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**تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة**

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| المؤسسة المالكة | المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند |
| المرجع | Mss Eur F112/260 |
| التاريخ/ التواريخ | ١٥ مايو ١٩٢٠-١٤ أكتوبر ١٩٢١ (ميلادي) |
| لغة الكتابة | الإنجليزية في اللاتينية |
| الحجم والشكل | ملف واحد (٢٣٧ ورقة) |
| حق النشر | غير معروف |

**حول هذا السجلّ**

يحتوي الملف على مراسلات ومذكرات وتقارير رسمية تتعلق بالشؤون السياسية في مصر. المتراسلون والكاتبون هم مسؤولون في وزارة الخارجية (كان اللورد كرزون وزير الدولة للشؤون الخارجية في ذلك الوقت)، مكتب الحرب البريطاني، وزارة الطيران، الأميرالية، مكتب المستعمرات البريطانية، مجلس التجارة، مجلس التعليم، بالإضافة إلى الخدمة المدنية المصرية.

يحتوي الملف على نسخ من تقارير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر (الأوراق ١-٧، ٧٥-٩٣، ١٧٥-١٩٤) بقيادة اللورد ألفريد ميلنر، والتي كانت تهدف إلى إجراء التحقيقات وتقديم المشورة في أعقاب قيام الثورة المصرية في ١٩١٩. يأتي جزءٌ كبير من محتوى الملف ردًا على نتائج وتوصيات البعثة، ويناقش إمكانيات التوصل إلى تسوية سياسية مع مصر.

# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة
# [أمامي] (٤٧٣/١)



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SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL.

Milner 1st Report
March 3 1920

REPORT

OF THE

SPECIAL MISSION TO EGYPT.

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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [أمامي-داخلي] (٤٧٣/٢)



# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢و]
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

## COMPOSITION OF THE SPECIAL MISSION TO EGYPT.

The Right Hon. the Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies (*Chairman*).

The Right Hon. Sir Rennell Rodd, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.

General the Right Hon. Sir John G. Maxwell, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O.

Brigadier-General Sir Owen Thomas, M.P.

J. A. Spender, Esq.

C. J. B. Hurst, Esq., C.B., K.C., Foreign Office.

A. T. Loyd, Esq., O.B.E. (*Secretary*).

E. M. B. Ingram, Esq., O.B.E., Foreign Office (*Assistant Secretary and Private Secretary to the Chairman*).

*Viscount Milner to Earl Curzon.*

My Lord, *Colonial Office, May* 17, 1920.

THE Special Mission to Egypt, of which I have the honour to be Chairman, before leaving Cairo in March last drew up certain conclusions, which I now beg to submit for your consideration. In arriving at these conclusions the members of the Mission were unanimous.

It is the intention of the Mission to furnish you in due course with a full report, giving an account of the method and course of our enquiry and containing the evidence and arguments on which the present memorandum is based. But inasmuch as the preparation of this full report will, in view of the great mass of material to be digested and arranged, require a good deal more time, and meanwhile His Majesty's Government may be looking to us for guidance with regard to the immediate political situation in Egypt, we have thought it right to place our views on this branch of the subject before you without more elaboration. I hope that the urgency of the case will be held to excuse the summary and somewhat dogmatic form in which these views are presented.

I have, &c.

MILNER.

102 [3221] B



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢ظ]
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

## REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MISSION TO EGYPT.

### General Conclusions.

I.—The Present Situation and its Difficulties.

THOUGH there has been no serious recurrence of the disorders of last spring, there is no diminution in anti-British feeling, and the Nationalist movement continues to grow in strength.

Anti-British feeling is practically confined to the upper class and the *intelligenzia*, and is strongest among the latter—the students, doctors, lawyers and the bulk of the official class. Latterly it has also gained a strong hold on the Azhar, and Nationalism is now reinforced by Islamism.

There is no general hostility to the British among the fellahin or smaller landowners. Any manifestations of such hostility have been due to the influence of Nationalist emissaries from the towns, exploiting religious feeling or temporary grievances connected with the war. The most dangerous of these emissaries are the Azharites.

The bulk of the fellahin and smaller landowners would regard the prospect of the withdrawal of British influence with alarm, fearing that it must lead to a renewal of oppression by the great landowners and the official class.

It results from the foregoing considerations that actual rebellion is less to be apprehended than the progressive weakening of authority and respect for Government, arising from the disaffection of the upper and educated classes, and especially of the bulk of the native officials.

This weakening of the authority of Government shows itself not only in the difficulty of checking sedition, with which the Native Courts are largely in sympathy, but in a general feebleness of administration and an increase in ordinary (non-political) crime.

There can be no radical or permanent cure for this state of things except by such a reconciliation of British and Egyptians as will bring about a better understanding and heartier co-operation between the two elements and regain for the Government a certain measure of popular sympathy and support.

Such a reconciliation can only be effected by a generous recognition of what is sound and legitimate in the aspirations of Egyptian Nationalism.

The Nationalist movement, while embracing many evil tendencies and in its extreme form threatening a complete destruction of social order, nevertheless has its origin in the natural and inevitable growth of the spirit of independence due to the increased prosperity, the spread of education and the greater individual freedom, which are the results of the British occupation.

It should be the aim of British policy, by giving scope to this spirit of independence and to the increased capacity and desire of the Egyptians to govern their own country, to win over the better elements of Nationalism and restore the spirit of good-will and co-operation between British and Egyptians in the work of Government.

[In pursuing this policy we must take account of the sensitiveness of the Egyptians, of their self-importance and love of forms and phrases, and seek to give to the future status of Egypt the greatest appearance of independence compatible with the maintenance of the absolutely indispensable minimum of British control.]

II.—The Proposed Solution: A Treaty between Great Britain and Egypt.

This object could, in our opinion, be best attained by the conclusion of a treaty or convention between Great Britain and Egypt whereby Great Britain guaranteed the integrity and independence of Egypt and undertook to protect her against foreign agression or interference and Egypt in return acknowledged the right of Great Britain to exercise a certain measure of control for the protection of British and foreign interests.



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٣و]
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



Great Britain's claim to exercise some measure of control over Egypt rests upon certain vital considerations, of which the following are the chief :—

(*a.*) It is essential for the welfare and progress of Egypt that the restrictions which the Capitulations impose upon her, especially in the matter of taxation of foreigners, should disappear, but Great Britain cannot insist on the surrender of these privileges without making herself responsible for the defence of the legitimate rights of foreigners.

(*b.*) The great progress made by Egypt of recent years is the work of Great Britain, and Great Britain is entitled to watch over the results of her efforts until their continued maintenance is assured.

(*c.*) A recurrence of disorder in Egypt, while menacing European interests in the interior of the country, would also involve danger to the Suez Canal, in which international highway Great Britain has a special interest by virtue of her part ownership of the Canal itself, of its importance as the road to India and Australasia, and of the fact that more than half the vessels using the Canal are British.

In determining the measure of control which Great Britain must continue to exercise over Egypt, and for her right to exercise which any treaty must provide, we should be guided by the principle that it is desirable to restrict the direct exercise of British authority to the narrowest possible limits, and outside these limits to rely upon the moral influence of British officials serving under Egyptian Ministers in a genuinely Egyptian Administration.

The object of any treaty being to effect a real reconciliation and to lead to more harmonious co-operation between British and Egyptians, great latitude must be left to the negotiators in settling details. A good deal that is not in itself desirable from the point of view of efficiency may have to be conceded in order to arrive at a genuine agreement, and put an end to the present friction, which threatens to result in a complete breakdown of the existing system of government.

At the same time, certain fundamental positions cannot be abandoned without condemning the whole policy of agreement, which is necessarily an experiment, to failure.

The most important point to be safeguarded is the influence and prestige of the High Commissioner, who should remain in charge of the foreign relations of Egypt, in so far as they are of a political character, and be the recognised defender of the legitimate rights of foreigners in the country.

The application to foreigners of any Egyptian legislation should therefore be conditional on the concurrence of the High Commissioner.

At the same time, there should be an Egyptian High Commissioner in London to look after Egyptian interests, to be the exponent of the views of the Egyptian Government to the British Government and to supervise the selection of British officials for the Egyptian service.

Great Britain, having undertaken the responsibility for the defence of Egypt, must have the right to retain a military force in that country, to make use of its harbours, aerodromes and lines of communication and to establish and maintain W/T stations.

While Great Britain must retain complete freedom to determine the strength and distribution of the British forces in Egypt, it is obvious that, if a treaty such as is here contemplated were to be concluded, the strength of those forces could be reduced to very small proportions.

Great Britain's responsibility for the protection of foreign interests further involves a certain degree of control over the Egyptian Departments charged with the conduct of finance and with the maintenance of justice and public security.

The exact form which this control should take is a matter for negotiation, but it will probably be found to involve the retention of at least two British advisers, with their staffs, in the Egyptian service. These must continue to be nominated by the British Government, and the extent of their authority should be clearly defined.

With the exceptions aforesaid, the Egyptian Government should have complete control of Egyptian affairs, including the commercial relations of Egypt with foreign countries, and should have the right of concluding treaties of a non-political character with the assent of Great Britain.

It follows from the preceding articles that the Egyptian Government must in future be free to determine for itself, what posts in the Egyptian service, other than those to which Great Britain will retain the right to nominate, should be filled by





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non-Egyptians, but no non-Egyptians other than British should be so appointed except with the consent of the British Government.

A period of a few years, say five, must be fixed during which the Egyptian Government should decide which of the existing British officials in the Egyptian service, other than those occupying posts to which the British Government retains the right to nominate, should continue to be filled by British officials after the expiration of the fixed period. Terms of retirement for those, whom the Egyptian Government does not wish to retain, should be arranged between the British and Egyptian Governments, and these terms must be generous. British officials, who do not wish to remain in the service of the Egyptian Government under the new conditions, should be allowed to retire on the same terms as those whom the Egyptian Government does not wish to retain.

During the interim period, and after its termination, no British officials should be appointed to posts other than those to which the British Government retains the right to nominate, except at the request of the Egyptian Government.

It is certain that, unless the Egyptian Government decides to retain the services of a considerable number of the more important British officials, the Egyptian administration will break down. But all sensible Egyptians are aware of this, and it is reasonable to suppose that, with the reconciliation of British and Egyptians, which it is the main object of the proposed treaty to effect, the Egyptian Government will itself desire to keep many, and those the best, of the British officials.

The presence of an influential, if not very numerous, body of British officials in the Egyptian Service is necessary, not only for administrative efficiency, but in the interests of social justice. It is of special importance for the protection of the fellahin and of the poorer classes generally.

[While the grosser forms of oppression and cruelty, under which the lower orders of Egyptians suffered before the occupation, are never likely to revive, less progress has been made in eradicating nepotism and corruption. These are still the besetting sins of the native official class and would, if British influence were altogether removed, undoubtedly lead to a return of many of the old abuses.

The recurrence of these abuses would be especially dangerous in view of the grave economic and social problems with which Egypt is confronted at the present time.]

The recent phenomenal increase of wealth in Egypt is not only precarious in itself, but its benefits are mainly confined to one class, the landowners, great and small. On the other hand, the landless portion of the peasantry and the lower orders of the towns are suffering terribly from the scarcity of essential foodstuffs and the rise of prices.

The condition of Egypt to-day calls for a vigorous policy of social and agrarian reform to secure better conditions of life for the mass of the population.

Nothing substantial can be achieved in this direction without more liberal expenditure for such purposes as education, public health and housing. A free revenue of little more than 20 millions is totally inadequate to cover the administrative requirements, general and local, of a population of 13,000,000, rapidly increasing, and is altogether below what the income of the country would justify. For this reason it is essential to get rid of the barrier which the Capitulations oppose to an increase of the sources of revenue and an equitable system of taxation.

The same obstacle stands in the way of much legislation which is urgently required for purposes of social improvement.

The difficult and delicate nature of the problems ahead makes it more necessary than ever to get rid of the existing friction between British and Egyptians, so that all available capacities may co-operate in working out essential reforms.

Any treaty or convention regulating the relations of Great Britain and Egypt must at the same time define the general character of the future constitution of Egypt. In doing so, we must seek to safeguard individual liberty and the interests of the mass of the people.

Within these limits it is desirable to leave the detail of the future constitution to be settled by the Egyptians themselves in a representative Assembly. The convocation of such an Assembly will, in any case, be necessary to confirm the proposed treaty between Great Britain and Egypt.

### III.—The Immediate Future in Default of a Treaty.

While the conclusion of a treaty on the above lines appears to us the most likely means of improving the existing situation, it is possible that this solution may encounter insuperable obstacles at the present time.



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# (٤٧٣/٧)



In that case it appears desirable still to keep the door open and to let it be clearly understood that Great Britain is at all times prepared to enter into a treaty with Egypt on the above lines, provided there is a reasonable prospect of its acceptance by the majority of the Egyptians and of their subsequent good-will and co-operation, which it is the object of the treaty to ensure.

Without the conclusion of such a treaty no relaxation of British control is either possible or desirable. Indeed, it may be necessary for Great Britain to undertake fresh responsibilities. It is impossible to allow the decline of governmental authority, due to the inherent weakness of the present system, to continue.

## IV.—Administrative Reforms.

Apart from the general questions of policy above discussed, there are certain changes in the organisation* and spirit of the administration which are, in any case, desirable.

### (A.)—*The Residency.*

Owing to a variety of causes, of which the frequent changes of British agents and High Commissioners since the departure of Lord Cromer and the disturbing influences of the war have been the chief, British policy in Egypt has of late years been fluctuating and incoherent. In the absence of consistent leadership, departments have gone their own way. Definiteness of aim and a clear lead from the supreme direction are needed to re-establish discipline and co-ordination.

In order to enable the High Commissioner to recover his authority, and to restore unity of purpose throughout the administration, the staff of the Residency should be reorganised. The chief aim of such reorganisation should be to ensure continuity, and the constant presence at the Residency of an adequate number of men of local knowledge and experience.

The staffing of the Residency would be facilitated by the establishment of a single civil service for the Near East. If, as seems probable, it will be necessary to provide for a number of British officials in other Arab countries besides Egypt and the Soudan, the likelihood of obtaining men of the right stamp for the service of any of these countries, and of being able to make the best use of them, would be greatly enhanced by their interchangeability and by the prospects of a wider career than any that a number of small separate services can afford. We have been greatly impressed by the advantages of the limited measure of interchangeability which at present exists between the Soudan and Egypt.

[Cairo is the best centre of information for the Islamic world, and the point from which British policy in all the Arab countries could most efficiently be directed. If it were found possible, when Great Britain's responsibilities in the Near East have been defined, to give the High Commissioner at Cairo the general supervision over British activities in all the Arab countries, it would at the same time facilitate his task in controlling the Government of Egypt and make that control less obnoxious to the Egyptians.]

The reorganisation of the Residency must be supplemented by a better system for dealing with Egyptian affairs in London. The questions which constantly arise with regard to Egypt are not wholly or mainly diplomatic, but administrative and political. Whether or not the control of British policy in Egypt is confided to a new department for the Middle East, it certainly requires closer and more constant attention, supported by a greater degree of expert knowledge than it has hitherto received at home.

### (B.)—*British Officials in the Egyptian Service.*

A great and increasing amount of criticism has been levelled, not only by Egyptians, at the number of British officials in the Egyptian service. It is alleged to be excessive and constantly increasing, while the average quality of the men is said to be deteriorating.

As regards the alleged excessive number of British officials, it is obvious that since the early days of the occupation, when a relatively small number were appointed to co-operate in the Egyptian service and to deal with comparatively simple problems, there has been, with the expansion of the administrative machine, a very large increase

* Only recommendations of a general character can be included in this summary. Detailed suggestions with regard to several Departments are contained in the Appendices.



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# (٤٧٣/٨)



of the British personnel. The question to be examined is whether this increase has been unduly great, disproportionate to the increase in the number of Egyptian officials, and inconsistent with the original intention of the occupying Power, viz., to train Egyptian civil servants to fill the more responsible posts.

We are of opinion that, when all necessary allowance has been made for the inevitable great expansion of the public service in Egypt and for the difficulty of finding Egyptians fully qualified to fill the higher posts, the complaint that the number of British officials is excessive is substantially justified, and that a sufficient effort has not been made to train Egyptians for positions of the greatest responsibility.* Only a small minority of these, under those of Ministers, are actually occupied by Egyptians, though when the latter are available they have good prospects of promotion. It should be a cardinal aim of the administration to increase their numbers by education and training and by a radical revision of the present system of non-Egyptian appointments.

It has been the practice of the administration to fill every post falling vacant which has once been occupied by a non-Egyptian with another non-Egyptian, without the reference to the Council of Ministers, which is required when a new non-Egyptian post is created. Under this system there is no prospective diminution in the number of British officials, while the expansion of the service and the creation of new departments has inevitably led to their increase through the addition of new posts. There is a further constant addition of British or non-Egyptians employed under contract for special services.

In future, all appointments should be considered on their merits. When a British post falls vacant it should not be automatically filled by the appointment of another British official unless, after a careful review of all the circumstances, including legitimate claims of seniority to promotion, such an appointment is deemed essential. Similarly, in cases of promotion and transfer, it should be considered whether the post vacated should not be filled by an Egyptian. There should be one Selection Board to supervise all non-Egyptian appointments carrying salaries of more than 300*l.* a year, and the practice by which many departments select their own candidates without superior control should be discontinued.

In cases where Europeans and Egyptians hold posts of the same nature, the basic salary should be the same, and an expatriation allowance (which would not count for pension) should be granted to Europeans serving in Egypt, or Egyptians serving outside Egypt.

As regards the second allegation—the deterioration in quality of British officials—we do not consider it to be true. Egypt has been fortunate in past times in securing the services of men of outstanding ability. But in comparing all ranks of the service, present and past, there is, in our opinion, no ground for thinking that its general quality has declined. The average standard of the upper grades would, we think, compare not unfavourably with that of the corresponding grades in any Civil Service.

During the years of the war in particular, loyal and disinterested service has been rendered by a body of officials who, in very difficult circumstances and with greatly depleted ranks, succeeded in carrying the country safely through a period of great stress and anxiety. The importance of these services is in no way depreciated by the fact that a certain number of temporary officials, engaged owing to the urgency of war conditions, whose services have since been dispensed with, may have failed to reach the same high standard, and thus laid themselves open to legitimate criticism.

What we have rather found to criticise has been a want of leadership and direction in the past, and an absence of that co-operation and co-ordination which should inspire the work of departments and their relations to one another. This has been undoubtedly felt by the British officials themselves, who have received no indication of the general policy in view, and have come to regard their respective departments as rivals in competition for development rather than as organic parts of the same machine working for a common end.

There is a danger of the overgrowth of bureaucracy, of too much centralisation, correspondence and paper work. The number of officials in the lower grades is excessive. It is true that they are mostly Egyptians, but in these grades the British, except in certain technical services like the railways, are wholly out of place.

As a consequence of the growth of office work, there has been a tendency for the British officials to spend more time in Cairo and to lose touch with the life of the country districts. This tendency, which was aggravated by the diversion of so many

* Details supporting this conclusion will be found in an Appendix to the Report.



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٥و]
# (٤٧٣/٩)



of them to war work, has had unfortunate results. As long as we remain in any degree responsible for the good government of Egypt, the constant presence of a certain number of highly-qualified Englishmen in the provinces cannot possibly be dispensed with.

(C.)—*Local Government.*

The Government of Egypt is still too exclusively in the hands of the official class. To check the growth of a centralised bureaucracy, increasingly out of touch with the people, it is desirable to foster local self-governing institutions, such as the provincial councils, the municipalities and the local commissions now established in a number of towns and even in some villages. The number of the latter should be increased, and the spirit of interest in local affairs, of which there are hopeful indications, should be in every way encouraged.

The development of local self-governing institutions cannot, however, make much progress so long as an equitable system of local taxation is rendered impossible by the Capitulations. This is an additional reason for relieving Egypt from these international fetters.

But while the removal of these fetters will facilitate the development of self-governing institutions in the towns and larger villages, the administration of the villages of small or moderate size, in which the bulk of the country people live, must still for many years to come be mainly in the hands of the Omdehs, or village headmen.

The power of the Omdeh in an Egyptian village is very great and is frequently abused. The petty tyranny and corruption of which the Omdehs are often guilty, results in much suffering and discontent among the people, and is one of the causes of the great prevalence of crime.

The present method of appointing Omdehs by district committees under the presidency of a Government official is unsatisfactory. There is a strong feeling in favour of the election of the Omdeh in each village by the inhabitants themselves. Although, owing to the illiteracy of the people, it is difficult to carry out a system of secret voting, this should not prove insurmountable. It would be desirable to try the experiment of electing the Omdeh by ballot in a certain number of villages, and, if successful to extend it to the whole country.

## V.—The Capitulations and the Administration of Justice.

The removal of the obstacles which the Capitulations present to the good government of the country can only be effected by closing the foreign Consular Courts and by finding an effective method of applying local legislation to foreigners and subjecting them to a fair share of taxation.

The time is not ripe for unifying all the competing jurisdictions in Egypt (native, mixed, consular and religious). All that should be attempted at present is the fusion of the Mixed Courts and the Consular Courts, the Native and Religious Courts being left untouched. In carrying through this amalgamation, the Mixed Courts should be relieved as far as possible of purely administrative services, such as the registry of land deeds and mortgages.

The special position which Great Britain occupies, and must continue to occupy, in Egypt is now generally recognised by the foreign Powers. That special position imposes upon her responsibility for safeguarding the rights of foreigners, and therefore entitles her to claim that foreign Powers should enable her to discharge that responsibility and should confide to her that protection of the interests of their nationals in Egypt which is now assured by the Capitulations. Egypt will then, in matters affecting foreigners, be in a position to deal with Great Britain alone instead of having to approach each individual Power.

Great Britain must accordingly be the Power entitled to express any consent which, up till now, the Egyptian Government has been obliged to obtain from a foreign Government or from an international authority in Egypt. All privileges hitherto enjoyed in connection with the appointment of judges, the commutation of sentences, the application to foreigners of Egyptian legislation, or the payment by foreigners of Egyptian taxation, should be vested in Great Britain and exercised through the High Commissioner.

Foreign litigants should, so far as possible, enjoy in the reconstituted Mixed Courts the same privileges as those they enjoy in the existing Mixed Courts. For the



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extended criminal jurisdiction which these Courts will hereafter possess, a criminal procedure must be found which will give general satisfaction. In framing any new codes to be applied by the reconstituted Mixed Courts, particularly in framing a new Criminal Procedure Code, members of the Mixed Bar, representing the various foreign colonies, should be invited to take part.

The prestige and the independence which the Mixed Courts have enjoyed in the past must be scrupulously maintained. It would be disastrous if the opinion became prevalent that attempts were being made to undermine the independence and the authority of these Courts.

If the power to approve legislation so as to make it binding on foreigners is vested in the High Commissioner in lieu of the individual Governments, or of the General Assembly of the Mixed Court of Appeal, as heretofore, an Advisory Committee, representing the various foreign communities, should be constituted to advise him as to the approval of such legislation. The members of this Committee should be elected by the foreign colonies they represent and the numerical strength of these colonies should be taken into account in determining the number of their representatives.

The agreement with each of the foreign Powers for closing its Consular Court and for transferring to His Majesty's Government the exercise of its rights under the Capitulations should contain an assurance that the nationals of that Power shall stand on the same footing as British subjects in Egypt in all such matters as the administration of justice, commercial and industrial liberty, the right to hold property and the payment of taxation.

The fusion of the Mixed and Consular Courts will not affect the Native Courts, and no great change in their organisation seems called for at present. The new Codes—of which the preparation was commenced by the Capitulations Commission—are urgently required, and they should be completed and carried into effect with as little delay as possible.

The special régime, established in the Western and Eastern Deserts and in the Sinai Peninsular by the Frontier Districts Administration, should be maintained, and the jurisdiction of the Military Courts set up there should be preserved. In civil cases the jurisdiction of these Courts should be concurrent with that of the other Egyptian Courts.

## VI.—Representative Institutions.

If such a Treaty as is contemplated in Section II above were to be concluded, the powers of the Egyptian Legislature of the future would be determined by the Egyptians themselves, and it would be for them to say how far they desired to go in the direction of responsible government. In that case it is probable that the establishment of complete parliamentary control over the executive would, at any rate, be attempted. But even in default of such a Treaty it is desirable to foster the growth of representative institutions.

The only organ of national self-government at present existing in Egypt is the Legislative Assembly, which has important, though limited, powers with respect to legislation and taxation.

The sessions ot the Legislative Assembly have been suspended during the war, and it is doubtful whether they could now be resumed without a general election. It may be impossible to hold such an election while the present agitation is at fever heat, but we are strongly of opinion that, at the first favourable opportunity, the Legislative Assembly should be revived and should thenceforward continue to hold annual sessions.

It is to be expected that the Legislative Assembly, whenever it is revived, will adopt a very critical, if not hostile, attitude to the Government, but attacks upon the Government in a representative Assembly, which is bound to have some sense of responsibility, cannot be more damaging or less helpful than those which are now incessantly directed against it by a wholly irresponsible press.

The Assembly will also, no doubt, be constantly striving to increase its own powers, especially with regard to the control of finance. But this is the normal course of constitutional development, and as a representative Assembly gains in experience and authority, it is only right that its control over finance should extend till it finally becomes complete.

In any case, it is not just to condemn the Legislative Assembly because of the somewhat discouraging results of its first session in 1914. Both as a legitimate outlet for the expression of public feeling, and as a check on the bureaucratic engine, a representative Assembly is essential to the healthy development of political life in Egypt.



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٦و]
# (٤٧٣/١١)



At the same time it must be borne in mind that, owing to the backwardness of the mass of the people, of whom 90 per cent. are still quite illiterate, it will be many years before any elected Assembly is really representative of more than a comparatively limited class. Parliamentary government under the present social conditions means oligarchical government, and, if wholly uncontrolled, it would be likely to show too little regard for the interests of the majority of the Egyptian people.

The history of British rule in Egypt, especially in its earlier stages, has been marked by some great and striking improvements in the condition of the fellahin, and as long as Great Britain continues to exercise any measure of control over the internal affairs of Egypt it is both our duty and our interest to use our influence for the promotion of further reforms necessary for the protection of the mass of the people and for their advancement in education and capacity for self-government.

Whatever may be the immediate future, it seems to us essential that the British Administration in Egypt should make a far greater effort than heretofore to establish contact with the Egyptian people, to explain its policy and to refute the misstatements of fact which form so large a part of the campaign against it in the Egyptian newspapers. The time is past when British representatives can, in reliance on their own good intentions, permit a stream of uninformed criticism to continue without an effort to correct it; and if the Legislative Assembly is to resume its sittings and Egyptians are to obtain a greater control of their own affairs, it will be more than ever necessary that the essential objects of British policy in Egypt should be kept constantly before the Egyptian people.

Speeches or statements in the British Houses of Parliament will not of themselves meet this necessity. These, as we have frequently observed during our stay in Egypt, are liable to distortion in transmission or translation, and become a fruitful source of misunderstanding and recrimination. Nor is it sufficient that warnings and contradictions should be issued to the newspapers. Positive explanations of British aims and policy must be conveyed to the Egyptian people either in public speeches or communications to the press, and the heads of the administration must be prepared to take an active part in defending their measures when challenged. In this, as in many other respects, a vigorous initiative, in place of a passive acceptance of adverse circumstances, is a primary condition of successful administration.

## VII.—The Soudan.

None of the preceding paragraphs have any application to the Soudan. That country is physically, ethnically and historically quite distinct from Egypt, and in some respects presents a sharp contrast to it.

While the great majority of the people of Egypt are comparatively homogeneous, the Soudan is divided between Arabs and Negroids, and within each of these two great racial groups there are a number of races and tribes differing widely from one another and often mutually antagonistic.

But while thus greatly divided amongst themselves, the Soudanese are at one in their dislike of the Egyptians. That dislike grew to hatred in consequence of the gross misgovernment of the Soudan in the days of the Khedive Ismail. And though, as the memory of former Egyptian oppression fades, this hatred is dying out, the great diversity of character between Egyptians and all classes of Soudanese is calculated to keep up a certain antipathy between them.

This diversity, however, is much greater in some cases than in others. The Arabs of the Soudan speak dialects of the same language as the Egyptians and are united to them by the bond of religion. Islam, moreover, is spreading even among the non-Arab races of the Soudan. These influences mitigate in various degrees, but they nowhere wholly overcome the differences of race and character which divide the Egyptians from the Soudanese.

The political bonds which have at intervals in the past united Egypt with the Soudan have always been fragile. Egyptian conquerors have at various times overrun parts and even the whole of the Soudan. But it has never been really subdued by, or in any sense amalgamated with, Egypt. The Egyptian conquest of the Soudan in the last century was especially disastrous for both countries. After years of bloodshed and oppression, which failed to establish orderly government for any length of time, Egyptian rule was finally overthrown by the Mahdist rebellion, and the Egyptians were driven out of all but a small corner of the Soudan. As a consequence of this breakdown, Great Britain was obliged to undertake several costly expeditions for the





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [ظ٦]
# (٤٧٣/١٢)



rescue of the Egyptian garrisons and the defence of Egypt, which was in danger of being overrun by the Mahdist hordes.

Since the reconquest of the country by British and Egyptian forces under British leadership in 1896–8, the Government of the Soudan, which under the Convention of 1899 takes the form of an Anglo-Egyptian Protectorate, has been virtually in British hands. The Governor-General, though appointed by the Sultan (formerly the Khedive) of Egypt, is nominated by the British Government, and all the Governors of Provinces and principal officials are British.

Under this system of government, the progress of the Soudan in all respects, material and moral, has been remarkable. When full allowance is made for the simplicity of the problem, viz., the introduction of the first principles of orderly and civilised government among a very primitive people, the great success actually achieved during the long Governor-Generalship of Sir R. Wingate is one of the brightest pages in the history of British rule over backward races. The present administration is popular in the Soudan and, with few exceptions, peaceful and progressive conditions prevail throughout the country.

While Egypt and the Soudan are essentially separate countries, and are bound to develop on very different lines, Egypt will always have one interest of supreme importance in the Soudan. The Nile, upon which the very existence of Egypt depends, flows for hundreds of miles through the Soudan, and it is vital to Egypt to prevent any such diversion of water from the Nile as might diminish her present cultivable area or preclude the reclamation of that portion of her soil, some 2,000,000 acres in extent, which is capable of being brought under cultivation, when, by means of storage, the present supply of water available for irrigation has been increased.

Hitherto the amount of water drawn from the Nile in its passage through the Soudan has been of negligible amount, but as the population of the Soudan increases that country will require more water for its own development and a conflict of interest between it and Egypt might arise. At the same time there is every reason to hope that, properly conserved and distributed, the Nile will suffice for the irrigation of all the lands, whether in Egypt or the Soudan, which are ever likely to need it.

The natural arbiter in this matter is Great Britain, which not only commands the sources of the White Nile, but is equally interested in the welfare and development of both Egypt and the Soudan, and has a special interest of her own in the increase of the cultivation of cotton, the most valuable product of the soil of Egypt and one which certain portions of the Soudan are likewise well fitted to supply.

A number of large engineering works for the storage of water and for raising the level of the river will have to be undertaken in the Soudan, and ultimately perhaps also in Uganda, in order that the Nile may yield the maximum benefit in respect of irrigation to the countries through which it flows. Plans for two such works in the Soudan are already projected, and these schemes, which have given rise to much controversy, are at present the subject of enquiry by a commission of technical experts.

The control of the waters of the Nile for purposes of irrigation is a matter of such paramount importance and the technical and other problems involved are so difficult and intricate that it is, in our opinion, necessary to set up a permanent commission, composed on the one hand of experts of the highest authority and on the other hand of representatives of all the countries affected—Egypt, the Soudan and Uganda—to settle all questions affecting the regulation of the river and to ensure the fair distribution of the water.

While the contiguity of Egypt and the Soudan and their common interest in the Nile make it desirable that some political nexus between the two countries should always be maintained, it is out of the question that this connection should take the form of the subjection of the Soudan to Egypt. The former country is capable of and entitled to independent development in accordance with its own character and requirements.

It is much too early to attempt to determine the ultimate political status of the Soudan. For present purposes that status is sufficiently defined by the Convention of 1899 between Great Britain and Egypt, which provides for the necessary political connection between Egypt and the Soudan without hampering the independent development of the latter country.

While it is absolutely necessary for the present to maintain a single supreme authority over the whole of the Soudan, it is not desirable that the government of that country should be highly centralised. Having regard to its vast extent and the varied character of its inhabitants, the administration of its different parts should be left, as



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٧و]
# (٤٧٣/١٣)





far as possible, in the hands of the native authorities, wherever they exist, under British supervision. A centralised bureaucracy on the Egyptian model is wholly unsuitable for the Soudan.

Decentralisation and the employment, wherever possible, of native agencies for the simple administrative needs of the country, in its present stage of development, would both make for economy and avoid the necessity of retaining a large number of Egyptian officials in the civil service of the Soudan.

This necessity ought, in any case, to disappear as education progresses and a greater number of Soudanese themselves become capable of filling official posts. At the present time the officials of local origin are still largely outnumbered by those introduced from Egypt.

The gradual substitution of Soudanese for Egyptians in the Civil Service is not recommended because of any failure of the latter adequately to discharge their present duties. The introduction of Egyptians after the reconquest was necessitated by the circumstances of the time, and under undivided British control they have done their duty loyally and well. But service in the Soudan is not popular with Egyptians, and it is only natural that they should be replaced by men of local origin as the latter become capable of doing the work.

[There is another reason for limiting as far as possible the Egyptian element in the administration. As has already been stated, Nationalism pervades the Egyptian Civil Service, and is strongest amongst its younger members. It is undesirable to multiply propagandists of Egyptian Nationalism in the Soudan. Egyptian Nationalism has its good as well as its bad side in Egypt. But it has no *raison d'être* in the Soudan, and its introduction into that country is simply an element of disturbance without any corresponding advantage.]

The capacity of the Soudanese to take the place of imported officials in the Civil Service depends on the progress of education. At the same time we should be careful, in the matter of education, not to repeat the mistake which has been made in Egypt of adopting a system which fits pupils for little else than employment in clerical and minor administrative posts, and creates an overgrown body of aspirants to Government employment. There is no room in the Soudan for a host of petty officials, and education should be directed to giving the Soudanese a capacity and a taste for employment in other directions, such as agriculture, industry, commerce and engineering. The immediate need of the country is material development, and it can do without an elaborate administrative system.

The military forces still employed in the Soudan are very large. A large army was, no doubt, required to complete the conquest and pacification of the country, but the time has come when, in our opinion, the question of the number and organisation of its military forces should be reconsidered.

[The military forces in the Soudan are part of the Egyptian army, though more than half of them consist of regiments recruited in the Soudan, and they are all paid for by Egypt. Hitherto, the Governor-Generalship of the Soudan and the Command-in-Chief of the Egyptian army have been united in one person. There were good reasons for this in the past, but it is indefensible as a permanent arrangement At the first convenient opportunity a civil Governor-General should be appointed, and the Sirdar of the Egyptian army, with his headquarters staff, should be re-transferred to Egypt.

It is a matter for consideration whether those regiments of the army which are composed of Egyptians should not be brought back to Egypt and the remaining Soudanese regiments converted into a local gendarmerie. The duties which the Soudanese regiments at present discharge are rather those of a gendarmerie than of an army proper. A small striking force will always be required at the centre, but for the rest, order and security would be better maintained by a number of bodies locally recruited and commanded by British officers. This would both facilitate recruiting, as it is much easier to get men to serve in their own districts than in a force which may be employed far away from them, and reduce the financial burden on Egypt of maintaining an army in the Soudan, which now costs as much as 1½ millions a year.]

The revenue of the Soudan only just defrays the cost of its civil administration, and though, with the development of the country the revenue will certainly increase, its growth may for some years to come not be very rapid. Egypt will therefore in the immediate future still have to bear the main, if not the whole, burden of the military establishment.

This is an undesirable state of things. It is an additional argument for trying to reduce the military expenditure of the Soudan to more reasonable proportions that this



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٧ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٤)





reduction will help to relieve the Soudan from all financial dependence on Egypt at an earlier date than would otherwise be possible. The sooner the finances of the two countries can be entirely separated the better.

Whenever that separation can be effected it will be necessary to take account of the expenditure which Egypt has incurred on behalf of the Soudan since its reconquest and to fix the amount which the Soudan can be fairly asked to repay and the terms on which it should be liquidated. In determining that amount it would be reasonable to take into consideration the benefits which Egypt has herself derived from her expenditure in the Soudan.

Meanwhile something should be done immediately to draw a clearer line of division between Egyptian and Soudanese finance. At the same time, the Financial Department of the Soudan should be simplified and cheapened and its control over other departments rendered less rigid. An Auditor-General should be appointed, who should be independent of all departments.

There has of late days been an increasing tendency on the part of the more extreme section of Egyptian Nationalists to call in question the Convention of 1899, which defines the political status of the Soudan. While advocating "complete independence" for Egypt, they lay claims to the Soudan as an exclusively Egyptian possession. This contention is totally inadmissible. Any treaty which may be concluded between Great Britain and Egypt must provide for the recognition of that Convention and establish the relations of the two countries for the future upon a basis which will secure the independent development of the Soudan while safeguarding the vital interests of Egypt in the waters of the Nile.

Egypt has an indefeasible right to an ample and assured supply of water for the land at present under cultivation and to a fair share of any increased supply which engineering skill may be able to provide. A formal declaration on the part of Great Britain that she recognises this right and is resolved under all circumstances to uphold it would go far to allay the uneasiness which prevails in Egypt on this subject. We are of opinion that such a declaration might with advantage be made at the present time.

M.
R. R.
J. G. M.
O. T.
J. A. S.
C. J. B. H.

*March* 3, 1920.



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٨و]
# (٤٧٣/١٥)

TELEGRAM TO: Lord Allenby (Cairo)
15 MAY 1920. 10 p.m.

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A member of the Milner Mission has had some conversation in Paris with Adli and Zaghlool. Zaghlool, upon whom Adli has evidently exercised a moderating influence, is now in a much more conciliatory disposition, and is willing and indeed anxious to come to London to meet the Mission, but he is afraid of the inevitable publicity of such a step and its effect on his followers in Egypt. To get over this difficulty, the Mission are prepared to invite him to come and see him. He now asks whether he may make such invitation public. To this Lord Milner, after consultation with me, is replying that Zaghlool is at liberty to say that he has been invited to meet the Mission, but not to say that he has been so invited as the head of the Delegation, or as the recognised representative of Egypt or the Egyptian people. The invitation to him is a personal one and based on the fact that he is known to be a man of great influence with a large following in his own country, and therefore the sort of man whose views the Mission would naturally desire to hear. The distinction between receiving him as representative of a great body of Egyptian opinion and receiving him as the representative of Egypt is vital and must be upheld. If he were to give a different interpretation to the invitation -- which he will be warned not to do -- we should have to publish a rectification.

If Zaghlool does come, it will probably be directly after Whitsuntide, and he will be accompanied by Adli and perhaps one or two of his own followers.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٨ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٦)



Tel. to:
Lord Allenby.
Cairo. 15 May 1920.
–
Zaghlool wishes to come to London to meet the Milner Mission.
He is being invited to do so, but only in his private capacity, not as the recognised representative of Egypt.

# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٩و]
# (٤٧٣/١٧)



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58

Lord Curzon.
June 1920

SECRET.

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THE CABINET.

**NOTE BY THE WAR OFFICE ON ITS FINANCIAL RELATIONS WITH THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT.**

0143
1603

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

I circulate to my colleagues a Note prepared in the War Office on its finanical relations with the Egyptian Government. It is beyond question, as the Financial Adviser to that Government recognizes, that Lord Cromer's fixed contribution of 150,000*l.* a year to Army Funds is now completely out of date. It appears to me that the practical question is not so much what sum Egypt is in principle liable to pay, as what is the largest sum there is any real prospect of extracting from her. This, and the question whether the present is an opportune time for opening a discussion of the subject, are questions which go far beyond the sphere of the War Office and are for the consideration of the Cabinet.

W. S. C.

THE WAR OFFICE,
*25th June*, 1920.

1. There are several financial questions of importance now requiring settlement with the Egyptian Government.

A.—EGYPT'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE CHARGES OF THE GREAT WAR.

2. On the 6th November, 1914, when Turkey had entered the war, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Egypt, under instructions from the Foreign Office given without reference to the War Office (though Lord Kitchener, who then still held the post of High Commissioner, is understood to have been personally consulted), issued a proclamation stating that "Great Britain takes upon herself the sole burden of the present war, without calling upon the Egyptian people for aid therein."

3. In 1915, the possibility of some contribution from the Egyptian Exchequer was mooted, and questions arose in the War Office as to the meaning, in this connection, of "the burden of the present war," which seemed to be interpreted by the Egyptian Government as covering not only direct out-of-pocket expenditure on the war, but also charges constructively due to it. The then Financial Adviser to the Egyptian Government, in a report to the Foreign Office, said that while under the terms of the proclamation no contribution could be *claimed* from Egypt, there were good prospects of a substantial *voluntary* contribution and he himself would be prepared to advise one; that in the meantime large payments from Egyptian funds were being placed to a Suspense Account instead of being reclaimed currently from the British Government, and preferential treatment was being given to the British forces in respect of certain customs dues, telegraphs and railway charges. The matter was thereupon left in abeyance by agreement between the Treasury, Foreign Office and War Office, until the question of incidence of the charges placed to Suspense Account should come up for determination at the end of the war.

4. In 1917, the High Commissioner again held out hopes of either a direct money contribution by the Egyptian Government or an enlargement of the classes of items which were being placed to Suspense Account, with a view to their being borne in whole or in part by Egypt.

5. In March, 1918, the Egyptian Government made a definite offer to accept the whole of the items in Suspense up to 31st March, 1918 (about 3,000,000*l*E.), and to provide a further 500,000*l*E. for similar items in 1918–19. It is to be noted that this offer did not take either of the forms foreshadowed by the High Commissioner in 1917.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٩ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٨)



Examination of the "Suspense Account" showed that it included—

(*a.*) About 1,500,000*l*E. spent on railway developments. These works were to a large extent related to the defence of Egypt itself against invasion (which was not in immediate prospect when Sir John Maxwell's proclamation of 1914 was issued), and would seem to possess considerable value to the Egyptian Government for peace purposes.

(*b.*) About 500,000*l*E. military expenditure on suppression of the rising in Darfur. But the Treasury had already ruled in 1916 (against the view of the Egyptian Government) that these operations, though connected with the war, were not a part of "the present war" within the meaning of the proclamation, but were a local concern of the Egyptian and Sudan Governments.

(*c.*) About 500,000*l*E. for increased cost of *civil* administration arising out of war conditions.

(*d.*) About 155,000*l*E. for maintenance of interned aliens, political prisoners, &c., while in Egypt. All expenditure on internment camps in Egypt not directly attributable to these aliens, &c., and all expenses in Malta (to which these aliens were removed) have been borne by the British Government, though in principle the latter at all events would seem chargeable to Egypt.

6. Unless, therefore, it is held that the proclamation was tantamount to a guarantee to indemnify the Egyptian Government against all expenditure connected with the war—even against such items as have fallen upon the Governments of neutral States—the larger part of the so-called "contribution" consists of charges which properly fall upon the Egyptian Exchequer; so that the expectations of a generous contribution to the cost of the war have not been fulfilled.

7. In this connection the following extract from the Note of the Financial Adviser (Sir Paul Harvey) on the Egyptian Budget of 1920-21 is of interest:—

SUPPLEMENT AU JOURNAL OFFICIEL No. 29 DU JEUDI 1er AVRIL, 1920.

*Note of the Financial Adviser on the Budget of* 1920–21.

The economic situation of Egypt at the present day presents a number of features of considerable interest. Egypt is one of the very few countries in this hemisphere which derived little but economic advantage from the war. While the citizens of every nation in Europe, whether belligerent or neutral, have suffered heavily, if not from the operations of war itself, at least from increased taxation, high prices and restraint of trade, Egypt has on the whole received substantial benefits. The price of its chief product has risen to heights previously unknown, taxation has remained nearly stationary, and its adoption as a base for military operations has been a source of much commercial profit.

Some measure of this additional wealth may be gathered from the statistics of Egypt's foreign investments during the period 1915–19—

| | £E. |
|---|---|
| Investments by Government and Public Custodian ... | 13,000,000 |
| Investments on account of bank-note issue... ... ... | 65,000,000 |
| Investments by banks and mortgage companies ... ... | 60,000,000 |
| Investments by companies and private individuals .. ... | 14,000,000 |
| Total ... ... ... ... | 152,000,000 |

B.—MILITARY CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE CIVIL DISTURBANCES OF 1919.

8. The retention in Egypt of British and Australasian troops owing to the riots of the spring of 1919, caused extra expenditure during that year amounting to about 6 millions, of which about ½ million relates to Australian and New Zealand troops. The *extra* charge is so heavy because the great majority of the troops concerned were withheld from demobilization, so that their whole cost was extra. The Treasury, in August 1919, expressed to the Foreign Office the view that this military expenditure due to domestic troubles might properly be reclaimed from Egypt, and the matter has



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٠و]
# (٤٧٣/١٩)



been under the consideration of Lord Allenby, who is asking for details of expenditure. In view of the very large sum involved, time devoted to detailed investigation at the present stage seems likely to be unprofitably spent.

9. The view of the Dominion Governments, expressed officially through the Colonial Office, is that the Dominions are entitled to a refund of the expenses thrown upon them, whether the Imperial Government succeeds in recovering the money from Egypt or not. This position has been communicated to the Treasury by the Colonial Office (November, 1919).

10. It is to be observed that in the early years of the Egyptian annual Military Contribution (*see* paragraph 15 below), the principle was adopted that while extra military expenditure incurred on Imperial objects, such as the relief of Gordon, was wholly British, that incurred for the security of Egypt against raids by Dervishes, &c., should be paid by Egypt in addition to the normal annual contribution.

C.—War Gratuities to British Personnel with the Egyptian Army.

11. The Egyptian Government, in September, 1919, had agreed that war gratuities paid on the British scale to British officers and men attached to the Egyptian Army during the war should be refunded by the Egyptian Government. The amount involved is about 250,000*l.* The High Commissioner, in a dispatch to the Foreign Office dated 21st February, 1920, now desires to withdraw from this undertaking on the ground that such payments would give rise to claims to similar gratuities for all native officers and men, the refusal of which would greatly aggravate the difficulties of the present local political situation.

12. It is not denied that there may be force in this argument, but it is considered that a way should be found of making an equivalent contribution in some other form to the British Exchequer.

D.—Egypt's Annual Military Contribution to Army Funds.

13. From the year 1882 onwards, Egypt has annually made a payment to Army Funds in respect of the cost of the British troops in the country. This contribution has at different times been assessed in different ways, having at first been worked out on the basis of the numbers of troops actually maintained during the year, and at a later period having been fixed by estimate at a commuted figure for a series of years; but in principle it has always represented the *extra* cost of maintaining troops in Egypt as compared with home. The liability of Egypt was defined by the Treasury in 1885 as covering "all extra expenditure which the retention of the Queen's troops in Egypt for police purposes is calculated to entail on the Exchequer of the United Kingdom," in this respect differing from the liability of a Crown Colony, such as Hong Kong or Singapore, where the limit of the Colonial military contribution is not the extra, but the whole, cost of the garrison. In this connection, extra cost has been interpreted to mean the difference in cost (between Egypt and home) of the numbers of officers and men on the Home Establishment of an infantry battalion or other unit, together with the whole cost of any officers and men added to the Home Establishment in order to bring the unit up to "Colonial" establishment.

14. Thus, at the base of the whole calculation lies the theory that the British Army contains a fixed number of battalions and other units which, if not employed in Egypt, would be maintained (though it may be on a lower establishment) at home. This theory no longer holds good under present conditions. Apart from any question of possible reductions in the pre-war numbers of British cavalry regiments, infantry battalions, &c., there are now, in addition to some 10,000 British troops, about 20,000 Indian troops in Egypt which, if not so employed, would be returned to India for immediate disbandment. Allowing for the intended reduction of the latter to half these numbers during the year, the *extra* cost of the garrison to the British Exchequer, for Indian troops alone, will still be at least 4 millions this year.

15. The contribution originally assessed in 1882, after Arabi's rebellion, was 278,000*l.* for the period October, 1882, to March, 1883. For 1883–84 it was 334,000*l.* From 1885 to 1888 the strength of the garrison averaged about 6,000, and the contribution was 200,000*l.* a year. Reduction of the garrison to about 3,300, and rising prices at home, then brought the contribution down to about 87,000*l.* a year. Nothing was paid by Egypt for the troops employed in the Gordon Relief Expedition of 1885; but on the other hand an additional payment was made in 1889-90 in respect of the cost of a Dervish raid. In the early years of the present century the extra cost began to rise again, and in 1907, on the recommendation of Lord Cromer, the contribution was fixed at 150,000*l.* a year, representing (at then price levels and rates of pay) the extra



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٠ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٠)



cost of a garrison of about 5,700. This figure has since remained unchanged, though the garrison had in 1914 grown to about 6,300 and cost per head was rising. The *total* cost of that garrison at the then levels of prices and pay was about three-quarters of a million.

16. The sum to-day involved, even on the extra cost basis, is (as shown above) so greatly increased, and the political difficulty of an unlimited military contribution is so evident, that it appears necessary for a decision to be taken on general policy before exact calculations can be profitably made.

## E.—Customs Dues.

17. Connected with the question of military contribution is that of the customs dues leviable on army imports into Egypt. Before the war, duty was paid from army funds on dutiable articles imported for the public service, if they were of the character of general merchandise (provisions, &c.), but not on arms or other specifically warlike stores. The duties so paid were, however, reckoned as a factor of extra cost in calculating the amount of the military contribution, so that as long as that contribution adequately covered the extra cost, no duties on imports for the public service were in effect paid; but this has not been the position for many years past.

18. During the war, relaxations were secured locally which, while not taking the form of complete exemption of all public army imports (*e.g.*, imports for the army arriving as part of mixed cargoes in ordinary merchant vessels were still liable), had practically that effect.

19. The question of future peace arrangements has been under discussion locally, and Sir Paul Harvey, recognizing that any dues levied on public army imports are properly recoverable as part of the military contribution, and that the 150,000*l.* fixed in Lord Cromer's time must now be revised, has advised that the Egyptian Government should waive all claim to duty in respect of goods the property of the British Government imported into Egypt for the use of the army. This is satisfactory.

20. A further question has arisen as to duties on goods of dutiable character imported for the private use of the troops, either by the Canteen organization or by individual officers and men; but this does not affect the British Exchequer and is being dealt with separately. A technical question as to the mode of fixing the rates charged for services rendered to the British forces by the Egyptian State Railways is also under separate reference to a Board of Arbitration.

## CONCLUSION.

21. It is suggested, as a basis for discussion, that the liability of Egypt as regards annual Military Contribution remains in principle as defined by the Treasury in 1885 (paragraph 13 above), regard being had, within the maximum so arrived at, to taxable capacity; and that in view of the abounding prosperity indicated in paragraph 7, if the action referred to in paragraph 5 is regarded as finally disposing of the expected contribution to the cost of the war, then a substantial sum should be forthcoming in respect of the civil disturbances of last year, in fixing which the obligation in regard to gratuities (paragraph 11) might properly be taken into account.

*June*, 1920.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١١و]
# (٤٧٣/٢١)



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*Printed for the Cabinet. July* 1920.

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## NOTE BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE ON THE FINANCIAL RELATIONS OF THE WAR OFFICE WITH THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE Secretary of State for War recently (25th June) circulated a paper to the Cabinet in which the views of the War Office were set forth on the above important but very delicate subject. In the course of a covering memorandum he remarked that its discussion and settlement were matters, not for his Department, but for the Cabinet. Agreeing with this opinion, I circulate a note which states the Foreign Office point of view, and deprecates the raising of this issue with the Egyptian Government at the present time.

C. OF K.

*July* 13, 1920.

MEMORANDUM ON THE FINANCIAL RELATIONS OF THE WAR OFFICE WITH THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT.

1. In his memorandum of the 25th June the Secretary of State for War, after expressing the opinion that the present fixed contribution of 150,000*l.* per annum from the Egyptian Government to army funds is out of date and inadequate, goes on to raise two questions for the Cabinet to decide: firstly, the maximum amount of money which can be extorted from Egypt; and, secondly, whether the present is an opportune time to discuss the subject.

2. From the Foreign Office point of view the question of opportunity is clearly of greater moment than that of amount, and all that will be urged in support of that point of view applies with equal force to the revision of the annual fixed contribution.

3. To deal seriatim with the five heads under which the War Office claims are discussed, there is but little to be added to the statement A with regard to Egypt's financial contribution to the war. The spontaneous action of the Council of Ministers in assuming the burden of the suspense account towards the close of the financial year 1817–18 involved the sacrifice of the whole of the estimated budget surplus. As this surplus was due, not so much to the excess of income over expenditure as to the impossibility of spending money on maintenance and renewals, for which fresh provision now has to be made, the Council of Ministers were in effect mortgaging the resources of their Government in order to contribute to the cost of Imperial military operations from which they had definitely been promised immunity. They did so fully realising the consequences of their policy.

4. But the direct contribution in cash by no means exhausts the list of services rendered ungrudgingly to the military authorities, for the whole machinery of Government was to an ever-increasing extent placed at their disposal, and officials, both British and native, undertook work far removed from their normal administrative duties in order to assist the maintenance in the field of the British army.

5. The extract from the Financial Adviser's report on the Budget 1920–21 is scarcely germane to the discussion, for any cash contribution which has been, or may in the future be, made by Egypt must be drawn from the funds of the Government, and these are, and must remain, circumscribed by the practical impossibility of raising additional revenue. This can only be done by the imposition of fresh taxation, which is, however, not possible so long as the Capitulations are in force and their abolition contingent on the assent of twelve Capitulatory Powers who will certainly cling obstinately to their privileges.

[3861]



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١١ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٢)





6. The second claim under section B of the War Office Memorandum is in respect of the additional charges incurred through the civil disturbances of 1919. It is impossible for anyone mathematically to apportion the degree of blame to be attached to His Majesty's Government and the Egyptians respectively for these events. But, in any case, it is unreasonable to base on them an attempt to charge Egypt with the whole of the difference between the cost of the actual army of occupation during 1919 and the cost of the pre-war army.

7. It is further out of the question that we should impose a heavy fine on Egypt as a punishment for these disorders, seeing that they were merely a feature of political conditions which we have implicitly recognised to be such as to require change. A demand so heavy and so arbitrary as that now proposed could only be in place in dealing with a defeated aggressor. It would be in the highest degree impolitic to make it at the very moment when negotiations are in progress with a view to settling the future political status of Egypt on a basis which, by commanding the assent of the most influential native elements, will, it is hoped, restore tranquillity to that country and thereby enable us to reduce the army of occupation to pre-war strength, or even below it. Such a reduction would save us many millions in the future. The attempt may fail, but its failure would be converted into a certainty by the imposition of a crushing penalty as one of the terms of the contemplated settlement.

8. With regard to Section C, the war gratuities to British personnel with the Egyptian army, it is thought that the War Office have misinterpreted a statement by the Financial Adviser to the Egyptian Government, who, in explaining the impossibility of accepting such a charge on the Egyptian Budget, pointed out that the payment of such gratuities to British officers from Egyptian funds would inevitably entail a payment on a similar scale to native officers and men, and that this would involve a sum of 250,000*l.* and be beyond the resources at the disposal of the Government. It is therefore unlikely that the gratuities due to British officers and men amount to more than a small fraction of the figure quoted.

9. With regard to Section D, Egypt's annual contribution to army funds, it is admitted that conditions have entirely altered since the figure of 150,000*l.* was fixed in 1907, but, quite apart from the considerations of expediency urged in paragraph 7 of this memorandum, it would at the present moment be impossible to forecast the strength and nature of the military force which, for strategic reasons of an Imperial nature, it may be necessary to maintain in Egypt six months hence, nor is it a simple matter to decide the proportion of such a force which is required solely to protect Egypt from foreign aggression and to secure the maintenance of good order in that country, and manifestly it would be unfair to charge Egypt with anything beyond such a proportion.

10. If, however, it proves possible to negotiate an agreement under which our presence in the country would no longer provoke the hostility of its inhabitants, it is clear that the army of occupation could substantially be reduced, and it is probable that the Egyptian Government, no longer suspicious of our policy, would approach this very contentious and provocative question in a spirit of far greater cordiality than could be hoped for at the present juncture.

11. There remains Section E, the customs dues charged in respect of army imports into Egypt, which is at present under discussion with the War Office, who have been invited to go into the question fully with the Financial Adviser and the Director-General of the Egyptian Customs Administration next month. This is a matter of purely domestic concern, and there is no reason to suppose that a satisfactory solution should prove difficult of attainment.

12. In conclusion, it may be said that the Foreign Office are convinced that any attempt, whether now or in the future, to extort a heavy capital contribution from the Egyptian Government would not only in itself prove abortive, but would inevitably destroy all chances of friendly co-operation, and so actually increase the cost of upholding our position in Egypt instead of diminishing it. On the other hand, a reconsideration of the annual contribution towards army funds must await the conclusion of an arrangement with Egypt which will place our presence in that country on an accepted and constitutional basis.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٢و]
# (٤٧٣/٢٣)



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EGYPT AND SOUDAN. [August 21.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[E 10237/6/16]

No. 1.

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Scott (Cairo).*

(No. 750.)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office, August* 21, 1920.

LORD MILNER has handed me the document of which the full text is contained in my immediately following telegram, and has informed me that copies have been given by him to Adly Pasha for communication to Zaghlul and his associates.

Zaghlul has already returned to France, and the rest of his party followed him on 19th August. Adly Pasha has also left.

I understand from Lord Milner that four of Zaghul's followers will return to Egypt next month in order to persuade the country to support a settlement on the lines which the Mission are disposed to recommend.

His Majesty's Government have not yet considered the policy indicated in my immediately following telegram, and in the absence of the Prime Minister and of most of the members of the Cabinet, such consideration must necessarily be deferred.

It is on this clear understanding that the memorandum quoted in my immediately following telegram is sent for your information and that of the Sultan and his Ministers; it is not intended for publication, but as Zaghlul and his associates are acquainted with it, and will base their campaign upon it, the main points are certain to become generally known.

Lord Milner states that the conversations between his Mission and the Zaghlulists were conducted in a friendly and conciliatory spirit on both sides, and though no actual agreement has been reached, it is evident that the Egyptians are anxious for a settlement. In these circumstances, though the arrival of Zaghlul's emissaries in Egypt will probably cause a certain amount of excitement and a revival of political controversy, it is not desirable to interfere with their activities as long as these are kept within reasonable bounds, nor to use the censorship to check the discussion of the proposed settlement in the press. It would be a good thing if in the meantime the case of the men at present under trial could be disposed of one way or the other and this element of possible disturbance got out of the way.

Should the reception of the Zaghlulist campaign in Egypt prove so favourable as to warrant the mission making recommendations on the lines indicated, and should His Majesty's Government be prepared to endorse them, it is obvious that in the subsequent negotiations the Sultan would have to take the lead and depute properly accredited representatives to deal with His Majesty's Government.

[4053 *x*—1]



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢١ظ]
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



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٣و]
# (٤٧٣/٢٥)



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EGYPT AND SOUDAN. [August 21.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

[E 10237/6/16] No. 1.

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Scott (Cairo).*

(No. 751.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 21, 1920.

THE accompanying memorandum is the result of conversations held in London in June to August 1920 between Lord Milner and the members of the special mission to Egypt and Zaghlul Pasha and the members of the Egyptian Delegation, in which conversations Adly Pasha also took part. It outlines a policy for the settlement of the Egyptian question in the best interests both of Great Britain and Egypt.

The members of the mission are prepared to recommend the British Government to adopt the policy indicated in the memorandum if they are satisfied that Zaghlul Pasha and the delegation are likewise prepared to advocate it, and will use all their influence to obtain the assent of an Egyptian National Assembly to the conclusion of such a treaty as is contemplated in articles 3 and 4.

It is clear that unless both parties are cordially united in supporting it, the policy here suggested cannot be pursued with success.

*Memorandum.*

1. In order to establish the independence of Egypt on a secure and lasting basis it is necessary that the relations between Great Britain and Egypt should be precisely defined, and the privileges and immunities now enjoyed in Egypt by the capitulatory Powers should be modified and rendered less injurious to the interests of the country.

2. These ends cannot be achieved without further negotiations between accredited representatives of the British and Egyptian Governments respectively in the one case, and between the British Government and the Governments of the capitulatory Powers in the other case. Such negotiations will be directed to arriving at definite agreements on the following lines :—

3.—(1.) As between Egypt and Great Britain it is proposed that a treaty should be entered into, under which Great Britain will recognise the independence of Egypt as a constitutional monarchy with representative institutions, and Egypt will confer upon Great Britain such rights as are necessary to safeguard her special interests and to enable her to furnish the guarantees which must be given to foreign Powers to secure the relinquishment of their capitulatory rights.

(2.) By the same treaty, an alliance will be concluded between Great Britain and Egypt, by which Great Britain will undertake to support Egypt in defending the integrity of her territory ; and Egypt will undertake, in case of war, even when the integrity of Egypt is not affected, to render to Great Britain all the assistance in her power within her own borders, including the use of her harbours, aerodromes and means of communication for military purposes.

4. The proposed treaty will embody stipulations to the following effect :—

(1.) Egypt will enjoy the right to representation in foreign countries. In the absence of any duly-accredited Egyptian representative, the Egyptian Government will confide its interests to the care of the British representative. Egypt will undertake not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or will create difficulties for Great Britain, and will also undertake not to enter into any agreement with a foreign Power which is prejudicial to British interests.

(2.) Egypt will confer on Great Britain the right to maintain a military force on Egyptian soil for the protection of her Imperial communications. The treaty will fix the place where the force shall be quartered, and will regulate any subsidiary matters which require to be arranged. The presence of this force shall not constitute in any manner a military occupation of the country or prejudice the rights of the Government of Egypt.

(3.) Egypt will appoint, in concurrence with His Majesty's Government, a Financial Adviser, to whom shall be entrusted in due course the powers at present

[4053 *x*—2]



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exercised by the Commissioners of the Debt, and who will be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for all other matters on which they may desire to consult him.

(4.) Egypt will appoint, in concurrence with His Majesty's Government, an official in the Ministry of Justice, who shall enjoy the right of access to the Minister. He shall be kept fully informed on all matters connected with the administration of the law as affecting foreigners, and will also be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for consultation on any matter connected with the efficient maintenance of law and order.

(5.) In view of the contemplated transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights hitherto exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments, Egypt recognises the right of Great Britain to intervene, through her representative in Egypt, to prevent the application to foreigners of any Egyptian law now requiring foreign consent, and Great Britain on her side undertakes not to exercise this right except in the case of laws operating inequitably against foreigners.

*Alternative.*

In view of the contemplated transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights hitherto exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments, Egypt recognises the right of Great Britain to intervene, through her representative in Egypt, to prevent the application to foreigners of any Egyptian law now requiring foreign consent, and Great Britain on her side undertakes not to exercise this right except in the case of laws inequitably discriminating against foreigners in the matter of taxation, or inconsistent with the principles of legislation common to all the capitulatory Powers.

(6.) On account of the special relations between Great Britain and Egypt created by the alliance, the British representative will be accorded an exceptional position in Egypt, and will be entitled to precedence over all other representatives.

(7.) The engagements of British and other foreign officers and administrative officials who entered into the service of the Egyptian Government before the coming into force of the treaty, may be terminated at the instance of either the officials themselves or the Egyptian Government at any time within two years after the coming into force of the treaty. The pension or compensation to be accorded to officials retiring under this provision, in addition to that provided by the existing law, shall be determined by the treaty. In cases where no advantage is taken of this arrangement, existing terms of service will remain unaffected.

5. This treaty will be submitted to the approval of a Constituent Assembly, but it will not come into force until after the agreements with foreign Powers for the closing of their Consular Courts and the decrees for the reorganisation of the Mixed Tribunals have come into operation.

6. This Constituent Assembly will also be charged with the duty of framing a new Organic Statute, in accordance with the provisions of which the Government of Egypt will in future be conducted. This statute will embody provisions for the Ministers being responsible to the Legislature. It will also provide for religious toleration for all persons and for the due protection of the rights of foreigners.

7. The necessary modifications in the régime of the Capitulations will be secured by agreements to be concluded by Great Britain with the various capitulatory Powers. These agreements will provide for the closing of the foreign Consular Courts, so as to render possible the reorganisation and extension of the jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals and the application to all foreigners in Egypt of the legislation (including legislation imposing taxation) enacted by the Egyptian Legislature.

8. These agreements will provide for the transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights previously exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments. They will also contain stipulations to the following effect:—

(*a.*) No attempt will be made to discriminate against the nationals of a Power which agrees to close its Consular Courts, and such nationals shall enjoy in Egypt the same treatment as British subjects.

(*b.*) The Egyptian Nationality Law will be founded on the *jus sanguinis*, so that the children born in Egypt of a foreigner will enjoy the nationality of their father and will not be claimed as Egyptian subjects.

(*c.*) Consular officers of the foreign Powers shall be accorded by Egypt the same status as foreign consuls enjoy in England.

(*d.*) Existing treaties and conventions to which Egypt is a party on matters of commerce and navigation, including postal and telegraphic conventions, will remain in



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force. Pending the conclusion of special agreements to which she is a party, Egypt will apply the treaties in force between Great Britain and the foreign Power concerned on questions affected by the closing of the Consular Courts, such as extradition treaties, treaties for the surrender of seamen deserters, &c., as also treaties of a political nature, whether multilateral or bilateral, *e.g.*, arbitration conventions and the various conventions relating to the conduct of hostilities.

(*e.*) The liberty to maintain schools and to teach the language of the foreign country concerned will be guaranteed, provided that such schools are subject in all respects to the laws applicable generally to European schools in Egypt.

(*f.*) The liberty to maintain or organise religious and charitable foundations, such as hospitals, &c., will also be guaranteed.

The treaties will also provide for the necessary changes in the Commission of the Debt and the elimination of the international element in the Alexandria Board of Health.

9. The legislation rendered necessary by the aforesaid agreements between Great Britain and the foreign Powers will be effected by decrees to be issued by the Egyptian Government.

A decree shall be enacted at the same time validating all measures, legislative, administrative or judicial, taken under martial law

10. The decrees for the reorganisation of the Mixed Tribunals will provide for conferring upon these tribunals all jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the foreign Consular Courts, while leaving the jurisdiction of the Native Courts untouched.

11. After the coming into force of the treaty referred to in article 3, Great Britain will communicate its terms to foreign Powers and will support an application by Egypt for admission as a member of the League of Nations.

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



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

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S/S Foreign Affairs (Private Secretary)

SECRET.

20

Aug 24 1920

THE CABINET.

## THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSALS.

### MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

79 Egypt 55

I venture to ask most respectfully, but at the same time most urgently, that the Cabinet may be permitted to have an opportunity of at any rate discussing the proposals which have been published in all the newspapers for giving independence to Egypt. I read these proposals for the first time in yesterday's newspapers with very great bewilderment.

The Foreign Office telegrams of the 21st August (Nos. 750 and 751) which reached me last night show that the story published in the newspapers is in all respects true, and that the proposals have been simultaneously communicated to the Press, the public and the British representatives in Egypt before either the Cabinet or Parliament had been allowed to know of their existence.

I submit that this procedure raises a very great difficulty. While the British will be held committed to approving proposals of this character, the Egyptian Nationalists will be free to take them merely as a starting point for further demands; thus, even from the point of view of bargaining, the disclosures which have taken place seem to be regrettable. The cession of territory which has been definitely incorporated in the British Dominions is, however, a matter which requires the assent not only of the Cabinet, but of Crown and Parliament.

Coming to the actual proposals themselves, one must ask oneself, first, are they real or are they a manœuvre? If they are real, they mean that we are giving up Egypt. Egypt is to become an independent country, which will make a Treaty of Alliance with the United Kingdom, accord us certain military and naval facilities, and act in foreign affairs in general conformity with our wishes and interests. Egypt will be free to conduct her internal affairs as she pleases, *i.e.*, she may substitute the Communist for the individualist system of society. She may raise a large army by conscription or she may abolish the existing Egyptian Army altogether. She may erect a customs tariff or adopt Free Trade. She may appoint ambassadors throughout the world. All these imprescriptible rights of sovereignty are to be conferred upon Egypt *on paper*.

Alternatively, we may be told this is mere camouflage. Not one Egyptian from the Khedive downwards will be able to act otherwise than in accordance with British advice. Although Egypt will be free in theory to do all these things, in practice she will do all she is told. She will be ruled under such systems and through such agents as the British Government choose and under no other. Having formally divested ourselves of every shadow of legal right, we shall nevertheless exercise final and absolute power. It is true there will be no Army of Occupation, but the same troops living in the same barracks will be called "The British Army for maintaining the communications with the East." When a state of disorder arises in Cairo, British soldiers who are called upon to fire on the crowd will not be shooting in order to suppress tumult in Egypt. They will be "safeguarding our communications with the East," &c.

If this, as I expect, is really what is meant by the new instrument, I can only think that the Egyptian Nationalists must be very great simpletons if they let it rest there. Their demand is for the effective and responsible control of their own country and the right to govern or misgovern it as they please. It is because this has never been accorded to them, and never can be accorded to them while we remain in the country, that they are discontented. It is not the empty form of independence which they seek, but the reality. Is the British nation willing to concede that reality? If not, will the British resistance to the concession of that reality be rendered more difficult or more easy by the concession of the form? I think it will be rendered vastly more difficult.

Incidentally, I may observe that it sweeps away altogether any claim which we might make for recovering any portion of the cost of the garrison from the Egyptian taxpayer. This garrison is declared by us to be in Egypt for a purely Imperial

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# (٤٧٣/٣٠)



purpose, namely, the maintenance of our communications with the East, and not as an Army of Occupation. Therefore, obviously, we have no claim upon the independent State of Egypt.

The repercussion of these proposals and this model upon other parts of the British Empire may even be more serious than the effect on Egypt. If we leave out the word "Egypt" in the document circulated last night by the Foreign Office and substitute the word "Ireland," it would with very small omissions make perfectly good sense, and would constitute a complete acceptance of Mr. De Valera's demands.

One can also easily see that these proposals will become immediately the goal of Indian nationalism. The ideal which Mr. Montagu has been endeavouring to hold up before Indian eyes of India as a great self-governing Dominion within the ambit of the British Empire and under the supreme authority of the British Monarchy will be discarded in favour of an independent Indian Empire, according, no doubt, to the British the sort of trading and practical facilities which were obtained in the Eighteenth Century by the British East India Company. I thought we had all arrived in common at the conception of the British Empire as a grouping of self-governing Dominions gathered together under the ægis of the Crown, developing under various degrees of responsibility within that circle. Surely here we are taking a retrograde step.

After all, the Proclamation of the Protectorate over Egypt was a solemn act of State, and we have laboriously procured the assent of all our Allies, one after another, to that act. No sooner is this done than we come forward and tear up the charter to which we have just obtained the signatures of all the greatest Powers in the world.

It may have been wise or unwise to alter the juridicial status of Egypt in the war, and I myself have often thought that the ex-Khedive was treated with precipitate severity; but a step of this kind, once taken, ought not to be lightly retraced. In my judgment we should adhere to the broad ideal of full self-government within the Empire and under the Crown for all parts of the King's Dominions, whether in Egypt, Ireland or India, and that any departure from this ideal and goal should only be made by a Government which has definitely submitted its case to the British Parliament. Following this conviction, it seems to me that the most we have to offer to the Egyptians or to the Irish is real concessions in regard to the management of their own affairs, and that all demands to break away from the British Empire and British Crown should be perseveringly withstood.

Lastly, it is my duty to point out that neither the War Office nor the Air Ministry, nor, so far as I know, the Admiralty have been consulted in any way upon the strategic bearing of these proposals, and I submit that the Cabinet should have the advice of the military and naval experts before them before giving their assent to such a scheme.

I append memoranda by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and by the Chief of the Air Staff.

W. S. C.

War Office,
24*th August*, 1920.

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## APPENDIX.

### (I.)

### MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.

Secretary of State,

I wish to direct your attention to the attached documents,* and more particularly to paragraphs 3 (ii.) and 4 (ii) of the Memorandum drawn up between Lord Milner's Mission, and communicated apparently to Zaghloul Pasha and the members of the Egyptian Delegation.

From Foreign Office telegram No. 750, dated 21st August, it will be observed that "His Majesty's Government have not yet considered the policy" in question. At the same time it is recognized in a subsequent paragraph that though it is not intended for publication, yet "as Zaghloul and his associates are acquainted with it and will base their campaign upon it, the main points are certain to become generally known."

* Foreign Office telegrams to Mr. Scott, Nos. 750 and 751.



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٦و]
# (٤٧٣/٣١)



As you are aware, this has already occurred since the draft agreement has appeared in British newspapers, and is apparently accepted by the general public as being an expression of the policy of His Majesty's Government.

2. The draft agreement, if confirmed, must have a far-reaching effect on the military situation of the British Empire, since, as I have stated in previous papers, Egypt is the "Clapham Junction" of Imperial communications. There also arises the question of access to the Sudan, which presumably would not be united to Egypt if and when the latter country receives its independence. So far as I am aware the General Staff have not in any way been consulted as to the military effect of the proposal contained in the draft Memorandum, and this aspect of the question appears to have been overlooked, or was considered to be adequately safeguarded by paragraph 3 (ii) and 4 (ii).

Whether this is the case would undoubtedly depend very largely on the interpretation given to the paragraphs in question, and I would urge that in the event of the acceptance of the Agreement in principle by the Government, the fighting services be given full opportunity of expressing their views on the vital questions dealt with in these two paragraphs.

H. W.

25th August, 1920.

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(II.)

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF.

Secretary of State.

The changed status of Egypt, if the *Times* reports are true, is causing me considerable anxiety.

The matter is intimately bound up with our development and our programme for next year; for example, we are relying on Egypt to assist us in training personnel for our five reserve squadrons, and are proposing to start on a large rigid airship base in the country.

The Air Force has a peculiar interest in Egypt, and I hope the new policy of the Government will not undo the work of construction to which we are committed.

Owing to the pressure of work I have not had time to submit this draft quite in the form that I should have liked, or to examine it sufficiently carefully, as this would have taken some little time, but in view of your request and the urgency of the matter I venture to submit it.

H. TRENCHARD.

Air Ministry.
25th August, 1920.

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AIR STAFF NOTES ON THE EFFECT OF THE NEW STATUS OF EGYPT.

As far as can be ascertained from newspaper reports it is proposed to recognize the independence of Egypt in amity and association with the British Empire. From an Imperial defence point of view the most important items in the proposed treaty appear to be :—

(1.) The maintenance of a small British garrison (the figure 3,000 is mentioned) in the Canal zone, which thus becomes a British enclave.
(2.) The guarantee by Great Britain of Egypt's integrity against outside aggression.
(3. The recognition by Egypt of Great Britain's privileged position in the Valley of the Nile.
(4. In the case of war, Great Britain to have every facility and access to Egyptian territory.
(5.) The abolition of the capitulations. Under these foreigners in Egypt have the right to investigation and trial by their own Governments. The new proposal appears to entrust the interests of all foreigners to the British High Commissioner.
(6.) The exclusion of the Sudan.



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



It is difficult on the information given for the Air Staff to estimate the effects of these proposals on the distribution and development of the Royal Air Force, it is possible, however, to make a few comments on the situation as it appears from the small amount of information at present obtainable.

Clause (1). The maintenance of a British garrison in the Canal zone. Under this clause a certain number of Air Force units would be stationed in Egypt, essentially for the protection of the Canal, but these would not in any way suffice for the Royal Air Force requirements which will be referred to below. Even for the purposes of the Canal garrison it may be difficult to obtain the necessary number of aerodromes, though this cannot be definitely stated until the boundaries of the zone are more clearly defined, in any case the abandonment of existing Air Force stations in Egypt proper and the transference of a certain number of them to new sites in the British enclave would lead to considerable expense for works and buildings.

Clause (2). It is possible that in this clause Great Britain's guarantee of Egypt's integrity against outside aggression might be permitted to take the form of military assistance stationed in the country. A reference to the withdrawal of the normal British garrison in Egypt, however, appears to make it impossible to take this view, and it is possible that the guarantee will be similar to that given to Belgium and troops would only be sent to the country should necessity arise.

Clause (3). Appears to be almost entirely a reference to our commercial position in the Valley of the Nile; doubtless this has some bearing on the amount of British capital sunk in large irrigation works and other development schemes.

Clause (4). As it stands is exceptionally vague. Interpreted in its broadest sense in the event of any war, say, for example against an Arab Empire, Great Britain would be able to base her operations on Egyptian territory. In practice it would appear that grave complications might ensue, since the Egyptian Government might be on friendly terms with Great Britain's potential enemy, who might be waging a war of aggression on British territory at, say, Aden or in the Persian Gulf.

Clause (5). Regarding the capitulations is of little military interest.

Clause (6). Under this clause it is presumed that the Sudan would become a British protectorate, possibly on the lines of British Somaliland. Under these circumstances the Air Force would have no great interest in the country other than the provision of a small detachment to aid any military garrison stationed therein.

Apart from these details the policy of the Air Ministry appears to be affected in the gravest possible manner by the new proposals. Egypt has for some time occupied the position of a keystone in the Royal Air Force scheme. It is, on account of its climate, an admirable training ground for airmen; it is the headquarters of the Air Force throughout the Near and Middle East; in the country are stationed squadrons which form a semi-mobile reserve for these areas; large expenses have been incurred in the provision of workshops and depôts, and a proposal is in hand to form in the country a large rigid airship base; and, finally, it is possibly the most important junction in the world for an Imperial air route point of view.

If the proposals enumerated above have been rightly interpreted all these activities of the Royal Air Force must cease or be severely hampered, much money will have been thrown away and a complete new orientation of our policy undertaken. It is difficult at the moment to see any area which can take the place of Egypt in the scheme for the Royal Air Force as a whole; its central position, its comparative proximity to England, its equitable climate and its situation on the highways of the world's commerce render it unique, and it is thus evident that the importance placed by the Air Staff on this country is of a quite especial nature even as compared with the interests of the Admiralty and War Office.

It is possible that these points have not been overlooked in arriving at the decision (if such has indeed been taken) on this matter; in any case, it is assumed that the details of the treaty to be enacted have yet to be worked out. In this belief the Air Staff assumes that His Majesty's Government will give due weight to the views herein expressed, and will afford the Air Ministry an opportunity of reviewing the same when the treaty is being definitely drafted.

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

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SECRET.

Memo of Lord Milner

THE CABINET.

## THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSALS.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

I AM not in the least surprised by the criticisms of the Secretary of State for War in C.P.–1803. Indeed, the wonder is that such criticisms have not been more numerous. I was quite prepared for an outcry in the press. But, contrary to my expectation, even the "Jingo" press has taken the suggestion of Egyptian "independence" very quietly. I have seen a great deal of favourable comment—some of it certainly from people whose approval makes me wince—and very little comment that was distinctly unfavourable. I have, however, had a few disapproving private letters. One of these, conceived "rather in sorrow than in anger," is from an anonymous correspondent, who concludes with the words: "I fear, my Lord, you are getting old."

This is unfortunately true. But I think that even in my hey-day I should have regarded the proposed concessions to Egyptian Nationalism as just and politic, and as calculated to strengthen and not to weaken our Imperial position.

On the face of them, it is true, the proposals look like a step backward. And in a sense they really are a step backward, but to a more secure position than that which we now occupy. In itself the acknowledgment of Egyptian "independence" is nothing new. We have declared, not once but scores of times during the last forty years, that we had no intention of appropriating Egypt. Mr. Churchill, indeed, regards Egypt as having been "definitely incorporated in the British Empire." I doubt whether that is correct. Presumably he is referring to our proclamation of a protectorate over Egypt in 1914. The proclamation of a protectorate over a foreign country may mean much or little, but it is certainly not equivalent to annexation. Moreover, at the very time when we proclaimed the protectorate we went out of our way to represent our action as intended to defend Egypt against dangers threatening her independence! And we at the same time raised the status of the ruler of Egypt from that of "Khedive," the vassal of Turkey, to that of "Sultan," the title of his former "overlord"! Whatever may have been the effect of these curious and somewhat contradictory acts and declarations, which have been very differently interpreted by us and the Egyptians, it is certainly difficult to contend that they constituted an incorporation of Egypt in the British Empire.

My own conviction is that it is totally impossible for any human being, however ingenious, to make out what the political status of Egypt at the present moment actually is. The object of the proposals now under discussion is to define that status for the future, and at the same time to give to such rights as Great Britain may hereafter possess in Egypt an unquestionable legal basis in the deliberate consent of the Egyptian people. These rights are to be conferred upon Great Britain by a Treaty made with the Sultan of Egypt and confirmed by a National Assembly.

At present we are in fact absolute masters of Egypt. But every act of authority which we exercise is liable to be challenged, and is in fact challenged, by Egyptian public opinion as a usurpation of powers to which we have no right. We are, in the eyes of the Egyptians, their rulers *de facto*, but not *de jure*. This will, in my opinion, prove in the long run to be an intolerable position. Sooner or later, and the sooner the better, we must settle the question of the status of Egypt and of our own position in that country, and there are only two ways of really settling it. One is to annex Egypt and thus definitely "incorporate it in the British Empire." The other is to gratify the constant and ever-increasing desire of the Egyptians to be recognised as an independent nation—a desire which we have done so much to encourage—and to make the best bargain we can with them on that basis.

If we can make a sufficiently good bargain, the latter course has enormous advantages. That we can maintain our position in Egypt in the teeth of Egyptian opposition, is in my opinion not doubtful. But we shall have to pay a very heavy





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



price. I am not thinking merely, or mainly, of the cost of the Army of Occupation, which would have in that case to be maintained, for an indefinite period, at something like its present strength. More serious still is the prospect of the difficulties which the permanent hostility of the Egyptian intelligentsia will create for us both in Egypt itself and throughout the world. In Egypt itself that hostility threatens to paralyse the administration. It is becoming increasingly difficult to get Egyptians of any standing to take office as Ministers or high officials. The middle and lower ranks of the bureaucracy and the Egyptian officers of the army are permeated with the spirit of repugnance to British control. This spirit may not again manifest itself in widespread strikes as it did last year, though the recurrence of such strikes is by no means improbable. But it is evident that, with the whole native Civil Service permanently disaffected, the amount of grit in the administrative machine is bound to make it work very badly, and the blame for its failure will be thrown upon the British chiefs. For the same reasons we can no longer rely on the army, or at any rate on that portion of it which is composed of, and largely officered by, native Egyptians. Nor does the trouble end here. What is to happen in future about legislation? We cannot go on indefinitely legislating by proclamations under martial law. But it would be impossible to devise any form of legislative assembly, having even the appearance of a representative character, which would not at once begin to agitate for "independence." Very probably it would reject every measure proposed to it, and we should have to fall back on legislation by Sultanic Decrees. The Nationalist movement would go on gathering force, and the agitation against Great Britain would be carried on all over Europe and America by Nationalist emissaries. Owing to the spread of education, the number of Egyptians capable of carrying on such a campaign effectively is constantly increasing, and so, thanks to the great prosperity of the country, are the funds available for their support, which will be freely lavished in the future, as they are to-day, by ambitious "patriots" who have more money than they know what to do with. Zaghloul's subscription of £5,000 to the "Herald," given, I may say, before we entered into discussions with him, is an illustration of what we should have to expect.

Now all this may have to be faced, if there is in fact no other way of securing the essential and permanent interests of Great Britain in Egypt except direct British control of the whole administration. What are those interests? Why did we ever occupy Egypt at all? We occupied it, very reluctantly in the first instance, in order to prevent a country which, owing to its geographical position, is of special importance to us as forming a vital link in our communications with the East from falling into other and possibly hostile hands. Egypt being unable to stand on her own legs, and European interests in Egypt being so great and influential that the country could not be allowed to remain in chaos, we had no choice but to restore order there, or else to allow some other Great Power to restore it and thereby to place itself right athwart our main road to our Eastern Empire. The security of our communications with India, and other parts of the Empire beyond India, was the supreme object which led to our intervention. And certainly that object is more vital to us than ever to-day, since Egypt is now not only the road to our Eastern Empire, but has also become the road to the new territories under the British flag, which stretch in an unbroken chain from the southern confines of Egypt to the Cape of Good Hope. It is truly the nodal point of our whole Imperial system.

But is it therefore necessary that we should own it? Is it not sufficient, if we have a firm foothold there? The question is, whether we cannot retain such a foothold without antagonising the whole of the educated and semi-educated classes of the Egyptian people by keeping them in a subjection, which they detest and will, I am convinced, constantly kick against. In my opinion it is not impossible that we should retain a position in Egypt sufficient for all our own purposes without incurring such animosity, if we retain it by their consent, as friends and allies, not by the undisguised use of our superior power, as their masters. On that footing, I believe a great number of them will even welcome our presence, and the rest will not greatly mind it. Even now it is not so much the presence of British troops which excites the hostility of the Egyptians. It is our "*administrative* occupation" of the country, our interference with all their domestic affairs. Whatever dislike they feel for our army is due to the fact that it is an "Army of Occupation," intended in their eyes to keep them in subjection. As a force stationed in their country, not to dominate them, but to secure objects of our own, extraneous to Egypt, while available, in case of need, for the defence of Egypt against foreign aggression, it will appear to them in a quite different light.



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٨و]
# (٤٧٣/٣٥)





All intelligent Egyptians recognise the special interest we have in safeguarding our communications with the East. Even Zaghloul was ready to admit our right to safeguard the Suez Canal. But in our discussions I think we convinced him, as we certainly convinced most of his associates, that even the Canal was not everything, but that in these days Egypt was also very important to us as a station for the Air Force and a centre of wireless telegraphy. For this and other reasons we substituted the wider formula, the "defence of Imperial communications," for any special reference to the Canal, as we were anxious to emphasise the fact that the Canal was not our only strategic interest in Egypt.

This point is of importance, as it meets the objections to the proposed agreement raised, and very naturally raised, by Field-Marshal Wilson and by Air-Marshal Trenchard in their appendices to Mr. Churchill's Memorandum. I entirely agree with Sir Henry Wilson's description of Egypt as the "Clapham Junction" of Imperial communications. But it is a mistake to think that this point of view was left out of consideration by myself or by my colleagues of the Mission, or that it was not made clear to the Egyptians. It is true that, in some of the statements which have appeared in the press, it was alleged that we had agreed to the British force, which was to be kept in Egypt, being stationed at Kantara, or, at any rate, "on the banks of the Canal," and to its being limited to "about 3,000 men." As a matter of fact, the Egyptians never even attempted to suggest any limit to the number of this force. They did, at the outset, wish us to say that it should be kept "in the Canal zone," but this, for the reasons just given, we absolutely rejected, and they did not attempt to press the point. In the Memorandum recording the results of our conversations, as finally drafted, the question, where the British force in Egypt was to be stationed, was deliberately left open—to be settled in the Treaty—and the strength of the force was not referred to at all. The statements that it was to be a "*small* British garrison" of "about 3,000 men" and "in the Canal zone" are unauthorised glosses, and the Mission never agreed to anything of the kind. Obviously, if we ever get to the point of drawing up a Treaty, we must take care to exclude any provision limiting the numbers of the British "military force," which we must remain free to determine according to the varying exigencies of our Imperial strategy, while the question, where we should keep it, will have to be carefully considered in relation to all that it may have to defend, and with special reference to the protection of our aerial communications.

These are not matters, on which personally I foresee any great difficulty with the Egyptians, as long as we base our demands on our own Imperial needs and avoid the appearance of "garrisoning" Egypt. It is the idea, that we keep our army to buttress our "administrative occupation," which offends Egyptian *amour-propre*, and which would certainly be inconsistent with the basic conception of the future relations between Great Britain and Egypt as an "independent" State.

It is true, that the "administrative occupation," to which the Egyptians so greatly object, has been a great blessing to their country. Without taking over, at any rate for a time, the control of her internal affairs, we could never have raised Egypt from bankruptcy to her present condition of great material prosperity or put an end to the gross abuses, the cruelty, the injustice and the corruption, which prevailed under the old native administration. And, of course, there is a danger, and a serious danger, that, with the withdrawal of British control, these abuses will, to some extent, revive. But it would be taking too mean a view of the effect of nearly forty years of British direction and example to imagine that Egypt could ever relapse into the state in which we found her. We have set up a wholly new standard of administration, and, though the mass of the people are still very backward—more than 90 per cent. quite illiterate—and living in primitive conditions, it would nevertheless be impossible for any native Government to apply the methods of the past. All Egyptians have learned something of what civilised government means, while the number of them who are more or less fitted to administer the country on modern lines has enormously increased, as have the material resources necessary for the maintenance of an up to date administration.

No doubt the native intelligentsia are not as capable as they think themselves of practising the new methods which we have taught them. But the great change which our presence has wrought in their circumstances, their character and their outlook makes it absolutely necessary to give them more scope for their increased manliness and, no doubt, excessive ambition. They will never again be content to be the mere servants of any master, native or foreign, and like everybody else they are at the moment somewhat intoxicated with the new craze for "self-determination."





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٨ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٣٦)





It is unquestionably a bold experiment to leave them to devise their own constitution and run the country themselves with so few restrictions as are contemplated under the proposed arrangement. The experiment may well be a failure, but it is not so certain to be a failure as any half-measures would be. For, with any limited system of self-government, we should have the whole body of Egyptian "Nationalists" —that is to say, practically all the educated and semi-educated natives—united not to try and work the new institutions, but to make them unworkable, with the object of getting something more.

Even if our more liberal plan is adopted, there will, at any rate at the outset, be a party clamouring for still larger concessions and wishing to get rid of us altogether. But as against these extremists we shall have, as indeed I believe we already have, the saner elements of Egyptian "Nationalism" on our side. The next few weeks, or months, will show whether these saner elements are also the stronger. If they are, the great experiment can be tried with good hope of success. If they are not, the experiment will not be made. Certainly I should be the last to recommend it.

When I speak of the saner elements of Egyptian Nationalism I am thinking of those influential men—and I believe they are the majority—who are perfectly well aware that Egypt cannot get on without British help, that a large number of the present British officials are indispensable to the administration of the country, and that Egypt cannot hope to retain the services of these men except on fairly lucrative and entirely honourable terms. They may think the number of British officials excessive, as indeed it is, and they resent having them imposed upon them, whether they feel that they want them or not. They desire that the British officials should be really, as they always have been nominally, Egyptian civil servants, not the masters of their nominal chiefs. In my own opinion—I may be quite wrong, but that has been the dominant consideration in my mind—we have now reached a stage, at which British influence in the conduct of the administration will be strengthened, and not weakened, if we frankly accept this position. On no other condition will cordial co-operation between British and native officials be possible in future. The present system means constantly-increasing friction. But once remove the main cause of that friction—the feeling of the Egyptians that the British are there as their masters—and I believe that native Ministers will continue to lean—often, indeed, to lean too heavily—upon the British members of their staffs. It is true that the latter will no longer be in a position to dictate, but will have to rely upon their personal qualities to carry the day by influence and persuasion. But that is how the best of them have always worked in the past. The Egyptians are, as a rule, very quick to recognise ability in men of any foreign race which they respect, and ready to be guided by it, especially if it is combined with tact and good manners.

If we had only to consider ourselves and the Egyptians, I should have very little anxiety about the settlement now proposed. I believe it could be effected with comparative ease, that it would be to the advantage of both parties and that it would work, not indeed perfectly, but much better than the present system. The blessed word "independence" will get us round many awkward corners just as the unfortunate word "Protectorate" would make even Paradise unattractive to the Egyptians.

The difficulties that I foresee lie in a different direction, *i.e.*, the attitude of the Foreign Powers—twelve in number—who have Capitulatory Rights in Egypt. It is essential to the success of the proposed settlement that we should be in a position to exclude foreign interference in the internal affairs of Egypt. On the other hand, there are great and permanent foreign interests in that country which we are bound to recognise, and the inevitable necessity of providing safeguards for those interests, of guaranteeing to the European communities the same security of life and property as they enjoy to-day, will always involve some infringement of the "complete independence" of Egypt. What we must be prepared for is that the foreign Powers specially interested in Egypt may be alarmed, or pretend to be alarmed, at the degree of "independence" which we propose to accord, and on that ground may refuse to abandon the rights which they now have under the Capitulations. But unless these foreign Powers will abandon those rights, it is impossible for us to relax our control, for in that case we should not really be helping Egypt on the road to "independence," but, on the contrary, be giving her a number of masters instead of one. This would be reactionary from the Egyptian point of view and fatal to our own position. Therefore it is essential that we should be able to show that, under the proposed new system, all legitimate foreign interests will be as safe as they are to-day.

As a matter of fact, the proposed arrangements do safeguard all legitimate foreign interests, though it does not follow that all the foreign Powers concerned will



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٩و]
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



admit it. The line which they may take—indeed, which some of them are already taking—is this: "We were prepared to give up our rights under the Capitulations, if Egypt was a British Protectorate. But now that you say she is to be 'independent', we must reconsider the position." To that contention we have a good answer, but it is not quite a simple one. The Capitulations have two aspects—they have a good and an evil side. In so far as they provide security for the lives and property of foreigners, they are beneficent. But in giving to the subjects of the Capitulary Powers a position of special privilege, in which they are exempt from taxation and in many other respects not amenable to laws applying to all other inhabitants of the country, the Capitulations are unjust to Egypt and a bar to her progress. It is only these latter abuses which will disappear with the abandonment of the Capitulations. Their beneficent effects will be preserved by the proposed treaty between Great Britain and Egypt. Under that treaty, cases in which foreigners are interested will still be dealt with by courts in which European judges preponderate. Laws which cannot now be made applicable to foreigners without foreign consent will still require the consent of the British High Commissioner. And the administration of all laws, in so far as they affect foreigners, will be under the supervision of a British official.

Legitimate foreign interests will thus be amply safeguarded. Indeed, the effect of the proposed arrangement is to emphasise, rather than to diminish, the responsibility of Great Britain for the protection of foreign rights. As far as the foreigner is concerned, the Protectorate is completely maintained in substance, if not in name.

The answer is sound, but it may take some time and a good deal of negotiation to get it accepted. The danger is, that the objections raised by some foreign Powers may not be *bonâ fide* objections, but mere pretexts for embarrassing us in our attempt to come to a settlement with the Egyptians. But here again, as it seems to me, we may reckon on having the better elements of Egyptian Nationalism on our side. While the fight was at its hottest, and all Nationalists were united in hostility to British policy, it was the fashion for them to say that they did not mind the maintenance of the Capitulations if only they could get rid of our Occupation. And the Extremists may continue to take that line, absurd as it is, for nothing could be more contradictory than to scream for "complete independence" and at the same time be willing to accept a system, under which the Egyptian Government cannot perform the most common-place and every-day acts of administration without the consent of a dozen foreign Powers. But, while this irrational attitude may still be maintained by some of the Nationalists, it is clear that the moderate section are now disposed to take a different line, and that, in view of the large concessions which we are ourselves prepared to make, they recognise the reasonableness of our claim to retain such a measure of control as will enable us to give to foreign Powers the assurances they may justly demand in exchange for the abandonment of their capitulary rights. The Moderates, like Adly Pasha, fully realise that under the proposed arrangements the balance of advantage will be on the side of Egyptian independence. Therefore in this, as in other respects, the really important question is whether the Moderates can carry the day in their attempt to conquer Nationalist opinion. The course of events in Egypt will shortly show us whether they can or not, and the answer to that question will, as it seems to me, be decisive as to the feasibility of the proposed settlement.

M.

*September* 16, 1920.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٩ظ]
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



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٠و]
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

Extract from letter from Mr. R. Greg. to Sir Eyre Crowe.
Alexandria Oct. 3. 1920.

"I came back here in August in time for the Milner proposals. People were at first rather stunned by the magnitude and unexpectedness of the concessions but when the four delegates started their campaign the country declared itself pretty generally in favour of acceptance. I cannot say that in private conversations I have discovered any very great enthusiasm as I think the more responsible and interested Egyptians are very apprehensive about the future and doubtful as to how far they can run their own show - more especially on the top of last year's troubles which have undermined all sense of authority and obedience to constituted authority. The moderates are naturally unable to come forward and say 'we do not want independence' but I think they hope that somehow or other the British control will not be withdrawn as completely as the Milner proposals foreshadow. The situation would be comic were it not so serious."

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٠ظ]
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



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

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*Printed for the Cabinet. October* 1920.

