *Bulâk*, *Nahiyeh*, etc., which, again, are subdivided into parishes and villages.

Some of the governments are very small and do not bear subdivision into districts, while others are very large and comprise several provinces.

Governors have the title of *Vâli*, *Firman Firma*, *Hâkîm*, *Zâbit*; deputy governors are known as *Naïb el Hukumah*.

Every town has a mayor or chief magistrate, called *Beglerbeggi*, *Kalântar* or *Darogha*, and every parish (*Mahalla*) of a town and every village has a chief called *Kedkhoda*. These officers, who are responsible for the collection of the revenues and the orderly state of their towns, parishes, and villages, are sometimes appointed by the Crown, sometimes by the governors, but generally elected by the citizens. In the larger provinces the governors have attached to them a man of experience to whom are entrusted the accounts and details of the government. This person is often nominated by the Shah, and his functions in the provincial government may be said to be similar to those of the *Sadr Azam* in the Central Government. He is called *Vazir*, or *Pishkar*, and has very extended administrative powers, including, at times, the military command of the province.

For the collection of revenues in towns and villages, the chiefs are often assisted by a *pâkâr*, who is a man of experience elected by the citizens. The *Vazirs*, *pishkars*, and *pâkars* of provinces, towns, and villages derive their incomes from certain charges paid by the citizens according to old-established usage in excess of the assessed revenues, and from payments in cash and kind extorted from the rayots.

In each province there are also a number of Government officials representing various departments, notably the accountants of the Revenue Department, called *Mustaufi*, *Sar-rishtehdar*, *Daftardar*) and those of the Military Department (*Lashkarnavis*), etc., all in direct communication with the Central Government.

According to the last published Year-Book (for the year 1899-1900) the administrative divisions of Persia are as follows:—

1. Azarbaijân.
2. Isfahân.
3. Yezd.
4. Gulpaigan and Khonsâr.
5. Mahallât.
6. Fars.
7. Banâdar (Persian Gulf ports).
8. Khorasân and Sistân.
9. Kermânschâhân.

'Report on the Persian Army' [9r] (17/170)

7

10. Kurdistân.
11. Gerrûs.
12. Kermân and Balûchistan.
13. Astrâbâd and Gurgân.
14. Shâhrûd and Bôstâm.
15. Semnân and Damghân.
16. Mâzandarân.
17. Gilan and Tâlish.
18. Arabistân. } Under one governor.
19. Bakhtiâri. }
20. Luristân. }
21. Burûjird. } Under one governor.
22. Kamarah. }
23. Irâk.
24. Kazvin.
25. Malâyar. }
26. Tûsirkân. } Under one governor.
27. Nahâvand. }
28. Hamadân.
29. Kâshân.
30. Kom.
31. Khamsah.
32. Savah. }
33. Zarand. } Under one Governor.
34. Shâh Sevin i Baghdadi. }
35. Kharakân.
36. Firûzkûh.
37. Teherân.
38. Assadâbâd.
39. Natanz, fief of the sons of the late Hissam es Saltaneh.
40. Kangâvar.
41. Khâr.
42. Joshakân, fief of Muizz ed Dowleh.
43. Tâlakân, fief of sons of late Motamad ed Dowleh.
44. Târom.
45. Demavend.

(d.) *Judiciary Organisation.*

Justice is administered by the governors and their representatives, and by the clergy. The former administer justice according to the *Urf*, or common and customary law, perhaps equity, the latter according to the *Shar'*, the written or divine law.

There is also a kind of jurisdiction for commercial cases exercised by the Ministry of Commerce, sometimes assisted by a board composed of merchants; the tribunal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (*Muhâkamât i Vazârat i Khâraje*) at Teheran, as well as the agents (*Kârguzâr*) of that ministry in the provinces, looks after civil suits between foreign and Persian subjects.

'Report on the Persian Army' [9v] (18/170)

8

(e.) *Clergy.*

The Persian clergy (*Ulema*) is still very powerful, and, being very conservative, generally against all progress and reform. All society is based exclusively on religious law, almost as it was in biblical times among the Jews, with this difference, however, that in Islam there exists no sacerdotal caste.

In Persia, practically any person capable of reading the Koran and interpreting its laws may act as a priest (*Mulla*) and as soon as such a priest becomes known for his just interpretation of the Divine law and for his superior knowledge of the traditions and articles of faith, he is called *Mujtahid*, literally meaning "one who strives hard"—to acquire knowledge—and is a chief priest. The *mullas* are referred to in questions concerning religious law, hold religious assemblies, preach in mosques, and are appointed by the Shah as judges, head preachers, etc. Thus the dignitaries, whose character seems to us specially a religious one, are, in reality, doctors, or expounders and interpreters of the law, and officiating ministers charged with the ordinary accomplishment of certain ceremonies which every other "true believer" has an equal right to fulfil.

Formerly there were only four or five *mujtahids* in Persia, now there are many, sometimes several in one town—in Teheran, for instance, there are ten—but there are only a few whose decisions are accepted as final and without appeal. The highest authority of all is the *mujtahid* who resides at Kerbela, or Najaf, near Baghdad, and some consider him the vice-regent of the Prophet and the representative of the *Imâm*.

The Shah and the Government have no voice whatever in the matter of appointing *mullas* or *mujtahids*, but the judges (*Shaikh ul Islam, Kâzi*), as well as the preachers at the great mosques, are appointed by Government. The chief priest of the principal mosque (*Masjid i Jâmoh*) is called *Imâm i Juma'*, and he appoints his subordinates. He or his representative reads the Friday oration (*Khutbeh*) and also preaches. The *Pishnamâz* leads the daily prayers, and the *Muazzin* is the crier for prayers. The reader of the *Koutbeh* is also called *Khatib*. The guardians (*Mutavalli*) of shrines are generally *mullas*, but frequently a high Government official is appointed guardian of a shrine as a reward for past services rendered to the State.

(f.) *Instruction.*

There are many colleges (*Madrasseh*), generally attached to mosques and supported by endowments, in which students are instructed gratuitously in religion, Persian and Arabic literature, and a certain amount of scientific knowledge. The teachers (*mudarris*) are members of the clergy and receive their emoluments out of the endowed funds. There are also many schools (*maktab*) for children, where reading—often only sufficient for reading the Koran—and writing are taught. None of these colleges and schools is under the supervision of

the Minister for Sciences (*Vazir i ulûm*) or, as he was intended to be, Minister for Public Instruction, and consequently many teachers are inefficient and, sometimes, practically illiterate, the children in the schools are improperly treated, and the school-rooms are unsanitary. A scheme is at present on foot for making this ministry responsible for the efficiency of the teachers, the sanitary arrangements of the rooms, etc.

A public school, on the principle of a polytechnic school, with the object of educating officers for the army and of introducing the knowledge of Western languages and sciences, was opened at Teheran in 1850. It is called *Madrasseh Dar el Funûn*, and the Government now expends about £5,000 per annum on it. Efficient European officers have been teaching at this college since its beginning (two Prussian officers since 1881), but owing to the persistent opposition on the part of the military authorities only a small number of their pupils has found any employ in the army.

A military college, called *Madrasseh Nizâmiyeh*, was opened in Teheran about twenty-four years ago at the instigation of the late Mirza Husain Khan, Mushired Dowleh, then Commander-in-Chief of the army, and Minister for War, but it ceased to exist after a short period. In 1885 another military college, this time called *Madrasseh i Nâssiriyyeh*, was established by H.I.H. Naib es Saltaneh, and it still exists, but with its very small grant—only 3,000 *Tomans* per annum—not much can be done; efficient teachers could not be paid for, and its result to the army has been, and is, nil.

A similar institution, but on a still smaller scale, exists in Tabriz, and is under the direction of the Minister for Sciences, who also directs the *Dâr el funûn*, but not the *Nâssiriyyeh*.

In connection with a scheme for the reorganisation of the army I recommended certain reforms for the colleges in 1897 and submitted them to the Government, but for reasons which are well known nothing has so far been done.

(g.) *Weights and Measures, Money and Calendar.*

The unit of weight is the *Miskal*—71 grains; 16 miskals make 1 *sîr*, 5 *sîrs* 1 *abassi*. Provisions are bought and sold by the weight called a *mann*, and there are various *manns* in use. In the accounts of the Central Government the so-called *Tabriz mann*—which is not used in Tabriz—of 8 *abassis* or 640 *miskals*, and its double, the *Shâh-mann*, are only employed. The *Tabriz-mann* is equal to 6·49 pounds avoirdupois, the *Shâh-mann* to 12·98 pounds; 100 *manns* are 1 *Kharvâr*; a *Kharvâr* of *Tabriz-manns* is, therefore, equal to 649 pounds, one of *Shâh-manns* to 1,298 pounds.

Taxes, which have to be paid in kind, are collected according to the weight locally in use; for instance, a *Kharvâr* at Shiraz equals 730 pounds (the *Shiraz-mann* equals 720 *miskals*, or 7·3 pounds), and at Tabriz, where the *Mann-i-Kohne*, i.e., "old mann," of 1,000 *miskals* or 10·14 pounds, is in use, a *Kharvâr* equals 1,014 pounds. Liquids are weighed.

[619]

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The unit of measure is the *zar*, and of this standard there are also several, but the most common is the so-called Tabriz one, *which is not used at Tabriz*, and equals 40.95 inches. The *farsakh* equals 6,000 of these *zars*, thus 3.87 statute miles.

The measure of surface is the *jirib*, varying from 1,000 to 1,066 square *zars*, or 1,294 to 1,379 square yards.

The monetary unit is the *Kran*, a silver coin with a fineness of 900 and weighing one *miskal* or 71 grains. The value of the *Kran* depends on the price of silver on the London market, and on the demand and supply of bills. At present (March, 1898), the value of a *Kran* is about $4\frac{3}{4}d.$, a bill for one pound sterling on London being worth 52 *Krans*. A sum of 10 *Krans* silver is called a *Toman*, and in accounts a *Toman* is always 10 *Krans*.

Gold coins, called *Ashrafi*, of different denominations are issued, but are not in circulation. The most usual gold coin is one weighing $7\frac{1}{2}$ *miskal* (41.4 grains), with fineness of 900, and commonly known as a gold *Toman*. The value of a gold coin depends on the price of silver or the exchange value of the *Kran*, and the gold *Toman* is now worth 17 *Krans*.

The calendar in use in Persia is the lunar, known as the *Hijriyeh*, because its era began with the flight—*Hijreh*—of the prophet Muhammad from Mekka to Madina on July 16th, A.D. 622. It has years of 354 and 355 days divided into twelve months of 29 to 30 days. We are now in the year 1315 of the *Hijreh*, which will end on May 21st, 1898. In Government accounts and documents a solar calendar is always used together with the lunar. This calendar has years beginning on the vernal equinox, the 21st of March, and of 365 to 366 days each, and is known as the *Uighûr*, or Mongolian Calendar. The years run in cycles of twelve, each of the twelve years being distinguished by the name of an animal. The present year, 21st March, 1899, to 20th March, 1900, is the "year of the hog," and Government documents written during it are dated "year of the hog," with the addition of the *Hijreh* date. Thus, if written in the last month of the present *Hijriyeh* year, the date would be expressed: "Year of the hog, month of Zilhijjat of the *Hijreh* year 1316." The names of the animals distinguishing the years of the cycle are in Turkish and as follows:—

<i>Sijkân</i>	..	..	..	mouse
<i>Uâ</i>	..	..	..	cow
<i>pârs</i>	..	..	..	tiger
<i>tushkân</i>	..	..	..	hare
<i>hû</i>	..	..	..	crocodile
<i>îlân</i>	..	..	..	serpent
<i>yânt</i>	..	..	..	horse
<i>Kûz</i>	..	..	..	sheep
<i>pîchî</i>	..	..	..	monkey
<i>takhakûi</i>	..	..	..	hen
<i>ît</i>	..	..	..	dog
<i>tungûc</i>	..	..	..	hog

The word *il*, meaning year, is suffixed to the name, thus the present year is *tungáz il* (year of the hog).

(h.) *Revenues and Finance.*

The fixed revenues of Persia, comprising direct and indirect contributions at rates which vary according to localities, peoples, and occupations, are derived from

1. Regular taxation (*máliât*), composed of taxes on land, animals, flocks, herds, shopkeepers, artisans and trade.
2. Revenues on Crown-lands (*Khallissajât*).
3. Customs (*gumrukât*).
4. Rents and leases of State monopolies.

The land tax is paid in money and in kind and is based upon the wealth-producing capacity of the soil, the taxation on animals, flocks, and herds exists either as a supplementary method of land taxation or as a contribution of a certain sum of money per animal, and the tax on shopkeepers, artisans, and trade sometimes takes the form of a poll-tax or capitation, at others that of an impost on the profits of trade.

The revenue from Crown-lands consists of a certain proportion of the produce. The customs are composed of an *ad valorem* duty of 5 per cent. upon merchandise imported and exported by foreign subjects, and of a duty ranging from 2 to 8 per cent. on the value of merchandise imported and exported by Persian subjects. The customs are farmed out to the highest bidder, and the amount of the farm money for all the customs of Persia was 1,500,000 *Tomans* for the year 1897-98, and is estimated at 1,750,000 *Tomans* for the current year.

Three Belgian Custom-house officials were engaged in 1898 with the view of organising the Customs Department on European principles and abolishing the farm system, and Azerbaijan and Kermanshah are now worked without any farming.

The revenue from *rents and leases* of State monopolies is derived from the proceeds of various establishments, institutions, concessions, etc., leased out by the Government, as posts, telegraphs, mines, forests, fisheries, factories, banks, etc.

There is also a kind of irregular revenue derived from public requisitions (*sâdirât*), presents (*pîshkash*), fines, confiscations, etc.

The total revenues from all sources averages about 7,000,000 *Tomans* per annum. Until about three or four years ago the expenditure was considerably less than the receipts and every year a surplus went into the Shah's treasury, but since then the expenditure has been in excess of the income, and large amounts of money have had to be taken out of the treasury in order to cover the deficit to some extent, and keep the affairs of State going. In May, 1892, the Government concluded a contract for a loan of £500,000, the produce of which served for indemnifying the Tobacco Corporation, which

had obtained a monopoly for tobacco and had to cease work in consequence of opposition on the part of the inhabitants. This loan, the only public debt of Persia, is guaranteed by the customs receipts of the Persian Gulf ports, and is repayable in eighty half-yearly instalments, together with 6 per cent. interest. The private debts of the Government to various institutions and to Government servants, military and civil, amount to about 5,000,000 of *Tomans*—five-sevenths of the revenue of the year 1899-1900.

(i.) *Communications.*

1. *Railways.* A small railway, single line, 1-mètre gauge, from Teheran to Shâh-Abdul-Azim, $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles in length, was opened in July, 1888. Two small branches, $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles in length, connecting some limestone quarries with the main line, were opened in 1893. The line is worked by a Belgian Company.

2. *Roads.* The only roads in Persia on which any construction has been done are:—

Teheran to Kom, 91 miles;

Teheran to Resht, about 220 miles;

Meshed to Bajgirha, on the Russian frontier, about 140 miles.

All other roads are as nature has made them. The road from Teheran to Resht was opened to traffic in August of the present year and has been constructed by a Russian Company, whose capital is guaranteed by the Russian Government. A mule track is in process of construction between Shushter and Isfahan under the auspices of Messrs. Lynch Brothers, of London.

3. *Telegraphs.* Persia has a system of telegraphs consisting of about 4,800 miles of line with about 6,980 miles of wire and 95 stations.

(a.) 675 miles of line, with three wires on iron posts, between Bushire and Teheran are worked by a British staff and form the "Indo-European Telegraph Department in Persia," whose chief director resides in London.

(b.) 415 miles of line, with three wires on iron posts, between Teheran and Julfa, on the Russian frontier in the north-west of Persia, are worked by the "Indo-European Telegraph Company, Limited," London.

(c.) About 3,710 miles of single-wire line on wooden poles belong to the Persian Government and are worked by a native staff. The Teheran-Meshed line, however, is under the supervision of an inspector of the Indian Government Department and has a British signaller at Meshed. The Persian telegraphs are held in farm by the Minister of Telegraphs for 30,000 *Tomans* per annum.

4. *Posts.* Persia belongs to the "Union postale universelle" and has 84 post offices. The postal department is at present held in farm by the Minister of Posts for 55,000 *Tomans* per

'Report on the Persian Army' [12r] (23/170)

(12)

13

annum. (Until June, 1898, the farm money was only 1,800 *Tomans*, from June to October of that year it was 40,000 *Tomans* per annum, then for three or four months it was at the rate of 70,000 *Tomans*, and then until September of this year 38,000 *Tomans*. There was a change of minister at every decrease or increase of the farm money.)

CHAPTER II.

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN ARMY.

It was not until the dawn of the seventeenth century that the foundations of a standing army were laid in Persia, and here our history of the Persian army may begin.

It is a history of alternate splendour and disgrace, during which the Persian army, at its prime under Shah Abbas the Great, sank to its lowest ebb under Shah Sultan Husain, the last of the Safavieh Shahs, emerged for a short period under Nadir Shah with a recrudescence which is one of the most startling phenomena of history, again spent itself in internecine conflict, was again revived by the genius of the first Kajar sovereign, Agha Muhammad Khan, and then, in futile efforts to infuse stability into the mobile and dissolvent atoms of an oriental fabric, had recourse to foreign leading strings and commenced the series of successive and unsuccessful experiments with French, English, Spanish, Italian, Austrian, Danish, German, Bulgarian, and Russian officers, which is not the least quaint or characteristic among the features that mark the tentative Europeanisation of Persia.

It was to the brothers Sherley, Sir Anthony and Sir Robert, about A.D. 1600, that Persia owed her first practical initiation of the military science of Europe. Herbert, who wrote in 1627, says that the Persians "got the use of cannon from the vanquished Portugal" and "the musquets they have had onely since the Portugals assisted King Tahamas with some Christian auxiliaries against the Turk, so as now they are become good shots." ("Some Yeares Travels, etc.," 3rd edition, p. 298.)* But if already acquainted with gunpowder and the new weapons of war, it was from the adventurous English knights that they learnt how to make proper use of them. Upon their advice Shah Abbas laid the foundation of a regular army by incorporating a large force of infantry armed with muskets, and, as we read in the work of a contemporary writer ("Purchas' Pilgrims," Vol. II, p. 1806), "The mightie Ottoman, terror of all the Christian world, quaketh of a Sherley fever . . . the prevailing Persian has learned Sherleian arts of war and he, which before knew not the use of ordnance, hath now 500 pieces of brasse and 60,000 musketiers; so that they, which at hand with the sword were before dreadful to the Turks, now also in remoter blows and sulfurian arts are grown terrible." After Sir Anthony's departure on a mission to the European powers, his brother

* Other historians say that the Persians learnt the use of muskets from the Turks when they were driven out of Tabriz in 1603 by Shah Abbas I.

13

15

Robert was made "Master General against the Turks," and upon his return to Persia in 1612 he brought with him from England Captain Thomas Powel, of Hertford, who became colonel of 700 horse under the Persian. It is interesting to read of English officers holding positions of trust in the service of the Shah at this early date and to know that English counsels were responsible for the earliest modern reform in the military organisation of Persia. Nevertheless, through this and the succeeding century the Persian army retained for the most part its original and almost immemorial organisation as a loose collection of irregular cavalry contingents. Even under Shah Abbas, when the army was at its best, there prevailed the most complete ignorance of scientific warfare, and battles were little else than desultory cavalry engagements on a large scale. In the campaign against Ormuz, which the Persians waged in conjunction with the English in 1622 against the Portuguese, the English were amazed at the ignorance and backwardness of their allies, and Edward Monoxe, the agent of the East India Company at Ormuz, wrote, "The Persians are ignorant of the art of warre, for they entered without feare or wit, and lost with shame what they might have maintayned with honour. Other defects I observed in the very sinewes of warre, such that I cannot but wonder that one of the wonders of our age, Sha Abbas, should send over an Armie so weakly provided with money, armes, munition, ships and all necessary furniture." ("Purchas' Pilgrims," II, lib. X, cap. 9.) Pietro della Valle, who was in Persia at this time, speaks of the newly enrolled infantry as fusiliers who owed their origin to Sir Anthony Sherley, were recruited from the lower orders of the country, and received their pay quarterly from the Shah. He describes them as a very useful body, 20,000 strong, and adds that they were in the beginning on foot, but were afterwards mounted and armed with matchlocks and a fork to fire from. He estimated the total strength of the army of Shah Abbas at 97,000 cavalry, while Herbert states that the Shah could march 300,000 horse and 70,000 foot, but could seldom readily advance more than 50,000 men, "enough to find forage or provant in such barren country." Chardin, who was in Persia from 1665 to 1677, mentions that at the death of Shah Abbas the effective strength of the army was 120,000—royal troops 50,000, provincial troops 70,000. So rapid, however, was the decline in military strength and efficiency under the nerveless rule of the successors of Abbas the Great, that Chardin, who was present at a review held before Shah Abbas II in 1666, saw the same troops passing and repassing from ten to twelve times, and a Persian remarked to him, "We have a good army for reviews, but a bad one for war." How bad a one did not fully appear till the Afghan invasion about half a century later, when the flower of the Persian army, over 50,000 strong, allowed itself to be worsted in the great battle at Gulnabad, near Isfahan, on the 3rd of March, 1722, and Isfahan was

beleaguered and ultimately taken by about 22,000 Afghans, ill equipped and exhausted with long marching and fatigue. At the battle of Gulnabad, the Persian artillery, which consisted of 24 heavy pieces served by 2,000 artillerymen, was practically useless, while the Zambureks, small swivel guns worked from the backs of camels, which the Afghans had brought with them, and were unknown in Persia before then, did excellent service and caused dismay in the Persian ranks. ("Histoire de Perse," La Mamyé Clairac, Paris, 1750.)

Less than twenty years after this disaster we see the Persian Conqueror, Tahmasp Kuli Khan, better known as Nadir Shah, overrunning Persia and adjacent countries, upsetting kingdoms and empires, and presenting in the eighteenth century the phenomenon in Asia that Europe owed to Napoleon in the nineteenth century.

As soon as Nadir was master of the throne he destroyed with the assistance of his troops those very noblemen who had favoured his ambition and also seized the property of the clergy, the yearly revenues of which are said to have amounted to a million tomans, to distribute to his soldiers. (The toman was then worth £1 18s. 9d.) His army was principally composed of Indians, Uzbeks, Afghans, Turkomans, and others belonging to the Sunni faith, of which he himself was a member, and Persians he employed but little. All his genius was specially directed to the military administration. At that time, as it had been for ages before, the Persian soldiers were men taken haphazard from all classes and all parts of the Empire. They served in the army just as long as they pleased and only fought as long as they were well paid or had prospects of plunder. But Nadir, convinced that the advantages which the Europeans gained over the Turks were due to the discipline and order which they employed in war, instructed himself in the foreign methods as much as possible, began organising an artillery, and, in order to hasten the organisation, entrusted the direction and command of the new corps to European officers. Most of these officers were French. In the "Histoire de Thamas Kouli Khan" (Nadir Shah) we read that "Nadir did not depend only on help from Persia but also looked for help from foreigners; he attached to himself by his bounty a great number of Europeans, among them engineers and officers who instructed the army in the manner of fighting and the evolutions which the Christians observe."

He ordered that the army was henceforth to be permanent, and that any one leaving it without his permission should be punished with death. He united different tribes and made them fight in company so as to excite their emulation; he formed regiments of 2,000 men each under the command of a *Sarhang*, and divided each regiment into two battalions, commanded by a *Min-bashi*, or "Chief of a thousand," which were again divided into ten companies of a hundred men under a *Yuz-bashi*, "Chief of a hundred" or centurion, and every ten men were commanded by an *On-bashi*, "Chief of ten."

'Report on the Persian Army' [14r] (27/170)

17

The infantry was of two kinds, the *sarbaz*, infantry of the line, and the *tufangchi*, literally "gun-bearers," militia; the latter were armed with long matchlocks, which they fired from pronged rests, projecting from the under side of the barrel, and used with great effect. These antique matchlocks, some with a 4 bore and the muzzle opening out like a funnel, are still in use in some districts of Persia and are known as *Shamkhal*, the men using them being the *Shamkhalchi*.

Nadir Shah also established some rules for the cavalry, but as the cavalry was composed of men who were furnished on the feudal system by chiefs of tribes, he was not able to introduce in it so radical a change as an organisation similar to that of his infantry would have involved. However, the chiefs of tribal contingents were called *Sultan*, and every ten or twelve sultans were placed under the orders of a commander called *Sarkardah*. He also created superior commanding officers with the titles of *Besh-min-Sardar*, and *On-min-Sardar*, generals of 5,000 and 10,000 men. He drew up a law concerning subordination and discipline, camp-police, order of march, and system of foraging which greatly relieved the population and considerably economised resources.

Nadir Shah's infantry, however, does not seem to have played a very important part in his wars. The army still depended principally on the cavalry, and whenever the cavalry could not operate with advantage his resources were unequal to the situation, as shown by his unsuccessful sieges of Basrah and Baghdad, neither of which possessed fortifications of any strength. How completely the Persian army still retained its cavalry organisation is shown by the statement of Nadir's biographer, that out of the 160,000 persons, soldiers and camp-followers, who composed the invading army at Delhi in February, 1739, there was not a single individual on foot.

Hanway, who saw Nadir's army on the march, said that it consisted of 200,000 men, the cost of maintaining whom, officers included, was £25 per annum a head, so that the total military outlay was £5,000,000 annually. When Nadir Shah converted the bands of brigands, with whom he had plundered Khorasan, into an army, he introduced into it a subordination and discipline which, although not comparable to those of the European armies, gave it an enormous advantage over the troops which were opposed to him. He lost only one battle, that on the 19th July, 1733, which he imprudently offered to Topal Othman, when he was besieging Baghdad, and his defeat, and loss of 40,000 men, forced him to raise the siege, while if he had remained within his lines the place would no doubt have soon submitted and Topal Othman would have hastened to effect a retreat. It was on this occasion that Nadir showed his genius and courage and resources, for, promptly retired to Kurdistan, he assembled a new army of 80,000 men and 200 guns, returned to Baghdad hardly two months after his defeat, and on the 26th September, 1733, took a brilliant revenge on the Turkish troops by utterly destroying

them, and besides massacring 12,000 Arabs who had gone over to the Turks on the 19th July. In the following year on the 12th June, at Erivan, he again signally defeated the Turks and caused them a loss of 50,000 men, his own death-roll being 8,000. Nadir Shah's organisation, however, had not had time to take proper root, and immediately after his assassination in 1747 his troops dispersed in bands all over the country, robbing and plundering wherever they went and offering their services to the various competitors for the throne who now appeared. Under these competitors and even under the Zends, who were ousted by the Kajars, the military condition of Persia was not ameliorated; discipline degenerated more and more; battles were merely engagements between bodies of irregular cavalry in which rarely more than a hundred men were killed. Of the army under the Zends we obtain some information from the works of George Forster and Comte Ferrières Sauvebœuf. The former, who wrote in 1783, says:—

"The Afghan army is to-day much superior to that of the Persians; these latter, deprived for a long time of a regular government, and submitted one time to a foreign yoke, and at another to the uncertain and temporary authority of some miserable party chief, have lost their patriotism and all spirit of enterprise. They know very little of firearms, and the successes which they have obtained were principally due to the impetuosity of their cavalry. The matchlock is the ordinary arm of the Persian infantry, with the exception of some troops of Azerbaijan, Shirvan, and Daghistan, where they took the use of flintlocks from the Turks, but the little esteem which they have for this arm will, no doubt, prevent its being adopted for a long time."

Ferrières Sauvebœuf, who wrote a year or two later and was a French officer, says:—

"The Persians have not reduced the custom which they have of destroying themselves into an art. They camp irregularly, without, however, pitching their tents too far away from each other. They absolutely ignore the means of fortifying their towns, considering that a simple wall constructed of sun-dried bricks and flanked by mud towers form a sufficient protection. The artillery, which they do not know how to use, is more an object of show with them than one of destruction. Their sieges are merely blockades, but they observe a certain order on the march and in combat. The infantry forms in large bodies, and although not in lines, always keeps close to its colours; the cavalry with the commander at the head forms up behind, and thus I saw Ali Murad Khan Zend march his 60,000 men against Agha Muhammad Khan Kajar. In front, on an elephant, were carried two enormous gongs and several trumpets for directing the march of the army. There were also many camels carrying small $\frac{1}{2}$ -pounder cannon, which were discharged when the animal was on its knees. The cavalry is excellent, and its horses are accustomed to climb hills, well support the cold, and can even in winter with deep snow on the ground make long marches. The infantry bears great fatigue. The frugality of the Persians makes the provision of supplies an easy task; bread, a little cheese, and perhaps some dried fruit or a little rice and less meat, composing their food. They have very little baggage, carried on mules, and one never sees any useless article in their camps."

Taking into consideration the ever-growing degeneration of discipline and the total want of military knowledge and inclinations shown by the rulers of Persia, it may be said that if the war with Russia at the beginning of this century had not

broken out the Persians would have completely lost all military knowledge, and perhaps been subjugated by their neighbours. It is true that the military spirit, which the genius of Nadir Shah had to some extent revived, was in part kept alive by the first Kajar monarch, Agha Muhammad Khan, who, "although neither an intrepid warrior nor a clever general" (Dr. Olivier), once more raised the prestige of the Persian arms, conquered all the rebellious provinces of Persia, captured Tiflis, etc.; but his successor, his nephew Khan Baba Khan, who afterwards took the name of Fath Ali Shah, had no military inclinations whatever, and the army was completely neglected until the military interest was shifted from Teheran to Tabriz, from the sovereign to the heir-apparent, Abbas Mirza, who in preparing for a war with Russia laid the foundations of the army as it at present exists. From the work of Dr. Olivier, who was sent to Persia by the French Government, we obtain a description of the Persian army under Agha Muhammad Khan in 1796. During time of peace there was, properly speaking, no army at all, and during times of war the army was generally disbanded on the approach of winter and did not join the colours until the following spring. The household of the Shah in itself formed quite a numerous corps always ready for a campaign, and other fighting men were enrolled or assigned for active service from all points of the empire and generally reached the place they had been ordered to go to in a short time. Men who did not come quickly were severely punished, and Dr. Olivier relates that in 1796 forty men, who had refused to join the army, had their eyes put out. Twenty-seven Russian sailors, who had been seized in some of the Caspian ports, were forced to execute this cruel act on the Persians, and were later, on the 27th September, 1796, executed before Agha Muhammad Khan in his palace. Many similar acts of cruelty and brutal ferocity have much obscured Agha Muhammad Khan's quite uncommon attainments. The tribal khans and governors of provinces were also always ready with their own men and with others which they levied in accordance with the royal firmans or orders. There were also available for military service men of the various nomad tribes, as, for instance, Kurds, Turkomans, Afghans, Uzbeks, Lesghis, who were subdivided into branches, each with a particular chief. These tribes nearly always composed the largest part of the cavalry. The infantry, less respected and esteemed than the cavalry, was composed of the rural population taken indiscriminately from all tribes. The commander-in-chief of an army was called *Sardar*, the Khans, or chiefs of tribal contingents, were, as with Nadir Shah, known as *Sultans*, while chiefs of tribes and governors of provinces acted, when appointed by the Shah, as generals of divisions. Other officers were commanders of 1,000, 500, 100, 50, and 10 men, called *Min-bashi*, *Pansad-bashi*, *Yuz-bashi*, *Panjah-bashi*, and *Dah-bashi*. The principal arms of these troops were bows and arrows, clubs, lances, swords, and daggers; they were acquainted with firearms, but

'Report on the Persian Army' [15v] (30/170)

20

used them less than the Turks. Artillery was seldom employed, and Dr. Olivier believed that there was none of it in the two expeditions which Agha Muhammad Khan made to Tiflis and Mashhad. Their firearms were long muskets, mostly matchlocks, which in firing were supported by a fork fixed to the barrel with a pivot. This weapon was only used by the infantry, but some horsemen carried a carbine, which, however, like the Turkomans of twenty years ago, they fired only once during an engagement, the process of loading probably being very lengthy and laborious. Most of the cavalry was armed with a lance, a long and very much curved sword, "its cutting edge inside," a club, and a number of other weapons attached to the saddle, and two pistols in the belt. Nearly all still wore coats of mail, armlets, steel helmets, and some used small shields. The tribes residing east of the Caspian, Turkomans and Uzbeks, had no firearms, but used light bamboo lances with sharp steel points with great effect, and bows and arrows. In the use of the latter they were also very skilful both when attacking and retreating. When retreating they reclined on the back of the horse, resting their head on the crupper, and discharged the arrow on the pursuing enemy while the horse was in full gallop—the warfare of 2,000 years ago. The whole forces of Agha Muhammad Khan did not exceed 70,000 or 80,000 men, and his revenues were so small that he could not maintain his army for more than six or seven months a year, and that only on the condition of his being successful and obtaining plunder and spoil from the vanquished foe. His troops were so badly armed and so little disciplined that Dr. Olivier had not the least doubt but that the Shah would be beaten by the Russians in the very first engagement.

Scott Waring, in his "Tour to Shiraz" (London, 1807), gives a description of the Persian army as it was in 1802, when Fath Ali Shah had been four years on the throne. He was told that all the troops were immediate servants of the Shah. Some of the khans were chiefs of tribes. Tribes were usually in the Shah's service, but their chiefs were not feudatories, for they were regularly paid and liable to be dismissed at the discretion of the Government. The troops were generally quartered in the district where they had been levied, but to ensure their obedience to the Shah's commands, either the chief or his son was kept at Court as hostage. The principal military force was the cavalry. The troops were clothed, horsed, armed, etc., at the Shah's expense, and the pay which they received was 10 to 15 Tomans a year. In addition to their pay they had an allowance of barley and straw for the horses, and of wheat, rice, and butter for themselves. They also received a present, but this Scott Waring believed to be uncertain. Considering the value of money in Persia, then four or five times greater than in England, he calculated that the pay and allowances of a horseman amounted to about 50 or 60 guineas a year. The officers were said to receive their pay regularly, and he was told that the troops also were paid regularly once a year, or, some-

(16)

21

times, every three months, and that they never suffered much from the length of arrears because they were supplied with most of the things they required. The Khan commanded the whole force, and it depended on the will of the Shah to what number it should amount. Whenever a body of men was enlisted into the Shah's service the names of the men and those of their fathers, and their ages, etc., were written down in a general muster roll, and should any one of the men die, information was immediately given to the officer who kept the muster roll, and a chief who would keep a smaller number of men than his prescribed quota would have incurred much risk, for if he dismissed any of the original number he would be instantly detected by their making a complaint to the Shah, or if he delayed filling up any vacancies caused by deaths, the *Ambar dar*, or "Storekeeper," who supplied the troops with provisions, would discover the imposition. Nor could the commander keep back any of the men's pay, for the troops would either immediately depose him or forward a representation to the Shah. When the Shah put himself at the head of the army different chiefs were ordered to assemble their troops, and the Shah having hostages in his hands—a pledge for the fidelity of his soldiers—was certain of having an army of 50,000 to 60,000 men in a few days. Besides these troops there were the *Gholam i Shah*, who were considered the *elite* of the army, had charge of the Shah's person, received greater pay and were clothed in a more expensive manner than the other cavalry. These *Gholam i Shah* were said to number about 20,000, but the flower of the corps was formed into a body of 4,000, distinguished by an excessive richness of dress and insolence of behaviour. The length of their marches was surprising; forty to fifty miles a day was of frequent occurrence, and on urgent occasions they have marched at the rate of seventy miles for three days together, but they had no baggage. So far Scott Waring's description of Fath Ali Shah's army is rather favourable, but it seems that it was based on information which was given him with little regard to truth by Persian friends. The troops which he saw in Fars were wholly undisciplined. The infantry was seldom employed in any kind of service, and was much worse than the cavalry. The troops had no proficiency whatever in military affairs, and were ignorant of the most elementary matters. Once at Bushire some artillerymen had to fire a salute, and considered that, as the guns were loaded with powder only, the people crowding in front would not be hurt, and on discharging the guns many people were killed on the spot. The infantry was only employed at sieges, and their principal business was to fire off a piece of cannon once an hour. A body of *bildar*, "spade-bearers," generally accompanied the army. In drawing outlines of camps, posting sentries, sending out picquets, they imitated the European armies, but their camps generally formed a circle. Scott Waring's final opinion of the army, derived from what he saw, was:—

"The army is nothing more than an immense band of robbers only held together by expectation of plunder. Impressed with ridiculous notions of the superiority of their arms, the Persians, happily for them, are not likely to be opposed to the steady discipline and determined bravery of European troops."

Already before Abbas Mirza's arrival in Tabriz a number of Russian deserters and renegades who had taken refuge in Persia brought with them the first ideas of European tactics. They were made officers, and, encouraged by Ahmad Khan, then *Beglerbeggi*, or governor of Tabriz, they formed a few battalions, whose instruction, however, seems not to have gone beyond the simplest platoon exercises, and were so imperfectly organised that after some months not a man remained with the colours. The military of Persia had thus once again fallen into the greatest disorder, which continued until Abbas Mirza obtained the assistance of efficient European officers. The first nation whose military tutorship was now obtained was France, and here a few words are necessary to explain why this nation was chosen.

Already in 1789 the French Republic had the idea of re-establishing the influence of France in the East, and of continuing her traditional policy in those regions, and sent to Asia for this object two men of science, Dr. Olivier, whose notes on the Persian army under Agha Muhammad Khan we have already given, and M. Brugnière, apparently for the collection of notes on natural history but really to make alliances. If anything more than an exchange of some polite letters with various states resulted of this mission it was, as far as French intentions in Persia were concerned, completely counteracted by the treaty of January, 1801, which Captain (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm* concluded on behalf of the English Government with the Shah of Persia and formerly engaged the Persian Government to prevent the French from settling or residing in Persian territory. In 1800 Russia had declared herself first protectress of and then heir to Georgia, and immediately took possession of that country, declaring it an integral part of the Russian Empire without any consideration of the rights of Persia, whose vassal Georgia was. Russia also formed military establishments on the river Phasis, and wishing to further extend her dominions at the cost of Persia, invented some prettexts, declared war in 1803, and invaded Persian territory. In consequence of several reverses, quite inevitable, seeing the great disorder existing in her army, Persia very soon recognised that she could not oppose the ambitions of her powerful neighbour, and, naturally, on account of the treaty of 1801, turned to

* Sir John Malcolm, born 2nd May, 1769, at Burnfoot, near Langholm, in Scotland; went to India as cadet in 1782; distinguished himself at siege of Seringapatam, 1792; commanded Nizam of Deccan's troops, 1794; sent on diplomatic missions to Persia, 1800, 1802, 1808, 1810; colonel, 1802; knighted, 1812; major-general, 1817; governor of Bombay, 1827-31; then M.P. for Launceston; died at Windsor, 1833, on the 31st of May, and monument was erected to him in Westminster Abbey.

England for protection. England imposed conditions which Persia considered too onerous, among them being the cession of all Persian ports on the Caspian, the construction of a fort at Bushire, and the occupation of the island of Kharak in the Persian Gulf, and Persia had to turn elsewhere. Fath Ali Shah then bethought himself of the power which he had been led by England to neglect and slight, and had now become famous throughout the Mussulman world by its rapid conquest of Egypt. The result of the French campaigns in Egypt had reached all the cities of Persia, and the name of Napoleon and the renown of the French army were spoken of by all tribes. Fath Ali Shah for a long time had to keep his idea a secret, really because he was not able to obtain any reliable information on the nation and the new conqueror whom he desired for an ally; he had heard vague and poetical reports of glory and conquest, but practically France and Napoleon were mysteries to him. It was quite by chance that he obtained the necessary information, and this happened during the campaign against the Russians in 1804, which he opened in person. At Erivan he met David, the Armenian Patriarch of Etch-Miadzin, and, having received all the required information from this prelate, he sent off a letter addressed to Napoleon. The letter reached Maréchal Brune, the French Ambassador in Constantinople, in December, 1804, and was immediately forwarded to Napoleon, who received it in the January following. Napoleon had already been thinking of a French expedition to India, and, naturally, considering an alliance with Persia of the highest importance, hastened to reply to Fath Ali Shah's letter, and sent Amédée Jaubert, a secretary-interpreter to the court, to Persia, but in order to keep his intentions from becoming known to British agents, gave Jaubert at the same time a letter for Sultan Selim of Turkey, and officially announced that Jaubert was sent on a special mission to Constantinople. The relation of Jaubert's journey to Persia reads like a romance. He left Paris on the 17th March, 1805, and reaching Constantinople on the 10th of April, delivered Napoleon's letter to the Sultan. He then left Constantinople, pretending to return to France, but once outside of the city he tacked towards Fanaraki, on the Black Sea end of the Bosphorus, and remained there for some time in hiding while the French Ambassador officially reported his death. He then, under the assumed name of Allier and provided with passports which the Ambassador had obtained, proceeded to Persia by way of Erzeroum and Bayazid. The measures which had been taken for keeping the mission secret must have been incomplete, for Jaubert, dead though he was to the world, was tracked, and, as the French believed, seized at the instigation of British agents by Mahmud Pasha at Bayazid and incarcerated in an underground dungeon for eight months. Napoleon, however, had not trusted to Jaubert alone, and had sent off a duplicate of his letter to Fath Ali Shah by Adjutant General Romieux (some writers have Romieu), who left Paris shortly after Jaubert, and travel-

ling *via* Aleppo and Baghdad, arrived at Teheran in October, 1805. A few days after his arrival he died very suddenly, and his death was attributed by the French to poison which had been administered by British agents, and caused great consternation at the Persian court. Flandin, writing in 1850, says that Romieux's servant, M. Outrey, who was afterwards French Consul at Trebizonde, was poisoned at the same time, but being of stronger constitution, escaped. Jaubert was released from his dungeon at Bayazid at the urgent request of the Persian Government, and reaching Teheran in June, 1806, was cordially received by the Shah, who, fearing that he might share the fate of Romieux, sent him quickly back to France with proposals for an alliance.* A copy of Fath Ali Shah's letter and proposals of alliance to Napoleon reached Mr. Jones, the British Consul in Baghdad, a few days later and was forwarded to London.

