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Papers on British policy and the Arab movement

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About this record

This file contains correspondence, memoranda, maps, manuscript notes, and other papers relating to the political and territorial settlement of parts of the Middle East following the First World War. Many of the papers were collected for the attention of the Middle East Committee (later named the Eastern Committee, following the mergence of the Foreign Office's Russia Committee and the interdepartmental Persia Committee) of the War Cabinet. Contributors include officials from the War Office, Foreign Office, Admiralty, and India Office, as well as indivduals such as Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence. Correspondence comes from representatives of the French and Italian governments as well as British officials in Cairo and other parts of the Middle East.

The papers deal with plans for the region presuming and following an Allied victory in the First World War and take into consideration the imperial ambitions of the victorious European Powers (France, Italy, Russia, Britain, and the United States) and the multitudinous commitments made by the British to various groups. The plans are based on evolving agreements rooted in the Sykes-Picot, or Asia Minor, Agreement between the British and French of 1916. Regions under consideration include the Hejaz (sometimes written Hedjaz), Syria, Northern Iraq, Southern Iraq, Palestine, Armenia, Turkey, the Idrisi state, Yemen, Persia, and Afghanistan. Various matters are covered in the file, but particular focus is given to plans for the Sherifian family of the Hejaz, led by King Husein [Ḥusayn bin ʻAlī al-Hāshimī], which impacted upon policy in Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and the Arabian Peninsula. Other matters include the situation between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, wartime commitments to ruling shaikhs in the Persian Gulf, the French position in the region, and desiderata of the Government of India for any peace settlement.

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SECRET.

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT,
FOREIGN OFFICE.
Special 3.

WAR CABINET
E.C. 2201
2 WHITEHALL GARDENS

MEMORANDUM
ON
BRITISH COMMITMENTS TO KING HUSEIN.

OUR commitments to King Husein are not embodied in any agreement or treaty signed, or even acknowledged, by both parties. In this way they differ from those to Russia, France, Italy, and certain independent Arab rulers such as the Idrisi and bin Saud. They can only be analysed by summarising the history of our dealings with the King during the war, under different heads. And the position is complicated by the King's habit of ignoring or refusing to take note of conditions laid down by us to which he objects, and then carrying on as if the particular question had been settled between us according to his own desires.

(1a)

BRITISH commitments to King Husein are analysed in this memorandum under the following heads :—

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internal dissension—their principle of government—and provided that the Government of Great Britain would guarantee these fundamental principles clearly and in writing. This guarantee we expect to receive at the first opportunity" (p. 23).

This request was met in a Foreign Office telegram of the 31st October 1914 (the date on which war between Great Britain and Turkey was declared) :—

"Lord Kitchener's salaams to Sherif Abdullah. . . . . If the Arab nation assist England in this war that has been forced upon us by Turkey, England will guarantee that no internal intervention takes place in Arabia, and will give Arabs every assistance against external aggression.

"It may be that an Arab of true race will assume the Khalifate at Mecca or Medina and so good may come by the help of God out of all the evil that is now occurring" (p. 24).

This statement was transmitted to Abdullah by letter from Cairo with the following addition :—

"If the Emir of Mecca is willing to assist Great Britain in this conflict, Great Britain is willing, recognising and respecting the sacred and unique office of the Emir Husein (titles), to guarantee the independence, rights and privileges of the Sherifiate against all external foreign aggression, in particular that of the Ottomans. Till now we have defended Islam in the person of the Turks; henceforward it shall be in that of the noble Arabs" (p. 24).

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

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The references in the following summary, where not to Foreign Office papers, are to the historical narrative compiled by the Arab Bureau at Cairo and dated the 29th November, 1916. The pagination referred to is that of the Foreign Office copy (filed in the Library under "Confidential: Turkey: Arab Bureau: 1914 *seqq.* (No. 112)").

(i.) *General Guarantees against the Restoration of the* status quo.

His Majesty's Government's representatives in Egypt had been in touch with Sherif Husein and his sons—especially Abdullah—before the war.

On the 24th September 1914 (in the interval during which Great Britain was at war with Germany but not yet with Turkey) the Foreign Office telegraphed at Lord Kitchener's request to Cairo, instructing that a special messenger should be sent to Abdullah to enquire what would be the Sherif's attitude in the event of war with Turkey breaking out (p. 21*a*). Abdullah sent a written answer expressing his preference for Great Britain over Turkey,—

> "So long as she protects the rights of our country and the rights of the person of His Highness our present Emir and Lord and the rights of his Emirate and its independence in all respects, without any exceptions or restrictions, and so long as it supports us against any foreign aggression and in particular against the Ottomans, especially if they wish to set up any one else as Emir with the intention of causing internal dissension—their principle of government—and provided that the Government of Great Britain would guarantee these fundamental principles clearly and in writing. This guarantee we expect to receive at the first opportunity" (p. 23).

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In the letter which Sherif Husein sent to Sir H. McMahon in July, 1915, definitely proposing an agreement with His Majesty's Goverment, he laid down the following condition :—

> "*Thirdly*, for the security of this Arab independence and the certainty of such preference of economic enterprises, both high contracting parties to offer mutual assistance to the best ability of their military and naval forces, to face any foreign Power which may attack either party. Peace not to be decided without agreement of both parties" (p. 40).

This condition was more emphatically stated in the Sherif's third letter to Sir H. McMahon, dated the 5th November 1915 :—

> "(5) When the Arab knows that the Government of Great Britain is their Ally who will not leave them to themselves at the conclusion of peace, in the face of Germany and Turkey, and that she will support and effectively defend them, then to enter the war at once will be, no doubt, in conformity with the general interest of the Arabs" (p. 94).

In reply to this, Sir H. McMahon, acting on Foreign Office instructions, gave the following assurance in his third letter to the Sherif, dated the 13th December, 1915 :—

> "It is most essential that you should spare no effort to attach all the Arab peoples to our united cause, and urge them to afford no assistance to our enemies.
>
> "It is on the success of these efforts, and on the more active measures which the Arabs may hereafter take in support of our cause, when the time for action comes, that the permanence and strength of our agreement must depend.
>
> "Under these circumstances, I am further directed by the Government of Great Britain to inform you that you may rest assured that Great Britain has no intention of concluding any peace, in terms of which the freedom of the Arab peoples from German and Turkish domination does not form an essential condition" (p. 103).

The Sherif took note of this assurance in his fourth letter to Sir H. McMahon, dated the 1st January, 1916 :—

> "I have a strong belief, which the living will inherit from the dead, in the declarations which you gave in the conclusion of your honoured letter" (p. 113).

The assurance was of course contingent, but the Sherif's action since that date has evidently brought it into operation.

It was repeated in a Foreign Office message telegraphed to Sir R. Wingate, on the 4th February, 1918, for transmission to the Sherif (now King of the Hejaz) :—

> "His Majesty's Government, along with their Allies, stand for the cause of the liberation of the oppressed nations, and are determined to stand by the Arab peoples in their struggle for the reconstruction of an Arab world, in which law shall once again replace Ottoman violence and unity the artificial rivalries promoted by Turkish officials. His Majesty's Government re-affirm their former pledges to His Highness in regard to the freeing of the Arab peoples. Liberation is the policy His Majesty's Government have pursued and intend to pursue with unswerving determination by protecting such Arabs as are already liberated from the danger of re-conquest, and assisting such Arabs as are still under the yoke of the oppressor to obtain their freedom."[1]

Relation of Commitments under (i) *to British desiderata* :—

No conflict, if interpreted in the light of our reservations under (iii), (iv) and (v).

(ii.) *Guarantees regarding the Moslem Holy Places.*

The Government of India issued the following proclamation on the 2nd November, 1914 :—

> "In view of the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Turkey, which to the regret of Great Britain has been brought about by the ill-advised, unprovoked, and deliberate action of the Ottoman Government, his Excellency the Viceroy is authorised by His Majesty's Government to make the following public announce-

[1] 22108/146/18.

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ment in regard to the Holy Places of Arabia, including the Holy Shrines of Mesopotamia and the Port of Jeddah, in order that there may be no misunderstanding on the part of His Majesty's most loyal Moslem subjects as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government in this war, in which no question of a religious character is involved. These Holy Places and Jeddah will be immune from attack or molestation by British naval and military forces, so long as there is no interference with pilgrims from India to the Holy Places and Shrines in question. At the request of His Majesty's Government, the Governments of France and Russia have given similar assurances" (p. 2).

A much looser pledge, extending to the whole of Arabia, was given in a Foreign Office telegram of the 14th November, 1914, to the High Commissioner, Cairo:—

"His Majesty's Government have no intention of undertaking any military or naval operations in Arabia, or against its ports, unless such a course becomes necessary for the protection of Arabian interests against Turkish or other aggression, or in support of any attempt by the Arabs to free themselves from Turkish rule."

On the 14th April, 1915, the Foreign Office (acting on the strength of a letter addressed by Seyyid Sir Ali Morghani, Grand Kadi of the Sudan, to Sir R. Wingate—then Sirdar—and forwarded by him) telegraphed to the High Commissioner, Cairo:—

"You should inform Sir R. Wingate that he is authorised by me to let it be known, should he think it desirable, that His Majesty's Government will make it an essential condition in the terms of peace that the Arabian Peninsula and its Mohammedan Holy Places should remain in the hands of an independent Sovereign State" (p. 30).

This was communicated to Sir Ali Morghani, and by him, apparently, to Sherif Husein. Later, towards the end of June, the substance of it was embodied in proclamations distributed in Egypt, the Sudan, and Arabia.

In October, when the negotiations with the Sherif were well advanced, Faroki (a member of one of the Arab Nationalist organisations in the Ottoman army, who had passed over to the British lines at Gallipoli and had been brought to Egypt in October) submitted suggestions to the High Commissioner for assurances to the Sherif, one of them being that "England will guarantee the Holy Places against external aggression and recognise their inviolability" (p. 51). Sir H. McMahon communicated this in a private telegram to Sir E. Grey on the 18th October, 1915. Instructions were sent him in a Foreign Office telegram of the 20th October, 1915, and embodied by him in his second letter, dated the 24th October, 1915, to Sherif Husein. In this letter Faroki's suggested assurance regarding the Holy Places was conveyed verbatim.

Finally, the following declaration was made in an official communiqué published on the 29th July, 1916, in Egypt, after the Sherif's revolt, with the authorisation of the Foreign Office:—

"It remains the fixed policy of Great Britain to abstain from all interference in religious matters and to spare no effort to secure Holy Places of Islam from all external aggression.

"It is an unalterable point of British policy that those Holy Places should remain under independent Moslem rule and authority.

"The present state of war places many difficulties and dangers in the way of those wishing to perform the pilgrimage, but the action taken by the Sherif of Mecca gives rise to hopes that arrangements may be made whereby the pilgrims may in the coming year visit the Holy Shrines in peace and security" (p. 57, Part II).

Relation of Commitments under (ii) *to British desiderata*:—

No conflict.

(iii.) *Boundaries of Arab Independence.*

In the Foreign Office telegram of the 14th April, 1915 (No. 173), to the High Commissioner, Cairo (quoted in section (ii) above), His Majesty's Government committed themselves to a public declaration that "they will make it an essential condition in the terms of peace that the Arabian Peninsula should remain in the hands

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of an independent Sovereign State." They added, however, that "it is not possible to define at this stage exactly how much territory should be included in this State."

That question was raised in July 1915 by Sherif Husein in his first letter to Sir H. McMahon, the first of the conditions on which he proposed co-operation with Great Britain against the Turks being as follows:—

> "England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to 37° of latitude, on which degree falls Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Amadia Island,[2] up to the border of Persia; on the east, by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basrah; on the south, by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west, by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina" (p. 40).

It appears from a statement made by Faroki (for whom see section (ii) above) that Lord Kitchener's assurance of the 31st October, 1914, to Sherif Abdullah (see section (i)) had been discussed between Sherif Husein and the Central Arab Nationalist Committee, which was at that time in being at Damascus, and that this territorial demand was suggested to the Sherif by the Committee.[3] Emissaries were sent from Damascus to Jeddah with instructions to bargain about this demand in detail, but to insist on a general acceptance of it by Great Britain as a condition of continuing negotiations.

On the 30th August, 1915, Sir H. McMahon, in his first letter to Sherif Husein, gave a non-committal answer on this point, re-affirming Lord Kitchener's pledges, but alluding to the discussion of boundaries as "premature" (p. 43).

On the 9th September, 1915, however, the Sherif, in his second letter, pressed for definition:—

> "Your Excellency will pardon me and permit me to say clearly that the coolness and hesitation displayed in the question of the limits and boundaries, by saying that the discussion of these at present is of no use and loss of time, and that they are still in the hands of the Government which is ruling them, etc., might be taken to infer an estrangement or something of the sort.
>
> "As the limits and boundaries demanded are not those of one person whom we should satisfy, and with whom we should discuss them after the war is over, but our peoples have seen that the life of their new proposal is bound at least by these limits and their word is united on this;
>
> "Therefore they have found it necessary to discuss this point first with the Power in whom they now have their confidence and trust as a final appeal, viz., the illustrious British Empire" (p. 44).

The substance of this letter was conveyed to the Foreign Office by Sir H. McMahon on the 18th October, 1915 (telegram No. 623), and in a private telegram of the same date to Sir E. Grey[4] (p. 49) he reported the results of further conversations with Faroki. Faroki declared that Germany had promised the Arab party the fulfilment of all their demands, and that they were at the parting of the ways. He expressed the opinion that:—

> "The occupation by France of purely Arab districts of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Damascus would be opposed by Arabs with force of arms, but with this exception . . . . they would accept some modification of the North-western boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca" (p. 51).

This latter suggestion by Faroki is important; for though it does not appear certain that it would have been agreed to by the rest of the Damascus party, and it has certainly never been agreed to by Sherif Husein, it was taken by His Majesty's Government as the basis of their negotiations with France, and is the origin of the division between the Blue Area and Area A.

It was embodied on the 24th October, 1915, in Sir H. McMahon's second letter to the Sherif:—

> "The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries. With the above modifications, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab Chiefs, we accept these limits and boundaries; and in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her Ally, France, I am empowered in the

[2] ? "Inland" or else "Jezireh, Amadia." [3] 157740/15: statement by Faroki, pp. 4 and 10. [4] 153045/15.

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name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances, and make the following reply to your letter:—

"'Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca'" (p. 53).

It will be noted that the reservation in favour of French interests, even within the narrower boundaries of Arab independence here proposed, prepared the ground for the establishment of Area A.

On the 5th November, in his third letter, the Sherif agreed to the exclusion of Mersina and Adana, but formally reiterated his claim to the rest:—[5]

"In order to facilitate an agreement and to render a service to Islam, and at the same time to avoid all that may cause Islam troubles and hardships—seeing moreover that we have great consideration for the distinguished qualities and dispositions of the Government of Great Britain—we renounce our insistence on the inclusion of the vilayets of Mersina and Adana in the Arab Kingdom. But the provinces of Aleppo and Beirout, and their sea-coasts, are purely Arab provinces, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab: they are both descendents of one forefather" (p. 92).

It may be remarked that he does not mention either the vilayet of Lebanon or the sanjak of Jerusalem—territories which were both excluded from the independent Arab State in the subsequent Anglo-French Agreement. But he has expressly claimed Lebanon on other occasions since then, and his reference to the Christian Arabs here implies its inclusion.

The policy laid down with regard to the Christians was evidently inspired by the Damascus Committee, for Faroki, in his conversations at Cairo, stated their views on the point thus:—

"The basis of the new Arab Empire will be national, not religious. It will be an Arab, not a Moslem Empire. Christian Arabs, Druses, and Nosairia will have the same rights as Moslems, but the Jews will be governed by a special law."[6]

The Sherif's renunciation of Mersina and Adana and guarantees to the Christian Arabs were taken note of by Sir H. McMahon in his third letter of the 13th December, 1915. His reiterated claim to Aleppo and Beirout vilayets was ignored (p. 102).

On the 1st January, 1916, in his fourth letter to Sir H. McMahon, the Sherif answered by declaring that he would not press his claims against France till after the war, but announcing his intention of then doing so:—

"As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our previous letter what were the utmost possible modifications; and all this was done only so as to fulfil those aspirations whose attainment is desired by the will of the Blessed and Supreme God. It is this same feeling and desire which impelled us to avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and the agreement made between them during the present wars and calamities; yet we find it our duty that the eminent Minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from to-day) for what we now leave to France in Beirout and its coasts . . . . (p. 112).

"It is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France or any other Power a span of land in those regions" (p. 113).

Sir H. McMahon answered this in his fourth letter of the 30th January 1916, by taking note of the Sherif's "desire to avoid anything which might possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France," and warning him that the friendship between the two countries would endure after the war (Part II, p. 5). The Sherif, on his part, never referred to the boundary question again during the negotiations, but there is evidence to show that the claims not accepted by His Majesty's Government have not been withdrawn by him.

[5] This formula (and not the Damascus–Homs–Hama–Aleppo line) was proposed to Sir Mark Sykes by Faroki about the beginning of November (p. 104). Faroki and the Sherif were in communication through the Sherif's messenger to Cairo. [6] 157740/15: Faroki's statement, p. 10.

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For instance, a letter written to him by his son Sherif Ali on the 26th May, 1916, on the eve of the revolt, and mostly occupied with military details, concludes :—

"Our Lord will not, we hope, forget Alexandretta, Beirout, and those regions" (Part II, p. 41).

Again, Sherif Abdullah remarked to Colonel Wilson at Jeddah on the 1st November, 1916,[7] *à propos* of his father's assumption of the title of "King of the Arabs," that "the boundaries of his kingdom were settled previous to the revolt"—a misstatement of the facts, unless it was intended, as it certainly was not, as an acceptance of the boundaries His Majesty's Government had consented to.

On the 29th July, 1917, King Husein expressed his views on the boundary question to Captain Lawrence :—[8]

"The main points were that he had altogether refused to permit any French annexation of Beirout and the Lebanon. 'They are Arab countries, but I will neither take them myself nor permit anyone else to take them. They have deserved independence and it is my duty to see they get it.'

"He said that he refused a detailed discussion of boundaries on the grounds that hostilities between Turkey and the Allies still continue and all decisions taken now would necessarily have to be modified in accordance with the actual results of military operations, for which he must have an absolutely free hand. 'If advisable we will pursue the Turks to Constantinople and Erzerum, so why talk about Beirout, Aleppo, and Hail.'"

He revealed the same state of mind in conversations with Colonel Wilson a few months later.[9]

From conversations with him during the second week of January, 1918, Commander Hogarth gathered that he still expected France and Great Britain to fall out, and calculated that he would be able to force the hand of the French with our backing.[10]

On the 11th February, 1918, Colonel Basset wrote to Sir R. Wingate that "King Husein had read into the terms of His Majesty's Government's 'pledge' very wide territorial boundaries, and professes the most implicit trust in the intention and ability of Great Britain to redeem the 'pledge' as he reads it."[11]

Relation of Commitments under (iii) *to British Desiderata.*

The boundaries of Arab independence to which His Majesty's Government are committed by Sir H. McMahon's second letter to Sherif Husein (24th October, 1915), exclude (*a*) the British territory and Protectorate of Aden ; and presumably also (*b*) the British Protectorate of Bahrein, since the Sherif's claims take the "Indian Ocean" as the boundary of the Arabian Peninsula, and make no mention of islands (see first letter of July 1915, quoted above).

On the other hand, they include (*c*) Akka-Haifa and (*d*) Basra, though, in the agreement of the 6th May, 1916, with France, and in correspondence which has passed at various times between the Foreign Office and the India Office, it seems to be assumed that both these places will become British enclaves in the independent Arab area, attached in some formal way (whether by annexation, protectorate, or lease) to the British Empire.

Sir Mark Sykes reported that, in his conversations with Faroki early in November 1915, the latter stated that "the Arabs would agree to Basra town and all cultivated lands to the south being British territory."[12] But there is no other record of such a concession on his part or on the part of any other representative of the Arab nationalist organisations in Turkey. And King Husein has never mentioned the possibility of this, nor have His Majesty's Government mentioned it in their correspondence with him.[13]

Again, the right of transporting British troops, in peace or war, along a British-owned railway from Akka-Haifa to Irak and the Persian Gulf has only been agreed to by France, Italy, and Russia, but has never been either demanded or consented to in any negotiations between His Majesty's Government and the Arabs themselves.

In these cases, then, the relation between British commitments and desiderata remains unsettled.

As regards the nature of the Arab independence to which His Majesty's Government have committed themselves within the boundaries specified in Sir H. McMahon's letter of the 24th October, 1915, that is limited by reservations under (iv.) Foreign

[7] 222016/16. [8] 174974/17. [9] 228069/17. [10] 25577/18. [11] 42105/18.
[12] p. 105 ; also 23579/16. [13] See pp. 4–5 of this Memorandum.

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Administration in Irak, Syria, and Palestine; (v.) Relation of Sherif Husein to His Majesty's Government; and (vii.) Existing British Treaties and Agreements with Arab Governments in the independent area. The relation of British commitments to desiderata under these heads will be discussed below.

(iv.) *Foreign Administration in Irak, Syria and Palestine.*

In his private telegram of the 18th October, 1915, to Sir E. Grey, Sir H. McMahon reported that "with regard to Basra vilayet Faroki accepts the fact that special measures of British control will be necessary, in view of Great Britain's interest there" (p. 51).

In their instructions telegraphed to Sir H. McMahon on the 20th October, 1915, the Foreign Office replied on this point:—

> "*Mesopotamia.*—In view of the special interests in the Bagdad Province and area actually in our occupation, the proposed sphere of British control, namely, the Basrah vilayet, will need extension. This will not, of course, prejudice our interests with Arab Chiefs" (p. 52).

This was embodied on the 24th October, 1915, in Sir H. McMahon's second letter to the Sherif:—

> "With regard to the vilayets of Bagdad and Basrah, the Arabs will recognise that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special measures of administrative control in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local population and to safeguard our mutual economic interests" (p. 54).

The Sherif took up the question on the 5th November, 1915, in his third letter to to Sir H. McMahon:—

> "As the provinces of Irak are parts of the pure Arab Kingdom, and were, in fact, the seat of its government in the time of Ali, and in the time of all the Khalifs who succeeded him; and as in them began the civilisation of the Arabs, and as their towns in those provinces were the first towns built in Islam, where the Arab power became so great; therefore these provinces are greatly valued by all Arabs, far and near, and their traditions cannot be forgotten by them. Consequently we cannot satisfy the Arab Nation or make them give up such a title to nobility. But in order to render an accord easy, and taking into consideration the assurances mentioned in the fifth article of your letter, to keep and guard our mutual interests in that country as they are one and the same, for all these reasons we might agree to leave under the British administration for a short time those districts that are now occupied by British troops, without the rights of either side being prejudiced thereby (especially those of the Arab Nation, which interests are economic and vital to it), and against a sum paid as compensation to the Arab Kingdom for the period of the occupation, in order to meet the expense which every new Kingdom is bound to support; at the same time respecting your agreements with the Sheikhs of those districts, and especially those which are essential" (p. 92).

About the same date, in his conversations with Sir Mark Sykes, Faroki discussed the whole question of British priority of economic enterprise and administrative assistance in Mesopotamia, and of a similar position in Syria for France:—

> "The Arabs would agree to a convention with France to allow her a monopoly of all concessionary enterprise in Palestine and Syria: the latter being defined as bounded as far south as Deir Zor by the Euphrates, thence to Deraa and to Maan along the Hejaz Railway.
>
> "As far South as Maan the Hejaz Railway could be sold to French concessionnaires, Arabs further agreeing to employ in this area European employés and none but French as advisers. To be noted that Arabs only undertake to employ Europeans if they need them, but Faroki points out that the object of this stipulation is to avoid any appearance of control over them (Arabs). In this area the Arabs would agree to accord special recognition to all French educational establishments.
>
> "As regards the remainder of the Greater Arabia (Irak and Jezireh and Northern Mesopotamia) the Arabs would agree to an identical convention with Great Britain" (p. 104).

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On the 13th December, 1915, in his third letter to the Sherif, Sir H. McMahon reserved the details of Great Britain's position in Bagdad vilayet for future consideration :—

> "The Government of Great Britain, as I have already informed you, are ready to give all guarantees of assistance and support within their power to the Arab Kingdom, but their interests demand, as you yourself have recognised, a friendly and stable administration in the vilayet of Bagdad, and the adequate safeguarding of these interests calls for a much fuller and more detailed consideration than the present situation and urgency of these negotiations permits" (p. 103).

On the 1st of January, 1916, in his fourth letter to Sir H. McMahon, the Sherif omitted further discussion of the conditions of British administration, and left the fixing of the financial compensation (which he had proposed, but to which His Majesty's Government had not committed themselves) to His Majesty's Government's discretion :—

> "With regard to what had been stated in your honoured communication concerning al-Irak, as to the matter of compensation for the period of occupation, we, in order to strengthen the confidence of Great Britain in our attitude and in our words and actions, really and veritably, and in order to give her evidence of our certainty and assurance in trusting her glorious Government, leave the determination of the amount to the perception of her wisdom and justice" (p. 112).

On the 30th January, 1916, Sir H. McMahon took note of this in his fourth letter to the Sherif, and promised to "take the question into careful consideration when the enemy has been defeated and the time for peaceful settlement arrives" (p. 5, Part II).

On the 19th May, 1917, in conversation with Sir Mark Sykes and M. Picot,[14] King Husein "admitted the necessity for European advisers to heads of departments, and referred to Syria and Irak," but he objected to the suggestion that these advisers must have executive authority. In an interview on the following day, a declaration by the King, in answer to a message from the French Government which had been delivered to him by M. Picot, was read aloud to the following effect :—

> "That His Majesty the King of Hejaz learned with satisfaction that the French Government approved of Arab national aspirations; and that, as he had confidence in Great Britain, he would be content if the French Government pursued the same policy towards Arab aspirations on the Moslem Syrian Littoral as the British did in Bagdad."

On the same occasion Sherif Faisal delivered the following message from his father to Sir Mark Sykes :—

> "We are ready to co-operate with France in Syria to the fullest extent and with England in Mesopotamia. . . . ."[15]

King Husein's view of the results of these two interviews is given in a report by Captain Lawrence of an illuminating conversation with him on the 29th July, 1917 :—[16]

> "The King is extremely pleased to have trapped M. Picot into the admission that France will be satisfied in Syria with the position that Great Britain desires in Iraq. That, he says, means a temporary occupation of the country for strategical and political reasons (with probably an annual grant to the Sherif in compensation and recognition), and concessions in the way of public works. 'I was ready without being asked to guard their interests in the existing railways, and assist their schools; but the Hejaz and Syria are like the palm and fingers of one hand, and I could not have consented to the amputation of any finger or part of a finger without leaving myself a cripple.'
>
> "In conclusion, the Sherif remarked on the shortness and informality of conversations, the absence of written documents, and the fact that the only change in the situation caused by the meeting was the French renunciation of the ideas of annexation, permanent occupation or suzerainty of any part of Syria—'but this we did not embody in a formal treaty, as the war is not finished. I merely read out my acceptance of the formula *as the British in Iraq*, proposed to me by M. Picot, since Sir Mark Sykes assured me that it would put a satisfactory conclusion to the discussion.'"

[14] 104269/17. [15] Irak only, or Irak and Jezireh? [16] 174974/17.

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With regard to Palestine, His Majesty's Government are committed by Sir H. McMahon's letter to the Sherif on the 24th October, 1915, to its inclusion in the boundaries of Arab independence. But they have stated their policy regarding the Palestinian Holy Places and Zionist colonisation in their message to him of the 4th January, 1918 :—[17]

"That so far as Palestine is concerned, we are determined that no people shall be subjected to another, but that in view of the fact :

"(*a.*) That there are in Palestine shrines, Wakfs, and Holy Places, sacred in some cases to Moslems alone, to Jews alone, to Christians alone, and in others to two or all three, and inasmuch as these places are of interest to vast masses of people outside Palestine and Arabia, there must be a special régime to deal with these places approved of by the world.

"(*b.*) That as regards the Mosque of Omar, it shall be considered as a Moslem concern alone, and shall not be subjected directly or indirectly to any non-Moslem authority.

"That since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favour of a return of Jews to Palestine, and inasmuch as this opinion must remain a constant factor, and further, as His Majesty's Government view with favour the realisation of this aspiration, His Majesty's Government are determined that in so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population, both economic and political, no obstacle should be put in the way of the realisation of this ideal."

This message was delivered personally to King Husein by Commander Hogarth, and the latter reported on his reception of it as follows :—

"The King would not accept an independent Jewish State in Palestine, nor was I instructed to warn him that such a State was contemplated by Great Britain. He probably knows nothing of the actual or possible economy of Palestine, and his ready assent to Jewish settlement there is not worth very much. But I think he appreciates the financial advantage of Arab co-operation with the Jews."

Finally, it may be noted that King Husein was violently disturbed by the allusions to the Anglo-French Agreement of the 16th May, 1916, made in a speech by Jemal Pasha at Beirout on the 30th November, 1917, and reported in No. 101 of the "Mustakbal," of Paris.[18] Jemal represented that Great Britain and France would so interpret their special position in Mesopotamia and Syria respectively as to confine King Husein's effective power to the Hejaz. In view of the King's attitude towards this question recorded above, the effect upon him of Jemal's insinuation was inevitable.

Relation of Commitments regarding Mesopotamia under (iv.) *to British Desiderata.*

Area.—His Majesty's Government stipulated for "special measures of administrative control" in Basra and Bagdad vilayets. The Sherif, in his final statement on the subject on the 1st January, 1916, referred to Irak, which is equivalent.

N.B.—In November, Faroki talked to Sir Mark Sykes about a special position for Great Britain in "Mesopotamia," and the same word is used in Sir Mark Sykes' report of the Sherif's message to him on the 20th May, 1917.

It is not clear whether this is simply a rendering of "Irak" or is intended to include Jezireh.

Terms.—Sherif Husein laid down no terms except a monetary compensation to himself (as representing the Arab Confederation) for the duration of the British control. He left the fixing of the amount to His Majesty's Government. His Majesty's Government have not committed themselves to such payment or to any other condition.

Duration.—Throughout the negotiations the Sherif assumed that this would be limited, and it is clear from his conversation with Captain Lawrence that he regards it as understood that it shall be short. His Majesty's Government, on their side, have committed themselves to no time limit whatsoever.

(v.) *Relation of Sherif Husein to Great Britain.*

In his first letter of July, 1915, Sherif Husein proposed that Great Britain should enjoy priority of economic enterprise throughout the territory included within

[17] 245810/18. [18] 123868/18 : King Husein's letter of the 5th June, 1918, to Sir R. Wingate.

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the boundaries of Arab independence claimed by him (Proposal 2). In the same area he asked for our assent to the abolition of the Capitulations, and our assistance in securing an "International Convention" to the same effect (Proposal 5).

The proposal regarding the Capitulations was ignored by His Majesty's Government and does not appear to have been referred to again by the Sherif.

With regard to British priority, which Sir H. McMahon proposed to extend to the political as well as the economic sphere (p. 50), the Foreign Office instructed him as follows in their telegram of the 20th October, 1915 :—

> "Unless it is necessary in order to secure Arab consent, you should not include the stipulation that they will recognise British interests as paramount and work under British guidance, &c. Such stipulation might give rise in France to the impression that we are aiming not only at the securing of Arab interests, but also at the establishment of our own interests in Syria at the expense of the French (p. 52).

On the 24th October, 1915, in his second letter to the Sherif, Sir H. McMahon interpreted these instructions as follows :—

> "When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those territories.
>
> "On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British" (p. 54).

The point was taken up again in Sir E. Grey's telegram No. 860, of the 2nd November, 1915, to Sir H. McMahon :—

> "I propose that my main object shall be to persuade the French Government to agree to include within the Arab boundaries the cities of Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Damascus.
>
> "In order to gain this point, however, we must be ready to waive the condition that European officials and advisers of the Arab Government are to be only British, and that the Arabs are to turn to Great Britain alone for guidance and advice.
>
> "I should like to know whether this condition was included not to meet the wishes of the Arabs, but merely for the sake of our own interests. If the latter is the case and if by dropping it we can obtain the concurrence of the French Government in promising the four cities to the Arabs, I shall consider myself free to do so in consultation with Mr. Chamberlain (Secretary of State for India).
>
> "To win the Arabs over to our side against the Turks is our vital and foremost object, not the acquisition of a new sphere of influence for ourselves" (p. 60).

This was answered by Sir H. McMahon on the 7th November, 1915 :—

> "It was at the express request of the Arabs that the clause concerning the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that all advisers and officials should be British, was included. They do not welcome the idea of French influence in the territories of the four cities, and were anxious to have British advisers, &c., there—in fact, they wished the clause to apply to the whole of Arabia" (p. 61).

This view was in a general way corroborated by a passage in a letter, dated the 28th December, 1916, from Sherif Husein to Sir Ali Morghani :—[19]

> "It is impossible for us to acknowledge any other Power than Great Britain in our communications and representations. I say this from a purely economic point of view, but from the military point of view we none of us ignore the certainty that we shall stand in great need of the power of Great Britain to extinguish any trouble that is liable to break out in the interior of the country in the initial stages of so great changes; more particularly because our friends[20] will not hesitate by all possible means to incite their own partisans against us for their own ends, in spite of the fact that they will have to defend their own interests in

[19] 30674/16. [20] ? The other independent Arab rulers.

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the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean until we become powerful enough to defend (them) ourselves. It is therefore necessary to take such action as will protect British interests and at the same time will preserve all the rights of independence" (p. 117).

Later, on the occasion of the first French Mission to the Hejaz at the beginning of October, 1916, Sherif Husein consulted His Majesty's Government through Abdullah as to the form of his reply to the greeting brought by the Mission from the French Government.[21] And in the same connection he informed Colonel Wilson at Jeddah that "he would much prefer that no one helped him except the British Government"[22] Again, in telephone conversations on the 1st November, 1916, and the 2nd November, 1916, on the subject of Husein's assumption of the Royal title, Abdullah referred to Great Britain as "our sole and respectable Ally," and the King himself remarked that "if any other Government were to ask him to do what he was doing now, he would not accept it, but knowing that the British Government was popular and just, he accepted to take it."

Such declarations must, of course, be discounted in view of the circumstances in which they were made and the fact that they were made by Orientals; but there is little doubt that they represent the genuine desire of King Husein and his sons.

Relation of Commitments under (v) *to British Desiderata.*

His Majesty's Government have committed themselves to no special position towards King Husein which is incompatible with their agreements with France. So long as our good relations with France do not suffer, it is clearly our interest that we should have a predominant position with King Husein and any other Arab rulers in the independent area. On the other hand, one of the King's strongest motives for seeking to place us in a special position towards himself, as representative of the Arab movement throughout the independent area, is the idea that he may eventually play us off against France. This appears, for example, in the following passage on the boundary question in his fourth letter to Sir H. McMahon of the 1st January, 1916:—

> "I do not find it necessary to draw your attention to the fact that our plan is of greater security to the interests and presumption of the rights of Great Britain than it is to us, and will necessarily be so whatever may happen, so that Great Britain may finally see all her own peoples in that contentment and advancement which she is endeavouring to establish for them now; especially as her Allies being neighbours to us will be the germ of difficulties and discussion with which there will be no peace of mind. In addition to which the people of Beirout will decidedly never accept such isolation, and they may oblige us to undertake new measures which may exercise Great Britain, certainly not less than her present troubles, because of our belief and certainty in the reciprocity of our interests, which is the only cause that caused us never to care to negotiate with any other Power but you" (p. 113).

His eagerness to deal solely with us thus has its embarrassing side.

(vi.) *Sherif Husein's Title.*

In his correspondence with Sir H. McMahon Sherif Husein repeatedly declared himself to be speaking in the name of the Arab people. This claim was reiterated in each of his first four letters (pp. 40, 45, 46, 93, 95), as well as in his letter of the 28th December, 1915 to Sir Ali Morghani (p. 117). The most emphatic statement of it was perhaps the following:—

> "Had it not been for the determination which I see in the Arabs for the attainment of their objects, I would have preferred to seclude myself on one of the heights of a mountain—but they, the Arabs, have insisted that I should guide the movement to this end" (p. 95).

On the question of the boundaries of Arab independence, he was at particular pains to make it clear that he was not putting forward mere personal demands but acting as mandatory of the Arab inhabitants of the territories in question.

This claim was based on his relations with the Arab Nationalist organisations, civilian and military, which had sprung up in the Arab provinces of Turkey with their

[21] 201319/16. [22] 220970/16.

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centre at Damascus, and which in the summer of 1915 (when the military strength of the Turks was concentrated at the Dardanelles, at the opposite extremity of the Empire) were a more effective political factor than at any time before or since.

From Faroki's statement,[23] we know that the Damascus Committee had given their allegiance to Sherif Husein before he opened negotiations with Sir H. McMahon, and that the terms he put forward (particularly on the question of boundaries) were largely suggested by them. He virtually declared this in his fourth letter to Sir H. McMahon, on the 1st January, 1916:—

> "Your Honour will have realised after the arrival of Mohammed (Faroki) Sherif and his interview with you, that all our procedure up to the present was of no personal inclination or the like, which would have been wholly unintelligible, but that everything was the result of the decisions and desires of our peoples, and that we are but transmitters and executants of such decisions and desires in the position they (our people) have pressed upon us.
>
> "These truths are in my opinion very important and deserve Your Honour's special attention and consideration" (p. 111).

This explains the large pretensions (otherwise difficult to understand) with which the Sherif started and which he has never given up. But before the Sherif's revolt in the Hejaz came to a head, the movement in Syria, from which his initiative had come, was crushed by the Turks. From Faroki's statement it appears that the military branch was broken up about August 1915, while the civilian leaders were mostly hanged or deported in February 1916.[24] In his fifth letter to Sir H. McMahon of the 18th February, 1916, the Sherif mentioned that the Syrian movement had practically been stamped out (p. 6, Part II), and in another letter, dated the 29th March, 1916, he stated that the Syrians were now incapable of action.[25] His Majesty's Government on their part discouraged the Sherif from a forward policy in Syria on the eve of his revolt, both on military grounds and for fear of political complications with France.[26]

Thus, during the period between the beginning of the negotiations in July 1915, and the outbreak of the revolt in the Hejaz in June 1916, the relative importance of the Syrian movement dwindled while that of the Sherif increased; and when the question was raised of sending Faroki and al Masri, as representatives of the movement, to Basra to get into touch with the Arabs in the Turkish Army on that front, His Majesty's Government referred to the Sherif's claim to represent the Arab nation, and laid down their policy as follows:—[27]

> "While there is no clear evidence as to how far this claim accords with facts, it has not been questioned by His Majesty's Government. If the claim be well founded, it is a matter for consideration whether independent assurances should be given to other and ex-hypothesi less responsible Arabs."

When, therefore, the Sherif threw off his allegiance to Turkey, he found his effective sovereignty confined to the Hejaz, as Amir of which he was merely one among a number of independent Arab rulers, who divided between them the allegiance of the tribes and oases of the Arabian Peninsula. The Arabs of Syria and Jezireh, whose allegiance had promised to make him the indisputable leader of the National Movement in the (Asiatic) Arab countries, were still under the heel of the Turk, with no immediate prospect of liberation. But the title to leadership which they had enabled him to assume had been confirmed by the relations into which he had meanwhile entered with His Majesty's Government; and this, together with his prestige as hereditary guardian of the Holy Cities, made it difficult for him to accept bin Saud, the Imam, the Idrisi, etc., who were his equals in fact, as his peers in honorary rank.

These facts explain the problems that have arisen over his title and his relations with the other independent Arab Chiefs.

On the 5th August, 1916, in a telegram of thanks to His Majesty the King for his congratulations on the success of the Hejaz revolt, Husein signed himself, entirely correctly, as "Sherif and Amir of Mecca,"[28] and the same signature appeared under a proclamation he issued next month to the people of Irak.[29]

[23] 157740/15; *cp.* 152729/15: Telegram of the 16th October, 1915, from General Maxwell to Lord Kitchener. [24] The Turkish account of the Arab movement is given in "Verité sur la question Syrienne" (Stamboul: 1916, issued by the Fourth Turkish Army Command). [25] 71430/16. [26] 76013/16; 81915/16; 95496/16; 107964/16. [27] 54229/16: Foreign Office telegram No. 262 of the 5th April, 1916, to Sir H. McMahon. [28] 153580/16. [29] 205733/16.

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On the 29th October, 1916, however, the "Ministers, Notables, Inhabitants and Ulema of Mecca" presented an address to Sherif Husein, in which they declared after a long preamble :—

> "We proclaim His Majesty our Seyyid and Lord, Husein bin Ali, *King of the Arabs*, to rule us according to the law of God and His Prophet, and we swear to you the oath of loyalty and obedience, secretly and openly; and in addition we consider you as a final religious authority, which fact we have agreed upon pending the decision of the Moslem World regarding the Caliphate."[30]

Sherif Husein declared on his part :—

> "This sentiment of loyalty does not belong only to the inhabitants of this country, but the Arabs of Syria and Irak likewise are yearning to be united with us and to restore their freedom and glory. I have received messages from their notables to this effect."

On the same day Sherif Abdullah telegraphed as follows to Sir H. McMahon and to the Governments of all Allied and Neutral countries :—

> "Je suis très heureux de vous informer que les notables, les ulémas du pays et toutes les classes de la population, s'étant réunis aujourd'hui, ont à l'unanimité reconnu Sa Majesté le Grand Chérif Hussein-ben-Aly '*Roi de la nation arabe.*' Sa Majesté devient de ce fait Souverain des Arabes, étant donné que le pays est pénétré de sa capacité diplomatique, de sa parfaite loyauté envers sa patrie, et de son désir sincère de répandre les bienfaits de l'instruction et de la justice dans toutes les régions arabes délivrées du joug de la bande Union et Progrès.
>
> "La nation arabe a tout lieu d'espérer que vous la reconnaîtrez membre actif dans la société des nations, et connue telle. Elle le prouvera dans l'avenir.
>
> "Avec l'appui du Tout-Puissant, veuillez agréer, etc.
>
> (Signé) "Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Gouvernement arabe, le CHÉRIF ABDULLAH."[31]

Sherif Husein was duly crowned "King of the Arabs" at Mecca, on the 4th November, 1916,[32] and there was a simultaneous ceremony at Jeddah, which was not, however, attended by the French and British representatives.[33]

On the 2nd November, 1916, in his telegram No. 961 to the Foreign Office, Sir H. McMahon suggested that, in view of our treaties recognising the independence of other Arab Chiefs, we could only recognise Sherif Husein as "King (Malik) of the Hejaz".[34]

On the 3rd November, 1916, the Foreign Office telegraphed to Sir H. McMahon (No. 880) that the Sherif might be congratulated but not yet accorded recognition, and that the French Government desired to conform their action to that of His Majesty's Government.[35]

On the 6th November, 1916, the Foreign Office telegraphed to Sir R. Wingate (Khartoum) the following instructions for a reply to Sherif Abdullah on behalf of the Governments of Great Britain, France and Russia :—[36]

> "His Majesty's Government and the Governments of France and Russia, though they regard, and will continue to regard, His Highness as the *titular head* of the Arab peoples in their revolt against Turkish misrule, and are glad further to recognise him as the lawful and *de facto* ruler of the Hejaz, are unable to recognise the assumption by him of any sovereign title which might provoke disunion among Arabs at the present moment and thus prejudice the final political settlement of Arabia on a satisfactory basis. That settlement, to be durable, must be come to with the general assent of other Arab rulers, of which at present there is no evidence, and must follow, rather than precede, military success."

On the 9th November, 1916, Sir H. McMahon telegraphed to the Foreign Office (No. 991) demurring to the expression "titular head"; and the French Government proposed the substitution for the words "Arab race" of the words "population of Arabia."[37]

[30] 249121/16. (Translation from "El Qibla," the 30th October, 1916.) The Address is also translated in Colonel Wilson's despatch, No. 12, of the 31st October, 1916, to Sir H. McMahon (233117/16). For the ceremony, compare Colonel Brémond's account derived from Moslem officers of the French Mission who were present (220734/16). [31] 217652/16. [32] 222840/16. [33] 242008/16. [34] 220339/16. [35] 220832/16. See also 222021/16. [36] 221869/16. [37] 227374/16 and 228969/16.

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On the 15th November, 1916, Lord Bertie telegraphed that the French Government had instructed Colonel Brémond not to address the Sherif as "His Majesty." [38]

On the 27th November, 1916, the French Government suggested to His Majesty's Government, through their Ambassador in London, that Sherif Husein's title should be "Malik al Haramein" (King of the two Holy Cities) and his style Siyadiya ("Seigneurie," or "Lordship"). [39]

On the 4th December, 1916, Sir R. Wingate telegraphed (No. 53) that, in the reply from His Majesty's Government to the Sherif, which by this time had been despatched, he had styled him "Sahib al Siyada." But he criticised the proposed title of "Malik al Haramein" on account of its possible religious connotation. [40] It was also objected to on the same grounds by Sir H. McMahon and by the India Office, [41] and both proposed independently the title "King of the Hejaz," which had been Sir H. McMahon's original suggestion.

A telegram was accordingly sent to Sir R. Wingate instructing him to address the Sherif as "His Lordship" (Siyada) "the King (Malik) of Hejaz," and this style and title have been adhered to since. [42] At the same time Colonel Wilson was instructed, at the suggestion of the India Office, to explain to the Sherif that the limitation of the title did not affect the Agreement between His Majesty's Government and him. [43]

The Sherif did not question His Majesty's Government's decision (presumably because he knew himself to have been in the wrong in acting without their knowledge), but it is evident that he considers that the wider title is properly his.

For example, in January, 1917, he seems to have composed a second message to the people of Irak in which he signed himself "King of the Arab country and Sherif and Amir of Mecca." [44] Again, when he was asked by Commander Hogarth in January, 1918, [45] to compose a message for the Arabs of Jerusalem, he proposed to sign it as "King of the Arabs" or "of the Arab nation"; and even when he abandoned this signature, he drafted the message in terms which implied this title so patently that he had to be prevailed upon to draft it again.

> "It is obvious," Commander Hogarth wrote, in his report to Sir R. Wingate on this mission, "that the King regards Arab unity as synonomous with his own kingship, and as a vain phrase unless so regarded. . . . .
>
> "While the King accepted without demur His Majesty's Government's declaration on this matter, as conveyed in Foreign Office telegram No. 6 of the 6th November, 1916, to yourself, he left me in little doubt that he secretly regards this as a point to be reconsidered after the Peace, in spite of my assurance that it was to be a definitive arrangement. He compared ourselves and himself (in his habitual homely way) to two persons about to inhabit one house but not agreed which should take which floor or rooms. Often in the course of our conversations he spoke with a smile of accounts which he would settle after the war, pending which settlement he would press nothing. I doubt if he has any fixed plan or foresees his way; but I have no doubt that in his own mind he abates none of his original demands on behalf of the Arabs, or in the fulness of time, of himself."

Relation of Commitments under (vi.) *to British Desiderata.*

His Majesty's Government avoided according Sherif Husein a title incompatible with their commitments to other independent Arab rulers, while the title which they have recognised does not conflict with the wider claims of the Sherif to which they consented in the previous negotiations.

But though His Majesty's Government's position on this question may be satisfactory on paper, it is far from being so in fact. The harm done by the Sherif's *coup d'État* of the 29th October, 1916, has never been repaired. The other independent Arab rulers have not been inwardly reassured by our restriction of the Sherif's title to the Hejaz; while he, on his part, has only accepted this restriction as provisional.

The problem has been postponed, not solved.

[38] 230285/16. [39] 240161/16.
[40] 244179/16. There does not appear to be any copy in the Foreign Office of the final text of this note as drafted at Khartoum on the instructions of the Foreign Office (see 238323/16).
[41] 246846/16. [42] 251737/16 (memorandum, dated December 11, 1916, by Sir R. Graham).
[43] 250438/16 and 253937/16. [44] 33292/17. [45] 25577/18.

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(vii.) *Treaties and Agreements between His Majesty's Government and other Arab rulers in the independent area.*

The boundaries of Arab independence assented to by Sir H. McMahon on the 24th October, 1915, in his second letter to Sherif Husein, included not only (*a*) Arab territories still subject to the Turk, but also (*b*) the dominions of independent Arab rulers like the Sultans of Mokalla and Maskat, the Trucial Chiefs, and the Sheikh of Koweit, with whom His Majesty's Government had treaties, in some cases of more than half a century's standing; and (*c*) the dominions of Arab rulers, like bin Saud and the Idrisi, whom His Majesty's Government had recognised before the war as being within the Turkish sphere, but with whom we had since made agreements, or were on the point of making them. (The Treaty with the Idrisi was signed on the 30th April, 1915, before Sherif Husein had opened negotiations with us, and that with bin Saud on the 26th December, 1915, before we had concluded them with him.)

Sir H. McMahon, therefore, stated in his letter that "we accept these limits and boundaries without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab Chiefs" (p. 53).

The point does not appear to have been taken up by the Sherif until his third letter of the 5th November, 1915, in which, *à propos* of British administration in Irak, he wrote that he might consent to it "for a short time, without the rights of either side being prejudiced thereby (especially those of the Arab Nation, which interests are economic and vital to it) . . . . at the same time respecting your agreements with the Sheikhs of those districts, and especially those which are essential" (p. 93).

On the 10th December, 1915, the Foreign Office, in a telegram of instructions to Sir H. McMahon, laid it down that:—

> "It should be made clear to the Sherif that when we spoke of our existing agreements with Sheikhs being upheld, we referred to the Arabian Peninsula no less than Mesopotamia" (p. 102).

And in his third letter of the 13th December, 1915, Sir H. McMahon embodied these instructions as follows:—

> "In stating that the Arabs are ready to recognise and respect all our treaties with Arab Chiefs, it is of course understood that this will apply to all territories included in the Arab Kingdom, as the Government of Great Britain cannot repudiate engagements which already exist."

This stipulation was ignored by the Sherif in his fourth letter of the 1st November, 1916, and does not appear to have been referred to again during the negotiations.

After the outbreak of the revolt and the reduction of the Turkish garrisons at Mecca, Jeddah and Taif, Abdullah, as Sherifial "Minister for Foreign Affairs," appears to have sent messages announcing the victory to the neighbouring Arab rulers, to which both bin Saud and the chief of the Hashid and Bekil Confederation sent extremely courteous, though non-committal, replies.[46]

Bin Saud was also informed of the Hejaz revolt officially by His Majesty's Government through Sir P. Cox. In his reply to the latter,[47] dated the 20th July, 1916 (or 25th July, 1916), he expressed pleasure at the event as a blow to the Turks and a success for His Majesty's Government, but intimated doubts as to Sherif Husein's intentions, mentioned that he and the Sherif had been at war for years over demarcation and allegiance questions, and took exception to the fact that "in the official communiqué mention was made of 'the Arabs' as if they were a compendious whole."

Early in August, 1916, Sherif Husein appears to have written a second letter to bin Saud, asking for "alliance" and "assistance." Bin Saud reported this to Sir P. Cox in a letter dated the 15th August, 1916, and expressed even graver concern at the Sherif's intentions than before.[48] Sir P. Cox submitted that His Majesty's Government should assure bin Saud that their treaty with him would be adhered to, and that they should communicate the terms of it to the Sherif. Both Sir P. Cox's suggestions were adopted,[49] and the text of His Majesty's Government's treaty with bin Saud was conveyed to the Sherif by Colonel Wilson on the 30th October, 1916.[50]

On the 1st November, 1916, Sherif Abdullah, in his telephonic communication to Colonel Wilson,[51] regarding the proclamation of his father as "King of the Arabs" two days before, defined the position of the other independent Arab rulers as follows:—

[46] Translations in 242002/16. [47] 182436/16; full translation in 231939/16 (No. 52).
[48] 180581/16. [49] 183725/16 and 187737/16. [50] 219296/16. [51] 242002/16.

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"As for bin Saud, he is a Sheikh of Arabs and the Sherif does not interfere with his work or his land. Let every one rule his part, it does not make any difference.

"As for the Idrisi, he is a man who is not recognised by anyone to be anything. He has made himself Sheikh and landed in some places which were not ruled by anyone.

"As for Imam Yahya, let him govern his part of the land, but he will not deny the fact that the Amir of Mecca should be the ruler of Hejaz and King of Arabs.

"As for the Arab tribes, none of them would oppose the Sherif's declaring himself King of the Arabs.

"The history of the Amir of Mecca goes back to the Abbasides.

"It is not important whether these people would agree or not."

In his telephonic conversation later on the same day he added the following somewhat more satisfactory but still equivocal assurances :—

"Bin Saud, Idrisi, &c., are rulers in their places, and we would not interfere with them. They are respected, and if anyone were to attack them we have to help them.

"Our boundaries were settled before the rising, and therefore we have no other ambition, as terms were concluded before that Kingdom of the Sherif will be up to Iraq.

"Our respect to this treaty concluded between us and Great Britain forbids us to oppose them, and such is well known to you."

This attitude was confirmed by Sherif Husein himself in a letter to Colonel Wilson dated the 4th November, 1916, and he defended it by enclosing copies of the letters to him from bin Saud and the chief of the Hashid and Bekil Confederation, referred to above. These letters had, of course, no bearing on the assumption of the title "King of the Arabs," since they were written several months before, on the occasion of his revolt against the Turks.

On the 6th November, 1916, His Majesty's Government took note of Abdullah's assurances, such as they were, in their instructions to Sir R. Wingate for the official reply to Abdullah's circular telegram announcing the assumption of the royal title.[52]

Meanwhile, bin Saud had apparently answered the Sherif's second letter to him by expressing readiness to co-operate, but asking for assurances that the Sherif would no longer encroach on what bin Saud regarded as his own tribal sphere.

The Sherif returned this letter unanswered with a "most discourteous and arrogant" covering note.[53] And he sent equally unsatisfactory replies to congratulatory letters from the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit.[54]

Upon receiving a report of this from the India Office, the Foreign Office telegraphed the following message to the Sirdar on the 25th November, 1916 (No. 24), [55] for transmission to the Sherif:—

"His Majesty's Government learnt with great regret that the three great Arab Chiefs, the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit and bin Saud, have reason to feel aggrieved at the reception of their advances by the Sherif. His Majesty's Government are convinced that such an incident is entirely contrary to the wishes and intentions of the Sherif himself, and that it is no doubt due to an oversight on the part of his subordinates; but they must observe that, in view of the very satisfactory attitude of the three Sheikhs in question, the Sherif's own interests, no less than courtesy towards His Majesty's Government, require him to meet the advances of the King's Allies with civility and even with cordiality. His Majesty's Government are using all their influence to secure the cordial co-operation of all Arabs with the Sherif, but their efforts will be of no avail if the Sherif himself repels those whom His Majesty's Government have attracted to his support."

In response to this message, the Sherif sent two telegrams to the three Sheikhs, the one congratulating them in turn on their conference with Sir P. Cox at Koweit in

[52] 221869/16.
[53] 236884/16 Telegram of the 21st November, 1917, from Sir P. Cox.
[54] It does not appear whether the congratulations were for the Sherif's coronation or for some previous event.
[55] 236884/16.

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November,[56] and the other making fairly satisfactory amends for his previous behaviour.[57] In the second telegram he explained his relation to the general movement for Arab Independence in the following terms, which are practically identical with those employed during his negotiations with His Majesty's Government :—

> "You and I are friends and Allies of the British Government, the powerful friend of the Arabs, and we should unite and co-operate with each other to expel the Turkish tricksters, our personal enemies and the enemies of the truth, and to purge the Arab country from their vileness and iniquity. This is the first necessity and everything else will follow. I have absolutely no personal ambition in this matter ; my objects are to secure our safety (yours and my own), and the integrity of the Arabian country and its purification from the wickedness and series (? the lies) of the deceitful Turks."

On the 12th December, 1916, the Sheikh of Koweit returned a suitable reply, and this particular incident was closed.[58] The relations of Sherif Husein with the Idrisi and bin Saud, however, have caused His Majesty's Government perpetual difficulties.

On the 20th May, 1917, on the occasion of the meeting between the Sherif and M. Picot and Sir Mark Sykes at Jeddah,[59] Faisal gave Sir Mark Sykes the following message from his father :—

> "We are ready to co-operate with France in Syria to the fullest extent and England in Mesopotamia, but we ask for help from England with Idrisi and bin Saud, without in any way infringing on their independence. We beg that Great Britain will endeavour to induce them to recognise King's position as leader of Arab movement."

The Foreign Office consulted with the India Office as to how far it was possible to obtain recognition from the Idrisi and bin Saud of Sherif Husein's special position as leader of the Arab movement,[60] and the question was referred respectively to the Resident at Aden and to Sir P. Cox. Both reported that the moment was inopportune, and the matter was not proceeded with.[61]

The difficulties between the Sherif and the Idrisi over Kunfida in August, 1916,[62] and between the Sherif and bin Saud over Khoruma in the summer of 1918, do not fall within the scope of the present section. They were essentially demarcation and allegiance disputes between the Sherif, in his quality of a local Arab ruler, and his nearest neighbours, and the question of his rank and relation to the Arab Movement was not technically involved. There is no doubt, however, that these and other disputes of the kind have been and will be considerably embittered by the presence of this larger question in the background.

Relation of Commitments under (vii) *to British Desiderata.*

All commitments hitherto made by His Majesty's Government to the Sherif on the one part and the other independent Arab rulers on the other appear to be compatible with one another.

On the other hand, the problem of retaining the goodwill of the Sherif and securing him the position required by British and French desiderata in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria, while at the same time retaining the confidence of the other independent Chiefs, remains unsolved.

(viii.) *The Caliphate.*

On the 31st October, 1914, Lord Kitchener, in his second message to Sherif Abdullah wrote :—

> "It may be that an Arab of true race will assume the Khalifate at Mecca or Medina, and so good may come by the help of God out of all the evil that is now occurring."

On the strength of this message, Abdullah, on the occasion of King Husein's coronation in November 1916, and His Majesty's Government's message of congratulation

[56] 241296/16. [57] 243796/16. [58] 251680/16. [59] 104269/17. [60] 117999/17.
[61] 126081/17, 137978/17, 141413/17 (the Idrisi) and 152629/17, 118989/17, 119702/17 (bin Saud).
[62] 182183/16 and 215155/16 (No. 142).

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on that event, telegraphed in Husein's name to Colonel Wilson at Jeddah, conveying thanks to His Majesty's Government "which once addressed him as Caliph."[63] When pressed on the point by Colonel Wilson, Abdullah admitted over the telephone that no letter was ever addressed to Sherif Husein as Caliph, and quoted the text of Lord Kitchener's message with sufficient accuracy.[64]

That message, did not, of course, commit His Majesty's Government to more than the pious hope that the question of the Caliphate would be dealt with in a certain manner by the Moslems themselves. But the incident mentioned above shows how dangerous even the most guarded reference to the Caliphate by His Majesty's Government may be, and it is a danger that will increase as we approach the peace settlement.

Any possible ambiguity in Lord Kitchener's message was removed by His Majesty's Government's more detailed declaration in the same sense, conveyed in the Foreign Office Telegram No. 173 of the 14th April, 1915, to Sir H. McMahon:—

> "His Majesty's Government consider that the question of Khalifate is one which must be decided by Mohammedans themselves without interference of non-Mohammedan Powers. Should the former decide for an Arab Khalifate, that decision would therefore naturally be respected by His Majesty's Government, but the decision is one for Mohammedans to make" (p. 30).

This declaration evoked an important memorandum, dated the 6th May, 1915, from Sir Ali Morghani, Grand Kadi of the Sudan, in which he argued that Sherif Husein was the most suitable candidate for the Caliphate, and that if he received unobtrusive support from His Majesty's Government, he had good prospects of obtaining recognition from a majority of Islam. (pp. 32 *seqq.*)

In July 1915, in his first letter to Sir H. McMahon, Sherif Husein demanded that "England should approve of the proclamation of an Arab Caliphate of Islam" (p. 40). In this he was no doubt encouraged by Lord Kitchener's message, and stimulated by his own ambition for the office, but it appears that he was also prompted, as he was on the boundary question, by the Nationalist Committee at Damascus. Faroki, in his statement at Cairo in October 1915,[65] mentioned that when he was stationed at Damascus (apparently early in the winter of 1914–15, before the first Turkish attack on the Canal) he found that the civilian committee there "had already paid allegiance to the Sherif of Mecca as Caliph and renounced allegiance to Reshad the Sultan of Turkey. Our first action, therefore, after joining that society was that we sent an officer to the Sherif of Mecca, and he paid him allegiance on behalf of all the officers in our party and renounced our allegiance to Reshad."

He further stated that one of the formal aims of the Arab Party was that "Sherif Husein of Mecca should be Caliph and Sultan of the new Empire."

In conversation with General Clayton he added that:—

> "The members of the Society have taken a solemn oath on the Koran that they will enforce their object and establish an Arab Caliphate in Arabia, Syria, and Mesopotamia at all costs and under any circumstances, sacrificing for this object all their efforts and property and, if need be, their lives."

The fact, which thus seems established, that Sherif Husein, before opening negotiations with us, was offered the Caliphate by an organisation which might reasonably claim at that time to represent the Arab nation in the Ottoman provinces, at any rate in Syria, may be of some importance when the question comes up for settlement.

On the 30th August, 1918, Sir H. McMahon, in his first letter to the Sherif, answered the latter's demand regarding the Caliphate by repeating Lord Kitchener's message to Abdullah. He interpreted this as "approval of the Arab Caliphate when it should be proclaimed," and added: "We declare once more that His Majesty's Government would welcome the resumption of the Caliphate by an Arab of true race" (p. 43).

On the 2nd November, 1915,[66] the Aga Khan called on Sir E. Grey and protested against the idea of an Arab Caliphate in the name of the Indian Moslems, and Sir E. Grey gave him an assurance in the following terms:—

> "I said that we were prepared to favour an independent or autonomous Arabia in the country inhabited by the Arabs; but anything that we promised to the Arabs, or any action that we took to support them, would be of a political and

[63] 224419/16 and 224579/16. [64] 226649/16. [65] 157740/15. [66] 164776/15.

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secular character. We regarded the Khalifate as a thing which should be settled by Moslems for themselves, and in which neither we nor any non-Moslem Power should interfere."

The Aga Khan expressed himself quite satisfied, but asked that, in all communications with the Arabs, His Majesty's Government's attitude should be made very clear. A record of this conversation was transmitted to Sir H. McMahon and Sir R. Wingate.

On the 17th November, 1915, after receiving from Sir H. McMahon a revised summary of the Sherif's third letter of the 5th November, 1915, the Foreign Office telegraphed to the former (No. 887)[67] :—

"You will, of course, bear carefully in mind the necessity of avoiding all possibility of being involved in any questions concerning the Caliphate."

The subject was accordingly ignored by Sir H. McMahon in the subsequent negotiations.

Sherif Husein, however, gave a clearer indication of his policy on the question in his letter of the 28th December, 1915, to Sir Ali Morghani[68] :—

"I had not claimed before to be the qualified chief of the Amirs (the Caliph), but I explained to them more than once that I was ready to extend my hand to any man who would come forward and take the reins of authority. I was, however, chosen in every quarter and even forced to take up the question of their future prospects; and, therefore, I can see no ground for making (further) conditions, such as the universal agreement of the Amirs and tribes which were mentioned, especially the 'Shias,' *i.e.*, the Persians, who lack the necessary qualifications and every other right (to decide the question of the chosen Caliph of Islam)" (p. 118).