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## THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSALS.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE decision at which His Majesty's Government must arrive upon Lord Milner's proposals is one of the most momentous that will ever have been taken by a British Government, not only in its effect on Egypt itself, but in its reaction on every country in the East towards which we act in a governing, or fiduciary, or mandatory capacity. For what is given to Egypt, over which we have solemnly declared our Protectorate scarcely six years ago, can with difficulty be withheld from other countries, whose national spirit is equally clamant and assertive. We are therefore not merely solving a difficulty, but creating a precedent. The Cabinet have already had a memorandum from the Secretary of State for War, expressing grave alarm at the proposals, and a general reply from Lord Milner. They will desire to hear the Foreign Office point of view, which has not been arrived at except after a prolonged discussion of the case with Lord Milner and Lord Allenby.

*Position of the Case.*

In May last there was circulated to the Cabinet a letter from Lord Milner to me forwarding the general conclusions arrived at by his Mission at the end of their sojourn in Egypt. In this letter a full Report was promised at a later date, but has not been received.

Towards the end of August, just as Parliament was separating, Lord Milner sent to the Foreign Office a further memorandum reporting the results of his conversations with Zaghloul Pasha, Adly Pasha, and other prominent Egyptians, who had been invited to London to assist in the deliberations of the Mission. This memorandum contained the outlines of a complete scheme for establishing the independence of Egypt by means of a Treaty of Alliance and for surrendering the British Protectorate, while retaining a certain position of predominance or superior influence for Great Britain. The scheme had been prepared quite independently of the Foreign Office, but it represented, I understood, the unanimous views of Lord Milner and his colleagues, and it had the support of the Egyptian politicians above mentioned, who were prepared to return to Egypt and to advocate it there. The scheme had not, of course, the authority of His Majesty's Government. Had not the Cabinet already adjourned, I should have at once arranged for its submission to my colleagues. As it was, the utmost that could be done, as Lord Milner pressed for its transmission to Cairo, in order to prevent erroneous versions from getting abroad, was to inform the British representative there that the proposals had not been considered by the British Government, but were sent not for publication but for his information, and that of the Sultan and his Ministers. As a matter of fact, the Nationalist party did not hesitate to introduce into their version of the scheme features which formed no part of it.

Nevertheless, the scheme in its broad outlines has been received in Egypt by the members of the old Legislative Assembly and by Nationalist opinion in general with a good deal of satisfaction, and there seems every reason to suppose that, if it be endorsed by His Majesty's Government, it will be in the long run accepted in Egypt. This, indeed, is not surprising, considering the large and ample concessions that have been made to native sentiment, which can hardly have expected so substantial a victory. How far the final decision of His Majesty's Government has been prejudiced or compromised by these events it is difficult precisely to say. No doubt the Nationalist party in Egypt will already have invested the scheme prepared by such high authority with an almost sacrosanct character, and will resent or resist any substantial modification of its terms. Due weight must be attached to this considera-tion. But it cannot be allowed to prevent us from examining minutely the proposals themselves, both individually and collectively; and if, in the interests either of Great Britain in Egypt or of the British Empire, His Majesty's Government find it necessary

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



to introduce certain modifications, this will, I think, be generally recognised as falling within, not merely our powers, but our duty. Nor can I believe that even the general considerations, to which Lord Milner has given such powerful expression in his reply to Mr. Churchill, and with the spirit of which I entirely concur, need commit us to an unqualified acceptance of his scheme, or debar the Egyptians themselves from accepting such changes as, after a full discussion with them, we may decide to insist upon. It is from this point of view that I submit the following comments.

*Nature of the Proposals.*

Broadly speaking, Lord Milner proposes to convert Egypt from a British Protectorate into an independent Sovereign State, ruled by a constitutional sovereign, a representative Assembly, and an Egyptian Ministry responsible to that Assembly. The executive will be Egyptian, assisted in an advisory or subordinate capacity by such British officials as the Egyptian Government may decide to employ or retain. The police and the army will be, with an important exception to be named presently, Egyptian forces, and the maintenance of law and order will be an exclusively Egyptian responsibility. There will be an Egyptian Foreign Office, with an Egyptian Foreign Minister at Cairo and Egyptian diplomatic representatives in London and in other capitals. The Egyptian Government will be able to pass such legislation and to take such administrative action as it pleases, subject to a certain power of supervision by the British High Commissioner in cases affecting foreigners. The two British advisers, Financial and Judicial, upon whom it is proposed to insist, will be merely advisers; and already an attempt is being made by the Nationalist party in Egypt still further to emphasise their subordination. Taxation will be in the hands of the native Government, provided that they do not discriminate against foreigners. They will be able to conclude commercial or other treaties. The whole of these conditions are to be laid down in a treaty concluded between Great Britain and Egypt.

On the other hand, the reality or the relics of British authority in Egypt—whichever it be—are to be demonstrated by the following arrangements:—

There is to be a British High Commissioner in Egypt who "will be accorded an exceptional position and will be entitled to precedence over all other representatives." He is to have the right to intervene in cases where foreigners are likely to be unfavourably affected by Egyptian legislation. These are the sole powers specifically mentioned in the memorandum. There is to be a British military force in Egypt, but it is not to be a garrison, and its numbers and location are to be determined by imperial as distinct from local considerations. In times of war Egypt is to render such military assistance to Great Britain as may be within her means. Abroad she is to undertake "not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or will create difficulties for Great Britain, and not to enter into any agreement with a foreign Power which is prejudicial to British interests."

*Military Position.*

I will first examine the military position. The strength of the British military force is not stated, and is left to be determined. The Egyptians will probably seek to define its numbers. Lord Milner is, I believe, hopeful that a total strength of something between 3,000–5,000 will suffice. On the other hand the treaty is to fix *the place* (not places) where it shall be quartered. Lord Milner has in mind some locality contiguous to the Canal, and in any case on its western side, probably in the neighbourhood of Ismailia. Now let us see what functions this army is to perform. It is intended primarily "for the protection of Imperial communications," *i.e.*, first and foremost the Canal, but also, I imagine, such railroads, harbours, and aerodromes as are a part of the scheme of necessary Imperial communications. This does not appear to be made sufficiently clear in the memorandum, which speaks of these resources as only being available to the British "in case of war"—a limitation which is probably not intended.

Secondly, Great Britain is to "undertake to support Egypt in defending the integrity of her territory." Now Egyptian territory may be attacked either by sea, in which case the British Navy will *ex hypothesi* proceed to her defence, or by land; and land attacks may be delivered from any of three quarters: (i) the Senoussi on the west; (ii) Bedouins, Arabs, or Syrians on the east and south-east; (iii)—but less



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



likely—African tribes from the south. In the event of the Egyptian Army being inadequate for the purpose, or having been defeated by the enemy, the British Imperial force will then be called upon "to support Egypt in defending the integrity of her territory." In other words, it may conceivably be required for Egyptian, as distinct from Imperial purposes, and be called upon to fight inside or on the frontiers of the country.

Lastly, though this is not mentioned, it is easy to conceive circumstances in which, in the event of internal rebellion, fanatical outbreaks, or grave disorder endangering European life and property in the towns—which the native army might be either unable or unwilling to quell—an appeal might be made for the assistance of the British Imperial force which it would be difficult to refuse.

In other words, if I am right, this force may conceivably find itself committed to action on a wider scale than that which is contemplated in the proposed treaty.

Even in its Imperial aspect I imagine that this army cannot be considered only in terms of Egypt or the Canal. The position of Egypt renders it the inevitable and indispensable centre of British military strategy and operations in the Middle East. If British forces are to be maintained in Palestine, they can hardly be altogether severed from the Egyptian command. If military operations are at any time called for in Western Arabia, or the Soudan, the same remark applies. In other words, the G.O.C. in Egypt will be the pivot of a much bigger organisation than Egypt itself. The Imperial force must therefore be adequate for this purpose, or must have the requisite power and expansion without undue delay. The question thus arises whether the reduction of the proposed force to relatively small numbers and its confinement to a single station will enable it satisfactorily to discharge these varied responsibilities.

Lord Allenby, at the Foreign Office meeting, quoted, with agreement, the opinion of General Congreve, the present G.O.C., Egypt, that the minimum force required will be two brigades of infantry, two regiments of cavalry and a fleet of light cars everywhere, and he thought that it would be necessary to have troops at the majority of the following places: Cairo, Alexandria, the Canal (*i.e.*, Port Said, Kantara, Suez). He pointed out that, with the British force entirely removed to the Canal zone, the Egyptians would have the Sweet Water Canal in their hands, and could cut off the water supply of the British force altogether. For himself, if there was to be a single British camp, he would prefer that it should be at Cairo, where great barracks (Abbasieh and Kasr-el-Nil) are already in existence. In any case he could not contemplate Cairo and Alexandria totally denuded of British troops.

We cannot indeed altogether exclude the possibility of conditions under which such a force might be found essential. Let us suppose a fanatical or racial rising in Cairo, directed, not necessarily against the British, but against Europeans or Christians as such, or against the nationals of one of those foreign countries to whom we are to offer certain guarantees; let us even conceive an attack upon the British Residency or upon the High Commissioner at a time of excited feeling. In such a contingency the native army, even if it were partially officered by Englishmen, might prove unreliable. Telegraphic communications with the British camp at Ismailia would be instantly cut and the rails would be torn up. A very valuable and steadying influence might be exercised at such a moment by a small force in or outside the capital. I leave this case, however, if real importance is to be attached to it, to be dealt with by our military advisers.

Lord Milner has explained in his reply to Mr. Churchill the reasons for the military recommendations of himself and his colleagues, and their extreme desire—which is the foundation of this part of the Treaty—to avoid all appearance of a garrison, and to take no step inconsistent with the conception of Egypt as an independent State.

Making full allowances for this, I cannot see why it should be impossible, or even difficult, if the necessity be established, to provide in the initial stage and for a limited period for a British force of limited number, to be placed both at Cairo and at Alexandria. It would be a guarantee that the new system were started under conditions of tranquillity and order. After a fixed period—say, three years—the decision might be open to revision in the light of experience, and it might then be possible to dispense with all British troops save at the Imperial station.

I suggested at the Foreign Office meeting that, if the Imperial force, whether in peace or war, is to have full control of the means of communication essential to its purpose, there must be a definite *liaison* between it and that branch of the Egyptian Administration which will control harbours, railways, post office, telegraphs, and telephones.





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٢ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٤٤)



It would be an absurd position if at a time of crisis the British G.O.C. found himself deprived of the mechanical means by which alone he could act with efficiency.

There is one military duty in Egypt which it was generally agreed that the British must continue to perform. This is the Frontier Districts Administration, as it now exists in the Eastern and Western deserts and in the Sinai Peninsula. It is alluded to on p. 8 of Lord Milner's earlier Report. The force is a native one consisting of 1 infantry battalion, 2 camel-corps companies, and 30–40 cars. It is paid for by Egypt, but it is under British officers and British control. This arrangement must doubtless continue.

*The Egyptian Army.*

This is not mentioned either in Lord Milner's first Report or in the later memorandum, although its continued existence is clearly postulated, since upon it will depend (apart from the police) the maintenance of law and order in Egypt, and in the first resort the defence of the country. At the present time this army—apart from its Egyptian officers—is officered by Englishmen, and its Sirdar, who is also Governor-General of the Soudan—an arrangement that will obviously come to an end—is an Englishman. It also supplies and pays for the military forces of the Soudan, even when these are recruited in that country. Lord Milner's first Report contemplates, and rightly contemplates, the withdrawal of the Egyptian army as soon as may be from the Soudan. This is one of the questions that will call for careful handling when we come to the subject o the Soudan.

As regards the Egyptian army itself, to whose numerical strength it is proposed to place no limit, this might be thought a danger were military science popular in Egypt or were the Egyptians a martial people. Neither proposition, fortunately, is true; and the only conditions in which the native army might become a source of danger would presumably be if it were officered or commanded by foreigners other than Englishmen. This must be absolutely prohibited. Whether it is necessary or not that the Sirdar should be, as now, an Englishman I cannot say. Perhaps not—a native figure-head might be innocuous. But that the force should have European officers, if it is to be of the slightest use and if it is to save the British Imperial force from being repeatedly called in to perform the duties for which it is incompetent, seems to me clear. It remains for discussion whether this should be effected by an agreement that the European officers should continue to be British (possibly in a proportion to be fixed) or by a stipulation that if and when foreign officers are required, they should not be drawn from any other country. A similar condition should probably apply to the police. We cannot afford to have a reproduction in Egypt of the experiment of which Persia in the last century has provided so many melancholy illustrations, namely, an army and a gendarmerie officered at different periods from various foreign States, whose subjects imported into the Persian service the international jealousies and rivalries of Europe. The Egyptian town police, which is now officered by Englishmen, is more important than the country police, and the Egyptian Government would probably be willing to come to an arrangement by which the existing system should continue.

*The British High Commissioner.*

I am somewhat troubled as to the future position of this high official. As contemplated in the earlier Report, he was "to remain in charge of the foreign relations of Egypt"—a subject to which I shall presently revert. Under the later scheme he is only to enjoy the somewhat shadowy authority which I have already described. He is to have titular precedence over all other foreign representatives, but his position as the defender of their rights—as previously enjoyed under the Capitulations—seems to me likely to expose him on the one hand to a good deal of unpleasant responsibility—if, as is more than likely, the foreign representatives, whenever they cannot obtain redress from an inefficient native Government, turn to him for relief—and on the other hand to equally unpleasant odium and abuse if he is not able to give them satisfaction. I think that the degree of his responsibility for the protection of the rights of foreigners in Egypt in the future will need to be very carefully defined, otherwise the responsibility itself will be a source of friction and danger. The reverse situation may be not less disagreeable. Supposing the foreign representatives to ignore the High Commissioner altogether and to endeavour to settle their disputes with the Egyptian Government by independent action, by threats, or even by hostilities, would not his position be a very difficult one? The principle upon which our policy in Egypt has been regulated ever since the days of Lord Palmerston—if we except the



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٣و]
# (٤٧٣/٤٥)





period of the shadowy condominium with France—has been that we will not admit the interference of any foreign Power in Egypt. I suppose that this principle is still to be maintained.

Lord Milner and his colleagues clearly foresaw in the first instance the nature of the responsibility which the devolution upon the High Commissioner of the protection of foreign interests must entail. For in their earlier Report they wrote that "this responsibility involves a certain degree of control over the Egyptian Departments charged with the conduct of finance and with the maintenance of justice and public security, and will probably be found to involve the retention of at least two British advisers with their staffs, in the Egyptian service, who must continue to be nominated by the British Government, and the extent of whose authority should be clearly defined." But in the second memorandum, after the Conference with Zaghloul Pasha and his friends, these conditions would appear to have been decidedly whittled down. These two all-important officials are, it is true, to be appointed by the Egyptian Government "with the concurrence of His Majesty's Government" but the Financial Adviser who is ultimately to replace the present Commissioners of the Debt is only to "be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for all other matters on which they may desire to consult him"—a conceivably restricted sphere—while the Judicial Adviser is only to "be kept fully informed on all matters connected with the administration of the law as affecting foreigners, and will also be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for consultation on any matter connected with the efficient maintenance of law and order." It is further significant that at the meeting of the members of the old Egyptian Legislative Council which has given a general support to Lord Milner's later proposals, the reservation found unanimous approval that the clauses giving to the Egyptian Government the option of consulting these officials should be eliminated. It appears to me that if these officials are to operate either as an effective administrative safeguard or as a *liaison* between the High Commissioner and the Egyptian Government their functions will need the more careful definition postulated in Lord Milner's earlier Report.

Let me say, before I leave the subject, that such influence as they are able or are permitted to exercise, will depend to a very large extent on their ability to speak French. That is the language in which the business of the Egyptian Government and the meetings of the Cabinet are conducted, and if they are unable to speak it with ease, their influence will be small.

I am also left in some doubt as to the position of the High Commissioner, *vis-à-vis* the Egyptian Government. He is clearly intended by Lord Milner and his colleagues to retain a quite exceptional position in the country. But I am not equally clear upon what sanction (other than that of personal influence and moral prestige) this will rest. If there are flagrant abuses in the Administration, if the British officials remaining in Egyptian employ have to complain of outrageous treatment, if the Egyptian Government deliberately ignores the High Commissioner's advice, what exactly is to be done? I could quote plenty of instances in the history of Eastern countries where the representative of a Great Western Power, whether Great Britain, Russia, or France, has been placed in a position of veiled superiority over a native Government which was conceded the forms of a purely nominal independence. But I know of none in which that position has been maintained in face of an independence which was not nominal but real, and of foreign representatives who were technically equal and, in some cases, none too friendly. It is, of course, easy to say that if the High Commissioner is flouted or the superior position of Great Britain ignored, the treaty can be cancelled and we shall go back again to the Protectorate, and there are already some cynical spirits who contend that this is the insidious object of Great Britain in making the present proposals. But such threats are more readily made than carried out; and I imagine that our real object is to conclude an arrangement that will endure. I think, therefore, that we should devote special attention to the position of the High Commissioner.

*Foreign Relations.*

I have pointed out that in his original Report Lord Milner proposed that the High Commissioner "should remain in charge of the foreign relations of Egypt in so far as they are of a political character," but that, in deference to the opposition of Zaghloul Pasha and his friends, who, I believe, were insistent on the point, this has been abandoned in favour of the complete surrender to Egypt of the control of her foreign relations, including the appointment of foreign Ministers abroad. I cannot conceal



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٣ظ]
# (٤٦/٤٧٣)





from my colleagues that I view this proposal with considerable anxiety, and that I would greatly prefer any arrangement that would offer greater safeguards for the future.

The situation must be looked at (*a*) in its external and (*b*) in its internal aspect.

(*a.*) There will, as contemplated in Lord Milner's first Report, be an Egyptian Minister or High Commissioner with an Egyptian Legation in London (to be followed presently, I suppose, by an Afghan Legation, an Arab Legation, and I dare say a good many more); and there will be Egyptian Ministers at the majority of the foreign capitals. Their good faith and loyalty to the British connection are to be maintained by the stipulation that "Egypt will undertake not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the Alliance or will create difficulties for Great Britain, and will also undertake not to enter into any agreement with a foreign Power which is prejudicial to British interests." This language, particularly the first sentence, is very vague, and within its ambit it is not difficult to conceive of intrigues at Paris and Rome which might be very prejudicial to British interests. To anyone familiar either with the history of French diplomacy towards Egypt or with the present tortuous proceedings of Italian policy in the East, it will not be difficult to imagine conditions which would hover continually on the line between good faith and bad faith, and might cause us much trouble. The only answer given to me is that we must trust, and that if the Egyptian Government had unofficial instead of official representatives at foreign capitals they would probably intrigue much more.

(*b.*) I confess that I view with greater anxiety the possible position at Cairo. In 1904 Lord Lansdowne, by his agreement with the French, purchased the French acceptance of our superior position in Egypt by a corresponding recognition of the French Protectorate and abandonment of our own claims in Morocco. France retains and is daily extending and consolidating the position thus conceded to her in Morocco, and is making it an excuse for being exceedingly disagreeable to us both about the Egyptian clauses of the Turkish Treaty, to which her assent is required, and about Tangier. Are we perhaps paving the way by which she may redeem the, as she thinks, disastrous error that she committed in Egypt when she abdicated her share in the condominium over thirty years ago, and are we creating the opportunity for one more source of discord between her and Great Britain? The Anglo-Persian Agreement, which conceded to Great Britain in Persia a position somewhat analogous to that which it is proposed that we should occupy in Egypt, has not prevented France from intriguing against us, and putting every conceivable obstacle in our path at Tehran. In Egypt she already retains the great advantages of the French language, French judges and judicial procedure, and French schools. She will be dealing there in future with an independent sovereign State. May she not be tempted at times of friction or strained relations to use the first opportunity provided for her of twisting the Lion's tail? May she not even revive her dreams of a North African sphere of French influence from the Atlantic Ocean to the Suez Canal? Even if the Quai d'Orsay be innocent of any such deliberate intention, may not extreme nationalist elements in Egypt, which will not be suppressed by the proposed treaty, but will probably gather fresh strength as time goes on, intrigue with the French in Egypt as their most natural anti-British ally? So long as we were both the protecting and the occupying Power in Egypt we could deal sharply with such pretensions. We shall in future lack the local power, while not escaping the responsibility.

The only guarantee that I can think of, supposing Lord Milner's proposals to be accepted, for rendering the position less dangerous than it might otherwise become, is a categorical undertaking that the Egyptian Government shall not appoint foreign officials to any branch—or at least any important branch—of the Administration without the consent of the High Commissioner. It may be said that, once the British Protectorate has disappeared, our relations with the Egyptian Government will be so cordial that no danger of foreign intrigue will survive, and that they will regard us as a natural buffer against the meddlesomeness of other foreign Powers. This is an excellent theory. But I have too much experience of the zest with which ~~neutral~~ Oriental Governments fish in troubled waters, ~~and~~, if there is the slightest chance of extracting some profit from the operation, to be at all confident that it will always be acted upon.

*The British Services.*

I am in general agreement with Lord Milner's proposals as to future appointments to the Egyptian service and as to the retirement, whether voluntary or compulsory, of the present British staff. I do not doubt that the Egyptian Govern-



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



ment, unless they are swayed by some violent gust of anti-foreign feeling, will desire to retain a considerable number of these, and will propose equitable terms for the remainder. What we have more to fear is that the British officials may stampede in large numbers—a course which we should do all in our power to dissuade.

In his earlier Report Lord Milner proposed a period of five years, within which the fate of the present British staff should be decided. In his memorandum this is cut down to two years. Might it not be desirable to fix a minimum of two years and a maximum of five in order to prevent any undue dislocation?

*Trade.*

Egypt is to enjoy complete freedom in her commercial relations with foreign countries, *i.e.*, she may conclude Tariff Treaties. There must of course be most-favoured-nation treatment for British trade.

*Finance.*

This is barely mentioned in the papers submitted. Egypt must, as I have argued, continue to bear the expense of the Frontier Districts Administration. To her Soudan contribution I will come in a moment. She is not, I understand, to be asked for any contribution to the High Commissioner's office, even though a portion of his services will be rendered to the Egyptian Government. This is probably right. Nor, I gather, is she to make any contribution towards the British Imperial force, even though there is a contingent claim upon this force for Egyptian purposes. In the event of the British army being called upon to assist in the defence of the Egyptian frontiers, or the suppression of internal revolt, I imagine that a special case would arise.

*The Soudan.*

This is not mentioned in the memorandum; but it occupies three pages of the earlier Report. It cannot be omitted from the Treaty because (1) the Egyptians will insist upon its inclusion; (2) Egyptian finances are involved; (3) it is equally to our interest to settle its future by agreement with the Egyptian Government. Egypt's interest in the Soudan, as has been pointed out by Lord Milner, is fourfold. Her life depends on the water which flows down from or through the Soudan. The Soud n Civil Service is still largely filled by Egyptians. The Soudanese army is a part of the Egyptian army and is paid for by Egypt. Ever since the Cromer Agreement of 1899 Egypt has been called upon to pay for the deficit in the Soudanese budget.

Lord Milner does not propose the abrogation of the latter agreement. On the contrary, he proposes its continuance. But we shall have difficulty in maintaining a a position in which, while Egyptian participation both in the Civil Service and in the Army is expected to dwindle rapidly and as soon as possible disappear, Egyptian revenues are to continue, for some time at any rate, to bear a considerable charge. The answer, I suppose, will be that Egypt must continue to pay for the water that she enjoys, having, of course, a seat on the permanent Board of Control, and that a part of the price which she must pay for the withdrawal of the British garrison from Egypt is the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrison from the Soudan. The complete political and military independence of the Soudan is in any case the ulterior object which British interests demand.

*General Considerations.*

The remarks which I have made in this paper must not be held to detract from the thanks which we all owe to Lord Milner and his colleagues for their immense and self-sacrificing labours in the solution of the Egyptian problem. They have rendered a great national and Imperial service. Nor do I dissent from Lord Milner's main proposition that the ~~letter~~ solution is to be found in a treaty of alliance between Great Britain and the Egyptian Government, or from the major premiss on which that principle is founded, namely, that if we are to advance, it must be a large advance in the direction not merely of co-operation but of trust.

Lord Milner's own defence of his proposals will, I think, be that they are in the nature of a gamble in which we stake a good deal on the chance that the Egyptians will be willing to work his projected constitution with loyalty, while if they fail we shall always be in a position to go back.



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٤ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٤٨)



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It has been my object to elucidate those aspects of his proposal which seem to me to be fraught either with obscurity or with danger; so that we may by careful examination remedy the one and avoid the other. That study the various Departments of our Government who are concerned will, I am sure, give without delay.

*Procedure.*

So far the only Egyptians committed have been Zaghloul Pasha and his associate, Adly Pasha, and a few others who came over to England in a private capacity to give their views. In Egypt there has been the general discussion of the proposals as outlined in the press, to which I have already referred. The *fellaheen*, who are vitally affected, have not so far given any sign. We are, however, under a pledge given by Lord Allenby to the Sultan of Egypt that he shall appoint a formal and official deputation, representing different important parties and elements in the Egyptian community, to discuss the projected arrangement with His Majesty's Government.

I suggest that when His Majesty's Government have decided upon the general outlines of the scheme which they propose to offer, Lord Allenby on his return to Egypt, which I have asked him to postpone for a fortnight, in order that the decision may be taken while he is here, should invite the Sultan to appoint and to despatch this delegation to England, in order to draw up the actual terms of the treaty with His Majesty's Government.

Should we come to an agreement, the text will then be taken back to Egypt and submitted to a National Assembly in the course of the forthcoming spring. We can hardly expect an earlier solution.

C. OF K.

*Foreign Office, October* 11, 1920.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٥و]
# (٤٧٣/٤٩)



I CIRCULATE the following papers to the Cabinet concerning the Egyptian proposals of Lord Milner :—

No. 1.—Report of his special mission to Egypt containing the general conclusions arrived at by the members of the mission before they left Egypt last spring. The bracketed passages in this Report were intended by Lord Milner and his colleagues to be seen by the Government, but, if publication were decided upon at a later date, they were on no account to be included.

No. 2.—Memorandum containing the later proposals of Lord Milner and his colleagues (after conversations with the Egyptian Nationalists who visited London this summer). This memorandum is attached to a forwarding telegram from me to the British representative at Cairo dated the 21st August, 1920.

No. 3.—Telegram to Mr. Scott of the same date explaining that the proposals in the above memorandum had not yet been considered by His Majesty's Government.

No. 4.—A memorandum by myself on these proposals.

C. OF K.

*Foreign Office,*
*October* 12, 1920.

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



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

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SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL.

# REPORT

OF THE

# SPECIAL MISSION TO EGYPT.

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## GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٦ظ]
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



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

COMPOSITION OF THE SPECIAL MISSION TO EGYPT.

The Right Hon. the Viscount MILNER, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies (*Chairman*).

The Right Hon. Sir RENNELL RODD, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.

General the Right Hon. Sir JOHN G. MAXWELL, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O.

Brigadier-General Sir OWEN THOMAS, M.P.

J. A. SPENDER, Esq.

C. J. B. HURST, Esq., C.B., K.C., Foreign Office.

A. T. LOYD, Esq., O.B.E. (*Secretary*).

E. M. B. INGRAM, Esq., O.B.E., Foreign Office (*Assistant Secretary and Private Secretary to the Chairman*).

*Viscount Milner to Earl Curzon.*

My Lord, *Colonial Office, May* 17, 1920.

THE Special Mission to Egypt, of which I have the honour to be Chairman, before leaving Cairo in March last drew up certain conclusions, which I now beg to submit for your consideration. In arriving at these conclusions the members of the Mission were unanimous.

It is the intention of the Mission to furnish you in due course with a full report, giving an account of the method and course of our enquiry and containing the evidence and arguments on which the present memorandum is based. But inasmuch as the preparation of this full report will, in view of the great mass of material to be digested and arranged, require a good deal more time, and meanwhile His Majesty's Government may be looking to us for guidance with regard to the immediate political situation in Egypt, we have thought it right to place our views on this branch of the subject before you without more elaboration. I hope that the urgency of the case will be held to excuse the summary and somewhat dogmatic form in which these views are presented.

I have, &c.

MILNER.

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

## REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MISSION TO EGYPT.

### General Conclusions.

I.—The Present Situation and its Difficulties.

THOUGH there has been no serious recurrence of the disorders of last spring, there is no diminution in anti-British feeling, and the Nationalist movement continues to grow in strength.

Anti-British feeling is practically confined to the upper class and the *intelligenzia*, and is strongest among the latter—the students, doctors, lawyers and the bulk of the official class. Latterly it has also gained a strong hold on the Azhar, and Nationalism is now reinforced by Islamism.

There is no general hostility to the British among the fellahin or smaller landowners. Any manifestations of such hostility have been due to the influence of Nationalist emissaries from the towns, exploiting religious feeling or temporary grievances connected with the war. The most dangerous of these emissaries are the Azharites.

The bulk of the fellahin and smaller landowners would regard the prospect of the withdrawal of British influence with alarm, fearing that it must lead to a renewal of oppression by the great landowners and the official class.

It results from the foregoing considerations that actual rebellion is less to be apprehended than the progressive weakening of authority and respect for Government, arising from the disaffection of the upper and educated classes, and especially of the bulk of the native officials.

This weakening of the authority of Government shows itself not only in the difficulty of checking sedition, with which the Native Courts are largely in sympathy, but in a general feebleness of administration and an increase in ordinary (non-political) crime.

There can be no radical or permanent cure for this state of things except by such a reconciliation of British and Egyptians as will bring about a better understanding and heartier co-operation between the two elements and regain for the Government a certain measure of popular sympathy and support.

Such a reconciliation can only be effected by a generous recognition of what is sound and legitimate in the aspirations of Egyptian Nationalism.

The Nationalist movement, while embracing many evil tendencies and in its extreme form threatening a complete destruction of social order, nevertheless has its origin in the natural and inevitable growth of the spirit of independence due to the increased prosperity, the spread of education and the greater individual freedom, which are the results of the British occupation.

It should be the aim of British policy, by giving scope to this spirit of independence and to the increased capacity and desire of the Egyptians to govern their own country, to win over the better elements of Nationalism and restore the spirit of good-will and co-operation between British and Egyptians in the work of Government.

[In pursuing this policy we must take account of the sensitiveness of the Egyptians, of their self-importance and love of forms and phrases, and seek to give to the future status of Egypt the greatest appearance of independence compatible with the maintenance of the absolutely indispensable minimum of British control.]

II.—The Proposed Solution: A Treaty between Great Britain and Egypt.

This object could, in our opinion, be best attained by the conclusion of a treaty or convention between Great Britain and Egypt whereby Great Britain guaranteed the integrity and independence of Egypt and undertook to protect her against foreign agression or interference and Egypt in return acknowledged the right of Great Britain to exercise a certain measure of control for the protection of British and foreign interests.



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Great Britain's claim to exercise some measure of control over Egypt rests upon certain vital considerations, of which the following are the chief:—

(*a.*) It is essential for the welfare and progress of Egypt that the restrictions which the Capitulations impose upon her, especially in the matter of taxation of foreigners, should disappear, but Great Britain cannot insist on the surrender of these privileges without making herself responsible for the defence of the legitimate rights of foreigners.

(*b.*) The great progress made by Egypt of recent years is the work of Great Britain, and Great Britain is entitled to watch over the results of her efforts until their continued maintenance is assured.

(*c.*) A recurrence of disorder in Egypt, while menacing European interests in the interior of the country, would also involve danger to the Suez Canal, in which international highway Great Britain has a special interest by virtue of her part ownership of the Canal itself, of its importance as the road to India and Australasia, and of the fact that more than half the vessels using the Canal are British.

In determining the measure of control which Great Britain must continue to exercise over Egypt, and for her right to exercise which any treaty must provide, we should be guided by the principle that it is desirable to restrict the direct exercise of British authority to the narrowest possible limits, and outside these limits to rely upon the moral influence of British officials serving under Egyptian Ministers in a genuinely Egyptian Administration.

The object of any treaty being to effect a real reconciliation and to lead to more harmonious co-operation between British and Egyptians, great latitude must be left to the negotiators in settling details. A good deal that is not in itself desirable from the point of view of efficiency may have to be conceded in order to arrive at a genuine agreement, and put an end to the present friction, which threatens to result in a complete breakdown of the existing system of government.

At the same time, certain fundamental positions cannot be abandoned without condemning the whole policy of agreement, which is necessarily an experiment, to failure.

The most important point to be safeguarded is the influence and prestige of the High Commissioner, who should remain in charge of the foreign relations of Egypt, in so far as they are of a political character, and be the recognised defender of the legitimate rights of foreigners in the country.

The application to foreigners of any Egyptian legislation should therefore be conditional on the concurrence of the High Commissioner.

At the same time, there should be an Egyptian High Commissioner in London to look after Egyptian interests, to be the exponent of the views of the Egyptian Government to the British Government and to supervise the selection of British officials for the Egyptian service.

Great Britain, having undertaken the responsibility for the defence of Egypt, must have the right to retain a military force in that country, to make use of its harbours, aerodromes and lines of communication and to establish and maintain W/T stations.

While Great Britain must retain complete freedom to determine the strength and distribution of the British forces in Egypt, it is obvious that, if a treaty such as is here contemplated were to be concluded, the strength of those forces could be reduced to very small proportions.

Great Britain's responsibility for the protection of foreign interests further involves a certain degree of control over the Egyptian Departments charged with the conduct of finance and with the maintenance of justice and public security.

The exact form which this control should take is a matter for negotiation, but it will probably be found to involve the retention of at least two British advisers, with their staffs, in the Egyptian service. These must continue to be nominated by the British Government, and the extent of their authority should be clearly defined.

With the exceptions aforesaid, the Egyptian Government should have complete control of Egyptian affairs, including the commercial relations of Egypt with foreign countries, and should have the right of concluding treaties of a non-political character with the assent of Great Britain.

It follows from the preceding articles that the Egyptian Government must in future be free to determine for itself, what posts in the Egyptian service, other than those to which Great Britain will retain the right to nominate, should be filled by





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non-Egyptians, but no non-Egyptians other than British should be so appointed except with the consent of the British Government.

A period of a few years, say five, must be fixed during which the Egyptian Government should decide which of the existing British officials in the Egyptian service, other than those occupying posts to which the British Government retains the right to nominate, should continue to be filled by British officials after the expiration of the fixed period Terms of retirement for those, whom the Egyptian Government does not wish to retain, should be arranged between the British and Egyptian Governments, and these terms must be generous. British officials, who do not wish to remain in the service of the Egyptian Government under the new conditions, should be allowed to retire on the same terms as those whom the Egyptian Government does not wish to retain.

During the interim period, and after its termination, no British officials should be appointed to posts other than those to which the British Government retains the right to nominate, except at the request of the Egyptian Government.

It is certain that, unless the Egyptian Government decides to retain the services of a considerable number of the more important British officials, the Egyptian administration will break down. But all sensible Egyptians are aware of this, and it is reasonable to suppose that, with the reconciliation of British and Egyptians, which it is the main object of the proposed treaty to effect, the Egyptian Government will itself desire to keep many, and those the best, of the British officials.

The presence of an influential, if not very numerous, body of British officials in the Egyptian Service is necessary, not only for administrative efficiency, but in the interests of social justice. It is of special importance for the protection of the fellahin and of the poorer classes generally.

[While the grosser forms of oppression and cruelty, under which the lower orders of Egyptians suffered before the occupation, are never likely to revive, less progress has been made in eradicating nepotism and corruption. These are still the besetting sins of the native official class and would, if British influence were altogether removed, undoubtedly lead to a return of many of the old abuses.

The recurrence of these abuses would be especially dangerous in view of the grave economic and social problems with which Egypt is confronted at the present time.]

The recent phenomenal increase of wealth in Egypt is not only precarious in itself, but its benefits are mainly confined to one class, the landowners, great and small. On the other hand, the landless portion of the peasantry and the lower orders of the towns are suffering terribly from the scarcity of essential foodstuffs and the rise of prices.

The condition of Egypt to-day calls for a vigorous policy of social and agrarian reform to secure better conditions of life for the mass of the population.

Nothing substantial can be achieved in this direction without more liberal expenditure for such purposes as education, public health and housing. A free revenue of little more than 20 millions is totally inadequate to cover the administrative requirements, general and local, of a population of 13,000,000, rapidly increasing, and is altogether below what the income of the country would justify. For this reason it is essential to get rid of the barrier which the Capitulations oppose to an increase of the sources of revenue and an equitable system of taxation.

The same obstacle stands in the way of much legislation which is urgently required for purposes of social improvement.

The difficult and delicate nature of the problems ahead makes it more necessary than ever to get rid of the existing friction between British and Egyptians, so that all available capacities may co-operate in working out essential reforms.

Any treaty or convention regulating the relations of Great Britain and Egypt must at the same time define the general character of the future constitution of Egypt. In doing so, we must seek to safeguard individual liberty and the interests of the mass of the people.

Within these limits it is desirable to leave the detail of the future constitution to be settled by the Egyptians themselves in a representative Assembly. The convocation of such an Assembly will, in any case, be necessary to confirm the proposed treaty between Great Britain and Egypt.

### III.—The Immediate Future in Default of a Treaty.

While the conclusion of a treaty on the above lines appears to us the most likely means of improving the existing situation, it is possible that this solution may encounter insuperable obstacles at the present time.



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# (٤٧٣/٥٧)



In that case it appears desirable still to keep the door open and to let it be clearly understood that Great Britain is at all times prepared to enter into a treaty with Egypt on the above lines, provided there is a reasonable prospect of its acceptance by the majority of the Egyptians and of their subsequent good-will and co-operation, which it is the object of the treaty to ensure.

Without the conclusion of such a treaty no relaxation of British control is either possible or desirable. Indeed, it may be necessary for Great Britain to undertake fresh responsibilities. It is impossible to allow the decline of governmental authority, due to the inherent weakness of the present system, to continue.

## IV.—Administrative Reforms.

Apart from the general questions of policy above discussed, there are certain changes in the organisation* and spirit of the administration which are, in any case, desirable.

### (A.)—*The Residency.*

Owing to a variety of causes, of which the frequent changes of British agents and High Commissioners since the departure of Lord Cromer and the disturbing influences of the war have been the chief, British policy in Egypt has of late years been fluctuating and incoherent. In the absence of consistent leadership, departments have gone their own way. Definiteness of aim and a clear lead from the supreme direction are needed to re-establish discipline and co-ordination.

In order to enable the High Commissioner to recover his authority, and to restore unity of purpose throughout the administration, the staff of the Residency should be reorganised. The chief aim of such reorganisation should be to ensure continuity, and the constant presence at the Residency of an adequate number of men of local knowledge and experience.

The staffing of the Residency would be facilitated by the establishment of a single civil service for the Near East. If, as seems probable, it will be necessary to provide for a number of British officials in other Arab countries besides Egypt and the Soudan, the likelihood of obtaining men of the right stamp for the service of any of these countries, and of being able to make the best use of them, would be greatly enhanced by their interchangeability and by the prospects of a wider career than any that a number of small separate services can afford. We have been greatly impressed by the advantages of the limited measure of interchangeability which at present exists between the Soudan and Egypt.

[Cairo is the best centre of information for the Islamic world, and the point from which British policy in all the Arab countries could most efficiently be directed. If it were found possible, when Great Britain's responsibilities in the Near East have been defined, to give the High Commissioner at Cairo the general supervision over British activities in all the Arab countries, it would at the same time facilitate his task in controlling the Government of Egypt and make that control less obnoxious to the Egyptians.]

The reorganisation of the Residency must be supplemented by a better system for dealing with Egyptian affairs in London. The questions which constantly arise with regard to Egypt are not wholly or mainly diplomatic, but administrative and political. Whether or not the control of British policy in Egypt is confided to a new department for the Middle East, it certainly requires closer and more constant attention, supported by a greater degree of expert knowledge than it has hitherto received at home.

### (B.)—*British Officials in the Egyptian Service.*

A great and increasing amount of criticism has been levelled, not only by Egyptians, at the number of British officials in the Egyptian service. It is alleged to be excessive and constantly increasing, while the average quality of the men is said to be deteriorating.

As regards the alleged excessive number of British officials, it is obvious that since the early days of the occupation, when a relatively small number were appointed to co-operate in the Egyptian service and to deal with comparatively simple problems, there has been, with the expansion of the administrative machine, a very large increase

* Only recommendations of a general character can be included in this summary. Detailed suggestions with regard to several Departments are contained in the Appendices.



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



of the British personnel. The question to be examined is whether this increase has been unduly great, disproportionate to the increase in the number of Egyptian officials, and inconsistent with the original intention of the occupying Power, viz., to train Egyptian civil servants to fill the more responsible posts.

We are of opinion that, when all necessary allowance has been made for the inevitable great expansion of the public service in Egypt and for the difficulty of finding Egyptians fully qualified to fill the higher posts, the complaint that the number of British officials is excessive is substantially justified, and that a sufficient effort has not been made to train Egyptians for positions of the greatest responsibility.* Only a small minority of these, under those of Ministers, are actually occupied by Egyptians, though when the latter are available they have good prospects of promotion. It should be a cardinal aim of the administration to increase their numbers by education and training and by a radical revision of the present system of non-Egyptian appointments.

It has been the practice of the administration to fill every post falling vacant which has once been occupied by a non-Egyptian with another non-Egyptian, without the reference to the Council of Ministers, which is required when a new non-Egyptian post is created. Under this system there is no prospective diminution in the number of British officials, while the expansion of the service and the creation of new departments has inevitably led to their increase through the addition of new posts. There is a further constant addition of British or non-Egyptians employed under contract for special services.

In future, all appointments should be considered on their merits. When a British post falls vacant it should not be automatically filled by the appointment of another British official unless, after a careful review of all the circumstances, including legitimate claims of seniority to promotion, such an appointment is deemed essential. Similarly, in cases of promotion and transfer, it should be considered whether the post vacated should not be filled by an Egyptian. There should be one Selection Board to supervise all non-Egyptian appointments carrying salaries of more than 300*l.* a year, and the practice by which many departments select their own candidates without superior control should be discontinued.

In cases where Europeans and Egyptians hold posts of the same nature, the basic salary should be the same, and an expatriation allowance (which would not count for pension) should be granted to Europeans serving in Egypt, or Egyptians serving outside Egypt.

As regards the second allegation—the deterioration in quality of British officials—we do not consider it to be true. Egypt has been fortunate in past times in securing the services of men of outstanding ability. But in comparing all ranks of the service, present and past, there is, in our opinion, no ground for thinking that its general quality has declined. The average standard of the upper grades would, we think, compare not unfavourably with that of the corresponding grades in any Civil Service.

During the years of the war in particular, loyal and disinterested service has been rendered by a body of officials who, in very difficult circumstances and with greatly depleted ranks, succeeded in carrying the country safely through a period of great stress and anxiety. The importance of these services is in no way depreciated by the fact that a certain number of temporary officials, engaged owing to the urgency of war conditions, whose services have since been dispensed with, may have failed to reach the same high standard, and thus laid themselves open to legitimate criticism.

What we have rather found to criticise has been a want of leadership and direction in the past, and an absence of that co-operation and co-ordination which should inspire the work of departments and their relations to one another. This has been undoubtedly felt by the British officials themselves, who have received no indication of the general policy in view, and have come to regard their respective departments as rivals in competition for development rather than as organic parts of the same machine working for a common end.

There is a danger of the overgrowth of bureaucracy, of too much centralisation, correspondence and paper work. The number of officials in the lower grades is excessive. It is true that they are mostly Egyptians, but in these grades the British, except in certain technical services like the railways, are wholly out of place.

As a consequence of the growth of office work, there has been a tendency for the British officials to spend more time in Cairo and to lose touch with the life of the country districts. This tendency, which was aggravated by the diversion of so many

* Details supporting this conclusion will be found in an Appendix to the Report.



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of them to war work, has had unfortunate results. As long as we remain in any degree responsible for the good government of Egypt, the constant presence of a certain number of highly-qualified Englishmen in the provinces cannot possibly be dispensed with.

(C.)—*Local Government.*

The Government of Egypt is still too exclusively in the hands of the official class. To check the growth of a centralised bureaucracy, increasingly out of touch with the people, it is desirable to foster local self-governing institutions, such as the provincial councils, the municipalities and the local commissions now established in a number of towns and even in some villages. The number of the latter should be increased, and the spirit of interest in local affairs, of which there are hopeful indications, should be in every way encouraged.

The development of local self-governing institutions cannot, however, make much progress so long as an equitable system of local taxation is rendered impossible by the Capitulations. This is an additional reason for relieving Egypt from these international fetters.

But while the removal of these fetters will facilitate the development of self-governing institutions in the towns and larger villages, the administration of the villages of small or moderate size, in which the bulk of the country people live, must still for many years to come be mainly in the hands of the Omdehs, or village headmen.

The power of the Omdeh in an Egyptian village is very great and is frequently abused. The petty tyranny and corruption of which the Omdehs are often guilty, results in much suffering and discontent among the people, and is one of the causes of the great prevalence of crime.

The present method of appointing Omdehs by district committees under the presidency of a Government official is unsatisfactory. There is a strong feeling in favour of the election of the Omdeh in each village by the inhabitants themselves. Although, owing to the illiteracy of the people, it is difficult to carry out a system of secret voting, this should not prove insurmountable. It would be desirable to try the experiment of electing the Omdeh by ballot in a certain number of villages, and, if successful to extend it to the whole country.

## V.—The Capitulations and the Administration of Justice.

The removal of the obstacles which the Capitulations present to the good government of the country can only be effected by closing the foreign Consular Courts and by finding an effective method of applying local legislation to foreigners and subjecting them to a fair share of taxation.

The time is not ripe for unifying all the competing jurisdictions in Egypt (native, mixed, consular and religious). All that should be attempted at present is the fusion of the Mixed Courts and the Consular Courts, the Native and Religious Courts being left untouched. In carrying through this amalgamation, the Mixed Courts should be relieved as far as possible of purely administrative services, such as the registry of land deeds and mortgages.

The special position which Great Britain occupies, and must continue to occupy, in Egypt is now generally recognised by the foreign Powers. That special position imposes upon her responsibility for safeguarding the rights of foreigners, and therefore entitles her to claim that foreign Powers should enable her to discharge that responsibility and should confide to her that protection of the interests of their nationals in Egypt which is now assured by the Capitulations. Egypt will then, in matters affecting foreigners, be in a position to deal with Great Britain alone instead of having to approach each individual Power.

Great Britain must accordingly be the Power entitled to express any consent which, up till now, the Egyptian Government has been obliged to obtain from a foreign Government or from an international authority in Egypt. All privileges hitherto enjoyed in connection with the appointment of judges, the commutation of sentences, the application to foreigners of Egyptian legislation, or the payment by foreigners of Egyptian taxation, should be vested in Great Britain and exercised through the High Commissioner.

Foreign litigants should, so far as possible, enjoy in the reconstituted Mixed Courts the same privileges as those they enjoy in the existing Mixed Courts. For the



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# (٤٧٣/٦٠)





extended criminal jurisdiction which these Courts will hereafter possess, a criminal procedure must be found which will give general satisfaction. In framing any new codes to be applied by the reconstituted Mixed Courts, particularly in framing a new Criminal Procedure Code, members of the Mixed Bar, representing the various foreign colonies, should be invited to take part.

The prestige and the independence which the Mixed Courts have enjoyed in the past must be scrupulously maintained. It would be disastrous if the opinion became prevalent that attempts were being made to undermine the independence and the authority of these Courts.

If the power to approve legislation so as to make it binding on foreigners is vested in the High Commissioner in lieu of the individual Governments, or of the General Assembly of the Mixed Court of Appeal, as heretofore, an Advisory Committee, representing the various foreign communities, should be constituted to advise him as to the approval of such legislation. The members of this Committee should be elected by the foreign colonies they represent and the numerical strength of these colonies should be taken into account in determining the number of their representatives.

The agreement with each of the foreign Powers for closing its Consular Court and for transferring to His Majesty's Government the exercise of its rights under the Capitulations should contain an assurance that the nationals of that Power shall stand on the same footing as British subjects in Egypt in all such matters as the administration of justice, commercial and industrial liberty, the right to hold property and the payment of taxation.

The fusion of the Mixed and Consular Courts will not affect the Native Courts, and no great change in their organisation seems called for at present. The new Codes—of which the preparation was commenced by the Capitulations Commission—are urgently required, and they should be completed and carried into effect with as little delay as possible.

The special régime, established in the Western and Eastern Deserts and in the Sinai Peninsular by the Frontier Districts Administration, should be maintained, and the jurisdiction of the Military Courts set up there should be preserved. In civil cases the jurisdiction of these Courts should be concurrent with that of the other Egyptian Courts.

## VI.—Representative Institutions.

If such a Treaty as is contemplated in Section II above were to be concluded, the powers of the Egyptian Legislature of the future would be determined by the Egyptians themselves, and it would be for them to say how far they desired to go in the direction of responsible government. In that case it is probable that the establishment of complete parliamentary control over the executive would, at any rate, be attempted. But even in default of such a Treaty it is desirable to foster the growth of representative institutions.

The only organ of national self-government at present existing in Egypt is the Legislative Assembly, which has important, though limited, powers with respect to legislation and taxation.

The sessions ot the Legislative Assembly have been suspended during the war, and it is doubtful whether they could now be resumed without a general election. It may be impossible to hold such an election while the present agitation is at fever heat, but we are strongly of opinion that, at the first favourable opportunity, the Legislative Assembly should be revived and should thenceforward continue to hold annual sessions.

It is to be expected that the Legislative Assembly, whenever it is revived, will adopt a very critical, if not hostile, attitude to the Government, but attacks upon the Government in a representative Assembly, which is bound to have some sense of responsibility, cannot be more damaging or less helpful than those which are now incessantly directed against it by a wholly irresponsible press.

The Assembly will also, no doubt, be constantly striving to increase its own powers, especially with regard to the control of finance. But this is the normal course of constitutional development, and as a representative Assembly gains in experience and authority, it is only right that its control over finance should extend till it finally becomes complete.

In any case, it is not just to condemn the Legislative Assembly because of the somewhat discouraging results of its first session in 1914. Both as a legitimate outlet for the expression of public feeling, and as a check on the bureaucratic engine, a representative Assembly is essential to the healthy development of political life in Egypt.



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# (٤٧٣/٦١)



At the same time it must be borne in mind that, owing to the backwardness of the mass of the people, of whom 90 per cent. are still quite illiterate, it will be many years before any elected Assembly is really representative of more than a comparatively limited class. Parliamentary government under the present social conditions means oligarchical government, and, if wholly uncontrolled, it would be likely to show too little regard for the interests of the majority of the Egyptian people.

The history of British rule in Egypt, especially in its earlier stages, has been marked by some great and striking improvements in the condition of the fellahin, and as long as Great Britain continues to exercise any measure of control over the internal affairs of Egypt it is both our duty and our interest to use our influence for the promotion of further reforms necessary for the protection of the mass of the people and for their advancement in education and capacity for self-government.

Whatever may be the immediate future, it seems to us essential that the British Administration in Egypt should make a far greater effort than heretofore to establish contact with the Egyptian people, to explain its policy and to refute the misstatements of fact which form so large a part of the campaign against it in the Egyptian newspapers. The time is past when British representatives can, in reliance on their own good intentions, permit a stream of uninformed criticism to continue without an effort to correct it; and if the Legislative Assembly is to resume its sittings and Egyptians are to obtain a greater control of their own affairs, it will be more than ever necessary that the essential objects of British policy in Egypt should be kept constantly before the Egyptian people.

Speeches or statements in the British Houses of Parliament will not of themselves meet this necessity. These, as we have frequently observed during our stay in Egypt, are liable to distortion in transmission or translation, and become a fruitful source of misunderstanding and recrimination. Nor is it sufficient that warnings and contradictions should be issued to the newspapers. Positive explanations of British aims and policy must be conveyed to the Egyptian people either in public speeches or communications to the press, and the heads of the administration must be prepared to take an active part in defending their measures when challenged. In this, as in many other respects, a vigorous initiative, in place of a passive acceptance of adverse circumstances, is a primary condition of successful administration.

## VII.—The Soudan.

None of the preceding paragraphs have any application to the Soudan. That country is physically, ethnically and historically quite distinct from Egypt, and in some respects presents a sharp contrast to it.

While the great majority of the people of Egypt are comparatively homogeneous, the Soudan is divided between Arabs and Negroids, and within each of these two great racial groups there are a number of races and tribes differing widely from one another and often mutually antagonistic.

But while thus greatly divided amongst themselves, the Soudanese are at one in their dislike of the Egyptians. That dislike grew to hatred in consequence of the gross misgovernment of the Soudan in the days of the Khedive Ismail. And though, as the memory of former Egyptian oppression fades, this hatred is dying out, the great diversity of character between Egyptians and all classes of Soudanese is calculated to keep up a certain antipathy between them.

This diversity, however, is much greater in some cases than in others. The Arabs of the Soudan speak dialects of the same language as the Egyptians and are united to them by the bond of religion. Islam, moreover, is spreading even among the non-Arab races of the Soudan. These influences mitigate in various degrees, but they nowhere wholly overcome the differences of race and character which divide the Egyptians from the Soudanese.

The political bonds which have at intervals in the past united Egypt with the Soudan have always been fragile. Egyptian conquerors have at various times overrun parts and even the whole of the Soudan. But it has never been really subdued by, or in any sense amalgamated with, Egypt. The Egyptian conquest of the Soudan in the last century was especially disastrous for both countries. After years of bloodshed and oppression, which failed to establish orderly government for any length of time, Egyptian rule was finally overthrown by the Mahdist rebellion, and the Egyptians were driven out of all but a small corner of the Soudan. As a consequence of this breakdown, Great Britain was obliged to undertake several costly expeditions for the





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# (٤٧٣/٦٢)



rescue of the Egyptian garrisons and the defence of Egypt, which was in danger of being overrun by the Mahdist hordes.

Since the reconquest of the country by British and Egyptian forces under British leadership in 1896–8, the Government of the Soudan, which under the Convention of 1899 takes the form of an Anglo-Egyptian Protectorate, has been virtually in British hands. The Governor-General, though appointed by the Sultan (formerly the Khedive) of Egypt, is nominated by the British Government, and all the Governors of Provinces and principal officials are British.

Under this system of government, the progress of the Soudan in all respects, material and moral, has been remarkable. When full allowance is made for the simplicity of the problem, viz., the introduction of the first principles of orderly and civilised government among a very primitive people, the great success actually achieved during the long Governor-Generalship of Sir R. Wingate is one of the brightest pages in the history of British rule over backward races. The present administration is popular in the Soudan and, with few exceptions, peaceful and progressive conditions prevail throughout the country.

While Egypt and the Soudan are essentially separate countries, and are bound to develop on very different lines, Egypt will always have one interest of supreme importance in the Soudan. The Nile, upon which the very existence of Egypt depends, flows for hundreds of miles through the Soudan, and it is vital to Egypt to prevent any such diversion of water from the Nile as might diminish her present cultivable area or preclude the reclamation of that portion of her soil, some 2,000,000 acres in extent, which is capable of being brought under cultivation, when, by means of storage, the present supply of water available for irrigation has been increased.

Hitherto the amount of water drawn from the Nile in its passage through the Soudan has been of negligible amount, but as the population of the Soudan increases that country will require more water for its own development and a conflict of interest between it and Egypt might arise. At the same time there is every reason to hope that, properly conserved and distributed, the Nile will suffice for the irrigation of all the lands, whether in Egypt or the Soudan, which are ever likely to need it.

The natural arbiter in this matter is Great Britain, which not only commands the sources of the White Nile, but is equally interested in the welfare and development of both Egypt and the Soudan, and has a special interest of her own in the increase of the cultivation of cotton, the most valuable product of the soil of Egypt and one which certain portions of the Soudan are likewise well fitted to supply.

A number of large engineering works for the storage of water and for raising the level of the river will have to be undertaken in the Soudan, and ultimately perhaps also in Uganda, in order that the Nile may yield the maximum benefit in respect of irrigation to the countries through which it flows. Plans for two such works in the Soudan are already projected, and these schemes, which have given rise to much controversy, are at present the subject of enquiry by a commission of technical experts.

The control of the waters of the Nile for purposes of irrigation is a matter of such paramount importance and the technical and other problems involved are so difficult and intricate that it is, in our opinion, necessary to set up a permanent commission, composed on the one hand of experts of the highest authority and on the other hand of representatives of all the countries affected—Egypt, the Soudan and Uganda—to settle all questions affecting the regulation of the river and to ensure the fair distribution of the water.

While the contiguity of Egypt and the Soudan and their common interest in the Nile make it desirable that some political nexus between the two countries should always be maintained, it is out of the question that this connection should take the form of the subjection of the Soudan to Egypt. The former country is capable of and entitled to independent development in accordance with its own character and requirements.

It is much too early to attempt to determine the ultimate political status of the Soudan. For present purposes that status is sufficiently defined by the Convention of 1899 between Great Britain and Egypt, which provides for the necessary political connection between Egypt and the Soudan without hampering the independent development of the latter country.

While it is absolutely necessary for the present to maintain a single supreme authority over the whole of the Soudan, it is not desirable that the government of that country should be highly centralised. Having regard to its vast extent and the varied character of its inhabitants, the administration of its different parts should be left, as



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far as possible, in the hands of the native authorities, wherever they exist, under British supervision. A centralised bureaucracy on the Egyptian model is wholly unsuitable for the Soudan.

Decentralisation and the employment, wherever possible, of native agencies for the simple administrative needs of the country, in its present stage of development, would both make for economy and avoid the necessity of retaining a large number of Egyptian officials in the civil service of the Soudan.

This necessity ought, in any case, to disappear as education progresses and a greater number of Soudanese themselves become capable of filling official posts. At the present time the officials of local origin are still largely outnumbered by those introduced from Egypt.

The gradual substitution of Soudanese for Egyptians in the Civil Service is not recommended because of any failure of the latter adequately to discharge their present duties. The introduction of Egyptians after the reconquest was necessitated by the circumstances of the time, and under undivided British control they have done their duty loyally and well. But service in the Soudan is not popular with Egyptians, and it is only natural that they should be replaced by men of local origin as the latter become capable of doing the work.

[There is another reason for limiting as far as possible the Egyptian element in the administration. As has already been stated, Nationalism pervades the Egyptian Civil Service, and is strongest amongst its younger members. It is undesirable to multiply propagandists of Egyptian Nationalism in the Soudan. Egyptian Nationalism has its good as well as its bad side in Egypt. But it has no *raison d'être* in the Soudan, and its introduction into that country is simply an element of disturbance without any corresponding advantage.]

The capacity of the Soudanese to take the place of imported officials in the Civil Service depends on the progress of education. At the same time we should be careful, in the matter of education, not to repeat the mistake which has been made in Egypt of adopting a system which fits pupils for little else than employment in clerical and minor administrative posts, and creates an overgrown body of aspirants to Government employment. There is no room in the Soudan for a host of petty officials, and education should be directed to giving the Soudanese a capacity and a taste for employment in other directions, such as agriculture, industry, commerce and engineering. The immediate need of the country is material development, and it can do without an elaborate administrative system.

The military forces still employed in the Soudan are very large. A large army was, no doubt, required to complete the conquest and pacification of the country, but the time has come when, in our opinion, the question of the number and organisation of its military forces should be reconsidered.

[The military forces in the Soudan are part of the Egyptian army, though more than half of them consist of regiments recruited in the Soudan, and they are all paid for by Egypt. Hitherto, the Governor-Generalship of the Soudan and the Command-in-Chief of the Egyptian army have been united in one person. There were good reasons for this in the past, but it is indefensible as a permanent arrangement At the first convenient opportunity a civil Governor-General should be appointed, and the Sirdar of the Egyptian army, with his headquarters staff, should be re-transferred to Egypt.

It is a matter for consideration whether those regiments of the army which are composed of Egyptians should not be brought back to Egypt and the remaining Soudanese regiments converted into a local gendarmerie. The duties which the Soudanese regiments at present discharge are rather those of a gendarmerie than of an army proper. A small striking force will always be required at the centre, but for the rest, order and security would be better maintained by a number of bodies locally recruited and commanded by British officers. This would both facilitate recruiting, as it is much easier to get men to serve in their own districts than in a force which may be employed far away from them, and reduce the financial burden on Egypt of maintaining an army in the Soudan, which now costs as much as 1½ millions a year.]

The revenue of the Soudan only just defrays the cost of its civil administration, and though, with the development of the country the revenue will certainly increase, its growth may for some years to come not be very rapid. Egypt will therefore in the immediate future still have to bear the main, if not the whole, burden of the military establishment.

This is an undesirable state of things. It is an additional argument for trying to reduce the military expenditure of the Soudan to more reasonable proportions that this



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

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reduction will help to relieve the Soudan from all financial dependence on Egypt at an earlier date than would otherwise be possible. The sooner the finances of the two countries can be entirely separated the better.

Whenever that separation can be effected it will be necessary to take account of the expenditure which Egypt has incurred on behalf of the Soudan since its reconquest and to fix the amount which the Soudan can be fairly asked to repay and the terms on which it should be liquidated. In determining that amount it would be reasonable to take into consideration the benefits which Egypt has herself derived from her expenditure in the Soudan.

Meanwhile something should be done immediately to draw a clearer line of division between Egyptian and Soudanese finance. At the same time, the Financial Department of the Soudan should be simplified and cheapened and its control over other departments rendered less rigid. An Auditor-General should be appointed, who should be independent of all departments.

There has of late days been an increasing tendency on the part of the more extreme section of Egyptian Nationalists to call in question the Convention of 1899, which defines the political status of the Soudan. While advocating "complete independence" for Egypt, they lay claims to the Soudan as an exclusively Egyptian possession. This contention is totally inadmissible. Any treaty which may be concluded between Great Britain and Egypt must provide for the recognition of that Convention and establish the relations of the two countries for the future upon a basis which will secure the independent development of the Soudan while safeguarding the vital interests of Egypt in the waters of the Nile.

Egypt has an indefeasible right to an ample and assured supply of water for the land at present under cultivation and to a fair share of any increased supply which engineering skill may be able to provide. A formal declaration on the part of Great Britain that she recognises this right and is resolved under all circumstances to uphold it would go far to allay the uneasiness which prevails in Egypt on this subject. We are of opinion that such a declaration might with advantage be made at the present time.

M.
R. R.
J. G. M.
O. T.
J. A. S.
C. J. B. H.

*March* 3, 1920.



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No. 2.

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Scott (Cairo).*

(No. 751.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 21, 1920.

THE accompanying memorandum is the result of conversations held in London in June to August 1920 between Lord Milner and the members of the special mission to Egypt and Zaghlul Pasha and the members of the Egyptian Delegation, in which conversations Adly Pasha also took part. It outlines a policy for the settlement of the Egyptian question in the best interests both of Great Britain and Egypt.

The members of the mission are prepared to recommend the British Government to adopt the policy indicated in the memorandum if they are satisfied that Zaghlul Pasha and the delegation are likewise prepared to advocate it, and will use all their influence to obtain the assent of an Egyptian National Assembly to the conclusion of such a treaty as is contemplated in articles 3 and 4.

It is clear that unless both parties are cordially united in supporting it, the policy here suggested cannot be pursued with success.

*Memorandum.*

1. In order to establish the independence of Egypt on a secure and lasting basis it is necessary that the relations between Great Britain and Egypt should be precisely defined, and the privileges and immunities now enjoyed in Egypt by the capitulatory Powers should be modified and rendered less injurious to the interests of the country.

2. These ends cannot be achieved without further negotiations between accredited representatives of the British and Egyptian Governments respectively in the one case, and between the British Government and the Governments of the capitulatory Powers in the other case. Such negotiations will be directed to arriving at definite agreements on the following lines :—

3.—(1.) As between Egypt and Great Britain it is proposed that a treaty should be entered into, under which Great Britain will recognise the independence of Egypt as a constitutional monarchy with representative institutions, and Egypt will confer upon Great Britain such rights as are necessary to safeguard her special interests and to enable her to furnish the guarantees which must be given to foreign Powers to secure the relinquishment of their capitulatory rights.

(2.) By the same treaty, an alliance will be concluded between Great Britain and Egypt, by which Great Britain will undertake to support Egypt in defending the integrity of her territory ; and Egypt will undertake, in case of war, even when the integrity of Egypt is not affected, to render to Great Britain all the assistance in her power within her own borders, including the use of her harbours, aerodromes and means of communication for military purposes.

4. The proposed treaty will embody stipulations to the following effect :—

(1.) Egypt will enjoy the right to representation in foreign countries. In the absence of any duly-accredited Egyptian representative, the Egyptian Government will confide its interests to the care of the British representative. Egypt will undertake not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or will create difficulties for Great Britain, and will also undertake not to enter into any agreement with a foreign Power which is prejudicial to British interests.

(2.) Egypt will confer on Great Britain the right to maintain a military force on Egyptian soil for the protection of her Imperial communications. The treaty will fix the place where the force shall be quartered, and will regulate any subsidiary matters which require to be arranged. The presence of this force shall not constitute in any manner a military occupation of the country or prejudice the rights of the Government of Egypt.

(3.) Egypt will appoint, in concurrence with His Majesty's Government, a Financial Adviser, to whom shall be entrusted in due course the powers at present

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



exercised by the Commissioners of the Debt, and who will be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for all other matters on which they may desire to consult him.

(4.) Egypt will appoint, in concurrence with His Majesty's Government, an official in the Ministry of Justice, who shall enjoy the right of access to the Minister. He shall be kept fully informed on all matters connected with the administration of the law as affecting foreigners, and will also be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for consultation on any matter connected with the efficient maintenance of law and order.

(5.) In view of the contemplated transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights hitherto exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments, Egypt recognises the right of Great Britain to intervene, through her representative in Egypt, to prevent the application to foreigners of any Egyptian law now requiring foreign consent, and Great Britain on her side undertakes not to exercise this right except in the case of laws operating inequitably against foreigners.

*Alternative.*

In view of the contemplated transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights hitherto exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments, Egypt recognises the right of Great Britain to intervene, through her representative in Egypt, to prevent the application to foreigners of any Egyptian law now requiring foreign consent, and Great Britain on her side undertakes not to exercise this right except in the case of laws inequitably discriminating against foreigners in the matter of taxation, or inconsistent with the principles of legislation common to all the capitulatory Powers.

(6.) On account of the special relations between Great Britain and Egypt created by the alliance, the British representative will be accorded an exceptional position in Egypt, and will be entitled to precedence over all other representatives.

(7.) The engagements of British and other foreign officers and administrative officials who entered into the service of the Egyptian Government before the coming into force of the treaty, may be terminated at the instance of either the officials themselves or the Egyptian Government at any time within two years after the coming into force of the treaty. The pension or compensation to be accorded to officials retiring under this provision, in addition to that provided by the existing law, shall be determined by the treaty. In cases where no advantage is taken of this arrangement, existing terms of service will remain unaffected.

5. This treaty will be submitted to the approval of a Constituent Assembly, but it will not come into force until after the agreements with foreign Powers for the closing of their Consular Courts and the decrees for the reorganisation of the Mixed Tribunals have come into operation.

6. This Constituent Assembly will also be charged with the duty of framing a new Organic Statute, in accordance with the provisions of which the Government of Egypt will in future be conducted. This statute will embody provisions for the Ministers being responsible to the Legislature. It will also provide for religious toleration for all persons and for the due protection of the rights of foreigners.

7. The necessary modifications in the régime of the Capitulations will be secured by agreements to be concluded by Great Britain with the various capitulatory Powers. These agreements will provide for the closing of the foreign Consular Courts, so as to render possible the reorganisation and extension of the jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals and the application to all foreigners in Egypt of the legislation (including legislation imposing taxation) enacted by the Egyptian Legislature.

8. These agreements will provide for the transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights previously exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments. They will also contain stipulations to the following effect:—

(*a.*) No attempt will be made to discriminate against the nationals of a Power which agrees to close its Consular Courts, and such nationals shall enjoy in Egypt the same treatment as British subjects.

(*b.*) The Egyptian Nationality Law will be founded on the *jus sanguinis*, so that the children born in Egypt of a foreigner will enjoy the nationality of their father and will not be claimed as Egyptian subjects.

(*c.*) Consular officers of the foreign Powers shall be accorded by Egypt the same status as foreign consuls enjoy in England.

(*d.*) Existing treaties and conventions to which Egypt is a party on matters of commerce and navigation, including postal and telegraphic conventions, will remain in



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

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force. Pending the conclusion of special agreements to which she is a party, Egypt will apply the treaties in force between Great Britain and the foreign Power concerned on questions affected by the closing of the Consular Courts, such as extradition treaties, treaties for the surrender of seamen deserters, &c., as also treaties of a political nature, whether multilateral or bilateral, *e.g.*, arbitration conventions and the various conventions relating to the conduct of hostilities.

(*e.*) The liberty to maintain schools and to teach the language of the foreign country concerned will be guaranteed, provided that such schools are subject in all respects to the laws applicable generally to European schools in Egypt.

(*f.*) The liberty to maintain or organise religious and charitable foundations, such as hospitals, &c., will also be guaranteed.

The treaties will also provide for the necessary changes in the Commission of the Debt and the elimination of the international element in the Alexandria Board of Health.

9. The legislation rendered necessary by the aforesaid agreements between Great Britain and the foreign Powers will be effected by decrees to be issued by the Egyptian Government.

A decree shall be enacted at the same time validating all measures, legislative, administrative or judicial, taken under martial law.

10. The decrees for the reorganisation of the Mixed Tribunals will provide for conferring upon these tribunals all jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the foreign Consular Courts, while leaving the jurisdiction of the Native Courts untouched.

11. After the coming into force of the treaty referred to in article 3, Great Britain will communicate its terms to foreign Powers and will support an application by Egypt for admission as a member of the League of Nations.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٣٤ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٦٨)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٣٥و]
# (٤٧٣/٦٩)



No. 3.

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Scott (Cairo).*

(No. 750.)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office, August* 21, 1920.

LORD MILNER has handed me the document of which the full text is contained in my immediately following telegram, and has informed me that copies have been given by him to Adly Pasha for communication to Zaghlul and his associates.

Zaghlul has already returned to France, and the rest of his party followed him on 19th August. Adly Pasha has also left.

I understand from Lord Milner that four of Zaghul's followers will return to Egypt next month in order to persuade the country to support a settlement on the lines which the Mission are disposed to recommend.

His Majesty's Government have not yet considered the policy indicated in my immediately following telegram, and in the absence of the Prime Minister and of most of the members of the Cabinet, such consideration must necessarily be deferred.

It is on this clear understanding that the memorandum quoted in my immediately following telegram is sent for your information and that of the Sultan and his Ministers; it is not intended for publication, but as Zaghlul and his associates are acquainted with it, and will base their campaign upon it, the main points are certain to become generally known.

Lord Milner states that the conversations between his Mission and the Zaghlulists were conducted in a friendly and conciliatory spirit on both sides, and though no actual agreement has been reached, it is evident that the Egyptians are anxious for a settlement. In these circumstances, though the arrival of Zaghlul's emissaries in Egypt will probably cause a certain amount of excitement and a revival of political controversy, it is not desirable to interfere with their activities as long as these are kept within reasonable bounds, nor to use the censorship to check the discussion of the proposed settlement in the press. It would be a good thing if in the meantime the case of the men at present under trial could be disposed of one way or the other and this element of possible disturbance got out of the way.

Should the reception of the Zaghlulist campaign in Egypt prove so favourable as to warrant the mission making recommendations on the lines indicated, and should His Majesty's Government be prepared to endorse them, it is obvious that in the subsequent negotiations the Sultan would have to take the lead and depute properly accredited representatives to deal with His Majesty's Government.

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[4551 B]

# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٣٥ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٧٠)





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*Printed for the Cabinet. October* 1920.

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No. 4.

# THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSALS.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE decision at which His Majesty's Government must arrive upon Lord Milner's proposals is one of the most momentous that will ever have been taken by a British Government, not only in its effect on Egypt itself, but in its reaction on every country in the East towards which we act in a governing, or fiduciary, or mandatory capacity. For what is given to Egypt, over which we have solemnly declared our Protectorate scarcely six years ago, can with difficulty be withheld from other countries, whose national spirit is equally clamant and assertive. We are therefore not merely solving a difficulty, but creating a precedent. The Cabinet have already had a memorandum from the Secretary of State for War, expressing grave alarm at the proposals, and a general reply from Lord Milner. They will desire to hear the Foreign Office point of view, which has not been arrived at except after a prolonged discussion of the case with Lord Milner and Lord Allenby.

## *Position of the Case.*

In May last I received a letter from Lord Milner forwarding the general conclusions arrived at by his Mission at the end of their sojourn in Egypt. In this letter a full Report was promised at a later date, but has not been received. I was under the impression that the condensed and earlier Report had been issued by the Cabinet; but, as this appears not to have been done, I circulate it with this paper.

Towards the end of August, just as Parliament was separating, Lord Milner sent to the Foreign Office a further memorandum reporting the results of his conversations with Zaghloul Pasha, Adly Pasha, and other prominent Egyptians, who had been invited to London to assist in the deliberations of the Mission. This memorandum contained the outlines of a complete scheme for establishing the independence of Egypt by means of a Treaty of Alliance and for surrendering the British Protectorate, while retaining a certain position of predominance or superior influence for Great Britain. The scheme had been prepared quite independently of the Foreign Office, but it represented, I understood, the unanimous views of Lord Milner and his colleagues, and it had the support of the Egyptian politicians above mentioned, who were prepared to return to Egypt and to advocate it there. The scheme had not, of course, the authority of His Majesty's Government. Had not the Cabinet already adjourned, I should have at once arranged for its submission to my colleagues. As it was, the utmost that could be done, as Lord Milner pressed for its transmission to Cairo, in order to prevent erroneous versions from getting abroad, was to inform the British representative there that the proposals had not been considered by the British Government, but were sent not for publication but for his information, and that of the Sultan and his Ministers. As a matter of fact, the Nationalist party did not hesitate to introduce into their version of the scheme features which formed no part of it.

Nevertheless, the scheme in its broad outlines has been received in Egypt by the members of the old Legislative Assembly and by Nationalist opinion in general with a good deal of satisfaction, and there seems every reason to suppose that, if it be endorsed by His Majesty's Government, it will be in the long run accepted in Egypt. This, indeed, is not surprising, considering the large and ample concessions that have been made to native sentiment, which can hardly have expected so substantial a victory. How far the final decision of His Majesty's Government has been prejudiced or compromised by these events it is difficult precisely to say. No doubt the Nationalist party in Egypt will already have invested the scheme prepared by such high authority with an almost sacrosanct character, and will resent or resist any substantial modification of its terms. Due weight must be attached to this consideration. But it cannot be allowed to prevent us from examining minutely the proposals themselves, both individually and collectively; and if, in the interests either of Great Britain in Egypt or of the British Empire, His Majesty's Government find it necessary





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# (٤٧٣/٧٢)





to introduce certain modifications, this will, I think, be generally recognised as falling within, not merely our powers, but our duty. Nor can I believe that even the general considerations, to which Lord Milner has given such powerful expression in his reply to Mr. Churchill, and with the spirit of which I entirely concur, need commit us to an unqualified acceptance of his scheme, or debar the Egyptians themselves from accepting such changes as, after a full discussion with them, we may decide to insist upon. It is from this point of view that I submit the following comments.

*Nature of the Proposals.*

Broadly speaking, Lord Milner proposes to convert Egypt from a British Protectorate into an independent Sovereign State, ruled by a constitutional sovereign, a representative Assembly, and an Egyptian Ministry responsible to that Assembly. The executive will be Egyptian, assisted in an advisory or subordinate capacity by such British officials as the Egyptian Government may decide to employ or retain. The police and the army will be, with an important exception to be named presently, Egyptian forces, and the maintenance of law and order will be an exclusively Egyptian responsibility. There will be an Egyptian Foreign Office, with an Egyptian Foreign Minister at Cairo and Egyptian diplomatic representatives in London and in other capitals. The Egyptian Government will be able to pass such legislation and to take such administrative action as it pleases, subject to a certain power of supervision by the British High Commissioner in cases affecting foreigners. The two British advisers, Financial and Judicial, upon whom it is proposed to insist, will be merely advisers; and already an attempt is being made by the Nationalist party in Egypt still further to emphasise their subordination. Taxation will be in the hands of the native Government, provided that they do not discriminate against foreigners. They will be able to conclude commercial or other treaties. The whole of these conditions are to be laid down in a treaty concluded between Great Britain and Egypt.

On the other hand, the reality or the relics of British authority in Egypt—whichever it be—are to be demonstrated by the following arrangements:—

There is to be a British High Commissioner in Egypt who "will be accorded an exceptional position and will be entitled to precedence over all other representatives." He is to have the right to intervene in cases where foreigners are likely to be unfavourably affected by Egyptian legislation. These are the sole powers specifically mentioned in the memorandum. There is to be a British military force in Egypt, but it is not to be a garrison, and its numbers and location are to be determined by imperial as distinct from local considerations. In times of war Egypt is to render such military assistance to Great Britain as may be within her means. Abroad she is to undertake "not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or will create difficulties for Great Britain, and not to enter into any agreement with a foreign Power which is prejudicial to British interests."

*Military Position.*

I will first examine the military position. The strength of the British military force is not stated, and is left to be determined. The Egyptians will probably seek to define its numbers. Lord Milner is, I believe, hopeful that a total strength of something between 3,000–5,000 will suffice. On the other hand the treaty is to fix *the place* (not places) where it shall be quartered. Lord Milner has in mind some locality contiguous to the Canal, and in any case on its western side, probably in the neighbourhood of Ismailia. Now let us see what functions this army is to perform. It is intended primarily "for the protection of Imperial communications," *i.e.*, first and foremost the Canal, but also, I imagine, such railroads, harbours, and aerodromes as are a part of the scheme of necessary Imperial communications. This does not appear to be made sufficiently clear in the memorandum, which speaks of these resources as only being available to the British "in case of war"—a limitation which is probably not intended.

Secondly, Great Britain is to "undertake to support Egypt in defending the integrity of her territory." Now Egyptian territory may be attacked either by sea, in which case the British Navy will *ex hypothesi* proceed to her defence, or by land; and land attacks may be delivered from any of three quarters: (i) the Senoussi on the west; (ii) Bedouins, Arabs, or Syrians on the east and south-east; (iii)—but less



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likely—African tribes from the south. In the event of the Egyptian Army being inadequate for the purpose, or having been defeated by the enemy, the British Imperial force will then be called upon "to support Egypt in defending the integrity of her territory." In other words, it may conceivably be required for Egyptian, as distinct from Imperial purposes, and be called upon to fight inside or on the frontiers of the country.

Lastly, though this is not mentioned, it is easy to conceive circumstances in which, in the event of internal rebellion, fanatical outbreaks, or grave disorder endangering European life and property in the towns—which the native army might be either unable or unwilling to quell—an appeal might be made for the assistance of the British Imperial force which it would be difficult to refuse.

In other words, if I am right, this force may conceivably find itself committed to action on a wider scale than that which is contemplated in the proposed treaty.

Even in its Imperial aspect I imagine that this army cannot be considered only in terms of Egypt or the Canal. The position of Egypt renders it the inevitable and indispensable centre of British military strategy and operations in the Middle East. If British forces are to be maintained in Palestine, they can hardly be altogether severed from the Egyptian command. If military operations are at any time called for in Western Arabia, or the Soudan, the same remark applies. In other words, the G.O.C. in Egypt will be the pivot of a much bigger organisation than Egypt itself. The Imperial force must therefore be adequate for this purpose, or must have the requisite power of expansion without undue delay. The question thus arises whether the reduction of the proposed force to relatively small numbers and its confinement to a single station will enable it satisfactorily to discharge these varied responsibilities.

Lord Allenby, at the Foreign Office meeting, quoted, with agreement, the opinion of General Congreve, the present G.O.C., Egypt, that the minimum force required will be two brigades of infantry, two regiments of cavalry and a fleet of light cars everywhere, and he thought that it would be necessary to have troops at the majority of the following places: Cairo, Alexandria, the Canal (*i.e.*, Port Said, Kantara, Suez). He pointed out that, with the British force entirely removed to the Canal zone, the Egyptians would have the Sweet Water Canal in their hands, and could cut off the water supply of the British force altogether. For himself, if there was to be a single British camp, he would prefer that it should be at Cairo, where great barracks (Abbasieh and Kasr-el-Nil) are already in existence. In any case he could not contemplate Cairo and Alexandria totally denuded of British troops.

We cannot indeed altogether exclude the possibility of conditions under which such a force might be found essential. Let us suppose a fanatical or racial rising in Cairo, directed, not necessarily against the British, but against Europeans or Christians as such, or against the nationals of one of those foreign countries to whom we are to offer certain guarantees; let us even conceive an attack upon the British Residency or upon the High Commissioner at a time of excited feeling. In such a contingency the native army, even if it were partially officered by Englishmen, might prove unreliable. Telegraphic communications with the British camp at Ismailia would be instantly cut and the rails would be torn up. A very valuable and steadying influence might be exercised at such a moment by a small force in or outside the capital. I leave this case, however, if real importance is to be attached to it, to be dealt with by our military advisers.

Lord Milner has explained in his reply to Mr. Churchill the reasons for the military recommendations of himself and his colleagues, and their extreme desire—which is the foundation of this part of the Treaty—to avoid all appearance of a garrison, and to take no step inconsistent with the conception of Egypt as an independent State.

Making full allowances for this, I cannot see why it should be impossible, or even difficult, if the necessity be established, to provide in the initial stage and for a limited period for a British force of limited number, to be placed both at Cairo and at Alexandria. It would be a guarantee that the new system was started under conditions of tranquillity and order. After a fixed period—say, three years—the decision might be open to revision in the light of experience, and it might then be possible to dispense with all British troops save at the Imperial station.

I suggested at the Foreign Office meeting that, if the Imperial force, whether in peace or war, is to have full control of the means of communication essential to its purpose, there must be a definite *liaison* between it and that branch of the Egyptian Administration which will control harbours, railways, post office, telegraphs, and telephones.





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It would be an absurd position if at a time of crisis the British G.O.C. found himself deprived of the mechanical means by which alone he could act with efficiency.

There is one military duty in Egypt which it was generally agreed that the British must continue to perform. This is the Frontier Districts Administration, as it now exists in the Eastern and Western deserts and in the Sinai Peninsula. It is alluded to on p. 8 of Lord Milner's earlier Report. The force is a native one consisting of 1 infantry battalion, 2 camel-corps companies, and 30–40 cars. It is paid for by Egypt, but it is under British officers and British control. This arrangement must doubtless continue.

*The Egyptian Army.*

This is not mentioned either in Lord Milner's first Report or in the later memorandum, although its continued existence is clearly postulated, since upon it will depend (apart from the police) the maintenance of law and order in Egypt, and in the first resort the defence of the country. At the present time this army—apart from its Egyptian officers—is officered by Englishmen, and its Sirdar, who is also Governor-General of the Soudan—an arrangement that will obviously come to an end—is an Englishman. It also supplies and pays for the military forces of the Soudan, even when these are recruited in that country. Lord Milner's first Report contemplates, and rightly contemplates, the withdrawal of the Egyptian army as soon as may be from the Soudan. This is one of the questions that will call for careful handling when we come to the question of the Soudan.

As regards the Egyptian army itself, to whose numerical strength it is proposed to place no limit, this might be thought a danger were military science popular in Egypt or were the Egyptians a martial people. Neither proposition, fortunately, is true; and the only conditions in which the native army might become a source of danger would presumably be if it were officered or commanded by foreigners other than Englishmen. This must be absolutely prohibited. Whether it is necessary or not that the Sirdar should be, as now, an Englishman I cannot say. Perhaps not—a native figure-head might be innocuous. But that the force should have European officers, if it is to be of the slightest use and if it is to save the British Imperial force from being repeatedly called in to perform the duties for which it is incompetent, seems to me clear. It remains for discussion whether this should be effected by an agreement that the European officers should continue to be British (possibly in a proportion to be fixed) or by a stipulation that if and when foreign officers are required, they should not be drawn from any other country. A similar condition should probably apply to the police. We cannot afford to have a reproduction in Egypt of the experiment of which Persia in the last century has provided so many melancholy illustrations, namely, an army and a gendarmerie officered at different periods from various foreign States, whose subjects imported into the Persian service the international jealousies and rivalries of Europe. The Egyptian town police, which is now officered by Englishmen, is more important than the country police, and the Egyptian Government would probably be willing to come to an arrangement by which the existing system should continue.

*The British High Commissioner.*

I am somewhat troubled as to the future position of this high official. As contemplated in the earlier Report, he was "to remain in charge of the foreign relations of Egypt"—a subject to which I shall presently revert. Under the later scheme he is only to enjoy the somewhat shadowy authority which I have already described. He is to have titular precedence over all other foreign representatives, but his position as the defender of their rights—as previously enjoyed under the Capitulations—seems to me likely to expose him on the one hand to a good deal of unpleasant responsibility—if, as is more than likely, the foreign representatives, whenever they cannot obtain redress from an inefficient native Government, turn to him for relief—and on the other hand to equally unpleasant odium and abuse if he is not able to give them satisfaction. I think that the degree of his responsibility for the protection of the rights of foreigners in Egypt in the future will need to be very carefully defined, otherwise the responsibility itself will be a source of friction and danger. The reverse situation may be not less disagreeable. Supposing the foreign representatives to ignore the High Commissioner altogether and to endeavour to settle their disputes with the Egyptian Government by independent action, by threats, or even by hostilities, would not his position be a very difficult one? The principle upon which our policy in Egypt has been regulated ever since the days of Lord Palmerston—if we except the


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period of the shadowy condominium with France—has been that we will not admit the interference of any foreign Power in Egypt. I suppose that this principle is still to be maintained.

Lord Milner and his colleagues clearly foresaw in the first instance the nature of the responsibility which the devolution upon the High Commissioner of the protection of foreign interests must entail. For in their earlier Report they wrote that "this responsibility involves a certain degree of control over the Egyptian Departments charged with the conduct of finance and with the maintenance of justice and public security, and will probably be found to involve the retention of at least two British advisers with their staffs, in the Egyptian service, who must continue to be nominated by the British Government, and the extent of whose authority should be clearly defined." But in the second memorandum, after the Conference with Zaghloul Pasha and his friends, these conditions would appear to have been decidedly whittled down. These two all-important officials are, it is true, to be appointed by the Egyptian Government "with the concurrence of His Majesty's Government" but the Financial Adviser who is ultimately to replace the present Commissioners of the Debt is only to "be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for all other matters on which they may desire to consult him"—a conceivably restricted sphere—while the Judicial Adviser is only to "be kept fully informed on all matters connected with the administration of the law as affecting foreigners, and will also be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for consultation on any matter connected with the efficient maintenance of law and order." It is further significant that at the meeting of the members of the old Egyptian Legislative Council which has given a general support to Lord Milner's later proposals, the reservation found unanimous approval that the clauses giving to the Egyptian Government the option of consulting these officials should be eliminated. It appears to me that if these officials are to operate either as an effective administrative safeguard or as a *liaison* between the High Commissioner and the Egyptian Government their functions will need the more careful definition postulated in Lord Milner's earlier Report.

Let me say, before I leave the subject, that such influence as they are able or are permitted to exercise, will depend to a very large extent on their ability to speak French. That is the language in which the business of the Egyptian Government and the meetings of the Cabinet are conducted, and if they are unable to speak it with ease, their influence will be small.

I am also left in some doubt as to the position of the High Commissioner, *vis-à-vis* the Egyptian Government. He is clearly intended by Lord Milner and his colleagues to retain a quite exceptional position in the country. But I am not equally clear upon what sanction (other than that of personal influence and moral prestige) this will rest. If there are flagrant abuses in the Administration, if the British officials remaining in Egyptian employ have to complain of outrageous treatment, if the Egyptian Government deliberately ignores the High Commissioner's advice, what exactly is to be done? I could quote plenty of instances in the history of Eastern countries where the representative of a Great Western Power, whether Great Britain, Russia, or France, has been placed in a position of veiled superiority over a native Government to which were conceded the forms of a purely nominal independence. But I know of none in which that position has been maintained in face of an independence which was not nominal but real, and of foreign representatives who were technically equal and, in some cases, none too friendly. It is, of course, easy to say that if the High Commissioner is flouted or the superior position of Great Britain ignored, the treaty can be cancelled and we shall go back again to the Protectorate, and there are already some cynical spirits who contend that this is the insidious object of Great Britain in making the present proposals. But such threats are more readily made than carried out; and I imagine that our real object is to conclude an arrangement that will endure. I think, therefore, that we should devote special attention to the position of the High Commissioner.

*Foreign Relations.*

I have pointed out that in his original Report Lord Milner proposed that the High Commissioner "should remain in charge of the foreign relations of Egypt in so far as they are of a political character," but that, in deference to the opposition of Zaghloul Pasha and his friends, who, I believe, were insistent on the point, this has been abandoned in favour of the complete surrender to Egypt of the control of her foreign relations, including the appointment of foreign Ministers abroad. I cannot conceal





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from my colleagues that I view this proposal with considerable anxiety, and that I would greatly prefer any arrangement that would offer greater safeguards for the future.

The situation must be looked at (*a*) in its external and (*b*) in its internal aspect.

(*a.*) There will, as contemplated in Lord Milner's first Report, be an Egyptian Minister or High Commissioner with an Egyptian Legation in London (to be followed presently, I suppose, by an Afghan Legation, an Arab Legation, and I dare say a good many more); and there will be Egyptian Ministers at the majority of the foreign capitals. Their good faith and loyalty to the British connection are to be maintained by the stipulation that "Egypt will undertake not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the Alliance or will create difficulties for Great Britain, and will also undertake not to enter into any agreement with a foreign Power which is prejudicial to British interests." This language, particularly the first sentence, is very vague, and within its ambit it is not difficult to conceive of intrigues at Paris and Rome which might be very prejudicial to British interests. To anyone familiar either with the history of French diplomacy towards Egypt or with the present tortuous proceedings of Italian policy in the East, it will not be difficult to imagine conditions which would hover continually on the line between good faith and bad faith, and might cause us much trouble. The only answer given to me is that we must trust, and that if the Egyptian Government had unofficial instead of official representatives at foreign capitals they would probably intrigue much more.

(*b.*) I confess that I view with greater anxiety the possible position at Cairo. In 1904 Lord Lansdowne, by his agreement with the French, purchased the French acceptance of our superior position in Egypt by a corresponding recognition of the French Protectorate and abandonment of our own claims in Morocco. France retains and is daily extending and consolidating the position thus conceded to her in Morocco, and is making it an excuse for being exceedingly disagreeable to us both about the Egyptian clauses of the Turkish Treaty, to which her assent is required, and about Tangier. Are we perhaps paving the way by which she may redeem the, as she thinks, disastrous error that she committed in Egypt when she abdicated her share in the condominium over thirty years ago, and are we creating the opportunity for one more source of discord between her and Great Britain? The Anglo-Persian Agreement, which conceded to Great Britain in Persia a position somewhat analogous to that which it is proposed that we should occupy in Egypt, has not prevented France from intriguing against us, and putting every conceivable obstacle in our path at Tehran. In Egypt she already retains the great advantages of the French language, French judges and judicial procedure, and French schools. She will be dealing there in future with an independent sovereign State. May she not be tempted at times of friction or strained relations to use the first opportunity provided for her of twisting the Lion's tail? May she not even revive her dreams of a North African sphere of French influence from the Atlantic Ocean to the Suez Canal? Even if the Quai d'Orsay be innocent of any such deliberate intention, may not extreme nationalist elements in Egypt, which will not be suppressed by the proposed treaty, but will probably gather fresh strength as time goes on, intrigue with the French in Egypt as their most natural anti-British ally? So long as we were both the protecting and the occupying Power in Egypt we could deal sharply with such pretensions. We shall in future lack the local power, while not escaping the responsibility.

The only guarantee that I can think of, supposing Lord Milner's proposals to be accepted, for rendering the position less dangerous than it might otherwise become, is a categorical undertaking that the Egyptian Government shall not appoint foreign officials to any branch—or at least any important branch—of the Administration without the consent of the High Commissioner. It may be said that, once the British Protectorate has disappeared, our relations with the Egyptian Government will be so cordial that no danger of foreign intrigue will survive, and that they will regard us as a natural buffer against the meddlesomeness of other foreign Powers. This is an excellent theory. But I have too much experience of the zest with which Oriental Governments fish in troubled waters, if there is the slightest chance of extracting some profit from the operation, to be at all confident that it will always be acted upon.

*The British Services.*

I am in general agreement with Lord Milner's proposals as to future appointments to the Egyptian service and as to the retirement, whether voluntary or compulsory, of the present British staff. I do not doubt that the Egyptian Govern-



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

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ment, unless they are swayed by some violent gust of anti-foreign feeling, will desire to retain a considerable number of these, and will propose equitable terms for the remainder. What we have more to fear is that the British officials may stampede in large numbers—a course which we should do all in our power to dissuade.

In his earlier Report Lord Milner proposed a period of five years, within which the fate of the present British staff should be decided. In his memorandum this is cut down to two years. Might it not be desirable to fix a minimum of two years and a maximum of five in order to prevent any undue dislocation?

*Trade.*

Egypt is to enjoy complete freedom in her commercial relations with foreign countries, *i.e.*, she may conclude Tariff Treaties. There must of course be most-favoured-nation treatment for British trade.

*Finance.*

This is barely mentioned in the papers submitted. Egypt must, as I have argued, continue to bear the expense of the Frontier Districts Administration. To her Soudan contribution I will come in a moment. She is not, I understand, to be asked for any contribution to the High Commissioner's office, even though a portion of his services will be rendered to the Egyptian Government. This is probably right. Nor, I gather, is she to make any contribution towards the British Imperial force, even though there is a contingent claim upon this force for Egyptian purposes. In the event of the British army being called upon to assist in the defence of the Egyptian frontiers, or the suppression of internal revolt, I imagine that a special case would arise.

*The Soudan.*

This is not mentioned in the memorandum; but it occupies three pages of the earlier Report. It cannot be omitted from the Treaty because (1) the Egyptians will insist upon its inclusion; (2) Egyptian finances are involved; (3) it is equally to our interest to settle its future by agreement with the Egyptian Government. Egypt's interest in the Soudan, as has been pointed out by Lord Milner, is fourfold. Her life depends on the water which flows down from or through the Soudan. The Soudan Civil Service is still largely filled by Egyptians. The Soudanese army is a part of the Egyptian army and is paid for by Egypt. Ever since the Cromer Agreement of 1899 Egypt has been called upon to pay for the deficit in the Soudanese budget.

Lord Milner does not propose the abrogation of the latter agreement. On the contrary, he proposes its continuance. But we shall have difficulty in maintaining a a position in which, while Egyptian participation both in the Civil Service and in the Army is expected to dwindle rapidly and as soon as possible disappear, Egyptian revenues are to continue, for some time at any rate, to bear a considerable charge. The answer, I suppose, will be that Egypt must continue to pay for the water that she enjoys, having, of course, a seat on the permanent Board of Control, and that a part of the price which she must pay for the withdrawal of the British garrison from Egypt is the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrison from the Soudan. The complete political and military independence of the Soudan is in any case the ulterior object which British interests demand.

*General Considerations.*

The remarks which I have made in this paper must not be held to detract from the thanks which we all owe to Lord Milner and his colleagues for their immense and self-sacrificing labours in the solution of the Egyptian problem. They have rendered a great national and Imperial service. Nor do I dissent either from Lord Milner's main proposition that the solution is to be found in a treaty of alliance between Great Britain and the Egyptian Government, or from the major premiss on which that principle is founded, namely, that if we are to advance, it must be a large advance in the direction not merely of co-operation but of trust.

Lord Milner's own defence of his proposals will, I think, be that they are in the nature of a gamble in which we stake a good deal on the chance that the Egyptians will be willing to work his projected constitution with loyalty, while if they fail we shall always be in a position to go back.

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



It has been my object to elucidate those aspects of his proposal which seem to me to be fraught either with obscurity or with danger; so that we may by careful examination remedy the one and avoid the other. That study the various Departments of our Government who are concerned will, I am sure, give without delay.

*Procedure.*

So far the only Egyptians committed have been Zaghloul Pasha and his associates, Adly Pasha, and a few others who came over to England in a private capacity to give their views. In Egypt there has been the general discussion of the proposals as outlined in the press, to which I have already referred. The *fellaheen*, who are vitally affected, have not so far given any sign. We are, however, under a pledge given by Lord Allenby to the Sultan of Egypt that he shall appoint a formal and official deputation, representing different important parties and elements in the Egyptian community, to discuss the projected arrangement with His Majesty's Government.