Jaubert's description of the Persian army in 1806 shows that very little progress had been made since 1802, when Scott Waring wrote. He says that nearly all the fighting men of the army were obtained from the tribes. The inhabitants of the towns were effeminate and indolent and never took up arms unless there was a pressing danger, but the nomads were always armed and ready to fight. These mercenary troops fought simply for their pay or for the plunder which they hoped to get, but were the only men upon whose courage the Shah could rely. In the spring the troops left their winter quarters and assembled in the locality fixed by royal firman. The men enrolled themselves only for one campaign and returned to their homes and families on the approach of winter.

The Turkish-speaking nomad tribes were the most powerful and supplied the best men, and the best tribes were the Afshar and Kajar. The troops when on the march lived almost entirely at the expense of the inhabitants of the districts they traversed. The army intendants gave receipts for the supplies which the troops took, and the value of the supplies was supposed to be deducted from the revenues which the inhabitants had to pay, but the reduction was rarely made, and the districts suffered not much less than if they had been occupied by an enemy. The Shah was fully aware of the losses which his subjects suffered, and once, in 1805, ordered that the districts through which his troops had passed should be exempted from all revenues and taxes during that year. As campaigns were undertaken only during the summer, the troops mostly marched at night-time with torches and music. Their marches averaged six farsakhs a day, but on extraordinary occasions they were able to double that distance. In 1795

* Pierre Amédée Émilien Probe Jaubert, born 3rd June, 1779; distinguished pupil of Silvestre de Sacy; appointed interpreter to Egyptian expedition in 1797, then secretary-interpreter to Napoleon; sent to the East in 1818 to purchase Tibetan goats for the French Government, brought 400 to France; appointed Professor of Persian at the Collège de France, 1841; Conseiller d'État and Pair de France; died 30th January, 1847.

Agha Muhammad Khan marched with his cavalry from Teheran to Tiflis in fifteen days, or about eleven farsakhs a day. The Turkish army, adds Jaubert, was not nearly so rapid, Yusuf Pasha taking fourteen months from Constantinople to Egypt. Since Agha Muhammad Khan's reign it was not usual for women, with the exception of those of princes, to follow the army, and the abrogation of this immemorial custom was a step towards military discipline. Jaubert condemned the Persian system of hobbling the horses at night, of not having advanced guards, and of not closing their camps, all greatly exposing the troops to night surprises. Already Xenophon pointed out the danger of hobbling horses, and one may well be astonished, says Jaubert, at the Persians not having long ago found out the vice of this system by experience, if one did not see other nations also obstinately reject inventions of evident utility, as, for instance, bayonets, pumps, windmills, etc. The troops kept no order whatever, and their idea of fighting was to destroy the enemy if possible with the first attack, and to run away with the rapidity of lightning if the attack failed. A horseman of the nomad tribes who fell from his horse was considered vanquished. The principal object in an engagement was not to remain master of the field, but to make as much spoil as possible. "The Persian troops as they are, incapable of sustaining a prolonged attack on the part of any kind of troops, cannot withstand disciplined soldiers fighting in proper order and commanded by officers acquainted with the art of war." Persia, when Jaubert wrote, had no barracks, military hospitals, stores; every soldier was obliged to provide all necessities out of his pay. The pay, regularly paid to the troops present at a review, varied according to the service, and sometimes reached to six or seven tomans (£4 16s. to £5 12s.) for a soldier, and twenty to thirty tomans (£16 to £24) for an officer, for the whole campaign. Horses killed in an engagement were replaced by the Government, and the chiefs of tribes received a pay more in proportion to the number of men they furnished than to their rank.

After Jaubert's departure from Teheran in 1806 there arrived, at short intervals, M. Jouannin, M. Delablanche, and Captain Auguste de Bontems-Lefort, all bringing letters from Napoleon urging the execution of the promises which Fath Ali Shah had made. Captain de Bontems, accompanied by his interpreter, M. Nerciat, proceeded to the camp of Abbas Mirza near Tabriz and there began the organisation of the Persian army. Delablanche remained at Teheran until relieved in October, 1807, by M. Rouman, who had come to Persia as French representative, and was in his turn relieved in December by General Gardane. About a year before this the Persian Government had sent Mirza Reza Khan on a special mission to Napoleon, and the result of this mission was the treaty between France and Persia signed 4th May, 1807, at Finkenstein. The principal points of this treaty were as follows:—France guaranteed the integrity of Persia's actual

[619]

D

territory, recognised Georgia as belonging to Persia, promised to use her efforts to force Russia to evacuate Persian territory and Georgia, and engaged to supply Persia with arms, officers, and artificers; Persia, on her part, engaged to immediately declare war against England, expel all Englishmen from her territory and close the same to all English agents, employ her influence in order to determine the Afghans and "the other peoples of Kandahar" to join her against England and invade India, to give free passage to a French army through Persia, should Napoleon send an expedition to India, etc. All the hopes of the Persian court were now centred in France, and the Shah sent another ambassador to Paris with magnificent presents for Napoleon, among them the swords of Timur and Nadir, which the accompanying letter called "*The swords of the conquerors of Asia offered to the conqueror of Europe.*" There were also some fine bezoar stones, considered as antidotes and talismans against poison, which Napoleon threw into the fire "*avec dédain.*"

General Gardane, who arrived at Teheran on the 4th December, 1807, with a staff of seventy commissioned and non-commissioned officers, was received by the Persian court with great enthusiasm, and according to French reports, there were public rejoicings for several days. Fath Ali Shah without much delay ratified the Finkenstein treaty, ordered the expulsion of all English subjects from Persia, recalled his representative from Bombay, signed a convention for 20,000 muskets to be purchased in France, signed a treaty of commerce, and ceded the island of Kharak in the Persian Gulf to France. General Gardane, his brother, and several other officers were made khans, and, together with a number of other members of the mission, received the Order of the Sun.

The military members of the mission soon began their work of instruction: Captains Fabvier* and Reboul were sent to Isfahan and there started a cannon foundry (General Gardane stated in his report to Napoleon that Isfahan was chosen in preference to Tabriz because nearer to India); Captains Verdier and Lamy† were sent to Tabriz as instructors; others, as Engineer-Captain Truillier and Messrs. Dupré and Trézel, were sent about travelling in Persia with the object of surveying the districts and roads suitable for the French march to India and

* Fabvier, Charles Nicolas, Baron, born 15th December, 1783. Lieutenant of artillery, 1804; after leaving Persia, served for some time in Poland under Poniatovski in 1809; then entered the French Imperial Guard, fought in Spain and Russia; colonel after the battle on the Moskva (Borodino), September, 1812; baron and chief of staff of 11th Army Corps in 1813; one of the signers of the Capitulation of Paris, 1814; compromised in various conspiracies against the Government 1820-1822; goes to England although declared innocent by Parliament; entered Greek Service 1824, and commanded the *regular* Greek forces in 1825; returned to France 1829; chief of staff of National Guard 1830; lieutenant-general 1839; peer of France 1845; ambassador, Turkey 1848; deputy for Meurthe 1849-51; died in Paris 1855.

† Lamy died as brigadier-general in 1837 at Constantine, in Algeria.

'Report on the Persian Army' [19r] (37/170)

27

gathering useful information. Among much useful information it is curious to read that Yezd, one of the most fanatical towns of Persia, could supply brandy for an army of 40,000 men at about a shilling a bottle.

Tancoigne, a member of the Gardane mission, and writing in 1808, gives the following account of the Persian army and the doings of his countrymen in Persia :—

"The great strength of the army consists in the cavalry. Each province, or rather the great vassals of the Shah, the khans who are at the head of the military tribes, must furnish a certain number of men, and the total, when the number of tribes and the population of the country are considered, cannot exceed 150,000 or 200,000 men. These military tribes, or *teifehs*, form four great divisions, which are named according to the language used by them, viz., *Turk-zaban*, *Kurd-zaban*, *Arab-zaban*, and *Lur-zaban*. The *Afshar* and *Kajar*, both *Turk-zaban*, are the most powerful tribes; the first is reputed to be the bravest and was long the strongest (Nadir Shah belonged to it), but the second, to which the reigning dynasty belongs, has lately deprived it of its eminence. The pay of the Persian cavalry is trifling, and even this they receive only in time of war. They have also the benefit of all spoil and booty—very accommodating resources and admirably favourable to indiscipline. They arm and mount themselves at their own expense and are dressed like warriors of antiquity; a steel helmet, coat of mail" (note, this in 1808), "a lance, and a shield forming their usual accoutrements. Some of them also carry a bow and a quiver full of arrows, and, in short, were it not for the pistol and carbine which several add to the above equipment, they might be mistaken for the Persians of the time of Darius. This cavalry does not know how to fight in order and could not withstand the shock of our regular cavalry of the line or break our infantry; it is, however, excellent for turning the flanks of an army and for skirmishing. The Persian swords are much superior to ours in temper, and make wide and deep wounds which are generally mortal. Every six months or so the Shah reviews the cavalry stationed in the capital and its environs. On these occasions he is seated on a portable throne placed in a kiosk of the court of the palace, and the horsemen are confusedly massed together at one of the extremities of the court. The chiefs of the tribes, standing below the window of the kiosk, call each man by his name, and the man replies by galloping across the court and past the kiosk, and then places himself at the other side of the court. Men who are no longer capable of doing service or those who desire to leave it are dismissed and measures are taken to fill up vacancies. The men then return to their quarters." (Similar reviews still take place before cavalry commanders and are known as *San-didan*.)

"The Persian infantry is the most miserable species of troops that can be imagined and is composed of *tufangchis*, or fusiliers. It never amounts to more than 50,000 or 60,000 men—all unfortunate peasants taken from the cultivation of their lands for the Shah's service. They are greatly despised by the cavalry, have trifling pay, and are, I believe, obliged to clothe and equip themselves at their own expense. I have seen some who had no other dress than blue cotton trousers and a sheepskin coat. They are armed with matchlock, dagger, and sword. The infantry service has always been held in little esteem by the Persians, and is still with them, as it was in France during the feudal times, abandoned to the lowest classes of the people, while only the cavalry was reputed a noble and honourable service. There is however, every appearance that they will soon abandon this unjust and unfounded prejudice, for at the desire of the Shah our officers are now organising a new corps of infantry at Tabriz on the European system. When the Persians are once enabled to appreciate the advantages of our tactics and military discipline, they will be obliged to acknowledge that infantry ought to be the principal force of an army. The science of artillery, so perfect in Europe, is utterly unknown to the Persians. It is true they have some cannon of large calibre, captured from the Portuguese at Ormuz, and some others taken from the Russians during the last war, but

[619]

D 2

they do not know how to use them, and the cannon are either lying dismounted or placed on clumsy carriages in the principal court of the Royal palace. The *Zambureks*, small pieces that carry a ball of a pound weight, is the only artillery now used in military expeditions. These pieces turn on a swivel on the pack-saddle of a camel; the camel's crupper is ornamented with two flags, and the artilleryman, who is dressed in a fantastic manner and wears a cap like that of a rope-dancer, turns and points the piece at pleasure. In a battle such artillery must be more destructive to the cannoniers than to the enemy. When they have loaded their pieces the men advance their camels at a quick trot, and return without any order after they have discharged them. I leave you to judge of the disorder that must result from this manner of fighting, and what ravages such heavy animals as camels are likely create in the ranks. The *Zamburekchis* are commanded by a khan of an inferior order, who seems to possess but little influence at court. There is also a commander-in-chief of the artillery, *Tupchi-bashi*, but as there are no guns used his title is quite honorary.

"Fabvier and Reboul have now established a cannon foundry at Isfahan, and Fath Ali Shah owes to them the first field pieces which have been seen in Persia. Attached to Abbas Mirza at Tabriz are Verdier, captain of infantry, assisted by three non-commissioned officers, Captain Lamy, of engineers, and M. Joinnard, student interpreter. The Prince's camp has about 2,500 men, organised according to European system, commanded by Persian officers, and instructed by Verdier. These soldiers are called *Sarbaz*, and armed with muskets made in Tabriz on the model of our own. Their uniform consists of a brown jacket, cut as ours, with a row of white metal buttons in front, blue cotton trousers, and half boots; but the head-dress, a black sheepskin cap, common to the Persians of all ranks and classes, has not been altered, although some men, to give themselves more of a martial appearance, stick a feather in it. From the order and discipline which accompany a parade in the Prince's camp, one might suppose oneself in a French camp. It is to Captain Verdier and the generosity of Abbas Mirza that the Shah will soon owe an infantry that will enable the Persian army to contend with advantage against their enemies, while it is to Captain Lamy, who has formed a kind of polytechnic school in the camp, that he will owe efficient officers of engineers. He will also be indebted to these two officers for his cannon and artillerymen. The artillery, which is as yet limited, is commanded by Tahmuras Khan, a Christian nobleman of the family of the last Prince of Georgia. Abbas Mirza has incorporated about 150 Russian deserters, and also a major of that nation with his own troops, and they, like the Persians, are under the orders of Captain Verdier."

No one then foresaw the impending cessation of French activity in Persia, and Tancoigne says:—

"Is there not something great in the reflection that the zeal and ability of only a few Frenchmen have sufficed to create in a short time such extraordinary changes in a distant and barbarous country, that it owes to them already this great step towards European civilisation, that it will, perhaps, in some future period owe to them the preservation of its independence, and that the French name will henceforth never be mentioned there without respect and gratitude?"

While the French officers were hard at work, the English mission under Sir Harford Jones reached Persia (November, 1808), and James Morier, who accompanied the mission as secretary, gives some valuable supplementary notes on the Persian army which are worth mentioning here:—

"The Shah's body-guard consists of 12,000 men, half of whom are disciplined in the European manner and called *Janbaz*, in contradistinction to those raised and disciplined by the princes, particularly by Abbas Mirza, Governor of Azerbaijan, who are called *Sarbaz*. These 12,000 men are taken indiscriminately from the tribes or from the population of cities, but

principally from Mazandaran and the tribes connected with the Shah's own race. They are divided into bodies of 3,000 men, and do duty by turns. Besides this body-guard of 12,000, the King has 3,000 Gholams, or slaves, horsemen who always attend him when he makes any excursion. Each prince-governor of a province also has his body-guard, which in like manner is never disbanded. The Prince of Fars has a command of 20,000 men, but his troops have never been summoned to assist the Shah in his wars, as they are necessary for the protection of the southern parts of Persia, and his actual body-guard consists of only 1,000 horsemen—200 being Bakhtiariis. The troops of the Prince of Fars provide their own arms and clothing, and receive annually a pay of forty piastres (about £4) and a daily allowance of one Shiraz mann (7½ lbs.) of barley, two manns of straw, and a quarter of a mann of wheat. They have further, in their own countries, for the maintenance of their families, certain allotments of land which they till and sow and of which they reap the profits. The Prince of Azerbaijan (Abbas Mirza), it is said, can raise from the different tribes 50,000 horse and foot, over which the Shah has no direct control, but which, in case of war, he can call into action by requiring the attendance of his son and all his forces."

In the summer of 1809, when Morier visited Tabriz and the French officers had left, there were only 3,000 men in garrison, while the amount of the general force under the Prince's government was, according to the information given by his Prime Minister, as follows:—

Cavalry	..	..	..	..	..	22,000
Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	12,000
Infantry disciplined according to Euro- pean system	..	..	..	..	..	6,000
						40,000

Besides this number actually enrolled, it was said that each man had a substitute, who was similarly instructed in the use of arms and ready to supply his place if he should be cut off in battle or prevented by any other accident. The Prince-Governor of Khorasan could raise 20,000 horse and foot; Mazandaran supplied the same number; the province of Zenjan paid no revenue, but furnished 5,000 horsemen complete, paid, fed, and clothed from its own produce; and the Faili Lurs, the people of Isfahan, and those of Kashan were altogether exempted from military service and bore the epithet of arrant cowards, "more happy perhaps to live a quiet life at home than attempt to regain the reputation of brave men by fighting abroad." Of the soldiers Morier says:—"As a nation as fit stuff for soldiers, I know of no better material. The Persian possesses the true qualities of a soldier; active, inured to labour, careless of life, admiring bravery, and indeed aspiring to the appellation of '*rashid*,' or courageous."

Fath Ali Shah's principal object in concluding the alliance with Napoleon and ratifying the Finkenstein treaty was that France should help him against Russia, but Napoleon had in the meantime concluded peace with Russia at Tilsit and could not act as the Shah desired. French influence in Persia rapidly diminished in consequence. The Finkenstein negotiations and the presence of the French mission in Persia had the effect of rousing the British Government to serious efforts for the

recovery of their lost ascendancy at the Court of Teheran, considered necessary for the protection of the Indian Empire, and Sir Harford Jones was sent by the British Government to oust the French and negotiate a new treaty with the Shah. The Indian Government also sent Sir John Malcolm on his second mission to Persia. The Shah having lost all faith in the professions of the French, which, in consequence of the peace with Russia and reverses in Europe, they were no longer able to fulfil, looked with renewed hopes to England, and agreed to receive the British mission. General Gardane, altogether left in the lurch by his Government, could do nothing more than protest in accordance with the Finkenstein treaty, which stipulated that no English subjects were to enter Persian territory, and announced that he and all members of his embassy would have to leave Persia if the British mission were permitted to enter Persian territory. Sir Harford Jones landed at Bushire on the 13th October, 1809, left that port in December, and reached Teheran on the 14th February of the following year, a few days after Gardane had left. Thus abruptly ended Fath Ali Shah's dream of recovering his lost provinces from Russia with the help of the "Conqueror of Europe," and Sir Harford Jones found no difficulty in concluding a preliminary treaty on the 12th March, 1809, by which all previous treaties contracted by the Shah with European powers were annulled, the Shah engaged himself to prevent the passage of European armies through his dominions towards India, and the English were to assist him with troops and officers free of charge, or pay him an annual subsidy of 200,000 tomans if any European forces should invade his territories. In fulfilment of this treaty Sir John Malcolm, starting from India on his third mission to Persia in 1810, took with him a number of Anglo-Indian officers who passed into Persian service, and among whom were included the distinguished names of Christie, Lindsay, Monteith, and H. Willock. Sir Gore Ouseley, following Sir H. Jones in 1811, was also accompanied by some English officers and a detachment of English serjeants of the 47th regiment to discipline the Persian army; among the officers were Majors D'Arcy and Hart and Stone. The English officers were principally employed in Azerbaijan with Abbas Mirza and worked with the most untiring zeal under the liberal patronage of the Prince. Christie, of the Bombay army, undertook the charge of the infantry, and Lindsay, of the Madras army, that of the artillery. Lindsay (afterwards Sir H. Bethune, Bart.) for nearly forty years from this date occupied an important position in the Persian army. In recognition of his services he was made a baronet by the British Government, and in 1836 received the local rank of major-general as well as a salary of £2,200 a year while in Persia. He died at Teheran in February, 1851. From Morier, who accompanied Sir Gore Ouseley, and visited Tabriz for the second time in 1812, we take the following notes on the progress made by the Persian troops under English tuition:—

"One of the most remarkable facts in the modern history of Persia is the introduction of European discipline in the armies of Persia. Abbas Mirza, in fact, must be looked upon as the origin, the support, and the chief promoter of it, and consequently the benefactor of his country. The Prince described what were the first motives which induced him to attempt its introduction among his troops. He said that he soon found out that it was in vain to fight the Russians without soldiers like theirs, and that their artillery could only be opposed by artillery. His first essays in discipline were attended with little success, because he had, at the outset, to combat the prejudice of the Persian recruits themselves, who rejected the idea of being assimilated in any manner to Feringees, and particularly to Russians, whom they hated more than all other Europeans. To efface such impressions, the Prince was obliged to adopt a soldier's dress and to submit to learn military exercise from a Russian. He commenced with twenty or thirty men at a time, whom he caused to be drilled in a separate court by themselves, in order that they might not be exposed to the ridicule of the populace, and it was not until he ordered his nobles to follow his example and handle a musket that he found his scheme progressing. He succeeded in teaching a few of his men the platoon exercise, to march abreast and turn about at the word of command, and to beat a drum, but he wanted officers, and he would, very probably, have got no farther, if the French embassy from Napoleon had not arrived in Persia at that time, when the officers attached to it were put into commands of large bodies and advanced his views to the utmost of his expectations. The English mission which succeeded the French also supplied him with officers, and his first wish was to raise an artillery, which was done by Lieutenant Lindsay in a manner truly astonishing. The Prince liberally adopted every method proposed, and supported Lindsay against every difficulty. He gave him full power to punish the recruits in any manner he chose and gave him unlimited control over his troop. The Sarbaz, or infantry, were placed under Major Christie, of the Bombay army, an officer of the greatest merit. The great changes that are now making in the military system of Persia, particularly by the Prince Royal in Azerbaijan, will in a very short time so much influence the general character and disposition of the people that they will scarcely be recognisable. Ever since their late wars with Russia and their political connection with Europe, the effect produced has been most striking, and a person of excellent authority, who was in Persia during the time of Kerim Khan, affirmed, in my hearing, that the nation could scarcely be considered the same. . . . The Prince's camp had been pitched under the superintendence of the English officers, and displayed a regularity unknown to Persians. The front was occupied by the small tents of a disciplined regiment of infantry; then came a line of the tents of the English officers, and behind these a large crimson pavilion which served as the *Divan-Khaneh*. The Prince's own tent, enclosed by the distinguishing *sarpardeh* (canvas walls surrounding the tent), was next in order; to the right and left of this were several large pavilions, belonging to the vizir, secretaries, military and civil officers, and behind all were the numerous small tents of the Prince's household. On the left flank was stationed the artillery, and on the right the Persian cavalry. . . . Another surprise which awaited us was the sight of a troop of Persian horse artillery dressed like Europeans, with shaven chins, with English arms and accoutrements, booted and spurred, riding with long stirrups, and headed by an English officer."

At this time also there was at Tabriz, Wilhelm von Freygang, a Russian official, sent by his Government to negotiate for more amicable relations between his Government and Persia, and in his letters written at the time he highly praises the work of the English officers, adding, however, that "even with this assistance Persia will never be able to successfully war against Russia." At Erivan, on his way from Tiflis to Tabriz, he saw, under the command of Musain Kuli-Khan Sardar, 8,000 horse and 6,000 foot, the latter organised and

drilled by English officers, and 12 guns of horse artillery under an English captain (Lindsay). At Nakchivan he assisted at a review of a body of infantry which the khan of the place himself had formed. Of this body he speaks with great contempt:—

"It was impossible to imagine anything more ridiculous than this species of newly-organised infantry. Should the Asiatic ever be feared, it would only be on horseback, and one shot from a cannon suffices to disperse the most numerous body of Persian infantry."

At Tabriz he resided with an English major of artillery who "occupied the position of Abbas Mirza's Minister for War and was the superintendent of the foundry and taught tactics to the Prince with the help of a young Persian who spoke a little English." He was very much astonished to hear all the English at Tabriz speak Persian fluently—not counting the artillery major, who had to employ an interpreter—and to see that they lived according to Persian usages, even to the most unimportant details. In the same way he expressed his astonishment at finding that Sir Gore Ouseley, who arrived in Tabriz on the 10th June, also spoke Persian fluently, and pointed out that ministers who speak Persian are more trusted by the Persian Government, and have the advantage of being able to do without interpreters, who are generally traitors and open to bribery.

Sir Gore Ouseley did much to help Freygang, but Abbas Mirza had received information of Napoleon's entry into Russia, and rejecting all offers of peace, decided to make another expedition to Georgia, thinking thereby to obtain more favourable terms and to increase the glory of his own exploits. Since 1800, when Russia took Georgia, there had practically been war between her and Persia. The war, as the Russians alleged, was of small importance to them, but caused much loss to Georgia. Bodies of irregular cavalry frequently attacked the Georgian villages and carried off men, women and children, and cattle. Other means employed by the Persians against the Russian Government in Georgia were to create revolts with the help of the fugitive Prince Alexander of Georgia, who possessed the unhappy talent of misleading his countrymen by vain hopes. The revolts were sometimes successful in a way, but a few shots always restored order and brought the rebels back to submission. Russian writers further stated that "the Emperor of Russia, out of paternal regard and with the intention of obtaining an honourable peace, several times opened negotiations with the Persian Government, but the obstinacy, cunning, and double-tonguedness of the Persians, combined with a certain craftiness which always leads them into the most intricate intrigues, have so far been the cause that his well-meant and peaceful intentions had no result." Nevertheless, Freygang was sent to make another attempt. He also failed as we have seen. Abbas Mirza very soon had cause to regret his hastiness in refusing the conditions of peace and rejecting Sir Gore Ouseley's advice, for on the 31st October, 1812, he was completely defeated at Aslanduz by

(22)

33

General Kotlerofsky, and was finally forced to accept the conditions that were originally proposed by Russia and laid down in the Treaty of Gulistan, concluded 12th October, 1813.

While still at Tabriz, Sir Gore Ouseley heard certain rumours of a reconciliation between Great Britain and Russia, and instructed the British officers in Persian service not to take any further part in the Russo-Persian campaign still proceeding. Abbas Mirza, however, pleaded so urgently, that two officers, Christie and Lindsay, and thirteen serjeants were permitted to stay. Christie paid the penalty with his life, being killed on the battlefield of Aslanduz, 31st October, 1812. He was succeeded in command of Abbas Mirza's infantry by Major Hart, of the Royal army, who, until his death of cholera at Tabriz in June, 1830, occupied a position unequalled by that of any other British officer in Persia. He acquired an extraordinary influence over the Shah and over Abbas Mirza, the former entrusting him with the money for the payment of the Azerbaijan troops, "having more confidence in the honour of an English major than in that of his own son," and the latter never failed to support him.

The termination of the Perso-Russian war by the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813 was followed by a third Anglo-Persian treaty, based on the preliminary treaty of March, 1809, and signed at Teheran in November, 1814. In pursuance of the terms of this treaty the British Government continued to supply officers for drill and discipline, arms and munitions, and the material and workmen for a foundry at Tabriz, where guns and shot of every description were cast, gun-carriages built, and powder manufactured at a cost of about fourpence per pound. The war with Russia being, however, at an end, and no immediate peril overhanging, Abbas Mirza, who, like most members of his family, was lacking in stability of purpose or character, began to lose interest in army reforms, and even treated his English officers with some suspicion. In 1815, in consequence of a dispute between England and Persia about the continuance of the subsidy of 200,000 tomans per annum, all English non-commissioned officers in the Persian service were ordered by the British Minister to leave the country. Among the officers who remained in Persia were Majors Lindsay, D'Arcy, Hart, McIntosh, Captain Monteith, Lieutenant Willock, and others.

D'Arcy was soon after sent to England with two Persian youths, one to learn surgery, the other military engineering.

The French have done their best to belittle the work of the English officers during this period, and E. Flandin, who accompanied De Sercey, French Minister to Persia in 1839, evidently led away by the traditional anglophobia of Frenchmen, epitomised French opinion by writing:—

"It is known how the English succeeded in ousting the French Embassy in 1809, and all the officers attached to it. They pointed out to the Persians how advantageously English officers would replace those of Napoleon, and then, with the sole object of delaying or neutralising the military instruction of the Persian soldiers, they pretended to continue the work commenced by

our officers, while in reality their object was to destroy it. The change was fatal to Persia in all respects. The English for a time imagined they were working for their own interests, but they really worked for those of Russia. They had made a treaty with Fath Ali Shah, by which they had agreed to give him a subsidy of £200,000 on condition of his maintaining a corps of 12,000 regular infantry and 25 pieces of cannon. In spite of this assistance the army commanded by Abbas Mirza was continually beaten on the Araxes, Georgia was conquered by Russia, and, later, the Treaty of Turkmanchai was the only means of stopping the conquerors within six days march from the capital. The English instructors had meanwhile remained about twenty years in Persia with enormous salaries."

It may here, however, be asked whether Persia really had gained in military strength by the institution of a regular army on the European plan and by the employment of European officers, armament, ammunition, discipline, and skill. All competent authorities say "No." The French and English officers found the men docile and intelligent, but the Persian officers were described by them as the greatest rascals in the world. Led by such superiors, a Persian force brought face to face with European troops was apt to take *saue qui peut* as the general order. But it was in its effect upon the military spirit and resources of the country as a whole that the disastrous consequences of the change were most seriously felt. Prior to the reign of Fath Ali Shah, the military strength of Persia had consisted in its inexhaustible supplies of light horsemen, furnished by the tribal chieftains, who, on the feudal basis of a military contribution, preserved a nominal independence. Each of these great khans, or *Ikhanis*, lived in state and in comparative isolation from the central authority, among his own clansmen, keeping large studs of the finest breeds of Persian, Turkoman, and Arabian horses, and encouraging the spirit of horsemanship and patriotism among his followers. This system was absolutely broken down by the policy, or fears, of Fath Ali Shah, who set himself to disintegrate the authority of these feudal barons, and, shearing the locks of the Persian Samson, found, when it was too late, that he had sacrificed his strength. Colonel Stuart ("Journal of a Residence," p. 216) relates that General Yermoloff, formerly commander-in-chief in Georgia, could not conceal his joy when he was told that Abbas Mirza had begun to form a regular army, saying that he should now be able to get at the Persians, which he never could do before. This opinion Colonel Stuart heard fully confirmed by Count Woronzow at Odessa:—

"The Count related several particulars which occurred in the campaigns of 1802-3 against Persia. . . . At that time there were no *serbaz*, but the irregular horse were so active and intelligent that the Russians were constantly harassed at all points. They could not stir from their camp, and one morning whilst beleaguering Erivan they suddenly found themselves surrounded by Fath Ali Shah and all his forces. The only wish then felt by the Russian officers was that the Persians would endeavour (as they since have under our auspices) to organise a 'Nizam,' become tangible, and abandon their Parthian tactics!"

Not less emphatic was Sir John Malcolm, who saw clearly

22

35

that in a country so backward as Persia, and possessing governing institutions and a national character so foreign to the civilised idea, it was to an irregular army alone that the safety of the kingdom must be confided. In the twenty-first chapter of his "History of Persia" he says:—

"An army cannot be maintained in a state of discipline and efficiency for any length of time unless its pay be regular and its equipment complete, and this can never be the case except in a state where the succession to the throne is settled, where the great majority of the population are of peaceable habits, and where the establishments are permanent and the laws respected and administered upon principles well understood, and not liable to be altered at the will of the sovereign and of his delegates. That a regular army, by the influence of its example and habits of order, may be instrumental in promoting civilisation, there can be no doubt, but this change must coincide with many other reforms, or every effort to render it effectual to the great end of national defence will prove abortive, and terminate in disappointment."

The highest authority, however, that can be quoted is that of Sir Henry Rawlinson, who was himself an officer in the Persian army, and enjoyed unrivalled opportunities of forming a judgment upon the matter. These are his words:—

"It can be proved that whatever benefit Persia may have derived, as far as regards the centralisation of the power of her monarch, from the introduction into her armies of European discipline, she has been as a substantive power progressively weakened by the change, and rendered less capable of sustaining pressure from without. . . . To a nation devoid of organisation in every other department of government a regular army was impossible. It thus happened that, notwithstanding the admirable material for soldiery which was offered by the hardy peasantry of Azerbaïjan, and the still harder mountaineers of Kermanshah, notwithstanding the aptitude of the officers to receive instruction, notwithstanding that the due portion of physical courage appertained generally to the men, the disciplined forces of Persia were from the epoch of their first creation contemptible. Beyond drill and exercise they never had anything in common with the regular armies of Europe and India. System was entirely wanted, whether in regard to pay, clothing, food, carriage, equipage, commissariat, promotion, or command. At the same time a false confidence arose of a most exaggerated and dangerous character; the resources of the country were lavished on the army to an extent which grievously impoverished it; above all, the tribes, the chivalry of the empire, the forces with which Nadir overran the East, and which, ever yielding but ever present, surrounded, under Agha Muhammad Khan, the Russian armies with a desert, were destroyed. Truly, then, may it be said that, in presenting Persia with the boon of a so-called regular army in order to reclaim her from her unlawful loves with France, we have clothed her in the robe of Nessus." ("England and Russia in the East," p. 30.)

In 1814 when the reverses of Napoleon appeared to have completely closed a soldier's prospects in Europe, many officers sought and found in the troubled regions of the East an ample field for the gratification of their passion, and a number of them, having come to Persia, were engaged by the Crown Prince Abbas Mirza and by Muhammad Ali Mirza, the Prince-Governor of Kermanshah and Kurdistan, and drilled the Persian troops after the disappearance of the greater part of the English detachment in 1815. Of these officers, five Frenchmen and four Italians entered the service of Abbas Mirza, eight others (among them Devaux, Court, Oms) found

employment under the Governor of Kermanshah.* In 1816 a Colonel Gaspard Drouville, a Frenchman, and colonel of Russian cavalry, formed a regiment of lancers in Azerbaïjan, which in 1819, when he left, was passed on to Lieutenant G. Willock. Of the officers who found employment under Muhammad Ali Mirza, two Frenchmen, two Italians, and one Spaniard were still at Kermanshah when Captain the Hon. George Keppel ("Personal Narrative," London, 1827) visited that city in 1824. "They were all Khans, and Knights of the Lion and Sun as well as of another order, the insignia of which were a star with the curious device of two lions fighting for the Persian crown, instituted by the late Prince, who, heretofore ignorant of the value attached to ribands in Europe, was surprised and gratified to find that his European auxiliaries were content with so cheap a remuneration for their many and important services." They apparently occupied much of their time by quarrelling amongst themselves, for "the pitch to which duelling had at one time been carried by the European officers in the service of the Prince of Kermanshah at once excited his astonishment and alarm." Señor Oms, the Spaniard, was a "ruffian," who was sent to prison for conduct which Keppel describes as "having motives as diabolical as they were dastardly." Of the officers under Abbas Mirza, Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, a British officer travelling in Persia in 1817, says:—

"Seeing that our Government will not permit any of its officers or soldiers to remain in the Persian service or take part in any act of hostility against the Russians, the Persians are employing our ancient rivals the French. When we travelled through Persia there were five officers of that nation and four others of Italy and Sicily, whom the Prince had at once raised to the highest ranks. These officials drilled for some time according to English system, but abandoned that system a short time ago."

And Moritz von Kotzebue, a brother of the German poet and attached to Yermoloff's fruitless mission to Persia in 1817, adds:—

"The Italian officers had, it seems, not succeeded in finding the philosopher's stone in their own country they bore the rank of officers; but appeared to be men of low origin, and one of them said that he had come to Persia because he had found the climate of Sicily too hot for him."

On Abbas Mirza's troops we take the following from Johnson:—

"There are now in Persian service 1,000 Russian deserters. The army consists of about twenty battalions, but the soldiers are on active service for only three months during the year, passing the remainder of the time in their villages. The pay of a soldier is at the rate of ten tomans (then £9 16s.) per annum, and on active service he receives daily two pounds of bread. He also receives one toman per annum for his uniform, and an overcoat every three years. The foot artillery receives the same pay, but the horse artilleryman has 15 tomans (£14 14s.) per annum. The pays of the officers vary according to circumstances and individuals; every man makes his own con-

* R. C. Money, who visited Kermanshah in 1825, saw three of these officers, who were not much respected because they dressed like Persians, "beard and all."

'Report on the Persian Army' [24r] (47/170)

37

ditions and tries to obtain the best terms, while the official who enrols him tries to cut down the pay as much as possible. Two superior officers of artillery and infantry of our Indian army have a yearly pay of 850 tomans (£816), and the subalterns receive 350 tomans per annum. Any Englishman who can fulfil the duties of an officer can easily obtain a pay of one toman (19s. 2d.) per diem. Mr. Armstrong, an excellent mechanic, receives 800 tomans (£768) per annum for superintending the construction of mills, and Mr. Williamson, a mineralogist, is working copper mines with the choice of having either half the profits or an annual salary of 1,200 tomans (£1,102). . . . We inspected the artillery and found it in a most pitiful state; there were some 6-pounders, which they called mountain guns, mounted on low and light carriages for transport on mules and about twenty-four 9 and 12-pounders, all cast at Tabriz. This was all the artillery for the defence of Tabriz and probably for that of the frontier, and it is doubtful if the ammunition in the stores was sufficient for it. The pieces are fairly well cast and bored, but the carriages, particularly the iron parts, are much inferior to what we have in India, and altogether there are hardly any small fortified places in India which are not better provided with cannon and munitions for the defence of the town than Tabriz."

At the time of Colonel Johnson's visit Abbas Mirza was repairing the fortifications of the city.

"The Prince was repairing the ramparts, but would not listen to the advice of Captain Monteith, the engineer officer, seemingly depending more on the prayers of the chief priest, which, however, will not help him much against Russian artillery. The town has two walls. The inner wall is of earth, but is flanked by towers of brick; it is about 20 feet high and has a parapet which is much weakened by barbicans and holes cut into it for throwing stones through. The rampart as well as the parapet is full of cracks, and a few cannon shots would suffice to knock them down, and in fact the wall in its present state only increases the danger to which the defenders would be exposed through the enemy's fire, for with the first shot of the enemy bricks and stones would fly in all directions. Also a defence of a high and narrow wall is dangerous here on account of the earthquakes which frequently happen, besides, it could only stop an enemy who had no artillery. The outer wall consists of a high, narrow parapet on a scarp, which is entirely of earth and already, before being finished, slipping down under its own weight. The distance between the two walls is in many places not more than 10 feet, and in others 20 to 30 feet. The ditch has a depth of 20 feet and is 30 to 40 broad. Its sides are constructed of stone; in order to give cover to the walls a mass of earth has been thrown on the counter-scarp, and they have not considered that this will also give the enemy cover from the fire from the ramparts when he has reached the foot of the wall. They have committed another mistake in letting houses and watercourses touch the ditch, and they are now building some barracks contiguous to the town wall, which should not be done in any fortified place. On one of the sides stands a building called the citadel, but it is merely an advanced part of the rampart separated from the city by a simple earth wall."

Kotzebue had many opportunities of seeing Persian troops, and being in the suite of General Yermoloff, for whom all possible preparations had been made in order to show him the great power of the "invincible army" and thereby obtain easy conditions in the settlement of the frontier questions, no doubt saw the soldiers at their best. He relates as follows: On the third day of May, 1817, the Ambassador was received at Erivan by a body of 2,000 sarbaz (regular infantry) and six pieces of horse artillery. The troops presented arms, and the drums and fifes played the English hymn, "God save the King."

Six days later, when the Embassy arrived at Tabriz, the garrison was drawn up outside of the city in a line extending

from the bridge over the Aji Chai to about six miles away to the north. There were 48 pieces of horse artillery, eight squadrons of regular cavalry, 8,000 men regular infantry, and a large body of irregular cavalry.

"The introduction of discipline in the army and the formation of the artillery within a few years are entirely due to Abbas Mirza, who has in so short a period, with the assistance of able English officers, achieved a great deal. Only those who are acquainted with the pertinacious obstinacy of the Persians and their dislike of every innovation can form any conception of the obstacles which the Prince has had to surmount. Nothing less than the appearance of so enlightened a prince, a phenomenon in Persia, could have produced such a reform in the Army. His principal attention has been directed to the infantry and cavalry. The infantry has blue or red tunics made of English cloth; the cavalry has blue tunics trimmed with cotton lace; the officers have gold or silver lace, and wear red silk sashes as are used in the English army. Wide, white trousers are generally worn, and the head-dress is the national hat or cap of Persia, which, however, does not suit the uniform. Instead of slippers the military now wear boots, but only after having been encouraged by the example of Abbas Mirza. The muskets are sent from England, but there is a cannon foundry at Tabriz, where good powder is also made. The manoeuvres are simple, and only meant for moving the troops in bodies and in making them fire regularly. The horse artillery and cavalry are provided with English sabres, the infantry have no side arms, and only occasionally bayonets."

At the time of Kotzebue's visit to Tabriz there were the English officers, Major Lindsay, Major Macintosh, Captain Hart, Captain Monteith, and Lieutenant G. Willock. There was also Dr. Cornick. At a review of 18 pieces horse artillery and some troops Abbas Mirza took his position in front and ordered the cavalry to manoeuvre.

"This produced a ludicrous scene; the aide-de-camp, who stood at a distance and had to carry the Prince's orders to the commanding officer, was on foot and in slippers, and when zealously running to and fro looked for all the world like an angry shrew in full chase after her husband. When the cavalry manoeuvres were concluded the artillery, which owes its formation to Captain Lindsay, was inspected. The men shot with remarkable skill at a distant target, and although they did not hit it, yet every shot fell close to it."

From Tabriz, General Yermoloff went to Sultanieh in order to be received by the Shah (Fath Ali), who arrived there on 19th July with 500 Zambureks, "the men clothed like clowns and wearing caps with red feathers," and a flying battery of 18 pieces. Muhammad Ali Mirza, Prince-Governor of Kermanshah, also came, accompanied by 15,000 irregular cavalry and 29 pieces of artillery. There was also some infantry, which was being drilled daily, but could not be compared with that of Tabriz.

"The sentries who guarded our camp used to give one another their muskets when they wanted to go away, and frequently a soldier was seen to hold several muskets. The sentries also often stopped and plundered persons who were passing, and we were constantly called out of our tents in order to restore the property which the sentries had taken. These poor devils of sentries had a hard service to perform. Their officers mostly forgot them altogether, and left them at their posts all day; yet some of the men, who apparently had not fully acquired European discipline, gave their officers a hint when it was time that they should be relieved."

General Yermoloff was unable to come to an understanding with the Persian authorities, and the frontier questions continued to cause difficulties and were only settled by the war which ended with the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828. Colonel Johnson, who saw much of what was going on while Yermoloff was in Persia, says :—

“General Yermoloff's endeavours have not had any result. The Persians imagine that the small increase of their army makes them powerful enough to oppose the Russians. They speak of their former successes against the Russians, and explain Yermoloff's mission as having been dictated by fear. They forget the want of union which reigns amongst themselves, and do not seem to be aware of their political decline. They ignore the great change which has taken place in the Russian army, the great superiority of talents which distinguish its officers, and, above all, the experience which the Russian commanders have acquired in the last war. They consider all the reports of the immense forces which Russia has to-day as empty boasts raised for political purposes, and, unfortunately, the authorities share the ignorance of the people.”

Colonel Johnson also deprecated the institution of a regular army for Persia, and adds :—

“Persia possesses natural means of defence which European armies cannot surmount, and whenever she intends to attack or to plunder she is certain of finding a great number of intrepid champions among the nomad tribes, who from the heights of their inaccessible strongholds always hail the approach of regular troops equipped with all modern luxuries with joy, for, as they themselves have nothing to lose, it promises them abundant booty without risk.”