The above passage lends significance to the declaration contained in the address presented to Sherif Husein on the 29th October, 1916, by the "Ministers, Notables, Inhabitants and Ulema of Mecca,"[69] to the effect that "We take the oath of obedience, loyalty and sincerity to Husein bin Ali, and consider him also to be our religious leader until all the Moslem world be of one opinion concerning the Islamic Caliphate." And Sherif Abdullah emphasised this declaration in his short telegram of the 29th October, 1916, to Colonel Wilson, announcing the proclamation of his father as king.

In conversation over the telephone with Colonel Wilson on the 1st November, 1916,[70] Abdullah explained that :—

"His Majesty the Sherif has left the question of the Caliphate to the opinion of the Moslem world, and, therefore, he declared that there was no pre-suggested Caliphate, but that the whole question is left to the public opinion of Islam, and the Ulema of the Qibla decided not to accept the Turkish Caliphate, and the whole question will come back later on to its origin."

In a similar conversation on the following day, King Husein himself declared :—

"I have denied the Caliphate entirely and officially, leaving it to the opinion of those who know all about its regulations, until all Moslems choose one person to be their Caliph. . . . .

"I repeat that our not declaring the Caliphate will not put us in any suspicion, until all Moslems are of one opinion. It is a question of dissociating the Moslems from the Turks."

On the 6th November, 1916, the Foreign Office telegraphed instructions to Sir R. Wingate for a reply to Abdullah's communication[71]; and in this telegram His Majesty's Government's policy regarding the Caliphate was once more laid down, as follows :—

"That it should be strongly impressed on the Sherif that his own interests require that the question of the Caliphate should be left open until the end of the war; that it would be quite impossible for Christian Powers, numbering among their subjects many millions of Moslems, to expose themselves to the charge of taking sides in the affairs of Islam and forcibly supporting one Caliph against another, and that his claims could only be weakened by such support in the eyes of the Moslem world."

[67] 172416/15. [68] 30674/16.
[69] 233117/16; see also 249121/16 (extract from "Al Qibla"). [70] 242002/16. [71] 221869/16.

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A reply in this sense was eventually conveyed to King Husein by Colonel Wilson.[72]

In his conversation with Colonel Wilson on the 2nd November 1916, quoted above, the Sherif twice spoke of the Caliphate as being in abeyance, and mentioned that he possessed a book by a Wahabi authority in which this was demonstrated, and which he would publish if necessary.

He developed this thesis further in a conversation with Captain Lawrence on the 28th July 1917,[73] and the latter received the impression that he was genuinely averse from the idea of reviving the office in his own person. For the "false Caliphate" of the Osmanlis he would prefer, it seems, to substitute a spiritual leadership of Islam in his own family with some such title as Amir al Muminin, if this were genuinely offered to him. His view appears to be that the spiritual leader of Islam should not aim at being the political sovereign of the whole Moslem world, but that the office should be combined with a small temporal sovereignty—for instance, over the Hejaz and its Holy Cities—in order to secure the holder of it the independence necessary to his position.

In fact, according to this conversation, Sherif Husein aims at a position very like that of the Papacy when it possessed the temporal power over the Estates of the Church.

If this is the Sherif's real view, it is remarkably divergent from the chauvinistic trend of opinion concerning the Caliphate which seems to be more common among Moslems at present. And it remains to be seen how he would regard the title of Caliph if it were actually placed within his grasp.

Relation of commitments under (viii) *to British desiderata.*

His Majesty's Government have succeeded so far in making it clear that they regard the question of the Caliphate as a purely Moslem affair, without causing Sherif Husein to doubt their goodwill towards his aspirations in the matter.

We have two purely negative desiderata—avoidance of offence on the one hand to Moslem opinion and on the other hand to the Sherif—which have to be reconciled with one another, and hitherto we have avoided committing ourselves in either direction in a way that would compromise us in the other.

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[72] There appears to be no record in the Foreign Office of the final text of this note, the drafting of which was left to the discretion of Sir R. Wingate, Colonel Brémond, and Colonel Wilson.

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Sir A. Hirtzel (11)

SECRET. 6 July 16

THE SHERIF OF MECCA AND THE ARAB MOVEMENT.

1. In April, 1915, the Prime Minister assembled a committee to consider the nature of British desiderata in Turkey in Asia in the event of a successful conclusion of the war. This committee was composed of representatives of the Foreign Office, India Office, War Office, Board of Trade and Admiralty, with Sir Mark Sykes and the Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.

2. Their report, presented on the 30th June, 1915, dealt mainly with the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in Asia and only incidentally with Arabia. In arriving at their conclusions, the Committee were guided by a desire to restrict as far as possible the military responsibilities which would be thrown upon the British Empire owing to the establishment of new frontiers where British, Russian and French interests might easily come into collision. The future of Arabia, including a statement of British guarantees to various Sheikhs, was sketched in Appendix 28 to the Committee's report. In this document there will be found the important assurance given by Lord Kitchener to the Sherif of Mecca in November, 1914, to the effect that, if the Sherif and Arabs assist Great Britain in the war with Turkey, Great Britain will not intervene in any manner whatsoever, whether in things religious or otherwise, and will respect the office of the Sherif and guarantee the Sherifate against all external aggression. Lord Kitchener also suggested the creation of an Arab Khalifate at Mecca and the freedom of the Arab race. This assurance really formed the starting point of the Arab movement, whose object was to throw off the Turkish yoke by force of arms, and to found an Arab state in Arabia and Syria.

3. Negotiations with the Sherif were opened by a letter to Mr. Storrs dated 14th July, 1915. In it the Sherif asked Great Britain to countenance the independence of all Arab lands and to approve of an Arab Khalifate. Acting on the instructions of the Foreign Office, the High Commissioner of Egypt, on the 28th August, 1915, sent a reply to the Sherif expressing general sympathy with the movement. On the 9th September the Sherif wrote to Sir H. McMahon complaining of the lukewarmness accorded to his overtures, and late in October the latter replied definitely asking for the exclusion from the Sherif's plans of certain districts of Cilicia and Northern Syria. Subject to these modifications and to existing British treaties with Arab chiefs, the High Commissioner pledged Great Britain to recognize and support Arab independence in those portions of the agreed area in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France; to guarantee the inviolability of the Holy Places; and to give all possible help and advice towards the establishment of "the most suitable forms of government in the various territories," on the condition that Great Britain be the sole foreign adviser, and that only her advisers and officials (if any) be requisitioned in those areas. He made the final reservation that the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra should necessarily be subject to special measures of British administrative control.

It is to be observed that this pledge was given by the authority of the Foreign Office. There is no record in the War Office as to whether, before giving it, the War Committee or the General Staff were consulted regarding the military commitments thereby involved.

4. On the 5th November the Sherif agreed to certain, but not to all, of the High Commissioner's stipulations, subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions by Great Britain, the most important being that she should not make peace with her present enemies without securing Arab independence.

In his reply of the 17th December, the High Commissioner gave, in carefully guarded language, the desired undertaking regarding peace terms, and discussed numerous details.

On the 1st January, 1916, the Sherif agreed to some of the British conditions, but reiterated his claim that the area of Arab independence must include Beirut and district.

5. It had now become obvious that the agreement with the Sherif involved French as well as British interests, and accordingly Sir Mark Sykes was authorized by the Foreign Office to enter into negotiations with M. Picot, representing the French

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Government, as to the future boundaries of the prospective Arab state and the delimitation of the respective French and British spheres of influence. These negotiations involved the settlement of many difficult questions, but were finally brought to a definite conclusion as between Great Britain and France. The attitude of Russia had then to be taken into account, and Sir M. Sykes and M. Picot proceeded to Petrograd, where an agreement was arrived at with M. Sazonoff in March, 1916. The accompanying map shows the decisions which were ultimately reached.

6. Meanwhile correspondence had been passing between the Sherif and the High Commissioner, and in Appendix A will be found the more important points which have or have not been agreed to by the contracting parties. Eventually the Sherif pledged himself to take action towards expelling the Turks from the Arab area, and asked for British assistance in the shape of arms, ammunition and money. These have been given, and on the 5th June the Arabs rose in Medina, thus commencing the revolt.

7. Having thus dealt with the history of the movement, it is necessary to consider the position and resources of the chief actors in the drama. The Sherif of Mecca exercises sway over the greater part of north-western Arabia and, in addition, exerts a wider influence outside his own particular district than any other Arab potentate. He commands a certain spiritual consideration throughout the whole of Islam, and his family is both the most enlightened of all the Arab ruling houses, and possesses the greatest resources of various kinds. He has always represented himself, in his correspondence with the High Commissioner, as being the spokesman of the Arab nation, but so far as is known, he is not supported by any organization of Arabs nearly general enough to secure, even throughout the larger part of the Arab area, the automatic acceptance of the terms agreed to by him. It would, therefore, be futile to treat with him alone and to assume that through him all Arabs could be influenced and bound.

8. In March, 1916, the Sherif estimated that he could raise a force of 250,000 men, but, although it is possible that such a number might temporarily respond to his orders, difficulties of supply, lack of discipline and the want of cohesion inherent in the Arab race would certainly prevent the concentration and maintenance of even a tithe of that number in any one locality. There is no information as to the stock of arms and ammunition in the Sherif's possession, but his demands for a small number of rifles have been so insistent that it may be assumed that he possesses but few. As, however, he must have been well aware of the strength of the Turkish forces in the Hejaz, it seems reasonable to assume that before revolting he considered his resources sufficient to overcome them. It is important to obtain from the Sherif some idea of the amount of arms and ammunition at his disposal, as without this information no proper estimate can be formed of the assistance he may require.

9. The other Arab chiefs of whom account may be taken are Bin Saud, Emir of Nejd (*see* small map attached); the Idrissi, ruler of Asir; the Imam of Yemen; Ibn Reshid, Emir of Hail; and the chiefs of the Anazeh tribes.

Bin Saud has been recognized by Great Britain as independent ruler of Nejd, El Qatif, and Hasa, and, by a treaty recently negotiated by Sir Percy Cox, we have undertaken to aid him against unprovoked aggression by any foreign Power, provided he observes certain conditions as to his dealings with other nations. It is therefore necessary that he should be carried with us in any settlement of Arabian affairs. His relations with the Sherif are now friendly, but he has consistently opposed Ibn Reshid, with whom he was at war until the summer of 1915. His forces probably amount to about 10,000 armed men.

The Idrissi has, thanks to Italian gold, preserved a loyal attitude towards this country, and has been supplied with a certain quantity of arms and ammunition. The Indian Government are at present negotiating a treaty with him by which he will secure autonomy and security from maritime attack. He has been more or less in a state of active revolt against the Turks since 1892.

The Imam, who is a rival of the Idrissi, has, on the other hand, definitely thrown in his lot with the Turks, and, although the Resident of Aden has called upon him to join with the Sherif, it would seem unlikely that he will take any steps to interfere with the Turkish troops in his district. He could assemble a large force, and has guns and ammunition of his own.

The relations of Ibn Reshid with the Sherif are normally friendly, but he is openly hostile to the British, and his recent approach to Basra with an armed following gave rise to certain misgivings. He has a hereditary feud with Bin Saud, and the difficulties of persuading him to co-operate with the other Arab leaders against the Turks would be considerable. One of the objects of British diplomacy should be to patch up the

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quarrel between Ibn Reshid and Bin Saud so as to promote unison of action and a common enthusiasm for the cause of Arab freedom. Ibn Reshid might, at the outside, muster a force of 10,000 men.

It would appear from the statements of the Sherif that the powerful Anazeh tribes who inhabit the interior of Syria are prepared to co-operate with him in throwing off the Turkish yoke.

10. By encouraging the Sherif to rebel against the Turks, by supplying him with arms and money, by guaranteeing Arab independence, and by promising to aid the future Arab state against foreign aggression, Great Britain has undoubtedly assumed serious military responsibilities. It is true that we have avoided giving to the Sherif any promise of direct co-operation, and that therefore we would not technically be guilty of any breach of faith by adopting an inactive attitude in the Sinai Peninsula. It cannot, however, be doubted that in the eyes of Islam we would be held morally responsible if we deserted the Sherif after inciting him to try conclusions with the Turks, and after proclaiming Arab freedom, and that at our door would be laid the responsibility of the desecration of the Holy places that would inevitably follow the defeat of the Sherif, and the reconquest of Mecca by the Turks. The result of this feeling might be far-reaching throughout our Moslem possessions, and would be exploited to the full by Germany.

The Arabs may not perhaps count on any large British operations being undertaken, much as they would appreciate an expedition into Syria, but they will not understand total inaction. They will look for co-operation in a minor degree, and also to be supplied with war material. The fact that Great Britain has studiously avoided any definite agreement for joint military action will count for little should their efforts not meet with success.

11. Owing to the difficulty of estimating the religious effect of the Sherif's rising it is not easy to forecast the action of the Turkish Government, but it is certain that they will regard it with considerable anxiety. Were it not for the fact that Turkish operations are now controlled by the German General Staff, it is not improbable that Turkish reinforcements would be hurried to the south with a view to re-establish the Sultan's authority in the Hejaz, and to deal drastically with the Sherif's adherents. It is, however, unlikely that the German General Staff will allow any sentimental considerations connected with the Hejaz movements to upset their strategical distribution of the Turkish Army in the various theatres in which it is engaged. At the same time the possibility of the detachment of considerable forces to this theatre cannot wholly be excluded.

12. For some months past the Turks have foreseen the danger that might arise from the existence of large Arab units in their armies, and since October, 1914, such formations have been gradually eliminated. Two Arab divisions have definitely ceased to exist as such, whilst a third Arab division has not figured in any fighting since the evacuation of Gallipoli. It is therefore improbable that the Arab revolt will have any far-reaching influence on the Turkish Army. That Army now consists of 50 so-called divisions, of which 4 are in Arabia, viz. :—2 in Southern Yemen, 1 in Asir, and 1 in the Hejaz. 25 divisions are in Armenia, 6 in Mesopotamia and on the Persian frontier, 3 in Palestine and Syria, and 12 in European Turkey, Smyrna (4) and parts of Asia Minor where no hostilities are in progress.

13. The first action of the Turks will probably be attempt to concentrate the two divisions in Yemen, amounting to about 6,000 men with 40 field guns, with the division in Asir whose strength may be taken at 3,000 men with 8 field guns. The possibility of their so doing will depend firstly on whether the British exert any pressure on them from Aden, and secondly on the attitude of the Idrissi and Imam. If the concentration is effected, the Turks may then decide either to march the divisions into the Hejaz to attack the Sherif, or to bring them away altogether before it is too late, the decision being guided by the extent of their ammunition supply, the state of their transport, and the condition of the roads, of all of which no precise details are available. In the latter case they might be marched *viâ* Ibha, Bisheh, Arf and Hail to Nejef on the Euphrates, if difficulties of transport and supply proved to be not insuperable. If, on the other hand it were decided to attack the Sherif in the Hejaz the three divisions in question could combine with the remains of the 22nd Division already in the Hejaz, and with any reinforcements that might be brought down the Medina Railway. Without materially interfering with the strategical distribution of the Turkish armies two divisions might be made immediately available from Smyrna and one from the Aleppo—Alexandretta area, and by assuming a defensive attitude in Armenia five more divisions could eventually be brought up from about Sivas. Thus it would be possible

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to make available some 60,000 to 70,000 men, but whether as many as this could be supplied is a doubtful matter, and, even if they could, it would take at least three months before they could all arrive.

Whatever course the Turks may adopt there is a strong probability that they will take early steps to strengthen their garrison at Maan and Akaba so as to prevent the revolt spreading into Syria. They have ample troops immediately at hand for that purpose.

It is also not improbable that they may seek to re-establish their prestige with the Arabs by means other than a direct attack on the Sherif. They may, therefore, decide to punish the rebellious Shiahs in Kerbela and Nejef, an operation which would have the additional advantages that it could be carried out by the troops now in Mesopotamia and would ultimately pave the way for an attack on the British base at Basra.

14. It is suggested that, if the War Committee approve, the following military and naval measures should be taken at once to support the Sherif :—

(i.) The Commander-in-Chief in Egypt should make all possible preparation for the occupation of El Arish and Akaba.

A force established at these places would directly threaten the Turkish communication between Syria and the Hejaz, and would encourage the Syrian Arabs, while at the same time effectively defending the eastern frontier of Egypt.

It is unlikely that the climatic conditions will admit of these operations being undertaken before October, and their practicability must then be considered in the light of the situation at that time.

The immediate steps required are :—That the railway now under construction to Katia should be pushed forward and all preparations made for its rapid extension to El Arish ;

That plans for the occupation of Akaba should be elaborated in conjunction with Naval Commander-in-Chief.

(ii.) Prevent by means of naval patrols the Turks from using the Red Sea from Hodeida to Lith.

(iii.) Endeavour to obtain the co-operation of the Idrissi and, if possible, of the Imam in preventing the withdrawal of the 3 Turkish Divisions now in Asir and Yemen.

(iv.) Continue and develop the naval and the military measures designed to lead the enemy to fear a landing at Alexandretta or Smyrna.

(v.) Take steps to meet the probable demands of the Idrissi and the Sherif for arms and ammunition, as far as our requirements elsewhere permit.

General Staff,
War Office,
1st *July*, 1916.

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APPENDIX A.

POINTS RELATING TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SHERIF AND GREAT BRITAIN.

1. The Sherif on his part has not agreed to :—

(*a.*) The exclusion of Alexandretta (which is part of the vilayet of Aleppo) or any part of Syria from the area of Arab independence.

(*b.*) The permanent alienation of any part of Irak (vilayets of Basra and Baghdad) or even the temporary concesssion to us of any province, except that of Basra ("districts now, November 5th, occupied by British troops").

(*c.*) Ottoman or other foreign suzerainty over any part of the area.

2. Great Britain on her part has not agreed to :—

(*a.*) Do more than approve an Arab Khalifate, if set up by the Arabs themselves.

(*b.*) Recognize Arab independence in Syria, west of the line Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Damascus, or in any other portion of the Arab area in which we are not free to act without detriment to the interests of our Ally, France.

(*c.*) Recognize any single political chief of the independent Arab area, or the subjection of any Arab chief to any other.

(*d.*) Set any term to our occupation of Irak; define the conditions on which we are to hold any part of it; or limit our occupation to the vilayet of Basra alone.

(*e.*) Annul the extra-territorial privileges of foreigners.

3. What has been agreed to, therefore, on behalf of Great Britain is :—

To recognise the independence of those portions of the Arab speaking area in which we are free to act without detriment to the interests of France. Subject to these undefined reservations, the said area is understood to be bounded north by about latitude 37 degrees, east by the Persian frontier, south by the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, west by the Red Sea and Mediterranean up to about latitude 33 degrees and beyond by an indefinite line drawn inland west of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo; all that lies between this last line and the Mediterranean being, in any case, reserved absolutely for future arrangement with the French and the Arabs.

4. Within the above independent area it has been stipulated that :—

(*a.*) Aden and district remains British possession.

(*b.*) Irak to be in part leased to and administered by Great Britain and in other part, subject to our control in some degree and manner; Great Britain to hold any part of Irak, not by Imperial right, but under concession from the Arabs.

(*c.*) Great Britain shall assist the Arabs :—

(i.) To obtain their independence in that area.

(ii.) To set up and maintain such forms of autonomous government in the several districts of the area as may be suitable to each.

(*d.*) Great Britain shall approve of an Arab Khalifate *vice* the Ottoman Khalifate, should the Arabs succeed in establishing one satisfactorily.

(*e.*) Great Britain shall advise and find personnel to assist in the administration of Arab districts should their constituted governments, when formed, so desire; but not otherwise to interfere in the internal affairs of the area, provided that our existing treatise with Arab chiefs are not violated by the autonomous governments.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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COMMUNICATED BY FRENCH AMBASSADOR.

Ambassade de France
à Londres.

Confidentiel.

Dans une note précédente, en date de ce jour, l'Ambassadeur de France a exposé au Gouvernement britannique les affaires purement musulmanes faisant l'objet principal de la mission de M.Cherchali au Hedjaz.

Il a toutefois paru préférable au Gouvernement français de prévoir, au cours des relations qui vont s'établir entre l'envoyé français et le Grand Chérif la possibilité de conversations politiques.

M.Cherchali doit s'attacher, le cas échéant, à prévenir tout malentendu sur l'attitude de la France en Arabie et dans les régions limitrophes de la péninsule.

En ce qui concerne plus particulièrement la Syrie, le chérif doit connaître (peut-être inexactement) la substance de l'entente intervenue entre la France et l'Angleterre. Le silence observé jusqu'ici à La Mecque à ce sujet n'a plus aujourd'hui de raison d'etre. Il fait le jeu en Arabie et dans les milieux syriens de ceux qui représentent la France soit comme se désintéressant de l'avenir de la Syrie, soit au contraire comme faisant obstacle aux desseins d'expansion formés par le Chérif. Le Gouvernement français a tout intéret à mettre fin à ces légendes: il lui semble possible

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

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

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possible de le faire, sans divulguer les accords eux-memes, et en se bornant à laisser connaitre le sens général de l'arrangement franco-britannique.

M.Cherchali n'aura d'ailleurs aucune initiative à prendre à cet égard. Il a été invité seulement à ne pas décourager les demandes d'informations qui lui seraient présentées par le Chérif. Si ce souverain l'interrogeait sur la politique éventuelle de la France en Syrie, l'envoyé français ne lui répondrait qu'après en avoir référé à M. Ribot.

Voici d'ailleurs le texte meme des instructions complémentaires du Gouvernement français à M.Cherchali:

"En Arabie, la France, en plein accord avec l'Angleterre, ne tient qu'à maintenir, d'une part, l'indépendance du Chérif, et d'autre part, l'intégrité des possessions de ce Souverain. Nous estimons, comme nos Alliés, qu'aucune Puissance européenne ne saurait exercer d'influence dominante ou meme prépondérante dans les Lieux Saints de l'Islam et nous sommes résolus à ne point intervenir dans les questions politiques de la péninsule arabique.

En pleine union avec nos Alliés, nous considérons en outre qu'aucun Gouvernement européen ne saurait acquérir de nouvel établissement en Arabie.

C'est pour fournir au Chérif les moyens de protéger son indépendance et l'intégrité de ses états contre tout retour offensif des Turcs, que la France a envoyé auprès de lui une mission militaire destinée à procurer aux Chefs des colonnes arabes des conseillers en meme temps que des techniciens.

Tout en estimant qu'aucune Puissance ne saurait

obtenir

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

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

obtenir ni territoire nouveau, ni prestige politique en Arabie, le Gouvernement français reconnait que la proximité des cotes égyptiennes d'un coté et du Golfe Persique de l'autre créent toutefois en faveur des intérets commerciaux de nos Alliés anglais une situation dont vous devez tenir compte. Je verrais donc avantage, toutes les fois que des questions de cet ordre seront agitées devant vous, à ce que vous réserviez votre opinion jusqu'à la réception d'instructions que vous demanderez soit au Département, soit à notre Ministre au Caire, et qui seront concertées avec le Gouvernement britannique.

En ce qui concerne la Syrie et son arrière-pays, la France ne saurait laisser à d'autres le soin d'assurer le développement de ces régions. D'une part, le Gouvernement français n'a jamais cessé de s'intéresser au sort des populations qui les habitent et nous pouvons, à cet égard, invoquer les plus anciennes et les plus constantes traditions. D'autre part, l'établissement d'entreprises importantes a marqué dans ces dernières années le souci que nous avions de collaborer à la mise en valeur de cette partie de l'Asie Mineure. Désireux non d'asservir les habitants de ces contrées, mais, au contraire, de faciliter leur évolution, le Gouvernement de la République, en plein accord avec le Gouvernement anglais, serait disposé à leur reconnaitre des régimes adaptés aux conditions spéciales aux diverses régions.

C'est ainsi que dans les provinces où domine l'élément arabe, la France encouragerait la création d'émirats à Alep, Damas, Mossoul, etc.. dont les souverains

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

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

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souverains auraient des liens avec le roi du Hedjaz. Il est bien entendu que le Gouvernement français se réserverait le droit de fournir seul les conseillers dont les émirs pourraient avoir besoin pour mener à bonne fin leur oeuvre de civilisation. De meme, c'est à la France que devraient etre demandés les capitaux nécessaires à la mise en valeur du pays, tandis que nous assumerions la charge des grandes entreprises destinées à assurer le développement économique de ces régions.

le protectorat

Sur le front de mer où les populations sont plus mélangées, la nécessité d'un régime spécial s'impose qui leur serait accordé sous l'égide directe du Gouvernement français.

En ce qui concerne Jérusalem et la Palestine, on étudierait un modus vivendi de nature à garantir le respect de toutes les religions, et le Chérif ne serait pas écarté de cette étude.

Vous n'avez point à prendre l'initiative de faire connaitre au Malek ces projets du Gouvernement français. Mais comme il est à penser qu'il a été mis au courant, inexactement peut-etre, du sens général de notre entente avec l'Angleterre, il est probable qu'il vous entretiendra à ce sujet. Vous lui marquerez que vous n'en avez qu'une notion imparfaite, mais que vous etes pret à transmettre au Gouvernement français une demande d'information et à communiquer au Chérif la réponse de la France. Je vous indiquerai dans ce cas, s'il y a lieu pour vous de compléter ou de réduire l'exposé ci-dessus. Mais, vous pouvez déjà, sans avoir besoin de m'en référer, opposer un

démenti

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

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

(19)

démenti autorisé aux affirmations qui représenteraient la France soit comme se désintéressant du sort de la Syrie, soit au contraire comme faisant obstacle aux desseins d'expansion du Chérif. Vous déclarerez que la France est disposée à en tenir largement compte.

Parmi les autres questions politiques qui pourront faire l'objet d'entretiens avec le Chérif figure celle de la création d'un établissement de banque franco-britannique à Djeddah.

Depuis 1913, la Banque ottomane possédait une agence à Djeddah. Bien que cet établissement eut rendu et fut appelé encore à rendre des services aux pélerins et au commerce au Hedjaz, sa dénomination de "Banque impériale ottomane" lui donne aux yeux du Gouvernement chérifien l'apparence d'une institution officielle ottomane.

Tenant compte de cette situation, le Directeur de l'agence, M.Aboucassem, après avoir pris l'avis des directions de la Banque à Paris et à Londres, se montra disposé à modifier le titre de l'établissement financier de Djeddah et à le transformer en une banque autonome, qui pourrait rendre au Gouvernement chérifien de précieux services et qui jouirait de la confiance des deux pays alliés, la France et l'Angleterre.

A la suite de la reconnaissance par les Gouvernements anglais et français du Grand Chérif comme Malek, le Gouvernement hachimite parut pret à accepter une entente sous la condition que la Banque prendrait, par exemple, le titre de "Banque arabe du Hedjaz" et qu'elle se soumettrait à la juridiction des tribunaux religieux.

Cependant

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

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

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Cependant au début de Décembre 1916, le Directeur de l'agence était avisé que les pourparlers devaient etre différés. Quelques semaines plus tard, il lui était notifié, par lettre officielle, que le Gouvernement hachimite refusait de reconnaitre son établissement et qu'il déclinait toute responsabilité sur les conséquences de son maintien à Djeddah.

Il y aurait lieu de ne pas laisser ignorer au Malek la pénible impression que ce changement d'attitude a laissée aux deux Gouvernements français et anglais. Ces deux Gouvernements veulent croire que la situation nouvelle provient d'un malentendu, car le Malek Houssein avait reconnu antérieurement les services que serait appelé à rendre au développement économique du nouvel état l'établissement financier franco-anglais, qui devait etre substitué à l'agence de la Banque ottomane. Pour maintenir le crédit du nouvel état, pour assurer dans des conditions satisfaisantes son organisation financière, le concours de cet établissement sera nécessaire au Malek, qui doit envisager les conséquences graves qu'entrainerait l'influence des notables de Djeddah, qui se livrent à des opérations de prêts et de changes de monnaies, dans des conditions usuraires. Les pélerins musulmans et les Gouvernements ayant des sujets musulmans doivent etre assurés de posséder à Djeddad un établissement financier sérieux et honnete, capable d'inspirer confiance au dedans et au dehors. Des questions de détail peuvent sans doute etre l'objet de négociations, mais il ne semble pas possible qu' étant donné les avantages politiques et économiques

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

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

(21)

que le Malek doit en retirer pour son pays le principe de la création d'un établissement financier franco-anglais ne soit pas admis par lui."

M. Paul Cambon saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à Son Excellence Monsieur Balfour les assurances de sa haute considération.

16 Mai 1917.

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

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(22)

Sykes Picot May 17 1917

Observations on Arabian Policy as results of visit to RED SEA PORTS, JEDDAH, YEMBO, WEJH, KAMARAN and ADEN.

ENTENTE POLICY.

As regards Entente policy I refer to the attached recommendations drafted by myself and M.Picot but which have not yet his final approval.

BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY.

I am more firmly convinced than ever that until the whole of the Western littoral is under one hand we shall not make progress, not get full value out of the enmity between Arabs and Turks.

BRITISH MILITARY POLICY.

1. Aden should be liquidated and the Turkish force at Lahej destroyed.

2. The Turks should be driven out of any coast towns they may hold by naval bombardments frequently applied.

3. The organisation of an effective Hedjaz army should be proceeded with with all speed. This can only be done in Egypt through the Arab legion.

BRITISH POLITICAL POLICY.

1. We should aim at getting the King of Hedjaz regarded as titular leader and premier among the Arabs.

2. We should obtain from the French recognition of

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

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

(23)

of our predominant commercial and financial position in the Hedjaz.

3. We should obtain similar recognition from the Italians as regards Yemen and Assir.

4. We should avoid being drawn into any outward connection which would exhibit us as controlling the Holy Places.

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

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

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R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S.

GENERAL Policy.

1. After careful study of the situation we are of opinion that the first essential to obtaining for both powers their economic, political, and strategic desiderata, is, that they should both agree to pursue a permanent, identical, and co-operative policy in their respective spheres of control and interest.

2. The future prosperity and peaceable development of the Arabic speaking areas depend on the elimination of certain potential dangers which if not guarded against in the beginning will retard the progress of the areas and expose the interested powers themselves to the risk of becoming the instruments of Arab political elements, and so being involved in an undesirable rivalry.

3. If the political leaders among the various sections of Arab speaking peoples understand that the interested powers are united and impartial, they will not be tempted to endeavour to play one power off against another, which they would certainly do under other circumstances.

Under this head it should be remembered that Arab politicians and leaders of all grades of development are particularly versed in the arts of promoting dissension and partizanship. Unless therefore this tendency is guarded against the following alternative dangers are to be anticipated.

1. If

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

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1. If the policy adopted by one power appeared more in consonance with Arab national aspirations than that of the other, the political influence of the popular power would inevitably extend into the area of the other, the dangers arising out of such a situation need not be rehearsed.

(2) If both powers gave the impression of desiring to impose their institutions and extend their control over thd country, the result would be that the population of the British area would be pro-French and the population of the French area would be pro-British.

4. It is therefore submitted that the two powers should agree that their mutual policy should have as its immediate ideal the development of Arab institutions and internal independence, and as its ultimate object the promotion of Arab unity by the final confederation of the various autonomous areas.

5. Before submitting the outline of the scheme whereby we believe such a policy could be realised, it would be useful to note the fears and prejudices which various elements among the Arabic speaking peoples entertain in regard to the two powers.

I. The Christians on the whole regard Great Britain as being unduly favourable to non-Christian elements namely Moslems and Jews, while the Moslems fear that the French would be unduly influenced by Syrian Christians resident in France.

II. The Moslems as a whole regard with fear the idea

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

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idea of the interference of Christian powers in the control of the Holy Places.

III. The intellectuals of nearly all classes fear from France (1) the introduction of an artificially created class of French colonists of French or Latin origin with superior political rights; (2) the introduction of an alien administrative staff; (III) an absorption of a favoured element of the population into the enfranchised colonial class, and the subsidence of the remainder into the inferior position of a governed race; (IV) the introduction of French culture and language and the degradation of the native language into the dialect of a conquered people.

(IV). Similarly the intellectuals fear the introduction by the British of a social colour-line distinguishing Europeans from natives, in spite of all rules and regulations. A people as vain and conceited as the Arabs are particularly susceptible to this fear.

6. In outlining a scheme we have therefore thought it advisable to take into consideration the above ideas which will eventually lie at the root of such administrative and political difficulties as may be encountered.

SCHEME.

1. The problems which have to be considered are threefold, viz: British policy and French policy in the Red and Blue areas; British policy and French policy in the areas A and B. The position of the King of Hedjaz and the Arab movement generally.

2.

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

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

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2. RED AND BLUE AREAS.

The administrative problems presented respectively to the two powers in the two areas are widely different. In lower Mesopotamia Great Britain has to deal with the most savage while on the Syrian littoral France has to deal with the most civilised regions in the Arabic speaking countries. However certain common grounds may be found.

(I) We are of opinion that the two powers should establish Arabic as the official language in both areas.

(II) That criminal and civil law of both areas should be as similar as possible.

(III) That the systems of education in both areas should make it possible for those who pass on to share in a common higher education.

(IV) That administrative personnel should be as locally recruited as possible, and the European personnel kept as small as possible, and that where local recruiting fails natives of areas A. and B. should be employed in preference to Egyptians or Indians in the Red Area, or Algerians or non-Arab levantines in the Blue Area.

3. AREAS A. and B.

(1) We are of opinion that the Government of these two areas will not be satisfactory unless the two powers come to identical agreements with the Arab political elements in regard to the status of departmental advisers.

The departments of Finance, Interior, Justice, Gendarmerie should have advisers nominated by the chief

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

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

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chief French official in the Blue Area, and the chief British official in the Red Area, and by agreement between the local governments of Areas A and B respectively, and the governments of France and Great Britain respectively, these advisers should have executive authority in their departments and should have fixed terms of office. This agreement should not be perpetual but of sufficient duration to ensure the departments in question being got into definite working order, a period of 25 years is suggested as the term of this agreement, it should then be revised in the light of development.

(II) We are also of opinion that it should be the policy of both British and French Governments to encourage to the utmost similarity of administration and common ideals in these two areas, and that both Governments should instruct their nominated advisers to co-operate as closely as possible in pursuance of this ideal. A common political and intellectual progress is the best guarantee of the realisation of the economic desiderata of the two interested powers.

4. ARAB MOVEMENT IN GENERAL.

(1) We are of opinion that it will be found advisable to assume that the King of Hedjaz is the leader of the Arab movement.

(II) That both Great Britain and France should encourage all Arab parties in areas A and B to look to him and his successors resident at Mecca as titular suzerains.

(III) The King of Hedjaz should have an assured revenue for the purpose of maintaining order in Hedjaz and

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

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

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and ensuring decent facilities for the pilgrimage.
We believe that areas A and B could without difficulty find this amount from the department of religious bequests and Imperial Domains.

(IV). We submit that the residence of the King of Hedjaz should be Mecca and that he should not have any permanent or temporary residence outside Hedjaz, and that this should be by agreement between the interested powers and the King.

(V). We are of opinion that there would be many advantages in the establishment by the King of one of his sons as hereditary Prince in Area A and one in Area B provided always that such an arrangement is fully in accord with the desires of the population of the respective areas. In this event succession should be settled by agreement and the suggested Princes and their issue should be debarred from succession to the Kingdom of Hedjaz.

May 17th. 1917.

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

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

(111433/17)

To the French Ambassador from Lord R. Cecil.

Foreign Office, June 7th.1917.

Your Excellency:-

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Notes of the 16th ultimo, in which you were so good as to inform me of the instructions which have been given by your Government to Monsieur Cherchali whom they are sending on a special mission to the Hedjaz.

I have the honour to request that Your Excellency will transmit to your Government an expression of the thanks of His Majesty's Government for this frank communication, and that you will assure them that the important issues raised therein will receive the early attention of His Majesty's Government and that a full reply will shortly be addressed to them.

In view, however, of the fact that M. Cherchali is being instructed to associate His Majesty's Government in a representation to King Hussein with regard to the closing of the branch of the Imperial Ottoman Bank at Jeddah, it is desirable that Your Excellency should be in a position to inform your Government without delay of the attitude of His Majesty's Government in this matter.

In Lord Grey's Note of the 10th of November last the opinion was expressed that the situation in the Hedjaz was not sufficiently secure to warrant the establishment there of a foreign bank, more especially in

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

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(31)

in view of the suspicion with which any banking institution is regarded by Arab opinion.

His Majesty's Government do not feel that circumstances in the Hedjaz have altered in such a way as to cause them to modify the view expressed in Lord Grey's above-mentioned Note; they consider that the action taken by King Hussein, in refusing to allow banking operations in the Hedjaz, and in closing the branch of the Ottoman Bank was perfectly justifiable; and they regret, therefore, that they are unable to associate themselves with the representations which M. Cherchali is instructed to make to the King under this head.

I may add that His Majesty's Government would in any case be unwilling to support the claim of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, in whatever form that Bank were constituted to trade in the Hedjaz, where its antecedents and relations render it an object of suspicion and unsuitable for conducting business with King Hussein and the Arabs.

(signed) R. Cecil.

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

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

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Agd. draft reply to which I objected

(3)

FOREIGN OFFICE.
July , 1917.

DRAFT.

French Ambassador.

Your Excellency:-

In continuation of my Note of June 7th. last, I have the honour to submit to Your Excellency, for the information of the French Government, the following observations on the Arabian Question, to which the instructions given by Your Excellency's Government to Monsieur Cherchali on the occasion of his mission to the Hedjaz form an important contribution.

These instructions relate indeed only to one aspect of this question:- that which is concerned with the Hedjaz; - and on this Monsieur Cherchali has been informed that France, in full agreement with Great Britain, desires to maintain the independence of the Sherif and the integrity of his dominions, and further that the French Government hold that no European Power should exercise a dominant or even a preponderating influence in the Holy Places of Islam.

His Majesty's Government are in entire sympathy with the spirit which

animates

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

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

(33)

animates this declaration, and they would be prepared to go even further, and say that it is undesirable that the Arab Power in possession of the Holy Places should, as regards its internal affairs, be under European influence at all.

It is true that recent circumstances have placed His Majesty's Government, with the full concurrence of our Allies, in a very special position in the Hejaz. The protracted negotiations, which culminated in the revolt of Sherif Hussein, were conducted entirely by His Majesty's Government; and the Malik, who initiated these negotiations, has throughout regarded the Representatives of His Majesty's Government as the channel through which he can most conveniently communicate with the Allied Powers. It may be added that the whole military and financial burden of the Rising has been borne by His Majesty's Government.

Though it is probably in the military and political interests of the Allied Powers that this exceptional condition of things should continue during the war, there is no reason known to His Majesty's Government why it should continue when the war is over. When that event occurs, it is the intention of His Majesty's Government that the "status" of

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

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

(34)

of the Hejaz should revert to the condition of complete internal independence referred to in the earlier part of this communication.

The position in the Arabian Peninsula outside the Hejaz is, however, of a different character, as Your Excellency's Government have on more than one occasion fully recognised. I would refer Your Excellency in this connexion to the assurance contained in the letter which Monsieur Jules Cambon addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris on the 8th. of December last, in which it is expressly stated that "the French Government consider, as in the past, that it is for the British Government, whose interest in the affairs of Arabia is preponderant, to furnish the necessary contingents, etc."

More recently also, in the Note communicated by Your Excellency's Government to Lord Bertie on the 22nd. May, relative to the withdrawal of the French Military Mission from Mecca, it is stated that "the Government of the Republic are ready to admit that the proximity of Egypt and the Persian Gulf create in Arabia a peculiar situation in favour of Great Britain", and that

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

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that "France is determined to abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of the Arabian Peninsula".

The justification for these declarations is to be found in the geographical, historical, and political position of Arabia in relation to the British Empire, which is quite different from that of any other Power. The Arabian Peninsula is bounded on all sides by British possessions or British spheres of influence. For many years, Great Britain has been established upon the Arabian Peninsula, with responsibilities that extend along the coast from the Red Sea to Koweit; and she is bound by Treaties with Native Rulers in Southern Arabia which impose upon her responsibilities from which she could not, even if she would, divest herself; while the complicated network of tribal politics makes it impossible for her to ignore the trend of political events in other parts of the Peninsula. His Majesty's Government have, indeed, no desire to extend their sphere of political influence in Arabia, still less to assume a Protectorate over that country. Their desire is to diminish, not to increase, their responsibilities. But I need not point out to Your Excellency that there exists no more

fruitful

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

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

(36)

fruitful source of trouble in these semi-civilised countries than a condition of things in which rival factions can entertain the hope of enlisting one European Power against another. Nothing has produced a happier effect in the past than a strict delimitation of the spheres in which such Powers can legitimately exercise their influence; and it seems evident that, if this policy is to be carried out in Arabia, it is to Great Britain that Arabian factions should be taught to look as the advocate of internal peace and the supporter of Arabian independence.

To these general principles I believe that the French Government are as much attached as the Government of this country, and I feel sure that they will welcome a clear statement of our views, as we appreciate the friendly frankness with which they have communicated to us their instructions to Monsieur Cherchali.

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

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(37)

Hejaz Phase

CIRCULATED TO THE KING AND WAR CABINET

Decypher. Sir R. Wingate. (Cairo). July 3rd,1917.
D. 11.55.a.m.
R. 3.40.p.m. July 3rd,1917.

No. 696.

Your telegram No. 533 and my telegram No. 583.

Receipt of full text of French Government Note forwarded to Foreign Office with Lord Bertie's despatch No. 244 of May 24th makes it abundantly clear that question of withdrawal of French Mission from Hedjaz and other questions which have arisen or may in future arise between His Majesty's Government and French Government with regard to Arabia cannot be settled satisfactorily until existing Sykes-Picot (group omitted ? agreement) has been amended.

It is essential that above agreement should be so amended as to eliminate present southern boundary of Area B as marked on map attached to agreement thus ensuring that, for the purposes of agreement between Great Britain and France, the provisions which apply to Area B should also apply to whole of Arabia South of that Area. Anything less than this jeopardizes our whole position in the East.

One of the main advantages of agreement between Great Britain and France is to enable us to fulfil as completely as possible the assurances given to Arabs and more especially King of the Hedjaz. On the other hand vis-à-vis France we are (either with or without an

agreement

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

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

(38)

agreement) in following position in regard to British areas.

(a). We have expelled Turkish Government from Mesopotamia and conquered that country by force of arms.

(b). Shereef has carried out a successful revolt against Turkish authority by means of assistance in advice, munitions of war, supplies and money given him by British Government alone. Great Britain is therefore in a predominant position in Hedjaz.

(c). A powerful British army is on the soil of Palestine. So much for progress of Great Britain towards the objective aimed at.

France on the contrary has made no advance towards establishing her claims in Syria where in any case she has much hostile feeling to contend against, which will render good offices of Great Britain of the utmost value.

The above considerations appear sufficient to justify revision of an agreement made at a time when situation was an entirely different one.

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

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

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Hogarth on ~~Persia~~

Sykes agreement

SECRET.

Copy No. 2

July 10. 1917

NOTE ON THE ANGLO-FRANCO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT
ABOUT THE NEAR EAST.

July 10, 1917.

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

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NOTE ON THE ANGLO-FRANCO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT ABOUT THE NEAR EAST.

This Agreement was drafted early in 1916. It favoured one of the three parties - France - as against the other two, not only in the quantity and quality of territory reserved to occupation or exclusive influence, and the concession of the best harbour sites in Syria, but also because France alone had not yet established rights by actual occupation to any part of her prospective allotment, and did not undertake to proceed within a specified period to establish such rights.

Nevertheless the Agreement was ratified, for, presumably, sufficient reasons of general policy which made it worth our while at that time to so favour France. If these reasons exist at the present moment, and are equally cogent under the changed conditions of 1917, I have nothing more to say, except to point out (1) that the Agreement left a large part of the Arab area - the Peninsula of

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

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Arabia Proper - unallotted, and that in this we both had then, and have strengthened since, paramount interests; and (2) that one party, Russia, has apparently renounced her claim to a large part of her allotment, which, therefore, has become once more unsettled; and that much of this part is so remote and difficult to administer that neither of the other parties is likely to have both will and power to take up its reversion. It will accordingly not improbably remain part of an Ottoman Empire, and give sufficient bulk and substance to the latter to enable it to continue a Power with a Caliphate and exercise a disturbing influence on the lands allotted to France and ourselves.

If, however, those reasons, suggested above, are no longer equally cogent, I would point out that much water has run under the bridge this past year and a half, during all of which period, be it

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(42)

remembered, the Agreement has remained in suspense of action, it not having been possible, except perhaps in Mesopotamia, for any of the parties to realize their claims. Not only has Russia disturbed the Agreement by preferring to renounce much of her claim, and America, who has strong interests in Asiatic Turkey, and especially in Syria, and is likely in any case to have democratic views about the future of liberated Ottoman territories, has become a party to be considered in any Agreement about the Near East, but also the position of one beneficiary - ourselves- has been very greatly strengthened both by the part we have played among the Arabs in the Hejaz and in Mesopotamia, and by the open and insistent preference declared by the Zionist Jews.

While, on the one hand, the vast majority of such Arabs as look to Christian Power at all for liberation, now regard us as their

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

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principal, or even sole, champions (as do also the majority of the Zionist Jews) a strong and increasing feeling has manifested itself in opposition to French penetration of any part of the Arab Area.

The Political Commissioners, when recently in Cairo, did all they could to modify this feeling by conversations with, and representations to, leaders of divers sections of Arab-speaking peoples of all denominations; but, in spite of verbal assent, they had not left Egypt before these same leaders were reasserting and reinforcing their anti-French propaganda; while in Cairo we had ample evidence (I can state its nature if required) that the King of the Hejaz, if he had ever really understood what the Commission-ers said to him, was in no way minded to observe either the letter or the spirit of the Agreement to which he was understood to have consented.

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

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The reasons, one or more of which actuate each of the divers Arab parties, and bring all to a common anti-French conclusion, are often inconsistent because those, who are moved by them, desire different political alternatives, Roughly speaking there are three:

1. Complete Independence. This is believed to be feasible only by the less instructed, or the more blindly fanatical.

2. British Protection. This is the alternative desired by the majority of both Moslem & Christian Arabs on sever-al grounds e.g. (a) Because it is believed that we should exploit Arab lands less selfishly than another Power and be more willing to leave them one day to themselves, (b) Because, under such conditions Syria and Arabia would form one political and economic whole with Egypt and Mesopotamia. This argument is paramount with the Syrians resident in Egypt, who fear above all things to lose that field for exploitation which the country of their adoption has long afforded them.

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

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3. Ottoman Protection. under an Ihtilaf (Decentralization) scheme of a thorough going kind, guaranteed by the Allied Powers.

There has been a revival of this idea among Syrians since some inkling of the provisions of our agreement with the French got abroad. Contributory causes are : (a) postponement of the Allied victory; (b) belief that the Turks are becoming sufficiently exhausted and sufficiently apprehensive of their ultimate fate at the hands of the Central Powers, to be amenable to the Ihtilaf; (c) belief, nevertheless, that, with Constantinople, a Caliphate, and a large Asia Minor territory left to her, Turkey will remain a Power, the protagonist of Islam, and inevitably of great influence even in Arab lands. I have been assured recently ~~that~~

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

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(46)

by good authority that Ihtilaf would now be more palatable to seventy per cent of the Syrians than the status proposed by our Agreement.

The above is a bare outline of the reasons which, I submit, call for some reconsideration of the Agreement. But in submitting them, I wish to add that I do not hold any of the following views:-

(1). That any section of the Arab people is capable at present of constituting a stable independent state, or of carrying on one when constituted.

(2). That it is desirable for us to assume tutelage of all the Arab area, or even of much more of it than, at present, we do in fact "protect", this being understood to include all the parts of the Arabian Peninsula in which any Christian Power has a footing. (N.B. I would add Palestine).

(3). That it is possible or desirable to exclude France from more or less equal territorial or economic gains under any revised agreement.

7.

37

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

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

(47)

(4). That a peace should be made with Turkey which would leave any part of the Arab Area under her direct control, or, indeed, under her better than nominal suzerainty, or subject to any economic influence except that of the Allied Powers.

D.G. Hogarth

9 July 1917.

8.

38

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

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Note 2 C Aug 23 17

British and French positions in Arabia. (48)

As the British Note is intended as a reply to the French claims put forward in the instructions to Monsieur Cherchali, it is desirable to be quite clear as to what those claims are.

They appear to be the following:

(1) "No European Power shall exercise a dominant or even preponderant influence in the Holy Places of Islam".

(2) "We (i.e. the French) are resolved not to interfere at all in the political questions of the Arabian peninsula".

Lest however it should be thought that this self denying ordinance is intended by the French Government to tie their own hands only, the note goes on to say

(3) (a) "No European Government should acquire any new establishments" (whatever that may mean) "in Arabia" (without qualification).

(b) "No Power should acquire fresh territory or political prestige in Arabia" (again without qualification).

(4) Nevertheless "the proximity of the Egyptian shores on the one side and of the Persian Gulf on the other, create a situation in favour of the commercial interests of Great Britain, which M. Cherchali must take into account".

(5) France, meanwhile, is to exercise exclusive political control in Syria, and the Arabian provinces or territories extending eastwards as far as Mosul, creating Amirates, with French political advisers or counsellors.

The above is a very subtly designed statement of French pretensions, conceived exclusively in French interests, and intended as far as possible to magnify and safeguard the future French rôle in Arabia, while restricting and minimising that of Great Britain.

I

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

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(49)

I imagine that our reply is intended to indicate our cordial acceptance of the French contentions, where they are identical with our own, but also to state quite clearly our interpretation of our political position in Arabia, which has behind it the sanction and prescription of 100 years, whereas the French claims rest on no achievement and are only pegged out in the air.

If this be our object, I do not think that it is adequately carried out by the proposed draft.

(i) The draft accepts and joins in the French declaration as regards the Holy Places. This is quite sound; but it goes on, unsolicited, to lay down that "it is undesirable that the Arab Power in possession of the Holy Places should, as regards its internal affairs, be under European influence at all".

(ii) The draft then proceeds to explain what is meant by this disclaimer. It says that Great Britain has been placed in a very special position in the Hejaz, and has borne the whole military and financial burden of the rising, but that "there is no reason known to His Majesty's Government why this exceptional condition of things should continue when the war is over, at which date it is the intention of His Majesty's Government that the status of the Hejaz should revert to the condition of complete internal independence".

I submit that the above passage is open to two grave objections:

(a) It gives as an illustration of interference with internal affairs and with complete internal independence what has really nothing to do with either viz.

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

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viz. the grant of arms and subsidies to the Sovereign. We give both to the Amir of Afghanistan, who is a far more independent Sovereign than the King of the Hejaz is likely, for many a long day, to be.

(b) Nothing to my mind is more certain than that, when the war is over, whether the King of the Hejaz expands into the head of a great Arab Confederacy, or, as is more likely, remains the Sovereign of a contracted area, he will require from Great Britain - just as the Amir of Afghanistan has done for half a century - a subsidy and arms for many years to come; and further that we shall have to supply them if we are to save him from extinction.

Why then should we propose unasked to debar ourselves from doing that which we shall almost certainly be compelled to do, and place ourselves in a position where we cannot subsidise or support the King in the future, without asking the consent of the French?

Such action, I maintain, has nothing to do with internal administration or internal independence. It will flow from the superior political interest of Great Britain in Arabia as a whole. In the succeeding sentences of the draft, we proceed to reassert and to vindicate the latter. Why then exclude the first and most inevitable illustration of its existence?

The analogy of Afghanistan seems to me to be the one that we ought to bear in mind. The Amir is in closer political relations with ourselves than with any other Power; he accepts our money; he to a large extent looks to us for advice. But his internal independence is quite unqualified; and the Russians, who after all are contiguous to his dominions, which the French are not to the Hejaz, occupy in relation to him much the sort

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

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sort of position in which the French wish to stand to King Hussein.

I hope therefore that while stating our intention not to interfere with the internal administration of the King, and our interest in the internal independence of his Kingdom, we shall not tie our hands by disclaimers which will probably be a source of much trouble in the future.

(iii) The draft then proceeds to deal with the position created by geographical and political conditions in Arabia. It ignores - no doubt intentionally - the claim put forward in the French Note to M. Cherchali, which only recognises a superior commercial interest on the part of Great Britain, and it quotes two earlier passages of December 8th 1916, and May 22nd 1917, in which the French Government has admitted the preponderant interest of Great Britain, without any such qualification.

The draft rests itself upon these admissions, but then proceeds to apply them exclusively to Arabia outside the Hejaz, i.e. outside the dominion of King Hussein. There it claims that the "Arabian factions should be taught to look to Great Britain as the advocate of internal peace" (a very shadowy and platonic position) "and the supporter of Arabian independence".

But I call attention to the fact that it is to the Hejaz, and not to Arabia outside the Hejaz, that the French geographical admissions about the contiguity of Egypt apply, and it is to Arabia without

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

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without qualification, i.e. Arabia including the Hejaz, that the French admission of "a preponderant interest" and "a peculiar situation in favour of Great Britain" extends.

This is made even more clear when we come to the British argument in the long penultimate paragraph of the draft reply. If the argument is valid at all - as it certainly is - it is valid for the whole of the Arabian peninsula; and yet, after a successful demonstration of this cardinal fact, we are brought to the conclusion that "it is to Great Britain that Arabian factions should look" &c; and the phrase "Arabian factions" is apparently intended to apply to the various Arab tribes (who would greatly resent being described as factions) outside the Hejaz. In other words the claim which has been successfully established (with the admission of the French) for the whole peninsula is suddenly surrendered for everything and everybody except the factions, whoever they may be.

I venture to suggest that the line of argument could be more effectively stated in another way and that it should take note of the following distinctions:

(1) We agree with the French in not desiring to interfere at all with the Holy Places. Our desire with regard to them is confined to securing the uninterrupted continuance and the safe conduct of the Pilgrimage.

(2) We have no desire to interfere with the complete internal independence of the King.

(3)

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

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

(63)

(3) But our historical connections, our geographical position, and our political interests in Arabia, render it inevitable and indeed essential, as is admitted by the French, that a preponderant political influence should be exercised by Great Britain throughout the Arabian peninsula.

The case for this line of reasoning is powerfully fortified by a passage from General Clayton's letter to Sir M. Sykes, received on July 31st and printed in Eastern Report No.XXVII of August 2nd 1917, "I hold that a definite settlement of our predominance throughout Arabia is vital. Any doubt as to our position on the frontier of the roads Port Said-Bombay and Port Said-Basra would constitute, in my opinion, a grave danger to our whole Near Eastern system."

(Signed) Curzon of Kedleston.

August 23rd, 1917.

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

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Lord Curzon 1

(54)

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No. 165801/W/44.

FOREIGN OFFICE,

August 29th, 1917.

Your Excellency:-

In continuation of my Note of June 7th last, I have the honour to submit to Your Excellency, for the information of the French Government, the following observations on the Arabian Question, to which the instructions given by Your Excellency's Government to Monsieur Cherchali on the occasion of his mission to the Hedjaz form an important contribution.

These instructions relate indeed only to one aspect of this question - that which is concerned with the Hedjaz - and on this Monsieur Cherchali has been informed that France, in full agreement with Great Britain, desires to maintain the independence of the Sherif and the integrity of his dominions, and further that the French Government hold that no European Power should exercise a dominant or even a preponderating influence in the Holy Places of Islam.

His Majesty's Government are in entire sympathy with the spirit which animates this declaration. They have, indeed, no wish to interfere with the complete internal independence of King Hussein and their desires in regard to the Holy Places are confined to securing the uninterrupted continuance and the safe conduct of the Pilgrimage.

The general position in the Arabian Peninsular has been on more than one occasion fully recognised by Your Excellency's Government. I would refer Your Excellency in this connexion to the assurance contained in the letter which Monsieur Jules Cambon addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris on the 8th of December last, in which it is expressly stated that "the French Government consider, as in the past, that it is for the British Government, whose interest in the affairs of Arabia is preponderant, to furnish the necessary contingents &c."

More recently also, in the Note communicated by Your Excellency's Government to Lord Bertie on the 22nd May, relative to the withdrawal of the French Military Mission from Mecca, it is stated that "the Government of the Republic are ready to admit that the proximity of Egypt and the Persian Gulf create in Arabia a peculiar situation in favour of Great Britain", and that "France is determined to abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of the Arabian Peninsula".

The reason for these declarations is to be found in the geographical, historical, and political position of Arabia in relation to the British Empire, which is quite different from that of any other Power. The Arabian Peninsula is bounded on all sides by British possessions or British spheres of influence. For more than 100 years Great Britain has been established upon the Arabian Peninsula, with responsibilities that extend along the coast

His Excellency
Monsieur Cambon,
&c., &c., &c.,

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

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from the Red Sea to Koweit; and she is bound by Treaties with Native Rulers in Southern Arabia which impose upon her responsibilities from which she could not, even if she would, divest herself; while the complicated network of tribal politics makes it impossible for her to ignore the trend of political events in other parts of the Peninsula. His Majesty's Government have no desire to extend their sphere of political influence in Arabia, still less to assume a Protectorate over that country. Their wish is to diminish, not to increase, their responsibilities. But I need not point out to Your Excellency that there exists no more fruitful source of trouble in these semi- civilised countries than a condition of things in which tribal combinations can entertain the hope of enlisting one European Power against another. Nothing has produced a happier effect in the past than a strict delimitation of the spheres in which such Powers can legitimately exercise their influence; and His Majesty's Government are convinced that the avoidance of internal strife in Arabia can only be secured through the retention by Great Britain of the influence which this country has for so long held throughout the Peninsula as the European Power most closely concerned with the internal peace and external politics of Arabia.

I trust that the French Government will realise equally with His Majesty's Government the dangerswhich would be entailed by any attempt to internationalize Arabian politics and that they will agree that the above solution is the only one which offers any certain prospect of order and tranquillity within the Peninsula. I feel sure also that they will welcome a clear statement of our views, as we appreciate the friendly frankness with which they have communicated to us their instructions to Monsieur Cherchali.

I have, etc.,

(For the Secretary of State)

(Initialled) R.C.

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

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

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No.165801/W/44.

FOREIGN OFFICE,
August 29th, 1917.

Your Excellency:-

In continuation of my Note of June 7th last, I have the honour to submit to Your Excellency, for the information of the French Government, the following observations on the Arabian Question, to which the instructions given by Your Excellency's Government to Monsieur Cherchali on the occasion of his mission to the Hedjaz form an important contribution.

These instructions relate indeed only to one aspect of this question - that which is concerned with the Hedjaz - and on this Monsieur Cherchali has been informed that France, in full agreement with Great Britain, desires to maintain the independence of the Sherif and the integrity of his dominions, and further that the French Government hold that no European Power should exercise a dominant or even a preponderating influence in the Holy Places of Islam.

His Majesty's Government are in entire sympathy with the spirit which animates this declaration. They have, indeed, no wish to interfere with the complete internal independence of King Hussein and their desires in regard to the Holy

His Excellency
Monsieur Cambon,
&c., &c., &c.

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

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

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Holy Places are confined to securing the uninterrupted continuance and the safe conduct of the Pilgrimage.

The general position in the Arabian Peninsula has been on more than one occasion fully recognised by Your Excellency's Government. I would refer Your Excellency in this connexion to the assurance contained in the letter which Monsieur Jules Cambon addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris on the 8th of Decembe last, in which it is expressly stated that "the French Government consider, as in the past, that it is for the British Government, whose interest in the affairs of Arabia is preponderant, to furnish the necessary contingents &c."

More recently also, in the Note communicated by Your Excellency's Government to Lord Bertie on the 22nd May, relative to the withdrawal of the French Military Mission from Mecca, it is stated that "the Government of the Republic are ready to admit that the proximity of Egypt and the Persian Gulf create in Arabia a peculiar situation in favour of Great Britain", and that "France is determined to abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of the Arabian Peninsula".

The reason for these declarations is to be found in the geographical, historical, and political position of Arabia in relation to the British Empire, which is quite different from that of any other Power. The Arabian Peninsula is bounded on all sides by British possessions or British spheres of influence. For more than 100 years Great Britain has been established upon the Arabian Peninsula, with

responsibilities

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

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

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responsibilities that extend along the coast from the Red Sea to Koweit; and she is bound by Treaties with Native Rulers in Southern Arabia which impose upon her responsibilities from which she could not, even if she would, divest herself; while the complicated network of tribal politics makes it impossible for her to ignore the trend of political events in other parts of the Peninsula. His Majesty's Government have no desire to extend their sphere of political influence in Arabia, still less to assume a Protectorate over that country. Their wish is to diminish, not to increase, their responsibilities. But I need not point out to Your Excellency that there exists no more fruitful source of trouble in these semi-civilised countries than a condition of things in which tribal combinations can entertain the hope of enlisting one European Power against another. Nothing has produced a happier effect in the past than a strict delimitation of the spheres in which such Powers can legitimately exercise their influence; and His Majesty's Government are convinced that the avoidance of internal strife in Arabia can only be secured through the retention by Great Britain of the influence which this country has for so long held throughout the Peninsula as the European Power most closely concerned with the internal peace and external politics of Arabia.

I trust that the French Government will realise equally with His Majesty's Government the dangers which would be entailed by any attempt to internationalize Arabian politics and that they will agree that the

above

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

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

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above solution is the only one which offers any certain prospect of order and tranquillity within the Peninsula. I feel sure also that they will welcome a clear statement of our views, as we appreciate the friendly frankness with which they have communicated to us their instructions to Monsieur Cherchali.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration,

Your Excellency's most obedient,

humble Servant,

(For the Secretary of State)

(Sd) R. Cecil

SD

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

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SECRET.

Oct 1917 Hejaz

[191542]

PROJET D'ARRANGEMENT.

LES développements de la lutte poursuivie par les Arabes contre les Turcs et la nécessité d'aider le Roi du Hedjaz à les libérer du joug ottoman ayant amené les Gouvernements anglais et français à accuser leur action au Hedjaz, les deux Gouvernements ont reconnu l'opportunité de préciser les termes des accords conclus par eux en mai 1916, en ce qui concerne les pays arabes. En conséquence, les deux Gouvernements se mettent d'accord sur les principes suivants :

1. En raison du caractère sacré reconnu par les musulmans au territoire du Hedjaz, les deux Gouvernements sont résolus à maintenir l'indépendance entière de ce royaume et l'intégrité de ses limites conformément à la carte annexée au présent arrangement, étant entendu qu'aucune Puissance quelconque ne pourra exercer une influence dominante ou même intervenir de quelque façon que ce soit dans l'administration ni dans les affaires intérieures de ce royaume.

2. Au cas où des concessions de toute nature seraient offertes à un particulier, à un groupement ou à une société ressortissant à l'une des deux Puissances contractantes, le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement britannique s'engagent respectivement à ne pas donner leur agrément à l'entreprise envisagée avant d'avoir prévenu l'autre partie et s'être assurée qu'une coopération des ressortissants des deux pays n'est pas réalisable.

3. Il est entendu qu'en ce qui concerne la zone (A) le Gouvernement français et en ce qui concerne la zone (B) le Gouvernement anglais seront seuls qualifiés pour traiter avec le Roi du Hedjaz toutes les questions intéressant la souveraineté arabe sans aucune intervention de l'autre puissance.

4. Jusqu'à la fin des hostilités les Gouvernements anglais et français continueront à assurer au Roi du Hedjaz l'aide qui lui est nécessaire conformément aux méthodes suivies jusqu'ici.

5. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique fait valoir que les relations de voisinage avec ses possessions, l'importance qu'il y a pour lui à éliminer toutes causes de troubles dans la péninsule arabique lui ont créé des intérêts politiques spéciaux. Le Gouvernement français est prêt à reconnaître ces intérêts spéciaux et renouvelle sa ferme intention de ne rechercher aucune influence politique dans ces régions. Il reste bien entendu que le Gouvernement britannique emploiera l'influence qu'il peut acquérir sur les chefs locaux à assurer au commerce licite et à la navigation français un traitement aussi avantageux que celui fait au commerce licite et à la navigation britanniques. Comme il est de la plus haute importance pour les deux pays contractants de mettre un terme aux trafics pouvant favoriser les troubles—tels que le trafic des armes et munitions de guerre, vente des esclavages, &c.—les deux Gouvernements conviennent que le Gouvernement britannique fera le nécessaire pour faire interdire ces trafics par les autorités locales, auxquelles il pourra prêter le concours de ses forces navales pour faire la police des eaux territoriales.

Paris, le 3 octobre, 1917.

[1035]

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

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SECRET.

[191542]

PROJET D'ARRANGEMENT.

LES développements de la lutte poursuivie par les Arabes contre les Turcs et la nécessité d'aider le Roi du Hedjaz à les libérer du joug ottoman ayant amené les Gouvernements anglais et français à accuser leur action au Hedjaz, les deux Gouvernements ont reconnu l'opportunité de préciser les termes des accords conclus par eux en mai 1916, en ce qui concerne les pays arabes. En conséquence, les deux Gouvernements se mettent d'accord sur les principes suivants :

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Paris, le 3 octobre, 1917.

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

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Hejaz
Ibn Saud

SECRET.

M.E.C.23.

WAR CABINET.

MIDDLE EAST COMMITTEE.

Attitude of the King of the Hejaz toward

Ibn Saud.

Extract from a private letter from Major Cornwallis, Director of the Arab Bureau, to Capt. Ormsby Gore, dated from Sherif Abdullah's Camp at Wadi Eis, 14th December, 1917.

"I saw King Hussein several times at Jeddah. He is a fine old man, and I feel convinced has quite made up his mind what to do when Medina falls, and he can turn his attention to his Arab neighbours, only I am rather afraid that he is intending to do something foolish; he continually spoke of Ibn Saud and the Idrissi in terms of contempt and abuse, in a way which did not augur well for the future.

Ibn Rashid he referred to as a fool, though I think he is quite willing to have him back in the fold if he will only come. He was rather colourless in his views about Imam Yahya, and seemed to regard his doubtful attitude as natural.

What I most disliked about his conversation was the apparent absence of any real effort to work towards Arab unity.

Sherif Abdullah is quite different. He fully realises that his father can only make good in Arabia by conciliating the other Emirs, and is wise enough to see that a strong Chief, if friendly, will be a great asset. He wants to see each of the big Emirs self-ruling in his own dominions, but recognising his father's nominal suzerainty as King of the Arabs. He is very suspicious of Ibn Saud's good faith, but will be open to reason about him. He would accept Ibn Rashid if the latter came over to our side against the Turks, otherwise he would put another member of his family in his place.

He is

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He is surprisingly generous towards the Idrissi, and sees in him one of the most promising instruments for bringing about unity.

The Imam Yahya he distrusts, and will have a go at him later if he does not fall into line; here he is on the right track, and I think we should do everything we can to back him up.

The stumbling block may be the old King, but Abdullah will go to Mecca as soon as Medina falls, and I hope will prevail in persuading him to his own views. The King is bound to be disappointed about Syria, for whatever happens there, he will be left out. He has long hankered after Damascus. I think we should do all we can to recompense him for the help he has given us in the War, by aiding him to make good his position in Arabia, - without our help and guidance, there is every chance of Arabia lapsing into inter necine war after the War - but if we work on a definite policy, I think we can get the other Emirs to recognise the King, and preserve international peace. I was doubtful of it in Cairo, but if Abdullah is allowed a fairly free hand, I have hopes of it being brought about.

What does the F.O., think about it all. I do not remember ever having heard their views."

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.
23rd January, 1918.

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Hejaz 88

CIRCULATED TO THE KING AND THE WAR CABINET.

Decypher. Sir R. Wingate (Cairo) January 2nd.1918.

D. 12.5 p.m. January 2nd.1918.
R. 2.40 p.m.

No. 11.

I have now received copy of draft "Projet d'arrangement" referred to in your telegram No. 1152 of December 4th.

I still think that we should look for something more in Hedjaz than equal rights with French. The latter, I feel sure, calculate that with their hold on Syria and on this source of possible funds for Shensi, and also with, perhaps, Feisal in Damascus they will be able to run King Hussein in reality whilst nominally conceding equality in Hedjaz to us. If therefore we have to concede this equality we ought to control this source of his revenue.

Clause 5 of Projet is a satisfactory advance on 1916 agreement with French. But is it not possible to represent that our special political interests require a freer hand economically than is provided by Clause 2? I have particularly in mind the advisability of replacing Ottoman Bank by a purely British concern which would absorb a greater part, if not all, of the Banking business of Hedjaz and the development of commercial relations between that country and the Empire.

In light of his strongly declared preference for us we cannot expect the King to welcome the dual arrangement in Clauses 1 and 2: and at the present critical stage of his affairs it might be dangerous to mention it to him.

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

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

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Jan 1915

MIDDLE EAST COMMITTEE.

Mesopotamia: British Engagements as to future Status.

I.—Pledges to local Arabs, &c.

1. Sir P. Cox wrote as follows to various Arab Chiefs in the Persian Gulf region (including Bin Saud and the Sheikh of Mohammerah) in November 1914:—

> "I am authorised by my Government to assure Your Excellency that in the event of our success—and succeed we shall, Inshallah—Basra will never again be allowed to be subject to Turkish authority."

In acknowledging Sir P. Cox's letter, the Chiefs of Maskat, Koweit, and El Katr said that they had circulated the information which it contained.

2. A proclamation addressed to the people of Basra and issued on the 22nd November 1914, contained the following passage:—

> "We have no enmity or ill-will against the populace, to whom we hope to prove good friends and protectors. No remnant of Turkish administration now remains in this region. In place thereof the British flag has been established, under which you will enjoy the benefits of liberty and justice both in regard to your religious and your secular affairs."

3. In December 1914 Sir P. Cox asked for authority to make a definite public announcement to the effect that "our occupation of Basra is permanent." His Majesty's Government demurred, on the ground that such an announcement "would be regarded as a definite breach of the under-"taking between the Allies that a final settlement must await the end of the "war"; but they raised no objection to a proposal made by the Government of India that Sir P. Cox "should allow it to be understood in conversation "that places where we assume control with the co-operation of the "inhabitants may in all circumstances count on our future protection "against the Turks."

4. On the 3rd February 1915 the Viceroy (Lord Hardinge), replying to a deputation at Basra, said:—

> "You are, of course, aware that, in the great struggle in which we are involved, we are not fighting single-handed, and we cannot therefore lay down plans for the future without a full exchange of views with the other great Powers who are our Allies; but in any case we may be permitted to indulge a very confident assurance that henceforth a more benign administration will bring back to Iraq that prosperity to which her rich potentialities give her so clear a title."

5. The famous proclamation issued by General Maude "to the people of Baghdad" (19th March 1917) on the occupation of the city contained nothing amounting to an absolute pledge that Baghdad would never be allowed to revert to Ottoman rule; but the general sense of the document (the language of which, it will be remembered, was adopted after very careful consideration by His Majesty's Government) pointed strongly in that direction. Its character can only be conveyed by copious quotation. After opening with an assurance that "our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators," and dwelling upon the evils wrought by Turkish rule in the past, the proclamation proceeded:—

> (4) Since the days of Midhat, the Turks have talked of reforms, yet do not the ruins and wastes of to-day testify the vanity of those promises?

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(5) It is the wish not only of my King and his peoples, but it is also the wish of the great nations with whom he is in alliance, that you should prosper even as in the past, when your lands were fertile, when your ancestors gave to the world literature, science, and art, and when Baghdad city was one of the wonders of the world.

(6) Between your people and the dominions of my King there has been a close bond of interest. For 200 years have the merchants of Baghdad and Great Britain traded together in mutual profit and friendship. On the other hand, the Germans and Turks who have despoiled you and yours, have for 20 years made Baghdad a centre of power from which to assail the power of the British and the Allies of the British in Persia and Arabia. Therefore the British Government cannot remain indifferent as to what takes place in your country now or in the future, for in duty to the interests of the British people and their Allies, the British Government cannot risk that being done in Baghdad again which has been done by the Turks and Germans during the war.

(7) But you people of Baghdad, whose commercial prosperity and whose safety from oppression and invasion must ever be a matter of the closest concern to the British Government, are not to understand that it is the wish of the British Government to impose upon you alien institutions. It is the hope of the British Government that the aspirations of your philosophers and writers shall be realised and that once again the people of Baghdad shall flourish, enjoying their wealth and substance under institutions which are in consonance with their sacred laws and their racial ideals. In Hejaz the Arabs have expelled the Turks and Germans who oppressed them and proclaimed the Sherif Hussein as their King, and his Lordship rules in independence and freedom, and is the ally of the nations who are fighting against the power of Turkey and Germany; so, indeed, are the noble Arabs, the Lords of Koweyt, Nejd, and Asir.

(8) Many noble Arabs have perished in the cause of Arab freedom, at the hands of those alien rulers, the Turks, who oppressed them. It is the determination of the Government of Great Britain and the great Powers allied to Great Britain, that these noble Arabs shall not have suffered in vain. It is the hope and desire of the British people and the nations in alliance with them, that the Arab race may rise once more to greatness and renown among the peoples of the earth, and that it shall bind itself together to this end in unity and concord.

In conclusion, the inhabitants were called upon "to participate in "the management of your civil affairs in collaboration with the political "representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British Army, so that "you may be united with your kinsmen in North, East, South and West in "realising the aspirations of your race."

6. At the end of March 1917 His Majesty's Government, in a telegram to the Government of India, laid it down as their policy (1) that the Basra Vilayet should remain permanently under British administration; and (2) that the Baghdad Vilayet should be made into an Arab State with a local ruler or Government, but under a British Protectorate in everything but name; the State, behind its Arab *façade*, to be administered as an Arab province by indigenous agency and in accordance with existing laws and institutions as far as possible.

In his recent speech on the War Aims of Great Britain, the Prime Minister declared (5th January 1918) that "Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, "Syria and Palestine are, in our judgment, entitled to a recognition of their "separate national conditions." He added that it would be "impossible to restore" the territories in question "to their former sovereignty."

Both Baghdad and Basra lie within the "red area" as defined by the Anglo-Russo-French Agreements of May 1916, *i.e.*, the zone within which the British Government may "establish such direct or indirect administra- "tion or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the "Arab State or Confederation of Arab States."

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II.—Pledges to King Husain.

7. The Sherif of Mecca's territorial demands, as formulated by him during his negotiations with the High Commissioner for Egypt (Sir Henry MacMahon) in the latter part of 1915 were as follows :—

> "England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina-Adana up to the 37° of latitude, on which degree falls Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Amadia Island, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina."

8. The area so defined includes the whole of Mesopotamia and Irak. Replying on the 24th October 1915, Sir H. MacMahon informed the Sherif that, subject to certain modifications (not affecting Mesopotamia), Great Britain was "prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed." With regard to Mesopotamia he put in the following *caveat* :—

> "With regard to the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognise that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special measures of administrative control in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local populations and to safeguard our mutual economic interests."

9. The Sherif replied (5th November 1915) :—

> "As the Provinces of Irak are parts of the pure Arab Kingdom and were in fact the seat of its Governments in the time of Ali Ibn Abu Talib, and in the time of all Caliphs who succeeded him; and as in them began the civilisation of the Arabs, and as their towns in those provinces were the first towns built in Islam where the Arab power became so great; therefore these provinces are greatly valued by all Arabs far and near, and their traditions cannot be forgotten by them. Consequently, we cannot satisfy the Arab nations or make them submit to give up such a title to nobility. But in order to render an accord easy, and taking into consideration the assurances mentioned in the fifth article of your letter, to keep and guard our mutual interests in that country as they are one and the same, for all these reasons we might agree to leave under the British Administration for a short time those districts now occupied by the British troops, without the rights of either party being prejudiced thereby (especially those of the Arab nation, which interests are to it economic and vital) and against a suitable sum paid as compensation to the Arab Kingdom for the period of occupation, in order to meet the expenses which every new kingdom is bound to support, at the same time respecting your agreements with the Sheikhs of those districts, and especially those which are essential."

10. The Sherif's proposal was never formally accepted. Sir H. MacMahon merely replied (17th December 1915) :—

> "The Government of Great Britain, as I have already informed you, are ready to give all guarantees of assistance and support within their power to the Arab Kingdom, but their interests demand, as you yourself have recognised, a friendly and stable administration in the vilayet of Baghdad, and the adequate safeguarding of these interests calls for a much fuller and more detailed consideration than the present situation and the urgency of these negotiations permits."

11. The Sherif's reply (1st January 1916) purported to be an acceptance of Sir H. MacMahon's view, but he was careful not to let the question of

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compensation (which Sir H. MacMahon had ignored) go by default. It ran as follows :—

"With regard to what had been stated in your honoured communication concerning El Irak, as to the matter of compensation for the period of occupation, we, in order to strengthen the confidence of Great Britain in our attitude and in our words and actions, really and veritably, and in order to give her evidence of our certainty and assurance in trusting her glorious Government, leave the determination of the amount to the perception of her wisdom and justice."

12. The correspondence, so far as Mesopotamia is concerned, closed with Sir H. MacMahon's reply, in which he merely "took note" of the Sherif's "remarks concerning the Vilayet of Baghdad," and promised that he would "take the question into careful consideration when the enemy has been "defeated and the time for peaceful settlements arrives."

13. On the 25th August 1916 the Sherif, in acknowledging the grant to him of a monthly subsidy of 125,000*l.* by His Majesty's Government, wrote as follows to Sir H. MacMahon :—

"Your Excellency knows that the above-mentioned monthly pay of 125,000*l.* is for the organisation of government and its necessary administrations, and will be deducted from the amount which we left to the justice of Great Britain to decide for our deficient Government, which is under Great Britain's guardianship and protection, during her occupation of Basra and Irak."

No reply appears to have been returned to this letter.

14. In a recent telegram (22nd January 1918) Sir R. Wingate has recommended that, in view of what he describes as the "growing uneasiness among Arabs about the Entente's intentions for Arab countries," he should be authorised at once to give King Husain the following definite assurances :—

(1) that His Majesty's Government is still determined to secure Arab independence and to fulfil the promises made at the beginning of the Hejaz revolt ;
(2) that His Majesty's Government will countenance no permanent foreign or European occupation of Palestine, Irak (except the province of Basra) or Syria after the war ; and
(3) that these districts will be in the possession of their natives, and that foreign interference with Arab countries will be restricted to assistance and protection.

15. Commenting on these recommendations, Sir P. Cox (telegram of 25th January 1918) has protested strongly against Mesopotamia being "treated as a pawn in our negotiations or relations with young Arabs of "Egypt and the Sherif" ; and has urged that, if any new declarations are considered necessary, no reference should be made to the promises of 1915, at all events so far as Mesopotamia is concerned. The Government of India (telegram of 29th January) support Sir P. Cox's view, and recommend that, if further discussion with King Husain at the present stage is really unavoidable, an endeavour should be made to obtain the King's assent to a "definite modification of MacMahon's unfortunate pledge in the light of "actual facts and his acceptance of principle that we should have right to "continue administration in both Vilayets with the object of gradually "building up self-government in both."

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT,
INDIA OFFICE,
30th January 1918.

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

(66)

War Office,
Whitehall,
S.W. 1.

The Right Hon.
Earl Curzon of Kedleston K.G.
with the Director of Military Intelligence's
Compliments.

4/9/18

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

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

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WAR CABINET
EC1133
2 WHITEHALL GARDENS

B IV

(Circulated to Eastern Committee)

Copy.
No.303,
(136947/W/44)

EASTERN COMMITTEE.

FOREIGN OFFICE,
August 10th, 1918.

Sir:-

The Italian Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 6th instant, and enquired of Lord Robert Cecil whether any further agreement was being negotiated between Sir Mark Sykes and Monsieur Picot.

Lord Robert Cecil informed His Excellency that the conversations had so far turned almost exclusively on the position of Monsieur Picot in the event of the British troops advancing into that part of Syria which had been reserved to the French, and that the idea was that in agreeing to his exercising the duties of civil and political adviser we should make a joint declaration limiting the extent to which the French and ourselves should administer the Government of the districts reserved to us under the Sykes-Picot agreement.

Lord Robert Cecil observed that there was considerable anxiety in Arab circles lest it should be the intention of His Majesty's Government to annex districts which

His Excellency were

The Right Honourable
Sir R. Rodd, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
etc., etc., etc.

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

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

were populated by Arabs, and it was partly to allay these anxieties that we were considering whether we should formally propose to the French Government some declaration of this kind.

Marquis Imperiali expressed a strong hope that before we made any definite agreement with the French we should keep the Italian Government informed of what we were doing. His Excellency said that Baron Sonnino was exceedingly sensitive on the subject, and would greatly value a volunteered communication from us as a mark of confidence.

Lord Robert Cecil promised Marquis Imperiali to bear in mind the Italian wishes on the subject.

I am, with great truth and respect,

Sir,

Your Excellency's most obedient

humble Servant,

(Signed) V. Wellesley.

(For the Secretary of State)

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

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

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WAR CABINET
E.C. 1700
2 WHITEHALL GARDENS

CIRCULATED TO THE EASTERN COMMITTEE.

No.805. FOREIGN OFFICE,
September 23rd. 1918.

My Lord,

Monsieur Cambon called on me this afternoon and spoke to me about the situation which seemed likely to be created in the immediate future by General Allenby's success in Palestine. The Turkish Armies in that country had apparently been now destroyed, and there seemed every probability that General Allenby would penetrate into Syria. Syria, as Monsieur Cambon reminded me, was, by the Sykes-Picot Agreement within the French sphere of influence, and it was extremely important from the French point of view that this fact should not be lost sight of in any arrangement that General Allenby, as Commander-in-Chief, might make for the administration of the country he was presumably about to occupy.

We had a conversation of considerable length, in which Sir Mark Sykes, the joint author of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, took a part.

Finally, I drafted for Monsieur Cambon's guidance the following statement of policy, which seemed

His Excellency,
The Right Honourable,
The Earl of Derby K.G., G.C.V.O.,
&c. &c. &c.

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

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

seemed to me to be required by the letter and spirit of the Agreement:

Private.

The British Government adhere to their declared policy with regard to Syria: namely that, if it should fall into the sphere of interest of any European Power, that Power should be France. They also think that this policy should be made perfectly clear both in France and elsewhere.

The exact course which should be followed by the two Governments in case General Allenby takes his forces into Syria should be immediately discussed in Paris or London. But it is understood that in any event, wherever officers are required to carry out civilian duties, these officers should (unless the French Government express an opinion to the contrary) be French and not English: without prejudice of course to the supreme authority of the Commander-in-Chief while the country is in military occupation.

Monsieur Cambon, I gathered, regarded this statement as accurate and adequate.

I am with great truth and respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient,

humble Servant,

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

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

B.IV.

F112/277 (71)

From:- G.O.C.in C. Egypt.

To:- C.I.G.S.

Cir. E.C. 1751

Despatched 2.30 a.m. 30.9.18.

E.A.1707 29th September.

Your telegram 67160 cipher 25th September. I do not intend to extend the jurisdiction of the occupied enemy territory administration under General Money into the area of French influence. Wherever administration may be necessary in the French "Blue" area I shall appoint French Military officers. As Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force they will be under my orders, which will be communicated to them through my Chief Political officer. The existing occupied enemy territory administration will not be extended to places East of the Jordan in the "B" area, such as AMMAN and ES Salt, but I am merely appointing a British officer to safeguard the interests of the inhabitants until such time as an Arab administration be formed later. As regards area "A", especially the city of DAMASCUS I shall recognise the local Arab administration which I expect to find in existence and shall appoint French liaison officer as required. I shall continue to communicate with the French Political Mission through my Chief Political officer. By the above procedure I hope to safeguard French and Arab interests at the same time ensuring that supreme control remains in my own hands as Commander-in-Chief.

General Staff,
War Office
1st October, 1918.

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

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

From Political Officer, Baghdad, 4th October 1918.
(Repeated to Simla and Cairo.)
(Received 5th October, 11.30 p.m.)

WAR CABINET
E.C. 1866

[P 4410] 8362. 4th. Following telegram sent to Political Officer, Najaf:—

"Convey thanks of General Officer Commanding-in-Chief to the Ulema notables, merchants, and the Persian Consul for their congratulations. General Officer Commanding-in-Chief desires you to remind them it is well-known to all that Great Britain entered into war with Germany in order to maintain the inviolability of international treaties and the freedom of smaller nations whose welfare depends on the observance of those treaties. The instant result of the victories gained by the arms of the Allies in the Near East is to set at liberty the nationalities which have suffered under the oppression of the Central European Powers and their Allies. Bulgaria has sued for peace, and her defeat entails the evacuation of Serbia and Albania, where the Bulgarian armies have for close on three years spread desolation. With a true regard for the rights of nationalities those regions of Bulgaria which are inhabited by Greeks will be handed over to the custody of Greece, while those which are inhabited by Serbians will be placed in charge of Serbia.

"The same solicitude for the rights of nations governs the policy of the Allies towards the armies. Just as the Serbians have participated in the re-conquest of their native land, so the Arabs have fought side by side with the Allies for the liberation of an Arab province."

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

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(73)

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B.iv. WAR CABINET. SECRET.

EASTERN COMMITTEE. E.C. 1838.

EGYPT.

Decypher. General Clayton(Cairo) October 6th, 1918.
D. 2.50 a.m. October 7th, 1918.
R. 8 a. m. October 8th, 1918.
No. 80.

I have just returned from Damascus. The main points of situation are set forth in Commander-in-Chief's telegrams Nos. 689 and 690 to War Office. It will be seen that Arabs have established in Damascus an Arab administration which was in being when our troops actually entered the city. Ali Pasha Ridi El Rikabi was appointed Governor of occupied territory in areas A and B and has been recognised by Commander-in-Chief as Military Governor.

I proceeded to Damascus with Captain Coulondre on the same train as Commander-in-Chief. Major Cornwallis has been appointed British liaison officer with Arab Administration and Captain Mercier French liaison officer. I have consulted Captain Coulondre and we agree that the two officers should work entirely together and not separate their duties in accordance with the A and B zone as regards their dealings with the Arab Administration. I have shown him my instructions to the British liaison officer which include following points.

Begins. Firstly, Director of Military Operations to maintain close touch with his French Colleague and impress on the Arab Administration the complete agreement existing between two Governments, Secondly, all questions affecting the A area should be referred to the French liaison officer and the policy should be based on the principle that Arab Administration must look for advice and assistance in the A area to the French Government. Thirdly, immediate questions requiring consideration in above connection are currency, relief of distress, public security and restoration of normal conditions. In these and similar questions, he will work together with his French Colleague in order that the latter may make representation to his own Government. Fourthly, I have told him that he may inform the Arab Administration of the general line of demarcation between the A and B and blue areas if he finds it necessary to do so. Fifthly, he should remember that while military (group undecypherable) continue all administration is military and under supreme control of Commander-in-Chief. Ends.

The establishment of exclusive Arab Administration is greeted with universal acclamation but it is early yet to gauge the real feeling of the population in so large a city or to see how they really regard Hashimite influence. French influence appears weak and the general tendency is to turn to the British Authorities for everything. The policy which is being pursued is to refer the Arab Administration to the French for all advice and assistance but it will be necessary for French Government to enunciate liberal policy and to contribute generously to the Arab Administration. It is only thus that they can secure control and the sympathy of the Arab. They are evidently in urgent need of stronger representation (?) here. At present they have only three junior officers of M. Picot who do not carry the necessary weight and are unable to speak with authority. As regards Beirut the situation is difficult and is set forth in Commander-in-Chief's

telegram

79

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

telegram No. 689. The appointment of a French military governor by the Commander-in-Chief will give rise to dissat isfaction especially to Sheriff Feisal but it appears inevitable if French interests are to be safe guarded. In this connection assurances given to the Arab leaders in consequence of telegram No. 753 June 16th, 1918, are interpreted by them as establishing their right but it may fairly be said that evacuation of Beirut by Turkey was a direct consequence of the Commander-in-Chief's capture of Damascus and not due to Arab military action. In any case it is difficult to appreciate the situation exactly until Beirut is occupied by our troops which will not be for some days. A proportion of Druses from the Hauran co-operated with the Arab forces around Deraa and entered Damascus with them. As far as can be ascertained however the Druses are more favourably inclined to the British than to any form of control by a Shereefian Govefnment. They are certainly not pro-French. As regards Damascus itself certain amount of looting by Druses took place when Arab troops first entered which was suppressed by the Arab Authorities who employed Shereefian troops to restore order. Considering the size of the city and the great upheaval which its capture from Turkey has occasioned, the situation is wonderfully quiet. There is sufficient food for the moment but it is essential to restore normal conditions as soon as possible in order that the flow of supplies from the Hauran may not cease in which case Egyptian danger of famine. The most urgent question at present is that of Turkish paper. It passes as long as the banks sanction it but the banks are now asking whether it has any value. The alternatives are to fix a value at approximately that which it has today or to introduce some other form of currency. In the latter case holders of Turkish paper suffer severely. I have brought this question to the notice of the acting French Commission with a view to his making representation to his Government but the matter is an urgent (group omitted).

I hope to return to Damascus in a week's time when the situation should have become more clear. At present it is too confused for a detailed appreciation.

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3 (74)

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-SECRET- WAR CABINET.

EASTERN COMMITTEE.

~~B. iv~~
A. ii FRANCE - MILITARY. E.C. 1835.

Cypher telegram to Lord Derby (Paris)

Foreign Office, October 8th 1918, 11.30 p.m.

No. 2116

Following for Lord Robert Cecil and Sir Mark Sykes from Allenby to War Office dated October 6th No. 695 (BEGINS)
In continuation of No. 689.
The fact that Arab leaders are aware of assurances contained in Foreign Office telegram 753 June 11th 1918 * to High Commissioner complicates position at Beirut; in this wire His Majesty's Government recognised Native Army and sovereign of independent Arabs inhabitating the areas emancipated from Turkish control by action of Arabs themselves during present war. Concerning areas which Allied forces occupy His Majesty's Government drew attention to proclamations issued on capture of Baghdad and Jerusalem and added that future government of these regions would be based principally on consent of those governed. I was not consulted before this assurance was given. Further, Arab leaders have never been officially notified of terms of Anglo-French Agreement.

* Reproduced below for convenience of reference :-

EGYPT. MILITARY.

E.C. 529.

Cypher telegram to Sir R. Wingate (Cairo)

Foreign Office, 11th June, 1918, 7 p.m.

No. 753.

Your despatch No. 90 (of May 7th - Syrian Moslem opinion in Egypt).
Following is reply of His Majesty's Government to memorial of Syrians in Egypt. Text begins. (Beginning of R).
His Majesty's Government have considered the memorial of the seven with the greatest care. His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the reasons why the memorialists desire to retain their annonymity, and the fact that the memorial is anonymous has not in any way detracted from the importance which His Majesty's Government attribute to the document.

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

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

(75)

The areas mentioned in the memorandum fall into four categories :-

1. Areas in Arabia which were free and independent before the outbreak of war.
2. Areas emancipated from Turkish control by the action of the Arabs themselves during the present war;
3. Areas formerly under Ottoman dominion occupied by the Allied forces during the present war.
4. Areas still under Turkish control. In regard to the first two categories, His Majesty's Government recognise the complete and sovereign independence of the Arabs inhabitating these areas and support them in their struggle for freedom.

In regard to the areas occupied by Allied forces, His Majesty's Government draw the attention of the memorialists to the texts of the proclamations issued respectively by the General Officers Commanding in Chief on the taking of Baghdad ( ) and Jerusalem ( ). These proclamations embody the policy of His Majesty's Government towards the inhabitants of those regions. It is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that the future Government of these regions should be based upon the principle of the consent of the Governed and this policy has and will continue to have the support of His Majesty's Government.

In regard to the areas mentioned in the fourth category, it is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that the oppressed peoples of these areas should obtain their freedom and independance and towards the achievement of this object His Majesty's Government continue to labour.

His Majesty's Government are fully aware of, and take into consideration, the difficulties and dangers which beset those who work for the regeneration of the populations of the areas specified.

In spite, however, of these obstacles His Majesty's Government trust and believe that they can and will be overcome, and wish to give all support to those who desire to overcome them. They are prepared to consider any scheme of co-operation which is compatible with existing military operations and consistent with the political principles of His Majesty's Government and the Allies.

(End of R.) Text ends.

You should request Syrians to treat matter as confidential. Please report how reply is received by memorialists.

(12.6. 8-4).

(2)

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

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B.iv. WAR CABINET. SECRET.

EASTERN COMMITTEE. E.C.1916.

EGYPT.

MILITARY.

Decypher. General Clayton (Cairo). 11th. October, 1918.

D. 1.45 a.m. 12th. October, 1918.
R. 5.45 p.m. 12th.

No.110.

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My telegrams 104 of October,9th. and 106 of October 10th.
Situation at Beyrout has become difficult as Shukri Pasha refuses to relinquish his position as Governor without direct orders from Feisal and objects to hauling down the Arab flag. Following is summary of position up to the evening of October 10th. Municipality is willing and anxious to work with French Military Governor Colonel de Piepape. On the other hand Shukri Pasha has been appointed Governor of Beyrout and district by Feisal and is disposing of Police and gendarmerie and parading the town with an escort and flying the Arab flag over the palace. The Arab flag over the municipality has been lowered. Shukri Pasha maintains that he can only leave on direct orders from Feisal and states that he does not believe that we shall forcibly expel him or publicly lower the Arab flag after having fought side by side for so many months.
A later telegram reports a modification of Shukri Pasha's attitude in that he has told the President of the Municipality and heads of police and gendarmerie that in future they should take orders from corps Commander though they should not carry out any orders to lower the Arab flag. Instructions have been sent by Commander-in-Chief to British Liaison Officer at Damascus to request Feisal to order Shukri Pasha to withdraw from the Town as Colonel de Piepape has been appointed Military Governor by the Commander-in-Chief. Feisal has already been informed that only orders and proclamations emanating from Commander-in-Chief are valid. Feisal has attempted to assume control of the Railways and telegraphs at Damascus but he has been informed that all railways and telegraphs must be directly under military authorities.
I shall proceed to Damascus tomorrow and interview Feisal. I shall emphasise instructions which I have telegraphed today to British Liaison Officer and which are as follows: Begins.
The general policy is based on attached Anglo-French agreement. You should warn Feisal that he will only prejudice his case by attempting to control Blue area, final settlement of which must await peace conference. Remind him that status of the Lebanon is peculiar ~~xxx~~ and has been for many years guaranteed by the powers so that in attempting undue interference there he is on very delicate ground. Urge him to devote all his energy to establishing sound administration in the A. and B. areas so that he may be able to show real improvement over Turkish system when the time for final settlement arrives. Inform him that it is very undesirable that he should take action leading to political consequences without taking the advice of the two Liaison officers.
Ends.

(13.10., 8-4)

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

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B.iv. WAR CABINET. SECRET.

22 EASTERN COMMITTEE. E.C.-1918.

EGYPT.

Decypher. General Clayton (Cairo).

October 12th.

D. 11.30 a.m. October 12th, 1918.
R. 12.20 p.m. October 13th, 1918.

No. 115.

Political situation as between French and Arabs is as follows:-

Arabs have never been officially informed of terms of Anglo-French agreement but have a good idea of its provisions owing to Bolshevik indiscretions and publication by Jemal Pasha. This has increased their distrust of French intentions in regard to Syria. They have therefore taken every advantage of the assurances given to the Arab leaders in Foreign Office telegram 753 of June 16th and have nominated Governors to take over control of towns in the coastal area immediately on their evacuation by the Turks. This was the case at Beyrout where an Arab Governor Shukri Pasha El Ayubi was found installed on the arrival of our troops. The Commander-in-Chief appointed Colonel de Piepape as Military Governor but difficulty was caused by Shukri Pasha who refused to give up his post without definite instructions from Feisal. The matter has been arranged locally and Colonel de Piepape has been installed but the main principle has not been settled as Feisal states that he cannot officially recall Shukri without such loss of prestige as might necessitate his resignation, except on the following conditions :-

(1) He wishes to have a personal assurance from the Commander-in-Chief that whatever arrangements may now be made for districts in the coastal area are of a military nature and without prejudice to the eventual settlement which will be decided (? eventually) by the enemy's position at the Peace Conference.

(2) That the Commander-in-Chief's assurance be confirmed in due course by both British and French Governments. Feisal's attitude towards us is one of complete confidence but he is very suspicious of French intentions. I consider it essential that a definite announcement of French policy of a nature to allay these suspicions be made as soon as possible, otherwise we shall have the same difficulties all up the coast as we have had already at Beyrout, Tyre and Sidon. Another serious difficulty, as I have already observed, is the absence of any French official of high standing with wide powers. Problems arise daily in the "A" area on which the Arabs require immediate advice and assistance. We are standing aside in accordance with our agreements with France, but there are no Frenchmen (? permitted) or empowered to act. If the present unsatisfactory situation continues in which we have to hold the balance between French and Arabs, it must end in our being accused of bad faith by both. It is no use the French reiterating their claims unless they take the problem in hand seriously and produce the advice and material assistance which alone can conciliate the considerable body of Arab opinion which at the present moment is opposed to their Syrian policy. It is of interest to note the opinion of our political officer in Beyrout which is regarded as the centre of French influence. He reports that it is difficult to gauge public opinion accurately but he estimates that 75% of the population desire autonomy under British guidance, 10% hold similar views but wish for French guidance, while 15% would prefer a Sherifian form of Government.

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

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WAR CABINET.
EASTERN COMMITTEE.

B. iv.

E.C. 1915.

FUTURE GOVERNMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

Copy of a letter from Lord R. Cecil to M. Pichon covering a draft Memorandum.

Dear M. Pichon,

In reference to the affiars of Syria of which you spoke to me to-day, I have great pleasure in sending you the annexed Memorandum to which the Prime Minister agrees. It has not yet been approved by the Cabinet and until that has taken place it must be treated as to that extent provisional.

Yours very sincerely,
(Intd) R.C.

DRAFT MEMORANDUM.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
PARIS.
October 8th 1918.

His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the arrangement reached at the Conference held at the Foreign Office on the 30th day of September upon the understanding that it is to be treated solely as providing for the situation caused by the recent advance of General Allenby's force into Syria and is to be deemed to refer only to the territories occupied, or to be occupied, by that force.

With regard to the future government of the other territories mentioned in the Anglo-French Convention of 1916, His Majesty's Government think it right to point out that the general position has so much changed since that Agreement was entered into that its provisions do not in all respects appear suitable to present conditions. Not only has the military position in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria completely altered but two political changes of vast importance have taken place. The United States have come into the war and Russia has gone out. It is manifest on the one hand that America cannot be ignored in any settlement of the future of these countries and particularly of Syria and Palestine. And on the other the arrangements contemplated for the North Eastern part of Armenia have been completely upset by the collapse of Russia. A further difficulty is caused by Clause 9 of the Treaty of London which recognises the claims of Italy in connection with the Eastern Mediterranean. The provisional suggestions made at Saint-Jean de Maurienne for meeting these claims have lapsed and indeed would in any case be difficult now to enforce without protests from Greece and even from Turkey. While calling attention to these points His Majesty's Government feel that it would be useless to attempt a settlement of them at the present moment and they suggest that they should form the subject of fresh conversations in which the Governments of Italy and the United States as well as the French and British Governments should be invited to take part.

(Signed) ROBERT CECIL.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1
12th October, 1918.

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

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WAR CABINET
E.C. 3054
2, WHITEHALL GARDENS

GENERAL STAFF, W.O.
M. I. 2.
23 OCT 1918
DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

(79)

Operations.

From:- G.O.C. in C. Egypt.

To :- War Office.

Despatched 1900 21st October, 1918.
Received 0330 22nd October, 1918.

I.6979. 21st October.

Feisal is anxious that there should be a more clear definition with regard to his position. Hitherto he has been regarded as Commander of the Arab Forces in Syria solely while the man regarded as my military administrator of such occupied territory in "A" and "B" areas as are under my control has been Ali Rida.

The relative position of the two requires regulating, as Feisal claims to have appointed Ali Rida as military governor of all Syria (an appointment which cannot be recognised).

Therefore Feisal is being informed that I shall regard him as supreme authority in Syria on all Arab matters whether administrative or military in future. Feisal approves this arrangement.

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

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WAR CABINET
E.C. 2051
WHITEHALL GARDENS

MILITARY.

ITALY.

Cypher telegram to Sir R. Rodd, (Rome),
Foreign Office, October 22nd. 1918. 1.45.p.m.
No.1581.

(Asia Minor and the Arab question).

Your telegram No.745 (of October 14th).

Italian Government have expressed concurrence in terms of modus vivendi which we are concluding with French Government for administration of areas recognised as of French interest in Agreement of 1916. In expressing to French Government our acceptance of modus vivendi we have made it clear that it is to be treated as providing solely for the situation created by our military advance and is to apply only to the territories occupied or to be occupied by General Allenby's forces.

2. With regard to the other territories mentioned in the Anglo-French Convention of 1916 we have pointed out that the entry of the United States into the war and the collapse of Russia have so completely changed the situation that the provisions of the agreement are no longer suitable in all respects to present conditions. We have expressed the opinion that it would be useless to attempt a settlement of the question at present and have suggested that

it

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

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

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it should form the subject of fresh conversations in which both the Italian and United States Governments should be invited to take part. I have reason to believe French Government accept this view of the situation.

3. I hope that Italian Government may take part in these discussions and in expressing this wish to Italian Ambassador I am assuring him that there is no intention by initiating such discussions to call in question the validity of the Treaty of London of 1915 which remains in full force and effect.

4. The British and French Governments are about to issue a declaration to the effect that they propose to assist native populations to establish Governments in liberated territories but not to impose them any special form of Government.

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

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MILITARY.

B iv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

WAR CABINET E.C.2065. 2, WHITEHALL GARDENS

Cypher telegram to Mr. Barclay, (Washington);

Foreign Office, October 23rd. 1918. 6.0.p.m.

No.6360.

(Situation in Asia Minor).

Since despatch of my personal telegram of October 10th situation in Asia Minor has developed as follows:-

As a result of our advance interpretation of our Agreement of 1916 with the French became a matter of urgency. From publication made by the Bolsheviks and from other sources both Arabs and French public were aware of general tenour of Agreement and it became necessary to reach some working arrangement with the French in order to avoid serious complications which might hamper our further military operations.

2. Modus Vivendi has accordingly been arranged whereby while supreme authority in all matters is left with Commander-in-Chief civil administration in the districts recognised by the Agreement as having special interest for the French is to be in the hands of French officials acting as General Allenby's political advisers.

3. In intimating to French Government our acceptance

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

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acceptance of this arrangement we have stipulated that it is to apply only to the territories occupied, or to be occupied by General Allenby's force. With regard to the future Government of the other territories mentioned in the 1916 Agreement we have pointed out that the provisions of that Agreement no longer appear suitable in all respects to present conditions in that the entry of the United States into the war and the defection of Russia have radically changed the whole situation. We have therefore suggested that as it would be useless to attempt a settlement at present this question should form the subject of fresh conversations in which the United States and Italian Governments should also be invited to take part. We have ground for believing that the French Government will accept this suggestion.

4. In informing the Italian Ambassador of the substance of the above communication to the French Government we have invited Italian participation in the proposed conversations while assuring His Excellency at the same time that there is no intention of calling in question the validity of the Treaty of London of 1915.

5. But in addition to these measures for meeting the immediate practical difficulties with the French and placing the question in its wider aspect

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

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

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(3).

aspect on a proper Inter-Allied footing it has become essential to make some public declaration in order to allay the misgivings and suspicions of the Arabs and Syrians which may be dangerously exploited by our enemies. It has therefore been decided to publish an Anglo-French declaration outlining the policy which the two countries wish to pursue in the territories in Syria and Mesopotamia delivered from the Turkish yoke and we have stipulated that this declaration should be communicated to President Wilson before publication. The text will be telegraphed to your French colleague and you should co-operate with him in communicating it to the President with the least possible delay and telegraph when this has been done.

6. You should also explain frankly to the State Department the whole situation as set out in this telegram.

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

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

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EGYPT.

Cypher telegram to General Clayton (Cairo)

Foreign Office 25th. October 1918. 6.45 p.m.

No.222 (R).

Following memorandum is being presented to French Ambassador here:-

MEMORANDUM.

On the 17th. November, 1917, the Conference of Missionary Societies in Great Britain and Ireland presented to Mr. Balfour a memorandum regarding the position of missionary work in Palestine and Syria in relation to any future Government which may be established in these territories.

2. This memorandum drew attention to the work and to the rights and established interests of missionary societies in these parts of the Turkish Empire and to the claims of the British Missions to have restored to them the property taken from them in the course of the present war. The memorandum further expressed the hope that the following two principles might be laid down in any arrangement made respecting the future government of Syria and Palestine:-

(1) That both the native inhabitants of these countries and foreign residents shall enjoy full religious liberty, and that the followers of all religions shall be

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

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be free from interference in the exercise of their religion, and from any political or civil disability on the ground of their religious beliefs or in consequence of a change of faith.

(2) That British subjects in the peaceable pursuit of their calling as Christian Missionaries shall not be hindered or interfered with and shall be at no disadvantage as compared with the citizens of other nations or the followers of other creeds; and that British Churches and Missionary Societies shall be permitted to acquire and hold property and to erect buildings for missionary purposes.

3. In view of recent events these principles become of immediate importance and though the British Government assume that they are already recognised by all the Allied Governments, it is clear that many difficult questions will arise in their application. These questions will have to be dealt with in the final settlement and it would be well that they should, without delay, form the subject of consideration by the various Allied Governments. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government have taken steps to bring these principles to General Allenby's attention, and Mr. Balfour assumes that French officials acting in these territories under the

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

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

the terms of the recently concluded agreement will likewise be guided by them."

Administration under General Allenby's authority should of course be conducted in accordance with these principles so far as possible.

Please report any problems which may arise from time to time in this connexion.

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

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

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WAR CABINET
E.C. 2131
2, WHITEHALL GARDENS

FOR CIRCULATION TO EASTERN COMMITTEE.

No.176523/W/44.

FOREIGN OFFICE,
October 25th, 1918.

Your Excellency:-

1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note which you were good enough to address to me on October 22nd on the subject of the provisional arrangement of September 30th for the administration of the districts occupied by our military forces in the Levant.

2. I note that in Your Excellency's communication reference is made to a Haut Commissaire francais and that it is stated that the provisional arrangement applies to Palestine and will eventually apply to Cilicia. I would point out that none of these expressions are to be found in the agreement of September 30th which we have recently confirmed by an exchange of notes. Under that arrangement the official who is to be recognised as chief political officer, subject to the conditions stated in the arrangement itself, is styled "the representative of the French Government". There is not and cannot be any question of appointing a French High Commissioner and any attempt to create in Syria a French official of that description would produce the greatest unrest among the Arabs, and is explicitly objected to by

Excellency General
Monsieur Cambon, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.
&c., &c., &c.

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

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

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General Allenby, the Commander-in-Chief.

3. Further, the agreement refers to "territory occupied or to be occupied" and not to Cilicia, as to which no question arises at present, since it has not been occupied and may not be occupied in the future; still less does the agreement refer to Palestine which is outside the area of special French interest.

4. While taking note with pleasure of the acceptance by the French Government of our proposal that fresh conversations on the subject of the territories comprised in the agreement of 1916 should take place between the Governments of France Italy, the United States and Great Britain, His Majesty's Government find the reference to "the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire" in this connection open to possible misconstruction. If it means, as it no doubt does, that the territory in which the Ottoman Turks unquestionably predominate may rightly be claimed by a Turkish Government, His Majesty's Government would in principle agree, But the phrase might convey the impression, far removed as I assume from the intentions of the French Government, that Turkish domination over other races, such as for instance, the Armenians, the Syrians and the Jews, was not to be entirely abolished, and to any policy of that kind the British Government would be as resolutely opposed as would doubtless be the French Government also.

5. We seek, as has often been said, a lasting peace and such a peace must be based not on any considerations of finance or political advantage for this or that Power,

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

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

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Power, but on the principle of giving to each people as far as possible the Government which is most in accord with its desires and most likely to secure for it stability and prosperity, having regard to all relevant historical, geographical and strategic considerations.

6. Finally, His Majesty's Government, though always ready and willing to discuss with the French Government with the frankness and cordiality which befit Allies all questions connected with the subject matter of these agreements, yet ventures to point out that our experience of 1916 indicates the disadvantages and dangers of any separate negotiations between France and Great Britain upon a subject which is of great interest and importance to their other Ally, Italy.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) R. Graham.

(For the Secretary of State)

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

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SECRET.

Sir S Macdonogh Oct 28 1918

Printed for the War Cabinet, November, 1918.

E.C. 2133

NOTE ON POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

A.—The victories of General Allenby, culminating in the capture of Aleppo and the consequent liberation of all Syria from Turkish domination, together with the apparent imminence of an armistice with Turkey, render it essential that the position of Great Britain in relation to Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia should be reviewed, and that a final decision should be reached as to the policy which should be adopted in those countries.

B.—The chief obstacle to a satisfactory solution of the problems presented, at least so far as Syria is concerned, consists in the attitude of the French. They are intensely jealous of any interference by third parties in that area, while their claims are based on sentiment rather than on any solid foundation, such as that of military conquest. That difficulties would arise with the French in the event of British troops invading Syria has been foreseen since the early days of the war, and it was for the purpose of providing some *modus vivendi* both then and when peace was declared that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was concluded in the Spring of 1916. It is doubtful if this Agreement could ever have been satisfactory at any rate, owing to its inherent faults and to the vastly altered circumstances of the present time, it has become not merely unsatisfactory but a positive source of danger, likely to lead to constant friction with France, and, not improbably, to an eventual rupture with that Power.

C.—The circumstances which have contributed most largely to the discrediting of the Sykes-Picot Agreement are the following :—

(1.) The Arab revolt, which has led to the expulsion of the Turks from Hejaz, and has been an important factor in the deliverance of Syria from the Ottoman yoke.

(2.) The conquest of Palestine and Syria by General Allenby with practically no military assistance from the French, but with important assistance from the Arabs.

(3.) As a result of (1) and (2), the establishment of Feisal and an Arab administration in Damascus and other parts of Syria.

(4.) The recognition of Zionism by the British Government.

(5.) The revolution and subsequent, and still existing, anarchy in Russia.

(6.) The further massacres of Armenians, which have greatly decreased the numbers of that people.

(7.) The British conquest of Mesopotamia.

(8.) The wave of democratic feeling which has passed over the world and which has expressed itself in the condemnation of secret diplomacy, and of Imperial aggression, and in the acceptance of the principle, so loudly voiced by President Wilson, of popular determination.

(9.) The entry of the United States into the war.

D.—Every one of these circumstances has militated against the usefulness of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The Arab revolt and the Anglo-Arab conquest of Syria have converted an academic exercise into a treaty fraught with the gravest practical consequences. Not least among the factors now apparent is the intensity of the mistrust of the French evinced by the Arabs and their resentment against the administration of Arab districts by Frenchmen. The danger of the position produced by adherence to the terms of the 1916 Agreement is exemplified by General Officer Commanding in-Chief, Egypt's, telegram No. I. 7052 P., of the 26th October, relating to Feisal's objection to the Ottoman Kazas of Hasbeya Rasheya and Baalbek being placed under the French Chief Administrator.

E.—It seems unnecessary to elaborate this point any further, as for some months past the Eastern Committee has recognized the imperfections and dangers of the Agreement and has sought some means of cancelling it. It is suggested that the best means of achieving this result is through the intervention of President Wilson, whose principles are diametrically opposed to those of the Agreement. It will be by insisting

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on the principle of self-determination that the Agreement will best be avoided, and it is essential that in any Conference which may be assembled to consider the affairs of Syria, the Arabs should be represented equally with the Americans, British, French and Italians.

F.—If this principle of self-determination is adopted it is probable that a settlement could be reached on the following lines :—

(i.) The northern boundary of Sinai to pass just north of Gaza and Beersheba to the southern end of the Dead Sea.

(ii.) Palestine, under a Jewish-Arab Administration, but subject to British protection, to extend from the Northern boundary of Sinai (as in (i.)) to the Litani, and to be bounded on the east by the eastern edge of the Jordan Valley between the Yermuk Valley and the Wadi el Hesa.

(iii.) Haifa to become a British Naval Base.

(iv.) France to be given the control of the non-Arab area north of the Litani, west of the crest of the Lebanon, and south of a line joining the north end of the Lebanon with a point on the coast just south of Tripoli, as well as the district about Alexandretta, from Arsus (exclusive) to Bayas (inclusive) with the hinterland as far as the crest of the Amanus.

(v.) The Arabs to have all the remainder of the Arab speaking parts of Syria, together with the coast line from Tripoli to Arsus, both inclusive, the eastern boundary of Syria to run southwards along the right bank of the Euphrates, as far as its confluences with the Kharbur. Under the principle of self-determination it is almost certain that Great Britain would be given the controlling voice in the Arab area, this area should be under the rule of Feisal.

(vi.) The Armenians to be given the Cilician Plain with the coast line from Bayas (exclusive) to Mersina (inclusive). The western boundary might run from west of the latter port to the west of Hajjin and the extent of the territory would be dependent on the number of Armenians that could be collected in it. Some transference of population would be essential here, and probably elsewhere as well.

(vii.) A separate Arab State, but also under British influence, to be constituted in the Arab-speaking districts of Jezireh, that is in area bounded on the west by the Euphrates from above Birijik to the mouth of the Kharbur, and thence eastwards to the right bank of the Tigris, and including Jebel Sinjar. Sherif Zeid would be a suitable ruler.

(viii.) Irak, from north of Mosul to the Gulf, to form a separate Arab State, with capital at Baghdad and under direct British administration. Sherif Abdullah might be made the ruler. If British rule were firmly established behind this Arab-façade there would be no reason to discriminate between the Basra-Qurna area and the remainder of Mesopotamia.

(ix.) No foreign Power other than Great Britain should be allowed any voice in the country south of the dotted line on the map accompanying the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

G.—It should be noted that there is a great difference in Arab sentiment regarding Syria and Mesopotamia. The Arabs are determined that in the former a purely Arab administration is to be established, and that they will not tolerate any foreign advisres or employees other than salaried servants of the Arab State. In Mesopotamia, however, they recognize the British right of conquest, and would acquiesce in a British protectorate. While, therefore, it would be permissible to have a British Resident in Baghdad, it would be only proper to maintain a British Minister in Damascus. At the same time the Syrian State should be united by close ties with Great Britain. Feisal is about to raise a force of 8,500 gendarmes of whom half are to be mounted, and a standing army of two brigades for the purpose of policing Syria and of preventing any revulsion of feeling against himself and King Hussein when peace comes. It is essential that these forces should be equipped by the British, as all Shereefian troops have hitherto been, and not by the French, and Feisal should be granted by Great Britain such financial assistance as he may need.

H.—It must be remembered that it will be possible to raise an army of some 300,000 men in Syria. If the Government of that country is friendly to Great Britain it will be necessary to retain a far smaller British garrison in Egypt than if the Syrian administration is under French influence, and consequently a lesser drain will be imposed on the resources of the Empire.

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I.—Too much stress cannot be laid on the danger attaching to any attempt to place the Syrian Arabs under French control. Unless some scheme can be devised for deflecting the French elsewhere, it is not unlikely that the Turks may come to some agreement with the Arabs which will be in every way contrary to British interests not merely in Syria but elsewhere in the Middle East. This is a very real danger.

K.—It would seem not out of place to mention here the importance of the proposal made by the War Office in their Memorandum of the 21st October, for the creation of one political department for the whole Arab area, and for the appointment of a High Commissioner to deal with the affairs of the district. It is suggested that this officer should not be directly connected with the Egyptian administration, and that he should not have his seat of Government in Cairo, though some place on the Suez Canal such as Ismailia would not be unsuitable. He should have his subordinate officials in Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Jedda, Aden, &c.

L.—So far nothing has been said of the position of King Hussein. He should remain the ruler of the Hejaz and it would appear that he would be satisfied if he were prayed for in all mosques in the Arab area. His obvious successor is his son Ali.

(Signed) G. M. W. MACDONOGH.

28*th October*, 1918.

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

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WAR CABINET E.C. 2137 WHITEHALL GARDENS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

MILITARY.

Decypher. Mr. Barclay (Washington)
November 3rd, 1918.

R. 1.30.p.m. November 3rd, 1918.

No. 4263.

Urgent.

Secret. Your telegram No. 6526.

Text of Anglo-French declaration was presented to President this afternoon by French Ambassador. Wording of passage mentioned by you was as stated in your telegram.

In handing it to the President Monsieur Jusserand alluded to various agreements saying that they had been negotiated at a time when there was a very exacting Russia to deal with and that he supposed they might be subject to some revision. He did this knowing that President objected to them.

After reading translation of text which Monsieur Jusserand handed to him at the same time as original President praised sentiments which had inspired declaration and which he said were the same as those he had expressed so often himself. He seemed concerned however as to prospects which would lead he thought through force of circumstances to creation of sphere(s) of influence, some resulting from assistance rendered, others from community of interests and yet others from proximity -

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

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

- all of which were legitimate.

President then referred to a scheme which he said was in his mind, though without definite form, whereby the league of nations should assume care of regions such as those that formed object of our declaration, and entrust their welfare and development to the care of a small neutral nation acting as it were as trustee.

Monsieur Jusserand pointed out that whatever practicability of such a scheme it might well happen that local populations would prefer to deal with great Powers whom they knew than with a neutral they did not know, and that to impose a neutral upon them against their will would be in opposition to President's own tenets. President saw justice of this remark.

French Ambassador gathered firm impression that President will propound such a scheme as roughly described above at Peace Conference.

French Ambassador is not in possession of various documents mentioned by you and consequently does not propose to make any further communication to President or State Department for the present.

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

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GENERAL STAFF, W.O.
M. I. 2.
5 NOV 1918
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

B.4

RECONSTRUCTION OF ARABIA.

The wish of the last generation of British statesmen (expressed in many ways beside the Bagdad Railway Agreements and the Alexandretta negotiations of 1915) to withdraw from their Imperial position in the Middle East, made it desirable to find indirect means of keeping intact our "Monroe" area, the quadrangle of land between Egypt, Alexandretta, Persia and the Indian Ocean. When war broke out an urgent need to divide Islam was added, and we became reconciled to seek for allies rather than subjects. We therefore took advantage of the dissatisfaction felt by the Arabic-speaking peoples (formerly voiced by Abbas Hilmi) with their alien rulers, and of the tendency, each day more visible, of the subject eastern peoples to demand a share in the dangers of government. We hoped by the creation of a ring of client states, themselves insisting on our patronage, to turn the present and future flank of any foreign power with designs on the three rivers.

The greatest obstacle, from the war standpoint, to an Arab movement, was its greatest virtue in peace time—the lack of solidarity between the various Arabic movements. The local jealousies in Syria, in Mesopotamia, in Arabia and in Egypt made it hard to know where or with whom to begin. There were abortive attempts with Sayid Taleb and with Aziz el Masri before we made up our minds to concentrate on the Sherif of Mecca. The Sherif was ultimately chosen because of the rift he would create in Islam, because his geographical position gave him a fair chance of surviving, and because his pre-eminence amongst Arabs was based on the arbitrary and empiric, but in the East unassailable, ground of family prestige.

Negotiations began between the Sherif and Sir Henry MacMahon, who was given discretion by the British Government to conclue an agreement that would bring him in. Sir Henry was unfortunately not informed of the Sykes-Picot Agreement then in proof. The Sherif had no idea that we wanted him only as a figure-head; throughout the correspondence he spoke as the mandatory of the Arabs—meaning everyone under Turkish rule who spoke Arabic.

His first season as a rebel was not fortunate, and his chances were not improved by the dismissal of Sir Henry MacMahon and the substitution of Sir Archibald Murray, Sir Reginald Wingate and Colonel Brimond as his advisors. Nevertheless he was able eventually to carry all Western Arabia with him from Mecca northwards, until the occupation of Akaba by Feisul in August, 1917, closed the Sherefian military movement.

Feisul now undertook for his father (who had aged very fast) the liberation of Syria. His status for so doing was as a sealed member of the Syrian Revolutionary Committee. He remained in constant touch with his fellow-members in Egypt, with him in the field, and in undelivered Syria, treating them as colleagues. For his instrument he formed a regular army of Syrians and Mesopotomians, and returned to the Hejaz all his Arabians. As a detail of interest I may mention that only 8 Hejazis shared in the entry into Damascus.

Feisul's military operation could not be independent: he made himself the handmaid of General Allenby, the Allied Commander-in-Chief. I hope that in dividing the common spoils we will not descend to commercial arguments of the exact participating contingents of British, French, Indian, Arab, Jew, or Armenian troops. The Commander-in-Chief's Arab alliance enabled him to throw his cavalry, without lines of communication or the usual precautions, from Jaffa to Aleppo in pursuit of the Turks through country nominally hostile, but really our own. General Allenby reversed the old policy towards the Arabs, and helped them in every way he could in materials, advice and men. Their rapid success is due to him.

The war work of the ruling family of Mecca is now completed. We can hardly question the courage of King Hussein, who joined us, against Feisul's advice, soon after the fall of Kut, with the example of our other small friends before his eyes. It is also easy to see the moral ordeal it has been for the oldest, most holy, and most powerful family of the Arabs (a people who lay more stress on faith and pedigree than others), to cast off the friends and allegiance of a lifetime and to incur, on behalf of their national freedom, the unmeasured abuse of India, Turkey, Afghanistan and Egypt.

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The physical dangers and sufferings of the four princes in the very difficult campaigns of 1916, 1917 and 1918 must be reckoned to their credit. The loyalty to their word and Allies of the old King and his sons, who have refused from the Turks successive offers of autonomy in Arabia, independence in Arabia with autonomy in Syria, and of the Khalifate, with independence in Arabia and autonomy in all the Arabic provinces, may be recommended as an example to the Power which persuaded him to revolt, but which was ready, without his knowledge, to hand him over, with the people for whom he stood guardian, to the Turks on much worse terms.

The Present Intention of the Arab Governments.

(*a.*) In Arabia, meaning the peninsula proper, the old man of Mecca intends to be the unquestioned head. If he has patience, he will become so by slow processes of time and pilgrimage. As, however, he is foolish, it would be well if one of his sons joined him soon at Mecca. In Yemen the Sherif has no concrete aims. Ibn Rashid and Kuweit are already in touch with him. In Nejd, the situation created by the indirect conflict of India and Egypt over Ibn Saud and the Idrisi presents no real difficulties. Both men are fortunately heretics in Islam, not much better than the Agha Khan in orthodox opinion. Idrisi tried to graft elements of African fetishism on the abstract creeds of Arabia, and is failing. His disappearance is only a question of years. Ibn Saud is now striving to limit the puritan revival becoming too strong for him. If he is carried away by it, and attacks the holy places, the orthodox Islam will deal with him, as with his ancestor. If he can control it he will remain Emir of Nejd after military failure has warned him to recognize the Sherif as his overlord. I think Ibn Saud is friendly to us and that he is the only person so minded in his dominions.

I would like to suggest that the experience of the last four years has shown the undesirability of allowing Arabia to be controlled by any or by all of the present authorities in Cairo, Bagdad, Damascus or Simla. We have been provincial, if not parochial, in view.

(*b.*) In Syria the Arab movement becomes really important, since its origin was to prevent the man-power and strategic advantages of that country falling into the hands of any continental power. For this purpose the Arabs require equal rights with any other power in the Gulf of Alexandretta, the coast line from there to Tripoli, the port of Tripoli and its railway to Homs, the Bukaa from Homs to Lake Huleh, access by treaty to Haifa, and all the country east of this line and the Jordan. Further, Feisul requires to be sovereign in his dominions, with complete liberty to choose any foreign advisers he wants of any nationality he pleases. These advisers will be part of the Arab Government and will draw their executive authority from it and not from their own Government. It may be possible to secure Arab recognition of the Turkish Dette in return for an equitable share of the Beyrout and Haifa Customs receipts. Feisul will, however, not consider himself bound by any agreement to which he is not a party.

His assets in Syria are not small. He controls most of the good corn land and the four industrial towns. He has 80 per cent. of the Moslems (including all the fighting men) on his side, all the Ansariya, all the Jews. He has inherited the old Turkish Civil Service, all whose lower ranks, and many of whose upper ranks, are Arab. He himself is clear-sighted and well educated, and is capable of satisfying the needs of Syria in local self-government. If he fails the responsibility will lie at the door of the European Powers, in whose word he shows an undue simplicity of trust.

(*c.*) In Palestine the Arabs hope that the British will keep what they have conquered. They will not approve Jewish independence in Palestine, but will support so far as they can Jewish infiltration, if it is behind a British, as opposed to an international, façade. If any attempt is made to set up the international control proposed in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Feisul will press for self-determination in Palestine, and give the moral support of the Arab Government to the peasantry of Palestine, to resist expropriation.

(*d.*) In Irak the Arabs expect the British to keep control. The Sherif, relying on his agreement with us, hopes for a nominal Arab administratien there.

(*e.*) In Jezireh there are very vivid Arab Nationalists, but they are in an unsatisfactory geographical position, until a proportion of the nomadic and settled Kurds can be persuaded to join hands with the local government requirod there.

I would suggest that areas *d* and *e* should be kept quite separate, at least administratively. The problems of Irak are those of great public works and of a highly developed agriculture. The problems of Jezireh are those of turbulent mountain villagers, and semi-nomadic tribes.

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The Kurdish question is likely to be much larger and more difficult than the Armenian one.

If representations of small nations are admitted to the Peace Conference the cry of self-determination is likely to be raised, and agreements made semi-secretly between the Powers previously may be regarded with some suspicion. For this reason I would suggest that no second edition of the Sykes-Picot Treaty be produced. The geographical absurdities of the present Agreement will laugh it out of court, and it would be perhaps as well if we spared ourselves a second effort on the same lines. If we do not, I hope that we will at least recognize our official inclusion of the Arabs among the belligerents, and make them a party to any decisions affecting Arab areas conquered by themselves.

T. E. LAURENCE,
Lieut.-Colonel.

4th November, 1918.

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

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EASTERN. [November 5.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[183342]

PAPERS RELATING TO KING HUSEIN'S VERSION OF HIS AGREEMENTS WITH HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.

(Secret.)

KING HUSEIN'S letter of the 28th August, 1918, to Sir Reginald Wingate (Enclosure 1 in No. 1) has created a very serious situation.

The memorandum (Enclosure 2 in No. 1) which the King entitles a "Translation of the Agreement come to with the British Government regarding the (Arab) Rising and its Foundation," does not correspond to any document which has been assented to, or even seen by, His Majesty's Government. Our commitments to King Husein, unlike those to the Idrisi and Bin Saud, were never embodied in a single statement signed by both parties, but took the form of a correspondence between the King and Sir H. McMahon, who was High Commissioner at Cairo at the time of these negotiations.

The commitments made in this correspondence on the part of His Majesty's Government are reviewed, together with those of later date, in a memorandum ("Special," 3) recently printed and circulated by the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, which may be referred to here.

The version of these commitments set out in the King's memorandum in no way corresponds to the actual facts, but is simply a repetition, in more concise form, of the demands originally made by the King when he opened negotiations in July 1915. Some of these demands were accepted, and others rejected by His Majesty's Government in the course of the negotiations.