I suggest that when His Majesty's Government have decided upon the general outlines of the scheme which they propose to offer, Lord Allenby on his return to Egypt, which I have asked him to postpone for a fortnight, in order that the decision may be taken while he is here, should invite the Sultan to appoint and to despatch this delegation to England, in order to draw up the actual terms of the treaty with His Majesty's Government.

Should we come to an agreement, the text will then be taken back to Egypt and submitted to a National Assembly in the course of the forthcoming spring. We can hardly expect an earlier solution.

C. OF K.

*Foreign Office, October* 11, 1920.



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٤٠و]
# (٤٧٣/٧٩)



Private & Personal.

THE HAGUE.
October 13th,1920.

My dear Lord Curzon:-

It was only yesterday afternoon that I received Campbell's letter transmitting your memorandum on the Egyptian proposals and also his personal and confidential telegram. In view of the urgency you evidently attach to the matter, which I quite understand, I am forwarding my observations by the Air Post from Amsterdam this morning without awaiting the receipt of the general conclusions of the Milner Mission. My observations are necessarily framed in a great hurry and, apart from the conclusions of the Mission, I have not had an opportunity of seeing any of Lord Milner's memoranda or letters or his reply to Mr. Churchill, which are all referred to in your memorandum. I am therefore liable, through ignorance of the true inwardness of the proposals or the reasons which make such drastic changes necessary, to go off the lines and I hope you will forgive me if I have done

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٤٠ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٨٠)



done so. No-one can accuse me of being anti-native, indeed in Egypt I suffered under the opposite imputation. But to speak frankly the proposals fill me with astonishment and sincere misgivings which are not altogether allayed by my great confidence in Lord Milner or my respect for the local knowledge and judgment of Maxwell and Rodd or the sound sense of Hurst. I think we are going altogether too fast, and that it will be the Egyptians who will suffer. But I confess to considerable bias on the subject. When ones Egyptian education has been in the Cromer-Gorst-Kitchener school, which inculcated our obligations towards the Fellaheen and our duty to improve their lot, it is disconcerting to be told by Hurst, as I was, that whatever the Egyptians may do to each other is no concern of ours and that we ought to confine ourselves to the object for which we first entered Egypt, viz. the protection of the foreign bondholders!



bondholders! This may be a convenient limitation of our responsibilities, but can we so limit them? Are we justified in trying to do so and will the new arrangement be workable? Time only can give the answer and I hope that it will be in the affirmative. In any case we have now committed ourselves, for I do not see how we can go back, to what is a very bold and interesting experiment. As you will see I entirely concur in your memorandum. It seems to me to cover all the ground.

Yours,

R Crewe.

# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٤١ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٨٢)





Private and Confidential.

Oct 13 1920

OBSERVATIONS ON THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSALS
AND LORD CURZON'S MEMORANDUM OF OCTOBER 11th.

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I am entirely in agreement with Lord Curzon's Memorandum and have few observations to offer excepting of a general character.

I understand that under the proposed arrangement we ~~entirely~~ altogether dissociate ourselves from the internal government of Egypt, which will no longer be our concern, and that the rights of the British High Commissioner will be limited to intervention in cases where foreigners are likely to be unfavourably affected by Egyptian legislation. But can we, with our High Commissioner enjoying an "exceptional" position, and with, as it is evidently hoped, a number of British officials still in Egyptian employment, in effect limit our responsibilities to such a degree? My fear is that we are retaining a responsibility which we cannot properly fulfil. We are requesting Foreign Powers to surrender their Courts and capitulatory rights; we may be able to guarantee them justice in the Courts of Law, but can we guarantee them administrative justice and fair play, especially in the Provinces? What control, if any, shall we hav e? It is the feeling of uncertainty on this head which is rendering Foreign Powers so chary of agreeing to our request.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٤٢ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٨٤)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٤٣و]
# (٤٧٣/٨٥)



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- 2 -

The position of the British High Commissioner will certainly be "exceptional", -- to my mind rather exceptional than enviable. Without under-rating the importance of "precedence" in an Oriental country, it need not imply power. May not the High Commissioner's position be, or become, one of "dignity and impotence" ? Hitherto in Egypt we have endeavoured to give the Native as much precedence and dignity as possible, but to retain the power in our own hands. There is now a complete reversal of policy. What powers, if any, will the High Commissioner have? I grant that Field-Marshal Allenby, with his immense personal prestige, may for some time to come exercise a great moral influence. But will this be sufficient, and will he have at his disposal any machinery to do more than this? Yet I am sure that more will be required of him.

What is to happen at the Ministry of the Interior? That Ministry is, when all is said and done, the political and administrative heart of the country; for which excellent reason the Egyptians have always desired to exclude us from it and to obtain complete control for themselves. It was due to the breakdown of the British side of the Interior and the weakening of its Inspectorate, with the inevitable consequence of mal-practice and maltreatment by native officials out of control, that induced the general dissatisfaction leading up to the events of March 19th.

Through the ~~change~~ chain, Mudir - Mamur - Omdeh, the Minister of the Interior has almost complete power to squeeze ~~the~~ an enemy or adversary out of existence without any attendant circumstances which could be brought before a Court of Law. My friend, Mohamet Said Pacha, when Minister of the Interior, repeatedly tried to initiate the process against his rivals

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٤٣ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٨٦)





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

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- 3 -

of the Party of the People, and he had to be checked. With the Minister's approval, a local magnate may be allowed to render the life of his neighbours impossible. Water can be cut off or diverted, crops burnt and up-rooted, stock driven away, etc., without any evidence being obtainable as to how it all came about. During my time at the Interior foreign land-owners and Land Companies, including British concerns, were frequently subjected to such treatment. They complained to the Residency, or to me, or to a British official; a British Inspector was sent to the spot, explanations were demanded from the Mudir and, unless there was improvement and redress, the local Mudir or Omdeh lost his post. Will any such machinery be retained or not? I may add that the ex-Khedive used to be one of the worst offenders in his efforts to grab his neighbours' land and to bully and intimidate neighbouring land-owners. The local Native Authorities would never lift a finger in such cases, and it was only by purely British agency that His Highness's machinations could be stopped.

There will, of course, be no Adviser in the Interior under the new arrangement, but will there be any high British Official at all in that Ministry? If, for instanc a British Director-General of Public Security is retained, this will be very important. The British District Inspect-or will have someone to whom he can report. Unless there is such a high official, I hardly think that any of the best District Inspectors will remain, nor would the position of the British Police Commandants at Cairo and Alexandria -- and it seems essential that British officers should for

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٤٤ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٨٨)





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

- 4 -

some time to come be retained in these posts -- be tenable.

Unless such an Official is retained in the Interior, and given access to the High Commissioner, the latter will have no means of procuring information. At the same time, the continued presence of such an Official in the Administration implies British responsibility.

I have referred to official oppression, but in Upper Egypt, Girgeh and Assiout, the sport of Copt-baiting has always been as legitimate and popular a diversion as was Jew-baiting in Russia in the olden days. The Saidi, or Upper Egyptian, is an excitable and murderous fellow, as was shewn by his treatment of our officials in the train last year, and the baiting might easily lead to something more serious. Not a few of these Copts are foreign protégés.

Is it an impossible hypothesis to suppose that at some future date the massacre of, say, Greek moneylenders at Tantah might, if we declined responsibility and adequate redress was not forthcoming, lead to the appearance of the Greek fleet off Alexandria?

I am assuming throughout that, as Sir Cecil Hurst has told me, we can entirely divest ourselves of all responsibility towards the Fellaheen and leave them to the tender mercies of the big land-owner or Effendi, who will oppress or exploit them. Nor need any reforms for their benefit be expected from the Legislative Assembly, a body composed almost entirely of provincial notables, who are in some ways the most stable and best element in the population, but are hopelessly selfish, reactionary and ignorant of anything

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٤٥ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٩٠)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٤٦و]
# (٤٧٣/٩١)



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- 5 -

but their own immediate material interests. During these last years they have shewn themselves to be rack-renters and arch-profiteers. Thereby, however, hangs another tale, as events in Egypt are inevitably marching towards an acute agrarian crisis and a conflict between the big land-owner and the small man, the tenant and the labourer. The movement at present lacks leaders and may take some time to materialise, but it will be serious when it comes. We shall be fortunate if we can escape responsibility in the matter.

As Lord Curzon has pointed out, much depends on how the new arrangement will be worked. In the West, princi-ples are more important than personalities, but I am not sure that in the East the converse is not the case. Matters seem to have been so managed that the whole credit for the extensive concessions now made to Egyptian national aspira-tions will go to Saad Zaghloul and his satellites, Adly keeps discreetly in the background, and the Sultan and the elder statesmen, Ruchdi, Sirri, Mazloum, and the present Government in Egypt scarcely appear. The first Adminis-tration of the Independent Egyptian State will be principally composed of Zaghloulites. I know them all well, and regard them with profound distrust. Zaghloul himself is probably the best of them, but he is quite unscrupulous and, acting as the Khedive's paid agent, he behaved very badly during the last session of the Legislative Assembly. Mahmoud, the leader of the last delegation to Egypt, is a plausible fellow and, as an ex-Mudir, will have a claim to high office

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٤٦ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٩٢)





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

- 6 -

in the Interior. He lost his post for torturing witnesses in a Police case at Damanhur. Ismail Sidki, perhaps the cleverest man in Egypt, had lost all caste by being implicated in a series of scandals with women, but has now no doubt regained it. Hamed-el-Basel, a profligate spendthrift and a Senussi agent during the war, will become Dictator of the Fayoul. I trust that the new Government will contain some more decent elements; also that the position of those Natives who were our open and whole-hearted partisans in the past, such as Sirri Pacha and Sheikh Demerdash, will be safeguarded. It is possible that they hedged in time.

We have guaranteed the Throne to the present Sultan, and the succession to his son. I scarcely see how he can last. His position must have been totally undermined, not only by Chirol's gratuitous attacks, but by the course of recent events and the way in which he has been ignored. He is fatuous, but comparatively honest, loyal and well-meaning, and we have scarcely been fair to him. The Nationalist leaders will almost certainly quarrel with him, and he has no support in the contry outside the Residency. They will want Omar Tussum or the ex-Khedive,(who is, I notice, already on the warpath), or Kemal-el-Din, but I do not think the last named of these will give trouble. We shall have no easy task in maintaining Fuad I. on the Throne. He was possible as a Ruler under our tutelage, but is scarcely so as the Sovereign of an independent State.

I am in entire agreement with Lord Curzon as regards the absolute necessity of excluding any European officers excepting

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٤٧ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٩٤)





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

- 7 -

excepting British from the Egyptian army. The alternative to European officers would probably be Turks. It is also most important to guarantee that foreigners shall not be appointed to replace the British officials in the Administration. We shall have sufficient foreign intrigue to deal with from outside that Administration, and every foreign official appointed, especially if a Frenchman or Italian, would be a political agent.

I agree with every word in "b" on Page 6 of Lord Curzon's Memorandum. The Department where such a thing would be most likely to occur is that of the Public Works and Irrigation. There will be Englishmen in the Finance and Justice, and the Egyptians will want to run the Interior and Education themselves, but they know that they cannot manage Public Works and Irrigation. In spite of all that our Inspectors could do, this Department has always been a hot-bed of corruption. In a dry summer, with water worth its weight in gold and every cultivator ready to pay for it, the temptation to the native engineer is very great. In such matters an Italian Chief would be more easy to deal with than a British one, but it will, I hope, come to pass that, from motives of self-interest, if not of gratitude, the Egyptians will retain British advisers in the Public Works and Irrigation.

As regards the British Service, I fear that few of the best British officials will desire to stay in Egypt under the new arrangement. They are already most of them very dissatisfied with their present scale of pay, which, under the existing expense of maintenance and

travelling /

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٤٨ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٩٦)





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

- 8 -

travelling, makes life very difficult for them and leave almost impossible.

In the last section of Lord Curzon's memorandum - "Procedure", Paragraph 1, I would suggest the omission of the sentence " The Fellaheen --- any sign " . The Fellah isequite inarticulate and could not be expected to give any sign. He is capable of tearing up railways if worked up to do so by agitators, but he would not at presen t take any action on his own initiative.

(Signed) R,Graham.

13.10.20.



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٤٩ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٩٨)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٥٠و] (٤٧٣/٩٩)



Circulated by the Secretary of State for India.

Montagu

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C.P. 2000
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Oct 19 1920

## EGYPT.

CP 1960

The proposals of Lord Milner's mission to Egypt have now been circulated to the Cabinet, and I feel bound to draw the attention of my colleagues to the effect of these proposals on Indian affairs. I know so very little about Egypt that it is only from this standpoint that I would approach the subject, and I am quite prepared to believe that Lord Milner's proposals are in every way suitable to the conditions of Egypt.

(1) I would draw the attention of the Cabinet to the marked difference between the two missions—to India and to Egypt. The mission of the Secretary of State for India to India was carefully considered by the Cabinet. Its view was circumscribed by a Cabinet pronouncement; it was instructed to discuss only with the Government of India: its proposals were formulated in a report to the Cabinet. They were only published with the permission of the Cabinet, and they were then laid before Parliament.

I can find no record that Lord Milner's mission was ever considered by the Cabinet. No limitation was placed upon his mission. His proposals were published months before the Cabinet had ever seen them, and he negotiated not with the Government of Egypt, but with the extremists in Egypt, and his proposals were published as being contingent in their fulfilment on their acceptance by the extremists. I do not believe that there is any weight to be attached to the suggestion that because they had not been approved when published by the Government we have a free hand. Theoretically, that may be so. Practically, loyalty to our colleague, the position that he holds, and the authority with which he put forward his proposals, ties our hands. He is prepared, and if I am right in my premise, the Government is prepared, to do what he suggests if Zaghlul will accept it. (Am I right in describing Zaghlul as the Tilak, the Gandhi, or the de Valera of Egyptian politics?) If he will accept no consideration of efficient Government, no consideration of the fact that Egypt as a Protectorate has been incorporated in the British Imperial system, no consideration of the well-being of Egyptian civil servants is to modify or circumscribe his proposal. In India, Parliament has demanded and the Government has been scrupulous to secure that the employment of Indian civil servants, and indeed their prospects of employment, shall not be jeopardised by any reforms. Disorder, inefficient Government, is to be avoided. Searching enquiries are to be made as to whether the new Government will be really representative of the people. I can find no trace that these considerations weighed in Egypt. I have always been told that India cannot aspire to self-government because ultimately the maintenance of order and the preservation of public safety depends upon the British Army. For Egypt, I

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٥٠ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٠٠)





presume that the British garrison that is still to continue, would not remain absolutely quiescent whatever happened internally in Egypt now that Egyptian independence is to be complete. The extremists in India are ignored, and I understand that nobody disputed the wisdom of doing so. In Egypt, the treaty is made with the extremists. I, like the Secretary of State for War, can find nothing which makes it possible to negotiate with Zaghlul, which does not at least point the way to a negotiation with de Valera or Gandhi, and I have only to say that, apart from the conditions, for nobody can doubt the difference between Egypt and India, the methods of the Milner proposals contrasted with the method of settlement of Indian affairs, has enormously increased our Indian difficulties. My police reports show this conclusively. My letters from the Governors emphasise it. Let me quote:—

> "The general impression in Indian circles is that Great Britain has been compelled to make Egypt independent, that the Egyptians have by intrigue and violent agitation, gained freedom for themselves. They add that those who advocate moderation and counsel the adoption of constitutional methods of political agitation in India will have to hang their heads in shame and that a veritable premium is put on violence, anarchy and anti-British intrigue. On one point Indians of all classes are agreed that the concession of independence to Egypt is a grievous blow to British prestige. That it will greatly add to the difficulties and political complications of Great Britain in various parts of the world; that its effect on the situation in Mesopotamia, Persia and Central Asia generally will be very bad; and that it will also put heart into the Turks, who had begun to despair of their success. In Indian circles the opinion is general that the decline and fall of the British Empire has begun, that the British have degenerated, and that the process will be rapid, if what has been done in Egypt is followed before long in Ireland and the oversea Dominions."

As I have stated in another paper, it is difficult for us to insist upon the control of foreign relations in Mesopotamia when we have abandoned it in Egypt. Mesopotamia has never been incorporated in the British Imperial system. All I can say is that Lord Milner's proposals may lead to peace in Egypt. I can only hope that it may be possible to treat one part of the British Empire wholly separately and without reference to other parts. I envy proposals which do not require Parliamentary enactment, and have not got to regard the well-being of the Civil Services for fear of the ex-civil servants and their influence on the Government. I do not see that they even regard the well-being of British commercial interests which I am always enjoined to protect and safeguard in India.

I repeat that I do not write in any hostility to the proposals which I am unable to judge, but merely to contrast them with the admittedly different conditions in India.

E. S. M.

19th October 1920.



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٥١و]
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

Palace Hotel,
Bruxelles.
Oct. 20th, 1920.

Your letter of the 18th has just arrived asking whether I shall be able to take part in the Egyptian discussion. I hardly know how to answer it. I do not think that I shall be able to do any work here outside that imposed upon me by our meetings of the League of Nations Council. This is heavy and con--tinuous, and is apt to be varied only by ceremonial entertainments as laborious as themselves, and per--haps not more unprofitable. I doubt therefore whether I shall be able to write any memorandum worth having upon the Milner proposals, especially as I have not got here the necessary documents. I have some hope of being back in London before Allenby sails; and, in that case, the very small stock of wisdom on which, in this connection, I can draw will be entirely at the disposal of the Cabinet.

We are to discuss the Permanent Court of Inter--national Justice to-morrow; and I sent by the Mes--senger who left to-night a copy of a few Notes which I have circulated to the members of the Council, and which I hope are in conformity with the views of the Cabinet.

A Lithuanian and a Polish representative are by way of meeting us on Monday; but the Lithuanian path--etically telegraphs that he doubts whether he can attend in time because the Poles are detaining him in

# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٥١ظ]
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



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٥٢و]
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

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2.

the "Corridor" ! The Polish situation is tragic;
but you will admit that this is a humorous element
~~of~~ in it.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٥٢ظ]
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

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

Lord Curzon

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31

THE STATUS OF EGYPT.

October 29th 1920.

I ask the earnest attention of the Cabinet to the accompanying Memorandum from the Chief of Naval Staff.

The importance of the views expressed therein will be at once apparent.

I am not aware what are the present steps which it is proposed to take to deal with this most important question.

I am sure it will have been considered by Lord Milner and that my colleagues will be ready to take such steps as are necessary and may seem desirable to ensure making the position secure.

(Intd.) W.H.L.



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



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

NAVAL STRATEGY AS AFFECTED BY THE PROPOSED FUTURE STATUS OF EGYPT.

Memorandum by the Chief of the Naval Staff.

In view of the far-reaching proposals with regard to the future Government of Egypt which are now before the Cabinet, it is desirable that the naval aspect of this question should be clearly stated, as the decision which will be taken is one of vital importance to our Naval Strategy.

2. The control of the sea communications of the Empire is the duty of the Navy, and one of the main arteries of these communications, connecting the United Kingdom with India, Australia, and our other territories in the Far East, passes through the heart of Egypt. The diversion of traffic to the Cape route in the event of the Canal not being available would be a very grave disadvantage.

3. The safety of the Suez Canal route to the East is a matter of more urgent importance at the present time than ever before, for the reason that we are called upon to face a naval situation which has never previously arisen.

4. Up to the time of the late War, the principal foreign naval power was concentrated in Europe, and necessitated a similar concentration of our naval forces. At the present time our only two serious rivals on the sea - Japan and the U.S.A. - are to be found in widely separated quarters of the globe, and it is impracticable to keep the fleet at a sufficient strength to effect the double concentration at home and in the East which would enable us to meet the situation satisfactorily.

5. The fleet must, therefore, make up for its lack of preponderance in all oceans by its mobility, that is to say, its capacity for effecting a quick passage to any threatened portion of the Empire.

6. In this question of mobility the Suez Canal plays a vital part. The alternative route to the East, via the Cape, is far longer, and time may be of the utmost importance: the security or loss of an outpost of Empire like Hong Kong may be decided by the availability of the Canal route.

7. The Suez Canal and its approaches are the most delicate link in the chain of naval communications with the East, since the narrow and shallow nature of these waterways renders them more easily open to interruption by attack from land or sea than any other portion of the route.

8. It is essential to our naval strategy that the safety of the Canal route is assured to us.

(Sd.) BEATTY.

27. 10. 20.

# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٥٤ظ]
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



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# (٤٧٣/١٠٩)



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S E C R E T.

DRAFT CONCLUSIONS of a Conference of Ministers held in Mr. Bonar Law's Room at the House of Commons S.W., on Monday, 1st November, 1920 at 4-0 p.m.

- - - - - - - - -

P R E S E N T:-

The Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A.Chamberlain, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. W.S.Churchill, M.P., Secretary of State for War & Air.

The Right Hon. R. Munro, K.C., M.P., Secretary for Scotland.

The Right Hon. H.A.L. Fisher, M.P., President of the Board of Education.

The Right Hon. A.J. Balfour, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. E.S.Montagu, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

The Right Hon. Sir Hamar Greenwood, Bart., K.C., M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland.

The Right Hon. Sir Robert Horne, G.B.E., K.C., M.P., President of the Board of Trade.

The Right Hon. Sir L. Worthington Evans, Bart., M.P.,

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Field-Marshal the Viscount Allenby, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., — Mr. Philip Kerr, C.H.,

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B., ..... Secretary, Cabinet.

Brigadier-General S.H.Wilson, C.B., C.M.G., Principal Assistant Secretary.

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# (٤٧٣/١١٠)



# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٥٦و]
# (٤٧٣/١١١)



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THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MEETING AT BRUSSELS.

(1) The Prime Minister, on behalf of his colleagues, congratulated and thanked Mr Balfour on the singularly successful way in which he had represented British interests at the recent meeting of the Council of the League of Nations at Brussels, and more particularly in connection with the question of the Court of International Justice.

INTER-ALLIED AND ANGLO-AMERICAN DEBTS.

(2) With reference to Cabinet 30 (20), Conclusion 2, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that the question of Inter-Allied and Anglo-American debts had now become urgent, and he had asked that it might be placed on the Agenda for that day. In view, however, of the urgency of discussing the status of Egypt, he did not wish to press the matter, provided that it could be discussed at a very early date.

The Secretary was instructed to place the question on the Agenda Paper of the next meeting of the Cabinet, on Wednesday next, November 3rd.

THE STATUS OF EGYPT.

(3) Lord Milner made a full statement to the Conference in connection with the visit of his Special Mission to Egypt, and proposed recommendations regarding the future status of that country. A summary of this statement, as well as of explanations given in reply to certain questions, is given in the Appendix.

There was general agreement that if any Treaty were to be enacted, it should provide, inter alia, that in cases where non-Egyptians were required to act in an advisory capacity as Government officials or officers, whether in the Civil Administration or as Military Officers, they should only be appointed with the consent of the British Government; this provision being subject to exception in the case of certain posts already reserved for non-Egyptian officials of nationalities other than British, as well as in the case of Syrians, for whom special arrangements

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٥٦ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١١٢)





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

would have to be made.

After hearing Lord Milner's statement, the Conference adjourned the discussion until the morning of Thursday next, November 4th.

. . . .

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1,
November 1, 1920.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٥٧ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١١٤)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٥٨و]
# (٤٧٣/١١٥)



A P P E N D I X.

LORD MILNER said that he had been occupied for practically eleven months in considering the question of Egypt. For four months it had taken up practically his whole time, and for seven months the greater part of it. He thought that everyone would admit that if Egypt were a friendly and allied country which was decently governed and able to stand on its own feet, and if it were prepared to give us of its own accord a strategic base at all times and to place its harbours, railways, and other means of communication at our service not only in time of war but even in time of peace, it would be better, from the purely British point of view, than if Egypt were to be a British Possession, kept in subjection by force and requiring in time of peace a large permanent garrison. He foresaw considerable danger if the present situation were allowed to continue, as it was, in fact, a reproduction of that in Southern and Western Ireland. He would not go so far as to say it was so bad as in Ireland, but it was rapidly moving that way, and quite needlessly so. The quarrel with the Irish people was really a secular one, whereas in Egypt the trouble was really a new one and was, in his opinion, due to remedial causes. He saw no reason why, with good statesmanship and patience, we should not get on the same tolerable terms with the Egyptians as we were twenty years previously. Even now there was no very bad feeling amongst the greater number of people in Egypt towards the British. The Fellahin did not really care whether there was a British Protectorate or not, and this was even true of the Fellahin in the large towns. In fact, it might be said that 90 per cent. of the people in Egypt did not take very much interest one way or the other, and he was quite sure that a very large number of them did not know what the extremists were fighting for. To put it broadly, the Fellahin neither loved nor hated us, and, as he had always been governed by somebody, he was

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



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

App.

quite prepared to acquiesce in being governed by us, so long as he got his water and his crops were not interfered with, and provided he was not stirred up against us by the social superiors of his own race, and especially by the priesthood. It might be asked, in these circumstances, what was the cause of the outbreaks which took place in Egypt last year? These were, in his (Lord Milner's) opinion, due to temporary causes, and the trouble was caused primarily by the riff-raff and scallywags. He thought the feeling of unrest was partly caused by things which went wrong in the government of the country during the War, when many of the best administrators were taken away; also to the hardships which had to be endured in many cases, and to the requisitioning of labour. All this had caused bad feeling. The point he wished to emphasize, however, was that the Fellahin could be worked up against us by his social superiors: and if we were to have peace in Egypt and avoid having to maintain that peace by martial law, it was not sufficient to have 90 per cent. of the people on our side: it was essential to get some of the remaining 10 per cent. -- that was, the educated and semi-educated classes -- also to take our side. This he considered essential, for if we had some of the 10 per cent. on our side they could make opinion and we could afford to leave the rest. In the years gone by we always had some of the middle and semi-educated classes who were favourable to British rule, and it had been the greatest shock to him, when he visited Egypt, to find out what a change had taken place in the country. The Nationalist movement had only begun about 15 years ago, and it had been growing ever since. There was also, of course, the unrest caused by the War and its inevitable results. Things had been done which we would never have dreamed of doing before. He was not, however, going to labour this point, as it would be dealt with fully in the Final Report of his Commission: but he did want to emphasize the

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



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

App.

strength of the spirit of Egyptian Nationalism which dominated the 10 per cent. of the population to which he was referring. Many men dreaded at heart the withdrawal of British influence from Egypt, but no man was prepared to stand up publicly and say that he was in favour of a Protectorate; or even, without going this far, no man was prepared to stand up and say that he did not want Egyptian government. If anybody was even suspected of favouring in any way British rule, he was immediately hauled over the coals and at once made to toe the line and make a public confession of his orthodoxy. The Sultan himself had said once to him (Lord Milner) when he was talking of his weakness and unpopularity, that he could be the most popular man in Egypt on the following day if he followed the example of the Princes and agreed with their manifesto. It would thus be seen that we were up against a solid phalanx of Egyptian opinion, and in his (Lord Milner's) view, if we were to keep any control over the country otherwise than by martial law we must break up the 10 per cent. of the more educated classes and get some of them on our side, even if, in order to do so, it was necessary to make some considerable sacrifices. In the opinion of the Commission of which he was Chairman, it would be possible to re-establish genuine co-operation between the British and Egyptians in the government of Egypt by giving to the latter, who for forty years past had been saying they could govern themselves the same independent status which we contemplated giving to the much less civilised Arabs in Mesopotamia after a much shorter period of tutelage. He noticed that the Secretary of State for India had suggested that his Commission had been bargaining with the Egyptian extremists. This was not so. Adly Pasha was essentially a moderate, and was not at all anti-British; he had been more instrumental in bringing about conversations than any other man in Egypt, and had in his (Lord Milner's) opinion the best political head in

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



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

App. (61)

that country. All the men with whom they had been carrying on conversations belonged to the old Hisbel Omma, a party favoured, and it might almost be said created, by Lord Cromer. Zaghlul himself was one of Lord Cromer's men. The Hisbel Omma party used to be at daggers drawn with the Hisbel Watani, which was really the anti-British party. The mistakes which had been made by us had led them to think that we meant to destroy entirely their nationality and their individuality as a people, and to swallow them up in the British Empire. This feeling had brought the two parties together, and all joined in the cry of "No Protectorate" and "Long live complete independence". As always happened in such combinations, the extremists got the upper hand, but the deep underlying difference was still there. On the one hand there were those who neither thought they could do without us nor wanted to try, and who knew that if left to themselves they would fall under some other much less lenient domination. These men still wanted to lean upon the British, but not as subjects. They wanted to be able to hold their heads up in Egypt and not to appear less patriotic than the opposing side. He himself had been one of those who had recommended, after the War, that His Majesty's Government should receive an Egyptian Delegation in London, and he now realised that the refusal had done a good deal of harm and had given colour in Egypt to the idea that we not only wanted a Protectorate but that our intention was to absorb Egypt entirely into the British Empire.

LORD CURZON pointed out that His Majesty's Government had never declined to receive Egyptian Ministers, but that they were not prepared to receive Zaghlul, who was the leader of the party which was working against British rule. The Ministers had refused to come without Zaghlul, and the proposed journey to London accordingly fell through.

LORD MILNER, continuing, said that the main effort of his Commission had been directed towards finding a settlement which, alike in form and in substance, would allow that

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



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

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App.

section of the more educated Egyptian classes which was not not irreconcilable again to become our friends. It was necessary to take into account the self-respect and national self-consciousness of this party, or, one might almost say, its conceit: and that was why the term "Bi-lateral Agreement" had been used, as it implied the frank recognition of their nationality, of their having retained or regained a place of their own "in the sun", their relation to us being that of allies, not subjects or fellow-citizens. Throughout the discussions phraseology and face-saving had played an enormous part, as the Commission realised that they were dealing with Orientals and with children, very clever and potentially very naughty children, but also people who, once they were convinced of our sincerity and real good will towards them, were very manageable. Some doubt had been expressed as to what extent these Egyptians represented Egyptian opinion. There was no question that they had every conceivable credential that unofficial emissaries could have. There was practically no public body in Egypt which had not passed a resolution saying that Zaghlul represented their views, and there was not a voice raised on the other side. This was, however, when Zaghlul and his colleagues were supposed to advocate the extreme national demand. The real question was how they would be received when they went back to Egypt to advocate the permanent maintenance of a British Army in Egypt and the permanent concentration of the exceptional rights of foreigners in British hands, typified by the dropping of the famous predicate "complete" from the formula "independence". So far as he (Lord Milner) could make out, however, their proposals swept the boards. It did not follow, however, that this feeling would continue, but he thought it reasonable to say that the dominant feeling of hostility against the British in Egypt had been broken. The old fissure was once more apparent, and it was wider than ever. "Entente" was the order of the day, and for the moment the party of "Entente"

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٦٢ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٢٤)






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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٦٣و]
# (٤٧٣/١٢٥)



(63)

App.

had completely got the upper hand. The practical question was whether the price which the Mission was prepared to recommend to Great Britain to pay for this separation of the sheep from the goats was too high. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had quite clearly pointed out its weak points. It had always been made perfectly clear to the Egyptians with whom his (Lord Milner's) Commission had been dealing, that His Majesty's Government were not committed in any way, although he personally and his colleagues were committed to advocating a settlement on the lines laid down in their Memorandum of August last.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would like Lord Milner to give a picture of what he thought would be achieved under his proposals. He wondered whether the Egyptians would be prepared to take advice now in the same way as they did twenty years ago, for it must be remembered that at that time the situation was very different. For example, the Egyptian Government could not then get any money, whereas now they probably would think that they could raise a loan just as well as anyone else.

LORD MILNER said that his idea was that, under his scheme, the situation would revert to what it was twenty or thirty years ago, when the British Government had much less actual power in Egypt but much greater influence. Under the present arrangement the want of co-operation would bring things entirely to a standstill, and he thought we would get much greater efficiency if we gave up direct control and relied on greater influence. He did not think that anyone doubted for a moment that the Egyptians would have to have some foreign help, and that they would prefer British to anything else. They certainly wanted to run their internal affairs on their own lines, and in that respect to get rid of all outside interference. When he had been in Egypt previously, all questions in connection with finance and irrigation, and practically everything else, had been dealt with by the

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٦٣ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٢٦)






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

App.

(64)

Egyptians themselves, and the British officials merely used their influence.

A short discussion then ensued regarding the system which had been in vogue in Egypt in years gone by, during which it was pointed out that His Majesty's Government exercised a very great control, in so far as they only allowed those ministers to be appointed who were prepared to carry out a policy in accord with the British point of view. The point was also raised as to what extent it would be necessary, under the proposals, for the Egyptian Government to take the advice of the British officials in Egypt, and as to whether, if they wanted an engineer or a man to run the railways, it would be possible to insist on their employing British officials and not French or American: and, again, as to whether, if they wanted officers for the Egyptian Army, they might not say that the French knew much more about military matters than the British and that they wanted to employ French officers.

LORD MILNER explained that,under the general lines of the scheme as already outlined, this was not expressly barred, but it certainly was his intention that it should be so. His idea was that special arrangements should be created between the British and Egyptian Governments.

LORD CURZON, in reply to a question by the Prime Minister, explained the system of control over Native States in India as regards their military forces and the employment of foreign officials. He suggested that in the case of Egypt the best way would surely be to lay down certain conditions, and expressly to state that if foreign officers were required they could only be appointed with the concurrence of His Majesty's Government.

Mr BONAR LAW asked if anyone could say what views were held by British officials,at present serving in Egypt, on Lord Milner's proposals. He would like to know, for example, was opinion unanimous that they would not work?

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٦٤ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٢٨)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٦٥و]
# (٤٧٣/١٢٩)



App.

LORD ALLENBY said that he thought opinion was unanimous that something in the nature of Lord Milner's scheme would be quite workable, but he would like to point out that this view was held before the scheme provided for representation in foreign countries, and he thought most of the British officials in Egypt would be very shy of this provision.

LORD MILNER said he did not think anyone thought for a moment that the system under which an Egyptian Minister had control, with British Civil Servants working under him, would not work. Egypt remained overshadowed by British power, and he believed they were much better disposed to us than to anyone else. There was also the question of the accessibility of Egypt by sea, and with our sea power we could do practically what we liked strategically. Moreover, by her own act we were to have a permanent base in Egypt. As regards the possibility of foreign intrigues in Egypt, she was only to have an Alliance with us.

Mr BONAR LAW thought that, with good will on the part of the Egyptians, the proposed scheme might work, but if not, it appeared to him to be hopeless. He very much doubted if the fourteen foreign Powers who had Capitulatory rights would be willing to agree to the proposals. He did not think for a moment that if the British Government were in the place of one of these Powers they would do so.

Some discussion then ensued, during which considerable doubt was expressed as to how, under the proposed scheme, it would be possible to prevent the French or any other foreign Power from intriguing in Egypt and gradually strengthening their position.

The question was also discussed as to the extent to which His Majesty's Government would be responsible for providing troops for the maintenance of internal order in Egypt and the protection of the property of foreigners in the case of the Egyptian Army proving unreliable.

-8-

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



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App. (66)

It was also pointed out that the situation could never be exactly what it was in years gone by, and that, after all that had passed, the present and future High Commissioners in Egypt could never hold the same position as Lord Cromer had in the past.

LORD MILNER said that there was only one thing which he still intended to say when certain questions had been asked. He had been very careful to impress on the Egyptian Delegation that he was talking qua Mission, and could not speak for the Government any more than the Egyptian delegates could speak for the Egyptian Government. He was of opinion that his Mission was committed to reporting in favour of some scheme on the lines indicated in their Interim Report, but His Majesty's Government were, of course, not committed in any way. His hope, however, was that they might see fit to approve, with certain reservations, relations with the Egyptian Government on the lines contemplated, rather than on the lines of the relationship of a Colony or Protectorate to the Home Government. The next step would have to be to appoint representatives on both sides to draw up some formal document. A Treaty would then have to be drafted and submitted to the Egyptian Assembly. Regarding reservations, he had looked through Lord Curzon's remarks, and he thought most of his proposals were quite in accordance with the spirit of the scheme. There were, however, one or two of them which, if adopted, might upset it altogether. Regarding the military forces to be retained in Egypt, and the keeping open of our lines of communication to the East, he did not think that this had been very clearly expressed in the Memorandum. The basis of the whole thing was an Alliance in which we guaranteed Egyptian independence and the sending of an Army to protect her if need be; in return for this we demanded a valuable quid pro quo, namely, that in war all her local resources should be placed at our disposal; and, further, that we should have a permanent military base in Egypt. Moreover, in wartime, ever

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



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App.

though Egypt were not directly concerned, we were to have full use of all her resources, including railways. Regarding the point raised by Lord Curzon in connection with officers other than British serving in the Egyptian Army, he did not think that anyone had ever contemplated that any but British officers should be employed. It was merely a question of the form in which the Agreement should be drawn up. It might be made a general principle that any foreigner employed in the Public Service in Egypt must be a Britisher, or else appointed with the consent of the British Government. He did not think a stipulation of this sort would entirely upset the agreement, and it would be possible to get them to agree to it.

A short discussion then took place with regard to the best means of further considering the question, during which it was pointed out that, as the hauling down of the British Flag in Egypt and turning Egypt into an Independent State was a very serious proposal, it was desirable that the general principles should be decided before the details were discussed.

The Conference agreed to adjourn the discussion until the morning of Thursday next, November 4th.

. . . . .

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1,
November 1, 1920.

-10-

# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٦٧ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٣٤)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٦٨و]
# (٤٧٣/١٣٥)

Lord Curzon (68)

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S E C R E T .

CONCLUSIONS of a Conference of Ministers held at 10, Downing Street, S.W.1. on Thursday, 4th, November, 1920 at 11-30 a.m.

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P R E S E N T:-

THE PRIME MINISTER (in the Chair).

The Right Hon.A.Bonar Law, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon.A.Chamberlain, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon.Viscount Milner, G.C.B.,G.C.M.G.,Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon.W.S.Churchill, M.P.,Secretary of State for War & Air.

The Right Hon.A.J.Balfour,O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon.Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G.,G.C.S.I.,G.C.I.E. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon.E.S.Montagu,M.P., Secretary of State for India.

The Right Hon.H.A.L.Fisher,M.P., President of the Board of Education.

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Field-Marshal the Viscount Allenby, G.C.B.,G.C.M.G.,

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Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M.P.A.Hankey, G.C.B., ..... Secretary, Cabinet.

Brigadier-General S.H.Wilson, C.B.,C.M.G., Principal Assistant Secretary.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٦٨ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٣٦)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٦٩و]
# (٤٧٣/١٣٧)



(69)

DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION AT THE VATICAN.

(1) With reference to War Cabinet 631, Conclusion 1, arising out of a Question in Parliament, it was agreed --

That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should have authority to retain the British Diplomatic Representative at the Vatican.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.
---
Questions in Parliament in regard to the Brussels Council.

(2) The attention of the Conference was called to a series of Questions addressed to the Prime Minister on subjects discussed at the recent meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

It was agreed --

That Mr.Balfour should deal with these Questions on the basis of making the resolutions of the Council and the pertinent Memoranda available for Members of Parliament at the earliest possible moment.

THE STATUS OF EGYPT.

(3) The Conference resumed the discussion on the status of Egypt, initiated at the meeting held on November 1st.

After Lord Milner had made some important corrections in the draft summary attached to the Conclusions of the previous meeting, the discussion was resumed.

In regard to the proposal that Egypt should enjoy the right to representation in foreign countries, apprehensions were expressed that this would give too great an opportunity for anti-British intrigues by Powers with interests or traditional ambitions in Egypt.

Lord Milner made it clear that the omission of this provision would be contrary to the spirit and letter of the scheme, and that no scheme which omitted it could be carried through any representative Egyptian assembly.

It was pointed out, however, that British control over Egyptian foreign relations was safeguarded in great measure by the provision that Egypt should enter into no agreement with a foreign Power which was prejudicial to British interests.

It was explained that the Egyptians attached great

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٦٩ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٣٨)





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

importance to representation on the League of Nations and on International Conferences on all questions, technical or otherwise. This was one of the reasons for the insertion of the provision under discussion.

The trend of the discussion was in the direction that some alternative must be found to our present position in Egypt, the maintenance of which required the presence of a large military force, and this even though, as foreshadowed by the Secretary of State for War, considerable reductions in the present force of 15,000 to 16,000 men might prove practicable. The question for consideration was whether Lord Milner's proposed alternative was the best possible.

This led to considerable discussion on the military aspects, and the question was asked as to how the size of the garrison would compare on the alternative assumptions --

(i) that the present state of affairs continued,

and

(ii) that the proposals of Lord Milner's Commission were adopted and received only a moderate degree of general acceptance by the Egyptian people.

Field-Marshal Lord Allenby stated that, under the Commission's proposals, the British forces at Ismalia (where Lord Milner suggested they would be stationed) would be at the mercy of the Egyptians since their water-supply would be at the mercy of Cairo, which must be considered the heart of Egypt from a military point of view. He laid great stress, therefore, on the maintenance of a British force in Cairo. If no British troops were kept there, he felt certain that foreign nations, including the Americans, would probably insist on the provision of Legation Guards. Otherwise, the High Commissioner and other Europeans in Cairo would be at the mercy of any seditious movement.

Questioned as to his views on the scheme as a whole, Lord Allenby (who was due to leave for Egypt on the following day) stated that he did not like the manner in which negotiations

-2-



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٧٠ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٤٠)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٧١و]
# (٤٧٣/١٤١)



(3)

had been carried out with Zaghlul, who is our enemy, instead of with the Egyptian Government. He felt, however, that we were now to a considerable extent committed to the scheme, a view which did not meet with unanimous concurrence in the Conference. Lord Allenby attached great importance to a future procedure supporting our friends instead of trying vainly to conciliate our enemies. Among our friends are the present Egyptian Ministry, who would then in all probability give us their loyal support in the execution of the scheme. At the present time the Egyptians were coming to realise that they were receiving fair-play from the British, both in internal and in foreign affairs. Unless, however, they received a large measure of autonomy, they would consider that they had been betrayed, as, even though wrongly, they regarded Lord Milner as a plenipotentiary. Lord Allenby attached great importance to the fact that the British Government had guaranteed to uphold the Sultan and his dynasty. This committed them to some degree of interference in the affairs of Egypt. In his experience the Sultan, though unpopular, was a shrewd man and an honest man, who would support us if we supported him. If we failed to give such support, we should earn the contempt of our enemies and the hostility of our friends. He urged that any army of occupation must be British. The conduct of the Indian troops had been unexceptionable, but the Egyptians disliked the long-continued presence of coloured troops. Subject to these remarks, Lord Allenby was not opposed to Lord Milner's proposals, as a basis for consideration in consultation with a representative Egyptian Delegation to be nominated by the Sultan; but he regarded as essential the retention for the present of troops in Cairo.

The question was then discussed as to whether the proposed British force was sufficient to enable us to maintain the dynasty.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٧١ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٤٢)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٧٢و]
# (٤٧٣/١٤٣)



(72)

The Prime Minister, with the agreement of his colleagues, impressed on Lord Allenby that he should make it clear in Egypt that the British Government was not finally committed to the scheme. Egypt was not bound by the adherence of Zaghlul and his colleagues to the proposals, and knew that she was perfectly free to examine them and to suggest amendments. The position of the British Government was precisely similar; it was merely in process of examining and considering a scheme presented to them only in the form of a summary by the Commission which had drawn it up. The Prime Minister made it clear that the question of whether the Government would exercise its freedom was a question of policy to be considered later.

Lord Allenby made it perfectly clear that he would be obliged, in conversation with the Sultan, to enter into the question in some detail.

This led to a discussion as to the nature of the Delegation, representing all shades of Egyptian opinion, which it was proposed, as the next step, should be sent by the Egyptian Government to London. It was pointed out that it was essential to make clear to this Delegation whether it was to discuss details of a scheme already accepted in principle, or merely to reopen the whole question.

Lord Milner pointed out that, notwithstanding the boycott of his Mission in Egypt, it had in the end succeeded in eliciting the attitude of all shades of Egyptian opinion.

It was generally agreed that no decision could be taken at the moment as to the precise purpose of the proposed Delegation. The procedure should be somewhat as follows :-

(a) Consideration by the Cabinet of Lord Milner's Report ;

(b) A decision by the Cabinet on the question of policy;

-4-

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٧٢ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٤٤)





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

(73)

(c) If that decision were of a character to render such procedure desirable, the reception of a Delegation, appointed by the Egyptian Government, to discuss the details of the British Government's decision.

.....

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,

November 4, 1920.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٧٣ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٤٦)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٤٧و]
# (٤٧٣/١٤٧)



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No. 1. — Secretary of State

EGYPT AND SOUDAN. [November 10.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 3

[E 13957/6/16] No. 1.

*Statement by Viscount Milner made at the Meeting between the Special Mission to Egypt and Saad Pasha Zaghlul and his Colleagues at 3 P.M. at the Colonial Office on the 9th November, 1920.—(Received at Foreign Office November 10.)*

IT seemed desirable to have this meeting before the departure of the Egyptian representatives in order to clear up the situation and leave room for further co-operation between them and the mission in the future.

The report, which the gentlemen who have lately returned from Egypt have brought back to us, seems to indicate that there is a great body of opinion favourable to a settlement on the basis outlined in the memorandum of August. On the other hand, they state that there are several points in the memorandum which they desire to modify and several fresh conditions which they wish to add to it before promising their unconditional support. It is not necessary for me to dwell upon these points to-day, because the mission are unanimously of opinion that no good purpose would be served by a further discussion of details at the present stage.

The memorandum never professed to do more than indicate the general lines on which an agreement could be arrived at. In any case, as we have always foreseen, the agreement itself, if it is decided to proceed with it, will have to be the outcome of formal negotiations between duly accredited representatives of the British and Egyptian Governments. In those negotiations the fresh points, which you have brought forward as the result of the visit of some of your number to Egypt, can be raised, as other points may be raised on one side or the other. It would be impossible and undesirable to exclude any proposals not evidently inconsistent with the spirit of the agreement outlined in the memorandum, which on the face of it requires elucidation and elaboration before it can be converted into a formal treaty. It would, in our opinion, not facilitate a settlement if we were to anticipate these discussions; therefore we think it wiser to refrain from any expression of opinion on the new points recently raised by you at the present time, though we believe that a satisfactory solution can and will be found, when regular negotiations can be undertaken.

What is far more important at the present stage than any further discussion of details is to influence opinion both here and in Egypt in a sense favourable to a settlement on the lines which we both favour, and above all to cultivate and strengthen by every means the spirit of friendship and mutual confidence which our conversations here have helped to engender, but which must become general on both sides if our efforts are to lead to the desired result. As far as this country is concerned, we hope that the presentation of the report of the mission, which we are anxious to complete as quickly as possible, will conduce to that end. But it is equally important that a similar effect should be produced in Egypt by your endeavours. We gratefully recognise how much you have already done in that direction. But it is evident that there is still opposition to be overcome, that there are great numbers of people in Egypt who are not imbued with the spirit of the agreement, but are for one reason or another hostile to a good understanding between Great Britain and Egypt. They are, or profess themselves to be, suspicious of the intentions of this country, and they do not recognise the generous spirit in which Great Britain is prepared to meet the aspirations of the Egyptian people. In so far as you are able to dispel this suspicion and misunderstanding and create a better feeling, you will be doing more than can be done in any other way to bring about the settlement which we all so earnestly desire.

[4744 *k*—3]



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



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
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Report

of the

Special Mission to Egypt.

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# (٤٧٣/١٥٠)

## TERMS OF REFERENCE.

"To enquire into the causes of the late disorders in Egypt, and to report on the existing situation in the country and the form of the Constitution which, under the Protectorate, will be best calculated to promote its peace and prosperity, the progressive development of self-governing institutions, and the protection of foreign interests."

### Composition of the Special Mission to Egypt.

The Right Hon. the Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies (*Chairman.*)

The Right Hon. Sir Rennell Rodd, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.
General the Right Hon. Sir John G. Maxwell, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O.
Brigadier-General Sir Owen Thomas, M.P.
Sir Cecil J. B. Hurst, K.C.B., K.C., Foreign Office.
J. A. Spender, Esq.

A. T. Loyd, Esq., O.B.E. (*Secretary*).
E. M. B. Ingram, Esq., O.B.E., Foreign Office (Assistant Secretary and Private Secretary to the Chairman).

My Lord,

*December* 9, 1920.

I beg to submit to your Lordship the Report of the Special Mission to Egypt, of which I am Chairman. The Report bears the signatures of all the members of the Mission except General Sir John Maxwell, who, for reasons of health, had to leave England early in November and is at present in Egypt. I have, however, received the following letter from him in which he expresses his general agreement with the recommendations of the Report:—

"*My Lord,*

"*S.S. 'Narkunda,' November* 4, 1920.

"*I regret to inform you that owing to ill-health, and being ordered abroad by my medical attendant, I am unable to take further part in the Mission's deliberations on Egyptian affairs. I would, however, like to take this opportunity to state that I entirely concur in their general trend up to date, and am in accord with the policy outlined in the project of agreement as handed to Saad Pasha Zaghlul in August last.*

"*I have, &c.*

"*J. G. MAXWELL, General.*"

I have the honour, my Lord,
to remain your Lordship's obedient Servant,
MILNER.

The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., &c.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

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

I.

WORK OF THE MISSION IN EGYPT.

THE despatch of a Special Mission to Egypt had been under the consideration of His Majesty's Government since April 1919, when the prevailing unrest in that country had culminated in manifestations of violence and disorder; and in May the announcement was made that such a Mission, under the chairmanship of Lord Milner, would proceed thither in the autumn. The openly-avowed intention of the Egyptian Nationalists to organise a boycott of the Mission received great encouragement from the protest of Mohammed Said Pasha, the Prime Minister, against its arrival before the peace with Turkey had been signed, and was intensified after his resignation, which followed the overruling of his protest. Mohammed Said Pasha was succeeded as Prime Minister by Wahba Pasha, and the new Ministry was in office during the whole of our stay in Egypt.

Wahba Pasha himself has since resigned, owing to ill-health, and his place has been taken by Tewfik Nessim Pasha, one of his colleagues, who, during our stay in Egypt, was Minister of the Interior. The courage and patriotism of these two Prime Ministers and of their colleagues in taking office at a time when their country was passing through so grave a crisis, and when their own lives were daily in danger, cannot be too highly commended. Tewfik Nessim Pasha's Ministry, which is still in office, consists, with one exception, of the same men as Wahba Pasha's and is of the same character. It is a Ministry of affairs, composed of capable administrators, loyal to the Sultan and working harmoniously with the British High Commissioner, but of no distinct political colour and indisposed to take any decided line with regard to the burning question of the future of Egypt.

The change of Ministry in Egypt, and other circumstances, caused the departure of the Mission to be delayed until the end of November. We arrived at Port Said on the morning of Sunday, the 7th December, and in Cairo on the afternoon of the same day. In view of the general attitude of hostility to the Mission, which had been sedulously fostered, every precaution was taken for our security, and we reached the hotel where quarters had been prepared for our reception without incident. The day after our arrival we were all presented by Lord Allenby to His Highness the Sultan, a formal visit, which had been preceded by a short audience of a more intimate kind which he had accorded to Lord Milner. This was the first of a number of conversations which, during our stay in Egypt, our Chairman and other members of the Mission had with His Highness, who always treated us with great friendliness. In these conversations he expressed himself freely about the political situation in Egypt, the events of the last few years, and the difficulties of his own position. But he carefully abstained from giving any advice with regard to the subject of our reference, *viz.*, the future constitution of Egypt. Beyond warning us to be slow in forming conclusions and on our guard against busybodies, and indicating certain men of position whom it would be well for us to consult—such as Rushdi Pasha, Adli Pasha, Mohammed Said Pasha and Mazlum Pasha, all of them ex-Ministers—he never attempted in any way to guide or influence our deliberations. His attitude, as far as the main object of the Mission was concerned, was one of studied reserve.

This reserve was even more marked in the case of the Ministers, Wahba Pasha and his colleagues, to whom we were introduced at a party given by Lord Allenby at the Residency on the 11th December, and with whom throughout our stay in Egypt we maintained very cordial relations. They were at all times ready to assist us in our enquiries, to put every sort of information at our disposal, and to bring us into touch with any officials whom we desired to see. There was never any doubt of their willingness to give us every opportunity of becoming acquainted with the mechanism of government or the state of the country. But they were particularly careful to leave us to form our own conclusions. Though freely invited to do so, they were not disposed to make any suggestions of their own on constitutional, as distinct from purely administrative questions, and never evinced any desire to know in what direction the thoughts of the Mission were tending with regard to the future government of Egypt.

In strong contrast with the caution and reserve exhibited by the native official world was the storm of protest and disapprobation with which the arrival of the Mission was greeted by the native public and the native press. We had not been many days, or even hours, in Cairo before we had ample evidence of active and





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



organised antagonism. Telegrams poured in announcing the intention of the senders to go on strike as a protest against our presence. Many of these were despatched by schoolboys and students, but others came from public bodies, such as Provincial Councils, a few from Government officials, and a considerable number from corporations or communities of greater or less importance. We received in all 1,131 such messages during our stay, while only twenty-nine telegrams of welcome were received, mostly from private persons acquainted with individual members of the Mission. The Egyptian vernacular press, with rare exceptions, exhausted the repertory of vituperation and inuendo, proclaiming that any recognition of the Mission would be interpreted as an acceptance of the existing situation and that any Egyptian who had dealings with its members would be guilty of treason to his country. The majority of writers consistently maintained that Zaghlul Pasha at Paris was the accredited representative of the Egyptian people, and the Mission was recommended to address itself to him. A series of short strikes were declared by students, lawyers, tramwaymen, cab drivers and shopkeepers, and processions of strikers, reinforced by numbers of schoolboys and the rougher elements of the city, paraded the streets with banners, denouncing the Mission and Lord Milner in particular, and acclaiming Zaghlul Pasha and the "Complete Independence of Egypt." Nor were such demonstrations confined to the male population. The Cairene ladies availed themselves of this occasion to abandon their seclusion and to drive through the streets with similar war cries. This procession, however unwonted, was orderly enough, but the schoolboys and hooligans were frankly riotous, and but for the admirable order maintained by the police with occasional military support there would have been considerable destruction of property and even bloodshed. As it was, beyond the wrecking of a few tramcars, little damage to property actually resulted. And after the first week or two disorder in Cairo gradually subsided, though throughout our stay occasional attacks upon British soldiers and three successive attempts to assassinate members of the Ministry showed that the criminal element was still active, especially among a section of the student class.

It seems needless to dwell at greater length upon the many manifestations of hostility to the Mission and its object. Mention should, however, be made of two of them, which as indicative of the strength of the popular current appeared to be of special importance. In the second week after our arrival the heads of the El Azhar University, the centre of Mahommedan religious teaching, addressed a manifesto to the High Commissioner, which set forth the claims of Egypt to complete independence and demanded the withdrawal of the British. There was some reason to believe that the religious leaders who actually signed this document were not particularly enamoured of the political course on which they thus found themselves embarked, but yielded to the pressure of the teachers and students, among whom anti-British propaganda had for some time been increasingly active. This manifesto was followed a little later by a similar declaration, signed by six Princes of the family of Mohammed Ali, near relatives of the Sultan, which was contained in a letter to Lord Milner and simultaneously published in the press. The action of the Princes may have been prompted by various motives, but the dominant one was undoubtedly their desire to gain popularity by identifying themselves with a movement which at the moment was sweeping like a tidal wave over the country.

The immediate object of the promoters of this movement was to prevent the members of the Mission from coming into friendly touch with representative Egyptians and thus ascertaining for themselves how much substance there was in the demand for "complete independence," and in the ceaseless denunciations of "the Protectorate." With this end in view the headquarters of the Mission were constantly watched by unostentatious pickets. The visit of any Egyptian of note was at once communicated to the press and became the subject of minatory comment. Moreover, the offender was liable to be subjected to a domiciliary visit in his own house from a group of students, demanding an explanation of his conduct, which generally ended in his making a profuse profession of his Nationalist faith and affirming that in his conversation with the Mission he had been careful in no wise to depart from it. Only in one or two cases did the person thus visited have the courage to tell the intruders to mind their own business. Meantime, the movements of members of the Mission were carefully followed, especially when any of us went into the provinces. Emissaries would be immediately despatched from Cairo to dog our footsteps, to try to prevent our getting into touch with the local people, especially the fellahin, and to arrange demonstrations calculated to impress us with the solidarity of Egyptian opinion.





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



The visit to Tanta of one member of the Mission led to serious riots, which continued for many days and were only quelled by the intervention of the military. These demonstrations naturally to some extent hampered our work. But they certainly failed in their main object, for it was impossible not to come to the conclusion that, if the Egyptians were really so unanimous as we were intended to think, we should have been left to find that out for ourselves by going about the country without let or hindrance.

It must not be supposed that the boycott of the Mission, carried out as it mainly was by students and schoolboys, was approved by educated Egyptians generally, or even by all those who held advanced Nationalist views. Rudeness to strangers appeared to them inconsistent with the courtesy and hospitality upon which all Egyptians pride themselves. Moreover, there were a large number of men who were really anxious to bring their views before the Mission, but were deterred from doing so by fear of the personal annoyance to which they might in consequence be exposed. It was, therefore, suggested to us in many quarters that, if only we would make it clear, that by appearing before the Mission a man did not necessarily compromise his position as a Nationalist, the barrier to free converse would be removed. We accordingly drew up the following declaration, which was published on the 29th December in the Official Journal and the press :—

> "The British Mission has been struck by the existence of a widespread belief that the object of its coming is to deprive Egypt of rights which it has hitherto possessed. There is no foundation whatever for this belief. The Mission has been sent out by the British Government, with the approval of Parliament, to reconcile the aspirations of the Egyptian people with the special interests which Great Britain has in Egypt and with the maintenance of the legitimate rights of all foreign residents in the country.
>
> "We are convinced that with goodwill on both sides this object is attainable, and it is the sincere desire of the Mission to see the relations of Great Britain and Egypt established on a basis of friendly accord which will put an end to friction and will enable the Egyptian people to devote the whole of their energies to the development of their country under self-governing institutions.
>
> "In pursuance of this task the Mission desires to hear all views, whether of representative bodies or individuals who have the welfare of their country at heart. All opinions may be freely expressed. There is no wish on the part of the Mission to restrict the area of discussion nor need any man fear to compromise his convictions by appearing before it. He will be no more compromised by expressing his opinions than the Mission will be compromised by hearing them. Without a perfectly frank discussion it is difficult to put an end to misunderstanding and arrive at agreement."

This declaration certainly had some effect in mitigating hostility, but it did not get over the reluctance of Egyptians generally to enter into formal relations with the Mission. We therefore made up our minds that, as far as Egyptian opinion was concerned, we must rely upon our individual opportunities of social intercourse with men of various classes to elicit it. As such opportunities constantly presented themselves, and as the people whom we thus met, and who certainly included most of the leaders of Egyptian opinion, expressed their views in private with the greatest frankness and unreserve, we succeeded during the three months of our stay in very thoroughly gauging the main currents of thought and feeling in the Egyptian world.

While a good deal of time was spent in these conversations, we were also busily engaged in studying the situation from an entirely different angle. In addition to the carefully prepared volumes of official documents drawn up for the instruction of the Mission by the Foreign Office, a very considerable amount of valuable evidence had been collected before our arrival by an Information Committee instituted by the High Commissioner, which had obtained the considered views, on many issues, of prominent officials, of unofficial residents and representative bodies. The study and collation of these views, which had been ably edited by the Secretary of the Committee, Captain B. A. Hooper, occupied some time. They remain as an important source of information at the disposal of His Majesty's Government.

While the perusal of this mass of documents was of the greatest assistance to us, we sought to supplement the information contained in them by getting into personal touch with as many members of the British community, official and unofficial, as we had time to see, as well as with the principal foreign residents, who, of course, had no hesitation about coming into open and constant contact with the Mission. The



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evidence and advice of the chief British officials was freely available to us from the first, and we are greatly indebted to them for the ready help they gave us. With their aid we were enabled not only to gain a fairly comprehensive view of recent events, but to make an exhaustive examination of the organisation and personnel of every department of the Egyptian Government. This work was divided up between sub-committees, who reported to the Mission, which also assembled in full strength to hear the views of the highest British officials, as well as those of Sir William Brunyate, the late Acting Financial Adviser to the Egyptian Government, who was present in Cairo during the latter part of our stay. Meantime, the legal member of the Mission, Mr. (now Sir Cecil) Hurst, while co-operating as far as possible in these activities, devoted the greater part of his time to enquiring into the judicial system and the modifications best adapted to bring it into harmony with present requirements. Similarly Sir Owen Thomas, besides serving on one of the sub-committees just referred to, paid special attention to the study of agricultural conditions, and visited a number of estates, public and private, to make himself familiar with the methods of cultivation and the life of the people. The whole Mission, with the exception of one member who was otherwise engaged, passed the inside of a week at Alexandria, where opportunity was afforded us of coming into contact with the important foreign communities of the great commercial centre of Egypt. We were there able to hear the views of the French, Italian and Greek, as well as of the British Chamber of Commerce. Many centres of activity in Upper and Lower Egypt were also visited by individual members of the Mission, who communicated their impressions to their colleagues, and, in spite of the endeavours already described to prevent our getting into direct contact with the local population, valuable experience was thus gained and placed on record.

Two of our number, General Sir John Maxwell and Sir Owen Thomas, also paid a visit of several weeks to the Sudan, and the impressions they brought back were a valuable supplement to the information we had already obtained from the evidence of British and native residents in that country, whom we had been able to see in Cairo.

The manifold activities which we have briefly summarised kept us all very busy during the months of January and February. Towards the end of the latter month, as the time available for our enquiries in Egypt was drawing to a close, since several of our members were obliged to be back in England before the end of March, we began to hold a number of meetings for the purpose of collating the information obtained and comparing the views which we had severally formed. It at once became apparent that, in view of the immense mass of material and the number of points requiring thorough discussion, it would be impossible for us to draw up a Report during the remainder of our time in Egypt, especially as interviews still occupied a good deal of it. The preparation of our Report had, therefore, necessarily to be deferred until after our return to England. At the same time these preliminary discussions revealed a remarkable unanimity between us on certain cardinal points, and we even drew up, before leaving Cairo, though only in outline and subject to such modifications as further discussion might suggest, a series of propositions in which we were all able provisionally to agree.

These propositions ranged over the whole field of our enquiry and have formed the groundwork of the present Report. It may, therefore, be convenient at this stage to review the results of our investigations in Egypt and the conclusions to which they had led us.

## II.

### Provisional Conclusions arrived at in Egypt.

#### (A.)—*Causes of the Recent Disorders and Existing Unrest.*

##### 1. *Prior to the War.*

The disorders which broke out in March 1919 were brought to a climax by specific events connected with the war, but they can by no means be attributed solely to recent or contemporary conditions and the ground had been prepared through a long antecedent period.

It appears to be frequently assumed in current talk and writing in this country that Egypt is a part of the British Empire. This is not and never has been the case.



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

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The "special position" which Great Britain occupies in Egypt dates from her intervention in 1882 to restore order during the Arabi rebellion—an intervention in which the other Powers, though invited, declined to participate. This threw upon her responsibilities which she could not decline, and which could only be discharged by the occupation of the country, until at least there was a reasonable certainty that order would be maintained and the lives and property of foreign residents rendered secure. But at that time it was the declared intention of the British Government to evacuate the country so soon as these objects were accomplished, and in 1887 Sir Henry Drummond Wolff was despatched to Constantinople to prepare the way for evacuation. He drew up a Convention with the Sultan whereby Great Britain agreed to withdraw her troops from Egypt at the end of three years provided that there was then no new danger, external or internal, to require their retention, and provided further that she should have the right of reoccupying the country if any such danger arose. It was only at the last moment that the Sultan under foreign pressure withheld his signature and the negotiations fell through.

But, though Great Britain remained in Egypt, she did nothing during the next twenty-seven years either to legalise her own position or to disturb the theory that Egypt was an autonomous nationality under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey. Egypt was in theory governed by the Khedive, the Council of Egyptian Ministers, the Egyptian Legislative Council and Assembly; and the British Representative was in name merely "Agent and Consul-General," the exponent, like the Representatives of other Powers, of the views and wishes of his Government to the Government of Egypt. Though, in virtue of the Army of Occupation and of the numerous duties and responsibilities which circumstances gradually imposed on him, he came to be the real arbiter of the country, he was always studiously careful to observe this theory, and the observance of it was regarded by Egyptians as an implied pledge that the occupying Power did not intend to impair the national status of their country.

It was also so regarded by foreign Powers, and when the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 was concluded, a declaration was signed in London to the following effect:—

> "His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt. The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country, by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other manner."

This understanding would no doubt have served for all practical purposes, if European peace had been maintained. But with the outbreak of war and the entry of Turkey into the war on the side of the enemy, questions of extreme difficulty arose. Egyptians were nominally subjects of the Sultan of Turkey, owing allegiance to him and not to the British Crown. This was obviously an intolerable situation. But the mere abolition of Turkish suzerainty by an act of war would have deprived Egypt of any definite status and left her in the position of a former Turkish dependency in the hands of Great Britain. This difficulty might, of course, have been summarily disposed of by the annexation of Egypt to the British Empire, but the British Government deliberately chose a less drastic course which would afford security to Egypt, while leaving the principle of an Egyptian national entity unimpaired. This was to place Egypt under the protection of Great Britain. A proclamation was accordingly issued in the Official Journal on the 18th December, 1914:—

> "His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gives notice that in view of the state of war arising out of the action of Turkey, Egypt is placed under the protection of His Majesty, and will henceforth constitute a British Protectorate.
>
> "The suzerainty of Turkey over Egypt is thus terminated, and His Majesty's Government will adopt all measures necessary for the defence of Egypt and protect its inhabitants and interests."

On the following day a further proclamation was issued deposing Abbas Hilmi, the then Khedive, on the ground that he had adhered to the King's enemies, and announcing that the succession had been offered to and accepted by His Highness Prince Hussein Kamel, with the title of Sultan of Egypt.

It has been constantly asserted by Egyptian Nationalists that they understood the Protectorate to be merely a war measure, and the defence of Egypt promised under it in the second clause of the Proclamation to be limited to defence in the war. The wording of the Proclamation seems to us to offer no ground for this interpretation, but

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



the Egyptians were certainly given to understand that efforts would be made at the end of the war to satisfy their national aspirations, and great pains were taken to assure them that their national status was not changed for the worse by the Protectorate. For example, in the telegram which he addressed to Sultan Hussein on his accession to the Sultanate, His Majesty the King used these words :—

> "On the occasion when your Highness enters upon your high office, I desire to convey to your Highness the expression of my most sincere friendship and the assurance of my unfailing support in safeguarding the integrity of Egypt, and in securing her future well-being and prosperity.
>
> "Your Highness has been called upon to undertake the responsibilities of your high office at a grave crisis in the national life of Egypt, and I feel convinced that you will be able, with the co-operation of your Ministers and the Protectorate of Great Britain, successfully to overcome all the influences which are seeking to destroy the independence of Egypt, and the wealth, liberty and happiness of its people."

It should be added that Egyptian Nationalists are able to point to a long series of declarations by British statesmen disowning the idea of annexing, or even permanently occupying, the country, and affirming, in the words of Sir Eldon Gorst, that "the fundamental idea" of the British Government "has been to prepare the Egyptians for self-government, while helping them in the meantime to enjoy the benefit of good government." Englishmen are aware of the circumstances which have till now prevented the fulfilment of these pledges, but they are naturally treasured by Egyptians and too easily made the ground of accusations of bad faith. It is necessary to bear them in mind, if we would understand the resentment of Egyptians at the common assumption that Egypt is a British possession or that the Protectorate has naturally made it so.

The situation in Egypt has therefore always remained an abnormal one since the British Occupation in 1882. In the initial stages, problems which appeared almost insuperable had been surmounted with remarkable success under an exceptionally able administrator, and as time went on, and the machine appeared superficially to be running smoothly, public opinion in Great Britain ceased to concern itself with the indefinite character of the situation. But in reality a settlement was becoming progressively more urgent, the more widely the influence of our presence in Egypt and the introduction of western methods made themselves felt. With the removal of that fear of oppression which in old days had made Egyptians acquiescent and submissive, new impulses and ambitions were inevitably aroused. The Egyptians of 1920, whether townsmen or peasants, are different people from those of 1910, and very different indeed from the Egyptians of 1890. We have never honestly faced the Egyptian problem, and our neglect to do so is in a measure responsible for the present situation.

The régime inaugurated by the late Lord Cromer to redeem a bankrupt administration was never more than a provisional one, because for many years there was no reason to believe that the Occupation, which we had in 1887 actually agreed to terminate, would be other than of brief duration. But provisional and extemporised expedients gradually hardened into established institutions and the stronger element in a combination of administrative forces tended to become the dominant one, to acquire powers and responsibilities not originally contemplated, and to restrict the Egyptian element in the public service to a secondary position. The policy pursued in the early days of the Occupation had been to engage a restricted number of carefully selected British officials to advise and assist, especially in the Finance and Irrigation services. A Judicial and Educational Adviser were, in due course, added, and later again an Adviser to the Interior, with a body of Inspectors for the Provinces. So long as their numbers were strictly limited, and only men of high capacity and experience were appointed, not only was the co-operation of British officials tolerated, but they were themselves regarded with esteem and affection.

As the resources at the disposal of Egypt increased the public services were greatly expanded, and with this expansion the obligation arose concurrently to add to the number of foreign assistants and experts. Thus, with the prolongation of the Occupation, the number of British officials in Egypt steadily increased, and the principle that the aim of the administration should be to train and equip Egyptians to manage their own affairs fell into the background. In spite of the fact that Egyptian Ministers have of recent years taken a greater part and a more direct interest in their departments than in the early days of the Occupation, when many of them were content with little more than an honorary position, the work of Under-Secretaries and heads of



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departments, for the most part non-Egyptian, has become increasingly independent of the Council of Ministers. A growing resentment at the number of posts monopolised by the British was noticed for a long period antecedent to the war. Egyptian officials of long experience and considerable competence felt that they were definitely excluded from rising to the highest positions in view of the system consecrated by prescription that a post once held by a non-Egyptian was, on its becoming vacant, automatically filled by a non-Egyptian.

Particular resentment was occasioned in Egypt at the time of the arrival of the Mission by a recent increase in the numbers of the British engaged for the public service. This increase, if it was greatly exaggerated by ill-informed rumour, was nevertheless appreciable, and affected also a few very subordinate offices hitherto filled by natives of the country. It may here be mentioned that the number of British officials has risen from a few hundred in the earlier years of the occupation to upwards of sixteen hundred at the present day, with scales of pay different from those enjoyed by the Egyptians. These higher scales, if amply justified by special circumstances, were readily represented as constituting a grievance.

Another feature of Egyptian life has undoubtedly contributed to the unrest. As British officials have increased in number they have more and more lived apart from the Egyptian community, and their chief residential quarter on the Island of Ghezireh has come to be a self-contained community, furnished, like an Indian cantonment, with a complete equipment for social intercourse, sport and physical exercise. This has added to the amenities of life for the official class, but it has withdrawn them from society with Egyptians and tended to create a British *enclave* from which Egyptians are excluded. We are aware of the difficulties on both sides which stand in the way of free and unembarrassed relations between men and women of different races and customs, but when the necessary allowance has been made it must, we think, be said that the increasing segregation of the British community, which has been a feature of recent years, has been a cause of estrangement between British and Egyptians and made the fact of an alien occupation more obtrusive than it need have been.

We have noticed with pleasure the cordial and intimate relations which many old residents in Egypt, and not a few senior officials and their wives, have established with their Egyptian neighbours, and we have seen much evidence of the value and influence of these friendships in the recent times of stress and difficulty. We are convinced that it would greatly help if more efforts were made to cultivate these neighbourly relations. The forms and conventions of conduct should be studied and carefully respected by British residents in Egypt and visitors to Egypt. It should be realised, especially by the latter, that altogether disproportionate harm may be done by offences against good taste which, though trivial in themselves, cause comment and scandal. It should, in general, be the aim of the British residents and visitors to break down the barriers that exist rather than to create new ones, to enter as far as possible into the life of the Egyptian people, to learn enough of their language to make social contact possible and agreeable, and to avoid the minor causes of offence which in the aggregate become mischievous.

On the other hand, a criticism not infrequently heard that the quality of the British officials has deteriorated does not seem to us to be justified. There are many officials of high capacity in Egypt to-day, as there were in former times men of exceptional and others of only moderate calibre. But the critical sense of the Egyptians has been greatly developed by progress and contact with other countries, and they have become more exacting than the older generation with regard to standards of efficiency.

Again, since the retirement in 1907 of Lord Cromer, there have been no less than five British Agents or High Commissioners, and Egypt has felt herself to some extent a field for successive experiments. The result of these repeated changes, due to the accident of circumstances, tended to increase the independence of the permanent British officials, who were more concerned with departmental efficiency than with questions of policy, while to Egyptian observers they conveyed an impression of uncertainty and instability.

Another contributory cause of the general discontent was the manifest insuccess of educational policy resulting in the production of an unnecessarily large and ever-increasing number of candidates for official posts, provided with examination certificates, but destitute of any real educational culture. It was necessary in the initial stage to train a number of young men to such a standard of efficiency as would enable them to undertake clerical duties in State departments which had hitherto been largely performed by non-Egyptians, and to prepare pupils for the higher colleges of medicine, law and engineering. But here again there seems, until quite recently, to have been





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little attempt to revise a system adopted under exceptional circumstances or to realise that changing conditions required new methods. Education, for which there is a real and crying demand among the people, remains atrophied. The mass of the population is not only still illiterate, but without social or moral training. The only real education in the higher sense available in the country itself is provided by religious or benevolent institutions, controlled for the most part by the French or Americans, or by the admirable Victoria College, which owes its institution to the British residents at Alexandria. In spite of these criticisms, however, it must be admitted that the general level of instruction has greatly advanced since the early years of the Occupation, and that the number of those capable of taking an intelligent interest in public affairs is very much larger to-day.

Nationalist propaganda has been at work for many years in Egypt. The evolution of a sane and moderate Nationalist spirit might have been regarded with sympathy and interest, and, indeed, the late Lord Cromer had hopes that it might be turned to good account. But unfortunate political rivalries among the Western Powers led it from the first to assume an anti-British colour. The Nationalists were alternately encouraged and opposed by the ex-Khedive for his own personal aims. Their ranks were swelled by the members of a thoroughly dissatisfied civil service, who regarded the presence of the British as a bar to promotion, and who were further discouraged by a system of selection which made it possible for the influential to secure the preferment of relations and dependents. The increasing number of the students who look only to State employment as a reward for the often real sacrifices made in order to qualify for it, and who regard their prospects of obtaining any appointment as diminished by the competition of the foreigner, made them a ready instrument for such propaganda in the provinces.

Finally, there is the latent but ever-present impatience of the Moslem with Christian rule. That a Mohammedan should occupy a position of political subordination to a Christian is opposed to the essential spirit of Islam, and the sentiment which this spirit has engendered survives long after strong religious feeling has been greatly attenuated, or even become altogether extinct. Its existence no doubt exercised an influence in creating a prejudice which the religious element would make the most of against the name of Protectorate, interpreted as implying the permanent subjection of a Mahommedan Ruler and State to a Christian Sovereign. There is in the East a patriotism of religion which is an even more fundamental sentiment than the patriotism of home and tradition.

### 2. *During the War.*

Such were the influences which had long been active when in 1914 Turkey, the seat of the Caliphate, entered the war as the enemy of the occupying Power, and German agents freely promised the liberation of Egypt from British control after the final victory which they confidently predicted. In these circumstances, and in view of the spirit of hostility towards the occupying Power which had been gathering volume over a number of years, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief in Egypt was no doubt well advised, in the Proclamation announcing the state of war with Turkey, to make it clear that Great Britain took upon herself "the solemn burden of the present war without calling on the Egyptian people for aid therein." It is, however, only just to record that, whatever may have been the hopes or anticipations raised by the war in a certain section of the Egyptians, the obligations and disabilities which it entailed upon the people were borne with patience and goodwill; that the services rendered by the Egyptian Labour Corps were of inestimable value and indispensable to the campaign in Palestine; and that the Sultan's Government supported the British authorities in a spirit of the most cordial co-operation, evidenced among other things by their writing off the suspense account under which Egypt would have been entitled to reclaim advances of 3 millions sterling.

So far we have only dealt with the causes of unrest in Cairo and the larger centres during the period preceding the riots which broke out in March 1919. It remains to consider the reasons which affected the fellahin and made them susceptible to nationalist agitation and propaganda.

Unrest among the educated classes in Egypt was, as has already been pointed out, manifest long before the crisis of 1919. But that it should have spread to the fellahin, and should have led to outbreaks of savage violence among a class, which has derived such immense benefits from the British Occupation, needs explaining.

In the first place, it may be laid down that the agitation among the fellahin was of a far more partial character than has been generally supposed, and that disorders were confined to the neighbourhood of large centres and to districts along the main lines of communication. In remoter villages, less readily accessible to propagandists



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and agitators, little disposition was shown by the small farmers to take part in any such movement. Where disorders occurred, it was generally the railways which became the object of aggression, and there is reason to believe that the attacks upon them were carried out in pursuance of a pre-existing plan for a Germano-Turkish attack on the Canal, supported by a simultaneous rising in Egypt. This would account for certain indications of concerted action revealed in the disturbances of March 1919.

There is some evidence to show that discontent was stimulated by the controlled price of cotton, which denied the cultivator the advantage of competing in foreign markets, while the rent of his land continued to advance. But the more obvious factors arising out of the war to alienate his goodwill were: (*a*) The recruiting for the Egyptian Labour and Camel Transport Corps; (*b*) the requisition of domestic animals; (*c*) the requisition of cereals; (*d*) the collections for the Red Cross Fund. In each case it was not so much the measures themselves that were resented as the manner in which they were carried out.

As regards (*a*), the recruiting for the Egyptian Labour and Camel Transport Corps, it seems evident that once enrolled the men were, as a rule, satisfied with the conditions, and that the wages paid were of great benefit to the poorer classes of the population. The hospital accommodation provided for them does not seem to have been altogether satisfactory, and there were evidently among their officers many ignorant of their language and without experience in handling them. But their readiness to re-enlist again and again, and the fact that those actually serving gave no trouble during the events of March 1919, shews that grievances against the service were not serious. So long as the Labour Corps was locally raised from volunteers arrangements worked satisfactorily. There was some discontent at the prolongation of service beyond the contractual period after recruiting was taken over by a military organisation. But it was after the voluntary system had ceased to supply a sufficient number of recruits, and when administrative pressure was applied to obtain them, that abuses began. In view of the announcement made at the outbreak of war with Turkey that Egyptians would not be required to take part in it, the voluntary system was maintained in name, but measures of compulsion were applied by the Omdehs, the unpaid administrative officers in the country districts, to whom recruiting was entrusted without supervision by British officials, most of whom had been recalled for duties elsewhere. There is no doubt that unscrupulous Omdehs took advantage of the position, sending their enemies to serve, while letting off their friends, and accepting bribes for exemptions and substitutions. In some cases measures resembling those of the press gang were adopted, and British pressure was asserted as the excuse for them. As to the extent of the abuses there seems to be some conflict of opinion. But they were frequent enough to cause much discontent in certain regions, and gave the political agitator his opportunity.

As regards (*b*), the requisition of domestic animals, though the fellah was often hardly hit by the removal of his means of transport, prices which were good at the time seem to have been paid when the animals were taken. On the other hand the prices at which they could be bought back at the end of the war were often considerably higher. While the fellahin were naturally most unwilling to part with their animals, there does not appear to have been much real ground for grievance on account of these requisitions, inevitable in a state of war. But they naturally would not tend to increase goodwill towards those held responsible for them.

A more fertile source of discontent was (*c*), the requisition of cereals. Owing to the demand for the army prices advanced, and market rates were considerably higher than requisition rates. Districts were assessed to furnish a given quantity, and the collection was left to local officials, who derived large profits from the transaction. Not only did Omdehs collect larger amounts than they were required to furnish at requisition rates and sell the balance at the higher market rate, but individuals who possessed no wheat had to buy their quota at market rates and hand it over at the lower requisition rate. The process of verification and repayment was slow, and it appears to be substantiated from the evidence submitted that the provincial officials retained the sums received to make payments in their own hands for long periods, and that Omdehs and Sheikhs, who were entrusted with sums in bulk for distribution, in many cases held back a portion of these moneys. The local officials were mainly responsible for the abuses which occurred, but they were attributed to the British, who, under the exceptional conditions prevailing, were unable to control them.

As regards (*d*), the collections for the Red Cross Fund, these were organised locally by Egyptian Mamurs and Omdehs, and while intended to be voluntary, were, in practice, frequently made compulsory by officials seeking to acquire merit by the







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amounts which their districts contributed. There was a current belief in the country that only a portion of the total amount collected reached its real destination. It is open to question whether it was prudent or opportune, under the special conditions prevailing in Egypt, where the opposition of Cross and Crescent was inevitably emphasised, to do more than notify the opening of a fund for the aid of the wounded, to which many wealthy Egyptians and resident foreigners would no doubt have responded. To entrust the collection to local Egyptian officials was inevitably to open the door to abuses, entailing additional pressure on the poorer classes, with whom many other circumstances made the war unpopular. It should be added that the Joint Committee of the British Red Cross and the Order of St. John, after the close of the war, assigned upwards of a 100,000*l.* for the relief of victims of the war in the Egyptian Labour Corps and their families.

In addition to the specific grievances, to which attention has been drawn, there was in Egypt also an unprecedented and progressive rise in prices, especially the necessaries of life, such as corn, clothing and fuel, which weighed heavily on the poorer classes, whose wages were quite inadequate to meet the enhanced cost of living, while they saw a limited number of their countrymen and the unpopular foreigner making large fortunes. A family of four—a man, his wife and two small children—could not, at the beginning of 1919, obtain a sufficiency of food except at a cost which considerably exceeded the ordinary rate of wages.

These various factors had contributed by the end of 1918 to create a condition of discontent and unrest among the fellahin and some loss of confidence in the benefits of British administration. There was thus a favourable field in which the agitator could work. The fellah had seen no British officials for a long period, and none had intervened to protect him from inequitable demands. Even before the war, the once familiar figure of the British inspector riding through the fields and stopping to listen to the small farmer's claims and grievances had almost disappeared, and motor-cars conveyed the hurried official from one administrative centre to another. His disappearance made it easier to believe reports which were spread of the imminent departure of the British, when the land would be divided among the fellahin, with an unrestricted water supply and no taxation. There is also reason to believe, though there are no grounds for suspecting the leaders of the Nationalist Party of their inspiration, that highly-coloured and wholly imaginary accounts of outrages committed on native women by British soldiers and murderous assaults on the villages were circulated by unprincipled agitators, and that a spirit of vindictive resentment was thus aroused, which culminated in the brutal murders of British soldiers at Deirut.

The death of Sultan Hussein in 1917 had removed from the scene a ruler of character and ability, who thoroughly understood his own countrymen. He had accepted the onerous position of the first Sultan of Egypt as a not too welcome duty, and had loyally and courageously co-operated in the difficult task of administering a Moslem State in occupation by a Christian Power at war with the Sovereign who represented the Caliphate of Islam. He had to a great extent lived down the unpopularity which his substitution for his nephew had at first aroused, and enjoyed the general regard of all classes. His successor, who had been educated in Italy, and had served for a time in the Italian Army, was regarded as something of a foreigner, and found himself from the first in a much weaker position as regards his own countrymen, on whom he had as yet little hold. With the best will in the world, therefore, he could have little influence in stemming the rising tide of anti-British sentiment which was gathering strength.

### 3. *After the War.*

In the preceding pages we have endeavoured to describe the internal situation in Egypt up to the concluding phases of the war. It will now be more readily understood why the principles enunciated by President Wilson and approved by the Allies produced an immediate and decisive effect on Egyptian opinion. The acceptance of the idea of self-determination appeared to give international sanction to sentiments which had long been maturing among the educated classes.

Those in Egypt who had anticipated, and would at one time even have welcomed, a German and Turkish victory, now found a favourable opportunity for shifting their ground. This section now claimed that by contributing morally and materially to the victory of the Allies Egypt had herself been instrumental in throwing off all that was left of the Turkish yoke.

At the same time the voice of moderate opinion in Egypt also began to urge that the time had come to assert a claim to self-government consistent with the repeated declarations of British statesmen regarding the provisional character of our intervention. It was genuinely felt that the attitude of the country as a whole during the war, the co-operation of the Sultan and his Ministers, and the conspicuous sacrifices



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



which the Egyptian people had been called upon to make, entitled them to the particular consideration of Great Britain. The idea of definitely regulating the relations between Great Britain and Egypt had, indeed, already been mooted by Rushdi Pasha, the Prime Minister, at the end of 1917.

This movement received great encouragement from the publication, in the beginning of November 1918, of the Anglo-French declaration regarding Syria and Mesopotamia, which announced that Great Britain and France contemplated the complete and definitive enfranchisement of the peoples liberated from Turkish oppression and the institution among them of national Governments deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the people themselves. The High Commissioner (Sir R. Wingate) did not fail to point out that the policy indicated in this declaration would have its repercussion in Egypt. Moreover, the Egyptians had recently witnessed the establishment of an independent kingdom in Arabia, which they had always regarded as far behind their own half-occidentalised country in civilisation and development.

At the very moment when these ideas were being widely discussed, public opinion was greatly stirred by the revelation of a confidential memorandum, which was interpreted as denying to Egypt the privileges of self-government advocated for other less advanced communities. A special commission to consider constitutional reform had been nominated at the beginning of 1918, and Sir Wm. Brunyate, the Acting Financial Adviser, was requested by this commission to draw up a note to serve as a basis for their discussions. He was invited, in particular, to examine the principle of giving the foreign colonies some share in the legislation of the country, which might render more acceptable to the Powers the surrender of the practical veto exercised by them under the Capitulations over a considerable field of legislature. Sir Wm. Brunyate's note gave great offence to the Prime Minister, to whom it was presented in the middle of November 1918, and, though intended only as a basis for confidential discussion, its contents became generally known. A storm of protest was aroused by a project which was interpreted as assigning only consultative functions to an Egyptian Legislative Assembly, while bestowing all legislative power on a Senate in which the officially-nominated members and a group of elected foreigners would constitute the majority.

Simultaneously with the commission above referred to, another commission had been sitting for many months to consider the judicial reforms which would become necessary in the event of the abolition of the Capitulations. Although this commission had issued no report, a general impression prevailed that it contemplated the supersession of the Mixed Tribunals by new Courts in which the English language and British legal procedure would predominate—a measure which would entail disabilities on the native Bar and paralyse the foreign advocates who had hitherto used the French language. This assumption tended to confirm the hostility of the legal profession to any extended affirmation of British control.

On the 13th November, 1918, Zaghlul Pasha, with two other leaders of the advanced Nationalist group, paid a visit to the High Commissioner and expressed their desire to go to London in order to put forward a programme of "complete autonomy" for Egypt. Simultaneously, the Prime Minister, Rushdi Pasha, proposed that he should himself, together with Adli Pasha Yeghen, the Minister of Education, proceed to London to discuss the affairs of Egypt, a plan which he stated had the full approval of the Sultan. The contention of these Ministers was that the Peace Congress would give official consecration to the Protectorate, and that therefore its nature could not be left undefined. Under the Turkish suzerainty Egypt had had certain rights, and they desired to know what their rights would be as against Great Britain under the Protectorate.

Sir R. Wingate reported these proposals to the Foreign Office, and was informed in reply that "no useful purpose would be served by allowing Nationalist leaders to come to London," and that the visit of the two Ministers would not be "opportune" at that moment. The Foreign Secretary explained that, owing to the fact that he and other Ministers would be absent from London in connection with the peace negotiations, they would "not be able to devote sufficient time and attention to problems of Egyptian internal reform." In these circumstances the Ministers were invited to "defer their visit." Rushdi Pasha gave the High Commissioner to understand that he regarded the refusal of His Majesty's Government to give him an immediate hearing as involving an interpretation of the meaning of the Protectorate to which he could not agree and tendered his resignation. There were no doubt obvious difficulties in the way of discussing such questions with the Egyptian Ministers at a moment of high political pressure, when the Peace Conference was about to open, but it would appear





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



that, in spite of the insistence with which the High Commissioner appealed for their reception, the real urgency of dealing with the Egyptian problem at that critical moment had not been realised.

Every effort was made to induce Rushdi Pasha to withdraw his resignation, and a prospective date for the eventual visit of the Ministers was indicated. But the position of the Nationalists had now become so strong in Egypt that the Ministers were only willing to go if Zaghlul Pasha and his friends were allowed to do the same. As it was not considered expedient to permit this, they adhered to their resignation, and the High Commissioner was instructed to come to England himself to report on the situation.

The result of these events was that a number of the Moderate Party joined the advanced Nationalists, who now advocated a more far-reaching policy, while their agents initiated a violent anti-British campaign throughout the country, where, owing to the calls of the flag, only a relatively small number of British officials remained.

While the proposed visit of Egyptian Ministers to London was still under consideration in the beginning of 1919, a document was addressed to the foreign representatives and residents in Egypt announcing the constitution of a "Delegation" of twelve members, under the chairmanship of Zaghlul Pasha, which proposed to lay the legitimate aspirations of Egypt before other countries. The majority of the Delegation were identical with those included in a Nationalist Committee of fourteen formed at the end of the preceding year.

On the 3rd March the Delegation above referred to presented to the Sultan a petition which was generally interpreted as an attempt to intimidate His Highness and deter him from appointing a new Government. This proceeding was felt to be a challenge which could not be declined, and Sir Milne Cheetham, acting for the High Commissioner, decided with the approval of the British Government to deport Zaghlul Pasha and three of his most active adherents to Malta. This gave rise to renewed agitation and protest, beginning with anti-British demonstrations on the part of students in Cairo which quickly necessitated military intervention. Similar outbreaks were soon reported from the provinces. On the 12th March disturbances broke out at Tanta and were quelled by the military, not, however, without bloodshed. By the 14th and 15th March the trouble had spread to most of the Delta provinces, where attempts to interrupt communications had become general. Looting, pillaging, attacks on British troops, and murders of British soldiers and civilians were reported from many quarters. On the 16th the railway and telegraphic communication between Cairo and the Delta, as well as with Upper Egypt, was broken. By the 18th the provinces of Behera, Gharbia, Menufia and Dakhalia were in a state of open revolt. Upper Egypt and the foreigners living there were completely cut off, while the fanaticism of the insurgents culminated the same day in the murder at Deirut of two British officers and five other ranks and of an English Inspector of Government Prisons in the Assiut–Minia train. By the 26th March, however, the situation, from a purely military point of view, had become stabilised. The main railway and telegraphic communications had been re-established and the necessary dispositions of troops had been made for their adequate protection. Mobile columns had been moved in various directions to control the more violent areas, to arrest and bring to justice those responsible for the excesses, and to re-establish civil control. The outlying centres of disturbance in the south had been relieved and the first and most dangerous phase of the disorders was over.

Thus, within a week from the deportation of Zaghlul Pasha and his associates, a movement anti-British and even anti-European had assumed grave proportions. It was a national movement backed by the sympathy of all classes and creeds among the Egyptian population, including the Copts, and on the part of its more fanatical adherents it took the form of the systematic destruction of property and communications, with an increasing disregard for human life. Responsible though the Delegation undoubtedly was for the organisation of the original demonstrations out of which the movement grew, its more responsible members soon became alarmed at the development of a situation which rapidly passed out of their control and fell into the hands of irresponsible extremists, supported by a certain number of undesirable foreign elements.

The Commander-in-Chief in Egypt, Field-Marshal Lord Allenby, had left to join the Peace Conference at Paris on the 12th March. He was, however, back again in Cairo by the 25th, having been in the meantime appointed Special High Commissioner during the absence of Sir R. Wingate, the High Commissioner, in England. His instructions were to "restore law and order" and "to administer in all matters as may be required by the necessity of maintaining the King's Protectorate on a secure and equitable basis." The military measures which had been taken had rendered the



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situation outwardly calm. But there was little diminution of anti-British sentiment, which was now chiefly manifested against the military element, whose behaviour during the repression of disorder was speciously misrepresented. Lawyers and students continued to strike, and many officials absented themselves from their duties.

The conciliatory disposition adopted by the Special High Commissioner in addressing a group of notables who visited him by invitation did not prevent the outbreak on the 2nd April of a general strike, which had, however, practically subsided by the 6th. Meanwhile, in pursuance of his policy of conciliation, Lord Allenby, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, completely removed the embargo on the departure of Egyptians desiring to travel, a measure which carried with it the release from Malta of Zaghlul Pasha and his three associates. Thus, within a month of their deportation, the policy then adopted was reversed, and the leaders of the movement became free either to return to Egypt or to proceed elsewhere to renew their campaign of agitation.

Such, in brief, was the course of events in the first four months of the year 1919. It is obvious, after the event, that Egyptian Ministers should have been encouraged to come to London when they proposed to do so, and Sir Reginald Wingate, whose advice on this subject was fully justified by the sequel, would have done well, in our opinion, to urge his views with even greater insistency. After this initial mistake events moved more rapidly in Egypt than the Administration appear to have realised. The consequences of deporting the Nationalist leaders were not rightly estimated, and the revoking of that measure, after serious disturbances had taken place, necessarily gave the impression that British policy was wavering and liable to quick changes under the pressure of agitation. In the next stage, punitive measures for the murder of British officers and other outrages committed during the rebellion became a necessity, and though carried out, on the whole, with moderation, they inevitably prolonged the period of exasperation. The Administration endeavoured to conciliate Egyptian sentiment by transferring a large number of the trials, after the most urgent cases had been dealt with by martial law, to the ordinary tribunals, but by this time Nationalist opinion had hardened, and the almost invariable result was that evidence ceased to be forthcoming and that the accused were acquitted. In the meantime, Zaghlul Pasha and his colleagues had, on their release from Malta, proceeded to Paris, in the hope of obtaining a hearing for Egypt's claim to independence from the Peace Conference. On failing to achieve this object, they devoted all their energies to obtaining foreign support for their cause, and an emissary was despatched to America to canvass opinion in the United States. At the same time, their adherents in Egypt worked with the greatest industry to complete their organisation, collecting large sums of money and extending their propaganda to all parts of the country. Their activities in this latter sphere were largely concentrated upon the exploitation of the existing conditions of industrial unrest, resulting in a succession of more or less serious strikes. By this time it had been announced that the British Government intended to send the Special Mission to Egypt, but, having made up their minds that its object would be the extinction of Egyptian nationality, the agitators concentrated their attention on limiting the sphere of its activities by an organised boycott.

(B.)—*The Nationalist Movement and Egyptian Aspirations.*

Enough has been said to explain the rapid growth of the Nationalist movement. It is more difficult to give, within a reasonable compass, a correct and at the same time intelligible analysis of its real nature and objects.

It has been said, that "every Egyptian worth his salt is at heart a Nationalist." This is only true of the educated and semi-educated classes, who constitute less than 10 per cent. of the fourteen million inhabitants of Egypt. It would be meaningless as applied to the 92 per cent. of illiterates and especially to the fellahin, who are two-thirds of the whole people. The turbulent crowds of the great towns may indeed be easily worked up to excitement by political catchwords, which they vociferate without understanding. But the fellahin, as a body, are normally very indifferent to politics. They are a primitive peasantry, living on the land and by the land, to which they are passionately devoted, and from which, though working with rude instruments and with little aid from agricultural science, they raise by their matchless industry and perfect knowledge of the soil those wonderful crops which are the bed-rock of Egyptian prosperity. Their whole interest in life centres in these crops and in the regular supply of Nile water, without which their fields would be barren. But while their outlook remains limited their independence has developed, and they are far more tenacious of their rights than in the old days of despotism.





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٨١ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٦٤)





The fellahin, when left alone, are not unfriendly to the British. No doubt they do not love any foreigner, and as fervent Moslems they start with a certain antipathy to any Christian. But, in the case of the British, these initial prejudices have to a large extent been overcome by experience of the integrity and kindliness of the general run of British officials and by the manifest improvement which their presence has wrought in the condition of rural Egypt. It is true that a new generation, which has never known the evils of the old régime, is less grateful to us than were their fathers, by whom these evils were vividly remembered. But the fellahin, though much less helpless and submissive than in former times, have still cause to dread the rapacity of landowners and the bullying and extortion of a good number of native officials, and against these dangers they feel that British influence affords them a certain protection. Those unfortunate incidents of the war period, to which we have already alluded, shook for a time their confidence in our justice and good-will, and were predisposing causes of the savage outbreak of anti-British feeling in the spring of 1919. But these excesses were abnormal and short-lived. Except where they are directly stirred up by agitation from the towns, the fellahin appear to be once more reasonably well disposed to those British people whom they know, and who know how to handle them. We were greatly struck by the evidence of a number of our countrymen, official and unofficial, living in close contact with the Egyptian peasantry, who affirmed that the bitter feeling of the last year or two had now subsided, and that Englishmen who conducted themselves properly were as welcome as ever in the countryside.