In a campaign in Khorassan in 1818, according to a statement of the Armenians at Astrakhan quoted by Jaubert, a body of regular infantry was defeated by an equal number of undisciplined Turkomans. In 1819 the regulars of Azerbaijan under Abbas Mirza consisted, according to Moritz Wagner (“Reise nach Persien,” Leipzig, 1852), of six corps of infantry, and a small number of cavalry under Lieutenant G. Willock. There were also 36 guns and howitzers.

After 1819 the British officers gradually left the Persian service, and only Captain Hart remained as commander of Abbas Mirza's bodyguard. Then ensued a long period of apathy, until, in August, 1826, war with Russia broke out on the north-western frontier. The effects of this apathy were soon visible, and Persia cut a very sorry figure on the battlefield.

During the first few weeks of the war, when Yermoloff, the Russian commander-in-chief, had taken no measures to guard against surprise, the Persians carried all before them and caused heavy losses to the Russians, but Persian reverses, unfortunately hastened by treachery and divisions in the Persian camp, soon followed, and the Persians, in spite of much bravery on the part of some troops that was fully recognised by Paskievitch,*

* Colonel Stuart (p. 389) says : “Paskievitch certainly acquired a good reputation in Persia by his conciliatory manners and the maintenance of strict discipline among the troops. He says he had never more than 15,000 men in his army. At Genjeh the Persian serbaz behaved at first with great gallantry; he thought it right, for the sake of *morale*, to leave a good position and attack the Persians in the plain; the latter advanced to

who replaced Yermoloff, were defeated all along the line. The war, which lasted about a year and a half resulted in Persian discomfiture, and practically ending when the Russians entered Tabriz, 27th November, 1827,* found its close in the Treaty of Turkmanchâi in February, 1828.

Regarding the Persian forces immediately before and during the war, Dr. E. Eichwald gives the following particulars in his "Reise auf dem Caspischen Meere und in den Kaukasus" (Stuttgart, 1834-37):—

"Abbas Mirza employed French and English officers, and formed regular troops to the extent of 18 battalions of sarbaz. He also erected a cannon foundry and a gun factory at Tabriz, from which his army was supplied with cannon, muskets, pistols, etc. The Shah also formed some regular infantry, but this was known as *Janbaz*, and there were only 10 battalions of it. The Persian irregular troops are composed of the nomad tribes, and there are 50 tribes, numbering 439,600 families, viz.: 15 Turkish with 92,000 families, 18 Kurdish with 149,600, 9 Lur with 157,000, and 8 Arab with 41,000 families. Every five families being obliged to furnish one armed horseman, Persia's irregular cavalry consists theoretically of 87,900 men, but this number can be increased considerably. Since the introduction of regular infantry the irregular cavalry has been somewhat neglected, and has, in consequence, much declined in efficiency. The Kurds make the best cavalry. The '*gholams*,' who form the bodyguard of the Shah and other members of the royal family, number about 8,000, the Shah having 2,000 and Abbas Mirza 1,800. It is not possible to estimate the number of the irregular infantry, which, since the introduction of sarbaz and janbaz, is used only for garrisoning fortresses.

"Before the outbreak of the war Erivan, Abbasabad, Serdarabad, Teheran, and Meshed were garrisoned by Mazandarani tufangchis numbering 5,000 altogether. The sarbaz consisted of the following *foj* (battalions):

- "1 Khaseh (Guards).
- "1 Tabriz.
- "1 Mazandaran.
- "1 Nakhchivan.
- "2 Erivan.
- "2 Shakaki.
- "1 Maragha.
- "1 Gerrus.
- "2 Urumia or Afshar (with the remains of Colonel Drouville's dragoons).
- "1 Russian deserters.
- "1 Khoi.

within fifty paces of the Russians, halted, and commenced a sharp fire by platoons. Paskievitch charged their line in front and flank, a mode of attack which puzzled them, and they were soon completely broken; but he confesses that *the fate of Georgia was for a moment doubtful*. . . ."

* Fowler, mentioning that the Petersburg newspapers reported that the Russian troops took Tabriz after an obstinate resistance on the part of the Persians, and captured a number of colours, also that the governor of the city gave up its keys, states that there was no resistance whatever, Colonel Espejo riding into the town unmolested with a few Cossacks; Paskievitch came later; that the eight "captured colours," which he afterwards saw in the Kremlin at Moscow with the inscription, "Taken by Count Erivansky at Tabriz," had been ordered in the bazar long after the arrival of the Russians and duly shot at before despatch to Moscow, and that the keys had been specially made by "M. A. Khan," who was instructed to make them look as ancient as possible. He observed that there were fifteen keys, although Tabriz had only seven gates.

'Report on the Persian Army' [26r] (51/170)

41

- "1 Ardabil.
"1 Karadagh.
"2 Hamadan.

"The battalions of Khoi, Ardabil, Karadagh, Gerrus, and Hamadan were formed just before the outbreak of the war. There were also two foj at Isfahan, three others were maintained by the Governor of Kermanshah, and two by the Governor of Burujird. Each foj consists of 1,000 men and 100 dahbashes (corporals, commanders of ten). There were therefore, with the ten foj of the Shah, 35 battalions of regular infantry, numbering 38,500 men, and the whole available forces of Persia at the outbreak of the war were:—

38,500 regular infantry.
87,900 irregular cavalry.
8,000 gholams.
5,000 tufangchis.

139,400 men.

"The artillery was as follows:—

- 3 twelve-pounders.
5 " cast at Tabriz.
1 nine-pounder.
3 " taken from the Turks.
54 six-pounders.
4 " at Erivan.
4 four-pounders.
3 two-pounders, mountain guns.

77 altogether.

"Forty-two of these pieces formed the field artillery organised by Abbas Mirza. There were also in the arsenal of Tabriz 18 falconets and 15 incomplete pieces of various calibre, and the Shah had 18 pieces, the Governor of Kermanshah 12, and there were 4 at Burujird and 12 at Shiraz. There were also some guns in the various forts, but it was difficult to obtain any information as to their number.

"Against this considerable force, Russia had only a small number of troops in the Caucasus. The whole army there numbered only 34,150 men, and was distributed over a vast area in order to suppress the never-ceasing risings of the hill tribes. Sickness had reduced most of the regiments to three-quarters of their strength, and deducting from the total strength of 34,000 the sick and the men necessary for guarding the outposts and maintaining order in the various districts, General Yermoloff had only 15,000 men to oppose against Abbas Mirza, who entered Karadagh with 40,000 men and was joined there soon after by about 20,000 from Karadagh and Talish."

So far Dr. Eichwald, whose statements as to the strengths of the Russian and Persian armies at the outbreak of the war are fully corroborated by Prince Jehangir Mirza, a son of Abbas Mirza, who took an active part in the war and related his adventures in the "Tarikh i No." By the terms of the Treaty of Turkmanchai Persia had to pay a heavy war indemnity, which crippled her resources for a long time, and lost her Caucasian provinces. Jehangir Mirza states that the Russians also carried off all guns and munitions from Azerbaijan with the exception of 50 guns at Ardabil, took away 25,000 muskets and bayonets, and the taxes of the province for one year. According to the same author, General Paskievitch's* parting advice to Abbas Mirza at Turkmanchai was:—

* Ivan Fedorovitch Paskievitch, Count of Erivan, Prince of Warsaw, born 19th May, 1782; lieutenant 1800; major-general 1810; adjutant-general [619]

"It is evident that you have had much sorrow and suffered great losses from my Government both in the first and in this last war, and as you are the heir-apparent and will, no doubt, occupy the throne one of these days, you will certainly always think of revenge and ways to retrieve your losses, but permit me to tell you, as your sincere friend, always consider the friendship of the Emperor and peace with Russia as of greater advantage to you than anything else, and believe that a war with Russia will always be the worst that could happen to you. I hope you will never forget this."

It was but natural that after the war, when the treasury was exhausted, the army should have been neglected and considerably reduced, and if serious troubles had not broken out in the interior of Persia, to suppress which necessitated resource to armed force, the army would probably have altogether ceased to exist. Under the year 1830, Jehangir Mirza writes:—"The army has been neglected for two years, the payments are much in arrears, and the total force consists of only 14 foj and 50 guns." But Abbas Mirza, who soon after was also appointed Governor-General of Khorassan, was a man of resources, obtained money, as Jehangir Mirza relates, by appointing new deputy-governors to all sub-provinces and districts and getting a *pishkash* from each, paid the troops, and got together quite a respectable army, with which he quickly restored order in the revolted provinces. "His successes, however, had a most unfortunate effect upon the temper of the Persians, who became inflated with unreasonable pride and thought themselves good enough to conquer any enemy without European assistance."

J. H. Stocqueler, who travelled in Persia in 1831, gives the following information on Persian military matters at this period ("Fifteen Months' Pilgrimage," London, 1832):—

"The disciplined forces of Azerbaijan consist of about 12,000 infantry, 1,200 horse artillery, and one regiment of lancers, drilled and organised according to European fashion. These are divided into 10 battalions of Persians and 2 of Russians, deserters from the army in Georgia.* The

1823; commander-in-chief Persian war, 1826-28, Turkish war 1829, Polish campaign 1831, Hungarian campaign 1849, forces on Danube 1854; Governor-General of Poland until his death 1st February, 1856. He was honorary field-marshal of Austria and Prussia since 1850, his jubilee of 50 years' military service.

* One of the most curious elements in the Persian army at this time was this corps of Russian deserters. Already, quite at the beginning of Fath Ali Shah's reign, a number of Russian deserters served in Abbas Mirza's army, and introduced the first ideas of European tactics into Persia. In 1822 Fraser estimated their number at 700 to 800. In 1826 a few hundred Russians were taken prisoner at the battle of Khunzerukh, and enlisted themselves in Persian service; Conolly in 1829 believed "that there were seven to eight thousand Russian deserters in Persia, 3,000 serving with the army . . . they were all Mussulmans." Jehangir Mirza mentions 400 as "just having arrived from Russia," in 1833. Those in the infantry were called *Bahaduran* (grenadiers) and were many years commanded by Samson Khan, a Russian sergeant-major, who deserted his countrymen, married the daughter of the Vali of Georgia, betook himself to Persia, and rose to high rank. He was wounded at the siege of Herat in 1836, and died some years later. The deserters were well paid, and fought well for their new masters until finally disbanded about 1840. Colonel Stuart described them in 1835 as "wearing heavy shakos with high green plumes, red coutees with wings of blue cloth and white lace, loose white trousers, and high boots."

27

43

battalions are named after the provinces in which they have been raised, a system of distinction which might, during periods of domestic convulsion, produce unfavourable disunion in the army, but has hitherto operated as a stimulant to emulation. The battalions are :—

- 1 from Tabriz.
- 1 „ Hamadan.
- 1 „ Khamseh (Zenjan).
- 1 „ Maragha.
- 1 „ Khōi.
- 1 „ Karadagh.
- 2 of Shakakis.
- 2 „ Afshars.
- 2 „ Russians.

“The artillery consists of 25 pieces of different calibre and forms the most useful and efficient branch of the army, having called forth the encomiums of the Russian officers. The uniform of these troops is a green jacket, excepting the guards who wear red, wide and loose white trousers, and boots reaching to the knee; the headdress is a black lambskin cap. The pay amounts to one toman per man per month during the time he is actually embodied, which, excepting when engaged in a campaign, is generally for about eight months a year. The guards and the Russian regiments receive pay during the whole year. Some Persian officers have as much as 600 and 800 tomans per annum. The European officers are rewarded according to the degree of estimation in which they are held by the Prince, and the importance of their charges. The expense of the Azerbaijan army—pay, equipment, provisions, etc.—is about 200,000 tomans per annum. No bounties are granted to the men entering the regular army, but on their retirement, if their service has been meritorious, they are rewarded with presents, grants of land, pensions, medals, and Orders of the Lion and Sun. While the Government is anxious to recompense merit, it is not slow to avenge dereliction of duty. Military flogging, as practised in the English army, arrest, imprisonment and degradation from rank visit the minor offences of soldiers, and in extreme cases the criminal is shot or blown away from the mouth of a cannon. As bounties are not given, it may be concluded that enlistment is not always voluntary. Certain districts, towns, and tribes must furnish a stated quota of men, and the best formed and most active are chosen. After a term of service they can generally get their discharge. Attached to the army is a commissariat, or quartermaster and quartermaster-sergeants, who are charged to collect provisions from districts and distribute them to the men. These functionaries are under the immediate orders of some officer of rank, who issues requisitions to the chiefs of districts, towns, villages, who supply what is required, receiving receipts in due form, which are passed to their credit in the revenue accounts. In parts of the country much oppression and irregularity occur in the collection of provisions. The camp equipage attached to the regular forces consists of tents, cooking utensils and a small quantity of baggage for each man. The whole is carried on mules, horses, or asses according to circumstances. The officers of the regular army are partly sons of the nobility, who have served for a certain time as ‘begzadehs,’ or cadets; the rest are the chiefs of tribes where, as is often the case, the regiment is raised of that tribe. The number of European officers is now greatly reduced. Messrs. Shee, Burgess, Littlejohn, and Borowsky are the only gentlemen now in the Prince’s service.* There are

* Besides these four Europeans mentioned by Stocqueler, there were many others, but only a few are mentioned in the works and documents which I have been able to consult. Colonel *Shee* was many years in the Persian army and rendered much service; we shall hear of him afterwards. *Burgess* started a printing establishment for Abbas Mirza in Tabriz, and also did some trading in European goods; Colonel Stuart in 1836 mentions the Shah’s ordering his court not to buy any goods from Burgess. Of *Littlejohn* I have only Stocqueler’s note and a nursery rhyme which is still remembered by some old people of Shiraz, and mentions him as liking

also seven or eight European sergeants with the army—good drill masters, but of no other material value.

"The irregular forces of Persia may be said to consist of all the tribes of the Shah's dominions. They are all bred to arms and fight either on foot or on horseback. The inhabitants of towns also furnish contingents of horse and foot, and about the person of the Shah and all the royal family there are always a certain number of *Gholams* or body-guards, who form a sort of irregular standing army. The superintendent of the Tabriz arsenal was Deputy-Commissary Nisbett. The arsenal was in the ark, where also barracks for some thousand troops were made. The occupants of these barracks were 700 Russians, principally deserters from the imperial army, who now compose a portion of Abbas Mirza's disciplined regiments. They were a fine looking lot of young men, reported to be a submissive, orderly body, not remarkable for any other vice than that of drunkenness, in which they indulged on every pretext or on every opportunity; but then their intoxication is productive of no violence, for a drowsy lethargy steals over their senses, and they slink into a corner to sleep themselves into sobriety. One thousand of them suffered themselves to be marched into Tabriz as prisoners of war; they had muskets and fixed bayonets, but were escorted by a very small number of Persians.

"Considerable attention is paid to the sick of the army. In garrison particular quarters are set apart for the sick, who are placed under the care of native doctors, two of whom are attached to each battalion. When the case is serious the assistance of the British medical officer is called in. In the field the sick are placed in a hospital tent, and when marching are carried on cattle, levied on the country passed over. The medical men march with the battalions."

When Stocqueler wrote the above, Abbas Mirza was in Khorassan occupied in reducing the refractory chiefs of that province to obedience and punishing the *Salor* Turkomans. He had with him about fifty guns, some irregular cavalry, and most of the regular Azerbaijan infantry, including the battalion of Russian deserters commanded by Samson Khan. By the end of the year 1832 Abbas Mirza had defeated the rebel

curds and whey, or *Soordook* as the Scotch have it. *Borowsky*, a natural son of Prince Radzivil (Antoine Henri, who died 1833) by a Jewish lady of Borowsk in Poland, came to Persia with Colonel *Chesney* (Euphrates Expedition) in 1831, and was at once given a high position in the Persian army. Dr. Joseph Wolff called him a Jew on the father's as well as on the mother's side ("Travels," p. 282), and, suspecting him as a spy, warned Sir John Campbell, the British Envoy in Persia, against him; Lord William Bentinck, Viceroy of India, was of the same opinion (Wolff's "Travels," p. 426), but whether Jew or Russian spy, Borowsky greatly distinguished himself in the Persian service, and met the death of a brave soldier on the ramparts of Herat in the assault on that city on June 23rd, 1836. Colonel Stuart (p. 204) and Dr. Fraser (pp. 281, 312) speak very highly of him. Dr. J. Wolff mentions a Major *Stokes* as being in Persian service at this time, and Captain Mignan mentions a Lieutenant *Christian*, but I have not found any further information about them. There was also a Frenchman, *Semino*, who served 27 years in Persia. Born at Nice in 1797, he was sous-officier in the French 84th Regiment in 1813; left France in 1815; fought under Ypsilanti in Greece until 1822; came to Persia 1824; served under Colonel *Monteith*, surveying and mapping Azerbaijan and receiving pay from the East India Company until 1827; then entered Persian service; defined Russo-Persian boundary 1828; accompanied Prince Khosro Mirza to St. Petersburg in 1829, and obtained a Russian pension of £60 per annum; took part in all campaigns of Abbas Mirza 1830-33; attained rank of lieut.-general at siege of Herat 1836-37; resigned after capture of the Salar at Meshed in 1851; left Persia and died at Smyrna some years later.

28

45

Karai and Kurdish Khans by taking their forts of Turshiz, Sultan Maidan, Amirabad, and Kuchan, and annihilated the Salor Turkomans at Serrekhs.* Order was restored in the province, and Abbas Mirza's successes against the Turkomans inspired so much terror throughout Turkistan, that it is said mothers could hush their children by pronouncing the dreaded name of Abbas. In the following year the Prince, having been called to Teheran by his father, Fath Ali Shah, who was induced by some intriguers to suspect him of evil designs, quitted Khorassan, leaving his eldest son, Muhammad Mirza (afterwards Muhammad Shah), as deputy-governor. Shortly before this the forces in Khorassan had been increased by two battalions of Afshar, one of Khoi, and two of Khamseh, 400 Russian deserters "who had just fled to Persia" ("Tarikh i No"), 1,500 Karapapak, Kurd, and Afshar horse, and 1,000 Khamseh horse all brought from Azerbaijan by Khosro Mirza, son of Abbas. The Crown Prince arrived at Teheran 14th June, 1833, and, having satisfied his father that the accusations against him were unfounded, was reappointed Governor of Khorassan 16th July. Before leaving Teheran, he sent instructions to Muhammad Mirza to march against Herat with all available troops, and that prince, taking the invaluable Borovski with him, soon after took the fort of Kuhistan, defeated the Afghans in several engagements, and laid siege to Herat.

In the beginning of October, 1833, Abbas Mirza arrived at Meshed in a very bad state of health, and sent Kayam Makam (afterwards Prime Minister) with 8,000 men and eight guns to reinforce his son before Herat, much regretting that he could not take the field himself. A few days later he died,† and his son, on receiving the sad news at Hazarjirib, close to Herat, immediately raised the siege and proceeded to Meshed, arriving there on the 13th November. Muhammad Mirza was then appointed to the governments of Azerbaijan, Kerman, and Khorassan, which his father had held, proceeded to Teheran, where he was proclaimed heir-apparent (13th June, 1834), and went to Tabriz.

The successes of Abbas Mirza in Khorassan and his son's expedition against Herat re-aroused the languishing solicitude,

* All these places were taken after regular sieges, operations being directed by Europeans, principally *Semino*. There were also Borovski, Stokes, Shee, and five English sergeants. Amirabad, a great stronghold, fell in the latter part of July, 1832, Kuchan 21st September. Serrekhs was taken in November and razed to the ground, most of its inhabitants being slaughtered, and three to four thousand of the survivors brought to Meshed in chains. (Reports of Drs. M'Neill and Gerrard). One of the English sergeants fell at Amirabad.

† The Persian annals record his death as having taken place on the 24th October, 1833, but the tombstone over his grave in Meshed has the 26th. George Fowler's statement that the news of the Prince's death reached Teheran on the 11th of that month must be an error. Dr. Cormick, Abbas Mirza's faithful medical adviser for more than twenty years, died on the 28th at Maiomai while hastening towards Meshed in order to attend his master.

or alarms, of the Indian Government, and a more decisive step in support of British interests was now taken by the Governor-General, Lord W. Bentinck. A considerable supply of arms and accoutrements was despatched to Persia, and in 1834 (28th March), about six months before the death of Fath Ali Shah, there arrived at Teheran a large detachment of officers and sergeants from India with Colonel Pasmore in command, with ample provision for every branch of the service. The members of this mission were received in audience by the Shah on the 12th of the following month. Among the officers there were Sheil, Stoddart, Rawlinson, Farrant, Todd, and a short time after their arrival they were all actively employed in various parts of the country. Lieutenant Rawlinson, of the 1st, or Grenadier, Bombay native regiment (afterwards, 1856, Sir Henry Creswicke Rawlinson, K.C.B., 1859 to 1860 British Minister to the Shah of Persia), was given command of two battalions drawn from the Kurdish tribes of Guran and Kelhur, and in 1836 marched with Balman Mirza, Governor of Kermanshah, through Luristan to Khuzistan, where disorders had broken out; Sheil, a captain of infantry (afterwards Lieutenant-General Sir Justin Sheil, British Minister to the Persian Court, 1844 to 1851, died 1871), was sent to recruit a battalion of light infantry among the Shekaki tribe near Urumia in Azerbaijan; Lieutenant Farrant, of light dragoons (afterwards lieutenant-colonel and Chargé d'Affaires in 1848 during the critical period just before and after Muhammad Shah's death), was sent to Zenjan to form a regiment of lancers; Todd, a lieutenant of Bengal horse artillery (afterwards Colonel D'Arcy Todd, who greatly distinguished himself in Afghanistan), was placed in charge of a few batteries; and Colonel Pasmore went to Sultanabad (capital of Irak) with the object of raising and drilling several battalions; and Stoddart (afterwards colonel, and murdered 1842 in Bokhara), is mentioned in 1836 as being instructor of cadets, twelve ensigns and Prince Sultan Murad Mirza (afterwards Hissam es Sultaneh) being his first pupils.

In 1836, 2,000 rifles and accoutrements and 500,000 flints were despatched from England as presents for the Shah, and Lieutenant Wilbraham (now General Sir Richard, K.C.B.) and eight sergeants of the Rifle Brigade arrived at Tabriz on the 17th June.

Such were the character and the dimensions of the last serious attempt made by the British Government to remodel the army of Persia. This second English experiment was even less successful than the first. Persia was not at the time face to face with an overwhelming national danger, and Muhammad Shah, although inflamed with great ideas of personal military renown, which his Prime Minister, Hajji Mirza Akassi, fostered, neither paid heed to the sound advices for reforming the army, which our representatives repeatedly gave, nor employed the British officers to the best advantage. Then there was the old story: the Shah wanted cash to spend as he liked and we did not give it, hence dislike of the British, which was taken

29

47

advantage of by a number of needy and unscrupulous adventurers and representatives of alien nationalities. Also, the British Government having hospitably entertained and pensioned the three rebel princes who had fled from Shiraz in 1834 and found their way to England caused much mistrust at court and ill-feeling.* These were the causes that the officers were not well received from the start and were frequently subjected to humiliation from the spite and jealousy of their Persian colleagues, which the Persian authorities only rarely attempted to check. When Sir John Campbell, the British Minister, who had done so much for Persia, left Teheran on his return home and was accompanied by all his countrymen half-way to Kerd, the first village on the way to Tabriz, "not one of the many Persian nobles whom he had obliged came out" except Habbib Ullah Khan, the commander of the artillery. (Colonel Stuart, "Journal of a Residence, etc.," p. 182.) Farrant's lancers, a very serviceable body of about 100 men, "after having been nearly starved to death, were sent back to their homes, because their keep would cost four pounds daily." To pay them "would have made the rest of the army jealous. Poor Farrant is indignant and despairing—the Shah wishes him to drill and discipline 100 Gholams, but all sorts of difficulties are thrown in his way, and the Ameer in spite of his professions gives no support" (*ib.*, p. 213). These Gholams fared no better; we read: "Poor fellows, they complain to Farrant every morning, for that villain Nusr Oollah Khan, a relation of the royal family, has hitherto deprived them of their pay and frequently of their food." Colonel Pasmore had the same difficulties with his infantry in Irak: "He gives a pretty good account of the corps which he is employed in forming, but, like all other officers, is indignant at the manner with which they are neglected by the authorities" (*ib.*, p. 238). Here we also read that when Pasmore came to Teheran on leave of absence, and Ellis, the British Minister, accompanied by his staff and a good many officers, rode out to meet him, "not a single colonel made his appearance, although the Hajee (the Prime Minister) had ordered out all the army, which shows the sort of feeling existing in the upper ranks of the army towards British officers." And again: "The British officers are now never informed when a review is to take place" (p. 300). The

* The princes took their departure from England 3rd July, 1836, and proceeded to Baghdad, keeping in communication with the British authorities and regularly receiving their pensions, £200 each per annum. In 1840, when Layard and Mitford came to Persia, intending to travel to India, they were suspected by the Persian authorities of being agents of the British Government and intriguing with the princes at Baghdad for aiding them to raise revolts in Southern Persia, and were detained for a whole month (7th July to 8th August, 1840) in the Shah's camp between Kermanshah and Hamadan. Layard gave up his plan of travelling through Persia (but was soon afterwards in the Bakhtiari country), and Mitford was finally allowed to proceed, thanks to the intervention of Baron de Bode, Secretary to the Russian Legation. (Mitford, "Land March from England to Ceylon," London, 1884.)

British officers are naturally much disgusted with the present state of things. Commanding officers attend to their suggestions or not, very much as they think proper; they hate their interference, especially when it prevents them from amassing money illegally; and latterly they have shown considerable repugnance at the idea of being dictated to by captains and lieutenants. To obviate the latter difficulty Sir H. Ellis suggested to our Government that all the British officers in Persian employ should be given the local rank of lieutenant-colonel or major. This was done in the latter part of 1836 (p. 194). Among the regiments which the officers were expected to lick into shape they found it difficult to contend with the turbulence and rascality, the thieving and drunken propensities, of the officers and recruits. Sheil, after three months' hard work with the Shekakis, wrote: "I begin to think it hopeless to endeavour to establish a regular army." And later, in a note to Lady Sheil's "Glimpses of Life, etc., in Persia," he said:—

"With no power except that of the lash and such authority as from personal character they could acquire for themselves—no control over the pay or rations, which were always embezzled, or over promotion, which was always bestowed from corrupt motives—it is not surprising that the English officers did not effect more than was done. If they could not enable the Persian troops to contend successfully with the regular troops of other nations, they at all events gave the Persian artillery and infantry the means of beating an unlimited number of Afghans, Koords, and Toorkomans, or irregular Persian troops."

It was owing, however, to political and diplomatic rupture in the first place that this second British experiment in Persia broke down. In the second year of his reign Muhammad Shah commenced the execution of a design long cherished by himself but avowedly repugnant to England, by marching against Herat.* The growing ascendancy of Russia and the strained

* This design Count Simonitch, the Russian Minister to the Court of Persia, secretly favoured, principally, as Moritz Wagner ("Reise nach Persien," Leipzig, 1852) thought, with the idea of diminishing British influence and counteracting the English political and military agents in Persia, and probably, if the British Minister had been in favour of the expedition against Herat, his Russian colleague would have opposed it. In spite of Sir Henry Ellis's declaration that the conquest of any part of Afghan territory by Persia would be considered as an unfriendly act, the Shah continued his preparations for the intended expedition. Sir John McNeill, who had been appointed Minister to Persia in February, was now on his way out, and Ellis left Teheran 10th June, 1836. The Shah quitted his capital 3rd July, and McNeill arrived in September of the same year. But insuperable obstacles presented themselves to the fulfilment at this time of the Shah's intentions as to Herat, and, having directed his operations this year against the Turkomans, he returned discontented to Teheran towards the end of the year (Watson, "History of Persia," London, 1866). In the following year (1837), the Shah once more set out to the eastward. He mustered his army at Bostam (near Shahrud, half-way to Meshed), where it was found to consist of about 8,000 effective infantry and 1,500 cavalry. Four battalions and thirty guns had been sent on in advance to Sabzvar. On the 23rd November, 1837, the Shah arrived within a mile of Herat, and on the following day siege operations commenced, directed by European officers and watched by the Shah from a small tent on a hillock. The siege lingered on month after month, the pride of the Shah preventing him from

'Report on the Persian Army' [30r] (59/170)

49

relations with Great Britain were illustrated by the insulting dismissal of all English officers from the royal camp in the summer of 1836, and when after two years of ineffective protests and diplomatic duelling Sir John M'Neill finally hauled down his flag and quitted Persia all British officers in the Persian service were ordered to do likewise. Thus abruptly and futilely terminated the last appearance of British officers upon the parade grounds or battlefields of Persia.

Failure though the experiment may have been, viewed in the light either of immediate consequences or of its bearing upon Anglo-Persian relations, it yet remains true that, such as it is, the Persian army, even at this day, exists only by virtue of what British officers did for it in the past, and that though other nationalities may have stepped in to claim, or more frequently to ruin, the harvest, yet whatever of drill, or discipline, or efficiency, is still found among the soldiers of the Shah, has sprung from the seeds which were so laboriously sown for nearly thirty years by the exertions, and were even watered by the life-blood, of Englishmen.

giving up the enterprise, and the besieged being animated by the skilful efforts of Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger. In March of the year 1838 Sir John M'Neill arrived in the camp and endeavoured to persuade the Shah to renounce his plans, but a few days later Count Simonitch came and gave contrary advice, advanced money to the Shah, and instructed his aide-de-camp, Captain Blaramberg, to undertake the direction of the operations against Herat. M'Neill sent Todd into Herat, and went there himself in order to endeavour, if possible, to conclude a negotiation, being assured before leaving the Persian camp by the Persian Prime Minister that he was at liberty to act for the Shah's Government with as full powers of discretion as he would be invested with if acting in a matter directly concerning the British Crown. The Afghans were willing to make peace, but the Persian Prime Minister's bad faith upset all negotiations, Count Simonitch's counsel prevailed with the Shah, and M'Neill, after many explanations and protests, left the camp in June, arriving at Teheran on the 30th July, and sent Colonel Stoddart to the Shah to say that if hostile operations against Herat were continued all friendly relations with Great Britain must cease. The Shah, "preferring the friendship of Great Britain to the conquest of Herat" ("Tarikh i No"), thereupon raised the siege (9th September, 1838), and returned to Teheran, but some other complications having arisen and the Persian Government giving no satisfaction, M'Neill hauled down his flag and left on the 3rd of January, 1839. Soon after this Husain Khan was sent to Europe in order to renew amicable relations with the Court of St. James. Mitford, retrospectively these events, wrote that "the results of the Russian intrigues which induced the Shah to undertake the march to Herat were that we were plunged into a ruinous and disastrous war with Afghanistan. Russia, when asked to explain, disavowed the acts of her accredited agents, and her Envoy, Count Simonitch, induced either by promises or by threats, confessed that his orders had been to dissuade the Shah from the expedition, but that quite on his own responsibility he had persuaded him. The too zealous agent was made to bear the odium, and the Czar reaped the advantage. Simonitch was recalled to St. Petersburg, where he was soon after found dead in his bed, all his papers being burnt, and this was given out as 'the suicide of a conscience-stricken agent'! These lame explanations were really too barefaced for even English belief, but eventually our *firm* Ministers, after breaking off all communication with Persia for four years, at last overlooked all the insults offered to our officers and sacrificed the honour of the nation and every other point in dispute."

In order not to interrupt the history of the second British military mission to its end I have gone ahead of events, and must now go back a few years to record the doings of the Persian army.

Fath Ali Shah died at Isfahan on the 22nd of October, 1834. The Crown Prince in Tabriz was without money, and his troops had not received any pay for three years, but with the aid of Sir John Campbell, the British representative, and Sir Henry Bethune ("Lindsay Sahib"), who had returned to Persia, all difficulties were soon overcome.* Bethune was placed in command of the troops, and, with Shee as an able assistant, safely and expeditiously conducted the new sovereign, Muhammad Shah, to the capital and seated him upon the throne. (The Shah left Tabriz 16th November, 1834, arrived at Teheran 21st of December, and was enthroned 2nd January, 1835.)

A Frenchman, named Colombari, who entered Persian service in 1833 and later became a colonel of artillery, states in the "Spectateur Militaire, Paris, 1853," that Muhammad Shah reached Teheran accompanied by 40,000 irregular horse, 24 guns and 400 artillerymen, and six battalions of infantry. The Governor-General of Fars, Husain Ali Mirza, Firman Firma, a son of Fath Ali Shah, had already the year before refused to forward the provincial revenues—in fact, it was with the intention of bringing his son to reason that the aged Shah undertook the voyage which caused his death—and was now in open revolt. He had the Khutbeh (the Friday public prayer) read and coins struck in his name ("Tarikhi No"), and threatened to capture Isfahan with an army of 6,000 men. The Shah appointed Firuz Mirza (afterwards Nusret ed Dowleh, Firman Firma) Governor of Fars, and that prince, accompanied by Manucheher Khan, Motamad ed Dowleh, as Vizir, and 2,000 men and 16 guns in command of Sir Henry Bethune and Colonel Shee, left Teheran without delay and reached Isfahan by forced marches just in time to save it. With some slight reinforcements the Shah's troops then proceeded towards Shiraz, defeated the troops of the rebel prince between Komisheh and Maksudbeggi on the 28th February, and a few days later entered the capital of Fars without opposition. Firman Firma and his brother were arrested and sent to Teheran.† The brother was blinded before reaching the capital, and Firman Firma died of cholera shortly after.

* According to George Fowler, Sir John Campbell advanced £20,000 to the Shah, and by personally superintending work at the arsenal, in charge of Mr. Nisbett, for placing the artillery in a state of efficiency, reviewing the troops, paying each man £3 and promising to pay the balance of the arrears on arrival at Teheran, was of the greatest assistance. Fowler adds that the activity and energy shown by Sir John almost made one believe that he intended conquering the throne for himself and his descendants. Sir John accompanied the Shah to Teheran.

† "Tarikh i No" here relates that after the defeat of the Firman Firma's troops near Maksudbeggi, where Hasan Ali Mirza, his brother, commanded, some of his sons and a part of his harem fled *via* Bushire to Turkish territory (three sons afterwards going to England), but Firman Firma, believing in a

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Order having been restored, Sir Henry Bethune left and for some time went to England.

Colonel Shee, who had commanded the advanced guard on the march from Teheran and rendered distinguished services, remained in Fars in command of the troops, and in the following year was fighting the Mamasenis, wild tribes in the hills west of Shiruz, and captured their chief, Bakir Khan. A Mr. Laughton, of the East India Company's Engineers, is mentioned as having been with Colonel Shee.

Sir Henry Bethune returned to Persia in the following year (1836) with a letter from King William to the Shah, and in a re-awakened burst of activity a sum of £2,800 was granted to him for two years for the re-establishment of the foundry, and he was further authorised to lay out £400 in the purchase of musical instruments (Stuart). He was also made an Amir Toman and granted a mining monopoly for the province of Azerbaïjan.*

Good accounts of the army during the period 1834-1838 have been left by Lieut.-Colonel Stuart, who was in Persia as private secretary to the British Envoy, Sir Henry Ellis, from October, 1835, to August, 1836; by George Fowler, who visited Persia three times, in 1829, 1833, and 1836 to 1838, by Captain (afterwards Lieut.-Colonel) Blaramberg, a Russian officer, aide-de-camp to General Count Simonitch, the Russian Envoy, and also attached to the Legation, who was in Persia from 1837 to 1840 and for a short time in 1838 directed the Persian siege operation against Herat; and by others, as Sheil, Dr. Fraser, Baron de Bode, etc. Here follow some extracts from the works of Stuart and Blaramberg:—

Stuart ("Journal of a Residence in Northern Persia," London, 1854):—

"The *military stores* (at Tabriz) are kept in the hospital under Nisbett's superintendence. The greater part have now been furnished to the army. The troops are chiefly supplied with English firelocks, stamped with "John

letter which "the wily Armenian eunuch," Manucheher Khan, had written to him to the effect that Firuz Mirza and the troops now coming would go over to him and assist him against the Shah, quietly remained at Shiraz and persuaded his brother to remain also. He was so convinced of Firuz Mirza's having come to serve him that he made no opposition to the entry of the Shah's troops into Shiraz, and received Firuz Mirza and Sir Henry Bethune in solemn durbar, he sitting on a throne surrounded by princes and courtiers in full uniform. He was much astonished when the visitors, instead of salaaming, laid hands on him and had him carried off.

* This mining concession ruined poor Bethune. A large number of engineers and miners were brought out from Scotland, and works were started on a large scale, even a church was built, and it seems that Bethune himself paid all the expenses. The results did not come up to expectations, and the work had to be abandoned. Fowler states that the principal reason of failure was that the Persian authorities did not keep their engagements, the Shah completely neglecting him. Already, soon after his return to Persia in 1835, his own officers ceased to obey him, and finally, in 1837, the Shah in order to get him away offered him the command of some troops which were to march against Herat. Bethune thereupon resigned. He died at Teheran, February, 1851. I have no information as to whether his salary of £2,200 per annum continued to the end.

Company's" lion; but some are armed with Russian muskets, which are longer, and smaller in the bore than ours. These arms, together with twelve brass 18-pounders, were given to the Shah by the Emperor Nicholas in 1829. Syud (Said) Khan, a clever Armenian, once Ellis's steward, and more recently the self-constituted envoy of Abbas Mirza in England, has lately cast two 6-pounders with copper brought from Karadagh. A boring machine was speedily constructed by the native artisans under the superintendence of Mr. Armstrong, the Russians having destroyed the one formerly in use. Materials for making gunpowder abound in Persia. Lead is plentiful and cheap, iron very dear; flints are brought from Europe (p. 142).

"Serbaz, regular infantry. I went to look at the Serbaz, who were drawn up, unarmed, in line on one side of the Maidan. The lieutenant-colonel (Serhang) walked down the ranks with us, as if marching past, with pointed toes, and elbows close to his sides. He told us that some of the men had served in the last Russian war. Some among them are tall, soldier-like figures, but they have no pretension to uniformity of dress (p. 162).

"I saw the Shegaughee regiment face outwards by wings, and file in slow time into positions at right angles to the former one. The whole battalion lost the step before they had completed ten paces of this scientific manœuvre, but no fault was found (p. 300). Half-an-hour at least elapsed before the colonel of the Shegaughees could get his regiment into a line four deep (p. 241).

"Review of 4,500 infantry and artillery by the Shah. The troops marched past in slow time—a very long and tedious operation. The artillery came first, without their guns, preceded by trumpeters, playing execrably out of tune, lifting their left legs high in the air and coming down with a whack on their heels. This style of marching seems to be the regulation of the Persian army. Next came the Russian deserters. The Shah places great dependence on them in cases of internal rebellion or religious tumult; they are consequently better and more regularly paid than the native troops. They wear heavy schakos, with high green plumes, red coutees with wings of blue cloth and white lace, loose white trousers, and high boots. They are short men, but looked soldier-like and marched past tolerably well. The guards followed, under the command of the Sertip of the guards, Hajji Kassim Khan, who has been a good officer, but is now old and idle. This regiment was formerly under the command of Major Hart, but its former state of drill and discipline has long since vanished. Two skeleton battalions of Afshars, just returned from Khorassan, were dressed in patched coats of all colours, but they marched well and looked like soldiers. The Shah particularly pointed them out to Ellis. "See! see!" said his Majesty, "are they not fine fellows? They have not been paid these three years." The Shegaughees marched past very loosely; they are called light infantry, and some of their companies had no bayonets. The remainder of the troops were mere *canaille*, but all men of thews and sinews. They were dirty, half accoutred, many of them unarmed, and had no idea of stepping together. The rear was brought up by some squads of recruits from Kazvin, stout lads, but neither armed nor clothed, and officered by men with sticks. The rest of the army was prudently kept out of sight (p. 186-188).

"The Persian army is formed in two ranks, and the composition of the cadres and the system of drill, supposed to be enforced, are copied from that of our own infantry in 1812. Since the death of Major Hart, and the retirement of other British officers, the drill and discipline of the Azerbaijani army, which alone was regular, have fallen into complete decay. In the war of 1826-1827 some regiments behaved with firmness, others with the most ridiculous cowardice—the Hamadan regiment ran away at the sound of its own signal gun—but, as far as I can learn, all were totally deficient in the manœuvring qualities of regular troops. The ordinary nominal pay of a serbaz is seven tomans per annum. The guards have ten and the artillery twelve: out of this sum, when paid, there is a deduction of 10 per cent. for the regimental Mirza, who acts as paymaster, or rather as clerk, to the colonel. The troops are likewise nominally allowed three pounds of bread daily, but they do not in reality receive above one-third of their rations, the colonel pocketing the price of the remainder; while the mirza is entitled to one day's rations out of thirty from each soldier. Pay is usually given in

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barats, or orders upon villages or individuals, from whom it can seldom be obtained without bribery or force. The Persian army amounts, *on paper*, to 40,000 men, who, if embodied, clothed, armed, and paid, would cost the Government annually about £336,000 (£8 8s. each man), rather a severe pull upon a revenue of £1,250,000. About 20,000 men were embodied last year (1835), of whom those only from Azerbaijan were armed or clothed with any pretension to regularity. The remainder was raised in Mazandaran and Irak. When new regiments are raised the whole body of officers is usually composed of men who have never before been in the army; boys are frequently given the command, or made majors and captains, by bribery or connection. Captains (sultans) and subalterns are held very cheap, and seldom allowed to sit in presence of their commanding officer. The privates are usually impressed into the service, without any sort of fair conscription, from the district belonging to their colonel, or the tribe of which he is chief. Sometimes men are induced to enlist voluntarily by the promises made to them—not long since a bounty of two tomans was offered for recruits at Uroomiah, but that sum was afterwards deducted from their pay. Service is for life, but sometimes colonels sell discharges to their men. Some corps are composed entirely of Iliats, or clansmen, others of agricultural peasants and citizens; the best corps are those where the two are pretty evenly mixed. The clan spirit often causes men to disobey orders given by the commander of another regiment when troops are brigaded. Whole regiments are occasionally allowed to return home for months, for the sake of saving their pay, and are thus virtually disbanded. They take their arms with them, which by that means always become unserviceable, if they were not so before. Leave of absence is frequently granted by colonels that they may pocket the rations of absentees; another source of emolument arises from lending money to the privates who are very long in arrear, at 100 per cent. interest, and repaying themselves when the pay is in their hands. Clothing is irregularly supplied, and usually of a very inferior material, the colonel pocketing a large portion of the money issued for the purchase of cloth and caps. The colonel likewise punishes men entirely at his own discretion. The Persian soldier is worthy of better treatment. He is hardy, strong, intelligent, patient, and good-tempered; that he should pillage when he cannot otherwise supply himself with food and warmth, or run away from an enemy when his officers set him the example, is not greatly to be wondered at. On the march three hundred asses are allowed for the conveyance of the baggage of a regiment, knapsacks being unknown in the service, and three hundred men are employed in taking care of them! Every soldier quarters himself where he pleases and consequently can never be found when wanted. He has no idea of taking care of his arms (p. 189-193). We met part of the Tabriz regiment on its way to the capital. Some men were mounted on donkeys, some on yaboos (ponies). They all straggled along the road without any attempt at order or discipline. The Azerbaijan regiments have, as usual, committed great depredations on their way up; they killed four men here (Kazvin) in a row, and have destroyed five villages between this place and the next station. The villages on the high road are consequently abandoned. In this case the Serbaz were perfectly inexcusable, as they had recently received considerable arrears of pay (p. 303). Chiefs of tribes now find it a much more profitable speculation (than commanding irregular cavalry) to get the command of a regiment of Serbaz, whom they can fleece and cheat at pleasure. A "moss-trooper," for such was the Iliat of the last century, and indeed as late as the war of 1812, "*nascitur non fit*," and if the Shah was now anxious to raise a body of irregular cavalry, I doubt whether he could collect 10,000 horsemen in many months, instead of the 100,000 who used annually to take the field with his grandfather. The breed of horses is likewise nearly extinct (p. 216).