It is not suggested that, in presenting this memorandum, the King is acting in bad faith. Oriental diplomacy is seldom precise unless compelled to be so, and the method by which the negotiations were conducted in 1915–6 left something to be desired in this respect. It is more probable that the King genuinely believes his memorandum to represent the sense of what was tacitly, if not explicitly, agreed to by His Majesty's Government, and there is little reason to doubt that he is in earnest in threatening to abdicate, if his view of what was agreed upon is not adopted by us.

It must be noted that the first two documents printed here, with their enclosures, were written before General Allenby's advance in Syria and the conclusion of an armistice with Turkey. But No. 4 shows that the situation, as regards His Majesty's Government's relations with King Husein, has been aggravated rather than relieved by these events.

Eastern Department, Foreign Office, November 5, 1918.

No. 1.

Sir R. Wingate to Mr. Balfour.

(No. 219. Secret.)

Sir, *Ramleh, September 21, 1918.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith translation of a letter, dated at Mecca on the 28th ultimo, and addressed to me by the King of the Hejaz. (Enclosure 1 in No. 1.)

In this letter King Husein declares that the fundamental purpose of his movement was to preserve the political state of Islam, which is threatened with decline by the demolition of the Ottoman Empire; and that the justification of his revolt, and of His Majesty's Government's support thereof, is contingent on the practical realisation of this fundamental aim. In view of new circumstances and, he hints, of certain disconcerting indications of a changed policy, he deems it necessary to take stock of his situation, and to ascertain precisely how far His Majesty's Government still subscribe to what he regards as the essential conditions of future success. To this end he sets forth, in an enclosure with his letter (Enclosure 2 in No. 1), his conception of the terms of his formal agreements with His Majesty's Government; and affirms that any

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substantial modification of them would leave him no option but to withdraw from all further participation in the Arab movement. In conclusion he expresses the hope that his fate may be decided by His Majesty's Government and not deferred for consideration by a Peace Conference.

As will be seen from a note—marked "A" and attached—by the Arab bureau,* the terms now quoted by King Husein are quite unacceptable as they stand. He has, in fact, merely reiterated the demands in his letters written previous to the revolt, with several additions to them, and has totally ignored the reservations imposed by His Majesty's Government in their replies. His general point of view is substantially as described in the first part of my despatch No. 129 of the 25th June. He is doubtful of his capacity unaided to realise his aims, and fearful of the censure which he feels will be meted out to him, as a duped schismatic, by Moslems if he fails. He is oppressed with affairs of State, accepted at an advanced age and under conditions of exceptional difficulty. He probably realises that the political Caliphate as conceived by Sultan Abdul-Hamid must disappear, but he is sufficiently conservative and under the influence of contemporary opinion to believe that a leader is still essential to the unity of Islam, and that such a leader must have, at any rate, a façade of Empire behind him.

Although I think it not improbable that Sunnite opinion on this subject will change, and will incline gradually to what I may term a "pontific" conception of the Caliph—I already see some slight indications of this amongst Moslem "intellectuals"—yet I have little doubt that King Husein's view is still that of the very large majority of his co-religionists. I also think that we shall be well advised to recognise actual Moslem sentiment in this respect, not in order to perpetuate an impracticable and dangerous conception, but as a means of counteracting Ottoman reactionary intrigue after the war, and to facilitate the smooth transition of Sunnite opinion from a temporal to a spiritual conception of the Caliphate.

I have set forth this somewhat theoretic aspect of the matter because I regard it as very pertinent to the proper consideration of our policy at the present juncture. Moslems in general have hitherto regarded the Hejaz revolt, and our share in it, with suspicion or dislike. In their eyes its justification is contingent on its success; failure would be seriously detrimental to our prestige and to our future relations with them. I consider that the withdrawal of King Husein from active leadership of the Arab movement would entail consequences little short of disastrous. It would remove the only commanding figure and reduce Arab military participation to spasmodic tribal activity against the Turks. Further disintegration would ensue, leading, in all probability, to a conflagration in Central Arabia of which our enemies would take full advantage, and which would seriously affect our military operations. It is, therefore, highly important to reassure the King, and to rectify his present attitude, which appears to be due, primarily, to uncertainty of our real intentions and policy regarding him. The Khurma incident, the disagreement with Emir Feisal (see my telegram 1335), and the tone of King Husein's letters, all indicate that the state of tension is increasing and, unless relieved at once, will produce a situation from which the King will seek escape by carrying out his threat of resignation.

In these circumstances I submit that there are only two courses open to us:—

1. To take King Husein into our confidence, as far as we can, and to inform him of our intentions in regard to him; or
2. To leave matters as they are and risk the collapse of the Arab movement.

Of these two alternatives I very strongly recommend the former for immediate adoption.

I am not aware to what extent the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement are still considered binding; and consequently, in considering the nature of the assurances we might give King Husein regarding Syria and the future arrangements in Central and Southern Arabia, I have not attempted to indicate the points on which previous reference to the French Government would be required.

In the first place I think it safe to assume that he now realises that any connection that may exist between his Government and the future Governments in Syria and Mesopotamia will be no more than nominal; and that his personal relations with the Moslem populations of these regions will be determined by his success or failure to establish a predominant position in Arabia. He should, therefore, have no real cause

* Not printed, since the passages quoted will be found in the memorandum ("Special," 3), recently printed and circulated by the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, on British commitments to King Husein.

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for complaint provided he is reassured that within the legitimate area of Arab irredentism there shall be no annexation of territory by an European Power, and that the new forms of Government within the area shall be instituted with the consent of the local inhabitants. The question of our policy within the Arabian Peninsula is on a different footing, and affects the King very intimately indeed. He perceives, and strongly resents, our uncertainty on the subject, and feels—not, I think, unreasonably—that unless his pre-eminence is secured, Arabia will remain a field of petty strife, its tribal and other units disunited and apt for Turkish and other enemy intrigue. Mindful of our pledges given him before his revolt against the Turks, and conscious alike of the moral obligations then incurred by us towards him and of his loyalty to our alliance, he expects our support—at the least, diplomatic—of his Peninsula schemes. These latter were discussed in the note enclosed with my despatch No. 315 of the 25th December last. I feel very strongly that the time has come when the policy suggested in that note and in my subsequent despatch No. 89, of the 7th May should be definitely accepted as the policy of His Majesty's Government, and then communicated to all British authorities concerned for their information and guidance.

If this is accepted, a verbal communication on the subject should be made to King Husein without further delay. I suggest the following as suitable:—

"That the *Entente* Powers are determined that the Arab race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a Nation in the world.

"That owing to the variety of conditions and sentiments amongst Arabs, this consummation will be reached only by gradual stages, through their own efforts and with the goodwill and assistance of the Allies.

"That the employment by His Majsty's Government of the appellation 'Arab Kingdom' did not prescribe nor exclude the establishment by the Arabs of one supreme Government in the restricted area, defined by Sir Henry McMahon in his letter of the 24th October, 1915, to the Sherif of Mecca.

"That as regards the future Governments to be established in Syria (west of the Damascus-Aleppo line), in Palestine, and in Mesopotamia, final decisions cannot be taken until circumstances permit the fuller expression, and consideration, of the requirements of the local populations.

"That King Husein can rest assured that such decisions will be made in accordance with Arab national interests and the wishes of the inhabitants of those districts.

"That it is clearly premature to attempt to settle the connection between the King's Government and the local Governments until the constitutions of these latter Governments are more precisely defined.

"That His Majesty's Government desire to see Arab unity in Central and Southern Arabia.

"That, so far as they can judge, the first step towards this would be by an alliance between the Arab chiefs under the leadership of one of them.

"That the twofold objects of this alliance would be to ensure the proper conduct of Peninsula affairs, and to guarantee to each Chief a full measure of autonomy and security within his own dominions.

"That His Majesty's Government consider King Husein to be the best fitted to assume the leadership of the Alliance, and would welcome him in that capacity.

"That His Majesty's Government agree to promote the fulfilment of this policy by all diplomatic means, and short of coercion, which would be foreign to their principles, in the assurance that King Husein, on his part, will continue to consult and be guided by them on all matters of external policy affecting the area."

I enclose a translation of my acknowledgment of King Husein's letter

I have, &c.

R. WINGATE

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Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

King Husein to Sir R. Wingate.

In the name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful.

Mecca, 21 *Dhu'l Qada*, 1336,
(*August* 28, 1918.)

Illustrious Administrator,

After offering my respects and regards to your Excellency, I have seen—especially at the present time—all the attention and repeated assurances of your Excellency in removing the causes of misunderstanding, which I do not doubt are specially intended to protect the susceptibilities of your sincere friend. Therefore, considering what small matters of this kind may lead to, I thought it good to sound His Majesty's Government as to the original decisions made with her respecting the Rising and its foundations in the enclosed terms of agreement. I did not ask the British Government what I did ask in the way of conditions (which His Majesty's Government pledged herself to) in the interest of the country, for the purpose of establishing a Government or constituting a power, in order to monopolise its sovereignty myself, coveting the influence and headship derived therefrom; but, when Great Britain invited me as she did, and I understood that her aims were to secure the Moslem interest in general and that of the Arabs in particular, I could not but comply with her request, at least according to those terms, which, in my opinion, amount to the following:—

1. The protection of the status of the Moslem world in view of what has befallen, and will befall, Turkey.
2. To save Great Britain from being accused of aims inconsistent with her real ones.
3. To prevent my being accused of intriguing with her in opposition to the fundamental principles of the rising.

It is true that in my meeting with Mr. Storrs in the first year at Jeddah, also in my subsequent meeting with the distinguished Sir Mark Sykes, and last year with the eminent Commander Hogarth, I found nothing contrary to, or departing from, the said decisions. However, the delicate nature and vital importance of our enterprise, and the occurrence of circumstances, demanded further explanations of the questions involved, and that further details and assurances should be given as to the fixed conditions (or boundaries) and what is implied therein; but, as regards the other terms, I feel that it is impossible for me adequately to offer thanks to your Excellency for their having been fulfilled, especially as regards the different forms of subsidies. If you were to learn that mistakes were made concerning the same in our original decisions, or rather that events dictated their being modified (or changed), this not being a matter which would affect the status of the Moslem world, notwithstanding that I think, and "certain thoughts are wicked" (Arabic proverb), that this matter is not altogether free from it in my own opinion, which may be mistaken and wrong, and when we add to this my apparent failure in attaining the hoped-for results, there would remain no alternative for your sincere friend but to withdraw from the work and to give it up, owing to my personal conviction as to the result of the modification of our original agreement above referred to. Moreover, a departure from the original agreement, thereby exposing us to the dangers mentioned in the above three clauses, will blacken my page of history, will destroy and take from me the confidence and trust of my country and the people most attached to me, when they see the opposite of those agreements which I have proclaimed and expressed to them, verbally and in writing, during this period, and on which I had founded many important enterprises. I should, therefore, have defrauded myself and deceived you, my friend, owing to the subsequent disturbances, revolutions, &c., in the country, which would destroy all the confidence of His Majesty's Government in me and would even deprive me of my personal benefit. My sincere loyalty compels me to say, at this moment, that the first signs that these fears may be realised are almost apparent from frequent requests from different sources manifesting a desire that the independence of the country be declared. I can only reply to them that my independence is the independence of all parts of the country, but they bring forward further arguments. Therefore, in case modification is necessary, there is no alternative for your sincere friend but to abdicate and withdraw—an action I doubt not but that the noble spirit of Great Britain would consider, as it is, a vital necessity, and not for any trivial aim or personal

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interest. Her great heart will never cease to think that I and my sons are her friends, whose loyalty and friendship will never change; so name the country where she desires we should live, that we may proceed to it at the first opportunity. Whether her decision be favourable or otherwise, we shall continue to praise and thank her; and God is a witness of this. If, however, she agrees to this, but thinks that the present state of war necessitates its being held over until the end of the war, we shall, on account of her favour and our gratitude to her, be obliged to persevere, in the face of redoubled private and public accusations, and content ourselves with a pure and clear conscience. In short, the decision one way or the other rests with you. As regards deferring the question until the peace conference, know, your Excellency, that we are not concerned with, or related to, it, that we should await its decisions in the negative or affirmative. Were the said Conference to decide (to give us) double our original stipulations, and the decision came through any source but your hands, may we be expelled from God's mercy if we accept it. God is observing all my statements, and to Him I pray to give us all His divine protection.

Please accept, &c.

HUSEIN.

(*Note.*—The word "hudud" may mean "boundaries" or "conditions.")

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Translation of the Agreement come to with the British Government regarding the Rising and its Foundation.

1. GREAT BRITAIN agrees to the formation of an independent Arab Government in every meaning of the word "independence," internally and externally; the boundaries of the said Government being, on the east, the Persian Gulf; on the west, the Red Sea, the Egyptian frontier, and the Mediterranean; on the north, the northern boundaries of the vilayets of Aleppo and Mosul up to the river Euphrates and its junction with the Tigris as far as their mouths in the Persian Gulf, but with the exception of the Aden colony, which is excluded from these boundaries.

The Arab Government will undertake to respect the agreements and contracts which the British Government makes with any Arab or any individual Emir who happens to be within these boundaries; namely, that she will replace the British Government in seeing that the rights involved in those agreements and contracts are maintained for the benefit of those who are entitled to them.

2. Great Britain undertakes to shield the said Government and protect it against any interference or encroachment of any kind or form whatever, affecting her internally or her boundaries by land or sea; and even, in the case of an internal rising caused by enemy intrigues or the jealousy of Emirs, the British Government will give the Arab Government moral and material help in putting down the rising; this help in internal disorders and risings shall be limited to the time when the Arab Government shall have completed its material formation.

3. Basra shall be in the occupation of the British Government until the said new Arab Government shall have completed its material formation as above mentioned. A sum of money shall be allotted by the British Government, in assessing which the requirements of the Arab Government will be taken into consideration, seeing that the said Government is like a minor in the keeping of the British Government, and the sum referred to will be a gift made in respect of the said occupation.

4. Great Britain undertakes to supply her foster-daughter, the Arab Government, with all its requisitions of arms, ammunitions, war materials, and money, in the way of subsidies, for the duration of the war.

5. Great Britain undertakes to cut the railway line at Karsin or any other convenient spot in that area.

No. 2.

Brigadier-General Clayton to Sir R. Wingate.

The Residency, Alexandria, *G.H.Q., B.E.F., 1st Echelon, September* 13, 1918.

I BEG to forward, for the consideration of his Excellency the High Commissioner, a secret note on the situation in Central and Southern Arabia.

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If his Excellency approves of the contents of this note I suggest that it form the basis of a telegram to the Foreign Office.

It is obvious that action in the sense which I have recommended can only be taken provided it is clear that we are not bound by the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement to act in conjunction with the French in matters affecting Central and Southern Arabia.

G. F. CLAYTON, *Brigadier-General, C.P.O.*

Enclosure in No. 2.

Secret Note by Brigadier-General Clayton on King Husein's Letter and Memorandum.

Ramleh, September 8, 1918.

KING HUSEIN is in a state of mind which, unless rectified, may lead to serious consequences. He may at any moment take action which would involve disastrous effects on our Arab policy. In that case we should be forced to intervene, and our only effective method of controlling him is by stopping his subsidy. If we threaten to do this we must carry out our threat unless he falls in with our wishes. In his present frame of mind he would probably refuse, and the first result would be his actual resignation, which he has threatened more than once.

If King Husein were to resign now, the whole existence of the Arab movement would be endangered. Disintegration would be the result, followed perhaps by a conflagration in Central Arabia, of which the enemy would take full advantage, and which would seriously affect our military operations, apart from the loss of prestige involved by a collapse of our Arab policy.

It is of vital importance, therefore, to rectify King Husein's present attitude of mind, which is primarily due to uncertainty as to the eventual intentions of His Majesty's Government regarding him.

Two courses appear open :—

First, that His Majesty's Government inform King Husein definitely that their policy in regard to Central and Southern Arabia is directed towards Arab unity under a suzerain authority, with complete guarantee of local independence and autonomy for each chief concerned. That His Majesty's Government would welcome King Husein as Suzerain, provided he is accepted by other chieftains. That the influence of His Majesty's Government will be exerted towards the fulfilment of this policy, in so far as may be possible without the use of compulsion. To employ coercive measures against any friendly Arab chief would be contrary to the principles of His Majesty's Government. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government must insist that their continued support of this policy is contingent upon King Husein accepting the advice of His Majesty's Government on all matters of external policy.

In considering this course we have to remember our pledges to King Husein and the moral obligation imposed upon us by his initiation of the Arab revolt and his unswerving loyalty to Great Britain.

Second, to leave matters as they are and to risk the consequences.

In this case we risk the resignation of King Husein, who is the only commanding figure in the Arab revolt, which must then either collapse entirely or at best relapse into spasmodic tribal action against the Turks. In any case much of the military and the bulk of the political value of the movement must be lost. As regards future settlement in the Arabian peninsula, the best that could then be hoped for is the formation of a number of small States under Arab rulers devoid even of the nominal controlling influence formerly exercised by the Turkish Government.

A definite decision on this question is essential, and the policy decided on should be communicated to all concerned, with definite instructions to act in accordance with its principles. As matters stand at present, there is ambiguity which has already given rise to misunderstanding.

It would be neither necessary nor advisable to make any public declaration of the "Suzerain" policy at present, but it would reassure King Husein if the British agent at Jeddah could be authorised to inform him that it had been adopted by His Majesty's Government.

In the event of His Majesty's Government deciding to adopt the "Suzerain"

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policy, the following are suggested as the terms of a verbal assurance to be given to King Husein:—

The policy of His Majesty's Government in Central and Southern Arabia is directed towards the establishment of freedom and independence of all ruling chiefs within their own dominions. Furthermore, His Majesty's Government would welcome the union of all these independent States of Central and Southern Arabia in an Arab alliance, as head of which they would welcome King Husein, with a suitable title to be decided upon hereafter. His Majesty's Government are prepared to use their influence to secure the realisation of this policy in so far as is possible without the employment of coercive measures against any friendly Arab chief. To use compulsion would be to violate the established principles of self-determination of peoples which His Majesty's Government are resolved to uphold.

It is for King Husein to prove to all Arab chiefs concerned his fitness for the position of head of an Arab alliance in Central and Southern Arabia.

As regards Syria and Mesopotamia, in which a purely military situation still maintains, settlement must await the Peace Conference, at which the Allies will uphold the principles of freedom and self-determination of peoples as the basis of settlement.

His Majesty's Government must insist, as a condition of their continued support of this policy, that King Husein, on his part, gives definite assurance that he will accept and follow the advice of His Majesty's Government on all matters of external policy and in dealings with other independent Arab rulers and States.

G. F. CLAYTON, *Brigadier-General, C.P.O.*

Ramleh, September 8, 1918.

No. 3.

Sir R. Wingate to King Husein.

(Translation.)

Cordial greetings, *September* 15, 1918.

I WRITE to inform your Highness that your letter of the 28th August, 1918, has arrived safely. It has been translated into English with all the care that the importance and very confidential character of its subject matter required, and after attentive perusal of it I am transmitting it to London for consideration by His Majesty's Government.

Pending receipt of their instructions and opinion, I cannot usefully say anything beyond asking your Highness to believe that the happenings of the past few years have only increased the appreciation and admiration of the Allied peoples for the noble cause of which your Highness has been the chief promoter, and have fortified their desire to see an era of peace, progress, and prosperity inaugurated in every part of the Arab countries. I beg that your Highness will feel assured that it is in this spirit, and with this single purpose in view, that His Majesty's Government will examine and reply to your Highness's present communication.

Salutations.

REGINALD WINGATE,
High Commissioner.

No. 4.

Sir R. Wingate to Mr. Balfour.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 1600.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, November* 1, 1918.

YOUR telegram No. 1240.

I informed King Husein in accordance with your instructions. His Highness has sent me two messages in reply.

First mainly acknowledges receipt of my communication, and states that His Highness's views have already been given in various papers, notably in his letter of the 28th August (see enclosure with my despatch No. 219 of 21st September), to which he invites His Majesty's Government's very [? careful] consideration. Tone of message clearly shows his dislike of present arrangements in liberated territories.

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Second message, apparently despatched twenty-four hours after the first, is to the following effect :—

That arrangements in Palestine, Syria, and neighbouring countries are fatal to his interests. That whilst he realises that disagreement between British and French Governments has to be avoided, and he has no wish to incur enmity of the latter Government, yet he cannot conceive a country prospering without access to coast, and entirely under foreign control. Last sentence of message is as follows, "as for Islamic world, it is now a case for suicide."

After making every allowance for oriental exaggeration and diplomatic methods, I believe that we should be ill-advised to regard King's latest outburst as insincere. In a separate correspondence he has referred to an early change of Government at Mecca, and I feel little doubt that he genuinely contemplates early abdication and withdrawal from active participation in Arab movement.

King Husein's political opinions were explained in my despatch No. 219, and I most strongly urge that a message from His Majesty's Government on the lines suggested in that despatch should be sent to him without delay. Military situation has developed rapidly since my despatch was written, and it is most important, in my opinion, that French Government should no longer defer a formal declaration of their policy and aims in Syria. So far as I can judge, such a declaration will not appeal to King Husein and great majority of Arabs (Syrians included) unless it includes the following :—

1. That France will not annex any part of Arab or Syrian territory.
2. That, in future Government of any part of Syria in which they are concerned, French should exercise their control with object of developing local self-government and [?in] safeguarding Arab national aspirations.
3. That British and French Governments recognise necessity for Damascus Arab Government to have free access to, and control of, a port in the Mediterranean. I am informing King Husein that I have reported to you the sense of his messages and have reminded him that present administrative arrangemeuts in liberated territories are provisional and necessary to safeguard military requirements.

I have consulted General Allenby, who has seen this telegram and concurs.

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F112/277

(101)

21

WAR CABINET
E.C.2287
2, WHITEHALL GARDENS

EGYPT.

MILITARY.

B4

Decypher. General Clayton (Cairo).
November 8th, 1918.

D. 10.35 p.m. November 8th, 1918.

R. 8.00 a.m. November 10th, 1918.

No. 176.

::::::::::::

Monsieur Picot has arrived and had an interview with the Commander-in-Chief. The Commander-in-Chief has fully explained his position as defined by telegrams received from the War Office. M. Picot leaves for Beirut but will maintain his headquarters at General Headquarters.

Beirut. There are indications that Christian and Moslem sections of the population are combining in order to prepare a united opinion as to nature of Government desired by Syrians. With the exception of the Maronites who are for the most part pro-French a considerable section of the Christian population is ready to combine with the Moslems in requesting an Arab National Government provided that this does not entail Sherifian rule. The general desire is for local autonomy in the various

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

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various districts with a central Arab Government linking all the States together for economic political and defensive purposes.

Tripoli and Ladikiya. Both districts contain a marked Moslem (? majority) variously estimated at from 75 per cent to 90 per cent which is unanimously in favour of an Arab National Government and is also opposed to French control. The majority of the inhabitants are unaccustomed to any control and are (? strongly) religious in tendency.

Damascus and Arab area. Still strongly in favour of independent Arab Government with British assistance and increasingly distrustful of French intentions. Declaration of Allied Governments will be issued tomorrow and I will report later on the effect which it has on the various districts. In any case it is essential that the French should proceed with great tact if they wish to establish their influence. If they act precipitately they will increase the existing distrust and may even provoke active hostility.

An unfortunate incident occurred in Damascus on November 6th. Emir Said and Emir Abd El Kader grandsons of the great Abd El Kader have from the beginning assumed

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

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assumed an attitude of hostility to the presence of Arab troops. This reached a pitch at which Emir Faisal strongly urged their arrest and deportation. On the morning of November 7th the Chief Administrator sent police to arrest them but Abd El Kader resisted and after firing at the police mounted his horse and galloped up the street. The police fired on him and killed him. Full inquiry is being made and question will be decided by the Commander-in-Chief.

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

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WAR CABINET E.C. 2324 WHITEHALL GARDENS

L.S.9. 566.

SECRET.

10th November, 1918.

B.4

Dear General,

The French High Commissioner in Syria wired on November 6th, reporting that Feysal is doing vigorous propaganda work east of Libanus. His view is that the question of the Syrian coast region is reserved for future settlement, and he considers that the French, the British and himself are like traders, confronted with a piece of ownerless property; in the circumstances he considers it logical that each of the candidates for its ownership should try and anticipate the others.

The French High Commissioner urges that it would be of the most immediate advantage that the Allied Powers should make a declaration, specifying the rights of each of them, so as to put an end to the present equivocal situation, which is being exploited by Feysal in anticipation of the population of the regions in question being consulted as to their future fate.

Yours sincerely,

E.L. Spears.

Brigadier-General G.S.

Major-General P.R. de B. Radcliffe, C.B., D.S.O.

General Staff,
War Office.
14.11.18.

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

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TURKEY.

MILITARY.

2

(185606/W/44).

Cypher Telegram to Vice Admiral Sir S. Calthorpe (Constantinople)

Foreign Office, November 11th. 1918.

No. 4. (219Z).

WAR CABINET
E.C.2333
2, WHITEHALL GARDENS

His Majesty's Minister at Athens has communicated to me the substance of your telegraphic correspondence with him in regard to Admiral Condouriotis' message.

I do not think that any objection need be taken to form of this message. You will see from instructions which will reach you by Admiral Webb that we have no wish whatever to minimise the defeat and capitulation of the Turks. On the contrary in the interests of the future peace of the Near East we are determined that Turkish domination over subject races shall irrevocably be ended. It is best that the Turks should realise from the outset that these are the terms which we intend to impose. There is the additional consideration that the Moslems of Egypt and India should realise that Turkey has been completely defeated, and we wish to give the Turkish Government no opportunity of implying that the armistice was a mere suspension of hostilities pending amicable negotiations.

You will see from the above that we wish you to observe the strictest reserve in your relations with the Turkish

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

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

(106)

Turkish Government and to refuse to be drawn into any discussion as to the eventual peace settlement. I have provided your Chief Political Officer, who is leaving England immediately, with a private letter to you from me in which the above views are elaborated and explained. In the meantime your intercourse with the Turkish Authorities should be restricted to an official character. We have no desire to interfere with the composition of the Turkish Government and you should transact business with the Sultan or Izzet Pasha or other responsible authorities; but you should refuse to have any dealings, either official or private, with Talaat Pasha or Enver Pasha, as we are considering the propriety of special action in their case.

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

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A.ii

WAR CABINET

SECRET

EASTERN COMMITTEE

E.C.2370.

KING HUSAIN'S TITLE.

(Note by India Office)

1. The Foreign Office have recently raised (at the instance, it is understood, of Colonel Lawrence) the question of granting King Husain the title of "King of the Arabs". The original title chosen by the Sherif himself, when he first assumed the style of royalty in October, 1916, was "King of the Arab nation". The India Office observed (letter of 4th November, 1916) that this title, being national not territorial, "would not necessarily exclude the idea of the local autonomy of other Arab Chiefs". But the formula evoked criticism in various quarters, and a number of alternatives were suggested. Colonel Wilson, after personal discussion with Husain and his son Abdulla, suggested "His Majesty the Sherif"; Sir R.Wingate (then Sirdar, not High Commissioner) preferred "King of the Arabs in Hejaz". The French Government proposed "Malik-el-Haramein" (King of the Holy Places), considering that any such title as "King of the Arabs"or "of Arabia" might prove inconveniently wide. Sir H.MacMahon suggested "King of the Hejaz". The Government of India took strong objection to the French suggestion, and were disposed to favour "King of the Arabs in the Hejaz and its dependencies", which they considered would be inoffensive to other Arab Chiefs. Sir P. Cox, then at Baghdad, recommended, as a combined temporal and spiritual title, "Sultan-el-Hejaz Hamil-el-Haramein" (Sultan of the Hejaz and Protector of the Holy Places). Eventually "Malik-el-Hejaz" (King of the Hejaz") was adopted.

2. The case against the wider title turns upon the effect likely to be produced upon other independent Arab Chiefs (e.g. Bin Saud and the Idrisi: even, perhaps, the Sultan of Maskat and the Sheikh of Koweit) with whom we are in treaty relations; and secondly upon the claims which the grant of such a title would establish, or might be held to establish, in Mesopotamia. It is proposed, as a preliminary step, if the Committee agree, to telegraph to the Government of India and the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, in the following terms :-

"For reasons connected with negotiations regarding Syria and Arabs generally at peace conference Foreign Office are anxious to recognise title of King of the Arabs for King Husain as early as possible. I fully appreciate objections that have always been taken on your side to this title, and I do not like it myself. But change of title will, it is thought, not involve change of status vis à vis of other Arab Chiefs which will remain what Husain can make it, and though it is not part

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

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

of our policy to force any Chief or tribe to submit to him, some modus vivendi must eventually be arrived at between them all unless Arabia is to be scene of perpetual fighting and security of Holy Places possibly threatened, odium of which would fall on us.

I should like you therefore to take the broadest possible view of the question and advise me with least possible delay as to probable effect of recognition on Bin Saud and throughout Mesopotamia, and as to any measures that could be taken to make it palatable".

INDIA OFFICE,

14th November, 1918.

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

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MEMORANDUM ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS OF SETTLEMENT OF WESTERN ASIA.

1. *Hejaz.*—We have never arrived at any settlement of the question of sphere of influence here, though M. Picot has more than once assured us that he had obtained from his Government a settlement in our favour. We ought to secure a treaty with Husein similar to those in force with "Trucial Chiefs" (but, N.B., we should then be under obligations to protect Husein against Ibn Saud, as we are already to protect Ibn Saud against Husein). The Ottoman Bank question, which is intimately related to the larger question, ought to be solved by direct encouragement to Husein to close the Jiddah branch, and by the establishment, through Gellatly, Hankey and Co. or otherwise, of a British or British Indian Bank.

Settlement of the *Khurma* question would be best deferred as long as possible. If Feisal makes good in Damascus and Ibn Rashid joins the Sherif's League, Ibn Saud will have to cave in eventually. On the Gulf, in Iraq, at Damascus, and on the Hejaz coast we control all his avenues of supply except the long caravan route from Yemen, on which, through the Imam, we might also exercise a certain influence.

The King of the Hejaz ought never to be allowed more than the most nominal suzerainty over any other Arab area, since his rule must necessarily be theocratic and always (however well-intentioned) repressive of Arab Christians. But (1) a vague general title, such as "Malik el-Arban" or "Malik el-Hashimi," should be recognized by us, and we might well encourage by every discreet and unobvious means in our power the practice of praying for him in the *Khutba* as *Emir* em-*Numinin*, not only in the general Arab area, but also in India.

But in the full recognition of him or anyone else as *Caliph* we ought to take no hand whatever, since that title necessarily implies sovereignty over our own subjects and potential hostility to all Christian Powers. We ought in no way to follow the bad Italian precedent in Tripolitania, where rights of religio-legal interference were conceded to the Ottoman Caliph. We should never, as I think, in any diplomatic document or in any other way acknowledge the existence of a Caliph, and no hope of conciliating Indian Moslems ought to modify this rule. The more Caliphs there are actually recognized by the Moslem world at one time the better for us. At present there are virtually three, the Ottoman, the Arab and the Moroccan.

2.—*Idrisi.*—I will only put on record my profound disbelief in Idrisi ever being of the smallest use to us. He will never become a power in Arabia. But I should not advise encouragement of the Imam of Sanaa to encroach on Idrisi's domain since this is Sunnite and will never be quiet under Zeidite Government. King Husein ought to have Kunfida and the Idrisi be left where he is now to make what arrangements with the Asiri tribes he will. If the tribes of the Yemen Tihama want him as overlord, well and good, but don't let him have Hodeida in any event. If he does intrigue with the Italians, it will matter very little.

3. *Imam of Sanaa.*—(*See* remarks on Idrisi.) If the Imam wishes to be our friend, I should let him have Mocha as his port; but he must abjure all aggression in the Aden Protectrate and east of it. If the Tihama definitely does not want his rule, make "Trucial Chief" treaties with its notables. Zebid is its natural capital. The Italians will never be able to penetrate any part of Yemen worth having if their Abyssinian and Tripolitan deeds are any guide.

4. *Ibn Saud.*—(*See* remarks on Hejaz.)

5. *Syria.*—Pending settlements with French, whom no Syrian district, not even Lebanon and Beirut, will accept willingly (especially if Palestine and the Arab State are virtually British), the points to insist on provisionally seem to be these :—

(*a.*) That all inter-Ally agreements lose validity with the opening of the Peace Conference, if not before.

(*b.*) That in all official inter-Ally conversations about any part of the Arab area henceforth, Arabs themselves must participate, as Allies.

(*c.*) That meanwhile the Arab State must have a sea port, preferably Tripoli, in order to pay its way. Indirect taxation, through Customs, is its only reliable source of revenue.

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(*d.*) *That a non-Turkish Cilicia* is absolutely necessary if the Arab State is to be secured in the future against penetration from the north, whether hostile or still more pacific (the later very subtle, dangerous and certain).

(*e.*) That Syria be treated as an entity apart from either Mesopotamia and Iraq or Hejaz.

(*f.*) That Arab leaders receive, as soon as possible, explicit assurances on above points. The recent Joint Declaration will not reassure any of them by any means. They will see that France can find an easy loophole to Protectorate or Annexation in the phrase "effectivement etablis," and that wholesale tutelage is assumed in the wording of the last part.

6. *Armenia.*—So far as I can see, the only "Armenia" which we shall be able to constitute and guarantee is the old Kingdom of Cilicia and North Syria. It contains many non-Armenian elements, notably Kurds, Turcomans and Yuraks, as well as Nusairi and Afghans, &c. Its boundaries ought roughly to be prolonged from the Geuk Su mouth on the west along the ridge of Taurus and up to Gurun on the Tokhma Su; thence to Divrik; thence down the Euphrates to east of Kharput and thence by Suwarek to Birejik. Thence by Tel Bashar to the northern horn of Alexandretta Bay (near Payas).

Into this area Armenians from the rest of the "six vilayets" should be invited to migrate. Probably some compulsion will be necessary. These vilayets are so largely Kurdish that they cannot make a satisfactory "Armenia," and whoever polices them (and someone *must*, unless Turkey is strengthened and restored there, which, in view of her connection with massacres in all that region, is deeply to be deprecated) must be prepared to put in a strong force for 50 years, and expect little return but the traditional reward of virtue.

If there is no, or very little, migration into an Armenian Cilicia, the latter will never be able to develop its agriculture. The American Armenian is almost always a skilled artizan or a professional man.

7. *North Mesopotamia*—This must be distinct from Iraq—a separate native State with Mosul or Urfa for capital. How far it will extend north will depend on the Khurds. These last affect Arab manners, and may well throw in their lot with an Arab State in considerable numbers. The more of them who will do so in the six vilayets the better.

8. *Turkey.*—The Anatolian population is the most stable and solid in West Asia. It ought to remain independent under a Moslem Power, though perhaps Smyrna and a small enclave should be Greek. All islands Greek of course. Italy has no business in the Ægean, still less in Asia Minor, and her Adalia claim would lead to endless trouble. In my view the future Ottoman State should be *all* Anatolia, with Brusa as capital, and the "six vilayets" detached under a European Protectorate.

(Signed) D. G. HOGARTH.

General Staff,
War Office.
15*th November*, 1918.

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MEMORANDUM ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS OF SETTLEMENT OF WESTERN ASIA.

1. *Hejaz.*—We have never arrived at any settlement of the question of sphere of influence here, though M. Picot has more than once assured us that he had obtained from his Government a settlement in our favour. We ought to secure a treaty with Husein similar to those in force with "Trucial Chiefs" (but, N.B., we should then be under obligations to protect Husein against Ibn Saud, as we are already to protect Ibn Saud against Husein). The Ottoman Bank question, which is intimately related to the larger question, ought to be solved by direct encouragement to Husein to close the Jiddah branch, and by the establishment, through Gellatly, Hankey and Co. or otherwise, of a British or British Indian Bank.

Settlement of the *Khurma* question would be best deferred as long as possible. If Feisal makes good in Damascus and Ibn Rashid joins the Sherif's League, Ibn Saud will have to cave in eventually. On the Gulf, in Iraq, at Damascus, and on the Hejaz coast we control all his avenues of supply except the long caravan route from Yemen, on which, through the Imam, we might also exercise a certain influence.

The King of the Hejaz ought never to be allowed more than the most nominal suzerainty over any other Arab area, since his rule must necessarily be theocratic and always (however well-intentioned) repressive of Arab Christians. But (1) a vague general title, such as "Malik el-Arban" or "Malik el-Hashimi," should be recognized by us, and we might well encourage by every discreet and unobvious means in our power the practice of praying for him in the *Khutva* as *Emir* em-*Numinin*, not only in the general Arab area, but also in India.

But in the full recognition of him or anyone else as *Caliph* we ought to take no hand whatever, since that title necessarily implies sovereignty over our own subjects and potential hostility to all Christian Powers. We ought in no way to follow the bad Italian precedent in Tripolitania, where rights of religio-legal interference were conceded to the Ottoman Caliph. We should never, as I think, in any diplomatic document or in any other way acknowledge the existence of a Caliph, and no hope of conciliating Indian Moslems ought to modify this rule. The more Caliphs there are actually recognized by the Moslem world at one time the better for us. At present there are virtually three, the Ottoman, the Arab and the Moroccan.

2.—*Idrisi.*—I will only put on record my profound disbelief in Idrisi ever being of the smallest use to us. He will never become a power in Arabia. But I should not advise encouragement of the Imam of Sanaa to encroach on Idrisi's domain since this is Sunnite and will never be quiet under Zeidite Government. King Husein ought to have Kunfida and the Idrisi be left where he is now to make what arrangements with the Asiri tribes he will. If the tribes of the Yemen Tihama want him as overlord, well and good, but don't let him have Hodeida in any event. If he does intrigue with the Italians, it will matter very little.

3. *Imam of Sanaa.*—(*See* remarks on Idrisi.) If the Imam wishes to be our friend, I should let him have Moeha as his port; but he must abjure all aggression in the Aden Protectrate and east of it. If the Tihama definitely does not want his rule, make "Trucial Chief" treaties with its notables. Zebid is its natural capital. The Italians will never be able to penetrate any part of Yemen worth having if their Abyssinian and Tripolitan deeds are any guide.

4. *Ibn Saud.*—(*See* remarks on Hejaz.)

5. *Syria.*—Pending settlements with French, whom no Syrian district, not even Lebanon and Beirut, will accept willingly (especially if Palestine and the Arab State are virtually British), the points to insist on provisionally seem to be these :—

(*a.*) That all inter-Ally agreements lose validity with the opening of the Peace Conference, if not before.

(*b.*) That in all official inter-Ally conversations about any part of the Arab area henceforth, Arabs themselves must participate, as Allies.

(*c.*) That meanwhile the Arab State must have a sea port, preferably Tripoli, in order to pay its way. Indirect taxation, through Customs, is its only reliable source of revenue.

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(*d.*) *That a non-Turkish Cilicia* is absolutely necessary if the Arab State is to be secured in the future against penetration from the north, whether hostile or still more pacific (the latter very subtle, dangerous and certain).

(*e.*) That Syria be treated as an entity apart from either Mesopotamia and Iraq or Hejaz.

(*f.*) That Arab leaders receive, as soon as possible, explicit assurances on above points. The recent Joint Declaration will not reassure any of them by any means. They will see that France can find an easy loophole to Protectorate or Annexation in the phrase "effectivement etablis," and that wholesale tutelage is assumed in the wording of the last part.

6. *Armenia.*—So far as I can see, the only "Armenia" which we shall be able to constitute and guarantee is the old Kingdom of Cilicia and North Syria. It contains many non-Armenian elements, notably Kurds, Turcomans and Yuraks, as well as Nusairi and Afghans, &c. Its boundaries ought roughly to be prolonged from the Geuk Su mouth on the west along the ridge of Taurus and up to Gurun on the Tokhma Su; thence to Divrik; thence down the Euphrates to east of Kharput and thence by Suwarek to Birejik. Thence by Tel Bashar to the northern horn of Alexandretta Bay (near Payas).

Into this area Armenians from the rest of the "six vilayets" should be invited to migrate. Probably some compulsion will be necessary. These vilayets are so largely Kurdish that they cannot make a satisfactory "Armenia," and whoever polices them (and someone *must*, unless Turkey is strengthened and restored there, which, in view of her connection with massacres in all that region, is deeply to be deprecated) must be prepared to put in a strong force for 50 years, and expect little return but the traditional reward of virtue.

If there is no, or very little, migration into an Armenian Cilicia, the latter will never be able to develop its agriculture. The American Armenian is almost always a skilled artizan or a professional man.

7. *North Mesopotamia.*—This must be distinct from Iraq—a separate native State with Mosul or Urfa for capital. How far it will extend north will depend on the Khurds. These last affect Arab manners, and may well throw in their lot with an Arab State in considerable numbers. The more of them who will do so in the six vilayets the better.

8. *Turkey.*—The Anatolian population is the most stable and solid in West Asia. It ought to remain independent under a Moslem Power, though perhaps Smyrna and a small enclave should be Greek. All islands Greek of course. Italy has no business in the Ægean, still less in Asia Minor, and her Adalia claim would lead to endless trouble. In my view the future Ottoman State should be *all* Anatolia, with Brusa as capital, and the "six vilayets" detached under a European Protectorate.

(Signed) D. G. HOGARTH.

General Staff,
War Office.
15*th November*, 1918.

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2

MILITARY.

WAR CABINET
E.C. 2382
2 WHITEHALL GARDENS

B4

EGYPT.

Decypher. General Clayton, (Cairo), November 16th. 1918.

D. 5.50.p.m. November 16th. 1918.

R. 8.0.a.m. November 17th. 1918.

No.185.

Following reports have been received as to impression created by public declaration of British and French Governments.

Damascus. Great procession and demonstration culminating in visit to office of British and French liaison officers, where the notables were received and speeches made expressing gratification to British and French Governments for their declaration of policy. French liaison officer made suitable reply.

Beirut. Maronites were somewhat upset, especially those holding official posts. All others both Moslem and Christian, jubilant, impression produced is that Syria may choose her own form of Government, and the power to guide Government is to be Palestine.

Comment caused by omission of any mention of Palestine in declaration, and several (group undecypherable)s were asked whether declaration applied to Palestine or not. They replied that they had no further information than that contained in the declaration which was open to all to read. General impression appears to be that declaration will apply to Palestine and Moslems and Christians are relieved at what they consider a check to extravagant Zionist aspirations.

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

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F112/277 (112)

EGYPT

MILITARY

WAR CABINET E.C. 2430 2 WHITEHALL GARDENS

Decypher General Clayton (Cairo).

D. 6.40 p.m. 20th November 1918.
R. 8 a.m. 21st

No. 17364P.

****

Following from Sykes for Ormsby-Gore. With sanction of General Clayton had full interview with Zionist (?Commission) Tel Aviv yesterday. Present Eder Epstein Jabotinsky Bianchini. Following points agreed. (A) That it was desirable that at early date there should be a declaration that the Tutelage of Palestine should be permanent until both Jewish and non-Jewish elements by decisive respective majorities elected otherwise.

(B). That at an early date there should be a definite declaration of policy regarding the functions of the Tutelary Administration regarding emigration, language, maintenance of civic equality and control of land transactions with a view to giving full scope to Zionist movement while safeguarding economic and political interests of non-Jewish population. (1). I am of opinion that both these declarations are desirable but I do not feel competent to suggest from whom declaration (A) should emanate though on the whole I am of opinion it should emanate from Zionists. (2) Joint effect of the 2 declarations would be to put matters on a sound basis. Nothing is worse for the highly strung Jews and apprehensive Arabs than present feeling of uncertainty

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

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F112/277

(113)

uncertainty as described in Clayton's No.73 (group undecypherable). (3) Joint declaration re Syria and Mesopotamia has provoked a movement of non-Jews to ask for junction to Sherif's dominions. This you may put down at its true value but is symptomatic. I submit above for careful consideration both by Eastern Committee and Zionists. Local circumstances do not justify any unnecessary commitments or sacrifices of essentials but if above 2 declarations are satisfactory it is most important that Balfour declaration should be amplified so that people should know where they stand. Non-Jews vacillate between (?natural) fear that they may be handed over to Jewish rule and belief that Balfour declaration may as result of agitation be rendered nugatory. Jews without definite rule vacillate between fear that declaration may (?be) (?abandon)ed and most extravagant ideas stimulated by various resolutions and unauthorised statements of Zionist policy of Jewish republic etc. (4) Please note I exclude from above all questions of holy places and village of Bethlehem which are separate questions.

(21.11 8-4)

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

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Advance copy: Col. Stokes also sent to Col. Hankey 20/11/20

(114)

POLICY IN ARABIA.

(Note by India Office.)

1. If the peace negotiations regarding the Middle East are not to be a failure, it seems to me absolutely essential that His Majesty's Government should, without further delay, lay down for the British delegation the main lines of their policy. I venture to put the case somewhat strongly, because there are manifest signs of a tendency to sacrifice Mesopotamia and British and local interests there to diplomatic exigencies in Syria; and at present the India Office is responsible for the interests of Mesopotamia.

2. The points on which a decision is essential are these:—

(i) *The Status of the King of the Hejaz.*—Is he to be suzerain of the whole Arab territory as defined in our negotiations with him and in the Sykes-Picot Agreement? Or is he merely to be *primus inter pares*? If this question is to be answered on the basis of local option, it is certain that no one in the Arabian peninsula (except possibly Bin Rashid) and few in Iraq will vote for King Husain's suzerainty.

(ii) *The Status of Iraq.*—As regards this, His Majesty's Government have approved the proposals made in Sir P. Cox's memorandum of 22nd April last as the basis of their policy in Iraq. Sir P. Cox proposed as the ideal (assuming annexation to be out of the question) "government by "a High Commissioner assisted by a Council, formed partly of the "heads of the most important departments of State, and partly of "representative non-official members from among the inhabitants," foreign relations being in British hands. But "if it is decided that "we should have a nominal headpiece to the administration to conduct "his own affairs under British guidance . . . . we have in the "Naqib of Baghdad and his family a dynastic element which would "carry the necessary moral sanction, in the Baghdad Vilayet un-"doubtedly, and in my opinion in Iraq as a whole. I believe they could "be brought to identify themselves with British interests." His Majesty's Government have not decided between those alternatives, but they must decide which they prefer and which they intend to put forward at the Conference. The question is therefore urgent. For another reason also. The Anglo-French declaration presumably commits us to taking the vote of representatives of the various communities in the country. Our officers must therefore be preparing the ground in order to secure the vote we wish, and they must therefore have instructions. The urgent necessity for this is shown by the Civil Commissioner's telegrams 9906 of the 16th and 9926 of the 17th November 1918, which not only show the confusion into which he and the pro-British sections of the population have been thrown by the Anglo-French declaration, but also suggest that if *we* do not prepare the ground, others will ("local Muhammadan gentry . . . . are "already announcing to Jews and Christians that they will shortly see "themselves once more under Muhammadan domination," &c.).

3. It seems not improbable from such evidence as is available that we might get a British Protectorate, in the sense of Sir P. Cox's first alternative, accepted in Iraq, if we worked for it at once. But presumably we have to consider the effect that this would have on Franco-Arab relations in Syria and the French sphere. A British Protectorate in Iraq would be interpreted by the French as entitling them to a protectorate in Syria, if they could get the Arabs to vote for it; and the Arabs would round on us for betraying them to the French.[1] This is an important consideration,

[1] The idea that we can get the French out of Syria by an appeal to local option under the Anglo-French declaration seems to me visionary, unless the League of Nations or some other outside force imposes this upon them; nor do I see that we have any particular interest in getting the French out of Syria.

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but I submit that it is not conclusive. The material interests involved in Mesopotamia are far too great to be jockeyed away merely for the sake of diplomatic convenience. We are not pledged to King Husain to prevent the French from establishing a protectorate: our pledges relate only to those areas in which we can act without detriment to French interests, and we ought to take our stand firmly on that ground, and not allow ourselves to be used by the Arabs to secure their interests in Syria at the expense of the French. That, however, is what we are doing at present; and in doing it we risk losing the fruits of the Mesopotamian campaign for the *beaux yeux* of King Husain and his scheming sons.

4. But it may be impossible on other grounds to put forward an avowed British Protectorate at the Peace Conference. In that case we must work for Sir P. Cox's second alternative—real British control behind the façade of an Arab ruler, and we must have our candidate ready and take the necessary steps to secure his acceptance in Iraq. The candidate who at present holds the field is the Naqib of Baghdad, but at the eleventh hour Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence has come home with a proposal to put one of the sons of King Husain in as King of Iraq, and another as King of Northern Mesopotamia with his capital at Mosul or Ras-el-Ain. Although I am not aware that anything has occurred since the Eastern Committee accepted Sir P. Cox's proposal last spring to cause them to alter their decision, something must be said about Colonel Lawrence's proposal.

5. And in the first place, without in the least wishing to depreciate Colonel Lawrence's achievements and his undoubted genius, it must be said about him that he does not at all represent—and would not, I think, claim to represent—the local views of Northern Mesopotamia and Iraq; of the latter, indeed, he has practically no first-hand knowledge at all, and if His Majesty's Government want to know what they are they will naturally turn to the Civil Commissioner and his officers.

6. As to their views there is little doubt. Sir P. Cox was asked the definite questions: "Can any Arab authority be discovered, dynastic or representative, that "will command the necessary moral sanction in [Mesopotamia] as a whole? What "weight does King Husain or his family carry with the local Arabs?" His answer to the first has already been quoted—he considered that the Naqib of Baghdad and his family possess the necessary qualifications. To the second he replied: "King Husain "and his family carry no weight in Iraq, where only the most distant interest is "taken in him"; and he said: "I cannot see the least justification or necessity for introducing one of the family" as local potentate. The recognition accorded to the Sherif, writes Miss Bell, "is of the most tenuous kind. The respect which his name "undoubtedly arouses is given to him as a religious luminary, the first in Islam, not "as a political leader." She points out that though "there have been individual instances of his being regarded as the centre of Arab unity," they have occurred not among the better instructed town population, but among the tribes and provincial *saiyids*," and among Shiahs looking to a potentate who is more than suspected of Shiah leanings. If these views are correct—and there is no reason to doubt it—it is clear that Abdullah, who is personally unknown in Mesopotomia, would find in his father's prestige a very weak claim to acceptance; and if, as appears to be the case, Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence's scheme further contemplates the eventual succession to King Husain of his son Ali, whose Sunni orthodoxy is undoubted, even that slender claim would disappear.

7. The fact is that the scheme presupposes a solidarity which does not exist, and which we have no interest in encouraging. The outlook of east and west Arabia is widely different in this respect. "When the Shaikhs of the Beni Hasan," says Miss Bell, "write of uniting the Arab nation, it can be confidently affirmed that the "words convey no definite political conception. They are not indeed in a position "to form one. Their political horizon is bounded by Baghdad and Kufah; Amarah "and Basra are almost outside the circle of their interest, to say nothing of Syria or "Morocco. But in Baghdad itself, where alone there are men who have a hearsay "acquaintance with the Arab world beyond Mesopotamia, there exists a deep seated "jealousy of Arabs who are not of local birth." As an example she quotes their dislike of Syrians, and adds: "Patriotism, as can be remarked in any part of the "Arab provinces, is strictly local, when it leaves the realm of windy phrase-making "and comes to practical applications." With this may be compared what Captain

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Wilson says in his telegram 9926 of the 17th November: "If the future status of this "country is to be dealt with successfully, it must, I am convinced, be treated "independently of Arab problems elsewhere. Arabs of Mesopotamia will not tolerate "that Arabs from elsewhere should have any say in their affairs, whether they come "from Syria or from Hejaz. In practice they dislike and distrust both. National "unity means for them united Mesopotamia, and not unity with either Syria or "Hejaz." And Sir P. Cox had already said: "The Naqib of Baghdad considers "himself superior in purity of descent and nobility to the Sherif, and no less "important; and the introduction of a relative of the Sherif of Mecca as head of the "State of Iraq would, in my opinion, be greatly misunderstood and resented by the "Naqib and his family, and thus tend to alienate our most potent element of influence "over the Arabs of Iraq."

8. These are the views of our responsible officers, and if they are correct (and there is no new evidence to make them less correct that when the Eastern Committee approved Sir P. Cox's proposals in April last) Shereef Abdullah would not be accepted by the Arabs of Iraq as King, and would greatly embarrass us. His candidature, therefore, seems to have nothing to recommend it.

9. As regards the proposal to carve out a kingdom of Northern Mesopotamia under Shereef Zeid, we have no evidence as to the feelings of the local Arabs, tribal or urban, towards his person; but the creation of a separate independent or quasi-independent kingdom would obviously be highly inconvenient. Captain Wilson has recently been emphasising the close connection, economic and political, which exists between the vilayets of Mosul and Baghdad. It was very unfortunate that the Sykes-Picot Agreement assigned the former to France, and a strong endeavour is to be made to get France out. Clearly an Arab kingdom under England would be much less inconvenient than one under France, but three serious disadvantages may be mentioned:—(1) We do not yet know how close our control over these Arab "kings" is to be, and, in any case, we are avowedly working for a time when it is to disappear altogether: if Mosul were a separate kingdom there would be no sufficient guarantee of that close and friendly co-operation which is necessary to secure the most important interests of Baghdad and Basra (*e.g.*, irrigation); (2) the whole mechanism of British control or administration would have to be duplicated; (3) the Sykes-Picot Agreement divided Kurdistan into three, and this undesirable partition would remain. The seat of control would naturally lie in the Kingdom of Mosul, but the Kurds extend across the Kingdom of Iraq. This would greatly hinder the unification and confederation of Kurdistan, which is so important for the peace alike of Armenia and Mesopotamia.

10. It is submitted, therefore, that Colonel Lawrence's scheme has nothing to commend it so far as Mesopotamia and Iraq are concerned, convenient as it may be as a means of providing for the embarrassing ambitions of King Husain's other two sons, when Ali has been installed at Mecca and Feisal at Damascus.

11. Captain Wilson's telegrams 9906 and 9926 of 16th and 17th November, were received after the first part of this Memorandum had been written. I need hardly say that I share his apprehensions if the Anglo-French declaration means what he thinks. In any case, those who are now responsible for Iraq are bound to protest against any sacrifice of the interests of the Arabs of Iraq to those of the Arabs of Syria or elsewhere. As I have already said, I cannot see that we are bound by honour or interest to defend the Arabs against the French. That the French will allow themselves to be eliminated from Syria by any local option under the declaration—or that, if they do, they will allow us to take their place, as some imagine—is surely incredible. Syria is too deeply graven on the heart of France for that. If we support the Arabs in this matter, we incur the ill-will of France, and we have to live and work with France all over the world. We have no interests of our own in Syria at all commensurate with those in Mesopotamia; and if we had, and could eliminate the French in our own favour, could we possibly undertake the control of Syrian politics and administration in addition to our responsibilities in Mesopotamia and the Arabian peninsula?

12. And if we cannot eliminate the French from Syria, neither can we weaken their hold there without, *pro tanto*, weakening our hold over Mesopotamia. But if Mesopotamia is to be developed, our control of the administration must be complete,

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for only so (to put it at its lowest) will the capital necessary for its development be forthcoming. Now, as I ventured to say when first writing on this subject nearly four years ago, "The Power which detaches these regions from the Ottoman Empire "cannot stop at that. By its action it has made itself morally responsible to "humanity and to civilisation for their reclamation and development; that is to say "it must either undertake the work itself or make it possible for others to do so." It may be that a League of Nations will decide on the latter alternative. But in the meantime we dare not gamble away our responsibility for the sake of anyone's dreams in Syria.

13. But there is, in fact, nothing inconsistent between the Anglo-French declaration and Sir P. Cox's proposals accepted by the Eastern Committee; and I submit that His Majesty's Government should at once pronounce themselves accordingly for the guidance both of the British delegation at the Peace Conference and of the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, and that the latter should be instructed to begin propaganda at once with a view to winning local acceptance of and, if possible, demand for, British administration of the vilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, with a view to eventual self-government.

A. H.

20th November 1918.

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C4

Nov 25 1918

POLICY IN ARABIA.

(Note by India Office.)

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but I submit that it is not conclusive. The material interests involved in Mesopotamia are far too great to be jockeyed away merely for the sake of diplomatic convenience. We are not pledged to King Husain to prevent the French from establishing a protectorate: our pledges relate only to those areas in which we can act without detriment to French interests, and we ought to take our stand firmly on that ground, and not allow ourselves to be used by the Arabs to secure their interests in Syria at the expense of the French. That, however, is what we are doing at present; and in doing it we risk losing the fruits of the Mesopotamian campaign for the *beaux yeux* of King Husain and his scheming sons.

4. But it may be impossible on other grounds to put forward an avowed British Protectorate at the Peace Conference. In that case we must work for Sir P. Cox's second alternative—real British control behind the façade of an Arab ruler, and we must have our candidate ready and take the necessary steps to secure his acceptance in Iraq. The candidate who at present holds the field is the Naqib of Baghdad, but at the eleventh hour Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence has come home with a proposal to put one of the sons of King Husain in as King of Iraq, and another as King of Northern Mesopotamia with his capital at Mosul or Ras-el-Ain. Although I am not aware that anything has occurred since the Eastern Committee accepted Sir P. Cox's proposal last spring to cause them to alter their decision, something must be said about Colonel Lawrence's proposal.

5. And in the first place, without in the least wishing to depreciate Colonel Lawrence's achievements and his undoubted genius, it must be said about him that he does not at all represent—and would not, I think, claim to represent—the local views of Northern Mesopotamia and Iraq; of the latter, indeed, he has practically no first-hand knowledge at all, and if His Majesty's Government want to know what they are they will naturally turn to the Civil Commissioner and his officers.

6. As to their views there is little doubt. Sir P. Cox was asked the definite questions: "Can any Arab authority be discovered, dynastic or representative, that "will command the necessary moral sanction in [Mesopotamia] as a whole? What "weight does King Husain or his family carry with the local Arabs?" His answer to the first has already been quoted—he considered that the Naqib of Baghdad and his family possess the necessary qualifications. To the second he replied: "King Husain "and his family carry no weight in Iraq, where only the most distant interest is "taken in him"; and he said: "I cannot see the least justification or necessity for introducing one of the family" as local potentate. The recognition accorded to the Sherif, writes Miss Bell, "is of the most tenuous kind. The respect which his name "undoubtedly arouses is given to him as a religious luminary, the first in Islam, not "as a political leader." She points out that though "there have been individual instances of his being regarded as the centre of Arab unity," they have occurred not among the better instructed town population, but among the tribes and provincial *saiyids*," and among Shiahs looking to a potentate who is more than suspected of Shiah leanings. If these views are correct—and there is no reason to doubt it—it is clear that Abdullah, who is personally unknown in Mesopotomia, would find in his father's prestige a very weak claim to acceptance; and if, as appears to be the case, Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence's scheme further contemplates the eventual succession to King Husain of his son Ali, whose Sunni orthodoxy is undoubted, even that slender claim would disappear.

7. The fact is that the scheme presupposes a solidarity which does not exist, and which we have no interest in encouraging. The outlook of east and west Arabia is widely different in this respect. "When the Shaikhs of the Beni Hasan," says Miss Bell, "write of uniting the Arab nation, it can be confidently affirmed that the "words convey no definite political conception. They are not indeed in a position "to form one. Their political horizon is bounded by Baghdad and Kufah; Amarah "and Basra are almost outside the circle of their interest, to say nothing of Syria or "Morocco. But in Baghdad itself, where alone there are men who have a hearsay "acquaintance with the Arab world beyond Mesopotamia, there exists a deep seated "jealousy of Arabs who are not of local birth." As an example she quotes their dislike of Syrians, and adds: "Patriotism, as can be remarked in any part of the "Arab provinces, is strictly local, when it leaves the realm of windy phrase-making "and comes to practical applications." With this may be compared what Captain

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Wilson says in his telegram 9926 of the 17th November: "If the future status of this "country is to be dealt with successfully, it must, I am convinced, be treated "independently of Arab problems elsewhere. Arabs of Mesopotamia will not tolerate "that Arabs from elsewhere should have any say in their affairs, whether they come "from Syria or from Hejaz. In practice they dislike and distrust both. National "unity means for them united Mesopotamia, and not unity with either Syria or "Hejaz." And Sir P. Cox had already said: "The Naqib of Baghdad considers "himself superior in purity of descent and nobility to the Sherif, and no less "important; and the introduction of a relative of the Sherif of Mecca as head of the "State of Iraq would, in my opinion, be greatly misunderstood and resented by the "Naqib and his family, and thus tend to alienate our most potent element of influence "over the Arabs of Iraq."

8. These are the views of our responsible officers, and if they are correct (and there is no new evidence to make them less correct that when the Eastern Committee approved Sir P. Cox's proposals in April last) Shereef Abdullah would not be accepted by the Arabs of Iraq as King, and would greatly embarrass us. His candidature, therefore, seems to have nothing to recommend it.

9. As regards the proposal to carve out a kingdom of Northern Mesopotamia under Shereef Zeid, we have no evidence as to the feelings of the local Arabs, tribal or urban, towards his person; but the creation of a separate independent or quasi-independent kingdom would obviously be highly inconvenient. Captain Wilson has recently been emphasising the close connection, economic and political, which exists between the vilayets of Mosul and Baghdad. It was very unfortunate that the Sykes-Picot Agreement assigned the former to France, and a strong endeavour is to be made to get France out. Clearly an Arab kingdom under England would be much less inconvenient than one under France, but three serious disadvantages may be mentioned:—(1) We do not yet know how close our control over these Arab "kings" is to be, and, in any case, we are avowedly working for a time when it is to disappear altogether: if Mosul were a separate kingdom there would be no sufficient guarantee of that close and friendly co-operation which is necessary to secure the most important interests of Baghdad and Basra (*e.g.*, irrigation); (2) the whole mechanism of British control or administration would have to be duplicated; (3) the Sykes-Picot Agreement divided Kurdistan into three, and this undesirable partition would remain. The seat of control would naturally lie in the Kingdom of Mosul, but the Kurds extend across the Kingdom of Iraq. This would greatly hinder the unification and confederation of Kurdistan, which is so important for the peace alike of Armenia and Mesopotamia.

10. It is submitted, therefore, that Colonel Lawrence's scheme has nothing to commend it so far as Mesopotamia and Iraq are concerned, convenient as it may be as a means of providing for the embarrassing ambitions of King Husain's other two sons, when Ali has been installed at Mecca and Feisal at Damascus.

11. Captain Wilson's telegrams 9906 and 9926 of 16th and 17th November, were received after the first part of this Memorandum had been written. I need hardly say that I share his apprehensions if the Anglo-French declaration means what he thinks. In any case, those who are now responsible for Iraq are bound to protest against any sacrifice of the interests of the Arabs of Iraq to those of the Arabs of Syria or elsewhere. As I have already said, I cannot see that we are bound by honour or interest to defend the Arabs against the French. That the French will allow themselves to be eliminated from Syria by any local option under the declaration—or that, if they do, they will allow us to take their place, as some imagine—is surely incredible. Syria is too deeply graven on the heart of France for that. If we support the Arabs in this matter, we incur the ill-will of France, and we have to live and work with France all over the world. We have no interests of our own in Syria at all commensurate with those in Mesopotamia; and if we had, and could eliminate the French in our own favour, could we possibly undertake the control of Syrian politics and administration in addition to our responsibilities in Mesopotamia and the Arabian peninsula?