But it is idle to hope that the comparatively satisfactory attitude of the peasantry will long be maintained, if our relations with the middle and upper classes of their countrymen continue as strained as at present. Nationalism has, for the time being at any rate, established complete dominance over all that is vocal and articulate in Egypt. From the Princes of the Sultan's family down to the children of the primary schools, the men of property, the professional men, the religious teachers, the *literati*, the journalists, the students and school-boys have all, more or less willingly, been swept into the Nationalist movement. Most serious of all, perhaps, it now permeates the official class and the upper ranks of the army. Discipline and official decorum may prevent their sympathies finding open expression —the attitude of Egyptian officials towards the Mission was always courteous and correct—but in their hearts they are mostly strong Nationalists, and the influence radiating from them is all in the same direction. It is inconceivable that the sentiment of their social superiors of every class, of all the men who make opinion, should not in the long run profoundly affect the mass of the people. No doubt Nationalism as a political creed has little attraction for these unlettered millions, though they can easily be taught to repeat its catchwords. But then it is not so much by abstract political arguments that the extremist agitator seeks to win their support, as by the constant vilification of everything British and by subtly attributing every local disaster and every personal grievance to the malignity or incompetence of British officials. This campaign of mendacious denigration is carried on by many agencies, by preachers in the mosques, by country-bred students returning for the holidays, by all but a few organs of the Arabic press. It is true that the fellah cannot, as a rule, read himself, but he can always be read to, and if everything that is spoken or written to influence him points the same way, the falsehoods so sedulously instilled cannot fail ultimately to poison his mind.

We make allowance for the fact that at the time of our visit anti-British clamour was exceptionally intense. It was no doubt artificially stimulated by the more extreme section in order to impress us. And no man of any experience in such matters would mistake the extravagances of a political agitation at fever pitch for the deliberate expression of the mind of a people. But it is a significant fact, that, while many Egyptians undoubtedly disapproved of the excesses of this agitation, no one, who was not compelled to do so by his official position, made any effort to stem them. Men of standing, whatever their personal views, were much too nervous of appearing to be out of sympathy with national "aspirations" to exercise any moderating or restraining influence. No one would have dared to say that he was in favour of the "Protectorate," or that he was not in favour of "complete independence." To all outward appearance, independent opinion was solidly Nationalist. And in our judgment it is likely to remain so.

The position is undoubtedly a serious one, and in face of this solid phalanx of opposition it might seem at first sight as if we had no choice but either to abandon our position in Egypt altogether, or to maintain it by sheer force, in the teeth of the general and ever-increasing hostility of the Egyptian people. But a closer study of



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٨٢و]
# (٤٧٣/١٦٥)



the problem led us to take a more hopeful view. From many and intimate conversations with representative Egyptians, including some who were commonly regarded as extreme Nationalists, the conviction was borne in upon us, that they were not so intransigeant, and certainly not so anti-British, as the frantic diatribes of the press might have led us to suppose. The broad banner of Nationalism was seen to cover many shades of opinion, and, above all, most notable differences of temper and of aim. Undoubtedly there are a number of Nationalists whose fundamental hatred of all foreign, and especially all British, control leads them to commit, or at any rate sympathise with, acts of lawlessness and crime. Not only are their aims wholly incompatible with any sort of understanding between British and Egyptians, but they are prepared to pursue them by methods which nothing could justify and which no Government could do otherwise than strive to repress. They are deliberately encouraging a system of terrorism, which is intended to render any co-operation between British and Egyptians impossible in the future.

The untoward events of the last few years in Egypt itself and the restless and revolutionary spirit throughout the whole world, which has had a strong repercussion in that country, have undoubtedly been grist to the mill of this extreme section and have given a more sinister character to the Nationalist movement. No wonder that, under these circumstances, Nationalism has appeared to many British people on the spot, and perhaps to even more at home, to be synonymous with violent Anglophobia and to be aiming at the complete subversion of the existing system of government in Egypt.

But we were satisfied, even before leaving Cairo, that it would be a profound mistake to take this sweeping view. It would be wrong to allow the impressions of a period of turbulence, like the preceding twelve months, to blind us to what is reasonable and legitimate in the aspirations of Egyptian Nationalism. Such an indiscriminating attitude could only tend to drive moderate men more and more into the camp of the Extremists and to convert the present deplorable friction between British and Egyptians, which is not incapable of being remedied, into bitter and enduring hostility. Violence and disorder must, of course, be suppressed, and here let us say that the measures taken to that end during our stay in Egypt were as temperate as they were effective. The necessity of continuing to maintain Martial Law in Egypt is regrettable, but under Lord Allenby Martial Law was being administered with the minimum of severity or of disturbance to the normal course of justice and the everyday life of the people. The duty of promptly suppressing violence and disorder must not, however, lead us to confound all those who are in a greater or less degree opposed to the existing system of government with the pronounced revolutionaries, or simple criminals, who were responsible for the outbreak of the spring of 1919 and the sporadic acts of violence which have been perpetrated since. In talking to many men who professed Nationalist opinions—and indeed it was difficult to find anyone who repudiated all sympathy with them—we encountered a very different spirit from that which found expression in such detestable outrages. These men denounced the resort to violence, or open rebellion, as not only criminal, but useless. Great Britain—such was the general view—was more than strong enough to keep Egypt in permanent subjection, if she preferred unwilling subjects to friendly and grateful allies. For they all recognised, with more or less warmth and spontaneity, the great benefits which Great Britain had conferred upon Egypt, while most of them also recognised that Egypt still stood in need of British assistance, not only in the work of internal reconstruction, but for her defence against foreign interference, and the danger of once more becoming the arena of international rivalry and intrigue. They all, without exception, admitted that Great Britain had a very special interest in Egypt, as the central link in her communications with her Eastern Empire and the Australasian Dominions, and a perfect right to safeguard these communications from any danger of interruption. But was it necessary for the fulfilment of these objects to deprive Egypt of her independence, to try to convert her into an integral part of the British Empire, and to run counter to the ineradicable desire of the Egyptians to take their place, as a distinct people, among the nations of the world? Would not an orderly and friendly Egypt, in intimate association with Great Britain, serve British purposes as well, or even better, while removing all sense of grievance and all spirit of revolt on the Egyptian side? Moreover, was not such a consummation the only one consistent with the avowed policy of Great Britain, with her reiterated declarations, that it was not her intention to appropriate Egypt, or to incorporate her in the British Empire, but to make her capable of standing on her own feet? In the sincerity of these declarations they had long believed, but were now ceasing to believe. After nearly forty years of British occupation, they seemed







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to be not nearer to, but distinctly further from, the goal at which Great Britain had professed to be aiming. With our continued insistence on the Protectorate, which they all regarded as implying the permanent subjection of their country, Great Britain had definitely departed from her original policy, and, in fact, broken her word. They had accepted the Protectorate, when it was first declared, as a necessity of the moment. Great Britain, being at war with Turkey, had not unreasonably severed the remaining links between Turkey and Egypt, and something had immediately to be substituted for the former Turkish suzerainty. The Protectorate was thus justified as a temporary expedient, but at the end of the war they had always expected that Great Britain would proceed to regulate her relations with Egypt in a manner more consistent with her declarations, with her real interests, and with her honour. Instead of that, they now saw nothing before them but the permanent loss of their nationality, of their existence as a people. They were to become a "British Colony," to be British subjects. Against that they appealed, and would continue to appeal, to the British sense of justice and in the last resort to the sympathy of the whole civilised world.

(C.)—*Future Policy.*

Such, we believe, is a fair statement of the average opinion of Egyptian Nationalists. The violence, unfairness and unreason of the more extreme and noisy section have given to the whole movement an appearance of intransigeance which, in our opinion, is not essential or necessarily enduring. The remarkable organisation known as the *Wafd* ("Delegation") which, under the leadership of Zaghlul Pasha, has established, for the time being at least, so complete an ascendancy over the Egyptian public, and claims, not without many credentials, to speak in the name of "the nation," does not consist mainly of extreme men. Its members were drawn largely from the ranks of the old *Hisb el Umma*, which, in contrast to the *Hisb el Watani*, the real revolutionary and anti-British party, stood for gradual and constitutional progress. It is true that in face of an attitude on our part which seemed to them to present a blank negative to all their hopes, Zaghlul and his associates have, until quite recently, been drifting steadily to the left. But in our experience, it only needed some effort to understand their point of view and to remove their suspicions of the intentions of Great Britain, in order to get many of the Zaghlulists to discuss the situation in a perfectly reasonable spirit. And the same is naturally true of men of even more moderate views, like the ex-Ministers Rushdi, Adli and Sarwat Pashas, who, while sympathising with the ideals of Nationalism, had never actually joined the *Wafd*. In such discussions, when once we had got away from phrases and formulæ and come to grips with the practical difficulties of the problem, it soon became apparent that there were many shades and varieties of opinion among Egyptians. The one thing common to them all was the desire to preserve their nationality, their distinctive character as a people.

It is evident from what has been said that any effort at reconciliation between British and Egyptians, any policy which seriously attempts to bring the more moderate and friendly elements of Egyptian Nationalism once more on to our side, must take account of this deeply-rooted feeling. No grant to Egypt of a greater or less measure of "self-government," even if it went the length of what is known as "Dominion Home Rule," would meet the case, because Egyptians do not regard their country as a British Dominion or themselves as British subjects. This wholly differentiates the problem of constitutional development in Egypt from the same problem in countries which have for years indubitably formed part of the British Empire, as, for instance, British India. We talk of such countries gradually attaining the status of nationhood. The Egyptians claim that they already have this status. No settlement of the future of Egypt which does not recognise this claim is ever likely to be accepted by—it can only be imposed on—the Egyptian people.

As against these considerations, we have the patent fact that Egypt, though not actually a part of the British Empire, is of vital importance to our whole Imperial system, and that that country under British guidance has attained a new level of civilisation, from which it would be disastrous to allow it to relapse. To reconcile the defence of these interests—Egyptian as well as British—with the recognition of the national status of Egypt is no easy matter. And the problem seems, at first sight, to be further complicated, though on a closer study it may turn out to be really simplified, by the exceptionally strong position which the foreign Colonies, other than the British, occupy in Egypt. In no other Eastern country are there so many resident Europeans, enjoying such special privileges or filling so many important posts in commerce, in education, in the professions, in society and even in the Govern-



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ment departments. The great towns, especially Alexandria, are to a large extent Europeanised, and in a certain sense Egypt will always remain an international country. No solution of the Egyptian problem can be enduring unless it provides for the security of the great European interests, which are so strongly entrenched in the Nile valley. Thus that problem may well appear as insoluble as it is certainly unique. But then everything in and about Egypt always has been unique. There are no precedents for us to follow in dealing with conditions so abnormal. Any system which really fits these conditions is bound to be novel, and it should not be condemned as unsound merely because it looks paradoxical.

In view of all these difficulties, we gradually came to the conclusion that no settlement could be satisfactory which was simply imposed by Great Britain upon Egypt, but that it would be wiser to seek a solution by means of a bilateral agreement—a Treaty—between the two countries. In no other way did it appear possible to release Egypt from the tutelage to which Egyptians so vehemently object, without endangering any of the vital interests which we are bound to safeguard. All necessary safeguards, as it seemed to us, could be provided in the terms of a Treaty of Alliance by which Egypt, in return for Great Britain's undertaking to defend her integrity and independence, would agree to be guided by Great Britain in her foreign relations and would at the same time confer upon Great Britain certain definite rights in Egyptian territory. The rights we contemplated were of a two-fold character. Firstly, in order to protect her special interest in Egypt—the safety of her Imperial communications—Great Britain was to have the right to maintain a military force on Egyptian soil; and secondly, for the protection of all legitimate foreign interests, she was to have a certain measure of control over Egyptian legislation and administration, as far as they affected foreigners. The former privilege was no more than what Egypt could honourably concede to an ally who undertook to defend her against all external dangers, and whose strength and security were therefore of vital importance to Egypt herself. And the latter privilege would involve no greater infringement of Egyptian independence than that to which, by virtue of the Capitulations,* Egypt has always been exposed. Indeed, by substituting a single Power, Great Britain, for the thirteen foreign Powers which have hitherto enjoyed capitulatory rights in Egypt, it would tend to enlarge rather than to curtail that independence. Moreover, it was part of our scheme, as it has always been a feature of British policy in Egypt, to confine the special privileges enjoyed by foreigners under the Capitulations within more reasonable limits, and by so doing to make Egypt much more the mistress in her own house than she is to-day. But this could only be done if Egypt was prepared to recognise Great Britain as the protector of these foreign privileges when reduced to reasonable proportions.

This latter point requires a word of explanation. The restrictions which the Capitulations impose upon the sovereign rights of Egypt have a good as well as a

* "Capitulations" is the name given by Europeans to those concessions which secured from the early Sultans of Turkey extra-territorial rights to foreigners residing there, in continuation of similar privileges granted to foreign residents by the Byzantine Empire. They are unilateral and non-terminable, but liable to modification by subsequent Treaties. If, however, these latter Treaties are terminable, the Capitulations revive on the expiration of such Treaties. Primarily, they were intended to make it possible for Christians to trade and reside in the territories of the Ottoman Empire by safeguarding them against any forms of injustice or ill-usage, to which, as foreigners of a different religion, they might otherwise have been subjected. The Capitulations granted to Great Britain by the Porte date back to a very early period, but after various alterations now bear the date of 1675, and were confirmed in the Treaty of Peace concluded at the Dardanelles in 1809. Capitulations were granted to France in 1581, 1604 and 1673, and were renewed in 1740. The Dutch were granted Capitulations in 1612; these were renewed in 1680 and still continue in force. Nearly all the other great Powers obtained similar concessions from the Porte at one time or another in the course of the last 400 years.

It is in virtue of these unilateral Treaties with the Porte that Capitulations exist in Egypt. The Powers enjoying them were, before the war, fifteen in number, viz., Great Britain, United States of America, France, Italy, Spain, Holland, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary. The privileges of the two latter were terminated in the recent Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. In Egypt the rights conferred on foreigners by the Capitulations, apart from certain commercial concessions, included:—immunity from personal taxation without the assent of their Governments; inviolability of domicile and protection from arbitrary arrest; and exemption from the jurisdiction of the local Courts. Since the creation of the Mixed Tribunals in 1876, the practical effects of the last-mentioned privilege are that no legislation applicable to foreigners can be enforced without the consent of the capitulatory Powers, and that civil jurisdiction in cases between Europeans and natives or between Europeans of different nationality is exercised by the Mixed Courts, while criminal jurisdiction over Europeans and jurisdiction in civil cases between Europeans of the same nationality is exercised by the Consular Courts applying the laws of their own countries. The only internal taxes to which foreigners are at present liable are the house and land tax.





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bad side. In so far as they protect the liberties and property of foreigners by ensuring them justice in the Courts and immunity from arbitrary action on the part of the local authorities, their operation is beneficent. But, on the other hand, by exempting foreigners from taxation and from the necessity of conforming to local laws and regulations of an equitable kind, they constitute a great and unjustifiable hindrance to the progress of the country. For this reason it is, and always has been, the policy of Great Britain to get rid of the Capitulations and to substitute for them a system which, while protecting all legitimate foreign interests, would put an end to the indefensible privileges which foreigners now enjoy. Negotiations to secure that object have for some time been going on between Great Britain and the other Powers who have capitulatory rights in Egypt. But the Powers in question cannot be expected to give up these rights unless they are assured that their nationals can rely on obtaining justice and fair treatment in the future. In order to be able to give them that assurance, Great Britain must be put into a position enabling her to implement it. Thus it is in Egypt's own interest to empower Great Britain to act as the protector of such of the privileges now enjoyed by foreigners in Egypt as it is just and reasonable to maintain. It is in this sense that the recognition in the recent Peace Treaties of Great Britain's special position in Egypt should be interpreted.

These, in broad outline and reserving details for later explanation, are the main features of the settlement by which we had come to think that the relations between Great Britain and Egypt might in future be regulated. And when we began to discuss them with those Egyptians, all of more or less advanced Nationalist opinions, with whom we were in friendly contact, it was encouraging to find that our suggestions met with a large measure of sympathy. No doubt the idea of a Treaty, of a settlement arrived at by agreement as between equals, not by dictation from above, appealed strongly to their sense of being a distinct people, to their national self-respect. For evidently that idea involved the recognition, in principle, of the independence of Egypt and was inconsistent with the theory of her being a British possession. And when they came to consider the conditions which in our proposal were attached to this recognition, they were ready to admit that, however unacceptable to extreme Nationalists, these conditions were nevertheless such as they could themselves justify to their countrymen, as being compatible with their status as a nation. For that status could only be maintained in fact by the support of Great Britain and Great Britain was entitled to a reasonable *quid pro quo* for this indispensable support. That she should claim to control the foreign policy of Egypt and should have the right to maintain, for her own Imperial purposes, a force on Egyptian soil, was no more than such a *quid pro quo*. As regards her domestic affairs, Egypt would be completely self-governing except in respect of the privileges of foreigners. And the restrictions upon the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty which the maintenance of some of these privileges involved were no greater but less, and far less irksome, than the restrictions which had always existed. In view of these practical considerations, it could not be denied that the proposed arrangement was conceived in the interests, not only of Great Britain, but of Egypt, and could be defended as a fair and reasonable basis for future co-operation.

The point of view of the Egyptians of whom we are speaking can, of course, only be stated in general terms. There was much discussion between us, and much difference of opinion among the Egyptians themselves, about details. Interminable and wearisome argumentation about the meaning of words—"Protectorate," "Sovereignty," "Independence," and "Complete Independence"—occupied much time. But it did not prevent a great deal of practical consideration of the actual provisions of the contemplated Treaty or indicate that agreement about them was in any way impossible. On the whole the conversations which we had while in Egypt left on our minds the impression that we had made great progress towards a good understanding, and especially that we had got into a much better atmosphere. The bitterness and suspicion, with which all Egyptian Nationalists had recently come to regard Great Britain, were beginning to disappear, and there was a good prospect of gaining the support of the more moderate section for a policy of reconciliation.

But there was a distinct limit to anything which we could achieve, while still in Egypt, in the shape of definite results. It was not within our competence to arrange a settlement of the Egyptian problem. We could only advise as to the best course to be followed to that end. And the Egyptians with whom we conversed, one and all, were emphatic in stating that they were only expressing their individual opinions, and that they could not claim to speak for the great body of their countrymen. Indeed, almost all of them went further, and referred us to Zaghlul Pasha and his Delegation as being the only men authorised by general acclamation to represent



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the Egyptian people. We ourselves, of course, could not admit that Zaghlul Pasha and his associates possessed the full measure of authority thus claimed for them, but neither could we blind ourselves to the fact that they were for the time being the most powerful leaders of Egyptian opinion, and that no scheme to which they were definitely hostile stood any chance of favourable consideration, much less of general acceptance. But it was essential, from our point of view, as we had explained to the Egyptians from the first, that the Treaty which we contemplated, if it was to have any real value, must be concluded in such a manner as to make it not only technically but morally binding upon Egypt. As a matter of form, it would be a Treaty between the British and Egyptian Governments. But an agreement merely between Governments would not be sufficient. It might always be said afterwards that the Egyptian Government was not a free agent, but was bound to accept any terms that Great Britain chose to impose, and that in any case it was an autocratic Government, not really representing the Egyptian people. For these reasons it had always been a fundamental point in our plan that the Treaty should not be allowed to come into force unless it had been approved by a genuinely representative Egyptian Assembly. This might be the existing Legislative Assembly, the sittings of which have been suspended since the outbreak of war, or preferably it might be a new body elected *ad hoc*. It was rather for the Egyptians than for us to say what kind of Assembly would be in the truest sense representative. But it must in any case be a popularly elected body, deliberating with perfect freedom and taking its decision without official or other pressure of any kind.

In any such Assembly, we were assured on all hands, Zaghlul Pasha and his associates would command a substantial, if not an overwhelming, majority. In these circumstances it appeared to us absurd to let any question of etiquette stand in the way of our engaging in discussion with him, if he was willing to confer with us. Had we not from the outset invited representative Egyptians to lay their views before us, without prejudice on either side? And, as a matter of fact, it seemed likely at one time that Zaghlul Pasha, who was still in Paris, would return to Egypt in order to meet the Mission. Great efforts to induce him to do so were made by the Egyptians, who had been conferring with us, and some of whom were among his strongest adherents. Adli Pasha also, who, though himself occupying an independent position, was in friendly relations with Zaghlul, and was most anxious to effect a meeting between him and us, lent his powerful influence to second these efforts. But Zaghlul Pasha did not as yet see his way to respond to these appeals and, though numerous communications passed between him and his friends in Egypt during the latter portion of our stay, he remained for the time being in Paris.

The position, therefore, at the time when we left Egypt was as follows: We had obtained, from British and Egyptian sources, a vast amount of information about existing conditions; we had had ample opportunities of making ourselves acquainted with the state of public feeling; and we had formed our own opinion as to the policy best calculated to reconcile British and Egyptian interests. But we were not yet in a position to say whether the scheme which we had in our minds, even if it commended itself to British opinion, was likely to command sufficient support in Egypt to make it worth while to attempt a settlement on our lines. All we could do, therefore, was to report on the situation as we had found it, to indicate the conclusions to which our enquiries had led us, and to express the hope that the better understanding between British and Egyptians, of which we saw some promising signs, would ultimately make it possible to determine the future status of Egypt by mutual agreement.

## III.

### Proceedings of the Mission after leaving Egypt.

#### A.—*Discussions with Egyptian Delegates in London.*

We left Egypt at the end of the first week of March, travelling by different routes, and met again in London about the middle of April, with the view of drawing up our Report. But soon after we had begun to do so, a new and not wholly unexpected development of the situation caused us to interrupt our work, in the hope of being able to obtain fuller information with regard to the capital point on which, when leaving Egypt, we had still remained in doubt. That point, as already explained, was the attitude likely to be adopted by the chief exponents of Nationalist opinion towards the policy which we were ourselves disposed to advise the British Government to adopt. A prospect, however, now presented itself of clearing up this point of doubt by the Mission coming into direct contact with Zaghlul Pasha.



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# (٤٧٣/١٧٠)





At the end of April Adli Pasha, who commands the universal respect of his countrymen and whose advice had been of the greatest value to us in Egypt, paid a visit to Paris, and at once put himself into communication with Zaghlul Pasha with the object of bringing about a meeting between him and the Mission. Early in May we became aware that, largely owing to Adli Pasha's good offices, Zaghlul Pasha and the Delegation were now disposed to abandon their former attitude and enter into direct relations with the Mission. Accordingly, during the third week in May, Mr. (now Sir Cecil) Hurst, who happened to be in Paris, conveyed to them an invitation to meet the Mission in London. Zaghlul Pasha, having satisfied himself that by so doing he would not compromise his position as the advocate of Egyptian independence, arrived in London on the 7th June. He was accompanied by seven members of the Delegation, who were subsequently joined by one or two of their colleagues.

Then followed a series of conversations which, with frequent interruptions, due to the fact that several of the members of the Mission were now busily engaged in other work, lasted till the middle of August.

These prolonged discussions took a variety of forms. There were a number of meetings at which the Mission, as a body, met Zaghlul Pasha and his companions, Adli Pasha being also present. From time to time, points which it was found difficult to discuss in so large a body were referred to committees consisting of a few members of either party, and these to some extent cleared the ground. Moreover, there was, in the interval between formal meetings, a great deal of useful private discussion between individual members of the Mission and one or more of the Egyptians. It would serve no useful purpose to try and give an account of the many changing phases of this lengthy debate, but it is necessary to indicate its general character.

In the first place, we record with pleasure that very friendly relations were maintained from first to last, and that, even when differences of opinion were sharpest, the controversy was always conducted in an amicable spirit. There was never any doubt in our minds that our visitors were as sincerely anxious as we were ourselves to find a way out of the difficulties of the situation. But they were to some extent hampered—and this is specially true of Zaghlul Pasha himself—by the uncompromising line which they had taken in the recent past, when they believed that there was an unbridgeable gulf between Egyptian aspirations and the policy of Great Britain. They had no doubt come to recognise by this time that they had misunderstood that policy, but it was not easy for them to readjust their position to suit their altered view of British intentions. Over and over again they declared that it was impossible for them to accept some proposal or other made by us, the fairness of which they did not directly dispute, because it was inconsistent with the "mandate" which they had received from the Egyptian people. It was useless to point out to them that the alleged "mandate" was really their own programme, which the Egyptian public had simply accepted from them, and that there was nothing to prevent their modifying a policy of their own creation. The reply always was, that they had no authority to depart from claims which, even if originally put forward by themselves, had been enthusiastically endorsed by a great majority of their countrymen. The war-cries of the past eighteen months were, indeed, a perpetual stumbling-block, and, while in the course of our discussions we were often very near agreement on points of substance, it was always difficult to clothe such agreement in words which did not conflict with formulæ to which the Egyptians felt themselves committed.

The idea of a Treaty between Great Britain and Egypt was readily accepted. That was our starting-point, and without it we should have made little progress. But when it came to discussing those terms of the Treaty which embodied the few, but essential, safeguards for British and foreign interests, the Egyptians were always extremely apprehensive of agreeing to something which might conflict with their ideal of independence. As a matter of fact, our proposals did not conflict with that ideal—reasonably interpreted—as the Egyptians themselves, or at any rate some of them, were ready to admit. But there was always the fear in their minds that their countrymen would not take the same view, and that they would be regarded in Egypt as having betrayed the national cause.

In spite of these difficulties, one obstacle after another was gradually surmounted, and we finally succeeded in drafting the outlines of a settlement with which both parties were more or less satisfied. This result was only achieved by considerable concessions on the part of the Mission. On one point in particular, to



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which we shall presently refer at greater length, we acquiesced in a claim on the part of the Egyptians which we were at first disposed to resist, because we were assured that the admission of that claim would do more than anything else to gratify popular sentiment in Egypt. This concession seemed to us not too high a price to pay if it secured the cordial acceptance of the scheme as a whole by the Egyptian people. Moreover, we were bound to recognise that the delegates also were ready to give up a good deal of what they had originally demanded, in their anxiety to come to a good understanding with the Mission.

The compromise thus reached was one which commended itself to us on its merits subject to one essential condition. That condition was that Zaghlul and his associates would undertake to use all their influence to obtain its acceptance by the people of Egypt, and ultimately to get a Treaty giving effect to it approved by an Egyptian Popular Assembly. This, as it seemed to us, was no more than we had a right to ask of them. We could not, indeed, expect them to promise that their efforts would be successful, any more than we could ourselves promise that our advice would be approved by the British Government and the British people. What we did demand was that they should commit themselves to supporting wholeheartedly the result of our joint efforts. For unless they did this, it was too much to hope that the settlement would be rightly understood, much less cordially welcomed, in Egypt. Yet it would be idle for us, if we could not cherish that hope, to recommend it ourselves as a solution of the Egyptian problem. The British people, we believed, would be quite willing to accord very generous terms to Egypt, but only if they were convinced that those terms would be gratefully accepted and would lead to permanently improved relations and hearty co-operation between them and the Egyptians in the future.

Zaghlul Pasha and his friends were, however, not yet prepared to commit themselves to this extent. They were evidently still nervous of being repudiated by a considerable number of their followers in Egypt. They accordingly kept on suggesting further modifications of the terms so far agreed to, mainly on points of form, with the view of making them more acceptable to Egyptian opinion. But we had now gone as far as we deemed wise in the way of concession. For we, too, as we did not fail to point out, had to reckon with public opinion, and it was no use to agree to anything, with a view of pleasing the Egyptians, which would lead to the rejection of the whole scheme in Great Britain. We seemed, therefore, after all, to have reached an *impasse*.

B.—*The Memorandum of August* 18, 1920.

At this stage, however, it was suggested on the Egyptian side that the discussion should be temporarily suspended, in order that some members of the Delegation might have time to visit Egypt, to explain to the public of that country the nature of the settlement which the Mission was disposed to recommend, and the great advantages which Egypt would derive from it. If, as they hoped, they met with a favourable reception, this would constitute a "mandate" from the people which would justify the Delegation, on the return of the emissaries, in pledging itself to give our proposals an unconditional support. Zaghlul Pasha himself was not disposed to undertake the journey, but he approved of the idea, and three or four of his companions were willing to go.

This proposal had obvious advantages from the Egyptian point of view. For it would enable the emissaries to advocate the acceptance of certain terms without being absolutely committed to them, and thus running the risk of finding themselves isolated from the bulk of their party in case those terms met with an unfavourable reception. But it had advantages for us also, inasmuch as the general public discussion, which was bound to ensue, would enable us to gauge Egyptian opinion more completely than had yet been possible, and to judge of the comparative strength of moderate and extreme Nationalists. A memorandum was accordingly drawn up—the last of a series of efforts to reduce the result of our discussions to a definite shape—which laid down in general terms the main features of the settlement, which, on the condition already specified, the Mission would be disposed to recommend. The object of the memorandum was to enable the emissaries to elicit an expression of Egyptian public opinion. This document, which presently came to be known as the "Milner-Zaghlul Agreement," but which, on the face of it, was not an agreement, but merely an outline of the bases on which an agreement might subsequently be framed, was handed by Lord Milner to Adli Pasha, who, as an intermediary between the two parties, had had a large share in all our negotiations, to be communicated by





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



him to Zaghlul Pasha and his friends. It was understood that they might make free use of it in public discussion in Egypt. It was dated the 18th August and was in the following terms :—

" The accompanying memorandum is the result of conversations held in London in June to August 1920 between Lord Milner and the members of the Special Mission to Egypt, and Zaghlul Pasha and the members of the Egyptian Delegation, in which conversations Adli Pasha also took part. It outlines a policy for the settlement of the Egyptian question in the best interests both of Great Britain and Egypt.

" The members of the Mission are prepared to recommend the British Government to adopt the policy indicated in the memorandum, if they are satisfied that Zaghlul Pasha and the Delegation are likewise prepared to advocate it, and will use all their influence to obtain the assent of an Egyptian National Assembly to the conclusion of such a Treaty as is contemplated in Articles 3 and 4.

" It is clear that unless both parties are cordially united in supporting it, the policy here suggested cannot be pursued with success.

(Signed) MILNER.

*Memorandum.*

"1. In order to establish the independence of Egypt on a secure and lasting basis, it is necessary that the relations between Great Britain and Egypt should be precisely defined, and the privileges and immunities now enjoyed in Egypt by the capitulatory Powers should be modified and rendered less injurious to the interests of the country.

" 2. These ends cannot be achieved without further negotiations between accredited representatives of the British and Egyptian Governments respectively in the one case, and betwen the British Government and the Governments of the capitulatory Powers in the other case. Such negotiations will be directed to arriving at definite agreements on the following lines :—

" 3.—(i.) As between Egypt and Great Britain a Treaty will be entered into, under which Great Britain will recognise the independence of Egypt as a constitutional monarchy with representative institutions, and Egypt will confer upon Great Britain such rights as are necessary to safeguard her special interests and to enable her to furnish the guarantees which must be given to foreign Powers to secure the relinquishment of their capitulatory rights.

(ii.) By the same Treaty, an alliance will be concluded between Great Britain and Egypt, by which Great Britain will undertake to support Egypt in defending the integrity of her territory, and Egypt will undertake, in case of war, even when the integrity of Egypt is not affected, to render to Great Britain all the assistance in her power, within her own borders, including the use of her harbours, aerodromes and means of communication for military purposes.

" 4. This Treaty will embody stipulations to the following effect :—

(i.) Egypt will enjoy the right to representation in foreign countries. In the absence of any duly-accredited Egyptian representative, the Egyptian Government will confide its interests to the care of the British representative. Egypt will undertake not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or will create difficulties for Great Britain, and will also undertake not to enter into any agreement with a foreign Power which is prejudicial to British interests.

(ii.) Egypt will confer on Great Britain the right to maintain a military force on Egyptian soil for the protection of her Imperial communications. The Treaty will fix the place where the force shall be quartered and will regulate any subsidiary matters which require to be arranged. The presence of this force shall not constitute in any manner a military occupation of the country, or prejudice the rights of the Government of Egypt.

(iii.) Egypt will appoint, in concurrence with His Majesty's Government, a Financial Adviser, to whom shall be entrusted in due course the powers at present exercised by the Commissioners of the Debt, and who will be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for all other matters on which they may desire to consult him.



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(iv.) Egypt will appoint, in concurrence with His Majesty's Government, an official in the Ministry of Justice, who shall enjoy the right of access to the Minister. He shall be kept fully informed on all matters connected with the administration of the law as affecting foreigners, and will also be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for consultation on any matter connected with the efficient maintenance of law and order.

(v.) In view of the contemplated transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights hitherto exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments, Egypt recognises the right of Great Britain to intervene, through her representative in Egypt, to prevent the application to foreigners of any Egyptian law now requiring foreign consent, and Great Britain on her side undertakes not to exercise this right except in the case of laws operating inequitably against foreigners.

"*Alternative:*—

In view of the contemplated transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights hitherto exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments, Egypt recognises the right of Great Britain to intervene, through her representative in Egypt, to prevent the application to foreigners of any Egyptian law now requiring foreign consent, and Great Britain on her side undertakes not to exercise this right except in the case of laws inequitably discriminating against foreigners in the matter of taxation, or inconsistent with the principles of legislation common to all the capitulatory Powers.

(vi.) On account of the special relations between Great Britain and Egypt created by the Alliance, the British representative will be accorded an exceptional position in Egypt and will be entitled to precedence over all other representatives.

(vii.) The engagements of British and other foreign officers and administrative officials who entered into the service of the Egyptian Government before the coming into force of the Treaty may be terminated, at the instance of either the officials themselves or the Egyptian Government, at any time within two years after the coming into force of the Treaty. The pension or compensation to be accorded to officials retiring under this provision, in addition to that provided by the existing law, shall be determined by the Treaty. In cases where no advantage is taken of this arrangement existing terms of service will remain unaffected.

"5. This Treaty will be submitted to the approval of a Constituent Assembly, but it will not come into force until after the agreements with foreign Powers for the closing of their Consular Courts and the decrees for the reorganisation of the Mixed Tribunals have come into operation.

"6. This Constituent Assembly will also be charged with the duty of framing a new Organic Statute, in accordance with the provisions of which the Government of Egypt will in future be conducted. This Statute will embody provisions for the Ministers being responsible to the Legislature. It will also provide for religious toleration for all persons and for the due protection of the rights of foreigners.

"7. The necessary modifications in the régime of the Capitulations will be secured by agreements to be concluded by Great Britain with the various capitulatory Powers. These agreements will provide for the closing of the foreign Consular Courts, so as to render possible the reorganisation and extension of the jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals and the application to all foreigners in Egypt of the legislation (including legislation imposing taxation) enacted by the Egyptian Legislature.

"8. These agreements will provide for the transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights previously exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments. They will also contain stipulations to the following effect :—

(*a.*) No attempt will be made to discriminate against the nationals of a Power which agrees to close its Consular Courts, and such nationals shall enjoy in Egypt the same treatment as British subjects.

(*b.*) The Egyptian Nationality Law will be founded on the *jus sanguinis*, so that the children born in Egypt of a foreigner will enjoy the nationality of their father, and will not be claimed as Egyptian subjects.





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(*c.*) Consular officers of the foreign Powers shall be accorded by Egypt the same status as foreign Consuls enjoy in England.

(*d.*) Existing Treaties and Conventions to which Egypt is a party on matters of commerce and navigation, including postal and telegraphic Conventions, will remain in force. Pending the conclusion of special agreements to which she is a party, Egypt will apply the Treaties in force between Great Britain and the foreign Power concerned on questions affected by the closing of the Consular Courts, such as extradition Treaties, Treaties for the surrender of seamen deserters, &c., as also Treaties of a political nature, whether multilateral or bilateral, *e.g.*, arbitration Conventions and the various Conventions relating to the conduct of hostilities.

(*e.*) The liberty to maintain schools and to teach the language of the foreign country concerned will be guaranteed, provided that such schools are subject in all respects to the laws applicable generally to European schools in Egypt.

(*f.*) The liberty to maintain or organise religious and charitable foundations, such as hospitals, &c., will also be guaranteed.

"The Treaties will also provide for the necessary changes in the Commission of the Debt and the elimination of the international element in the Alexandria Board of Health.

"9. The legislation rendered necessary by the aforesaid agreements between Great Britain and the foreign Powers, will be effected by decrees to be issued by the Egyptian Government.

"A decree shall be enacted at the same time validating all measures, legislative, administrative or judicial, taken under Martial Law.

"10. The decrees for the reorganisation of the Mixed Tribunals will provide for conferring upon these Tribunals all jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the foreign Consular Courts, while leaving the jurisdiction of the Native Courts untouched.

"11. After the coming into force of the Treaty referred to in Article 3, Great Britain will communicate its terms to foreign Powers and will support an application by Egypt for admission as a member of the League of Nations.

"*August* 18, 1920."

### C.—*The Policy of the Memorandum.*

#### 1. *Representation of Egypt in Foreign Countries.*

The policy of the above document in its general character is in accordance with the conclusions at which, for the reasons already given, we had arrived before leaving Egypt. But, as a result of our discussions with Zaghlul Pasha and his associates, we were now prepared to go somewhat further. The most important point on which we were led by their arguments to modify our earlier view is one to which the memorandum gives especial prominence, viz., the right of Egypt to appoint her own representatives in foreign countries. It has always been, and is, from our point of view, a fundamental principle that the foreign relations of Egypt should be under the general direction of Great Britain. All reasonable Egyptians, however strongly Nationalist, recognise the immense value of the security which an alliance with Great Britain would afford them. But it is obviously impossible to expect that Great Britian should shoulder the responsibility of defending the integrity and independence of Egypt against all possible dangers, if that country were free to pursue a policy of her own in foreign affairs inconsistent with or prejudicial to the policy of Great Britain. This axiom none of the Egyptians with whom we were dealing ever attempted to dispute. They were quite prepared—in a Treaty of Alliance—to give whatever pledges might be necessary to exclude the possibility of any action on the part of Egypt which could cause embarrassment to her great ally. There was, indeed, no difference of opinion on this point in the course of our discussions, and the words of the memorandum dealing with it appear to us to make the complete understanding which existed with regard to the subject sufficiently clear. For in this, as in other respects, it must always be borne in mind, that in drawing up the memorandum, we were not attempting to draft a Treaty but simply to express in ordinary language the ideas which a Treaty, to be subsequently



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



negotiated, would express with much more detail and in terms of greater precision.

The real issue here was not whether Egypt should be free to follow a foreign policy independent of Great Britain—the impossibility of our assenting to this was not disputed—but whether this principle necessarily involved the conduct of all her foreign relations remaining in British hands.

This was a question upon which we had already, before discussing it with the Egyptians at all, come to a very definite conclusion. In our opinion British control should be limited to Egypt's political relations. Egyptian commercial or other interests of a non-political character in foreign countries had better be left in Egyptian hands. These interests are numerous and growing. The development of commerce and communications, the rapidly increasing number of Egyptians who now travel or reside abroad, especially in Western Europe, and the multifarious connections which they form there constitute a need for a certain amount of official protection. If the duty of looking after all Egyptian private interests abroad is to continue to fall upon British diplomatic and consular agents, it will become an excessive burden. And the inevitable failure to discharge that duty to the satisfaction of the Egyptians will be a constant source of grievance. For these reasons it seemed to us from the first to be eminently desirable that Egypt should appoint representatives of her own in foreign countries.

But what we originally contemplated was that these Egyptian representatives should have only consular and not diplomatic status. It was on this point that during our discussions in London we came, not without hesitation, to adopt a different view. The Egyptians were all absolutely unanimous in maintaining that the denial of diplomatic status to the representatives of Egypt vitiated the idea of an Alliance and would make the settlement we were contemplating entirely unacceptable to their countrymen. And in this assertion we believed them to be justified. For, even while in Egypt, we had realised that all Egyptians, including the Sultan and his Ministers, however much they were divided on other questions, were united in their desire for the diplomatic representation of their country abroad. It was a sore point with all of them that, when declaring the Protectorate, we had dispensed with an Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs and placed the Egyptian Foreign Office, with which it was found impossible to dispense, under the High Commissioner. The hope was universal that, when the time came to put the relations of Great Britain and Egypt on a permanent footing, we should allow the Ministry for Foreign Affairs once more to have an Egyptian chief and foreign representatives, as of old, to be directly accredited to the ruler of Egypt. And on the same principle it was hoped that, now that Turkish suzerainty had disappeared, Egyptian representatives in those foreign countries to which it might be necessary to send them would enjoy a similar status to that of foreign representatives in Egypt.

In this matter, therefore, we could have no doubt that the Egyptian delegates were speaking for all their countrymen. And indeed they were most emphatic in declaring that, unless we could meet them on this point, there was no prospect of settling the future relations between Great Britain and Egypt by the method of agreement. On the other hand this recognition of the status of Egypt would, as they affirmed, be so great a satisfaction to national pride that it would make the acceptance of all our other conditions easy. And what, they asked, were we afraid of? We recognised that Egypt had many interests of her own in foreign countries, which could best be looked after by Egyptians. There was no advantage to Great Britain in withholding from the men entrusted with the care of those interests the dignity of diplomatic status. For they could not take any action injurious to British interests or conflicting with British policy, without breaking the Treaty, which, as had already been agreed between us, was to be so drafted as to preclude the possibility of such action. Moreover, the number of Egypt's diplomatic representatives abroad would be very limited. Egypt did not desire, and could not afford, to have such representatives in more than a few countries. The fact that everywhere else Egyptian interests would be entrusted to the care of Great Britain marked the specially intimate character of the relations between the two countries.

We could not but feel that these were weighty considerations. At the same time it was evident, as we strongly insisted, that the presence of Egyptian diplomatists, even in a few European capitals, and of foreign diplomatists in Cairo, would afford opportunities for intrigue, which might lead to much trouble. The very fact that these diplomatists would, in the political sphere, have really nothing to do might tempt them to justify their existence by transgressing their proper functions. But the delegates would not admit that there was any real danger of this happening.





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Their view was that, satisfied with the position acquired by Egypt under the Treaty, the Egyptians would be the last to favour intrigues, which might give other foreign nations an opportunity of interfering in their country by first making mischief between them and Great Britain. The greatest safeguard which we could have against such machinations was the fact that the Egyptians themselves would be whole-heartedly in favour of an Alliance which fully recognised their national status and dignity.

Such were the arguments which led us to reconsider our position on the question of diplomatic status. In so doing we were well aware, and we frankly told the delegates, that this was a concession which might alarm public opinion in this country and imperil the acceptance of the agreement as a whole by the British people. And, judging from the unfavourable comments which this proposal has already excited in many quarters, it is evident that we were not mistaken in anticipating that it would meet with serious opposition. Nevertheless, we remain of opinion that the balance of argument is decisively in its favour. So long as bitterness and friction continue to exist between Great Britain and Egypt, we shall always be exposed to the hostility of Egyptians in foreign countries. Associations for the purpose of anti-British propaganda have been actively at work for a number of years in Switzerland, France, Germany and Italy. There is no remedy for this, except in restoring friendly relations and we rely on the whole policy here proposed to have this effect. If that result is achieved there will, in our opinion, be positive advantages in giving diplomatic status to Egyptian representatives abroad. For if, as is only to be expected, a certain number of irreconcilables are still left to carry on the campaign against Great Britain, the official representatives of Egypt will be bound to try to restrain them. No Egyptian Minister could do otherwise than discountenance activities on the part of his own countrymen, directed against Egypt's ally, without failing in his duty and rendering himself liable to be recalled.

2. *The Defence of Imperial Communications.*

The supreme importance which the delegates attached to the question of national status was once more strongly in evidence when we came to deal with Great Britain's strategic interest in Egypt—the protection of her Imperial communications. To Great Britain—as an ally—they thought that Egypt could, without indignity, accord a base in Egyptian territory, "a strong place of arms," a *point d'appui* in the chain of her Imperial defences, linking East and West. They were not averse from the idea that Great Britain, in case of war, should have the command of Egyptian resources, and especially of all means of communication, railways, aerodromes, &c., for the conduct of military operations. Such a stipulation was even welcome as emphasising the "bilateral" character of the agreement between the two countries, inasmuch as Egypt would be giving something in exchange for what she got. As by a Treaty of Alliance, Great Britain would be undertaking to defend Egypt, it was only fair that Egypt should do something to assist the British Empire, if Great Britain was engaged in a war, even a war in which Egypt was not directly interested.

A more difficult point was the maintenance of a British military force in Egypt in time of peace. But here again it was not so much the numbers of the force in question which interested the Egyptians as its character. As long as it was not there as an "Army of Occupation," as a force intended to "keep order" in Egypt, which was merely another way of saying to keep Egypt in subjection, but was maintained for an external object, the defence of the British Empire, the presence of a British force in Egypt was justifiable from their point of view. The question of the strength of that force was never raised in the course of the discussion. It was recognised that this depended on external conditions and, apart from what would be necessary if Egypt was herself in danger, might vary with the varying exigencies of Imperial defence. The great point was, that it should not be regarded in any sense as a garrison of Egypt. The maintenance of internal order was a matter for the Egyptians themselves.

In order to emphasise this aspect of the case the delegates urged very strongly, that the force in question should be stationed on the bank of the Suez Canal and preferably on its eastern side. But to this it was quite impossible for us to agree. For, in the first place, the presence of British troops in the neutral "canal zone" would be calculated to raise trouble with other Powers interested in that international waterway. The neutrality of the canal is guaranteed by international agreements and the permanent occupation of the canal zone by troops of any single Power might be challenged as a breach of that neutrality. Moreover, Great Britain's strategic



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interest in Egypt is not limited to securing a free passage through the Suez Canal. "The defence of her Imperial communications" involves much more than that. For Egypt is becoming more and more a "nodal point" in the complex of those communications by land and air as well as by sea. In face of these considerations, the idea of fixing Kantara, or some other spot in the canal zone, as the site of a cantonment had to be abandoned and, the principle of the maintenance of a British military force in Egypt having been admitted, the question where that force should be stationed was left open—to be settled, with other details, in the official negotiations for the conclusion of the contemplated Treaty.

### 3. *The British Officials in the Egyptian Service.*

The seventh clause of Article IV of the memorandum deal with the position of British officials in the Egyptian service. This is a matter of supreme importance to the good government of Egypt. The whole system of internal administration as it exists to-day, has been mainly built up by the work and example of British officials, many of whom have spent the best part of their lives in the country. The immediate elimination of the British element would bring the whole fabric down in ruins. Even an over-hasty reduction of that element would threaten its stability, and greatly impair the efficient conduct of public business.

It is not indeed to be feared that, with the retirement of the British officials, the country would relapse into the state of maladministration, from which we have delivered it, and that all the old evils would return. The number of Egyptians qualified by education and character to take part in the work of government on civilised principles has greatly increased since the occupation. All the Egyptians, even the humblest, have become so habituated to the new standard of orderly, equitable and honest administration, that a complete return to the abuses of the past would not be tolerated. Nevertheless, the "new model" would certainly be exposed to danger of serious deterioration, if the men who have built it up and are still its mainstay were to be suddenly withdrawn.

Thus it is only natural that the proposal to leave a purely Egyptian Government entirely free to retain or not to retain British or other foreign officials in the Civil Service should be at first sight regarded with considerable uneasiness. But a calm consideration of the practical aspects of the case is calculated greatly to allay these misgivings. The idea of any Egyptian Government, however free to do so, attempting to make a clean sweep of its foreign officials is a chimera. One has only to picture the plight of such a Government, suddenly deprived of its most experienced and responsible advisers and confronted with the general unpopularity which the consequent administrative breakdown would entail, to realise that no sane men would deliberately plunge into such a sea of trouble. And it is not only Egyptian disapproval which would have to be reckoned with, but the anger and alarm of the foreign residents. The large and wealthy foreign Colonies, on which the economic welfare of Egypt so greatly depends, would at once be up in arms. For these have all come to regard the presence of a British nucleus in the administration as the sheet-anchor of their own safety and prosperity. Nor is it to be anticipated that the High Commissioner—or whatever the British representative may in future be called—would not have a word to say in the matter. True, he will, *ex hypothesi*, have no right to dictate to the Egyptian Government. But as the representative of Egypt's ally, as the foremost foreigner in Egypt, and the guardian of foreign interests, he will still carry great weight, and it will always be a matter of interest to Egyptian Ministers to be on good terms with him. The influences which would militate against the abuse by these Ministers of the right to dispense with the services of British officials are thus immensely strong. And at the same time the great satisfaction which they would feel at knowing that they had that right, and that the British officials were really there to assist and not to dictate, would make them more and and not less ready to rely on British help.

For no sensible Egyptian seriously wishes to dispense with foreign aid in the government of his country, or believes that Egypt could, for a long time to come at any rate, afford to do without it. Egyptians generally no doubt think, and they are right in thinking, that the importation of British officials has sometimes, especially of late years, been overdone. They hold firmly to the principle that no Englishman or other foreigner should be appointed to any post for which a reasonably competent man of their own race can be found. They look forward to the time when the whole or almost the whole of the public service will be staffed by their fellow-countrymen. They feel that progress in that direction has been unduly slow and would like to see





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# (٤٧٣/١٧٨)



it sensibly accelerated. But they certainly do not wish to get rid of those British officials—and there are a goodly number of them—whom they really respect, or to be precluded from engaging others of equal competence in the service of their country in the future.*

The danger lies rather in the opposite direction. There may be a stampede of British and other foreign officials, scared by the prospect of finding themselves at the mercy of a purely Egyptian Government. That would be a grave misfortune, but it seems to us very improbable that such an exodus will ever assume large dimensions. In the first place, there are in many branches of the Public Service, such as ports, railways, customs, public works, &c., a considerable number of Englishmen and other Europeans, who are employed as experts for lack of Egyptians possessing the necessary technical skill. These men are not likely to feel their position in any way affected by a change in the political status of Egypt. It is rather those occupying genuinely administrative posts, and having authority over large bodies of Egyptians, who are likely to fear this change. Will Egyptian Ministers, they may ask themselves, still support them in the exercise of that authority? Will it still be possible to carry on the perpetual struggle against corruption and nepotism, and for promotion by merit and not by influence, with any measure of success? Such fears are not unnatural, and they may lead some of the men in question to prefer retirement. But there are others who will feel more confidence in themselves and in the essential strength of their future position. For they will not be, like the handful of Europeans who, before the occupation, fought an uphill battle for decent administration in an unreformed Egypt, and even under those depressing conditions were not without influence and certainly were not treated with any personal disregard. The British officials who remain in Egypt to-day will be in a country which is permeated by European influences, which has now grown used to British methods of government and which will remain in contact on its borders with concrete evidences of British power. Moreover, the recognition of Egyptian independence will remove one great obstacle to their present usefulness. The growing prejudice against imported officials, which threatens, if unchecked, to put an end to all hearty co-operation between them and their Egyptian fellows, is

*We took considerable pains to discover the truth about the number of foreign officials in the Egyptian Service. Returns were prepared for us by the Statistical Department, showing the distribution of all posts in the 1919-1920 Budget, while a comparative statement was called for from each Ministry, showing the distribution of pensionable and contract posts in the years 1905, 1910, 1914 and 1920.

In the returns submitted by the Statistical Department, posts are described as "pensionable," "contract," "monthly paid" and "daily paid." In the two latter classes 98½ per cent. of the posts are occupied by Egyptians. So in this category foreign competition is evidently not excessive.

An examination of the pensionable and contract posts, however, revealed a different state of affairs. Omitting the seven ministerial posts, the staff of the Sultan's Cabinet, the Council of Ministers, the Legislative Assembly and the Ministry of Wakfs, in which, with one or two exceptions, the posts are held exclusively by Egyptians, Egyptians hold 86 per cent. of the posts in the administration and draw 71 per cent. of the salaries, while the British hold 6 per cent. of the posts and draw 19 per cent. of the salaries, others (viz., non-Egyptian and non-British) holding 8 per cent. of the posts and drawing 10 per cent. of the salaries. In some statistical diagrams which were prepared to show the distribution of these posts and salaries among the different Ministries, the posts are divided into six classes. The first three classes range from the lowest salaries to £E. 799 per annum, and may be described as "Lower Posts;" the other three classes cover "Higher Posts," and include salaries of £E. 800 to £E. 2,999.

Among the lower posts, Egyptians hold roughly two-thirds of those between £E. 240 and £E. 499; but after that the Egyptian share declines to little more than one-third of the posts between £E. 500 and £E. 799. In the higher posts the disparity is even more marked and the Egyptian share does not amount to one-quarter. It is true that in the £E. 1,200-£E. 1,499 class, the Egyptian share rises to over one-third, but this can be traced to the Ministries of Interior and Justice, which provide Egyptian Mudirs (Provincial Governors) and Judges. In the higher posts of the Ministries of Finance, Education, Public Works, Agriculture and Communications, however, there are only 31 Egyptians, as against 168 British and 32 "others" holding posts over £E. 800. Doubtless in these particular Ministries there are many higher posts requiring special technical qualifications which it is impossible at the moment to find Egyptians qualified to fill. If, however, Egyptians are to be responsible for the internal administration of their country, it is essential that better provision should be made for training them to occupy such higher posts.

As far as the comparative tables showing the distribution of pensionable and contract posts in 1905, 1910, 1914 and 1920 are concerned, owing to the imperfect state of the records the figures can only be regarded as approximate. They sufficed, however, to give a general impression of the turnover in personnel. In the total of posts the Egyptian element has grown from 45·1 per cent. in 1905 to 50·5 per cent. in 1920. Egyptians in lower posts have also increased from 48·4 per cent. of the total in 1905 to 55 per cent in 1920. But in the higher posts their number has declined from 27·7 per cent. in 1905 to only 23·1 per cent. in 1920, while in the same category the British share of posts has increased from 42·2 per cent. to 59·3 per cent. of the total.



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not due to the men but to the system. It is because they are, or can be represented to be, imposed upon Egypt against her will, as the agents and symbols of foreign domination, that hostility to them is easily excited. The grounds for such hostility will disappear when they can no longer be regarded as instruments of a foreign government, and their efforts to maintain efficiency will then have an increased amount of native support. For, as individuals, British administrators and the British officers in the Egyptian army are not unpopular. The best of them not only command the respect, but win the affection, of a people who are very quick to recognise capacity, especially when it is combined with graciousness and tact. Given time for reflection—and it is certain that nothing will be done in a hurry—it is likely that these considerations will determine many Englishmen in the Egyptian service to stick to their posts. And indeed Englishmen could perform no more honourable service than in establishing a friendly partnership between Great Britain and Egypt and assisting Egyptians to make a success of self-governing institutions.

But while any general or rapid displacement of the British and other foreign officials is not to be anticipated, it is nevertheless desirable to make careful provision for those, with whose services the Egyptian Government may wish to dispense or who may themselves wish to retire, when the new system comes into force. Such men must be treated not only with fairness, but with generosity. For nothing could have a worse effect upon Anglo-Egyptian relations in the future than that a number of former officials should be left with a sense of grievance. In any Treaty between Great Britain and Egypt their position will have to be absolutely safeguarded, and the conditions of retirement carefully laid down after consultation with representatives of those concerned. Under the existing law Egyptian officials, who are retired by the Government for reasons other than misconduct, receive pensions on a not ungenerous scale proportionate to their length of service. No new arrangement can infringe existing rights. But it is evidently necessary, in view of the altered circumstances, to make special provision for those whose careers may be prematurely cut short. And it is quite essential that men who under the new system retire of their own accord, should receive the same favourable treatment as those with whose services the Egyptian Government may choose to dispense. In ordinary circumstances a man voluntarily resigning a public post before the normal time for his retirement does so at a certain sacrifice. But this principle does not apply where the conditions of service are essentially altered. In that case the official should have the right to choose, whether he will or will not go on serving under the new conditions, and if he prefers to retire, should be entitled to do so on the same terms as if his retirement had been compulsory.

### 4. *Reservations for the Protection of Foreigners.*

To the general principle that the Egyptian Government should in future be free to determine for itself what posts are to be filled by non-Egyptians, the memorandum in Article IV, §§ 3 and 4, makes two exceptions. According to these clauses, a Financial Adviser and an official in the Ministry of Justice, whose special function will be to watch the administration of the law as it affects foreigners, are still to be appointed "in concurrence with His Majesty's Government." It may be asked, in view of what has already been said on this subject, why it was thought necessary to make these exceptions. The answer is to be found in the special responsibilities which under the proposed settlement Great Britain would assume for the protection of foreign rights.

The two points of supreme interest to the foreign Powers whose nationals at present enjoy special privileges under the Capitulations are the solvency of Egypt, which is not only of importance to the bondholders but indirectly affects all foreign capital and enterprise in the country, and the safety of the lives and property of foreigners. To ensure these objects the Powers will certainly continue to insist on the maintenance of some measure of foreign control. They have come to acquiesce in the exercise of that control by Great Britain. But if Great Britain ceased to exercise it, they would demand that some other Power or group of Powers should take her place.

It is, however, a fundamental principle of the contemplated settlement that any powers, which may still be necessary to safeguard foreign interests in Egypt and to assure foreign Governments that the rights of their nationals will be respected, shall be vested in Great Britain. This is the reason for the stipulation that the two high officials already referred to should continue to be appointed with the concurrence of the British Government—the duty of the one being to ensure solvency, that of the





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other to watch the administration of the laws as affecting foreigners. The functions of these officials are only described in general terms in the memorandum, and the scope of their authority will have to be very carefully defined in drafting the Treaty. Here again we had to content ourselves with agreement in principle and to leave details to be settled in future negotiations.

The same applies to the clause (IV, § 7) which gives the British representative in Egypt the right, in certain cases, to prevent the application of Egyptian laws to foreigners. This proposal was much discussed. The delegates were very anxious to avoid this right being converted into a general veto on Egyptian legislation. We, on our side, did not desire this. But the exact limits of the right were difficult to agree upon, and for this reason alternative solutions are suggested in the memorandum. The subject, indeed, is extremely complicated. But, stripped of technicalities, what it all comes to is this. The Egyptian Government is hampered at every turn by its inability to make laws applicable to the subjects of foreign Powers which have capitulatory rights in Egypt without the consent of those Powers, though that consent may in some cases be given on their behalf by the General Assembly of the Mixed Tribunals. As already explained, it has always been the aim of British policy, and it is part of the scheme contemplated in the memorandum, greatly to diminish the restrictions thus imposed on the legislative authority of the Egyptian Government. But it would be practically impossible, and it is not proposed, to remove these restrictions altogether. In so far as they are maintained, somebody must have the right to exercise them. In the scheme embodied in the memorandum it is contemplated that that right, intended as it is to safeguard the legitimate interests of all foreigners, should be conferred by Egypt on a single Power—Great Britain.

### D.—*The Sudan.*

The scheme embodied in the memorandum deals only with Egypt. It has no application to the Sudan, a country entirely distinct from Egypt in its character and constitution, the status of which is not, like that of Egypt, still indeterminate, but has been clearly defined by the Anglo-Egyptian Convention of the 19th January, 1899.* For that reason the subject of the Sudan was deliberately excluded from all our discussions with the delegates. This was all along clearly understood by them, but, in order to prevent any misunderstanding in Egypt of the scope of our discussions, Lord Milner, when transmitting the memorandum to Adli Pasha, also handed him the following letter :—

" My dear Pasha, *August* 18, 1920.

" Referring to our conversation of yesterday, I should like once more to repeat that no part of the memorandum which I am now sending you is intended to have any application to the Sudan. This is, I think, evident on the face of the document, but, to avoid any possibility of future misunderstanding, it seems desirable to place on record the view of the Mission that the subject of the Sudan, which has never been discussed between us and Zaghlul Pasha and his friends, lies quite outside the scope of the proposed agreement with regard to Egypt. There is a wide difference of conditions between the two countries, and in our opinion they must be dealt with on different lines.

" The Sudan has made great progress under its existing administration, which is based on the provisions of the Convention of 1899, and no change in the political status of Egypt should be allowed to disturb the further development of the Sudan on a system which has been productive of such good results.

" On the other hand, we fully realise the vital interest of Egypt in the supply of water reaching her through the Sudan, and we intend to make proposals calculated

*This Convention, which was signed by the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Lord Cromer, laid it down that Great Britain was " by right of conquest " entitled " to share in the settlement and future working and development " of the Sudan. By the acceptance of this principle any claim of Turkey to suzerainty over the Sudan was disallowed, and that country was definitely excluded from the area subject to the régime of the Capitulations. It was accordingly provided in the Convention that the jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals should " not extend to or be recognised in any part of the Sudan," and that no foreign consuls should reside in the country without the consent of the British Government. The supreme military and civil power was to be vested in the person of a " Governor-General," who would be appointed on the recommendation of the British Government by a decree of the Khedive of Egypt, and whose proclamations would have the force of law.



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



to remove any anxiety which Egypt may feel as to the adequacy of that supply both for her actual and her prospective needs.

(Signed) "MILNER."

"His Excellency Adli Yeghen Pasha."

At this point it may be convenient that we should briefly state the reasons which, in our opinion, make it wholly impossible to contemplate, in the case of the Sudan, a settlement on the lines proposed for Egypt, indicating at the same time the general line of policy which appears most suitable to the present requirements of the former country.

While the great majority of the people of Egypt are comparatively homogeneous, the Sudan is divided between Arabs and Negroids, and within each of these two great racial groups there are a number of races and tribes differing widely from one another and often mutually antagonistic. The Arabs of the Sudan speak dialects of the same language as the people of Egypt and are united to them by the bond of religion. Islam, moreover, is spreading even among the non-Arab races of the Sudan. These influences mitigate in various degrees, but they have not overcome the antagonism of the two countries, which rankling memories of Egyptian misgovernment in the past have done much to intensify.

The political bonds which have at intervals in the past united Egypt with the Sudan have always been fragile. Egyptian conquerors have at various times overrun parts and even the whole of the Sudan. But it has never been really subdued by, or in any sense amalgamated with, Egypt. The Egyptian conquest of the Sudan in the last century was especially disastrous to both countries, and ended in the complete overthrow of Egyptian authority in the early eighties by the Mahdist rebellion. For more than ten years no vestige of Egyptian authority was left in the Sudan except in a small district surrounding Suakin. As a consequence of this breakdown, Great Britain was obliged to undertake several costly expeditions for the rescue of the Egyptian garrisons and the defence of Egypt, which was in danger of being overrun by the Mahdist hordes.

Since the conquest of the country by British and Egyptian forces under British leadership in 1896–8, the Government of the Sudan, which under the Convention of 1899 takes the form of an Anglo-Egyptian Protectorate, has been virtually in British hands. The Governor-General, though appointed by the Sultan (formerly the Khedive) of Egypt, is nominated by the British Government, and all the Governors of Provinces and principal officials are British. Under this system of government the progress of the Sudan in all respects, material and moral, has been remarkable. When full allowance is made for the simplicity of the problem, viz., the introduction of the first principles of orderly and civilised government among a very primitive people, the great success actually achieved during the long Governor-Generalship of Sir R. Wingate is one of the brightest pages in the history of British rule over backward races. The present administration is popular in the Sudan and, with few exceptions, peaceful and progressive conditions prevail throughout the country.

But while Egypt and the Sudan are essentially distinct countries, and are bound to develop on very different lines, Egypt will always have one interest of supreme importance in the Sudan. The Nile, upon which the very existence of Egypt depends, flows for hundreds of miles through the Sudan, and it is vital to Egypt to prevent any such diversion of water from the Nile as might diminish her present cultivable area or preclude the reclamation of that portion of her soil, some 2,000,000 acres in extent, which is capable of being brought under cultivation, when, by means of storage, the present supply of water available for irrigation has been increased. Hitherto the amount of water drawn from the Nile in its passage through the Sudan has been of negligible amount, but as the population of the Sudan increases that country will require more water for its own development, and a conflict of interest between it and Egypt might arise. At the same time there is every reason to hope that, properly conserved and distributed, the Nile waters will suffice for all the lands, whether in Egypt or the Sudan, which are ever likely to require irrigation. The control of the waters of the Nile for purposes of irrigation is a matter of such paramount importance and the technical and other problems involved are so difficult and intricate that it is, in our opinion, necessary to set up a permanent Commission, composed on the one hand of experts of the highest authority and on the other hand of representatives of all the countries affected—Egypt, the Sudan and Uganda—to settle all questions affecting the regulation of the river and to ensure the fair distribution of the water.

The contiguity of Egypt and the Sudan and their common interest in the Nile make it desirable that some political nexus between the two countries should always





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٩٠ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٨٢)





be maintained, but it is out of the question that this connection should take the form of the subjection of the Sudan to Egypt. The former country is capable of and entitled to independent development in accordance with its own character and requirements. It is much too early to attempt to determine its ultimate political status. For present purposes that status is sufficiently defined by the Convention of 1899 between Great Britain and Egypt, which provides for the necessary political connection between Egypt and the Sudan without hampering the independent development of the latter country.

Though it is absolutely necessary for the present to maintain a single supreme authority over the whole of the Sudan, it is not desirable that the government of that country should be highly centralised. Having regard to its vast extent and the varied character of its inhabitants, the administration of its different parts should be left, as far as possible, in the hands of the native authorities, wherever they exist, under British supervision. A centralised bureaucracy is wholly unsuitable for the Sudan. Decentralisation and the employment, wherever possible, of native agencies for the simple administrative needs of the country, in its present stage of development, would make both for economy and efficiency. At the present time the officials of local origin are still largely outnumbered by those introduced from Egypt, with whom service in the Sudan is by no means popular. This difficulty will be overcome as education progresses and a greater number of Sudanese themselves become capable of filling official posts. At the same time care should be taken, in the matter of education, not to repeat the mistake which has been made in Egypt of introducing a system which fits pupils for little else than employment in clerical and minor administrative posts, and creates an overgrown body of aspirants to Government employment. There is no room in the Sudan for a host of petty officials, and education should be directed to giving the Sudanese a capacity and a taste for employment in other directions, such as agriculture, industry, commerce and engineering. The immediate need of the country is material development, and it can do without an elaborate administrative system.

The military forces still employed in the Sudan are very large. A large army was, no doubt, required to complete the conquest and pacification of the country, but the time has come when, in our opinion, the question of the number and organisation of its military forces should be reconsidered, and the financial burden upon Egypt which the maintenance of that force involves be reduced. Hitherto, the Governor-Generalship of the Sudan and the Command-in-Chief of the Egyptian army have been united in one person. There were good reasons for this in the past, but it is indefensible as a permanent arrangement. At the first convenient opportunity a civil Governor-General should be appointed.

In general it should be the aim of British policy to relieve Egypt from any financial responsibility for the Sudan and to establish the relations of the two countries for the future upon a basis which will secure the independent development of the Sudan while safeguarding the vital interests of Egypt in the waters of the Nile.

Egypt has an indefeasible right to an ample and assured supply of water for the land at present under cultivation and to a fair share of any increased supply which engineering skill may be able to provide. A formal declaration on the part of Great Britain that she recognises this right and is resolved under all circumstances to uphold it would go far to allay the uneasiness which prevails in Egypt on this subject. We are of opinion that such a declaration might with advantage be made at the present time.

E.—*Visit of Egyptian delegates to Egypt.*

At the close of the discussions which resulted in the memorandum of the 18th August, Zaghlul Pasha and the other delegates as well as Adli Pasha left London for France. Four of the Delegation (Mohammed Pasha Mahmud, Ahmed Lutfi Bey el Said, Abdel Latif Bey el Mukabati, and Ali Bey Maher) proceeded immediately to Egypt in accordance with the understanding already referred to (see p. 23) in order to enlist the support of their countrymen for the scheme outlined in the memorandum. The substance of that document, with certain inaccuracies of detail, had meanwhile found its way into the press and been received in Egypt with expressions of approval.

About the same time publicity was given in that country to a long manifesto from Zaghlul Pasha, in which he emphasised the representative character of the Delegation and the support which it had received from the nation. He referred to the endeavours made by the Delegation to submit the Egyptian case to the Peace Conference and to the world at large, claiming that a considerable amount of sympathy had been gained in foreign countries. He went on to speak of the appoint-



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٩١و]
# (٤٧٣/١٨٣)





ment of the Special Mission and the obstacle to any direct contact with its members presented by insistence on the Protectorate, the steps which had eventually led to the visit of the Egyptian delegates to London, and the discussions which had taken place there. This document concluded by announcing that the proposals which had resulted from these discussions would now be submitted to the nation by emissaries appointed for the purpose, and, should the project be favourably received, representatives would then be nominated to negotiate a treaty on the basis suggested.

The inconclusive character of this message appears to have somewhat damped the enthusiasm with which the local committee of the Delegation in Cairo had, in the first instance, greeted the announcement of a settlement. The four emissaries, however, who reached Alexandria on the 7th of September, were received with warm demonstrations of welcome and their arrival revived a feeling of optimism. A telegram from the local committee to Zaghlul Pasha expressed the confidence which "the whole of the country" placed in the Delegation and the prevailing enthusiasm of the public. At the same time it was noticeable that there was a marked relaxation of that sense of strain and tension which had for some time past governed the relations between British and Egyptians, and conciliation was in the air.

It is true that at first a very determined set was made against the proposed settlement by the *Hisb-el-Watani* and other extremists. The critics maintained that the contemplated independence of Egypt was not a reality, and specifically protested against the non-inclusion of the Sudan in the scheme. Among the principal objectors four of the Khedivial Princes, who had signed the manifesto already referred to (see p. 4), now took the opportunity to publish in the Arabic newspapers on the 11th of September, 1920, a declaration that their views remained unchanged and that they did not support any agreement which restricted the independence of Egypt. But this demonstration had little effect on the public, and in view of the good reception generally accorded to the proposals the Princes shortly afterwards endeavoured to explain it away.

While the four emissaries of the Delegation did not enter into any contact with the official world in Egypt, every care was taken to ensure them complete liberty of action and movement. The procedure which they adopted was to invite small groups of representative Egyptians to meet them and to discuss the proposed settlement. The latter in turn reported to other groups in the provinces, whence resolutions of adherence were received by the four delegates, so that within a fortnight of their arrival it became evident that a substantial majority of the representative elements in the country were favourable to the basis for negotiation which they had submitted. But by far the most important testimony of general approval was secured at a meeting of the remaining members of the Legislative Assembly convened to confer with the delegates on the 16th September. Of the forty-nine members who were present on that occasion, forty-five recorded their votes in favour of the proposals. Two abstained from any expression of opinion, and only two voted in opposition. Two other members who had been unable to attend in person wrote to express their concurrence with the project, which thus received the support of forty-seven out of fifty-one surviving members.

At the same time, while this general approval was recorded, further interpretation of certain particular points was invited, and the hope was expressed that the Delegation would on its return to London obtain definite assurances on these points. The most important of these was the universal desire for some definite indication that the Protectorate would cease to exist with the conclusion of the Treaty of Alliance.

F.—*Concluding Interviews with Egyptian delegates in London.*

The four emissaries returned from Egypt to Paris early in October, and there rejoined Zaghlul Pasha and their other colleagues who had remained in Europe. At the end of the month the whole party, again accompanied by Adli Pasha, once more came to London and had two further meetings with the Mission, at which the four emissaries related their experiences in Egypt, and the resulting situation was discussed. It was apparent from the statement of the emissaries, confirming as it did the reports which had already appeared in the press, that the terms of the proposed settlement had been well received by the Egyptian public, and that the determined attempt which was at first made to excite opposition to them had ended in complete failure. At the same time, the emissaries did not fail to impress upon us that the general approval of the settlement was accompanied, on the part of the Egyptians with whom they had conferred, by certain reservations, and that they had been instructed to try and obtain modifications of it on several points. What they chiefly desired was a limitation of the functions of the Financial Adviser and





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# (٤٧٣/١٨٤)



of the British official in the Ministry of Justice; the abandonment of the provision of Article 5 of the memorandum—that the coming into force of the contemplated Treaty between Great Britain and Egypt should be dependent upon the previous conclusion of agreements with the Powers for necessary modifications in the régime of the Capitulations; and, above all, the formal abolition of the Protectorate. Some other points of minor importance were also raised, and it was evident that, if all these matters were to be gone into again, we should reopen the whole of the discussion in which we had been occupied for the greater part of the summer. This was a course in which the members of the Mission were unanimously of opinion that it would be perfectly useless for them to engage. As we pointed out to the delegates, any agreement arrived at between us and them could not in any case be final. All we could do was to pave the way for the official negotiations, which must be subsequently undertaken, if the idea of a Treaty on the lines which we had been discussing commended itself to British and Egyptian opinion. The points now brought forward might all be raised in the official negotiations, as other points no doubt would be on both sides, and for us to try and anticipate a decision upon every detail, while it would certainly delay the commencement of those negotiations, might also seriously prejudice their successful conduct.

The point of view of the Mission was summed up by Lord Milner in a statement which he made at the second meeting of the delegates on the 9th November. It was to the following effect:—

"It seemed desirable to have this meeting before the departure of the Egyptian representatives in order to clear up the situation and leave room for further co-operation between them and the Mission in the future.

"The report, which the gentlemen who have lately returned from Egypt have brought back to us, seems to indicate that there is a great body of opinion favourable to a settlement on the basis outlined in the memorandum of August. On the other hand, they state that there are several points in the memorandum which they desire to modify and several fresh conditions which they wish to add to it before promising their unconditional support. It is not necessary for me to dwell upon these points to-day, because the Mission are unanimously of opinion that no good purpose would be served by a further discussion of details at the present stage.

"The memorandum never professed to do more than indicate the general lines on which an agreement could be arrived at. In any case, as we have always foreseen, the agreement itself, if it is decided to proceed with it, will have to be the outcome of formal negotiations between duly accredited representatives of the British and Egyptian Governments. In those negotiations the fresh points which you have brought forward as the result of the visit of some of your number to Egypt can be raised, as other points may be raised on one side or the other. It would be impossible and undesirable to exclude any proposals not evidently inconsistent with the spirit of the agreement outlined in the memorandum, which on the face of it requires elucidation and elaboration before it can be converted into a formal treaty. It would in our opinion not facilitate a settlement if we were to anticipate these discussions, therefore, we think it wiser to refrain from any expression of opinion on the new points recently raised by you at the present time, though we believe that a satisfactory solution can, and will, be found when regular negotiations can be undertaken.

"What is far more important at the present stage than any further discussion of details is to influence opinion both here and in Egypt in a sense favourable to a settlement on the lines which we both favour, and above all to cultivate and strengthen by every means the spirit of friendship and mutual confidence which our conversations here have helped to engender, but which must become general on both sides if our efforts are to lead to the desired result. As far as this country is concerned, we hope that the presentation of the report of the Mission, which we are anxious to complete as quickly as possible, will conduce to that end. But it is equally important that a similar effect should be produced in Egypt by your endeavours. We gratefully recognise how much you have already done in that direction. But it is evident that there is still opposition to be overcome, that there are great numbers of people in Egypt who are not imbued with the spirit of the agreement, but are for one reason or another hostile to a good understanding between Great Britain and Egypt. They are, or profess themselves to be, suspicious of the intentions of this country, they do not recognise the generous spirit in which Great Britain is prepared to meet the aspirations of the Egyptian people. In so far as you are able to dispel this suspicion and misunderstanding and create a better feeling you will be doing more than can be done in any other way to bring about the settlement which we all so earnestly desire."



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To this statement Zaghlul Pasha replied in a speech, the gist of which was that while he was as anxious as we were to help to create an atmosphere favourable to a settlement, he would be greatly weakened in his efforts to do so by being unable to give any promise to the Egyptians about the proposed reservations, and specially by being unable to say that Great Britain had finally repudiated the Protectorate. To the latter point he returned again and again, and he subsequently reiterated these views in a letter addressed to Lord Milner.

This was the last of our interviews with the Egyptians, who all left England shortly after it. It is only necessary to add that the tone of our discussions remained throughout of the most friendly character, and that at parting, though no final agreement had been reached and both sides remained uncommitted, we certainly gathered the impression that, reservations or no reservations, public opinion in Egypt had been very favourably impressed by the terms of the proposed settlement, and that most if not all of the delegates were hopeful of its ultimate complete acceptance by their countrymen, and anxious to bring it about.

## IV.—General Summary.

In view of the complicated nature of the subject, and the length to which our Report—though we have striven to omit all unessential details—has necessarily run, we desire to recapitulate the main features of the policy which we now recommend, and the stages by which our conclusions have been reached.

When we arrived in Egypt we found a general state of unrest and discontent. The rebellion had been suppressed, but agitation was undiminished, and among an extreme group still took dangerous and violent forms. Everywhere the demand was for "complete independence," beginning with the abolition of the "Protectorate," which was construed as implying the extinction of Egyptian nationality. To justify this inference, the Nationalists pointed to the refusal of the British Government to permit Egyptian Ministers to come to London after the Armistice, to the deportation of Zaghlul Pasha and his associates, to the increase since the war in the number of British officials, and to the continuance of martial law. At the same time the enunciation of President Wilson's fourteen points had aroused wide-spread expectations, and the promise of self-determination to other Eastern peoples whom the Egyptians thought inferior to themselves had added to their discontent. Religious feeling had also been inflamed by the defeat of the Turks and the doubts and uncertainties as to the future of the Caliphate.

On the British side the situation was full of difficulty. A large number of experienced officials had been lost to the service since the beginning of the war and their places taken by new men who knew little of the traditional system by which, in the days of Lord Cromer, British control was maintained without wounding Egyptian susceptibilities. The work of the Administration during the war deserves the warmest acknowledgment, but it necessarily entailed a certain subordination of Egyptian to British interests, and the employment of rough and ready methods likely to be resented by a people whose sympathies were not actively engaged on our side. When the war ended, many of the old landmarks had disappeared and there was a break of continuity with the past. Martial law had become necessary, not merely to maintain order, but to carry on the civil government; the "Agent-General" had become a High Commissioner who was also Commander-in-chief, and though Egyptian Ministers continued to hold office, the Legislative Assembly was suspended. The Administration in these circumstances had to be carried on in the teeth of almost universal opposition, affecting even the official class, upon which the Government had to rely for a large part of its executive work.

We soon came to the conclusion that this situation could not be met by any return to the pre-war system or by any reforms of a merely departmental character. A more radical change was required to meet the new conditions. But the agitation against the "Protectorate" had greatly increased the difficulty of finding any acceptable policy which would satisfy the Egyptians while securing British interests. The word "Protectorate" had become a symbol of servitude in the minds of the Egyptians, and they insisted that it must mean what they said it meant. Argument on this point was wholly useless, and it thus became evident to us that, unless we could get on to new ground, it would be impossible to reach a settlement by agreement.

Fortunately the informal conversations which we had with leading men in Egypt encouraged us to hope that such a settlement was not impossible on new lines. They said with one accord that, though they objected to having an inferior status imposed upon Egypt by the British Government, they would welcome a Treaty of Alliance freely entered into on both sides, which, while establishing the independence





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of Egypt, would give to Great Britain all those safeguards and guarantees which the Protectorate, as we understood it, was intended to secure. The greater part of our subsequent work lay in examining this possibility, and our aim throughout has been to find the basis of a Treaty which should supersede all debates about words and phrases, and be the sole and final definition of the relations of Great Britain and Egypt.

There is nothing new in the recognition of Egyptian independence by Great Britain. Throughout our occupation we have most carefully respected the theory that Egypt was a national unit under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey, and when we abolished the Turkish suzerainty we deliberately chose to proclaim a Protectorate in preference to annexing Egypt or making her part of the British Empire. We have constantly renewed our promise of self-government for Egypt. We are of opinion that the fulfilment of this promise cannot be postponed. The spirit of Egyptian Nationalism cannot be extinguished, and, though it may always be possible to suppress its more violent manifestations, the government of the country in the teeth of a hostile people, who charge us with breach of faith, must be a difficult and distasteful task, alike to those who take part in it and to the British people who are responsible for it.

But there are formidable difficulties in the way of any sudden or complete transfer of all the powers of government to Egyptian hands. There are essential British interests to be upheld; it is also imperative to ensure the safety and protect the rights of the large number of foreign residents whose presence in Egypt differentiates her position from that of other Eastern countries and greatly complicates the problem.

The essential British interests are that the great Imperial communications which pass through Egyptian territory shall not be jeopardised, either by internal disturbances or foreign aggression; that they shall be available in time of war, and for necessary purposes in time of peace; that the struggle for ascendency in Egypt between rival Powers shall not be renewed; and, finally, that an independent Egypt shall not pursue a foreign policy hostile or prejudicial to that of the British Empire. It is therefore necessary that any Treaty entered into between us and the Egyptians should secure the special position of the British representative in Egypt, enable us to maintain an army on Egyptian territory for the protection of our Imperial communications, and take adequate security that Egyptian policy shall be in line with that of the British Empire.

The protection of foreign rights presents a problem of even greater complexity. These are at present secured by the Capitulations. But the Capitulations are the greatest of all the disabilities from which Egypt now suffers (see note on p. 19). The multiplicity of jurisdictions arising out of them, and the facilities which they give to men of uncertain nationality to escape from the local jurisdiction greatly complicate the problem of law and order; while the exemption of foreigners from direct taxation, other than the land and house tax, cripples the Government in raising revenue, since it is in practice impossible to impose on Egyptians taxes from which foreigners are exempt. Thus, although the wealth of the country is rapidly increasing and its resources are now ample for all the needs of good government, the Administration has for some time past been compelled to starve essential public services, such as Education and Public Health. During the war it has only been possible to raise sufficient revenue for the auxiliary police (*Ghaffirs*) by a special tax imposed under Martial Law.

It was evident to us that, without the removal of these restrictions, no Egyptian Government could enjoy any real independence. To leave an Egyptian Ministry to struggle with conditions which threatened to bring the present Administration to a stand-still would be to foredoom it to failure. We foresaw that, if the Capitulations were maintained, the Egyptian Government without British support would in all probability be exposed to a competing pressure of foreign influences, which might paralyse its action. It was therefore clearly in the interests of Egypt that the Capitulations should be removed and the Mixed Tribunals reorganised so as to enable them to take over the jurisdiction of the Consular Courts and to act in criminal as well as civil suits affecting foreigners. But this could only be effected through the mediation of Great Britain, and Great Britain could only expect to succeed in inducing the Powers to part with their present privileges, if she were in a position to assure them that solvency would be maintained and that the lives and property of foreigners would be secure. Our efforts were accordingly directed to securing for Great Britain such a position as would enable her to give this necessary assurance. In order to achieve this object, it is necessary that any Treaty should provide for the right of Great Britain to intervene in legislation affecting foreigners



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and to exercise a certain measure of control over those branches of the administration which most directly affect foreign interests.

Subject to these safeguards for the special interests of Great Britain and the protection of foreign rights, we hold that the Government of Egypt should be restored in fact to what it has always, during our occupation, been in theory, a Government of Egypt by Egyptians. We have sufficient faith in the reforming work of the last forty years to believe that such a course can now be followed with a good prospect of success. But it must be adopted wholeheartedly and in a spirit of hopefulness and sympathy. Nothing would be more likely to lead to failure than to overload this policy with an excessive number of timorous restrictions, which would obscure the principle of Egyptian independence, create suspicion as to our real intentions, and defeat our main object—the re-establishment of mutual goodwill and hearty co-operation between British and Egyptians.

We make no attempt to conceal our conviction that Egypt is not yet in a position to dispense with British assistance in her internal administration. But the Egyptians know this, and when once the responsibility is clearly theirs, they will be slow to dispense with such help from us as is essential to the prosperity and good government of their country. They will be all the slower to do so, because under this system it will be impossible to attribute any failure that may occur to British dictation, and because the good work of British officials in the future will redound to the credit of the Ministers who are wise enough to retain them. Moreover, the whole atmosphere will, in our opinion, be completely changed when the Egyptians are satisfied that the purpose of British policy is to help them to realise their ideal of independence and not to stand in the way of its attainment. We are greatly fortified in that belief by our own experience in dealing with the representative Egyptians with whom we have come into such intimate contact. Once convinced of the sincerity of our intentions they showed every readiness to appreciate our point of view, to recognise the special interests which Great Britain has in Egypt, the debt of gratitude due to her for her past work in that country, and the indispensability of her future help in maintaining its integrity and independence. And we are not discouraged by the fact that they were not all as yet prepared to commit themselves unreservedly to every point in the settlement which they had collaborated with us in devising. We make no doubt that they are wholeheartedly in favour of the main features of the settlement and that they are anxious to secure its acceptance by their countrymen. And, as far as we can judge, public opinion in Egypt is moving decisively in that direction. There is a sensible diminution of the bitter feeling and violent propaganda which were recently so prevalent, and the country is anxious to settle down. The moment is favourable for placing the relations of Great Britain and Egypt on the satisfactory and enduring basis of a Treaty, which will at one and the same time establish the independence of Egypt and secure the essential interests of Great Britain. It will be an undoubted advantage to Great Britain to have those interests carefully defined and placed beyond challenge in a Treaty accepted by the Egyptians, as it will obviously be an advantage to Egypt to have her integrity and independence guaranteed by Great Britain. We therefore strongly advise His Majesty's Government to enter without undue delay into negotiations with the Egyptian Government for the conclusion of a Treaty on the lines which we have ventured to recommend. It would, in our opinion, be a great misfortune if the present opportunity were lost.

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We have thought it desirable to confine this Report to a description of the general situation in Egypt and a statement of our main recommendations as to future policy. We have not included in it numerous suggestions which, in the course of our investigations, we were led to make with regard to details of departmental administration and other matters affecting the educational and social progress of the country. These suggestions are embodied in separate memoranda, some of which have already been placed at the disposal of the Foreign Office, as the rest will be in due course. They are full of technical detail, and, though we believe them to be useful, they are not of the same general public interest as the questions discussed in this Report.

One of these memoranda deals with the Antiquities Department, which, as we found in our conversations with the Delegation, the Egyptians are quite willing to leave under its present control.

We desire in conclusion to record our thanks to the two Secretaries of the Mission and to express our appreciation of their invaluable services.

Mr. A. T. Loyd, the senior of the two, had, after many years' experience in





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# (٤٧٣/١٨٨)



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Egypt and in the Foreign Office, retired from the Public Service shortly before the Mission began its labours. But, yielding to the earnest request of our Chairman, he agreed to accompany us to Egypt and to act as our principal Secretary there, though it was understood from the first that the call of other duties would not allow him to retain that position long after our return to England. During our stay in Egypt we derived great benefit from his intimate knowledge of the country and the people, his familiarity with all Departments of the Government, and his popularity both with British and Egyptians.

When Mr. Loyd left us in May last, the whole of the secretarial work of the Mission devolved upon Mr. E. M. B. Ingram, of the Foreign Office, who had also accompanied us to Egypt, as assistant to Mr. Loyd and Private Secretary to Lord Milner. Mr. Ingram's duties during the last seven months have been very arduous, but he has discharged them with unfailing zeal and ability, and we are deeply indebted to his assistance.

MILNER.
RENNELL RODD.
OWEN THOMAS.
CECIL J. B. HURST.
J. A. SPENDER.

*December* 9, 1920.



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# (٤٧٣/١٨٩)

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SECRET.

CABINET 79 (20).

MEETING to be held at 10, Downing Street, S.W.1.,
on Wednesday, December 29th. 1920 at 11.30 a.m.

A G E N D A.

11.30 a.m. 1. THE STATUS OF EGYPT.

Reference:- Conference of Ministers 1st.November, 1920, Conclusion 3.
Conference of Ministers 4th. November, 1920, at 11.30 a.m., Conclusion 3.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War.
C.P. 1803 (already circulated).
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
C.P. 1870 (already circulated).
Report by Lord Milner on his Mission to Egypt, with Covering Note by Lord Curzon.
C.P. 1960 (already circulated).
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India.
C.P. 2000 (already circulated).
Memorandum by the Board of Trade.
C.P. 2080 (already circulated).
Memorandum by the President, Board of Education.
C.P. 2120 (already circulated).
Copy of telegram from the Prime Minister of Australia to Mr. Lloyd George.
C.P. 2158 (already circulated).
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India.
C.P. 2204 (already circulated).
Special Mission to Egypt. Report by Lord Milner.
C.P. 2349 (already circulated).

Telegram No. 982 of Novr. 24th 1920 from Lord Curzon to Lord Allenby covering Egypt and Soudan Print Novr.10th, Section 3.

THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WILL BE TAKEN IF TIME PERMITS:-

2. ANCILLARY FOOD SERVICES.

Reference:- Cabinet 78 (20) Conclusion 7 (i).

3. REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN IN THE CIVIL SERVICE.

Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
C.P. 2301 (already circulated).

4. BATTLEFIELD MEMORIALS.

Memorandum by the First Commissioner of Works.
C.P. 2291 (already circulated).

5. SUPPLY OF STORES FOR POLAND AND GREECE.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War.
C.P. 2289 (already circulated).

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,
28th. December, 1920.

(Signed) M.P.A. HANKEY.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٤٩٤ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٩٠)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٩٥و]
# (٤٧٣/١٩١)



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S E C R E T.

FINAL COPY.

CONCLUSIONS of a Conference of Ministers held in Mr. Bonar Law's Room at the House of Commons, S.W., on Monday, 1st November, 1920 at 4 p.m.

.....

P R E S E N T:-

The Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon.A.Bonar Law,M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon.A.J.Balfour,O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon.A.Chamberlain,M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon.Earl Curzon of Kedleston,K.G.,G.C.S.I.,G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon.Viscount Milner, G.C.B.,G.C.M.G., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon.E.S.Montagu,M.P., Secretary of State for India.

The Right Hon.W.S.Churchill,M.P., Secretary of State for War & Air.

The Right Hon.Sir Hamar Greenwood, Bart.,K.C.,M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland.

The Right Hon.R.Munro,K.C., M.P., Secretary for Scotland.

The Right Hon.H.A.L.Fisher,M.P., President of the Board of Education.

The Right Hon.Sir Robert Horne, G.B.E.,K.C.,M.P., President of the Board of Trade.

The Right Hon.Sir L.Worthington-Evans, Bart., M.P.,

.....

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Field-Marshal the Viscount Allenby G.C.B.,G.C.M.G.,

Mr. Philip Kerr, C.H.,

.....

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M.P.A.Hankey,G.C.B..... Secretary, Cabinet.

Brigadier-General S.H.Wilson,C.B.,C.M.G.....Principal Assistant Secretary.

.....

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٩٥ظ]
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



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

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MEETING AT BRUSSELS.

(1) The Prime Minister, on behalf of his colleagues, congratulated and thanked Mr Balfour on the singularly successful way in which he had represented British interests at the recent meeting of the Council of the League of Nations at Brussels, and more particularly in connection with the question of the Court of International Justice.

INTER-ALLIED AND ANGLO-AMERICAN DEBTS.

(2) With reference to Cabinet 30 (20), Conclusion 2, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that the question of Inter-Allied and Anglo-American debts had now become urgent, and he had asked that it might be placed on the Agenda for that day. In view, however, of the urgency of discussing the status of Egypt, he did not wish to press the matter, provided that it could be discussed at a very early date.

The Secretary was instructed to place the question on the Agenda Paper of the next meeting of the Cabinet, on Wednesday next, November 3rd.

THE STATUS OF EGYPT.

(3) Lord Milner made a full statement to the Conference in connection with the visit of his Special Mission to Egypt, and proposed recommendations regarding the future status of that country. A summary of this statement, as well as of explanations given in reply to certain questions, is given in the Appendix.

There was general agreement that if any Treaty were to be enacted, it should provide, inter alia, that in cases where non-Egyptians were required to act in an advisory capacity as Government officials or officers, whether in the Civil Administration or as Military Officers, they should only be appointed with the consent of the British Government; this provision being subject to exception in the case of certain posts already reserved for non-Egyptian officials of nationalities other than British, as well as in the case of Syrians, for whom special arrangements

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٩٦ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٩٤)





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

would have to be made.

After hearing Lord Milner's statement, the Conference adjourned the discussion until the morning of Thursday next, November 4th.

. . . .

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1,
November 1, 1920.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٩٧ظ]
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


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

APPENDIX.

LORD MILNER said that he had been occupied for practically eleven months in considering the question of Egypt. For four months it had taken up practically his whole time, and for seven months the greater part of it. He thought that everyone would admit that if Egypt were a friendly and allied country which was decently governed and able to stand on its own feet, and if it were prepared to give us of its own accord a strategic base at all times and to place its harbours, railways, and other means of communication at our service not only in time of war but even in time of peace, it would be better, from the purely British point of view, than if Egypt were to be a British Possession, kept in subjection by force and requiring in time of peace a large permanent garrison. He foresaw considerable danger if the present situation were allowed to continue, lest it should become a reproduction of that in Southern and Western Ireland.

It was rapidly moving that way, and quite needlessly so. The quarrel with the Irish people was really a secular one, whereas in Egypt the trouble was really a new one and was, in his opinion, due to remedial causes. He saw no reason why, with good statesmanship and patience, we should not get on the same tolerable terms with the Egyptians as we were twenty years previously. Even now there was no very bad feeling amongst the greater number of people in Egypt towards the British. The Fellahin did not really care about any political question and this was even true of the Fellahin in the large towns. In fact, it might be said that 90 per cent. of the people in Egypt did not take very much interest one way or the other, and he was quite sure that a very large number of them did not know what the extremists were fighting for. To put it broadly, the Fellah neither loved nor hated us, and, as he had always been governed by somebody, he was

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٩٨ظ]
# (٤٧٣/١٩٨)






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

App.

quite prepared to acquiesce in being governed by us, so long as he got his water and his crops were not interfered with, and provided he was not stirred up against us by the social superiors of his own race, and especially by the religious leading/ It might be asked, in these circumstances, what was the cause of the outbreaks which took place in Egypt last year? These were, in his (Lord Milner's) opinion, due to temporary causes.

They were largely due to the things which went wrong in the government of the country during the War, when many of the best administrators were taken away; also to the hardships which had to be endured in many cases, and to the requisitioning and forced supplies of labour. All this had caused bad feeling. The point he wished to emphasize, however, was that the Fellahin could be worked up against us by their social superiors: and if we were to have peace in Egypt and avoid having to maintain that peace by martial law, it was not sufficient to have 90 per cent. of the people ready to acquiesce in our presence, if left alone. It was essential to get some of the remaining 10 per cent. -- that was, the educated and semi-educated classes -- on to our side. This he considered essential, for if we had some of the 10 per cent. on our side they could make opinion and we could afford to leave the rest. In the years gone by we always had some of the middle and semi-educated classes who were favourable to British rule, and it had been the greatest shock to him, when he visited Egypt, to find out what a change had taken place in the country. The Nationalist movement had only begun about 15 years ago, and it had been growing ever since. There was also, of course, the unrest caused by the War and its inevitable results.

He was not, however, going to labour this point, as it would be dealt with fully in the Final Report of his Commission; but he did want to emphasize the

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٩٩ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٠٠)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٠٠و]
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

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strength of the spirit of Egyptian Nationalism which now dominated the 10 per cent. of the population to which he was referring. Many men dreaded at heart the withdrawal of British influence from Egypt, but no man was prepared to stand up publicly and say that he was in favour of the Protectorate; no man was prepared to stand up and say that he did not want "complete independence" / If anybody was even suspected of favouring in any way British rule, he was immediately hauled over the coals and at once made to toe the line and make a public confession of his orthodoxy. The Sultan himself had said once to him (Lord Milner) when he was talking of his own weakness and unpopularity, that he could be the most popular man in Egypt on the following day if he followed the example of the Princes and agreed with their manifesto. It would thus be seen that we were up against a solid phalanx of Egyptian opinion, and in his (Lord Milner's) view, if we were to keep any control over the country otherwise than by martial law we must break up the 10 per cent. of the more educated classes and get some of them on our side, even if, in order to do so, it was necessary to make some considerable sacrifices. In the opinion of the Mission of which he was Chairman, it would be possible to re-establish genuine co-operation between the British and Egyptians in the government of Egypt by giving to the latter, who for forty years past we had professed to be training to govern themselves, the same independent status which we contemplated giving to the much less civilised Arabs in Mesopotamia after a much shorter period of tutelage. He noticed that the Secretary of State for India had suggested that his Mission had been bargaining with the Egyptian extremists. This was not so. Adly Pasha was essentially a moderate, and was not at all anti-British; he had been more instrumental in bringing about the conversations with the Mission than any other man in Egypt, and had in his (Lord Milner's) opinion the best political head in

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٠٠ظ]
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

# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٠١و]
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

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that country. All the men with whom the Mission had been carrying on conversations belonged to the old Hisb-el-Omma, a party favoured, and it might almost be said created, by Lord Cromer. Zaghlul himself was one of Lord Cromer's men. The Hisb-el-Omma party used to be at daggers drawn with the Hisb-el-Watani, which was really the anti-British party. The mistakes which had been made by us had led the Egyptians to think that we meant to destroy entirely their nationality and their individuality as a people, and to swallow them up in the British Empire. This feeling had brought the two parties together, and all non joined in the cry of "No Protectorate" and "Long live complete independence". As always happened in such combinations, the extremists got the upper hand, but the deep underlying difference was still there. On the one hand there were those who neither thought they could do without us nor wanted to try, and who knew that if left to themselves they would fall under some other much less lenient domination. These men still wanted to lean upon the British, but not as subjects. They wanted to be able to hold their heads up in Egypt and not to appear less patriotic than the extreme men who were really anti-British. He himself had been one of those who had recommended, after the War, that His Majesty's Government should not receive an Egyptian Delegation in London, but he now realised that the refusal had done a good deal of harm and had given colour in Egypt to the idea that we not only wanted a Protectorate but that our intention was to absorb Egypt entirely into the British Empire.