"As to the Shah's camp on the march to Khorassan, Todd writes to me of the tents: 'If the stars were to tumble down they would probably arrange themselves in similar order.' The camp is in a wretched state, no sort of regularity is observed, the stench is poisonous, and provisions are twice as dear as at Teheran (p. 330). (The camp was then at Firuzkuh.) When the Shah was leaving the capital the troops were knocked out of their quarters by the blows of ferrashes. A major was bastinadoed, and a colonel

who entered the camp late was struck over the head by one of the boy princes (p. 321)."

Blaramberg (Lieut.-Colonel J. F.), in his "Statistical Review of Persia" (in Russian), gives some very useful information on the army at this period. The regular infantry (*serbaz*) consisted of fifty battalions, each of a strength of 1,097 officers and men, or 54,850 men altogether. The fifty battalions were:—

Guards.

- 1 foj Bahaduran (the Russian deserters).
- 2 „ Khasseh, I and II.
- 1 „ Valiahd.

Line.

2 foj Karadagh.	2 foj Khoi.
2 „ Maragha.	3 „ Tabriz.
2 „ Shakaki.	1 „ Merend.
2 „ Afshar.	2 „ Hamadan.
2 „ Khamseh.	1 „ Kazvin.
2 „ Khalej.	1 „ Malayer.
1 „ Gerrus.	2 „ Isfahan.
1 „ Shiraz.	1 „ Demavend.
1 „ Firuzkuh.	2 „ Semnan-Damghan.
1 „ Larijan.	1 „ Nishapur.
1 „ Teheran.	1 „ Kezzaz.
1 „ Irak.	1 „ Rudbar.
1 „ Ferahan.	1 „ Burujird.
1 „ Kemereh.	1 „ Begi-arlu.
1 „ Gulpaigan.	1 „ Bandpei.
1 „ Hazar Jirib.	1 „ Kermanshah.
1 „ Guran.	1 „ Bakhtiari.

Total number of battalions 50.

TABLE I.—Showing the strength of a Persian battalion of infantry in 1838, with rates of pay, rations, and allowances.

	Number in battalion.	Annual pay each man—Tomans.		Daily rations each man in Tabriz batmans of 6½ lbs.			Annual allowance for washing and boots —Tomans.		Total annual pay for battalion—Tomans.		Total daily rations for battalion in Tabriz batmans of 6½ lbs.			Total annual allowance for washing and boots —Tomans.	
		Guards.	Line.	Bread.	Barley.	Straw.			Guards.	Line.	Bread.	Barley.	Straw.		
Serhang (colonel) ..	1	500	300	10	20	30	—	—	500	300	10	20	30	—	—
Xavar (major) ..	2	200	150	4	10	15	—	—	400	300	8	20	30	—	—
Sultan (captain) ..	10	100	60	2	4	6	—	—	1,000	600	20	40	60	—	—
Ajudan (adjutant) ..	1	80	40	1	2	3	—	—	800	400	1	2	3	—	—
Naib avval (1st lieutenant) ..	10	60	30	1	2	3	—	—	600	300	10	20	30	—	—
Naib doyum (2nd lieutenant) ..	10	30	28	1	2	3	—	—	300	280	10	20	30	—	—
Begzadeh (ensign) ..	1	70	40	1	2	3	—	—	70	40	1	2	3	—	—
Beirakdar (standard-bearer) ..	1	50	30	1	—	—	—	—	50	30	1	—	—	—	—
Vakil Bashi (sergeant-major) ..	50	16	9	1	—	—	—	—	800	450	25	—	—	50	—
Dah Bashi (corporal) ..	50	14	8	1	—	—	—	—	700	400	25	—	—	50	—
Baraban Bashi (drum major) ..	1	50	30	1	2	3	—	—	50	30	1	2	3	—	—
Baraban (drummer) ..	50	12	8	1	—	—	—	—	600	400	25	—	—	50	—
Serbaz (private) ..	900	12	7	—	—	—	—	—	10,800	6,370	450	—	—	900	—
Totals ..	1,097								16,810	9,970	597	126	189		1,050

From this table it appears that a battalion of the guards cost the State 16,810 tomans for pay and 1,050 tomans for allowances, while a line battalion cost 9,870 for pay and 1,050 for allowances. Calculating the rations at the prices current at the time, viz., bread at $\frac{4}{10}$ of a kran (8 shahis) per batman of 6½ lbs., barley at 12 krans the kharvâr of 650 lbs., and straw at 5 krans a kharvâr, they would have represented a cash value of 9,613 tomans per annum, and the cost of the fifty battalions would have been as follows:—

One battalion of guards:—

Pay	16,810
Allowances	1,050
Rations	9,613

27,473 tomans.

Four battalions 109,892 tomans.

One battalion of line:—

Pay	9,870
Allowances	1,050
Rations	9,613

20,533 tomans.

Forty-six battalions 944,518 tomans.

Total cost of fifty battalions .. 1,054,410 tomans.

The toman being worth 11s. in 1838, according to Blaramberg, the fifty battalions of infantry, or 54,850 men, cost the Persian Government £579,920 in English money, or nearly £10 1s. 6d. per man, without the cost of arms and ammunition, uniforms and accoutrements, barracks, medical service, etc. But as many battalions were not kept up to their full strength and half of them were not in active service and received no pay, the actual amount spent by the Government for the regular infantry was no doubt less than this amount.

The artillery corps (Tup-Khaneh) consisted in 1838 of 3,093 officers and men, and about 150 pieces of various calibre, 60-pounders to 4-pounders, as shown by the following table from Blaramberg:—

TABLE II.—Showing the strength of the Persian Artillery in 1838, with rates of pay, rations, and allowances.

	Number in Corps.	Annual pay each man —Toman.	Daily rations each man in Tabriz batmans of 6½ lbs.			Annual allowance for washing and boots —Toman.	Total annual pay for corps —Toman.	Total daily rations in Tabriz batmans of 6½ lbs.			Total annual allowances for washing and boots —Toman.
			Bread.	Barley.	Straw.			Bread.	Barley.	Straw.	
Amir i Tufkhaneh (Commander-in-Chief)	1	3,000	30	50	100	—	3,000	30	50	100	—
Serhang (colonel)	2	600	10	20	30	5.8	1,200	20	40	60	11.6
Xavar (major)	8	400	4	12	24	5.8	3,200	32	96	192	46.4
Sultan (captain)	8	125	2	5	10	3.9	1,000	16	40	80	34.2
Naib arval (1st lieutenant)	8	70	1	3	6	3.9	560	8	24	48	34.2
Naib doyum (2nd lieutenant)	8	50	1	3	6	3.9	400	8	24	48	34.2
Ajudan I (1st adjutant)	1	125	2	5	10	2.3	140	2	5	10	3.9
Ajudan II (2nd adjutant)	2	70	1	3	6	2.3	432	19	38	76	43.7
Begzadeh (ensign)	19	28	1	2	4	2.3	224	8	—	—	20.4
Vakil bashi (wachtmeister, sergeant-major)	8	28	1	—	—	1.0	576	12	—	—	24.0
Vakil (sergeant)	24	24	—	—	—	1.0	900	24	—	—	48.0
Sarjuki (corporal)	48	18.71	—	—	—	1.0	720	30	—	—	60.0
Karamachi, shai-purchi (trumpeter)	60	12	—	—	—	1.0	34,644	1,443½	—	—	2,887.0
Tupchi (privates)	2,887	12	—	—	—	—	200	2	5	10	—
Mirza Bashi (chief accountant)	1	200	2	5	10	—	204	8	16	32	—
Mirza (accountant)	8	28	1	2	4	—	—	—	—	—	—
Totals	3,093						47,525	1,667½	344	668	3,252.2

[619]

'Report on the Persian Army' [34v] (68/170)

58

Blaramberg gives the following list of European military instructors in Persian service during the period from 1834 to 1838:—

	Pay.		Rations— Tabriz batmans of 6½ lbs., daily.
	Tomans.	Equivalent English money— £	
General Sir Henry Bethune (Lindsay), at first in command of Persian army, then Director of the Karadagh iron mines; resides at Teheran, has 40 mules when on march	3,000	1,650	60
Colonel Shee, Instructor-in-Chief, East India Company's officer, resides in barracks; has 20 mules on board	1,000	550	30
Lieut.-Colonel Rawlinson	400	220	20
Major Todd, of artillery	400	220	15
Major Farrant, of cavalry	360	198	12
Lieut.-Colonel Wilbraham, of rifles	360	198	12
Mr. Nesbitt, superintendent of arsenal	140	77	8
Dr. Riach, free quarters and 50 Tomans allowance for fire and light	700	385	10
Dr. Bell, free quarters and 40 Tomans allowance for fire and light	360	198	12
1 clerk, English	70	38·5	8
14 English sergeants, 50 Tomans pay per annum each and 3 batmans of rations each	700	385	42
Lieut.-Colonel Stoddart, is attached to the English Legation, but gives lessons in tactics to some cadets	—	—	—
Lieut.-General Borovski (killed at Herat in 1838)	2,500	1,375	—
Baron Emmerich, cavalry officer (killed Ghurian, 1837)	400	220	—
Captain Semino (major-general after Herat campaign, with double pay)	500	275	—
The Bavarian Dotterweis	365	200·7	—
The Italian Barbieri, chief of powder mill	365	200·7	—
	11,620 Ts.	£6,391	229

From this list it appears that the expenditure under the head of instruction was about £7,000 per annum from 1834 to 1838.

The British detachment having retired in 1837 and 1838, the French again appeared upon the scene. Muhammad Shah had the common sense to understand that the possession of his throne was due to the military reforms which the British officers had introduced, and that the ambition of his uncles and some neighbouring states could only be checked by maintaining an army on the European system and strictly disciplined. England being unfriendly at the time, and Russia being too dangerous a neighbour and rival to be trusted with the education and command of Persian troops, it was now remembered that other powers than England and Russia existed, and France having

once before helped, it was decided to ask that nation for some instructors. Husain Khan, Ajudan Bashi (adjutant-general) was sent on a mission to Europe, ostensibly with the object of restoring amicable relations with the British Government, but in reality to go to Paris and get French aid. He fulfilled his mission in France, but was not recognised at the Court of St. James as a diplomatic agent and had only one informal interview with Lord Palmerston. The result of his mission was that twelve subalterns and non-commissioned officers of various branches of the French army and a medical man (Dr. Cloquet) for the Shah were sent out, and that he bought a large quantity of goods in Paris, which Louis Philippe was asked to pay for after his departure from that city (20th August, 1839), and the Shah seized on arrival at Teheran (Wagner), and further, that he received a severe application of the bastinado (Watson). Eugène Flandin, a painter who was attached to the special Embassy* sent to Persia shortly after Husain Khan's departure, relates in his "Voyage en Perse" (Paris, 1851) that the French Government gave twelve non-commissioned officers of artillery, cavalry, and infantry permission to enter Persian service as instructors.

"These young men were well picked, and were not adventurers going to Persia to make their fortunes like so many others before them. They were engaged on a special mission, and retained their positions in the French army. No end of difficulties and all kinds of intrigues rendered their stay in Persia utterly useless. Not a single one of them was able to turn a Persian into a soldier. They remained four years in Persia and returned to France, having done nothing."

When the Embassy arrived at Tabriz these officers complained bitterly to the Ambassador of their sufferings on the voyage out and of the bad faith of Husain Khan, who not only failed to keep the engagements he had made with them in the name of the Persian Government, but did not even satisfy their ordinary requirements. They still wore their French uniforms,

"but were disfigured by the Persian Kulla (high-peaked cap), which was their first experience of the usages of a country in which they had to suffer so cruelly afterwards. Their pay was several months in arrear, and they were in a terrible condition. To alleviate their position was the first business which the Ambassador took in hand. The Persians made many promises, but kept none. The Ambassador did not then know the amount of bad faith on a Persian's tongue, neither was he aware of the fact that payments are never made in Persia on the date they are due. He also ignored the many intrigues which there were for preventing the utilisation of the services which the instructors might render to the Persian army. Russian policy was against it. Russia objected to Persian soldiers—who are naturally brave and disciplined—completing their military education under

* This Embassy left Paris in September, 1839, arrived at Tabriz in January, 1840, and returned to France in the following year without having attained any success. It was composed of the Ambassador, Comte Edouard de Sercey, four secretaries, two interpreters (one was the well-known Biberstein-Kasimirski) a doctor, an architect, and a painter (Flandin). There were also two military attachés, Captain Marquis de Beaufort d'Hautpoul and Captain Vicomte Paul Daru, who gave much useful advice on military matters to the Persians during their short stay in the country.

French instructors. The English, who had aided Abbas Mirza in the war against Russia in order to prevent the conquest of Georgia, also did not wish the Persians to become better soldiers now that the conquest of Georgia by Russia was a *fait accompli*. The zeal of these young officers was already much reduced.*

In the following year (1841) Flandin meets the officers in Teheran "without anything to do and continually begging for their pay"; Mitford, while detained in the Shah's camp near Hamadan in August, 1840, saw some of them, who had come from Teheran for their arrears of pay, amounting to the small sum of £300. Flandin several times calls them *young men*, but Wagner speaks of them as veterans who had fought under Napoleon and left the service. "They gave themselves the title of colonel and wore fancy uniforms of many hues and colours." There was among them a lame old man, Comte Damas, "an impudent charlatan and adventurer," who had been a subaltern officer twenty-five years before, and told the Shah, when he was received in audience, that "he and Napoleon had defeated the Austrians at Austerlitz." At this same audience he seated himself on a sofa before the Shah, remarking that standing up caused him pain, and this act, as well as his martial appearance and his aristocratic manners, so much imposed upon the Shah and Hajji Mirza Akassi, the Prime Minister, that he was made a general on the spot with the pay of a Serdar, and two of the other officers, Delacroix and Pigeon, were appointed his aides-de-camp. (Wagner.) He died not long after.

We have seen the French themselves confessing this second French military mission to have been a complete failure, and it would hardly have been worthy of mention had not one of its members been General J. P. Ferrier, whose memorable journey through unfrequented parts of Afghanistan, then completely unknown, resulted in his interesting work, "Caravan Journeys" (London, 1859), wherein may be found one of the most notable tributes to British rule that was ever paid by a rival pen.†

* It will be somewhat of a surprise to hear that the bad Persian usages as to irregular payments and bad faith of which Flandin and other Frenchmen so often complain are simply imitated from the English. The well-known *Eugène Borée*, who came to Persia at about this time, accompanied by some French priests, as the agent of the Lyons Society for the propagation of the Catholic Faith, writes in his "Lettres de Perse" (Vol. II, p. 355):

"Si nous ne craignons de mêler à un sujet religieux les considérations de la politique, nous ferions remonter la cause de ces habitudes vénales de la Perse à la diplomatie anglaise, achetant l'expulsion du général Gardane et de tous les Français de la Perse, par un tribut annuel de deux millions de francs."

† Ferrier commenced his career by enlisting as a private in the French 1st Regiment of Carabiniers. Afterwards he joined the 2nd Regiment of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, served with distinction in Africa, and gained the rank of adjutant-major. He came to Persia in 1839 with Husain Khan, as a member of the mission, and was made a Sertip (general). Getting into trouble from his known opposition to Russian interests, he was removed from his post in 1843, as he believed, through the intrigues of the Russian Envoy, and returned to France with the vain hope of obtaining the assistance of his

'Report on the Persian Army' [36r] (71/170)

61

Flandin has given much information on the Persian army for the period 1840-42 in his work, "Voyage en Perse," but as most of his information is practically the same as that given by Colonel Stuart and others for the period 1834-38—no progress having been made—it will not be necessary to quote all of it, and I shall give only a part:—

"It was in the camp at Isfahan that we saw for the first time in Persia an appearance of an army, or something resembling regular regiments. The clothes of the men were all in rags; but they had belts, which once were white, and on them was hanging a scabbard for the bayonet. The muskets were mostly without flints, or even without their powder pans. The men were commanded by officers as miserable as themselves, and their whole instruction seemed to be how to carry and present arms. These were the *débris* of the battalions entrusted to the "Talimjis" (instructors) of the Indian army. Only some primitive exercises, useless in battle, have been kept up. The blue tunic of the French has been substituted for the English red coat, and further, to make the force useless for any serious service, it has been armed with English muskets of very inferior make. These arms were so bad that they lost, in a short time, their powder pans, and the bayonets were so badly fitted that the soldiers during the siege of Herat had to tie them to their muskets with their handkerchiefs. These are the battalions called 'guards.' The line regiments garrison the principal towns of the provinces, and are distinguished from the guards by having blue or yellow tunics. All the battalions have fifes and drums; only one battalion of the guards has a band, which plays some marches to the tune of national airs arranged by Germans and Italians. The uniforms of the officers are simple—tunics of the same colour as those of their men, buttoned all the way up, large boots, and a Persian sword. Only colonels wear epaulettes. The artillery is organised as 'light.' The pieces are 6 and 8-pounders, and the gunners are mounted and are armed with English swords. The artillery uniform consists of a thick cloth tunic of dark blue, with red facings, blue or white cotton trousers, and large boots. Their heads are covered with enormous hats of black or grey sheepskin with long wool. The officers are distinguished from the privates by gold braided tunics and three rows of buttons; they also wear epaulettes, but these do not show any distinguishing marks, and I have seen a captain wearing the enormous epaulettes of a Russian colonel.

The Persian possesses the natural qualities which make a good soldier, intelligence, bravery, sobriety, and endurance, but he is altogether without the knowledge necessary to make him redoubtable to his neighbours. The system of conscription based on individual chance is unknown in Persia. Recruiting is left to the good-will of the citizens, or, more often, to the discretion of the governor. When the Shah requires soldiers he sends firmans to all the provinces with the number of men each province must furnish, and according to requirements from 1 to 6 per cent. of the men are enrolled. Only one son in each family is supposed to serve the army. The Persian soldier serves during his whole life unless the Shah dismisses him. During marches the troops live at the expense of the inhabitants. The treasury supplies the salaries, but it sometimes happens that the pay of the soldiers is worth only half by the time they get it, and then only after waiting for it a long time. I have known a regiment which received no pay for two years. Sometimes the unhappy men, forced by misery, are guilty of

Government. Not getting any assistance, he at last determined to seek his fortune in Lahore, and, leaving France in 1845, proceeded to Baghdad, travelled thence in disguise through Persia, and until the following year unsuccessfully attempted several times to pass through Afghanistan. Finally he was forced to return to Persia, and after a short residence in that country in a private capacity, was appointed Juge de Paix in Pondicherry. Some years later he became Sub-Governor of Chandarnagor, where he was, I believe, until his death about twenty years ago.

mutinous conduct, and, arming themselves, ask for their pay. Sometimes they gain redress and obtain tardy justice, but more often it is found more convenient to disband the mutinous regiment, and replace it by a new one. While the Government does not in any way scrupulously observe its engagements towards its soldiers, it yet enforces upon them a severe code of discipline. Desertion is punished very cruelly. When a soldier has deserted orders are published throughout Persia calling upon the inhabitants to capture and deliver him. When he is captured he is made to pass between two rows of 500 soldiers armed with rods, who beat him as he goes through. He must go up and down once. If he survives this punishment—which rarely happens—he is sent away as being unfit to serve in the army. For all other infractions of discipline the punishment is the bastinado, and it often happens that the culprit dies during the application. The recompenses are honorary and consist of decorations, but the higher orders have an intrinsic value which makes them appreciated. There are portraits of the Shah framed in brilliants, large stars in diamonds and rubies having in the centre the Persian Lion and Sun, stars of commanders and others, all in diamonds. Then there are gold and silver medals for bravery. I have seen some men who wore several medals of the same kind, and was told that each medal represented the head of an enemy cut off on the battlefield. The highest rank in the army is that of Amir Nizam, the Commander-in-Chief. Under him are four Serdars who each command 10,000 men. They are stationed at Teheran, Meshed, Shiraz, and Kermanshah. After them come the Sertips and Serhangs, or colonels, who command one or several battalions. Some battalions of 1,000 men are commanded by a Yavar. . . . The regimental colours are a lion and sun in a red ground, the lion's forepaw being like that of a human hand, that of Ali."

The corps of Zambureks, or camel artillery, which had rendered useful services in former times, had been totally neglected for many years and only used on occasions of a tamasha, when Hajji Mirza Akassi in 1847 raised it again to a state of some importance. He used to say, "The horse is the Persian's companion, but the camel is his slave," and always considered that the camel should be employed more in the military service than it was. In 1845 he tried to substitute the camel for the horse in the field artillery, but the experiment did not succeed: the beasts pulled the 8-pounders to which they were harnessed very well so long as they had to go straight ahead, but when it was desired to make them turn, for getting the guns into position, their legs got mixed between the poles and wheels, and fearful confusion ensued. Nevertheless, in 1846, the Hajji had a number of guns for the Khorassan expedition of that year drawn by camels all the way from Teheran, while the horses were led along doing nothing "in order to keep them fresh for meeting the enemy." In the following year he obtained a pattern of a mountain gun from the East India Company, of the kind used in the Afghan campaign and carried on camels. The English gun requiring two animals for its transport, it being of heavier calibre than the Zamburek and having a carriage, the Hajji considered it unsuitable and retained the old weapon, but reorganised the corps. He began by weeding out all old men and all refractory characters, and picked his new recruits from among the most robust camel drivers of the tribes in Irak. The dromedaries also were specially picked, and none less than six years old was accepted.

A vast piece of ground was arranged for a parade ground and enclosed on its four sides by small rooms to serve as

'Report on the Persian Army' [37r] (73/170)

(37)

63

quarters for the men. "The camels required for service were kept on some adjoining ground, while the others were stabled in villages not far from the city." The strength of the re-organised corps was as follows in 1847:—

1 colonel.
2 majors.
4 captains.
8 lieutenants.
25 musicians.
200 gunners and corporals.

—
240

The corps was divided into four dastehs (companies) of 50 men each. The officers were mounted on horses, the 225 men on camels, and there was also a reserve of 20 camels for replacing animals dying on the march. Thus the total number of animals of the corps was 15 horses and 245 camels. The gunners received a pay of 9 tomans per annum, and their uniforms consisted of a blue cloth tunic with red facings, wide blue cotton trousers, high black boots, and grey long-sleeved mantles. Each gunner carried a cavalry sword with white belt. The musicians, whose camels had "superb trappings," announced sunrise, curfew, solemn entries of the Shah into the city, receptions at court, etc., "with drums, tamtams, and clarions." The guns are of iron and 70 centimètres (28 inches) in length, have flintlocks, and, fixed to the breech, a piece of wood 40 centimètres long (10 inches) like the stock of a musket. The weight of the ball is 80 miskals (13 ounces). Each camel carries in two saddle-bags 50 cartridges with ball and 20 cartridges with powder only, the latter for salutes. Colombari, from whose paper in the "Spectateur Militaire" the above details have been taken, proposed some useful improvements, better saddles, better system of mounting the guns on them, increased strength of the company, etc., but Muhammad Shah's death intervened and abruptly ended Hajji Mirza Akassi's artillery reforms. The Zambureks now (1899) in use are, I believe, identical with those of 1847, and the following further details from Colombari's paper may be useful:—

Weight of gun, pivot, and sponge	12½ batmans =	61 lbs. Eng.
" saddle, felt saddle-cloth, girth, bridle, stirrups, ornaments	15 " =	97½ "
" saddle-bags and munition	19 " =	123½ "
" provisions, ½ batman of bread, 1 of barley flour rolled into balls, and 2 of straw	3½ " =	22¼ "
" gunner	25 " =	162½ "
Total weight carried by camel....	75 batmans, or	487½ lbs.

The only useful pace of the dromedary for military purposes is the amble, the trot and gallop (very few camels can be made to gallop) fatiguing the rider too much, and besides completely damaging the load in a very short time. The following table

'Report on the Persian Army' [37v] (74/170)

64

shows the length of the camel's step when ambling under different loads, and the distance the animal ambles in an hour (from Colombari):—

	Weight of load.		Steps per minute.	Length of step.		Distance done per hour.	
	batmans.	lbs.		centim.	inches.	kilon.	miles.
Ambling with a full load	120	780	80	80	32	3.840	2.370
„ „ zamburek load.	75	487	90	110	44	5.940	3.666
Ambling with only rider and saddle.	30	195	100	130	52	7.800	4.814

For quite ten years, from 1838 to the end of the Shah's reign in 1848, no progressive work was done in the army. The unsuccessful issue of the expedition to Herat had done much to cool the Shah's ardour for military matters, and bad state of health prevented his taking any active part in soldiering. The army, as well as all other State departments, was left in charge of the Prime Minister, Hajji Mirza Akassi, whose nepotism and avarice, and absurd cranks and fads, caused disorder and great confusion in all departments. Next to filling his coffers with tomans his principal mania was that of making cannon, arms, and other war material. The arsenals were unceasingly at work, and the money of the treasury was uselessly spent in unserviceable weapons and munitions. Colombari, who seems to have been a partisan of the Hajji, considered the arms manufactured in Persia as good as those of France, but Flandin gives the following account:—

“Hajji Mirza Akassi, an ignorant Mulla, without any knowledge of military art, greatly contributed to the decline of the artillery. He fancied himself a scientific artilleryman, and had taken the whole department of artillery into his own hands. At the arsenal he at first employed German and Russian foremen, who not only did not possess the requisite knowledge for directing the works, but were also continually interrupted and hampered by his absurd fads and capricious innovations. The foremen were also much persecuted by the native workmen, who were jealous. These foremen gradually left, and when we were in Teheran the arsenal was exclusively directed by a Persian who had passed a few months in England, and thought himself quite a man of science. The arsenal was in a pitiful state. Ignorance reigned supreme, and inexperience was met with every step. The cannon which they cast were very defective. Very often the casting was not properly done, and even when it succeeded the result was a cannon which could only have a very short life. In order to show how little reliance should be placed in the Persian artillery I need merely say that the most important operation in the manufacture of cannon, to wit the casting, is the one the Persians are most ignorant of. In this art they are much more backward than they think. They do not follow the modern system of boring the pieces after casting, but cast the piece hollow with the bore ready made. This causes the bore to be irregular, and makes straight shooting impossible. The operation of casting

is done so carelessly that the metal, instead of being throughout of uniform compactness and solidity, has many air-holes and cracks, which cause the cannon to burst. Only one out of every ten cannon which are cast at the arsenal can stand the test, and that one is serviceable for only a short time. The Persians also cannot make good projectiles, and are obliged to depend for such upon their neighbours. One can easily conceive how disastrous such a dependence must be in time of war."

Fortunately for the Persian troops the cannon which Flandin describes were never mounted on carriages or put in use, but piled up in stacks in the arsenal. If they had been intended for service there would have been no animals to pull them. Delacroix, an artillery officer and a member of the second French mission, told Wagner in Tiflis that he was not able to get more than two batteries ready for the field, and that only with the greatest difficulty. Colombari gives the following list of the arms and munitions manufactured at the Teheran arsenal during the eight years following the expedition to Herat:—

"600 bronze cannon of various calibre from 4 to 48-pounder.
200 mortars.
Many zambureks, carbines, and muskets.
20,000 Congreve fuzes.
1,500,000 cannon balls.
Several hundred thousand cartridges of grapeshot and mitraille.
Several thousand tons of gunpowder.
3,000,000 ball cartridge.
6,000 harnesses for horses.
2,000 harnesses for camels."

Not many muskets were made in Persia, as it was found more advantageous to buy them from "English speculators, who delivered them, with the bayonet and including freight to Teheran, at 19 francs (15s. 2d.) apiece." When the Prime Minister had no more money to continue work at the arsenal he invited some high personage to visit the cannon foundry, "an honour which the personage had to pay for with a few hundred thousand francs." He, finally, ordered provincial governors to pay a part of the revenues in gun-metal. Daood Khan, an Armenian who had once been a Russian officer and figures in the Persian annals as "interpreter-in-chief," was, it seems, appointed military instructor-in-chief at the close of the Shah's reign, but he too could not stop the army's rapid march towards utter decay. The discipline which the British officers had introduced was forgotten, and the army was in a very bad state, but fortunately circumstances now brought to the fore a man who gave it some new life.

Muhammad Shah died in a village near Teheran on the 4th September, 1848. The new Shah on his accession and for a year or two after it was too young and inexperienced to have formed any definite plans of his own, and wisely followed the valuable counsel of Muhammad Taki Khan, Vizir Nizam, who had been Deputy-Governor of Azerbaijan since 1843, and shown on many occasions that he possessed extraordinary capabilities. He now saved the position and placed the Shah safely on the throne. His resources and the activity and energy which he dis-

played were, as the author of the "Tarikh i No" states, "wonderful." When the news of Muhammad Shah's demise reached Tabriz, the Crown Prince, now become Nassir ed din Shah, had no funds whatever, and his available forces consisted of two or three badly-equipped battalions in arrears of pay, but Muhammad Taki Khan enabled him to leave Tabriz eleven days later accompanied by 14,000 men and some guns.* Various bodies of troops joined on the road, and the Shah arrived on the 20th November at his capital with the imposing force of 40,000 men. Hajji Mirja Akassi, who had been driven out of the capital the day following the Shah's death and retired since then into sanctuary at Shah Abdulazim, was allowed to go to Kerbela, where he died three months later. Muhammad Taki Khan was now appointed Prime Minister, with the title of *Amir Nizam*, and as a further mark of favour and gratitude, the Shah gave him his sister in marriage and there were public festivities for a week. A fortnight after this the indefatigable Amir Nizam despatched a well-equipped force of 8,000 men and 18 guns, under the command of Sultan Murad Mirza (afterwards Hissam es Saltaneh) to Meshed, where the Salar (son of Yar Muhammad Khan, Asaf ed dowleh) had revolted and defied the authority of Hamzeh Mirza (afterwards Hishmat ed dowleh), the Governor of Khorassan. The serious troubles which broke out in other provinces, notably in Mazandaran, Isfahan, Yezd, Kerman, and Fars, were quelled in a short time, and by the middle of 1849 order was restored throughout the Shah's dominions, excepting in Khorassan, where the Salar's revolt continued until his capture and execution (29th April, 1850). These successes over local pretenders and undisciplined, badly-armed rabbles did not make the Amir Nizam lose sight of the fact that the army required reform, and as an important step towards this object he decided to establish a military college for the education of officers. The Shah too now took great interest in military matters and fully supported his Prime Minister's schemes. During the next two years there was much military activity, and the Persian annals record a goodly array of results. The most important were the following:—

The existing battalions of infantry were brought up to their full complements and sixteen new battalions were formed. All battalions were properly named and numbered and divided into *Tumans* (divisions) of ten battalions each, and every tuman had a special flag on which the names and numbers of the battalions composing it were painted. The sixteen new battalions were the following:—

* Vambéry relates that the Greek firm of Ralli Brothers, then established at Tabriz, helped by advancing a few thousand tomans. "Six months later the Shah sent the amount he owed accompanied by a rich present. On the first parcel was written: 'This is sent by Nassir ed din, the Prince'; on the other: 'This is sent by Nassir ed din Shah.'"

- 3 Isfahan.
1 Ferahan.
1 Kezzaz.
1 Gerrus, commanded by Hassan Ali Khan, who is now
(1899) Amir Nizam, Governor of Kerman.
1 Maragha.
1 Kerman.
1 Turshiz.
1 Kurdistan.
1 Mazandaran.
1 Khalkhal.
1 Khamseh.
1 Afshar.
1 Nishapur.
1 Christians of Urumia and Selmas.

To the last-named *faj* were added some officers and men which were left of the old Bahaduran battalion of Russian deserters, and the command was given to Gabriel Khan, son of Samson Khan. Fourteen battalions were permanently garrisoned in Teheran, four in Tabriz.

The obnoxious system of *siyursat*, by which troops on the march obtained supplies from villages against drafts on the treasury, which were seldom paid, was abolished, and all supplies had to be paid for in cash.

Twelve thousand five hundred irregular cavalry were kept in a state of efficiency so as to be ready for immediate service when required, and 750 Shahseven horse were formed into a regiment of regular cavalry.

Arsenals were opened in Isfahan and Meshed, the former turning out "300 muskets a month, and 50,000 uniforms and 1,000 ammunition pouches per annum," the latter, under the superintendence of Ustad Ali Akbar, making "very good muskets." An arsenal was also started in Shiraz, and the Teheran arsenal "made 1,000 muskets a month, good swords, bugles, bayonets, and artillery fuses which would burn under water."

Prince Bahram Mirza, Muizz ed dowleh, wrote a treatise on the art of war ("Kitab i Nizam i Nassiri dar ilm i Nizam") for the use of officers, and 400 copies of it were printed.

Dr. Cassolani, who had been in practice for some years in Tabriz and was called to Teheran by the Shah, was appointed surgeon-general of the army, and no medical practitioner was engaged as regimental surgeon without having passed an examination before him.

An order was published to the effect that commanding officers of battalions were to accompany their men when going to their home districts on leave and were not to remain behind in Teheran. This was done in order to keep the commanding officers in touch with their men at home and facilitate mobilisation.

Tight trousers and short tunics were introduced at this time,

and the officers were strictly ordered to wear them when on duty.

The new military college which it had been decided to establish was opened in the beginning of 1851, and officers were already receiving some tuition, but neither the Persian teachers nor the few European officers then in Persian service possessed the requisite knowledge, and Muhammad Taki Khan recommended that a superior teaching element should be obtained from Europe. Political considerations again determined the choice of the nation which was to come to the rescue. The British, French, and Russians were not trusted, and Amir Nizam turned to Austria, whose victories over Sardinia in 1848-49 he had heard of, sending Daood Khan to Vienna in 1851, with the object of engaging some military and civilian teachers. Not long after, 24th of November of the same year, the man arrived at Teheran; there were one captain each of engineers and infantry, a lieutenant of artillery, and one of hussars, a mineralogist, a chemist, and a doctor of medicine—seven men altogether.

In consequence of court intrigues, which, unhappily, are of frequent occurrence in Persia, the Prime Minister, Amir Nizam, who had done so much for the country, had been dismissed eleven days before their arrival,* and Mirza Aka Khan Noori, the new Grand Vizir, was no great friend of progress, and being opposed to the new military college, a creation of his predecessor, as well as to the engagement of more Europeans, the Austrians, who had been led to expect that they would be received with open arms, had to encounter many difficulties before they were able to begin their work.

It was fortunate that the Shah took a personal interest in the college, for otherwise the Austrians, who had no diplomatic representative in Persia to protect them, and, having entered into private contracts with the Persian Government through Daood Khan, could not appeal direct to their Government, would probably never have received any pay or done any work in Persia.

* The awful fate of the Amir Nizam is matter of history. He fell a victim to the intrigues of jealous courtiers and their relations in the Shah's harem, and was killed in the garden of Feen, near Kashan, barely two months after his dismissal (9th of January, 1852). Binning, who was in Persia at the time, says that "he was unquestionably an able and clever man, but had many faults common to any half-educated, ill-formed Persian. . . . He was by no means free from the most prominent vices of his countrymen. . . . His brother, Vizir Nizam, or Minister of War, was a savage and inhuman brute, universally and deservedly detested. . . . With all his defects, it will be no easy matter to find any one of his countrymen better qualified to fill the situation" ("Journal of Two Years' Travel," II, 285.) Watson's praise is unstinted: "Belisarius did not tower over the degenerate Romans of his day more than did the Amir Nizam over his contemporaries, the successors of the adversaries of the 'last of the Roman generals.' . . . He, perhaps, alone of all Oriental statesmen and governors whose names appear in the history of modern Persia, would have satisfied the scrutiny of a Diogenes, and was fully entitled to be considered that 'noblest work of God,' an honest man." (History, p. 364.)

Finally in the beginning of 1852 they commenced work, the scientific members of the party teaching medicine, chemistry, mineralogy, and mining, the military members exercising recruits in the parade ground and expounding the theory of war and tactics to officers in the college. But bad luck pursued them. The mineralogist, Czernotta, died very soon after of malarial fever, and the captain of engineers, Zatti, in 1853 was accidentally suffocated by charcoal fumes. The engineer captain's place was taken by the Austrian colonel, Karaczay, a feeble old man, seventy years of age, who, it seems, had come to Persia in search of fortune and renown, but of his doings I have not been able to find any record.

In 1850 a number of refugees from various Italian states, who had taken an active part in the revolutionary movements of 1848-49, and were living in poor circumstances in Constantinople, petitioned the British Envoy to Persia (Colonel Sir Justin Sheil), to recommend them to the Persian Government as military instructors, and various posts having been promised, six of these refugees, calling themselves the "Mission of Italian Volunteers," arrived in Teheran in the early part of 1852, shortly after the Austrians had begun to work, and were appointed instructors of the infantry. The events of 1848-49, the war between Austria and Sardinia, to the disadvantage of the latter, were yet too recent, and the relations between the Austrian and Italian officers were anything but cordial—in fact, soon became as bad as they could possibly be. Squabbles and intrigues began at once, and the Italians, having the British Legation to take their part, while the Austrians had no one to look after them, generally had the advantage, much to the detriment of the army. The leader of the Italians was a Colonel Matarazzo, and he, receiving the title of "Instructor-in-Chief," much interfered with the work of the Austrian officers. Very few Persian officers and men had at that time any idea of discipline, and of tactical knowledge they were completely ignorant, yet the Colonel was for ever arranging grand manoeuvres, which from a military point of view were screaming farces, and wanted the Austrian officers to play a part in them, he, of course, being the stage manager. This led to no end of friction, and Baron de Gumoëns, the Austrian captain of infantry, resigned and left the country in February, 1853, after fifteen months of unsatisfactory service.

The Italians now were in sole charge of the infantry instruction, while the two remaining Austrians had the artillery and cavalry.

Dr. Polak relates that the Italians also started a college in opposition to the one where the Austrians taught. Colonel Matarazzo called it an "Infantry School," dressed his pupils in gold-embroidered uniforms, and surrounded himself with a guard which he dubbed his staff. Most of the boys were made generals and received high pays. "The cunning charlatan always had the best of it, but then he was an Ionian, therefore half an Oriental."

The results of the Austrian hussar's work with the Persian cavalry were very poor, practically not going beyond the uniforming of a few squadrons, and the popular idea of the Persians was that a European officer's coming to Persia in order to teach riding and fencing was an impertinence. The hussar, Nemiro, left the service in 1859, without leaving any traces of his work.

The artillery lieutenant, Krziz, was more successful, particularly in his tuition at the college. His book on mathematics and fortifications was for many years the text-book of the artillery class, his plan of Teheran and environs is still useful, and the first line of telegraphs constructed in Persia, from the Shah's palace in Teheran to a garden outside of the city, was his work. He returned to Europe in 1859.

The most successful member of the mission was the professor of medicine, Dr. Polak, but the splendid results which he achieved had little bearing on military matters. He was the Shah's principal medical adviser for several years, and retired when he found himself supplanted by Dr. Tholozan, whom the French Government sent out. He returned to Europe in 1860, his colleague at the college, the chemist, Foquetti, having retired the year before. Thus ended the first experiment with Austrian instructors, and, as we have seen, its results as far as the army was concerned were nil.

It was but natural that the two Austrian officers, the lieutenant of artillery and that of cavalry, hampered as they were, could not do much for the army, and the Italians, being almost totally dependent upon the Persians for their daily bread, did not dare to propose reforms which might be displeasing to the authorities and perhaps cause their removal, though, considering the very little military experience which they had had—only a short period of service in some revolutionary corps of volunteers—it is highly improbable that they could have proposed any reforms, much less executed them. The Shah could not help seeing the ever-growing disorder and took steps to put matters right. It was explained to him that the inefficiency of the army was mainly due to the irregularity of the payments to the troops, that the Commander-in-Chief had not sufficient powers, that defalcations on a large scale by the superior officers were of frequent occurrence, that the Prime Minister was guilty of nepotism to the disadvantage of senior and deserving men, etc., but instead of striking at the root of the evil and abolishing the pernicious system of leaving all affairs of State to the discretion of one man, and that not an able one, the Shah promulgated the following order to the Prime Minister in February, 1855:—

"The most important matter of a government is to maintain its army in a state of efficiency. Our army is not as we desire it to be. The Commander-in-Chief's insufficient authority over the troops has caused great inefficiency and much loss of discipline. Now, the Commander-in-Chief has his authority from you. We well know that you are always desirous that the affairs of State should be conducted in a proper manner, and you too are, no doubt, dissatisfied with the present state of the army, which, it

'Report on the Persian Army' [41r] (81/170)

71

seems, is caused by the Commander-in-Chief's not possessing the requisite powers. With the object of giving him these powers, you will now communicate to him the following orders, and fully support him in their execution, and without any delay punish any one who disobeys them :—

"I. The Commander-in-Chief will make proper inquiries as to the pay of the troops, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, and find out whether commanding officers have defrauded any men of their pay. He will punish any officer who has been guilty of peculation, recover the amounts, and refund them to the men. Should it become known hereafter that an officer who has been guilty of fraud and peculation has remained unpunished, the Commander-in-Chief himself will be punished.