12. And if we cannot eliminate the French from Syria, neither can we weaken their hold there without, *pro tanto*, weakening our hold over Mesopotamia. But if Mesopotamia is to be developed, our control of the administration must be complete,

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for only so (to put it at its lowest) will the capital necessary for its development be forthcoming. Now, as I ventured to say when first writing on this subject nearly four years ago, "the Power which detaches these regions from the Ottoman Empire "cannot stop at that. By its action it has made itself morally responsible to "humanity and to civilisation for their reclamation and development; that is to say "it must either undertake the work itself or make it possible for others to do so." It may be that a League of Nations will decide on the latter alternative. But in the meantime we dare not gamble away our responsibility for the sake of anyone's dreams in Syria.

13. But there is, in fact, nothing inconsistent between the Anglo-French declaration and Sir P. Cox's proposals accepted by the Eastern Committee; and I submit that His Majesty's Government should at once pronounce themselves accordingly for the guidance both of the British delegation at the Peace Conference and of the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, and that the latter should be instructed to begin propaganda at once with a view to winning local acceptance of and, if possible, demand for, British administration of the vilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, with a view to eventual self-government.

A. H.

20th November 1918.

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POLICY IN ARABIA.

(Note by India Office.)

1. If the peace negotiations regarding the Middle East are not to be a failure, it seems to me absolutely essential that His Majesty's Government should, without further delay, lay down for the British delegation the main lines of their policy. I venture to put the case somewhat strongly, because there are manifest signs of a tendency to sacrifice Mesopotamia and British and local interests there to diplomatic exigencies in Syria; and at present the India Office is responsible for the interests of Mesopotamia.

2. The points on which a decision is essential are these:—

(i) *The Status of the King of the Hejaz.*—Is he to be suzerain of the whole Arab territory as defined in our negotiations with him and in the Sykes-Picot Agreement? Or is he merely to be *primus inter pares?* If this question is to be answered on the basis of local option, it is certain that no one in the Arabian peninsula (except possibly Bin Rashid) and few in Iraq will vote for King Husain's suzerainty.

(ii) *The Status of Iraq.*—As regards this, His Majesty's Government have approved the proposals made in Sir P. Cox's memorandum of 22nd April last as the basis of their policy in Iraq. Sir P. Cox proposed as the ideal (assuming annexation to be out of the question) "government by "a High Commissioner assisted by a Council, formed partly of the "heads of the most important departments of State, and partly of "representative non-official members from among the inhabitants," foreign relations being in British hands. But "if it is decided that "we should have a nominal headpiece to the administration to conduct "his own affairs under British guidance . . . . we have in the "Naqib of Baghdad and his family a dynastic element which would "carry the necessary moral sanction, in the Baghdad Vilayet un-"doubtedly, and in my opinion in Iraq as a whole. I believe they could "be brought to identify themselves with British interests." His Majesty's Government have not decided between those alternatives, but they must decide which they prefer and which they intend to put forward at the Conference. The question is therefore urgent. For another reason also. The Anglo-French declaration presumably commits us to taking the vote of representatives of the various communities in the country. Our officers must therefore be preparing the ground in order to secure the vote we wish, and they must therefore have instructions. The urgent necessity for this is shown by the Civil Commissioner's telegrams 9906 of the 16th and 9926 of the 17th November 1918, which not only show the confusion into which he and the pro-British sections of the population have been thrown by the Anglo-French declaration, but also suggest that if *we* do not prepare the ground, others will ("local Muhammadan gentry . . . . are "already announcing to Jews and Christians that they will shortly see "themselves once more under Muhammadan domination," &c.).

3. It seems not improbable from such evidence as is available that we might get a British Protectorate, in the sense of Sir P. Cox's first alternative, accepted in Iraq, if we worked for it at once. But presumably we have to consider the effect that this would have on Franco-Arab relations in Syria and the French sphere. A British Protectorate in Iraq would be interpreted by the French as entitling them to a protectorate in Syria, if they could get the Arabs to vote for it; and the Arabs would round on us for betraying them to the French.[1] This is an important consideration,

[1] The idea that we can get the French out of Syria by an appeal to local option under the Anglo-French declaration seems to me visionary, unless the League of Nations or some other outside force imposes this upon them; nor do I see that we have any particular interest in getting the French out of Syria.

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but I submit that it is not conclusive. The material interests involved in Mesopotamia are far too great to be jockeyed away merely for the sake of diplomatic convenience. We are not pledged to King Husain to prevent the French from establishing a protectorate: our pledges relate only to those areas in which we can act without detriment to French interests, and we ought to take our stand firmly on that ground, and not allow ourselves to be used by the Arabs to secure their interests in Syria at the expense of the French. That, however, is what we are doing at present; and in doing it we risk losing the fruits of the Mesopotamian campaign for the *beaux yeux* of King Husain and his scheming sons.

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Wilson says in his telegram 9926 of the 17th November: "If the future status of this "country is to be dealt with successfully, it must, I am convinced, be treated "independently of Arab problems elsewhere. Arabs of Mesopotamia will not tolerate "that Arabs from elsewhere should have any say in their affairs, whether they come "from Syria or from Hejaz. In practice they dislike and distrust both. National "unity means for them united Mesopotamia, and not unity with either Syria or "Hejaz." And Sir P. Cox had already said: "The Naqib of Baghdad considers "himself superior in purity of descent and nobility to the Sherif, and no less "important; and the introduction of a relative of the Sherif of Mecca as head of the "State of Iraq would, in my opinion, be greatly misunderstood and resented by the "Naqib and his family, and thus tend to alienate our most potent element of influence "over the Arabs of Iraq."

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12. And if we cannot eliminate the French from Syria, neither can we weaken their hold there without, *pro tanto*, weakening our hold over Mesopotamia. But if Mesopotamia is to be developed, our control of the administration must be complete,

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for only so (to put it at its lowest) will the capital necessary for its development be forthcoming. Now, as I ventured to say when first writing on this subject nearly four years ago, "the Power which detaches these regions from the Ottoman Empire "cannot stop at that. By its action it has made itself morally responsible to "humanity and to civilisation for their reclamation and development; that is to say "it must either undertake the work itself or make it possible for others to do so." It may be that a League of Nations will decide on the latter alternative. But in the meantime we dare not gamble away our responsibility for the sake of anyone's dreams in Syria.

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A. H.

20th November 1918.

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Decypher. General Clayton (Cairo) November 21st, 1918.
D. 4.40 p.m. November 21st, 1918.
R. 8 a.m. November 22nd, 1918.

No. 200.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

My 17364-P and 19920 November 20th.

Conversation yesterday with Zionist Commission throws different light on proposal "A" to that conveyed to me by the wording of telegram No. 17364 over P.Sykes to Ormsby Gore. Declaration to which Zionist leaders here agree is in following sense.

Begins.

That it is desirable at an early date to issue declaration to the effect that tutelage of Palestine shall continue until both Jews and Arabs in Palestine agree mutually that it should cease. Agreement would necessitate a majority of both Jews and Arabs respectively in favour of complete autonomy and tutelage would continue if either party refused to agree.

Ends.

My telegram No. 19920 should therefore be cancelled as General Allenby agrees that a declaration inthe above sense would have a good effect provided it came from the Entente Powers.

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

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FRANCE.

MILITARY.

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B4

Decypher. Mr. Grahame (Paris) November 24th, 1918.

D. 11.27 p.m. November 24th, 1918.

R. 8 a.m. November 25th, 1918.

No. 1598 (E).

Urgent.

Your telegram No. 2545.

Following is translation of Memorandum from Minister for Foreign Affairs dated today.

"On November 21st Minister for Foreign Affairs had the honour to reply to British suggestion respecting coming to France of Emir Feisal as representative of the King of the Hedjaz to broach question of Arab territories at Peace Conference.

Minister for Foreign Affairs reminding His Majesty's Embassy that neither he nor French High Commissioner in Syria had been consulted defined views of French Government.

Question must be considered from two points of view, general and particular.

(1). Great Powers have not yet agreed on their views as to representation of various categories of belligerents and eventually of enemies and neutrals at Peace Conference and at preliminary discussions.

It

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

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It will be necessary to define who shall sit and at what kind of (? meeting). Rights of Great and Little Powers of recognised States and those in process of formation of enemies and neutrals are not equivalent. Qualification which shall accredit them to number of their representatives, of their complete or limited acceptation to Congress, to preliminary discussions meetings of Commissions or Committees must be made the object of a preliminary consideration in common and of a decision without which greatest confusion would ensue and there would be danger of constant discussions arising between Allies.

French Government (? proposes) to submit at once a Memorandum on question accompanied by concrete proposals.

(2). Particular category in which Emir Feisal is to be placed is easy to decide. He can but be considered at most as son and personal Delegate of King of the Hedjaz coming to ask in his name for constitution of an Arab Kingdom, more or less Independent or controlled by France and England (in zones agreed upon between them or under their influence). He could only be heard (even if this qualification is accepted) semi-officially. He cannot speak in the name of Arab populations who cannot in the present

state

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

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

(123)

[illegible] of things be freely, validly and scrupusly consulted: Congress must therefore remain quite free to examine Arab question alone or after hearing this Delegate of King of the Hedjaz. No Arab kingdom has been recognised by Allied Powers as a whole, France and England themselves have only recognised power of Malek of Mecca (strictly limited to Hedjaz by their agreement of 1917).

Arab kingdom or kingdams have therefore no real existence and have at present only a hypothetical character even between France and England.

In view of such circumstances Minister for Foreign Affairs cannot conceal his surprise that in spite of his remarks and incontestable nature of situation Emir Feisal should be sent to France by British advice and due to arrive at Marseilles on November 26th.

Minister for Foreign Affairs considers that it can only be a misunderstanding but to avoid its continuance and to clear up all doubts he has decided to act in the following manner and hopes to obtain agreement of His Majesty's Government on this matter as quickly as possible.

Emir Feisal shall be treated on arrival and during stay as distinguished foreigner, son of King of the Hedjaz: He will be told on disembarking that he has

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

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

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(4)

has no recognised official title and that his qualification for any purpose remains to be discussed between Allies: that in no case before a formal agreement between Allies can he be admitted as representative of Arabs to any meeting of plenipotentiaries (Congress Commission or Committee).

Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes that His Majesty's Government will cause clear statement of similar nature to be made at same time to Emir Feisal in order to avoid difficulty with regard to which Allies and in particular Great Britain and France are equally interested in arriving at agreement from outset".

Colonel Lawrence has not yet called here.

(25.11 8/4).

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

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12

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WAR CABINET

SECRET

EASTERN COMMITTEE

E.C.2467

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY.

The following extracts from a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs entitled "Synopsis of our Obligations to our Allies and Others" (War Cabinet Paper G-203, 14.3.18) are circulated for the information of Members of the Committee.

(signed) L. Storr,
Secretary.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.
25. 11. 18.

.....

TO FRANCE

We are bound —

1. By the Pact of London (5th September, 1914) whereby we undertook not to make peace separately nor to formulate peace terms without the consent of the other signatory Powers.

2. By the Anglo-French Agreements of April-May, 1916 (incorrectly called the Sykes-Picot Agreement), under which we agreed, "provided the Arabs fulfil the conditions, and that they obtain the towns of Homs, Hama, Damascus, and Aleppo" (N.B.- This reservation is to some extent invalidated by our recent assurance to the French that we had no intention of departing from the Agreement), that—

(i) France should have priority of enterprise and local loans, and supply advisers and public functionaries in the zone marked "A" on Map 1 in return for similar privileges being accorded to His Majesty's Government in the zone marked "B". Both the zones were in theory to be included within the territory of the future Arab State.

(ii) France should establish such administration or control as she should desire to arrange with the Arabs in the blue area on Map 1 in return for similar privileges to His Majesty's Government in the red area.

(iii) The brown area to be internationalised under a régime to be decided on after subsequent discussion.

(iv) We undertook not to cede Cyprus to a third Power without the consent of France.

(v) Haiffa, which is attributed to England, to be a free port, and French goods to have free transit through the red area in return for similar assurances as regards Alexandretta and transit of British goods through the blue area.

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

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(vi) We also undertook not to acquire, or to consent to a third party acquiring, any possessions in the Arabian Peninsula and not to cede to any but the Arab State our rights in the red area in return for a similar assurance on the part of France.

(vii) We undertook not to push the Baghdad Railway in area "B" north of Samarra until the completion of a railway from Baghdad to Aleppo, and then only with the concurrence of France. In return France promised on similar conditions not to extend the railway in area "A" south of Mosul.

(viii) The existing Turkish customs tariff was to remain in force throughout the red and blue areas for a period of twenty years.

3. By the Decision of the Paris Economic Conference (17th June, 1917), whereby we undertook —

(i) To prohibit all trading with the enemy during the war.
(ii) To refuse most-favoured-nation treatment to the enemy and to subject his commerce to a special régime during a period to be fixed.
(iii) To reserve for Allies essential raw materials.
(iv) Generally to develop Inter-Allied trade to the detriment of the enemy.

4. By the resolutions of the Conference (Paris, October 1917), whereby the so-called policy of the bloc was decided upon, i.e. enemy private property and interests in Allied or occupied territory at the end of the war is to be held as a pledge for Allied private property in enemy or enemy-occupied territory.

5. Apart from the above contractual obligations, we have made several official statements pledging ourselves to the evacuation of Northern France and the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, e.g. Lord R.Cecil in the House of Commons, 15th November, 1917: "The restitution of Alsace-Lorraine was a well-understood war aim from the moment we entered the war" (and c f. Prime Minister to Trades Unions Delegates, 5th January, 1918).

6. In addition to the above, there are two agreements at present under negotiation with France which may shortly be completed:--

(a.) A Supplementary Agreement is being negotiated whereby we would recognise that the Holy Places of Arabia and their immediate vicinity are open to foreign enterprise, the French recognising in return our predominant interests in the rest of Arabia.

(b) Discussions are proceeding for a mutual agreement by which in substance France will recognise for us a free hand in Egypt, and we for them a free hand in Morocco.

TO ITALY

We are bound —

1. By the Pact of London (see under France (1)).
2. By the Italian Agreement of the 26th April, 1915, whereby we pledged ourselves, subject to Italy employing the totality of her forces against all our enemies (a condition which has technically not been observed), that —

.....

(v) And abolish the rights retained by the Sultan of

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

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Turkey over Tripoli and Cyrenaica (i.e. complete annexation).

(vi) That "in a general way" we recognise the interest of Italy in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean, and that, in the event of the partition or partial partition of the Ottoman Empire, or even the redistribution of zones of interest in Turkey, Italy should obtain an "equitable share" in the region of Adalia.

.....

3. Under the Agreement with Italy respecting Asia Minor (8th August, 1917), we pledged ourselves, "subject to the consent of Russia" (which has not been obtained), that —

(i) Italy might administer the zone coloured green on Map 1, and appoint functionaries, &c., in the zone marked "C" on the same terms as France and Great Britain were allowed to administer or appoint functionaries in the blue and red zones and the zones "A" and "B" under the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

(ii) Italy to enjoy reciprocal commercial privileges in the Allied zones.

(iii) If, as a result of the war, it were found impossible to partition the Ottoman Empire to the full extent contemplated in the above agreements, then the principle of the balance of power in the Mediterranean will be observed in any distribution which takes place.

.....

TO RUSSIA

We are bound (if bound at all) —

1. By the Pact of London.

2. By the Constantinople Agreement (March 1915) under which we pledged ourselves "subject to the war being brought to a successful conclusion and to the desiderata of France and Great Britain in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere being realised" —

To agree to the incorporation in the Russian Empire of the city of Constantinople and the dependent territory as shown in yellow on Map 1.

3. By the Sykes-Picot Agreement under which we agreed that —

(i) Russia might annex the portion of Asia Minor coloured yellow on Map 1.

(ii) That Powers annexing portions of the Ottoman Empire should assume a proportionate charge of the Ottoman Public Debt.

.....

TO THE KING OF THE HEDJAZ

We are bound —

1. By the Anglo-French Agreements of 1916, which have

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

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been communicated to the King.

2. By various written assurances given to the King by the High Commissioner in Egypt, namely:-

(a) (17th December, 1917) that "His Majesty's Government had no intention of concluding any peace in the terms of which the freedom of the Arab people from German and Turkish domination did not form an essential condition."

(b) That His Majesty's Government were prepared to "recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within territories bounded on the west by the Red Sea, on the south by the Indian Ocean, on the east by the Persian Gulf and the Turco-Persian frontier. The northern and north-western to be left for subsequent discussion. As regards Mesopotamia the King was warned that "The established interests of Great Britain would necessitate special measures of administrative control".

(c) That Great Britain would guarantee the Holy Places against external aggression.

We are also bound by subsidiary treaties to Ibn Saud and the Idrissi Saiyid, but these obligations are of a local rather than an international character.

TO THE ARMENIANS

We are not bound by any valid contractual obligations, although we are morally committed to the Armenians not only by article 61 of the Berlin Treaty of 1878, but also by the many public statements made on their behalf. ϕ(see Appendix, section 8.)

TO PERSIA

We are not as yet bound by any definite agreements. His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has, however, just been authorised to intimate to the Persian Government that His Majesty's Government would be prepared, in certain circumstances, to regard the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 as being in suspense.

ϕ	WAR AIMS.			
	AMERICAN TERMS	BRITISH TERMS	FRENCH TERMS	ITALIAN TERMS.
8. Turkey (Armenia, Syria etc.)	Non-Turkish nationalities of Ottoman Empire to be assured autonomous development. Dardanelles to be permanently free to all ships.	Arabia, Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine entitled to recognition of their separate nationalities. Black Sea to be opened to all ships.	Armenia and Syria named as places to which principle laid down in 5a applies.	

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

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

(129)

We have also concluded (16th February, 1916) a local arrangement with the Bakhtiari Khans.

In connection with Persia it should be borne in mind that our responsibilities towards the Anglo-Persian Oil Company amount almost to an obligation.

TO AFGHANISTAN

The Ameer was assured in the summer of 1916 that—

1. No proposal affecting the interests of Afghanistan will be made or agreed to at the Peace Conference.

2. That if, as a sequel to the Peace Conference, any such question should arise, nothing will be decided without the Ameer being consulted.

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

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WAR CABINET
E.C. 2519
2 WHITEHALL GARDENS

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TURKEY.

MILITARY.

Decypher. Vice-Admiral Sir S. Calthorpe (Constantinople).

D. 8. p.m. November 25th, 1918.

R. 9.40 a.m. November 27th, 1918.

No. 33 (D).

****

In the course of conversation Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that Senate was taking exception to occupation of Mosul, and Alexandretta. It was pointed out to him that these places were in Mesopotamia and Syria. He said members of late Government which (sic) were persons who had plunged Turkey into the war with its best friend were making things as difficult as possible for present Government which was doing its utmost to carry out Armistice loyally and to maintain order. They had thirty million pounds Turkish to work with and they were working through chamber and Press and among the people. He spoke of them with great bitterness.

I should be glad to be favoured with views of His Majesty's Government as soon as possible as to course they wish pursued with regard to this party. I shall of course use every endeavour to ascertain degree of responsibility of individuals for massacres etc. Please see telegram of November 21st from Officer Commanding troops

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

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

troops to Director of Military Intelligence.

Foreign Minister complained strongly of attitude of Greeks which was calculated to provoke disorder amongst the populace thus intentionally providing an excuse for armed occupation by Allies. He said Greece proposed to appoint High Commissioner, an office which he considered should only be exercised by the Great Powers who had taken a real part in the war.

Despatch follows.

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

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CIRCULATED TO EASTERN COMMITTEE.

FOREIGN OFFICE,
November 26th, 1918.

Your Excellency:-

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note (No.4511) which Your Excellency was so good as to address to me on the 16th instant on the subject of the agreement concluded in London in August 1917, between the British, French and Italian Governments.

His Majesty's Government are quite unable to admit the contention advanced in Your Excellency's note under reply. The condition providing that the consent of Russia should be secured, on which the validity of the whole agreement was expressly made dependent, has not been fulfilled. The reasons for such non-fulfilment are, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, immaterial. It will be within Your Excellency's recollection that His Majesty's Government went out of their way to meet Italian interests by suggesting a fresh arrangement, to be based on discussions with France and the United States. They sincerely regret that their friendly offer should be met by a formal claim that an agreement is binding although one of its fundamental provisions remains unfulfilled.

In these circumstances His Majesty's Government regret that they are compelled, in answer to the formal claim put

His Excellency
The Marquis Imperiali, G.C.V.O.
&c., &c., &c.

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

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

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put forward by the Italian Government, to state quite categorically that they consider it altogether inadmissible.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) Arthur James Balfour.

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

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(191856/W/44)

ITALIAN EMBASSY,
November 16th, 1918.

Sir:-

In a Note dated October 30th last, Your Excellency informed me that the British Government considered it advisable to initiate conversations between the Governments of Italy, the United States, France and Great Britain regarding the territories mentioned in the Franco-British Agreement of 1916.

In accordance with instructions received, I hasten to inform Your Excellency that the Italian Government is disposed to participate in these discussions as proposed, with which, as you inform me, the French Government will be associated.

The Italian Government takes act of Your Excellency's declaration to the effect that, in opening these discussions, there is no intention of questioning the validity of the Treaty of London of 1915 which will remain in full force and effect.

The Italian Government adds, however, that until a subsequent agreement is reached, it must consider as valid the agreement concluded at London in August 1917 between the British,

e Right Honourable
A.J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.
c., &c., &c.

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

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

(135)

British, French and Italian Governments when the Italian Government gave its adherence to the Franco-British Agreement of 1916 and obtained the recognition of its interests in Anatolia, Arabia and the Red Sea. Advantage is taken of this opportunity to state that in the view of the Italian Government and in conformity with a reasonable interpretation of justice, the reservation in regard to Russian consent, made in the Agreement of 1917, cannot in any way invalidate it inasmuch as Russia has ceased to exist as a contracting Government and is not therefore in a position to express herself on the question.

I am, further, instructed to point out to Your Excellency that, in giving its adherence to Your Excellency's request regarding a modus vivendi between Great Britain and France for the conduct of relations with the Arabs in certain districts, the Italian Government must assume that not only the Franco-British Agreement of 1916 but also the Agreement of August 1917 remain valid.

On its part, the Italian Government wishes to declare that it pursues no objects in the Anatolian districts covered by the Agreement of 1917 other than to promote the establishment of a Government and national Administration supported by the free will of the people, with a view of assuring, with its support and effective assistance, the normal operation of justice, security and civil progress, and to promote the development of the country's economic resources.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) Imperiali.

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

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(196402).

TURKEY.

MILITARY.

Telegram (~~en clair~~) from Sir M.Sykes (Damascus).

D. November 27th, 1918.

R. November 27th, 1918.

WAR CABINET
E.C. 2564
2, WHITEHALL GARDENS

No. 14.

Secret.

My application (? appreciation) of political situation of Damascus and Lebanon is as follows: Damascus and district is pro ? Feisal but anti-Sheriffian. Anti-French feeling runs high and to impose French advisers now would invite disorder. Government working very feebly, vitality and cohesion are lacking and intrigue is rampant. Occasional doles of money instead of regular payment weakens and adds to (? insecurity) of Government. The prime necessity is the settlement of financial question for duration of period of provisional military administration. It is also necessary to appoint many financial controllers for the same period. Frenchmen would however be (? worse) than none. Two bad elements appear to be (? present) viz. the large numbers of Turkish officers and too much Hedjaz influence, both tend to estrange Syrians and make movement Islamic rather than national. Beirut and Lebanon-Druses, Moslems, Metwalis, orthodox protestants,

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

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protestants, fraction of Maronites, fraction of Greek Uniates, totalling slightly under half population (? amenable) and perhaps more than half Beirut is anti-French in favour of an autonomy under Damascus if Damascus is under non-French European tutelage. Remainder are pro-French, out and out pro-French supporters of annexation. After making allowance for previous happenings (? bad) French position in Damascus and Lebanon is due to (a) French having failed to provide in the first instance an adequate or competent staff. (b) Speeches, acts and propaganda all tending to give impression that France means to rule country directly and exploit it. (c) Bad appearance and alleged conduct of French troops. (d) General impression of hostility of French to Damascus Government given by censorship attitude of (? Martons) hatred of Press and general attitude of French officers. (e) Republication of Coulondre's letter as a reply to conjoint Anglo-French declaration. (f). The triumphal departure of Feisal in a British cruiser. Without visiting Ham., Homs and Aleppo it is quite impossible to make any useful suggestion as to general policy, except that French have much ground to make good which in these parts they can only do by making some effort to show that it is not their intention to annex or

favour

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

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favour minorities at expense of majorities. (?) From what I have seen I do not consider that French position is entirely lost in Damascus or Beirut but they have only to continue on our lines to render hopeless their chance of predominant position without recourse to violence which I (? assume) to be contrary to war aims of Entente. Mr. (? Picot) spoke to me of a proposal that the British should evacuate country and hand over to French, I think this course would undoubtedly lead to general contravention (sic). Hopes raised by departure of Feisal ? would give place to violent irritation. I am of opinion that the foundation of the present Anglophilism of Syria is nothing more solid than that French have made themselves unpopular and that Arabs love to set partners (sic) by the ears.

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

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E/C. 2584
2, WHITEHALL GARDENS
Misc

Settlement of Turkey and Arabian Peninsula.

(Note by India Office on Foreign Office Memorandum.)

The Foreign Office Memorandum calls for remarks on three points:—

I.—*The "Trucial System."*

1. First, as regards Arab countries generally, and the Arabian peninsula, too much stress seems to be laid on what the writer calls "the trucial system," and on the responsibility which Great Britain is to assume for the maintenance of internal peace. The facts also are rather overstated. It is too much to say that by this system "the peace is effectively kept already over a considerable part of the Arabian peninsula" (page 11), for it is only on a narrow strip of coast between Katr and Oman that it prevails. Again, the rulers with whom we had treaties before the war were not "*nearly* all coastal chiefs": except in the Aden Protectorate (which is *sui generis*) they were *all* coastal. Nor is it the case that the rulers with whom we have made treaties during the war "are mostly chiefs of inland tribes and oases," for we have made no treaties with anybody but the Idrisi and Bin Saud, both of whom are coastal chiefs (our treaty with Mavia has lapsed).

2. The fact is that the object of the trucial treaties was the suppression of maritime piracy, and that before the war His Majesty's Government always set their face rigidly against intervention in the interior of Arabia. They would not even respond to Bin Saud's overtures until, by ejecting the Turks from Hasa, he, too, became a coastal chief, and a potential danger to the peace of the Persian Gulf. The reason for this attitude is obvious: intervention was physically impossible. It is no less so now. Our only weapon for enforcing our will in the interior is the blockade. But we cannot blockade the Hejaz without offending Moslems everywhere. We cannot blockade Asir and the Yemen without constant friction with the French and Italians. We cannot effectually blockade the East Coast of Arabia because the blockade can so easily be evaded through Koweit and Mesopotamia, and evasion will be the more easy as railway communication is improved.

3. If it is impossible for us to intervene, it is necessary to avoid treaty engagements requiring intervention. At present it is claimed that we have none. This point should be cleared up, for the Foreign Office Memorandum suggests (page 12, top) that we are pledged to Bin Saud in this respect. But this is more than doubtful. All the treaty binds us to is (*a*) to recognise him as independent sovereign of certain territories hereafter to be defined, with the implication that we will assist in defining them; (*b*) to protect him against aggression by any foreign Power. It is submitted that (*a*) does not oblige us to compel anyone else so to recognise him, though we should doubtless use our good offices in his behalf, and refuse to recognise, *e.g.*, the Shereef's claim to any part of his territories as defined with our approval. As to (*b*), it has been laid down from the first that "any foreign Power" does not include Arabs (Secretary of State to Government of India, 19th September 1916)[1]; and in this connection it may be noted that our obligation (undertaken in 1899) to use our good offices in behalf of Koweit, if attacked, was held to refer to attacks by the Turks or by tribes *under Turkish control* (India Office to Foreign Office, 8th April 1911).

4. And if we have at present no such engagements in the interior, neither do our own interests call for any. The Arab tribes have always roamed the interior and raided one another at will, and they will probably always continue to do so—"for God hath made them so." But so long as they had not the Turk behind them they did, and could do, us and our Arab friends little harm. With the elimination of Turkish intrigue, these internecine wars will to some extent cease, and will lose most of their danger for us. And our concern will be limited to (i) seeing that no other foreign Power (*i.e.*, neither Italy nor France) takes the place of Turkey as a disturber of the peace; (ii) controlling the traffic in arms; (iii) providing that caravan and pilgrimage routes are kept open—if necessary, by the payment of subsidies.

5. An extension of the "trucial system," either in the interior or on the Red Sea coast is therefore of very doubtful expediency. We are committed to adjudicating

[1] *See* Appendix.

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after the war between the territorial claims of the Idrisi and the Imam or any other rival, and to protecting the Idrisi against foreign aggression. This we must do, but we should not go any further. And on the other hand, it should be understood by foreign Powers that while we claim to have special political interests in the peninsula and will protect the chiefs against unprovoked aggression, we ourselves undertake no responsibilities as regards the protection of foreign subjects or their trade.

6. This point has been dwelt on at some length because the prospect of His Majesty's Government having to maintain the peace throughout Arabia and the Arab countries is so alarming as to be absolutely prohibitive. We shall have quite enough on our hands in those regions without the addition of that impossible duty. For it should not be too easily assumed—as it sometimes is, when we talk of "having the Arabs behind us" and the like—that the Arabs love us and are coming to feed from our hands. So long as the Turk was a real danger, the Arabs disliked us less than him. But when once that danger is permanently removed, the balance of dislike will almost inevitably be transferred to us, and there will be a strong tendency on their part to minimise the evils and magnify the advantages of the Government which they no longer endure or enjoy. The less we have to intervene in their domestic affairs the better.

II.—*The Hejaz.*

7. It seems desirable that the least possible limitation should be imposed on the independence of the Hejaz, and even the "trucial treaty on a restricted basis" proposed on page 12 of the Memorandum is of doubtful expediency. Every limitation and everything savouring of protectorate will be looked upon with the utmost suspicion by Moslems, at all events in India. As is pointed out in the Memorandum, the Hejaz will, to a large extent, be self-sterilised. We ought to provide by treaty that the King shall receive pilgrimage agents, and that they shall not have diplomatic status; but it is very doubtful whether we ought to require that his diplomatic relations shall be conducted through us. It would, of course, save us a vast amount of inconvenience; but on the whole it seems better to leave him absolutely free, and to rely on our own energy and the other factors mentioned on page 12 for maintaining our influence. If the King of the Hejaz became Caliph there would obviously be considerable disadvantage in allowing him to fall under the influence of another Power; but it is not easy to see what practicable measure of sterilisation will effectually prevent this, if we allow our own activity and watchfulness to slacken, and these will be our best safeguard. For the rest, the more we can keep our own sphere apart from the Hejaz and its influences, the less anxiety we need feel about the Hejaz itself. This, as far as it goes, is an argument against setting up Abdullah in Mesopotamia.

III.—*Syria.*

8. It is doubtless worth while to try to persuade the French to give up Syria, but very doubtful whether we shall succeed. In any case we ought to be ready with an alternative. From our point of view the most important thing is to get them out of Area A and perhaps a strip of the blue area up to and including Diarbekr. In Syria itself, as the Foreign Office Memorandum admits (page 13), we have less direct political interest than anywhere else. In fact, apart from Alexandretta (which is to remain French under any revision of the Agreement), our only interest lies in the relations between Syria and the tribes of the desert. The Memorandum points out on page 14 that the present arrangement cuts the Ruwallah-Anazeh country into three, with the possible result that these tribes would "realise their natural destiny and gravitate towards Syria," the effect of which "would be to carry French influence into the heart of the Arabian peninsula." Somehow or other this risk must be averted. The point has been put to Captain Wilson and Miss Bell (who knows that side of the desert better than anyone), and their reply is as follows:—

> "Our view is that it should be excluded from all spheres, Syria and Iraq maintaining right to police caravan road west and east respectively of, say, longitude 39°. It is clear that no Government will exercise effective control over Syrian desert. Governments are concerned only with the administration of settled districts, and the relations of tribes to borders of cultivated

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land. These borders in southern Syria, south of Hauran, will be under British influence, Ruwallah of Jof will turn to native market towns (such as Salt or Madabah) which we choose to organise and enlarge in Moab, and unless hand of British Political Officer on the Euphrates loses its cunning, the Anazeh of Central Arabia will turn more readily to him than to his French colleagues in Damascus, charm they never so wisely."

9. It is suggested, therefore, that if the French cannot be induced to quit Syria altogether, we should at all events endeavour to persuade them, in exchange for Armenia, to give up Area A, or at least the part of it east of the Euphrates, and to recognise the Ruwallah-Anazeh country as lying outside either sphere. The status of Nuri Shaalan would then be the same as that of Bin Saud or Bin Rashid.

IV.

10. It is noticed that the Memorandum does not mention the *Baghdad Railway*. But it is a British desideratum of the first magnitude that the section in the British sphere should be the property of the Arab State and British controlled, without any foreign voice in either the finance or the administration. The same applies to that part of the concession which relates to the construction of ports at Baghdad and Basra, and to mineral rights, as well as to any rights to participate in the navigation of the rivers which may have arisen out of the concession.

A. H.

30th November 1918.

APPENDIX.

(Guarantee to Bin Saud.)

The point is so important that it is worth while to set out the facts at length.

Bin Saud's original draft, which was communicated to us in January 1915, when our negotiations with the Shereef were in their infancy, and the only enemy on the horizon was the Turk, proposed that "Great Britain shall undertake defence of his "territories from all external aggression and encroachment on the part of any other "Power, whether by land or sea." On this Sir P. Cox commented (telegram of 16th January 1915):—"When we invited Bin Saud to move on Basrah we undertook to "protect him against reprisals by Turks, so that, as far as latter are concerned, what "Bin Saud now asks us to give does not amount to much more. Apart from Turks, "Central Arabia is practically inaccessible by land to any Power but ours, and I "venture to think that we should incur little risk by giving the desired undertaking "subject to the reservation that aggression be unprovoked." (P. 561B/15.) Accordingly Article 2 of the British counterdraft ran:—"In the event of unprovoked "aggression by any foreign Power . . . the British Government will aid Bin "Saud to such extent and in such manner as the situation may seem to them to "require." Bin Saud, replying on 24th April, struck out "unprovoked" (on the ground that it was tautological, since the Arabic word meant "molestation without a cause"), and for the last words substituted "will aid Bin Saud in all circumstances and in any place." (P. 2832/15.) On 16th August His Majesty's Government ordered that "unprovoked" should be restored, and that if Bin Saud would not agree to the original language the following might be accepted:—"Will aid Bin "Saud to such extent and in such manner as British Government, after consultation "with Bin Saud, may consider most effective for protecting his interests." (P. 2966/15.) Bin Saud was obdurate as regards "unprovoked," but accepted another important modification, and in the Treaty signed on 26th December 1915 the material part of Article 2 runs:—

"In the event of aggression by any foreign Power . . . without reference to the British Government and without giving her [*sic*] an opportunity of communicating with Bin Saud and composing the matter, the British Government will aid Bin Saud to such extent and in such manner as the British Government, after consulting Bin Saud, may consider most effective for protecting his interests and countries." (P. 668/16.)

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The question of the meaning of the term "foreign Power" was soon raised. For in September 1916, Bin Saud having expressed mistrust of the Shereef's intentions, Sir P. Cox proposed to reply that "no present or future understandings "between us and the Shereef would prejudice our adherence to the terms of Articles "1 and 2 of our Treaty with him of 26th December 1915" (telegram of 8th September 1916), and the India Office (with Foreign Office concurrence, W. 183725/16) instructed Sir P. Cox on 19th September that "reference to treaty should be confined "to Article 1, as we could not admit that Article 2 is binding on us as against other "Arabs." (P. 3827/16.) Accordingly Sir P. Cox wrote to Bin Saud on 18th October:—"As for ourselves *vis-à-vis* yourself and the Shereef, have we not our "treaty with you, in Article 1 of which we have recognised you as independent ruler "of your territories of Nejd? Of course the Shereef must naturally recognise this "treaty also, and His Majesty's Government would by no means support him in any "other attitude towards you." (P. 4918/16.)

The question came up again in August last, when Captain Wilson, in his telegram No. 6491 of the 8th August, recommended that Bin Saud should "be informed in writing that Article 2 of Treaty of 26th December 1915 [*i.e.*, the Article guaranteeing him against aggression by 'any foreign Power'] applies equally to aggression by King Husain." The point was considered by the Eastern Committee on the 15th August, and on the same day the Secretary of State telegraphed to India and Baghdad that the proposal was "open to objection that it *places a doubtful interpretation on Article 2 of Treaty with Bin Saud.*" It does not appear that the Eastern Committee was aware of the earlier and more categorical decision to the same effect.

Captain Wilson reverted to the point in his telegram No. 8789, of 16th October 1918, in which he again invited His Majesty's Government "to consider possibility of making a declaration on the lines of paragraph 1" of his telegram No. 6491 quoted above. The Secretary of State replied to Captain Wilson, with Lord Curzon's concurrence (28th October):—"We do not think it advisable to make declaration in terms of Baghdad telegram No. 6491." The utmost length to which His Majesty's Government appear to have gone in their commitments to Bin Saud is to "recognise our obligations to use every influence in our power to prevent encroachments upon Bin Saud's territories" (telegram of 15th August 1918, communicated to him 27th August, *see* Baghdad telegrams 7548 and 7550 of 10th September 1918).

It may be added that Bin Saud himself does not seem ever to have appealed to Article 2 of the Treaty. His complaint has been that he was being attacked not by a foreign Power, but by an ally of Great Britain, who was using British gold to fight against him instead of against the Turk. But after the war the flow of British gold to potential aggressors will presumably cease, or be reduced to an insignificant stream; and our most effective means of securing that such order as is necessary for our purpose is maintained will probably be the grant of small subsidies to those who are charged with the duty of keeping the routes open, and their prompt withdrawal from those who offend.

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7. It seems desirable that the least possible limitation should be imposed on the independence of the Hejaz, and even the "trucial treaty on a restricted basis" proposed on page 12 of the Memorandum is of doubtful expediency. Every limitation and everything savouring of protectorate will be looked upon with the utmost suspicion by Moslems, at all events in India. As is pointed out in the Memorandum, the Hejaz will, to a large extent, be self-sterilised. We ought to provide by treaty that the King shall receive pilgrimage agents, and that they shall not have diplomatic status; but it is very doubtful whether we ought to require that his diplomatic relations shall be conducted through us. It would, of course, save us a vast amount of inconvenience; but on the whole it seems better to leave him absolutely free, and to rely on our own energy and the other factors mentioned on page 12 for maintaining our influence. If the King of the Hejaz became Caliph there would obviously be considerable disadvantage in allowing him to fall under the influence of another Power; but it is not easy to see what practicable measure of sterilisation will effectually prevent this, if we allow our own activity and watchfulness to slacken, and these will be our best safeguard. For the rest, the more we can keep our own sphere apart from the Hejaz and its influences, the less anxiety we need feel about the Hejaz itself. This, as far as it goes, is an argument against setting up Abdullah in Mesopotamia.

III.—*Syria.*

8. It is doubtless worth while to try to persuade the French to give up Syria, but very doubtful whether we shall succeed. In any case we ought to be ready with an alternative. From our point of view the most important thing is to get them out of Area A and perhaps a strip of the blue area up to and including Diarbekr. In Syria itself, as the Foreign Office Memorandum admits (page 13), we have less direct political interest than anywhere else. In fact, apart from Alexandretta (which is to remain French under any revision of the Agreement), our only interest lies in the relations between Syria and the tribes of the desert. The Memorandum points out on page 14 that the present arrangement cuts the Ruwallah-Anazeh country into three, with the possible result that these tribes would "realise their natural destiny and gravitate towards Syria," the effect of which "would be to carry French influence into the heart of the Arabian peninsula." Somehow or other this risk must be averted. The point has been put to Captain Wilson and Miss Bell (who knows that side of the desert better than anyone), and their reply is as follows:—

> "Our view is that it should be excluded from all spheres, Syria and Iraq maintaining right to police caravan road west and east respectively of, say, longitude 39°. It is clear that no Government will exercise effective control over Syrian desert. Governments are concerned only with the administration of settled districts, and the relations of tribes to borders of cultivated

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land. These borders in southern Syria, south of Hauran, will be under British influence, Ruwallah of Jof will turn to native market towns (such as Salt or Madabah) which we choose to organise and enlarge in Moab, and unless hand of British Political Officer on the Euphrates loses its cunning, the Anazeh of Central Arabia will turn more readily to him than to his French colleagues in Damascus, charm they never so wisely."

9. It is suggested, therefore, that if the French cannot be induced to quit Syria altogether, we should at all events endeavour to persuade them, in exchange for Armenia, to give up Area A, or at least the part of it east of the Euphrates, and to recognise the Ruwallah-Anazeh country as lying outside either sphere. The status of Nuri Shaalan would then be the same as that of Bin Saud or Bin Rashid.

IV.

10. It is noticed that the Memorandum does not mention the *Baghdad Railway*. But it is a British desideratum of the first magnitude that the section in the British sphere should be the property of the Arab State and British controlled, without any foreign voice in either the finance or the administration. The same applies to that part of the concession which relates to the construction of ports at Baghdad and Basra, and to mineral rights, as well as to any rights to participate in the navigation of the rivers which may have arisen out of the concession.

A. H.

30th November 1918.

APPENDIX.

(Guarantee to Bin Saud.)

The point is so important that it is worth while to set out the facts at length.

Bin Saud's original draft, which was communicated to us in January 1915, when our negotiations with the Shereef were in their infancy, and the only enemy on the horizon was the Turk, proposed that "Great Britain shall undertake defence of his "territories from all external aggression and encroachment on the part of any other "Power, whether by land or sea." On this Sir P. Cox commented (telegram of 16th January 1915):—"When we invited Bin Saud to move on Basrah we undertook to "protect him against reprisals by Turks, so that, as far as latter are concerned, what "Bin Saud now asks us to give does not amount to much more. Apart from Turks, "Central Arabia is practically inaccessible by land to any Power but ours, and I "venture to think that we should incur little risk by giving the desired undertaking "subject to the reservation that aggression be unprovoked." (P. 561B/15.) Accordingly Article 2 of the British counterdraft ran:—"In the event of unprovoked "aggression by any foreign Power . . . the British Government will aid Bin "Saud to such extent and in such manner as the situation may seem to them to "require." Bin Saud, replying on 24th April, struck out "unprovoked" (on the ground that it was tautological, since the Arabic word meant "molestation without a cause"), and for the last words substituted "will aid Bin Saud in all circumstances and in any place." (P. 2832/15.) On 16th August His Majesty's Government ordered that "unprovoked" should be restored, and that if Bin Saud would not agree to the original language the following might be accepted:—"Will aid Bin "Saud to such extent and in such manner as British Government, after consultation "with Bin Saud, may consider most effective for protecting his interests." (P. 2966/15.) Bin Saud was obdurate as regards "unprovoked," but accepted another important modification, and in the Treaty signed on 26th December 1915 the material part of Article 2 runs:—

"In the event of aggression by any foreign Power . . . without reference to the British Government and without giving her [*sic*] an opportunity of communicating with Bin Saud and composing the matter, the British Government will aid Bin Saud to such extent and in such manner as the British Government, after consulting Bin Saud, may consider most effective for protecting his interests and countries." (P. 668/16.)

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The question of the meaning of the term "foreign Power" was soon raised. For in September 1916, Bin Saud having expressed mistrust of the Shereef's intentions, Sir P. Cox proposed to reply that "no present or future understandings "between us and the Shereef would prejudice our adherence to the terms of Articles "1 and 2 of our Treaty with him of 26th December 1915" (telegram of 8th September 1916), and the India Office (with Foreign Office concurrence, W. 183725/16) instructed Sir P. Cox on 19th September that "reference to treaty should be confined "to Article 1, as we could not admit that Article 2 is binding on us as against other "Arabs." (P. 3827/16.) Accordingly Sir P. Cox wrote to Bin Saud on 18th October:—"As for ourselves *vis-à-vis* yourself and the Shereef, have we not our "treaty with you, in Article 1 of which we have recognised you as independent ruler "of your territories of Nejd? Of course the Shereef must naturally recognise this "treaty also, and His Majesty's Government would by no means support him in any "other attitude towards you." (P. 4918/16.)

The question came up again in August last, when Captain Wilson, in his telegram No. 6491 of the 8th August, recommended that Bin Saud should "be informed in writing that Article 2 of Treaty of 26th December 1915 [*i.e.*, the Article guaranteeing him against aggression by 'any foreign Power'] applies equally to aggression by King Husain." The point was considered by the Eastern Committee on the 15th August, and on the same day the Secretary of State telegraphed to India and Baghdad that the proposal was "open to objection that it *places a doubtful interpretation on Article 2 of Treaty with Bin Saud.*" It does not appear that the Eastern Committee was aware of the earlier and more categorical decision to the same effect.

Captain Wilson reverted to the point in his telegram No. 8789, of 16th October 1918, in which he again invited His Majesty's Government "to consider possibility of making a declaration on the lines of paragraph 1" of his telegram No. 6491 quoted above. The Secretary of State replied to Captain Wilson, with Lord Curzon's concurrence (28th October):—"We do not think it advisable to make declaration in terms of Baghdad telegram No. 6491." The utmost length to which His Majesty's Government appear to have gone in their commitments to Bin Saud is to "recognise our obligations to use every influence in our power to prevent encroachments upon Bin Saud's territories" (telegram of 15th August 1918, communicated to him 27th August, *see* Baghdad telegrams 7548 and 7550 of 10th September 1918).

It may be added that Bin Saud himself does not seem ever to have appealed to Article 2 of the Treaty. His complaint has been that he was being attacked not by a foreign Power, but by an ally of Great Britain, who was using British gold to fight against him instead of against the Turk. But after the war the flow of British gold to potential aggressors will presumably cease, or be reduced to an insignificant stream; and our most effective means of securing that such order as is necessary for our purpose is maintained will probably be the grant of small subsidies to those who are charged with the duty of keeping the routes open, and their prompt withdrawal from those who offend.

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Indian Desiderata for Peace Settlement.

(Note by Political Department, India Office.)

PART I.—DISPOSAL OF CONQUERED TERRITORIES.

I. Mesopotamia.

1. Indian interest in Mesopotamia is not a thing of yesterday. Very close ties, mainly religious and commercial, have existed between the two countries for centuries past. The majority of the Moslems of Mesopotamia are Shiahs, and though the Shiahs of India are relatively few in number they are influential. There has been an Indian colony at Kerbela and Nejef for more than a century, and the famous shrines at those places have always been objects of great devotion, which has found concrete expression in the Oudh Bequest, made by the King of Oudh in 1825, and now administered by the Government of India, under which the sum of 5,000*l.* is distributed annually for charitable purposes among the faithful. Similarly, the tomb and mosque of Abdul Qadir at Baghdad are regarded by the Sunnis of India with great veneration, and that city, though not one of the "Holy Places," is considered by them to possess a high degree of sanctity.

2. The commercial connection of the East India Company with Mesopotamia began in the middle of the 17th century, though a permanent factory was not established at Basra till 1723. The British agent at Basra acquired Consular status in 1728. A Resident and Consul was appointed to Baghdad in 1798, and was raised to the status of Consul-General in 1851. This functionary has steadily grown in importance, and has normally been recruited from the Political Department of the Government of India, to whom he reported directly as well as to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. The importance of his position was further marked by the maintenance of an escort of Indian troops. The commercial relations of India with all parts of the Persian Gulf are too well-known to require description; but it may be mentioned that the value of British trade (in which India was largely interested) passing through Baghdad in the year before the war was over 2,500,000*l.*

3. Further, it was the Indian Government which first policed the waters of the Persian Gulf, thus, at the cost of much blood and treasure, opening Mesopotamia to the outer world, and giving security and free navigation to the shipping of all nations.

4. It was fitting, then, that a country in which India was thus deeply interested should be liberated by Indian arms. The expedition which was launched from India in the autumn of 1914 was provided by the Indian Army, and its operations were controlled by the Government of India, and though the control was taken over by the War Office early in 1916, it was mainly from India that the great army which has so highly distinguished itself was recruited, equipped and supplied. And the campaign, undertaken in the first instance for the defence of India, soon assumed the character of a campaign of liberation. Turkish misrule in Mesopotamia, as in other non-Turkish parts of the Ottoman Empire, was notorious. The Turks, it is true, had conquered a country which had never recovered from the devastation of Hulagu. But it is potentially one of the richest areas in the world, and their administration, during the three centuries for which they occupied it, did little or nothing to restore it. Its wealth depends upon irrigation; but the Mongols had destroyed the principal canals, and, with the exception of the Hindiyah barrage, the Turks undertook no works of restoration. Agriculture languished, except in those estates which the Sultan Abdul Hamid acquired, and the proceeds of which were drained into the privy purse. Education languished, for the Turks provided only Sunni religious instruction in the public schools, and the Shiah inhabitants withdrew

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their boys. The law which was administered was Sunni law, and the Shiahs had to make the best of it. Even the mosques were allowed to fall into decay. The nomad tribes were ridden—as such tribes must be ridden—on a very loose rein; but the policy of the Turks was to divide and rule, and they saved themselves trouble by setting the tribes upon one another.

5. In the four years of British occupation great changes have been effected. The first purpose of the administration has necessarily been to supply the army in the field. That this has been successfully done is in itself no small achievement. But a great deal more has been done. Irrigation and drainage works have been undertaken or restored. New land has been brought under cultivation. At the beginning of this year the cultivated area in the Baghdad Vilayet alone was estimated to be 620,000 acres, and in a single tract on the Euphrates the sown area was calculated by the inhabitants to be three or four times greater than the largest area ever known to have been cultivated under the Turkish Government. Successful experiments have been made with Indian and Egyptian wheat and cotton, and the potato has been introduced. Railways have been built—not all of them strategic—and other means of transport improved. Every effort has been made to meet the growing demand for education, and the religious instruction required by the people has been provided. Sunni and Shiah Courts have been separated, and a judicial system has been established, based on the existing law of the land, and permitting the fullest use to be made of native personnel. Order is maintained in towns by native police and in the country by native levies, under British officers. The central departments are carried on under the supervision of British directors assisted by Arab advisers and committees. In towns and country districts municipal and divisional councils have been formed under the presidency of British officers; and the inhabitants have begun to appreciate some of the advantages of light, water, and sanitation. In his proclamation of 19th March 1917 Sir Stanley Maude invited the people of the country through their elders and representatives to participate in the management of their civil affairs in collaboration with the political representatives of Great Britain. The pledge implied in this invitation has been fulfilled, and it is officers of the Indian Political Department, and the Indian Army, and the Indian Civil Service under whose direction this great work has been mainly done.

6. The primary requirement of the country now is the continuance of stable administration, without which neither material development nor moral progress is possible. The maintenance of such an administration must depend, for some time to come, on effective European guidance and control. On that point there is no room for illusion. Our political authorities have frequently commented on the difficulty of finding qualified local candidates even for subordinate posts under the British administration. The material for filling the higher offices of Government does not exist. An indigenous administration, standing alone, could not inspire the requisite confidence either at home or abroad.

7. On the economic side, the result of abandoning the country to its own devices would inevitably be a relapse into the old sterile conditions: for capital could not be obtained for its development unless investors felt that their interests were properly safeguarded. Politically, there would be no security for equitable government, or for the protection of minorities against injustice and oppression. The population of Mesopotamia is not a homogeneous one. The predominating element is Arab; but there are many Jews and Christians also, particularly in Baghdad city, where they constitute the most progressive and enlightened section of the whole community. Even the Arabs are divided, as between townsmen and Beduin. The Baghdad Jews have already taken fright at the prospect of an uncontrolled Arab government, which they declare "would be far worse than the old Turkish despotism, as the Turks are more enlightened and tolerant than the Arabs." Failing a British protectorate, they have declared their wish to become British subjects, "so as to be assured of protection against Arab tyranny." The Civil Commissioner tells us that their fears are not without ground.

8. It is quite clear that some supervisory authority will be required, for the present at all events, to hold the balance between these diverse elements and interests and to work for the common benefit of all. Who is that authority to be? There can

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surely be only one answer to such a question. Mesopotamia is on a different footing from Syria or Palestine. We owe nothing there to outside assistance, Arab or European. We fought the whole campaign unaided, and have administered the occupied territories on our own lines, without external help. That the work has been well done, and solid foundations laid of a new political system, is generally admitted. It can be to nobody's interest, least of all to that of the local inhabitants, that we should leave our task unfinished. As the head of the American Relief Mission to Persia recently remarked to the Civil Commissioner at Baghdad: "You British must stay here to carry on this great work in the interests of the world."

9. Moreover, we have a *strategic* interest in Mesopotamia. The story of German penetration in the direction of the Persian Gulf—the celebrated "Berlin-Baghdad" project—is well known. It was recognised even before the war as a direct menace to our position in India. By good fortune the enemy designs were still incomplete when the war broke out. We were able, within a very few weeks of Turkey's intervention, to occupy Basra; and, by the time that Turkey sued for an armistice, had pushed our front northwards beyond Baghdad to the very gates of Mosul. It is essential to the safety of India that our rivals should in no circumstances and under no conditions whatsoever be permitted to resume their operations after the war. A barrier must be set up in Mesopotamia, whatever its precise form, that will effectually close the land line to the head of the Gulf against any potential enemy of the British Empire.

10. If this object is to be achieved, it may be regarded as axiomatic (1) that no part of Mesopotamia should be restored to the Turks; and (2) that at any rate the portion of the conquered territories lying nearest the Gulf (*i.e.*, the Basra Vilayet) should remain under effective British control. Annexation having been ruled out, even as regards the Basra Vilayet, the most favourable alternative appears to be the establishment of an Arab State under British control. This being so, we should at least aim at securing that the control is real and exclusive, and leaves no opening for the machinations of foreign Powers. So far as Basra is concerned, this is vital. We need be under no illusions as to the ability of an Arab administration, if left to itself, to resist foreign intrigue or to bar the way to foreign encroachment. It is not enough to expel the Turk. We cannot afford to leave a vacuum for others to fill. It is essential that we should control, and effectively control, the external relations of the Arab State. If there is to be a fair diplomatic field and no favour, we run the risk that German diplomacy (supposing Germany to regain anything like her old strength and ambitions) will beat us with the Arabs, just as it beat us with the Turks. In that event, the results of our vast military efforts during the last four years might conceivably be neutralised. We might even (to put an extreme case) live to see another Baghdad railway contract granted by an Arab Government; or, if we relax our control over Basra and the surrounding district, we may start the next war with the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab fortified by German engineers as strongly as the mouth of the Thames, and with German submarine bases all along the Persian Gulf. The risk is one that we cannot afford to take.

11. This is of course an extreme case. What may more probably be expected to happen, if a vacuum is left, is this. The Germans will be driven to seek raw material wherever they can find it, and not only to obtain it for themselves, but to make it difficult for us to obtain it. A peaceful commercial penetration of Mesopotamia is therefore indicated. But commercial penetration means political penetration, and political penetration—if the object is to make difficulties for us—means the creation and encouragement of every kind of anti-British feeling (and experience has shown that in such circumstances the Germans do not shrink from playing on anti-*Christian* feeling) in a particularly sensitive region. We should find ourselves engaged in constant small feuds in Arabia, Mesopotamia, and on the coast of the Persian Gulf; German warships would appear in those waters: the impotent and incapable Persia would be drawn in; Panislamism would lift up its head again—and all the predisposing causes of an international quarrel would be reproduced.

12. It is obvious, then, that the work to be done in Mesopotamia, if regard be had to its nature and magnitude, to the size of the area concerned, and to the neighbours with whom the country must stand in relation, is one which can only be performed by a

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Great Power, with all the resources of a Great Power at its back; and it is submitted that the above considerations show that no other Power has any claim, moral or material, to undertake the task comparable with that of the British Empire.

13. As regards the outward form of the new Mesopotamian State, it is not proposed to discuss here the various suggestions that have been made. From the Indian point of view, the form matters little provided the reality of British supervision and control is secured, and provided the administrative system is such as to commend itself to the local population, and to afford them full scope for self-development on national lines. A word may be said about the geographical limits of the new State. That it must include the old Turkish vilayets of Basra and Baghdad goes without saying; but there are solid grounds for including the vilayet of Mosul as well. The Civil Commissioner has recently pressed this point strongly. The Mosul vilayet, he tells us, is the hinterland of Iraq; the connection between Baghdad and Mosul is as close as that between Basra and Baghdad. This was fully recognised by the Turks, whose first step, when they turned their attention in 1910 to the reorganisation of the Baghdad vilayet, was to place both Mosul and Basra under the supreme authority of the Baghdad administration. "It may be laid down on general lines," says Colonel Wilson, "that it is vital to the welfare of the Iraq province that the "province of Mosul should be under an administration not only friendly "to, but in active co-operation with that of Iraq." The whole of Mesopotamia falls within the area in respect of which Sir Henry McMahon pledged us, *vis-à-vis* the Sherif (King of the Hejaz), in October 1915 to recognise the "independence of the Arab countries"; but this pledge was qualified by the proviso that our "established position and interests" in the occupied districts of Iraq necessitated "special measures of administrative control to secure these "territories from foreign aggression, *to promote the welfare of the local populations*, "and to safeguard our mutual economic interests." In the recent Anglo-French "Declaration," published on the 5th November, we declared it to be our policy to encourage and assist the establishment "de gouvernements et d'administrations *indigènes*" in the liberated territories; we disclaimed any wish to impose "telles ou telles institutions" on the local populations, and avowed our sole object to be to assure by our support and effective assistance "le fonctionnement normal des "gouvernements et administrations qu'elles se seront librement donnés." These pledges, though they preclude annexation and perhaps even the establishment of a formal British "protectorate," are not inconsistent with effective British control, exercised through an indigenous administration. In regard to Mosul, a special difficulty arises, because the town and part of the vilayet lie within the sphere of influence assigned to France by the Agreement of May 1916. It is very much to be hoped that some means may be found of inducing the French Government to forgo their claims.

2. German East Africa.

14. India is interested in German East Africa (1) because, in the hands of a Power hostile, or potentially hostile, to Great Britain, it might afford a base for enemy naval activity in the Indian Ocean; and (2) because of the advantages offered by the Colony for Indian immigration. It may be remarked in connection with point (2) that Indian traders were established in this region long before the German occupation. The claims of India to colonisation rights in the conquered territory are very strong:—

(*a*) There is not in India the possibility of suitably rewarding with land a fraction of the million of Indian soldiers who have served the Empire in the war, and it is land above all things that they want.

(*b*) The Indian immigrant of this type—the Jat and Punjabi Mussulman, for example—has the qualities which make a good colonist. He is, moreover, a small holder, cultivating his land in his own way with his own labour and that of his family. He would thus not compete with the European settler, who is a larger farmer and planter.

(*c*) The question has an important political aspect. It cannot be denied that the position of Indians who wish to settle in our Dominions is very unsatisfactory. It is true that by agreements as to reciprocity and by

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certain ameliorations that have been sympathetically considered by Dominion Prime Ministers, some of the acerbities of the position are being removed, and the best construction possible will be placed on the situation; but the fact remains, and every Indian knows it, that His Majesty's Indian subjects are not welcomed, and indeed barely tolerated, in many of the countries flying the British flag, and that at present they do not get in all cases as favourable treatment as other Asiatics, such as the Japanese. This is undoubtedly resented in India, and is undoubtedly opposed to the whole principle upon which the Empire is based, a partnership of free and equal nations and races. But if any sympathy can be shown to her feelings by definite action, it would make a deep impression throughout India. German East Africa presents the opportunity, and if India could be permitted to colonise it she would have the satisfaction of knowing that at any rate in one substantial territory she was being given the same opportunity of colonial enterprise as the European enjoys elsewhere.

15. If German East Africa were made over to the Government of India for administration and for the regulation of Indian colonisation, it would be a cardinal principle that this colonisation should be regulated in the interests of the original native population. The Government of India are proved by the high example that has been set in India and by the traditions that have characterised British rule there to be fully qualified for this new trust, and by employing the Government of India as their agency, His Majesty's Government would be in a position to assert their superior authority and vindicate their responsibilities. There would be no question of an Indian monopoly in East African colonisation. There would be no question of India's imitating the policy of exclusion adopted by the Dominions. Our policy would be one which defined the position of the European settler, recognised the special claims of the Indian colonist and subordinated all to the interest of the African native.

16. If, however, the difficulties in the way of handing the country over to India are insuperable, it is strongly urged that at least special facilities for colonisation there should be given to Indian soldiers.

3. Abu Musa.

17. This case has nothing to do with the disposal of conquered territory; but as it concerns a long-standing dispute with an enemy (German) Government, it may be conveniently considered in this part of the Memorandum. The island of Abu Musa belongs to the Sheikh of Shargah, one of the "Trucial" chiefs of the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf. It contains valuable deposits of *red oxide*, a product used in the manufacture of certain classes of paint. In 1898 the ex-Sheikh, uncle of the ruling Chief, leased the oxide mines on the island to three native concessionnaires, one of whom, in the year 1906, entered into a contract with the well-known German firm of Wönckhaus, granting to the latter for four years, with a preferential option of renewal, a monopoly of purchase of oxide from the mines. The ruling Sheikh subsequently cancelled the concession and took steps to prevent further mining operations by the concessionnaires.

18. In December 1907 the German Government approached the British Foreign Office on behalf of Wönckhaus. The Foreign Office undertook to make inquiry into the case, agreeing in the meantime to the removal by the firm of oxide already mined and ready for shipment. The reply to the German representation was sent in July 1908. It was to the effect that His Majesty's Government regarded the Sheikh's action in cancelling the concession as perfectly legal, but that they were prepared, pending final settlement, to facilitate the conclusion of a temporary arrangement to enable the firm to obtain a limited amount of oxide. The German Government replied in December 1909; they contended that the owner of the island had no right to cancel the concession, that they regarded the Sheikh's proceedings as illegal, and that they looked to His Majesty's Government, by whom he had been assisted, to compensate the German firm. In August 1910 His Majesty's Government agreed to the removal by Wönckhaus of a further quantity of oxide. In December 1911 they

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

replied to the second German note, maintaining that the firm's claim lay against the concessionnaire with whom their agreement had been concluded, and not against the Sheikh or the British Government. At the same time they suggested a compromise, and expressed readiness to consider a claim by Messrs. Wönckhaus to compensation, and to recommend the Sheikh to grant the firm a new contract.

19. Messrs. Wönckhaus' counter-proposals reached the Foreign Office in May 1913, and subsequent negotiations with the firm led to an agreement to settle the question on the basis of a cash payment in extinction of all their rights at Abu Musa. The firm made no formal estimate of the amount of their pecuniary claim, though their representative, in the course of an informal discussion at the Foreign Office in September 1913, mentioned the extravagant figure of 27,000*l*. It was decided in June 1914, after consultation with the Board of Trade, to offer them the sum of 2,000*l*. in full settlement of their demands. The offer had not actually been made when the outbreak of the war put an end to negotiations.

20. It would be desirable to obtain from the German Government a renunciation on behalf of Messrs. Wönckhaus, of all claims in respect of the Abu Musa concession. If it is considered necessary to pay the firm some reasonable sum by way of compensation there would be no special objection from the Indian point of view.

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PART II.—ARRANGEMENTS WITH ALLIED POWERS.

1.—French Possessions in India.