LORD CURZON pointed out that His Majesty's Government had never declined to receive Egyptian Ministers, but that they were not prepared to receive Zaghlul, who was the leader of the party which was working against British rule. The Ministers had refused to come without Zaghlul, and the proposed journey to London accordingly fell through.

LORD MILNER, continuing, said that the main effort of his mission had been directed towards finding a settlement which, alike in form and in substance, would allow that

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٠١ظ]
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




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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٠٢و]
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

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(102)

section of the more educated Egyptian classes which was not irreconcilable again to become our friends. It was necessary to take into account the self-respect and national self-consciousness of the Egyptians, or, one might say, their conceit: and that was why the term "Bi-lateral Agreement" had been used, as it implied the frank recognition of their nationality, of their having retained or regained a place of their own "in the sun", their relation to us being that of allies, not subjects or fellow-citizens. Throughout the discussions phraseology and face-saving had played an enormous part, as the Mission realised that they were dealing with Orientals and with children, very clever and potentially very naughty children, but also people who, once they were convinced of our sincerity and real good will towards them, were very manageable. Some doubt had been expressed as to what extent the Egyptians with whom the Mission had dealt really represented Egyptian opinion. There was no question that they had every conceivable credential that unofficial emissaries could have. There was practically no public body in Egypt which had not passed resolutions saying that Zaghlul represented their views, and there was not a voice raised on the other side. This was, however, when Zaghlul and his colleagues were supposed to advocate the extreme national demand. The real question was how they would be received when they went back to Egypt to advocate the permanent maintenance of a British Army in Egypt and the permanent concentration of the exceptional rights of foreigners in British hands, typified by the dropping of the famous predicate "complete" from the formula "independence". So far as he (Lord Milner) could make out, however, their proposals swept the board . It did not follow. that this feeling would continue, but he thought it reasonable to say that the dominant feeling of hostility against the British in Egypt had been broken. The old fissure was once more apparent, and it was wider than ever. "Entente" was the order of the day and for the present the party of "Entente"

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٠٢ظ]
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


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

(103)

had completely got the upper hand. The practical question was whether the price which the Mission was prepared to recommend Great Britain to pay for this separation of the sheep from the goats was too high. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had quite clearly pointed out its weak points. It had always been made perfectly clear to the Egyptians with whom his (Lord Milner's) mission had been dealing, that His Majesty's Government were not committed in any way, although he personally and his colleagues were committed to advocating a settlement on the lines laid down in their Memorandum of August last.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would like Lord Milner to give a picture of what he thought would be achieved under his proposals. He wondered whether the Egyptians would be prepared to take advice now in the same way as they did twenty years ago, for it must be remembered that at that time the situation was very different. For example, the Egyptian Government could not get any money, whereas now they probably would think that they could raise a loan just as well as anyone else.

LORD MILNER said that his idea was that, under his scheme, the situation would revert to what it was twenty or thirty years ago, when the British Government had much less actual power in Egypt but much greater influence. Under the present arrangement the want of co-operation between British and Egyptians threatened to bring things entirely to a standstill, and he thought we would get much greater efficiency if we gave up direct control and relied more on influence. He did not think that anyone doubted for a moment that the Egyptians would have to have some foreign help, and that they would prefer British to any other. But they certainly wanted greater freedom to run their domestic affairs on their own lines. When he had been in Egypt previously, we confined our direct action to finance and irrigation. It was a later and much more doubtful development when we began to take charge of all branches of administration especially the Interior.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٠٣ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٠٨)



# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٠٤و]
# (٤٧٣/٢٠٩)



(104)

A short discussion then ensued regarding the system which had been in vogue in Egypt in years gone by, during which it was pointed out that His Majesty's Government exercised a very great control, in so far as they only allowed those ministers to be appointed who were prepared to carry out a policy in accord with the British point of view. The point was also raised as to what extent it would be necessary, under the proposals for the Egyptian Government to take the advice of the British officials in Egypt, and as to whether, if they wanted an engineer or a man to run the railways, it would be possible to insist on their employing British officials and not French or American; and, again, as to whether, if they wanted officers for the Egyptian Army, they might not say that the French knew much more about military matters than the British and that they wanted to employ French officers.

LORD MILNER explained that, under the general lines of the scheme as already outlined, this was not expressly barred, but it certainly would not be in accordance with the spirit of the Agreement that British officials should be replaced by other foreigners. He believed that the Egyptians would readily agree to give a pledge to that effect.

LORD CURZON, in reply to a question by the Prime Minister, explained the system of control over Native States in India as regards their military forces and the employment of foreign officials. He suggested that in the case of Egypt the best way would surely be to lay down certain conditions, and expressly to state that if foreign officers were required they could only be appointed with the concurrence of His Majesty's Government.

MR. BONAR LAW asked if anyone could say what views were held by British officials, at present serving in Egypt, on Lord Milner's proposals. He would like to know, for example, was opinion unanimous that they would not work?

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٠٤ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢١٠)




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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٠٥و]
# (٤٧٣/٢١١)



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App.

LORD ALLENBY said that he thought opinion was unanimous that something in the nature of Lord Milner's scheme would be quite workable, but he would like to point out that this view was held before the scheme provided for representation in foreign countries, and he thought most of the British officials in Egypt would be very shy of this provision.

LORD MILNER said he did not think that the system under which an Egyptian Minister had control, with British Civil Servants working under him, would not work. Egypt remained overshadowed by British power, and he believed they were much better disposed to us than to anyone else. There was also the question of the accessibility of Egypt by sea, and with our sea power we could do practically what we liked strategically. Moreover, by her own act we were to have a permanent base in Egypt. As regards the possibility of foreign intrigues in Egypt, it must be remembered that under the proposed scheme she was to have an Alliance with us, and with us only.

Mr BONAR LAW thought that, with good will on the part of the Egyptians, the proposed scheme might work, but if not, it appeared to him to be hopeless. He very much doubted if the fourteen foreign Powers who had Capitulatory rights would be willing to agree to the proposals. He did not think for a moment that if the British Government were in the place of one of these Powers they would do so.

Some discussion then ensued, during which considerable doubt was expressed as to how, under the proposed scheme, it would be possible to prevent the French or any other foreign Power from intriguing in Egypt and gradually strengthening their position.

The question was also discussed as to the extent to which His Majesty's Government would be responsible for providing troops for the maintenance of internal order in Egypt and the protection of the property of foreigners in the case of the Egyptian Army proving unreliable.

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


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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٠٦و]
# (٤٧٣/٢١٣)



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It was also pointed out that the situation could never be exactly what it was in years gone by, and that, after all that had passed, the present and future High Commissioners in Egypt could never hold the same position as Lord Cromer had in the past.

LORD MILNER said that there was only one thing which he still intended to say when certain questions had been asked. He had been very careful to impress on the Egyptian Delegation that he was talking qua Mission, and could not speak for the Government any more than the Egyptian delegates could speak for the Egyptian Government. He was of opinion that his Mission was committed to reporting in favour of some scheme on the lines indicated in their Interim Report, but His Majesty's Government were, of course, not committed in any way. His hope, however, was that they might see fit to approve, with certain reservations, relations with the Egyptian Government on the lines contemplated, rather than on the lines of the relationship of a Colony or Protectorate to the Home Government. The next step would have to be to appoint representatives on both sides to draw up some formal document. Such a Treaty when drafted would have to be submitted to the Egyptian Assembly. Regarding reservations, he had looked through Lord Curzon's remarks, and he thought most of his proposals were quite in accordance with the spirit of the scheme. There were, however, one or two of them which, if adopted, might upset it altogether. Regarding the military forces to be retained in Egypt, and the keeping open of our lines of communication to the East, he did not think that this had been very clearly expressed in the Memorandum. The basis of the whole thing was an Alliance in which we guaranteed Egyptian independence and the sending of an Army to protect Egypt if need be; in return for this we demanded a valuable quid pro quo, namely, that in war all her local resources should be placed at our disposal; and, further, that we should have a permanent military base in Egypt.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٠٦ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢١٤)





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

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Regarding the point raised by Lord Curzon in connection with officers other than British serving in the Egyptian Army, he did not think that anyone had ever contemplated that any but British officers should be employed. It was merely a question of the form in which the Agreement should be drawn up. It might be made a general principle that any foreigner employed in the Public Service in Egypt must be a Britisher, or else appointed with the consent of the British Government. He did not think a stipulation of this sort would entirely upset the agreement, and it would be possible to get them to agree to it.

A short discussion then took place with regard to the best means of further considering the question, during which it was pointed out that, as the hauling down of the British Flag in Egypt and turning Egypt into an Independent State was a very serious proposal, it was desirable that the general principles should be decided before the details were discussed.

The Conference agreed to adjourn the discussion until the morning of Thursday next, November 4th.

. . . . .

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1,
November 1, 1920.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٠٧ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢١٦)



# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٠٨و]
# (٤٧٣/٢١٧)



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S E C R E T .

CONCLUSIONS of a Conference of Ministers held at 10, Downing Street, S.W.1. on Thursday, 4th, November, 1920 at 11-30 a.m.

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P R E S E N T:-

THE PRIME MINISTER (in the Chair).

The Right Hon.A.Bonar Law, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon.A.Chamberlain, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon.Viscount Milner, G.C.B.,G.C.M.G.,Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon.W.S.Churchill, M.P.,Secretary of State for War & Air.

The Right Hon.A.J.Balfour,O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon.Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G.,G.C.S.I.,G.C.I.E. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon.E.S.Montagu,M.P., Secretary of State for India.

The Right Hon.H.A.L.Fisher,M.P., President of the Board of Education.

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Field-Marshal the Viscount Allenby, G.C.B.,G.C.M.G.,

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Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M.P.A.Hankey, G.C.B.,..... Secretary, Cabinet.

Brigadier-General S.H.Wilson, C.B.,C.M.G., Principal Assistant Secretary.

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# (٤٧٣/٢١٨)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٠٩و]
# (٤٧٣/٢١٩)



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DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION AT THE VATICAN.

(1) With reference to War Cabinet 631, Conclusion 1, arising out of a Question in Parliament, it was agreed -

That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should have authority to retain the British Diplomatic Representative at the Vatican.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Questions in Parliament in regard to the Brussels Council.

(2) The attention of the Conference was called to a series of Questions addressed to the Prime Minister on subjects discussed at the recent meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

It was agreed --

That Mr.Balfour should deal with these Questions on the basis of making the resolutions of the Council and the pertinent Memoranda available for Members of Parliament at the earliest possible moment.

THE STATUS OF EGYPT.

(3) The Conference resumed the discussion on the status of Egypt, initiated at the meeting held on November 1st.

After Lord Milner had made some important corrections in the draft summary attached to the Conclusions of the previous meeting, the discussion was resumed.

In regard to the proposal that Egypt should enjoy the right to representation in foreign countries, apprehensions were expressed that this would give too great an opportunity for anti-British intrigues by Powers with interests or traditional ambitions in Egypt.

Lord Milner made it clear that the omission of this provision would be contrary to the spirit and letter of the scheme, and that no scheme which omitted it could be carried through any representative Egyptian assembly.

It was pointed out, however, that British control over Egyptian foreign relations was safeguarded in great measure by the provision that Egypt should enter into no agreement with a foreign Power which was prejudicial to British interests.

It was explained that the Egyptians attached great

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



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# (٤٧٣/٢٢١)



(110)

importance to representation on the League of Nations and on International Conferences on all questions, technical or otherwise. This was one of the reasons for the insertion of the provision under discussion.

The trend of the discussion was in the direction that some alternative must be found to our present position in Egypt, the maintenance of which required the presence of a large military force, and this even though, as foreshadowed by the Secretary of State for War, considerable reductions in the present force of 15,000 to 16,000 men might prove practicable. The question for consideration was whether Lord Milner's proposed alternative was the best possible.

This led to considerable discussion on the military aspects, and the question was asked as to how the size of the garrison would compare on the alternative assumptions --

(i) that the present state of affairs continued,

and

(ii) that the proposals of Lord Milner's Commission were adopted and received only a moderate degree of general acceptance by the Egyptian people.

Field-Marshal Lord Allenby stated that, under the Commission's proposals, the British forces at Ismalia (where Lord Milner suggested they would be stationed) would be at the mercy of the Egyptians since their water-supply would be at the mercy of Cairo, which must be considered the heart of Egypt from a military point of view. He laid great stress, therefore, on the maintenance of a British force in Cairo. If no British troops were kept there, he felt certain that foreign nations, including the Americans, would probably insist on the provision of Legation Guards. Otherwise, the High Commissioner and other Europeans in Cairo would be at the mercy of any seditious movement.

Questioned as to his views on the scheme as a whole, Lord Allenby (who was due to leave for Egypt on the following day) stated that he did not like the manner in which negotiations

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# (٤٧٣/٢٢٢)





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

had been carried out with Zaghlul, who is our enemy, instead of with the Egyptian Government. He felt, however, that we were now to a considerable extent committed to the scheme, a view which did not meet with unanimous concurrence in the Conference. Lord Allenby attached great importance to a future procedure supporting our friends instead of trying vainly to conciliate our enemies. Among our friends are the present Egyptian Ministry, who would then in all probability give us their loyal support in the execution of the scheme. At the present time the Egyptians were coming to realise that they were receiving fair-play from the British, both in internal and in foreign affairs. Unless, however, they received a large measure of autonomy, they would consider that they had been betrayed, as, even though wrongly, they regarded Lord Milner as a plenipotentiary. Lord Allenby attached great importance to the fact that the British Government had guaranteed to uphold the Sultan and his dynasty. This committed them to some degree of interference in the affairs of Egypt. In his experience the Sultan, though unpopular, was a shrewd man and an honest man, who would support us if we supported him. If we failed to give such support, we should earn the contempt of our enemies and the hostility of our friends. He urged that any army of occupation must be British. The conduct of the Indian troops had been unexceptionable, but the Egyptians disliked the long-continued presence of coloured troops. Subject to these remarks, Lord Allenby was not opposed to Lord Milner's proposals, as a basis for consideration in consultation with a representative Egyptian Delegation to be nominated by the Sultan; but he regarded as essential the retention for the present of troops in Cairo.

The question was then discussed as to whether the proposed British force was sufficient to enable us to maintain the dynasty.



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# (٤٧٣/٢٢٤)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١١٢و]
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

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The Prime Minister, with the agreement of his colleagues, impressed on Lord Allenby that he should make it clear in Egypt that the British Government was not finally committed to the scheme. Egypt was not bound by the adherence of Zaghlul and his colleagues to the proposals, and knew that she was perfectly free to examine them and to suggest amendments. The position of the British Government was precisely similar; it was merely in process of examining and considering a scheme presented to them only in the form of a summary by the Commission which had drawn it up. The Prime Minister made it clear that the question of whether the Government would exercise its freedom was a question of policy to be considered later.

Lord Allenby made it perfectly clear that he would be obliged, in conversation with the Sultan, to enter into the question in some detail.

This led to a discussion as to the nature of the Delegation, representing all shades of Egyptian opinion, which it was proposed, as the next step, should be sent by the Egyptian Government to London. It was pointed out that it was essential to make clear to this Delegation whether it was to discuss details of a scheme already accepted in principle, or merely to reopen the whole question.

Lord Milner pointed out that, notwithstanding the boycott of his Mission in Egypt, it had in the end succeeded in eliciting the attitude of all shades of Egyptian opinion.

It was generally agreed that no decision could be taken at the moment as to the precise purpose of the proposed Delegation. The procedure should be somewhat as follows :-

(a) Consideration by the Cabinet of Lord Milner's Report ;

(b) A decision by the Cabinet on the question of policy;

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



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

(c) If that decision were of a character to render such procedure desirable, the reception of a Delegation, appointed by the Egyptian Government, to discuss the details of the British Government's decision.

.....

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,

November 4, 1920.

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



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SECRET.

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THE CABINET.

## THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSALS.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

79
Egypt
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I venture to ask most respectfully, but at the same time most urgently, that the Cabinet may be permitted to have an opportunity of at any rate discussing the proposals which have been published in all the newspapers for giving independence to Egypt. I read these proposals for the first time in yesterday's newspapers with very great bewilderment.

The Foreign Office telegrams of the 21st August (Nos. 750 and 751) which reached me last night show that the story published in the newspapers is in all respects true, and that the proposals have been simultaneously communicated to the Press, the public and the British representatives in Egypt before either the Cabinet or Parliament had been allowed to know of their existence.

I submit that this procedure raises a very great difficulty. While the British will be held committed to approving proposals of this character, the Egyptian Nationalists will be free to take them merely as a starting point for further demands; thus, even from the point of view of bargaining, the disclosures which have taken place seem to be regrettable. The cession of territory which has been definitely incorporated in the British Dominions is, however, a matter which requires the assent not only of the Cabinet, but of Crown and Parliament.

Coming to the actual proposals themselves, one must ask oneself, first, are they real or are they a manœuvre? If they are real, they mean that we are giving up Egypt. Egypt is to become an independent country, which will make a Treaty of Alliance with the United Kingdom, accord us certain military and naval facilities, and act in foreign affairs in general conformity with our wishes and interests. Egypt will be free to conduct her internal affairs as she pleases, *i.e.*, she may substitute the Communist for the individualist system of society. She may raise a large army by conscription or she may abolish the existing Egyptian Army altogether. She may erect a customs tariff or adopt Free Trade. She may appoint ambassadors throughout the world. All these imprescriptible rights of sovereignty are to be conferred upon Egypt *on paper*.

Alternatively, we may be told this is mere camouflage. Not one Egyptian from the Khedive downwards will be able to act otherwise than in accordance with British advice. Although Egypt will be free in theory to do all these things, in practice she will do all she is told. She will be ruled under such systems and through such agents as the British Government choose and under no other. Having formally divested ourselves of every shadow of legal right, we shall nevertheless exercise final and absolute power. It is true there will be no Army of Occupation, but the same troops living in the same barracks will be called "The British Army for maintaining the communications with the East." When a state of disorder arises in Cairo, British soldiers who are called upon to fire on the crowd will not be shooting in order to suppress tumult in Egypt. They will be "safeguarding our communications with the East," &c.

If this, as I expect, is really what is meant by the new instrument, I can only think that the Egyptian Nationalists must be very great simpletons if they let it rest there. Their demand is for the effective and responsible control of their own country and the right to govern or misgovern it as they please. It is because this has never been accorded to them, and never can be accorded to them while we remain in the country, that they are discontented. It is not the empty form of independence which they seek, but the reality. Is the British nation willing to concede that reality? If not, will the British resistance to the concession of that reality be rendered more difficult or more easy by the concession of the form? I think it will be rendered vastly more difficult.

Incidentally, I may observe that it sweeps away altogether any claim which we might make for recovering any portion of the cost of the garrison from the Egyptian taxpayer. This garrison is declared by us to be in Egypt for a purely Imperial

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١١٤ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٣٠)



purpose, namely, the maintenance of our communications with the East, and not as an Army of Occupation. Therefore, obviously, we have no claim upon the independent State of Egypt.

The repercussion of these proposals and this model upon other parts of the British Empire may even be more serious than the effect on Egypt. If we leave out the word "Egypt" in the document circulated last night by the Foreign Office and substitute the word "Ireland," it would with very small omissions make perfectly good sense, and would constitute a complete acceptance of Mr. De Valera's demands.

One can also easily see that these proposals will become immediately the goal of Indian nationalism. The ideal which Mr. Montagu has been endeavouring to hold up before Indian eyes of India as a great self-governing Dominion within the ambit of the British Empire and under the supreme authority of the British Monarchy will be discarded in favour of an independent Indian Empire, according, no doubt, to the British the sort of trading and practical facilities which were obtained in the Eighteenth Century by the British East India Company. I thought we had all arrived in common at the conception of the British Empire as a grouping of self-governing Dominions gathered together under the ægis of the Crown, developing under various degrees of responsibility within that circle. Surely here we are taking a retrograde step.

After all, the Proclamation of the Protectorate over Egypt was a solemn act of State, and we have laboriously procured the assent of all our Allies, one after another, to that act. No sooner is this done than we come forward and tear up the charter to which we have just obtained the signatures of all the greatest Powers in the world.

It may have been wise or unwise to alter the juridicial status of Egypt in the war, and I myself have often thought that the ex-Khedive was treated with precipitate severity; but a step of this kind, once taken, ought not to be lightly retraced. In my judgment we should adhere to the broad ideal of full self-government within the Empire and under the Crown for all parts of the King's Dominions, whether in Egypt, Ireland or India, and that any departure from this ideal and goal should only be made by a Government which has definitely submitted its case to the British Parliament. Following this conviction, it seems to me that the most we have to offer to the Egyptians or to the Irish is real concessions in regard to the management of their own affairs, and that all demands to break away from the British Empire and British Crown should be perseveringly withstood.

Lastly, it is my duty to point out that neither the War Office nor the Air Ministry, nor, so far as I know, the Admiralty have been consulted in any way upon the strategic bearing of these proposals, and I submit that the Cabinet should have the advice of the military and naval experts before them before giving their assent to such a scheme.

I append memoranda by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and by the Chief of the Air Staff.

W. S. C.

War Office,
*24th August*, 1920.

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## APPENDIX.

(I.)

### MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.

Secretary of State,

I wish to direct your attention to the attached documents,* and more particularly to paragraphs 3 (ii.) and 4 (ii) of the Memorandum drawn up between Lord Milner's Mission, and communicated apparently to Zaghloul Pasha and the members of the Egyptian Delegation.

From Foreign Office telegram No. 750, dated 21st August, it will be observed that "His Majesty's Government have not yet considered the policy" in question. At the same time it is recognized in a subsequent paragraph that though it is not intended for publication, yet "as Zaghloul and his associates are acquainted with it and will base their campaign upon it, the main points are certain to become generally known."

* Foreign Office telegrams to Mr. Scott, Nos. 750 and 751.



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# (٤٧٣/٢٣١)





As you are aware, this has already occurred since the draft agreement has appeared in British newspapers, and is apparently accepted by the general public as being an expression of the policy of His Majesty's Government.

2. The draft agreement, if confirmed, must have a far-reaching effect on the military situation of the British Empire, since, as I have stated in previous papers, Egypt is the "Clapham Junction" of Imperial communications. There also arises the question of access to the Sudan, which presumably would not be united to Egypt if and when the latter country receives its independence. So far as I am aware the General Staff have not in any way been consulted as to the military effect of the proposal contained in the draft Memorandum, and this aspect of the question appears to have been overlooked, or was considered to be adequately safeguarded by paragraph 3 (ii) and 4 (ii).

Whether this is the case would undoubtedly depend very largely on the interpretation given to the paragraphs in question, and I would urge that in the event of the acceptance of the Agreement in principle by the Government, the fighting services be given full opportunity of expressing their views on the vital questions dealt with in these two paragraphs.

H. W.

25th August, 1920.

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(II.)

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF.

Secretary of State.

The changed status of Egypt, if the *Times* reports are true, is causing me considerable anxiety.

The matter is intimately bound up with our development and our programme for next year; for example, we are relying on Egypt to assist us in training personnel for our five reserve squadrons, and are proposing to start on a large rigid airship base in the country.

The Air Force has a peculiar interest in Egypt, and I hope the new policy of the Government will not undo the work of construction to which we are committed.

Owing to the pressure of work I have not had time to submit this draft quite in the form that I should have liked, or to examine it sufficiently carefully, as this would have taken some little time, but in view of your request and the urgency of the matter I venture to submit it.

H. TRENCHARD.

Air Ministry.
25th August, 1920.

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AIR STAFF NOTES ON THE EFFECT OF THE NEW STATUS OF EGYPT.

As far as can be ascertained from newspaper reports it is proposed to recognize the independence of Egypt in amity and association with the British Empire. From an Imperial defence point of view the most important items in the proposed treaty appear to be :—

(1.) The maintenance of a small British garrison (the figure 3,000 is mentioned) in the Canal zone, which thus becomes a British enclave.
(2.) The guarantee by Great Britain of Egypt's integrity against outside aggression.
(3. The recognition by Egypt of Great Britain's privileged position in the Valley of the Nile.
(4. In the case of war, Great Britain to have every facility and access to Egyptian territory.
(5.) The abolition of the capitulations. Under these foreigners in Egypt have the right to investigation and trial by their own Governments. The new proposal appears to entrust the interests of all foreigners to the British High Commissioner.
(6.) The exclusion of the Sudan.





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# (٤٧٣/٢٣٢)





It is difficult on the information given for the Air Staff to estimate the effects of these proposals on the distribution and development of the Royal Air Force, it is possible, however, to make a few comments on the situation as it appears from the small amount of information at present obtainable.

Clause (1). The maintenance of a British garrison in the Canal zone. Under this clause a certain number of Air Force units would be stationed in Egypt, essentially for the protection of the Canal, but these would not in any way suffice for the Royal Air Force requirements which will be referred to below. Even for the purposes of the Canal garrison it may be difficult to obtain the necessary number of aerodromes, though this cannot be definitely stated until the boundaries of the zone are more clearly defined, in any case the abandonment of existing Air Force stations in Egypt proper and the transference of a certain number of them to new sites in the British enclave would lead to considerable expense for works and buildings.

Clause (2). It is possible that in this clause Great Britain's guarantee of Egypt's integrity against outside aggression might be permitted to take the form of military assistance stationed in the country. A reference to the withdrawal of the normal British garrison in Egypt, however, appears to make it impossible to take this view, and it is possible that the guarantee will be similar to that given to Belgium and troops would only be sent to the country should necessity arise.

Clause (3). Appears to be almost entirely a reference to our commercial position in the Valley of the Nile; doubtless this has some bearing on the amount of British capital sunk in large irrigation works and other development schemes.

Clause (4). As it stands is exceptionally vague. Interpreted in its broadest sense in the event of any war, say, for example against an Arab Empire, Great Britain would be able to base her operations on Egyptian territory. In practice it would appear that grave complications might ensue, since the Egyptian Government might be on friendly terms with Great Britain's potential enemy, who might be waging a war of aggression on British territory at, say, Aden or in the Persian Gulf.

Clause (5). Regarding the capitulations is of little military interest.

Clause (6). Under this clause it is presumed that the Sudan would become a British protectorate, possibly on the lines of British Somaliland. Under these circumstances the Air Force would have no great interest in the country other than the provision of a small detachment to aid any military garrison stationed therein.

Apart from these details the policy of the Air Ministry appears to be affected in the gravest possible manner by the new proposals. Egypt has for some time occupied the position of a keystone in the Royal Air Force scheme. It is, on account of its climate, an admirable training ground for airmen; it is the headquarters of the Air Force throughout the Near and Middle East; in the country are stationed squadrons which form a semi-mobile reserve for these areas; large expenses have been incurred in the provision of workshops and depôts, and a proposal is in hand to form in the country a large rigid airship base; and, finally, it is possibly the most important junction in the world for an Imperial air route point of view.

If the proposals enumerated above have been rightly interpreted all these activities of the Royal Air Force must cease or be severely hampered, much money will have been thrown away and a complete new orientation of our policy undertaken. It is difficult at the moment to see any area which can take the place of Egypt in the scheme for the Royal Air Force as a whole; its central position, its comparative proximity to England, its equitable climate and its situation on the highways of the world's commerce render it unique, and it is thus evident that the importance placed by the Air Staff on this country is of a quite especial nature even as compared with the interests of the Admiralty and War Office.

It is possible that these points have not been overlooked in arriving at the decision (if such has indeed been taken) on this matter; in any case, it is assumed that the details of the treaty to be enacted have yet to be worked out. In this belief the Air Staff assumes that His Majesty's Government will give due weight to the views herein expressed, and will afford the Air Ministry an opportunity of reviewing the same when the treaty is being definitely drafted.

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CABINET
Sep 1870
HALL GARDENS

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SECRET.

## THE CABINET.

## THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSALS.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

I AM not in the least surprised by the criticisms of the Secretary of State for War in C.P.–1803. Indeed, the wonder is that such criticisms have not been more numerous. I was quite prepared for an outcry in the press. But, contrary to my expectation, even the "Jingo" press has taken the suggestion of Egyptian "independence" very quietly. I have seen a great deal of favourable comment—some of it certainly from people whose approval makes me wince—and very little comment that was distinctly unfavourable. I have, however, had a few disapproving private letters. One of these, conceived "rather in sorrow than in anger," is from an anonymous correspondent, who concludes with the words: "I fear, my Lord, you are getting old."

This is unfortunately true. But I think that even in my hey-day I should have regarded the proposed concessions to Egyptian Nationalism as just and politic, and as calculated to strengthen and not to weaken our Imperial position.

On the face of them, it is true, the proposals look like a step backward. And in a sense they really are a step backward, but to a more secure position than that which we now occupy. In itself the acknowledgment of Egyptian "independence" is nothing new. We have declared, not once but scores of times during the last forty years, that we had no intention of appropriating Egypt. Mr. Churchill, indeed, regards Egypt as having been "definitely incorporated in the British Empire." I doubt whether that is correct. Presumably he is referring to our proclamation of a protectorate over Egypt in 1914. The proclamation of a protectorate over a foreign country may mean much or little, but it is certainly not equivalent to annexation. Moreover, at the very time when we proclaimed the protectorate we went out of our way to represent our action as intended to defend Egypt against dangers threatening her independence! And we at the same time raised the status of the ruler of Egypt from that of "Khedive," the vassal of Turkey, to that of "Sultan," the title of his former "overlord"! Whatever may have been the effect of these curious and somewhat contradictory acts and declarations, which have been very differently interpreted by us and the Egyptians, it is certainly difficult to contend that they constituted an incorporation of Egypt in the British Empire.

My own conviction is that it is totally impossible for any human being, however ingenious, to make out what the political status of Egypt at the present moment actually is. The object of the proposals now under discussion is to define that status for the future, and at the same time to give to such rights as Great Britain may hereafter possess in Egypt an unquestionable legal basis in the deliberate consent of the Egyptian people. These rights are to be conferred upon Great Britain by a Treaty made with the Sultan of Egypt and confirmed by a National Assembly.

At present we are in fact absolute masters of Egypt. But every act of authority which we exercise is liable to be challenged, and is in fact challenged, by Egyptian public opinion as a usurpation of powers to which we have no right. We are, in the eyes of the Egyptians, their rulers *de facto*, but not *de jure*. This will, in my opinion, prove in the long run to be an intolerable position. Sooner or later, and the sooner the better, we must settle the question of the status of Egypt and of our own position in that country, and there are only two ways of really settling it. One is to annex Egypt and thus definitely "incorporate it in the British Empire." The other is to gratify the constant and ever-increasing desire of the Egyptians to be recognised as an independent nation—a desire which we have done so much to encourage—and to make the best bargain we can with them on that basis.

If we can make a sufficiently good bargain, the latter course has enormous advantages. That we can maintain our position in Egypt in the teeth of Egyptian opposition, is in my opinion not doubtful. But we shall have to pay a very heavy







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



price. I am not thinking merely, or mainly, of the cost of the Army of Occupation, which would have in that case to be maintained, for an indefinite period, at something like its present strength. More serious still is the prospect of the difficulties which the permanent hostility of the Egyptian intelligentsia will create for us both in Egypt itself and throughout the world. In Egypt itself that hostility threatens to paralyse the administration. It is becoming increasingly difficult to get Egyptians of any standing to take office as Ministers or high officials. The middle and lower ranks of the bureaucracy and the Egyptian officers of the army are permeated with the spirit of repugnance to British control. This spirit may not again manifest itself in widespread strikes as it did last year, though the recurrence of such strikes is by no means improbable. But it is evident that, with the whole native Civil Service permanently disaffected, the amount of grit in the administrative machine is bound to make it work very badly, and the blame for its failure will be thrown upon the British chiefs. For the same reasons we can no longer rely on the army, or at any rate on that portion of it which is composed of, and largely officered by, native Egyptians. Nor does the trouble end here. What is to happen in future about legislation? We cannot go on indefinitely legislating by proclamations under martial law. But it would be impossible to devise any form of legislative assembly, having even the appearance of a representative character, which would not at once begin to agitate for "independence." Very probably it would reject every measure proposed to it, and we should have to fall back on legislation by Sultanic Decrees. The Nationalist movement would go on gathering force, and the agitation against Great Britain would be carried on all over Europe and America by Nationalist emissaries. Owing to the spread of education, the number of Egyptians capable of carrying on such a campaign effectively is constantly increasing, and so, thanks to the great prosperity of the country, are the funds available for their support, which will be freely lavished in the future, as they are to-day, by ambitious "patriots" who have more money than they know what to do with. Zaghloul's subscription of £5,000 to the "Herald," given, I may say, before we entered into discussions with him, is an illustration of what we should have to expect.

Now all this may have to be faced, if there is in fact no other way of securing the essential and permanent interests of Great Britain in Egypt except direct British control of the whole administration. What are those interests? Why did we ever occupy Egypt at all? We occupied it, very reluctantly in the first instance, in order to prevent a country which, owing to its geographical position, is of special importance to us as forming a vital link in our communications with the East from falling into other and possibly hostile hands. Egypt being unable to stand on her own legs, and European interests in Egypt being so great and influential that the country could not be allowed to remain in chaos, we had no choice but to restore order there, or else to allow some other Great Power to restore it and thereby to place itself right athwart our main road to our Eastern Empire. The security of our communications with India, and other parts of the Empire beyond India, was the supreme object which led to our intervention. And certainly that object is more vital to us than ever to-day, since Egypt is now not only the road to our Eastern Empire, but has also become the road to the new territories under the British flag, which stretch in an unbroken chain from the southern confines of Egypt to the Cape of Good Hope. It is truly the nodal point of our whole Imperial system.

But is it therefore necessary that we should own it? Is it not sufficient, if we have a firm foothold there? The question is, whether we cannot retain such a foothold without antagonising the whole of the educated and semi-educated classes of the Egyptian people by keeping them in a subjection, which they detest and will, I am convinced, constantly kick against. In my opinion it is not impossible that we should retain a position in Egypt sufficient for all our own purposes without incurring such animosity, if we retain it by their consent, as friends and allies, not by the undisguised use of our superior power, as their masters. On that footing, I believe a great number of them will even welcome our presence, and the rest will not greatly mind it. Even now it is not so much the presence of British troops which excites the hostility of the Egyptians. It is our "*administrative* occupation" of the country, our interference with all their domestic affairs. Whatever dislike they feel for our army is due to the fact that it is an "Army of Occupation," intended in their eyes to keep them in subjection. As a force stationed in their country, not to dominate them, but to secure objects of our own, extraneous to Egypt, while available, in case of need, for the defence of Egypt against foreign aggression, it will appear to them in a quite different light.



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# (٤٧٣/٢٣٥)



All intelligent Egyptians recognise the special interest we have in safeguarding our communications with the East. Even Zaghloul was ready to admit our right to safeguard the Suez Canal. But in our discussions I think we convinced him, as we certainly convinced most of his associates, that even the Canal was not everything, but that in these days Egypt was also very important to us as a station for the Air Force and a centre of wireless telegraphy. For this and other reasons we substituted the wider formula, the "defence of Imperial communications," for any special reference to the Canal, as we were anxious to emphasise the fact that the Canal was not our only strategic interest in Egypt.

This point is of importance, as it meets the objections to the proposed agreement raised, and very naturally raised, by Field-Marshal Wilson and by Air-Marshal Trenchard in their appendices to Mr. Churchill's Memorandum. I entirely agree with Sir Henry Wilson's description of Egypt as the "Clapham Junction" of Imperial communications. But it is a mistake to think that this point of view was left out of consideration by myself or by my colleagues of the Mission, or that it was not made clear to the Egyptians. It is true that, in some of the statements which have appeared in the press, it was alleged that we had agreed to the British force, which was to be kept in Egypt, being stationed at Kantara, or, at any rate, "on the banks of the Canal," and to its being limited to "about 3,000 men." As a matter of fact, the Egyptians never even attempted to suggest any limit to the number of this force. They did, at the outset, wish us to say that it should be kept "in the Canal zone," but this, for the reasons just given, we absolutely rejected, and they did not attempt to press the point. In the Memorandum recording the results of our conversations, as finally drafted, the question, where the British force in Egypt was to be stationed, was deliberately left open—to be settled in the Treaty—and the strength of the force was not referred to at all. The statements that it was to be a "*small* British garrison" of "about 3,000 men" and "in the Canal zone" are unauthorised glosses, and the Mission never agreed to anything of the kind. Obviously, if we ever get to the point of drawing up a Treaty, we must take care to exclude any provision limiting the numbers of the British "military force," which we must remain free to determine according to the varying exigencies of our Imperial strategy, while the question, where we should keep it, will have to be carefully considered in relation to all that it may have to defend, and with special reference to the protection of our aerial communications.

These are not matters, on which personally I foresee any great difficulty with the Egyptians, as long as we base our demands on our own Imperial needs and avoid the appearance of "garrisoning" Egypt. It is the idea, that we keep our army to buttress our "administrative occupation," which offends Egyptian *amour-propre*, and which would certainly be inconsistent with the basic conception of the future relations between Great Britain and Egypt as an "independent" State.

It is true, that the "administrative occupation," to which the Egyptians so greatly object, has been a great blessing to their country. Without taking over, at any rate for a time, the control of her internal affairs, we could never have raised Egypt from bankruptcy to her present condition of great material prosperity or put an end to the gross abuses, the cruelty, the injustice and the corruption, which prevailed under the old native administration. And, of course, there is a danger, and a serious danger, that, with the withdrawal of British control, these abuses will, to some extent, revive. But it would be taking too mean a view of the effect of nearly forty years of British direction and example to imagine that Egypt could ever relapse into the state in which we found her. We have set up a wholly new standard of administration, and, though the mass of the people are still very backward—more than 90 per cent. quite illiterate—and living in primitive conditions, it would nevertheless be impossible for any native Government to apply the methods of the past. All Egyptians have learned something of what civilised government means, while the number of them who are more or less fitted to administer the country on modern lines has enormously increased, as have the material resources necessary for the maintenance of an up to date administration.

No doubt the native intelligentsia are not as capable as they think themselves of practising the new methods which we have taught them. But the great change which our presence has wrought in their circumstances, their character and their outlook makes it absolutely necessary to give them more scope for their increased manliness and, no doubt, excessive ambition. They will never again be content to be the mere servants of any master, native or foreign, and like everybody else they are at the moment somewhat intoxicated with the new craze for "self-determination."







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



It is unquestionably a bold experiment to leave them to devise their own constitution and run the country themselves with so few restrictions as are contemplated under the proposed arrangement. The experiment may well be a failure, but it is not so certain to be a failure as any half-measures would be. For, with any limited system of self-government, we should have the whole body of Egyptian "Nationalists"—that is to say, practically all the educated and semi-educated natives—united not to try and work the new institutions, but to make them unworkable, with the object of getting something more.

Even if our more liberal plan is adopted, there will, at any rate at the outset, be a party clamouring for still larger concessions and wishing to get rid of us altogether. But as against these extremists we shall have, as indeed I believe we already have, the saner elements of Egyptian "Nationalism" on our side. The next few weeks, or months, will show whether these saner elements are also the stronger. If they are, the great experiment can be tried with good hope of success. If they are not, the experiment will not be made. Certainly I should be the last to recommend it.

When I speak of the saner elements of Egyptian Nationalism I am thinking of those influential men—and I believe they are the majority—who are perfectly well aware that Egypt cannot get on without British help, that a large number of the present British officials are indispensable to the administration of the country, and that Egypt cannot hope to retain the services of these men except on fairly lucrative and entirely honourable terms. They may think the number of British officials excessive, as indeed it is, and they resent having them imposed upon them, whether they feel that they want them or not. They desire that the British officials should be really, as they always have been nominally, Egyptian civil servants, not the masters of their nominal chiefs. In my own opinion—I may be quite wrong, but that has been the dominant consideration in my mind—we have now reached a stage, at which British influence in the conduct of the administration will be strengthened, and not weakened, if we frankly accept this position. On no other condition will cordial co-operation between British and native officials be possible in future. The present system means constantly-increasing friction. But once remove the main cause of that friction—the feeling of the Egyptians that the British are there as their masters—and I believe that native Ministers will continue to lean—often, indeed, to lean too heavily—upon the British members of their staffs. It is true that the latter will no longer be in a position to dictate, but will have to rely upon their personal qualities to carry the day by influence and persuasion. But that is how the best of them have always worked in the past. The Egyptians are, as a rule, very quick to recognise ability in men of any foreign race which they respect, and ready to be guided by it, especially if it is combined with tact and good manners.

If we had only to consider ourselves and the Egyptians, I should have very little anxiety about the settlement now proposed. I believe it could be effected with comparative ease, that it would be to the advantage of both parties and that it would work, not indeed perfectly, but much better than the present system. The blessed word "independence" will get us round many awkward corners just as the unfortunate word "Protectorate" would make even Paradise unattractive to the Egyptians.

The difficulties that I foresee lie in a different direction, *i.e.*, the attitude of the Foreign Powers—twelve in number—who have Capitulatory Rights in Egypt. It is essential to the success of the proposed settlement that we should be in a position to exclude foreign interference in the internal affairs of Egypt. On the other hand, there are great and permanent foreign interests in that country which we are bound to recognise, and the inevitable necessity of providing safeguards for those interests, of guaranteeing to the European communities the same security of life and property as they enjoy to-day, will always involve some infringement of the "complete independence" of Egypt. What we must be prepared for is that the foreign Powers specially interested in Egypt may be alarmed, or pretend to be alarmed, at the degree of "independence" which we propose to accord, and on that ground may refuse to abandon the rights which they now have under the Capitulations. But unless these foreign Powers will abandon those rights, it is impossible for us to relax our control, for in that case we should not really be helping Egypt on the road to "independence," but, on the contrary, be giving her a number of masters instead of one. This would be reactionary from the Egyptian point of view and fatal to our own position. Therefore it is essential that we should be able to show that, under the proposed new system, all legitimate foreign interests will be as safe as they are to-day.

As a matter of fact, the proposed arrangements do safeguard all legitimate foreign interests, though it does not follow that all the foreign Powers concerned will



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admit it. The line which they may take—indeed, which some of them are already taking—is this: "We were prepared to give up our rights under the Capitulations, if Egypt was a British Protectorate. But now that you say she is to be 'independent', we must reconsider the position." To that contention we have a good answer, but it is not quite a simple one. The Capitulations have two aspects—they have a good and an evil side. In so far as they provide security for the lives and property of foreigners, they are beneficent. But in giving to the subjects of the Capitulary Powers a position of special privilege, in which they are exempt from taxation and in many other respects not amenable to laws applying to all other inhabitants of the country, the Capitulations are unjust to Egypt and a bar to her progress. It is only these latter abuses which will disappear with the abandonment of the Capitulations. Their beneficent effects will be preserved by the proposed treaty between Great Britain and Egypt. Under that treaty, cases in which foreigners are interested will still be dealt with by courts in which European judges preponderate. Laws which cannot now be made applicable to foreigners without foreign consent will still require the consent of the British High Commissioner. And the administration of all laws, in so far as they affect foreigners, will be under the supervision of a British official.

Legitimate foreign interests will thus be amply safeguarded. Indeed, the effect of the proposed arrangement is to emphasise, rather than to diminish, the responsibility of Great Britain for the protection of foreign rights. As far as the foreigner is concerned, the Protectorate is completely maintained in substance, if not in name.

The answer is sound, but it may take some time and a good deal of negotiation to get it accepted. The danger is, that the objections raised by some foreign Powers may not be *bonâ fide* objections, but mere pretexts for embarrassing us in our attempt to come to a settlement with the Egyptians. But here again, as it seems to me, we may reckon on having the better elements of Egyptian Nationalism on our side. While the fight was at its hottest, and all Nationalists were united in hostility to British policy, it was the fashion for them to say that they did not mind the maintenance of the Capitulations if only they could get rid of our Occupation. And the Extremists may continue to take that line, absurd as it is, for nothing could be more contradictory than to scream for "complete independence" and at the same time be willing to accept a system, under which the Egyptian Government cannot perform the most common-place and every-day acts of administration without the consent of a dozen foreign Powers. But, while this irrational attitude may still be maintained by some of the Nationalists, it is clear that the moderate section are now disposed to take a different line, and that, in view of the large concessions which we are ourselves prepared to make, they recognise the reasonableness of our claim to retain such a measure of control as will enable us to give to foreign Powers the assurances they may justly demand in exchange for the abandonment of their capitulary rights. The Moderates, like Adly Pasha, fully realise that under the proposed arrangements the balance of advantage will be on the side of Egyptian independence. Therefore in this, as in other respects, the really important question is whether the Moderates can carry the day in their attempt to conquer Nationalist opinion. The course of events in Egypt will shortly show us whether they can or not, and the answer to that question will, as it seems to me, be decisive as to the feasibility of the proposed settlement.

M.

*September* 16, 1920.





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# (٤٧٣/٢٣٨)





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

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# EGYPT.

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The proposals of Lord Milner's mission to Egypt have now been circulated to the Cabinet, and I feel bound to draw the attention of my colleagues to the effect of these proposals on Indian affairs. I know so very little about Egypt that it is only from this standpoint that I would approach the subject, and I am quite prepared to believe that Lord Milner's proposals are in every way suitable to the conditions of Egypt.

(1) I would draw the attention of the Cabinet to the marked difference between the two missions—to India and to Egypt. The mission of the Secretary of State for India to India was carefully considered by the Cabinet. Its view was circumscribed by a Cabinet pronouncement; it was instructed to discuss only with the Government of India: its proposals were formulated in a report to the Cabinet. They were only published with the permission of the Cabinet, and they were then laid before Parliament.

I can find no record that Lord Milner's mission was ever considered by the Cabinet. No limitation was placed upon his mission. His proposals were published months before the Cabinet had ever seen them, and he negotiated not with the Government of Egypt, but with the extremists in Egypt, and his proposals were published as being contingent in their fulfilment on their acceptance by the extremists. I do not believe that there is any weight to be attached to the suggestion that because they had not been approved when published by the Government we have a free hand. Theoretically, that may be so. Practically, loyalty to our colleague, the position that he holds, and the authority with which he put forward his proposals, ties our hands. He is prepared, and if I am right in my premise, the Government is prepared, to do what he suggests if Zaghlul will accept it. (Am I right in describing Zaghlul as the Tilak, the Gandhi, or the de Valera of Egyptian politics?) If he will accept no consideration of efficient Government, no consideration of the fact that Egypt as a Protectorate has been incorporated in the British Imperial system, no consideration of the well-being of Egyptian civil servants is to modify or circumscribe his proposal. In India, Parliament has demanded and the Government has been scrupulous to secure that the employment of Indian civil servants, and indeed their prospects of employment, shall not be jeopardised by any reforms. Disorder, inefficient Government, is to be avoided. Searching enquiries are to be made as to whether the new Government will be really representative of the people. I can find no trace that these considerations weighed in Egypt. I have always been told that India cannot aspire to self-government because ultimately the maintenance of order and the preservation of public safety depends upon the British Army. For Egypt, I

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



presume that the British garrison that is still to continue, would not remain absolutely quiescent whatever happened internally in Egypt now that Egyptian independence is to be complete. The extremists in India are ignored, and I understand that nobody disputed the wisdom of doing so. In Egypt, the treaty is made with the extremists. I, like the Secretary of State for War, can find nothing which makes it possible to negotiate with Zaghlul, which does not at least point the way to a negotiation with de Valera or Gandhi, and I have only to say that, apart from the conditions, for nobody can doubt the difference between Egypt and India, the methods of the Milner proposals contrasted with the method of settlement of Indian affairs, has enormously increased our Indian difficulties. My police reports show this conclusively. My letters from the Governors emphasise it. Let me quote:—

> "The general impression in Indian circles is that Great Britain has been compelled to make Egypt independent, that the Egyptians have by intrigue and violent agitation, gained freedom for themselves. They add that those who advocate moderation and counsel the adoption of constitutional methods of political agitation in India will have to hang their heads in shame and that a veritable premium is put on violence, anarchy and anti-British intrigue. On one point Indians of all classes are agreed that the concession of independence to Egypt is a grievous blow to British prestige. That it will greatly add to the difficulties and political complications of Great Britain in various parts of the world; that its effect on the situation in Mesopotamia, Persia and Central Asia generally will be very bad; and that it will also put heart into the Turks, who had begun to despair of their success. In Indian circles the opinion is general that the decline and fall of the British Empire has begun, that the British have degenerated, and that the process will be rapid, if what has been done in Egypt is followed before long in Ireland and the oversea Dominions."

As I have stated in another paper, it is difficult for us to insist upon the control of foreign relations in Mesopotamia when we have abandoned it in Egypt. Mesopotamia has never been incorporated in the British Imperial system. All I can say is that Lord Milner's proposals may lead to peace in Egypt. I can only hope that it may be possible to treat one part of the British Empire wholly separately and without reference to other parts. I envy proposals which do not require Parliamentary enactment, and have not got to regard the well-being of the Civil Services for fear of the ex-civil servants and their influence on the Government. I do not see that they even regard the well-being of British commercial interests which I am always enjoined to protect and safeguard in India.

I repeat that I do not write in any hostility to the proposals which I am unable to judge, but merely to contrast them with the admittedly different conditions in India.

E. S. M.

19th October 1920.



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

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E G Y P T.

Note by the President of the Board of Trade.

I circulate for the information of the Cabinet a Memorandum that has been prepared by the Board of Trade on the Economic Aspects of the Report of Lord Milner's Special Mission to Egypt.

R. S. H.
9th November, 1920.

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



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# (٤٧٣/٢٤٣)

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THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE REPORT OF THE MILNER COMMISSION ON EGYPT.

Preliminary Memorandum by the Board of Trade.

I. The political aspects and consequences of the proposals of Lord Milner's Commission are so important and far-reaching, that their purely economic effects are liable to be overlooked. It is proposed in the present note to consider in a preliminary way what safeguards are necessary for British commercial and shipping interests (and incidentally for the commercial and shipping interests of other civilized countries) if the Egyptian Government is in future to be virtually uncontrolled by Great Britain.

How far it is really intended to remove British control is not indeed quite clear. The document signed by the Commission on March 3rd differs very materially from that forwarded to Mr.Scott of the Foreign Office on August 21st after the conversations with the Egyptian Delegates. It is presumed, however, that the latter of the two documents is that which we have now to consider.

II. Tariff and external commercial relations.

The British Empire has a larger interest than any other country in the external trade of Egypt, and the question of the Tariff leviable on imports into and exports from that country therefore concerns us more nearly than any other Power.

In the Appendix to this Paper will be found a detached examination of the statistics of Egypt's foreign trade, from which it will be seen that more than half the imports of Egypt are derived from the Empire, goods to the value of nearly 22 millions sterling having been imported from the United Kingdom in 1919 and goods to the value of 5¾ millions from other parts of the Empire, out of total imports valued at rather over 47 millions. France, Italy and the United States each contributed between 2 and 3 millions sterling. Nearly half the imports from the United Kingdom consisted of Cotton piece goods of which only insignificant quantities were imported from any other source

Of the exports of Egypt (over 80 per cent. of the value of which consist of raw cotton) substantially more than half are directed to the United Kingdom, which relies on Egypt as the main source of supply of the finer description of Cotton. A substantial and increasing quantity of Egyptian Cotton is sent to the United States and France, Italy and Switzerland account for nearly the whole of the remaining consumption of this Article. Practically the whole of the export of cotton-seed (which is next in importance to Cotton in the Egyptian export trade) is sent to this Country.

At present the Import Tariff of Egypt is for the most part at the rate of 8% ad valorem, a legacy from the previous connection of Egypt with Turkey before the 8% tariff of the latter country was raised by consent to the present 11% level. In 1889 and following years a systematic effort seems to have been made, without much success, to secure greater tariff freedom for Egypt by negotiations with other countries. The results of these negotiations may be summarised briefly as

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٢١ظ]
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



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

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follows:- Great Britain consented in 1889 to complete tariff freedom for Egypt except on certain important groups of articles of special interest to British Trade on which the tariff was to be limited to 10%; these articles included most textiles, yarns and fabrics, metals, machinery, and certain other iron and steel goods and coal, and also (doubtless at the suggestion of India) indigo, rice and oilseeds. But, to give effect to this concession, the consent of the other Capitulary Powers was necessary and each of them struck a bargain of its own. Austria-Hungary, Belgium and Italy successively added new categories to the 10% schedule which enlarged it from 9 to 24 groups of articles, and made it cover two-thirds instead of forty per cent. of Egyptian imports.

The Treaty with Germany in 1892 practically included all important articles in the 10% schedule, while France refused or failed for another ten years to conclude any Treaty at all. Ultimately in 1902 France concluded a treaty with Egypt on the basis of a tariff of 8%, which practically defeated the whole attempt to raise the Egyptian tariff.

In 1906 Greece and Italy concluded Treaties with Egypt on a similar basis.

All these Treaties were to continue in force for definite periods and thereafter, subject to twelve month's notice. These periods have long expired in the case of the earlier series, but the French Treaty has seven more years to run, and in the case of Italy (whose Treaty, though concluded in 1906, was not ratified until 1909) there is still an unexpired period of ten years. The French obstacle to tariff revision is not regarded by the Foreign Office as serious, but the Italian obstacle is very formidable.

Hence we are in the unsatisfactory position that for ten years Egypt cannot, without Italy's consent (which is almost certain to be withheld) raise her tariff above 8% ad valorem, while at the expiration of that period she can by twelve months' notice free herself from all tariff restrictions and impose any duties she pleases. The position during the next ten years will certainly be galling to an independent Egypt, while that which will arise at the end of ten years may well inspire great anxiety and uncertainly in Great Britain and the commercial world generally.

It appears to me that if we have to negotiate with foreign countries on behalf of Egypt to obtain their consent to any of the changes arising out of the proposed new status of Egypt we shall almost certainly have to offer them some guarantee against excessive tariffs on their trade after 1930, and that in particular the best (perhaps the only) means of persuading Italy to agree to a tariff of 10 or 12 per cent. forthwith would be to extend the period during which the limit shall apply for (say) another ten years, i.e. until 1940.

If such an arrangement should be concluded with Italy it would of course be applicable to Great Britain and the other countries entitled to "most favoured nation" treatment in Egypt, but it is important if Egypt is in future to possess complete control over her commercial relations with foreign countries, that the tariff stipulation should be incorporated, not only in treaties with other foreign powers, but in the proposed Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. Otherwise, if we rely purely on the protection of a "most favoured nation" clause we may have some very

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٢٢ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٤٦)





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

(123)

unpleasant experiences when Egypt proceeds to conclude special tariff bargains with other Countries.

It is assumed above that the Milner Commission seriously intend that Egypt shall have full control over her foreign commercial relations. This is clearly stated in the original Report, but in the very same sentence it is stated that Egypt "should have the right of concluding treaties of a non-political nature "with the assent of Great Britain" - which would appear to give us the ultimate control of Egyptian commercial treaties. Again, in the later memorandum of August we read that Egypt will "undertake not to enter into any agreement with a Foreign Power which is prejudicial to British interests". If "British interests" are to be understood to include "commercial interests" this stipulation, if intended to be effective, involves British control at some stage and in some form over Egyptian commercial agreements with foreign countries. On the other hand the Foreign Office Memorandum (page 7 paragraph headed "Trade") evidently understands the Commission to propose full commercial autonomy for Egypt. The ambiguity certainly needs to be cleared up.

As regards Export Duties, which are now limited to 1% ad valorem (also a legacy from Turkey under the capitulations), we have already, I believe, concurred in a proposal to raise the limit from 1% to 2%, but this concession was blocked by Italy, which insisted in excepting raw cotton. Here, again, we might try to get Italy's assent to 2% with the offer to extend the period of limitation for another ten years. It is certainly desirable to avoid exciting apprehensions of countries which are large consumers of Egyptian cotton that an uncontrolled Egyptian Government will abuse its freedom by excessive export duties on an article of which she has to a great extent a monopoly, and which is becoming more and more essential to Industry.

The Anglo-Egyptian Convention of 1889 already referred to authorised exceptional tariff arrangements between Egypt and Turkey or Persia. Any need for such special arrangements has now disappeared, and no such Article should be included in the contemplated Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

Presumably the ordinary stipulations as to national treatment of shipping will be included in any arrangement, together with the other stipulations as to trade and shipping generally included in commercial treaties. (Most of these matters are dealt with in the Convention of 1889, which, however, is not in the most modern form and can be denounced by either side, by twelve months' notice.)

It also seems very desirable to insert the Article which is included in all our recent Treaties with the New States and in the Palestinian and Mesopotamian and Syrian Mandates requiring Egypt to adhere to various International Conventions, including, among others, any conventions relating to transit, communications, and equitable treatment of commerce, which may be concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations.

III. The Suez Canal.

Presumably sufficient safeguards will have to be inserted in any Treaty to guarantee the protection of the Canal Zone, and of course the International Conventions with regard to

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



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

the Canal, of which the principal ones are perpetual, will be unaffected by the change in the status of Egypt.

But it is to be remembered that the Suez Canal Company's concession expires in 1968, and the Canal will then fall under the control and ownership of the Egyptian Government. In the opinion of the Foreign Office the Convention of 1863 regulating the Sweet Water Canal will probably be held to expire concurrently. Obviously this situation gives rise to the grave question as to whether an uncontrolled Egyptian Government is likely to be strong and trustworthy enough to ensure the efficient and impartial working of this great World Highway. It has not been thought safe to entrust the Danube Mouths to the sole control of the riparian States, and the Suez Canal is of greater international importance than the Danube, while an independent Egypt is likely to be a weaker State than Roumania. It seems desirable to insert some safeguards in the coming Treaty for ensuring the proper canal management after 1968.

As regards the Sweet Water Canal, on which any British garrison will probably depend for its potable water, the difficulty is not merely what will happen when the Suez Canal Company goes out of existence (although this is an important point) but whether means can be found to safeguard the water supply in the meantime, since the Canal passes through Cairo which will, presumably, be outside the Zone occupied by British troops. The whole question of the Sweet Water Canal needs very careful consideration.

IV. The Nile.

It is not quite certain whether the effect of conferring independence on Egypt would be to render the Nile an international navigable waterway within the meaning of the draft Convention about to be discussed by the League of Nations. This question depends on the interpretation of the definition in the draft Convention, especially in relation to the navigable Canal connecting Cairo with Alexandria and to the Assouan Dam. Should an affirmative answer be returned, it will be necessary to scrutinise the provisions of this Convention very carefully in their bearing both on Egypt and on the Sudan, especially with regard to the right of nationals of all States members of the League of Nations to navigate the Nile. If, on the other hand the answer is negative, it does not seem safe to leave the matter where it is without safeguarding the right of British and Sudanese craft to ply on the Nile within Egyptian territory. Probably it will be best not to rely on the international Convention (which may or may not be adopted in its present form) especially in view of the doubtful status of the Nile as a navigable International river. Hence, suitable clauses for the purposes indicated above should go in any Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

V. Foreign officials in the Egyptian Service.

This is not wholly or mainly an economic question but it has a very serious economic aspect. If British Advisers, officials and employees are to be withdrawn or diminished in numbers, we ought to have stringent guarantees that they will

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



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

not be replaced by foreigners of other nationalities. We may perhaps have to tolerate Egyptian mismanagement of Customs, Railways, Irrigation and Communications, but it would surely be intolerable if French, German or other foreign officials were imported to control these services. There seems nothing in the Milner Commission Report to safeguard us against this contingency. It is suggested that a Clause be inserted giving us priority in the event of Egypt requiring assistance from foreigners in her public services, and perhaps precluding the employment of foreigners of any other nationality in the higher branches of the Egyptian Service without our assent.*

VI. This is only a preliminary Note and it may be necessary to circulate a supplementary memorandum as the result of further examination.

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* It is possible that some exception to this rule may be necessary in view of existing arrangements with France. The Foreign Office will know about this.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٢٥ظ]
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



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

APPENDIX.

Statistics of Egyptian Import & Export Trade.

i) Exports from Egypt.

In the year 1919, the value of the merchandise exported from Egypt amounted to £.E.75,829,483. Of this total, £.E.65,441,901 represented the value of raw cotton, £.E.3,013,993 cotton seed, £.E.412,477 cotton seed cake and £.E.22,614 cotton seed oil, making 91 per cent. of the total value of exports as yielded by cotton and its products. The remainder of the exports included cigarettes valued at £.E.1,032,076, Hides and Skins valued at £.E.694,595, Sugar valued at £.E.654,646, Leather valued at £.E.570,545, Rice valued at £550,580, Onions valued at £.E.424,634, Gum arabic valued at £.E. 359,193, Eggs valued at £.E.282,184, Cigarette paper valued at £.E.240,536 and Raw Wool at £.E.181,498.

As the above-named articles cover 97 per cent. of the export trade, the examination of the countries to which the specified goods were sent will best illustrate the extent and character of the interest of each country in Egypt as a source of supply.

Value in thousand £.E. of Exports in 1919.

| Articles | United Kingdom. | British Possessions | France and Algeria | Italy | Switzerland. | U.S.A. | Japan |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Raw Cotton..... | 35,284 | - | 5,287 | 3,199 | 1,759 | 16,552 | 1,794 |
| Cotton seed..... | 3,014 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Cotton seed cake | 412 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Cotton seed oil. | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | - |
| Cigarettes..... | 218 | 82 | 128 | 20 | 44 | 2 | 6 |
| Hides & Skins... | 90 | 6 | 72 | 126 | - | 129 | - |
| Leather..... | 27 | 90 | 16 | 13 | - | - | - |
| Sugar..... | - | 512 | 52 | - | - | - | - |
| Rice..... | - | 79 | 16 | - | - | - | - |
| Onions..... | 336 | 5 | 44 | 12 | 1 | 4 | - |
| Eggs..... | 276 | 2 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Gum Arabic..... | 39 | 6 | 215 | 54 | 6 | 8 | 12 |
| Cigarette papers | - | 24 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Raw Wool..... | 176 | - | 2 | 1 | - | - | - |
| All other Articles. | 292 | 185 | 101 | 74 | 1 | 19 | 52 |
| Total..... | 40,164 | 991 | 5,933 | 3,500 | 1,811 | 16,714 | 1,854 |



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



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In 1913, the value of the Exports was £.E.31,513,291 of which the leading countries were credited in the official record with the following amounts in £.E., United Kingdom, 13,604,352, British Possessions 122,455, Germany 4,066,287. Austria-Hungary 1,756,320, Turkey 664,214, Bulgaria 2,405 (or a total for ex-enemy countries of 6,489,899) France and Algeria 2,705,092, U.S.A. 2,484,905, Russia 2,241,701, Italy 1,012,254, Switzerland 1,012,217, Japan 719,201. The value of raw and waste cotton exported in 1913 was £.E.25,516,418, of cotton seed £.E.3,294,813, of cotton seed cake £.E.295,796, and of cotton seed oil £.E.38,058. The proportionate share of cotton and its products in Egypt's export trade in 1913 was thus 92 per cent. The general distribution of the export trade was as stated below.

Value in Thousand £.E. of Exports in 1913.

| Articles | United Kingdom. | British Dominions. | France and Algeria | Italy | Switzerland. | U.S.A. | Japan |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Raw Cotton..... | 10,996 | 26 | 2,406 | 971 | 1,002 | 2,443 | 655 |
| Cotton Seed..... | 1,699 | - | 109 | - | - | - | - |
| Cotton Seed Cake... | 294 | - | 2 | - | - | - | - |
| Cotton Seed Oil.... | 3 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Cigarettes..... | 59 | 57 | 22 | 4 | 9 | 3 | 3 |
| Hides & Skins Raw.. | 11 | 1 | 48 | 4 | - | 16 | - |
| Hides & Skins Tanned | 8 | 1 | 4 | - | - | - | - |
| Sugar..... | - | 1 | 9 | - | - | - | - |
| Rice..... | - | 1 | 19 | 9 | - | - | - |
| Onions..... | 126 | 3 | 5 | 10 | - | 1 | - |
| Eggs..... | 210 | - | 30 | - | - | - | - |
| Gum Arabic..... | 3 | 2 | 4 | 3 | - | 3 | - |
| Cigarette Papers... | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Raw Wool..... | 126 | - | 7 | - | - | - | - |
| All other Articles. | 69 | 29 | 40 | 11 | 1 | 19 | 61 |
| Total..... | 13,604 | 122 | 2,705 | 1,012 | 1,012 | 2,485 | 719 |

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



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

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Of the exports in 1913 to ex-Enemy countries, cotton and cotton seed account for £.E. 3,910,677 of the exports to Germany and £.E. 1,584,115 of those to Austria-Hungary, leaving £.E. 155,610 to Germany and £.E. 172,878 to Austria-Hungary of other goods, figures which include £.E. 87,986 and £.E. 45,911 respectively from cigarettes. Rice was the principal export to Turkey, hides and skins being also an important item.

For a comparison of the position in 1919 with that in 1913, there is no other course available than to assume that the trade with ex-enemy countries, so far as it has not been simply killed, has been distributed among the remaining countries recipients of Egyptian exports. Deducting, therefore, the value of exports to the ex-enemy group, we find that 55 per cent. the remainder was consigned to British Empire countries. France stands in the record for 11 per cent. U.S.A. for 10 per cent., Italy and Switzerland each for 4 per cent. and Japan for 3 per cent.

In 1919 the British Empire's share of Egyptian exports was 54 per cent. in spite of the development of direct shipment of cotton to the U.S.A. which gave that country an interest measured by 22 per cent. in value of Egyptian exports, while France and Algeria were entered on the record for 8 per cent., Italy for under 5 per cent. and Switzerland and Japan each for 2½ per cent.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٢٨ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٥٨)






المرجع: Mss Eur F112/260 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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ii) Imports into Egypt.

The value of the Imports into Egypt in 1919 was £.E. 47,402,319, and of this total the United Kingdom contributed £.E. 21,837,890 and the British Empire other than the United Kingdom £.E. 5,766,332. The Countries next in order, with the values consigned from each to Egypt, stated in £.E. were, United States, 2,889,749, Italy 2,512,028, France 2,447,809, Greece 1,893,105, Japan 1,729,164 and China 1,317,270.

The principal classes of commodities imported in 1919 were valued in £.E. as follows:- Cotton piece goods, 11,087,457, Coal 3,001,021, Tobacco leaf 2,856,472, Kerosene 1,710,897, Cotton manufactures other than piece goods 1,694,873, Silk Yarn and manufactures 1,665,326, Manufactured Iron and Steel, 1,430,705, Chemical manures (mainly Chili Nitrate) 1,425,746, Cotton Yarns, 1,395,399, Woollen and worsted cloths and mixtures 1,125,330, Meat fresh or refrigerated, 942,838. These articles made up 60 per cent. in value of the imports. The countries from which they were consigned are shewn below:-

Value in thousand £.E. of Imports in 1919.

| Articles. | United Kingdom | British Possessions. | France and Algeria | Italy. | Greece | U.S.A. | Japan. | China. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cotton piece goods. | 10,025 | 35 | 32 | 791 | - | 7 | 166 | - |
| Cotton yarn and thread..... | 655 | 606 | 15 | 109 | - | 1 | 6 | 1 |
| Other cotton goods. | 630 | 20 | 210 | 169 | - | 79 | 439 | 8 |
| Coal..... | 2,573 | 370 | - | - | - | 51 | - | - |
| Tobacco leaf..... | 83 | 124 | 1 | 14 | 1,568 | 25 | 148 | 843 |
| Kerosene..... | - | - | - | - | - | 1,480 | - | - |
| Silk yarns & goods. | 55 | 16 | 494 | 205 | - | 8 | 388 | 401 |
| Manufactured Iron and Steel..... | 1,148 | 6 | 38 | 6 | - | 105 | 45 | - |
| Chemical Manures... | 163 | 75 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Woollen & Worsted cloths..... | 1,037 | 1 | 40 | 32 | - | 2 | 4 | - |
| Meat, fresh or refrigerated..... | - | 943 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| All other articles. | 5,469 | 3,570 | 1,618 | 1,186 | 325 | 1,132 | 533 | 64 |
| | 21,838 | 5,766 | 2,448 | 2,512 | 1,893 | 2,890 | 1,729 | 1,317 |



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٢٩ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٦٠)





المرجع: Mss Eur F112/260 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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In 1913 the imports into Egypt from all sources were valued at £.E. 27,826,881, including £.E. 6,324,219 from ex-enemy countries (Turkey 2,716,320, Austria-Hungary, 1,940,340, Germany 1,608,881, Bulgaria 58,678), and £.E. 21,502,662 from other countries. Of the latter the chief were the following, the values of imports of merchandise being stated in £.E:- United Kingdom 8,470,443, British Possessions 1,985,477, France and Algeria 2,576,098, Italy 1,473,033, Belgium 1,177,998, Russia 890,866, Greece 528,195, U.S.A. 525,160. Imports from Japan were only £.E. 70,704.

Thus, of imports from other than ex-enemy countries, the share of the British Empire in 1913, according to the Egyptian accounts, was 48.6 per cent., while in 1919 it was 58.2 per cent. The share of France was 12 per cent. in 1913 and 5 per cent. in 1919, that of Italy 7 per cent. in 1913 and somewhat over 5 per cent. in 1919. Greece, U.S.A. and Japan have all increased their share of Egypt's import trade, while imports from Belgium and Russia have greatly declined.

The classification of the trade in 1913 does not permit of a statement precisely parallel to that given above for 1919, but the following table shows the distribution of the trade by principal commodities and leading countries.

Value in thousand £.E. of Imports in 1913.

| Articles. | United Kingdom. | British Possessions. | France and Algeria. | Italy. | U.S.A. | Ex-enemy countries. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cotton piece goods..... | 2,990 | - | 36 | 478 | - | 137 |
| Cotton yarn and thread..... | 130 | 50 | 2 | 82 | - | 37 |
| Fabrics wholly of wool..... | 132 | - | 63 | 16 | - | 158 |
| Silk yarn, piece goods, lace, &c... | 3 | 3 | 97 | 76 | - | 1 |
| Total, textiles & clothing..... | 3,770 | 398 | 595 | 817 | 3 | 1,017 |
| Manufactured Iron & steel..... | 727 | - | 97 | 13 | 18 | 319 |
| Coal..... | 1,792 | - | - | - | 160 | 56 |
| Fertilisers - chemical..... | 2 | - | - | 9 | - | 8 |
| Flour of wheat & maize..... | 214 | 552 | 689 | 307 | 100 | 131 |
| Other Articles..... | 1,965 | 1,035 | 1,195 | 327 | 244 | 4,793 |
| Total..... | 8,470 | 1,985 | 2,576 | 1,473 | 525 | 6,324 |



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



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٣١و]
# (٤٧٣/٢٦٣)

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The principal item in the "other articles" imported from British Possessions was Rice from India (£.E. 438,250). The empty sacks imported from India are included in the textiles group (£324,124). In the case of the other countries named, the "other articles" are made up of a great variety of relatively small items.

The situation in 1920 may be briefly surveyed, with a view to indicating how far, if at all, the relative importance of British and other interests may have been affected by the disappearance of special war influences on the currents of Egyptian trade.

For the seven months ended July 1920, the distribution of import and export trade was as follows. The figures relate to merchandise only, excluding both coin and gold and silver bullion.

Trade of Jan. - July, 1920. Values in £.E.

| Country from or to which consigned. | Exports. | Imports. |
|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom ..... | 25,946,852 | 22,734,242 |
| British Possessions. | 812,777 | 7,177,114 |
| France ..... | 6,433,889 | 2,721,765 |
| U.S.A. ..... | 25,076,487 | 4,828,563 |
| Italy ..... | 2,456,585 | 3,537,852 |
| Japan ..... | 1,163,832 | 1,603,232 |
| Germany ..... | 764,500 | 433,463 |
| Other countries ... | 4,147,178 | 14,901,855 |
| All Countries ..... | 66,782,100 | 57,938,086 |

The leading commodities Imported and Exported in the first seven months of 1920 were :-

Table/

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٣١ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٦٤)





المرجع: Mss Eur F112/260 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٣٢و]
# (٤٧٣/٢٦٥)



(132)

Values in £.E.

| Articles. | Exports. | Articles. | Imports. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Raw Cotton..... | 60,590,310 | Cotton piece goods. | 12,567,062 |
| Cotton seed..... | 2,045,069 | Cotton yarn and thread..... | 1,167,053 |
| Cotton seed cake.... | 381,434 | Other Cotton manufactures..... | 2,408,811 |
| Cotton seed oil..... | 50,161 | Woollen or worsted cloths..... | 1,870,481 |
| Cigarettes..... | 581,586 | Silk yarns and manufactures..... | 1,977,007 |
| Onions..... | 527,451 | Jute Sacks..... | 686,210 |
| Hides and Skins..... | 306,371 | Coffee..... | 814,354 |
| Eggs..... | 285,968 | Sugar, raw..... | 1,688,941 |
| Phosphate..... | 249,880 | Wheat flour..... | 5,204,423 |
| Leather..... | 170,909 | Wheat..... | 2,016,426 |
| Rice..... | 163,925 | Coal..... | 2,390,166 |
| Other Articles..... | 1,429,036 | Kerosene..... | 1,207,691 |
| | | Fuel Oil..... | 655,563 |
| | | Timber - sawn - fir, pine, spruce..... | 906,345 |
| | | Glass and Glassware | 427,947 |
| | | Soda Nitrate..... | 1,283,082 |
| | | Soap..... | 472,567 |
| | | Iron and Steel manufactured..... | 3,006,787 |
| | | Other Articles..... | 17,187,170 |

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٣٢ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٦٦)





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

(133)

(iii) Shipping at Egyptian Ports.

The table which follows shows the numbers and net tonnage of vessels recorded at Egyptian ports in 1919. The dominance of the British flag is somewhat less than might have been expected from the preceding tables. The excess of arrivals over departures with cargo is presumably related to the sailing of a larger proportion of British (and American) vessels than of other vessels without cargo, these vessels having brought coal to Egypt. The tonnage of goods landed or loaded was, it will be noted, not in the same proportion to ship tonnage for all flags.

Similarly, in the table showing entries and clearances by Countries, the proportion of cargo tonnage to net tonnage of the vessels carrying it is markedly less for some of the countries specified than for the general average of all countries or for others of the principal countries specified.

Year 1919.

| Nationality of Vessels. | Steamers Entering at and Clearing from Ports in Egypt. | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Entered with cargo | | | Cleared with cargo. | | |
| | No. of Steamers. | Net Registered Tonnage. | Tons of cargo discharged. | No. of Steamers. | Net Registered Tonnage. | Tons of cargo shipped. |
| British .... | 649 | 1,123,559 | 1,556,755 | 579 | 869,670 | 852,729 |
| American ... | 37 | 84,940 | 47,561 | 33 | 66,687 | 22,456 |
| French ..... | 56 | 153,367 | 9,562 | 55 | 151,471 | 18,578 |
| Greek ..... | 99 | 66,680 | 15,371 | 108 | 68,409 | 45,561 |
| Italian .... | 179 | 306,069 | 34,683 | 196 | 326,785 | 91,012 |
| Japanese ... | 42 | 91,184 | 99,431 | 46 | 101,498 | 101,338 |
| Other Nationalities .. | 159 | 166,838 | 130,921 | 178 | 167,328 | 117,425 |
| TOTAL .... | 1,221 | 1,992,637 | 1,894,284 | 1,195 | 1,751,848 | 1,249,109 |

Table/

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٣٣ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٦٨)



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(134)

YEAR, 1919.

| Countries of Origin or of Destination. | Steamers Entering at and Clearing from Ports in Egypt. | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Entered with cargo. | | | Cleared with Cargo | | |
| | Number of Steamers. | Net Registered Tonnage. | Tons of cargo-discharged.* | Number of Steamers. | Net Registered Tonnage. | Tons of cargo shipped.* |
| Unitod Kingdom | 179 | 444,053 | 810,526 | 173 | 380,289 | 593,873 |
| British Possessions... | 109 | 177,726 | 228,892 | 114 | 207,712 | 139,011 |
| Egypt..... | 297 | 297,779 | 236,778 | 267 | 223,184 | 61,820 |
| United States of America.... | 40 | 135,347 | 150,371 | 14 | 42,806 | 55,239 |
| France..... | 46 | 107,813 | 35,763 | 60 | 130,804 | 71,826 |
| Greece..... | 115 | 98,653 | 5,863 | 116 | 102,715 | 74,642 |
| Italy..... | 109 | 239,104 | 40,296 | 93 | 202,905 | 80,414 |
| Turkey (Mediterranean Sea)..... | 161 | 216,462 | 20,215 | 236 | 290,393 | 87,049 |
| Other Foreign Countries..... | 165 | 285,700 | 365,580 | 122 | 171,040 | 87,232 |
| Total..... | 1,221 | 1,992,637 | 1,894,284 | 1,195 | 1,751,848 | 1,249,109 |

*Includes cargo discharged from, or shipped on, vessels in transit through the Suez Canal and entered from or cleared to the countries named.

The corresponding figures for 1913 show, by comparison, the nature of the changes which the war brought about and enable the magnitude of pre-war trade to be compared with that of last year by other measures than money value.

YEAR, 1913.

| Nationality of Vessels. | Steamers Entering at and Clearing from Ports in Egypt. | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Entered with Cargo. | | | Cleared with Cargo. | | |
| | Number of Steamers. | Net Registered Tonnage. | Tons of cargo discharged. | Number of Steamers. | Net Registered Tonnage. | Tons of cargo shipped.* |
| British..... | 1,398 | 2,254,406 | 3,435,147 | 1,042 | 1,187,605 | 711,159 |
| Austro-Hungarian..... | 333 | 691,834 | 271,471 | 308 | 632,133 | 136,992 |
| French..... | 170 | 538,332 | 95,393 | 163 | 528,254 | 53,687 |
| German..... | 209 | 511,432 | 387,886 | 177 | 418,927 | 212,505 |
| Greek..... | 145 | 117,050 | 156,218 | 115 | 74,371 | 53,960 |
| Italian..... | 256 | 426,063 | 111,604 | 258 | 424,111 | 69,797 |
| Russian..... | 259 | 493,262 | 209,976 | 218 | 429,052 | 79,968 |
| Other Nationalities. | 231 | 319,225 | 407,141 | 173 | 216,388 | 95,025 |
| Total..... | 3,001 | 5,351,604 | 5,074,836 | 2,454 | 3,910,841 | 1,412,893 |

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



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٣٥و]
# (٤٧٣/٢٧١)

(135)

YEAR 1913.

Steamers Entering at and Clearing from Ports in Egypt.

| Countries of Origin or of Destination. | Entered with Cargo. | | | Cleared with Cargo. | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of Steamers. | Net Registered Tonnage. | Tons of cargo discharged.x | Number of Steamers. | Net Registered Tonnage. | Tons of cargo shipped x |
| United Kingdom.... | 676 | 1,429,022 | 3,193,906 | 204 | 395,999 | 563,159 |
| British Possessions | 184 | 230,020 | 246,876 | 178 | 192,661 | 66,668 |
| Egypt..... | 307 | 321,547 | 55,698 | 450 | 350,179 | 69,819 |
| Austria-Hungary.... | 210 | 454,261 | 185,871 | 181 | 435,863 | 89,546 |
| Belgium..... | 72 | 137,155 | 142,912 | 22 | 39,802 | 10,163 |
| France..... | 150 | 463,729 | 148,666 | 131 | 447,080 | 74,044 |
| Germany..... | 57 | 103,417 | 110,166 | 109 | 203,429 | 219,857 |
| Italy..... | 209 | 318,482 | 81,627 | 149 | 211,341 | 34,451 |
| Roumania.... | 114 | 159,577 | 212,559 | 51 | 61,550 | 7,356 |
| Russia..... | 199 | 403,207 | 183,292 | 188 | 387,489 | 83,982 |
| Turkey, Mediterranean Sea..... | 563 | 992,669 | 85,735 | 584 | 1,022,597 | 133,172 |
| United States of America. | 27 | 101,877 | 136,305 | - | - | 917 |
| Other Foreign Countries.. | 233 | 236,641 | 291,223 | 207 | 164,851 | 59,759 |
| Total.... | 3,001 | 5,351,604 | 5,074,836 | 2,454 | 3,912,841 | 1,412,893 |

xIncludes cargo discharged from, or shipped on, vessels in transit through the Suez Canal and entered from or cleared to the countries named.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٣٥ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٧٢)





المرجع: Mss Eur F112/260 حق النشر: رخصة حكومة مفتوحة
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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٣٦و]
# (٤٧٣/٢٧٣)

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SECRET.

C.P.-2120.

(Revised)

CABINET.

THE CASE OF EGYPT.

Memorandum by the President, Board of Education.

As my duties at Geneva will prevent me from participating in the concluding deliberations of the Cabinet upon the Egyptian question, I take this opportunity of expressing such views as I have been able to form on the basis of the two Conferences which I have attended.

(1) Although it has been explained to us that the Cabinet is in no wise committed to the recommendations of the Milner Mission we should, I think, encounter serious risks if we were altogether to reject the conclusions of a body so influential in composition and presided over by a Minister of the Crown who, of all living Englishmen, is best qualified by reason of his experience to speak with authority upon Egyptian questions. Technically, we are well within our rights in discarding the Milner Report. Practically, we should be confronted with great difficulties if we were to adopt such a course and upon this Lord Allenby, who does not like every feature in the Report, spoke with no uncertain voice. Egyptian opinion would be inflamed; the Arab-speaking world would accuse us of yet another broken pledge. Nor could the case for a refusal of the policy be stated to the British public without affronting a great body of opinion upon which the Government relies for its support.

(2) Quite apart from this and judging the case purely on merits I should like the Cabinet to accept the governing principle of the Report. What is that governing principle? It is that our position in Egypt should be regularised by a bi-lateral agreement between the British Government on the one hand and by those who are qualified to speak for the Egyptian nation on the other, and that it should be thus founded upon the expressed and formal consent of the

-1- Egyptian



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



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

(137)

Egyptian people. I will not elaborate the arguments which Lord Milner has adduced in support of the conclusion that we should endeavour to secure a willing acceptance by the Egyptian nationalists of our privileged position in Egypt. Those arguments are, in my view, very strong. Failing such acceptance our predominance in Egypt will always be contested from within and challenged from without. If, on the other hand, we can arrive at an agreement which satisfies Egyptian national pride - and political self-respect is after all, a good and not a bad element in human nature and one for the development of which among the Egyptians we ourselves are mainly responsible,- without sacrificing conditions essential to the military security of the Empire, our position in the world will be greatly improved.

(3) It is true that the agreement involves the abandonment of the Protectorate which was assumed during the War. We shall be asked to haul down the British flag and I appreciate and to some extent share, the repugnance which most Englishmen feel when they are asked to retreat from a forward position which they have once taken up. I think, however, that in the circumstances of this case that repugnance is reduced to a minimum. We assumed the Protectorate of Egypt as a War measure. It was just as much a war measure as the establishment of the Central Control Board. It was useful to us in an emergency but now that the emergency is passed we can review the situation without prejudice and reverse our decision if we think it politic to do so, without any damage to national prestige. The Milner Report offers us all the essentials of a Protectorate without the name. We are in fact to be the sole protectors of Egypt. We are to ratify all her foreign treaties. Though our Army of Occupation is to be withdrawn the overwhelming pressure of the British Empire will be the predominant fact which will colour and shape all

-2-

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٣٧ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٧٦)





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

(13)

the relations of Egypt with the outside world.

(4) The two principal points of difficulty are the concession of foreign relations and the military control. Under the scheme of the Milner Mission, Egypt will be represented by accredited envoys in foreign countries and the foreign countries will have their accredited envoys in Cairo. The Egyptian Ministers abroad will be charged with the duty of looking after the interests of Egyptian traders and travellers and of negotiating arrangements which will have to be submitted to us for approval and then presumably registered by the League of Nations. So long as Great Britain has the right of controlling the treaty-making power I can see only good in this proposal. Let us assume that we refuse such a concession to the Egyptians, do we in any way diminish the opportunities for intrigue open to Egypt in foreign capitals, or the opportunities for intrigue open to foreign Powers in Cairo? I do not think so. Intrigues will go on whether or not the intriguers are duly accredited, but it is reasonable to suppose that if the spirit of Egyptian nationalism can be enlisted on behalf of the British Empire instead of against it, our diplomatic position in foreign capitals will be so much the easier.

(5) It is admitted that Egypt is vital to the security of our military communications with the East. It is a thousand times more valuable to us than Mesopotamia or Persia. Lord Milner seems to have been successful in securing the assent of Egyptian nationalism to the proposition that we must take precautions for securing our military position in Egypt. On the other hand, it is part of the agreement that there is to be no Army of Occupation. This raises a difficulty, for Lord Allenby gave it as his opinion that if there were to be troops anywhere in Egypt, that they should be placed in Cairo,

- 3 -

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٣٨ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٧٨)





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

(139)

the centre of all vital communications. I do not know how far the Egyptians would accept as an integral part of the proposal, an arrangement under which a small body of troops should be retained in Cairo, mainly for the police purpose of securing the personal safety of the High Commissioner and of the Foreign Legations. This seems to me to be a proposal which might be worth making, especially in view of the fact that it is desirable that foreign Powers should make their representations to us and not directly to the Egyptian Government in the event of a disturbance in Cairo affecting the safety of their own nationals. I would not, however, insist on this condition if it were likely to prove fatal to an agreement. After all Lord Cromer got on well enough without troops. So does our Political Officer at Hyderabad. I should have thought also that it was quite possible to give to the Suez Canal zone an interpretation sufficiently liberal to enable British troops, and more particularly British aerodromes, to be stationed in no immediate proximity to the Canal. With complete naval control, with an established system of aerial communications, with our Military grip on the Sudan, and on the Canal zone in peace time, and with the right to complete an effective use of the whole country for military purposes in time of war, with Palestine under British influence, and with the German Navy at the bottom of the seas, with Malta and Cyprus at no great distance, I should imagine that we might snap our fingers at any military risks to our position in Egypt for the next generation.

(6) Meanwhile Egyptian nationalism is a force which we cannot permanently affront without increasing our difficulties all through the East as well as in Europe. I do not know Egypt, but I have met a considerable number of Young Egyptian Nationalists during the last fifteen years. They are capable of stirring up a good deal of trouble. I know of an epic in Arabic on the rise of Japan written a few years

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٣٩ظ]
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



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

(140)

before the War by an Egyptian Copt which had a considerable circulation all over Arabia. The Arab speaking world does not look with indifference on the rise and progress of this Egyptian movement and as we are not likely to have friendship with the Russian for some time to come, and have encountered the deep enmity of the Turk, it appears to be a plain counsel of common sense to stretch a point if the acceptance of this Report can be so described, with a view to showing the Arab-speaking world that we are honestly studious of their interests and susceptibilities.

7. It is suggested that we should hold out to Egypt the prospect - and if we were to speak our true mind it would be a very distant prospect - of becoming a Dominion of the British Empire. To this I am opposed. Egypt has never, save during the wholly exceptional period of the war, been part of the British Empire, nor does she desire to be part of the British Empire. There are few regions of the world more alien to us in history, national temperament or institutions. Egypt is a thoroughly foreign country. If she is allowed the symbols of Nationality, she will acquiesce in the substance of a Protectorate.

(Sgd) H.A.L.Fisher.

British Delegation,
Hotel Beau Rivage,
Geneva.

November 15th, 1920.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٤٠ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٨٢)





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

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SECRET. Copy No. 61

C.P.-2158.

CABINET.

THE STATUS OF EGYPT.

Copy of telegram from the Prime Minister of Australia to Mr. Lloyd George.
(Despatched November 18th, 1920.)

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PRIME MINISTER, LONDON.

Most Secret. Egyptian press reports state that it is the intention of British Government grant Egypt what amounts to independent government this done on the recommendation of Lord Milner's commission. Last week further cables reported Curzon denies that Government had decided this question but that it was considering or going to consider Lord Milner's report. In absence of any direct information Commonwealth Government is completely in darkness as to what facts are but is much perturbed at such a policy as recommended by Lord Milner's Commission. Commonwealth of course quite recognises that officially it has no standing in the matter which theoretically at all events is one Britain alone to decide but recognising that Egypt is gateway to India, and East, including Australia, and that an independent and possibly or probably hostile Egypt in the case of strained relations with (hypothesis) (of) other nations is deadly menace to safety, dependent as it is, like all the rest of the overseas, upon the free seas, which in turn depend upon complete control by Britain or the Empire of all waterways, i.e. Suez Canal, ventures to enter its most emphatic protest handing control of Egypt to those elements which there as elsewhere are either already conspiring against the Empire or at the best are as dry tinder in harmony with the flame of Carranza (?) by conspiracy of Bolshevic, German or any

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٤١ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٨٤)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٤٢و]
# (٤٧٣/٢٨٥)



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other actual or potential question. I am of course quite aware that it is intended retain control of canal but quite sure effective control this narrow and most vulnerable waterway cannot (be?) maintained when and if hinterland is in possession of hostile populations. One ship sunk could block canal. To guard this waterway which is one of the main arteries imperial body, if Egypt possibly hostile, Milner would require very much larger forces than at present and these would be in almost untenable strategic position. The Government has given India a measure of self government; has it satisfied or pacified India? It certainly would not appear so. On behalf of Commonwealth, I most earnestly trust you will not alter present arrangements in Egypt, at least until I have had opportunity of discussing whole question foreign policy in its relation to overseas Dominions with you and my colleagues of other Dominions next June.

HUGHES.

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2 Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.
November 25th, 1920.

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# (٤٧٣/٢٨٦)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٤٣و] (٤٧٣/٢٨٧)



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Circulated by the Secretary of State for India.

CABINET
C.P. 2204
2, WHITEHALL GARDENS

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**SECRET.**

I have read Mr. Hughes' contribution to the study of the Egyptian question.

I most sincerely trust that the question will not be delayed until next year's Imperial Cabinet. I do not gather from Mr. Hughes' telegram that he proposes to make any real contribution to its study. I have, moreover, a lively recollection of Mr. Hughes' contributions to the Treaty of Versailles, which, in that they delayed the conclusion of peace and the fixation of reparation at a reasonable figure, have been largely responsible for the present condition of Europe and the present uncertainties of British trade.

But my excuse for intervention is Mr. Hughes' characteristically ignorant remarks about India. Perhaps the Colonial Secretary will take some opportunity of pointing out to him that even the most convinced enemy of our policy with regard to India would admit that the very limited measure (not yet in force) of association with the Government which we have given to Indians, and our conditional promise of self-government in the future, have ameliorated and not worsened the condition of that country, where such disquieting features that exist are due entirely to the Treaty of Sèvres and the regrettable extravagances as an outcome of shocking murders which occurred in the Punjab. Perhaps self-government is dangerous. I suppose that some time or other in history our Government gave it to Australia; I suppose that the activities of her Prime Minister in European politics may be an unfortunate consequence of self-government. But we have not tried it yet in India; and when it comes I do not suppose that the economic arguments of Indian leaders will be worse, or their carelessness as to facts more egregious, than in Australia.

E. S. M.

26th November 1920.

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See CP 2158

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٤٣ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٨٨)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة
# [١٤٤وأ] (٤٧٣/٢٨٩)



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144a

I CIRCULATE to the Cabinet at once the Report of Lord Milner and his colleagues on Egypt.

Lord Milner is anxious that it should be considered at a very early date. I concur.

C. of K.

*Foreign Office,*

*December* 23, 1920.

CABINET
C.P. 2349
WHITEHALL GARDENS

of the

# Special Mission to Egypt.

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




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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٤٤ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٩١)

## TERMS OF REFERENCE.

"To enquire into the causes of the late disorders in Egypt, and to report on the existing situation in the country and the form of the Constitution which, under the Protectorate, will be best calculated to promote its peace and prosperity, the progressive development of self-governing institutions, and the protection of foreign interests."

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COMPOSITION OF THE SPECIAL MISSION TO EGYPT.

The Right Hon. the Viscount MILNER, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies (*Chairman.*)

The Right Hon. Sir RENNELL RODD, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.
General the Right Hon. Sir JOHN G. MAXWELL, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O.
Brigadier-General Sir OWEN THOMAS, M.P.
Sir CECIL J. B. HURST, K.C.B., K.C., Foreign Office.
J. A. SPENDER, Esq.

A. T. LOYD, Esq., O.B.E. (*Secretary*).
E. M. B. INGRAM, Esq., O.B.E., Foreign Office (Assistant Secretary and Private Secretary to the Chairman).

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My Lord, *December* 9, 1920.

I beg to submit to your Lordship the Report of the Special Mission to Egypt, of which I am Chairman. The Report bears the signatures of all the members of the Mission except General Sir John Maxwell, who, for reasons of health, had to leave England early in November and is at present in Egypt. I have, however, received the following letter from him in which he expresses his general agreement with the recommendations of the Report:—

"*My Lord,* "*S.S. 'Narkunda,' November* 4, 1920.

"*I regret to inform you that owing to ill-health, and being ordered abroad by my medical attendant, I am unable to take further part in the Mission's deliberations on Egyptian affairs. I would, however, like to take this opportunity to state that I entirely concur in their general trend up to date, and am in accord with the policy outlined in the project of agreement as handed to Saad Pasha Zaghlul in August last.*

"*I have, &c.*
"*J. G. MAXWELL, General.*"

I have the honour, my Lord,
to remain your Lordship's obedient Servant,
MILNER.

The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., &c.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

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# (٤٧٣/٢٩٢)



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I.

WORK OF THE MISSION IN EGYPT.

THE despatch of a Special Mission to Egypt had been under the consideration of His Majesty's Government since April 1919, when the prevailing unrest in that country had culminated in manifestations of violence and disorder; and in May the announcement was made that such a Mission, under the chairmanship of Lord Milner, would proceed thither in the autumn. The openly-avowed intention of the Egyptian Nationalists to organise a boycott of the Mission received great encouragement from the protest of Mohammed Said Pasha, the Prime Minister, against its arrival before the peace with Turkey had been signed, and was intensified after his resignation, which followed the overruling of his protest. Mohammed Said Pasha was succeeded as Prime Minister by Wahba Pasha, and the new Ministry was in office during the whole of our stay in Egypt.

Wahba Pasha himself has since resigned, owing to ill-health, and his place has been taken by Tewfik Nessim Pasha, one of his colleagues, who, during our stay in Egypt, was Minister of the Interior. The courage and patriotism of these two Prime Ministers and of their colleagues in taking office at a time when their country was passing through so grave a crisis, and when their own lives were daily in danger, cannot be too highly commended. Tewfik Nessim Pasha's Ministry, which is still in office, consists, with one exception, of the same men as Wahba Pasha's and is of the same character. It is a Ministry of affairs, composed of capable administrators, loyal to the Sultan and working harmoniously with the British High Commissioner, but of no distinct political colour and indisposed to take any decided line with regard to the burning question of the future of Egypt.

The change of Ministry in Egypt, and other circumstances, caused the departure of the Mission to be delayed until the end of November. We arrived at Port Said on the morning of Sunday, the 7th December, and in Cairo on the afternoon of the same day. In view of the general attitude of hostility to the Mission, which had been sedulously fostered, every precaution was taken for our security, and we reached the hotel where quarters had been prepared for our reception without incident. The day after our arrival we were all presented by Lord Allenby to His Highness the Sultan, a formal visit, which had been preceded by a short audience of a more intimate kind which he had accorded to Lord Milner. This was the first of a number of conversations which, during our stay in Egypt, our Chairman and other members of the Mission had with His Highness, who always treated us with great friendliness. In these conversations he expressed himself freely about the political situation in Egypt, the events of the last few years, and the difficulties of his own position. But he carefully abstained from giving any advice with regard to the subject of our reference, *viz.*, the future constitution of Egypt. Beyond warning us to be slow in forming conclusions and on our guard against busybodies, and indicating certain men of position whom it would be well for us to consult—such as Rushdi Pasha, Adli Pasha, Mohammed Said Pasha and Mazlum Pasha, all of them ex-Ministers—he never attempted in any way to guide or influence our deliberations. His attitude, as far as the main object of the Mission was concerned, was one of studied reserve.