"II. Let it be well understood that commanding and other officers receive their salaries only by Our favour and grace. In the hope that they will show themselves worthy of it, We shall continue Our Royal favour, but they must strive to become worthy of it. As it is they make large claims for little services. Serhangs act as if they were Sertips; the Sertips fancy themselves Mir Panjehs, and the latter strut about as if they were Amir Tumans. The officers neglect drill and their lessons at the college, and show no zeal in their duties. The Commander-in-Chief will now explain matters to all commanding and other officers of the army, and make them understand once for all that if they neither do their duty properly, nor distinguish themselves by courage and bravery in war, they will not get any increase of pay, not advance in rank, and not have conferred upon them any ribbons or decoration, and you, Sadr Azam, will have no authority to confer a rank upon any one, unless it be on an occasion similar to our recent victory at Bender Abbas,* when the Saram ed dowleh justly rewarded every man who had distinguished himself. Understand well that henceforth only those who distinguish themselves will be rewarded, and that the others will get neither higher pay nor rank.

"III. The Commander-in-Chief will seal and sign all barats (orders, drafts, cheques on the treasury) for pays and rations, and all others connected with expenditure for the army, and punish at once any sarrishtehdar (paymaster) or officer found tampering with a barat, and if any lashkernavis (army accountant) has been guilty of falsifying a barat, the Commander-in-Chief will at once inform you or Us of the fact, and steps will be taken to punish him.†

"The Commander in-Chief will exercise his full authority in the execution of these orders, and re-establish proper discipline and order in the army."

In consequence of insults to Mr. Murray, the British envoy, amicable relations were suspended, and the envoy quitted Teheran on the 5th December, 1855. In January, 1856, an agreement had been concluded between Great Britain and Persia by which the latter engaged not to send any troops to Herat, and Mirza Aka Khan, the Sadr Azam, or Prime Minister, now that the British Legation was away, instructed Hissam es Saltaneh, Governor of Khorassan, to march upon Herat, thereby affording to Great Britain an unquestionable *casus belli*. The Persian expedition to Herat was undertaken partly in order to gratify the national Persian desire for the possession of that place, and partly in the hope that successes in the direction of Afghanistan would afford Persia some advantages by the sacrifice of which reparation might afterwards be made to the British Government. Early in the year 1856 Hissam es Saltaneh marched from Meshed, and soon afterwards commenced

* 8th of March, 1854.

† This clause shows that the *lashkernavis*, or army accountants, who seem to possess hereditary rights to live on plunder, were distinctly favoured, as they are now.

the siege of Herat. During the progress of the operations each party attempted to blind and deceive the other—the Persians giving assurances of grace and protection whilst besieging the town and devastating the country around it, the Afghans boasting of their loyalty and obedience to the Shah whilst openly opposing the advance of the Persian army. But whilst the Sadr Azam was allowed to pursue his reckless course preparations were being made in India for an expedition to Bushire for the purpose of showing Persia that she could not with impunity depart from her treaty engagements with England, and in the proclamation which was issued at Calcutta on the 1st of March, 1856, the cause of the war that was to commence was declared to be the Persian hostile expedition to Herat. At about this time a Captain A. Buhler of the French 2nd Regiment of Engineers, had come to Persia and was sent to the camp before Herat. That Afghan stronghold was then not defended, as in 1838, by Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, and accordingly fell before the regular approaches set on foot by a European scientific officer (25th November, 1856). By the time Herat had fallen it was too late for Persia to avoid the consequences of the rash course she had determined to pursue, and the war began. On the 4th of December, 1856, the island of Kharak was occupied by the British troops, on the 10th of the month Bushire surrendered with 59 guns and many stores. In the engagements which followed (occupation of Borazjun, 5th February, 1857, Persian troops abandoning their entrenchments before the arrival of the British, battle of Khushab on the 8th, capture of Muhamrah on the 26th March) most of the Persian commanders behaved shamefully and deserted their men, who fought well. At Muhamrah 13,000 Persian troops under Prince Khamler Mirza fled precipitately on the landing of the British troops, and three days later 7,000 Persians retired before three or four hundred men of the 64th and 78th Regiments under Captain Hunt of the 78th. Peace had been concluded at Paris on the 11th of March (1857) but there was then no Suez Canal to facilitate communication with the Persian Gulf and there was no telegraph, and the result was that intimation of the conclusion of peace reached Sir James Outram, the British Commander-in-Chief at Muhamrah, only on the 4th of April. In the following month the ratifications of the treaty were exchanged at Baghdad, and most of the British troops in Persia were hurried on to India, where the mutiny had broken out. General Jacob remained at Bushire in command of some Bombay native infantry and Sind horse until Persia had fulfilled the conditions imposed upon her by the Treaty of Paris.

If the Persian war had continued, India would have been deprived of the services, when she most wanted them, of Sir James Outram, Sir Henry Havelock (who was the first to leave Bushire with the famous 64th and 78th Regiments that so soon afterwards stemmed the tide of rebellion in Bengal), Sir George Jacob, Sir Edward Lugard, and others. But for the

timely arrival of the British troops from Persia the mutineers must have been allowed to keep the field for a time almost unopposed, and it is impossible to assign any limits to the proportions which the mutiny might in such case have assumed. (Watson.)

The Afghan campaign and the war with England both occurring at the same time showed that Persia could still without great difficulty put a considerable number of good fighting men, fairly well armed and equipped but badly officered, into the field. By the time that the troops had returned from the scene of war and most of them gone on leave to their homes the Shah was planning new reforms, but again only attacked details, evidently still wishing to spare his Prime Minister. This is shown by a firman of February, 1858, addressed to "The chiefs and khans of the Kajar tribe, the palace-guard, the chamberlains and body-guard, the executioners, court-criers and mace-bearers, ferrashes, couriers and stablemen, the victorious army, Amirs, Sertips, Serhangs, and all officers and commanders of artillery, arsenals, infantry, and cavalry, instructors and pupils of the military college, adjutants, and others"—an extraordinary jumble where, no doubt, the army was purposely placed last by a malignant court scribe. After a preamble stating that military men ought to be easily distinguishable from civilians and wear a uniform which would increase the respect due to them from civilians, and that the ordinary dress in use in Persia, particularly the tall hat, was not at all suitable, it was ordered that in future all hats were to be of kind called *Khorassani*, which were less tall than the others, but not to cost more than 25 kran each for officers and from 3 to 20 kran each for privates and subalterns. (A kran at this time had the value of a shilling.) Then follow some regulations as to the materials which were to be used for uniforms, all native stuffs, and from the clause "but the uniforms supplied by the Government will be of cloth" it seems that the articles of dress previously mentioned were paid for by the officers and men. Then there are some regulations as to tents and camp equipments on the march; only Amirs (Tuman and Panjeh) were allowed double-roofed tents, a sartip was to have only a part of his tent double-roofed "in order to protect him from rain and cold," unless when in chief command of an expedition, when he could have one like an Amir. "For every battalion which an officer commands he will be allowed two ardals (orderlies), for instance a sartip who commands two battalions will have four ardals and a sartip who commands one battalion will have one" (*sic*). The number of *Karavuls*, or guards, "for walking in front of officers in the streets and bazars," was not to exceed eight for an Amir Tuman, six for an Amir Panjeh, five for a sartip, four for a serhang, and two for a yavar, "but if the officers like they may take less." Abbas Kuli Khan, Saif es Saltaneh, was charged with the execution of these orders, forward them by couriers to all garrisons and camps, and "if within a month from the date of this firman,

[619]

G

uniforms, tents, orderlies, and Karavuls are not as ordered and he not report the fact he will be punished himself." In this firman adjutants of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd class were ranked with Sertip, Serhang, and Yavar respectively.

At last, on August 30th of this year Mirza Aka Khan Nuri was relieved* of the Grand Vizirate which he had held since 1851, and a cabinet composed of six ministers was formed. For the first time in Persian history we now meet with the title of "Vizir i Jang," Minister of War, there having been until now a Commander-in-Chief and a "Vizir-i Lashkar," the latter meaning Minister of the Army, but being, as at present, only the chief accountant and paymaster. The first holder of the new office of "Vizir i Jang" was Muhammad Khan, Kashikchi Bashi, and he was at the same time Commander-in-Chief, or Sipah Salar.

There were now only three of the Italian instructors left, and the two remaining Austrians having notified that they wished to retire at the end of their contracts, the Shah decided to get some more instructors from Europe. Having been taught by the experience of the last few years that there was little difference between his own officers and those who had come from Italy, the Shah did not desire to engage any more of that nation. Considering it dangerous to apply to Russia, not quite trusting the English yet in consequence of the recent war, and seeing that the Austrian officers were wishing to leave and loudly proclaiming their discontent, the Shah applied to France. The Shah also was grateful to Napoleon III for his assistance the previous year in the negotiations for peace with Great Britain, and after Buhler's distinguished services before Herat in 1836 and against the Turkomans in 1837-38 was personally much in favour of French officers. The French Government, with the traditional idea of gaining predominant influence in the Levant and Persia, at once acceded to the Shah's request, which was communicated by the Persian Envoy to France, and sent out a mission with Commandant Brognart as chief, composed of two captains, two lieutenants, four non-commissioned officers, a superintendent of arsenals, and a bandmaster. All its members had served in Algiers, and it was thought that they would be able to acclimatise themselves easily to the Persian climate, as well as to the manners and

* The Shah's autograph letter to the Prime Minister said: "You have taken all the affairs of State into your own hands, and have not appointed a single person to assist you, and it is evident that you alone are not able to cope with all the affairs, and many errors and mistakes have been made in consequence, and business has got in arrears. You, we are sure, do not desire that our affairs be neglected, and it is now our order that you be relieved of the Grand Vizirate, and go to your own house and live there contentedly and without any fear. Trust to the continuation of our goodwill towards you. Hajab ed dowlah, who will deliver this to you, will verbally communicate to you our expressions of kindness, and the assurance of our entire confidence in you and your family." 20th Muharram, 1275 (30th August, 1858).

customs of the country. Dr. Tholozan,* a surgeon-major of the French army, was also sent out and was appointed chief medical adviser to the Shah in the year following his arrival, causing the Austrian Doctor Polak's retirement soon after. The mission reached Teheran in November, 1858.

The Persian authorities considered that the system of instruction of the new arrivals was not much different from that of the Italians and left the instruction of the infantry to the latter, but the real reason of the Italians keeping their ground was that they had acquired Persian ways and become morally and physically acclimatised, while the Frenchmen were arrogant and difficult to deal with, that is, the Italians, being dependent upon the authorities, waited for their pay and did just what they were told to do, while the French officers, being in the service of their Government and not depending upon the Persians, claimed their pay when it was due and wanted to do serious work. Also, the emptiness of the treasury, due to the great expenditure incurred in connection with the Herat campaign and the war with Great Britain, did not allow of any radical reorganisation of the army being taken in hand, and after a three years' residence in Persia this mission quitted the country without leaving any trace of its activity anywhere but at the arsenal, where Monsieur Rousse did some good work. In the Persian annals for 1859-61 it is recorded that "Rousse made good rifles, percussion caps (five millions per annum) cartridges, detonators, fuses 'which go off by pulling a string,' rifled 6-pounders and mountain guns." There is also the remark that "Rousse constructed a railway for transporting cannon from the place where they were cast to the place where they were bored," which shows that the system of not boring at all, which Flandin mentioned in 1841, had been done away with. Not much is said of the activity of the other members of the mission. In 1861 "the French captain of artillery went daily outside of Teheran with twenty officers and eighty men of the Isfahan battalion in order to teach them how to make fougasses and field works," and the enthusiastic annalist adds, "Every soldier will soon become a teacher." Captain Duhousset of infantry accompanied the Shah in 1859 to the summer quarters at Sultanieh, about half-way between Teheran and Tabriz, and was very useful in superintending the camp arrangements; that he then *commanded* 20,000 men, as he states in his "*Étude sur la Population de Perse*" (Paris 1863), is not a fact.

* Joseph Désiré Tholozan, born 1820 at Diego Garcia, one of the Maldive islands. Entered French military service in 1842. Sent to Persia in 1858. Until Nassir ed din's death in 1896 was chief medical adviser at the Court of Persia, and accompanied the Shah on his three journeys to Europe, 1873, 1878, 1889. Died at Teheran, 30th July, 1897. He was a K.C.M.G., Knight Commander of the Légion d'Honneur, and distinguished by high decorations from nearly all courts of Europe. He was also a Member of the Académie des Sciences, and his medical works (10 or 12 volumes) on plague and cholera in the East are well known.

In order to finish with the French military missions in Persia it may here be said that their want of success seems to have been due, outside of circumstances beyond their control, to the fact that the Frenchman, when in a strange country where he is cut off from direct communication with his people at home and *is not the absolute master*, very quickly loses the vivacity and activity peculiar to him and becomes indifferent and indolent, without, however, for a moment abstaining from displaying Gallic arrogance and imagined superiority to his employers and colleagues of other nationalities. The Persians are generally called the French of the East, but there is not much sympathy between the two nations. The character of the average Frenchman, easily roused and ever-changing, is neither understood nor appreciated by the Persian, and it is an incontestable fact, even now in 1899, that French officers, with two or three notable exceptions, have never been able to adapt themselves to Persian ideas, or, as some writer expressed it, "play their music to the pitch of the Persian authorities and soldiers." On the contrary, the aptitude of the Italians of quickly acclimatising themselves to Persian usages has been remarkable. They drove out the Austrian mission of 1851 and were not driven out by the French and others afterwards. They quickly adapted themselves to their surroundings, and when difficulties arose generally gained their purpose. Whether this was of any advantage to the Persian army is, of course, another question, which can only be answered negatively.

Dissatisfied with these experiments, and disgusted at the calamitous defeat experienced by a Persian army of more than 20,000 men at Merv in the autumn of 1860, the Shah now bethought himself again of his ancient allies and once more applied for British assistance. It was characteristic of the attitude of the British and Indian Governments towards Persia at this time, and of the superb indifference displayed by both to British interests in Central Asia, that the proposal fell through owing to a petty squabble as to the share of the expense to be borne by the Indian and Persian exchequers. Once again, in 1870, the request was renewed; but the criminal reign of masterly inactivity being then in its prime, it was again refused, the plea for rejection being the charge that Persia was engaged in hostilities against British allies in the shape of Afghanistan and Beluchistan.

After the departure of the third French mission the three Italians again remained masters of the field. One of them, Gianuzzi, who had been a bombardier in an Italian volunteer corps, died about twenty years after, another, Matarazzo, brother of the colonel of same name who came out in 1852, retired in 1888, and the third, Andreini, a lieutenant of Tuscan volunteers in 1848, became "Instructor-in-Chief" and remained in service until his death in 1894. The "Internationale Révue" called his appointment "a sinecure without the least influence on military organisation or instruction." All three rose to the rank of general. Andreini to that of a general of the first class.

From now and for nearly sixteen years military matters in Persia remained *in statu quo*. Peace reigned throughout the country, excepting on the Turkestan frontier, where some troops had to be kept in readiness for checking the inroads of the Turkomans from the north and the east. The greater part of these troops was garrisoned in Meshed. Seven to ten battalions were in Teheran. The garrisons in the provinces were kept as small as possible and were mostly without uniforms and badly armed.

The Turkoman raids from the north became less frequent when the Russians began their conquest of Transcaspia, and with the Russian occupation of that province ceased altogether, but as late as 1876 Akhal Turkomans frequently attacked caravans and plundered villages right in the heart of Khorassan as far down as the neighbourhood of Shahrud. The raids from the east continued much longer, and large parties of Tekkes from Merv, as well as Salors and Saruks, made the whole eastern frontier from Kelat i Nadiri to the Afghan frontier unsafe, and Sir A. Condie Stephen, when surveying the frontier in the winter of 1882-3, barely escaped capture by a large party near Pul i Khatun, east of Meshed. Some of the raiding parties were composed of only a few badly armed men, but the fear of the people was so great that half a dozen Turkomans, with frequently only one shooting weapon between them, sufficed "to hold up" large caravans. The horsemen who were supposed to guard the frontier were generally absent because the local governors gave them no pay. When I constructed the telegraph to Meshed in 1876 the governors were ordered to give me an escort of 50 horse, but I never had more than *seven* men.*

During this period there were in Persia, besides the three Italians, the Frenchman Buhler, whom I have mentioned before as distinguishing himself before Herat in 1856, another Frenchman named Mechin, Gasteiger, an Austrian, and de Laessoe, a Dane,† but these two could not do

* It was in the summer of that year that a party of five or six Akhals attacked a large caravan of about 1,000 animals and over 200 men and carried off some mules with their loads of Manchester goods and a girl. The attack took place about 50 miles from Shahrud and about 10 from my camp, which the caravan reached some hours after it. Followed by my cavalry detachment of seven men I pursued the robbers for many miles, and finally found the girl and the goods abandoned in the hills, but my cavalymen telling me they had no ammunition, I gave up the pursuit, and the robbers escaped with the mules. Ten days later I captured two marauders, who were afterwards executed in Meshed, and I believe these were the last Turkomans seen on the Meshed road.

† Buhler, taught at the college, commanded many expeditions against the Turkomans, constructed the ramparts of Teheran, became a general of the first class, and died in 1887. Gasteiger was an Austrian who came to seek his fortune in Persia and found employ as an engineer officer. He constructed some buildings for the Shah and the Mazandaran road through the hills north of Teheran; accompanied the Shah to Europe in 1873 and 1878; acted as adviser to the Austrian mission until 1881; was sent some years later to Khorassan to construct the Askabad road from Meshed to the Russian frontier; then accused of communicating political information to the Russian

anything for the amelioration of the army. Some good work was done at the Teheran arsenal by two English mechanics, the brothers Stanley, who put up a steam engine with boiler, fly-wheel, and other parts made in Persia, and of Persian iron obtained from a mine in Mazandaran, and retired in 1869. Other things were done at the arsenal in the usual slipshod way, and robbery was rampant. I had once supplied to me direct from the arsenal many thousands of ball cartridge which contained only half the proper quantity of powder and instead of balls had thin cup-like segments of lead weighing only one-eighth of what the projectile should have weighed.

Occasionally the Shah, finding that things were not going on as they ought to, changed his Minister of War or the Commander-in-Chief, but very soon everything went on as before; occasionally too a firman was published with the view of restoring discipline, but became a dead letter after a very few weeks. The following speech of the Shah at a durbar on September, 28th, 1871, gives a good idea of the state of the army at the time:—

“ You are, no doubt, wondering why I to-day appear in military uniform. I will tell you the reason. As to-day is the anniversary of the birth of the Amir el Momenin (Ali, the prophet's son-in-law) and one of our greatest festivals and most auspicious days, I have taken over the chief command of the army and from now on consider myself as being in military service. You cannot be unaware of the reason of this step. During past years the progress in the various branches of the army has not been in a manner befitting the importance of Persia, or as I desired. Weapons of war, system of drilling, and military education are continually being improved in Europe, but nothing is being done in Persia. Commanders and officers, great and little, have neglected their duties, the glory and prestige of the army have disappeared, officers act in a way which is contrary to the spirit of the army and have forgotten all rules of discipline. The troops, which should have been continually exercised while on the march or on the frontiers, or in their cantonments in the interior of the country, have been left without drill and exercises and have forgotten how to march. There are many other things to find fault with, and now the maintenance of the army in a state of efficiency being the most important affair of State, I have considered it necessary to take charge of the army myself, and I myself shall be responsible for its efficiency and discipline. But I require a well-meaning and honest and able servant to act as intermediary between me and the army, and I therefore appoint Hajji Mirza Husain Khan, Mushir ed dowleh, who is now present,

Government, was removed in 1889; returned to Europe and died. *Mechin* was a non-commissioned officer of the French army, and having come to Persia was employed as infantry instructor from 1873 until his death seven or eight years later. *F. de Laessoe* was a subaltern in the Danish service; had fought with distinction with the French in the war of 1870-71, where he was made a captain and received the Légion d'Honneur; came to Persia in 1874 and was engaged as instructor of artillery; afterwards opened a “staff college,” which had a very short existence, and tried to oust the Italian who was “Instructor-in-Chief” (*Andreini*); retired from Persian service and after a time, in 1880, entered the Indian Civil Service, served on the Afghan Boundary Commission 1884-87, and is now Political Agent in Bhowapur, Central India. A Frenchman who called himself *Baron de Langsdorff* and said he was a cavalry officer came to Teheran in 1875 and easily obtained an engagement as cavalry instructor, but before commencing work had to be sent out of the country by the French Legation for various swindles and thefts.

'Report on the Persian Army' [45r] (89/170)

79

my lieutenant and give him the rank and title of Sipah Salar Azam and Vizir i Azam i Askariyeh (greatest commander of the army and greatest minister of the army). I now with my own hands give him these two books, which contain rules and regulations for the army written some time before this but not yet promulgated, and please God he will see that they are strictly followed. Titles and military ranks will henceforth be conferred only in accordance with services rendered, and not by way of personal influence or hereditary rights. We shall in future reward good services and severely punish any one guilty of neglect of duty. The good servant will not remain without reward, and the bad servant will not remain without punishment."

For a short time after this speech the Shah took a lively interest in military matters, but five weeks later Mushir ed Dowleh was appointed Sadr Azam (Grand Vizir), and although Paragraph VI of the firman which was published stipulated that he was to act, as regards the army, as before (*i.e.*, as intermediary between Shah and troops), an additional clause ordering him to submit reports twice a week through a special adjutant showed that the Shah had cooled down, and his Commander-in-Chiefship became altogether nominal very soon after.

In the spring of 1872 a Military Council was instituted, to meet every Sunday, and for some Sundays the members, nominally presided over by the Shah, but simply saying what the Grand Vizir wished, sat in Council and were supposed to occupy themselves with military affairs. During the latter part of the same year the Shah was preparing for his first journey to Europe, and things went on as they did before the orders of the previous year. During the Shah's first voyage to Europe (1873) the great military spectacles performed before him made a great impression, and it is said that he asked the German Government for the loan of a number of active officers, but the Germans did not respond very enthusiastically, and the matter was dropped. Court intrigues brought about the Sadr Azam's fall, and he was dismissed on the Shah's arrival at Resht, a new cabinet of six ministers was formed, and Nusret ed Dowleh, Firuz Mirza, a man without any brilliant military capacities, who had been Minister for War once before, a short time in 1871, was entrusted with the portfolio for war. He resigned soon after and was replaced by Ala ed Dowleh, another mediocrity. Things did not go on well, and in the spring of 1874 Mushir ed Dowleh was recalled from Resht, where he had been governor since his disgrace the year before, and appointed Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the army with the title of Sipah Salar Azam, as well as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He held these appointments until 1880, when he was again dismissed. While he was at the head of the army not much serious progress was made. His detractors and enemies, of whom there were many, said that he spent a large part of the army budget for furthering his own ends and benefiting his creatures and retainers, that he defrauded the State of huge sums of money by charging for improvements and reforms which were never done, and for troops and military establishments which never existed but on paper. They were not altogether wrong, but on the other side it is a fact that he

introduced a more uniform system of clothing officers and men, gave prestige to the army, and was the cause of bringing the Austrian mission to Persia, and of forming the Cossack brigade.

During his second journey in Europe (1878), the Shah asked the Emperor of Austria for the loan of a number of instructors, and the Emperor having acceded to the Shah's request, the second Austrian mission came to Persia, arriving in Teheran in January, 1879. Some Uchatius guns and some thousands of Werndl rifles with a great quantity of ammunition were bought at the same time. This mission was composed of its chief, Colonel von Schönowski, one major, two captains and three lieutenants of infantry, one lieutenant of jägers (chasseurs), one lieutenant of engineers, one captain of field artillery, one arsenal assistant, and one bandmaster, and General Gasteiger Khan was attached to it as its guide, mentor, and interpreter. For the reorganisation of the cavalry the Shah had in the same year applied to Russia, and very soon after the arrival of the Austrians a Russian mission, for the first time in history, came to Persia. There were Colonel Demantovitch, four officers and five non-commissioned officers, all Cossacks.

For the Austrians about 5,000 men were recruited in Irak (a central province with chief town Sultanabad) and formed into seven *foj* (six infantry, one jäger), and one battery of field artillery (six Uchatius guns), called the Austrian corps. Some irregular cavalry known as Muhajeran were embodied into a regiment of Cossacks for the Russian instructors. At the beginning the Austrians received ample funds and in a comparatively short time had their seven battalions in a state of efficiency not seen in Persia for many years, all well uniformed (in cloth uniforms of Austrian pattern), well armed with Werndl rifles, and housed in good barracks. But not before long money began to be irregularly supplied or not paid at all, and the original number of battalions was not only never increased, but not kept up.

It was a great mistake on the part of the chief of the mission to insist upon giving native officers as much pay as officers of the same ranks were receiving in the Austrian army, thereby greatly adding to the already much increased military expenditure, and causing much jealousy among the less favoured officers of the old troops. The Persian authorities strongly disliked paying a lieutenant of the new corps more than what a major of the old troops received, and as soon as possible reduced the pays of all officers by half, and when the Austrian officers left (1881) this half was again reduced by half, and finally, the native officers of the new corps found themselves worse off than their comrades of the old corps and lost all zeal and interest. They would have been well satisfied if they had received only the old scale pay regularly; as it was they were led to have great expectations, and being disappointed, formed a party of malcontents which did much to undermine discipline in other corps. Another great mistake

was that Colonel von Schönovski was only a nominal chief of the mission. Each officer of the mission had a separate contract with the Persian Government, and it was stipulated in the contracts that every officer was to be under the direct orders of the Persian Minister of War. The officers, being considered in the active service of Austria and retaining their ranks and promotion, naturally should have been entirely under the orders of the Colonel, and the rights due to seniority and rank should not have been put aside in Persia. The faulty arrangement led to subalterns aspiring to rights of equality with their superiors, and to much friction between the officers and their hierarchical chief, and caused much detriment to the service. Differences also arose between the Colonel and the Austrian Envoy at Teheran, and the Colonel was recalled in October, 1879.

It is a curious fact that differences between the chiefs of military missions and the diplomatic representatives of their countries should so frequently have arisen. The first two chiefs of the Russian mission also did not agree with their Legation. The writer of the article in the "Internationale Revue" (Year V, 917 *et seq.*), who is my authority for all the details concerning the Austrian officers and their work in Persia, ascribes these unfortunate occurrences as having been mostly due to a sort of agreement between the members of the Corps Diplomatique by which they have created for themselves in Teheran society an exceptional position as regards rank and precedence, which a staff officer in active service cannot accept.

Colonel von Schönowski, who had been a *persona grata* with the Shah and the high Persian officials, was replaced by Colonel Schemel, who understood neither how to keep on good terms with the authorities nor how to gain the esteem and sympathies of his subordinates. The fine edifice which the mission had erected gradually fell to pieces, and although 1,200 men and a battery of six Uchatius guns of the new corps did good service in Azerbaijan, whither they had been sent with other troops to quell the Kurdish revolt of 1880-81, the Austrian officers were not retained after the end of their contracts, and all, with the exception of the bandmaster, left Persia at the end of 1881. Soon after this the "Austrian corps" broke up, its men being drafted into other battalions, and many of its officers figuring for years in the Army List without being in service.

After the departure of the Austrian mission in 1881, the Persian Government engaged, through its representative in Vienna, some commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the Austrian reserve or not in service on a one year's contract, and at salaries which were much inferior to those which had been paid to the members of previous missions. There were four officers, one captain and lieutenant of infantry (Geissler and Wedell), one captain of cavalry (Smolak), and one captain of artillery (von Prueschenck), and five corporals (three infantry,

one cavalry, one artillery), and they arrived at Teheran in March, 1882. They had not been permitted to retain their officer's title while in Persian service and never attained the social standing of their predecessors. The non-commissioned officers were too young and could not obtain any authority or influence over the soldiers. The two cavalymen found their field of operations occupied by the Russian Cossacks, and left Persia at the end of their contracts without having done any work at all; the other three officers renewed their contracts for three years, and of the non-commissioned officers only one remained. Major von Staudach, a member of the mission of 1878, returned in the early part of 1882 and entered Persian Service, and two other members of the mission (Captain Krauss of infantry and Captain Wagner von Wetterstaedt of artillery), having retired from the Austrian service, now also returned to Persia and were engaged as instructors. The Persian authorities made little use of them. They gave one battalion, or sometimes two, to each infantry officer and expected him to turn it out in a short time in a state of efficiency, but the drilling was done by Persian instructors who had learned their work under the previous mission. The Austrians only exercised a kind of police supervision to see that the Austrian regulations were more or less kept up, but were in no way responsible for the efficiency of the battalion, held no command, and had no influence on organisation, uniforms, duration of service, promotion, etc. The Austrian "Internationale Révue" said that it was to be regretted that these instructors had been the possessors of the fatal legacy left by previous missions, and added:—

"Personal and official differences and quarrels between the officers began on the day of their arrival in Persia, and have now, after four years' residence, not ended. It is evident that this state of affairs will not aid in raising the prestige of the Europeans in that country. The duties of the instructors are perfectly equal, yet their ranks and pays vary considerably. Of the six Austrian instructors now in Persia, two are generals of the second class, two are generals of the third class, and two are colonels. Three, who were members of the previous mission, possess the "Lion and Sun" of the second class, while the others have only the third class. These unequal distinctions, as well as the unequal pays, do not depend upon special or distinguished services, but are mostly due to a clever exploitation of accidental and favourable circumstances, and cause many difficulties."

So far the "Internationale Révue," but before reverting to other matters, it will here be appropriate to conclude with the Austrian officers. In addition to the officers mentioned in the "Internationale Révue," there were the bandmaster and one non-commissioned officer (Mottes). The latter, through the more or less mysterious influences which play so great a part in Persia, quickly rose to the rank of colonel, then became an officer of the night-watch of the city under the Chief of the police, and finally, a general of the first class. In 1896 he was sent by Naib es Saltaneh, Minister for War, on a mission to Vienna for purchasing discarded Werndl rifles and ammunition from the Austrian Government. This was against the

interests of the Persian representative in Vienna and caused certain difficulties, and when General Mottes returned to Persia, the Naib es Saltaneh, then no longer Minister in consequence of the changes after Nassir ed din Shah's death (May 1st, 1896), was not able to protect him, and he left the country. His mission had been a success, since he bought the rifles at about a third of what others had paid, or charged for. The bandmaster, Gebauer, did excellent service, became a general of the second class, and died in 1895 of a sunstroke which he caught while leading his band during the balloon ascent of an American "professor" on a hot day. Of the six Austrian officers mentioned in the "Révue," only one (Wagner) is now in the service and is Instructor-in-Chief, but the authorities not aiding him in any way, he is much dissatisfied. His pay is £600 per annum. Of the other officers, von Staudach and Krauss died, von Prueschenck retired in 1888, Geissler and Wedell were dismissed in 1894.

The Russian mission, composed of Colonel Demantovitch, four commissioned and five non-commissioned officers, which came to Teheran in 1879, has done very good work. To employ Cossack officers for the instruction of the Persian cavalry was a happy idea. In their way of living, their riding, discipline, etc., the Caucasian Cossacks, being so very little different from the Persians, have a much better chance of success in Persia than any Europeans could ever hope for. A fine regiment of 400 to 600 men and 22 officers was soon organised, and in 1880 a second regiment was formed, the two together being known as the "Cossack Brigade." The men were armed with Berdan carbines purchased from the Russian Government and swords made in Persia. Some years later, a third regiment was embodied and the force raised to 1,800 men, but on account of the excessive expenditure it was soon disbanded, and the effective strength of the brigade remained 1,000 to 1,200. The Russian officers come out on contracts of three years, and several batches have come and gone during the twenty years that the brigade is in existence. Colonel Demantovitch left in the summer of 1882, and was replaced by Colonel Tscharkovski, who arrived in the winter of that year. In the autumn of 1884 the Tsar made the Shah a present of four 8.7 centimètre steel Krupp guns, and a battery of Cossack light field artillery under a captain was added to the brigade. After Colonel Tscharkovski's departure, Colonel Karavayeff took command; he was followed by Colonel Schnéour, and when his contract came to a end, Colonel Kossakoffsky came out and is here now.

The Cossack brigade is the most popular body of troops in Persia, but the cost of maintaining it being very great, it is doubtful whether its existence would not be much endangered if "the mighty neighbour in the north, whose power is paramount in Persia, did not every now and then exert considerable pressure." ("Internationale Révue.") Russia seems to attach great importance to having the instruction of

even a small part of the Persian army in the hands of her own officers, and in spite of many *contretemps* and much opposition has now maintained the mission for more than twenty years, the "record" life of a military mission in Persia. An important fact is that the chief of the Cossack brigade is the actual and responsible commander and paymaster, while chiefs of former missions have been only nominal commanders without any discretionary powers over pays and promotions. During the last few years the Russian Government has supplied the arms and munitions for the whole brigade gratuitously, and the chief being in continual direct communication with the Russian War Office, under whose orders he is, the brigade is practically a Russian force, and as a German writer lately stated. "Persia's capital is already in the hands of Russia." The importance which the Persian authorities attach to the position of the chief of the Cossack brigade and the little consideration which they have for the other instructors is well illustrated by the way in which those persons figure in the official army list. The Russian colonel is "His Excellency, the Amir of the Great Amirs (the usual way of addressing an Amir Toman), Kossakoffsky, Chief and Commander of the Brigade," ("Raïs va fermandar"), while General Wagner is "Wagner Khan, Sertip I, Instructor-in-Chief." In comparison with former times the influx of military men of various nationalities who came to find employ has been very small during the twenty years since the establishment of the Russian mission. In the early eighties there came an Italian who was engaged as drum-major, and, perhaps aspiring to a higher position, committed murder and was transported home to be hanged. Ten years later a Bulgarian found his way to Teheran, became infantry instructor, and committed suicide. Then there came another Italian, Major Maletta, who had been a subaltern in the Italian army and served for some years with distinction in the Egyptian Gendarmerie, where he attained the rank of major. He left the Egyptian service when British officers took command of the forces, came to Persia, and was engaged as infantry instructor; he is a smart and efficient officer. There also came an Austrian lieutenant of dragoon guards, Count Berchthold, who was given the post of cavalry instructor at the request of the Austrian Legation and returned to Europe after three years' residence in Teheran, without, it is said, having once attended any drill or manoeuvre. There are now only two European instructors in Persian service, Wagner and Maletta.

By a decree issued in July, 1875, it was ordered that the army should for the future be raised by conscription and that the term of service should be twelve years and not for life as hitherto, but the decree has never been enforced, and the old system, as described in many works, is in full force. The following is from "Persia and the Persian Question":—

"The men are recruited in no fixed numerical proportion, but in the most arbitrary fashion, from provinces, districts, villages, or tribes, the

'Report on the Persian Army' [48r] (95/170)

85

selection of the individual and the command of the whole being left to the chief or governor of the area concerned. Some districts, accordingly, supply far more than their due quota, others much less. There is great lamentation when the order for a levy of recruits comes round, the lot of the Persian serbaz being so supremely unattractive that few would voluntarily espouse it. As a rule the villagers settle among themselves the choice of recruits, clubbing together in order to pay an allowance to the courageous individual (or to his family in his absence) who is willing to go. This informal payment is known as *Khanehwari* (i.e., home pay), and varies from 3 to 20 tomans a year, the average being 8 to 10 tomans, or about £2; but the soldier cannot count upon it with certainty, and in many cases it is not paid at all. Service is for life, unless the soldier can scrape together sufficient money to buy a discharge from his colonel, or can bribe a substitute to take his place, and the ranks contain, on the one hand, beardless boys of fifteen or sixteen, and on the other, many grey-headed and toothless old dotards, who can scarcely hobble through the movements on parade. . . . Theoretically, out of every three years the soldier is supposed to spend two on service and one at home. But if this were so, a far larger number would be found with the colours than is actually the case. As a matter of fact considerably more than half the regiments are disbanded; and of those that are mobilised, few display more than two-thirds of their nominal strength."

Proposals for radically reforming the army, as well as for doing away with the great number of *fainéants* officers and the crowd of hereditary Lashkernavis, all highly paid and robbing the exchequer, have often been submitted by able and well-intentioned persons and were favourably received by the head of the State, but the high functionaries have always succeeded in counteracting any measures which would do away with corruption and tend to stop the sources of illegal emoluments, and nothing was done. In the beginning of 1898 it was seriously intended to reduce the army to a strength of 20,000 five years' service men, divided into four brigades, and reserve troops to be recruited as needs would require. Ten or twelve thousand irregular cavalry were to be formed into a corps of *Mustahfiz* (gendarmerie) on the Turkish or Egyptian system and be used for road guards, rural police, etc. Ala ed dowlah, just the man for the post, was appointed chief commander of the force. Major Maletta was ordered to commence work by proceeding to the south and form the corps there, but the Prime Minister, Amin ed dowlah, lost his office, and all the good projects fell with him.

During all these years while military matters were looked after in the manner described the bands were in good hands. I have already mentioned Gebauer, the Austrian bandmaster, who did excellent service from 1879 to 1895, but there was also the Frenchman Lemaire, who, a good musician, 1^{er} Prix du Conservatoire, was sent by the French Government in 1868, when the Persian army had been without any European bandmaster for several years, is still in service and very active. He has the rank of a Sertip of the first class, also teaches music at the colleges, and has, comparatively speaking, very good pay. Some time ago he was assisted by a M. Duval, a bandmaster of a famous French regiment.

The Teheran arsenal during the period under consideration

made hardly any improvement upon former times. It is true that various machines were put up by French and Austrian foremen and engineers (Vauvillier, Bottin, Horvath, Poteau, etc.), but the system remained the same as before, bad work and robbery, and whether the chief director was Jehangir Khan, an Armenian who was the nephew of Manuchehr Khan, Motamed ed dowlah of the forties, and had the title of Sani ed dowlah, or any one of his numerous, incapable, high-titled successors, lately called "Ministers of Arsenals," made no difference. Many machines were obtained from Europe and allowed to fall into decay, guns were cast, cartridges, swords, bayonets, bugles, pouches, etc., were made, a new percussion-cap factory, with machinery bought by Dr. Tholozan, was erected, French "tabatières," which were originally transformed muzzle loaders, were re-transformed into muzzle loaders, many thousands of rifles, chassepots, Werndls, Berdans, were purchased and stacked up like firewood without ever being looked after, while the troops were supplied with old "Brown-Besses," uniforms supposed to be of cloth were made up of cheap and shoddy material costing about two shillings a yard, etc. Here too Lord Curzon's description of the arsenal as it was ten years ago holds good now.

The military college "Dar el funun," which was opened under the auspices of the Amir Nizam at the beginning of Nassir ed din Shah's reign, has, as already stated in the first chapter, not been of any great use to the army, since only very few of its pupils have obtained any employment in the service. This is much to be regretted, for Fellmer and Weth,* two Prussian officers who have been teaching at the college for the last 18 or 19 years, have turned out hundreds of young men who are able and willing to serve and have become possessed, thanks to their teachers, of military bearing and discipline and knowledge which are absent in the army. The rival college which was opened in 1885 has been of no use whatever as far as the army is concerned. Quoting our text-book again:—

"Of the Persian officers as a class no one has ever been found to speak, except in terms of contempt. Ignorant of military science, destitute of *esprit de corps*, selected and promoted with no reference to aptitude, they are an incubus under which no military system could do otherwise than languish. When it is known that the command of regiments is sometimes inherited, sometimes vested in the hands of infants, and commonly bought and sold, a high stamp of officers is an impossible result. . . . Patronage and promotion in a regiment are in the hands of the colonel, who makes such a good thing out of the distribution that the goodwill, so to speak, of his post is a marketable commodity, like that of a public-house in England, and has to be purchased for a fixed sum upon appointment. He sells commissions to his subordinate officers, he sells exemptions from service and discharges to the private soldier, he makes his perquisites out of the rations and pay, and he frequently only advances a portion of the latter, subject to a ruinous dis-

* *Fellmer* was in the Prussian artillery until about twenty years ago and has the "Iron Cross" for distinguished services in the war of 1870-71. *Weth*, a younger man, was a short time in the Prussian infantry. They have the rank of second class generals in the Persian service.

count. Cases are well known of men being appointed generals or colonels whose whole life had been spent in civilian avocations, and, when a regiment is raised, it not infrequently happens that of the officers not one has ever worn a uniform or attended a drill. . . . If the superior ranks are more commonly filled by men of good family, frequently, as I have pointed out, by hereditary descent, the lower grades of commissioned officers, from the major downwards, are drawn from the middle and lower classes, and occupy no social position whatsoever. Finally, it may be said of the Persian officer that on the battlefield he suffers from an ineradicable disposition to run."

The same as in all general statements, there are exceptions to the latter part of the above. I could cite numerous instances where officers, unfortunately, however, mostly of the lower grades, have distinguished themselves by bravery and courage which would have done honour to the bravest officer of any European army and would in ours have been rewarded with the V.C.

It will have been seen that Persia has had military instructors of many nationalities, but that only four of the great powers sent official missions, viz.: France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia. Of the officers of other nationalities some were engaged in Europe and came with the cognisance and approval of their governments, but most of them came to Persia at their own risk in search of adventure or means of living. Naturally, members of missions had a great advantage over those who came at their own risk; the former were well paid, generally well protected by their diplomatic representatives, and sure of their position, pension, etc., at home, could initiate or, at least, advise reforms which were not always pleasing to the authorities, while the latter were generally considered as adventurers, received little pay, and were forced by their precarious circumstances to be the obedient and silent servants of their employers. The work of the former was therefore more satisfactory. We have seen, however, that the results which even the successful missions achieved were not brilliant and never lasted long, and that some missions had no results at all to show, while the efforts of the officers, who were not members of missions, merely resulted in teaching a few battalions every year some elementary drill, which the troops forgot when they were disbanded for their customary stay in their home districts.

Persia possesses the material out of which a soldiery might again be created worthy of its ancestral renown, but so long as the present system continues there is not much chance of such consummation. Elementary reforms—such as the issue of a single and simple manual of drill, the entire overhauling of the arms and ammunition, the institution of a proper code of military punishment, the promulgation of some system of promotion other than one based upon bribery and corruption, a permanent organisation of the regular infantry and a resuscitation of the powerful force of irregular cavalry which the country is still capable of producing, and better tuition for officers of all classes—might be introduced, and if such reforms be entrusted to a military mission, selected without considering

political reasons and composed of few commissioned and a considerable number of non-commissioned officers of any European power, not for one or even three years, but for at least ten, and fully supported by the Persian authorities, the Persian army would become an important factor in any future European war in the East, "but as long as the whole administration remains rotten at the core, and the army is regarded as a profitable source of plunder for embezzling officials, instead of an instrument of national defence and an outlet for the manhood of the nation, so long will disgrace attend the Persian arms, and the Lion and Sun be no more than a boastful symbol of disaster."