21. French territorial rights in India fall under two heads, viz. :—(1) Settlements held in full sovereignty and administered by French resident officials ; and (2) certain scattered patches of land, known as the *Loges*, the sites of former French factories, over which the French Government claim to exercise certain rights of jurisdiction. The settlements are five in number. The most important is Pondicherry, which, with its dependencies, covers an area of 115 square miles, and contains a population of over 170,000. Of the remaining four, three (Karikal, Mahé and Yanaon) are, like Pondicherry, situated on the coast and within the limits of the Madras Presidency. The fifth (Chandernagore, which covers four square miles and contains about 27,000 inhabitants) is on the river Hooghly, some 20 miles north of Calcutta. The Pondicherry Settlement is not a compact block of territory, but comprises, besides the main settlement on the coast, in which the town of Pondicherry is situated, some 10 isolated strips of French territory in the adjoining British district. The main settlement itself is very irregular in shape, dovetailing in and out with British territory ; it also contains a British *enclave* approximately in its centre. Of the *Loges*, the largest is that at Masulipatam in Madras, which covers an area of 67 acres. There are two at Surat in Bombay, and two at Dacca in Bengal. In all, some 12 of these *Loges* are claimed by the French Government, though the claim is not in every case admitted by the British authorities. Even where the French claim is not denied, the nature of the actual rights either recognised or exercised varies considerably in the different localities.

22. Negotiations on the subject of the French Settlements passed between the British and French Governments in 1857 and again in 1883-85. On the former occasion the object aimed at was the cession of all French territory except Pondicherry and Karikal ; on the latter, the extinction of French rights in the *Loges* in return for territorial compensation in the Pondicherry region. On neither occasion was any agreement reached. The matter was not again broached with the French Government until April 1914, when the question of Chandernagore (which had developed into a dangerous centre of Indian sedition) was raised by Sir Edward Grey during a visit to Paris. No progress was made towards an agreement on the subject.

23. So far as the four Madras Settlements (Pondicherry, Karikal, Mahé, and Yanaon) are concerned, the worst that can be said is that their continued existence constitutes an administrative inconvenience. But the question of really vital importance is that of Chandernagore. The situation there may fairly be described as intolerable. Thanks to the weakness of the local French administration, the town has become a veritable hotbed of revolutionary conspiracy directed against the British Government. It provides an anarchist centre, within a few miles of Calcutta, where plans can be hatched, bombs manufactured, arms imported, emissaries instructed and youths depraved *with absolute impunity*. Numerous outrages, including in all probability the attack made upon the Viceroy himself in December 1912, can be traced to this source. The British police and magistracy are necessarily impotent, while the local French authorities, given the best will in the world, are not strong enough to control the situation. It is true that a temporary agreement was concluded with the French Government in the early part of the present year for the expulsion in certain cases, and surveillance in others, of seditionists seeking refuge in French territory. But this arrangement is merely in the nature of a war measure, and will terminate automatically a year after the conclusion of peace. It is not too much to say that the only hope of a permanent solution lies in the cession of Chandernagore to Great Britain. It is also very desirable that French rights in the *Loges* should be finally extinguished, both on account of the practical inconveniences to which they give rise, and because the existence of these small *enclaves* is an anomaly which contains a certain element of danger—however slight it may be—to the good relations between the British and French Governments.

24. It would be desirable to press in the first instance for the complete extinction of French territorial rights of every description throughout India. Failing that, for

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(1) the cession of Chandernagore and (2) the abolition of the *Loges*. It is to be hoped that these two *desiderata* may be secured without territorial compensation in India, which is open to objection both in principle and practice. But if this proves impossible, a solution might be found on the lines of cession to France of territory round Pondicherry, with the object of converting that settlement into one compact area, in return for the surrender of all the other Settlements and of all French rights in the *Loges*. If required, definite proposals can be submitted as to the area to be ceded to France in the Pondicherry region.

25. There is one other point in connection with French India that should be mentioned. Under a Treaty of 1815 (reciprocal in form) we enjoy special rights in respect of the extradition of criminals from French India. These rights have in practice largely fallen into desuetude. But importance is attached to their maintenance in principle; and any attempt to include their abandonment in a bargain over the cession of French territory should be resisted.

2.—Portuguese Possessions in India.

26. Portuguese possessions in India consist of three settlements (Goa, Diu and Daman), all situated in the Bombay Presidency. The elimination of Portuguese territorial rights would be an administrative convenience; but it can hardly be put higher. We should not be justified in paying a heavy price for its attainment. If Portuguese jurisdiction disappeared, the question of the *Padroado* or ecclesiastical jurisdiction in British India, at present vested in the Portuguese Government, and including certain rights in connection with the appointment of high Roman Catholic dignitaries, would also have to be considered. It is very desirable that this jurisdiction should be got rid of.

3.—Afghanistan and Tibet.

27. These two countries, which, with Persia, formed the subject of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, may conveniently be considered together. As regards Tibet, the Convention of 1907 was largely in the nature of a "self-denying ordinance," under which both Great Britain and Russia undertook, *inter alia*, to seek no concessions in the country and to send no representatives to the Tibetan capital. This act of self-abnegation was much greater on the part of Great Britain than of Russia, seeing that Tibet marches with the Indian Empire for many hundreds of miles, whereas it is separated from Russia by a wide expanse of inhospitable territory. In practice, while we have observed the letter of the Convention, we have found it impossible to carry the policy of 1907 to its logical conclusion. The Tibetans have not allowed us to disinterest ourselves in their affairs. Awakened to a desire for progress from within and threatened by Chinese aggression from without, they have tended more and more to turn to the Government of India for advice and assistance in all their difficulties.

28. The ejection of the Chinese from Lhasa in 1912 was followed by a prolonged, if somewhat desultory, campaign on the Sino-Tibetan frontier, which was only terminated by a temporary truce concluded within the last few months. Shortly before the great war, in response to repeated appeals from the Tibetans, and in order to put an end to a situation that was growing intolerable, we offered our mediation to effect a settlement between China and Tibet. The offer was accepted, and a "tripartite" agreement was negotiated in India, only to be rendered inoperative at the last moment by the refusal of the Chinese delegate, under orders from Peking, to sign the draft which he had previously initialled on his own authority. The Agreement was, however, signed by the British and Tibetan representatives on the 3rd July 1914, and is valid as between ourselves and Tibet. Apart from the settlement with China, it contained provisions designed to place our own relations with the Tibetans on a footing more in accord with actualities. These provisions affected the Convention of 1907 at two points, viz., (1) it rendered necessary the rescission of the "self-denying ordinance" in regard to concessions; and (2) it contained a clause giving the British Trade Agent at Gyantse the right of access to Lhasa under certain conditions, thus conflicting with the undertaking in the Convention not to send representatives to Lhasa. The Russian Government, to whom the Agreement was submitted in May 1914, demanded, as the price of their acquiescence,

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that we should address them a note engaging "not to support any demand on the "part of British subjects for irrigation works, railways, or any preferential rights for "commercial or industrial enterprises in Northern Afghanistan." The demand was an embarrassing one. The Amir had never accepted the Afghan section of the 1907 Convention, and would be sure to object to his country being made the subject of further bargaining between the Russian Government and ourselves. The mention of "Northern Afghanistan"—as recalling the division of Persia into "spheres of influence"—was particularly unfortunate. The question was still under discussion when the war broke out, though the Russian Government had in the meantime agreed to our signing the Tibetan Agreement, subject to an undertaking not to give effect to the disputed clauses without a previous understanding with Russia. The Russian Government revived the question of Northern Afghanistan in March 1915, but no further discussion on the subject took place.

29. The present position differs entirely from that of 1914. The Bolshevist Government has formally denounced the Convention of 1907. Russia has deserted the Alliance, and will not (it is presumed) be represented at the Peace Conference at all. It is doubtful whether any central Russian Government, whatever its ultimate form, will ever again hold the territories adjoining Afghanistan, the possession of which gave its predecessors an interest in irrigational and other questions in the northern part of the Amir's kingdom. The Amir has rendered invaluable services to ourselves, and to the whole Allied cause, by his resolute adherence of neutrality throughout the war. The case against action likely to be offensive to him, strong as it was in 1914, is infinitely stronger at the present time. The question seems to call for no immediate action. We must wait until there is a Russian Government with which we can negotiate; and then endeavour to get rid of the self-denying ordinance in Tibet without the embarrassing conditions that the Tsar's Government desired to impose in 1914. The fact that the Bolshevists have denounced the treaty, which alone gave Russia the right to impose conditions at all, will be a strong point in our favour.

30. Another Afghan question still outstanding with the Russian Government is that of the status of certain islands in the river Oxus on the Russo-Afghan frontier. The question is not an urgent one, and there seems no object in raising it in connection with the peace negotiations.

31. It should be mentioned that we are pledged to the Amir not to bring up questions affecting Afghanistan at the Peace Conference; and, if they are brought up subsequently, as a sequel to the Conference, to agree to nothing without prior reference to him.

4.—Persia.

32. The whole Persian question is so much in the melting-pot that, if it is to be brought before the Peace Conference at all, it can presumably only be considered in its broadest aspects. Such a question, for example, as Sir P. Cox's recent proposal for a "mandate" to Great Britain to undertake the reformation of Persia, might perhaps form the subject of international discussion. But the international questions that exercised our minds as recently as two years ago—the readjustment of the "spheres of influence" prescribed by the Convention of 1907, the allocation of particular railway concessions, and so forth—have disappeared with the disappearance of Russia. The Convention is dead, and the "spheres of influence" no longer have any meaning. The controversies to which they gave rise have for the time being been laid to rest and need not be disturbed. There is, in fact, now that Russia is out of court, no one with whom they could profitably be discussed. It is just conceivable that the Trans-Persian railway project, in which French, as well as British and Russian, financial interests were concerned, may be revived by the French Government. If so, Indian interests require that the project should be firmly resisted. From the Indian point of view there have always been the strongest possible objections to the scheme on strategic grounds; and it was only the desire to stand well with Russia that induced His Majesty's Government before the war to proceed even as far as they did with its examination.

33. It may be convenient to state briefly and in general terms the Indian aspect of the Persian question. Persia lies across the most vulnerable flank of our Indian position, and the defence of India must always be the governing consideration in our

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

Persian policy. So long as we hold India, we cannot afford to disinterest ourselves in the affairs of her western neighbour. If Persia were a well-organised State under a stable administration, we might be content to take a merely passive interest in her affairs. Unfortunately, the reverse is the case. Persia, as a body politic, is in the last stages of decay and decomposition. The Government at Tehran is hopelessly weak and inefficient. Cabinets follow one another in rapid succession, but little serious attempt is ever made to remedy the confusion in public affairs. The Shah's writ scarcely runs beyond the capital itself, and even there the Government has little real authority over the faction of irresponsible "democrats," who control what passes for public opinion, and resort, when necessary, to assassination as a means of achieving their purpose. It was only by foreign assistance that even a semblance of tranquillity was maintained in the interior before the war; and there is no reason to suppose that it can be maintained without such assistance when peace conditions have been restored. Anglo-Russian rivalry has played its part in the past in preventing any satisfactory solution of the Persian question; but it ought not to be impossible, now that our rival is removed, to devise some means of restoring conditions to a reasonable degree of stability. It is most desirable, in Indian interests, that this end should be attained, and attained in a manner and by methods that involve the least drain on Indian military resources and the least increase of Indian financial and military responsibilities.

34. India's primary requirement is that Persia should enjoy sufficient political stability to make her a tolerable neighbour. How far this ideal falls short of realisation at the present time may be illustrated by the following extract from a recent telegram from the British Minister at Teheran (27th November 1918):—"Owing "to inveterate corruption, extortion and injustice on the part of the ruling classes, "from the Shah downwards, the condition of the peasantry is admittedly "deplorable. At present Persia is only saved from bankruptcy by our financial "help and from active disorder by the presence of our troops. Were these "safeguards to be withdrawn on the signature of peace, North Persia "must become a prey to complete chaos, if not to violent revolution . . . . "In our own interests we cannot contemplate such a disquieting prospect in a "border State." Sir P. Cox might have added that, in the interests of the Persians themselves—for whose welfare we have, by our past acts, incurred a certain degree of moral responsibility—we cannot acquiesce in the indefinite continuance of present conditions. The difficulty is that no substantial reform is possible without effective foreign assistance, and that effective foreign assistance is just what is most unpalatable to Persian "public opinion." There are, however, indications of a change of sentiment in this respect. Sir P. Cox, in the telegram already quoted, reports that a considerable section of the Persian public recognise that "a very wide measure of [external] control" will be necessary; and that the task of supervision must be entrusted "to a single Power and one enjoying the goodwill and support of Great Britain." As regards the nature of the supervision required, Sir P. Cox is "convinced that the only completely satisfactory solution will be to have a trained "administrator in control of every department of the State and in every provincial "Government. This would be for a specified time of years during which Persians "would be associated with those administrators and trained with a view to taking "their place in due course."

35. Such, stated very briefly, is the problem. It is to nobody's interest, least of all that of the Persians themselves, that Persia should be given over to anarchy and chaos. Yet, if she is left to her own devices, that is her inevitable fate. The question is one that concerns the general interests of civilisation, and as such might suitably form the subject of international discussion. Supervision, based on an international "mandate," whether proceeding from the Peace Conference or from a future "League of Nations," would probably be less distasteful to the Persians (and to Muhammadan opinion generally) than assistance proffered by a single Power on its own account, particularly if such supervision were imposed (in Sir P. Cox's words) "for a specified period and in return for full guarantees of her independence and integrity, and safeguards against unscrupulous exploitation." It is even possible that the Persian Government might be induced to make a spontaneous request for assistance on such terms.

36. There remains the question, who is to be the supervisory Power? If the choice fell upon ourselves—who are beyond all question the nation best qualified for

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the task—it would mean the continuance for a certain number of years of a considerable drain upon our military and financial resources; but it would be a limited period only, and there would be the prospect at the end of a stable and revitalised Persia, bound to ourselves by ties of genuine gratitude and goodwill. If an alternative selection could be made—and the choice fell on a Power of sufficient resources and capacity—we could stand aside with a good grace, safe in the knowledge that no Power attempting to set the Persian house in order could dispense with our support, or could afford to disregard our just claims and interests.

5.—Arabia.

(a) *General.*

37. As regards the Arabian peninsula generally, while we have no interests in the interior and no means of effectively intervening there, we are vitally concerned in the exclusion of all foreign influence from a country which lies on the main line of approach to India. It is therefore an important desideratum that foreign Powers should expressly recognise our predominant political interests there. What we want to get established is a sort of Monroe Doctrine for Arabia. Existing treaties secure our position from Koweit (*see* paragraph 44) to Maskat (as to which *see* paragraphs 38–40) and from Maskat to Aden. In the Red Sea we have treaties with the Idrisi Saiyid of Asir, which give us a measure of control over him and preclude the intervention of foreign Powers; and we require similar arrangements with the Imam of Sanaa and the Sheikh of Mavia. Our sole right to conclude such treaties should be recognised by the Powers. The Hejaz stands on a different footing, and it is doubtful whether we should attempt to claim any special rights or to impose any limitations on the sovereign independence which has been promised to King Husain, and which is of great importance in the eyes of all Moslems. The sanctity of the country will to a great extent protect it from foreign intrusion, and for the rest we must rely on our own watchfulness and energy. The interior of Arabia we should let severely alone, undertaking no obligations for the maintenance of peace, except so far as our treaty with Bin Saud of Nejd (*see* paragraph 42) obliges us to protect him in case of aggression by a foreign Power.

(b) *Maskat.*

38. Our only international difficulty at Maskat is with France. It arises out of two diplomatic instruments, viz.:—(1) the Franco-Maskat Commercial Treaty of 1844, and (2) the joint Anglo-French Declaration of 1862. It was under cover of the former, which gave French subjects the right of complete freedom of trade at Maskat except in regard to certain specified articles, that French arms dealers were enabled to make Maskat the centre of a thriving traffic in arms that spread throughout the Middle East, and flooded the North-West Frontier of India and adjacent regions with modern rifles and ammunition. The position was rectified in 1914, when the French Government renounced the right of invoking, on behalf of French citizens, the privileges conferred by the Treaty of 1844, in so far as they might be opposed to local regulations for the control of the arms traffic. But the Declaration of 1862, whereby Great Britain and France jointly guaranteed the "independence" of Maskat, still remains; and so long as it remains our control over the arms traffic must be regarded as lacking in completeness; for our ability to keep the Sultan of Maskat up to his engagements—on which everything depends—is clearly qualified by an undertaking which, if we ever found it necessary to take strong measures with His Highness, might afford the French Government plausible grounds for objection.

39. The Declaration of 1862 is also attended with certain other inconveniences of a more general character, as to which the following extract may be quoted from a Despatch from the Government of India, dated the 29th September 1916:—

> "We have long felt that this Treaty is open to grave objection in that it gives the French a position at Maskat and consequently in the Gulf which interferes with our prescriptive rights in that region, and that further, as interpreted in connection with the Bandar Jisseh case, it precludes our acquiring or even leasing territory belonging to Maskat. Now, as His Majesty's Government are aware, it may be at any time desirable on naval, commercial, or administrative grounds for us to secure a portion of such territory either by

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lease or purchase. Gwadur is a case in point. We feel sure that, if the French Government can be induced to abrogate the Treaty of 1862, difficulties and friction in the future will certainly be obviated. . . . We trust that such steps as are possible will be taken to persuade the French Government to cancel this obsolete agreement, which, while it not only confers no benefit, but actually imposes an obligation, on them, trammels us in our dealings with a petty State on whose protection we have spent so much in recent years."

40. The cancellation of the Declaration of 1862 would be of substantial advantage to us. But the matter cannot be regarded as one of extreme urgency; it is not, for example, in the same category with the question of Chandernagore. It need not be pressed if the price demanded by the French is too high.

(c) *Sheikh Said.*

41. This is another case in which France is concerned. Sheikh Said is a fortified promontory in the extreme south-west corner of Arabia, within gunshot of the British station on Perim Island, which has in fact been bombarded from it during the war. The promontory is situated within a small triangular area, immediately adjoining the frontier of the Aden Protectorate, which the Turkish Government agreed, after the Aden Boundary Commission of 1905, not to alienate "de quelque manière que ce soit." With the disappearance of the Turks, we may be content to leave Sheikh Said in the possession of the local Arabs,[1] provided we can obtain a formal renunciation of the French claims to the place. These claims date from 1869, when two Frenchmen purchased Sheikh Said from the local Sheikh for a sum of $80,000. The Porte denied the right of the Sheikh to sell, but the French, though they occupied the place for a very short time only, have never abandoned their interest in it, and have never recognised it as Turkish territory. The desirability of occupying it was urged in the French Chamber in 1893, and as recently as November 1914 there was talk of a French company—apparently a very dubious concern—having acquired the rights of the original proprietors. It would be desirable to dispose of the French claim once for all.

(d) *Nejd, and other Independent Arabian Principalities.*

42. The question of Nejd, and the other territories of the Emir Bin Saud, does not concern any European Allied Power except ourselves. If any difficulty arises, it will be with King Husain. As the latter is to be represented at the peace discussions, and as his representative may possibly advance extravagant claims on the King's behalf, it is as well to place it on record that we have recognised Bin Saud by formal treaty as the "independent ruler" of the provinces of Nejd, Al Hasa, Qatif and Jubail. During the negotiations of 1915-16, which preceded the Arab rising of the latter year, Sir H. McMahon was careful, in giving assurances to the Sherif, to put in a reservation, in which the Sherif acquiesced, in favour of our existing treaties with Arab chiefs.

43. Similar remarks apply to the other independent Arab chieftains with whom we are in treaty relations: the Sheikh of Mohammerah (nominally a Persian subject), the Sheikhs of Koweit and Bahrein, the Trucial Chiefs, the Sultan of Maskat, the two Hadramaut Sultans (Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla and of Socotra and Kishm), the various protected Chiefs of the Aden hinterland, and the Saiyid Idrisi of Asir. No settlement with King Husain can be accepted which does not safeguard the territorial rights of these various chieftains.

44. It is taken for granted that the settlement with Turkey will dispose finally of Turkish claims to suzerainty over Koweit, and of all Turkish territorial rights of every description on the Arabian littoral of the Persian Gulf and its hinterland.

(e) *The Persian Gulf.*

45. The Civil Commissioner at Baghdad has recently suggested that the opportunity should be taken to obtain from the Peace Conference formal recognition of our protectorate rights over the various Arab principalities of the Persian Gulf

[1] The Anglo-French joint engagement of May 1916, not to annex territory in Arabia, is subject to the following proviso:—"Ceci n'empêchera telle rectification de la frontière d'Aden qui pourra être jugée nécessaire, par suite de la récente agression des Turcs." In other words, if we desired to annex Sheikh Said, we should be free to do so, so far as the Agreement of 1916 is concerned.

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littoral (Koweit, Bahrein, the Trucial Chiefs, &c.), as well as of our predominant position in the Gulf generally. That such a course would have some advantages need not be denied. It would regularise once for all a position resting on a prescriptive rather than a juridical basis. On the other hand, our predominance in the Gulf, created as it has been by nearly a century of sustained effort and sacrifice, is not seriously challenged in any quarter. It was publicly proclaimed by Lord Lansdowne in 1903 and by Sir Edward Grey in 1907; and on neither occasion was anyone found to dispute it. Since then we have expelled the Turks from the whole Gulf region, and have thus rendered our position more unassailable than ever. The facts speak for themselves. We cannot allow that they are open to argument or discussion; nor can we submit to international arbitrament, however perfunctory, a cardinal article of British policy which we are resolved to maintain at all costs. The case against raising the question at the Peace Conference seems decisive.

6.—China and Japan.

46. The general question of Japanese policy in China lies somewhat outside the scope of Indian interests. But it is very desirable, from the Indian point of view, that Japan should not be permitted to establish herself, politically or commercially, in the two Chinese provinces of Szechuan and Yunnan, which border on Tibet and the Indian Empire. If, in return for compensation elsewhere, Japan could be induced formally to recognise that these two provinces and Tibet itself lie outside her sphere of influence, it would be a great advantage.

47. Secondly, the possibility has been suggested that France, exhausted by the war and faced with new and exacting responsibilities in other directions, may find herself unable to maintain her position—already none too strong—in Indo-China, and may seek for some means of relieving herself of the burden. There is also the question of the Dutch East Indies, where there are indications that the hold of the Dutch authorities has been materially weakened. Should either of these regions pass from the hands of their present possessors, it is important, from the Indian point of view, that their new owner should not be Japan. In the Dutch East Indies we already possess, under treaty with Holland, a reversionary right to certain specified areas in the event of their abandonment by the Dutch.

48. As regards China herself, the principal outstanding question, so far as India is concerned, is that of Tibet. The present position of this question has been briefly sketched in an earlier section of this Memorandum (*see* paragraph 28). For the moment the situation has improved. After years of desultory warfare, hostilities between the Tibetans and Chinese have at length been suspended, through the good offices of a British Consular officer, and a provisional boundary has been laid down which the local Chinese and Tibetan military authorities have agreed to respect. But the central Chinese Government shows little disposition to confirm the provisional arrangement. It is true that these outlying regions are at present beyond the effective control of Peking, and that, unless and until the central Government succeeds in restoring its authority, the recent truce is likely to be maintained locally. But there can be no permanent security until the whole position has been regularised; and it is very desirable that the Chinese Government should be brought into line with as little delay as possible. It is not suggested that the question should be formally raised at the Peace Conference, or that Tibetan affairs should be made the subject of international discussion. But China, as an Allied Power, will be represented at the Conference, and it is possible that an opportunity may arise for informal conversations between British and Chinese representatives which would pave the way to a satisfactory settlement of this long-standing controversy.

7.—Arms Traffic.

49. The interest of India in the control of the arms traffic is well known. For many years before the war modern rifles and ammunition found their way *viâ* Maskat and the Persian Gulf to the tribesmen of the North-West Frontier and adjoining regions; but it was only from about the year 1900 onwards that the traffic assumed really alarming proportions, and brought about conditions which, as the Government of India reported in 1909, "have upset the balance of power, and constitute a serious menace to the maintenance of peace." Various palliatives were attempted with indifferent success.

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

French obstruction, based on the Treaty of 1844 (*see* paragraph 38 above), prevented effective action at Maskat, the distributing centre of the whole traffic; and so long as the centre remained intact, action on the circumference was difficult and ineffectual. Eventually, in 1910, we found it necessary to establish a naval blockade in the Persian Gulf, with the object of preventing the transit of arms from the Arabian to the Persian Coast. This measure, which was maintained right up to the outbreak of the war, was a cumbrous and costly expedient; but it achieved a large measure of success, and went so far towards killing the traffic that the French Government thought it advisable to come to terms on the Maskat question. We bought out the French arms dealers for 60,000*l*., and acquired liberty of action to regulate the trade at Maskat. This arrangement was reached only a few months before the outbreak of the war. The whole question of the control of the arms traffic after the war was considered by a Sub-Committee of the War Cabinet which reported in March 1917. The Sub-Committee regarded the matter as one "of vital importance to the future of the British Empire," and urged that it should be raised at the Peace Conference "as a high moral issue of the utmost consequence to civilisation in general." Of their specific recommendations the most important were as follows:—

(1) that a preliminary understanding should be arrived at between Great Britain and France with a view to securing *bonâ fide* co-operation in any restrictive measures that might be introduced;

(2) that undertakings should be obtained from all Powers represented at the Conference not to sell or alienate their surplus stock of arms, and to regulate the manufacture, sale, and export of certain classes of weapon as well as of ammunition of all kinds;

(3) that a new international Convention should be negotiated to replace the ineffectual "Brussels Act" of 1890, for the regulation of the traffic in what may be described as the "danger zone," *i.e.*, those parts of Asia and Africa in which it is of special importance to prevent modern arms and ammunition from reaching the hands of the indigenous races.

50. The above recommendations have received the cordial support of the Government of India, and their adoption is very desirable from the point of view of Indian interests. The first step, if the procedure advocated by the Sub-Committee is to be followed, would be to approach the French Government with a view to arriving at the "preliminary understanding" contemplated in (1). It is particularly desirable to secure the regulation of the traffic at Jibuti in French Somaliland, which, in the past, has been second only to Maskat as a distributing centre. France has a strong interest in maintaining the trade at Jibuti, which represents a considerable source of income to the local French administration; and so long as she retains the port, it is doubtful whether restrictive measures of a permanently effective character will ever be introduced. It would be worth paying a high price for the cession of Jibuti to Great Britain, if France could be brought to consider such a transaction. Failing that, we must endeavour to persuade the French Government, if not to suppress the traffic at Jibuti altogether, at any rate to bring it under strict regulation.

India Office,
4th December 1918.

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ITALY.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Sir R.Rodd (Rome) December 12th, 1918.
D. 9.20 p.m. December 12th, 1918.
R. 8 a.m. December 14th, 1918.

No. 942.

Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me once more on the subject of attaching an Italian military officer to the Consulate at Jeddah while I was pressing for facilities for General Phipps to proceed to Albania.

He said they would no longer ask for a small Italian military contingent to go to Hedjaz on the ground that there were French troops there. But different treatment accorded to French troops and Italians was much felt here. French had such an officer at Jeddah and he much hoped that we should not continue to refuse similar privilege to Italy.

I much hope it may now be possible to meet the wishes (? of Italian Government) in this respect which have been so often urged upon me.

Repeated to Cairo.

(14.12 8/4).

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

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SECRET.

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

Special I.

MEMORANDUM

RESPECTING

THE SETTLEMENT OF TURKEY AND THE ARABIAN PENINSULA.

[Maps illustrating this Memorandum issued separately.]

1. THIS paper is divided into three parts: (A) "Commitments," in which a summary is given of treaties, agreements, and understandings at present binding upon His Majesty's Government; (B) "Desiderata," in which the lines of settlement necessary or desirable in British interests are sketched out; and (C) "Policy," in which suggestions are put forward for the revision of "commitments" in the direction of "desiderata," if and when opportunities offer in the course of negotiations.

2. The first part deals mainly with questions of fact, the second with aims, and the third with action, and it has therefore seemed convenient to keep them distinct.

3. The problems of Ottoman finance have been dealt with separately,* and in regard to the questions of Constantinople, the Black Sea Straits, the Dodekannese, Cyprus, and the Italian claims in Anatolia, reference should also be made to the series of memoranda dealing with the settlement of Southern and South-Eastern Europe.

* See memoranda printed for the Treasury in 1916, 1917, and 1918, and annexes to memoranda dealing with the settlement of Southern and South-Eastern Europe (section on European Turkey).

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(A.)—Part One. Commitments.

It will be convenient to give, first, a schedule of the principal treaties, agreements, and understandings in which these commitments are embodied, and then to analyse their bearing both in general and in regard to different areas.

Under the Anglo-Turkish Conventions of the 29th July, 1913, and the 9th March, 1914, the Arabian Peninsula south and east of a line prolonging the frontier of the Aden Protectorate north-eastward to latitude 20°, and thence running due north to a point on the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf approximately south of Bahrein Island, was recognised as a British sphere. Nearly all the independent Arab rulers in this area had previously entered into permanent relations with His Majesty's Government, and the remainder have done so subsequently. And since these relations are altogether in the interests of Great Britain, and are most unlikely to be called in question by any other Power, it seems superfluous to discuss them in this memorandum.

Our bipartite agreements with Turkey lapsed with the war, and bind neither her nor us unless or until they are specifically renewed. Our agreements with Russia regarding the war and the peace settlement lapsed either when there ceased to be a Central Russian Government recognised by the Allies, or when the Bolshevik Government made peace with Germany. This leaves the following agreements to be taken into account:—

1. "Règlement organique" of the Lebanon vilayet, dated June 9, 1861.
2. "Règlement organique" of the Lebanon vilayet, dated September 6, 1864.
3. Treaty of Berlin, dated July 13, 1878, article 61, relative to ameliorations and reforms in the Ottoman provinces inhabited by Armenians.
4. Proclamation by the Government of India, dated November 2, 1914, regarding the Moslem holy places.*
5. Assurance, dated November 3, 1914, made by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Sheikh of Koweit.
6. Assurance, dated November 22, 1914, made by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Sheikh of Mohammerah.†
7. Treaty, dated April 26, 1915, with Italy.
8. Treaty, dated April 30, 1915, and ratified November 6, 1915, with the Idrisi Sayyid of Sabia (see Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, "Special" 4).
9. Understanding with King Husein of the Hejaz. (Not embodied in any single instrument, but see Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, "Special" 3.)
10. Treaty, dated December 26, 1915, and ratified July 18, 1916, with Abdul-Aziz Bin Saud, Amir of Nejd and Al Hasa.
11. Agreement, dated May 16, 1916, with France.
12. Agreement, dated August 18, 1917, with Italy.‡
13. Letter, dated November 2, 1917, from Mr. Balfour to Lord Rothschild, regarding Jewish Zionist aspirations.
14. Joint Declaration, dated November 9, 1918, by His Majesty's Government and the French Government regarding the future of Syria and Mesopotamia.

* A briefer version of this proclamation was circulated to the Gulf Chiefs on the 3rd November, 1914.

† This Arab ruler and his tribesmen are nominally Persian subjects and their country Persian territory, and strictly therefore they fall outside the scope of the present memorandum. But the future of Mohammerah is bound to be considered in relation to that of Mesopotamia and the Arabian Peninsula.

‡ This agreement was made (*a*) "subject to the consent of Russia," which has never been given; and (*b*) in pursuance of article 9 of the treaty of the 26th April, 1915 (No. 7 above), which makes it in effect conditional upon the execution of the Anglo-French Agreement of the 16th May, 1916, and of the parallel agreements (now void) which France and Great Britain made with Russia, this contingent character being also expressly laid down in article 8 of No. 12.

Technically, therefore, No. 12 is invalid, but Great Britain and France are bound by No. 7 to take Italian claims into consideration if they ultimately obtain advantages in the Middle East for themselves. The full text of Article 9 of No. 7 will be found on p. 17 of the present memorandum.

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I.—*General Commitments.*

(i.) His Majesty's Government have not committed themselves to giving up any of their pre-existing rights, relations, facilities, or other interests, political or economic, in this region (*e.g.*, territorial possessions, protectorates, capitulations, concessions to British subjects, &c.).

(ii.) They have declared in a general way that the non-Turkish populations shall be liberated from Turkish misrule, and given an opportunity of national life and economic development.

(iii.) They have pledged themselves, in general or specifically, that the legitimate interests of the Moslem world, Jewry, the Roman Catholic Church, and other international bodies in shrines and holy cities situated in this region, or in territories in this region where they have traditional claims, shall not be prejudiced in the settlement, or even that they shall be secured more satisfactorily than hitherto.

They have also pledged themselves to the satisfaction, if possible, of specific desiderata of their Allies, and they are morally bound to take all legitimate interests of their Allies into consideration.

(iv.) They have entered into positive permanent liabilities, both military and political, towards certain independent Arab rulers, and have assured the inhabitants of certain occupied territories specifically that they shall not be put back under Turkish rule.

II.—*Commitments in Different Areas.*

(1.) As regards *European Turkey and Anatolia*, His Majesty's Government are not pledged to the extinction of an independent Turkish National State, but they did provisionally agree (see Schedule, No. 12) that Italy shall establish such direct or indirect administration or control as she desires in the Green Area, and shall have political and economic priority in Area C, though the latter is to form part of an independent State (presumably Turkey). Italian rights in the Green Area and Area C are subject to the following limitations: Smyrna is to be a free port for British and French trade; the existing Ottoman customs tariff is to remain in force for twenty years; and there are to be no internal customs barriers between any of the "coloured" or "lettered" areas.

The British-owned Aidin Railway in the Green Area is protected by a mutual undertaking on the part of Great Britain, Italy, and France (No. 12) that the interests of each Power in the areas assigned to the others shall be scrupulously respected.

His Majesty's Government have not consented to any modification of the Capitulation Treaties in European Turkey or Anatolia, or in any other part of the former territories of the Ottoman Empire; but since these treaties are bipartite only, they have lapsed with the war and will have to be renewed specifically if their maintenance is desired.

As regards the control of the *Black Sea Straits*, His Majesty's Government are no longer bound by their qualified acceptance of the Russian circular telegram of the 4th March, 1915, in which Russia claimed those portions of the littoral of the Straits which are coloured yellow on the map. Their hands are now entirely free in regard both to the control of the Straits and to the disposal of *Constantinople*.

(2.) As regards the *Dodekannese* group of islands, which are still nominally Ottoman territory, but have been occupied by Italy since 1911, we have pledged ourselves that Italy shall obtain complete sovereignty over them (No. 7, article 8).

As regards *Cyprus*, we are pledged not to cede it to any third Power without the previous consent of France (No. 11, article 4.)

(3.) As regards *Armenia*, we are bound, perhaps juridically and certainly morally, by article 61 of the Berlin Treaty (No. 3), under which Turkey is pledged to "introduce ameliorations and reforms into the provinces inhabited by Armenians." This article was substituted, at our instance, for article 16 of the superseded Treaty of San Stephano, which provided that the Russian troops should remain in occupation of these provinces until satisfactory reforms were carried out. Turkey has actually omitted to carry out her pledge for forty years, in spite of repeated protests from His Majesty's Government, and has added the massacres of 1895–7, 1909, and 1915 (the worst of all) to her record of misrule.

It is clearly incumbent upon us to put an end to these wrongs to humanity and violations of an international treaty to which we are a party, now that it lies within our power to do so.

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We are, however, committed in regard to the south-western half of Armenia (Sivas, Kharput, Diarbekir, Cilicia) by its inclusion in the Blue Area, where we have agreed (No. 11) that France shall establish such direct or indirect administration or control as she desires.* But we have a free hand in the Yellow Area, which was assigned to Russia, and in those districts west of the Yellow Area and north of the Blue which equitably should be included in an Armenian State.

We are also parties to an undertaking, made to Italy by France, that Mersina and all other harbours on the Cilician coast shall be free ports for Italian trade with the Green Area.

Note.—The future of Russian Armenia will have to be considered in connection with that of Turkish Armenia, but it falls outside the scope of the present memorandum.

(4.) *Arab Countries and Kurdistan.*

The Arab countries concerned are the Arab provinces of Turkey and the Independent States of the Arabian Peninsula—the Aden Protectorate on the mainland and islands, especially the Protectorate of Bahrein, being excluded.

Our commitments in this area are as follows :—

(*a.*) His Majesty's Government are parties to the "Règlements organiques" of the Lebanon vilayet (Nos. 1 and 2 in the Schedule).

(*b.*) They have treaties, agreements, and understandings with the Sultans of Mokalla and Maskat, Chiefs of "Trucial Oman," Sheikhs of Koweit and Al Katar, Bin Saud, the Idrisi and other independent Arab rulers, and with the Sheikh of Mohammerah, who is an autonomous ruler under the sovereignty of Persia.

Some of these commitments are nearly a century old, others (including the most important) have been entered into during the war. They vary greatly in scope and strictness, as the parties to them differ in power and in the closeness of their contact with Great Britain; but there is a standard "trucial" pattern (see below) to which they more or less approximate.

(*c.*) Subject to the maintenance of all the above obligations and rights, and so long as there is no detriment to the interests of France, His Majesty's Government are pledged to King Husein (by a letter to him dated the 24th October, 1915, from the High Commissioner (Cairo)) that not merely his own dominions in the Hejaz, but also the Red and Brown Areas, the Akka-Haifa Enclave, Areas A and B, and the whole mainland of the Arabian Peninsula south of Area B, with the exception of the Aden Protectorate, shall be "Arab" and "Independent."

We are not committed to the establishment of a unitary State or of a Confederation of States in this area, nor to any suzerainty of King Husein outside the Hejaz. King Husein claimed the boundaries of Arab independence to which we have assented, not in his own name, but as the spokesman of the various populations, and our pledge was given to him in this capacity only.

Nor are we committed to him, or to anyone, in regard to the Caliphate. His Majesty's Government have consistently maintained that this is a question to be decided by the Moslems themselves, and they have merely expressed a pious hope that "an Arab of true race *will assume* the Caliphate at Mecca and Medina."†

As a result of agreements with King Husein, other independent rulers, and our Allies, we have obtained a special position for ourselves, to the exclusion of other outside Powers, in the greater part of the Arab area, with certain important exceptions, which appear when our commitments are analysed province by province.

* Subject to the same limitations regarding customs tariffs as Italy has agreed to in the Green Area, and to an undertaking not to cede her rights (except to the Arab State or Confederation!) without the previous consent of Great Britain. France has also agreed that Alexandretta (which is included in the Blue Area and should probably be reckoned to Armenia) shall be a free port for British and Italian trade with the Red Area and Areas A and B.

† Message from Lord Kitchener to Sherif Abdullah, son of King Husein, despatched on the 31st October, 1914, the date on which war broke out between Great Britain and Turkey.

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III.—*Commitments in the different Arab Countries (including Kurdistan).*

1. *The Arabian Peninsula, excluding the Hejaz.*

(*a.*) We have treaties with the independent rulers enumerated above (Part I, section 4), the standard of which has been set by the series concluded in the years 1820, 1839, 1853, and 1892 with the "Trucial Chiefs" of the Oman coast.

The fundamental points in a "trucial treaty" are the following:—

(1.) The native Governments agree to keep the peace, and to refer their disputes with one another to the arbitration of His Majesty's Government.

(2.) His Majesty's Government undertake to arbitrate, to enforce their awards, and to watch over the peace.

(3.) The native Governments undertake to abstain from relations with outside Powers other than Great Britain, and not to receive representatives of such Powers without His Majesty's Government's consent; further, that they will not alienate or lease territory to any outside Power except Great Britain, nor grant concessions to any foreigners except British subjects.

(4.) His Majesty's Government undertake to protect the native Governments against unprovoked aggression by outside Powers.

It may be noted that it has been the practice of His Majesty's Government to limit their obligations to the keeping of the peace and defence against unprovoked aggression *at sea*, but that this limitation has not been specified in the treaty concluded during the war with Bin Saud (No. 10). This is an important departure from precedent.

Our treaty with the Idrisi (No. 8) is much looser than the "trucial" kind. We also made an agreement in 1915 with the Sheikh of Mavia, who rules a district of great strategical importance immediately beyond the frontier of the Aden Protectorate, but it has become void through his siding with the Turks. We have no commitments to Imam Yahya of Sanaa (Yemen), or to Bin Rashid, Amir of Jebel Shammar; and Bin Rashid's recent act in acknowledging the overlordship of King Husein probably precludes the establishment of direct relations hereafter between him and His Majesty's Government.

(*b.*) We have pledged ourselves to King Husein (No. 9) that the whole mainland of the peninsula with the exception of the Aden Protectorate (within its pre-war limits) shall be "independent" and "Arab"; in other words, we have pledged ourselves to the expulsion of the Turks, but in other respects to the *status quo*. We have declared further, in a Foreign Office statement dated the 11th June, 1918, in reply to a memorial from Syrians resident in Egypt, that, "in regard to areas in Arabia which were free and independent before the outbreak of war, and areas emancipated from Turkish control by the action of the Arabs themselves during the present war, His Majesty's Government recognise the complete and sovereign independence of the Arabs inhabiting these areas, and support them in their struggle for freedom."

(*c.*) We are pledged to France and provisionally to Italy, and they to us (No. 11, article 10, and No. 12, article 7), that we "will not ourselves acquire and will not consent to a third Power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian Peninsula, nor consent to a third Power installing a naval base either on the east coast, or on the islands, of the Red Sea. This, however, shall not prevent such adjustment of the Aden frontier as may be necessary in consequence of recent Turkish aggression."

In subsequent discussions the French Government have recognised that Great Britain has "special political interests" in the Arabian Peninsula.

The three Powers are also pledged to consider measures regarding the arms traffic. No definite arrangement has yet been agreed upon, but there have been discussions between French and British representatives, in which the French proposed to leave it to the discretion of His Majesty's Government to take the necessary steps for stopping "any trade capable of fomenting disturbances, such as the arms trade, slave trade, &c.," in the Arabian Peninsula.

2. *The Hejaz.*

The Hejaz is covered by our general commitments to France, Italy, King Husein, and the Syrian memorialists regarding the independence of the Arabian Peninsula (see above), and we were pledged specifically that the Holy Places, including Jeddah, should be immune from attack during the war (No. 4).

We have also recognised Husein as an independent ruler with the style and title of "His Lordship the King of the Hejaz."

Husein, on his part, has never accepted this title, and regards himself as "His Majesty the King of the Arabs" (the style and title under which he was crowned at Mecca in 1916). Our understanding with him, in his capacity of local ruler, amounts to little more than a recognition of independenc and a provisional arrangement for the joint conduct of the war.

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The French Government have consented (No. 11, article 11) that "the negotiations with the Arabs as to the boundaries of the Arab State or Confederation (*i.e.*, the negotiations with King Husein) shall be continued through the same channel as before" the Agreement of 1916 (*i.e.*, through His Majesty's Government), and they have observed this understanding in practice—for instance, in the negotiations regarding King Husein's title, referred to above.

On the other hand, there has been a French military mission at Jeddah and a French Moslem agent at Mecca. And the latter was not only instructed to deal with the Hejaz Government regarding pilgrimage facilities for the Moslem subjects of France (a matter in which His Majesty's Government could not, and would not desire to, prevent the maintenance of direct relations between the Hejaz and other outside Powers), but was given written instructions regarding certain purely political questions, which were communicated at the time to His Majesty's Government by the French Ambassador. This has created an awkward precedent, and in subsequent negotiations (which were not, however, carried to a conclusion) we virtually admitted that France has a status in the Hejaz which is in some manner an exception to the general political priority of Great Britain in the Arabian Peninsula.

It may be expected, moreover, that Italy will claim any privileges that are acquired by France.

3. *Mesopotamia* (*Irak and parts of Jezireh*).

(*a.*) His Majesty's Government are pledged to King Husein that the whole of this area shall be "independent" and "Arab," but King Husein has consented that Great Britain shall take "special measures of administrative control" in the former Turkish vilayets of Basra and Bagdad (together = Irak). King Husein suggested that this régime should be short, and that he should be compensated for it by a contribution from Mesopotamian revenues, but His Majesty's Government have not committed themselves to any such payment, nor to any limitations on their control, either of period or function.

As regards those parts of Jezireh which go naturally with Irak (see below), King Husein has neither been asked to concede, nor has conceded, any reservations in regard to the independence assented to by us.

(*b.*) France and Italy have agreed (No. 11, article 2, and No. 12, article 1) that Great Britain shall establish such direct or indirect administration or control in the Red Area as she desires and may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation (see below), and that she shall have political and economic priority in Area B (which covers part of Mesopotamia).* France has also agreed to guarantee to Great Britain a "given supply" of water from the Tigris and Euphrates in Area A for Area B.

His Majesty's Government on their part are pledged to France to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State or Confederation, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief, in Area B; not to cede their rights in the Red Area to any third Power, except the Arab State or Confederation, without the previous consent of the French Government (No. 11, article 9); and not to extend the Bagdad Railway northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Bagdad with Aleppo viâ the Euphrates Valley has been completed.

Further, that in the Red Area and Area B the existing Ottoman customs tariff is to remain in force for twenty years, and that there are to be no internal customs barriers between any of the "coloured" or "lettered" areas.

Moreover, those parts of Jezireh which go naturally with Irak (that is, at least the parts east of the line Verdi–Jeziret Ibn Omar, including Jebel Sinjar and Mosul) are included in Area A, in which we have agreed that France shall have political and economic priority, under the same conditions as we in Area B.

(*c.*) We are also pledged to the Sheikh of Koweit (No. 5), the Sheikh of Mohammerah and Bin Saud, that Basra shall never again be subject to Turkish authority. The same assurance has been given verbally to the notables of Basra vilayet, and the Viceroy of India, in a speech delivered at Basra on the 3rd February, 1915, to a local deputation, indicated plainly, though not expressly, that Turkish administration would not be restored.

(*d.*) As regards the (Shia) Holy Cities in Mesopotamia, they were included specifically in the Government of India's Proclamation concerning Moslem Holy Places (No. 4), and in the similar assurance to the Gulf Chiefs, but reference to them was carefully avoided in our negotiations with King Husein. Lord Grey of Fallodon also avoided discussion of their status in his conversation with the Aga Khan on the subject

* Including the country of the Amarat-Anazeh tribe, on the Mesopotamian side of the Syrian steppe.

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of the Arab movement and the Caliphate in 1915.* On the occasion of the occupation of the Bagdad district by the British forces in 1917, His Majesty's Government informed the Persian Government that the British military authorities would do all in their power to protect the Shia Holy Places.†

Our commitments, written, verbal, or implicit, to the "Mujtahids" and inhabitants of these Holy Cities since our occupation of Bagdad vilayet can only be reported upon adequately by the Chief Political Officer attached to General Marshall's Army, and this is also true of our commitments to the rest of the population in Mesopotamian occupied territory.

(*e.*) In reply to a memorial by Syrians resident in Egypt, His Majesty's Government declared on the 11th June, 1918, that, "in areas formerly under Ottoman dominion occupied by the Allied forces during the present war, it is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that the future government should be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed," and that "this policy has and will continue to have the support of His Majesty's Government." We have since declared jointly with France (No. 14) that:—

"The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations.

"In order to give effect to these intentions, France and Great Britain have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia already liberated by the Allies, and in the territories which they are proceeding to liberate, and they have agreed to recognise such governments as soon as they are effectively established. So far from desiring to impose specific institutions upon the populations of these regions, their sole object is to ensure, by their support and effective assistance, that the governments and administrations adopted by these regions of their own free will shall be exercised in the normal way. The function which the two Allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories is to ensure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by encouraging local initiative; to promote the diffusion of education; and to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy."

4. *Kurdistan.*

This country may be defined as the territory south of the Bohtan River, and east of the Tigris and the Jebel Hamrin, which has hitherto belonged to Turkey, and is bounded on the east by the Persian frontier.

We are pledged to King Husein that the parts of this territory south of a line running west-and-east from Jeziret-ibn-Omar, on the Tigris, through Amadia to the Persian frontier, shall be "independent" and "Arab."

We are also pledged to France (No. 11, Article 1) that the same parts shall be included in the independent Arab State or Confederation which is to be recognised and upheld by us, and this pledge has been adhered to provisionally by Italy (No. 12, Article 1).

It has also been agreed that in these parts France shall have political and economic priority north of a line running up the Lesser Zab River, through Khoi Sanjak to the Persian frontier and Great Britain a similar priority south of that line.

We have a free hand in the parts of Kurdistan north of the Jeziret–Amadia line, since they were included in the Yellow Area assigned to Russia. These parts contain the settlements of the Nestorian Christians (Assyrians) in the upper valley of the Greater Zab, and we are under a certain obligation to secure their future, since they were under the auspices of an Anglican Mission before the war, and have suffered atrocities during it at the hands of the Turks and Kurds.

We are thus committed to the partition of Kurdistan into three sections, in the two largest of which certain rights are secured to ourselves, the French, and the Arabs, but none to the Kurds.

5. *Syria* (including parts of Jezireh that do not go with Irak).

(*a.*) *Lebanon*: In the protocol signed at Constantinople on the 6th September, 1864, by the representatives of Turkey, Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia,

* 164776/34982/15. † 60225/55826/17.

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the Ottoman Government declared, "in accord with the representatives of the other Powers," that they maintained all the provisions of the Règlement organique of the Lebanon, and of the additional Act, of the 9th June, 1861. The text of the Règlement, with certain modifications, was attached to the above protocol.

The Règlement defines the boundaries of the Lebanon vilayet, provides that it shall be administered by a Christian Governor, calls into being an Administrative Council, and lays down details of local government, justice, finance, and contributions to the Ottoman Treasury.

Since the protocol to which this Règlement is attached is not a mere bipartite agreement between Great Britain and Turkey, it cannot be regarded as having simply lapsed with the war. His Majesty's Government are probably bound by it juridically as regards, at any rate, the other parties to it who are at present their Allies, and morally as regards the inhabitants of the Lebanon, in the sense that the specific rights of autonomy secured to them under the Règlement ought not to suffer detriment through the abolition of Ottoman suzerainty, but ought to be secured to them, if they so desire, under whatever régime may be established in this and other adjoining territories which Turkey will have to cede at the peace.

It may be noted that these obligations to the Lebanon might be incompatible with the rights that have been accorded by His Majesty's Government to France in the Blue Area (see below), though this of course would depend upon the use France chose to make of them.

(*b.*) We are pledged to King Husein that Syria and Syrian Jezireh east and south of the boundary between the Blue Area and Area A shall be "independent" and "Arab," so long as there is no detriment to the interests of France.

(*c.*) In that part of Syria which is covered by the Blue Area (*i.e.*, in the Blue Area south of the Alexandretta–Killis line) we have agreed that France shall establish such direct or indirect administration or control as she desires and may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation, and that she shall have political and economic priority in Area A (which includes the whole of Syrian Jezireh and part of the Bedouin country that depends on Syria).*

The French Government, on their part, are pledged to us to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State or Confederation, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief, in Area A; not to cede their rights in the Blue Area to any third Power, except the Arab State or Confederation, without the previous consent of Great Britain (No. 11, article 9); and not to extend the Bagdad Railway southwards beyond Mosul, until a railway connecting Bagdad with Aleppo, viâ the Euphrates Valley, has been completed.

Further, that, in the Blue Area and Area A, the existing Ottoman customs tariff is to remain in force for twenty years, and that there are to be no internal customs barriers between any of the "coloured" or "lettered" areas.

Moreover, the Trans-Jordan country, and part of the Bedouin country that depends on Syria (that is, the districts along the Hejaz Railway from Deraa to Maan, and the Ruweilah-Anazeh country round the Wady Sirhan), are included in Area B, in which France has agreed that His Majesty's Government shall have political and economic priority, under the same conditions as France in Area A. Part of the Syrian Bedouin country, again, lies south of Area B, and is presumably reckoned to the Arabian Peninsula, in which the "special political position" of Great Britain has been recognised by France in subsequent discussions (see III, 1 above).

Besides this, France has agreed (No. 11, article 5) that there shall be free railway transit across the Blue Area from Alexandretta for British trade with Areas A and B and the Red Area, and that His Majesty's Government may carry a railway from Haifa to Bagdad (see Palestine below) through Area A.

(*d.*) Our statement to the Syrian memorialists and our joint declaration with France (No. 14) apply to the future of Syria as well as that of Mesopotamia (see above).

6. *Palestine* (west of Jordan).

(*a.*) We are pledged to King Husein that this territory shall be "Arab" and "independent."

(*b.*) France (No. 11, Article 4) and provisionally Italy (No. 12, Article 4) have "accorded" the ports of Akka and Haifa to Great Britain, but His Majesty's Govern-

* That is, the countries of the Fedaan Anazeh (between Homs and the Euphrates), the Sibaa Anazeh (between Damascus and Der-el-Zor), and a corner of the Wuld Ali and Ruweilah-Anazeh country, which is mostly included in Area B and the Peninsula Area south of it.

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ment have agreed, on their part, that these ports shall be free for French and Italian trade with the Blue Area and Areas A and B.

(*c.*) France has agreed (No. 11, Article 7) that Great Britain may build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway from Haifa to Bagdad, and that she shall have a perpetual right to transport troops along such a line at all times.

(*d.*) In the Brown Area,* Great Britain, France (No. 11, Article 3), and provisionally Italy (No. 12, Article 3) have agreed that an "international administration" shall be established, the form of which shall be decided upon in consultation with the other Allies and the representatives of King Husein.

(*e.*) Moslem Holy Places in Palestine (*i.e.*, the Mosque of Omar, and Abrahaun's Tomb at Hebron, the latter of which is excluded from the Brown Area) are implicitly included in the Government of India's proclamation (No. 4).

(*f.*) His Majesty's Government have conveyed (No. 13) to the Zionist Federation the statement that "they view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

(*g.*) The draft proclamation prepared for General Allenby's entry into Jerusalem was not issued officially, either on that occasion or subsequently, but it has been published in the English press, and was referred to in the statement of British policy issued by the Foreign Office on the 11th June, 1918, in reply to a memorial from Syrians resident in Egypt.

IV.—*Summary.*

(i.) *European Turkey and Anatolia:* Free hand in Constantinople and on the littoral of the Straits; commitments to Italy in Anatolia (No. 12).
(ii.) *Black Sea Straits:* Free hand.
(iii.) *Dodekannese:* Commitment to Italy (No. 7).
(iv.) *Cyprus:* Commitment to France (No. 11).
(v.) *Armenia:* Commitments under Treaty of Berlin (No. 3) and to France (No. 11) and Italy (No. 12) in parts; in remainder, free hand.
(vi.) *Arab Countries in General and Kurdistan:* Commitments under the "Règlements organiques" of the Lebanon Vilayet (Nos. 1 and 2) and to various independent Arab rulers, King Husein (No. 9), France (No. 11), and Italy conditionally (No. 12).
(vii.) *Arab Federation:* Free hand.
(viii.) *Caliphate:* Free hand.
(ix.) *Arabian Peninsula, excluding Hejaz:* Commitments to various independent Arab rulers, King Husein (No. 9), France (No. 11), and Italy (No. 12).
(x.) *Hejaz:* Commitments to King Husein (No. 9), France (No. 11), and Italy (No. 12), and (regarding Holy Places) to Moslem world (No. 4).
(xi.) *Mesopotamia:* Commitments to King Husein (No. 9), France (No. 11), Notables of Basra Vilayet, Sheikhs of Koweit (No. 5) and Mohammerah, Bin Saud, Moslem world (No. 4) as regards Moslem Holy Places in general, Persia as regards Shia Holy Places in particular.
(xii.) *Kurdistan:* Commitments in parts to King Husein and France; in parts free hand.
(xiii.) *Syria:* Commitments under "Règlements organiques" of the Lebanon (Nos. 1 and 2), and to King Husein (No. 9) and France (No. 11).
(xiv.) *Palestine:* Commitments to King Husein (No. 9), France (No. 11), Italy (No. 12), the Moslem world regarding Moslem Holy Places (No. 4), and the Zionist Federation (No. 13).

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* The Brown Area covers practically all the rest of Palestine west of Jordan, with the exception of a few square miles at either extremity.

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(B.)—Part Two. Desiderata.

I.—*General Desiderata.*

(1.) Maintenance of pre-existing British rights, relations, facilities, and other British interests, political and economic, in this region.

(2.) A settlement of the whole of this region (which as lying between Egypt and India is of direct interest to the British Empire) on a stable and friendly basis.

"Stability" means the establishment of an effective Government, or Governments, acceptable to the populations; "friendliness" means the intention of such Governments neither to pursue a policy hostile to the British Empire nor to serve the interests of a third Power pursuing such a policy.

(3.) That in carrying out such a settlement no arrangements shall be entered into that are likely to prejudice seriously the good relations of the British Empire with the Moslem world, Jewry, the Roman Catholic Church, or any other international body legitimately interested in the future of this region or in shrines or holy cities situated in it.

A fortiori, all new arrangements, however desirable in themselves, are subordinate to the maintenance of good relations with our Allies, so long as our own vital interests are preserved.

(4.) That, in view of the above considerations, the desired settlement shall be secured with the least possible increase of political and military liabilities for the British Empire.

II.—*Desiderata in Different Areas.*

(1.) *In European Turkey and Anatolia* His Majesty's Government have no interest in preventing the maintenance of an independent Turkish National State, and the substitution of some satisfactory alternative for the Capitulations in this area; but some effective safeguard must be found for the non-Turkish elements in the population, and especially for the Greeks in Smyrna and other important centres on the west coast of Anatolia.

With regard to the *Black Sea Straits*, it is indispensable that they should be under effective international control; but His Majesty's Government are prepared to discuss the methods by which this control is to be established and have not committed themselves to any particular solution in advance.

With regard to the future of *Constantinople*, the establishment of such control over the Straits would satisfy British strategical and economic desiderata. But since the prestige with which the Ottoman Sultan is invested by the possession of Constantinople is one of his chief supports in the retention of the Caliphate, and since the transference of the Caliphate from the Turks to the Arabs is distinctly desirable from the British point of view (see below), the expulsion of Turkey from Constantinople may perhaps be regarded as a British desideratum on political grounds. In view, however, of ancient rivalries for the possession of Constantinople, there are considerable and, it may be, convincing objections to this course.

(2.) As regards the *Dodekannese* group of islands, it is desirable that they should be accorded to Greece by some friendly arrangement between the Greek and Italian Governments, since they are purely Greek in population. And as regards Cyprus, it would be well that His Majesty's Government should recover freedom to offer it if they desire, and if that is the desire of the inhabitants, to Greece.

(3.) *In Armenia* it is desirable to establish an independent State that would secure equal justice for all religions and nationalities; this State eventually to be self-governing, but to be reconstructed for a term of years by a third Power; this Power to be friendly to Great Britain, and to be capable of building up Armenia into an effective barrier against Pan-Turanianism, and also against the aggression of foreign Powers in the direction of the Arab countries.

For the reconstruction of Armenia by an outside Power to be effective, Armenia would need a coast-line on the Mediterranean from which access to the interior would be feasible. So long as equality for all elements in the population is secured, it is desirable that Armenia should be given a wide extension in the direction of Anatolia, and that the frontiers of the latter country should be confined to districts where the Turks undoubtedly constitute the bulk of the population.

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(4.) *Arab Countries* (as enumerated in Part One, Section (4)) *and Kurdistan* :—

(*a.*) Subject to the maintenance of existing British interests and obligations ("Règlements organiques" of the Lebanon Vilayet, Aden and Bahrein protectorates, possible enlargement of Aden protectorate (see article 10 of No. 11: Anglo-French Agreement of the 16th May, 1916) and treaties with Sultans of Mokalla and Maskat, Chiefs of "Trucial Oman," Sheikhs of Koweit, Mohammerah, and Al Katar, Bin Saud, the Idrisi, &c.), that the Arab countries should, as far as possible, be independent under effective Governments, acceptable to the British Empire, and at peace with one another and with outside Powers.

The federation of the independent Arab States is a question for the Arabs themselves. It is a British desideratum in so far as the establishment of a united independent Arab Power (even though merely nominal) might counteract any odium we may incur with Moslem opinion as the chief agents in the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire (the sole remaining representative of Islamic power and independence before the war). On the other hand, this rather imponderable advantage would have to be balanced against the possible detriment to the peacefulness and effectiveness of the independent Governments which a premature attempt at federation might involve. And Great Britain could not allow a precarious federal scheme to prejudice the "trucial" relations between herself and various independent Arab rulers, by which the peace is effectively kept already over a considerable part of the Arabian peninsula. Nor could she admit that the establishment of a federation should prevent the extension of "trucial" relations to other local Arab Governments with which she is not yet in treaty relationship, if such extension appeared necessary for the effective maintenance of peace over the whole Arab area.

The reassumption of the Caliphate by an Arab house is a question for the Arabs to settle with other Moslems, and His Majesty's Government can take no open initiative in the matter. At the same time, it is desirable from the British point of view that the Caliphate should be transferred by a consensus of Moslem opinion from the Turks to the Arabs. The only other British desideratum in regard to it is that it should be kept distinct from the questions of Arab independence and Arab federation, discussed above.

(*b.*) In the independent Arab countries, whether federated or not, it is a British desideratum that there should be the least possible intervention, both in internal administration and in inter-State relations, by outside Powers.

But where outside intervention is necessary—as, for example, in the administration of Syria, Irak, and Jezireh, and in the relations between Arab Governments involving questions of tribal allegiance or the demarcation of boundaries (*i.e.*, questions calculated to disturb the peace)—it is desirable that, except in Syria, where the question must be left open for the moment, this intervention should as far as possible be the monopoly of the British Empire.

The grounds of this claim are as follows: The peace of the Arab countries is a vital interest of the British Empire; it can only be maintained by a trucial system; a trucial system to be effective must be in the hands of a single Power, since, if the responsibility is divided, the local rulers who are to be kept in order will attempt to maintain anarchy by playing off one mediator against the other; and if this position is to be a monopoly, Great Britain has an overwhelming claim to it as the Power with the greatest interests in this area and the neighbourhood, and as the only Power which has established a trucial system in any part of Arabia hitherto.

On the other hand, this claim to a special political position in the Arab countries does not imply a similar economic claim in the same area. His Majesty's Government will continue to take all legitimate official action for preserving and increasing British trade and concessions in their Arabian territories and protectorates, and in the independent Arab countries, but they do not aim at securing a paramount economic position in the whole of this area by means of a political monopoly.

British desiderata in the Arab countries may be summed up as a British Monroe Doctrine for Arabia, but with certain qualifications, which appear when these desiderata are analysed province by province.

III.—*Desiderata in the different Arab Countries (including Kurdistan).*

1. *The Arabian Peninsula, excluding the Hejaz.*

Independence for all effective local Governments, and the conclusion of treaties, on the "trucial pattern" (see Part One, Section III), with all that have not already made treaties or agreements with Great Britain.

It is to be noted that the rulers with whom His Majesty's Government had treaties before the war were nearly all coastal chiefs, with no hinterland except the uninhabited south-eastern desert, and therefore without suzerainty over Bedouin tribes. Their subjects lived by pearl fishing and coastal trade, and breaches of the peace on their part generally occurred at sea.

His Majesty's Government therefore made it their practice to limit their rights and obligations, under these treaties, to the keeping of the peace at sea.

On the other hand, the rulers with whom His Majesty's Government have made treaties during the war, are mostly chiefs of inland tribes and oases, drawing their power from the interior and apt to

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break the peace over questions of demarcation and tribal allegiance, over which sea-power gives us no control.

If we undertake to keep the peace throughout the Peninsula, we must therefore be prepared, in the last resort, to intervene directly on land, not only in case of aggression by outside Powers, but for the enforcement of our awards between the Arab rulers themselves.

This problem has already been raised by our Treaty with Bin Saud, and by the difficulties that have arisen in the interior between him and King Husein.