This reserve was even more marked in the case of the Ministers, Wahba Pasha and his colleagues, to whom we were introduced at a party given by Lord Allenby at the Residency on the 11th December, and with whom throughout our stay in Egypt we maintained very cordial relations. They were at all times ready to assist us in our enquiries, to put every sort of information at our disposal, and to bring us into touch with any officials whom we desired to see. There was never any doubt of their willingness to give us every opportunity of becoming acquainted with the mechanism of government or the state of the country. But they were particularly careful to leave us to form our own conclusions. Though freely invited to do so, they were not disposed to make any suggestions of their own on constitutional, as distinct from purely administrative questions, and never evinced any desire to know in what direction the thoughts of the Mission were tending with regard to the future government of Egypt.

In strong contrast with the caution and reserve exhibited by the native official world was the storm of protest and disapprobation with which the arrival of the Mission was greeted by the native public and the native press. We had not been many days, or even hours, in Cairo before we had ample evidence of active and

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



organised antagonism. Telegrams poured in announcing the intention of the senders to go on strike as a protest against our presence. Many of these were despatched by schoolboys and students, but others came from public bodies, such as Provincial Councils, a few from Government officials, and a considerable number from corporations or communities of greater or less importance. We received in all 1,131 such messages during our stay, while only twenty-nine telegrams of welcome were received, mostly from private persons acquainted with individual members of the Mission. The Egyptian vernacular press, with rare exceptions, exhausted the repertory of vituperation and inuendo, proclaiming that any recognition of the Mission would be interpreted as an acceptance of the existing situation and that any Egyptian who had dealings with its members would be guilty of treason to his country. The majority of writers consistently maintained that Zaghlul Pasha at Paris was the accredited representative of the Egyptian people, and the Mission was recommended to address itself to him. A series of short strikes were declared by students, lawyers, tramwaymen, cab drivers and shopkeepers, and processions of strikers, reinforced by numbers of schoolboys and the rougher elements of the city, paraded the streets with banners, denouncing the Mission and Lord Milner in particular, and acclaiming Zaghlul Pasha and the "Complete Independence of Egypt." Nor were such demonstrations confined to the male population. The Cairene ladies availed themselves of this occasion to abandon their seclusion and to drive through the streets with similar war cries. This procession, however unwonted, was orderly enough, but the schoolboys and hooligans were frankly riotous, and but for the admirable order maintained by the police with occasional military support there would have been considerable destruction of property and even bloodshed. As it was, beyond the wrecking of a few tramcars, little damage to property actually resulted. And after the first week or two disorder in Cairo gradually subsided, though throughout our stay occasional attacks upon British soldiers and three successive attempts to assassinate members of the Ministry showed that the criminal element was still active, especially among a section of the student class.

It seems needless to dwell at greater length upon the many manifestations of hostility to the Mission and its object. Mention should, however, be made of two of them, which as indicative of the strength of the popular current appeared to be of special importance. In the second week after our arrival the heads of the El Azhar University, the centre of Mahommedan religious teaching, addressed a manifesto to the High Commissioner, which set forth the claims of Egypt to complete independence and demanded the withdrawal of the British. There was some reason to believe that the religious leaders who actually signed this document were not particularly enamoured of the political course on which they thus found themselves embarked, but yielded to the pressure of the teachers and students, among whom anti-British propaganda had for some time been increasingly active. This manifesto was followed a little later by a similar declaration, signed by six Princes of the family of Mohammed Ali, near relatives of the Sultan, which was contained in a letter to Lord Milner and simultaneously published in the press. The action of the Princes may have been prompted by various motives, but the dominant one was undoubtedly their desire to gain popularity by identifying themselves with a movement which at the moment was sweeping like a tidal wave over the country.

The immediate object of the promoters of this movement was to prevent the members of the Mission from coming into friendly touch with representative Egyptians and thus ascertaining for themselves how much substance there was in the demand for "complete independence," and in the ceaseless denunciations of "the Protectorate." With this end in view the headquarters of the Mission were constantly watched by unostentatious pickets. The visit of any Egyptian of note was at once communicated to the press and became the subject of minatory comment. Moreover, the offender was liable to be subjected to a domiciliary visit in his own house from a group of students, demanding an explanation of his conduct, which generally ended in his making a profuse profession of his Nationalist faith and affirming that in his conversation with the Mission he had been careful in no wise to depart from it. Only in one or two cases did the person thus visited have the courage to tell the intruders to mind their own business. Meantime, the movements of members of the Mission were carefully followed, especially when any of us went into the provinces. Emissaries would be immediately despatched from Cairo to dog our footsteps, to try to prevent our getting into touch with the local people, especially the fellahin, and to arrange demonstrations calculated to impress us with the solidarity of Egyptian opinion.





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# (٤٧٣/٢٩٤)



The visit to Tanta of one member of the Mission led to serious riots, which continued for many days and were only quelled by the intervention of the military. These demonstrations naturally to some extent hampered our work. But they certainly failed in their main object, for it was impossible not to come to the conclusion that, if the Egyptians were really so unanimous as we were intended to think, we should have been left to find that out for ourselves by going about the country without let or hindrance.

It must not be supposed that the boycott of the Mission, carried out as it mainly was by students and schoolboys, was approved by educated Egyptians generally, or even by all those who held advanced Nationalist views. Rudeness to strangers appeared to them inconsistent with the courtesy and hospitality upon which all Egyptians pride themselves. Moreover, there were a large number of men who were really anxious to bring their views before the Mission, but were deterred from doing so by fear of the personal annoyance to which they might in consequence be exposed. It was, therefore, suggested to us in many quarters that, if only we would make it clear, that by appearing before the Mission a man did not necessarily compromise his position as a Nationalist, the barrier to free converse would be removed. We accordingly drew up the following declaration, which was published on the 29th December in the Official Journal and the press :—

> "The British Mission has been struck by the existence of a widespread belief that the object of its coming is to deprive Egypt of rights which it has hitherto possessed. There is no foundation whatever for this belief. The Mission has been sent out by the British Government, with the approval of Parliament, to reconcile the aspirations of the Egyptian people with the special interests which Great Britain has in Egypt and with the maintenance of the legitimate rights of all foreign residents in the country.
>
> "We are convinced that with goodwill on both sides this object is attainable, and it is the sincere desire of the Mission to see the relations of Great Britain and Egypt established on a basis of friendly accord which will put an end to friction and will enable the Egyptian people to devote the whole of their energies to the development of their country under self-governing institutions.
>
> "In pursuance of this task the Mission desires to hear all views, whether of representative bodies or individuals who have the welfare of their country at heart. All opinions may be freely expressed. There is no wish on the part of the Mission to restrict the area of discussion nor need any man fear to compromise his convictions by appearing before it. He will be no more compromised by expressing his opinions than the Mission will be compromised by hearing them. Without a perfectly frank discussion it is difficult to put an end to misunderstanding and arrive at agreement."

This declaration certainly had some effect in mitigating hostility, but it did not get over the reluctance of Egyptians generally to enter into formal relations with the Mission. We therefore made up our minds that, as far as Egyptian opinion was concerned, we must rely upon our individual opportunities of social intercourse with men of various classes to elicit it. As such opportunities constantly presented themselves, and as the people whom we thus met, and who certainly included most of the leaders of Egyptian opinion, expressed their views in private with the greatest frankness and unreserve, we succeeded during the three months of our stay in very thoroughly gauging the main currents of thought and feeling in the Egyptian world.

While a good deal of time was spent in these conversations, we were also busily engaged in studying the situation from an entirely different angle. In addition to the carefully prepared volumes of official documents drawn up for the instruction of the Mission by the Foreign Office, a very considerable amount of valuable evidence had been collected before our arrival by an Information Committee instituted by the High Commissioner, which had obtained the considered views, on many issues, of prominent officials, of unofficial residents and representative bodies. The study and collation of these views, which had been ably edited by the Secretary of the Committee, Captain B. A. Hooper, occupied some time. They remain as an important source of information at the disposal of His Majesty's Government.

While the perusal of this mass of documents was of the greatest assistance to us, we sought to supplement the information contained in them by getting into personal touch with as many members of the British community, official and unofficial, as we had time to see, as well as with the principal foreign residents, who, of course, had no hesitation about coming into open and constant contact with the Mission. The



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



evidence and advice of the chief British officials was freely available to us from the first, and we are greatly indebted to them for the ready help they gave us. With their aid we were enabled not only to gain a fairly comprehensive view of recent events, but to make an exhaustive examination of the organisation and personnel of every department of the Egyptian Government. This work was divided up between sub-committees, who reported to the Mission, which also assembled in full strength to hear the views of the highest British officials, as well as those of Sir William Brunyate, the late Acting Financial Adviser to the Egyptian Government, who was present in Cairo during the latter part of our stay. Meantime, the legal member of the Mission, Mr. (now Sir Cecil) Hurst, while co-operating as far as possible in these activities, devoted the greater part of his time to enquiring into the judicial system and the modifications best adapted to bring it into harmony with present requirements. Similarly Sir Owen Thomas, besides serving on one of the sub-committees just referred to, paid special attention to the study of agricultural conditions, and visited a number of estates, public and private, to make himself familiar with the methods of cultivation and the life of the people. The whole Mission, with the exception of one member who was otherwise engaged, passed the inside of a week at Alexandria, where opportunity was afforded us of coming into contact with the important foreign communities of the great commercial centre of Egypt. We were there able to hear the views of the French, Italian and Greek, as well as of the British Chamber of Commerce. Many centres of activity in Upper and Lower Egypt were also visited by individual members of the Mission, who communicated their impressions to their colleagues, and, in spite of the endeavours already described to prevent our getting into direct contact with the local population, valuable experience was thus gained and placed on record.

Two of our number, General Sir John Maxwell and Sir Owen Thomas, also paid a visit of several weeks to the Sudan, and the impressions they brought back were a valuable supplement to the information we had already obtained from the evidence of British and native residents in that country, whom we had been able to see in Cairo.

The manifold activities which we have briefly summarised kept us all very busy during the months of January and February. Towards the end of the latter month, as the time available for our enquiries in Egypt was drawing to a close, since several of our members were obliged to be back in England before the end of March, we began to hold a number of meetings for the purpose of collating the information obtained and comparing the views which we had severally formed. It at once became apparent that, in view of the immense mass of material and the number of points requiring thorough discussion, it would be impossible for us to draw up a Report during the remainder of our time in Egypt, especially as interviews still occupied a good deal of it. The preparation of our Report had, therefore, necessarily to be deferred until after our return to England. At the same time these preliminary discussions revealed a remarkable unanimity between us on certain cardinal points, and we even drew up, before leaving Cairo, though only in outline and subject to such modifications as further discussion might suggest, a series of propositions in which we were all able provisionally to agree.

These propositions ranged over the whole field of our enquiry and have formed the groundwork of the present Report. It may, therefore, be convenient at this stage to review the results of our investigations in Egypt and the conclusions to which they had led us.

## II.

### Provisional Conclusions arrived at in Egypt.

### (A.)—*Causes of the Recent Disorders and Existing Unrest.*

#### 1. *Prior to the War.*

The disorders which broke out in March 1919 were brought to a climax by specific events connected with the war, but they can by no means be attributed solely to recent or contemporary conditions and the ground had been prepared through a long antecedent period.

It appears to be frequently assumed in current talk and writing in this country that Egypt is a part of the British Empire. This is not and never has been the case.



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

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The "special position" which Great Britain occupies in Egypt dates from her intervention in 1882 to restore order during the Arabi rebellion—an intervention in which the other Powers, though invited, declined to participate. This threw upon her responsibilities which she could not decline, and which could only be discharged by the occupation of the country, until at least there was a reasonable certainty that order would be maintained and the lives and property of foreign residents rendered secure. But at that time it was the declared intention of the British Government to evacuate the country so soon as these objects were accomplished, and in 1887 Sir Henry Drummond Wolff was despatched to Constantinople to prepare the way for evacuation. He drew up a Convention with the Sultan whereby Great Britain agreed to withdraw her troops from Egypt at the end of three years provided that there was then no new danger, external or internal, to require their retention, and provided further that she should have the right of reoccupying the country if any such danger arose. It was only at the last moment that the Sultan under foreign pressure withheld his signature and the negotiations fell through.

But, though Great Britain remained in Egypt, she did nothing during the next twenty-seven years either to legalise her own position or to disturb the theory that Egypt was an autonomous nationality under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey. Egypt was in theory governed by the Khedive, the Council of Egyptian Ministers, the Egyptian Legislative Council and Assembly; and the British Representative was in name merely "Agent and Consul-General," the exponent, like the Representatives of other Powers, of the views and wishes of his Government to the Government of Egypt. Though, in virtue of the Army of Occupation and of the numerous duties and responsibilities which circumstances gradually imposed on him, he came to be the real arbiter of the country, he was always studiously careful to observe this theory, and the observance of it was regarded by Egyptians as an implied pledge that the occupying Power did not intend to impair the national status of their country.

It was also so regarded by foreign Powers, and when the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 was concluded, a declaration was signed in London to the following effect:—

> "His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt. The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country, by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other manner."

This understanding would no doubt have served for all practical purposes, if European peace had been maintained. But with the outbreak of war and the entry of Turkey into the war on the side of the enemy, questions of extreme difficulty arose. Egyptians were nominally subjects of the Sultan of Turkey, owing allegiance to him and not to the British Crown. This was obviously an intolerable situation. But the mere abolition of Turkish suzerainty by an act of war would have deprived Egypt of any definite status and left her in the position of a former Turkish dependency in the hands of Great Britain. This difficulty might, of course, have been summarily disposed of by the annexation of Egypt to the British Empire, but the British Government deliberately chose a less drastic course which would afford security to Egypt, while leaving the principle of an Egyptian national entity unimpaired. This was to place Egypt under the protection of Great Britain. A proclamation was accordingly issued in the Official Journal on the 18th December, 1914:—

> "His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gives notice that in view of the state of war arising out of the action of Turkey, Egypt is placed under the protection of His Majesty, and will henceforth constitute a British Protectorate.
>
> "The suzerainty of Turkey over Egypt is thus terminated, and His Majesty's Government will adopt all measures necessary for the defence of Egypt and protect its inhabitants and interests."

On the following day a further proclamation was issued deposing Abbas Hilmi, the then Khedive, on the ground that he had adhered to the King's enemies, and announcing that the succession had been offered to and accepted by His Highness Prince Hussein Kamel, with the title of Sultan of Egypt.

It has been constantly asserted by Egyptian Nationalists that they understood the Protectorate to be merely a war measure, and the defence of Egypt promised under it in the second clause of the Proclamation to be limited to defence in the war. The wording of the Proclamation seems to us to offer no ground for this interpretation, but

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



the Egyptians were certainly given to understand that efforts would be made at the end of the war to satisfy their national aspirations, and great pains were taken to assure them that their national status was not changed for the worse by the Protectorate. For example, in the telegram which he addressed to Sultan Hussein on his accession to the Sultanate, His Majesty the King used these words :—

> "On the occasion when your Highness enters upon your high office, I desire to convey to your Highness the expression of my most sincere friendship and the assurance of my unfailing support in safeguarding the integrity of Egypt, and in securing her future well-being and prosperity.
>
> "Your Highness has been called upon to undertake the responsibilities of your high office at a grave crisis in the national life of Egypt, and I feel convinced that you will be able, with the co-operation of your Ministers and the Protectorate of Great Britain, successfully to overcome all the influences which are seeking to destroy the independence of Egypt, and the wealth, liberty and happiness of its people."

It should be added that Egyptian Nationalists are able to point to a long series of declarations by British statesmen disowning the idea of annexing, or even permanently occupying, the country, and affirming, in the words of Sir Eldon Gorst, that "the fundamental idea" of the British Government "has been to prepare the Egyptians for self-government, while helping them in the meantime to enjoy the benefit of good government." Englishmen are aware of the circumstances which have till now prevented the fulfilment of these pledges, but they are naturally treasured by Egyptians and too easily made the ground of accusations of bad faith. It is necessary to bear them in mind, if we would understand the resentment of Egyptians at the common assumption that Egypt is a British possession or that the Protectorate has naturally made it so.

The situation in Egypt has therefore always remained an abnormal one since the British Occupation in 1882. In the initial stages, problems which appeared almost insuperable had been surmounted with remarkable success under an exceptionally able administrator, and as time went on, and the machine appeared superficially to be running smoothly, public opinion in Great Britain ceased to concern itself with the indefinite character of the situation. But in reality a settlement was becoming progressively more urgent, the more widely the influence of our presence in Egypt and the introduction of western methods made themselves felt. With the removal of that fear of oppression which in old days had made Egyptians acquiescent and submissive, new impulses and ambitions were inevitably aroused. The Egyptians of 1920, whether townsmen or peasants, are different people from those of 1910, and very different indeed from the Egyptians of 1890. We have never honestly faced the Egyptian problem, and our neglect to do so is in a measure responsible for the present situation.

The régime inaugurated by the late Lord Cromer to redeem a bankrupt administration was never more than a provisional one, because for many years there was no reason to believe that the Occupation, which we had in 1887 actually agreed to terminate, would be other than of brief duration. But provisional and extemporised expedients gradually hardened into established institutions and the stronger element in a combination of administrative forces tended to become the dominant one, to acquire powers and responsibilities not originally contemplated, and to restrict the Egyptian element in the public service to a secondary position. The policy pursued in the early days of the Occupation had been to engage a restricted number of carefully selected British officials to advise and assist, especially in the Finance and Irrigation services. A Judicial and Educational Adviser were, in due course, added, and later again an Adviser to the Interior, with a body of Inspectors for the Provinces. So long as their numbers were strictly limited, and only men of high capacity and experience were appointed, not only was the co-operation of British officials tolerated, but they were themselves regarded with esteem and affection.

As the resources at the disposal of Egypt increased the public services were greatly expanded, and with this expansion the obligation arose concurrently to add to the number of foreign assistants and experts. Thus, with the prolongation of the Occupation, the number of British officials in Egypt steadily increased, and the principle that the aim of the administration should be to train and equip Egyptians to manage their own affairs fell into the background. In spite of the fact that Egyptian Ministers have of recent years taken a greater part and a more direct interest in their departments than in the early days of the Occupation, when many of them were content with little more than an honorary position, the work of Under-Secretaries and heads of



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



departments, for the most part non-Egyptian, has become increasingly independent of the Council of Ministers. A growing resentment at the number of posts monopolised by the British was noticed for a long period antecedent to the war. Egyptian officials of long experience and considerable competence felt that they were definitely excluded from rising to the highest positions in view of the system consecrated by prescription that a post once held by a non-Egyptian was, on its becoming vacant, automatically filled by a non-Egyptian.

Particular resentment was occasioned in Egypt at the time of the arrival of the Mission by a recent increase in the numbers of the British engaged for the public service. This increase, if it was greatly exaggerated by ill-informed rumour, was nevertheless appreciable, and affected also a few very subordinate offices hitherto filled by natives of the country. It may here be mentioned that the number of British officials has risen from a few hundred in the earlier years of the occupation to upwards of sixteen hundred at the present day, with scales of pay different from those enjoyed by the Egyptians. These higher scales, if amply justified by special circumstances, were readily represented as constituting a grievance.

Another feature of Egyptian life has undoubtedly contributed to the unrest. As British officials have increased in number they have more and more lived apart from the Egyptian community, and their chief residential quarter on the Island of Ghezireh has come to be a self-contained community, furnished, like an Indian cantonment, with a complete equipment for social intercourse, sport and physical exercise. This has added to the amenities of life for the official class, but it has withdrawn them from society with Egyptians and tended to create a British *enclave* from which Egyptians are excluded. We are aware of the difficulties on both sides which stand in the way of free and unembarrassed relations between men and women of different races and customs, but when the necessary allowance has been made it must, we think, be said that the increasing segregation of the British community, which has been a feature of recent years, has been a cause of estrangement between British and Egyptians and made the fact of an alien occupation more obtrusive than it need have been.

We have noticed with pleasure the cordial and intimate relations which many old residents in Egypt, and not a few senior officials and their wives, have established with their Egyptian neighbours, and we have seen much evidence of the value and influence of these friendships in the recent times of stress and difficulty. We are convinced that it would greatly help if more efforts were made to cultivate these neighbourly relations. The forms and conventions of conduct should be studied and carefully respected by British residents in Egypt and visitors to Egypt. It should be realised, especially by the latter, that altogether disproportionate harm may be done by offences against good taste which, though trivial in themselves, cause comment and scandal. It should, in general, be the aim of the British residents and visitors to break down the barriers that exist rather than to create new ones, to enter as far as possible into the life of the Egyptian people, to learn enough of their language to make social contact possible and agreeable, and to avoid the minor causes of offence which in the aggregate become mischievous.

On the other hand, a criticism not infrequently heard that the quality of the British officials has deteriorated does not seem to us to be justified. There are many officials of high capacity in Egypt to-day, as there were in former times men of exceptional and others of only moderate calibre. But the critical sense of the Egyptians has been greatly developed by progress and contact with other countries, and they have become more exacting than the older generation with regard to standards of efficiency.

Again, since the retirement in 1907 of Lord Cromer, there have been no less than five British Agents or High Commissioners, and Egypt has felt herself to some extent a field for successive experiments. The result of these repeated changes, due to the accident of circumstances, tended to increase the independence of the permanent British officials, who were more concerned with departmental efficiency than with questions of policy, while to Egyptian observers they conveyed an impression of uncertainty and instability.

Another contributory cause of the general discontent was the manifest insuccess of educational policy resulting in the production of an unnecessarily large and ever-increasing number of candidates for official posts, provided with examination certificates, but destitute of any real educational culture. It was necessary in the initial stage to train a number of young men to such a standard of efficiency as would enable them to undertake clerical duties in State departments which had hitherto been largely performed by non-Egyptians, and to prepare pupils for the higher colleges of medicine, law and engineering. But here again there seems, until quite recently, to have been







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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٤٨ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٢٩٩)



little attempt to revise a system adopted under exceptional circumstances or to realise that changing conditions required new methods. Education, for which there is a real and crying demand among the people, remains atrophied. The mass of the population is not only still illiterate, but without social or moral training. The only real education in the higher sense available in the country itself is provided by religious or benevolent institutions, controlled for the most part by the French or Americans, or by the admirable Victoria College, which owes its institution to the British residents at Alexandria. In spite of these criticisms, however, it must be admitted that the general level of instruction has greatly advanced since the early years of the Occupation, and that the number of those capable of taking an intelligent interest in public affairs is very much larger to-day.

Nationalist propaganda has been at work for many years in Egypt. The evolution of a sane and moderate Nationalist spirit might have been regarded with sympathy and interest, and, indeed, the late Lord Cromer had hopes that it might be turned to good account. But unfortunate political rivalries among the Western Powers led it from the first to assume an anti-British colour. The Nationalists were alternately encouraged and opposed by the ex-Khedive for his own personal aims. Their ranks were swelled by the members of a thoroughly dissatisfied civil service, who regarded the presence of the British as a bar to promotion, and who were further discouraged by a system of selection which made it possible for the influential to secure the preferment of relations and dependents. The increasing number of the students who look only to State employment as a reward for the often real sacrifices made in order to qualify for it, and who regard their prospects of obtaining any appointment as diminished by the competition of the foreigner, made them a ready instrument for such propaganda in the provinces.

Finally, there is the latent but ever-present impatience of the Moslem with Christian rule. That a Mohammedan should occupy a position of political subordination to a Christian is opposed to the essential spirit of Islam, and the sentiment which this spirit has engendered survives long after strong religious feeling has been greatly attenuated, or even become altogether extinct. Its existence no doubt exercised an influence in creating a prejudice which the religious element would make the most of against the name of Protectorate, interpreted as implying the permanent subjection of a Mahommedan Ruler and State to a Christian Sovereign. There is in the East a patriotism of religion which is an even more fundamental sentiment than the patriotism of home and tradition.

### 2. *During the War.*

Such were the influences which had long been active when in 1914 Turkey, the seat of the Caliphate, entered the war as the enemy of the occupying Power, and German agents freely promised the liberation of Egypt from British control after the final victory which they confidently predicted. In these circumstances, and in view of the spirit of hostility towards the occupying Power which had been gathering volume over a number of years, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief in Egypt was no doubt well advised, in the Proclamation announcing the state of war with Turkey, to make it clear that Great Britain took upon herself "the solemn burden of the present war without calling on the Egyptian people for aid therein." It is, however, only just to record that, whatever may have been the hopes or anticipations raised by the war in a certain section of the Egyptians, the obligations and disabilities which it entailed upon the people were borne with patience and goodwill; that the services rendered by the Egyptian Labour Corps were of inestimable value and indispensable to the campaign in Palestine; and that the Sultan's Government supported the British authorities in a spirit of the most cordial co-operation, evidenced among other things by their writing off the suspense account under which Egypt would have been entitled to reclaim advances of 3 millions sterling.

So far we have only dealt with the causes of unrest in Cairo and the larger centres during the period preceding the riots which broke out in March 1919. It remains to consider the reasons which affected the fellahin and made them susceptible to nationalist agitation and propaganda.

Unrest among the educated classes in Egypt was, as has already been pointed out, manifest long before the crisis of 1919. But that it should have spread to the fellahin, and should have led to outbreaks of savage violence among a class, which has derived such immense benefits from the British Occupation, needs explaining.

In the first place, it may be laid down that the agitation among the fellahin was of a far more partial character than has been generally supposed, and that disorders were confined to the neighbourhood of large centres and to districts along the main lines of communication. In remoter villages, less readily accessible to propagandists



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



and agitators, little disposition was shown by the small farmers to take part in any such movement. Where disorders occurred, it was generally the railways which became the object of aggression, and there is reason to believe that the attacks upon them were carried out in pursuance of a pre-existing plan for a Germano-Turkish attack on the Canal, supported by a simultaneous rising in Egypt. This would account for certain indications of concerted action revealed in the disturbances of March 1919.

There is some evidence to show that discontent was stimulated by the controlled price of cotton, which denied the cultivator the advantage of competing in foreign markets, while the rent of his land continued to advance. But the more obvious factors arising out of the war to alienate his goodwill were: (*a*) The recruiting for the Egyptian Labour and Camel Transport Corps; (*b*) the requisition of domestic animals; (*c*) the requisition of cereals; (*d*) the collections for the Red Cross Fund. In each case it was not so much the measures themselves that were resented as the manner in which they were carried out.

As regards (*a*), the recruiting for the Egyptian Labour and Camel Transport Corps, it seems evident that once enrolled the men were, as a rule, satisfied with the conditions, and that the wages paid were of great benefit to the poorer classes of the population. The hospital accommodation provided for them does not seem to have been altogether satisfactory, and there were evidently among their officers many ignorant of their language and without experience in handling them. But their readiness to re-enlist again and again, and the fact that those actually serving gave no trouble during the events of March 1919, shews that grievances against the service were not serious. So long as the Labour Corps was locally raised from volunteers arrangements worked satisfactorily. There was some discontent at the prolongation of service beyond the contractual period after recruiting was taken over by a military organisation. But it was after the voluntary system had ceased to supply a sufficient number of recruits, and when administrative pressure was applied to obtain them, that abuses began. In view of the announcement made at the outbreak of war with Turkey that Egyptians would not be required to take part in it, the voluntary system was maintained in name, but measures of compulsion were applied by the Omdehs, the unpaid administrative officers in the country districts, to whom recruiting was entrusted without supervision by British officials, most of whom had been recalled for duties elsewhere. There is no doubt that unscrupulous Omdehs took advantage of the position, sending their enemies to serve, while letting off their friends, and accepting bribes for exemptions and substitutions. In some cases measures resembling those of the press gang were adopted, and British pressure was asserted as the excuse for them. As to the extent of the abuses there seems to be some conflict of opinion. But they were frequent enough to cause much discontent in certain regions, and gave the political agitator his opportunity.

As regards (*b*), the requisition of domestic animals, though the fellah was often hardly hit by the removal of his means of transport, prices which were good at the time seem to have been paid when the animals were taken. On the other hand the prices at which they could be bought back at the end of the war were often considerably higher. While the fellahin were naturally most unwilling to part with their animals, there does not appear to have been much real ground for grievance on account of these requisitions, inevitable in a state of war. But they naturally would not tend to increase goodwill towards those held responsible for them.

A more fertile source of discontent was (*c*), the requisition of cereals. Owing to the demand for the army prices advanced, and market rates were considerably higher than requisition rates. Districts were assessed to furnish a given quantity, and the collection was left to local officials, who derived large profits from the transaction. Not only did Omdehs collect larger amounts than they were required to furnish at requisition rates and sell the balance at the higher market rate, but individuals who possessed no wheat had to buy their quota at market rates and hand it over at the lower requisition rate. The process of verification and repayment was slow, and it appears to be substantiated from the evidence submitted that the provincial officials retained the sums received to make payments in their own hands for long periods, and that Omdehs and Sheikhs, who were entrusted with sums in bulk for distribution, in many cases held back a portion of these moneys. The local officials were mainly responsible for the abuses which occurred, but they were attributed to the British, who, under the exceptional conditions prevailing, were unable to control them.

As regards (*d*), the collections for the Red Cross Fund, these were organised locally by Egyptian Mamurs and Omdehs, and while intended to be voluntary, were, in practice, frequently made compulsory by officials seeking to acquire merit by the





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



amounts which their districts contributed. There was a current belief in the country that only a portion of the total amount collected reached its real destination. It is open to question whether it was prudent or opportune, under the special conditions prevailing in Egypt, where the opposition of Cross and Crescent was inevitably emphasised, to do more than notify the opening of a fund for the aid of the wounded, to which many wealthy Egyptians and resident foreigners would no doubt have responded. To entrust the collection to local Egyptian officials was inevitably to open the door to abuses, entailing additional pressure on the poorer classes, with whom many other circumstances made the war unpopular. It should be added that the Joint Committee of the British Red Cross and the Order of St. John, after the close of the war, assigned upwards of a 100,000*l.* for the relief of victims of the war in the Egyptian Labour Corps and their families.

In addition to the specific grievances, to which attention has been drawn, there was in Egypt also an unprecedented and progressive rise in prices, especially the necessaries of life, such as corn, clothing and fuel, which weighed heavily on the poorer classes, whose wages were quite inadequate to meet the enhanced cost of living, while they saw a limited number of their countrymen and the unpopular foreigner making large fortunes. A family of four—a man, his wife and two small children—could not, at the beginning of 1919, obtain a sufficiency of food except at a cost which considerably exceeded the ordinary rate of wages.

These various factors had contributed by the end of 1918 to create a condition of discontent and unrest among the fellahin and some loss of confidence in the benefits of British administration. There was thus a favourable field in which the agitator could work. The fellah had seen no British officials for a long period, and none had intervened to protect him from inequitable demands. Even before the war, the once familiar figure of the British inspector riding through the fields and stopping to listen to the small farmer's claims and grievances had almost disappeared, and motor-cars conveyed the hurried official from one administrative centre to another. His disappearance made it easier to believe reports which were spread of the imminent departure of the British, when the land would be divided among the fellahin, with an unrestricted water supply and no taxation. There is also reason to believe, though there are no grounds for suspecting the leaders of the Nationalist Party of their inspiration, that highly-coloured and wholly imaginary accounts of outrages committed on native women by British soldiers and murderous assaults on the villages were circulated by unprincipled agitators, and that a spirit of vindictive resentment was thus aroused, which culminated in the brutal murders of British soldiers at Deirut.

The death of Sultan Hussein in 1917 had removed from the scene a ruler of character and ability, who thoroughly understood his own countrymen. He had accepted the onerous position of the first Sultan of Egypt as a not too welcome duty, and had loyally and courageously co-operated in the difficult task of administering a Moslem State in occupation by a Christian Power at war with the Sovereign who represented the Caliphate of Islam. He had to a great extent lived down the unpopularity which his substitution for his nephew had at first aroused, and enjoyed the general regard of all classes. His successor, who had been educated in Italy, and had served for a time in the Italian Army, was regarded as something of a foreigner, and found himself from the first in a much weaker position as regards his own countrymen, on whom he had as yet little hold. With the best will in the world, therefore, he could have little influence in stemming the rising tide of anti-British sentiment which was gathering strength.

### 3. *After the War.*

In the preceding pages we have endeavoured to describe the internal situation in Egypt up to the concluding phases of the war. It will now be more readily understood why the principles enunciated by President Wilson and approved by the Allies produced an immediate and decisive effect on Egyptian opinion. The acceptance of the idea of self-determination appeared to give international sanction to sentiments which had long been maturing among the educated classes.

Those in Egypt who had anticipated, and would at one time even have welcomed, a German and Turkish victory, now found a favourable opportunity for shifting their ground. This section now claimed that by contributing morally and materially to the victory of the Allies Egypt had herself been instrumental in throwing off all that was left of the Turkish yoke.

At the same time the voice of moderate opinion in Egypt also began to urge that the time had come to assert a claim to self-government consistent with the repeated declarations of British statesmen regarding the provisional character of our intervention. It was genuinely felt that the attitude of the country as a whole during the war, the co-operation of the Sultan and his Ministers, and the conspicuous sacrifices



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

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which the Egyptian people had been called upon to make, entitled them to the particular consideration of Great Britain. The idea of definitely regulating the relations between Great Britain and Egypt had, indeed, already been mooted by Rushdi Pasha, the Prime Minister, at the end of 1917.

This movement received great encouragement from the publication, in the beginning of November 1918, of the Anglo-French declaration regarding Syria and Mesopotamia, which announced that Great Britain and France contemplated the complete and definitive enfranchisement of the peoples liberated from Turkish oppression and the institution among them of national Governments deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the people themselves. The High Commissioner (Sir R. Wingate) did not fail to point out that the policy indicated in this declaration would have its repercussion in Egypt. Moreover, the Egyptians had recently witnessed the establishment of an independent kingdom in Arabia, which they had always regarded as far behind their own half-occidentalised country in civilisation and development.

At the very moment when these ideas were being widely discussed, public opinion was greatly stirred by the revelation of a confidential memorandum, which was interpreted as denying to Egypt the privileges of self-government advocated for other less advanced communities. A special commission to consider constitutional reform had been nominated at the beginning of 1918, and Sir Wm. Brunyate, the Acting Financial Adviser, was requested by this commission to draw up a note to serve as a basis for their discussions. He was invited, in particular, to examine the principle of giving the foreign colonies some share in the legislation of the country, which might render more acceptable to the Powers the surrender of the practical veto exercised by them under the Capitulations over a considerable field of legislature. Sir Wm. Brunyate's note gave great offence to the Prime Minister, to whom it was presented in the middle of November 1918, and, though intended only as a basis for confidential discussion, its contents became generally known. A storm of protest was aroused by a project which was interpreted as assigning only consultative functions to an Egyptian Legislative Assembly, while bestowing all legislative power on a Senate in which the officially-nominated members and a group of elected foreigners would constitute the majority.

Simultaneously with the commission above referred to, another commission had been sitting for many months to consider the judicial reforms which would become necessary in the event of the abolition of the Capitulations. Although this commission had issued no report, a general impression prevailed that it contemplated the super-session of the Mixed Tribunals by new Courts in which the English language and British legal procedure would predominate—a measure which would entail disabilities on the native Bar and paralyse the foreign advocates who had hitherto used the French language. This assumption tended to confirm the hostility of the legal profession to any extended affirmation of British control.

On the 13th November, 1918, Zaghlul Pasha, with two other leaders of the advanced Nationalist group, paid a visit to the High Commissioner and expressed their desire to go to London in order to put forward a programme of "complete autonomy" for Egypt. Simultaneously, the Prime Minister, Rushdi Pasha, proposed that he should himself, together with Adli Pasha Yeghen, the Minister of Education, proceed to London to discuss the affairs of Egypt, a plan which he stated had the full approval of the Sultan. The contention of these Ministers was that the Peace Congress would give official consecration to the Protectorate, and that therefore its nature could not be left undefined. Under the Turkish suzerainty Egypt had had certain rights, and they desired to know what their rights would be as against Great Britain under the Protectorate.

Sir R. Wingate reported these proposals to the Foreign Office, and was informed in reply that "no useful purpose would be served by allowing Nationalist leaders to come to London," and that the visit of the two Ministers would not be "opportune" at that moment. The Foreign Secretary explained that, owing to the fact that he and other Ministers would be absent from London in connection with the peace negotiations, they would "not be able to devote sufficient time and attention to problems of Egyptian internal reform." In these circumstances the Ministers were invited to "defer their visit." Rushdi Pasha gave the High Commissioner to understand that he regarded the refusal of His Majesty's Government to give him an immediate hearing as involving an interpretation of the meaning of the Protectorate to which he could not agree and tendered his resignation. There were no doubt obvious difficulties in the way of discussing such questions with the Egyptian Ministers at a moment of high political pressure, when the Peace Conference was about to open, but it would appear

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



that, in spite of the insistence with which the High Commissioner appealed for their reception, the real urgency of dealing with the Egyptian problem at that critical moment had not been realised.

Every effort was made to induce Rushdi Pasha to withdraw his resignation, and a prospective date for the eventual visit of the Ministers was indicated. But the position of the Nationalists had now become so strong in Egypt that the Ministers were only willing to go if Zaghlul Pasha and his friends were allowed to do the same. As it was not considered expedient to permit this, they adhered to their resignation, and the High Commissioner was instructed to come to England himself to report on the situation.

The result of these events was that a number of the Moderate Party joined the advanced Nationalists, who now advocated a more far-reaching policy, while their agents initiated a violent anti-British campaign throughout the country, where, owing to the calls of the flag, only a relatively small number of British officials remained.

While the proposed visit of Egyptian Ministers to London was still under consideration in the beginning of 1919, a document was addressed to the foreign representatives and residents in Egypt announcing the constitution of a "Delegation" of twelve members, under the chairmanship of Zaghlul Pasha, which proposed to lay the legitimate aspirations of Egypt before other countries. The majority of the Delegation were identical with those included in a Nationalist Committee of fourteen formed at the end of the preceding year.

On the 3rd March the Delegation above referred to presented to the Sultan a petition which was generally interpreted as an attempt to intimidate His Highness and deter him from appointing a new Government. This proceeding was felt to be a challenge which could not be declined, and Sir Milne Cheetham, acting for the High Commissioner, decided with the approval of the British Government to deport Zaghlul Pasha and three of his most active adherents to Malta. This gave rise to renewed agitation and protest, beginning with anti-British demonstrations on the part of students in Cairo which quickly necessitated military intervention. Similar outbreaks were soon reported from the provinces. On the 12th March disturbances broke out at Tanta and were quelled by the military, not, however, without bloodshed. By the 14th and 15th March the trouble had spread to most of the Delta provinces, where attempts to interrupt communications had become general. Looting, pillaging, attacks on British troops, and murders of British soldiers and civilians were reported from many quarters. On the 16th the railway and telegraphic communication between Cairo and the Delta, as well as with Upper Egypt, was broken. By the 18th the provinces of Behera, Gharbia, Menufia and Dakhalia were in a state of open revolt. Upper Egypt and the foreigners living there were completely cut off, while the fanaticism of the insurgents culminated the same day in the murder at Deirut of two British officers and five other ranks and of an English Inspector of Government Prisons in the Assiut–Minia train. By the 26th March, however, the situation, from a purely military point of view, had become stabilised. The main railway and telegraphic communications had been re-established and the necessary dispositions of troops had been made for their adequate protection. Mobile columns had been moved in various directions to control the more violent areas, to arrest and bring to justice those responsible for the excesses, and to re-establish civil control. The outlying centres of disturbance in the south had been relieved and the first and most dangerous phase of the disorders was over.

Thus, within a week from the deportation of Zaghlul Pasha and his associates, a movement anti-British and even anti-European had assumed grave proportions. It was a national movement backed by the sympathy of all classes and creeds among the Egyptian population, including the Copts, and on the part of its more fanatical adherents it took the form of the systematic destruction of property and communications, with an increasing disregard for human life. Responsible though the Delegation undoubtedly was for the organisation of the original demonstrations out of which the movement grew, its more responsible members soon became alarmed at the development of a situation which rapidly passed out of their control and fell into the hands of irresponsible extremists, supported by a certain number of undesirable foreign elements.

The Commander-in-Chief in Egypt, Field-Marshal Lord Allenby, had left to join the Peace Conference at Paris on the 12th March. He was, however, back again in Cairo by the 25th, having been in the meantime appointed Special High Commissioner during the absence of Sir R. Wingate, the High Commissioner, in England. His instructions were to "restore law and order" and "to administer in all matters as may be required by the necessity of maintaining the King's Protectorate on a secure and equitable basis." The military measures which had been taken had rendered the



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situation outwardly calm. But there was little diminution of anti-British sentiment, which was now chiefly manifested against the military element, whose behaviour during the repression of disorder was speciously misrepresented. Lawyers and students continued to strike, and many officials absented themselves from their duties.

The conciliatory disposition adopted by the Special High Commissioner in addressing a group of notables who visited him by invitation did not prevent the outbreak on the 2nd April of a general strike, which had, however, practically subsided by the 6th. Meanwhile, in pursuance of his policy of conciliation, Lord Allenby, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, completely removed the embargo on the departure of Egyptians desiring to travel, a measure which carried with it the release from Malta of Zaghlul Pasha and his three associates. Thus, within a month of their deportation, the policy then adopted was reversed, and the leaders of the movement became free either to return to Egypt or to proceed elsewhere to renew their campaign of agitation.

Such, in brief, was the course of events in the first four months of the year 1919. It is obvious, after the event, that Egyptian Ministers should have been encouraged to come to London when they proposed to do so, and Sir Reginald Wingate, whose advice on this subject was fully justified by the sequel, would have done well, in our opinion, to urge his views with even greater insistency. After this initial mistake events moved more rapidly in Egypt than the Administration appear to have realised. The consequences of deporting the Nationalist leaders were not rightly estimated, and the revoking of that measure, after serious disturbances had taken place, necessarily gave the impression that British policy was wavering and liable to quick changes under the pressure of agitation. In the next stage, punitive measures for the murder of British officers and other outrages committed during the rebellion became a necessity, and though carried out, on the whole, with moderation, they inevitably prolonged the period of exasperation. The Administration endeavoured to conciliate Egyptian sentiment by transferring a large number of the trials, after the most urgent cases had been dealt with by martial law, to the ordinary tribunals, but by this time Nationalist opinion had hardened, and the almost invariable result was that evidence ceased to be forthcoming and that the accused were acquitted. In the meantime, Zaghlul Pasha and his colleagues had, on their release from Malta, proceeded to Paris, in the hope of obtaining a hearing for Egypt's claim to independence from the Peace Conference. On failing to achieve this object, they devoted all their energies to obtaining foreign support for their cause, and an emissary was despatched to America to canvass opinion in the United States. At the same time, their adherents in Egypt worked with the greatest industry to complete their organisation, collecting large sums of money and extending their propaganda to all parts of the country. Their activities in this latter sphere were largely concentrated upon the exploitation of the existing conditions of industrial unrest, resulting in a succession of more or less serious strikes. By this time it had been announced that the British Government intended to send the Special Mission to Egypt, but, having made up their minds that its object would be the extinction of Egyptian nationality, the agitators concentrated their attention on limiting the sphere of its activities by an organised boycott.

(B.)—*The Nationalist Movement and Egyptian Aspirations.*

Enough has been said to explain the rapid growth of the Nationalist movement. It is more difficult to give, within a reasonable compass, a correct and at the same time intelligible analysis of its real nature and objects.

It has been said, that "every Egyptian worth his salt is at heart a Nationalist." This is only true of the educated and semi-educated classes, who constitute less than 10 per cent. of the fourteen million inhabitants of Egypt. It would be meaningless as applied to the 92 per cent. of illiterates and especially to the fellahin, who are two-thirds of the whole people. The turbulent crowds of the great towns may indeed be easily worked up to excitement by political catchwords, which they vociferate without understanding. But the fellahin, as a body, are normally very indifferent to politics. They are a primitive peasantry, living on the land and by the land, to which they are passionately devoted, and from which, though working with rude instruments and with little aid from agricultural science, they raise by their matchless industry and perfect knowledge of the soil those wonderful crops which are the bed-rock of Egyptian prosperity. Their whole interest in life centres in these crops and in the regular supply of Nile water, without which their fields would be barren. But while their outlook remains limited their independence has developed, and they are far more tenacious of their rights than in the old days of despotism.





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٥١ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٣٠٥)





The fellahin, when left alone, are not unfriendly to the British. No doubt they do not love any foreigner, and as fervent Moslems they start with a certain antipathy to any Christian. But, in the case of the British, these initial prejudices have to a large extent been overcome by experience of the integrity and kindliness of the general run of British officials and by the manifest improvement which their presence has wrought in the condition of rural Egypt. It is true that a new generation, which has never known the evils of the old régime, is less grateful to us than were their fathers, by whom these evils were vividly remembered. But the fellahin, though much less helpless and submissive than in former times, have still cause to dread the rapacity of landowners and the bullying and extortion of a good number of native officials, and against these dangers they feel that British influence affords them a certain protection. Those unfortunate incidents of the war period, to which we have already alluded, shook for a time their confidence in our justice and good-will, and were predisposing causes of the savage outbreak of anti-British feeling in the spring of 1919. But these excesses were abnormal and short-lived. Except where they are directly stirred up by agitation from the towns, the fellahin appear to be once more reasonably well disposed to those British people whom they know, and who know how to handle them. We were greatly struck by the evidence of a number of our countrymen, official and unofficial, living in close contact with the Egyptian peasantry, who affirmed that the bitter feeling of the last year or two had now subsided, and that Englishmen who conducted themselves properly were as welcome as ever in the countryside.

But it is idle to hope that the comparatively satisfactory attitude of the peasantry will long be maintained, if our relations with the middle and upper classes of their countrymen continue as strained as at present. Nationalism has, for the time being at any rate, established complete dominance over all that is vocal and articulate in Egypt. From the Princes of the Sultan's family down to the children of the primary schools, the men of property, the professional men, the religious teachers, the *literati*, the journalists, the students and school-boys have all, more or less willingly, been swept into the Nationalist movement. Most serious of all, perhaps, it now permeates the official class and the upper ranks of the army. Discipline and official decorum may prevent their sympathies finding open expression —the attitude of Egyptian officials towards the Mission was always courteous and correct—but in their hearts they are mostly strong Nationalists, and the influence radiating from them is all in the same direction. It is inconceivable that the sentiment of their social superiors of every class, of all the men who make opinion, should not in the long run profoundly affect the mass of the people. No doubt Nationalism as a political creed has little attraction for these unlettered millions, though they can easily be taught to repeat its catchwords. But then it is not so much by abstract political arguments that the extremist agitator seeks to win their support, as by the constant vilification of everything British and by subtly attributing every local disaster and every personal grievance to the malignity or incompetence of British officials. This campaign of mendacious denigration is carried on by many agencies, by preachers in the mosques, by country-bred students returning for the holidays, by all but a few organs of the Arabic press. It is true that the fellah cannot, as a rule, read himself, but he can always be read to, and if everything that is spoken or written to influence him points the same way, the falsehoods so sedulously instilled cannot fail ultimately to poison his mind.

We make allowance for the fact that at the time of our visit anti-British clamour was exceptionally intense. It was no doubt artificially stimulated by the more extreme section in order to impress us. And no man of any experience in such matters would mistake the extravagances of a political agitation at fever pitch for the deliberate expression of the mind of a people. But it is a significant fact, that, while many Egyptians undoubtedly disapproved of the excesses of this agitation, no one, who was not compelled to do so by his official position, made any effort to stem them. Men of standing, whatever their personal views, were much too nervous of appearing to be out of sympathy with national "aspirations" to exercise any moderating or restraining influence. No one would have dared to say that he was in favour of the "Protectorate," or that he was not in favour of "complete independence." To all outward appearance, independent opinion was solidly Nationalist. And in our judgment it is likely to remain so.

The position is undoubtedly a serious one, and in face of this solid phalanx of opposition it might seem at first sight as if we had no choice but either to abandon our position in Egypt altogether, or to maintain it by sheer force, in the teeth of the general and ever-increasing hostility of the Egyptian people. But a closer study of



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٥٢و]
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

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the problem led us to take a more hopeful view. From many and intimate conversations with representative Egyptians, including some who were commonly regarded as extreme Nationalists, the conviction was borne in upon us, that they were not so intransigeant, and certainly not so anti-British, as the frantic diatribes of the press might have led us to suppose. The broad banner of Nationalism was seen to cover many shades of opinion, and, above all, most notable differences of temper and of aim. Undoubtedly there are a number of Nationalists whose fundamental hatred of all foreign, and especially all British, control leads them to commit, or at any rate sympathise with, acts of lawlessness and crime. Not only are their aims wholly incompatible with any sort of understanding between British and Egyptians, but they are prepared to pursue them by methods which nothing could justify and which no Government could do otherwise than strive to repress. They are deliberately encouraging a system of terrorism, which is intended to render any co-operation between British and Egyptians impossible in the future.

The untoward events of the last few years in Egypt itself and the restless and revolutionary spirit throughout the whole world, which has had a strong repercussion in that country, have undoubtedly been grist to the mill of this extreme section and have given a more sinister character to the Nationalist movement. No wonder that, under these circumstances, Nationalism has appeared to many British people on the spot, and perhaps to even more at home, to be synonymous with violent Anglophobia and to be aiming at the complete subversion of the existing system of government in Egypt.

But we were satisfied, even before leaving Cairo, that it would be a profound mistake to take this sweeping view. It would be wrong to allow the impressions of a period of turbulence, like the preceding twelve months, to blind us to what is reasonable and legitimate in the aspirations of Egyptian Nationalism. Such an indiscriminating attitude could only tend to drive moderate men more and more into the camp of the Extremists and to convert the present deplorable friction between British and Egyptians, which is not incapable of being remedied, into bitter and enduring hostility. Violence and disorder must, of course, be suppressed, and here let us say that the measures taken to that end during our stay in Egypt were as temperate as they were effective. The necessity of continuing to maintain Martial Law in Egypt is regrettable, but under Lord Allenby Martial Law was being administered with the minimum of severity or of disturbance to the normal course of justice and the everyday life of the people. The duty of promptly suppressing violence and disorder must not, however, lead us to confound all those who are in a greater or less degree opposed to the existing system of government with the pronounced revolutionaries, or simple criminals, who were responsible for the outbreak of the spring of 1919 and the sporadic acts of violence which have been perpetrated since. In talking to many men who professed Nationalist opinions—and indeed it was difficult to find anyone who repudiated all sympathy with them—we encountered a very different spirit from that which found expression in such detestable outrages. These men denounced the resort to violence, or open rebellion, as not only criminal, but useless. Great Britain—such was the general view—was more than strong enough to keep Egypt in permanent subjection, if she preferred unwilling subjects to friendly and grateful allies. For they all recognised, with more or less warmth and spontaneity, the great benefits which Great Britain had conferred upon Egypt, while most of them also recognised that Egypt still stood in need of British assistance, not only in the work of internal reconstruction, but for her defence against foreign interference, and the danger of once more becoming the arena of international rivalry and intrigue. They all, without exception, admitted that Great Britain had a very special interest in Egypt, as the central link in her communications with her Eastern Empire and the Australasian Dominions, and a perfect right to safeguard these communications from any danger of interruption. But was it necessary for the fulfilment of these objects to deprive Egypt of her independence, to try to convert her into an integral part of the British Empire, and to run counter to the ineradicable desire of the Egyptians to take their place, as a distinct people, among the nations of the world? Would not an orderly and friendly Egypt, in intimate association with Great Britain, serve British purposes as well, or even better, while removing all sense of grievance and all spirit of revolt on the Egyptian side? Moreover, was not such a consummation the only one consistent with the avowed policy of Great Britain, with her reiterated declarations, that it was not her intention to appropriate Egypt, or to incorporate her in the British Empire, but to make her capable of standing on her own feet? In the sincerity of these declarations they had long believed, but were now ceasing to believe. After nearly forty years of British occupation, they seemed

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



to be not nearer to, but distinctly further from, the goal at which Great Britain had professed to be aiming. With our continued insistence on the Protectorate, which they all regarded as implying the permanent subjection of their country, Great Britain had definitely departed from her original policy, and, in fact, broken her word. They had accepted the Protectorate, when it was first declared, as a necessity of the moment. Great Britain, being at war with Turkey, had not unreasonably severed the remaining links between Turkey and Egypt, and something had immediately to be substituted for the former Turkish suzerainty. The Protectorate was thus justified as a temporary expedient, but at the end of the war they had always expected that Great Britain would proceed to regulate her relations with Egypt in a manner more consistent with her declarations, with her real interests, and with her honour. Instead of that, they now saw nothing before them but the permanent loss of their nationality, of their existence as a people. They were to become a "British Colony," to be British subjects. Against that they appealed, and would continue to appeal, to the British sense of justice and in the last resort to the sympathy of the whole civilised world.

(C.)—*Future Policy.*

Such, we believe, is a fair statement of the average opinion of Egyptian Nationalists. The violence, unfairness and unreason of the more extreme and noisy section have given to the whole movement an appearance of intransigeance which, in our opinion, is not essential or necessarily enduring. The remarkable organisation known as the *Wafd* ("Delegation") which, under the leadership of Zaghlul Pasha, has established, for the time being at least, so complete an ascendancy over the Egyptian public, and claims, not without many credentials, to speak in the name of "the nation," does not consist mainly of extreme men. Its members were drawn largely from the ranks of the old *Hisb el Umma*, which, in contrast to the *Hisb el Watani*, the real revolutionary and anti-British party, stood for gradual and constitutional progress. It is true that in face of an attitude on our part which seemed to them to present a blank negative to all their hopes, Zaghlul and his associates have, until quite recently, been drifting steadily to the left. But in our experience, it only needed some effort to understand their point of view and to remove their suspicions of the intentions of Great Britain, in order to get many of the Zaghlulists to discuss the situation in a perfectly reasonable spirit. And the same is naturally true of men of even more moderate views, like the ex-Ministers Rushdi, Adli and Sarwat Pashas, who, while sympathising with the ideals of Nationalism, had never actually joined the *Wafd*. In such discussions, when once we had got away from phrases and formulæ and come to grips with the practical difficulties of the problem, it soon became apparent that there were many shades and varieties of opinion among Egyptians. The one thing common to them all was the desire to preserve their nationality, their distinctive character as a people.

It is evident from what has been said that any effort at reconciliation between British and Egyptians, any policy which seriously attempts to bring the more moderate and friendly elements of Egyptian Nationalism once more on to our side, must take account of this deeply-rooted feeling. No grant to Egypt of a greater or less measure of "self-government," even if it went the length of what is known as "Dominion Home Rule," would meet the case, because Egyptians do not regard their country as a British Dominion or themselves as British subjects. This wholly differentiates the problem of constitutional development in Egypt from the same problem in countries which have for years indubitably formed part of the British Empire, as, for instance, British India. We talk of such countries gradually attaining the status of nationhood. The Egyptians claim that they already have this status. No settlement of the future of Egypt which does not recognise this claim is ever likely to be accepted by—it can only be imposed on—the Egyptian people.

As against these considerations, we have the patent fact that Egypt, though not actually a part of the British Empire, is of vital importance to our whole Imperial system, and that that country under British guidance has attained a new level of civilisation, from which it would be disastrous to allow it to relapse. To reconcile the defence of these interests—Egyptian as well as British—with the recognition of the national status of Egypt is no easy matter. And the problem seems, at first sight, to be further complicated, though on a closer study it may turn out to be really simplified, by the exceptionally strong position which the foreign Colonies, other than the British, occupy in Egypt. In no other Eastern country are there so many resident Europeans, enjoying such special privileges or filling so many important posts in commerce, in education, in the professions, in society and even in the Govern-



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ment departments. The great towns, especially Alexandria, are to a large extent Europeanised, and in a certain sense Egypt will always remain an international country. No solution of the Egyptian problem can be enduring unless it provides for the security of the great European interests, which are so strongly entrenched in the Nile valley. Thus that problem may well appear as insoluble as it is certainly unique. But then everything in and about Egypt always has been unique. There are no precedents for us to follow in dealing with conditions so abnormal. Any system which really fits these conditions is bound to be novel, and it should not be condemned as unsound merely because it looks paradoxical.

In view of all these difficulties, we gradually came to the conclusion that no settlement could be satisfactory which was simply imposed by Great Britain upon Egypt, but that it would be wiser to seek a solution by means of a bilateral agreement—a Treaty—between the two countries. In no other way did it appear possible to release Egypt from the tutelage to which Egyptians so vehemently object, without endangering any of the vital interests which we are bound to safeguard. All necessary safeguards, as it seemed to us, could be provided in the terms of a Treaty of Alliance by which Egypt, in return for Great Britain's undertaking to defend her integrity and independence, would agree to be guided by Great Britain in her foreign relations and would at the same time confer upon Great Britain certain definite rights in Egyptian territory. The rights we contemplated were of a two-fold character. Firstly, in order to protect her special interest in Egypt—the safety of her Imperial communications—Great Britain was to have the right to maintain a military force on Egyptian soil; and secondly, for the protection of all legitimate foreign interests, she was to have a certain measure of control over Egyptian legislation and administration, as far as they affected foreigners. The former privilege was no more than what Egypt could honourably concede to an ally who undertook to defend her against all external dangers, and whose strength and security were therefore of vital importance to Egypt herself. And the latter privilege would involve no greater infringement of Egyptian independence than that to which, by virtue of the Capitulations,* Egypt has always been exposed. Indeed, by substituting a single Power, Great Britain, for the thirteen foreign Powers which have hitherto enjoyed capitulatory rights in Egypt, it would tend to enlarge rather than to curtail that independence. Moreover, it was part of our scheme, as it has always been a feature of British policy in Egypt, to confine the special privileges enjoyed by foreigners under the Capitulations within more reasonable limits, and by so doing to make Egypt much more the mistress in her own house than she is to-day. But this could only be done if Egypt was prepared to recognise Great Britain as the protector of these foreign privileges when reduced to reasonable proportions.

This latter point requires a word of explanation. The restrictions which the Capitulations impose upon the sovereign rights of Egypt have a good as well as a

* "Capitulations" is the name given by Europeans to those concessions which secured from the early Sultans of Turkey extra-territorial rights to foreigners residing there, in continuation of similar privileges granted to foreign residents by the Byzantine Empire. They are unilateral and non-terminable, but liable to modification by subsequent Treaties. If, however, these latter Treaties are terminable, the Capitulations revive on the expiration of such Treaties. Primarily, they were intended to make it possible for Christians to trade and reside in the territories of the Ottoman Empire by safeguarding them against any forms of injustice or ill-usage, to which, as foreigners of a different religion, they might otherwise have been subjected. The Capitulations granted to Great Britain by the Porte date back to a very early period, but after various alterations now bear the date of 1675, and were confirmed in the Treaty of Peace concluded at the Dardanelles in 1809. Capitulations were granted to France in 1581, 1604 and 1673, and were renewed in 1740. The Dutch were granted Capitulations in 1612; these were renewed in 1680 and still continue in force. Nearly all the other great Powers obtained similar concessions from the Porte at one time or another in the course of the last 400 years.

It is in virtue of these unilateral Treaties with the Porte that Capitulations exist in Egypt. The Powers enjoying them were, before the war, fifteen in number, viz., Great Britain, United States of America, France, Italy, Spain, Holland, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary. The privileges of the two latter were terminated in the recent Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. In Egypt the rights conferred on foreigners by the Capitulations, apart from certain commercial concessions, included:—immunity from personal taxation without the assent of their Governments; inviolability of domicile and protection from arbitrary arrest; and exemption from the jurisdiction of the local Courts. Since the creation of the Mixed Tribunals in 1876, the practical effects of the last-mentioned privilege are that no legislation applicable to foreigners can be enforced without the consent of the capitulatory Powers, and that civil jurisdiction in cases between Europeans and natives or between Europeans of different nationality is exercised by the Mixed Courts, while criminal jurisdiction over Europeans and jurisdiction in civil cases between Europeans of the same nationality is exercised by the Consular Courts applying the laws of their own countries. The only internal taxes to which foreigners are at present liable are the house and land tax.







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



bad side. In so far as they protect the liberties and property of foreigners by ensuring them justice in the Courts and immunity from arbitrary action on the part of the local authorities, their operation is beneficent. But, on the other hand, by exempting foreigners from taxation and from the necessity of conforming to local laws and regulations of an equitable kind, they constitute a great and unjustifiable hindrance to the progress of the country. For this reason it is, and always has been, the policy of Great Britain to get rid of the Capitulations and to substitute for them a system which, while protecting all legitimate foreign interests, would put an end to the indefensible privileges which foreigners now enjoy. Negotiations to secure that object have for some time been going on between Great Britain and the other Powers who have capitulatory rights in Egypt. But the Powers in question cannot be expected to give up these rights unless they are assured that their nationals can rely on obtaining justice and fair treatment in the future. In order to be able to give them that assurance, Great Britain must be put into a position enabling her to implement it. Thus it is in Egypt's own interest to empower Great Britain to act as the protector of such of the privileges now enjoyed by foreigners in Egypt as it is just and reasonable to maintain. It is in this sense that the recognition in the recent Peace Treaties of Great Britain's special position in Egypt should be interpreted.

These, in broad outline and reserving details for later explanation, are the main features of the settlement by which we had come to think that the relations between Great Britain and Egypt might in future be regulated. And when we began to discuss them with those Egyptians, all of more or less advanced Nationalist opinions, with whom we were in friendly contact, it was encouraging to find that our suggestions met with a large measure of sympathy. No doubt the idea of a Treaty, of a settlement arrived at by agreement as between equals, not by dictation from above, appealed strongly to their sense of being a distinct people, to their national self-respect. For evidently that idea involved the recognition, in principle, of the independence of Egypt and was inconsistent with the theory of her being a British possession. And when they came to consider the conditions which in our proposal were attached to this recognition, they were ready to admit that, however unacceptable to extreme Nationalists, these conditions were nevertheless such as they could themselves justify to their countrymen, as being compatible with their status as a nation. For that status could only be maintained in fact by the support of Great Britain and Great Britain was entitled to a reasonable *quid pro quo* for this indispensable support. That she should claim to control the foreign policy of Egypt and should have the right to maintain, for her own Imperial purposes, a force on Egyptian soil, was no more than such a *quid pro quo*. As regards her domestic affairs, Egypt would be completely self-governing except in respect of the privileges of foreigners. And the restrictions upon the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty which the maintenance of some of these privileges involved were no greater but less, and far less irksome, than the restrictions which had always existed. In view of these practical considerations, it could not be denied that the proposed arrangement was conceived in the interests, not only of Great Britain, but of Egypt, and could be defended as a fair and reasonable basis for future co-operation.

The point of view of the Egyptians of whom we are speaking can, of course, only be stated in general terms. There was much discussion between us, and much difference of opinion among the Egyptians themselves, about details. Interminable and wearisome argumentation about the meaning of words—"Protectorate," "Sovereignty," "Independence," and "Complete Independence"—occupied much time. But it did not prevent a great deal of practical consideration of the actual provisions of the contemplated Treaty or indicate that agreement about them was in any way impossible. On the whole the conversations which we had while in Egypt left on our minds the impression that we had made great progress towards a good understanding, and especially that we had got into a much better atmosphere. The bitterness and suspicion, with which all Egyptian Nationalists had recently come to regard Great Britain, were beginning to disappear, and there was a good prospect of gaining the support of the more moderate section for a policy of reconciliation.

But there was a distinct limit to anything which we could achieve, while still in Egypt, in the shape of definite results. It was not within our competence to arrange a settlement of the Egyptian problem. We could only advise as to the best course to be followed to that end. And the Egyptians with whom we conversed, one and all, were emphatic in stating that they were only expressing their individual opinions, and that they could not claim to speak for the great body of their countrymen. Indeed, almost all of them went further, and referred us to Zaghlul Pasha and his Delegation as being the only men authorised by general acclamation to represent



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



the Egyptian people. We ourselves, of course, could not admit that Zaghlul Pasha and his associates possessed the full measure of authority thus claimed for them, but neither could we blind ourselves to the fact that they were for the time being the most powerful leaders of Egyptian opinion, and that no scheme to which they were definitely hostile stood any chance of favourable consideration, much less of general acceptance. But it was essential, from our point of view, as we had explained to the Egyptians from the first, that the Treaty which we contemplated, if it was to have any real value, must be concluded in such a manner as to make it not only technically but morally binding upon Egypt. As a matter of form, it would be a Treaty between the British and Egyptian Governments. But an agreement merely between Governments would not be sufficient. It might always be said afterwards that the Egyptian Government was not a free agent, but was bound to accept any terms that Great Britain chose to impose, and that in any case it was an autocratic Government, not really representing the Egyptian people. For these reasons it had always been a fundamental point in our plan that the Treaty should not be allowed to come into force unless it had been approved by a genuinely representative Egyptian Assembly. This might be the existing Legislative Assembly, the sittings of which have been suspended since the outbreak of war, or preferably it might be a new body elected *ad hoc*. It was rather for the Egyptians than for us to say what kind of Assembly would be in the truest sense representative. But it must in any case be a popularly elected body, deliberating with perfect freedom and taking its decision without official or other pressure of any kind.

In any such Assembly, we were assured on all hands, Zaghlul Pasha and his associates would command a substantial, if not an overwhelming, majority. In these circumstances it appeared to us absurd to let any question of etiquette stand in the way of our engaging in discussion with him, if he was willing to confer with us. Had we not from the outset invited representative Egyptians to lay their views before us, without prejudice on either side? And, as a matter of fact, it seemed likely at one time that Zaghlul Pasha, who was still in Paris, would return to Egypt in order to meet the Mission. Great efforts to induce him to do so were made by the Egyptians, who had been conferring with us, and some of whom were among his strongest adherents. Adli Pasha also, who, though himself occupying an independent position, was in friendly relations with Zaghlul, and was most anxious to effect a meeting between him and us, lent his powerful influence to second these efforts. But Zaghlul Pasha did not as yet see his way to respond to these appeals and, though numerous communications passed between him and his friends in Egypt during the latter portion of our stay, he remained for the time being in Paris.

The position, therefore, at the time when we left Egypt was as follows: We had obtained, from British and Egyptian sources, a vast amount of information about existing conditions; we had had ample opportunities of making ourselves acquainted with the state of public feeling; and we had formed our own opinion as to the policy best calculated to reconcile British and Egyptian interests. But we were not yet in a position to say whether the scheme which we had in our minds, even if it commended itself to British opinion, was likely to command sufficient support in Egypt to make it worth while to attempt a settlement on our lines. All we could do, therefore, was to report on the situation as we had found it, to indicate the conclusions to which our enquiries had led us, and to express the hope that the better understanding between British and Egyptians, of which we saw some promising signs, would ultimately make it possible to determine the future status of Egypt by mutual agreement.

## III.

### Proceedings of the Mission after leaving Egypt.

#### A.—*Discussions with Egyptian Delegates in London.*

We left Egypt at the end of the first week of March, travelling by different routes, and met again in London about the middle of April, with the view of drawing up our Report. But soon after we had begun to do so, a new and not wholly unexpected development of the situation caused us to interrupt our work, in the hope of being able to obtain fuller information with regard to the capital point on which, when leaving Egypt, we had still remained in doubt. That point, as already explained, was the attitude likely to be adopted by the chief exponents of Nationalist opinion towards the policy which we were ourselves disposed to advise the British Government to adopt. A prospect, however, now presented itself of clearing up this point of doubt by the Mission coming into direct contact with Zaghlul Pasha.



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



At the end of April Adli Pasha, who commands the universal respect of his countrymen and whose advice had been of the greatest value to us in Egypt, paid a visit to Paris, and at once put himself into communication with Zaghlul Pasha with the object of bringing about a meeting between him and the Mission. Early in May we became aware that, largely owing to Adli Pasha's good offices, Zaghlul Pasha and the Delegation were now disposed to abandon their former attitude and enter into direct relations with the Mission. Accordingly, during the third week in May, Mr. (now Sir Cecil) Hurst, who happened to be in Paris, conveyed to them an invitation to meet the Mission in London. Zaghlul Pasha, having satisfied himself that by so doing he would not compromise his position as the advocate of Egyptian independence, arrived in London on the 7th June. He was accompanied by seven members of the Delegation, who were subsequently joined by one or two of their colleagues.

Then followed a series of conversations which, with frequent interruptions, due to the fact that several of the members of the Mission were now busily engaged in other work, lasted till the middle of August.

These prolonged discussions took a variety of forms. There were a number of meetings at which the Mission, as a body, met Zaghlul Pasha and his companions, Adli Pasha being also present. From time to time, points which it was found difficult to discuss in so large a body were referred to committees consisting of a few members of either party, and these to some extent cleared the ground. Moreover, there was, in the interval between formal meetings, a great deal of useful private discussion between individual members of the Mission and one or more of the Egyptians. It would serve no useful purpose to try and give an account of the many changing phases of this lengthy debate, but it is necessary to indicate its general character.

In the first place, we record with pleasure that very friendly relations were maintained from first to last, and that, even when differences of opinion were sharpest, the controversy was always conducted in an amicable spirit. There was never any doubt in our minds that our visitors were as sincerely anxious as we were ourselves to find a way out of the difficulties of the situation. But they were to some extent hampered—and this is specially true of Zaghlul Pasha himself—by the uncompromising line which they had taken in the recent past, when they believed that there was an unbridgeable gulf between Egyptian aspirations and the policy of Great Britain. They had no doubt come to recognise by this time that they had misunderstood that policy, but it was not easy for them to readjust their position to suit their altered view of British intentions. Over and over again they declared that it was impossible for them to accept some proposal or other made by us, the fairness of which they did not directly dispute, because it was inconsistent with the "mandate" which they had received from the Egyptian people. It was useless to point out to them that the alleged "mandate" was really their own programme, which the Egyptian public had simply accepted from them, and that there was nothing to prevent their modifying a policy of their own creation. The reply always was, that they had no authority to depart from claims which, even if originally put forward by themselves, had been enthusiastically endorsed by a great majority of their countrymen. The war-cries of the past eighteen months were, indeed, a perpetual stumbling-block, and, while in the course of our discussions we were often very near agreement on points of substance, it was always difficult to clothe such agreement in words which did not conflict with formulæ to which the Egyptians felt themselves committed.

The idea of a Treaty between Great Britain and Egypt was readily accepted. That was our starting-point, and without it we should have made little progress. But when it came to discussing those terms of the Treaty which embodied the few, but essential, safeguards for British and foreign interests, the Egyptians were always extremely apprehensive of agreeing to something which might conflict with their ideal of independence. As a matter of fact, our proposals did not conflict with that ideal—reasonably interpreted—as the Egyptians themselves, or at any rate some of them, were ready to admit. But there was always the fear in their minds that their countrymen would not take the same view, and that they would be regarded in Egypt as having betrayed the national cause.

In spite of these difficulties, one obstacle after another was gradually surmounted, and we finally succeeded in drafting the outlines of a settlement with which both parties were more or less satisfied. This result was only achieved by considerable concessions on the part of the Mission. On one point in particular, to



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which we shall presently refer at greater length, we acquiesced in a claim on the part of the Egyptians which we were at first disposed to resist, because we were assured that the admission of that claim would do more than anything else to gratify popular sentiment in Egypt. This concession seemed to us not too high a price to pay if it secured the cordial acceptance of the scheme as a whole by the Egyptian people. Moreover, we were bound to recognise that the delegates also were ready to give up a good deal of what they had originally demanded, in their anxiety to come to a good understanding with the Mission.

The compromise thus reached was one which commended itself to us on its merits subject to one essential condition. That condition was that Zaghlul and his associates would undertake to use all their influence to obtain its acceptance by the people of Egypt, and ultimately to get a Treaty giving effect to it approved by an Egyptian Popular Assembly. This, as it seemed to us, was no more than we had a right to ask of them. We could not, indeed, expect them to promise that their efforts would be successful, any more than we could ourselves promise that our advice would be approved by the British Government and the British people. What we did demand was that they should commit themselves to supporting wholeheartedly the result of our joint efforts. For unless they did this, it was too much to hope that the settlement would be rightly understood, much less cordially welcomed, in Egypt. Yet it would be idle for us, if we could not cherish that hope, to recommend it ourselves as a solution of the Egyptian problem. The British people, we believed, would be quite willing to accord very generous terms to Egypt, but only if they were convinced that those terms would be gratefully accepted and would lead to permanently improved relations and hearty co-operation between them and the Egyptians in the future.

Zaghlul Pasha and his friends were, however, not yet prepared to commit themselves to this extent. They were evidently still nervous of being repudiated by a considerable number of their followers in Egypt. They accordingly kept on suggesting further modifications of the terms so far agreed to, mainly on points of form, with the view of making them more acceptable to Egyptian opinion. But we had now gone as far as we deemed wise in the way of concession. For we, too, as we did not fail to point out, had to reckon with public opinion, and it was no use to agree to anything, with a view of pleasing the Egyptians, which would lead to the rejection of the whole scheme in Great Britain. We seemed, therefore, after all, to have reached an *impasse*.

### B.—*The Memorandum of August* 18, 1920.

At this stage, however, it was suggested on the Egyptian side that the discussion should be temporarily suspended, in order that some members of the Delegation might have time to visit Egypt, to explain to the public of that country the nature of the settlement which the Mission was disposed to recommend, and the great advantages which Egypt would derive from it. If, as they hoped, they met with a favourable reception, this would constitute a "mandate" from the people which would justify the Delegation, on the return of the emissaries, in pledging itself to give our proposals an unconditional support. Zaghlul Pasha himself was not disposed to undertake the journey, but he approved of the idea, and three or four of his companions were willing to go.

This proposal had obvious advantages from the Egyptian point of view. For it would enable the emissaries to advocate the acceptance of certain terms without being absolutely committed to them, and thus running the risk of finding themselves isolated from the bulk of their party in case those terms met with an unfavourable reception. But it had advantages for us also, inasmuch as the general public discussion, which was bound to ensue, would enable us to gauge Egyptian opinion more completely than had yet been possible, and to judge of the comparative strength of moderate and extreme Nationalists. A memorandum was accordingly drawn up—the last of a series of efforts to reduce the result of our discussions to a definite shape—which laid down in general terms the main features of the settlement, which, on the condition already specified, the Mission would be disposed to recommend. The object of the memorandum was to enable the emissaries to elicit an expression of Egyptian public opinion. This document, which presently came to be known as the "Milner-Zaghlul Agreement," but which, on the face of it, was not an agreement, but merely an outline of the bases on which an agreement might subsequently be framed, was handed by Lord Milner to Adli Pasha, who, as an intermediary between the two parties, had had a large share in all our negotiations, to be communicated by



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



him to Zaghlul Pasha and his friends. It was understood that they might make free use of it in public discussion in Egypt. It was dated the 18th August and was in the following terms :—

" The accompanying memorandum is the result of conversations held in London in June to August 1920 between Lord Milner and the members of the Special Mission to Egypt, and Zaghlul Pasha and the members of the Egyptian Delegation, in which conversations Adli Pasha also took part. It outlines a policy for the settlement of the Egyptian question in the best interests both of Great Britain and Egypt.

" The members of the Mission are prepared to recommend the British Government to adopt the policy indicated in the memorandum, if they are satisfied that Zaghlul Pasha and the Delegation are likewise prepared to advocate it, and will use all their influence to obtain the assent of an Egyptian National Assembly to the conclusion of such a Treaty as is contemplated in Articles 3 and 4.

" It is clear that unless both parties are cordially united in supporting it, the policy here suggested cannot be pursued with success.

(Signed) MILNER.

*Memorandum.*

"1. In order to establish the independence of Egypt on a secure and lasting basis, it is necessary that the relations between Great Britain and Egypt should be precisely defined, and the privileges and immunities now enjoyed in Egypt by the capitulatory Powers should be modified and rendered less injurious to the interests of the country.

" 2. These ends cannot be achieved without further negotiations between accredited representatives of the British and Egyptian Governments respectively in the one case, and betwen the British Government and the Governments of the capitulatory Powers in the other case. Such negotiations will be directed to arriving at definite agreements on the following lines :—

" 3.—(i.) As between Egypt and Great Britain a Treaty will be entered into, under which Great Britain will recognise the independence of Egypt as a constitutional monarchy with representative institutions, and Egypt will confer upon Great Britain such rights as are necessary to safeguard her special interests and to enable her to furnish the guarantees which must be given to foreign Powers to secure the relinquishment of their capitulatory rights.

(ii.) By the same Treaty, an alliance will be concluded between Great Britain and Egypt, by which Great Britain will undertake to support Egypt in defending the integrity of her territory, and Egypt will undertake, in case of war, even when the integrity of Egypt is not affected, to render to Great Britain all the assistance in her power, within her own borders, including the use of her harbours, aerodromes and means of communication for military purposes.

" 4. This Treaty will embody stipulations to the following effect :—

(i.) Egypt will enjoy the right to representation in foreign countries. In the absence of any duly-accredited Egyptian representative, the Egyptian Government will confide its interests to the care of the British representative. Egypt will undertake not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or will create difficulties for Great Britain, and will also undertake not to enter into any agreement with a foreign Power which is prejudicial to British interests.

(ii.) Egypt will confer on Great Britain the right to maintain a military force on Egyptian soil for the protection of her Imperial communications. The Treaty will fix the place where the force shall be quartered and will regulate any subsidiary matters which require to be arranged. The presence of this force shall not constitute in any manner a military occupation of the country, or prejudice the rights of the Government of Egypt.

(iii.) Egypt will appoint, in concurrence with His Majesty's Government, a Financial Adviser, to whom shall be entrusted in due course the powers at present exercised by the Commissioners of the Debt, and who will be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for all other matters on which they may desire to consult him.



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



(iv.) Egypt will appoint, in concurrence with His Majesty's Government, an official in the Ministry of Justice, who shall enjoy the right of access to the Minister. He shall be kept fully informed on all matters connected with the administration of the law as affecting foreigners, and will also be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for consultation on any matter connected with the efficient maintenance of law and order.

(v.) In view of the contemplated transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights hitherto exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments, Egypt recognises the right of Great Britain to intervene, through her representative in Egypt, to prevent the application to foreigners of any Egyptian law now requiring foreign consent, and Great Britain on her side undertakes not to exercise this right except in the case of laws operating inequitably against foreigners.

"*Alternative:*—

In view of the contemplated transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights hitherto exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments, Egypt recognises the right of Great Britain to intervene, through her representative in Egypt, to prevent the application to foreigners of any Egyptian law now requiring foreign consent, and Great Britain on her side undertakes not to exercise this right except in the case of laws inequitably discriminating against foreigners in the matter of taxation, or inconsistent with the principles of legislation common to all the capitulatory Powers.

(vi.) On account of the special relations between Great Britain and Egypt created by the Alliance, the British representative will be accorded an exceptional position in Egypt and will be entitled to precedence over all other representatives.

(vii.) The engagements of British and other foreign officers and administrative officials who entered into the service of the Egyptian Government before the coming into force of the Treaty may be terminated, at the instance of either the officials themselves or the Egyptian Government, at any time within two years after the coming into force of the Treaty. The pension or compensation to be accorded to officials retiring under this provision, in addition to that provided by the existing law, shall be determined by the Treaty. In cases where no advantage is taken of this arrangement existing terms of service will remain unaffected.

"5. This Treaty will be submitted to the approval of a Constituent Assembly, but it will not come into force until after the agreements with foreign Powers for the closing of their Consular Courts and the decrees for the reorganisation of the Mixed Tribunals have come into operation.

"6. This Constituent Assembly will also be charged with the duty of framing a new Organic Statute, in accordance with the provisions of which the Government of Egypt will in future be conducted. This Statute will embody provisions for the Ministers being responsible to the Legislature. It will also provide for religious toleration for all persons and for the due protection of the rights of foreigners.

"7. The necessary modifications in the régime of the Capitulations will be secured by agreements to be concluded by Great Britain with the various capitulatory Powers. These agreements will provide for the closing of the foreign Consular Courts, so as to render possible the reorganisation and extension of the jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals and the application to all foreigners in Egypt of the legislation (including legislation imposing taxation) enacted by the Egyptian Legislature.

"8. These agreements will provide for the transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights previously exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments. They will also contain stipulations to the following effect:—

(*a.*) No attempt will be made to discriminate against the nationals of a Power which agrees to close its Consular Courts, and such nationals shall enjoy in Egypt the same treatment as British subjects.

(*b.*) The Egyptian Nationality Law will be founded on the *jus sanguinis*, so that the children born in Egypt of a foreigner will enjoy the nationality of their father, and will not be claimed as Egyptian subjects.





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(*c.*) Consular officers of the foreign Powers shall be accorded by Egypt the same status as foreign Consuls enjoy in England.

(*d.*) Existing Treaties and Conventions to which Egypt is a party on matters of commerce and navigation, including postal and telegraphic Conventions, will remain in force. Pending the conclusion of special agreements to which she is a party, Egypt will apply the Treaties in force between Great Britain and the foreign Power concerned on questions affected by the closing of the Consular Courts, such as extradition Treaties, Treaties for the surrender of seamen deserters, &c., as also Treaties of a political nature, whether multilateral or bilateral, *e.g.*, arbitration Conventions and the various Conventions relating to the conduct of hostilities.

(*e.*) The liberty to maintain schools and to teach the language of the foreign country concerned will be guaranteed, provided that such schools are subject in all respects to the laws applicable generally to European schools in Egypt.

(*f.*) The liberty to maintain or organise religious and charitable foundations, such as hospitals, &c., will also be guaranteed.

"The Treaties will also provide for the necessary changes in the Commission of the Debt and the elimination of the international element in the Alexandria Board of Health.

"9. The legislation rendered necessary by the aforesaid agreements between Great Britain and the foreign Powers, will be effected by decrees to be issued by the Egyptian Government.

"A decree shall be enacted at the same time validating all measures, legislative, administrative or judicial, taken under Martial Law.

"10. The decrees for the reorganisation of the Mixed Tribunals will provide for conferring upon these Tribunals all jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the foreign Consular Courts, while leaving the jurisdiction of the Native Courts untouched.

"11. After the coming into force of the Treaty referred to in Article 3, Great Britain will communicate its terms to foreign Powers and will support an application by Egypt for admission as a member of the League of Nations.

"*August* 18, 1920."

## C.—*The Policy of the Memorandum.*

### 1. *Representation of Egypt in Foreign Countries.*

The policy of the above document in its general character is in accordance with the conclusions at which, for the reasons already given, we had arrived before leaving Egypt. But, as a result of our discussions with Zaghlul Pasha and his associates, we were now prepared to go somewhat further. The most important point on which we were led by their arguments to modify our earlier view is one to which the memorandum gives especial prominence, viz., the right of Egypt to appoint her own representatives in foreign countries. It has always been, and is, from our point of view, a fundamental principle that the foreign relations of Egypt should be under the general direction of Great Britain. All reasonable Egyptians, however strongly Nationalist, recognise the immense value of the security which an alliance with Great Britain would afford them. But it is obviously impossible to expect that Great Britian should shoulder the responsibility of defending the integrity and independence of Egypt against all possible dangers, if that country were free to pursue a policy of her own in foreign affairs inconsistent with or prejudicial to the policy of Great Britain. This axiom none of the Egyptians with whom we were dealing ever attempted to dispute. They were quite prepared—in a Treaty of Alliance—to give whatever pledges might be necessary to exclude the possibility of any action on the part of Egypt which could cause embarrassment to her great ally. There was, indeed, no difference of opinion on this point in the course of our discussions, and the words of the memorandum dealing with it appear to us to make the complete understanding which existed with regard to the subject sufficiently clear. For in this, as in other respects, it must always be borne in mind, that in drawing up the memorandum, we were not attempting to draft a Treaty but simply to express in ordinary language the ideas which a Treaty, to be subsequently



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negotiated, would express with much more detail and in terms of greater precision.

The real issue here was not whether Egypt should be free to follow a foreign policy independent of Great Britain—the impossibility of our assenting to this was not disputed—but whether this principle necessarily involved the conduct of all her foreign relations remaining in British hands.

This was a question upon which we had already, before discussing it with the Egyptians at all, come to a very definite conclusion. In our opinion British control should be limited to Egypt's political relations. Egyptian commercial or other interests of a non-political character in foreign countries had better be left in Egyptian hands. These interests are numerous and growing. The development of commerce and communications, the rapidly increasing number of Egyptians who now travel or reside abroad, especially in Western Europe, and the multifarious connections which they form there constitute a need for a certain amount of official protection. If the duty of looking after all Egyptian private interests abroad is to continue to fall upon British diplomatic and consular agents, it will become an excessive burden. And the inevitable failure to discharge that duty to the satisfaction of the Egyptians will be a constant source of grievance. For these reasons it seemed to us from the first to be eminently desirable that Egypt should appoint representatives of her own in foreign countries.

But what we originally contemplated was that these Egyptian representatives should have only consular and not diplomatic status. It was on this point that during our discussions in London we came, not without hesitation, to adopt a different view. The Egyptians were all absolutely unanimous in maintaining that the denial of diplomatic status to the representatives of Egypt vitiated the idea of an Alliance and would make the settlement we were contemplating entirely unacceptable to their countrymen. And in this assertion we believed them to be justified. For, even while in Egypt, we had realised that all Egyptians, including the Sultan and his Ministers, however much they were divided on other questions, were united in their desire for the diplomatic representation of their country abroad. It was a sore point with all of them that, when declaring the Protectorate, we had dispensed with an Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs and placed the Egyptian Foreign Office, with which it was found impossible to dispense, under the High Commissioner. The hope was universal that, when the time came to put the relations of Great Britain and Egypt on a permanent footing, we should allow the Ministry for Foreign Affairs once more to have an Egyptian chief and foreign representatives, as of old, to be directly accredited to the ruler of Egypt. And on the same principle it was hoped that, now that Turkish suzerainty had disappeared, Egyptian representatives in those foreign countries to which it might be necessary to send them would enjoy a similar status to that of foreign representatives in Egypt.

In this matter, therefore, we could have no doubt that the Egyptian delegates were speaking for all their countrymen. And indeed they were most emphatic in declaring that, unless we could meet them on this point, there was no prospect of settling the future relations between Great Britain and Egypt by the method of agreement. On the other hand this recognition of the status of Egypt would, as they affirmed, be so great a satisfaction to national pride that it would make the acceptance of all our other conditions easy. And what, they asked, were we afraid of? We recognised that Egypt had many interests of her own in foreign countries, which could best be looked after by Egyptians. There was no advantage to Great Britain in withholding from the men entrusted with the care of those interests the dignity of diplomatic status. For they could not take any action injurious to British interests or conflicting with British policy, without breaking the Treaty, which, as had already been agreed between us, was to be so drafted as to preclude the possibility of such action. Moreover, the number of Egypt's diplomatic representatives abroad would be very limited. Egypt did not desire, and could not afford, to have such representatives in more than a few countries. The fact that everywhere else Egyptian interests would be entrusted to the care of Great Britain marked the specially intimate character of the relations between the two countries.

We could not but feel that these were weighty considerations. At the same time it was evident, as we strongly insisted, that the presence of Egyptian diplomatists, even in a few European capitals, and of foreign diplomatists in Cairo, would afford opportunities for intrigue, which might lead to much trouble. The very fact that these diplomatists would, in the political sphere, have really nothing to do might tempt them to justify their existence by transgressing their proper functions. But the delegates would not admit that there was any real danger of this happening.







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Their view was that, satisfied with the position acquired by Egypt under the Treaty, the Egyptians would be the last to favour intrigues, which might give other foreign nations an opportunity of interfering in their country by first making mischief between them and Great Britain. The greatest safeguard which we could have against such machinations was the fact that the Egyptians themselves would be whole-heartedly in favour of an Alliance which fully recognised their national status and dignity.

Such were the arguments which led us to reconsider our position on the question of diplomatic status. In so doing we were well aware, and we frankly told the delegates, that this was a concession which might alarm public opinion in this country and imperil the acceptance of the agreement as a whole by the British people. And, judging from the unfavourable comments which this proposal has already excited in many quarters, it is evident that we were not mistaken in anticipating that it would meet with serious opposition. Nevertheless, we remain of opinion that the balance of argument is decisively in its favour. So long as bitterness and friction continue to exist between Great Britain and Egypt, we shall always be exposed to the hostility of Egyptians in foreign countries. Associations for the purpose of anti-British propaganda have been actively at work for a number of years in Switzerland, France, Germany and Italy. There is no remedy for this, except in restoring friendly relations and we rely on the whole policy here proposed to have this effect. If that result is achieved there will, in our opinion, be positive advantages in giving diplomatic status to Egyptian representatives abroad. For if, as is only to be expected, a certain number of irreconcilables are still left to carry on the campaign against Great Britain, the official representatives of Egypt will be bound to try to restrain them. No Egyptian Minister could do otherwise than discountenance activities on the part of his own countrymen, directed against Egypt's ally, without failing in his duty and rendering himself liable to be recalled.

2. *The Defence of Imperial Communications.*

The supreme importance which the delegates attached to the question of national status was once more strongly in evidence when we came to deal with Great Britain's strategic interest in Egypt—the protection of her Imperial communications. To Great Britain—as an ally—they thought that Egypt could, without indignity, accord a base in Egyptian territory, "a strong place of arms," a *point d'appui* in the chain of her Imperial defences, linking East and West. They were not averse from the idea that Great Britain, in case of war, should have the command of Egyptian resources, and especially of all means of communication, railways, aerodromes, &c., for the conduct of military operations. Such a stipulation was even welcome as emphasising the "bilateral" character of the agreement between the two countries, inasmuch as Egypt would be giving something in exchange for what she got. As by a Treaty of Alliance, Great Britain would be undertaking to defend Egypt, it was only fair that Egypt should do something to assist the British Empire, if Great Britain was engaged in a war, even a war in which Egypt was not directly interested.

A more difficult point was the maintenance of a British military force in Egypt in time of peace. But here again it was not so much the numbers of the force in question which interested the Egyptians as its character. As long as it was not there as an "Army of Occupation," as a force intended to "keep order" in Egypt, which was merely another way of saying to keep Egypt in subjection, but was maintained for an external object, the defence of the British Empire, the presence of a British force in Egypt was justifiable from their point of view. The question of the strength of that force was never raised in the course of the discussion. It was recognised that this depended on external conditions and, apart from what would be necessary if Egypt was herself in danger, might vary with the varying exigencies of Imperial defence. The great point was, that it should not be regarded in any sense as a garrison of Egypt. The maintenance of internal order was a matter for the Egyptians themselves.

In order to emphasise this aspect of the case the delegates urged very strongly, that the force in question should be stationed on the bank of the Suez Canal and preferably on its eastern side. But to this it was quite impossible for us to agree. For, in the first place, the presence of British troops in the neutral "canal zone" would be calculated to raise trouble with other Powers interested in that international waterway. The neutrality of the canal is guaranteed by international agreements and the permanent occupation of the canal zone by troops of any single Power might be challenged as a breach of that neutrality. Moreover, Great Britain's strategic



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interest in Egypt is not limited to securing a free passage through the Suez Canal. "The defence of her Imperial communications" involves much more than that. For Egypt is becoming more and more a "nodal point" in the complex of those communications by land and air as well as by sea. In face of these considerations, the idea of fixing Kantara, or some other spot in the canal zone, as the site of a cantonment had to be abandoned and, the principle of the maintenance of a British military force in Egypt having been admitted, the question where that force should be stationed was left open—to be settled, with other details, in the official negotiations for the conclusion of the contemplated Treaty.

3. *The British Officials in the Egyptian Service.*

The seventh clause of Article IV of the memorandum deal with the position of British officials in the Egyptian service. This is a matter of supreme importance to the good government of Egypt. The whole system of internal administration as it exists to-day, has been mainly built up by the work and example of British officials, many of whom have spent the best part of their lives in the country. The immediate elimination of the British element would bring the whole fabric down in ruins. Even an over-hasty reduction of that element would threaten its stability, and greatly impair the efficient conduct of public business.

It is not indeed to be feared that, with the retirement of the British officials, the country would relapse into the state of maladministration, from which we have delivered it, and that all the old evils would return. The number of Egyptians qualified by education and character to take part in the work of government on civilised principles has greatly increased since the occupation. All the Egyptians, even the humblest, have become so habituated to the new standard of orderly, equitable and honest administration, that a complete return to the abuses of the past would not be tolerated. Nevertheless, the "new model" would certainly be exposed to danger of serious deterioration, if the men who have built it up and are still its mainstay were to be suddenly withdrawn.

Thus it is only natural that the proposal to leave a purely Egyptian Government entirely free to retain or not to retain British or other foreign officials in the Civil Service should be at first sight regarded with considerable uneasiness. But a calm consideration of the practical aspects of the case is calculated greatly to allay these misgivings. The idea of any Egyptian Government, however free to do so, attempting to make a clean sweep of its foreign officials is a chimera. One has only to picture the plight of such a Government, suddenly deprived of its most experienced and responsible advisers and confronted with the general unpopularity which the consequent administrative breakdown would entail, to realise that no sane men would deliberately plunge into such a sea of trouble. And it is not only Egyptian disapproval which would have to be reckoned with, but the anger and alarm of the foreign residents. The large and wealthy foreign Colonies, on which the economic welfare of Egypt so greatly depends, would at once be up in arms. For these have all come to regard the presence of a British nucleus in the administration as the sheet-anchor of their own safety and prosperity. Nor is it to be anticipated that the High Commissioner—or whatever the British representative may in future be called—would not have a word to say in the matter. True, he will, *ex hypothesi*, have no right to dictate to the Egyptian Government. But as the representative of Egypt's ally, as the foremost foreigner in Egypt, and the guardian of foreign interests, he will still carry great weight, and it will always be a matter of interest to Egyptian Ministers to be on good terms with him. The influences which would militate against the abuse by these Ministers of the right to dispense with the services of British officials are thus immensely strong. And at the same time the great satisfaction which they would feel at knowing that they had that right, and that the British officials were really there to assist and not to dictate, would make them more and and not less ready to rely on British help.

For no sensible Egyptian seriously wishes to dispense with foreign aid in the government of his country, or believes that Egypt could, for a long time to come at any rate, afford to do without it. Egyptians generally no doubt think, and they are right in thinking, that the importation of British officials has sometimes, especially of late years, been overdone. They hold firmly to the principle that no Englishman or other foreigner should be appointed to any post for which a reasonably competent man of their own race can be found. They look forward to the time when the whole or almost the whole of the public service will be staffed by their fellow-countrymen. They feel that progress in that direction has been unduly slow and would like to see





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it sensibly accelerated. But they certainly do not wish to get rid of those British officials—and there are a goodly number of them—whom they really respect, or to be precluded from engaging others of equal competence in the service of their country in the future.*

The danger lies rather in the opposite direction. There may be a stampede of British and other foreign officials, scared by the prospect of finding themselves at the mercy of a purely Egyptian Government. That would be a grave misfortune, but it seems to us very improbable that such an exodus will ever assume large dimensions. In the first place, there are in many branches of the Public Service, such as ports, railways, customs, public works, &c., a considerable number of Englishmen and other Europeans, who are employed as experts for lack of Egyptians possessing the necessary technical skill. These men are not likely to feel their position in any way affected by a change in the political status of Egypt. It is rather those occupying genuinely administrative posts, and having authority over large bodies of Egyptians, who are likely to fear this change. Will Egyptian Ministers, they may ask themselves, still support them in the exercise of that authority? Will it still be possible to carry on the perpetual struggle against corruption and nepotism, and for promotion by merit and not by influence, with any measure of success? Such fears are not unnatural, and they may lead some of the men in question to prefer retirement. But there are others who will feel more confidence in themselves and in the essential strength of their future position. For they will not be, like the handful of Europeans who, before the occupation, fought an uphill battle for decent administration in an unreformed Egypt, and even under those depressing conditions were not without influence and certainly were not treated with any personal disregard. The British officials who remain in Egypt to-day will be in a country which is permeated by European influences, which has now grown used to British methods of government and which will remain in contact on its borders with concrete evidences of British power. Moreover, the recognition of Egyptian independence will remove one great obstacle to their present usefulness. The growing prejudice against imported officials, which threatens, if unchecked, to put an end to all hearty co-operation between them and their Egyptian fellows, is

*We took considerable pains to discover the truth about the number of foreign officials in the Egyptian Service. Returns were prepared for us by the Statistical Department, showing the distribution of all posts in the 1919-1920 Budget, while a comparative statement was called for from each Ministry, showing the distribution of pensionable and contract posts in the years 1905, 1910, 1914 and 1920.

In the returns submitted by the Statistical Department, posts are described as "pensionable," "contract," "monthly paid" and "daily paid." In the two latter classes 98½ per cent. of the posts are occupied by Egyptians. So in this category foreign competition is evidently not excessive.