APPENDIX.

MILITARY PAYS, RANKS, TITLES, AND DECORATIONS.

The Persian soldier's pay, expressed in toman, is at present practically the same as it was fixed originally in 1810, 7 to 14 toman per annum per man. But a toman was then represented by 10 big silver coins each worth nearly two shillings of our money, and had a value of nearly one pound sterling. The purchasing power of the toman was considerable and quite sufficient for buying food to keep a family for a month. About forty years later the toman was represented by ten pieces of silver worth about a shilling each and had a value of about half what it was before. Commodities were still cheap in Persia, and the toman could buy half what it bought forty years before. In consequence of further reductions in the weight of the coin which represented the tenth part of a toman (the modern Kran) and the great fall in the price of silver, the value of the toman was still further reduced and is at present less than four shillings, and its purchasing power has decreased in the same proportion. The pays of the officers, in toman, have also remained the same, and the result is that officers and men actually get only one-fifth of the pay which they originally were intended to have. In 1810 the pays of the colonels of line, guards, and artillery were 300, 500, and 600 toman respectively, or £287 to £575, but they are now 400 to 500 toman, or £80 to £100. The privates had 7 toman in the line, 12 in the guards and artillery, or £6 14s. and £11 10s.; they now have 7 to 14 toman, or £1 8s. to £2 16s. The daily rations are the same as they were ninety years ago, but as they are frequently compounded for in cash at rates which are much below the current bazar prices, the soldier loses on them also.

Before the institution of a regular army the officers were known by appellations which indicated the number of men

50

89

under their command; there were chiefs of 10, 50, 100, 1,000, and 10,000 men, and the modern ranks with their present signification were unknown. For instance, a *serhang* then merely meant the leader, "the head," or *sar* of the *ahang*, or line, "battle array," etc., and a *sartip* was the *sar*, or "head," of a *tip*, a "small body of men." When the regular infantry was formed and other grades of officers in accordance with the new system became necessary, various old titles were given to the different grades, and the lieutenant of the European armies became *Naib*, the captain *Sultan*, the major *Yavar*, the colonel *Serhang*, and the general *Sertip*. For many years after this the battalion had a strength of ten companies of 100 men each, or with officers of 1,097 men, and its commander was the *Serhang*, who had two *yavars*, the *sultans*, and twenty *naibs* under him. The *Sertip* commanded two to four battalions, or a brigade of cavalry, the latter, however, frequently not numbering more than four or five hundred men. A commander of five battalions was a "Mir Panjeh," one of ten battalions an "Amir Tuman." A *Sertip* or other officer when in command of an expedition, large or small, was called *Serdar*, that is "commander." There was also the title *Amir Nuyan* for a commander of an army corps. There does not seem to have been much difference in rank between a *Sertip* and a *Mir Panjeh*; in 1850 one of the latter is mentioned as commanding two battalions, one battery, and two troops of cavalry, while a *Sertip* commanded two battalions and 800 horse. At the present time there seems to be no rule whatever. There are *Amir Tumans* and *Sertips* of the first class who command only one battalion, and there are officers of the same rank who command several. There are *Sertips* of the second and third class who command two battalions, while some *Sertips* of the first class command only one. It is now very difficult to say what *Amir Tuman*, *Sertip*, and *Serhang* really mean; for instance, according to the official army list for 1899-1900, the small "Cossack brigade" has on its strength, besides the Russian officers, one *Amir Tuman*, 8 *Mir Panjeh*, 12 *Sertips* of the second class, and 29 *Serhangs*, and to consider the *Amir Tuman* here as the equivalent of the French "maréchal," or, better still, "field-marshal," as some holders of this title do, and to translate *Mir Panjeh* and *Sertip* of the second class as general and *Serhang* as colonel would be absurd. In addition to the 50 generals and colonels, the brigade has 26 majors and 68 lieutenants, or 144 officers in all for about 1,200 men.

In 1858 the rank of *Mir Panjeh* was abolished, and the *Sertips* were divided into three classes, the third class to correspond with the French *général de brigade*, the second with the old *Mir Panjeh*, and the first class with the French *général de division*. Some years later the *Serhangs* and *Yavars* were each divided into two classes. For every grade of officer there is a special decoration—stars of various sizes with different number of rays, five to eight, and the "Lion and Sun" in the centre; and the division of the grades into several classes was done

[619]

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more with the idea of increasing the number of decorations than for effecting any military improvements. Further gradations were instituted by conferring the decorations for Serhang and upwards with and without ribbon and also by conferring decoration and ribbon without the rank. For instance, a colonel of the second class might receive the decoration and ribbon, but not the rank, of a colonel of the first class and be still a colonel of the second class. At one time the gradations from Yavar II to Sertip I amounted to 18. All these were for military officers, and the lion on military decorations was, in heraldic phrase, "passant regardant" and held a sword in its right hand. Shortly after this, in imitation of the Russian 'tchin' system, by which civilians are assimilated to or rank with military officers, decorations of lieutenant, captain, etc., to Sertip are given to civilians, but were distinguished from those of military officers by having a lion "couchant regardant," and when there was a ribbon with the decoration it had yellow for the white on the ribbon of the military officer. It was then very easy to distinguish the military from the civilians. After a time, however, the yellow ribbons were discarded, the recumbent lion walked, and civilians wore the insignia of the military, donned military uniforms, and gave themselves military titles. This has created an extraordinary number of officers, all apparently military, and the traveller in Persia may be excused if he makes unpleasant remarks, as, for instance, J. de Morgan in 1890:—

"Jamais, je pense, recensement n'en (Persian officers) a été fait, mais si un jour la fantaisie prenait à Naïb Saltaneh (the Minister for War) de compter les gradés de son armée, sûrement il en trouverait dix ou quinze fois plus que des simples soldats." ("Mission Scientifique," I, 316.)

In the eighties the title of Mir Panjeh came into use again, and, at first conferred upon cavalry officers only, is now held by officers of other branches as well as by civilians. Then the title of "Serdar," as something between Amir Tuman and Amir Nuyan, was invented, but always with some qualifying adjective, like glorious, exalted, noble, etc., as for instance *Serdar i mukarram*, "the noble Serdar," or *Serdar i muazzam*, "the great Serdar," which is the title of the prince who attended the Queen's Jubilee in 1894, and is the Minister for War at present. Instead of the old Persian "Lion and Sun," with its lion "passant regardant," which other officers wear on their hats, a Serdar has two lions "combatant" under a Persian crown.

In addition to all the military decorations, which, really, are nothing but distinguishing marks of ranks, as epaulettes, stripes, buttons, etc., might be, there are two other series of the "Lion and Sun," one the "sacred," composed of three classes and seldom conferred, the other the "*Kharejeh*" or *foreign*, composed of five classes. The latter was instituted by Fath Ali Shah in 1808 in imitation of the French Légion d'Honneur, and was at first called "the Order of the Sun," then that of the "Sun and Lion," and finally "Lion and Sun." As

its qualification "foreign" implies, it was intended for foreign subjects only and appears as such in the last statutes, but thousands of Persian subjects have had it conferred upon them, and the first class, with its broad green ribbon, which was intended for foreign envoys and high functionaries only, is not infrequently seen on the breast of a person of comparatively low rank.

The most recent decree regarding decorations and other distinctions (*imtiāz*) is dated Zilhej 1311 and was published in the official gazette of the 19th June, 1894, where it fills three pages. I here give some extracts from it with short descriptions of the decorations as they ought to be according to the original statutes.

There are three series of the imperial order of the "Lion and Sun." The *first* series is divided into three classes, viz. :

Class I. *Nishan i akdas*, a large diamond star, with three circles round the lion and sun and three plumes in the crown; broad sky-blue ribbon. Is conferred upon reigning sovereigns only.

Class II. *Nishan i Kuds*, a large diamond star, with two circles round the lion and sun and two plumes in the crown; broad sky-blue ribbon with white borders. Is conferred upon sons of the Shah, sovereigns and their sons, and on Ministers of State who have the title *ashraf* (literally "most noble," but used for our "Highness").

Class III. *Nishan i mukaddas*, a large diamond star with one circle round centre; no plumes; broad sky-blue ribbon with a white band in the middle. Is conferred upon princes and great Ministers of State.

The above three decorations are fitly, though not quite correctly, called the "sacred," "more sacred," and "most sacred," and are conferred upon foreigners "as occasion may require." The stars are worn on the left breast and the ribbons over the right shoulder.

The *second* series is that known as the *Kharejeh*, "foreign," and like its prototype the Légion d'Honneur has five classes, viz. :—

Class I. Large eight-rayed star, three circles round centre, on left breast; broad green ribbon over right shoulder and fastened over hip by a small star.

Class II. Large seven-rayed star, two circles round centre, on right breast; a smaller six-rayed star on green ribbon round the neck.

Class III. A six-rayed star with clasp on green ribbon round the neck.

Class IV. A five-rayed star with green ribbon and bow on right breast.

Class V. A five-rayed star with green ribbon through ring on right breast.

The first class "is for foreign Ministers of State, ambassadors, and envoys accredited to the Court of Persia, and other persons whose rank is equivalent to that of a Minister." The second class is conferred upon persons "whose rank is one step lower than that of envoys and ministers plenipotentiary; that is on ministers resident, chargés d'affaires, etc." The third class is conferred "on first secretaries of legation, chargés d'affaires at interim, consuls-general, military attachés, etc." The fourth class is for persons whose rank is one step lower than that of the last, and the fifth class is conferred "on persons holding inferior positions in the diplomatic service and on merchants, inventors, and persons who have distinguished themselves in art or science." The stars of these five classes are in silver, but those of the first and third classes are occasionally in diamonds and "conferred as a special mark of His Majesty the Shah's favour." The decree here adds that the "Lion and Sun" of the above five classes will be conferred upon foreigners, but, "with the exception of members of the diplomatic service upon whom it will be conferred as a matter of course, no one will get it unless full inquiries will have proved him to have the proper social status and to be worthy of being decorated."

Regarding the *third* series the decree has the following :—

"The third series of the decorations of the 'Lion and Sun,' with three ribbons of various colours, for distinguishing the different military ranks from the Amir Nuyan to the Serhang and Yavar (the Sultans and Naibs are omitted) in no way resembles the other decorations, which are conferred irrespective of military ranks, but as the decorations of this series have been in use for a very long time they will not be abolished. Persons in military service will have these decorations conferred upon them in accordance with the rules and regulations of the army, but to persons not in military service they will be conferred only after due examination of their merits by the Council of Ministers, and with the approval of the Grand Vizir."

These decorations consist of silver stars of various sizes, which have from five to eight rays, a lion "passant regardant" holding a sword in his right hand, and red enamel between the rays. From the Serhang of the first class upwards the stars are accompanied by ribbons, the Serhang having white, the Sertip III red and white, the Sertip II red, the Sertip I red, white, red, the Amir Tuman green with red borders, the Amir Nuyan blue.

The thirteenth paragraph of the decree is on medals, and says that "medals of gold, silver, and bronze will be conferred upon soldiers in accordance with military rules, but on civilians only when they have well and honestly served for some years in a ministerial department or foreign legation,* or when

*Some foreign legations have taken advantage of the generosity of the Persian Government. A certain foreign envoy's demanding a gold medal for his cook, another legation's asking for a decoration for a lady who nursed one of its members during a serious sickness, another's asking for a decoration for one of its subjects who had kept its affairs going during a critical period, another's asking for medals for some workmen employed in a factory — all requests being granted—will long be remembered.

'Report on the Persian Army' [52r] (103/170)

93


they are artisans and merchants who have become known for their honesty in dealing with the public, or persons who have exposed their lives in counteracting rebellion in the interior or on the frontiers, or have given an impetus to trade and manufacture by some invention." There are several kinds of medals, and they are much appreciated by the subalterns and non-commissioned officers of the army. I remember a Sultan, who twenty-five years ago with forty or fifty men held a little fort on the Khorassan frontier against a considerable Turkoman force, being as pleased with the silver medal which he obtained as a superior officer would have been to become an Amir Tuman.

The remainder of the decree treats of other distinctions. There are the title of *Jenab*, "Excellency"; the *tamsil i humayun*, "Shah's portrait," in three classes; *snuff boxes* adorned with the Shah's portrait; jewelled *Shamsah*, "coat clasps with tassels," four classes; jewelled *pen-boxes* and *strings of pearls* for holding rolls of paper; military *overcoats* with diamond *epaulettes*, four classes; jewelled *swords*, *daggers*, and *knives*, various classes; jewelled *sticks*, three classes; *rings*.

The snuff-boxes are intended for persons who do not wear decorations, "as, for instance, members of the clergy, Envoys of Great Britain and the United States of America," and for persons to whom it would not be suitable to give the portrait, as foreign merchants of note, authors and artists. The decree concludes with the following paragraph:—

"It will be the duty of the Council of State to enhance the value of every one of the above-mentioned distinctions to such a degree that people will be ready to sacrifice their lives in order to obtain them, and will prize them above anything."

'Report on the Persian Army' [52v] (104/170)



(53)

PART II.

MILITARY ORGANISATION OF THE PERSIAN ARMY IN 1899.

CHAPTER I.

RECRUITMENT OF MEN.

Feudal System. Partial Military Conscription early part of Century.
Present-day System of Recruitment for Infantry and Artillery.
Khanewarrah or Home Allowance. Pedaraneh or Paternal Allowance.
System of Recruitment for Irregular Cavalry. Term of Service.
Recruitment of Officers.

"PRIOR to the reign of Fath Ali Shah the military strength of Persia had consisted of inexhaustible supplies of light horsemen furnished by the tribal chieftains on the feudal basis of a military contribution." Recruit-
ment, feudal
system.

Curzon talks of the "immemorial organisation" of the Persian army "as a loose collection of irregular cavalry contingents" which for the most part retained its original form during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

"Even under Shah Abbas, when the army was at its best, there prevailed the most complete ignorance of scientific warfare, and battles were little less than desultory cavalry engagements on a large scale."

The brothers Sherley, 1600 A.D., were the first to whom Persia owed her first practical initiation into the military science of Europe, and who enrolled a body of infantry 20,000 strong, recruited from the lower orders of the country, and receiving a regular pay from the king. The effect of the Sherley influence, however, does not appear to have been of any definite permanent nature, for shortly afterwards we see Nadir Shah overrunning Central Asia with large hordes of irregular cavalry, and as Curzon says, "How completely the Persian army still retained its cavalry organisation is shown by the statement of Nadir Shah's biographer, however exaggerated,

'Report on the Persian Army' [53v] (106/170)

96

that out of the 160,000 persons, soldiers and camp followers, who composed the invading army at Delhi in February, 1739, there was not a single individual on foot."

This ancient system by which the feudal chiefs were held responsible for meeting the requirements of the king was brushed on one side during the reign of Fath Ali Shah.

Partial
military
conscription
early part
of century.

"In his reign the military interest was shifted from Teheran to Tabriz, and from the sovereign to the heir-apparent, Abbas Mirza, and the rivalries of England, France, and Russia ushered in an epoch of foreign and especially of British military tutorship."

Sir John Malcolm started for India on his second mission to Persia in 1810, taking with him a number of Anglo-Indian officers, who passed into the Persian service, and among whom were Christie, Lindsay, Monteith, and Willock.

In 1811 Sir Gore Ouseley was also accompanied from England by some officers and a detachment non-commissioned officers of the 47th Regiment, and it is to Abbas Mirza and these officers and non-commissioned officers of the Anglo-Indian mission that Persia in the main owes its present system of recruitment and training.

Fath Ali Shah doubtless recognised that the more regular system of recruitment to which Abbas Mirza gave birth rendered him less liable to the exigencies of the moment and more independent of the tribal chiefs, of whose powers for good or evil the sovereigns of Persia were only too well aware. His policy was systematically followed by his successors, more especially by the late Nasr-ed-Din Shah, by whose time the strength of the tribal organisation was much curtailed.

It may be here mentioned, however, that of late years the Bakhtiari, Kashkais, Tangestanis, Lurs and Arabs, etc., of Southern Persia are again in a position, owing to the importation and sale of large quantities of modern weapons, to assume at any moment a threatening and dangerous attitude. Similarly with the Kurds of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, who are better armed than the regular troops of the Persian army.

Present-day
system of
recruitment
for infantry
and artillery.

The system of recruitment for infantry and artillery is what is known as the Bounitchéh or Budget, each village, district or tribe being under an obligation to furnish a certain quota of recruits proportionate to the amount of its revenue assessment, nominally one recruit for every 12 to 20 Tumans of revenue. Nominally the law applies to all parts of Persia and to all classes, with the exception of Christians, Jews, Parsis, the peasant cultivator of the crown lands, and the inhabitants of towns where land taxes are not levied. An exception is also made of Seyyids (descendants of the prophet) and Ulema, who number many thousands of well nourished and strong men.

As a matter of fact the rule has been but very partially applied, and has only seriously affected those parts of the country where the best soldiers are to be found, Azerbaijan

continuing, as in the past, to furnish the best part of the infantry and artillery, Khorassan, Fars, and the Bakhtiari districts the cavalry. Other districts, such as Yezd and Kirman, are entirely exempt, the poor quality of its men being a matter of common notoriety in the country.

Even in Azerbaijan, where the Bounitchéh can best be studied, the recruiting is conducted on no regular system, the numbers allotted to the various villages and districts being fixed after a very irregular and arbitrary manner. A village of 500 inhabitants, for instance, may be furnishing the same quota of recruits as another of 50; whilst the case is not uncommon of a small hamlet of not more than four or five houses being called upon to produce the same number of men as were originally allotted to it at the time of the first assessment by Abbas Mirza, when its total revenue may have been twenty times as great as at the present day.

These glaring inconsistencies give rise to little comment in Persia, for the same want of order and method is apparent in every department of public business, and it is not at all improbable that the Government assessment of the revenues in the year 1899 differs but little from that existing in the early part of the century.

In practice the Bounitchéh works after the following manner:—

On receipt of orders for the enrolment of a certain regiment, the colonel, who is possibly a large landed proprietor or chief of the district, accompanied by several of his officers and a representative, Lashkar Navis, of the pay department, commences a tour of all the villages responsible for his recruits.

Prior to his arrival the local fathers make a selection of those whom they can best spare, the poorest and weakest as a rule. These are in due course presented to the colonel, who after rejecting the unfits, will himself nominate a certain number of more capable and efficient young men to take their place. Great heartburning naturally follows, as military service is not popular in the lower ranks, and the richer members of the community will often pay large bribes to secure exemption. The result is almost invariably the same, the regiment being recruited with many of the village failures, who are far from qualified to represent the bone and muscle of the average countryman.

In regard to those villages where the conditions of existence have so altered as to have rendered the original assessment obviously impossible of execution, such are either passed over altogether or their quota of recruits may be reduced to a reasonable number commensurate with the position and wealth of the villages.

In any case the colonel is held responsible for finding the full number required at headquarters, and is little likely to be questioned as to the means he may adopt for that purpose. Moreover, as he is not expected to maintain more than half to

'Report on the Persian Army' [54v] (108/170)

98

Khane-
wareh or
home
allowance.

three-quarters of the paper strength of his regiment, a wide margin exists for deficiencies.

The soldiers enrolled under the Bounitchch system receive grants of money in the form of deduction from the land revenue called Khanewareh. These grants are borne by the villages.

The sums vary considerably in different parts of the country and apparently are fixed by the interested parties themselves without interference on the part of the authorities.

The following list will give a clear idea of the sums annually credited to the soldier or his family in various districts:—

Urumieh ..	5	Tumans	{ Deduction allowed on revenue or paid in cash.
Tabriz ..	12	"	"
Shagaghi ..	10	"	"
Karadagh ..	16	"	"
Khal Khal ..	1	"	"
Ardebil ..	1½	"	"
Karaghan ..	1½	"	"
Tehran ..	5	"	"
Kazrin ..	3	"	"

Pedaraneh
or paternal
allowance.

In some parts of the country the recruits also receive a bounty called Pedaraneh or paternal allowance, which is paid to the infantry soldier or the artilleryman (Tupchi) at the time of enrolment. The sums vary from 5 to 40 Tumans and are paid in cash or in grain.

The difference between Khanewareh and Pedaraneh is that the former is given every year, the latter once only.

System of
recruitment
for irregular
cavalry.
Term of
service.

The old feudal system still prevails in regard to the irregular cavalry. Further details of the method of raising these corps will be found in Chapter III, Irregular Cavalry.

Service in the infantry and artillery is nominally for life; but little difficulty is experienced by the soldier wishing to resume his civil occupation, if he is in a position to provide a substitute. Men are always to be found ready to serve for a price; whilst the sanction of those in authority can always be obtained for a consideration.

For full particulars regarding the development of the Persian army from the seventeenth century to date, *vide* Part I, Chapter II, History of the Persian Army.

Recruitment
of officers.

The junior regimental officers are chosen by the chiefs of the regiments from the petty proprietors of the districts and localities where the regiments are raised. They receive their commissions (Firman) from the Commander-in-Chief.

Majors, lieutenant-colonels, and colonels are selected by the Commander-in-Chief, who has the right of granting commissions to these ranks, but it would appear that the Firmans are generally issued by the Shah.

General officers obtain their Firmans from the Shah. The Vali Ahd (heir-apparent) is said to have the right of nominating generals of the third class.

55

99

There are no regulations in force in regard to the qualifications of officers for first appointment or for promotion. "The command of regiments is sometimes inherited, sometimes vested in the hands of infants, and commonly bought and sold." Curzon mentions that at the time of his visit to Teheran a child of 11 years of age (probably Aziz-es-Sultan, favourite of Nasr-ed-Din Shah) was a field-marshal, and at the royal levée stood between the Commander-in-Chief and an octogenarian veteran, no mean type of the system which prevails through the entire hierarchy, from general to ensign. Patronage and promotion in a regiment are in the hands of the colonel, who makes such a good thing out of the distribution that the goodwill, so to speak, of his post is a marketable commodity, like that of a public-house in England, and has to be purchased for a fixed sum. To obtain higher commands large sums varying from £200 to £1,000 are paid by the would-be Sartips or Sarhangs.

If the superior ranks are more commonly filled by men of good family, the lower grades of commissioned officers, from the Yavar or major downwards, are drawn from the middle and lower classes and occupy no social position whatever.

CHAPTER II.

INFANTRY.

Official List. Estimates of Nominal, Effective, and Strength under arms. Strength under arms, Nominal and Approximate. Composition of a Battalion. Training. Foreign Officers. Pay of Officers and Men under arms. Pay of Officers and Men not under arms. Arms. Ammunition. Quality of Troops. Power of Mobilisation of the Persian Army. Barracks.

Official list. There are 79 battalions of infantry on the official list of the Persian army, numbered regularly from 1 to 79. They are recruited and drawn from the provinces in the proportion herein noted:—

Azerbaijan	25
Khamseh	2
Garus	1
Mazanderan	9
Semnan-Damghan	1
Shahrud	1
Khorassan	2
Seistan	2
Kirman	3
Teheran	2
Zarand	1
Demavend	1
Kasvin	3
Kharakan	1
Irak.. .. .	5
Kamareh	1
Saveh	1
Gulpaigan	1
Ispahan	3
Hamadan	5
Nehavend	1
Burujird	1
Kirmanshah	4
Malayir	1
Luristan	2
Kurdistan	1

80

Battalion No. 49 is noted as composed of two battalions, and accounts for apparent difference in the number.

The numbers, names, strength, and localities of recruitment are as follows, but it must be clearly understood that the strength of the battalions is the nominal strength as shown on the official list. The actual strengths, as will be shown hereafter, differ very essentially from the nominal.

Regiment Number	Name	Officers	Men	Administered by	Controlled by or owned	Province	Locality	Remarks
1. Bahaduran	...	39	1,000	Serdar i Kul...	Shuja' es Saltaneh, Amir Tumân	Azerbaijan	Arwanak, Karadagh ...	The old grenadier regiment.
2. Khassch I...	...	36	1,000	"	"	"	Deh Khavagan, Gurgan ...	First foot guards.
3. Irbal	...	41	1,000	"	"	"	Ujan Abbas, round city of Tabriz.	
4. Nurez II	...	41	1,000	"	"	"	Marand, Gargar.	
5. Khassen II	...	31	1,000	"	Haji Nazm es Saltaneh, Amir Tumân	"	Tusoj, Arwanak...	Second foot guards.
6. Tabriz IV	...	26	1,000	Firman Firma	Ibrahim el Mamolik Serrip	"	Marand, round city of Tabriz.	
7. Amiriyeh	...	34	1,000	"	Zafar ed Dowleh, Amir Tumân	"	Tabriz.	Special guards of Shah Karavul i Makhsus.
8. Mukhterân i Shakaki	...	34	1,000	Serdar i Kul	Shuja' es Saltaneh, Amir Tumân	"	Sarab.	
9. Shakaki V	...	35	1,000	"	"	"	Garm Rud.	
10. Shakaki VII	...	35	1,000	"	"	"	Hasht Rud, Maneh.	
11. Shakaki VI	...	34	1,000	Firman Firma	Behjet el Mulk, Amir Tumân	"	Garm Rud.	
12. Kahrmanieh	...	34	1,000	"	Amir Bahadur Jang	"	Chahar Olmak.	
13. Ilat V	...	34	1,000	"	Baba Khan, Azim es Saltaneh	"	Karadagh.	
14. Nassir i Takht i Kapd	...	28	1,000	"	Amir Bahadur Jang	"	"	
15. Ardehl and Meschkin	...	35	1,000	"	Zafar es Saltaneh, Amir Tumân	"	Ardehl Meschkin.	
16. Khalkhal	...	27	1,000	"	Haji Kuli Khan, Amir Tumân	"	Khal-khal.	
17. Muzaffer Marigha	...	27	1,000	"	Haji Kuli Khan, Amir Tumân	"	Maragha.	
18. Maragha IV	...	27	1,000	"	Haji M. Kuli Khan, Serrip	"	"	
19. Mas'ud Teheran	...	28	1,000	"	Safar es Saltaneh, Amir Tumân	"	Urmiyah.	
20. Urumi Ashars VII	...	33	1,000	"	Zafar es Saltaneh, Amir Tumân	"	"	
21. Afsar VIII	...	34	1,000	"	Munazzam ed Dowleh, Amir Tumân	"	"	
22. Jedid (New) Ashar	...	27	1,000	"	"	"	"	
23. Khot IX	...	33	1,000	"	Abbas Kuli Khan, Serrip	"	Khoi.	
24. Khoi X	...	27	1,000	"	Haider Khan, Amir Tumân	"	"	
25. Mukhterân i Makd	...	28	1,000	"	Mohamad Pasha Khan, Serrip	"	Makd.	
26. Makhsus	...	28	1,000	"	"	Teheran	General recruitment	Mostly Turks.
27. Mas'ud Teheran	...	28	1,000	Amir Khan Serdar	Saif el Mulk, Amir Tumân	"	About Tehran	Türk Bayat tribe, of district Zerend. S.W. Teheran.
28. Bayat i Zerend	...	28	1,000	"	Mavakir es Saltaneh	Zarand	Zarand (S.W. of Tehran)	
29. Denavend	...	28	1,000	"	Intekhab ed Dowleh	Denavend	Denavend	
30. Khana of Savah	...	34	1,000	Vizir i Nizam	Saif es Saltaneh, Amir Panjeh	Savah	(Eli i Khaleh) Savah	Türk Khaleh tribe, of Khaleh district, belonging to Savah. S.W. Teheran.
Carried forward			30,000					

Rekiment Number.	Name.	Officers.	Men.	Administered by.	Controlled by or owned.	Province.	Locality.	Remarks.
49.	Brought forward ... Dodangeh...	3	46,900 400	Vizir i Nizam	Isma'il Khan, Sertip	Mazanderan	Char Dongeh	Persians, Mazandarans. Persians, Mazandarans. Ashraf, between Sari and Astrabad.
49.	Ashraf tavabgi	3	400	"	Abbas Kuli Khan, Sertip...	"	{ Environs of Ashraf in Mazanderan. Yakkash va Talish.	The number of officers is that of the M'ard (Superior), Yaver and upwards; Sultans, Nalbs, not given.
50.	Kamran i Ferhan	27	1,000	"	Mukabbib es Saltaneh, Mir Panjeh.	Irak	Ferahan	Persians.
51.	Bozchallu	23	1,000	"	Nasr el Mulk, Amir Tumân	"	Bozchallu...	"
52.	Mukhbherin of Kezzaz	23	1,000	"	Samsun el Mulk, Amir Tumân	"	Kozak	"
53.	Sarbaudi	29	1,000	"	Nasr el Mulk, Amir Tumân	"	Sarbaudi	"
54.	Khalaf of Kom, 2 battalions.	29	1,600	Nalbs es Saltaneh	Hemat i Nizam, Amir Tumân	"	Kom (near)	Turks of Kalaj tribe, Two Battalions.
55.	Kamareh i Ikhlas	23	1,000	"	Hishmat ed Dowleh, Amir Tumân.	Kamareh	Kamareh	Persians.
56.	Gulpaigani	27	1,000	"	Sahn el Mulk, Amir Tumân	Gulpaigani	Gulpaigani	"
57.	Sahaf	33	1,000	"	Jellâ ed Dowleh, Amir Tumân.	Ispahan	Schdeh, near Ispahan	"
58.	Chahar Mahal	23	1,000	"	"	"	Chahar Mahal, near Ispahan	"
59.	Ferhan	27	1,000	"	"	"	Ferdan, near Ispahan	"
60.	Karaguzid VI	26	1,000	"	Hissam el Mulk, Amir Tumân	Hamadan	Hamadan	Turkish tribe.
61.	Karaguzin Mansur	28	1,000	"	Siad es Saltaneh, Amir Tumân	"	"	Mostly Turkish, also Lurs.
62.	Fadavi	34	1,000	"	Mansur ed Dowleh, Amir Tumân.	"	"	Turks.
63.	Karaguzid Mukhbheran	28	1,000	"	"	"	"	"
64.	Malayiri	23	1,600	"	Kezad Nizam, Amir Tumân	Malayiri	Malayiri	Persians, Two Battalions.
65.	Nehavendi	29	1,000	"	Behâ ed Dowleh, Amir Tumân	Nehavend	Nehavend	Persians.
66.	Siakhori	23	1,000	"	"	Barojird	Barojird	"
67.	Guran	27	1,000	"	Husan Khan, Amir Tumân	Kirmaushah	Kirmaushah	Kurds.
68.	Kerindi	3	1,000	"	Itheham el Manalik, Amir Tumân.	"	"	"
69.	Kelhur	29	1,000	"	Mohamad Ali Khan, Sertip	"	"	"
	Carried forward		68,900					

Regiment Number.	Name.	Officers.	Men.	Administered by.	Controlled by or owned.	Province.	Locality.	Remarks.
70.	Brought forward	...	68,900	...	...	...	...	...
71.	Zengeneh ...	26	1,000	Zill es Sultan	Zahir el Mulk, Amir Tumán	Kirmanshah	Kirmanshah	Kurds.
72.	Pusht i Kuhl ...	26	800	"	Saram es Sutanah, Sordar	Luristan	Posh Kuh	Lurs.
73.	Amrai ...	26	800	"	Nazar Ali Khan, Serip	"	Feshkuh	Turks.
74.	Karai ...	26	1,000	"	Maza Ghos, Amir	Khorasan	Karai	Persians.
75.	Turshizi ...	27	1,000	"	Prasht Shuj' el Mulk	"	Turshiz	"
76.	Káin Kadim (old)	23	1,000	"	Shoket el Mulk, Amir Tumán	Seistan	Káin	"
77.	Káin Jadid (new)	27	1,000	"	Vakil el Mamalik, Amir Tumán	Kirman	Kirman	"
78.	Kerman Kadim ...	29	1,000	"	Behjet ed Dowleh, Serip	"	"	"
79.	Bahadur i Gernsar Ker- mani.	28	1,000	"	Zain el Abedin Khan, Serip	"	"	"
	Total men ...		78,500					

'Report on the Persian Army' [58r] (115/170)

105

NOTES.

It was decided to call regiments by their numbers, but this is not done. They are known by their old appellations, territorial or otherwise.

The regular infantry is divided into Azerbaijani and Iraki regiments. The origin of this denomination is to be found in the history of the Persian army in the beginning of the century, when Abbas Mirza's army was called by the name of the province where its troops were recruited. All other troops were known as Iraki, regardless of the place of recruitment. The appellation was more administrative than territorial and is so now, the Azerbaijan regiments drawing their pay from Azerbaijan, the Iraki from their separate provinces.

It is extremely difficult to arrive at any accurate notion of approximate effective strength of the infantry—that is to say, of the number of men borne on the rolls of the regiments and having actual existence.

Estimates of nominal, effective, and strength under arms.

The following are the numbers given by various writers, under the headings nominal, effective, and strength under arms:—

	Nominal.	Actual or Effective.	Strength under arms.
Colonel Smith (1883)	64,500	35,400	18,000 to 20,000
Mr. Herbert (1886)	—	—	26,100 Effective !!!
Carzon (1891)	63,700	25,000	13,000
Colonel Picot (1899)	78,500	35,000	13,600

The nominal strength recorded by Colonel Picot for 1899 is that given him by the Paymaster-General (Vazir-i-Lashkar) and tallies with the official Sal Nameh (year book for 1899-1900).

In regard to the actual or effective strength, the present writer thinks that the foregoing figures may be very misleading, for although it is more than probable that the effective is under 35,000 men, experience has shown that, given time and a fairly liberal expenditure of money, the owners of regiments are almost invariably able to bring up their numbers to a figure closely approaching to the nominal strength. For instance, when the Firman Firma was Commander-in-Chief in 1897, embodiment for service at the capital was ordered of the Ardebil and Meschkin regiment, which had not been under arms for fifteen years; yet in the course of six months it presented itself at Teheran with its complement of officers and men almost complete. As this is by no means an isolated instance of the practical working of the Bounitcheh system of recruitment, it may be safely concluded that, under favourable circumstances and a more flourishing state of the exchequer, a fair proportion (possibly two-thirds) of the nominal strength

[619]

I

'Report on the Persian Army' [58v] (116/170)

106

Strength
under arms,
nominal and
approximate.

could be called to the colours in a reasonable period of time, as time is counted in Persia.

Two lists are attached showing the nominal (official) and approximate distribution of the troops in Persia under arms in 1899.

The figures are scarcely less striking than those which have already been recorded, and show that of a nominal force of 27,750 men with the colours only 13,600 are actually employed. It occasionally happens, however, that camps are assembled for a few months at a time to overawe the tribes, and to demonstrate on the Turkish frontier. A camp of this nature, consisting of

5 infantry battalions, or 4,000 men
Cavalry, including 50 Cossacks of the
Cossack brigade 1,500
Artillery, with 8.7-cm. mountain guns .. 200

5,700

was employed with His Highness the Ain-ed-Dowleh in Luristan and Arabistan in the autumn of 1899. Its special purpose was to collect arrears of revenue and restore order. On the completion of this duty the larger part of the camp will probably be dismissed.

Nominal distribution of Troops in Persia according to Official List, 1899, under arms.

Locality.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Total.	Remarks.
Azerbaijan ..	4 to 5 battalions 3,200 men	400 to 500	300	3,900	
Kurdistan ..	1 battalion 800 men	—	—	800	
Kirmanshah ..	1 battalion 800 men	—	100	900	
Luristan and Burujird }	1 battalion 800 men	—	50	850	
Arabistan ..	2 battalions 1,600 men	—	100	1,700	
Fars ..	3 battalions 2,400 men	400	100	2,900	
Ispahan ..	1 battalion 800 men	200	100	1,100	
Kirman ..	2 battalions 1,600 men	300 to 400	100	2,000	
Seistan ..	2 battalions 1,600 men	—	—	1,600	
Khorassan ..	1 battalion, local 2,400 men	500	100 to 200	3,000	
Astrabad ..	2 battalions 1,600 men	300 to 500	100 to 200	2,000	
Tehran ..	6 to 7 battalions 4,800 men	500	200	5,500	
	Cossack Infantry	Cossack Cavalry	Cossack Artillery	1,500	
				27,750	

I

'Report on the Persian Army' [59r] (117/170)

107

Approximate distribution of Troops in Persia, 1899, under arms.

Locality.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Total.	Remarks.
Azerbaijan ..	1,600	250	150	2,000	
Kurdistan ..	400	—	—	400	
Kirmanshah ..	400	—	50	450	
Luristan and Burujird }	400	—	50	450	
Arabistan ..	800	—	50	850	
Fars ..	1,200	200	50	1,450	
Ispahan ..	400	100	50	550	
Kirman ..	800	150	50	1,000	
Seistan ..	300	—	—	300	The two battalions in Seistan are farmed out to the governors. It is improbable that more than 300 men are actually under arms.
Khorassan ..	1,200	250	50	1,500	One local battalion of infantry, two from other provinces.
Astrabad ..	800	150	50	1,000	The numbers under arms, owing to the proximity of the Turkomans, vary a good deal in Astrabad, but the total seldom exceeds 1,000.
Tehran ..	2,400	1,000	250	3,650	
	10,700	2,100	800	13,600	

The regulation strength of a battalion varies from 800 to 1,000 men, with 38 officers. The list of officers is as follows:—

- 1 Colonel.
- 1 Lieutenant-Colonel.
- 1 or 2 Majors.
- 1 Porte-drapeau (Captain).
- 1 Adjutant (Captain).
- 1 Bandmaster (rank varies).
- 1 Drum-Major, Lieutenant or Captain.
- 10 Captains of Companies.
- 20 1st and 2nd Lieutenants.

The military staff of the regiment consists of:—

- The Colonel.
- 1 Porte-drapeau.
- 1 Adjutant.
- 1 Bandmaster.
- 1 Drum-Major.

The civil staff of:—

- 1 Munsif, a civilian writer.
- 1 Lashkar Navis, or military writer.
- 1 Medical officer.
- 1 Surgeon.
- 1 Apothecary.

[619]

1 2

The medical staff seldom exists as explained in Chapter VII, on departments, Medical.

On parade the battalion is divided into 10 companies, those on the right being known as the Bahaderan and Mukhberan respectively, the others being numbered from right to left. Each company has 3 officers—1 sultan (captain), 2 naib aval or naib doyum (1st or 2nd subalterns).

Training.

Instruction in drill and tactics is based upon the Austrian system as imparted by the officers of the Austrian mission of 1878.

This mission trained a large number of officers and non-commissioned officers as instructors, many of whom remain; and it is to these officers that the Persian army, as represented by the garrison of Tehran, is indebted for the limited training it now enjoys. The training is restricted to the simplest of parade manœuvres, and to a perfunctory use of arms; of any higher training, of field manœuvres, of musketry practice, etc., the officers and men are kept in ignorance, and it would appear that the main duty of the infantry officer and soldier of the Persian army has been fulfilled when they are able to take part in a march past before the Shah in a fairly creditable manner. The whole of the work done in Tehran by the infantry, cavalry, and artillery (excepting always the Cossack brigade), is subordinated to this one aim and object. No call is made upon the intelligence of the officer, or the soldierly instincts of the men.

As regards musketry training there is little to be said. The expenditure of ball ammunition certainly does not exceed five rounds per man per annum, and furthermore, as it is only in the capital that any target practice takes place, the average per man under arms is even less.

The Turk soldier of Azerbaijan, Khamsel, Kasvin, etc., is not accustomed in his village to the use of arms, and is generally quite new to his rifle when enlisted for service. His deficiency is recognised by the authorities, and whatever ammunition may be set aside for musketry practice is devoted to him, but owing to the absence of theoretical instruction and the insufficiency of the practical, he acquires but little proficiency, and remains untrained all his service.

It is otherwise with the tribal infantry, Kurd, Lur, Bakhtiari, etc., who carry arms from their youth upwards, but it is certain that whatever skill they may possess has been learnt at their own expense, not at that of the Government.

The Persian soldier proper of Kirman, Khorassan, Shiraz, etc., comes between these two extremes. The reason of this state of affairs is not far to seek. The officers are themselves unfitted to impart instruction, whilst the Government is rarely in a position to purchase ammunition for the training of the men, or to safeguard it when purchased; moreover, the farming system as applied to the stores leads to the gravest of abuses, and prevents the Government from exercising any real check over the almost public sale of its property. A sufficient supply of

'Report on the Persian Army' [60r] (119/170)

109

ball cartridge is therefore never available for Government purposes, and the soldier is starved in this as in every other branch of his well-being.

The only foreign officer employed in the infantry is General Maletta, formerly a subaltern in the Italian army, who served for some years in the Egyptian Gendarmerie, where he attained the rank of major. He left the British service when British officers took command of the Egyptian forces. He then came to Persia, and was engaged under contract as an infantry instructor. He is an efficient and hard-working officer, but his abilities are entirely wasted. He has no concern whatever with the interior economy of the corps, their pay, clothing, or equipment, and in consequence possesses the very smallest modicum of authority. His tact alone enables him to maintain his position and dignity as a European officer.

Foreign officers.

Is Sartip second class, and receives 1400 tomans (£280) per annum. His contract expires in two years.

Vide page 84, Part I, Chapter II, for note on General Maletta.

The rates of pay, Jireh or ration allowance, Khanewareh or house allowance of the private soldier; the pay, Jireh, Alikh or horse allowance of the officers are as noted in the accompanying list.

Pay of officers and men under arms.

The question of pay calls for the following remarks:—

The private soldier receives his rations and house allowance always, not so his pay.

It is not uncommon for him to remain in arrears of pay for the year of his service under arms, and then to be dismissed with six months on account, possibly also with an order for the balance on the governor of his province; whether such orders are duly honoured is problematical. Shorn thus of his pay, and with his daily bread alone costing more than the combined Jireh and Khanewareh allowances, it would be impossible for him to keep body and soul together were soldiering the sole business of his life. Happily he has compensations, for he is allowed during the intervals of a not too exacting service with the colours to revert to civil life, where he is found as a labourer, a petty shopkeeper, and often as a money-lender, thereby not only securing a provision for himself, but, thanks to a system of percentages, providing a competency for his officers.

The situation of the latter is hardly preferable to that of their men. They are generally from six months to a year in arrears of pay and have moreover to submit to outrageous deductions before they can expect to realise in cash, the juniors suffering at the hands of their superiors, the latter at the hands of the administrator or owner of the regiment, and these again from the extortion of departmental officials.