2. *The Hejaz.*

It is extremely desirable that the Hejaz Government should accept a treaty with His Majesty's Government embodying an arbitration clause, since, if any one Government in the Peninsula remains outside the trucial system, the effectiveness of the whole system is endangered.

On the other hand, Great Britain would find it difficult to apply the same sanctions as in other parts of the Peninsula, since any landing of troops in the Hejaz, or even a blockade of the coast (especially in the pilgrimage season) would excite Moslem feeling against us everywhere; and a treaty giving us the right to do this would be regarded as a betrayal of independence on the part of any ruler of the Hejaz who concluded it.

As regards the renunciation of relations with any outside Power except His Majesty's Government, there would be less occasion for a clause providing against alienations of territory or concessions, since the ruler of the Hejaz would be debarred from alienating any of the sacred territory to a non-Moslem Power by Moslem opinion, and concessions to foreign subjects, even if they were operated through Moslem employees, would also be very unpopular (though the case might arise if other districts, *e.g.*, Maan, Akaba, Kunfida, were added to his direct dominions). Our main object might be obtained by a clause debarring the ruler of the Hejaz from leasing or alienating the sacred territory to any Power whatever, without that exception in favour of ourselves which, in the case of the Hejaz, would be offensive to Moslem opinion. But the question of concessions is more difficult, since public works will be needed in the Hejaz, and demanded by the inhabitants, which it will be impossible to carry out without foreign participation.

The elimination of all political relations with outside Powers except through His Majesty's Government is of course entirely out of the question in the case of the Hejaz. This element in a trucial treaty can only be reconciled with independence in cases in which the external relations of the local Government contracting are in fact almost exclusively with the British Empire. But in the Hejaz the presence of the Holy Cities, and the annual pilgrimage to them, creates relations of the highest importance between the Hejaz Government and every Power in the world which has Moslem subjects. The fact of these relations constantly puts the independence of the Hejaz to the test, and an attempt by Great Britain to become a recognised intermediary in these relations would not be tolerated by other Powers, or by the Islamic world, even if the ruler of the Hejaz were willing to countenance it himself. On the other hand, it would be unfortunate if His Majesty's Government's special trucial rights were to be confined to relations between the ruler of the Hejaz and his Arab neighbours, and we should aim rather at obtaining a clear recognition from other outside Powers that their direct relations with the Hejaz should extend to questions affecting the Pilgrimage, and to these alone.

In the Hejaz, then, British desiderata seem to be limited to the conclusion of a "trucial treaty" on a restricted basis, and for the maintenance of predominant influence we have to depend in part upon our present relations with King Husein, our position in Egypt and the Red Sea, and the relations we hope to establish with the surrounding Arab countries.

3. *Mesopotamia* (*Irak and parts of Jezireh*).

In this country the backward state of the population, its religious and social disunity and past misgovernment, combined with the potential resources of the country, their present neglect, and the great undertakings necessary to develop them, make a "trucial" system inadequate, and necessitate the conduct of internal administration by a foreign Power—at any rate, for a transitional period, the duration of which it is impossible to define.

It is a British desideratum that this should devolve, to the exclusion of all other Powers, upon Great Britain. And since the necessity is as great in Jezireh as in Irak, and parts of Jezireh are geographically hardly separable from Irak, it is a British desideratum that British administration in Mesopotamia should extend to such parts of Jezireh also.

On the other hand, His Majesty's Government have stated that they do not desire to annex Mesopotamia, partly because they do not wish to commit themselves beforehand to permanent political and military liabilities of such wide scope, and partly because they are anxious to give play to the Arab national revival when and where it is accompanied by the capacity to realise itself in an effective way.

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His Majesty's Government therefore desire to administer Mesopotamia for an indefinite period as mandatories of the Arabs, which may be done in several different ways :—

(*a.*) As mandatories of the local population (a method which might involve the rather objectionable sham of a titular local sovereign).

(*b.*) As mandatories of the head of an Arab Federation, if such were to be formed (a method which would avoid the embarrassments of (*a*), since the head of the Federation would presumably be the local sovereign of the Hejaz, and would not be seated in the administered provinces).

(*c.*) A possible compromise between the above alternatives would be the appointment of one of King Husein's sons as local ruler of Mesopotamia, with British administrative assistance. It is understood that Sherif Abdullah may be a candidate for this office.

4. *Kurdistan* (within the boundaries specified above in Part One, III, 4).

The Power paramount in this country will command the strategic approaches to Mesopotamia and control the water supply of the eastern affluents of the Tigris, on which the irrigation of Mesopotamia largely depends. It is therefore essential that the paramount Power in Kurdistan and Mesopotamia should be the same ; in other words, that Great Britain should have an exclusive position in Kurdistan as opposed to any other outside Power.

At the same time, the arguments against annexation apply even more strongly to Kurdistan than to Mesopotamia. It is desirable that the county should form an independent confederation of tribes and towns, and that His Majesty's Government should assume functions intermediate between the administrative assistance, amounting to direct responsibility for the conduct of government, which they intend to undertake in Mesopotamia, and the mere control of external relations, to which they propose to limit themselves in the case of the independent rulers of the Arabian Peninsula. In the hills British control should be exerted with the least direct intervention possible. In the lowlands bordering on Mesopotamia, where there are important oil-fields and other natural resources, it may have to approximate to the Mesopotamian pattern.

The Nestorian settlements in the upper valley of the Greater Zab, where the Kurds, under Turkish instigation, have worked havoc during the war, should be formed into an autonomous enclave, under the Government of the Nestorian Prince-Patriarch, with a constitution modelled on that of the Lebanon—the necessary outside assistance to be given by Great Britain.

5. *Syria* (including parts of Jezireh not assigned to Mesopotamia).

His Majesty's Government have less direct political interest in Syria than in any other of the Arab countries. So far as its internal affairs are concerned, they merely desire that it shall be independent under an effective Government friendly to the British Empire. But the inhabitants of the Lebanon vilayet, who as Ottoman subjects enjoyed administrative autonomy under guarantee of the Powers, ought not to be forced into any relation with the rest of Syria of which they do not approve.

Syria is more capable than other Arab countries of providing such a Government for itself on European lines. But if foreign assistance is needed in the internal administration (and it will in any case be needed to a lesser degree and for a shorter time than in Mesopotamia), His Majesty's Government are content, as in the case of Armenia, to see this assistance given by a friendly Power on the invitation of the native inhabitants. This disinterestedness in the internal affairs of Syria, however, does not hold if the conduct of them is found to affect prejudicially the relations between Syria and other Arab countries in which Great Britain is interested—particularly Mesopotamia, the Ruweilah–Anazeh country (through which a British railway from Haifa to Irak would run), and the Hejaz :—

(*a.*) Economic relations : Alexandretta is the natural Mediterranean port for Jezireh, and Tripoli might become so for Irak, while Damascus is the focus of trade for a large part of the Ruweilah–Anazeh country, Jebel Shammar, and Hejaz. It is a British desideratum that there should be free transit across Syria between these ports and centres and their hinterlands.

(*b.*) Political relations : Syria has an open frontier towards the desert, and is therefore bound to be involved in the demarcation and allegiance controversies of the Arabian Peninsula. Whether Syria be self-governing or assisted in her internal administration by a foreign Power other than Great Britain, it seems important, for the reasons advanced above in the case of the Hejaz, that the "trucial" relations of those

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independent Peninsula rulers whose spheres border upon Syria should be so arranged as to preclude the possibility of a Power which gave administrative assistance to Syria interfering in purely Peninsula affairs.

The interaction of tribal politics throughout the Arab countries has been put forcibly in a memorandum of the 20th January, 1917, by Sir Arthur Hirtzel :—*

"No part of Arabia can be completely indifferent to Great Britain, which is the only Power that at present has a foothold in the country. Our hold is limited to a narrow fringe along the coast . . . ; its security depends ultimately upon the tranquillity of the interior. Since we are unable to intervene in or control the interior, it is essential to exclude all possible seeds of disturbance.

"Arabia is not a State in any effective sense, but a fortuitous concourse of tribes . . . . under chiefs, the limits of whose sway are determined not by frontiers, but by the tribes which they for the time being control. *Their politics are closely interwoven, and a quarrel may run right across the continent.*"

These considerations were embodied in a memorandum of the 29th August, 1917, on French and British interests in the Arabian Peninsula by Lord R. Cecil :—†

"There exists no more fruitful source of trouble in these semi-civilised countries than a condition of things in which tribal combinations can entertain the hope of enlisting one European Power against another. . . . .

"His Majesty's Government are convinced that the avoidance of internal strife in Arabia can only be secured through the retention by Great Britain of the influence which this country has so long held throughout the Peninsula as the European Power most closely concerned with the internal peace and external politics of Arabia."

These principles clearly apply to Syria, in so far as her open frontier on the east and south-east makes her a party to the tribal politics of the Peninsula; and this is the point at which the question of French administration in Syria touches vital British interests.

6. *Palestine* (including Safed and Hebron, but excluding Akaba and the country east of Jordan).

British desiderata may be analysed as follows :—

(*a.*) Strategic : Palestine adjoins the Sinai Peninsula, the Suez Canal, and Akaba, and a British railway from Akka-Haifa to Irak would traverse Palestine in its first section. It is therefore a British desideratum that if the effective government of Palestine demands the intervention of a single outside Power in its administration, that Power should be either Great Britain or, failing that, the United States. An international administration would not, perhaps, have the same drawbacks as a single foreign (even though friendly) administering Power, but it may be doubted whether it would secure the political desiderata set out below.

(*b.*) Political : In view of the interests, often conflicting, of several international religious communities in Palestinian holy places, it is a British desideratum that there should be an administration capable of conciliating these interests, and this for two reasons : (1) To ensure orderly government in a country where disorder would react upon neighbouring countries in which Great Britain is interested ; and (2) to prevent the possibility of any of the international bodies interested in Palestine feeling resentment against Great Britain as a party to an arrangement there which they might consider unfair to themselves.

In particular, His Majesty's Government desire to insure reasonable facilities in Palestine for Jewish colonisation, without giving Arab or general Moslem opinion an opportunity for considering that Great Britain has been instrumental in handing over free Arab or Moslem soil to aliens.

From this point of view it is desirable that Palestine, whatever its administration and whatever the facilities granted to non-Arab elements in its population, should nominally be included in an Arab Confederation ; so that in Palestine, as well as in Mesopotamia, the establishment of such a confederation is from one point of view a British interest.

(*c.*) Economic : It is a British desideratum that there should be free transit across Palestine between Akka-Haifa and the Anazeh country, the Hejaz, Jebel Shammar, and Irak.

(*d.*) Trucial : In this one respect British desiderata in Palestine are less exacting than in Syria. The frontiers of Palestine specified above would lie entirely in settled territory, and a Palestinian Government would not therefore be involved in perpetual demarcation and allegiance disputes with its neighbours. A trucial treaty with Great Britain for the settlement of disputes with adjoining Arab States might therefore be

* Foreign Office/132784/93808/1917.
† Foreign Office/165801/93808/1917.

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dispensed with, but this would no longer be the case if the area of Palestine were extended to the east and south.

This raises the question of the future frontier between Palestine and Egypt. On the one hand, it seems desirable that all cultivated or cultivable land on the southern borders of Palestine, in the neighbourhood of Gaza, Rafa, and Beersheba, should go to Palestine. But, on the other hand, it would be preferable, for the reasons suggested above, that the Palestinian State should not have jurisdiction over Bedouin tribes. The tribes south of the Rafa–Beersheba line and west of the Wady Arabah go naturally with those of the Sinai Peninsula, and the pre-war frontier between Turkey and Egypt, which separated them, was a quite arbitrary line.

It might be desirable, therefore, to attach this triangle of formerly Turkish territory to Egypt. But the consent of the inhabitants would have first to be manifested in some clear form, in order to preclude any possibility of misinterpretat on For, since Egypt is a British Protectorate, the attachment of these tribes to Egypt might otherwise be represented as an annexation of free Arabs to the British Empire.

IV.—*Summary.*

(i.) *European Turkey and Anatolia:* Sovereign independence (the balance of advantage, as regards Constantinople, remaining in doubt).
(ii.) *Black Sea Straits:* Effective international control.
(iii.) *Dodekannese:* Friendly settlement between Italy and Greece.
(iv.) *Cyprus:* A free hand for ourselves.
(v.) *Armenia:* Independence, with equal rights for all nationalities, and with assistance of an outside Power for a term of years.
(vi.) *Arab Countries in General:* Maintenance of existing British possessions, protectorates, and treaties; widest local independence compatible with this; widest extension of British trucial system to independent Arab States; least possible interference of outside Powers in local internal administration.
(vii.) *Arab Federation:* Desirable, but without prejudice to (vi).
(viii.) *Caliphate:* To be settled by the Moslems themselves.
(ix.) *Arabian Peninsula, excluding Hejaz:* British trucial treaties with all independent States.
(x.) *Hejaz:* Independence; British trucial treaty to cover all foreign relations except those involved in the pilgrimage.
(xi.) *Mesopotamia:* Independence, with British administrative assistance (subject to no limitations of period or function).
(xii.) *Kurdistan:* Same desiderata as in Mesopotamia.
(xiii.) *Syria:* Independence, with outside administrative assistance if necessary; free transit for trade between Syrian ports and hinterland; independent Peninsula rulers whose spheres border on Syria, to have trucial treaties with Great Britain.
(xiv.) *Palestine:* Independence; administrative assistance to be either American or preferably British; free transit for trade between Palestinian ports and hinterland; British trucial treaty only in case Palestine includes country east of Jordan.

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(C.)—Part Three. Policy.

I.—*General Lines.*

1. It would appear from the survey given in Parts One and Two above that the greatest discrepancies between British commitments and desiderata are those which arise out of the claims of Italy in Anatolia and of France in Syria and Jezireh.

2. The entry of Italy into the Green Area and Area C would be bitterly and justifiably opposed by the inhabitants. The majority are Turks, there is an important Greek minority, and most nationalities of the Levant are represented at Smyrna; but the Italian colony is only one among many, the Italians have no traditional claim and no vested interests, and there is nothing to show that they are capable of looking after the country. On the contrary, their record in colonial enterprises elsewhere indicates that they would be oppressive and incompetent. The population would probably oppose Italian intervention on the plea of self-determination, and are quite capable of driving them into the sea, or at any rate confining them to a few strategical points on the coast. As parties to the Italian claim we, and the other Allies, would suffer the greatest moral damage from such a situation, and the results of Italian reverses in Tripoli have shown how dangerously the Pan-Islamic movement would be fostered by a similar reaction against an invader on the part of the Turks in Anatolia. It may be added that Great Britain has important material stakes in the Green Area in the shape of the Smyrna trade and the Aidin Railway (the only railway enterprise in Turkey which has paid its own way). In spite of Italy's undertakings under the Agreement (No. 12, see above), it is practically certain that, if the Italians came on the scene, the Aidin Railway as a British enterprise would be doomed.

3. In Syria (leaving the Lebanon vilayet on one side) the difficulty regarding the French claims is equally serious. The French are not wanted by the Arabs, the Arabs have established an effective administration there, not only in the four Syrian towns (Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo) assigned to Area A, but in considerable portions of the Blue Area—for instance, the Anti-Lebanon district and Latakia. It is fairly clear that they would resist the imposition upon them of any foreign "assistance" which they did not ask for themselves, and the idea of French assistance is obnoxious to them.

As regards British interests, they are much more directly affected by our pledges to France in this region than by our provisional pledges in Anatolia to Italy. Area A includes part of Kurdistan and Jezireh, and these territories—at least as far west as a line drawn across Jezireh roughly from Jeziret-Ibn-Omar on the Tigris to Verdi on the Euphrates—go naturally with Lower Mesopotamia, and are perhaps essential for the irrigation and general development of that country. Again, the boundary between Areas A and B separates the settled country east of Jordan (between Deraa and Maan) from Syria, though the population on either side is inseparable in social relations and political sympathy. And it also partitions into three arbitrary sections the country of the Ruweilah-Anazeh tribe, whose Chief, Nuri Shaalan, is one of the most powerful independent rulers in Arabia. If the line between Areas A and B were to be maintained, we should have the choice between carrying out this arbitrary partition (a solution which it would probably be impossible to enforce) or allowing Trans-Jordania and the Ruweilah country to realise their natural destiny and gravitate towards Syria. The latter solution is indeed bound to come to pass, but if this were combined with the enforcement of French claims under the Agreement, the result would be to carry French influence into the heart of the Arabian peninsula, and to give France such a footing in all tribal disputes concerning demarcation and allegiance as would make the establishment of a British "trucial" system in Arabia impossible.

4. It seems most desirable, therefore, that we should attempt, at least in these two cases, to obtain a thorough revision of the Agreements as they stand, and this leads on to a consideration of any contingent elements there may be in the text of the documents.

In the Agreement with France (No. 11) there is nothing contingent at all, but the Agreements with Italy (Nos. 7 and 12) both contain contingent clauses. Moreover, in the latter agreement* (No. 12) the contingent clause refers not merely to the Italian claims but to the whole series of Agreements regarding Turkey, and France, in subscribing to the document in which this clause is contained, would appear to have

* It is assumed in the following paragraphs, for the purposes of argument, that No. 12 is valid. But if its validity is not recognised (see footnote on p. 2 above), then the contingent clause in it falls to the ground like the other articles, and article 9 of No. 7 alone has to be taken into account in this connection.

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admitted thereby that the clause applies retrospectively to the earlier Agreement between her and Great Britain (No. 11).

5. In the two Agreements with Italy the following contingencies were provided for:—

(a.) *Total or Partial Partition of Turkey.*

"In a general way France, Great Britain (and Russia) recognise that Italy is interested in the balance of power in the Mediterranean, and that, in case of the total or partial partition of Asiatic Turkey, she ought to obtain an equitable share in the Mediterranean region adjoining the province of Adalia, where Italy has already acquired rights and interests which have been dealt with in an Anglo-Italian Convention. The zone which will eventually be attributed to Italy will be delimited, when the time comes, with consideration for the existing interests of France and Great Britain." (No. 7, Article 9.)

This article came into operation with the conclusion of the Anglo-French Agreement (No. 11), and was duly carried out in a second Agreement with Italy (No. 12).

(b.) *The incomplete realisation of arrangements provided for in the several Agreements concerning Turkey.*

"The interests of Italy have equally to be taken into consideration in case modifications are made in the zones of interest of the Powers." (No. 7, Article 9.)

This was duly taken into account in the second Agreement:—

"It is understood that, if at the conclusion of peace the advantages contemplated in the agreements made between the Allied Powers regarding the attribution to each of them of a part of the Ottoman Empire cannot be secured in their entirety to one or more of the said Powers, then in any alteration or arrangement of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire which takes place at the conclusion of the war, the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean shall receive equitable consideration in conformity with Article 9 of the Agreement of London, dated the 26th April, 1915." (No. 12, Article 8.)

(c.) *Maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.*

"The interests of Italy shall equally be taken into consideration in case the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire is maintained." (No. 7, Article 9.)

6. Of these three contingencies (*c*) (the maintenance of Turkish integrity) is already ruled out, and (*a*) (the total or partial partition of the Ottoman Empire among the Allied Powers) is an anachronism.

The falling out of Russia, the intervention of America, and the general development of the international situation have made the principles of nationality and democracy and the right of self-determination, in which these principles are translated into action, not merely one element among others in the aims of the Allies, but the essential aim and expression of their cause.

This general development has profoundly affected the local situation in the Middle East, and the native peoples themselves—Arabs, Armenians, Jewish colonists, Nestorians, and latterly also the Greeks—who in the earlier stages of the war, and during the greater part of the period during which the Agreements were made, were contributing comparatively little towards their own liberation—have taken a constantly greater part, while the Allied Powers, with the single exception of Great Britain, have shouldered less and less of the burden of war against Turkey. (Russia has fallen out altogether, France has contributed practically nothing since the Dardanelles, Italy nothing at all at any stage.) Under these circumstances the only conceivable satisfactory settlement of the countries formerly subjected to Turkey lies along the lines of the joint declaration recently made by the French Government and His Majesty's Government. The liberated peoples of Turkey are bound to have "national Governments and administrations, deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations." Outside Powers cannot impose specific institutions

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upon the populations of these regions, and will have to limit themselves to "ensuring by their support and effective assistance that the Governments and administrations adopted by these regions of their own free will shall be exercised in a normal way."

In other words, the peoples must be free to form what political groupings they choose, to establish what Governments they choose within these groupings, and to invite whatever outside Power they choose to assist them, without their freedom of choice being hampered by dictation or compulsion at any point.

This being established, it will be convenient to consider the situation with regard to contingency (*b*), which was that the arrangements agreed upon among the Allies might have to be altered or only realised in part. This contingency has, in fact, been brought into operation by the changes in the situation discussed above, and it is now incumbent upon His Majesty's Government to give "equitable consideration to the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean" in whatever "alteration or arrangement of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire" will result, under the new order of things, from the war.

It is, indeed, almost certain that this new order in Turkey will itself automatically maintain the balance of power in the Mediterranean as between the Allies. For, in place of the Ottoman Empire, as it existed before the war, there will arise no French, Italian, or British dominions or protectorates assigned to each Power on some ratio, whether equitable or not, but entirely new and independent national States, and the frontiers of the Allied Powers towards Turkey will remain where they stood under the *status quo*.* Some, or even all, of these new States will no doubt desire foreign assistance for setting them on their feet, and will be at liberty to ask for the good offices of whatever Power they choose; but, in accepting such an invitation, the Power which is freely chosen will in no sense be obtaining any of the "advantages" mutually agreed upon in the various treaties, even though that Power is invited voluntarily by the inhabitants of an area which had been pledged to it under the Agreements over the inhabitants' heads. The choice will be theirs, not ours, and we cannot be responsible for maintaining the balance of power where it is affected by action other than our own.

7. The above considerations suggest a line of policy which might be taken, in regard to French and Italian claims, by His Majesty's Government. Our Allies cannot in principle contest that the populations of Turkey, including the Turks themselves, are to constitute their own Governments, as this is specifically accepted in the joint Anglo-French Declaration, from which Italy cannot dissent. Nor are any of them likely to propose that the new independent national States shall be left severely to themselves in case they ask for foreign assistance. It seems to follow inevitably that there should not only be freedom for the Arabs, Turks, Armenians, &c., to invite what Power they like, but that the various Powers should be free towards each other to accept such invitations. Any private arrangements among the Powers by which some agreed to refuse invitations of assistance for the benefit of others, would obviously be simply a roundabout method of imposing those very restrictions on the liberties of the new States which we are professing to rule out.

At the same time, we are bound in loyalty to take the balance of power into equitable consideration in any manner which the new circumstances may permit, and we can at least make sure that, in the areas allocated to each Power under the Agreements, that Power shall have the fullest opportunity for obtaining the suffrages of the inhabitants, and shall have no impediment placed in its way by the other Powers. We should do well, however, to make it clear from the outset that we cannot either practise or countenance any form of coercion, and that, as we shall not exert pressure upon the inhabitants of the areas originally assigned to us to opt for our assistance, so also we shall not consider ourselves debarred from accepting an invitation from the inhabitants of other areas, if they genuinely and spontaneously turn to us.

The upshot, then, is this. The contingency calling for a revision of the Agreements has in fact arisen owing to the general consensus that the peoples of Turkey must determine their destinies themselves, and by the terms of our pact we are bound to give equitable consideration to the maintenance of the balance of power in adapting the Agreements to the new circumstances. We propose to do so by preserving equality of opportunity for the several Allies to secure, by the free choice of the inhabitants of their respective areas, such part of the rights accorded to them in these areas under the

* This applies only to the balance of power in respect of Turkey, since, when the whole Mediterranean is taken into account, Italy's gains in the Adriatic will upset the balance to her advantage and to the disadvantage of Great Britain and France.

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Agreements as is compatible with the liberties of the inhabitants laid down in the Joint Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918.

These suggestions are put forward tentatively, but there is a genuine case for revision, and these are lines on which we might be able to present it without placing ourselves at any stage in a false position.

Proposals in detail for the different regions are given in Section II below.

II.—*Detail.*

(i.) *European Turkey and Anatolia.*

(a.) *Constantinople.*—From the point of view of British interests, the arguments for and against leaving Constantinople under Turkish sovereignty are very evenly balanced. Against leaving it is the fact that its retention might enable the Ottoman Sultan to retain the Caliphate. In favour of leaving it is the rivalry among traditional claimants, which a transfer of ownership might bring to a head. We shall see more clearly when the question is actually under discussion, and we should not be too hasty in making up our minds.

(b.) *Anatolia.*—A policy in regard to the Italian claims has been suggested in Section I above. We should hold firmly to our general principles of "no annexations" and "self-determination," and let the local application follow of itself. Smyrna and the Ægean littoral, which are largely inhabited by Greeks, will be certain to oppose any suggestion of Italian ascendancy. But it is perhaps not inconceivable that the Turks in the region adjoining Adalia, which alone was contemplated as the Italian zone originally, might seek Italian support and assistance.

(ii.) *Black Sea Straits.*

The control of the Straits, as a strategic and commercial highway, is a separate question from that of the territorial sovereignty over the littoral and Constantinople, and we should not allow the settlement of the latter question to prejudice the former, which is of greater importance to us.

Our interests require effective international control, that is, control by a single mandatory Power, and the Power designated must of course be acceptable to us. We shall be well advised to work for the appointment of the United States, failing which, some mixed International Board of Control, on the model of the Danube Commission, may become inevitable.

(iii.) *Dodekannese.*

If we were not bound to Italy by the Treaty of 1915 (No. 7), we could, and perhaps should, use our friendly offices with Italy to secure the transfer of the sovereignty over these islands from Turkey to Greece. Italy has no more moral justification for remaining there than for entering Anatolia, but His Majesty's Government are not free to take this line, since we have promised Italy "complete sovereignty" over the Dodekannese under the original treaty (No. 7, Article 8), on the strength of which Italy entered the war.

The best way to approach the solution of this question might be to deal with it in connection with the settlement of the Northern Epirus question and others outstanding between Italy and Greece: in other words, to treat it as a South-East European rather than a Middle Eastern problem.

(iv.) *Cyprus.*

The disposal of Cyprus may be treated either as a Middle Eastern or a South-East European problem. It was not included in the Middle-Eastern Agreements (except for the servitude to France, which was entered into by His Majesty's Government under No. 11, Article 4), but it was involved in the earlier negotiations with Greece. The population of the island is Greek, with a small Turkish minority. On the other hand, it has to be considered geographically in relation to the Anatolian, Cilician, and Syrian coastline.

Juridically, Great Britain's title to possess Cyprus is perfectly good. We acquired the right to "occupy and administer" it under the Cyprus Convention with Turkey, of the 4th June, 1878, in the event of Kars–Ardahan–Batum being retained by Russia, and on the condition of assisting the Ottoman Government by force of arms to defend their remaining Asiatic territories against any subsequent Russian aggression.

This Convention, being bipartite only, lapsed with the outbreak of war, and Cyprus, as an occupied enemy territory, was annexed by His Majesty's Government.

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Nevertheless, it will be well to bear in mind (*a*) that the population is Greek, and (*b*) that we have already offered the island to Greece during the war, and that at a time when Greece was not yet an ally or a belligerent.

His Majesty's Government are not, indeed, called upon to make any sacrifice of territory which is legitimately under British sovereignty. It is only if a political situation should arise in which it would be useful for His Majesty's Government to have in hand a pawn convenient for negotiating a general settlement that a possible cession of Cyprus to Greece might come up for consideration. To what extent, however, such cession would affect important strategical interests of this country is a question which could only be answered by the naval and military authorities. In this connection it may be noted that, when the functions of an "assisting Power" are defined, it must be laid down clearly that an invitation to provide assistance shall not carry with it the right to make use of strategic points in the assisted country. For instance, if France assists Armenia (see below), there must be no question of a French naval base being established at Alexandretta.

(v.) *Armenia.*

The general principle of "self-determination" applies to Armenia, but in this particular case the principle of "equal rights for all nationalities" should take priority, since throughout the country there is a mixed population with divergent economic interests and traditional feuds, which cannot be got rid of so easily as the Turkish administration that fomented them. The maintenance of this principle should be the first duty of the mandatory Power.

It would be expedient to extend the area of Armenia as widely as possible, so as to include all territories north of the Arab boundary in which there is a mixed population of Turks, Armenians, and Kurds. This would at the same time conduce to a stable settlement, and would indirectly be of advantage to His Majesty's Government. The choice of a mandatory virtually lies between France and America. If France were chosen, she would obtain a sphere of activity in this direction far wider than that accorded to her under the Agreement of 1916 (see the boundaries of the Blue Area), and this should make her more ready to forgo her claims, under that Agreement, in Syria, in case these claims were not confirmed by the choice of the Syrians themselves. It would be to our advantage, for the same reason, to encourage Russian Armenia to unite with Turkish Armenia under a single régime, and to favour the extension of French assistance to the other Caucasian countries, which will be in need of help from outside and will hardly be able to obtain it from Russia.*

The attitude of the Armenians may be gathered from the communication recently addressed to the French and the British Governments by their National Delegation at Paris. They claim the right to set up an independent Armenian State under the joint protection of the "Allied Great Powers,"† one of whom is to be asked to act as a mandatory "for the organisation and administration of the new State for a term of years. An organic statute drawn up by the Protecting Powers would lay down the main lines of the administration of the new State during the period of transition, sanctioning the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, at a date approximately defined, which would determine the form of government to be adopted permanently, subject to the approval of the Protecting Powers. The provisional administration to last long enough, but only so long, as will be necessary to enable the survivors of the deported Armenians, and Armenians from other parts, to return to their 'National Home.'"

The principle of equality for all elements in the population is not disputed. On the other hand, in settling the proportional claims of these various elements to a voice in the government of the country, it should be laid down in Armenia that the dead and the exiles should be taken into account, and Armenian immigrants from other parts of the world into Armenia should be given the same facilities as Jewish immigrants into Palestine (see below) for settling down in their ancestral homes.

(vi.) *Arab Countries in General and Kurdistan.*

We should apply the general principles of self-determination and free choice of assisting Power, and should ask King Husein formally to accept these principles in lieu of the territorial boundaries of "Arab Independence" which we are pledged to him to

* See memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe, circulated to the Eastern Committee.
† Presumably this formula is intended to include the United States.

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obtain. On the new basis the Arabs would gain more in Syria than they would lose in Kurdistan, and we shall have an opportunity of suggesting it if and when we recognise King Husein as "King of the Arabs," which will be a change from a territorial to a national title. If he subscribes to "self-determination," His Majesty's Government will be in a stronger position for handling the difficulties between him and the other independent Arab rulers to whom they are committed—especially Bin Saud.

(ii.) *Arab Federation.*

We should be well advised not to make up our minds on this question till we see whether the different Arab countries opt for the same assisting Power or for different Powers in different cases. If both Syria and Mesopotamia opted for us, it would be an advantage to have some very loose political connection between them and the Hejaz. This could be arranged by obtaining the appointment of sons of King Husein to the Syrian and Mesopotamian thrones.

(viii.) *Caliphate.*

We should abstain from all direct action, whether covert or avowed; but we can influence the choice of the Moslem world indirectly—for example, by our policy in regard to Constantinople.

(ix.) *Arabian Peninsula, excluding Hejaz.*

The principles of self-determination and free choice of assistance apply here also, but we should make it clear that our existing treaties and relations with various independent chiefs are pre-eminently applications of this principle, since we have never exercised coercion in establishing them. We should obtain a formal recognition from the other parties to the Peace Conference of such existing treaties, and of our exclusive right to make similar treaties with the remaining rulers of the Peninsula, if they on their side are willing to make them with us.

(x.) *Hejaz.*

We shall have to take up again with the French Government the abortive negotiations of 1917, and endeavour to obtain their agreement to the principle that their direct relations with the Hejaz Government shall be restricted entirely to pilgrimage affairs.

If the French can be induced to agree to this, a precedent will be set against which it will be difficult for Italy, Holland, and lesser Moslem Powers to stand out.

The French will probably try to obtain our assent to French economic penetration of the Hejaz (and especially to the installation of a French bank at Jeddah) in return for a recognition on their part of our political priority. But we should be well advised to resist such suggestions, since they would open the way for a return of French influence by another channel.

It may be impossible to embody any of these arrangements regarding the Hejaz in formal instruments binding upon all parties concerned.

(xi.) *Mesopotamia.*

We shall be on safe ground here in taking our stand upon the principle of free option, since it is evident that the inhabitants do not wish us to withdraw.

We could also put forward our ancient commercial relations with the country, and claim our right to extend the Pax Britannica from the Persian Gulf, where the benefits of our presence are admitted by all, to its Mesopotamian hinterland. This historical line of argument might, it is true, give an opening to the traditional claims of France in Syria and Palestine, and would in appearance traverse our general line of policy, which is to rest the settlement, not on the claims of outside Powers, but on the self-determination and free choice of the native populations. Nor would a recital of benefits conferred in the Gulf carry much weight if it did not appear to impress a population that was neighbour to the Gulf and had had an opportunity of witnessing our activities there for the past hundred years.

The desire of the people of Mesopotamia for us to remain there is really the best proof that our past work in the Gulf has been as good as we assert, and our case ultimately stands or falls by it, whichever line of argument we take. We had therefore better take our stand regarding Mesopotamia upon the choice of the inhabitants, which is not, after all, in doubt. Nevertheless, it may become necessary to proclaim a sort of Monroe Doctrine, in our favour, in regard to these regions. It seems imperative

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to leave no doubt that, whatever happens in these territories, Great Britain cannot allow any other Power to acquire predominant rights there.

(xii.) *Kurdistan.*

It would be almost equally safe to rely here too upon the choice of the inhabitants, though it might also be well to point out that the country is bound up with Mesopotamia geographically and economically, and could not lead a satisfactory existence if dissociated from it.

(xiii.) *Syria.*

It will be advisable to draw a distinction between the Lebanon (within the old boundaries of the autonomous vilayet, with the inclusion of the Beirut enclave) and the remainer of the Syrian area.

It is understood that Sherif Feisal and the non-Lebanese Syrian Arabs are willing that the Lebanon should maintain its separate existence, unless, or until, it desires to merge itself in the larger Syrian body politic, and that it should receive assistance from France, so long as it is clearly established that the French are invited by the free choice of the Lebanese. Considerable opposition to the paramountcy of French influence at Beirut may, however, be offered by the United States, since the Presbyterian College at Beirut is one of the most important American missionary institutions in the Middle East, and it would be in danger of being throttled by the rival Jesuit Mission under a French or Francophil régime. British interests, on the other hand, would not suffer appreciably by the acceptance of French assistance in the Lebanon, and we can safely maintain an impartial attitude in case of disagreement between France and America.

It will be all the more important not to thwart French aspirations in the Lebanon if we intend, as regards the remainder of Syria, to pursue the policy suggested in Section I above.

It is understood that the Syrians are determined to assert their right of self-determination and free choice of assistance, that they have no intention of asking for the assistance of France, and that their choice will almost certainly fall upon Great Britain. We, on our part, have simply to affirm the general principle, and to allow the local application to work itself out. But since in Syria, unlike Anatolia, the result may not merely be to the disadvantage of an Ally, but also, in all probability, to our own advantage, it is particularly desirable that in this case our action should be so indisputably loyal and correct as to leave no ground for permanent French ill-feeling.

It may be best, therefore, to be perfectly frank with the French Government, and to tell them beforehand that we insist upon the Syrians exercising a genuinely free choice, and that we shall do nothing on our part to bias their decision, but that we think it not impossible that they will opt for us, and that, if they do, we intend to accept the invitation.

(xiv.) *Palestine.*

The problem of Palestine cannot be solved entirely on the principles of self-determination and free choice of assistance. As in Armenia, there will be a mixed population, and there will be one element in that population, in this case the Jewish colonists, which, for special reasons, will be entitled to a position more than mathematically proportionate to its numbers at the start.

Moreover, in Palestine there are international religious interests so important, and so difficult to reconcile, that they almost overshadow the internal problems of the native inhabitants.

For these reasons, the desires of the inhabitants, or of the several sections of them, will have, to some extent, to take the second place. The assisting Power will be bound to act not merely as their mandatory, but as the mandatory of the world, and in cases where local and international interests conflict, the former may often have to give way.

It is essential, therefore, that the mandatory should be impartial and effective. An "international administration," in the literal sense of mixed executive bodies, would evidently be the very worst régime which could be devised to meet the special Palestinian conditions, and should be decidedly ruled out. The practical choice lies between a mandate to the United States or a mandate to Great Britain.* From the British point of view, the balance of advantage as between these two solutions is not

* It understood that the Arabs would be less opposed to Zionist aspirations in Palestine if these were to be realised under British auspices.

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altogether easy to discern, and it might be wise to keep an open mind on the question till we see how the general discussion of the Middle Eastern settlement goes, and to take the general situation into account in eventually making our decision.

As regards boundaries, the Zionists are certain to ask for the country east of Jordan, but there are no Jewish agricultural colonies there, and the inhabitants have clearly manifested their desire to join the Syrian Arab State.

In the case of the southern frontier there are strong arguments, on grounds of tribal geography, for attaching the triangle south of the Rafa–Beersheba line and west of the Wady Arabah to Egypt (see Desiderata III, 6, above), and it is not improbable that this solution would be favoured by the tribes concerned. But this aim is of minor importance from the British point of view, and would not be worth pressing if it seemed likely to give our Allies an opening for representing that we were making a special exception in our own favour to the principle of "No Annexations" as applied to Ottoman territory, while insisting upon "Independence" in areas which, under the Agreements, had been assigned to them.

The acceptance by all parties of the principle of "free choice" as the general basis of settlement in Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula is the paramount interest from the British point of view.

Foreign Office,
November 21, 1918.

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

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SECRET.

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

Special No. 4.

MEMORANDUM ON BRITISH COMMITMENTS TO THE IDRISI.

THE Idrisi had for many years before the war been *de facto* the independent ruler of a tract of the Arabian Peninsula on the borders of Asir and Yemen. From this tract he had effectively excluded the Turks, with whom he was in a chronic state of war, and during the Turco-Italian war of 1911–12 the Italians entered into relations with him, and supplied him with arms.

On the other hand, his independence had never been recognised by foreign Powers; and in the division of the Arabian Peninsula into a Turkish and a British sphere, effected by the Anglo-Turkish Conventions of the 29th July, 1913, and 9th March, 1914,* the Idrisi's country was implicitly recognised by His Majesty's Government as being under the sovereignty of Turkey.

The fact, however, that the Idrisi possessed a coastline and two ports—Meidi and Jezan—over which the Turks had no control, brought him into direct relations with foreign governments on commercial matters, and he was thus in touch with His Majesty's Resident at Aden.†

In August 1913 he sent his Minister to Aden to discover His Majesty's Government's attitude towards him (in view, no doubt, of the Anglo-Turkish Convention concluded shortly before). And he again had a confidential agent at Aden in September 1914.‡ At that time Turkey had not intervened in the war, but her attitude was already threatening, and on the 11th September, 1914, the Resident at Aden accordingly telegraphed to Bombay suggesting that overtures to the Idrisi should be made by His Majesty's Government on the following lines:—

> "We could make Idrisi an offer of protection and friendship and a distinct adjudication of his claims against Imam; we could also make over to him Farsan, which was his property once and which was taken by Porte; also we would leave open his ports Meidi, Habl, and Djezan."

The Idrisi, the Turks, and the Imam of Sanaa were engaged in a three-cornered duel, and, in the event of war with Turkey, it was clearly His Majesty's Government's interest to obtain the co-operation against the Turks of at least one, and if possible both, of the two Arab rulers. The Turks, however, made a very high bid for the Imam's friendship, and it rapidly became clear that he would not take sides with us against them. In these circumstances the establishment of relations with the Idrisi became essential.

On the 30th October, 1914, the Resident telegraphed to the Government of India reporting that the Idrisi's agent had assured him that the Idrisi had not come to terms with the Imam and would never do so with the Turks, and proposing that a verbal message should be sent him through the agent.§

This proposal was transmitted by the Viceroy to the India Office in a telegram of the 1st November, 1914‖:—

> "It seems desirable that negotiations with Idrisi's agent should immediately be commenced by Resident on lines proposed in his telegram of the 11th ultimo with these modifications. He should offer our protection and friendship and good offices to Idrisi, but not adjudication in settlement of differences with Imam, also protection of his ports Djezan, Meidi, and Habl. Restoration to him of Farsan in event of war might be hinted but not promised by Resident. In negotiating with Idrisi Resident should be warned to do nothing likely finally to estrange Imam, who appears to be wavering."

* See Draft of Despatch, dated August 1914, to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.
† Reference to trade between Aden and Idrisi ports in 12453/15.
‡ 59460/14 and 38722/15 (reprint of correspondence communicated by Government of India).
§ 65723/14.
‖ 66302/14 and 68203/14.

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On the 31st October, 1914,* the India Office, anticipating the above telegram, had telegraphed instructions to the Viceroy, regarding the Resident's proposal, as follows :—

"His Majesty's Government are unwilling, subject to anything which you may have to say, to commit themselves to a definite offer to the Idrisi, fulfilment of which they may be unable to enforce even in the most favourable circumstances, and they are not prepared to undertake adjudication of details between his claims and those of the Imam. His Majesty's Government will, however, be glad to exercise their good offices in bringing the two parties together . . . . Assurance should be given to the Idrisi that Great Britain and her Allies will not touch the Holy Places or Jeddah, and that they have no intention of taking naval action which will affect his ports. In the general settlement on the conclusion of the war, he may count upon their diplomatic assistance to secure his autonomy. You may promise him such arms and ammunition as can be spared by you."

Their instructions differed from the Viceroy's in omitting all mention of the Farsan Islands, a point in which the Foreign Office concurred and on which specific instructions were sent to the Viceroy by the India Office on the 7th November, 1914.†

Meanwhile, on the 4th November, 1914, the Resident had telegraphed that the Idrisi's agent was leaving Aden to communicate to the Idrisi the terms of the Viceroy's telegram of the 1st November, 1914, and that it was urgent that the negotiations should be carried through.‡

On the 21st November, 1914, the Idrisi wrote to the Resident expressing approval of the suggestion that the Arabs should unite against the Turks, thanking His Majesty's Government for the promise to send him arms and to leave his ports unblockaded, and asking that his independence should be assured, and a reliable representative sent to discuss the preliminaries for an agreement.§

In view of this letter, the Government of India made the following proposals to the India Office in a telegram dated the 20th December, 1914 ‖ :—

"A reply might, we consider, be sent to the Resident, either by a letter or through a reliable source, to the effect that Idrisi's expressions of friendship have been received with satisfaction by the British Government, who are prepared to give him a guarantee of independence if he succeeds definitely in effecting a union of his Arabs against the Turks and in preventing their use of his country as a base of operations against Great Britain; also that the extent to which he co-operates will determine the question of any further reward."

And on the 28th December, 1914, the India Office, with the concurrence of the Foreign Office, accordingly instructed the Viceroy by telegram as follows ¶:—

"The Imam's attitude leaves us no alternative but to give a guarantee of independence to Idrisi, and I therefore approve your proposals, although the guarantee exceeds assurances sanctioned in my telegram of the 31st October."

On the 29th January, 1915, the Resident reported that the Idrisi's Minister had arrived at Aden to negotiate,** and on the 30th January, 1915, that the Idrisi had seized the Farsan Islands, forestalling the British Navy.††

On the 3rd February, 1915, the Resident telegraphed as follows ‡‡:—

"The Idrisi's Minister here is quite prepared to attack the Turks at once . . . . He asks for a protectorate treaty with us, and wants arms and ammunition immediately, and a sum of money to further his object . . . . Terms of any subsequent treaty need only include his security against attack by sea, and a promise of diplomatic support after the war to secure autonomy against his rival, the Imam."

In reply to this telegram, the Government of India sent the Resident instructions, of which they informed the India Office on the 5th February, 1915 §§:—

"We have . . . . authorised Resident to negotiate treaty with Idrisi on understanding that this is subject to confirmation of Government of India, and that any terms likely finally to alienate Imam while still wavering are avoided."

* 66302/14 and 68203/14. † 69670/14. ‡ 67437/14.
§ Telegram of the 17th December, 1914, from the Resident in 84480/14. ‖ 87030/14.
¶ 87030/14 and 1395/15. ** 11366/15. †† 12433/15. ‡‡ 13751/15 and 15889/15.
§§ 14126/15

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The India Office replied on the 17th February, 1915, by approving the Viceroy's action, but requesting that they should be given an opportunity of considering the terms of the treaty in substance.*

On the 9th March, 1915, the Resident at Aden telegraphed again :—†

> "Idrisi representative here is extremely anxious to make a treaty of friendship on the basis of security of his seaboard against all enemies, and our diplomatic support after conclusion of hostilities to effect his autonomy against all rivals. All this is as already intimated reasonable, and a necessary preliminary to a pact." The telegram then proceeds to urge that certain additional requests for arms on the part of the Idrisi shall be granted. "As representative wishes to leave for Djezan in three days, I ask for early sanction. After putting case before his master this agent will return to Aden to conclude a treaty."

In answer to this telegram, the Government of India instructed the Resident as follows on the 13th March, 1915 :—‡

> "You should inform Idrisi's agent that, before the Government of India can contemplate the gift of further arms or money, they must first see the draft agreement which Idrisi is prepared to conclude with them, and have some positive evidence of the co-operation he is prepared to offer in return for such agreement."

And on the 15th March, 1915, the Viceroy telegraphed in the same sense to the India Office.§

On the 16th March, 1915, however, the India Office replied to the Viceroy approving the proposals of the Resident in his telegram of the 9th March, 1915.‖

The terms of a treaty were accordingly drafted at Aden by the British authorities there and the Idrisi's Minister, and on the 30th April, 1915, the Viceroy transmitted to the India Office a report from the Resident, dated the 28th April, 1915,¶ announcing that a treaty had been concluded with the Idrisi, subject to ratification by the Government of India, and that the Idrisi would lose no time in acting against the Turks.

A copy of the treaty, signed, and dated the 30th April, 1915, was communicated to the Foreign Office by the India Office on the 26th May, 1915.** The text of it, in the form in which it was eventually ratified, is appended to the present memorandum, but a summary of its main provisions may be given here :—

Article 1. Names of the signatories.

Art. 2. The objects are—(*a*) to war against the Turks and (*b*) to make a pact of friendship between His Majesty's Government and the Idrisi and his tribesmen.

Art. 3. The Idrisi is to attack the Turks in the Yemen and extend his territories at their expense.

Art. 4. He will abstain from hostile or provocative action against the Imam so long as the latter does not join the Turks.

Art. 5. "His Majesty's Government undertake to safeguard the Idrisi's territories from all attack on the seaboard from any enemy who may molest him; to guarantee his independence in his own domain; and, at the conclusion of the war, to use every diplomatic means in their power to adjudicate between the rival claims of the Idrisi and the Imam, or any other rival."

Art. 6. "His Majesty's Government have no desire to enlarge their borders on Arabian soil," but desire that there shall be friendly relations (*a*) between all the Arab rulers, each in his own sphere; and (*b*) between each of them and His Majesty's Government.

Art. 7. His Majesty's Government promise to assist the Idrisi with arms and money, in proportion to the part played by the Idrisi in the war.

Art. 8. His Majesty's Government, while blockading all Turkish ports, will continue to leave trade open between the Idrisi ports and Aden.

Art. 9. Ratification by the Government of India is necessary to make this treaty valid.

On the 20th May, 1915, the Government of India commented on these terms as follows in a despatch to the India Office :—††

> "The only point that appears to require definite qualification is the expression 'Arabian soil' in article 6, as this scarcely falls in with our position in Mesopotamia. If the words 'Western Arabia' were substituted for 'Arabian soil' this objection would be removed, and our intentions would be sufficiently defined in the treaty.

* 20143/15. † 28470/15. ‡ 50398/15. § 30960/15. ‖ 33646/15
¶ 53328/15. ** 66940/15. †† 79794/15.

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"It might also be urged that, by allowing the Idrisi, under article 3, to extend his territories, and, at the same time, under article 5, guaranteeing his independence hereafter, we may be bringing ourselves into an embarrassing position *vis-à-vis* other Arab chiefs, but our position in this matter is safeguarded by the condition that the extension of the Idrisi's territories should be at the expense of the Turks, and, should he hereafter involve himself in a collision with other Arab chiefs by an aggressive policy, we could point to this condition, and disavow his action.

"Further, it might have been desirable to insert a clause giving British and British Indian traders free access to the Idrisi's ports, but this might legitimately be held to be a corollary of the pact of friendship which it is the object of the treaty to consolidate.

"As any further assistance in funds or munitions to the Idrisi is explicitly to be in accordance with the measure of the Idrisi's activities, our responsibilities in this matter would appear to be sufficiently safeguarded.

"We think, therefore, that, although the treaty as drafted is open to objection on the ground that it is neither very clear nor very concise, it will, if the small amendment suggested (in the first paragraph quoted) above be effected, adequately meet the requirements of the situation. We would ask, therefore, for authority to ratify it as it stands, subject to this qualification. To return it for extensive revision to our Political Resident would be to endanger the ultimate success of the negotiations, and would, at any rate, involve undesirable delay. If your Lordship agrees, we should be glad of orders by telegraph."

In answer to this, the India Office, with the concurrence of the Foreign Office,* telegraphed to the Viceroy as follows on the 21st June, 1915 :—†

"His Majesty's Government approve treaty with substitution of words 'Western Arabia.' We prefer this not so much because of Mesopotamia as because of Sheikh Saiyid, which it may be necessary to annex after war, and which we regard as Southern rather than Western Arabia. This possibility should be borne in mind in any language used to Arabs."

And these instructions were transmitted by the Government of India to the Resident at Aden in a telegram dated the 24th June, 1915.‡ Copies of the treaty, which had been forwarded from Aden to Simla on the 1st May, 1915, were now sent back on the 28th June, 1915, for this alteration to be made ; but on the 20th July, 1915, the Resident reported that it was not possible at that stage to get hold of the signatories.

On the 23rd August, 1915, the Resident reported § further that, in the Arabic text of the treaty, the counterpart to the English words "Arabian soil" (Art. 6) was "the Yemen."

"It was explained to Saiyid Mustafa, the signatory of the treaty, who is now here, that the word 'Yemen' was not an adequate translation of the amended English, but he did not approve of any alteration. He remarked that, were the British Government to annex Sheikh Said, Mokha or Hodeida, his master would be only too pleased, as he indeed was at our occupation of Kamaran.

"In these circumstances, it is not considered politic to amend the Arabic reading. The English wording is of course authoritative.

"It does not seem therefore necessary to re-write the treaty, for such a course would create suspicion in the Arab mind."

In view of this despatch the Viceroy telegraphed as follows to the India Office on the 5th October, 1915 :—‖

"We do not consider use of term Yemen in the Arab text open to serious objection. Should we desire to take over Sheikh Said, our action would be justifiable, in view of Arab and Turkish acts of aggression, under a broad interpretation of clause 6 of the proposed treaty. We therefore suggest immediate ratification."

And this was approved by the India Office, with the concurrence of the Foreign Office,¶ on the 23rd October, 1915.**

The Treaty was accordingly ratified by the Viceroy in Council on the 6th November, 1915,†† with the substitution of the words "Western Arabia" for "Arabian soil" in the English text, but with no alteration in the Arabic.

* 79794/15. † 83129/15. ‡ 126147/15. § 152356/15.
‖ 145027/15. ¶ 152356/15. ** 168899/15. †† 193583/15.

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Relation of Commitments to the Idrisi to British Desiderata.

The British desiderata involved in this treaty with the Idrisi appear to be (*a*) the extension of the British "trucial system" to the whole of the Arabian Peninsula, and (*b*) the maintenance and improvement of our position at Aden.

The general policy underlying both these desiderata is expressed in article 6 of the treaty; but, as the Government of India remarked in their despatch of the 20th May, 1915, the terms seem to lack precision.

As regards (*a*) it is an essential condition in a trucial treaty that the independent ruler who is a party to it shall have no relations with foreign Powers except through His Majesty's Government, and shall not lease or alienate to them any portion of his territory. In the present treaty this is nowhere laid down, and the India Office, in their letter of the 17th June, 1915, to the Foreign Office covering the Government of India's despatch of the 20th May, 1918, justly remarked in this connection (79794/15) :—

> "The matter referred to in paragraph 5 of the despatch (British trade in Idrisi ports and territory) will, in Mr. Chamberlain's opinion, be more suitably dealt with after the war, when some further treaty with the Idrisi will probably be necessary in any case, *e.g.*, to ensure that he does not cede any port or island to a foreign Power, and to regulate the arms traffic."

Again, in the stricter forms of trucial treaty, His Majesty's Government undertake to keep the peace between the other party to the treaty and his neighbours possessing similar treaties with His Majesty's Government, while the other party undertakes not to resort to force for the settlement of disputes, but to refer them to His Majesty's Government for arbitration.

In the present treaty His Majesty's Government merely undertake to endeavour, by diplomatic means, to adjudicate between the claims of the Idrisi and his neighbours. This was perhaps the most we could do at the time when the treaty was drafted, since neither the Sherif of Mecca nor the Imam of Sanaa were at that time in relations with us. But now that the Sherif has made an alliance with us, and the Imam has approached us with this object, it becomes important that we should place our relations with these three rulers as far as possible on an equal footing, and assume a greater control over their relations with one another.

The difficulties with which we shall be confronted are illustrated by the dispute in 1916 between the Idrisi and the Sherif over the possession of Kunfida (182183/16 and 215155/16 (No. 142)), in which the Idrisi accepted our award provisionally, but only subject to reconsideration, under article 5 of our treaty, at the conclusion of the war.

The still more difficult problem of demarcation between the Idrisi and the Imam was raised by the Resident at Aden in July of the same year (133274/16 and 133783/16), but this was deprecated by the Viceroy as premature (136686/16).

Whatever settlement of these questions we may succeed in making, fresh demarcation and allegiance disputes between these three rulers will continually be arising, and it is submitted that His Majesty's Government will not be able to deal with them effectively unless they conclude a trucial treaty on stricter lines with the Imam, and supplement their treaty with the Idrisi, and their still more indefinite arrangements with the Sherif, in this direction.

As regards trade, again, His Majesty's Government guarantee the Idrisi facilities at Aden under article 8, while there is no corresponding guarantee for British trade in the Idrisi's ports and territory. The Government of India, however, pointed out in their despatch of the 20th May, 1915, that this may be regarded as implicitly covered by the "pact of friendship" laid down in article 1.

Finally, as regards (*b*) the position of Great Britain at Aden, it may perhaps be doubted whether the words "Western Arabia" in the English text of article 6, and "Yemen" in the Arabic, do strictly admit of any territorial enlargement of our Protectorate. And our case on this point is prejudiced by our negotiations with King Husein. For in his first letter of July 1915 to Sir H. McMahon, Husein, while he excepted the Aden Protectorate from the boundaries he claimed for Arab independence, made no reference to rectifications of the Aden frontier; and Sir H. McMahon, when, in his letter of the 24th October, 1915, he accepted the proposed boundaries, subject to modifications in Syria, implicitly pledged himself, as regards Aden, to the *status quo*.

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In practice, however, any improvement of our position at Aden would affect not the Sherif and the Idrisi, but the Imam. And though the former may find it necessary in public to avoid signing away Moslem soil to the unbeliever, or Arab soil to the foreigner, they would neither of them be sorry to see their rival, the Imam, weakened by an extension of British power at his expense. In fact, the Idrisi's Minister has, in private, quite frankly adopted this point of view. (152356/15.) The real struggle over the Aden boundary will come in our negotiations with the Imam, and in this case lack of precision might be fatal. Apart from the Imam, we have to consider France, with her claims to Sheikh Said; but we have safeguarded ourselves here by the reservation attached to the self-denying proviso in article 10 of the Anglo-French Agreement of the 16th May, 1916. The two Powers agree "neither to acquire themselves, nor to consent to a third Power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian Peninsula. . . . . This, however, shall not prevent such readjustment of the Aden frontier as may be necessary in consequence of recent Turkish aggression."

We are safeguarded against Italy also by her inclusion in the provisions of the above article, under article 7 of the Italian Agreement of the 18th August, 1917.

As regards our desiderata at Aden, therefore, the present treaty with the Idrisi may be regarded as reasonably satisfactory.

APPENDIX.

Text of Treaty of April 30, 1915.

This Treaty of Friendship and Goodwill is signed by Major-General D. G. L. Shaw, the Political Resident, Aden, on behalf of the British Government and by Saiyid Mustafa-bin-Saiyid Abdu'l Ali on the part of His Eminence Saiyid Muhammad-bin-Ali-bin-Muhammad-bin-Ahmed-bin-Idris the Idrisi Saiyid and Amir of Sabia and its environments.

2. Its main objects are to war against the Turks and to consolidate a pact of friendship between the British Government and the Idrisi Saiyid, above mentioned, and his tribesmen.

3. The Idrisi Saiyid agrees to attack and to endeavour to drive the Turks from their stations in the Yemen and to the best of his power to harass the Turkish troops in the direction of the Yemen and to extend his territories at the expense of the Turks.

4. The Saiyid's prime objective will be against the Turks only, and he will abstain from any hostile or provocative action against Imam Yahya, so long as the latter does not join hands with the Turks.

5. The British Government undertakes to safeguard the Idrisi Saiyid's territories from all attack on the sea-board from any enemy who may molest him; to guarantee his independence in his own domain, and at the conclusion of the war to use every diplomatic means in its power to adjudicate between the rival claims of the Idrisi Saiyid and the Imam Yahya or any other rival.

6. The British Government has no desire to enlarge its borders in Western Arabia, but wishes solely to see the various Arab rulers living peacefully and amicably together, each in his own sphere, and all in friendship with the British Government.

7. As a mark of its appreciation of the work to be performed by the Idrisi Saiyid, the British Government has aided him with both funds and munitions, and will continue to assist him in the prosecution of the war so long as it lasts, in accordance with the measure of the Idrisi's activities.

8. Finally, while maintaining a strict blockade on all Turkish ports in the Red Sea, the British Government has for some months past been giving the Idrisi Saiyid full and free scope to trade and traffic between his ports and Aden, and this concession the British Government, in token of the friendship existing, will continue uninterruptedly to maintain.

9. This treaty will be held to be valid after its ratification by the Government of India.

Signed this day, Friday, the 30th April, 1915 A.D., corresponding with the 15th of Jamad Shani 1333 Hijra.

D. G. L. SHAW, *Major-General, Political Resident, Aden.*

H. F. JACOB, *Lieutenant-Colonel, First Assistant Resident.*

C. R. BRADSHAW, *Major-General, Staff Officer, Aden Brigade.*

Signed in vernacular, on behalf of the Idrisi Saiyid:

SAIYID MUSTAFA-BIN-SAIYID ABDU'L ALI.

Signed in vernacular:

SHEIKH MUHAMMAD-BIN-AWAD BA SALN.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This treaty was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Delhi on the 6th day of November A.D. 1915.

A. H. GRANT,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department.

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SECRET.

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT,
FOREIGN OFFICE.
Special 6.

MEMORANDUM
ON
BRITISH COMMITMENTS TO THE SHEIKH OF MAVIA.

SHEIKH BIN NASIR MUKBIL of Mavia is the most important local ruler on the Turkish side of the Aden-Yemen border, as laid down in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of the 9th March, 1914. "His jurisdiction extends from Kataba (on the plateau) down to Sheikh Said, and he can control Ahmed Noman in that neutral zone."*

The neutral zone referred to is of course the Yellow Area of the 1914 Convention, which is of vital strategical importance in connection with the control of the Red Sea, and which Turkey pledged herself not to alienate.

Mavia was thus recognised by us as falling within the sphere of Turkish sovereignty, and he held his chieftainship, with a stipend, as a Turkish kaïmakam (21661/15).

His Majesty's Government's negotiations with Mavia were started at a later stage than those with the Idrisi, at a date when Turkey had already intervened in the war, and when the Imam's intention of adopting a neutrality unfriendly to Great Britain had become more or less apparent. Mavia took the initiative by writing a letter to His Majesty's Resident at Aden, which was reported by the latter in a telegram of the 17th December, 1914 (84480/14):—

> "Powerful Sheikh Ibn Nasir Mukbil, hereinafter to be styled Mavia, writes praising our goodwill to Arabs and desire of pact between himself and Abdali Sultan, provided that we guarantee his independence thereafter. I have just received deputation of Mavia's agent and the influential Haj Ali Nasir al Kamarani . . . . Mavia and Abdali Sultan wish to make an offensive and defensive alliance, which would gain support of all our protected chiefs. If backed by us, and his independence under us guaranteed, Mavia will break away from Turks at once."

This was commented upon as follows by the Government of India in a telegram of the 20th December, 1914, to the India Office (87030/14):—

> "The proposed alliance between Mavia and Abdali, although it is not usual in the case of protected chiefs, should, we consider, be countenanced in the special circumstances, and the independence of Mavia, under the protection of Great Britain, at the close of the war should be guaranteed by Government. It should be made clear, however, that at present we have no intention of giving these chiefs support in offensive operations, but will merely help them to protect and pacify their territories by granting them arms, ammunition, and money, and that, unless Sheikh Said is used for the purpose of making an attack on Perim, we shall take no further action against it."

On the 28th December, 1914, the India Office telegraphed in regard to this to the Government of India (1395/15):—

> "Your proposals are approved. . . . . I understand from Resident's telegram that Mavia may be expected to get the Turks out of Sheikh Said."

On the 2nd February, 1915, however, the Turks invaded the Aden Protectorate, and the effect of this development upon our negotiations with Mavia was discussed by the Resident in a telegram dated the 8th February, 1915 (15601/15):—

> "Turks and Imam's troops crossed the frontier and were encamped within 7 miles Dala 2nd February. Amir Nasir is with Turks. He has been deposed by his people, who are prepared to resist invasion, but urgently press for assistance of arms and ammunition and presence of our troops. I can supply arms and ammunition.

* Telegram of the 17th December 1914, from the Resident at Aden, in 84480/14.

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"I have interviewed Mavia's confidential agent to-day. He is ready to conclude an agreement with our tribesmen to attack Turks, and asks for 75,000 rupees. This sum might well be spent in view of Government grant to Idrisi of 55,000 rupees for the same purpose. If grant sanctioned, propose payment at my discretion as scheme develops. He states if no assistance given him he cannot take action against Turks. He might, in my opinion, on the other hand, be compelled by Turks to fight against us, in which case we must move out of Aden to his assistance and that of our own friendly tribes on our borders. Since Turks are now over our border, I would strongly recommend as a better alternative to paying the money to Mavia that a British force of one brigade of infantry and one mountain battery should be sent to Dala. I have no doubt such an advance on our part will call in all our tribes as well as Mavia, who would fight with us in defence of their interests. Situation is entirely changed since the Turks crossed the frontier, and it is now imperative for British prestige among our protected tribes that the British should take action and lead them against the Turks, and not leave it to Mavia, a Turkish Arab, to do."

On the 9th February, 1915, the Resident telegraphed further as follows (16539/15):—

"If Government will render assistance as asked for in above-mentioned telegram, Mavia can certainly squash this movement, but I still consider it better for our troops to go up, as this step would be more likely effectually to check movement."

This telegram was repeated by the Viceroy to the India Office on the 10th February, 1915, with the following comment (16539/15):—

"We have informed Political Resident that no reinforcements, either permanent or temporary, can be sent from India, except in the case of extreme disorder. A sum of 75,000 rupees has been placed at his disposal to enable him to subsidise chiefs inside and on borders of protectorate, including Mavia. We have suggested that Mavia should not receive more than Idrisi."