An examination of the pensionable and contract posts, however, revealed a different state of affairs. Omitting the seven ministerial posts, the staff of the Sultan's Cabinet, the Council of Ministers, the Legislative Assembly and the Ministry of Wakfs, in which, with one or two exceptions, the posts are held exclusively by Egyptians, Egyptians hold 86 per cent. of the posts in the administration and draw 71 per cent. of the salaries, while the British hold 6 per cent. of the posts and draw 19 per cent. of the salaries, others (viz., non-Egyptian and non-British) holding 8 per cent. of the posts and drawing 10 per cent. of the salaries. In some statistical diagrams which were prepared to show the distribution of these posts and salaries among the different Ministries, the posts are divided into six classes. The first three classes range from the lowest salaries to £E. 799 per annum, and may be described as "Lower Posts;" the other three classes cover "Higher Posts," and include salaries of £E. 800 to £E. 2,999.

Among the lower posts, Egyptians hold roughly two-thirds of those between £E. 240 and £E. 499; but after that the Egyptian share declines to little more than one-third of the posts between £E. 500 and £E. 799. In the higher posts the disparity is even more marked and the Egyptian share does not amount to one-quarter. It is true that in the £E. 1,200-£E. 1,499 class, the Egyptian share rises to over one-third, but this can be traced to the Ministries of Interior and Justice, which provide Egyptian Mudirs (Provincial Governors) and Judges. In the higher posts of the Ministries of Finance, Education, Public Works, Agriculture and Communications, however, there are only 31 Egyptians, as against 168 British and 32 "others" holding posts over £E. 800. Doubtless in these particular Ministries there are many higher posts requiring special technical qualifications which it is impossible at the moment to find Egyptians qualified to fill. If, however, Egyptians are to be responsible for the internal administration of their country, it is essential that better provision should be made for training them to occupy such higher posts.

As far as the comparative tables showing the distribution of pensionable and contract posts in 1905, 1910, 1914 and 1920 are concerned, owing to the imperfect state of the records the figures can only be regarded as approximate. They suffice, however, to give a general impression of the turnover in personnel. In the total of posts the Egyptian element has grown from 45·1 per cent. in 1905 to 50·5 per cent. in 1920. Egyptians in lower posts have also increased from 48·4 per cent. of the total in 1905 to 55 per cent in 1920. But in the higher posts their number has declined from 27·7 per cent. in 1905 to only 23·1 per cent. in 1920, while in the same category the British share of posts has increased from 42·2 per cent. to 59·3 per cent. of the total.



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not due to the men but to the system. It is because they are, or can be represented to be, imposed upon Egypt against her will, as the agents and symbols of foreign domination, that hostility to them is easily excited. The grounds for such hostility will disappear when they can no longer be regarded as instruments of a foreign government, and their efforts to maintain efficiency will then have an increased amount of native support. For, as individuals, British administrators and the British officers in the Egyptian army are not unpopular. The best of them not only command the respect, but win the affection, of a people who are very quick to recognise capacity, especially when it is combined with graciousness and tact Given time for reflection—and it is certain that nothing will be done in a hurry—it is likely that these considerations will determine many Englishmen in the Egyptian service to stick to their posts. And indeed Englishmen could perform no more honourable service than in establishing a friendly partnership between Great Britain and Egypt and assisting Egyptians to make a success of self-governing institutions.

But while any general or rapid displacement of the British and other foreign officials is not to be anticipated, it is nevertheless desirable to make careful provision for those, with whose services the Egyptian Government may wish to dispense or who may themselves wish to retire, when the new system comes into force. Such men must be treated not only with fairness, but with generosity. For nothing could have a worse effect upon Anglo-Egyptian relations in the future than that a number of former officials should be left with a sense of grievance. In any Treaty between Great Britain and Egypt their position will have to be absolutely safeguarded, and the conditions of retirement carefully laid down after consultation with representatives of those concerned. Under the existing law Egyptian officials, who are retired by the Government for reasons other than misconduct, receive pensions on a not ungenerous scale proportionate to their length of service. No new arrangement can infringe existing rights. But it is evidently necessary, in view of the altered circumstances, to make special provision for those whose careers may be prematurely cut short. And it is quite essential that men who under the new system retire of their own accord, should receive the same favourable treatment as those with whose services the Egyptian Government may choose to dispense. In ordinary circumstances a man voluntarily resigning a public post before the normal time for his retirement does so at a certain sacrifice. But this principle does not apply where the conditions of service are essentially altered. In that case the official should have the right to choose, whether he will or will not go on serving under the new conditions, and if he prefers to retire, should be entitled to do so on the same terms as if his retirement had been compulsory.

4. *Reservations for the Protection of Foreigners.*

To the general principle that the Egyptian Government should in future be free to determine for itself what posts are to be filled by non-Egyptians, the memorandum in Article IV, §§ 3 and 4, makes two exceptions. According to these clauses, a Financial Adviser and an official in the Ministry of Justice, whose special function will be to watch the administration of the law as it affects foreigners, are still to be appointed "in concurrence with His Majesty's Government." It may be asked, in view of what has already been said on this subject, why it was thought necessary to make these exceptions. The answer is to be found in the special responsibilities which under the proposed settlement Great Britain would assume for the protection of foreign rights.

The two points of supreme interest to the foreign Powers whose nationals at present enjoy special privileges under the Capitulations are the solvency of Egypt, which is not only of importance to the bondholders but indirectly affects all foreign capital and enterprise in the country, and the safety of the lives and property of foreigners. To ensure these objects the Powers will certainly continue to insist on the maintenance of some measure of foreign control. They have come to acquiesce in the exercise of that control by Great Britain. But if Great Britain ceased to exercise it, they would demand that some other Power or group of Powers should take her place.

It is, however, a fundamental principle of the contemplated settlement that any powers, which may still be necessary to safeguard foreign interests in Egypt and to assure foreign Governments that the rights of their nationals will be respected, shall be vested in Great Britain. This is the reason for the stipulation that the two high officials already referred to should continue to be appointed with the concurrence of the British Government—the duty of the one being to ensure solvency, that of the



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other to watch the administration of the laws as affecting foreigners. The functions of these officials are only described in general terms in the memorandum, and the scope of their authority will have to be very carefully defined in drafting the Treaty. Here again we had to content ourselves with agreement in principle and to leave details to be settled in future negotiations.

The same applies to the clause (IV, § 7) which gives the British representative in Egypt the right, in certain cases, to prevent the application of Egyptian laws to foreigners. This proposal was much discussed. The delegates were very anxious to avoid this right being converted into a general veto on Egyptian legislation. We, on our side, did not desire this. But the exact limits of the right were difficult to agree upon, and for this reason alternative solutions are suggested in the memorandum. The subject, indeed, is extremely complicated. But, stripped of technicalities, what it all comes to is this. The Egyptian Government is hampered at every turn by its inability to make laws applicable to the subjects of foreign Powers which have capitulatory rights in Egypt without the consent of those Powers, though that consent may in some cases be given on their behalf by the General Assembly of the Mixed Tribunals. As already explained, it has always been the aim of British policy, and it is part of the scheme contemplated in the memorandum, greatly to diminish the restrictions thus imposed on the legislative authority of the Egyptian Government. But it would be practically impossible, and it is not proposed, to remove these restrictions altogether. In so far as they are maintained, somebody must have the right to exercise them. In the scheme embodied in the memorandum it is contemplated that that right, intended as it is to safeguard the legitimate interests of all foreigners, should be conferred by Egypt on a single Power—Great Britain.

### D.—*The Sudan.*

The scheme embodied in the memorandum deals only with Egypt. It has no application to the Sudan, a country entirely distinct from Egypt in its character and constitution, the status of which is not, like that of Egypt, still indeterminate, but has been clearly defined by the Anglo-Egyptian Convention of the 19th January, 1899.* For that reason the subject of the Sudan was deliberately excluded from all our discussions with the delegates. This was all along clearly understood by them, but, in order to prevent any misunderstanding in Egypt of the scope of our discussions, Lord Milner, when transmitting the memorandum to Adli Pasha, also handed him the following letter :—

"My dear Pasha, *August* 18, 1920.

"Referring to our conversation of yesterday, I should like once more to repeat that no part of the memorandum which I am now sending you is intended to have any application to the Sudan. This is, I think, evident on the face of the document, but, to avoid any possibility of future misunderstanding, it seems desirable to place on record the view of the Mission that the subject of the Sudan, which has never been discussed between us and Zaghlul Pasha and his friends, lies quite outside the scope of the proposed agreement with regard to Egypt. There is a wide difference of conditions between the two countries, and in our opinion they must be dealt with on different lines.

"The Sudan has made great progress under its existing administration, which is based on the provisions of the Convention of 1899, and no change in the political status of Egypt should be allowed to disturb the further development of the Sudan on a system which has been productive of such good results.

"On the other hand, we fully realise the vital interest of Egypt in the supply of water reaching her through the Sudan, and we intend to make proposals calculated

*This Convention, which was signed by the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Lord Cromer, laid it down that Great Britain was "by right of conquest" entitled "to share in the settlement and future working and development" of the Sudan. By the acceptance of this principle any claim of Turkey to suzerainty over the Sudan was disallowed, and that country was definitely excluded from the area subject to the régime of the Capitulations. It was accordingly provided in the Convention that the jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals should "not extend to or be recognised in any part of the Sudan," and that no foreign consuls should reside in the country without the consent of the British Government. The supreme military and civil power was to be vested in the person of a "Governor-General," who would be appointed on the recommendation of the British Government by a decree of the Khedive of Egypt, and whose proclamations would have the force of law.



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



to remove any anxiety which Egypt may feel as to the adequacy of that supply both for her actual and her prospective needs.

(Signed) "MILNER."

"His Excellency Adli Yeghen Pasha."

At this point it may be convenient that we should briefly state the reasons which, in our opinion, make it wholly impossible to contemplate, in the case of the Sudan, a settlement on the lines proposed for Egypt, indicating at the same time the general line of policy which appears most suitable to the present requirements of the former country.

While the great majority of the people of Egypt are comparatively homogeneous, the Sudan is divided between Arabs and Negroids, and within each of these two great racial groups there are a number of races and tribes differing widely from one another and often mutually antagonistic. The Arabs of the Sudan speak dialects of the same language as the people of Egypt and are united to them by the bond of religion. Islam, moreover, is spreading even among the non-Arab races of the Sudan. These influences mitigate in various degrees, but they have not overcome the antagonism of the two countries, which rankling memories of Egyptian misgovernment in the past have done much to intensify.

The political bonds which have at intervals in the past united Egypt with the Sudan have always been fragile. Egyptian conquerors have at various times overrun parts and even the whole of the Sudan. But it has never been really subdued by, or in any sense amalgamated with, Egypt. The Egyptian conquest of the Sudan in the last century was especially disastrous to both countries, and ended in the complete overthrow of Egyptian authority in the early eighties by the Mahdist rebellion. For more than ten years no vestige of Egyptian authority was left in the Sudan except in a small district surrounding Suakin. As a consequence of this breakdown, Great Britain was obliged to undertake several costly expeditions for the rescue of the Egyptian garrisons and the defence of Egypt, which was in danger of being overrun by the Mahdist hordes.

Since the conquest of the country by British and Egyptian forces under British leadership in 1896–8, the Government of the Sudan, which under the Convention of 1899 takes the form of an Anglo-Egyptian Protectorate, has been virtually in British hands. The Governor-General, though appointed by the Sultan (formerly the Khedive) of Egypt, is nominated by the British Government, and all the Governors of Provinces and principal officials are British. Under this system of government the progress of the Sudan in all respects, material and moral, has been remarkable. When full allowance is made for the simplicity of the problem, viz., the introduction of the first principles of orderly and civilised government among a very primitive people, the great success actually achieved during the long Governor-Generalship of Sir R. Wingate is one of the brightest pages in the history of British rule over backward races. The present administration is popular in the Sudan and, with few exceptions, peaceful and progressive conditions prevail throughout the country.

But while Egypt and the Sudan are essentially distinct countries, and are bound to develop on very different lines, Egypt will always have one interest of supreme importance in the Sudan. The Nile, upon which the very existence of Egypt depends, flows for hundreds of miles through the Sudan, and it is vital to Egypt to prevent any such diversion of water from the Nile as might diminish her present cultivable area or preclude the reclamation of that portion of her soil, some 2,000,000 acres in extent, which is capable of being brought under cultivation, when, by means of storage, the present supply of water available for irrigation has been increased. Hitherto the amount of water drawn from the Nile in its passage through the Sudan has been of negligible amount, but as the population of the Sudan increases that country will require more water for its own development, and a conflict of interest between it and Egypt might arise. At the same time there is every reason to hope that, properly conserved and distributed, the Nile waters will suffice for all the lands, whether in Egypt or the Sudan, which are ever likely to require irrigation. The control of the waters of the Nile for purposes of irrigation is a matter of such paramount importance and the technical and other problems involved are so difficult and intricate that it is, in our opinion, necessary to set up a permanent Commission, composed on the one hand of experts of the highest authority and on the other hand of representatives of all the countries affected—Egypt, the Sudan and Uganda—to settle all questions affecting the regulation of the river and to ensure the fair distribution of the water.

The contiguity of Egypt and the Sudan and their common interest in the Nile make it desirable that some political nexus between the two countries should always

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



be maintained, but it is out of the question that this connection should take the form of the subjection of the Sudan to Egypt. The former country is capable of and entitled to independent development in accordance with its own character and requirements. It is much too early to attempt to determine its ultimate political status. For present purposes that status is sufficiently defined by the Convention of 1899 between Great Britain and Egypt, which provides for the necessary political connection between Egypt and the Sudan without hampering the independent development of the latter country.

Though it is absolutely necessary for the present to maintain a single supreme authority over the whole of the Sudan, it is not desirable that the government of that country should be highly centralised. Having regard to its vast extent and the varied character of its inhabitants, the administration of its different parts should be left, as far as possible, in the hands of the native authorities, wherever they exist, under British supervision. A centralised bureaucracy is wholly unsuitable for the Sudan. Decentralisation and the employment, wherever possible, of native agencies for the simple administrative needs of the country, in its present stage of development, would make both for economy and efficiency. At the present time the officials of local origin are still largely outnumbered by those introduced from Egypt, with whom service in the Sudan is by no means popular. This difficulty will be overcome as education progresses and a greater number of Sudanese themselves become capable of filling official posts. At the same time care should be taken, in the matter of education, not to repeat the mistake which has been made in Egypt of introducing a system which fits pupils for little else than employment in clerical and minor administrative posts, and creates an overgrown body of aspirants to Government employment. There is no room in the Sudan for a host of petty officials, and education should be directed to giving the Sudanese a capacity and a taste for employment in other directions, such as agriculture, industry, commerce and engineering. The immediate need of the country is material development, and it can do without an elaborate administrative system.

The military forces still employed in the Sudan are very large. A large army was, no doubt, required to complete the conquest and pacification of the country, but the time has come when, in our opinion, the question of the number and organisation of its military forces should be reconsidered, and the financial burden upon Egypt which the maintenance of that force involves be reduced. Hitherto, the Governor-Generalship of the Sudan and the Command-in-Chief of the Egyptian army have been united in one person. There were good reasons for this in the past, but it is indefensible as a permanent arrangement. At the first convenient opportunity a civil Governor-General should be appointed.

In general it should be the aim of British policy to relieve Egypt from any financial responsibility for the Sudan and to establish the relations of the two countries for the future upon a basis which will secure the independent development of the Sudan while safeguarding the vital interests of Egypt in the waters of the Nile.

Egypt has an indefeasible right to an ample and assured supply of water for the land at present under cultivation and to a fair share of any increased supply which engineering skill may be able to provide. A formal declaration on the part of Great Britain that she recognises this right and is resolved under all circumstances to uphold it would go far to allay the uneasiness which prevails in Egypt on this subject. We are of opinion that such a declaration might with advantage be made at the present time.

E.—*Visit of Egyptian delegates to Egypt.*

At the close of the discussions which resulted in the memorandum of the 18th August, Zaghlul Pasha and the other delegates as well as Adli Pasha left London for France. Four of the Delegation (Mohammed Pasha Mahmud, Ahmed Lutfi Bey el Said, Abdel Latif Bey el Mukabati, and Ali Bey Maher) proceeded immediately to Egypt in accordance with the understanding already referred to (see p. 23) in order to enlist the support of their countrymen for the scheme outlined in the memorandum. The substance of that document, with certain inaccuracies of detail, had meanwhile found its way into the press and been received in Egypt with expressions of approval.

About the same time publicity was given in that country to a long manifesto from Zaghlul Pasha, in which he emphasised the representative character of the Delegation and the support which it had received from the nation. He referred to the endeavours made by the Delegation to submit the Egyptian case to the Peace Conference and to the world at large, claiming that a considerable amount of sympathy had been gained in foreign countries. He went on to speak of the appoint-



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ment of the Special Mission and the obstacle to any direct contact with its members presented by insistence on the Protectorate, the steps which had eventually led to the visit of the Egyptian delegates to London, and the discussions which had taken place there. This document concluded by announcing that the proposals which had resulted from these discussions would now be submitted to the nation by emissaries appointed for the purpose, and, should the project be favourably received, representatives would then be nominated to negotiate a treaty on the basis suggested.

The inconclusive character of this message appears to have somewhat damped the enthusiasm with which the local committee of the Delegation in Cairo had, in the first instance, greeted the announcement of a settlement. The four emissaries, however, who reached Alexandria on the 7th of September, were received with warm demonstrations of welcome and their arrival revived a feeling of optimism. A telegram from the local committee to Zaghlul Pasha expressed the confidence which "the whole of the country" placed in the Delegation and the prevailing enthusiasm of the public. At the same time it was noticeable that there was a marked relaxation of that sense of strain and tension which had for some time past governed the relations between British and Egyptians, and conciliation was in the air.

It is true that at first a very determined set was made against the proposed settlement by the *Hisb-el-Watani* and other extremists. The critics maintained that the contemplated independence of Egypt was not a reality, and specifically protested against the non-inclusion of the Sudan in the scheme. Among the principal objectors four of the Khedivial Princes, who had signed the manifesto already referred to (see p. 4), now took the opportunity to publish in the Arabic newspapers on the 11th of September, 1920, a declaration that their views remained unchanged and that they did not support any agreement which restricted the independence of Egypt. But this demonstration had little effect on the public, and in view of the good reception generally accorded to the proposals the Princes shortly afterwards endeavoured to explain it away.

While the four emissaries of the Delegation did not enter into any contact with the official world in Egypt, every care was taken to ensure them complete liberty of action and movement. The procedure which they adopted was to invite small groups of representative Egyptians to meet them and to discuss the proposed settlement. The latter in turn reported to other groups in the provinces, whence resolutions of adherence were received by the four delegates, so that within a fortnight of their arrival it became evident that a substantial majority of the representative elements in the country were favourable to the basis for negotiation which they had submitted. But by far the most important testimony of general approval was secured at a meeting of the remaining members of the Legislative Assembly convened to confer with the delegates on the 16th September. Of the forty-nine members who were present on that occasion, forty-five recorded their votes in favour of the proposals. Two abstained from any expression of opinion, and only two voted in opposition. Two other members who had been unable to attend in person wrote to express their concurrence with the project, which thus received the support of forty-seven out of fifty-one surviving members.

At the same time, while this general approval was recorded, further interpretation of certain particular points was invited, and the hope was expressed that the Delegation would on its return to London obtain definite assurances on these points. The most important of these was the universal desire for some definite indication that the Protectorate would cease to exist with the conclusion of the Treaty of Alliance.

F.—*Concluding Interviews with Egyptian delegates in London.*

The four emissaries returned from Egypt to Paris early in October, and there rejoined Zaghlul Pasha and their other colleagues who had remained in Europe. At the end of the month the whole party, again accompanied by Adli Pasha, once more came to London and had two further meetings with the Mission, at which the four emissaries related their experiences in Egypt, and the resulting situation was discussed. It was apparent from the statement of the emissaries, confirming as it did the reports which had already appeared in the press, that the terms of the proposed settlement had been well received by the Egyptian public, and that the determined attempt which was at first made to excite opposition to them had ended in complete failure. At the same time, the emissaries did not fail to impress upon us that the general approval of the settlement was accompanied, on the part of the Egyptians with whom they had conferred, by certain reservations, and that they had been instructed to try and obtain modifications of it on several points. What they chiefly desired was a limitation of the functions of the Financial Adviser and







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



of the British official in the Ministry of Justice; the abandonment of the provision of Article 5 of the memorandum—that the coming into force of the contemplated Treaty between Great Britain and Egypt should be dependent upon the previous conclusion of agreements with the Powers for necessary modifications in the régime of the Capitulations; and, above all, the formal abolition of the Protectorate. Some other points of minor importance were also raised, and it was evident that, if all these matters were to be gone into again, we should reopen the whole of the discussion in which we had been occupied for the greater part of the summer. This was a course in which the members of the Mission were unanimously of opinion that it would be perfectly useless for them to engage. As we pointed out to the delegates, any agreement arrived at between us and them could not in any case be final. All we could do was to pave the way for the official negotiations, which must be subsequently undertaken, if the idea of a Treaty on the lines which we had been discussing commended itself to British and Egyptian opinion. The points now brought forward might all be raised in the official negotiations, as other points no doubt would be on both sides, and for us to try and anticipate a decision upon every detail, while it would certainly delay the commencement of those negotiations, might also seriously prejudice their successful conduct.

The point of view of the Mission was summed up by Lord Milner in a statement which he made at the second meeting of the delegates on the 9th November. It was to the following effect:—

"It seemed desirable to have this meeting before the departure of the Egyptian representatives in order to clear up the situation and leave room for further co-operation between them and the Mission in the future.

"The report, which the gentlemen who have lately returned from Egypt have brought back to us, seems to indicate that there is a great body of opinion favourable to a settlement on the basis outlined in the memorandum of August. On the other hand, they state that there are several points in the memorandum which they desire to modify and several fresh conditions which they wish to add to it before promising their unconditional support. It is not necessary for me to dwell upon these points to-day, because the Mission are unanimously of opinion that no good purpose would be served by a further discussion of details at the present stage.

"The memorandum never professed to do more than indicate the general lines on which an agreement could be arrived at. In any case, as we have always foreseen, the agreement itself, if it is decided to proceed with it, will have to be the outcome of formal negotiations between duly accredited representatives of the British and Egyptian Governments. In those negotiations the fresh points which you have brought forward as the result of the visit of some of your number to Egypt can be raised, as other points may be raised on one side or the other. It would be impossible and undesirable to exclude any proposals not evidently inconsistent with the spirit of the agreement outlined in the memorandum, which on the face of it requires elucidation and elaboration before it can be converted into a formal treaty. It would in our opinion not facilitate a settlement if we were to anticipate these discussions, therefore, we think it wiser to refrain from any expression of opinion on the new points recently raised by you at the present time, though we believe that a satisfactory solution can, and will, be found when regular negotiations can be undertaken.

"What is far more important at the present stage than any further discussion of details is to influence opinion both here and in Egypt in a sense favourable to a settlement on the lines which we both favour, and above all to cultivate and strengthen by every means the spirit of friendship and mutual confidence which our conversations here have helped to engender, but which must become general on both sides if our efforts are to lead to the desired result. As far as this country is concerned, we hope that the presentation of the report of the Mission, which we are anxious to complete as quickly as possible, will conduce to that end. But it is equally important that a similar effect should be produced in Egypt by your endeavours. We gratefully recognise how much you have already done in that direction. But it is evident that there is still opposition to be overcome, that there are great numbers of people in Egypt who are not imbued with the spirit of the agreement, but are for one reason or another hostile to a good understanding between Great Britain and Egypt. They are, or profess themselves to be, suspicious of the intentions of this country, they do not recognise the generous spirit in which Great Britain is prepared to meet the aspirations of the Egyptian people. In so far as you are able to dispel this suspicion and misunderstanding and create a better feeling you will be doing more than can be done in any other way to bring about the settlement which we all so earnestly desire."



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



To this statement Zaghlul Pasha replied in a speech, the gist of which was that while he was as anxious as we were to help to create an atmosphere favourable to a settlement, he would be greatly weakened in his efforts to do so by being unable to give any promise to the Egyptians about the proposed reservations, and specially by being unable to say that Great Britain had finally repudiated the Protectorate. To the latter point he returned again and again, and he subsequently reiterated these views in a letter addressed to Lord Milner.

This was the last of our interviews with the Egyptians, who all left England shortly after it. It is only necessary to add that the tone of our discussions remained throughout of the most friendly character, and that at parting, though no final agreement had been reached and both sides remained uncommitted, we certainly gathered the impression that, reservations or no reservations, public opinion in Egypt had been very favourably impressed by the terms of the proposed settlement, and that most if not all of the delegates were hopeful of its ultimate complete acceptance by their countrymen, and anxious to bring it about.

## IV.—General Summary.

In view of the complicated nature of the subject, and the length to which our Report—though we have striven to omit all unessential details—has necessarily run, we desire to recapitulate the main features of the policy which we now recommend, and the stages by which our conclusions have been reached.

When we arrived in Egypt we found a general state of unrest and discontent. The rebellion had been suppressed, but agitation was undiminished, and among an extreme group still took dangerous and violent forms. Everywhere the demand was for "complete independence," beginning with the abolition of the "Protectorate," which was construed as implying the extinction of Egyptian nationality. To justify this inference, the Nationalists pointed to the refusal of the British Government to permit Egyptian Ministers to come to London after the Armistice, to the deportation of Zaghlul Pasha and his associates, to the increase since the war in the number of British officials, and to the continuance of martial law. At the same time the enunciation of President Wilson's fourteen points had aroused wide-spread expectations, and the promise of self-determination to other Eastern peoples whom the Egyptians thought inferior to themselves had added to their discontent. Religious feeling had also been inflamed by the defeat of the Turks and the doubts and uncertainties as to the future of the Caliphate.

On the British side the situation was full of difficulty. A large number of experienced officials had been lost to the service since the beginning of the war and their places taken by new men who knew little of the traditional system by which, in the days of Lord Cromer, British control was maintained without wounding Egyptian susceptibilities. The work of the Administration during the war deserves the warmest acknowledgment, but it necessarily entailed a certain subordination of Egyptian to British interests, and the employment of rough and ready methods likely to be resented by a people whose sympathies were not actively engaged on our side. When the war ended, many of the old landmarks had disappeared and there was a break of continuity with the past. Martial law had become necessary, not merely to maintain order, but to carry on the civil government; the "Agent-General" had become a High Commissioner who was also Commander-in-chief, and though Egyptian Ministers continued to hold office, the Legislative Assembly was suspended. The Administration in these circumstances had to be carried on in the teeth of almost universal opposition, affecting even the official class, upon which the Government had to rely for a large part of its executive work.

We soon came to the conclusion that this situation could not be met by any return to the pre-war system or by any reforms of a merely departmental character. A more radical change was required to meet the new conditions. But the agitation against the "Protectorate" had greatly increased the difficulty of finding any acceptable policy which would satisfy the Egyptians while securing British interests. The word "Protectorate" had become a symbol of servitude in the minds of the Egyptians, and they insisted that it must mean what they said it meant. Argument on this point was wholly useless, and it thus became evident to us that, unless we could get on to new ground, it would be impossible to reach a settlement by agreement.

Fortunately the informal conversations which we had with leading men in Egypt encouraged us to hope that such a settlement was not impossible on new lines. They said with one accord that, though they objected to having an inferior status imposed upon Egypt by the British Government, they would welcome a Treaty of Alliance freely entered into on both sides, which, while establishing the independence



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



of Egypt, would give to Great Britain all those safeguards and guarantees which the Protectorate, as we understood it, was intended to secure. The greater part of our subsequent work lay in examining this possibility, and our aim throughout has been to find the basis of a Treaty which should supersede all debates about words and phrases, and be the sole and final definition of the relations of Great Britain and Egypt.

There is nothing new in the recognition of Egyptian independence by Great Britain. Throughout our occupation we have most carefully respected the theory that Egypt was a national unit under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey, and when we abolished the Turkish suzerainty we deliberately chose to proclaim a Protectorate in preference to annexing Egypt or making her part of the British Empire. We have constantly renewed our promise of self-government for Egypt. We are of opinion that the fulfilment of this promise cannot be postponed. The spirit of Egyptian Nationalism cannot be extinguished, and, though it may always be possible to suppress its more violent manifestations, the government of the country in the teeth of a hostile people, who charge us with breach of faith, must be a difficult and distasteful task, alike to those who take part in it and to the British people who are responsible for it.

But there are formidable difficulties in the way of any sudden or complete transfer of all the powers of government to Egyptian hands. There are essential British interests to be upheld; it is also imperative to ensure the safety and protect the rights of the large number of foreign residents whose presence in Egypt differentiates her position from that of other Eastern countries and greatly complicates the problem.

The essential British interests are that the great Imperial communications which pass through Egyptian territory shall not be jeopardised, either by internal disturbances or foreign aggression; that they shall be available in time of war, and for necessary purposes in time of peace; that the struggle for ascendency in Egypt between rival Powers shall not be renewed; and, finally, that an independent Egypt shall not pursue a foreign policy hostile or prejudicial to that of the British Empire. It is therefore necessary that any Treaty entered into between us and the Egyptians should secure the special position of the British representative in Egypt, enable us to maintain an army on Egyptian territory for the protection of our Imperial communications, and take adequate security that Egyptian policy shall be in line with that of the British Empire.

The protection of foreign rights presents a problem of even greater complexity. These are at present secured by the Capitulations. But the Capitulations are the greatest of all the disabilities from which Egypt now suffers (see note on p. 19). The multiplicity of jurisdictions arising out of them, and the facilities which they give to men of uncertain nationality to escape from the local jurisdiction greatly complicate the problem of law and order; while the exemption of foreigners from direct taxation, other than the land and house tax, cripples the Government in raising revenue, since it is in practice impossible to impose on Egyptians taxes from which foreigners are exempt. Thus, although the wealth of the country is rapidly increasing and its resources are now ample for all the needs of good government, the Administration has for some time past been compelled to starve essential public services, such as Education and Public Health. During the war it has only been possible to raise sufficient revenue for the auxiliary police (*Ghaffirs*) by a special tax imposed under Martial Law.

It was evident to us that, without the removal of these restrictions, no Egyptian Government could enjoy any real independence. To leave an Egyptian Ministry to struggle with conditions which threatened to bring the present Administration to a stand-still would be to foredoom it to failure. We foresaw that, if the Capitulations were maintained, the Egyptian Government without British support would in all probability be exposed to a competing pressure of foreign influences, which might paralyse its action. It was therefore clearly in the interests of Egypt that the Capitulations should be removed and the Mixed Tribunals reorganised so as to enable them to take over the jurisdiction of the Consular Courts and to act in criminal as well as civil suits affecting foreigners. But this could only be effected through the mediation of Great Britain, and Great Britain could only expect to succeed in inducing the Powers to part with their present privileges, if she were in a position to assure them that solvency would be maintained and that the lives and property of foreigners would be secure. Our efforts were accordingly directed to securing for Great Britain such a position as would enable her to give this necessary assurance. In order to achieve this object, it is necessary that any Treaty should provide for the right of Great Britain to intervene in legislation affecting foreigners



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



and to exercise a certain measure of control over those branches of the administration which most directly affect foreign interests.

Subject to these safeguards for the special interests of Great Britain and the protection of foreign rights, we hold that the Government of Egypt should be restored in fact to what it has always, during our occupation, been in theory, a Government of Egypt by Egyptians. We have sufficient faith in the reforming work of the last forty years to believe that such a course can now be followed with a good prospect of success. But it must be adopted wholeheartedly and in a spirit of hopefulness and sympathy. Nothing would be more likely to lead to failure than to overload this policy with an excessive number of timorous restrictions, which would obscure the principle of Egyptian independence, create suspicion as to our real intentions, and defeat our main object—the re-establishment of mutual goodwill and hearty co-operation between British and Egyptians.

We make no attempt to conceal our conviction that Egypt is not yet in a position to dispense with British assistance in her internal administration. But the Egyptians know this, and when once the responsibility is clearly theirs, they will be slow to dispense with such help from us as is essential to the prosperity and good government of their country. They will be all the slower to do so, because under this system it will be impossible to attribute any failure that may occur to British dictation, and because the good work of British officials in the future will redound to the credit of the Ministers who are wise enough to retain them. Moreover, the whole atmosphere will, in our opinion, be completely changed when the Egyptians are satisfied that the purpose of British policy is to help them to realise their ideal of independence and not to stand in the way of its attainment. We are greatly fortified in that belief by our own experience in dealing with the representative Egyptians with whom we have come into such intimate contact. Once convinced of the sincerity of our intentions they showed every readiness to appreciate our point of view, to recognise the special interests which Great Britain has in Egypt, the debt of gratitude due to her for her past work in that country, and the indispensability of her future help in maintaining its integrity and independence. And we are not discouraged by the fact that they were not all as yet prepared to commit themselves unreservedly to every point in the settlement which they had collaborated with us in devising. We make no doubt that they are wholeheartedly in favour of the main features of the settlement and that they are anxious to secure its acceptance by their countrymen. And, as far as we can judge, public opinion in Egypt is moving decisively in that direction. There is a sensible diminution of the bitter feeling and violent propaganda which were recently so prevalent, and the country is anxious to settle down. The moment is favourable for placing the relations of Great Britain and Egypt on the satisfactory and enduring basis of a Treaty, which will at one and the same time establish the independence of Egypt and secure the essential interests of Great Britain. It will be an undoubted advantage to Great Britain to have those interests carefully defined and placed beyond challenge in a Treaty accepted by the Egyptians, as it will obviously be an advantage to Egypt to have her integrity and independence guaranteed by Great Britain. We therefore strongly advise His Majesty's Government to enter without undue delay into negotiations with the Egyptian Government for the conclusion of a Treaty on the lines which we have ventured to recommend. It would, in our opinion, be a great misfortune if the present opportunity were lost.

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We have thought it desirable to confine this Report to a description of the general situation in Egypt and a statement of our main recommendations as to future policy. We have not included in it numerous suggestions which, in the course of our investigations, we were led to make with regard to details of departmental administration and other matters affecting the educational and social progress of the country. These suggestions are embodied in separate memoranda, some of which have already been placed at the disposal of the Foreign Office, as the rest will be in due course. They are full of technical detail, and, though we believe them to be useful, they are not of the same general public interest as the questions discussed in this Report.

One of these memoranda deals with the Antiquities Department, which, as we found in our conversations with the Delegation, the Egyptians are quite willing to leave under its present control.

We desire in conclusion to record our thanks to the two Secretaries of the Mission and to express our appreciation of their invaluable services.

Mr. A. T. Loyd, the senior of the two, had, after many years' experience in



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



Egypt and in the Foreign Office, retired from the Public Service shortly before the Mission began its labours. But, yielding to the earnest request of our Chairman, he agreed to accompany us to Egypt and to act as our principal Secretary there, though it was understood from the first that the call of other duties would not allow him to retain that position long after our return to England. During our stay in Egypt we derived great benefit from his intimate knowledge of the country and the people, his familiarity with all Departments of the Government, and his popularity both with British and Egyptians.

When Mr. Loyd left us in May last, the whole of the secretarial work of the Mission devolved upon Mr. E. M. B. Ingram, of the Foreign Office, who had also accompanied us to Egypt, as assistant to Mr. Loyd and Private Secretary to Lord Milner. Mr. Ingram's duties during the last seven months have been very arduous, but he has discharged them with unfailing zeal and ability, and we are deeply indebted to his assistance.

MILNER.
RENNELL RODD.
OWEN THOMAS.
CECIL J. B. HURST.
J. A. SPENDER.

*December* 9, 1920.



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

Outline of Proposed Treaty of Alliance between

GREAT BRITAIN & EGYPT.

PREAMBLE

Great Britain, being desirous to establish and maintain on a secure and lasting basis the independence of Egypt, in connection with the British Empire, and Egypt, recognising that her independence and immunity from external aggression can best be secured by means of a treaty of Alliance with Great Britain, in which the relations between the two countries shall be clearly defined, the Governments of His Majesty the King and H.H. the Sultan have appointed accredited representatives to conclude a Treaty to achieve these ends.

1. Great Britain and Egypt recognise that the privileges and immunities now enjoyed in Egypt by the Capitulatory Powers must be modified and rendered less injurious to the interests of the country. To this end Great Britain undertakes to negotiate conventions with the Capitulatory Powers for the transfer to her of the rights and privileges hitherto enjoyed by them whilst Egypt will confer on Great Britain such rights as are necessary to safeguard her special interests and to enable her to furnish the guarantees which must be given to Foreign Powers to secure the relinquishment of their Capitulatory rights.

2. Great Britain undertakes to support Egypt in defending the integrity of her territory, and

Egypt/

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

Egypt will undertake, in case of war, even when the integrity of Egypt is not affected, to render Great Britain all the assistance in her power, within her own borders, including the use of her harbours and aerodromes and means of communication for military purposes.

3. To enable Great Britain to fulfil the obligation defined in Clause 2.and at the same time to protect her Imperial communications, Egypt confers on Great Britain the right to own certain military establishments and to maintain therein military forces which shall not be deemed to constitute a military occupation of the country or in any way prejudice the rights of the Egyptian Government.

For a period of seven years from the coming into force of this Treaty the military establishments shall be deemed to include

(a) Kasr el Nil Barracks in Cairo.

(b) Abbassia Barracks and Heliopolis Aerodrome near Cairo.

(c) Mustafa Pasha Barracks near Alexandria.

(d) Abukir Aerodrome near Alexandria.

(e) The Abu Zaabal Wireless Telegraphy station in Qalioubia.

(f) Tel el Kebir camp in Sharqia.

(g) Any camp or camps in the neighbourhood of Port Said, Ismailia and Suez or on the eastern or western frontiers of Egypt which may be deemed necessary by Great Britain in the execution of Clauses 2 and 3 of this Treaty, and which will be determined by the British and Egyptian Governments in agreement.

After the expiration of the period of seven years the preceding schedule of military establishments may be revised by the two Governments in agreement.

4/



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4. Egypt shall enjoy the right to representation in Foreign countries and in the absence of any duly accredited Egyptian representative, the Egyptian Government shall confide its interests to the care of the British Representative.

5. Egypt recognising that her interests in respect of foreign affairs are closely bound up with the interests of Great Britain undertakes that her Government shall at all times frankly and fully admit H.M.High Commissioner to ~~their~~ their confidence and shall consult him in relation to all such affairs. Great Britain ~~likewise~~ undertakes frankly and fully to consult the Egyptian Government through H.M.High Commissioner in regard to foreign affairs in any way affecting the interests of Egypt.

6. Egypt undertakes not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude inconsistent with this Treaty of Alliance or of a nature to create difficulties for Great Britain, nor to enter into any agreement with a foreign power without the concurrence of Great Britain, who ~~likewise~~ undertakes through her representatives abroad to support and further the interests of the Egyptian Government and to collaborate with Egyptian Representatives to this end.

7. In order to enable Great Britain to discharge her obligations towards foreign powers in all matters affecting the lives, properties, and interests of their nationals Egypt shall ~~appoint~~ in concurrence with H.M.G. an official ~~of the~~ rank

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

rank of Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Justice who shall enjoy the rights of access to the Minister. This official shall be the executive head under the Minister of that branch of the Ministry connected with the administration of law as affecting foreigners.

8. With the transfer to H.M.G. of the rights hitherto exercised under the regime of the Capitulations ~~under~~ by the various foreign governments Egypt recognises the right of Great Britain to intervene ~~to~~ through H.M.High Commissioner to prevent the application to foreigners of any Egyptian law now requiring foreign consent, and Great Britain on her side undertakes not to exercise this right except in the case of laws inequitably discriminating against foreigners in the matter of taxation, or inconsistent with the principles of legislation common to all the Capitulatory Powers.

9. When the consent of the Powers concerned to the termination of the Caisse de la Dette has been obtained, the Egyptian Government undertakes to constitute a special reserve fund whose capital amount shall be equal to the interests and amortisation charges on all the external debts of the Egyptian Government for a period of two years.

The amount of this fund shall be invested in British Government securities to be determined by the two Governments in agreement and the interest thereon shall be paid to the Egyptian Government. Egypt undertakes not to contract any further external debt save in agreement with Great Britain, and no recourse shall be had to the special re-

serve/



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

(166)

serve fund referred to in this clause without the previous consent of the British Government ~~is obtained~~ who shall ipso facto be entitled to assume and maintain such control of the Egyptian Ministry of Finance as may be necessary to re-establish the fund in its entirety and to restore the financial equilibrium of the Egyptian Government

10. On the coming into force of this Treaty and for a period of 7 years thereafter in order to avoid ~~abrupt~~ changes of a nature to jeopardise the Administration and financial ~~reforms~~ which have been introduced into Egypt during the past the Egyptian Government undertakes to appoint with the ~~concurrence~~ of H.M.G. an official of the rank of Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Interior, who shall be executive head under the Minister of the branch of the Ministry charged with the maintenance of public security and the direction of the civil police.

Likewise in the Ministry of Finance the Egyptian Government undertake to appoint, with the concurrence of H.M.G. an official of the rank of Under-Secretary of State who shall be executive head under the Minister of the branch of the Ministry charged with the preparation of the Budget and the direction of the State accounts.

On the expiration of the 7 year period aforesaid, the two Governments in agreement shall decide whether the retention of one or both of these officials may be necessary.

11. The engagements of British and other foreign officers and administrative officials who entered

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

the service of the Egyptian Government before the coming into force of this Treaty may be terminated at the instance of either the officials themselves or ~~of~~ the Egyptian Government at any time after the expiration of one year from the coming into force of this Treaty and within three years of that date. The compensation to be accorded to officials retiring under this provision, in addition to that provided by the existing laws, shall be determined in accordance with the schedule hereto annexed. In cases where no advantage is taken of this arrangement existing terms of service will remain unaffected.

12. From the coming into force of this Treaty the Egyptian Government undertakes not to appoint any foreign officials to the public services of the State save with the previous concurrence of H.M.High Commissioner.

13. On account of the special relations between Great Britain and Egypt created by this Treaty of Alliance Egypt undertakes to accord to H.M.High Commissioner an exceptional position and to grant him precedence over all representatives of Foreign countries.

14. This Treaty shall be submitted to the approval of a ~~constituent~~ Assembly but it shall not come into force until after the agreements with foreign powers for the closing of their Consular Courts and the decrees for the re-organisation of the Mixed Tribunals have come into operation.

15. The ~~Constituent~~ Assembly referred to in clause 14 shall be charged with the duty of framing a new Organic Statute in accordance with the/



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the provisions of which the Government of Egypt shall in future be conducted. This statute shall embody provisions for the Ministers being responsible to the Legislature and shall provide for religious toleration for all persons and for the due protection of the rights of foreigners. The constitutional head of the State and the succession to the throne are recognized by the High Contracting Parties as already determined and as being beyond the scope of the Constituent Assembly and of the Legislature to be set up in accordance with new organic statute.

16. The necessary modifications in the regime of the Capitulations will be secured by agreements to be concluded by Great Britain with the various Capitulatory Powers. These agreements will provide for the closing of the foreign Consular Courts, so as to render possible the re-organization and extension of the jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals and the application to all foreigners in Egypt of the legislation (including legislation imposing taxation) enacted by the Egyptian Legislature.

17. These agreements shall provide for the transfer to H.M.G. of the rights hitherto exercised under the regime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments. They shall further contain stipulations to the following effect:-

(a) No attempt shall be made to discriminate against the Nationals of a Power which agrees to close its Consular Courts and such nationals shall enjoy in Egypt the same treatment as British subjects.

(b)

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

(b) The Egyptian Nationality Law shall be founded on the jus sanguinis, so that the children born in Egypt of a foreigner shall enjoy the nationality of their father and shall not be claimed as Egyptian subjects.

(c) Consular officers of the foreign Powers shall be accorded by Egypt the same status as foreign Consuls enjoy in England.

(d) Existing Treaties and Conventions to which Egypt is a party on matters of commerce and navigation including postal and telegraphic Conventions, shall remain in force. Pending the conclusion of special agreements to which she is a party, Egypt shall apply the Treaties in force between Great Britain and the foreign Power concerned on questions affected by the closing of the Consular Courts, such as extradition Treaties, Treaties for the surrender of seamen deserters, etc.as also Treaties of a political nature, whether multilateral or bi-lateral, e.g. arbitration Conventions and the various Conventions relating to the conduct of hostilities.

(e) The liberty to maintain schools and to teach the language of the foreign country concerned, shall be guaranteed, provided that such

schools/



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

schools are subject in all respects to the laws applicable generally to European schools in Egypt.

(f) The liberty to maintain or organize religious and charitable foundations, such as hospitals,etc. shall also be guaranteed.

"The agreements shall also provide for the necessary changes in the Commission of the Debt and the elimination of the international element in the Alexandria Board of Health.

18. The legislation rendered necessary by the aforesaid agreements between Great Britain and foreign Powers, shall be effected by decrees to be issued by the Egyptian Government. A decree shallbe enacted at the same time validating all measures,legislative, administrative or judicial, taken under Martial Law.

19. The decrees for the reorganisation of the Mixed Tribunals shall provide for conferring upon these Tribunals all jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the foreign Consular Courts, while leaving the jurisdiction of the Native Courts untouched.

20. The special relations between Great Britain and Egypt being defined, and the interests of both countries secured by the coming into force of this Treaty, Great Britain undertakes for so long as the Treaty remains effective to withdraw the Protectorate declared over Egypt on the 18th December, 1914, and to admit Egypt to the privileges enjoyed by the federation of free nations composing the British Empire/

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

Empire.

21. Egypt relying on the undertakings of Great Britain as defined in clauses 2 and 3 hereof and desiring to demonstrate her pacific intentions to her neighbours undertakes within 5 years of the coming into force of this Treaty to abolish compulsory military service.m

22. The High Contracting Parties reaffirm their adherence to the Boutros-Cromer Convention and the Convention supplementary thereto of 1899 in regard to the Sudan.

23. Great Britain undertakes to secure for Egypt her fair share of the waters of the Nile and to this end the High Contracting Parties agree that no irrigation works on the Nile or its tributaries south of Wadi Halfa shall be undertaken without the concurrence of a Board of ~~the~~ three Conservators representing Egypt, the Sudan, and Uganda respectively.

24. The peaceful developments of the Sudan being essential for the security of Egypt and for the maintenance of her water supply, Egypt undertakes to continue to afford the Sudan Government the same military assistance as in the past or in lieu thereof to provide the Sudan Government with financial assistance to an extent to be agreed upon between the two Governments.

25. On the coming into force of this Treaty Great Britain undertakes to communicate its terms to Foreign Powers and to support an application by Egypt for admission as a member of the League of Nations.



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

From A.

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*Printed for the Cabinet. January* 1921.

SECRET.

## PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS OF LORD MILNER'S REPORT.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

IN my remarks on Lord Milner's Report on Egypt at the recent Cabinet, I said that I was prepared to advise the acceptance of the following principles underlying Lord Milner's proposals :—

(*a.*) The substitution of a treaty of alliance for the existing Protectorate.
(*b.*) The recognition, within certain defined limits, of the independence of Egypt.

On the other hand, I felt serious apprehensions and was prepared to suggest definite modifications in respect of certain points which I specified in the discussion.
They were the following :—

1. The management of foreign affairs, over which there appeared to me to be established an insufficient British supervision.
2. The position of the High Commissioner, which appeared to me to be, so to speak, suspended in the air.
3. The future locations of the British forces, a portion of which it seemed to me (concurring therein with Lord Allenby) imperative to keep for a term of years, at any rate, in the neighbourhood of Cairo and Alexandria.
4. The ambiguous position of the suggested Financial and Judicial Advisers.
5. The desirability of establishing some contact with and control over the Ministry of the Interior.
6. The necessity for providing that no foreigners shall in future be appointed to the Egyptian army, police or civil service without the consent of Great Britain, a point about which Lord Milner thought that no difficulty would be raised.
7. The desirability of guaranteeing as far as possible the stability of the constitutional monarchy and the succession to the Throne in Egypt.
8. There was also the point, raised by the Prime Minister, viz., the advisability of providing in some way for the association of the Egypt of the future with the fabric of the British Empire.

I have sought to secure these points, not by a draft treaty, which would at present be premature, but by the suggestion of a series of textual amendments of or additions to the Memorandum printed on pages 24–26 of Lord Milner's Report, and containing the bases of the policy recommended by him and his colleagues.
My alterations or additions are printed in italics.

*Modifications in the Milner Memorandum.*

4 (i). Last sentence to read as follows :—

Egypt will undertake not to adopt in relation to foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or will create difficulties for Great Britain, and will also undertake not to enter into any agreement with a foreign Power which is prejudicial to British interests.

*In furtherance of this undertaking Egypt will at all times frankly and fully consult the British representative in Egypt on all questions relating to foreign affairs, and will not enter into any agreement with a foreign Power without such consultation. Great Britain on her side will frankly and fully consult the Egyptian Government in regard to foreign affairs in any way affecting the interests of Egypt*

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



*and will also, through her representatives abroad, support and further the interests of Egypt and will collaborate with the Egyptian representatives to this end.*

(The above addition, while rendered palatable to the Egyptian Government by the reciprocal form in which it is couched, is intended to prevent a foreign policy, clandestine, or inimical to British interests, being pursued at Cairo by the Egyptian Foreign Office or the foreign representatives there, behind the back or over the head of the High Commissioner.)

Add the following new paragraph:—

4 (ii). *As a temporary measure and until the new régime set up by the treaty is firmly established, Great Britain shall also enjoy the right of using the existing military establishments in the neighbourhood of Cairo and Alexandria for the maintenance of troops, and shall also be entitled to maintain a guard for the protection of the Abu Zaabal wireless telegraphy station in Qalioubia.*

*No rights similar to those conferred on Great Britain by these provisions shall be conferred on any foreign Power.*

(The first of these two clauses will enable British military contingents, in accordance with the strongly-expressed opinions of Lord Allenby and General Congreve, to be maintained, say for a period of five or three years, either in the Kasr-el-Nil Barracks in Cairo, or perhaps preferably in the Abbassia Barracks near the Heliopolis Aerodrome a few miles outside, also in the Mustafa Pasha Barracks near Alexandria and in the neighbourhood of the Aboukir Aerodrome.

The second clause is intended to prevent Consular Guards from being placed by any foreign Power for the protection of their representatives or nationals in Cairo or elsewhere.)

4 (iiA). Add the following paragraph:—

*The use at all times of one or more aerodromes, as may be arranged, shall be secured to British aircraft. Great Britain shall also enjoy the use of the Abu Zaabal wireless telegraphy station in Qalioubia.*

(This paragraph is intended to provide for the use of the above stations—which are vital to our aerial and wireless communications, in times of peace as well as in times of war.)

4 (iii) to read as follows:—

Egypt will appoint, in *consultation* with His Majesty's Government, a Financial Adviser, to whom shall be entrusted in due course the powers at present exercised by the Commissioners of the Debt. *He shall be kept fully informed on all matters connected with the Department, and shall enjoy the right of access to the Minister.*

4 (iv) to read as follows:—

Egypt will appoint, in *consultation* with His Majesty's Government, an official *in the Ministry of the Interior* and an official in the Ministry of Justice. Each of these officials shall be kept fully informed on all matters connected with his Department, and shall enjoy the right of access to the Minister. *They shall be responsible respectively under the Minister for the conduct of matters relating to the maintenance of order*, and to the administration of the law as affecting foreigners.

(I have eliminated from the Milner Report the disputed passage about the liberty of the Egyptian Government to consult the Financial Adviser—which they might perhaps have declined to exercise—and have sought by the new words to provide for his being fully acquainted with all that passes in the Department, and having access at all times to the Minister.

I suggest similar provisions for the two officials in the Ministries of the Interior and Justice, but I do not call them Advisers. They may or may not be Under-Secretaries of State. I further assign a definite sphere of responsibility to each.

Incidentally—and this in my view is most important—the existence and powers of these three officials will enable the High Commissioner to be kept in sufficiently close contact with what is passing in the Egyptian administration.)

4 (viii). New article.

*Egypt will undertake not to appoint any foreign officers or officials to any of the public services without the previous concurrence of the British Representative.*



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# (٤٧٣/٣٤٢)



3

6. Add the following paragraph :—

*The constitutional Head of the State and the succession to the Throne, being already determined, will not be affected by the new Organic Statute, and will lie outside the scope of the legislature to be set up thereunder.*

11. New article :—

*The relations between Great Britain and Egypt established by the treaty referred to in article* 3 *will, from the moment when such treaty comes into force, supersede the Protectorate declared by Great Britain on the* 18*th December*, 1914. Great Britain will communicate the terms of the treaty to foreign Powers, and will support an application by Egypt for admission to the League of Nations.

It will be seen that I have not provided specifically in any of the above amendments for the implied incorporation of Egypt in the British Empire. I would propose in the explanatory despatch to Lord Allenby to invite him to place before the Egyptian Government the earnest desire of His Majesty's Government, while fully maintaining the independence of Egypt, to see her Prime Minister take part in any future meetings of the Imperial Conference.

Finally as to procedure. It is, I think, clear that the Milner Report must be published ; but it is also clear that if it were to be published now, or alone, any attempt to modify or amend it, if such be decided upon by His Majesty's Government, would be rendered well-nigh impossible, while it would become the irreducible minimum for which the Egyptian Nationalists would contend. I suggest therefore, as the best procedure in the circumstances, that after deciding whether or not and to what extent to accept my amendments, a despatch should be sent to Lord Allenby enclosing Lord Milner's Report, setting out the objections of His Majesty's Government to some of the articles, and stating our views as to the further points for which provision must be made ; the despatch might terminate with a copy of the Memorandum or "Basis of an Understanding" containing the modifications which we think necessary. The despatch would conclude with an invitation to the Egyptian Government to send the promised delegation to England to draw up the proposed treaty in the early spring. The despatch with its enclosures could then be published simultaneously in England and Egypt. But in the meantime we could telegraph to Lord Allenby the modifications on which we are disposed to insist, and obtain his opinion upon them before finally incorporating them in our draft.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

*January* 1, 1921.



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٧٠ظ]
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



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

Sat Hum 31 Jan 1921

Lord Curzon.

Attached hereto you will find a suggested draft of the amendments you desire in the Milner "Memorandum." I have proceeded upon the assumption that the revised draft is not to constitute the draft treaty, but merely to indicate alterations which are thought to be necessary in the proposed "Basis of an Understanding" agreed between Lord Milner and Zagloul. It probably will be wise to leave the earlier draft unaltered so far as possible and limit the modifications to points which are regarded as essential.

The provisions in the draft which you handed to me yesterday on the subject of a reserve fund seem to me to be unnecessary. These provisions are on the lines of those which were suggested by the Treasury at the time of the negotiations with the French in 1917. At that time the idea was that the Commission of the Debt should be abolished, but the arrangement with Egypt which is outlined in the "Memorandum" provides for the transfer to the Financial Adviser of the powers of the Commission of the Debt. This means that certain Egyptian revenues, amply sufficient to pay the interest on the debt, will be placed under the control of that official and will enable him to ensure that there is no default in the payment of the half-yearly coupons and renders the creation of any new reserve fund unnecessary.

I have not inserted the provision which was in the draft you gave me yesterday, prohibiting Egypt from contracting any further external loans. You did not mention it as one of the points to which attention had been drawn. The National Bank of Egypt is a financial house of sufficient strength to issue any loan which the Egyptian Government desired to raise, but a loan issued by that Bank could scarcely be described as external debt as it is an Egyptian company, ~~and~~ Egypt is now so wealthy that this provision really seems unnecessary.

I have also omitted the provisions in the new draft relating to the Soudan, as the arrangement under which the Memorandum was

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٧١ظ]
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

agreed not to deal with the Soudan at all may still be regarded as holding good.

On reflection I think it would be better to say nothing in this revised text of the Memorandum on the subject of inviting Egypt to be represented at meetings of the Imperial Conference. It would be so easy for the extremists in Egypt to attack this offer upon the ground that it indicates that Egypt has become part of the British Empire in a way that destroys her independence that I think it would be better to deal with the matter in another way.

If the Report of the Milner Mission is not published, I am afraid there may be opportunities for engineering trouble not only in Egypt but in this country, and I would suggest for your consideration whether it might not be well to provide for publication in the following way. To draw up a despatch to the High Commissioner to which the Report would form Annex I. and which would contain a statement of the views of His Majesty's Government as to the further points for which provision must be made, and setting out the objections to some of the existing Articles. The despatch might terminate with a copy of the "Memorandum" or "Basis of an Understanding", containing the modifications which are thought necessary. If this despatch could be sent off as soon as the Cabinet have decided upon the modifications which they consider necessary, it could be laid as soon as it reaches Egypt, but in the meantime the modifications which you proposed could be telegraphed to Lord Allenby and his observations obtained upon them.

With the exception of the addition of the provision for the permanent employment of a British official in the Ministry of the Interior, your proposed modifications do not seem to me to embody any very serious departure from the lines laid down in the previous draft, and the despatch to the High Commissioner might well treat these points as ones upon which further clearness was necessary in order to satisfy public opinion in this

country/



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٧٢و]
# (٤٧٣/٣٤٦)



(172)

country and to quiet the doubts of foreign Governments. If publication takes place as suggested above, it seems to me that the despatch to Lord Allenby would provide an admirable opportunity of explaining the desire of the British Government to extend to Egypt, while fully maintaining her independence, an invitation to take part in any future meetings of the Imperial Conference.

Cecil J B Hurst

31st January, 1920.

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



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٧٣و] (٤٧٣/٣٤٨)



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*Printed for the Cabinet. February* 1921.

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CABINET
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## PROPOSED CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF EGYPT.

I CIRCULATE to my colleagues a memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff on the proposed change in the status of Egypt.

W. S. C.

*February* 1921.

AIR STAFF MEMORANDUM ON THE PROPOSED CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF EGYPT.

The Air Staff has had under review the proposals for a changed status of Egypt, and wish to amplify, in the light of various Cabinet papers that have been circulated, their memorandum of the 25th August on this subject. (See Appendix II to C.P.–1803.)

*The Value of Egypt to the Air Force.*

The value of Egypt to the Air Force is comprised in the following:—

1. Her position as a junction of aerial and wireless communications.

In this respect the position of Egypt is unique. 2,300 miles from London, 3,000 from Bombay, 5,000 from Cape Town, she stands at the main cross-roads of our aerial highways. Malta is 1,200 miles, Bagdad 850, Khartoum 1,000 and Aden 1,600 miles; all of these are important centres of British influence and within the reach of low powered wireless sets.

The value of Egypt in any scheme of Imperial communication is thus self-evident; no other country can take its place.

2. Her command over the narrowest and most easily-blocked sea passage on the shortest route to the East.

The vital importance of the Suez Canal to the sea communications of the British Empire is an axiom; its peculiar danger lies in the fact that it is the narrowest and most easily-blocked portion of our only short route to the East. Egypt commands the canal throughout its length, and though her people may not be martially inclined, it does not require an extensive military operation to cause interruption of traffic. Apart from such military operation, surprise aerial attack on a series of ships in the canal would result in a serious blockage at a time when the smallest interruption of communications might have the most serious results. A large portion of the Air Force is constantly operating in the East, and until our Eastern dependencies develope, these forces are based on the United Kingdom for purposes of technical supply.

3. Her value as a convenient central base for the Eastern organisation of the Royal Air Force.

The Air Force in the Near and Middle East requires a centre closer than Great Britain from which its work may be supervised, on which it may to some extent (increasing as years go by) be based, and where its semi-mobile reserve for the various theatres may be stationed in a climate comparable to that they may be called upon to endure in Eastern service. The position of Egypt on the highway of seaborne traffic between Europe and the East (including East Africa) is such that no other theatre could so well serve the purposes of the Royal Air Force as a Central Eastern base.

[4956]



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# (٤٧٣/٣٤٩)



A base for aircraft working with the navy is essential to the senior service in the Eastern Mediterranean. The northern coast of Egypt offers the most favourable site for such a base.

4. Her convenience as a training ground for Royal Air Force personnel.

The climate of Egypt renders the country peculiarly suitable for flying training. Not only is the weather uniformly fine, but personnel become to some extent acclimatised and prepared for the conditions they will meet further east.

The importance of Egypt to the Royal Air Force has led to the establishment of large training stations, workshops and depots in the country, and large expenditure has been incurred thereon; it is important from a strategical, economical and administrative point of view that the facilities for air work so laboriously built up shall not be impeded by any change of status of the country. The Air Force is only now in a process of formation; disorganisation at this stage of its growth will delay for years the fulfilment of its possibilities.

*The Effect of the Milner Proposals.*

The original press report of the proposals of Lord Milner's Commission alluded to the withdrawal of the British garrison to a small enclave on the Canal and its reduction to a figure of 3,000–5,000 all ranks. It is now seen that this assumption was incorrect, and Lord Milner states that the treaty to be concluded should enable us to keep such forces in the country as we require for Imperial purposes and station these at such points as we desire. This is satisfactory if it is really feasible.

But is it possible to keep large military establishments in an independent country in which we have no responsibility for maintaining law and order and no control in peace over essential communications, such as roads, railways and telegraphs? Would there not be considerable difficulty in persuading the Egyptian Government that such a scheme was not, in practice, a veiled "occupation"? And is there not more than a possibility that to get rid of British occupation, rather than the achievement of independence, may once more speedily become the platform of the Egyptian "Nationalists" of the future? For the present, Lord Milner assures us that the extremists alone demand the complete removal of British troops; but who is to say that the future rule of the country may not be extremist in tendency?

There are, therefore, political difficulties to the maintenance in peace of British troops in an independent Egypt, and these may be intensified in case of war. The British Government is to have a somewhat nebulous control over Egyptian foreign policy, but we may find ourselves fighting an Arab State, not actually allied to Egypt (granted that our control of policy is real), but with whom the Egyptians are in fullest sympathy. Our air operations would necessarily be based on Egypt, and our position would be intolerable. Such difficulties may well increase if pan-Islamism becomes a real force, for our possible enemies in the neighbourhood of Egypt will be largely Mohammedan.

Internally the situation may well become unsatisfactory; there is nothing to prevent the Egyptians from adopting conscription and raising an army formidable in numbers if not in fighting temper. The danger is admittedly not great, but it must not be overlooked. On the other hand, Egypt may neglect her fighting and police forces, and be unable to repress disorders consequent on a venal administration. The situation of British troops "for Imperial purposes" in the midst of a disorderly and discontented population would be unenviable, and incidents could easily arise which would lead to international complications. The Air Force is intimately concerned in this matter since air units cannot be stationed in countries of potential unrest without a garrison of army troops. Again, should the Egyptians neglect their fighting forces, the British people will have to shoulder an unwarrantable burden to guarantee the country against outside aggression, and the calls on the British fighting services may be greatly increased and uncontrollable.

If it is difficult to imagine a satisfactory position in the present time, the future appears to offer further possibilities of trouble. What is to happen if a future Government of Egypt desires to repudiate the treaty with Great Britain? Are they to be coerced into its retention by force of arms? Such action is hardly consistent with the principles of self-determination. Or having granted independence, must we abandon what we cannot retain by peaceful means? The answers to the questions must be given by politicians, but the Air Service is unwilling to build up an organisation of which the



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keystone is liable to be removed at the whim of an unstable people and bring the whole edifice tumbling to the ground.

Lastly, and in the distant future an independent Egypt can raise an air force of any desired magnitude. It will be long before this will be formidable in technique, but the possible danger of such a force astride of our communications to the East is out of all proportion to its technical perfection. An excuse that it is for the maintenance of internal security alone would exempt it from interference from us till a crisis actually arose, and the delay caused by dealing with the menace in an adequate manner before reinforcements could be sent to a far Eastern theatre might be a deciding factor in operations, if we were confronted with a major war in such theatres.

*Air Staff, February* 1921.

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SUGGESTED TREATY CLAUSES FOR SAFEGUARDING AIR FORCE INTERESTS.

The peculiar value of Egypt to the Air Force has been shown above and the effect of the Milner Commission's proposals has been examined. The safeguarding of Air Force interests is difficult, but the following provisions in the treaty—which, it is presumed, will be made—may afford some measure of security :—

1. The strength of the Air Force to be maintained in Egypt will be as required for Imperial purposes.
2. Its distribution will be as necessitated for those purposes, and particularly—
   - (*a.*) To maintain and guard communications, Imperial and local.
   - (*b.*) To co-operate, as required, with the Navy and Army.
   - (*c.*) To form a reserve for the Air Forces in Eastern theatres.
   - (*d.*) To provide training establishments for Air Force personnel.
3. In the case of war outside Egypt, facilities are to be offered as follows :—
   - (*a.*) To use Egypt as a base.
   - (*b.*) To move freely over or control railways.
   - (*c.*) To control telegraphs, signals and wireless, and to establish a censorship as necessary.
4. Disciplinary clauses should confer :—
   - (*a.*) The right to carry arms at all times.
   - (*b.*) The right of British airmen to trials for civil offences by British and not local civil courts.
   - (*c.*) The right to maintain order among airmen in towns by means of Air Force police patrols.
   - (*d.*) Permission to employ native labour as needed, and to enlist Egyptian personnel if required.
5. Material concessions desired are :—
   - (*a.*) Free import of Air Force stores.
   - (*b.*) Choice of training localities as desired for the Air Force.
   - (*c.*) Acquisition and security of tenure of land and buildings required for Air Force purposes.
   - (*d.*) Facilities for storage of petrol and the supply thereof if found in quantity in Egypt.
   - (*e.*) Facilities for the establishment of strategical aerial routes.
   - (*f.*) The right to erect wireless stations and to run telegraph and telephone lines for Air Force purposes.
   - (*g.*) Port and rail facilities to be freely offered in peace as well as war on reasonable terms.
   - (*h.*) Permission to start aircraft munition works and factories.





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



6. Other clauses should provide for—

(*a.*) Freedom of passage of our "military" aircraft at all times.
(*b.*) Permission for warships ("aircraft carriers") to enter ports at all times.
(*c.*) A guarantee of the security of the fresh water canal.
(*d.*) The limitation of the size of the Air Force permitted to be maintained by Egypt.
(*e.*) Aircraft material used by the Egyptian State for service purposes should be of British pattern and supplied by British firms.
(*f.*) The Egyptian Air Service must not utilise the services of instructors from foreign Powers other than Great Britain.

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

EGYPT. No. 1 (1921).

# Report

of the

# Special Mission to Egypt.

*Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.*

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# (٤٧٣/٣٥٣)

## TERMS OF REFERENCE.

"To enquire into the causes of the late disorders in Egypt, and to report on the existing situation in the country and the form of the Constitution which, under the Protectorate, will be best calculated to promote its peace and prosperity, the progressive development of self-governing institutions, and the protection of foreign interests."

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COMPOSITION OF THE SPECIAL MISSION TO EGYPT.

The Right Hon. the Viscount MILNER, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies (*Chairman.*)

The Right Hon. Sir RENNELL RODD, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.
General the Right Hon. Sir JOHN G. MAXWELL, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O.
Brigadier-General Sir OWEN THOMAS, M.P.
Sir CECIL J. B. HURST, K.C.B., K.C., Foreign Office.
J. A. SPENDER, Esq.

A. T. LOYD, Esq., O.B.E. (*Secretary*).
E. M. B. INGRAM, Esq., O.B.E., Foreign Office (Assistant Secretary and Private Secretary to the Chairman).

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My Lord, *December* 9, 1920.

I beg to submit to your Lordship the Report of the Special Mission to Egypt, of which I am Chairman. The Report bears the signatures of all the members of the Mission except General Sir John Maxwell, who, for reasons of health, had to leave England early in November and is at present in Egypt. I have, however, received the following letter from him in which he expresses his general agreement with the recommendations of the Report:—

"*My Lord,* "*S.S. 'Narkunda,' November* 4, 1920.

"*I regret to inform you that owing to ill-health, and being ordered abroad by my medical attendant, I am unable to take further part in the Mission's deliberations on Egyptian affairs. I would, however, like to take this opportunity to state that I entirely concur in their general trend up to date, and am in accord with the policy outlined in the project of agreement as handed to Saad Pasha Zaghlul in August last.*

"*I have, &c.*

"*J. G. MAXWELL, General.*"

I have the honour, my Lord,
to remain your Lordship's obedient Servant,
MILNER.

The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., &c.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٧٦و]
# (٤٧٣/٣٥٤)



I.

WORK OF THE MISSION IN EGYPT.

THE despatch of a Special Mission to Egypt had been under the consideration of His Majesty's Government since April 1919, when the prevailing unrest in that country had culminated in manifestations of violence and disorder; and in May the announcement was made that such a Mission, under the chairmanship of Lord Milner, would proceed thither in the autumn. The openly-avowed intention of the Egyptian Nationalists to organise a boycott of the Mission received great encouragement from the protest of Mohammed Said Pasha, the Prime Minister, against its arrival before the peace with Turkey had been signed, and was intensified after his resignation, which followed the overruling of his protest. Mohammed Said Pasha was succeeded as Prime Minister by Wahba Pasha, and the new Ministry was in office during the whole of our stay in Egypt.

Wahba Pasha himself has since resigned, owing to ill-health, and his place has been taken by Tewfik Nessim Pasha, one of his colleagues, who, during our stay in Egypt, was Minister of the Interior. The courage and patriotism of these two Prime Ministers and of their colleagues in taking office at a time when their country was passing through so grave a crisis, and when their own lives were daily in danger, cannot be too highly commended. Tewfik Nessim Pasha's Ministry, which is still in office, consists, with one exception, of the same men as Wahba Pasha's and is of the same character. It is a Ministry of affairs, composed of capable administrators, loyal to the Sultan and working harmoniously with the British High Commissioner, but of no distinct political colour and indisposed to take any decided line with regard to the burning question of the future of Egypt.

The change of Ministry in Egypt, and other circumstances, caused the departure of the Mission to be delayed until the end of November. We arrived at Port Said on the morning of Sunday, the 7th December, and in Cairo on the afternoon of the same day. In view of the general attitude of hostility to the Mission, which had been sedulously fostered, every precaution was taken for our security, and we reached the hotel where quarters had been prepared for our reception without incident. The day after our arrival we were all presented by Lord Allenby to His Highness the Sultan, a formal visit, which had been preceded by a short audience of a more intimate kind which he had accorded to Lord Milner. This was the first of a number of conversations which, during our stay in Egypt, our Chairman and other members of the Mission had with His Highness, who always treated us with great friendliness. In these conversations he expressed himself freely about the political situation in Egypt, the events of the last few years, and the difficulties of his own position. But he carefully abstained from giving any advice with regard to the subject of our reference, *viz.*, the future constitution of Egypt. Beyond warning us to be slow in forming conclusions and on our guard against busybodies, and indicating certain men of position whom it would be well for us to consult—such as Rushdi Pasha, Adli Pasha, Mohammed Said Pasha and Mazlum Pasha, all of them ex-Ministers—he never attempted in any way to guide or influence our deliberations. His attitude, as far as the main object of the Mission was concerned, was one of studied reserve.

This reserve was even more marked in the case of the Ministers, Wahba Pasha and his colleagues, to whom we were introduced at a party given by Lord Allenby at the Residency on the 11th December, and with whom throughout our stay in Egypt we maintained very cordial relations. They were at all times ready to assist us in our enquiries, to put every sort of information at our disposal, and to bring us into touch with any officials whom we desired to see. There was never any doubt of their willingness to give us every opportunity of becoming acquainted with the mechanism of government or the state of the country. But they were particularly careful to leave us to form our own conclusions. Though freely invited to do so, they were not disposed to make any suggestions of their own on constitutional, as distinct from purely administrative questions, and never evinced any desire to know in what direction the thoughts of the Mission were tending with regard to the future government of Egypt.

In strong contrast with the caution and reserve exhibited by the native official world was the storm of protest and disapprobation with which the arrival of the Mission was greeted by the native public and the native press. We had not been many days, or even hours, in Cairo before we had ample evidence of active and

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# (٤٧٣/٣٥٥)



organised antagonism. Telegrams poured in announcing the intention of the senders to go on strike as a protest against our presence. Many of these were despatched by schoolboys and students, but others came from public bodies, such as Provincial Councils, a few from Government officials, and a considerable number from corporations or communities of greater or less importance. We received in all 1,131 such messages during our stay, while only twenty-nine telegrams of welcome were received, mostly from private persons acquainted with individual members of the Mission. The Egyptian vernacular press, with rare exceptions, exhausted the repertory of vituperation and inuendo, proclaiming that any recognition of the Mission would be interpreted as an acceptance of the existing situation and that any Egyptian who had dealings with its members would be guilty of treason to his country. The majority of writers consistently maintained that Zaghlul Pasha at Paris was the accredited representative of the Egyptian people, and the Mission was recommended to address itself to him. A series of short strikes were declared by students, lawyers, tramwaymen, cab drivers and shopkeepers, and processions of strikers, reinforced by numbers of schoolboys and the rougher elements of the city, paraded the streets with banners, denouncing the Mission and Lord Milner in particular, and acclaiming Zaghlul Pasha and the "Complete Independence of Egypt." Nor were such demonstrations confined to the male population. The Cairene ladies availed themselves of this occasion to abandon their seclusion and to drive through the streets with similar war cries. This procession, however unwonted, was orderly enough, but the schoolboys and hooligans were frankly riotous, and but for the admirable order maintained by the police with occasional military support there would have been considerable destruction of property and even bloodshed. As it was, beyond the wrecking of a few tramcars, little damage to property actually resulted. And after the first week or two disorder in Cairo gradually subsided, though throughout our stay occasional attacks upon British soldiers and three successive attempts to assassinate members of the Ministry showed that the criminal element was still active, especially among a section of the student class.

It seems needless to dwell at greater length upon the many manifestations of hostility to the Mission and its object. Mention should, however, be made of two of them, which as indicative of the strength of the popular current appeared to be of special importance. In the second week after our arrival the heads of the El Azhar University, the centre of Mahommedan religious teaching, addressed a manifesto to the High Commissioner, which set forth the claims of Egypt to complete independence and demanded the withdrawal of the British. There was some reason to believe that the religious leaders who actually signed this document were not particularly enamoured of the political course on which they thus found themselves embarked, but yielded to the pressure of the teachers and students, among whom anti-British propaganda had for some time been increasingly active. This manifesto was followed a little later by a similar declaration, signed by six Princes of the family of Mohammed Ali, near relatives of the Sultan, which was contained in a letter to Lord Milner and simultaneously published in the press. The action of the Princes may have been prompted by various motives, but the dominant one was undoubtedly their desire to gain popularity by identifying themselves with a movement which at the moment was sweeping like a tidal wave over the country.

The immediate object of the promoters of this movement was to prevent the members of the Mission from coming into friendly touch with representative Egyptians and thus ascertaining for themselves how much substance there was in the demand for "complete independence," and in the ceaseless denunciations of "the Protectorate." With this end in view the headquarters of the Mission were constantly watched by unostentatious pickets. The visit of any Egyptian of note was at once communicated to the press and became the subject of minatory comment. Moreover, the offender was liable to be subjected to a domiciliary visit in his own house from a group of students, demanding an explanation of his conduct, which generally ended in his making a profuse profession of his Nationalist faith and affirming that in his conversation with the Mission he had been careful in no wise to depart from it. Only in one or two cases did the person thus visited have the courage to tell the intruders to mind their own business. Meantime, the movements of members of the Mission were carefully followed, especially when any of us went into the provinces. Emissaries would be immediately despatched from Cairo to dog our footsteps, to try to prevent our getting into touch with the local people, especially the fellahin, and to arrange demonstrations calculated to impress us with the solidarity of Egyptian opinion.





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# (٤٧٣/٣٥٦)





The visit to Tanta of one member of the Mission led to serious riots, which continued for many days and were only quelled by the intervention of the military. These demonstrations naturally to some extent hampered our work. But they certainly failed in their main object, for it was impossible not to come to the conclusion that, if the Egyptians were really so unanimous as we were intended to think, we should have been left to find that out for ourselves by going about the country without let or hindrance.

It must not be supposed that the boycott of the Mission, carried out as it mainly was by students and schoolboys, was approved by educated Egyptians generally, or even by all those who held advanced Nationalist views. Rudeness to strangers appeared to them inconsistent with the courtesy and hospitality upon which all Egyptians pride themselves. Moreover, there were a large number of men who were really anxious to bring their views before the Mission, but were deterred from doing so by fear of the personal annoyance to which they might in consequence be exposed. It was, therefore, suggested to us in many quarters that, if only we would make it clear, that by appearing before the Mission a man did not necessarily compromise his position as a Nationalist, the barrier to free converse would be removed. We accordingly drew up the following declaration, which was published on the 29th December in the Official Journal and the press:—

> "The British Mission has been struck by the existence of a widespread belief that the object of its coming is to deprive Egypt of rights which it has hitherto possessed. There is no foundation whatever for this belief. The Mission has been sent out by the British Government, with the approval of Parliament, to reconcile the aspirations of the Egyptian people with the special interests which Great Britain has in Egypt and with the maintenance of the legitimate rights of all foreign residents in the country.
>
> "We are convinced that with goodwill on both sides this object is attainable, and it is the sincere desire of the Mission to see the relations of Great Britain and Egypt established on a basis of friendly accord which will put an end to friction and will enable the Egyptian people to devote the whole of their energies to the development of their country under self-governing institutions.
>
> "In pursuance of this task the Mission desires to hear all views, whether of representative bodies or individuals who have the welfare of their country at heart. All opinions may be freely expressed. There is no wish on the part of the Mission to restrict the area of discussion nor need any man fear to compromise his convictions by appearing before it. He will be no more compromised by expressing his opinions than the Mission will be compromised by hearing them. Without a perfectly frank discussion it is difficult to put an end to misunderstanding and arrive at agreement."

This declaration certainly had some effect in mitigating hostility, but it did not get over the reluctance of Egyptians generally to enter into formal relations with the Mission. We therefore made up our minds that, as far as Egyptian opinion was concerned, we must rely upon our individual opportunities of social intercourse with men of various classes to elicit it. As such opportunities constantly presented themselves, and as the people whom we thus met, and who certainly included most of the leaders of Egyptian opinion, expressed their views in private with the greatest frankness and unreserve, we succeeded during the three months of our stay in very thoroughly gauging the main currents of thought and feeling in the Egyptian world.

While a good deal of time was spent in these conversations, we were also busily engaged in studying the situation from an entirely different angle. In addition to the carefully prepared volumes of official documents drawn up for the instruction of the Mission by the Foreign Office, a very considerable amount of valuable evidence had been collected before our arrival by an Information Committee instituted by the High Commissioner, which had obtained the considered views, on many issues, of prominent officials, of unofficial residents and representative bodies. The study and collation of these views, which had been ably edited by the Secretary of the Committee, Captain B. A. Hooper, occupied some time.

While the perusal of this mass of documents was of the greatest assistance to us, we sought to supplement the information contained in them by getting into personal touch with as many members of the British community, official and unofficial, as we had time to see, as well as with the principal foreign residents, who, of course, had no hesitation about coming into open and constant contact with the Mission. The



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evidence and advice of the chief British officials were freely available to us from the first, and we are greatly indebted to them for the ready help they gave us. With their aid we were enabled not only to gain a fairly comprehensive view of recent events, but to make an exhaustive examination of the organisation and personnel of every department of the Egyptian Government. This work was divided up between sub-committees, who reported to the Mission, which also assembled in full strength to hear the views of the highest British officials, as well as those of Sir William Brunyate, the late Acting Financial Adviser to the Egyptian Government, who was present in Cairo during the latter part of our stay. Meantime, the legal member of the Mission, Mr. (now Sir Cecil) Hurst, while co-operating as far as possible in these activities, devoted the greater part of his time to enquiring into the judicial system and the modifications best adapted to bring it into harmony with present requirements. Similarly Sir Owen Thomas, besides serving on one of the sub-committees just referred to, paid special attention to the study of agricultural conditions, and visited a number of estates, public and private, to make himself familiar with the methods of cultivation and the life of the people. The whole Mission, with the exception of one member who was otherwise engaged, passed the inside of a week at Alexandria, where opportunity was afforded us of coming into contact with the important foreign communities of the great commercial centre of Egypt. We were there able to hear the views of the French, Italian and Greek, as well as of the British Chamber of Commerce. Many centres of activity in Upper and Lower Egypt were also visited by individual members of the Mission, who communicated their impressions to their colleagues, and, in spite of the endeavours already described to prevent our getting into direct contact with the local population, valuable experience was thus gained and placed on record.

Two of our number, General Sir John Maxwell and Sir Owen Thomas, also paid a visit of several weeks to the Sudan, and the impressions they brought back were a valuable supplement to the information we had already obtained from the evidence of British and native residents in that country, whom we had been able to see in Cairo.

The manifold activities which we have briefly summarised kept us all very busy during the months of January and February. Towards the end of the latter month, as the time available for our enquiries in Egypt was drawing to a close, since several of our members were obliged to be back in England before the end of March, we began to hold a number of meetings for the purpose of collating the information obtained and comparing the views which we had severally formed. It at once became apparent that, in view of the immense mass of material and the number of points requiring thorough discussion, it would be impossible for us to draw up a Report during the remainder of our time in Egypt, especially as interviews still occupied a good deal of it. The preparation of our Report had, therefore, necessarily to be deferred until after our return to England. At the same time these preliminary discussions revealed a remarkable unanimity between us on certain cardinal points, and we even drew up, before leaving Cairo, though only in outline and subject to such modifications as further discussion might suggest, a series of propositions in which we were all able provisionally to agree.

These propositions ranged over the whole field of our enquiry and have formed the groundwork of the present Report. It may, therefore, be convenient at this stage to review the results of our investigations in Egypt and the conclusions to which they had led us.

## II.

### Provisional Conclusions arrived at in Egypt.

### (A.)—*Causes of the Recent Disorders and Existing Unrest.*

#### 1. *Prior to the War.*

The disorders which broke out in March 1919 were brought to a climax by specific events connected with the war, but they can by no means be attributed solely to recent or contemporary conditions and the ground had been prepared through a long antecedent period.

It appears to be frequently assumed in current talk and writing in this country that Egypt is a part of the British Empire. This is not and never has been the case.



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The "special position" which Great Britain occupies in Egypt dates from her intervention in 1882 to restore order during the Arabi rebellion—an intervention in which the other Powers, though invited, declined to participate. This threw upon her responsibilities which she could not decline, and which could only be discharged by the occupation of the country, until at least there was a reasonable certainty that order would be maintained and the lives and property of foreign residents rendered secure. But at that time it was the declared intention of the British Government to evacuate the country so soon as these objects were accomplished, and in 1887 Sir Henry Drummond Wolff was despatched to Constantinople to prepare the way for evacuation. He drew up a Convention with the Sultan whereby Great Britain agreed to withdraw her troops from Egypt at the end of three years provided that there was then no new danger, external or internal, to require their retention, and provided further that she should have the right of reoccupying the country if any such danger arose. It was only at the last moment that the Sultan under foreign pressure withheld his signature and the negotiations fell through.

But, though Great Britain remained in Egypt, she did nothing during the next twenty-seven years either to legalise her own position or to disturb the theory that Egypt was an autonomous nationality under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey. Egypt was in theory governed by the Khedive, the Council of Egyptian Ministers, the Egyptian Legislative Council and Assembly; and the British Representative was in name merely "Agent and Consul-General," the exponent, like the Representatives of other Powers, of the views and wishes of his Government to the Government of Egypt. Though, in virtue of the Army of Occupation and of the numerous duties and responsibilities which circumstances gradually imposed on him, he came to be the real arbiter of the country, he was always studiously careful to observe this theory, and the observance of it was regarded by Egyptians as an implied pledge that the occupying Power did not intend to impair the national status of their country.

It was also so regarded by foreign Powers, and when the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 was concluded, a declaration was signed in London to the following effect:—

> "His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt. The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country, by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other manner."

This understanding would no doubt have served for all practical purposes, if European peace had been maintained. But with the outbreak of war and the entry of Turkey into the war on the side of the enemy, questions of extreme difficulty arose. Egyptians were nominally subjects of the Sultan of Turkey, owing allegiance to him and not to the British Crown. This was obviously an intolerable situation. But the mere abolition of Turkish suzerainty by an act of war would have deprived Egypt of any definite status and left her in the position of a former Turkish dependency in the hands of Great Britain. This difficulty might, of course, have been summarily disposed of by the annexation of Egypt to the British Empire, but the British Government deliberately chose a less drastic course which would afford security to Egypt, while leaving the principle of an Egyptian national entity unimpaired. This was to place Egypt under the protection of Great Britain. A proclamation was accordingly issued in the Official Journal on the 18th December, 1914:—

> "His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gives notice that in view of the state of war arising out of the action of Turkey, Egypt is placed under the protection of His Majesty, and will henceforth constitute a British Protectorate.
>
> "The suzerainty of Turkey over Egypt is thus terminated, and His Majesty's Government will adopt all measures necessary for the defence of Egypt and protect its inhabitants and interests."

On the following day a further proclamation was issued deposing Abbas Hilmi, the then Khedive, on the ground that he had adhered to the King's enemies, and announcing that the succession had been offered to and accepted by His Highness Prince Hussein Kamel, with the title of Sultan of Egypt.

It has been constantly asserted by Egyptian Nationalists that they understood the Protectorate to be merely a war measure, and the defence of Egypt promised under it in the second clause of the Proclamation to be limited to defence in the war. The wording of the Proclamation seems to us to offer no ground for this interpretation, but





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the Egyptians were certainly given to understand that efforts would be made at the end of the war to satisfy their national aspirations, and great pains were taken to assure them that their national status was not changed for the worse by the Protectorate. For example, in the telegram which he addressed to Sultan Hussein on his accession to the Sultanate, His Majesty the King used these words :—

> "On the occasion when your Highness enters upon your high office, I desire to convey to your Highness the expression of my most sincere friendship and the assurance of my unfailing support in safeguarding the integrity of Egypt, and in securing her future well-being and prosperity.
>
> "Your Highness has been called upon to undertake the responsibilities of your high office at a grave crisis in the national life of Egypt, and I feel convinced that you will be able, with the co-operation of your Ministers and the Protectorate of Great Britain, successfully to overcome all the influences which are seeking to destroy the independence of Egypt, and the wealth, liberty and happiness of its people."

It should be added that Egyptian Nationalists are able to point to a long series of declarations by British statesmen disowning the idea of annexing, or even permanently occupying, the country, and affirming, in the words of Sir Eldon Gorst, that "the fundamental idea" of the British Government "has been to prepare the Egyptians for self-government, while helping them in the meantime to enjoy the benefit of good government." Englishmen are aware of the circumstances which have till now prevented the fulfilment of these pledges, but they are naturally treasured by Egyptians and too easily made the ground of accusations of bad faith. It is necessary to bear them in mind, if we would understand the resentment of Egyptians at the common assumption that Egypt is a British possession or that the Protectorate has naturally made it so.

The situation in Egypt has therefore always remained an abnormal one since the British Occupation in 1882. In the initial stages, problems which appeared almost insuperable had been surmounted with remarkable success under an exceptionally able administrator, and as time went on, and the machine appeared superficially to be running smoothly, public opinion in Great Britain ceased to concern itself with the indefinite character of the situation. But in reality a settlement was becoming progressively more urgent, the more widely the influence of our presence in Egypt and the introduction of western methods made themselves felt. With the removal of that fear of oppression which in old days had made Egyptians acquiescent and submissive, new impulses and ambitions were inevitably aroused. The Egyptians of 1920, whether townsmen or peasants, are different people from those of 1910, and very different indeed from the Egyptians of 1890. We have never honestly faced the Egyptian problem, and our neglect to do so is in a measure responsible for the present situation.

The régime inaugurated by the late Lord Cromer to redeem a bankrupt administration was never more than a provisional one, because for many years there was no reason to believe that the Occupation, which we had in 1887 actually agreed to terminate, would be other than of brief duration. But provisional and extemporised expedients gradually hardened into established institutions and the stronger element in a combination of administrative forces tended to become the dominant one, to acquire powers and responsibilities not originally contemplated, and to restrict the Egyptian element in the public service to a secondary position. The policy pursued in the early days of the Occupation had been to engage a restricted number of carefully selected British officials to advise and assist, especially in the Finance and Irrigation services. A Judicial and Educational Adviser were, in due course, added, and later again an Adviser to the Interior, with a body of Inspectors for the Provinces. So long as their numbers were strictly limited, and only men of high capacity and experience were appointed, not only was the co-operation of British officials tolerated, but they were themselves regarded with esteem and affection.

As the resources at the disposal of Egypt increased the public services were greatly expanded, and with this expansion the obligation arose concurrently to add to the number of foreign assistants and experts. Thus, with the prolongation of the Occupation, the number of British officials in Egypt steadily increased, and the principle that the aim of the administration should be to train and equip Egyptians to manage their own affairs fell into the background. In spite of the fact that Egyptian Ministers have of recent years taken a greater part and a more direct interest in their departments than in the early days of the Occupation, when many of them were content with little more than an honorary position, the work of Under-Secretaries and heads of



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departments, for the most part non-Egyptian, has become increasingly independent of the Council of Ministers. A growing resentment at the number of posts monopolised by the British was noticed for a long period antecedent to the war. Egyptian officials of long experience and considerable competence felt that they were definitely excluded from rising to the highest positions in view of the system consecrated by prescription that a post once held by a non-Egyptian was, on its becoming vacant, automatically filled by a non-Egyptian.

Particular resentment was occasioned in Egypt at the time of the arrival of the Mission by a recent increase in the numbers of the British engaged for the public service. This increase, if it was greatly exaggerated by ill-informed rumour, was nevertheless appreciable, and affected also a few very subordinate offices hitherto filled by natives of the country. It may here be mentioned that the number of British officials has risen from a few hundred in the earlier years of the occupation to upwards of sixteen hundred at the present day, with scales of pay different from those enjoyed by the Egyptians. These higher scales, if amply justified by special circumstances, were readily represented as constituting a grievance.

Another feature of Egyptian life has undoubtedly contributed to the unrest. As British officials have increased in number they have more and more lived apart from the Egyptian community, and their chief residential quarter on the Island of Ghezireh has come to be a self-contained community, furnished, like an Indian cantonment, with a complete equipment for social intercourse, sport and physical exercise. This has added to the amenities of life for the official class, but it has withdrawn them from society with Egyptians and tended to create a British *enclave* from which Egyptians are excluded. We are aware of the difficulties on both sides which stand in the way of free and unembarrassed relations between men and women of different races and customs, but when the necessary allowance has been made it must, we think, be said that the increasing segregation of the British community, which has been a feature of recent years, has been a cause of estrangement between British and Egyptians and made the fact of an alien occupation more obtrusive than it need have been.

We have noticed with pleasure the cordial and intimate relations which many old residents in Egypt, and not a few senior officials and their wives, have established with their Egyptian neighbours, and we have seen much evidence of the value and influence of these friendships in the recent times of stress and difficulty. We are convinced that it would greatly help if more efforts were made to cultivate these neighbourly relations. The forms and conventions of conduct should be studied and carefully respected by British residents in Egypt and visitors to Egypt. It should be realised, especially by the latter, that altogether disproportionate harm may be done by offences against good taste which, though trivial in themselves, cause comment and scandal. It should, in general, be the aim of the British residents and visitors to break down the barriers that exist rather than to create new ones, to enter as far as possible into the life of the Egyptian people, to learn enough of their language to make social contact possible and agreeable, and to avoid the minor causes of offence which in the aggregate become mischievous.

On the other hand, a criticism not infrequently heard that the quality of the British officials has deteriorated does not seem to us to be justified. There are many officials of high capacity in Egypt to-day, as there were in former times men of exceptional and others of only moderate calibre. But the critical sense of the Egyptians has been greatly developed by progress and contact with other countries, and they have become more exacting than the older generation with regard to standards of efficiency.

Again, since the retirement in 1907 of Lord Cromer, there have been no less than five British Agents or High Commissioners, and Egypt has felt herself to some extent a field for successive experiments. The result of these repeated changes, due to the accident of circumstances, tended to increase the independence of the permanent British officials, who were more concerned with departmental efficiency than with questions of policy, while to Egyptian observers they conveyed an impression of uncertainty and instability.

Another contributory cause of the general discontent was the manifest insuccess of educational policy resulting in the production of an unnecessarily large and ever-increasing number of candidates for official posts, provided with examination certificates, but destitute of any real educational culture. It was necessary in the initial stage to train a number of young men to such a standard of efficiency as would enable them to undertake clerical duties in State departments which had hitherto been largely performed by non-Egyptians, and to prepare pupils for the higher colleges of medicine, law and engineering. But here again there seems, until quite recently, to have been





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little attempt to revise a system adopted under exceptional circumstances or to realise that changing conditions required new methods. Education, for which there is a real and crying demand among the people, remains atrophied. The mass of the population is not only still illiterate, but without social or moral training. The only real education in the higher sense available in the country itself is provided by religious or benevolent institutions, controlled for the most part by the French or Americans, or by the admirable Victoria College, which owes its institution to the British residents at Alexandria. In spite of these criticisms, however, it must be admitted that the general level of instruction has greatly advanced since the early years of the Occupation, and that the number of those capable of taking an intelligent interest in public affairs is very much larger to-day.

Nationalist propaganda has been at work for many years in Egypt. The evolution of a sane and moderate Nationalist spirit might have been regarded with sympathy and interest, and, indeed, the late Lord Cromer had hopes that it might be turned to good account. But unfortunate political rivalries among the Western Powers led it from the first to assume an anti-British colour. The Nationalists were alternately encouraged and opposed by the ex-Khedive for his own personal aims. Their ranks were swelled by the members of a thoroughly dissatisfied civil service, who regarded the presence of the British as a bar to promotion, and who were further discouraged by a system of selection which made it possible for the influential to secure the preferment of relations and dependents. The increasing number of the students who look only to State employment as a reward for the often real sacrifices made in order to qualify for it, and who regard their prospects of obtaining any appointment as diminished by the competition of the foreigner, made them a ready instrument for such propaganda in the provinces.

Finally, there is the latent but ever-present impatience of the Moslem with Christian rule. That a Mohammedan should occupy a position of political subordination to a Christian is opposed to the essential spirit of Islam, and the sentiment which this spirit has engendered survives long after strong religious feeling has been greatly attenuated, or even become altogether extinct. Its existence no doubt exercised an influence in creating a prejudice which the religious element would make the most of against the name of Protectorate, interpreted as implying the permanent subjection of a Mahommedan Ruler and State to a Christian Sovereign. There is in the East a patriotism of religion which is an even more fundamental sentiment than the patriotism of home and tradition.

2. *During the War.*

Such were the influences which had long been active when in 1914 Turkey, the seat of the Caliphate, entered the war as the enemy of the occupying Power, and German agents freely promised the liberation of Egypt from British control after the final victory which they confidently predicted. In these circumstances, and in view of the spirit of hostility towards the occupying Power which had been gathering volume over a number of years, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief in Egypt was no doubt well advised, in the Proclamation announcing the state of war with Turkey, to make it clear that Great Britain took upon herself "the sole burden of the present war without calling on the Egyptian people for aid therein." It is, however, only just to record that, whatever may have been the hopes or anticipations raised by the war in a certain section of the Egyptians, the obligations and disabilities which it entailed upon the people were borne with patience and goodwill; that the services rendered by the Egyptian Labour Corps were of inestimable value and indispensable to the campaign in Palestine; and that the Sultan's Government supported the British authorities in a spirit of the most cordial co-operation, evidenced among other things by their writing off the suspense account under which Egypt would have been entitled to reclaim advances of 3 millions sterling.

So far we have only dealt with the causes of unrest in Cairo and the larger centres during the period preceding the riots which broke out in March 1919. It remains to consider the reasons which affected the fellahin and made them susceptible to nationalist agitation and propaganda.

Unrest among the educated classes in Egypt was, as has already been pointed out, manifest long before the crisis of 1919. But that it should have spread to the fellahin, and should have led to outbreaks of savage violence among a class, which has derived such immense benefits from the British Occupation, needs explaining.

In the first place, it may be laid down that the agitation among the fellahin was of a far more partial character than has been generally supposed, and that disorders were confined to the neighbourhood of large centres and to districts along the main lines of communication. In remoter villages, less readily accessible to propagandists



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



and agitators, little disposition was shown by the small farmers to take part in any such movement. Where disorders occurred, it was generally the railways which became the object of aggression, and there is reason to believe that the attacks upon them were carried out in pursuance of a pre-existing plan for a Germano-Turkish attack on the Canal, supported by a simultaneous rising in Egypt. This would account for certain indications of concerted action revealed in the disturbances of March 1919.

There is some evidence to show that discontent was stimulated by the controlled price of cotton, which denied the cultivator the advantage of competing in foreign markets, while the rent of his land continued to advance. But the more obvious factors arising out of the war to alienate his goodwill were: (*a*) The recruiting for the Egyptian Labour and Camel Transport Corps; (*b*) the requisition of domestic animals; (*c*) the requisition of cereals; (*d*) the collections for the Red Cross Fund. In each case it was not so much the measures themselves that were resented as the manner in which they were carried out.