'Report on the Persian Army' [60v] (120/170)

110

Pay of Officers and Men under Arms.

	Yearly pay.	Yearly Jireh or Rations.	Yearly Khanewaréh or House Allowance.	Alikh or Horse Allowance.	
	Krans.	Krans.	Krans.		
Sarbaz	70	91.10	70		
Sarjugeh	80	91.10	70		
Vakil	90	91.10	70		
Vakil I	100	91.10	70		
Vakil bashi ..	180	288.14	—		
Tabal bashi ..	—	—	—		
Musin bashi ..	—	—	—		
Shaipurchi bashi..	120	288.14	—		
Vakili beduk ..	100	288.14	—		
Muffatesh	200	288.14	—		
Muffatesh bashi ..	300	384.18	—		
Major	250	384.18	—		
Naib II	20	288.14	—		
Naib I	300	384.14	—		
Bedukdar	400	577.9	—		
Adjutant	500	577.9	—		
Sultan	600	577.9	—		
Yavar II	1,200	1,154.18	—		
Yavar I	1,500	1,154.18	—		
Sarhang	5,000	1,939.16	—		
Sartip III	8,000	3,878.12	—		
Sartip II	10,000	4,849.10	—		
Sartip I	15,000	5,819.8	—		
Mirpanj					
				Barley. Maunds of 6½ lbs. each.	Fodder. Maunds of 6½ lbs. each.
				3	6
				6	12
				12	24
				24	48
				30	60
				36	72

NOTE.

The Jireh or ration allowance by regulation should be the equivalent in value of the following portions of wheat per diem :—

Sarbaz	½ Maund (1 Maund = 6½ lbs).
Non-commissioned officers..	1 "
Naib III	1½ "
Naib I	2 "
Sultan	3 "
Yavar II	4 "
Yavar I	4 "
Sarhang	4½ "
Sartip III	8 "
Sartip II	9 "
Sartip I	12 "
Emir Tuman	24 "

If the regulation in this respect were strictly followed the soldier would be in receipt of allowances considerably higher than he now enjoys. At Teheran, *e.g.*, he should, at present rates, receive 15 shahis per diem, instead of 7½, and in many other garrisons the allowances are equally at variance with current prices.

The portions of jireh vary slightly for the different branches

'Report on the Persian Army' [61r] (121/170)

111

of the service ; those of the artillery up to the grade of Sarhang are somewhat higher than for the infantry.

All officers' pay is liable to the following deductions :—

10 shahis per toman on the pay of all officers junior to the rank of Sarhang.

2 krans per toman for Sarhang and senior grades.

Whilst unemployed the soldier receives half pay, the whole of the Khanewaréh, no rations.

Regimental officers receive half pay, no rations or alikh. As a rule, however, officers senior to the rank of major often succeed in securing the whole of their pay. A number of officers, whose name is legion, are attached to the departments. They receive full pay and allowances on the scales mentioned.

Besides the foregoing, the military budget is burdened by an immense list of officers, who bear military rank, but otherwise have no connection with the army. On this list will be found merchants, doctors, bankers, and servants—samples, in fact, of all classes. The sale of rank and pay by successive commanders-in-chief, the grant of rank to the sons of deceased officers, the patronage afforded to various individuals by the governors of provinces, is responsible for this heavy charge. The rates of pay of this army of unemployed vary from 100 to 2,000 tumans, whilst their grades vary from Amir i Tuman to subaltern. Payments are in their cases, however, irregular, arrears of two or three years being of common occurrence. This fact has given rise to a systematic traffic in the sale and purchase of arrear accounts, which are bought up at from 50 to 80 per cent. discount by the officers of the treasury, native bankers, and others, to be presented for full payment as opportunity offers. Large sums of money are also made in this way by the officials and governors.

The Werndell is the regulation arm of the Persian infantry. About 70,000 of these weapons have from time to time been purchased by the diplomatic representative of Persia in Austria. During the reign of Nasr-ed-Din Shah the troops in garrison at Tehran and elsewhere were almost invariably armed with the old percussion gun. The Werndell were stored in the magazines and were only issued to specially selected regiments preparatory to a review by His Majesty. Of late, since the accession of Muzaffer-ed-Din Shah they have been served out to all troops in garrison at Tehran, and as a rule whilst in garrison in the provinces. Perhaps 20,000 Werndell may be taken as the total number of weapons outside the capital, of which Tabriz is said to account for 7,000. The balance of 50,000 should be in Tehran.

General Wagner, who was detailed as a member of a board assembled in the summer of 1899 to report on the reserve stores, informed the writer that many of the Werndell had disappeared and were believed to have been sold out of the stores by the officers in charge. The board of inquiry was, however, unable to arrive at anything definite on this point, and failed altogether in its efforts to verify the stock in hand.

Pay of
officers and
men not
under arms.

Arms.

'Report on the Persian Army' [61v] (122/170)

112

The following have also been noted as in the possession of the Government or the tribesmen:—

Martini-Peabody, possibly 50,000, the property of the tribesmen.

Berdan, 1,500 with the Cossack brigade. A large number are also in general use in Mazanderan and Khorassan.

Chassepots, 8,000 in store.

Gobelin, 4,000 in store.

Magazine rifles, 4,000 of Belgian make, purchased in Belgium in 1890.

Modern rifles, about 4,000 confiscated by the Persian Government in 1898 in the Persian Gulf.

Besides the foregoing a large number of modern rifles are held by the tribesmen in Luristan, Arabistan, Fars, and the Gulf (*vide* Chapter III on Irregular Cavalry—Arms), who appear to be much better armed than the troops of the regular army.

Ammuni-
tion.

Ball cartridge for the Werndell were originally imported with the rifle from Austria. The supply is still chiefly drawn from that source, though spasmodic efforts have been made by the Government to produce cartridges locally. These efforts have invariably resulted in failure, owing to reasons which have been set forth in detail in the article on The Cartridge Factory, Chapter VII.

General Wagner in 1899 found that the officers in charge of the stores have been in the habit of selling the Government reserves, and that quantities of ammunition have thus disappeared. The nominal reserve in 1899 is said to be about three million rounds of ball cartridge, but it is believed that the actual reserve is much below this figure. The major part of the ammunition is stored in Tehran.

The writer when inspecting the arsenals of Tabriz and Khoi in 1894 found a large quantity of ammunition of ancient date belonging to equally ancient types of obsolete arms. Other arsenals are said to be encumbered with similiar old weapons and ammunition.

Quality of
troops.

An analysis of the material of which the Persian infantry is composed gives the following results:—

Turks ..	..	26	Battalions Azerbaijan.
Turks ..	..	16	" Other Provinces.
Lurs and Kurds	8	"	
Persians	..	30	" Including Mazanderanis.
		—	
		80	

thereby showing how considerably the Turkish element preponderates.

The Persians have long since regarded the Turk as the mainstay of the Persian army, and as infantry and artillery they are undoubtedly far superior to all other troops in those branches of the service.

Sir H. Rawlinson in 1858 wrote, "There are no people

'Report on the Persian Army' [62r] (123/170)

113

in the world who afford better rough material for military purposes than the Persians." And Sir C. MacGregor echoes this feeling when he says, "They are, taken as a general rule, of fine physique and very hardy muscular frames, and just the fellows to make fine soldiers." General Sir Thomas Gordon also considered them promising material.

The present writer thinks that the word Persian as here implied is a misnomer. He would reserve such praise for the Turk and tribal soldier only, to the exclusion of the Persians.

The character, loyalty, courage, and physique of the Turk are proverbial, and history has shown that he has in him the makings of a soldier of quality. Should it ever be the good fortune of Russia to extend her frontier, so as to include Azerbaijan, and to raise any Turk infantry, she will find a raw material at hand with which any soldier would be glad to cast his lot.

The Persian as a soldier is held of little account in his own country. The experience of the Russian officer of the Cossack brigade, quoted in Chapter IV, on The Cossack Brigade, would appear to more than endorse this view.

The Persian is useful for policing the country and in serving in districts distasteful to the Turk.

As regards the officers of the Persian army, Curzon says, "Of the Persian officer as a class no one has ever been found to speak except in terms of contempt." This remark may be perfectly true of the purely Persian officer, and others who have deteriorated in the capital, but it will be only doing justice to the large number of junior officers of the Turk, Kurd, and Lur regiments, as also of the irregular cavalry, to express dissent with this view. They are, it is true, contemptible from the point of view of training, but are good soldiers by nature and carry considerable weight with their men.

During the Kurdish troubles of 1880-81, when Sheik Obeidullah was ravaging Kurdistan, it took the Persian Government three months to assemble and equip 20,000 men at Tehran for operations against that chief.

The administration of the army would appear to be in much the same state in 1899 as in 1880, and this may be taken for the utmost the Government could compass in the same period of time at the present moment.

Barracks are provided in Tehran in the Ark, or royal enclosure for the Shah's guards, and in the outlying quarters of the town for the ordinary infantry garrison.

The accommodation, though good, is insufficient, but the system is well suited to the wants of the men, many of whom, as already explained, gain a living in the bazaars and find it convenient to live near their work.

Similar arrangements are made in the chief garrison towns. When any large additions to the ordinary garrison take place, the men either go into tents or find quarters for themselves in the caravanserais, etc.

Power of
mobilisation
of the
Persian
Army.

Barracks.

CHAPTER III.

IRREGULAR CAVALRY.

Official list, Nominal Strength, Effective or Actual Approximate Strength. Distribution by Squadrons. Remarks on Strength of Cavalry. Remarks on Fighting Material Northern and North-western Persia. Fighting Material Southern and Western Persia. Training and Organisation. Shah's bodyguard. Arms. Pay not on Service. Pay on Service. Uniforms. Notes on Certain Branches of Irregular Cavalry, etc.

Official list, nominal strength, effective or actual approximate strength.

THE irregular cavalry is divided into regiments, or squadrons of varying strength, which are known by the name of their places of recruitment, or by that of their tribe.

The following list gives the official or nominal strength of their main divisions, approximate strength, place of recruitment, etc.:—

OFFICIAL LIST OF IRREGULAR CAVALRY OF THE PERSIAN ARMY.

63

115

OFFICIAL LIST OF IRREGULAR CAVALRY OF THE PERSIAN ARMY.

Name of Regiment or Squadron.	Nominal Strength.	Effective or Actual Approximate Strength.	Province.	Place of Embodiment.	Remarks.
Afshar-i-Sain Kaleh ...	350	170	Azerbaijan	Sain Kaleh.	{The Karasuran do the policing of the country, and are employed on all the main roads, etc.
Afshar-i-Urumi ...	351	170	"	Urumi.	
Savar-i-Chardauli ...	500	250	"	"	
" Chilibianlu ...	550	250	"	"	
" Shasevan ...	150	70	"	"	
" Ardebil ...	190	90	"	"	
" Shagahi-i-Shateranlu ...	150	70	"	"	
" Karadagh ...	300	150	"	"	
" Kara Papak ...	600	300	"	"	
" Karasuran ...	500	250	"	Azerbaijan	
" Mukkadam-i-Maragha ...	200	100	"	Maragha.	
" Muzafer ...	400	200	"	"	
" Galibiri vu Vikam-i-Marand ...	150	70	"	Marand.	
" Mukri ...	200	100	"	"	
" Nazmieh vu Ganjeh ...	200	100	"	Gaujeh.	
" Golan-i-Kishik Khaneh ...	200	100	"	Tabriz.	
" Savareh Shagahi ...	200	100	"	"	
" Savareh Tamuri ...	1,000	200	Khorassan	Khorassan.	
" Hazareh ...	700	300	"	"	
" Jani vu Bakharzi ...	400	100	"	Jam.	
Carried forward	7,291	3,140			

Official List of Irregular Cavalry of the Persian Army—continued.

Name of Regiment or Squadron.	Nominal Strength.	Effective or Actual Approximate Strength.	Province.	Place of Embodiment.	Remarks.
Brought forward	7,291	3,140			
Savareh Sahzawari	500	100	Khorassan	Sabzewar.	
" Mazinani	300	30	"	Mazinan.	
" Khafi	200	50	"	Khaf.	
Kazakh-i-Meshed	100	—	"	Meshed	
" Bujnurd vu Kuchan	200	100	"	Bujnurd Kuchan	
Savareh Shadlu i Kuchan vu Bujnurd	1,000	500	"	Kuchan Bujnurd	
" Zafaranlu-i-Kuchan	1,000	350	"	Kuchan.	
" Kalati	400	100	"	Kelat.	
" Daragez	400	150	"	Daragez.	
Gholam-i-Meshedi	200	50	"	Meshed	
Savareh-i-Khajawend	600	300	Mazanderan	Mazanderan.	
" Kurd vu Turk-i-Abdul Maliki	600	300	"	"	
" Amaranlu	150	70	"	"	
" Gulbadi	150	70	"	"	
" Afghan	100	50	"	"	
" i-Ispahani	1,000	400	Ispahan	Ispahan.	
" Bakhtiari	100	50	"	"	
" Bakhtiari vu Yar Ahmedi	1,000	200	Burujird	Burujird	
" Dovairan	600	300	Khamseh	Khamseh.	
" Afshar	600	300	"	"	

{ These men were originally voluntarily enlisted. They no longer exist.

{ Disorganised. Doubtful whether any exist.

{ Even doubtful if this number exists.

" Astrabad.

" Astrabad

200

150

400

1,000

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

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"

'Report on the Persian Army' [64v] (128/170)

118

Distribution
by squad-
rons.

The distribution of the squadrons by provinces is as follows:—

Squadrons			Squadrons		
Azerbaijan ..	..	17	Kirmanshah ..	..	1
Khorassan ..	..	13	Kurdistan ..	..	1
Mazanderan ..	..	5	Garus ..	..	1
Ispahan ..	..	2	Irak ..	..	1
Burujird ..	..	1	Luristan ..	..	1
Kahmseh ..	..	3	Malayir ..	..	1
Astrabad ..	..	3	Nehavend ..	..	1
Semnan ..	..	1	Hamadan ..	..	2
Tehran ..	..	9	Fars ..	..	1
Saveh ..	..	1	Kirman ..	..	1
Arabistan ..	..	1			
Kazvin ..	..	2			
			Total 69		

Remarks on
the strength
of the
cavalry.

It will be seen that the cavalry of the Persian army differs but in degree from the other branches of the service, the effective strength being totally at variance with the official.

It will be interesting in this connection to compare the foregoing figures with those recorded by Mr. Herbert, Mr. Curzon, and others:—

	Nominal.	Effective.
Mr. Herbert (report of 1886)....	—	21,271
Mr. Curzon	16,350	12,427
Captain de Lassoë (1883)	—	50,000
Lieut.-Colonel Picot (1899)	37,591	13,660

Remarks on
fighting
material of
Northern
Persia.

Captain de Lassoë's estimate of 50,000 is accompanied by the remark "under certain circumstances." This would appear to mean, provided the Persian Government were in a position to furnish sufficient money to the chiefs for the calling out of their mounted men.

In discussing the potentialities of the Persian army in Chapter II, on The Infantry, it has been shown that, given certain favourable circumstances, perhaps two-thirds of the nominal strength of the infantry could be embodied for service in a reasonable time.

The same remark will apply with the same truth to the cavalry. The chiefs certainly have at their disposal the greater part of the forces with which they are credited in the official list, and money alone would be required to bring them under arms.

In Northern Persia the Khorassan and Astrabad tribal cavalry bear a high reputation. Horses are, however, becoming scarce in the Astrabad province and still scarcer in Khorassan; the cavalry are consequently less well mounted than when they were constantly kept in a state of alarm owing to Turkoman forays.

'Report on the Persian Army' [65r] (129/170)

119

The Bujnurd cavalry (of Khorassan) forms an efficient compact force fairly well mounted and trained. Horses of a good stamp are bred by the chief of a mixed Turkoman and Arab blood, handsome animals with plenty of stamina; the corps is partly trained by Persian officers detached from the Cossack brigade in Tehran. These latter officers are already making some impression in the training of individual and special corps; and the Cossack uniform is finding general favour.

The cavalry of Azerbaijan are seldom spoken of in Persia when this branch of the service is under discussion. Attention has always been directed for obvious reasons to the cavalry of Khorassan and Southern Persia, and the cavalry of the north-west has in consequence suffered from official neglect. It would appear to differ but little from the best of the Persian cavalry, the men being tribal and the horses of a good stamp.

The best fighting material in Southern Persia would be found amongst the Lurs, Bakhtiari, and Kashkai (Turks), of the south-west.

In 1885 Major Bell estimated the numbers available in aid of a popular cause, as follows:—

	Cavalry
Arab tribes	4,000
Feili Lurs	5,000
Bakhtiari	4,000
Mamasenni (Lurs)	500
Kuhgilus (Lurs)	2,000
Kashkai Turks	2,500

Mr. Robertson, Assistant Political Agent, Bushire, estimated that the Arabs could muster 30,000, the Feili Lurs 30,000, Bakhtiari 20,000 fighting men, including a large proportion of horsemen.

Major Sawyer, who visited the Bakhtiari country in 1890, estimated that the Bakhtiari could not put into the field more than 1,500 horsemen and two to three thousand matchlockmen.

Mr. Consul Preece estimated in 1893 that the Bakhtiari chief could collect 20,000 men in a month. About that time, the Ilkhani was accompanied by 1,500 men, all mounted and armed with breech-loading carbines.

Authoritative information, as will be seen from the foregoing, is still wanting of the tribes of Southern Persia, and it is sincerely to be hoped that the establishment of military consuls in Southern Persia on the Karun, etc., as recommended by Her Majesty's Minister in Tehran in 1899, will have the effect of bringing us into closer contact with the tribes and give us exact information of their numbers, organisation, and characteristics.

The Bakhtiari horses are said to be very enduring. They are of mixed Persian and Arab blood and show considerable breeding.

Training and
organisation.

The same may be said of the horse of Southern Persia in general, but it would appear that the nearer Arabistan is approached the better, though lighter, the animal.

The training and organisation of the irregular cavalry is based upon the old Tartar system, and the tribal levies of this day differ, except in their method of armament, but little from those of the time of Jenghis Khan or Timur. We still find the Tartar divisions of tens, fifties, and hundreds.

A few selected regiments employed in garrison at Tehran, Ispahan, etc., have assumed a more regular Cossack organisation; their officers in respect to rank and pay are under conditions similar to those of officers of the infantry and artillery; whilst the men are in receipt of special pay and allowances. They are, moreover, armed with the Government pattern rifle. Their instruction has been somewhat modified by contact with the regular troops of the Cossack brigade, but in their chief circumstances they assimilate to the irregular cavalry.

These regiments are :—

1. The Saveh Cavalry, employed at Tehran.
2. The Hamadan Afshar Cavalry, employed at Tehran.
3. The Kasvin Cavalry, employed at Tehran.
4. The Mazanderan Cavalry, employed at Mazanderan.
5. The Kahmseh Cavalry, employed at Kahmseh and Tehran.
6. Savareh-i-Ispahani, employed at Ispahan.
7. Golam-i-Meshedi, employed at Meshed.
8. Savareh-i-Shadilu-i-Kuchan vu Bujnurd, employed at Bujnurd.

It should be noted that the Cossack training as imparted by the native officer of the Cossack brigade has not yet extended to the irregular cavalry of Southern Persia. The tendency, however, is in that direction, owing to the encouragement given to the brigade by the Persian Government and by the provincial governors.

Shah's body-
guard.

Only on very rare occasions are the irregular cavalry called upon to serve outside their own provinces or districts; such service would be extremely unpopular and is only resorted to on emergency.

Arms.

The Kishik-Khaneh, Nasiri, Khajar, and the Mansur have their headquarters in Teheran and form the Shah's own personal bodyguard. They are in receipt of special pay and allowances. Many of them are persons of rank, but it seems doubtful whether more than 500 out of a nominal strength of 2,500 are really effective. The rest are boys or pensioners existing on paper only.

The arms, with the exception of the Werndells issued to the cavalry employed in garrison at Teheran, Ispahan, Meshed, etc., almost invariably belong to the tribesmen.

In North-western Persia, Azerbaijan, and Kurdistan the Peabody-Martini and Berdans are chiefly affected. The Pea-

body-Martini is a souvenir of the Russo-Turkish war. The Berdan comes from across the Arax, a thriving trade in smuggled weapons being carried on by the tribes and Turks bordering on that river.

In Mazanderan and Khorassan the Berdan and Werndell are in general use, and a traffic in the Berdan is done by Armenians and others, who buy the rifle from the Russian side for sale to the tribesmen.

It would appear that a large number of the Government Werndells have found their way into hands of the tribesmen, to whom they have been sold by the Government contractor in charge of the local stores and arsenals.

In Luristan, Arabistan, Fars, and the Gulf arms of precision of all classes have been sown broadcast of late years, and it is believed that the Arabs, Lurs, Bakhtiaris, Kashkais, etc., have thousands of these weapons (more especially of Martinis) at their disposal.

In Persian Biluchistan the people are said to be but poorly furnished with modern rifles.

The chief responsible for the maintenance of the regulation number of horsemen is paid a sum varying from 10 to 20 Tumáns per mau per annum. He is expected in consideration of this retaining fee or subsidy, and of the duty which he does his Government, to be ready at any moment to call together for service his full complement of men, armed, clothed, mounted, and organised, after the method of his tribe.

Full responsibility is given to the chief in all matters affecting the interior economy of this levy.

The distribution of the Government grant is a tribal question. The men as a rule receive some consideration for their liability to service, which takes a form other than the payment of cash, possibly the present of a horse or a rifle, or the remission of some tribal tax. The leaders of the tens, fifties, and hundreds, etc., similarly come to terms with their chiefs, but the lion's share of the allowance is naturally appropriated by the more influential man of the tribe.

The Government grant is seldom or never paid in cash, the tribe recouping itself by the simple and recognised method of deducting its claims from the tribal revenue payable to Government. More often than not a sum larger than the regulation grant is deducted from the revenues by the chiefs, the excess depending on the strength or weakness of the provincial governors. It may be here noted that whatever the discrepancy between the nominal and actual strength of the levies, the Government invariably pay according to the nominal and official list. This rule seems to hold good for all branches of the service.

When embodied for service the irregular cavalry receive pay, Jireh or ration allowance, and Alikh or horse allowance, the value of these allowances depending on the current prices of grain and fodder.

On these occasions the rates of pay and horse allowance

[619]

K

'Report on the Persian Army' [66v] (132/170)

122

are as noted in the accompanying lists. The Jireh differs but little from that of the infantry or artillery.

PAY OF CAVALRY.

	Krans per Mensem.	Corresponding to rank of.
Sowar	15	
Yassaoul	30	Vakil I
Naib	60	Naib
Panja Bashi or leader of 50	80	Sultan
Yuzbashi or leader of 100	500	Sarhang
Sartip III	800	Sartip III
Sartip II	1,000	Sartip II
Sartip I	1,500	Sartip I
Emir Tumán	3,000	Emir Tumán

} in Infantry.

ALIKH OR HORSE ALLOWANCE.

	Maunds of Barley. 1 Maund = 6½ lbs.	Maunds of Fodder. 1 Maund = 6½ lbs.
Sowar	1	2
Yassaoul	2	4
Naib	3	6
Panja Bashi	6	12
Yuzbashi	12	24
Sartip III	24	48
Sartip II	30	60
Sartip I	36	72
Emir Tumán	60	120

Uniforms.
Notes on
certain
branches of
irregular
cavalry—
Bakhtiari
and others.

For uniforms, see Chapter IX.

Major Sawyer, who visited the Bakhtiari country in 1890, estimated that about 500 of the better-class Bakhtiari were armed with Peabody-Martini rifles of American or Constantinople make, and were well mounted on horses that could convey them for long distances at an easy gait.

He gives 1,000 as an estimate for men less well armed and mounted, whom he calls "second class Sowars." He says of this class:—

"There is a greater number of . . . men mounted on inferior nags and arms either of local make or the better-looking Martini, but with a broken mechanism. Sometimes a sword is added, but not often. After the sowar comes the Tufangchi—that is, the footman armed with a Tufang, or long smooth-bore gun, locally made matchlock, or with an old Enfield lock; of these there may be 2,000 or 3,000. They are all hardy mountaineers." He adds, "It is not believed that the Bakhtiari could muster any force that in the open one

battalion of infantry, European or native, could not blow into space, or at least beyond the visible horizon." Very few arms of precision are to be found amongst them. He considers that as enemies the Bakhtiari armed forces are insignificant, but that as auxiliaries they would be of immense value; their mounted men as guides, mounted infantry, and skirthers would be useful. Brigaded with our cavalry, they would be of no value and would soon dissolve.

The above remarks apply to their extempore use as they now exist. About 1,000 to 1,500 could be counted on or available, within a month of the demand being made.

Since Major Sawyer thus wrote in 1890, the Bakhtiaris, as well as Arabs, Lurs, and Kashkais, etc., have had an opportunity of procuring rifles imported chiefly by English firms at a moderate price, and it would seem that a much larger number have now become the owners of modern weapons.

It will be noted that the remark made by Major Sawyer in regard to the utilisation of the Bakhtiaris as irregulars applies to their extempore use as they now exist. There is little if any doubt that, officered by Europeans, they would furnish excellent material for irregular cavalry or mounted infantry, and that a large recruiting ground could be found for such amongst the Lurs, Bakhtiaris, and Kashkais of Southern Persia.

The foregoing remarks on the Bakhtiari can be equally well applied to the tribal cavalry in general throughout the whole of Persia; but it appears clear that at the present day Southern and South-western Persia presents a much finer field for the recruitment of irregular cavalry than the Northern or North-western, just as, in regard to infantry, Northern and especially the North-western Provinces provide a recruiting ground incomparably finer than the Southern.

CHAPTER IV.

REGULAR CAVALRY.

The Cossack Brigade. Foundation of the Brigade. Nominal Strength. Distribution. Constitution. Cavalry. Artillery. Infantry. Pensioners. Arms. Armament. Training. Uniform. Pay. Barracks. Employment of Russian Officers. Russian Sous-Officers. Appointment of Persian Officers. Recruitment. Military Qualifications and Status of Brigade.

THE COSSACK BRIGADE.

Foundation
of the
brigade.

THE original strength of the Cossack Brigade was fixed in 1879 at from 400 to 600 men with 22 Persian officers, exclusive of Russian officers and instructors. In 1880 a second regiment of the same strength was formed; the two were then called the Cossack Brigade. The original budget was said to have been 97,000 tomans. The brigade has been gradually increased in numbers, till it now in 1899 has an official strength of 1,500 men with a budget of tomans 219,000. For further particulars regarding the early history of the brigade, see Part I, Chapter II, pages 83-84.

Nominal
strength.

The commandant of the brigade gives his nominal strength at:—

1 Commandant	..	..	..	Russian
3 Officers	..	..	..	"
6 Sous-Officers	..	..	..	"
200 Officers	..	..	..	Persian
1,000 Mounted men, including artillery	..	..	..	"
500 Infantry	..	..	..	"

thus making a total of 1,700 men of Persian ranks. Owing, however, to the high price of living in Teheran, the effective of the brigade has always been below the nominal, and at the present moment the actual number borne on the rolls does not exceed 1,411.

Distribution.

The distribution of this force in October, 1899, was as follows:—

'Report on the Persian Army' [68v] (136/170)

126

The strength of the batteries in men and horses is as follows:—

100 Mounted gunners.			
32 Foot	"		
168 horses, of which—			
	100 the property of the gunners.		
	68 the property of the Government.		
12 Waggon horses the	"	"	"
14 Extra horses the	"	"	"

The 68 horses, the property of Government, were originally imported from Russia and were of the heavy draught type. These are now being exchanged as necessity arises for the smaller and sounder Karabagh and Persian horse, whose legs are found to stand the wear and tear of Persian roads much better than the underbred Russian animal.

Infantry.

The infantry branch of the brigade came into existence in 1899, following on the increase of the budget, of which mention has already been made. The commandant, however, states that he has no intention of permitting these men to remain permanently embodied as infantry, and that, as soon as the abnormal rates for grain and fodder which have prevailed for the last two years decline to the normal level, he will draft them into the squadrons to which they are already attached by name. In fact, the men are now serving under their own squadron officers and non-commissioned officers, who are temporarily acting as dismounted men.

Pensioners.

The battalion numbers 480 men exclusive of officers. The pensioners now borne on the rolls and paid from the budget of the brigade are men who have actually served in the ranks, and have been invalided and transferred to the pension list. They number 150 men in all.

Some few years ago the budget maintained a large number of refugee Caucasian officers or their descendants, to whom in times past the Persian Government had been indebted for service. These have now been altogether eliminated and have no further connection with the brigade.

Arms.

Armament.

The cavalry carry a rifle slung across the shoulder, sword and dagger. The rifle is the Russian Berdan.

The infantry carry the same rifle, with side arms and dagger. Ammunition is as a rule carried in a leather belt worn round the waist.

The artillery are armed with the 8·7 centimètre Krupp gun.

With the exception of 1,200 Berdans originally purchased by the Persian Government in Russia, the whole of the foregoing weapons, daggers excepted, as also a large quantity of ammunition, have been presented at different times by the Emperor of Russia to the late Nasr-ed-Din Shah or his successor Mozzufer-ed-Din, and it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the brigade, in so far as its armament and ammunition are concerned, is treated as a component part of the Russian army. The increase in strength in 1899 was followed by the departure

'Report on the Persian Army' [69r] (137/170)

127

of the commandant to Russia, who returned with all that was necessary for the arming of the new recruits.

The men undergo a regular course of training as regards drill and tactics. Their rifle and artillery practice is still defective, but this is to be rectified in the year 1900, as the brigade, thanks to the generosity of the Russian Government, is now for the first time in possession of a sufficient reserve of ammunition to enable it to carry out a regular course of musketry and artillery practice as laid down for the cavalry and artillery of the Russian army. Training.

The men are dressed like the Cossacks of the Russian army. They wear the Cherkaska and the Beshmet, the former a long skirted coat of woollen stuff reaching half-way to the ankles, the latter a similar garment of lighter material worn under the Cherkaska. In summer a blouse of white cotton drill takes the place of the foregoing, the Cossacks of the guard wearing red. Uniform.

The pantaloons are worn long, tucked into the boots, the material being of blue cloth or cotton.

The boots are of the long Russian pattern with a soft foot-piece of fine leather over which a slipper is worn, removable at will. This enables the men to comply with the Persian custom of removing the outer foot covering when entering a room.

The headpiece is the ordinary military cap, the Kulah, without the badge of "the Lion and the Sun."

The great-coat is the Cossack Burko or poncho.

As in other branches of the Persian army, the rule is for the supply of one winter and two summer suits of clothing. The clothing is debited to the brigade budget.

As regards pay it will be sufficient to quote from the figures given by Curzon, p. 595, Volume I, "Persia," which differ but slightly from those given to the writer by the commandant of the brigade in December, 1899. Curzon's figures enter in minute details, which are not considered necessary for the purpose of this chapter. Pay.

Rank.	Annual pay in Krans.	Jireh or ration money.	Horse Allowance.
Sartip (general)	14,000	The average ration money is in Krans, 15 per man per mensem.	The horse allowance for the cavalry Cossack is 25 krans per mensem. The horse allowance for the artillery Cossack is 30 krans per mensem. The commissioned grades receive higher rates in proportion to rank.
Sarhang (colonel)	3,000		
Yavar (major)	2,400		
Sultan (captain)	1,800		
Adjutan (adjutant)	1,800		
Naib Aval (1st lieutenant)	1,200		
Naib Doyum (2nd lieutenant)	840		
Tabib (surgeon)	3,000		
Vakil-i-kul (colour-sergeant)	400		
Vakil (sergeant)	350		
Sarjugeh (corporal)	315		
Savar (private)	300		

'Report on the Persian Army' [69v] (138/170)

128

Barracks.

The total budget of the brigade is 219,000 Tomans for the year 21st March to 21st March.

The Cossacks occupy in winter two-thirds of the large enclosure on the northern side of the grand parade ground. This enclosure is taken up by the guns and horses, officers' mess room, hospital, store rooms, wagon shed, magazine, etc.

Accommodation as yet has only been provided for a sufficient number of men to take charge of the artillery horses, and to provide small cavalry guards, the total number of men in barracks being about 130, all told. Space is, however, available for a greater number, and it is probable that huts will be erected as money is found available. The balance of the men, with their horses, live in their own private quarters in the town. In summer the brigade camps a few miles out of town to the north in a garden known as the Cossack Camp, near the Shah's palace of Kasr Kajar. There the men live in tents or temporary shelters, the horses being picketed in the open, with roof protection. The camp is well watered and timbered, and resembles in all essentials the summer camps found near garrisons in Trans-Caspia and Ferghana.

Employment
of Russian
officers.

The Russian officers are, with the exception of the commandant, engaged under contract for three years' service. The commandant is permitted to remain as long as his services can be spared by the Russian Government.

Russian
sous-officers.

The Russian sous-officers are engaged indefinitely.

Appoint-
ment of
Persian
officers.
Recruit-
ment.

The Persian officers up to the grade of Sultan (captain) are appointed by the commandant; from Sultan to Sarhang (colonel) by the Sadr Azm; higher grades by the Shah.

The men are recruited by the commandant, who controls all questions of enlistment or discharge without interference on the part of the Persian Government. The service is popular, owing to regularity of payment and the prestige attached to the Cossack uniform. The classes from which recruits are drawn are:—

The Turks from Azerbaijan and Kasvin.

The nomad tribes in the neighbourhood of Tehran, Kom, Kasvin.

Gilanis (very few).

Persians.

The commandant of the brigade, in expressing his appreciation of the men of the brigade, said that the Turks and nomads are preferred to all others owing to their warlike and soldierly qualities. Persians are greatly disliked, experience having shown them to be restive under discipline, untrustworthy, and wanting in courage.

Military
qualifica-
tions and
status of the
brigade.

The Persian Government possesses in the Cossack Brigade a well equipped and disciplined force, somewhat deficient in military training when judged from a European standpoint, but which has already attained a remarkable degree of efficiency, and is incomparably superior to anything Persia can present at the present day.

'Report on the Persian Army' [70r] (139/170)

129

The brigade gave proof of its quality and temper by its excellent behaviour at the time of the death of Nasr-ed-Din Shah. H.I.M. Mozuffer-ed-Din Shah is greatly indebted to it for its services at that critical time, and it is regarded in Tehran by both Europeans and Persians alike as the one stable element where all else is disorganised and dissolvent. Its prestige is almost as high in the provinces as in the capital, and few governors now care to set out for their governorships without a detachment of the Cossacks as a personal bodyguard. This feeling on the part of the Persian official deserves notice, as by its means the credit of the Russian-trained Persian soldier is gradually being established over a great part of Persia. A reference to the distribution of the brigade will show that parties are now detached in six governorships and that they are to be found as far south as Shiraz.

During the last six years the commandant has several times offered to take the infantry and artillery of the Tehran garrison in hand, and though the Persian Government has hitherto met the suggestion with disfavour, pleading want of funds, they have at the same time largely added to the Cossack budget, and have thus made the brigade representative of all three branches of the service.

It seems hardly probable that the Persian officer of the brigade will continue in the future to devote himself solely to the brigade, or that his services will not be finally utilised by the Government for the better training of the troops of the regular army. The Austrian-trained Persian instructor is rapidly losing his influence, and his replacement by the better-trained Persian of the brigade is a contingency which should always be kept in view.

That this would lead to a considerable expansion of Russian military interest in Persia is evident, and in due course of evolution the places now occupied by the only two foreign military instructors, General Wagner (artillery), whose contract expires in two years, and General Maletta (infantry) also under temporary contract, would be taken by officers of the Russian army.

The writer does not wish to give the impression that any such development is likely to take place in the near future, but points out that the tendency is in that direction, and given reform in the finances of the country, or in other words means for reorganisation, a reconstruction of the army on the lines sketched in the foregoing is by no means improbable.

CHAPTER V.

ARTILLERY.

Official List, Nominal Strength, Effective or Actual Approximate Strength. Distribution by Taifas or Tribes. Distribution under Arms, Nominal and Approximate. Recruitment. Composition of a Battery of Field Artillery. Composition of a Mountain Battery. Horsing of the Artillery. Armament. List of Modern Guns and their Distribution. Krupp and other Modern Guns. Obsolete Weapons. Ammunition. Pay on Service. Pay when not on Service. Administration. General Remarks on Instruction and Value of Artillery. European Officers.

Official list, nominal strength, effective or actual approximate strength.

THE artillery is divided into Taifas or tribes, which are generally known by the names of their locality.

The following list gives the official and nominal strength of these Taifas, approximate strength, their place of recruitment and province.

ARTILLERY.

Taifa (tribe).	Nominal strength.	Effective or actual approximate strength.	Locality.	Province.
Topchi Bahaderan-i-Baharlu.	450	270	Deh Kharagan ; Dizej.	Azerbaijan.
„ Aval-i-Baharlu	340	170	{ Deh Kharagan ... }	„
„ Arwaneh	440	200	{ Mameghan ... }	„
„ Afshar-i-Urumiehi	447	220	{ Yangicheh ... }	„
„ Arwaneki....	457	250	{ Arwanek ... }	„
„ Marand	383	200	{ Anzab }	„
„ Panjoun-i-Khoi	364	200	{ Khamseh ... }	„
„ Shishum-i-Lekh	450	200	{ Marand }	„
„ Tabriz vu Ardebil	600	300	{ Khoi }	„
„ Shagaghi	332	250	{ Salmas, Khoi ... }	„
„ Tabrizi	336	200	{ Tabriz, Ardebil }	„
„ Maragehi	470	235	{ Sarab }	„
„ Mianjhi	400	200	{ Khurd-i-Aimak }	„
„ -i-Ispahan....	500	250	{ Garm rud ... }	„
„ Khamseh	500	250	{ Tabriz }	„
Carried forward	6,469	3,395	{ Marageh ... }	Ispahan.
			{ Mianjh ... }	Khamseh.
			{ Ispahan ... }	
			{ Khamseh ... }	

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'Report on the Persian Army' [71r] (141/170)

131

Taifa (tribe).	Nominal strength.	Effective or actual approximate strength.	Locality.	Province.
Brought forward	6,469	3,395		
Topchi-i-Teheran	200	100	Teheran....	Teheran.
" " Kasvin	800	400	Kasvin	Kasvin.
" " Kirmanshah	500	250	Kirmanshah	Kirmanshah.
" " Kurdistan	300	150	Kurdistan	Kurdistan.
" " Garus	500	250	Garus	Garus.
" " Sharrai....	300	150	Malayir....	Malayir.
" " Malayir	200	100	"	"
" " Nehavend	400	200	Nehavend	Nehavend.
" " Hamadan	600	300	Hamadan	Hamadan.
" " Fars	500	250	Fars	Fars.
" " Shahrud	300	150	Shahrud	Shahrud.
" " Kirman....	250	125	Kirman....	Kirman.
Totals	11,319	5,820		

It will be seen from the foregoing that the official strength differs notably from the approximate, the relative figures being nominal as against actual strength. The approximate strength for Azerbaijan, the historical recruiting ground for the artillery of Persia, has been given by General Wagner, an artillery officer of the Austrian army, who served for many years in Azerbaijan as commandant of the forces. He vouches for the accuracy of his figures, having at one time or another inspected every corps in the province. As regards the figures for the other provinces, the information has been obtained from officials who have either held governorships or have been concerned financially with the province in question. They almost invariably recommend a reduction by one half, but it is not improbable that in following their advice an over-statement has been recorded.

The distribution of these Taifas by provinces is as follows: — Distribution by Taifas or tribes.

Azerbaijan	13	Taifas or tribes.
Khamseh	1	" "
Teheran.. ..	1	" "
Kasvin	1	" "
Malayir	2	" "
Nehavend	1	" "
Hamadan	1	" "
Kirmanshah	1	" "
Kurdistan	1	" "
Garus	1	" "
Fars	1	" "
Ispahan.. ..	1	" "
Kirman	1	" "
Shahrud	1	" "

Total 27

'Report on the Persian Army' [72r] (143/170)

133

supposed to be attached to the battery, as also 24 mules for baggage, tents, etc.

Each battery has two mechanics and two shoeing smiths attached.

The composition of a battery of mountain artillery of cm. Euchatius is as follows (General Wagner) :—

Composition
of a
mountain
battery.

- The battery consists of 4 guns.
- 1 Commandant, Sarhang or Yawer.
- 2 Commanders of sections (2 guns) Sultan or Naib.
- 1 Commander of ammunition, Sultan or Naib.
- 2 Vakil aval.
- 4 Vakil doyum.
- 6 Sarjugeh or dehbashi (corporal).
- 10 First class gunners (Tupchi).
- 30 Second,, ,, (,,).
- 2 Trumpeters.
- 12 Horses for mounted men.
- 16 Mules.

On active service extra mules are attached for the ammunition, baggage, tents. About 40 extra mules in all.

As a rule the mountain guns are drawn, the shafts being attached to the trail (timon fourchette), and not carried on the backs of the mules.

Mules for the mountain batteries are supplied for the mule breeding establishments of Mazanderan, etc., or are obtained by purchase. The Persian mule has a high and well merited reputation as a weight carrier. Large numbers are bred by the tribes in Southern and South-western Persia.

The supply of horses for the artillery is arranged for by a special department administered by a farming contractor (Rais-i-stable-i-Topkhaneh). The annual budget makes allowance for 4,000 horses.

Horsing of
the artillery.

The horses are drawn from the Shah's breeding establishments of Sultanieh in Azerbaijan, Ujan, and Tehran, from whence a small number are annually drafted into the service; owing, however, to the system of farming by which the higher posts are regulated, the establishment is kept at the lowest possible figure, and it is more than probable that less than 1,000 artillery horses could be accounted for at any given moment.

On emergency the department impresses or hires horses, and as they are seldom wanted for more than a few hours at a time the contractors find little or no difficulty in meeting such temporary requirements. The writer has only been able to account for an actual distribution of the following numbers of horses :—

Tehran	..	..	..	..	..	300
Tabriz	..	..	..	..	..	150
Ispahan	..	..	..	..	..	50
Meshed	..	..	..	..	..	50
Total						550

'Report on the Persian Army' [72v] (144/170)

134

Whatever the discrepancy between the nominal and the effective strength of horses, the Government pay for the maintenance of the full budgeted establishments. It is on these and similar profits that the enormous civil lists of Persia are maintained.

Armament.

List of modern guns.

The Persian artillery has for some considerable time been armed with second-hand Euehatus guns purchased in Austria. The following is a list of these weapons with their approximate number and distribution as tabulated by General Wagner.