Further developments were reported by the Viceroy in a telegram of the 22nd February, 1915 (21661/15):—

"Political Resident at Aden explains position of Mavia more difficult than that of Idrisi, as former is a Turkish pasha in receipt of Turkish stipend and on actual Turkish soil, while latter is free from Turkish attack. Mavia undertakes to drive out Turks and Turkish Arabs from Liwa of Taiz, including Kazas of Kataba, Kamaira al Hagariya, Mokha, that is, from Kataba down to Sheikh Said. He will further expel Turkish forces now within our borders at Dala and Jubbal Jihaf. Resident is concluding terms with Mavia on lines approved by your telegram of the 28th December, but in view of Imam's attitude and likelihood of his joining Turks, as also possibility of fight being prolonged and aims of Mavia not being fulfilled, advocates his being authorised to promise extra pecuniary assistance to Mavia if move rendered imperative to secure co-operation in expulsion of Turks. As governor-general, Yemen, is reported to be proceeding to Ibb and Turks are in possession of Dala and plateau and have ascended Jubbal Jihaf, Resident considers Mavia should strike at once. We have therefore placed further 50,000 rupees at Resident's disposal and have authorised his giving Mavia assurance within this limit, but have directed that before making any further promise he should satisfy himself that Mavia is seriously carrying out his engagements."

The agreement referred to in this telegram was actually signed at Aden on the 19th February, 1915, Sheikh Haj Ali Nasir al Kamarani acting on Mavia's behalf as his plenipotentiary. The text was enclosed in a despatch from the Resident, dated the 23rd February, 1915 (50398/15). A copy is appended to the present memorandum, but a summary of the provisions may be given at this point.

Article 1.—The Resident to pay Mavia 75,000 rupees in instalments, the first instalment of 25,000 rupees to be paid over at once, through the Sultan of Lahej, the remainder at the discretion of the Resident and the Sultan in proportion to the work done by Mavia.

Article 2.—His Majesty's Government will pay further subsidies, in excess of the 75,000 rupees, at their discretion, if the above sum appears insufficient for the expulsion of the Turks and their Arab allies from the Liwa of Taiz.

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Article 3.—His Majesty's Government will not treat separately with any other Arab Chief in the Liwa of Taiz, but will assure them, if necessary, that they "must be submissive to" Mavia.

Article 4.—When the fighting is over and Sheikh Muhammad Nasir (of Mavia) has gained the upper hand in the Liwa of Taiz, the British Government shall then recognise the chieftainship of Sheikh Muhammad Nasir and his independence. They undertake to place him under their protection and to protect him from the aggression of any European Power or from the Turks.

Article 5.—Mavia undertakes to break with the Turks from this date, to open hostilities against them upon receipt of the first instalment of the British subsidy, and not to desist until he has expelled both them and their Arab allies from the Liwa of Taiz (limits specified).

Article 6.—Mavia undertakes to remove Sheikh Kayid Saleh from the limits of the Aden Protectorate (which he had invaded at the instigation of the Turks), and to secure his co-operation for the objects of Article 5.

Article 7.—In case the Turks in Liwa of Taiz surrender to Mavia on condition of being deported to some other Turkish territory, the Resident agrees to take charge of them and carry out such stipulation after the termination of the war.

On the 13th March, 1915, the Government of India instructed the Resident at Aden regarding this agreement as follows (50398/15):—

> "The agreement concluded by you with the representative of Mavia is approved generally by the Government of India. It should, however, be made clear to Mavia that the guarantee given him under clause 4 is dependent on the obligations under clauses 5 and 6 being wholeheartedly carried out by him, and that it should also be clearly understood that the agreement can only be ratified on this condition."

In a telegram of the same date (50398/15) the Viceroy informed the India Office in a general way both of the terms of the agreement and of the Government of India's instructions to the Resident.

Relation of Commitments to the Sheikh of Mavia to British Desiderata.

The Agreement of the 19th February, 1915, with Mavia is presumably annulled by the fact that Mavia shortly afterwards joined forces with the Turks. His Majesty's Government may therefore consider themselves free of all commitments under this agreement for the present, but it does not follow that the agreement should not be taken into account in the peace settlement.

In the first place there is some evidence that Mavia's return to Turkish allegiance was merely due to necessity. So long as the Turks occupied the Aden hinterland and invested us within the walls of Aden town he could hardly take any other course, and it may well be true that he has never ceased to prefer relations with us.*

And, in the second place, he might, if loyal, provide a valuable counterpoise in the Yemen to the Imam of Sanaa, whose pretensions are very great. It would hardly be in His Majesty's Government's interest to allow the Imam to establish authority over the plateau of Kataba and the Yellow Area on the coast, which are both positions of the greatest strategical importance. A minor chief like Mavia would be preferable as a neighbour here. If we decided to retain him, the question would arise whether we should recognise his independence, on the lines of article 4 of the 1915 Agreement (replacing the agreement by a Trucial Treaty in stricter form), or whether we should treat his failure to observe the agreement as a ground for giving him less favourable conditions.

The alternative would be to make him a "protected" chief instead of an independent "trucial" chief, and to include his territory within the boundaries of the Aden Protectorate, instead of leaving it as one of the States of Independent Arabia.

We have a free hand to do this under article 10 of the Anglo-French Agreement of the 16th May, 1916, and it is unlikely that any opposition would be offered by the Idrisi or King Husein, to both of whom we are pledged not to extend our possessions in Arabia beyond the *status quo*. The question is almost certain to arise in the course of future negotiations with the Imam, and he alone is likely to offer violent opposition.

* On the 19th August, 1915, the Resident at Aden telegraphed (116337/15):—"Mavia Sheikh although with Turks at Lahej, has not actively participated against us. He would probably join us if we advanced, and would attempt to carry out his agreement with us. He is very anxious to become a stipendiary of the British Government."

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The conduct of Mavia since the Turkish occupation of the Aden hinterland is recorded in a memorandum by Colonel Jacob dated the 10th May, 1916 (India Office, Secret, B 231, 1916) :—

> "The Mavia Sheikh concluded an agreement on the 19th February, 1915. He tried to do his part, but we did not correspond. Had we done so, the move to Lahej would have been forestalled. Mavia has never taken an active part against us. His arrival on the Dala plateau was the result of the Amir's coquetting with the Kaimakam of Kataba. Mavia deposed the Amir and put up a relative. He then changed his quarters and went to Mavia. A brother of the present Abdali Sultan was deputed to meet him at Musemir. The house of Abdali, however, did not approve of the 'Mavia agreement.' The Abdali did not want to see a strong ruler in that quarter under our flag, which was the programme we had proposed, and to which Mavia had assented. The Abdali mission failed on account of the maladroitness of its representative. Mavia would not lead the attack on Lahej, pleaded sickness, and was eventually put on the Turkish black list as pro-British. He was not present at the occupation of Lahej, and has ever since then been moving about in the neighbourhood of Mavia, while once, to deceive the Turks, he led another movement on the the Dala plateau, this time against the Shairis."

In an earlier memorandum, dated the 9th September, 1915 (155634/15), Colonel Jacob summed up the situation with regard to Mavia as follows :—

> "Ibn Nasir Mukbil—known as Mavia—has foiled us. He expected to be kept in his tract of Kumaira and Shurman under our ægis. He dislikes both Turks and Imam. His adhesion to the Turkish cause—the result, I believe, of *force majeure*, and also some diffidence in his mind of our *bona fides*, since we did not move up to meet him at Dala—though not necessarily indicative of any hostile animus against us, will put him into a difficult position with ourselves when peace is concluded. His country is very fertile and rich, as is also that of Hujariya, to the south, which also Ibn Nasir Mukbil's influence pervades, and even so far south as Sheikh Said. This country the Imam will covet. It should properly be ours, in spite of our declared policy to hold aloof."

This quotation appears to cover the main points that will have to be taken into account when the time for settlement comes.

APPENDIX.

Text of Agreement of February 19, 1915.

This agreement is made between Major-General D. G. L. Shaw, Political Resident, Aden, on behalf of the Great British Government, and Sheikh Haj Ali Nasir al Kamarani, on behalf of Sheikh Muhammad Nasir Mukbil, Kaïmakam of Shurman and al Kama-ira.

1. The Political Resident, Aden, undertakes to pay to Sheikh Muhammad Nasir Mukbil the sum of 75,000 rupees by instalments. The first instalment of 25,000 rupees shall be paid at once through Sultan Sir Ali-bin-Ahmed-bin-Ali, K.C.I.E., of Lahej. The remaining instalments will be paid according to the discretion of the Political Resident as advised by the said Sultan, and they both will fix the amounts to be paid on each subsequent occasion. The sums which will be paid shall be determined both by the extent of the work already done by Sheikh Muhammad Nasir Mukbil and by that also which remains to be done by him in the future.

2. Should the sum of 75,000 rupees prove insufficient for the end in view, viz., the expulsion of Turks or their Arab allies—both of the Shafai and also the Zaidi creeds—who are actually co-operating with the Turks, from the Liwa of Taiz, the British Government undertakes in the same way to give still more monetary assistance in such quantity as may to Government seem sufficient and essential.

3. Should any of the chiefs and sheikhs in the Liwa of Taiz call on the Political Resident during the duration of the fighting, and demand to be detached from the control of Sheikh Muhammad Nasir, the Government (British) should assure such chief that he must be submissive to Sheikh Muhammad Nasir, and should decline to accept his overtures.

4. When the fighting is over, and Sheikh Muhammad Nasir has gained the upper hand in the Liwa of Taiz, the British Government shall then recognise the chieftainship of Sheikh Muhammad Nasir and his independence. They (Government) undertake to place him under their protection, and to protect him from the aggression of any European Power or from the Turks.

5. In consideration of the above, Sheikh Muhammad Nasir Mukbil swears by the Great God and undertakes to be true and faithful to this agreement in favour of the British Government, and that he shall relinquish the friendship existing between the Turks and himself from the date of this

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agreement. That after receiving the first instalment of the amount mentioned in article 1, he shall collect his forces and supporters, and shall stir up a quarrel and fight with full determination and firm resolution against all the Turks and their Arab allies (both Shafai and Zaidi) in the Liwa of Taiz. And by these aids, he binds himself to leave the Turks neither comfort nor repose, but to fight them throughout the Liwa both by night and by day till he expels them entirely from the Liwa, its districts, and environments as below specified :—

From the districts of al Kama ira, al Udein, al Hajaria, Ibb, Mokha, and Kataba and the appanages thereof, viz., Makbana, Shar Ab, Sabir, and Dhi Sharak. And further expel the Arabs therefrom or bring them under subjection to himself.

6. Sheikh Muhammad Nasir Mukbil undertakes to remove Sheikh Kayid Saleh and his adherents from the limits included in the protectorate of the Great British Government, and to bring his hostile movement at Dala, Jihaf, &c., to a close, and further to attach him (Kayid Saleh) as a co-helper in the enterprise alluded to above.

7. In the event of the Turks surrendering to Sheikh Muhammad Nasir Mukbil in the Liwa of Taiz on condition of their being deported to some country under Turkish sway, the Political Resident undertakes to take charge of such and to keep them in safety and secure from all harm, and after the termination of the war in Europe he will send them back to their country.

This agreement is made and drawn on Friday, the 5th Rabi Al Akhar 1333, corresponding with the 19th February, 1915 A.D.

D. G. L. SHAW, *Major-General,*
Political Resident, Aden.

Witnesses :

H. F. JACOB, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
First Assistant Resident, Aden.

C. R. BRADSHAW, *Major,*
General Staff Officer, Aden.

HAJ ALI NASIR, on behalf of SHEIKH MUHAMMAD NASIR MUKBIL.

Witnesses :

MAHOMED ABDU SALAM.

(SULTAN) ALI-BIN-AHMED-BIN-ALI (ABDALI SULTAN).

MOHSIN FADL-BIN-ALI.

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

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SECRET.

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT,
FOREIGN OFFICE.
Special 8.

MEMORANDUM
ON
BRITISH COMMITMENTS (DURING THE WAR) TO THE GULF CHIEFS.

THE name "Gulf Chiefs" is used to include a number of independent or autonomous Arab rulers—the Sultan of Maskat, the Trucial Chiefs of Oman, and the Sheikhs of Katar, Bahrein, Koweit, and Mohammerah—with whom His Majesty's Government have treaty relations, and who are dealt with by the Government of India through the British Resident in the Persian Gulf (Bushire) and the local political agents under his authority.

For our relations with the Gulf Chiefs before the war, it is sufficient to refer to the Foreign Office memorandum of the 12th February, 1908, respecting British interests in the Persian Gulf; to the appendices to the Anglo-Turkish Convention of the 29th July, 1913 (in which we communicated to the Turkish Government all our agreements with the Gulf Chiefs, except the Secret Agreement of the 16th October, 1907); and to the draft of a despatch, dated August 1914, to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, reviewing the course of negotiations and agreements concluded in 1913 and 1914 regarding affairs of Turkey and the Persian Gulf.

During the war certain fresh assurances and pledges have been given to the Gulf Chiefs, collectively and individually, by His Majesty's Government, and these are discussed below.

(i.) *Collective Assurances.*

In August 1914, after war had broken out between Great Britain and Germany, and Turkey had begun to display an intention of intervening on the German side, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf appears to have suggested to the Government of India that circular letters to the Gulf Chiefs ought to be drafted in advance, to be despatched the moment a state of war between Great Britain and Turkey came into existence.

On the 6th September, 1914, the Government of India communicated to the Resident the text of a draft circular communiqué on the responsibility of Turkey for the outbreak of war, as well as suggestions for specific assurances to the more important of the Chiefs, which they were submitting to the India Office (61684/61439/14, No. 1).

On the 14th September, 1914, the officiating Resident (64214/14, No. 1) submitted to the Government of India drafts of various notices, based on the drafts and suggestions previously communicated to him, which he proposed to issue in the event of war occurring. These drafts contained both individual and collective assurances. The former will be dealt with separately later. The latter were embodied in the following passage of a "Special Notice to be issued on the outbreak of war to the Arab rulers and sheikhs in the Persian Gulf and their subjects":—

> "Your relations with Great Britain are of long standing, and I take the opportunity of assuring you that in this struggle we shall do our utmost to preserve for you your liberty and religion. No act of ours shall threaten either of these, which are dearer to humanity than life itself."

Under the same cover, the Resident submitted to the Government of India the draft of a circular proclamation regarding the Holy Places:—

> "*From the High British Government.*
>
> "War has broken out between Great Britain and Turkey, but it is notified for the public information of all the Moslems that, so long as the Indian pilgrims proceeding to Mecca and Medina are not seriously interfered with, no hostile action will be taken by the British or Indian Government, or by their ships or soldiers, against the port of Jeddah or the Holy Places."

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In a telegram dated the 26th September, 1914 (64214/14, No. 12), the Government of India approved these two drafts, with the addition of a specific reference to the Holy Places in Mesopotamia.* And on the 6th October, 1914 (66896/14, No. 27), they informed the Resident that the issue of assurances, on the lines suggested in their previous telegram of the 6th September, 1914, had been approved provisionally by His Majesty's Government.

In both these telegrams the Resident was instructed not to despatch any of the approved documents until final instructions to that effect were sent to him. Accordingly, on the 1st November, 1914, when a state of war between Great Britain and Turkey had already existed for two days, he telegraphed to the Government of India for permission (82713/14, p. 7). On the 2nd November, 1914, the Government informed him that permission was implied in certain previous telegrams of theirs (p. 8), and on receipt of this authorisation he appears immediately to have telegraphed instructions for the delivery of the messages to the local residents at the courts of the various chiefs (p. 17).

The assurances therefore bear date of the 3rd November, 1914.

(ii.) *Assurances to the Sheikh of Mohammerah.*

The Sheikh of Mohammerah's authority extends over the port of Mohammerah (on the Karun River near its confluence with the Shatt-al-Arab), the navigable section of the Karun up to Ahwaz, and the Arab tribes in the neighbourhood of the river.

He is nominally a Persian subject, but it is many years since the Government at Tehran has exercised effective authority over him, or indeed over the other nominally Persian territories (Luristan, Bakhtiari-land, Kashgai-land, &c.) that border on his dominions. The competent administration of the Sheikh in these dominions has been in marked contrast to the surrounding disorder.

Commercial relations between Great Britain and Mohammerah are of old standing, and have given rise to political relations between His Majesty's Government and Sheikh Khazal since the beginning of the present century.† British interests at Mohammerah were vastly increased by the concession accorded by the Persian Government to Mr. W. K. d'Arcy in 1901, and taken up by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1909. The oil-fields on which the Company concentrated its activities lay north-east of the Karun, on the borders of Sheikh Khazal's country and Bakhtiari-land, and the natural access from the sea was across Mohammerah territory. The Company made an agreement with the Sheikh in 1909, and laid a pipe line from the fields to Mohammerah port. The fields proved so productive that by an agreement signed on the 20th May, 1914, His Majesty's Government acquired a predominant interest in the Company, and greatly increased the scale of its operations. Since that date His Majesty's Government's relations with Mohammerah have been of direct importance for the supply of oil fuel to the British Navy.

In view of these closer relations, which began in 1909, the Sheikh asked His Majesty's Government for more definite political assurances than they had previously given him (29456/24869/14). He was particularly anxious about a dynastic guarantee, and about the safeguarding of his position *vis-à-vis* the Persian Government and foreign Powers other than Great Britain. After due consideration of his detailed proposals, his request was met by the following statement, which was communicated to him in writing on the 15th October, 1910, by Sir P. Cox, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, together with the insignia of a K.C.I.E. :—

> "I am authorised to inform your Excellency that, whatever change may take place in the form of the government of Persia, whether it be Royalist or Nationalist, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to afford you the support necessary for obtaining a satisfactory solution in the event of an encroachment by the Persian Government on your jurisdiction and recognised rights, or on your property in Persia.
>
> "In like manner they will safeguard you to the best of their ability against an unprovoked attack by a foreign Power, or against any encroachment by such a Power on your said jurisdiction and recognised rights, or on your property in Persia."
>
> [In giving these two assurances, Colonel Cox was to add a verbal explanation to the effect that, while His Majesty's Government were perfectly sincere in their intentions towards the Sheikh, and had, therefore, given him these

* "After words 'Mecca and Medina' in the Proclamation, add words 'or the Holy Places in Mesopotamia,' and instead of 'Holy Places,' say at the end 'said Holy Places.'"

† See Report, dated December 7th, 1913, by Sir P. Cox in 29456/24869/14.

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assurances, yet circumstances might arise in which it would be impossible to intervene by force on his behalf. In such a case he would, of course, receive the strongest diplomatic support. Colonel Cox was to record in writing the substance of the conversation, in the course of which this intimation was made to the Sheikh.]

"These assurances are given for yourself, and are intended to extend to your male descendants, so long as you or they shall not have failed to observe your obligations towards the Central Government, and shall continue to be acceptable to your tribesmen, to be guided by the advice of His Majesty's Government, and to maintain an attitude satisfactory to them."

A version of this statement was also handed to the Sheikh (at his express request) for communication to his tribesmen. It differed from the other in the omission of the words "to be acceptable to your tribesmen" from the last paragraph, and in the fact that it was not accompanied by the verbal explanation.

On the 8th December, 1910, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs enquired whether there was any truth in information which had reached him that the Sheikh was under British protection. The British Minister at Tehran replied that the Sheikh was not a British-protected person, but that His Majesty's Government had special relations with him, and would support him in the event of any encroachment on his rights.

It was decided by the Foreign Office that no further information should be conveyed to the Persian Government regarding the Sheikh's relations with His Majesty's Government.

On the 4th December, 1913, at a time when His Majesty's Government were contemplating the acquisition of a controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Sheikh Khazal asked Sir P. Cox for still further assurances on the following lines (29456/14):—

(1.) That we would make the position regarding the succession more secure by a modification of the wording of our assurances.

(2.) That we would, now that peace had been made between the Bakhtiaris and himself, take cognisance of a definite compact of peace between them which would render him immune from the necessity and expense of collecting a large army annually each season for the protection of his territory against their aggression.

(3.) That we should endeavour to devise and take measures with the Persian Government, and in such directions as may be politically possible, to secure to him the status of local autonomy to which the history of the past entitled him, and which he at present enjoys in practice, but on a precarious basis.

In a report, dated the 7th December, 1913, to the Government of India Sir P. Cox conveyed these requests, and submitted that—

"we should meet the Sheikh's wishes as far as we can in the matter of the wording of our assurance to him, and that instead of the words 'and be acceptable to your tribesmen,' we should substitute the words, 'and provided always that the nomination of your successor from among your descendants shall be subject to confidential consultation with, and the approval of, His Majesty's Government.'"

He proposed to meet Sheikh Khazal's other requests by negotiating on certain lines with the Russian and Persian Governments.

The points raised in this report were still being discussed between the India Office and the Foreign Office when the outbreak of the war transformed the situation. The disintegration of Persia and the encroachment of Russia, which had previously been the main preoccupation of His Majesty's Government in the Persian Gulf, were eclipsed by the more immediate menace from Turkey and Germany. The Sheikh of Mohammerah appears to have sent assurances of his loyalty to His Majesty's Government soon after a state of war between Great Britain and Germany was declared (61684/61439/14, No. 1), and it was clearly essential that we should reaffirm and strengthen our assurances to him.

On the 6th September, 1914, the Government of India, in a telegram to the India Office repeated to the officiating Resident in the Gulf (61684/14, No. 1), made the following suggestion:—

"It is asserted by the Sheikh of Koweit, and there seem reasonable grounds to believe, that the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah, in collusion with certain

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notables of Basra with whom they are in close touch, and with the distant co-operation of Bin Saud, could (if given certain assurances) either prepare the way for our peaceful occupation of Basra, or, until we were in a position to take effective action, arrange to keep the place quiet and isolated.

"To the Sheikh of Mohammerah we should give the assurance already sanctioned in connection with recent grant of decoration; undertaking to maintain him in secure and untaxed possession of his date gardens on the Turkish side of the river, and perhaps a promise to do our best *vis-à-vis* Persia to maintain him in his present state of local autonomy."

In accordance with this, the officiating Resident submitted to the Government of India on the 14th September, 1914, the following draft of a special letter to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, together with drafts of other notices (discussed in section (1) above), to be despatched in the event of war between Great Britain and Turkey breaking out (64214/14: No. 1):—

"I am authorised by my Government to request your Excellency to co-operate with our honoured friends, their Excellencies the Amir of Nejd and the Sheikh of Koweit, in the capture of Basra from the Turks . . . .

"In return for this valuable co-operation, I am authorised by my Government to assure your Excellency that in the event of our success—and succeed we shall, insha Allah—Basra will never again be allowed to be subject to Turkish authority.

"I am further to assure your Excellency personally, and do so by this writing, that, whatever change may take place in the form of the Government of Persia, and whether it be Royalist or Nationalist, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to afford you the support necessary for obtaining a satisfactory solution in the event of any encroachment by the Persian Government on your jurisdiction and recognised rights, or on your property in Persia. These assurances are given for yourself and for your successors from among your male descendants, and shall hold good so long as you and they do not fail to observe your and their obligations towards the Central Government (provided always that the nomination of your successors from among your descendants shall be subject to confidential consultation with and the approval of His Majesty's Government), and so long as you and they shall continue to be guided by the advice of His Majesty's Government, and to maintain an attitude satisfactory to that Government.

"*Vis-à-vis* the Persian Government, we shall do our best to maintain your Excellency in your present state of local autonomy.

"Further, your date gardens on the Turkish side of the Shatt-el-Arab shall remain in full possession of you and your heirs, and for ever immune from taxation."

This draft was approved by the Government of India on the 26th September, 1914 (64214/14, No. 12), with the substitution of the words "date gardens which you now possess" for "your date gardens" in the last paragraph, and the omission of the words "for ever."

In this emended form the letter was eventually delivered to the Sheikh on the 3rd November, 1914.

Later, after the occupationof Basra, Sheikh Khazal asked that the wording of the letter should be revised again.

"These assurances, in the form originally sanctioned by Government, contained a reference to the co-operation expected from the Sheikh in the event of its being needed in connection with the capture of Basra. The Sheikh urged that as occasion did not arise for the fulfilment of this obligation, it seemed somewhat inconvenient and superfluous for it to be mentioned in a communication which would become an important permanent record; he therefore begged for a revised letter from which the passages relating to Basra should be omitted."*

Accordingly Sir P. Cox, after obtaining the approval of the Viceroy, sent the following document to Sheikh Khazal, dating it 22rd November, 1914, being the date on which Basra was occupied by the British forces:—

"With reference to the assurances conveyed to your Excellency in my letter dated the 15th October, 1910 (= 11th Shawwal, 1328), and having regard to the further valued services and co-operation which your Excellency has rendered to

* Letter, dated Basra, 1st April, 1915, from Sir P. Cox to Government of India, in 62555/15.

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the British Government and British interests in Arabistan and the Shatt-el-Arab, I am now authorised to assure your Excellency personally, and do so by this writing, that whatever change may take place in the form of the government of Persia, and whether it be Royalist or Nationalist, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to afford you the support necessary for obtaining a satisfactory solution, both to yourself and to us, in the event of any encroachment by the Persian Government on your jurisdiction and recognised rights, or on your property in Persia. In like manner they will safeguard you to the best of their ability against any unprovoked attack by a foreign Power, or against any encroachment by such Power on your said jurisdiction and recognised rights, or on your property in Persia. These assurances are given for yourself and for your successors from among your male descendants, and shall hold good so long as you and they do not fail to observe your and their obligations towards the Persian Government, provided always that the nomination of your successors from among your male descendants shall be subject to confidential consultation with, and the approval of, His Majesty's Government, and so long as you and they shall continue to be guided by the advice of His Majesty's Government, and to maintain an attitude satisfactory to that Government.

"*Vis-à-vis* the Persian Government, we shall do our best to maintain your Excellency in your present state of local autonomy.

"Further, the date gardens which you now possess on the Turkish side of the Shatt-el-Arab shall remain in full possession of you and your heirs, and immune from taxation.

"P. Z. Cox, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*"

Towards the end of the year 1915, when it appeared probable for a time that Persia would intervene in the war on the side of the enemy, there was some discussion on the question of recognising Sheikh Khazal's independence in this event, and a line of procedure was sketched out by Sir P. Cox in telegrams dated the 1st November, 1915 (163390/161734/15), and the 14th November, 1915 (171916/161734/15). But since the contingency never, in fact, occurred, the assurance of the 22nd November, 1914, has remained the final embodiment, up to the present date, of His Majesty's Government's commitments to the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

(iii.) *Assurances to the Sheikh of Koweit.*

Koweit became of vital interest to Great Britain when it was proposed to prolong the Bagdad Railway, as a German concern, to a deep-water port on the Persian Gulf. Before the outbreak of the war, His Majesty's Government's relations with the Sheikh of Koweit were based upon the secret agreements concluded with him in 1899 and 1907, and the Anglo-Turkish Convention of the 29th July, 1913. By the terms of the latter, the Sheikh was recognised as Kaïmakam of an autonomous kaza of the Ottoman Empire; the boundaries of his immediate territory and his wider tribal jurisdiction were delimited; the Ottoman Government recognised existing agreements between the Sheikh and His Majesty's Government; and His Majesty's Government undertook, on their part, not to alter the nature of British relations with the Government of Koweit, or to establish a protectorate there, so long as the *status quo*, as defined in the Convention, underwent no change.

On the 8th August, 1914, Sheikh Mubarak was informed officially by the officiating Resident in the Persian Gulf that a state of war existed between Great Britain and Germany (61684/61439/14, No. 12). On the 21st August, 1914, in an interview with the British Resident at Koweit, he made a declaration of loyalty to His Majesty's Government on behalf of himself and his tribes, placed "his efforts, his men, and his ships" at Great Britain's disposal, and expressed a desire to eject the Turkish garrisons from the islands at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, which he claimed as lawfully his. He repeated this declaration in a letter, of the same date, to the officiating Resident in the Gulf, which was formally acknowledged by the latter on the 25th August, 1914.

In view of the increasing likelihood that Turkey would intervene in the war on Germany's side, it became clear that His Majesty's Government's previous undertakings to the Sheikh of Koweit would have to be renewed, and contingently extended, against the event of a state of war arising between Great Britain and Turkey.

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On the 6th September, 1914, the Government of India, in a telegram referred to already in section (ii), made the following suggestion (61684/14, No. 1) :—

"It is asserted by the Sheikh of Koweit, and there seem reasonable grounds to believe, that the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah, in collusion with certain notables of Basra, with whom they are in close touch, and with the distant co-operation of Bin Saud, could (if given certain assurances) either prepare the way for our peaceful occupation of Basra, or, until we are in a position to take effective action, arrange to keep the place quiet and isolated.

"To secure these results I would offer the following inducements, in addition to the assurance that Basra would never again be subjected to Turkish authority.

"To the Sheikh of Koweit, we should offer full possession and immunity from taxation for his date gardens on the Turkish bank between Fao and Gurnah ; immunity from the consequences of ejecting the present small Turkish military posts from Safwan, Umm Kasr, and Bubiyan ; and thereafter recognition under British protection of independent principality of Koweit." *

On the 14th September, 1914, the officiating Resident in the Gulf submitted to the Government of India a draft of a special letter to the Sheikh of Koweit, together with other drafts referred to above in sections (i) and (ii) (64214/14, No. 1) :—

"In return for the valuable co-operation which we expect from you, I am authorised by the Government in the event of success—and, insha Allah, we shall succeed—to assure you that Basra will never again be allowed to be subject to Turkish authority.

"I am further to give your Excellency personally the following special assurances :—

"(1.) Your date gardens between Fao and Gurnah shall remain in the full possession of you and your heirs and for ever be immune from taxation.

"(2.) You are guaranteed by the great British Government against all consequences of your attack against Safwan, Umm Kasr, and Bubiyan.

"(3.) Koweit shall be recognised as an independent principality under British protection."

This draft, like the others, was approved by the Government of India on the 26th September, 1914 (64214/14, No. 12), with the same alterations in assurance (1), regarding the Sheikh's date gardens in the Basra vilayet, as were made in the corresponding passage in the draft special letter to the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

The letter, in its emended form, was eventually despatched on the 3rd November, 1914.

On the 28th February, 1917, upon the death of Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Subah, these undertakings were renewed in the "Kharita" to his son ; and after the latter had also died and had been succeeded by his brother, Sheikh Salim-bin-Mubarak, the Government of India forwarded to Sir P. Cox, for presentation to the new ruler, a "Kharita" from the Viceroy renewing to him likewise the undertakings which His Majesty's Government had made to his father (68308/34912/17).

During the first half of the year 1918 Sheikh Salim created considerable difficulties for His Majesty's Government over the question of the control of the blockade in Koweit territories and ports. And, in this connection, the following message was conveyed to him through the Resident at Koweit on the 5th July, 1918 (121490/49888/18) :—

"Government have deeply regretted the events of the last two years at Koweit, but they welcome your declaration† as affording an opportunity for re-establishment of our traditional friendship. In order that there may be no misunderstanding in the future, they desire to explain their policy towards your Excellency.

"On the one hand, should you show to Government same friendship and assistance which they have experienced for many years in their dealings with the rulers of Koweit, they will continue to you the assurances given to your illustrious father, the late Sheikh Mubarak, especially that 'the town of Koweit and its boundaries likewise belong to Sheikh Mubarak-us-Subah, ruler of Koweit, and to his heirs after him,'‡ and will extend to you the friendship and protection and assistance which they gave to him ; and, finally, they hope that you will raise

* "It is a question whether we should not hoist British flag at Koweit as soon after declaration of war as we are in a position to protect it from Turkish attack.—P. Z. Cox, September 2, 1914."

† Accepting the measures of control desired by the British authorities.

‡ Secret Agreement of the 16th October, 1907.

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name of your house and of Koweit to the high position which it held in the past in eyes of British Government and of peoples of Arabia.

"On the other hand, it is the plain duty of ruler of a State which is on terms of friendship with Government to prevent all acts, either by his own subjects or by other persons in his territory, which may be contrary to interests of Government; and since they know that, if you wish to do so, you have the power to control your subjects and others in your territory, Government will be compelled to hold your Excellency personally responsible should any such act unfortunately be committed in future. They hope your Excellency will fully realise your responsibility as the ruler of Koweit towards Government under whose protection and friendship Koweit has so greatly prospered in the past, and will understand that prosperity depends entirely on preservation of true friendship, both in word and deed, with Government."

This appears to be the most recent statement made on the part of His Majesty's Government with regard to their relations with Koweit.

(iv.) *Treaty with the Sheikh of al-Katar.*

Under the Anglo-Turkish Convention of the 29th July, 1913, the Turks renounced all their pretensions in the Peninsula of al-Katar, which lay east of the line laid down in the Convention as the eastern boundary of the "Ottoman Sanjak of Nejd."

This cleared up the situation in the al-Katar country, which had been obscure since the establishment of a Turkish military post there in 1872, and on the 15th July, 1914, the India Office telegraphed to the Viceroy (33406/1990/14) suggesting that the time was approaching when a treaty should be concluded with the new Sheikh* (*i.e.*, Abdullah-bin-Jasim-bin-Thani), and asking for definite proposals as soon as possible.

On the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Germany, Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Jasim was informed thereof officially by the officiating Resident in the Persian Gulf (66597/1990/14), and returned a satisfactory reply. But in a despatch to the Government of India, dated the 1st September, 1914, the officiating Resident drew attention to the fact that Sheikh Abdullah was not effective ruler of the country, and submitted that, while it was in His Majesty's Government's interest to assist him to become so, the immediate conclusion of a treaty would be premature.

It does not appear whether this despatch reached the Government of India before they drafted the telegram of suggestions, dated the 6th September, 1914 (61684/61439/14), which has been referred to several times above, and in which the question of al-Katar was discussed as follows :—

"As regards the Sheikh of Katar, it is probable that he could not and would not evict the Turkish garrison without active support from us, but their ejection in the event of war would be a simple matter, and if the Sheikh were first informed, and given an assurance that his position and privileges as ruling Sheikh of Katar would be thereafter recognised and maintained by us, we should doubtless have his co-operation in effecting their bloodless expulsion."

No special letter to Sheikh Abdullah was included among the drafts submitted by the officiating Resident in the Gulf on the 14th September, 1914, presumably for the reasons advanced in his despatch of the 1st September, 1914, and in a telegram dated the 6th October, 1914, to the Government of India (69321/61439/14, No. 3), he dealt with the point as follows :—

"Assurance to Sheikh of Katar is the only point about which I am doubtful. Hitherto I have regarded Sheikh of Katar as a factor to be neglected when interests of far greater importance are pressing, and my proposal was merely to furnish usual notification, which has been issued to other Gulf chiefs, to Sheikh Abdullah. Katar sheikhs, in view of their present internal quarrels, are quite unable to turn out existing Turkish garrison, which is quite isolated and innocuous. Kindly instruct me accordingly if you consider that anything further is required.

"In absence of specific instructions it is clearly understood that I take no action."

The officiating Resident's view appears to have been adopted by the Government of India, and no special commitments were entered into towards the Sheikh of Katar

* In 1868 a fairly loose agreement on trucial lines had been concluded with the then Sheikh, but His Majesty's Government had refused to renew it during the Turkish occupation of the post of al-Bidaa.

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on the occasion of the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Turkey. In the course of the year 1915, however, the question of concluding a treaty with Sheikh Abdullah was discussed between the Government of India and Sir P. Cox (Political Resident in the Gulf and Chief Political Officer at Basra), and in September 1915 a draft treaty was ready for presentation to the Sheikh. The terms of this draft may be summarised here :—

Art. 1. Reference to the treaty concluded with Sheikh Abdullah's predecessor in 1868. Sheikh Abdullah to undertake to co-operate with His Majesty's Government in the suppression of the slave-trade, piracy and the arms traffic in the same manner as the Trucial Chiefs, and to "abide by the spirit and obligations of the treaties and engagements" existing between them and His Majesty's Government.

Art. 2. His Majesty's Government to accord to Sheikh Abdullah the same advantages as to the Trucial Chiefs. Copies of all the Trucial Treaties to be signed by Sheikh Abdullah and the British representative.

Art. 3. Sheikh Abdullah to publish a proclamation forbidding the arms traffic in his ports and territories. His Majesty's Government, on their part, to furnish him with a fixed quantity of arms per annum for public use, and with a subsidy of rupees 1,000 per mensem.

Art. 4. Sheikh Abdullah to receive and protect British traders and, if His Majesty's Government so desire, a British agent.

Art. 5. Duties levied on British goods not to exceed those levied on Sheikh Abdullah's own subjects or 5 per cent. *ad valorem*, and no other dues to be imposed on British goods or British subjects.

Art. 6. Sheikh Abdullah not to have relations with any other Power without the consent of His Majesty's Government, and not to lease or alienate territory to any other Power or its subjects.

Art. 7. Sheikh Abdullah not to grant concessions without the consent of His Majesty's Government.

Art. 8. Sheikh Abdullah to accept and protect a British post-office and telegraph installation in his territory.

Art. 9. His Majesty's Government to undertake to protect Sheikh Abdullah, his subjects and his territory from aggression by sea.

Art. 10. "His Majesty's Government also to undertake to grant Sheikh Abdullah good offices, should he or his subjects be assailed by land within the territories of Katar. But that it shall be thoroughly understood that this obligation rests upon the British Government only in the event of such aggression, whether by land or sea, being unprovoked by any act or (of?) aggression on the part of Sheikh Abdullah or his subjects against others."

A draft proclamation in Sheikh Abdullah's name, prohibiting the arms traffic, was prepared at the same time.

On the 16th September, 1915 (116749/107294/16), copies of these drafts were communicated by Sir P. Cox to the Political Agent at Koweit, with instructions to proceed to Katar and negotiate a treaty with Sheikh Abdullah on this basis. Sir P. Cox noted that articles 3, 4, 6 and 7 were essential, but that concessions might be made regarding articles 5 and 8.

On the 21st and 22nd, October, 1915, the Political Agent at Koweit, accompanied by the Political Agent at Bahrein, discussed exhaustively with Sheikh Abdullah the two drafts, and also the treaties with the Trucial Chiefs, to the terms of which Sheikh Abdullah was to subscribe under article 1. Finally the Sheikh consented to everything except articles 4 (reception of British traders and agent), 5 (guarantees for British trade) and 8 (British post-office and telegraph installation) of the draft treaty, and article 6 of the general treaty of 1820 with the Gulf Chiefs, under which each party accorded the other the right to accredit a representative.* In regard to these articles Sheikh Abdullah sent the following verbal message to His Majesty's Government :—

> "Please tell them that I will gladly undertake everything else that you have put to me, and that I am very sorry indeed not to be able to accept British or any other foreign subjects as permanent residents in my country at present. I would welcome them gladly myself, but my people are not yet sufficiently civilised, nor is my rule sufficiently consolidated, and I am afraid of serious trouble, which could only end in my own destruction, if I allowed foreigners in now. You may add, however, that this is only a temporary difficulty which I hope a few years will remove, and I promise, if Government will allow clauses IV, V, and VIII to stand over for the

*At the headquarters of the several Chiefs on the one side, and at the British Residency at Bushire on the other.

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present, to consider them again later and to accept them at as early a date as possible."

In view of Sir P. Cox's instructions, the Resident at Koweit was unable to carry the negotiations further on his own initiative, but in his report, dated the 26th October, 1915, he made the following recommendations :—

"In consideration of the Sheikh's remarks given above, and the fact that the position is much as stated by him, I am disposed to recommend that the Government of India may be pleased to accept the explanation of his inability to admit British traders into his dominions for the present, and to negotiate the remainder of the draft treaty on the understanding that a subsidiary agreement regarding the clauses omitted will be made subsequently. I am convinced that Sheikh Abdullah will abide loyally by the engagements into which he is now prepared to enter, and I believe that practical experience of our encouragement and support will increase his reliance on us, which is really all that is necessary.

"It is quite possible that, should we decline to treat with him without these clauses, he might ultimately agree to their inclusion under protest, but, unless it is considered that there is any urgency in regard either to the admission of traders, or a British agent, or both, the acceptance for the present of the Sheikh's explanations will pay us best in the long run, as it will, in my opinion, be more likely to win his confidence and regard.

"I am averse, generally speaking, from coercive measures with Arab chiefs, except in cases of obvious breaches of engagements."

Sir P. Cox, in a report dated the 17th April, 1916, to the Government of India, proposed to meet the case in another way :—

"I would recommend another attempt to get the treaty signed without alteration, in order to keep it in line with those in force in the case of the other Sheikhs in treaty with us, but I think we might give Sheikh Abdullah a separate letter at the same time, explaining that it was important to have the treaty worded on the same lines as others, but assuring him that we have no intention at present of pressing for fulfilment of articles 4, 5, and 8. As long as our right in each of these respects is clearly enunciated, I think we can afford to reserve them for the present for the reason that, if trade and harbour facilities progress at Bahrein, as they are doing, the trade for the greater part of the Katar peninsula will depend upon Bahrein, when we shall have practical control over it.

"As regards article 6 of the general treaty, I am of opinion that it would be best for Sheikh Abdullah to sign the treaty as a whole, but with the reservation above the signature in regard to the above article that he does not subscribe to article 6."

The Viceroy, in a telegram to the India Office dated the 2nd June, 1916 (107294/16), suggested that Sheikh Abdullah's objections should be acceded to, if necessary :—

"Articles to which Sheikh takes exception are of no great importance at present time, and by accepting remaining articles Sheikh undertakes to do practically all that we immediately require. We therefore propose to authorise Cox to negotiate treaty on lines acceptable to Sheikh, should he find any difficulty in securing Sheikh's acceptance of articles to which he now objects. We consider it more important to secure a reasonably satisfactory treaty than run the risk of a breakdown of negotiations by insisting on conclusion of a treaty on all fours with other trucial treaties. Kindly telegraph your approval."

This suggestion was approved by the India Office (125270/16), with the concurrence of the Foreign Office (120978/16), in a telegram dated the 27th June, 1916.

Accordingly the Government of India telegraphed to Sir P. Cox on the 29th June, 1916 (164214/16), that he should resume negotiations with Sheikh Abdullah on the suggested lines, with the special instruction that article 3 of the draft, providing for the importation of arms, should be framed more strictly.

Sir P. Cox proceeded in due course to Katar and carried the negotiations to a conclusion (15720/17). The text of the treaty, as it was eventually signed by him and Sheikh Abdullah at Al Bidaa on the 3rd November, 1916, is printed in Appendix A to

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the present memorandum. In this text article 3 of the original draft, relating to the arms traffic, was made more stringent, while, as a concession to Sheikh Abdullah, article 6 was altered so as to apply to British merchandise only, and not to British traders. Articles 7, 8, and 9 (corresponding respectively to articles 4 and 8 of the draft), were left as they stood, but in a letter from Sir P. Cox to Sheikh Abdullah (Appendix B), of the same date as the treaty, it was agreed, in the name of His Majesty's Government, that they should remain in suspense for an unspecified period. It was also agreed that, notwithstanding article 9 of the treaty of 1820 with the Trucial Chiefs, to which he had now subscribed, Sheikh Abdullah and his subjects should be allowed to retain negro slaves already in their possession, on condition of their treatment being satisfactory. In pursuance of article 3, Sheikh Abdullah signed the draft proclamation regarding the arms traffic (Appendix C), and issued it, on the same date, in his own name.

On the 4th November, 1916, Sir P. Cox forwarded to the Government of India the texts of the treaty as signed, of his own letter to Sheikh Abdullah, and of Sheikh Abdullah's proclamation, together with a full report on the negotiations. In a telegram to the India Office, dated the 10th January, 1917, the Viceroy proposed that the treaty should be ratified (25485/15720/17), and the India Office, with the concurrence of the Foreign Office (25485/17), signified its approval in a telegram dated the 13th February, 1917 (35527/17). The signed copy of the treaty was accordingly returned to Sir P. Cox by the India Office with three parchment copies of the English version, and he was instructed to have the Arabic version reproduced on the margins of these copies, to sign them himself, and to obtain the signature of Sheikh Abdullah. These instructions appear to have been duly carried out, and the treaty was ratified on the 23rd March, 1918, by the Government of India.

Relation of Commitments (during the War) to the Gulf Chiefs to British Desiderata.

There would appear to be no serious conflict between the two.

The general collective assurance merely reaffirms, in the vaguest terms, our previous undertakings to the various chiefs.

The general assurance regarding British policy towards the Holy Places, including those in Mesopotamia, is in no way at variance with British interests or with commitments entered into on the same subject with other parties by His Majesty's Government.

The assurance, given to the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit, that "Basra should never again be allowed to be subject to Turkish authority," is practically identical with the assurances subsequently given to the notables of Basra Vilayet by Sir P. Cox, and again by the Viceroy of India in a speech delivered at Basra on the 3rd February, 1915. It is also consistent with our pledge to King Husein that Basra shall be included within the boundaries of Arab independence, while, unlike the latter pledge, it leaves His Majesty's Government a completely free hand in regard to the positive disposal of Basra, so long as a restoration of Turkish sovereignty is excluded.

The special assurance to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, of which the final text is contained in Sir P. Cox's communication dated the 22nd November, 1914, is for the most part a repetition, practically word for word, of the assurance of 1910, with the important exception that, in the dynastic guarantee, the stipulation that the Sheikh's successors must be acceptable to the tribesmen as well as to His Majesty's Government is omitted.

There are also two short additional clauses, and the first of these makes our undertaking to support the Sheikh's established rights *vis-à-vis* the Persian Government more definite, and introduces the word "autonomy." In effect it would make it morally incumbent upon His Majesty's Government to interfere in case the Sheikh's rights were violated by Tehran; but no doubt we should in any case take action, in such circumstances, in our own interests, and the assurance does not commit us to take specific action, or to carry our action further than we may think desirable at the time. The most important point is that none of our commitments to the Sheikh of Mohammerah are inconsistent with a loyal recognition of Persia's integrity.

The second additional clause, regarding the Sheikh's date gardens in what was formerly Turkish territory, is a comparatively trifling matter; and since the immunity from taxation is not specifically accorded in perpetuity, it could presumably be modified if it became a grave embarrassment to Basra finances.

The special assurance to the Sheikh of Koweit leaves the previous relations between the Sheikh and His Majesty's Government unaffected, and merely commits us to the abolition of Turkish suzerainty over him. This suzerainty was, of course, objectionable from the British point of view, and was in effect an anomaly, since our

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agreements with the Sheikh, which were recognised by the Turkish Government in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of the 29th July, 1913, had placed him, with the exception of this Turkish suzerainty, in a "trucial" relationship to His Majesty's Government. From the trucial point of view, the existing agreements appear satisfactory. But if it is desired to modify or amplify them at some future date, this can now be done without reference to Turkey. On this head, therefore, the assurance to the Sheikh of Koweit is at least as much in our interest as in his.

As regards Safwan, Umm Kasr, and Bubiyan, the guarantee against Turkish reprisals for an attack on the Turkish military posts there on the part of the Sheikh has, of course, been fully redeemed, and is now an obsolete question. The important point is the permanent political ownership of the places referred to.

Bubiyan is an island at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, and Safwan and Umm Kasr are forts on the mainland just north of it. All three had been in dispute for many years before the war between the Sheikh of Koweit and Turkey. The Anglo-Turkish Convention of the 29th July, 1913, effected a compromise, assigning Bubiyan Island to the direct territories of the Sheikh, while Safwan and Umm Kasr forts were excluded even from his outer sphere of tribal allegiance, and were assigned to the Turkish vilayet of Basra.

Our assurance practically commits us to recognising Sheikh Salim's sovereignty over Safwan and Umm Kasr, as well as Bubiyan. But since the Sheikh is in a trucial relationship with us, our position at Basra would in no way be injured by this, nor does the possession of these forts by the Sheikh appear to conflict with any other British interest.

The assurance regarding the Sheikh's date gardens is on the same footing as that given to the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

As regards the treaty with the Sheikh of al-Katar, the only point on which it goes beyond the normal type of "trucial treaty" is the undertaking, under article 11, that His Majesty's Government's good offices shall be used on the Sheikh's behalf in the event of unprovoked aggression against him *by land*. But the assurance is so vague and guarded that it hardly constitutes a serious innovation.

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APPENDIX A.

Text of Treaty, dated November 3, 1916, and ratified on March 23, 1918, with Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Jasim-bin-Thani of al-Katar.

Whereas my grandfather, the late Sheikh Mohammed-bin-Thani, signed an agreement on the 12th September, 1868, engaging not to commit any breach of the maritime peace, and whereas these obligations to the British Government have devolved on me his successor in Qatar;

I.

I, Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Jasim-bin-Thani, undertake that I will, as do the friendly Arab Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi, Dibai, Shargah, Ajman, Ras-ul-Khaima, and Umm-al-Qawain, co-operate with the High British Government in the suppression of the slave trade and piracy, and generally in the maintenance of the maritime peace.

To this end, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Cox, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, has favoured me with the treaties and engagements entered into between the Sheikhs above mentioned and the High British Government, and I hereby declare that I will abide by the spirit and obligations of the aforesaid treaties and engagements.

II.

On the other hand, the British Government undertakes that I and my subjects and my and their vassals shall receive all the immunities, privileges, and advantages that are conferred on the friendly Sheikhs, their subjects and their vassals. In token whereof, Sir Percy Cox has affixed his signature with the date thereof to each and every one of the aforesaid treaties and engagements in the copy granted to me, and I have also affixed my signature and seal with the date thereof to each and every one of the aforesaid treaties and engagements, in two other printed copies of the same treaties and engagements, that it may not be hidden.

III.

And in particular, I, Sheikh Abdullah, have further published a proclamation, forbidding the import and sale of arms into my territories and port of Qatar; and in consideration of the undertaking into which I now enter, the British Government on its part agrees to grant me facilities to purchase and import, from the Maskat Arms Warehouse, or such other place as the British Government may approve, for my personal use, and for the arming of my dependents, such arms and ammunition as I may reasonably need and apply for in such fashion as may be arranged hereafter through the Political Agent, Bahrein. I undertake absolutely that arms and ammunition thus supplied to me shall under no circumstances be re-exported from my territories or sold to the public, but shall be reserved solely for supplying the needs of my tribesmen and dependents, whom I have to arm for the maintenance of order in my territories and the protection of my frontiers. In my opinion, the amount of my early requirements will be up to five hundred weapons.

IV.

I, Shaikh Abdullah, further undertake that I will not have relations nor correspond with, nor receive the agent of, any other Power without the consent of the High British Government; neither will I, without such consent, cede, to any other Power or its subjects, land, either on lease, sale, transfer, gift, or in any other way whatsoever.

V.

I also declare that, without the consent of the High British Government, I will not grant pearl-fishery concessions, or any other monopolies, concessions, or cable landing rights to anyone whomsoever.

VI.

The customs dues on the goods of British merchants imported to Qatar shall not exceed those levied from my own subjects on their goods, and shall in no case exceed 5 per cent. *ad valorem*. British goods shall be liable to the payment of no other dues or taxes of any other kind whatsoever, beyond that already specified.

VII.

I, Shaikh Abdullah, further, in particular, undertake to allow British subjects to reside in Qatar for trade and to protect their lives and property.

VIII.

I also undertake to receive, should the British Government deem it advisable, an agent from the British Government, who shall remain at Al-Bidaa for the transaction of such business as the British Government may have with me, and to watch over the interests of British traders, residing at my ports or visiting them upon their lawful occasions.

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IX.

Further, I undertake to allow the establishment of a British post office and a telegraph installation anywhere in my territory whenever the British Government should hereafter desire them. I also undertake to protect them when established.

X.

On their part, the High British Government, in consideration of these treaties and engagements that I have entered into with them, undertake to protect me and my subjects and territory from all aggression by sea, and to do their utmost to exact reparation for all injuries that I, or my subjects, may suffer when proceeding to sea upon our lawful occasions.

XI.

They also undertake to grant me good offices, should I or my subjects be assailed by land within the territories of Qatar. It is, however, thoroughly understood that this obligation rests upon the British Government only in the event of such aggression, whether by land or sea, being unprovoked by any act or aggression on the part of myself or my subjects against others.

In token whereof I, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Cox, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and I, Shaikh Abdullah-bin-Jasim-bin-Thani, have respectively signed and affixed our seal to this original document and four copies thereof.

Dated 6th Moharram, 1335, corresponding to the 3rd November, 1916.

(Signed and sealed) ABDULLAH-BIN-JASIM.

P. Z. COX, *Major-General,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

(Signed) C[HELMSFORD],
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This treaty was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Delhi on the 23rd day of March A.D. one thousand nine hundred and eighteen.

(Signed) A. H. GRANT,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign and Political Department.

APPENDIX B.

Translation of Letter addressed by Political Resident, Persian Gulf, to Sheikh Abdullah.

(After compliments.)

Whereas your Honour has to-day entered into and signed with me, on behalf of the British Government, an agreement or treaty, with the object of cementing the relations between the High British Government and yourself, and whereas your Honour has expressed the opinion that the time has not yet come for giving effect to articles (7), (8), and (9), which relate to :—

1. The admission of British subjects to Qatar for trade.
2. The admission of an agent on behalf of Government.
3. The establishment of post and telegraph offices in your territory.

Therefore I, on behalf of the British Government, accept your opinion, and hereby inform you that the British Government sees no present necessity for the execution of these measures, and will refrain from pressing for them until some future time when the need for them shall be manifest, and the effect will not be given to these articles without full consultation with you and the obtaining of your consent.

And whereas you have represented to me that you and your dependents possess a good many slaves from of old time, previous to this treaty, and that it would be difficult if the officials of Government were to interfere between them and their masters, accordingly I inform you that I recognise how you are placed in regard to this question, and that supposing that you accord your negroes fair and just treatment there will not be interference on the part of Government representatives in the matter.

This is what had to be explained, and may God preserve you.

P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Dated, Al Bida, November 3, 1916 (*Moharram* 6, 1335).

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APPENDIX C.

Proclamation by Sheikh Abdullah regarding the Arms Traffic.

Be it known to all who may see this:

Whereas it has become known to us that traffic in arms into British India, Persia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Trucial Coast is prohibited;

I, the undersigned, Abdullah-bin-Jasim-bin-Thani, Shaikh of Qatar, have decided to do all in my power to assist the British Government in putting a stop to this illegal traffic, and I hereby declare that, from the date of this proclamation, the importation and sale of arms, cartridges, and all munitions into our territory, and the exportation of the same to other places, are absolutely prohibited. All arms and ammunition imported into Qatar territory, or exported therefrom, will in future be liable to seizure and confiscation.

That it may not be hidden.

(Signature and seal of) ABDULLAH-BIN-JASIM AL-THANI,
Chief of Qatar.

Dated at Al Bida, Moharram 6, 1335 (*November* 3, 1916).

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Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [175r] (355/380)



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Lord Curzon

Here is a collection of papers which show our engagements to the Arab chiefs.

1. Mohammerah
Koweit
El Katr
Bin Saud

2. Trucial Chiefs of Oman, including Muscat (desirability of getting rid of French rights see means proposed in Territorial Report part III)

3 Hadramaut.

an agreement with Makalla has just been concluded

4. Yemen.
The agreement with MAVIG

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

has lapsed.

Question of Sheikh Sayid.

by whom now occupied

French claims.

are we precluded from trying to obtain by undertaking not to cross territory in Arab Peninsula.

Imam of Sanaa. No treaty. He is still recalcitrant.

Idrisi. See special mem. A new supplementary Treaty has been negotiated 5.10.0 esp Farsan islands.

2. Hope to be able to let you have also a draft of some clauses respecting Arabia including the Hejaz which it is proposed might be incorporated eventually in a Treaty with the Allies which would include Turkey;

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

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

the object being to obtain the assent of the Powers to our special position & the recognition by Turkey of the independence of the States created in the Territory taken from her —

In the portion relating to the Hejaz it is a moot point whether or no we should say that the conduct of the King's foreign relations will be as heretofore — or not —

That would of course mean in our hands. — But the I.O. are of opinion that there are strong objections to saying so.

H. McMahon
Dec 7

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Clauses of the draft Treaty dealing with ceded territories of Turkey

3. The King of the Hedjaz being firmly resolved to do his utmost to encourage and facilitate the pilgrimage to the Holy Cities of Islam declares his willingness to receive agents of the powers who are interested in the pilgrim traffic. These agents will have no diplomatic status and their function will be to facilitate the settlement of all questions which may arise in connection with the participation of their nationals in the pilgrimage. Subject to the above the foreign relations of the Kingdom will be carried on as heretofore during the war.

4. In view of ~~the sanctity of its territory and~~ the losses it has endured during the war the Hedjaz will not be called upon to contribute any annuity to the service of the Ottoman Public Debt.

5. Property in the Hedjaz belonging to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan or to the Sultanic Ottoman Porte will pass to the King of the Hedjaz. The control and operation of the section of the Hedjaz railway lying within the limits of the Hedjaz will be entrusted to the Commission which is charged with the control and operation of the remainder of the line. Property in the Hedjaz belonging to the Administration of the Ottoman Debt will not pass to the King of the Hedjaz and no obstacle will be placed by His Highness in the realization of that property.

X considered of doubtful expediency by the I.O.
L.m.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Policy ~~in Arabia~~.

British desiderata in the Arabian Peninsula may be formulated as follows :-

(1) An admission of the special position of Great Britain in Arabia should be obtained from the French and Italian Governments.

Note: In this connection the Sykes-Picot Agreement provides that "the negotiations with the Arabs as to the boundaries of the Arab State or confederation of Arab States shall be continued through the same channel as heretofore on behalf of the two Powers" - the channel was H.M.G. and the Italians subscribed to this in Article 7 of the 1917 Agreement.

On December 8th, 1916, M. Jules Cambon, addressing Lord Bertie in a formal note, wrote :-

"Le Gouvernement de la République considère comme par le passé que c'est au Gouvernement Anglais, dont l'intérêt est prépondérant dans les affaires de l'Arabie, qu'il appartient de fournir les contingents d'infanterie necessaires".....The note went on to say that the substitution of French troops would give the impression that France wanted to play "un rôle de premier plan," which was "nullement desiré par le Gouvernement Français."

In another note to Lord Bertie of May 22nd, 1917, the French Government said :-

"The Government of the Republic are ready to admit that the proximity of Egypt and the Persian Gulf create in Arabia a peculiar situation in favour of Great Britain, and France is determined to abstain from any enterprises in the internal affairs of the Arabian Peninsula."

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

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(2) The Hedjaz cannot be brought under the same formula as the rest of Arabia.

(3) As regards a subsidy, it is most undesirable from the point of view of British interests that King Hussein should receive funds from foreigh Governments other than H.M.G., and it is impossible for King Hussein, who will be accepted by a large part of the Moslem world as their religious head, openly to accept subsidies from Christian Powers. The only method that suits both our interests and his is that he should be subsidised out of the revenues of Arab Governments established in Syria and Mesopotamia under British control.*

The F.O. instructions to Sir M. Sykes of Sept. 26, 1917, were:-

(i) That the Hedjaz was to be an exception to British political supremacy in Arabia.

(ii) That its limits must be defined.

(iii) That within those limits the Hedjaz should be recognised as a sovereign, independent State.

(iv) That France shall undertake not to enter into any arrangements with King Hussein on any matter concerning the Arabian Peninsula or this Red Area or Area B. without the knowledge and consent of Great Britain.

(v) That Great Britain shall undertake to enter into no agreement with the King or Government of Hedjaz on any matter concerning the Blue Area or Area A. without the knowledge of France.

The projet d'arrangement, which was drawn up but not signed, laid down:-

(i) That the two Governments were resolved to maintain the complete independence of the Hedjaz and its integrity; it being understood that no Power was to exercise a predominant influence or intervene in any

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* The Foreign office regard this as exceedingly important, and attention is drawn to the memorandum by the India Office with which they are in agreement.

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

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way in its administration or internal affairs.

(ii) As regards concessions offered to the subjects of either Power, neither was to assent to them without informing the other and without being able to assure her that co-operation was not realisable.

N.B. This does not seem a desirable clause, as it would open the door to intrigue. If, e.g., the King applied to a British firm for an electric light installation, we should have to inform the French also, who would immediately make a lower offer. It seems better to say nothing on this subject of concessions.

(iii) That as regards Area A., the French Government, and as regards Area B., the British Government would alone be qualified to treat with the King on "all questions relating to the Arab sovereignty without the intervention of the other Power".

(iv) That H.M.G. have special political interests in Arabia - that the French Government recognises them and renounces all intention of acquiring political influence in these regions.

That H.M.G. will use their influence on the local chiefs to assure to lawful French commerce and to French shipping all that which is accorded to British trade and navigation.

That as regards the Arms and Slave Traffic it is understood that H.M.G. will do what is necessary to prevent this traffic.

In the opinion of the Foreign Office it will be necessary to embody in a general Treaty with Turkey and the Powers, dealing with the cession of Turkish territory, clauses relating to the régime of the Hedjaz which will provide for its complete independence.

The F.O. recognises that it will be undesirable to require in that instrument that ~~their~~ Hedjaz diplomatic relations should be conducted through H.M.G.

But it will be necessary to provide that the

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

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

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King shall receive agents whose sole duty it will be to treat with him of matters relating to the pilgrimage, and a provision exempting the Hedjaz from making a contribution to the Ottoman Public Debt, will complete the instrument.

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

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(4) As regards concessions in the Arabian Peninsula, it is desirable that, except in the Hedjaz, they should be reserved for Great Britain. Bin Saud. he undertakes not to give any concessions except with our consent.
Sheihk of Katar undertakes the same.
The Idrisi engages not to cede, mortgage or surrender the islands situated on his sea-bord. We undertake to give him arms, and to facilitate the necessary avenues of obtaining telephonic and various developments respecting mines, commerce. With the Imam we have no agreement but propose to make one. In view of the religious conditions in the Hedjaz, foreign concessions would probably be confined to the Port of Jeddah, and the Hedjaz Government would naturally apply first to Great Britain. A monopoly of concessions here by Great Britain would not be compatible with independence.

(5) As regards trade we should undertake that, both in the Hedjaz and in the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, it would be free to the subjects of all nations, but the India Office have pointed out that aeroplanes carry such prestige among the nomadic Arabs that special arrangements should be made for the restriction of transit in Arabia.

(6) As regards King Husein's title, there is no objection to his being styled "H.M., King

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

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of the Arabs" if he wishes.

(7) The Foreign Office do not consider that French and Italian recognition of our special position in Arabia is worth a very high price in the event of the French making an extravagant demand. It has already been admitted and our de facto position there is strong already. It depends, however, greatly on our relations with King Husein. If we allow King Husein to fail, or cause him to feel bitterness against ourselves on account of any real or fancied failure on our part to fulfil our engagements, our position, (except on the shores of the Persian Gulf), will be imperilled, and French and Italian penetration will become a serious menace. In this connection it is necessary to remember the assurance which we have given him in regard to the establishment of Arab independence and to British support. We assured him through Sir H. MacMahon on October 24th, 1915, that we accepted the limits and boundaries set forth in his first letter, which comprised the whole of Mesopotamia.

(8) Apart from possible concession-hunting in the Hedjaz, the French appear to have no definite ambitions in Arabia. The Italians, on the other hand, are known to covet a sphere of action in Asir and Yemen, and have actually claimed to occupy the Farasan Islands. These Italian aspirations should be strongly resisted.

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

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G.R.

Italians do not know how to handle Arabs, and are never content with their boundaries. Their introduction into the politics of Arabia would be a source of un-rest and would be most prejudicial to British interests. Therefore any arrangements which are made with the French should be subscribed to by Italy.

In regard to the Arms Traffic it is suggested that the question must be to some extent dependent upon any general arrangement that may be come to.

Attention is called to the ~~Index~~ observations of the India Office on this important subject (clause 8 of I.O. Memorandum).

end
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

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