Allowance has not been made for temporary dislocation owing to the exigencies of the moment. Arabistan, for instance, accounts at the present time for a larger number of guns than the normal, the Government having collected a considerable force of artillery in that province with a view of overawing the Lurs and Arabs.

Distribution.

LIST OF EUCHATIUS.

	7-cm.	8-cm.	9-cm.
Tabriz	9	3	4
Khoi	2	—	4
Tehran	24	7	8
Kirmanshah	2	—	2
Ispahan	4	3	—
Meshed	2	—	—
Astrabad	4	2	—
Kirman	2	—	—
Senneh, Kurdistan	4	—	—
Arabistan	2	—	—
Burujird	2	—	—
Shiraz	4	3	—
Urmiah	3	—	—
Soudjboubagh	1	—	—
Ardebil	1	—	—
Khorrenabad	4	—	—
Totals	70	18	18

Krupp and other modern guns.

Tehran .. 8 Krupp 8.7-cm. with Cossack brigade.
4 Nordenfelt maxims for Männlicher, useless and out of order.
Ispahan .. 1 Krupp (calibre not known).
Tabriz .. 2 Native breechloaders.

Obsolete weapons.

Besides the foregoing the Persian Government possesses the following guns, some of which are with batteries and others stored in the arsenals (*vide* Douglas's "Report on Persian Army," 1892).

Tehran .. 99 rifled muzzle-loaders, native manufacture.
270 old smooth-bores.
52 old worn-out carronades.
41 " " howitzers.
Ispahan .. 18 English rifled muzzle-loaders.

'Report on the Persian Army' [73r] (145/170)

135

Khorassan ..	} 11 guns of native manufacture.			
Meshed ..				
Shahrud ..				
Enzeli ..		10	"	"
Kirman ..		6	"	"
Urumiah ..		12	"	"
Hamadan ..		13	"	"
Scattered about various places	28	"	"	"

Five thousand rounds of shrapnel were imported for the 7cm. Echatius by the Persian Government in 1897, being the only purchase of this class of ammunition during the last five years. Ammunition.

The late Minister of the Arsenal informed the writer that he would roughly estimate the ammunition for the 8cm. and 9cm. Echatius at from 2,000 to 3,000 rounds.

A quantity of old and deteriorated ammunition is probably stored in the chief arsenals for the muzzle-loaders, smooth-bores, etc.

The rates of pay, Jireh or ration money, Alikh or horse allowance for officers and men under arms are as follows:— Pay of officers and men under arms.

	Pay per Annum.	Rations per Annum.	Horse Allowance.	
			Barley, Maunds of 6½ lbs.	Fodder, Maunds of 6½ lbs.
	Krans.	Krans. Shabis.		
Topchi (gunner)	120	91 10	—	—
Dehbashi	190	91 10	—	—
Vakil....	240	91 10	—	—
Vakil bashi	280	183	—	—
Adjutant	650	369	—	—
Naib II	500	184 10	2	4
Naib I	700	246	2	4
Sultan	1,300	369	3	6
Yawar II	2,000	832	6	12
Yawar I	3,000	1,110	6	12
Sarhang	6,000	1,334	12	24
Sartip III	10,000	2,664	24	48
Sartip II	12,000	2,775	30	60
Sartip I	15,000	6,148	36	72
Amir-i-Tuman	30,000	—	60	120

Note.—All officers' pay is liable to the following deductions:—

Ten Shabis per Toman on the pay of all officers junior to the rank of Sarhang.

Two krans per Toman for Sarhang and senior grades.

The same rule applies to officers and men of the artillery when not under arms as to the infantry, vide Chapter II, Infantry, page 111. Pay of officers and men when not under arms.

Administra-
tion.

It is somewhat difficult to give any clear idea of the administration of the artillery.

In Tehran is a chief known as the Amir-i-Topkhaneh, who has the nominal control of all the artillery of the country; at all the chief artillery garrisons are other officers also known by the same title.

The real administrative business of the artillery is conducted either by the Sadr-Azam or the Sipah Salar.

In Chapter VII, page 144, under the heading Artillery Department, the curious system by which the stables are directed by a civil functionary, a nominee of the Government and quite independent of the Amir-i-Topkhaneh; the stores, including guns, ammunition, and equipments, by another, a military officer, a nominee of the Amir-i-Topkhaneh, has been explained.

The friction which occasionally arises can be better imagined than described, though the system is perhaps less chaotic than would be inferred. It is certainly exceedingly cumbersome and is appreciated only by the contractors, under which denomination the Amir-i-Topkhaneh, the store official, and the Rais-i-Stable, may be considered.

General
remarks on
instruction
and value of
artillery.

As already stated, the artillery is composed of about three-quarters Turks, and one-quarter of other tribes. The material is therefore excellent, and the artillery soldier has always borne a good reputation in the country. His training and general instruction in no wise differ in principle from that of his comrade of the infantry.

In Tehran even, where the artillery benefit by the presence of General Wagner, a capable artillery officer, the instruction is most crude and elementary, the whole service suffering as a body from the incapacity and venality of the superior officers.

Ammunition is dealt out with such a sparing hand that not more than three rounds per gun (Euchatius) per annum can be counted on. This is only expended as a means of amusing the Shah, for whom the batteries are paraded once a year in the spring a few miles out of Tehran for artillery practice, when specially selected officers then take charge of and sight the guns.

To save the Euchatius from wear and tear, the batteries in Tehran are exercised with 2 and 4½ pounder rifled muzzle-loaders of Persian make. Two batteries of each of these weapons are thus in daily use, the Euchatius being kept in store, only to be exhumed when the Shah reviews the garrison.

The batteries are generally well-horsed with small compact horses of the Karabagh or Shiraz types.

The equipment is fairly serviceable and the harness rough though good.

The system of instruction is based on the Austrian and dates from the time of the first mission.

European
officers.

General Wagner von Wetterstaedt, an Austrian officer of artillery, is the chief instructor to that branch.

He first came to Persia with the second Austrian mission, and retired with that mission. He returned and was re-engaged

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'Report on the Persian Army' [74r] (147/170)

137

in 1882. He served for many years with the present Shah when heir-apparent as the chief instructor of the forces in Azerbaijan. He is now employed in the same capacity in Tehran. He is thoroughly trusted by the Shah and is liked by the Turk troops, but like General Maletta is given no administrative control. He is broken down with hard work and the uphill struggle against Persian apathy. Is a Sartip of the first class and receives a salary of £600 per annum.

His time expires in two years.

[619]

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CHAPTER VI.

MISCELLANEOUS IRREGULAR BODIES.

Camel Corps or Zamburakchi. Local Police or Militia.

Camel corps
or Zambu-
rakchi. THIS corps, the remnant of the mountain artillery of Persia,
is employed in the arsenal and seldom appears in public except
on the occasion of a review by H.M. the Shah.

It consists of 40 to 50 camels with old swivel guns. It is
quite obsolete and useless.

Local police
or militia. Various bodies of men known as Tufangchis, Sham-
khalchis, Jezailchis, armed with old and antiquated weapons,
have been employed from time immemorial by local districts
and cities for the preservation of life and property within their
borders.

This force has been distinguished by some writers with the
title of militia, but it would appear to be a misnomer, for it is a
purely local force and is not liable for any general service. Its
numbers are insignificant, and it would appear to be rapidly
disappearing, owing to the more general use of the regular
troops and Cossacks for police purposes. Colonel Smith in
1883 gave their numbers at 1,300 ; Curzon at 2,000. Nothing
approaching these numbers appear to be now employed (1899).

CHAPTER VII.

DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY.

War. Pay. Arsenal and Cartridge Factory. Magazine. Clothing.
Artillery. Commissariat and Transport. Medical.

THE WAR DEPARTMENT (VAZARET-I-JANG).

His Imperial Majesty the Shah poses as the direct and supreme chief of the army, with a senior military officer as his executive and sometimes administrative officer. This officer is known as the

Vazir-i-Jang, Minister of War,
Sipah-Salar } Commander-in-Chief,
Sipah-Salar-i-Azam }

as the case may be. The latter is the highest title.

His powers are variable and undefined. They depend almost entirely on the social rank and character of the individual and are limited by neither rule nor regulation.

It often happens that the Commander-in-Chief is subordinated to the chief civil authority of the country, and it is not unusual for the Sadr Azam as the first civil officer of the crown to absorb the administrative functions of the Commander-in-Chief. The present Commander-in-Chief, Amir Khan, Sipah-Salar, for instance, has been relegated to the position of an executive officer with a command restricted to the troops actually in garrison in Teheran; whilst the Sadr Azam has absorbed his administrative functions and passes all orders regarding the pay, clothing, armament, movement, and relief of troops, whether in the capital or the provinces. In this work he is assisted by the Vazir-i-Lashkar or Paymaster-General, a civilian official, and by a considerable number of civilian clerks known as Mustaufis or accountants. He communicates directly with the provinces and it is to him alone that the governors look for orders.

The governors in their turn, following the example set in the capital, similarly subordinate the military to the civil authority.

With a capable and strong Commander-in-Chief this system might and probably would abruptly cease, for a decentralisation would take place by which the authority now exercised by the Sadr Azam in the military department would be re-transferred to the military chief of the army.

There is no regular staff service in the army, but attached to the households and offices of the Sadr Azam, the Commander-in-Chief, the provincial governors, and others, are a considerable number of officers known as adjutans or aide-de-

Administra-
tion.

Powers of
the Com-
mander-in-
Chief and
the civil
authorities.

Staff service.

camps. They are as a rule without any other military training than that of the ordinary regimental officer. They retain their quasi staff appointments just as long as their masters, and then become lost in the great army of the non-employed but fully paid officer. The nearest approach to a staff officer is to be found in the Adjutan Bashi, or Chief of the Staff, who is evidently an embryo of the État-Major of European armies. This officer assembles the troops for review and acts as a master of ceremonies on the occasion of military durbars in the Palace; otherwise his duties are nil. The choice of officers for the positions of Adjutan Bashi, Adjutan, etc., is one of favouritism tempered by purchase.

PAY DEPARTMENT, VAZARAT-I-LASHKAR.

Composition of.	The Pay Department comes next in importance after the Ministry of War. It consists of a civilian with the title of Vazir, who is known officially as the Vazir-i-Lashkar. He is assisted by a numerous staff of military accountants known as Lashkar-Navis.
Duties of.	The duties performed by the Pay Department are twofold, viz., the preparation of the annual budget, and the primary examination of the accounts as submitted by the various disbursing officers and departments of supply.
Preparation of the army budget.	In regard to the preparation of the budget the system pursued is as follows:— At Nauroz (21st March) the Pay Department prepares the army estimate for the whole of the military expenditure of the coming year. This estimate presents in detail the expenditure required for each province, district, or department, and is forwarded after compilation to the Minister of Finance (the Vazir-i-Daftar) for check and audit. After examination in this ministry, the estimates are passed and are included in the budgets of the provincial governors or the heads of departments to serve as the basis for their military disbursements of the year.
Remarks on the preparation of the budget.	It by no means follows that the routine herein set forth is effective or that any real control is exercised by the Minister of Finance over the estimates of the Pay Department. It has already been explained, in the account given of the War Department, that the administrative functions of the army are controlled by the Sadr Azam, and it follows that as the Pay Department forms one branch of the army administration, this department also comes within the circle of the Sadr Azam's influence. The Sadr Azam's position, again, as Prime Minister gives him complete authority over the Minister of Finance, who rarely feels himself called upon to criticise any military estimates bearing the impress of the Prime Minister's sanction. Whatever check is exercised depends therefore finally on the Sadr Azam or his Mustaufis. The system adopted in theory if properly conducted would possibly be very

'Report on the Persian Army' [76r] (151/170)

141

effective; as actually practised it is purely theoretical and should not be taken too seriously.

In the provinces the actual disbursements are made with the sanction of the local governors through the agency of the Lashkar Navis or military accountants, who are detached by the Paymaster-General to represent the Audit Department as part of the staff of the governors.

Disburse-
ments in the
provinces.

To meet the requirements of the garrison of the capital, a military chest is established under the control either of the Commander-in-Chief or of the Paymaster-General. The actual disbursements to the troops are made nominally by military authorities, but of late years the Paymaster-General has succeeded in usurping this executive function of the Commander-in-Chief and now controls all disbursements by means of his military accountants (Lashkar Navis). With a strong Commander-in-Chief this would never be allowed, as the perquisites attached to the military chest are very considerable, and are the object of much solicitude on his part.

Disburse-
ments in the
capital.

To assist the Vazir-i-Lashkar in the preliminary examination of the accounts of the various disbursing officers, military accountants (Lashkar Navis) are detached from his ministry to represent him in each province and department of supply. These accountants are expected to verify locally all receipts presented by the disbursing officers as vouchers for expenditures from the local revenues. After verification, the receipts are forwarded to the Pay Department in Tehran, where they undergo a further scrutiny by the audit section (Majilis-i-Manganeh) and if found satisfactory the sums represented in those receipts are embodied in a document called a Barat or bill voucher. This Barat is then transferred to the Ministry of Finance for further examination. It is considered valid when it has been sealed by the Finance Minister, the Sadr Azam, and the Shah. After receiving their seals, it is filed in the archives of the Finance Ministry and is utilised in checking the final annual provincial accounts of the governors and heads of departments.

Audit of the
accounts of
the pro-
vinces and
departments.

Much the same system is followed in the preparation and audit of the accounts of the capital.

Audit of the
accounts of
the garrison
at Teheran.
General
note.

Service in the Pay Department is much sought after, and large sums are paid to the Paymaster-General by the military accountants for the appointments of Lashkar Navis on the staff of the governors. The various members of the department form, in fact, a bureaucratic union for the exploitation of the military budget. The Paymaster-General himself pays a large sum of money to the Shah as Peshkash on appointment.

ARSENAL.

This department is known as the Vizarat-i-Kur Khaneh and is administered by a civilian official of the rank of minister. He is responsible for the purchase and supply of arms and ammunition, military equipment, and miscellaneous stores,

Composition
of.
Duties.
Accounts.

such as musical instruments, etc. He is assisted in those places where arsenals exist by subordinates of his own nomination and has also a very large staff of officers, pensioners, workmen, out of all proportion to the nature of their duties. A fixed sum is set apart every year for the expenses of the department in the military budget of the Paymaster-General (*Vazir-i-Lashkar*), but as regards disbursements he deals directly with the Minister of Finance, to whom the accounts are submitted for audit. Sometimes provincial requirements are met by the local arsenals; in such case the expenditure is shown in the accounts of the local governors.

The ministry is sold to the highest or most influential bidder, and it is the business of the farmer to make as large a profit at the expense of Government as his short tenure of office allows. The possibilities of such profit in the absence of Government purchases abroad, and the decline in local purchases owing to want of funds, have rendered the department a less desirable one from the point of view of the farmer. His prestige is no longer what it was, and the competition is not brisk.

Arsenals.

Arsenals are found at Tehran, Tabriz, Khoi, Urumieh, Ispahan, Shiraz, Meshed, Astrabad, Kermanshah, Khorremabad, Shuster, Kurdistan, Kerman, Sari (Mazanderan).

THE CARTRIDGE FACTORY.

Foundation of.

The following is from a report of Lieut.-Colonel Picot dated 1894:—

A small cartridge factory has been established as a branch of the arsenal near the grand parade ground in Tehran, and has been placed in charge of a German mechanic engaged on a three years' contract.

Establishment.

The Government establishment is maintained at a nominal strength of 35 men, but 20 only are actually employed.

Plant, etc.

The plant consists of an engine of 7 horse-power with presses, cutters, etc., imported from France or Austria.

The materials used in the factory, such as brass, steel, iron, etc., are imported from abroad. Powder is manufactured in Persia.

Administration.

The factory is leased on contract to a military officer, who supplies such cartridges as the Government or the public may be disposed to purchase.

Working capacity.

The working capacity of the factory was stated by Monsieur Horwart to be 10,000 cartridges per diem, but 5,000 per diem would probably be a fair estimate.

Present state.

Like so many other institutions, the factory has suffered from neglect since the accession of Muzzafer-ed-Din Shah, and is now in 1899 closed. The workmen, however, still continue to be paid by Government, and the contractor utilises their services in the production of wood and metal work for sale in the bazaars.

The machinery is in an exceedingly bad state, and a large

sum would be needed to place it in proper repair. General Weth, in commenting on the present condition of the plant, etc., remarked to the writer that as neither the Cossacks nor the Persian infantry burned a single cartridge from one year's end to the other there was little need for a factory. (There is a slight exaggeration in this statement, though it is practically correct.)

MAGAZINE DEPARTMENT.

This department was established on the return of Nasr-ed-Din Shah after his first journey to Europe, with the object of creating some check over the arsenal. It was then ordered that all arms, ammunition, or material furnished by the arsenals, by purchase or manufacture, should at once be transferred to the magazines for safe custody and future issue. Magazines were therefore established side by side with the arsenals, under separate and independent directors; but no sooner had this step been taken than conflicts arose between the heads of the departments. The superior grades being obtainable by purchase, it not unusually happened that the same officer held appointment as director in both the magazine and the arsenal, thereby nullifying the purpose of the reform, and opening up a wider field for speculation than before.

Short
account of,
and duties.

In Tehran the system was partially successful, though the officer commanding the artillery succeeded in withdrawing all artillery stores from the magazine, and in placing them in charge of an officer of his own selection.

The appointment of director in the capital or of assistant in the provinces being secured by purchase, some means had to be discovered whereby the farmer should recoup himself for his outlay. This appeared at first to be no easy matter, as the new department had no budget and made no disbursements; the reserve stores of arms and ammunition were, however, found very valuable, and it is believed that the sale of these articles to the general public more than repays the original outlay and makes the speculation a very successful one. Large quantities of stores have thus been disposed of, and the present emptiness of the magazine is in great part due to unchecked manipulation by the ever-changing stream of directors and assistants. Like all other departments, the administration is burdened by an excessive staff of officers of varying grades; whilst the number of underlings is legion.

CLOTHING DEPARTMENT.

This department deals with the supply and issue of clothing, tents, etc. It is under the direction of a civilian, who obtains the place by purchase, the general term of office being for one year.

Duties of.

Its budget is prepared in the usual way by the staff of the Paymaster-General; payments are made direct to the depart-

ment by the Minister of Finance through the Treasury. The receipts for all disbursements are checked by the Paymaster-General and are passed into account on the Barat system.

The department is centralised at Tehran, and all supplies are made direct, or by personal arrangement with the provincial governors. The estimates are almost invariably exceeded, and the post is much sought after, so much so that the Commander-in-Chief is occasionally the contractor, though his name seldom appears as a principal in the transaction.

ARTILLERY DEPARTMENT.

Store branch
of the de-
partment.

When the Magazine Department was inaugurated by the late Nasr-ed-Din Shah, it was intended that the whole of the military equipment, guns, ammunition, etc. should be transferred to the charge of that department. This reform, however, did not suit the views of the officer commanding the artillery, and it was arranged that all equipment, stores, ammunition, etc. belonging to that branch should be taken charge of by an officer selected by the Amir-i-Topkhaneh (military chief of artillery). This system still prevails, the selection of the stores officers in Tehran and elsewhere, however, being made at present by the Sipah-Salar and not by the Amir-i-Topkhaneh.

Stable
branch of
the depart-
ment.

To a separate branch of the department, if such it can be called, is confided the care of the artillery horses. At its head is a civil functionary known as the Rais-i-Stable-i-Topkhaneh (chief of the artillery stables). He is generally quite independent of the Amir-i-Topkhaneh, and secures his position by purchase.

Subordinate Rais-i-Stable are found at all the chief artillery centres. The post is valuable, as large quantities of Government grain and fodder pass through the hands of the department.

The present Sipah-Salar is believed to be the actual Rais-i-Stable, though the title is held by one of his nominees.

COMMISSARIAT AND TRANSPORT.

General
note.

These departments do not exist in the Persian army. It follows that all movements of troops are made with the greatest difficulty, and the collection of a force of a few thousand men is a matter which takes months to arrange. For instance, a camp of 5,000 men composed of the three arms was assembled in Kurdistan and Luristan in the summer of 1899, under the command of H. H. the Ain-ed-Dowleh, the governor of the province. This official made all the arrangements for the transport and supply of the camp, but despite every effort on his part and on that of the Government the main body was only able to leave Tehran after six months of preparation. Want of ready money and organisation bar the way to any

'Report on the Persian Army' [78r] (155/170)

145

rapid movements in this country, rather than want of transport or supplies.

Troops marching on relief provide their own transport, and the men are allowed to make their own way in their own manner to and from the garrison towns and their provinces. The most popular animal on these occasions is the donkey, which not only carries the burden of the soldier's kit, but helps him over many a weary mile of his road. A regiment on the move will spread itself over many marches, sometimes over hundreds of miles of road.

Troops
marching
on relief.

The camp of H.I. Majesty the Shah has a small permanent establishment of transport consisting of about 500 mules and 1,000 camels, with a chief of the transport, and an official known as the Nasakchi Bashi or commissariat officer. This appears to be the only permanent establishment of the kind in Persia. Its effective strength is said to be about 1,500 animals in all, its nominal 5,000 to 6,000.

The Shah's
transport.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

During the reign of Nasr-ed-Din Shah a first attempt was made to impart instruction to Persian students on the basis of Western medical science. Dr. Cloquet, a Frenchman, Dr. Polak, an Austrian, Dr. Schlemann, Dr. Tholozan, and others held classes in Tehran and established a medical section in the military college of the Darul Fanoun.

Commence-
ment of
medical
instruction
in Persia.

Dr. Dasil, of the Edinburgh University, now lectures to a class of 30 or 40 students. The courses are purely theoretical at present, and the period of study lasts six years. Students, however, often lose patience, and as civil and military employment is dependent on other than professional qualifications, a short course is often as useful in after life to the student as a long one.

The Government takes no note of the pretensions of Persian practitioners, and the country is consequently flooded with men calling themselves Hakims, Hakim Bashis, and doctors. The latter title is as a rule reserved for men who have studied in Europe and have obtained a degree of some kind, or who can show that they have attended courses abroad, even if for one year only. The right of the individual is seldom questioned, and Persians are always ready to believe in high-sounding titles.

At the head of the military department of the medical service is a gentleman known as the Lokhman-ed-Dowleh, a brother of the Shah's favourite doctor, the Hakim-ul-Mulk. His official title is the Rais-ul-Ataba or chief of the doctors. The appointment is disposed of by sale to the highest bidder, the price varying from 6,000 to 10,000 tomans. The period of incumbency is uncertain, and professional qualifications are unnecessary. The same man may one year be the Rais-ul-Ataba and another year the Rais-i-Stable of the artillery.

Contract
system.

The contractor recoups himself for his outlay by the sale of

'Report on the Persian Army' [78v] (156/170)

146

the junior appointments, the exaction of percentages, and by the confiscation of the monies set aside in the budget for the purchase of medicines, etc.

Composition
of depart-
ment.

The department bears on its rolls many hundreds of doctors, surgeons, apothecaries, who draw their pay from the Paymaster-General. Some thousands of men and boys, with nominal rank in the department, also draw their pay or pensions from the Minister of Finance. Most of the latter are pensioners pure and simple; they have no pretensions to be anything else.

Distribution
of medical
officers.

A certain regulation number of medical men are supposed to be attached to the infantry and artillery in the garrison towns at the expense of Government. In practice only such regiments have doctors attached as can afford to pay for them. In Tehran, for instance, where the garrison usually consists of two Taifas (tribes) of artillery and seven battalions of infantry, only two doctors are regimentally employed.

Note.

There are no regimental or garrison hospitals, but medicines are dispensed from a shop or shed in the vicinity of the barracks. As a rule, if a man is ill, he addresses himself to a civilian doctor and pays for his medicine and advice.

Out of an annual budget of from 20,000 to 30,000 tomans for medicines and necessities, it is said that not one-tenth is spent in a legitimate manner.

The payment of officers of this service is extremely irregular. The amount of income drawn by an individual depends entirely on his status or the length of his purse; an old grey-beard will be drawing 200 tomans per annum, a young student 2,000. The irregularity in payment leads to great abuse, and officers are often found hawking their bills in the market, where they are sold at from 30 to 80 per cent. discount.

The officers of the service bear military rank, though such is not always the case, many of the older school still preferring to be known as Hakims or Hakim Bashis, etc.

CHAPTER VIII.

MILITARY SCHOOLS.

The Military College, Darul Fanoun. Budget. Students and Curriculum.
Present Condition of College. Foreign Instructors. The Nasiri
College. Foundation and General Notes.

THE MILITARY COLLEGE, DARUL FANOUN.

THE career of this college, which dates from the early years of Nasr-ed-Din (1850) has been very chequered. It passed successively under the régime of the first Austrian, the Italian, the French, and second Austrian missions, and in 1882 was re-organised on a Prussian model by the Prussian officers Weth and Felmar, during whose direction the college has become a recognised training ground for military cadets. History of.

The family of the late Moukhbar-ed-Douleh has for many years been identified with the administration of this college, and one of the members of that family is at present its director.

A sum of 37,000 tomans is said to be set aside annually in the Government budget as a grant for public instruction, and it would appear that about 27,000 tomans is reserved for the expenses of the Darul Fanoun, the balance of 10,000 tomans being allotted to a similar institution at Tabriz. Budget.

The students of the Darul Fanoun consist of Persians and Turks, who are entered at the age of fourteen after passing a very simple examination in elementary subjects. They receive one free meal a day, two suits of uniform of Prussian pattern, and a small salary varying from 12 to 50 tomans per annum. Students and curriculum.

The curriculum of study embraces the following subjects:—
For infantry:—Tactics, fortification, surveying, military exercises, science of arms.

For artillery:—Science, drawing, military exercises.

Civilian classes are also formed for the study of geology, medicine, mathematics, Persian, Arabic, French, English, Russian, music, physics, geography.

The military classes are maintained at the nominal strength of 45 students for infantry, 30 students for artillery.

A complete course of study theoretically covers a period of eight years, pupils passing from the lower classes, where they learn Persian and Arabic, to the higher, where they are instructed in military science or the subjects above enumerated.

General Weth speaks highly of the intelligence of the students, but adds that the interest which they feel in their

'Report on the Persian Army' [79v] (158/170)

148

Present con-
dition of
college.

work is greatly discounted by the absence of any guarantee of future employment; and it would appear that a considerable percentage of the military students fail to obtain their commission after passing through the army course.

General Weth further remarks :—

"Since the accession of Muzzuffer-ed-Din Shah the military college, like all other institutions, has fallen into decadence. The school has not been paid for three years, and the Nayer-ul-Mulk, the director, has had to meet most of the expenses out of his own pocket. The school has been entirely closed since the 24th of May, 1899, and will remain closed until the director is able to recover the monies he has expended from his private purse. (Note.—It partially reopened in October, 1899.)

"The work and the prestige of the school have greatly suffered, and both professors and students are turning their attention to other means of earning a livelihood. It has been almost impossible of late years to find young men of sufficient instruction to follow the usual courses of study, and many of the classes have had in consequence to be abandoned.

"The discreditable state of the army does injury to the school in that it has under present conditions no need of properly instructed officers."

Foreign
instructors.

Two foreign officers are attached to the Darul Fanoun as instructors of military science—Generals Fellmer and Weth, who have been teaching at the college for the last eighteen years.

General Schindler makes the following note in regard to these officers, p. 86,*Part I, Chapter II :—

"Fellmar was in the Prussian artillery until about 20 years ago and has the "Iron Cross" for distinguished services in the war of 1870-71.

"Weth, a younger man, was a short time in the Prussian infantry. They have the rank of second class generals in the Persian service."

Both these officers are capable men and have done much good work. Outside the college their influence is nil. They have the rank of Sartep of second class. And are under contract to the Director of the College.

Monsieur Le Maire, a French musician, also teaches at the college, where he has a class.

He is described in Part I, Chapter II, as :—

"A good musician, 1^{er} prix au conservatoire, was sent by the French Government in 1868 when the Persian army had been without any European bandmaster for several years; is still in service and very active. He has the rank of Sartip first class."

THE NASIRI COLLEGE.

Foundation
of and
general note.

This military college was founded by H.H. the Naib-es-Saltaneh, third son of Nasr-ed-din Shah, when he held the position of Commander-in-Chief.

The curriculum of study was based upon that of the "Darul Fanoun," but no practical work was ever done, and since the retirement of its founder on the death of Nasr-ed-Din the college has ceased to exist. Once a year the old students parade at Dushan Tepe, six miles from Tehran, for the Shah's inspection at the conclusion of the spring race meeting; otherwise they appear to be neither seen nor heard of.

'Report on the Persian Army' [80r] (159/170)

149

The last relic of the college is to be found in a class of student musicians now instructed by Monsieur Le Maire, the musical director of the Persian army. This class forms a recruiting ground for the regimental bands of the Tehran garrison.

CHAPTER IX.

UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT OF MEN.

Distinctive Colours of Different Branches. Articles of Uniform of Different Branches. Uniform of Infantry. Equipment of Infantry. Uniform of Artillery. Equipment of Artillery. Uniform of Cavalry. Equipment of Cavalry. Issues of Clothing to Infantry and Artillery. Issues to Irregular Cavalry. General Remarks on the Clothing of the Army.

Distinctive colours of different branches.

THE official and distinctive colours of the various branches of the Persian army are as follows:—

Infantry	..	..	..	..	red.
Artillery	..	..	..	..	blue.
Cavalry	..	..	..	..	green.

Articles of uniform of different branches.

The articles of uniform worn by the different branches of the service are:—

Infantry.—Kulah or cap, tunic, pantaloons, boots or shoes, sometimes a great-coat.

Artillery.—Kulah, tunic, pantaloons, boots, sometimes a great-coat.

Cavalry.—Kulah, tunic, pantaloons, boots.

Uniform of infantry.

The kulah or cap is made of imitation black astrakan, or inferior black cloth. In front is attached a badge in metal carrying the arms of Persia, viz., "the Lion and the Sun," and a red cockade; a red band of about five centimètres in breadth encircles the kulah.

The material used is of bad quality and seldom lasts more than a few months.

Some regiments wear a kulah made of brown felt, with "the Lion and the Sun," but without the cockade or band. It is of more durable material than the imitation astrakan or cloth, but presents a poor appearance.

The headpiece of the Shah's bodyguard consists of a brass helmet.

The tunic is of a black or blue material with a single line of six bronze buttons in front stamped with the "Lion and the Sun," with four similar buttons on the skirt behind and two of smaller size on the epaulettes. The collar is cut straight; collar, cuffs, epaulettes, and beading in red.

In winter a cloth tunic of the cheapest material is sometimes, though rarely, issued; in summer the tunic is of Persian Kerbaz (thin cotton), very like Indian Dusootee, of the poorest quality. It retains a presentable appearance for about one month and then wears into rags. It is practically worn all the year round, winter and summer alike.

'Report on the Persian Army' [81r] (161/170)

151

Some regiments wear a scarlet tunic of thin baize with the collar in black cloth; cuffs, epaulettes, and beading in black. This is only used on special occasions.

The pantaloons is sometimes of blue cloth or more often of blue Kerbaz. It is worn of full length to the ankle, with a red band of five centimètres width on each side.

The boots.—Ankle boots for winter wear. In summer a native shoe called giveh is often worn. The giveh is a shoe without laces, upper part knitted of cotton, soles made of rags beaten together with glue and stitched. Heels and toes are strengthened with a slice of horse-hoof. With the uppers strengthened by a half-inch band of leather stitched all round the shoe, the walking life may last months.

There is also worn the old Turkish shoe of soft leather, laced up and having the sole curved up over the toes.

For full dress parades and reviews long boots of Russian pattern or black leather gaiters made in Persia are issued; both are exceedingly clumsy for infantry.

The great-coat is of brown felt with a hood of the same material. It weighs heavily, is clumsy but warm, and is fairly waterproof when new. It is only issued on rare occasions and does not form a regular part of the soldier's kit. Specimens can be seen worn by the guards at the legations in Teheran or at the Shah's palace.

The equipment of the infantry consists of a belt and pouch, water-bottle and haversack. Equipment of infantry.

The belt is of varnished black leather with steel buckles; the pouch of black leather, with a capacity for 30 rounds of ball. It is worn on the left side.

The water-bottle and haversack are worn occasionally at reviews held by the Shah or on active service. They do not form part of the regular kit of the soldier.

The water-bottle is of tin covered with thin felt or kerbaz; the haversack of kerbaz.

The kulah is similar to that worn by the infantry, except that the cockade and band are in blue. On parade a plume of black horsehair is attached. Uniform of artillery.

The tunic is of the infantry pattern and material, with the collar, cuffs, epaulettes, and beading in blue.

Some of the regiments wear a scarlet tunic, with the collar, cuffs, epaulettes, and beading in blue. The material may be of kerbaz or cloth.

The pantaloons are of the infantry pattern, generally tucked away in long Russian boots. Many still wear the old-fashioned baggy trousers, fastened round the waist with a band.

The boots are of long Russian pattern of black leather and made in Persia.

The great-coat is similar in pattern to the infantry.

The haversack and water-bottle are of similar pattern to those of the infantry. Equipment of artillery.

A black belt and sword are carried by every artilleryman.

The kulah is known as the tabrizi and differs from the Uniform of cavalry.

'Report on the Persian Army' [81v] (162/170)

152

infantry pattern in being higher in the crown. This rule does not always hold good, as the men are sometimes seen wearing the low kulah. The usual badge of "the Lion and the Sun" is attached, encircled by a wreath.

The material varies, white, grey, and black astrakan, sheepskin, or felt being utilised according to the taste of the commanding officer or the custom of the tribe.

Hats and caps :—

Bakhtiari, white felt, bowler-shape, brimless, rather tall.

Some Kurds, Kashkai, Shahsevan, and other Turkish tribes, brown-black felt, bowler shape, brimless, high and low.

Turkomans, Kurds, Turkish tribes Azerbaijan, sheepskin, long hair, soft and hard, large and small.

The tunic is generally of the old Persian pattern, pleated at the waist and with a skirt reaching to the knees; sometimes a red tunic is worn of kerbaz or cloth, of blouse pattern.

The buttons are of white metal stamped with "the Lion and the Sun." The facings and beading are of green.

The boots are of Russian pattern, of black leather, made in Persia. Gaiters are sometimes worn of stout black leather.

Note that uniform as described above is principally for the men. The officers do not wear kerbaz. Their tunics and trousers are of cloth, sateen, alpaca, and other material as suits their fancy. The uniforms of superior officers are again of different material.

For equipment of cavalry, see Chapter III.

Theoretically every Persian soldier of the infantry and artillery, whilst under arms, is by regulation supposed to receive one suit of thick winter and two suits of light summer uniform per annum.

The issue of such other articles as the great-coat, haversack, and water-bottle is regulated by necessity. They are not considered an essential part of the every-day working kit of the soldier.

Practically each man receives just such uniform as suits the convenience or the pocket of the Minister of War, the officers of the clothing and the pay departments of the Army. On an average he receives one suit of summer clothing every year or every two years. If the commanding officer of the regiment has influence he may succeed in squeezing two summer suits from the authorities, but such influence is exceptional.

Irregular cavalry dress as they like, only better class officers affect uniform.

Uniforms are not supplied by Government.

For further details regarding the manufacture and supply of clothing *vide* Chapter VII, Clothing Department.

It will be readily gathered from the foregoing that the system of supply, with its accompanying venality, speculation, and inadequacy, prevents the soldier from appearing to advantage, and does little justice to his physique or soldierly bearing. A month after arrival in garrison his uniform is in

Equipment
of cavalry.
Issues of
clothing to
infantry and
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Issues to
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General
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92
rags, and it has been well said that his cast-off clothing would be rejected by any self-respecting Darwish. It naturally follows that when His Majesty expresses a desire to review his troops some difficulty is experienced in clothing them in a manner befitting the occasion. This difficulty is overcome by the issue of a new set of uniform for the occasion of the review only. After parade the men march straight back to barracks, the uniforms are repacked and returned to store.

The system is as well known to his Majesty as to his officers, but it is the custom and calls for no special remark. The men, too, appear to enjoy the travesty as much as their superiors.

In the provinces the troops are occasionally quite decently equipped, the troops at one time under the Zil-es-Sultan, for instance, being a case in point; but such order is very exceptional, and is not encouraged by the central authorities.

I would here interpolate two extracts, one by McGregor, the other by Curzon, which sum up the appearance of the Persian soldier, and are as true to-day as when they were written.

McGregor said of some regiments at Meshed :—

"To look at them without the eye of a soldier was simply to condemn them as a rabble of dirty, slouching-looking ragamuffins; but as regarded as food for powder by one who knows the article required they are by no means to be despised."

Curzon says :—

"I have seen soldiers in many parts of the world, but rarely have I seen such creditable specimens of manhood so woefully attired or so dismally furnished."

CHAPTER X.

UNIFORM OF OFFICERS.

Regulation Dress. Distinctive Marks of Rank. Articles of Uniform and Equipment of the Infantry Officer. Articles of Uniform and Equipment of the Artillery Officer. Description of the Various Articles of Dress and Equipment. Orders of Dress of Junior Officers. Orders of Dress of Senior Officers. Uniform of Irregular Cavalry. General Note.

Regulation dress.

THE regulation dress of the officers of the Persian army is of the Austrian pattern slightly modified by Persian taste and prejudice.

The different ranks are marked by the variety in the make and material of the badge of the lion and the sun as used on the headdress (the Kulah); by the numbers of the stars worn on the collar of the tunic; by the material of the sash. There are other minor differences, the record of which seems hardly necessary.

Distinctive marks of rank.

The following list gives particulars of the chief distinctive marks of rank.

Naib-i-Doyum.—The badge of the lion and sun is all in white metal, generally of silver. One star of silver embroidery on the cloth collar. (Note.—The stars are six-pointed).

Naib-i-Aval.—Badge all white except the sabre, which is yellow. Two stars of silver on the collar.

Sultan.—Badge all white except the sabre, and the base of the lion, which are in yellow. Three stars of silver on the collar.

Yavar.—The badge of the lion and the head supporting the sun white, the rest yellow. One star on the gold embroidered collar.

Yavar-i-Aval.—The badge of the lion white, the rest yellow. Two stars on the gold embroidered collar.

Sarhang.—The lion yellow, the rest white. Three stars on the gold embroidered collar.

Sartip-i-Seyum.—The lion and head of the sun in yellow, the rest white. One star on the collar. (Embroidery differs from that of foregoing ranks).

Sartip-i-Doyum.—The sabre and base white, the rest yellow. Two stars on the gold embroidered collar.

Sartip-i-Aval.—Badge all yellow except the sabre, in white. Three stars on the gold embroidered collar.

Emir-i-Toman.—Badge all yellow; especially embroidered collar.

Sirdar, Sipah Salar.—Badge of two lions rampant facing inwards, surmounted by the imperial crown, all in yellow. Same collar as Amir-i-Toman.

'Report on the Persian Army' [83r] (165/170)

155

Note.—The badge of the lion and sun is composed of the following parts:—The sabre, the sun with face, the lion, the base.

The articles of uniform and equipment worn by the officers of infantry are a "Kulah," tunic, pantaloons, long or walking boots, great-coat, sash, sword and sling.

Articles of uniform and equipment of the infantry officer.

Officers of the artillery wear the above, with the addition of a cross belt and pouch.

Articles of uniform and equipment of the artillery officer.

The kulah is of the same pattern as the men's, but is generally of real astrakhan or fine black cloth.

Description of the various articles of dress and equipment.

The tunic is of Austrian pattern, usually of dark blue cloth with a single line of buttons for the grade of Sarhang and junior officers; a double line for the senior grades. The buttons are always marked with the lion and the sun. In summer a considerable variety is to be found in the material of the tunic.

The Sirdar or Sipah-Salar (Commander-in-Chief) wears a jacket of dark blue cloth of hussar pattern, cut rather longer in the skirt than the Austrian jacket to suit Persian etiquette.

The pantaloons are of dark blue cloth, either tucked away into the long boots or worn loose with the walking boot. They are without stripes for the juniors; with double gold embroidered stripes for the seniors. The long boots are usually of the Russian pattern made in Persia. The senior officers sometimes affect the patent leather long boot of European make. The great-coat is of Austrian pattern for all officers, of dark blue cloth, with a double row of buttons down the front. The collar is marked with red facings for infantry and blue for artillery.

The sword and slings are of Austrian pattern and are worn under the tunic. The sword knot as worn by all ranks without distinction is in gold embroidery with the lion and the sun on one side and the monogram of the reigning Shah on the other in silver thread.

The sash for Sarhang and junior grades is in yellow and black silk, the sash knot being marked with the lion and sun on one side and the monogram of the reigning Shah on the other in white silk.

The sash for the senior officers is in gold and black embroidery, the sash knot being marked similarly to the above in silver thread. The sash is worn at the waist over the tunic, and is knotted on the left side. Aide-de-camps of the Shah are distinguished by a sash worn *en bandolière*, from left to right, of greater width than that of the senior grades. Adjutants of regiments likewise wear their sashes *en bandolière*, from right to left.

The cross belt of artillery is of gold embroidery. The pouch is in white metal, with the lion and the sun embossed thereon in silver. Both are of Austrian pattern.

Orders of
dress of
junior
officers.

Orders of
dress of
senior
officers.

Uniform of
irregular
cavalry.
General
note.

The junior officers, from Sarhang downwards, have but one set of uniform for all orders of parade.

In drill order the seniors wear the dark blue tunic, pantaloons, long boots.

In review order the blue cloth tunic, red pantaloons, and long boots.

In full dress a white tunic, red pantaloons, long boots.

The Sirdar in full dress sometimes affects a white hussar jacket with diamond epaulettes, red pantaloons, and long boots; at other times he wears the hussar jacket, dark blue pantaloons, long boots.

Uniform of irregular cavalry, *vide* Chapter III.

As a rule the Persian officer is careful of his dress and presents a respectable appearance in uniform, whether on or off parade.

CHAPTER XI.

DECORATIONS, MEDALS, AND ORDERS.


Decorations,
medals, and
orders.

For particulars of decorations, medals, and orders, etc., *vide* Appendix, Part I, Chapter II, "Military Pays, Ranks, Titles and Decorations," p. 88.


'Persia, Afghanistan and Beluchistan [Baluchistan]' [84r] (1/2)



'Persia, Afghanistan and Beluchistan [Baluchistan]' [84v] (2/2)



'Report on the Persian Army' [back-i] (169/170)



'Report on the Persian Army' [back] (170/170)