As regards (*a*), the recruiting for the Egyptian Labour and Camel Transport Corps, it seems evident that once enrolled the men were, as a rule, satisfied with the conditions, and that the wages paid were of great benefit to the poorer classes of the population. The hospital accommodation provided for them does not seem to have been altogether satisfactory, and there were evidently among their officers many ignorant of their language and without experience in handling them. But their readiness to re-enlist again and again, and the fact that those actually serving gave no trouble during the events of March 1919, shews that grievances against the service were not serious. So long as the Labour Corps was locally raised from volunteers arrangements worked satisfactorily. There was some discontent at the prolongation of service beyond the contractual period after recruiting was taken over by a military organisation. But it was after the voluntary system had ceased to supply a sufficient number of recruits, and when administrative pressure was applied to obtain them, that abuses began. In view of the announcement made at the outbreak of war with Turkey hat Egyptians would not be required to take part in it, the voluntary system was maintained in name, but measures of compulsion were applied by the Omdehs, the unpaid administrative officers in the country districts, to whom recruiting was entrusted without supervision by British officials, most of whom had been recalled for duties elsewhere. There is no doubt that unscrupulous Omdehs took advantage of the position, sending their enemies to serve, while letting off their friends, and accepting bribes for exemptions and substitutions. In some cases measures resembling those of the press gang were adopted, and British pressure was asserted as the excuse for them. As to the extent of the abuses there seems to be some conflict of opinion. But they were frequent enough to cause much discontent in certain regions, and gave the political agitator his opportunity.

As regards (*b*), the requisition of domestic animals, though the fellah was often hardly hit by the removal of his means of transport, prices which were good at the time seem to have been paid when the animals were taken. On the other hand the prices at which they could be bought back at the end of the war were often considerably higher. While the fellahin were naturally most unwilling to part with their animals, there does not appear to have been much real ground for grievance on account of these requisitions, inevitable in a state of war. But they naturally would not tend to increase goodwill towards those held responsible for them.

A more fertile source of discontent was (*c*), the requisition of cereals. Owing to the demand for the army prices advanced, and market rates were considerably higher than requisition rates. Districts were assessed to furnish a given quantity, and the collection was left to local officials, who derived large profits from the transaction. Not only did Omdehs collect larger amounts than they were required to furnish at requisition rates and sell the balance at the higher market rate, but individuals who possessed no wheat had to buy their quota at market rates and hand it over at the lower requisition rate. The process of verification and repayment was slow, and it appears to be substantiated from the evidence submitted that the provincial officials retained the sums received to make payments in their own hands for long periods, and that Omdehs and Sheikhs, who were entrusted with sums in bulk for distribution, in many cases held back a portion of these moneys. The local officials were mainly responsible for the abuses which occurred, but they were attributed to the British, who, under the exceptional conditions prevailing, were unable to control them.

As regards (*d*), the collections for the Red Cross Fund, these were organised locally by Egyptian Mamurs and Omdehs, and while intended to be voluntary, were, in practice, frequently made compulsory by officials seeking to acquire merit by the





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amounts which their districts contributed. There was a current belief in the country that only a portion of the total amount collected reached its real destination. It is open to question whether it was prudent or opportune, under the special conditions prevailing in Egypt, where the opposition of Cross and Crescent was inevitably emphasised, to do more than notify the opening of a fund for the aid of the wounded, to which many wealthy Egyptians and resident foreigners would no doubt have responded. To entrust the collection to local Egyptian officials was inevitably to open the door to abuses, entailing additional pressure on the poorer classes, with whom many other circumstances made the war unpopular. It should be added that the Joint Committee of the British Red Cross and the Order of St. John, after the close of the war, assigned upwards of a 100,000*l.* for the relief of victims of the war in the Egyptian Labour Corps and their families.

In addition to the specific grievances, to which attention has been drawn, there was in Egypt also an unprecedented and progressive rise in prices, especially the necessaries of life, such as corn, clothing and fuel, which weighed heavily on the poorer classes, whose wages were quite inadequate to meet the enhanced cost of living, while they saw a limited number of their countrymen and the unpopular foreigner making large fortunes. A family of four—a man, his wife and two small children—could not, at the beginning of 1919, obtain a sufficiency of food except at a cost which considerably exceeded the ordinary rate of wages.

These various factors had contributed by the end of 1918 to create a condition of discontent and unrest among the fellahin and some loss of confidence in the benefits of British administration. There was thus a favourable field in which the agitator could work. The fellah had seen no British officials for a long period, and none had intervened to protect him from inequitable demands. Even before the war, the once familiar figure of the British inspector riding through the fields and stopping to listen to the small farmer's claims and grievances had almost disappeared, and motor-cars conveyed the hurried official from one administrative centre to another. His disappearance made it easier to believe reports which were spread of the imminent departure of the British, when the land would be divided among the fellahin, with an unrestricted water supply and no taxation. There is also reason to believe, though there are no grounds for suspecting the leaders of the Nationalist Party of their inspiration, that highly-coloured and wholly imaginary accounts of outrages committed on native women by British soldiers and murderous assaults on the villages were circulated by unprincipled agitators, and that a spirit of vindictive resentment was thus aroused, which culminated in the brutal murders of British soldiers at Deirut.

The death of Sultan Hussein in 1917 had removed from the scene a ruler of character and ability, who thoroughly understood his own countrymen. He had accepted the onerous position of the first Sultan of Egypt as a not too welcome duty, and had loyally and courageously co-operated in the difficult task of administering a Moslem State in occupation by a Christian Power at war with the Sovereign who represented the Caliphate of Islam. He had to a great extent lived down the unpopularity which his substitution for his nephew had at first aroused, and enjoyed the general regard of all classes. His successor, who had been educated in Italy, found himself from the first in a much weaker position as regards his own countrymen, on whom he had as yet little hold. With the best will in the world, therefore, he could have little influence in stemming the rising tide of anti-British sentiment which was gathering strength.

### 3. *After the War.*

In the preceding pages we have endeavoured to describe the internal situation in Egypt up to the concluding phases of the war. It will now be more readily understood why the principles enunciated by President Wilson and approved by the Allies produced an immediate and decisive effect on Egyptian opinion. The acceptance of the idea of self-determination appeared to give international sanction to sentiments which had long been maturing among the educated classes.

Those in Egypt who had anticipated, and would at one time even have welcomed, a German and Turkish victory, now found a favourable opportunity for shifting their ground. This section now claimed that by contributing morally and materially to the victory of the Allies Egypt had herself been instrumental in throwing off all that was left of the Turkish yoke.

At the same time the voice of moderate opinion in Egypt also began to urge that the time had come to assert a claim to self-government consistent with the repeated declarations of British statesmen regarding the provisional character of our intervention. It was genuinely felt that the attitude of the country as a whole during the war, the co-operation of the Sultan and his Ministers, and the conspicuous sacrifices



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which the Egyptian people had been called upon to make, entitled them to the particular consideration of Great Britain. The idea of definitely regulating the relations between Great Britain and Egypt had, indeed, already been mooted by Rushdi Pasha, the Prime Minister, at the end of 1917.

This movement received great encouragement from the publication, in the beginning of November 1918, of the Anglo-French declaration regarding Syria and Mesopotamia, which announced that Great Britain and France contemplated the complete and definitive enfranchisement of the peoples liberated from Turkish oppression and the institution among them of national Governments deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the people themselves. The High Commissioner (Sir R. Wingate) did not fail to point out that the policy indicated in this declaration would have its repercussion in Egypt. Moreover, the Egyptians had recently witnessed the establishment of an independent kingdom in Arabia, which they had always regarded as far behind their own half-occidentalised country in civilisation and development.

At the very moment when these ideas were being widely discussed, public opinion was greatly stirred by the revelation of a confidential memorandum, which was interpreted as denying to Egypt the privileges of self-government advocated for other less advanced communities. A special commission to consider constitutional reform had been nominated at the beginning of 1918, and Sir Wm. Brunyate, the Acting Financial Adviser, was requested by this commission to draw up a note to serve as a basis for their discussions. He was invited, in particular, to examine the principle of giving the foreign colonies some share in the legislation of the country, which might render more acceptable to the Powers the surrender of the practical veto exercised by them under the Capitulations over a considerable field of legislation. Sir Wm. Brunyate's note gave great offence to the Prime Minister, to whom it was presented in the middle of November 1918, and, though intended only as a basis for confidential discussion, its contents became generally known. A storm of protest was aroused by a project which was interpreted as assigning only consultative functions to an Egyptian Legislative Assembly, while bestowing all legislative power on a Senate in which the officially-nominated members and a group of elected foreigners would constitute the majority.

Simultaneously with the commission above referred to, another commission had been sitting for many months to consider the judicial reforms which would become necessary in the event of the abolition of the Capitulations. Although this commission had issued no report, a general impression prevailed that it contemplated the super-session of the Mixed Tribunals by new Courts in which the English language and British legal procedure would predominate—a measure which would entail disabilities on the native Bar and paralyse the foreign advocates who had hitherto used the French language. This assumption tended to confirm the hostility of the legal profession to any extended affirmation of British control.

On the 13th November, 1918, Zaghlul Pasha, with two other leaders of the advanced Nationalist group, paid a visit to the High Commissioner and expressed their desire to go to London in order to put forward a programme of "complete autonomy" for Egypt. Simultaneously, the Prime Minister, Rushdi Pasha, proposed that he should himself, together with Adli Pasha Yeghen, the Minister of Education, proceed to London to discuss the affairs of Egypt, a plan which he stated had the full approval of the Sultan. The contention of these Ministers was that the Peace Congress would give official consecration to the Protectorate, and that therefore its nature could not be left undefined. Under the Turkish suzerainty Egypt had had certain rights, and they desired to know what their rights would be as against Great Britain under the Protectorate.

Sir R. Wingate reported these proposals to the Foreign Office, and was informed in reply that "no useful purpose would be served by allowing Nationalist leaders to come to London," and that the visit of the two Ministers would not be "opportune" at that moment. The Foreign Secretary explained that, owing to the fact that he and other Ministers would be absent from London in connection with the peace negotiations, they would "not be able to devote sufficient time and attention to problems of Egyptian internal reform." In these circumstances the Ministers were invited to "defer their visit." Rushdi Pasha gave the High Commissioner to understand that he regarded the refusal of His Majesty's Government to give him an immediate hearing as involving an interpretation of the meaning of the Protectorate to which he could not agree and tendered his resignation. There were no doubt obvious difficulties in the way of discussing such questions with the Egyptian Ministers at a moment of high political pressure, when the Peace Conference was about to open, but it would appear





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



that, in spite of the insistence with which the High Commissioner appealed for their reception, the real urgency of dealing with the Egyptian problem at that critical moment had not been realised.

Every effort was made to induce Rushdi Pasha to withdraw his resignation, and a prospective date for the eventual visit of the Ministers was indicated. But the position of the Nationalists had now become so strong in Egypt that the Ministers were only willing to go if Zaghlul Pasha and his friends were allowed to do the same. As it was not considered expedient to permit this, they adhered to their resignation, and the High Commissioner was instructed to come to England himself to report on the situation.

The result of these events was that a number of the Moderate Party joined the advanced Nationalists, who now advocated a more far-reaching policy, while their agents initiated a violent anti-British campaign throughout the country, where, owing to the calls of the flag, only a relatively small number of British officials remained.

While the proposed visit of Egyptian Ministers to London was still under consideration in the beginning of 1919, a document was addressed to the foreign representatives and residents in Egypt announcing the constitution of a "Delegation" of twelve members, under the chairmanship of Zaghlul Pasha, which proposed to lay the legitimate aspirations of Egypt before other countries. The majority of the Delegation were identical with those included in a Nationalist Committee of fourteen formed at the end of the preceding year.

On the 3rd March the Delegation above referred to presented to the Sultan a petition which was generally interpreted as an attempt to intimidate His Highness and deter him from appointing a new Government. This proceeding was felt to be a challenge which could not be declined, and Sir Milne Cheetham, acting for the High Commissioner, decided with the approval of the British Government to deport Zaghlul Pasha and three of his most active adherents to Malta. This gave rise to renewed agitation and protest, beginning with anti-British demonstrations on the part of students in Cairo which quickly necessitated military intervention. Similar outbreaks were soon reported from the provinces. On the 12th March disturbances broke out at Tanta and were quelled by the military, not, however, without bloodshed. By the 14th and 15th March the trouble had spread to most of the Delta provinces, where attempts to interrupt communications had become general. Looting, pillaging, attacks on British troops, and murders of British soldiers and civilians were reported from many quarters. On the 16th the railway and telegraphic communication between Cairo and the Delta, as well as with Upper Egypt, was broken. By the 18th the provinces of Behera, Gharbia, Menufia and Dakhalia were in a state of open revolt. Upper Egypt and the foreigners living there were completely cut off, while the fanaticism of the insurgents culminated the same day in the murder at Deirut of two British officers and five other ranks and of an English Inspector of Government Prisons in the Assiut–Minia train. By the 26th March, however, the situation, from a purely military point of view, had become stabilised. The main railway and telegraphic communications had been re-established and the necessary dispositions of troops had been made for their adequate protection. Mobile columns had been moved in various directions to control the more violent areas, to arrest and bring to justice those responsible for the excesses, and to re-establish civil control. The outlying centres of disturbance in the south had been relieved and the first and most dangerous phase of the disorders was over.

Thus, within a week from the deportation of Zaghlul Pasha and his associates, a movement anti-British and even anti-European had assumed grave proportions. It was a national movement backed by the sympathy of all classes and creeds among the Egyptian population, including the Copts, and on the part of its more fanatical adherents it took the form of the systematic destruction of property and communications, with an increasing disregard for human life. Responsible though the Delegation undoubtedly was for the organisation of the original demonstrations out of which the movement grew, its more responsible members soon became alarmed at the development of a situation which rapidly passed out of their control and fell into the hands of irresponsible extremists, supported by a certain number of undesirable foreign elements.

The Commander-in-Chief in Egypt, Field-Marshal Lord Allenby, had left to join the Peace Conference at Paris on the 12th March. He was, however, back again in Cairo by the 25th, having been in the meantime appointed Special High Commissioner during the absence of Sir R. Wingate, the High Commissioner, in England. His instructions were to "restore law and order" and "to administer in all matters as may be required by the necessity of maintaining the King's Protectorate on a secure and equitable basis." The military measures which had been taken had rendered the



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situation outwardly calm. But there was little diminution of anti-British sentiment, which was now chiefly manifested against the military element, whose behaviour during the repression of disorder was speciously misrepresented. Lawyers and students continued to strike, and many officials absented themselves from their duties.

The conciliatory disposition adopted by the Special High Commissioner in addressing a group of notables who visited him by invitation did not prevent the outbreak on the 2nd April of a general strike, which had, however, practically subsided by the 6th. Meanwhile, in pursuance of his policy of conciliation, Lord Allenby, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, completely removed the embargo on the departure of Egyptians desiring to travel, a measure which carried with it the release from Malta of Zaghlul Pasha and his three associates. Thus, within a month of their deportation, the policy then adopted was reversed, and the leaders of the movement became free either to return to Egypt or to proceed elsewhere to renew their campaign of agitation.

Such, in brief, was the course of events in the first four months of the year 1919. It is obvious, after the event, that Egyptian Ministers should have been encouraged to come to London when they proposed to do so, and Sir Reginald Wingate, whose advice on this subject was fully justified by the sequel, would have done well, in our opinion, to urge his views with even greater insistency. After this initial mistake events moved more rapidly in Egypt than the Administration appear to have realised. The consequences of deporting the Nationalist leaders were not rightly estimated, and the revoking of that measure, after serious disturbances had taken place, necessarily gave the impression that British policy was wavering and liable to quick changes under the pressure of agitation. In the next stage, punitive measures for the murder of British officers and other outrages committed during the rebellion became a necessity, and though carried out, on the whole, with moderation, they inevitably prolonged the period of exasperation. The Administration endeavoured to conciliate Egyptian sentiment by transferring a large number of the trials, after the most urgent cases had been dealt with by martial law, to the ordinary tribunals, but by this time Nationalist opinion had hardened, and the almost invariable result was that evidence ceased to be forthcoming and that the accused were acquitted. In the meantime, Zaghlul Pasha and his colleagues had, on their release from Malta, proceeded to Paris, in the hope of obtaining a hearing for Egypt's claim to independence from the Peace Conference. On failing to achieve this object, they devoted all their energies to obtaining foreign support for their cause, and an emissary was despatched to America to canvass opinion in the United States. At the same time, their adherents in Egypt worked with the greatest industry to complete their organisation, collecting large sums of money and extending their propaganda to all parts of the country. Their activities in this latter sphere were largely concentrated upon the exploitation of the existing conditions of industrial unrest, resulting in a succession of more or less serious strikes. By this time it had been announced that the British Government intended to send the Special Mission to Egypt, but, having made up their minds that its object would be the extinction of Egyptian nationality, the agitators concentrated their attention on limiting the sphere of its activities by an organised boycott.

(B.)—*The Nationalist Movement and Egyptian Aspirations.*

Enough has been said to explain the rapid growth of the Nationalist movement. It is more difficult to give, within a reasonable compass, a correct and at the same time intelligible analysis of its real nature and objects.

It has been said, that "every Egyptian worth his salt is at heart a Nationalist." This is only true of the educated and semi-educated classes, who constitute less than 10 per cent. of the fourteen million inhabitants of Egypt. It would be meaningless as applied to the 92 per cent. of illiterates and especially to the fellahin, who are two-thirds of the whole people. The turbulent crowds of the great towns may indeed be easily worked up to excitement by political catchwords, which they vociferate without understanding. But the fellahin, as a body, are normally very indifferent to politics. They are a primitive peasantry, living on the land and by the land, to which they are passionately devoted, and from which, though working with rude instruments and with little aid from agricultural science, they raise by their matchless industry and perfect knowledge of the soil those wonderful crops which are the bed-rock of Egyptian prosperity. Their whole interest in life centres in these crops and in the regular supply of Nile water, without which their fields would be barren. But while their outlook remains limited their independence has developed, and they are far more tenacious of their rights than in the old days of despotism.





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٨٢ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٣٦٧)





The fellahin, when left alone, are not unfriendly to the British. No doubt they do not love any foreigner, and as fervent Moslems they start with a certain antipathy to any Christian. But, in the case of the British, these initial prejudices have to a large extent been overcome by experience of the integrity and kindliness of the general run of British officials and by the manifest improvement which their presence has wrought in the condition of rural Egypt. It is true that a new generation, which has never known the evils of the old régime, is less grateful to us than were their fathers, by whom these evils were vividly remembered. But the fellahin, though much less helpless and submissive than in former times, have still cause to dread the rapacity of landowners and the bullying and extortion of a good number of native officials, and against these dangers they feel that British influence affords them a certain protection. Those unfortunate incidents of the war period, to which we have already alluded, shook for a time their confidence in our justice and good-will, and were predisposing causes of the savage outbreak of anti-British feeling in the spring of 1919. But these excesses were abnormal and short-lived. Except where they are directly stirred up by agitation from the towns, the fellahin appear to be once more reasonably well disposed to those British people whom they know, and who know how to handle them. We were greatly struck by the evidence of a number of our countrymen, official and unofficial, living in close contact with the Egyptian peasantry, who affirmed that the bitter feeling of the last year or two had now subsided, and that Englishmen who conducted themselves properly were as welcome as ever in the countryside.

But it is idle to hope that the comparatively satisfactory attitude of the peasantry will long be maintained, if our relations with the middle and upper classes of their countrymen continue as strained as at present. Nationalism has, for the time being at any rate, established complete dominance over all that is vocal and articulate in Egypt. From the Princes of the Sultan's family down to the children of the primary schools, the men of property, the professional men, the religious teachers, the *literati*, the journalists, the students and school-boys have all, more or less willingly, been swept into the Nationalist movement. Most serious of all, perhaps, it now permeates the official class and the upper ranks of the army. Discipline and official decorum may prevent their sympathies finding open expression —the attitude of Egyptian officials towards the Mission was always courteous and correct—but in their hearts they are mostly strong Nationalists, and the influence radiating from them is all in the same direction. It is inconceivable that the sentiment of their social superiors of every class, of all the men who make opinion, should not in the long run profoundly affect the mass of the people. No doubt Nationalism as a political creed has little attraction for these unlettered millions, though they can easily be taught to repeat its catchwords. But then it is not so much by abstract political arguments that the extremist agitator seeks to win their support, as by the constant vilification of everything British and by subtly attributing every local disaster and every personal grievance to the malignity or incompetence of British officials. This campaign of mendacious denigration is carried on by many agencies, by preachers in the mosques, by country-bred students returning for the holidays, by all but a few organs of the Arabic press. It is true that the fellah cannot, as a rule, read himself, but he can always be read to, and if everything that is spoken or written to influence him points the same way, the falsehoods so sedulously instilled cannot fail ultimately to poison his mind.

We make allowance for the fact that at the time of our visit anti-British clamour was exceptionally intense. It was no doubt artificially stimulated by the more extreme section in order to impress us. And no man of any experience in such matters would mistake the extravagances of a political agitation at fever pitch for the deliberate expression of the mind of a people. But it is a significant fact, that, while many Egyptians undoubtedly disapproved of the excesses of this agitation, very few, who were not compelled to do so by their official position, made any effort to stem them. Men of standing, whatever their personal views, were much too nervous of appearing to be out of sympathy with national "aspirations" to exercise any moderating or restraining influence. No one would have dared to say that he was in favour of the "Protectorate," or that he was not in favour of "complete independence." To all outward appearance, independent opinion was solidly Nationalist. And in our judgment it is likely to remain so.

The position is undoubtedly a serious one, and in face of this solid phalanx of opposition it might seem at first sight as if we had no choice but either to abandon our position in Egypt altogether, or to maintain it by sheer force, in the teeth of the general and ever-increasing hostility of the Egyptian people. But a closer study of



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



the problem led us to take a more hopeful view. From many and intimate conversations with representative Egyptians, including some who were commonly regarded as extreme Nationalists, the conviction was borne in upon us, that they were not so intransigeant, and certainly not so anti-British, as the frantic diatribes of the press might have led us to suppose. The broad banner of Nationalism was seen to cover many shades of opinion, and, above all, most notable differences of temper and of aim. Undoubtedly there are a number of Nationalists whose fundamental hatred of all foreign, and especially all British, control leads them to commit, or at any rate sympathise with, acts of lawlessness and crime. Not only are their aims wholly incompatible with any sort of understanding between British and Egyptians, but they are prepared to pursue them by methods which nothing could justify and which no Government could do otherwise than strive to repress. They are deliberately encouraging a system of terrorism, which is intended to render any co-operation between British and Egyptians impossible in the future.

The untoward events of the last few years in Egypt itself and the restless and revolutionary spirit throughout the whole world, which has had a strong repercussion in that country, have undoubtedly been grist to the mill of this extreme section and have given a more sinister character to the Nationalist movement. No wonder that, under these circumstances, Nationalism has appeared to many British people on the spot, and perhaps to even more at home, to be synonymous with violent Anglophobia and to be aiming at the complete subversion of the existing system of government in Egypt.

But we were satisfied, even before leaving Cairo, that it would be a profound mistake to take this sweeping view. It would be wrong to allow the impressions of a period of turbulence, like the preceding twelve months, to blind us to what is reasonable and legitimate in the aspirations of Egyptian Nationalism. Such an indiscriminating attitude could only tend to drive moderate men more and more into the camp of the Extremists and to convert the present deplorable friction between British and Egyptians, which is not incapable of being remedied, into bitter and enduring hostility. Violence and disorder must, of course, be suppressed, and here let us say that the measures taken to that end during our stay in Egypt were as temperate as they were effective. The necessity of continuing to maintain Martial Law in Egypt is regrettable, but under Lord Allenby Martial Law was being administered with the minimum of severity or of disturbance to the normal course of justice and the everyday life of the people. The duty of promptly suppressing violence and disorder must not, however, lead us to confound all those who are in a greater or less degree opposed to the existing system of government with the pronounced revolutionaries, or simple criminals, who were responsible for the outbreak of the spring of 1919 and the sporadic acts of violence which have been perpetrated since. In talking to many men who professed Nationalist opinions—and indeed it was difficult to find anyone who repudiated all sympathy with them—we encountered a very different spirit from that which found expression in such detestable outrages. These men denounced the resort to violence, or open rebellion, as not only criminal, but useless. Great Britain—such was the general view—was more than strong enough to keep Egypt in permanent subjection, if she preferred unwilling subjects to friendly and grateful allies. For they all recognised, with more or less warmth and spontaneity, the great benefits which Great Britain had conferred upon Egypt, while most of them also recognised that Egypt still stood in need of British assistance, not only in the work of internal reconstruction, but for her defence against foreign interference, and the danger of once more becoming the arena of international rivalry and intrigue. They all, without exception, admitted that Great Britain had a very special interest in Egypt, as the central link in her communications with her Eastern Empire and the Australasian Dominions, and a perfect right to safeguard these communications from any danger of interruption. But was it necessary for the fulfilment of these objects to deprive Egypt of her independence, to try to convert her into an integral part of the British Empire, and to run counter to the ineradicable desire of the Egyptians to take their place, as a distinct people, among the nations of the world? Would not an orderly and friendly Egypt, in intimate association with Great Britain, serve British purposes as well, or even better, while removing all sense of grievance and all spirit of revolt on the Egyptian side? Moreover, was not such a consummation the only one consistent with the avowed policy of Great Britain, with her reiterated declarations, that it was not her intention to appropriate Egypt, or to incorporate her in the British Empire, but to make her capable of standing on her own feet? In the sincerity of these declarations they had long believed, but were now ceasing to believe. After nearly forty years of British occupation, they seemed





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to be not nearer to, but distinctly further from, the goal at which Great Britain had professed to be aiming. With our continued insistence on the Protectorate, which they all regarded as implying the permanent subjection of their country, Great Britain had definitely departed from her original policy, and, in fact, broken her word. They had accepted the Protectorate, when it was first declared, as a necessity of the moment. Great Britain, being at war with Turkey, had not unreasonably severed the remaining links between Turkey and Egypt, and something had immediately to be substituted for the former Turkish suzerainty. The Protectorate was thus justified as a temporary expedient, but at the end of the war they had always expected that Great Britain would proceed to regulate her relations with Egypt in a manner more consistent with her declarations, with her real interests, and with her honour. Instead of that, they now saw nothing before them but the permanent loss of their nationality, of their existence as a people. They were to become a "British Colony," to be British subjects. Against that they appealed, and would continue to appeal, to the British sense of justice and in the last resort to the sympathy of the whole civilised world.

(C.)—*Future Policy.*

Such, we believe, is a fair statement of the average opinion of Egyptian Nationalists. The violence, unfairness and unreason of the more extreme and noisy section have given to the whole movement an appearance of intransigeance which, in our opinion, is not essential or necessarily enduring. The remarkable organisation known as the *Wafd* ("Delegation") which, under the leadership of Zaghlul Pasha, has established, for the time being at least, so complete an ascendancy over the Egyptian public, and claims, not without many credentials, to speak in the name of "the nation," does not consist mainly of extreme men. Its members were drawn largely from the ranks of the old *Hisb el Umma*, which, in contrast to the *Hisb el Watani*, the real revolutionary and anti-British party, stood for gradual and constitutional progress. It is true that in face of an attitude on our part which seemed to them to present a blank negative to all their hopes, Zaghlul and his associates have, until quite recently, been drifting steadily to the left. But in our experience, it only needed some effort to understand their point of view and to remove their suspicions of the intentions of Great Britain, in order to get many of the Zaghlulists to discuss the situation in a perfectly reasonable spirit. And the same is naturally true of men of even more moderate views, like the ex-Ministers Rushdi, Adli and Sarwat Pashas, who, while sympathising with the ideals of Nationalism, had never actually joined the *Wafd*. In such discussions, when once we had got away from phrases and formulæ and come to grips with the practical difficulties of the problem, it soon became apparent that there were many shades and varieties of opinion among Egyptians. The one thing common to them all was the desire to preserve their nationality, their distinctive character as a people.

It is evident from what has been said that any effort at reconciliation between British and Egyptians, any policy which seriously attempts to bring the more moderate and friendly elements of Egyptian Nationalism once more on to our side, must take account of this deeply-rooted feeling. No grant to Egypt of a greater or less measure of "self-government," even if it went the length of what is known as "Dominion Home Rule," would meet the case, because Egyptians do not regard their country as a British Dominion or themselves as British subjects. This wholly differentiates the problem of constitutional development in Egypt from the same problem in countries which have for years indubitably formed part of the British Empire, as, for instance, British India. We talk of such countries gradually attaining the status of nationhood. The Egyptians claim that they already have this status. No settlement of the future of Egypt which does not recognise this claim is ever likely to be accepted by—it can only be imposed on—the Egyptian people.

As against these considerations, we have the patent fact that Egypt, though not actually a part of the British Empire, is of vital importance to our whole Imperial system, and that that country under British guidance has attained a new level of civilisation, from which it would be disastrous to allow it to relapse. To reconcile the defence of these interests—Egyptian as well as British—with the recognition of the national status of Egypt is no easy matter. And the problem seems, at first sight, to be further complicated, though on a closer study it may turn out to be really simplified, by the exceptionally strong position which the foreign Colonies, other than the British, occupy in Egypt. In no other Eastern country are there so many resident Europeans, enjoying such special privileges or filling so many important posts in commerce, in education, in the professions, in society and even in the Govern-



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# (٤٧٣/٣٧٠)



ment departments. The great towns, especially Alexandria, are to a large extent Europeanised, and in a certain sense Egypt will always remain an international country. No solution of the Egyptian problem can be enduring unless it provides for the security of the great European interests, which are so strongly entrenched in the Nile valley. Thus that problem may well appear as insoluble as it is certainly unique. But then everything in and about Egypt always has been unique. There are no precedents for us to follow in dealing with conditions so abnormal. Any system which really fits these conditions is bound to be novel, and it should not be condemned as unsound merely because it looks paradoxical.

In view of all these difficulties, we gradually came to the conclusion that no settlement could be satisfactory which was simply imposed by Great Britain upon Egypt, but that it would be wiser to seek a solution by means of a bilateral agreement—a Treaty—between the two countries. In no other way did it appear possible to release Egypt from the tutelage to which Egyptians so vehemently object, without endangering any of the vital interests which we are bound to safeguard. All necessary safeguards, as it seemed to us, could be provided in the terms of a Treaty of Alliance by which Egypt, in return for Great Britain's undertaking to defend her integrity and independence, would agree to be guided by Great Britain in her foreign relations and would at the same time confer upon Great Britain certain definite rights in Egyptian territory. The rights we contemplated were of a two-fold character. Firstly, in order to protect her special interest in Egypt—the safety of her Imperial communications—Great Britain was to have the right to maintain a military force on Egyptian soil; and secondly, for the protection of all legitimate foreign interests, she was to have a certain measure of control over Egyptian legislation and administration, as far as they affected foreigners. The former privilege was no more than what Egypt could honourably concede to an ally who undertook to defend her against all external dangers, and whose strength and security were therefore of vital importance to Egypt herself. And the latter privilege would involve no greater infringement of Egyptian independence than that to which, by virtue of the Capitulations,* Egypt has always been exposed. Indeed, by substituting a single Power, Great Britain, for the thirteen foreign Powers which have hitherto enjoyed capitulatory rights in Egypt, it would tend to enlarge rather than to curtail that independence. Moreover, it was part of our scheme, as it has always been a feature of British policy in Egypt, to confine the special privileges enjoyed by foreigners under the Capitulations within more reasonable limits, and by so doing to make Egypt much more the mistress in her own house than she is to-day. But this could only be done if Egypt was prepared to recognise Great Britain as the protector of these foreign privileges when reduced to reasonable proportions.

This latter point requires a word of explanation. The restrictions which the Capitulations impose upon the sovereign rights of Egypt have a good as well as a

* "Capitulations" is the name given by Europeans to those concessions which secured from the early Sultans of Turkey extra-territorial rights to foreigners residing there, in continuation of similar privileges granted to foreign residents by the Byzantine Empire. They are unilateral and non-terminable, but liable to modification by subsequent Treaties. If, however, these latter Treaties are terminable, the Capitulations revive on the expiration of such Treaties. Primarily, they were intended to make it possible for Christians to trade and reside in the territories of the Ottoman Empire by safeguarding them against any forms of injustice or ill-usage, to which, as foreigners of a different religion, they might otherwise have been subjected. The Capitulations granted to Great Britain by the Porte date back to a very early period, but after various alterations now bear the date of 1675, and were confirmed in the Treaty of Peace concluded at the Dardanelles in 1809. Capitulations were granted to France in 1581, 1604 and 1673, and were renewed in 1740. The Dutch were granted Capitulations in 1612; these were renewed in 1680 and still continue in force. Nearly all the other great Powers obtained similar concessions from the Porte at one time or another in the course of the last 400 years.

It is in virtue of these unilateral Treaties with the Porte that Capitulations exist in Egypt. The Powers enjoying them were, before the war, fifteen in number, viz., Great Britain, United States of America, France, Italy, Spain, Holland, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary. The privileges of the two latter were terminated in the recent Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. In Egypt the rights conferred on foreigners by the Capitulations, apart from certain commercial concessions, included:—immunity from personal taxation without the assent of their Governments; inviolability of domicile and protection from arbitrary arrest; and exemption from the jurisdiction of the local Courts. Since the creation of the Mixed Tribunals in 1876, the practical effects of the last-mentioned privilege are that no legislation applicable to foreigners can be enforced without the consent of the capitulatory Powers, and that civil jurisdiction in cases between Europeans and natives or between Europeans of different nationality is exercised by the Mixed Courts, while criminal jurisdiction over Europeans and jurisdiction in civil cases between Europeans of the same nationality is exercised by the Consular Courts applying the laws of their own countries. The only internal taxes to which foreigners are at present liable are the house and land tax.







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# (٤٧٣/٣٧١)



bad side. In so far as they protect the liberties and property of foreigners by ensuring them justice in the Courts and immunity from arbitrary action on the part of the local authorities, their operation is beneficent. But, on the other hand, by exempting foreigners from taxation and from the necessity of conforming to local laws and regulations of an equitable kind, they constitute a great and unjustifiable hindrance to the progress of the country. For this reason it is, and always has been, the policy of Great Britain to get rid of the Capitulations and to substitute for them a system which, while protecting all legitimate foreign interests, would put an end to the indefensible privileges which foreigners now enjoy. Negotiations to secure that object have for some time been going on between Great Britain and the other Powers who have capitulatory rights in Egypt. But the Powers in question cannot be expected to give up these rights unless they are assured that their nationals can rely on obtaining justice and fair treatment in the future. In order to be able to give them that assurance, Great Britain must be put into a position enabling her to implement it. Thus it is in Egypt's own interest to empower Great Britain to act as the protector of such of the privileges now enjoyed by foreigners in Egypt as it is just and reasonable to maintain. It is in this sense that the recognition in the recent Peace Treaties of Great Britain's special position in Egypt should be interpreted.

These, in broad outline and reserving details for later explanation, are the main features of the settlement by which we had come to think that the relations between Great Britain and Egypt might in future be regulated. And when we began to discuss them with those Egyptians, all of more or less advanced Nationalist opinions, with whom we were in friendly contact, it was encouraging to find that our suggestions met with a large measure of sympathy. No doubt the idea of a Treaty, of a settlement arrived at by agreement as between equals, not by dictation from above, appealed strongly to their sense of being a distinct people, to their national self-respect. For evidently that idea involved the recognition, in principle, of the independence of Egypt and was inconsistent with the theory of her being a British possession. And when they came to consider the conditions which in our proposal were attached to this recognition, they were ready to admit that, however unacceptable to extreme Nationalists, these conditions were nevertheless such as they could themselves justify to their countrymen, as being compatible with their status as a nation. For that status could only be maintained in fact by the support of Great Britain and Great Britain was entitled to a reasonable *quid pro quo* for this indispensable support. That she should claim to control the foreign policy of Egypt and should have the right to maintain, for her own Imperial purposes, a force on Egyptian soil, was no more than such a *quid pro quo*. As regards her domestic affairs, Egypt would be completely self-governing except in respect of the privileges of foreigners. And the restrictions upon the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty which the maintenance of some of these privileges involved were no greater but less, and far less irksome, than the restrictions which had always existed. In view of these practical considerations, it could not be denied that the proposed arrangement was conceived in the interests, not only of Great Britain, but of Egypt, and could be defended as a fair and reasonable basis for future co-operation.

The point of view of the Egyptians of whom we are speaking can, of course, only be stated in general terms. There was much discussion between us, and much difference of opinion among the Egyptians themselves, about details. Interminable and wearisome argumentation about the meaning of words—"Protectorate," "Sovereignty," "Independence," and "Complete Independence"—occupied much time. But it did not prevent a great deal of practical consideration of the actual provisions of the contemplated Treaty or indicate that agreement about them was in any way impossible. On the whole the conversations which we had while in Egypt left on our minds the impression that we had made great progress towards a good understanding, and especially that we had got into a much better atmosphere. The bitterness and suspicion, with which all Egyptian Nationalists had recently come to regard Great Britain, were beginning to disappear, and there was a good prospect of gaining the support of the more moderate section for a policy of reconciliation.

But there was a distinct limit to anything which we could achieve, while still in Egypt, in the shape of definite results. It was not within our competence to arrange a settlement of the Egyptian problem. We could only advise as to the best course to be followed to that end. And the Egyptians with whom we conversed, one and all, were emphatic in stating that they were only expressing their individual opinions, and that they could not claim to speak for the great body of their countrymen. Indeed, almost all of them went further, and referred us to Zaghlul Pasha and his Delegation as being the only men authorised by general acclamation to represent



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the Egyptian people. We ourselves, of course, could not admit that Zaghlul Pasha and his associates possessed the full measure of authority thus claimed for them, but neither could we blind ourselves to the fact that they were for the time being the most powerful leaders of Egyptian opinion, and that no scheme to which they were definitely hostile stood any chance of favourable consideration, much less of general acceptance. But it was essential, from our point of view, as we had explained to the Egyptians from the first, that the Treaty which we contemplated, if it was to have any real value, must be concluded in such a manner as to make it not only technically but morally binding upon Egypt. As a matter of form, it would be a Treaty between the British and Egyptian Governments. But an agreement merely between Governments would not be sufficient. It might always be said afterwards that the Egyptian Government was not a free agent, but was bound to accept any terms that Great Britain chose to impose, and that in any case it was an autocratic Government, not really representing the Egyptian people. For these reasons it had always been a fundamental point in our plan that the Treaty should not be allowed to come into force unless it had been approved by a genuinely representative Egyptian Assembly. This might be the existing Legislative Assembly, the sittings of which have been suspended since the outbreak of war, or preferably it might be a new body elected *ad hoc*. It was rather for the Egyptians than for us to say what kind of Assembly would be in the truest sense representative. But it must in any case be a popularly elected body, deliberating with perfect freedom and taking its decision without official or other pressure of any kind.

In any such Assembly, we were assured on all hands, Zaghlul Pasha and his associates would command a substantial, if not an overwhelming, majority. In these circumstances it appeared to us absurd to let any question of etiquette stand in the way of our engaging in discussion with him, if he was willing to confer with us. Had we not from the outset invited representative Egyptians to lay their views before us, without prejudice on either side? And, as a matter of fact, it seemed likely at one time that Zaghlul Pasha, who was still in Paris, would return to Egypt in order to meet the Mission. Great efforts to induce him to do so were made by the Egyptians, who had been conferring with us, and some of whom were among his strongest adherents. Adli Pasha also, who, though himself occupying an independent position, was in friendly relations with Zaghlul, and was most anxious to effect a meeting between him and us, lent his powerful influence to second these efforts. But Zaghlul Pasha did not as yet see his way to respond to these appeals and, though numerous communications passed between him and his friends in Egypt during the latter portion of our stay, he remained for the time being in Paris.

The position, therefore, at the time when we left Egypt was as follows: We had obtained, from British and Egyptian sources, a vast amount of information about existing conditions; we had had ample opportunities of making ourselves acquainted with the state of public feeling; and we had formed our own opinion as to the policy best calculated to reconcile British and Egyptian interests. But we were not yet in a position to say whether the scheme which we had in our minds, even if it commended itself to British opinion, was likely to command sufficient support in Egypt to make it worth while to attempt a settlement on our lines. All we could do, therefore, was to report on the situation as we had found it, to indicate the conclusions to which our enquiries had led us, and to express the hope that the better understanding between British and Egyptians, of which we saw some promising signs, would ultimately make it possible to determine the future status of Egypt by mutual agreement.

## III.

### Proceedings of the Mission after leaving Egypt.

#### A.—*Discussions with Egyptian Delegates in London.*

We left Egypt at the end of the first week of March, travelling by different routes, and met again in London about the middle of April, with the view of drawing up our Report. But soon after we had begun to do so, a new and not wholly unexpected development of the situation caused us to interrupt our work, in the hope of being able to obtain fuller information with regard to the capital point on which, when leaving Egypt, we had still remained in doubt. That point, as already explained, was the attitude likely to be adopted by the chief exponents of Nationalist opinion towards the policy which we were ourselves disposed to advise the British Government to adopt. A prospect, however, now presented itself of clearing up this point of doubt by the Mission coming into direct contact with Zaghlul Pasha.





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٨٥ظ] (٤٧٣/٣٧٣)



At the end of April Adli Pasha, who commands the universal respect of his countrymen and whose advice had been of the greatest value to us in Egypt, paid a visit to Paris, and at once put himself into communication with Zaghlul Pasha with the object of bringing about a meeting between him and the Mission. Early in May we became aware that, largely owing to Adli Pasha's good offices, Zaghlul Pasha and the Delegation were now disposed to abandon their former attitude and enter into direct relations with the Mission. Accordingly, during the third week in May, Mr. (now Sir Cecil) Hurst, who happened to be in Paris, conveyed to them an invitation to meet the Mission in London. Zaghlul Pasha, having satisfied himself that by so doing he would not compromise his position as the advocate of Egyptian independence, arrived in London on the 7th June. He was accompanied by seven members of the Delegation, who were subsequently joined by one or two of their colleagues.

Then followed a series of conversations which, with frequent interruptions, due to the fact that several of the members of the Mission were now busily engaged in other work, lasted till the middle of August.

These prolonged discussions took a variety of forms. There were a number of meetings at which the Mission, as a body, met Zaghlul Pasha and his companions, Adli Pasha being also present. From time to time, points which it was found difficult to discuss in so large a body were referred to committees consisting of a few members of either party, and these to some extent cleared the ground. Moreover, there was, in the interval between formal meetings, a great deal of useful private discussion between individual members of the Mission and one or more of the Egyptians. It would serve no useful purpose to try and give an account of the many changing phases of this lengthy debate, but it is necessary to indicate its general character.

In the first place, we record with pleasure that very friendly relations were maintained from first to last, and that, even when differences of opinion were sharpest, the controversy was always conducted in an amicable spirit. There was never any doubt in our minds that our visitors were as sincerely anxious as we were ourselves to find a way out of the difficulties of the situation. But they were to some extent hampered—and this is specially true of Zaghlul Pasha himself—by the uncompromising line which they had taken in the recent past, when they believed that there was an unbridgeable gulf between Egyptian aspirations and the policy of Great Britain. They had no doubt come to recognise by this time that they had misunderstood that policy, but it was not easy for them to readjust their position to suit their altered view of British intentions. Over and over again they declared that it was impossible for them to accept some proposal or other made by us, the fairness of which they did not directly dispute, because it was inconsistent with the "mandate" which they had received from the Egyptian people. It was useless to point out to them that the alleged "mandate" was really their own programme, which the Egyptian public had simply accepted from them, and that there was nothing to prevent their modifying a policy of their own creation. The reply always was, that they had no authority to depart from claims which, even if originally put forward by themselves, had been enthusiastically endorsed by a great majority of their countrymen. The war-cries of the past eighteen months were, indeed, a perpetual stumbling-block, and, while in the course of our discussions we were often very near agreement on points of substance, it was always difficult to clothe such agreement in words which did not conflict with formulæ to which the Egyptians felt themselves committed.

The idea of a Treaty between Great Britain and Egypt was readily accepted. That was our starting-point, and without it we should have made little progress. But when it came to discussing those terms of the Treaty which embodied the few, but essential, safeguards for British and foreign interests, the Egyptians were always extremely apprehensive of agreeing to something which might conflict with their ideal of independence. As a matter of fact, our proposals did not conflict with that ideal—reasonably interpreted—as the Egyptians themselves, or at any rate some of them, were ready to admit. But there was always the fear in their minds that their countrymen would not take the same view, and that they would be regarded in Egypt as having betrayed the national cause.

In spite of these difficulties, one obstacle after another was gradually surmounted, and we finally succeeded in drafting the outlines of a settlement with which both parties were more or less satisfied. This result was only achieved by considerable concessions on the part of the Mission. On one point in particular, to



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which we shall presently refer at greater length, we acquiesced in a claim on the part of the Egyptians which we were at first disposed to resist, because we were assured that the admission of that claim would do more than anything else to gratify popular sentiment in Egypt. This concession seemed to us not too high a price to pay if it secured the cordial acceptance of the scheme as a whole by the Egyptian people. Moreover, we were bound to recognise that the delegates also were ready to give up a good deal of what they had originally demanded, in their anxiety to come to a good understanding with the Mission.

The compromise thus reached was one which commended itself to us on its merits subject to one essential condition. That condition was that Zaghlul and his associates would undertake to use all their influence to obtain its acceptance by the people of Egypt, and ultimately to get a Treaty giving effect to it approved by an Egyptian Popular Assembly. This, as it seemed to us, was no more than we had a right to ask of them. We could not, indeed, expect them to promise that their efforts would be successful, any more than we could ourselves promise that our advice would be approved by the British Government and the British people. What we did demand was that they should commit themselves to supporting wholeheartedly the result of our joint efforts. For unless they did this, it was too much to hope that the settlement would be rightly understood, much less cordially welcomed, in Egypt. Yet it would be idle for us, if we could not cherish that hope, to recommend it ourselves as a solution of the Egyptian problem. The British people, we believed, would be quite willing to accord very generous terms to Egypt, but only if they were convinced that those terms would be gratefully accepted and would lead to permanently improved relations and hearty co-operation between them and the Egyptians in the future.

Zaghlul Pasha and his friends were, however, not yet prepared to commit themselves to this extent. They were evidently still nervous of being repudiated by a considerable number of their followers in Egypt. They accordingly kept on suggesting further modifications of the terms so far agreed to, mainly on points of form, with the view of making them more acceptable to Egyptian opinion. But we had now gone as far as we deemed wise in the way of concession. For we, too, as we did not fail to point out, had to reckon with public opinion, and it was no use to agree to anything, with a view of pleasing the Egyptians, which would lead to the rejection of the whole scheme in Great Britain. We seemed, therefore, after all, to have reached an *impasse*.

### B.—*The Memorandum of August* 18, 1920.

At this stage, however, it was suggested on the Egyptian side that the discussion should be temporarily suspended, in order that some members of the Delegation might have time to visit Egypt, to explain to the public of that country the nature of the settlement which the Mission was disposed to recommend, and the great advantages which Egypt would derive from it. If, as they hoped, they met with a favourable reception, this would constitute a "mandate" from the people which would justify the Delegation, on the return of the emissaries, in pledging itself to give our proposals an unconditional support. Zaghlul Pasha himself was not disposed to undertake the journey, but he approved of the idea, and three or four of his companions were willing to go.

This proposal had obvious advantages from the Egyptian point of view. For it would enable the emissaries to advocate the acceptance of certain terms without being absolutely committed to them, and thus running the risk of finding themselves isolated from the bulk of their party in case those terms met with an unfavourable reception. But it had advantages for us also, inasmuch as the general public discussion, which was bound to ensue, would enable us to gauge Egyptian opinion more completely than had yet been possible, and to judge of the comparative strength of moderate and extreme Nationalists. A memorandum was accordingly drawn up—the last of a series of efforts to reduce the result of our discussions to a definite shape—which laid down in general terms the main features of the settlement, which, on the condition already specified, the Mission would be disposed to recommend. The object of the memorandum was to enable the emissaries to elicit an expression of Egyptian public opinion. This document, which presently came to be known as the "Milner-Zaghlul Agreement," but which, on the face of it, was not an agreement, but merely an outline of the bases on which an agreement might subsequently be framed, was handed by Lord Milner to Adli Pasha, who, as an intermediary between the two parties, had had a large share in all our negotiations, to be communicated by





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



him to Zaghlul Pasha and his friends. It was understood that they might make free use of it in public discussion in Egypt. It was dated the 18th August and was in the following terms :—

"The accompanying memorandum is the result of conversations held in London in June to August 1920 between Lord Milner and the members of the Special Mission to Egypt, and Zaghlul Pasha and the members of the Egyptian Delegation, in which conversations Adli Pasha also took part. It outlines a policy for the settlement of the Egyptian question in the best interests both of Great Britain and Egypt.

"The members of the Mission are prepared to recommend the British Government to adopt the policy indicated in the memorandum, if they are satisfied that Zaghlul Pasha and the Delegation are likewise prepared to advocate it, and will use all their influence to obtain the assent of an Egyptian National Assembly to the conclusion of such a Treaty as is contemplated in Articles 3 and 4.

"It is clear that unless both parties are cordially united in supporting it, the policy here suggested cannot be pursued with success.

(Signed) MILNER.

*Memorandum.*

"1. In order to establish the independence of Egypt on a secure and lasting basis, it is necessary that the relations between Great Britain and Egypt should be precisely defined, and the privileges and immunities now enjoyed in Egypt by the capitulatory Powers should be modified and rendered less injurious to the interests of the country.

"2. These ends cannot be achieved without further negotiations between accredited representatives of the British and Egyptian Governments respectively in the one case, and betwen the British Government and the Governments of the capitulatory Powers in the other case. Such negotiations will be directed to arriving at definite agreements on the following lines :—

"3.—(i.) As between Egypt and Great Britain a Treaty will be entered into, under which Great Britain will recognise the independence of Egypt as a constitutional monarchy with representative institutions, and Egypt will confer upon Great Britain such rights as are necessary to safeguard her special interests and to enable her to furnish the guarantees which must be given to foreign Powers to secure the relinquishment of their capitulatory rights.

(ii.) By the same Treaty, an alliance will be concluded between Great Britain and Egypt, by which Great Britain will undertake to support Egypt in defending the integrity of her territory, and Egypt will undertake, in case of war, even when the integrity of Egypt is not affected, to render to Great Britain all the assistance in her power, within her own borders, including the use of her harbours, aerodromes and means of communication for military purposes.

"4. This Treaty will embody stipulations to the following effect :—

(i.) Egypt will enjoy the right to representation in foreign countries. In the absence of any duly-accredited Egyptian representative, the Egyptian Government will confide its interests to the care of the British representative. Egypt will undertake not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or will create difficulties for Great Britain, and will also undertake not to enter into any agreement with a foreign Power which is prejudicial to British interests.

(ii.) Egypt will confer on Great Britain the right to maintain a military force on Egyptian soil for the protection of her Imperial communications. The Treaty will fix the place where the force shall be quartered and will regulate any subsidiary matters which require to be arranged. The presence of this force shall not constitute in any manner a military occupation of the country, or prejudice the rights of the Government of Egypt.

(iii.) Egypt will appoint, in concurrence with His Majesty's Government, a Financial Adviser, to whom shall be entrusted in due course the powers at present exercised by the Commissioners of the Debt, and who will be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for all other matters on which they may desire to consult him.



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(iv.) Egypt will appoint, in concurrence with His Majesty's Government, an official in the Ministry of Justice, who shall enjoy the right of access to the Minister. He shall be kept fully informed on all matters connected with the administration of the law as affecting foreigners, and will also be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for consultation on any matter connected with the efficient maintenance of law and order.

(v.) In view of the contemplated transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights hitherto exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments, Egypt recognises the right of Great Britain to intervene, through her representative in Egypt, to prevent the application to foreigners of any Egyptian law now requiring foreign consent, and Great Britain on her side undertakes not to exercise this right except in the case of laws operating inequitably against foreigners.

"*Alternative:*—

In view of the contemplated transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights hitherto exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments, Egypt recognises the right of Great Britain to intervene, through her representative in Egypt, to prevent the application to foreigners of any Egyptian law now requiring foreign consent, and Great Britain on her side undertakes not to exercise this right except in the case of laws inequitably discriminating against foreigners in the matter of taxation, or inconsistent with the principles of legislation common to all the capitulatory Powers.

(vi.) On account of the special relations between Great Britain and Egypt created by the Alliance, the British representative will be accorded an exceptional position in Egypt and will be entitled to precedence over all other representatives.

(vii.) The engagements of British and other foreign officers and administrative officials who entered into the service of the Egyptian Government before the coming into force of the Treaty may be terminated, at the instance of either the officials themselves or the Egyptian Government, at any time within two years after the coming into force of the Treaty. The pension or compensation to be accorded to officials retiring under this provision, in addition to that provided by the existing law, shall be determined by the Treaty. In cases where no advantage is taken of this arrangement existing terms of service will remain unaffected.

"5. This Treaty will be submitted to the approval of a Constituent Assembly, but it will not come into force until after the agreements with foreign Powers for the closing of their Consular Courts and the decrees for the reorganisation of the Mixed Tribunals have come into operation.

"6. This Constituent Assembly will also be charged with the duty of framing a new Organic Statute, in accordance with the provisions of which the Government of Egypt will in future be conducted. This Statute will embody provisions for the Ministers being responsible to the Legislature. It will also provide for religious toleration for all persons and for the due protection of the rights of foreigners.

"7. The necessary modifications in the régime of the Capitulations will be secured by agreements to be concluded by Great Britain with the various capitulatory Powers. These agreements will provide for the closing of the foreign Consular Courts, so as to render possible the reorganisation and extension of the jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals and the application to all foreigners in Egypt of the legislation (including legislation imposing taxation) enacted by the Egyptian Legislature.

"8. These agreements will provide for the transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights previously exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments. They will also contain stipulations to the following effect:—

(*a.*) No attempt will be made to discriminate against the nationals of a Power which agrees to close its Consular Courts, and such nationals shall enjoy in Egypt the same treatment as British subjects.

(*b.*) The Egyptian Nationality Law will be founded on the *jus sanguinis*, so that the children born in Egypt of a foreigner will enjoy the nationality of their father, and will not be claimed as Egyptian subjects.







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(*c.*) Consular officers of the foreign Powers shall be accorded by Egypt the same status as foreign Consuls enjoy in England.

(*d.*) Existing Treaties and Conventions to which Egypt is a party on matters of commerce and navigation, including postal and telegraphic Conventions, will remain in force. Pending the conclusion of special agreements to which she is a party, Egypt will apply the Treaties in force between Great Britain and the foreign Power concerned on questions affected by the closing of the Consular Courts, such as extradition Treaties, Treaties for the surrender of seamen deserters, &c., as also Treaties of a political nature, whether multilateral or bilateral, *e.g.*, arbitration Conventions and the various Conventions relating to the conduct of hostilities.

(*e.*) The liberty to maintain schools and to teach the language of the foreign country concerned will be guaranteed, provided that such schools are subject in all respects to the laws applicable generally to European schools in Egypt.

(*f.*) The liberty to maintain or organise religious and charitable foundations, such as hospitals, &c., will also be guaranteed.

"The Treaties will also provide for the necessary changes in the Commission of the Debt and the elimination of the international element in the Alexandria Board of Health.

"9. The legislation rendered necessary by the aforesaid agreements between Great Britain and the foreign Powers, will be effected by decrees to be issued by the Egyptian Government.

"A decree shall be enacted at the same time validating all measures, legislative, administrative or judicial, taken under Martial Law.

"10. The decrees for the reorganisation of the Mixed Tribunals will provide for conferring upon these Tribunals all jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the foreign Consular Courts, while leaving the jurisdiction of the Native Courts untouched.

"11. After the coming into force of the Treaty referred to in Article 3, Great Britain will communicate its terms to foreign Powers and will support an application by Egypt for admission as a member of the League of Nations.

"*August* 18, 1920."

### C.—*The Policy of the Memorandum.*

#### 1. *Representation of Egypt in Foreign Countries.*

The policy of the above document in its general character is in accordance with the conclusions at which, for the reasons already given, we had arrived before leaving Egypt. But, as a result of our discussions with Zaghlul Pasha and his associates, we were now prepared to go somewhat further. The most important point on which we were led by their arguments to modify our earlier view is one to which the memorandum gives especial prominence, viz., the right of Egypt to appoint her own representatives in foreign countries. It has always been, and is, from our point of view, a fundamental principle that the foreign relations of Egypt should be under the general direction of Great Britain. All reasonable Egyptians, however strongly Nationalist, recognise the immense value of the security which an alliance with Great Britain would afford them. But it is obviously impossible to expect that Great Britian should shoulder the responsibility of defending the integrity and independence of Egypt against all possible dangers, if that country were free to pursue a policy of her own in foreign affairs inconsistent with or prejudicial to the policy of Great Britain. This axiom none of the Egyptians with whom we were dealing ever attempted to dispute. They were quite prepared—in a Treaty of Alliance—to give whatever pledges might be necessary to exclude the possibility of any action on the part of Egypt which could cause embarrassment to her great ally. There was, indeed, no difference of opinion on this point in the course of our discussions, and the words of the memorandum dealing with it appear to us to make the complete understanding which existed with regard to the subject sufficiently clear. For in this, as in other respects, it must always be borne in mind, that in drawing up the memorandum, we were not attempting to draft a Treaty but simply to express in ordinary language the ideas which a Treaty, to be subsequently



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# (٤٧٣/٣٧٨)



negotiated, would express with much more detail and in terms of greater precision.

The real issue here was not whether Egypt should be free to follow a foreign policy independent of Great Britain—the impossibility of our assenting to this was not disputed—but whether this principle necessarily involved the conduct of all her foreign relations remaining in British hands.

This was a question upon which we had already, before discussing it with the Egyptians at all, come to a very definite conclusion. In our opinion British control should be limited to Egypt's political relations. Egyptian commercial or other interests of a non-political character in foreign countries had better be left in Egyptian hands. These interests are numerous and growing. The development of commerce and communications, the rapidly increasing number of Egyptians who now travel or reside abroad, especially in Western Europe, and the multifarious connections which they form there constitute a need for a certain amount of official protection. If the duty of looking after all Egyptian private interests abroad is to continue to fall upon British diplomatic and consular agents, it will become an excessive burden. And the inevitable failure to discharge that duty to the satisfaction of the Egyptians will be a constant source of grievance. For these reasons it seemed to us from the first to be eminently desirable that Egypt should appoint representatives of her own in foreign countries.

But what we originally contemplated was that these Egyptian representatives should have only consular and not diplomatic status. It was on this point that during our discussions in London we came, not without hesitation, to adopt a different view. The Egyptians were all absolutely unanimous in maintaining that the denial of diplomatic status to the representatives of Egypt vitiated the idea of an Alliance and would make the settlement we were contemplating entirely unacceptable to their countrymen. And in this assertion we believed them to be justified. For, even while in Egypt, we had realised that all Egyptians, including the Sultan and his Ministers, however much they were divided on other questions, were united in their desire for the diplomatic representation of their country abroad. It was a sore point with all of them that, when declaring the Protectorate, we had dispensed with an Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs and placed the Egyptian Foreign Office, with which it was found impossible to dispense, under the High Commissioner. The hope was universal that, when the time came to put the relations of Great Britain and Egypt on a permanent footing, we should allow the Ministry for Foreign Affairs once more to have an Egyptian chief and foreign representatives, as of old, to be directly accredited to the ruler of Egypt. And on the same principle it was hoped that, now that Turkish suzerainty had disappeared, Egyptian representatives in those foreign countries to which it might be necessary to send them would enjoy a similar status to that of foreign representatives in Egypt.

In this matter, therefore, we could have no doubt that the Egyptian delegates were speaking for all their countrymen. And indeed they were most emphatic in declaring that, unless we could meet them on this point, there was no prospect of settling the future relations between Great Britain and Egypt by the method of agreement. On the other hand this recognition of the status of Egypt would, as they affirmed, be so great a satisfaction to national pride that it would make the acceptance of all our other conditions easy. And what, they asked, were we afraid of? We recognised that Egypt had many interests of her own in foreign countries, which could best be looked after by Egyptians. There was no advantage to Great Britain in withholding from the men entrusted with the care of those interests the dignity of diplomatic status. For they could not take any action injurious to British interests or conflicting with British policy, without breaking the Treaty, which, as had already been agreed between us, was to be so drafted as to preclude the possibility of such action. Moreover, the number of Egypt's diplomatic representatives abroad would be very limited. Egypt did not desire, and could not afford, to have such representatives in more than a few countries. The fact that everywhere else Egyptian interests would be entrusted to the care of Great Britain marked the specially intimate character of the relations between the two countries.

We could not but feel that these were weighty considerations. At the same time it was evident, as we strongly insisted, that the presence of Egyptian diplomatists, even in a few European capitals, and of foreign diplomatists in Cairo, would afford opportunities for intrigue, which might lead to much trouble. The very fact that these diplomatists would, in the political sphere, have really nothing to do might tempt them to justify their existence by transgressing their proper functions. But the delegates would not admit that there was any real danger of this happening.





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Their view was that, satisfied with the position acquired by Egypt under the Treaty, the Egyptians would be the last to favour intrigues, which might give other foreign nations an opportunity of interfering in their country by first making mischief between them and Great Britain. The greatest safeguard which we could have against such machinations was the fact that the Egyptians themselves would be whole-heartedly in favour of an Alliance which fully recognised their national status and dignity.

Such were the arguments which led us to reconsider our position on the question of diplomatic status. In so doing we were well aware, and we frankly told the delegates, that this was a concession which might alarm public opinion in this country and imperil the acceptance of the agreement as a whole by the British people. And, judging from the unfavourable comments which this proposal has already excited in many quarters, it is evident that we were not mistaken in anticipating that it would meet with serious opposition. Nevertheless, we remain of opinion that the balance of argument is decisively in its favour. So long as bitterness and friction continue to exist between Great Britain and Egypt, we shall always be exposed to the hostility of Egyptians in foreign countries. Associations for the purpose of anti-British propaganda have been actively at work for a number of years in Switzerland, France, Germany and Italy. There is no remedy for this, except in restoring friendly relations and we rely on the whole policy here proposed to have this effect. If that result is achieved there will, in our opinion, be positive advantages in giving diplomatic status to Egyptian representatives abroad. For if, as is only to be expected, a certain number of irreconcilables are still left to carry on the campaign against Great Britain, the official representatives of Egypt will be bound to try to restrain them. No Egyptian Minister could do otherwise than discountenance activities on the part of his own countrymen, directed against Egypt's ally, without failing in his duty and rendering himself liable to be recalled.

2. *The Defence of Imperial Communications.*

The supreme importance which the delegates attached to the question of national status was once more strongly in evidence when we came to deal with Great Britain's strategic interest in Egypt—the protection of her Imperial communications. To Great Britain—as an ally—they thought that Egypt could, without indignity, accord a base in Egyptian territory, "a strong place of arms," a *point d'appui* in the chain of her Imperial defences, linking East and West. They were not averse from the idea that Great Britain, in case of war, should have the command of Egyptian resources, and especially of all means of communication, railways, aerodromes, &c., for the conduct of military operations. Such a stipulation was even welcome as emphasising the "bilateral" character of the agreement between the two countries, inasmuch as Egypt would be giving something in exchange for what she got. As by a Treaty of Alliance, Great Britain would be undertaking to defend Egypt, it was only fair that Egypt should do something to assist the British Empire, if Great Britain was engaged in a war, even a war in which Egypt was not directly interested.

A more difficult point was the maintenance of a British military force in Egypt in time of peace. But here again it was not so much the numbers of the force in question which interested the Egyptians as its character. As long as it was not there as an "Army of Occupation," as a force intended to "keep order" in Egypt, which was merely another way of saying to keep Egypt in subjection, but was maintained for an external object, the defence of the British Empire, the presence of a British force in Egypt was justifiable from their point of view. The question of the strength of that force was never raised in the course of the discussion. It was recognised that this depended on external conditions and, apart from what would be necessary if Egypt was herself in danger, might vary with the varying exigencies of Imperial defence. The great point was, that it should not be regarded in any sense as a garrison of Egypt. The maintenance of internal order was a matter for the Egyptians themselves.

In order to emphasise this aspect of the case the delegates urged very strongly, that the force in question should be stationed on the bank of the Suez Canal and preferably on its eastern side. But to this it was quite impossible for us to agree. For, in the first place, the presence of British troops in the neutral "canal zone" would be calculated to raise trouble with other Powers interested in that international waterway. The neutrality of the canal is guaranteed by international agreements and the permanent occupation of the canal zone by troops of any single Power might be challenged as a breach of that neutrality. Moreover, Great Britain's strategic



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interest in Egypt is not limited to securing a free passage through the Suez Canal. "The defence of her Imperial communications" involves much more than that. For Egypt is becoming more and more a "nodal point" in the complex of those communications by land and air as well as by sea. In face of these considerations, the idea of fixing Kantara, or some other spot in the canal zone, as the site of a cantonment had to be abandoned and, the principle of the maintenance of a British military force in Egypt having been admitted, the question where that force should be stationed was left open—to be settled, with other details, in the official negotiations for the conclusion of the contemplated Treaty.

### 3. *The British Officials in the Egyptian Service.*

The seventh clause of Article IV of the memorandum deals with the position of British officials in the Egyptian service. This is a matter of supreme importance to the good government of Egypt. The whole system of internal administration as it exists to-day, has been mainly built up by the work and example of British officials, many of whom have spent the best part of their lives in the country. The immediate elimination of the British element would bring the whole fabric down in ruins. Even an over-hasty reduction of that element would threaten its stability, and greatly impair the efficient conduct of public business.

It is not indeed to be feared that, with the retirement of the British officials, the country would relapse into the state of maladministration, from which we have delivered it, and that all the old evils would return. The number of Egyptians qualified by education and character to take part in the work of government on civilised principles has greatly increased since the occupation. All the Egyptians, even the humblest, have become so habituated to the new standard of orderly, equitable and honest administration, that a complete return to the abuses of the past would not be tolerated. Nevertheless, the "new model" would certainly be exposed to danger of serious deterioration, if the men who have built it up and are still its mainstay were to be suddenly withdrawn.

Thus it is only natural that the proposal to leave a purely Egyptian Government entirely free to retain or not to retain British or other foreign officials in the Civil Service should be at first sight regarded with considerable uneasiness. But a calm consideration of the practical aspects of the case is calculated greatly to allay these misgivings. The idea of any Egyptian Government, however free to do so, attempting to make a clean sweep of its foreign officials is a chimera. One has only to picture the plight of such a Government, suddenly deprived of its most experienced and responsible advisers and confronted with the general unpopularity which the consequent administrative breakdown would entail, to realise that no sane men would deliberately plunge into such a sea of trouble. And it is not only Egyptian disapproval which would have to be reckoned with, but the anger and alarm of the foreign residents. The large and wealthy foreign Colonies, on which the economic welfare of Egypt so greatly depends, would at once be up in arms. For these have all come to regard the presence of a British nucleus in the administration as the sheet-anchor of their own safety and prosperity. Nor is it to be anticipated that the High Commissioner—or whatever the British representative may in future be called—would not have a word to say in the matter. True, he will, *ex hypothesi*, have no right to dictate to the Egyptian Government. But as the representative of Egypt's ally, as the foremost foreigner in Egypt, and the guardian of foreign interests, he will still carry great weight, and it will always be a matter of interest to Egyptian Ministers to be on good terms with him. The influences which would militate against the abuse by these Ministers of the right to dispense with the services of British officials are thus immensely strong. And at the same time the great satisfaction which they would feel at knowing that they had that right, and that the British officials were really there to assist and not to dictate, would make them more and and not less ready to rely on British help.

For no sensible Egyptian seriously wishes to dispense with foreign aid in the government of his country, or believes that Egypt could, for a long time to come at any rate, afford to do without it. Egyptians generally no doubt think, and they are right in thinking, that the importation of British officials has sometimes, especially of late years, been overdone. They hold firmly to the principle that no Englishman or other foreigner should be appointed to any post for which a reasonably competent man of their own race can be found. They look forward to the time when the whole or almost the whole of the public service will be staffed by their fellow-countrymen. They feel that progress in that direction has been unduly slow and would like to see





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it sensibly accelerated. But they certainly do not wish to get rid of those British officials—and there are a goodly number of them—whom they really respect, or to be precluded from engaging others of equal competence in the service of their country in the future.*

The danger lies rather in the opposite direction. There may be a stampede of British and other foreign officials, scared by the prospect of finding themselves at the mercy of a purely Egyptian Government. That would be a grave misfortune, but it seems to us very improbable that such an exodus will ever assume large dimensions. In the first place, there are in many branches of the Public Service, such as ports, railways, customs, public works, &c., a considerable number of Englishmen and other Europeans, who are employed as experts for lack of Egyptians possessing the necessary technical skill. These men are not likely to feel their position in any way affected by a change in the political status of Egypt. It is rather those occupying genuinely administrative posts, and having authority over large bodies of Egyptians, who are likely to fear this change. Will Egyptian Ministers, they may ask themselves, still support them in the exercise of that authority? Will it still be possible to carry on the perpetual struggle against corruption and nepotism, and for promotion by merit and not by influence, with any measure of success? Such fears are not unnatural, and they may lead some of the men in question to prefer retirement. But there are others who will feel more confidence in themselves and in the essential strength of their future position. For they will not be, like the handful of Europeans who, before the occupation, fought an uphill battle for decent administration in an unreformed Egypt, and even under those depressing conditions were not without influence and certainly were not treated with any personal disregard. The British officials who remain in Egypt to-day will be in a country which is permeated by European influences, which has now grown used to British methods of government and which will remain in contact on its borders with concrete evidences of British power. Moreover, the recognition of Egyptian independence will remove one great obstacle to their present usefulness. The growing prejudice against imported officials, which threatens, if unchecked, to put an end to all hearty co-operation between them and their Egyptian fellows, is

*We took considerable pains to discover the truth about the number of foreign officials in the Egyptian Service. Returns were prepared for us by the Statistical Department, showing the distribution of all posts in the 1919-1920 Budget, while a comparative statement was called for from each Ministry, showing the distribution of pensionable and contract posts in the years 1905, 1910, 1914 and 1920.

In the returns submitted by the Statistical Department, posts are described as "pensionable," "contract," "monthly paid" and "daily paid." In the two latter classes 98½ per cent. of the posts are occupied by Egyptians. So in this category foreign competition is evidently not excessive.

An examination of the pensionable and contract posts, however, revealed a different state of affairs. Omitting the seven ministerial posts, the staff of the Sultan's Cabinet, the Council of Ministers, the Legislative Assembly and the Ministry of Wakfs, in which, with one or two exceptions, the posts are held exclusively by Egyptians, Egyptians hold 86 per cent. of the posts in the administration and draw 71 per cent. of the salaries, while the British hold 6 per cent. of the posts and draw 19 per cent. of the salaries, others (viz., non-Egyptian and non-British) holding 8 per cent. of the posts and drawing 10 per cent. of the salaries. In some statistical diagrams which were prepared to show the distribution of these posts and salaries among the different Ministries, the posts are divided into six classes. The first three classes range from the lowest salaries to £E. 799 per annum, and may be described as "Lower Posts;" the other three classes cover "Higher Posts," and include salaries of £E. 800 to £E. 2,999.

Among the lower posts, Egyptians hold roughly two-thirds of those between £E. 240 and £E. 499; but after that the Egyptian share declines to little more than one-third of the posts between £E. 500 and £E. 799. In the higher posts the disparity is even more marked and the Egyptian share does not amount to one-quarter. It is true that in the £E. 1,200-£E. 1,499 class, the Egyptian share rises to over one-third, but this can be traced to the Ministries of Interior and Justice, which provide Egyptian Mudirs (Provincial Governors) and Judges. In the higher posts of the Ministries of Finance, Education, Public Works, Agriculture and Communications, however, there are only 31 Egyptians, as against 168 British and 32 "others" holding posts over £E. 800. Doubtless in these particular Ministries there are many higher posts requiring special technical qualifications which it is impossible at the moment to find Egyptians qualified to fill. If, however, Egyptians are to be responsible for the internal administration of their country, it is essential that better provision should be made for training them to occupy such higher posts.

As far as the comparative tables showing the distribution of pensionable and contract posts in 1905, 1910, 1914 and 1920 are concerned, owing to the imperfect state of the records the figures can only be regarded as approximate. They sufficed, however, to give a general impression of the turnover in personnel. In the total of posts the Egyptian element has grown from 45·1 per cent. in 1905 to 50·5 per cent. in 1920. Egyptians in lower posts have also increased from 48·4 per cent. of the total in 1905 to 55 per cent in 1920. But in the higher posts their number has declined from 27·7 per cent. in 1905 to only 23·1 per cent. in 1920, while in the same category the British share of posts has increased from 42·2 per cent. to 59·3 per cent. of the total.



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not due to the men but to the system. It is because they are, or can be represented to be, imposed upon Egypt against her will, as the agents and symbols of foreign domination, that hostility to them is easily excited. The grounds for such hostility will disappear when they can no longer be regarded as instruments of a foreign government, and their efforts to maintain efficiency will then have an increased amount of native support. For, as individuals, British administrators and the British officers in the Egyptian army are not unpopular. The best of them not only command the respect, but win the affection, of a people who are very quick to recognise capacity, especially when it is combined with graciousness and tact Given time for reflection—and it is certain that nothing will be done in a hurry—it is likely that these considerations will determine many Englishmen in the Egyptian service to stick to their posts. And indeed Englishmen could perform no more honourable service than in establishing a friendly partnership between Great Britain and Egypt and assisting Egyptians to make a success of self-governing institutions.

But while any general or rapid displacement of the British and other foreign officials is not to be anticipated, it is nevertheless desirable to make careful provision for those, with whose services the Egyptian Government may wish to dispense or who may themselves wish to retire, when the new system comes into force. Such men must be treated not only with fairness, but with generosity. For nothing could have a worse effect upon Anglo-Egyptian relations in the future than that a number of former officials should be left with a sense of grievance. In any Treaty between Great Britain and Egypt their position will have to be absolutely safeguarded, and the conditions of retirement carefully laid down after consultation with representatives of those concerned. Under the existing law Egyptian officials, who are retired by the Government for reasons other than misconduct, receive pensions on a not ungenerous scale proportionate to their length of service. No new arrangement can infringe existing rights. But it is evidently necessary, in view of the altered circumstances, to make special provision for those whose careers may be prematurely cut short. And it is quite essential that men who under the new system retire of their own accord, should receive the same favourable treatment as those with whose services the Egyptian Government may choose to dispense. In ordinary circumstances a man voluntarily resigning a public post before the normal time for his retirement does so at a certain sacrifice. But this principle does not apply where the conditions of service are essentially altered. In that case the official should have the right to choose, whether he will or will not go on serving under the new conditions, and if he prefers to retire, should be entitled to do so on the same terms as if his retirement had been compulsory.

### 4. *Reservations for the Protection of Foreigners.*

To the general principle that the Egyptian Government should in future be free to determine for itself what posts are to be filled by non-Egyptians, the memorandum in Article IV, §§ 3 and 4, makes two exceptions. According to these clauses, a Financial Adviser and an official in the Ministry of Justice, whose special function will be to watch the administration of the law as it affects foreigners, are still to be appointed "in concurrence with His Majesty's Government." It may be asked, in view of what has already been said on this subject, why it was thought necessary to make these exceptions. The answer is to be found in the special responsibilities which under the proposed settlement Great Britain would assume for the protection of foreign rights.

The two points of supreme interest to the foreign Powers whose nationals at present enjoy special privileges under the Capitulations are the solvency of Egypt, which is not only of importance to the bondholders but indirectly affects all foreign capital and enterprise in the country, and the safety of the lives and property of foreigners. To ensure these objects the Powers will certainly continue to insist on the maintenance of some measure of foreign control. They have come to acquiesce in the exercise of that control by Great Britain. But if Great Britain ceased to exercise it, they would demand that some other Power or group of Powers should take her place.

It is, however, a fundamental principle of the contemplated settlement that any powers, which may still be necessary to safeguard foreign interests in Egypt and to assure foreign Governments that the rights of their nationals will be respected, shall be vested in Great Britain. This is the reason for the stipulation that the two high officials already referred to should continue to be appointed with the concurrence of the British Government—the duty of the one being to ensure solvency, that of the



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other to watch the administration of the laws as affecting foreigners. The functions of these officials are only described in general terms in the memorandum, and the scope of their authority will have to be very carefully defined in drafting the Treaty. Here again we had to content ourselves with agreement in principle and to leave details to be settled in future negotiations.

The same applies to the clause (IV, § 5) which gives the British representative in Egypt the right, in certain cases, to prevent the application of Egyptian laws to foreigners. This proposal was much discussed. The delegates were very anxious to avoid this right being converted into a general veto on Egyptian legislation. We, on our side, did not desire this. But the exact limits of the right were difficult to agree upon, and for this reason alternative solutions are suggested in the memorandum, The subject, indeed, is extremely complicated. But, stripped of technicalities, what it all comes to is this. The Egyptian Government is hampered at every turn by its inability to make laws applicable to the subjects of foreign Powers which have capitulatory rights in Egypt without the consent of those Powers, though that consent may in some cases be given on their behalf by the General Assembly of the Mixed Tribunals. As already explained, it has always been the aim of British policy, and it is part of the scheme contemplated in the memorandum, greatly to diminish the restrictions thus imposed on the legislative authority of the Egyptian Government. But it would be practically impossible, and it is not proposed, to remove these restrictions altogether. In so far as they are maintained, somebody must have the right to exercise them. In the scheme embodied in the memorandum it is contemplated that that right, intended as it is to safeguard the legitimate interests of all foreigners, should be conferred by Egypt on a single Power—Great Britain.

### D.—*The Sudan.*

The scheme embodied in the memorandum deals only with Egypt. It has no application to the Sudan, a country entirely distinct from Egypt in its character and constitution, the status of which is not, like that of Egypt, still indeterminate, but has been clearly defined by the Anglo-Egyptian Convention of the 19th January, 1899.* For that reason the subject of the Sudan was deliberately excluded from all our discussions with the delegates. This was all along clearly understood by them, but, in order to prevent any misunderstanding in Egypt of the scope of our discussions, Lord Milner, when transmitting the memorandum to Adli Pasha, also handed him the following letter :—

" My dear Pasha, *August* 18, 1920.

" Referring to our conversation of yesterday, I should like once more to repeat that no part of the memorandum which I am now sending you is intended to have any application to the Sudan. This is, I think, evident on the face of the document, but, to avoid any possibility of future misunderstanding, it seems desirable to place on record the view of the Mission that the subject of the Sudan, which has never been discussed between us and Zaghlul Pasha and his friends, lies quite outside the scope of the proposed agreement with regard to Egypt. There is a wide difference of conditions between the two countries, and in our opinion they must be dealt with on different lines.

" The Sudan has made great progress under its existing administration, which is based on the provisions of the Convention of 1899, and no change in the political status of Egypt should be allowed to disturb the further development of the Sudan on a system which has been productive of such good results.

" On the other hand, we fully realise the vital interest of Egypt in the supply of water reaching her through the Sudan, and we intend to make proposals calculated

*This Convention, which was signed by the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Lord Cromer, laid it down that Great Britain was " by right of conquest " entitled " to share in the settlement and future working and development " of the Sudan. By the acceptance of this principle any claim of Turkey to suzerainty over the Sudan was disallowed, and that country was definitely excluded from the area subject to the régime of the Capitulations. It was accordingly provided in the Convention that the jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals should " not extend to or be recognised in any part of the Sudan," and that no foreign consuls should reside in the country without the consent of the British Government. The supreme military and civil power was to be vested in the person of a " Governor-General," who would be appointed on the recommendation of the British Government by a decree of the Khedive of Egypt, and whose proclamations would have the force of law.



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to remove any anxiety which Egypt may feel as to the adequacy of that supply both for her actual and her prospective needs.

(Signed) "MILNER."

"His Excellency Adli Yeghen Pasha."

At this point it may be convenient that we should briefly state the reasons which, in our opinion, make it wholly impossible to contemplate, in the case of the Sudan, a settlement on the lines proposed for Egypt, indicating at the same time the general line of policy which appears most suitable to the present requirements of the former country.

While the great majority of the people of Egypt are comparatively homogeneous, the Sudan is divided between Arabs and Negroids, and within each of these two great racial groups there are a number of races and tribes differing widely from one another and often mutually antagonistic. The Arabs of the Sudan speak dialects of the same language as the people of Egypt and are united to them by the bond of religion. Islam, moreover, is spreading even among the non-Arab races of the Sudan. These influences mitigate in various degrees, but they have not overcome the antagonism of the two countries, which rankling memories of Egyptian misgovernment in the past have done much to intensify.

The political bonds which have at intervals in the past united Egypt with the Sudan have always been fragile. Egyptian conquerors have at various times overrun parts and even the whole of the Sudan. But it has never been really subdued by, or in any sense amalgamated with, Egypt. The Egyptian conquest of the Sudan in the last century was especially disastrous to both countries, and ended in the complete overthrow of Egyptian authority in the early eighties by the Mahdist rebellion. For more than ten years no vestige of Egyptian authority was left in the Sudan except in a small district surrounding Suakin. As a consequence of this breakdown, Great Britain was obliged to undertake several costly expeditions for the rescue of the Egyptian garrisons and the defence of Egypt, which was in danger of being overrun by the Mahdist hordes.

Since the conquest of the country by British and Egyptian forces under British leadership in 1896–8, the Government of the Sudan, which under the Convention of 1899 takes the form of an Anglo-Egyptian Protectorate, has been virtually in British hands. The Governor-General, though appointed by the Sultan (formerly the Khedive) of Egypt, is nominated by the British Government, and all the Governors of Provinces and principal officials are British. Under this system of government the progress of the Sudan in all respects, material and moral, has been remarkable. When full allowance is made for the simplicity of the problem, viz., the introduction of the first principles of orderly and civilised government among a very primitive people, the great success actually achieved during the long Governor-Generalship of Sir R. Wingate is one of the brightest pages in the history of British rule over backward races. The present administration is popular in the Sudan and, with few exceptions, peaceful and progressive conditions prevail throughout the country.

But while Egypt and the Sudan are essentially distinct countries, and are bound to develop on very different lines, Egypt will always have one interest of supreme importance in the Sudan. The Nile, upon which the very existence of Egypt depends, flows for hundreds of miles through the Sudan, and it is vital to Egypt to prevent any such diversion of water from the Nile as might diminish her present cultivable area or preclude the reclamation of that portion of her soil, some 2,000,000 acres in extent, which is capable of being brought under cultivation, when, by means of storage, the present supply of water available for irrigation has been increased. Hitherto the amount of water drawn from the Nile in its passage through the Sudan has been of negligible amount, but as the population of the Sudan increases that country will require more water for its own development, and a conflict of interest between it and Egypt might arise. At the same time there is every reason to hope that, properly conserved and distributed, the Nile waters will suffice for all the lands, whether in Egypt or the Sudan, which are ever likely to require irrigation. The control of the waters of the Nile for purposes of irrigation is a matter of such paramount importance and the technical and other problems involved are so difficult and intricate that it is, in our opinion, necessary to set up a permanent Commission, composed on the one hand of experts of the highest authority and on the other hand of representatives of all the countries affected—Egypt, the Sudan and Uganda—to settle all questions affecting the regulation of the river and to ensure the fair distribution of the water.

The contiguity of Egypt and the Sudan and their common interest in the Nile make it desirable that some political nexus between the two countries should always







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be maintained, but it is out of the question that this connection should take the form of the subjection of the Sudan to Egypt. The former country is capable of and entitled to independent development in accordance with its own character and requirements. It is much too early to attempt to determine its ultimate political status. For present purposes that status is sufficiently defined by the Convention of 1899 between Great Britain and Egypt, which provides for the necessary political connection between Egypt and the Sudan without hampering the independent development of the latter country.

Though it is absolutely necessary for the present to maintain a single supreme authority over the whole of the Sudan, it is not desirable that the government of that country should be highly centralised. Having regard to its vast extent and the varied character of its inhabitants, the administration of its different parts should be left, as far as possible, in the hands of the native authorities, wherever they exist, under British supervision. A centralised bureaucracy is wholly unsuitable for the Sudan. Decentralisation and the employment, wherever possible, of native agencies for the simple administrative needs of the country, in its present stage of development, would make both for economy and efficiency. At the present time the officials of local origin are still largely outnumbered by those introduced from Egypt, with whom service in the Sudan is by no means popular. This difficulty will be overcome as education progresses and a greater number of Sudanese themselves become capable of filling official posts. At the same time care should be taken, in the matter of education, not to repeat the mistake which has been made in Egypt of introducing a system which fits pupils for little else than employment in clerical and minor administrative posts, and creates an overgrown body of aspirants to Government employment. There is no room in the Sudan for a host of petty officials, and education should be directed to giving the Sudanese a capacity and a taste for employment in other directions, such as agriculture, industry, commerce and engineering. The immediate need of the country is material development, and it can do without an elaborate administrative system.

The military forces still employed in the Sudan are very large. A large army was, no doubt, required to complete the conquest and pacification of the country, but the time has come when, in our opinion, the question of the number and organisation of its military forces should be reconsidered, and the financial burden upon Egypt which the maintenance of that force involves be reduced. Hitherto, the Governor-Generalship of the Sudan and the Command-in-Chief of the Egyptian army have been united in one person. There were good reasons for this in the past, but it is indefensible as a permanent arrangement. At the first convenient opportunity a civil Governor-General should be appointed.

In general it should be the aim of British policy to relieve Egypt from any financial responsibility for the Sudan and to establish the relations of the two countries for the future upon a basis which will secure the independent development of the Sudan while safeguarding the vital interests of Egypt in the waters of the Nile.

Egypt has an indefeasible right to an ample and assured supply of water for the land at present under cultivation and to a fair share of any increased supply which engineering skill may be able to provide. A formal declaration on the part of Great Britain that she recognises this right and is resolved under all circumstances to uphold it would go far to allay the uneasiness which prevails in Egypt on this subject. We are of opinion that such a declaration might with advantage be made at the present time.

### E.—*Visit of Egyptian delegates to Egypt.*

At the close of the discussions which resulted in the memorandum of the 18th August, Zaghlul Pasha and the other delegates as well as Adli Pasha left London for France. Four of the Delegation (Mohammed Pasha Mahmud, Ahmed Lutfi Bey el Said, Abdel Latif Bey el Mukabati, and Ali Bey Maher) proceeded immediately to Egypt in accordance with the understanding already referred to (see p. 23) in order to enlist the support of their countrymen for the scheme outlined in the memorandum. The substance of that document, with certain inaccuracies of detail, had meanwhile found its way into the press and been received in Egypt with expressions of approval.

About the same time publicity was given in that country to a long manifesto from Zaghlul Pasha, in which he emphasised the representative character of the Delegation and the support which it had received from the nation. He referred to the endeavours made by the Delegation to submit the Egyptian case to the Peace



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Conference and to the world at large, claiming that a considerable amount of sympathy had been gained in foreign countries. He went on to speak of the appointment of the Special Mission and the obstacle to any direct contact with its members presented by insistence on the Protectorate, the steps which had eventually led to the visit of the Egyptian delegates to London, and the discussions which had taken place there. This document concluded by announcing that the proposals which had resulted from these discussions would now be submitted to the nation by emissaries appointed for the purpose, and, should the project be favourably received, representatives would then be nominated to negotiate a treaty on the basis suggested.

The inconclusive character of this message appears to have somewhat damped the enthusiasm with which the local committee of the Delegation in Cairo had, in the first instance, greeted the announcement of a settlement. The four emissaries, however, who reached Alexandria on the 7th of September, were received with warm demonstrations of welcome and their arrival revived a feeling of optimism. A telegram from the local committee to Zaghlul Pasha expressed the confidence which "the whole of the country" placed in the Delegation and the prevailing enthusiasm of the public. At the same time it was noticeable that there was a marked relaxation of that sense of strain and tension which had for some time past governed the relations between British and Egyptians, and conciliation was in the air.

It is true that at first a very determined set was made against the proposed settlement by the *Hisb-el-Watani* and other extremists. The critics maintained that the contemplated independence of Egypt was not a reality, and specifically protested against the non-inclusion of the Sudan in the scheme. Among the principal objectors four of the Khedivial Princes, who had signed the manifesto already referred to (see p. 4), now took the opportunity to publish in the Arabic newspapers on the 11th of September, 1920, a declaration that their views remained unchanged and that they did not support any agreement which restricted the independence of Egypt. But this demonstration had little effect on the public, and in view of the good reception generally accorded to the proposals the Princes shortly afterwards endeavoured to explain it away.

While the four emissaries of the Delegation did not enter into any contact with the official world in Egypt, every care was taken to ensure them complete liberty of action and movement. The procedure which they adopted was to invite small groups of representative Egyptians to meet them and to discuss the proposed settlement. The latter in turn reported to other groups in the provinces, whence resolutions of adherence were received by the four delegates, so that within a fortnight of their arrival it became evident that a substantial majority of the representative elements in the country were favourable to the basis for negotiation which they had submitted. But by far the most important testimony of general approval was secured at a meeting of the remaining members of the Legislative Assembly convened to confer with the delegates on the 16th September. Of the forty-nine members who were present on that occasion, forty-five recorded their votes in favour of the proposals. Two abstained from any expression of opinion, and only two voted in opposition. Two other members who had been unable to attend in person wrote to express their concurrence with the project, which thus received the support of forty-seven out of fifty-one surviving members.

At the same time, while this general approval was recorded, further interpretation of certain particular points was invited, and the hope was expressed that the Delegation would on its return to London obtain definite assurances on these points. The most important of these was the universal desire for some definite indication that the Protectorate would cease to exist with the conclusion of the Treaty of Alliance.

### F.—*Concluding Interviews with Egyptian delegates in London.*

The four emissaries returned from Egypt to Paris early in October, and there rejoined Zaghlul Pasha and their other colleagues who had remained in Europe. At the end of the month the whole party, again accompanied by Adli Pasha, once more came to London and had two further meetings with the Mission, at which the four emissaries related their experiences in Egypt, and the resulting situation was discussed. It was apparent from the statement of the emissaries, confirming as it did the reports which had already appeared in the press, that the terms of the proposed settlement had been well received by the Egyptian public, and that the determined attempt which was at first made to excite opposition to them had ended in complete failure. At the same time, the emissaries did not fail to impress upon







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us that the general approval of the settlement was accompanied, on the part of the Egyptians with whom they had conferred, by certain reservations, and that they had been instructed to try and obtain modifications of it on several points. What they chiefly desired was a limitation of the functions of the Financial Adviser and of the British official in the Ministry of Justice; the abandonment of the provision of Article 5 of the memorandum—that the coming into force of the contemplated Treaty between Great Britain and Egypt should be dependent upon the previous conclusion of agreements with the Powers for necessary modifications in the régime of the Capitulations; and, above all, the formal abolition of the Protectorate. Some other points of minor importance were also raised, and it was evident that, if all these matters were to be gone into again, we should reopen the whole of the discussion in which we had been occupied for the greater part of the summer. This was a course in which the members of the Mission were unanimously of opinion that it would be perfectly useless for them to engage. As we pointed out to the delegates, any agreement arrived at between us and them could not in any case be final. All we could do was to pave the way for the official negotiations, which must be subsequently undertaken, if the idea of a Treaty on the lines which we had been discussing commended itself to British and Egyptian opinion. The points now brought forward might all be raised in the official negotiations, as other points no doubt would be on both sides, and for us to try and anticipate a decision upon every detail, while it would certainly delay the commencement of those negotiations, might also seriously prejudice their successful conduct.

The point of view of the Mission was summed up by Lord Milner in a statement which he made at the second meeting of the delegates on the 9th November. It was to the following effect:—

"It seemed desirable to have this meeting before the departure of the Egyptian representatives in order to clear up the situation and leave room for further co-operation between them and the Mission in the future.

"The report, which the gentlemen who have lately returned from Egypt have brought back to us, seems to indicate that there is a great body of opinion favourable to a settlement on the basis outlined in the memorandum of August. On the other hand, they state that there are several points in the memorandum which they desire to modify and several fresh conditions which they wish to add to it before promising their unconditional support. It is not necessary for me to dwell upon these points to-day, because the Mission are unanimously of opinion that no good purpose would be served by a further discussion of details at the present stage.

"The memorandum never professed to do more than indicate the general lines on which an agreement could be arrived at. In any case, as we have always foreseen, the agreement itself, if it is decided to proceed with it, will have to be the outcome of formal negotiations between duly accredited representatives of the British and Egyptian Governments. In those negotiations the fresh points which you have brought forward as the result of the visit of some of your number to Egypt can be raised, as other points may be raised on one side or the other. It would be impossible and undesirable to exclude any proposals not evidently inconsistent with the spirit of the agreement outlined in the memorandum, which on the face of it requires elucidation and elaboration before it can be converted into a formal treaty. It would in our opinion not facilitate a settlement if we were to anticipate these discussions, therefore, we think it wiser to refrain from any expression of opinion on the new points recently raised by you at the present time, though we believe that a satisfactory solution can, and will, be found when regular negotiations can be undertaken.

"What is far more important at the present stage than any further discussion of details is to influence opinion both here and in Egypt in a sense favourable to a settlement on the lines which we both favour, and above all to cultivate and strengthen by every means the spirit of friendship and mutual confidence which our conversations here have helped to engender, but which must become general on both sides if our efforts are to lead to the desired result. As far as this country is concerned, we hope that the presentation of the report of the Mission, which we are anxious to complete as quickly as possible, will conduce to that end. But it is equally important that a similar effect should be produced in Egypt by your endeavours. We gratefully recognise how much you have already done in that direction. But it is evident that there is still opposition to be overcome, that there are great numbers of people in Egypt who are not imbued with the spirit of the agreement, but are for one reason or another hostile to a good understanding between Great Britain and Egypt. They are, or profess themselves to be, suspicious of the intentions of this country, they do not recognise the generous spirit in which Great Britain is prepared to meet the



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aspirations of the Egyptian people. In so far as you are able to dispel this suspicion and misunderstanding and create a better feeling you will be doing more than can be done in any other way to bring about the settlement which we all so earnestly desire."

To this statement Zaghlul Pasha replied in a speech, the gist of which was that while he was as anxious as we were to help to create an atmosphere favourable to a settlement, he would be greatly weakened in his efforts to do so by being unable to give any promise to the Egyptians about the proposed reservations, and specially by being unable to say that Great Britain had finally repudiated the Protectorate. To the latter point he returned again and again, and he subsequently reiterated these views in a letter addressed to Lord Milner.

This was the last of our interviews with the Egyptians, who all left England shortly after it. It is only necessary to add that the tone of our discussions remained throughout of the most friendly character, and that at parting, though no final agreement had been reached and both sides remained uncommitted, we certainly gathered the impression that, reservations or no reservations, public opinion in Egypt had been very favourably impressed by the terms of the proposed settlement, and that most if not all of the delegates were hopeful of its ultimate complete acceptance by their countrymen, and anxious to bring it about.

## IV.—General Summary.

In view of the complicated nature of the subject, and the length to which our Report—though we have striven to omit all unessential details—has necessarily run, we desire to recapitulate the main features of the policy which we now recommend, and the stages by which our conclusions have been reached.

When we arrived in Egypt we found a general state of unrest and discontent. The rebellion had been suppressed, but agitation was undiminished, and among an extreme group still took dangerous and violent forms. Everywhere the demand was for "complete independence," beginning with the abolition of the "Protectorate," which was construed as implying the extinction of Egyptian nationality. To justify this inference, the Nationalists pointed to the refusal of the British Government to permit Egyptian Ministers to come to London after the Armistice, to the deportation of Zaghlul Pasha and his associates, to the increase since the war in the number of British officials, and to the continuance of martial law. At the same time the enunciation of President Wilson's fourteen points had aroused wide-spread expectations, and the promise of self-determination to other Eastern peoples whom the Egyptians thought inferior to themselves had added to their discontent. Religious feeling had also been inflamed by the defeat of the Turks and the doubts and uncertainties as to the future of the Caliphate.

On the British side the situation was full of difficulty. A large number of experienced officials had been lost to the service since the beginning of the war and their places taken by new men who knew little of the traditional system by which, in the days of Lord Cromer, British control was maintained without wounding Egyptian susceptibilities. The work of the Administration during the war deserves the warmest acknowledgment, but it necessarily entailed a certain subordination of Egyptian to British interests, and the employment of rough and ready methods likely to be resented by a people whose sympathies were not actively engaged on our side. When the war ended, many of the old landmarks had disappeared and there was a break of continuity with the past. Martial law had become necessary, not merely to maintain order, but to carry on the civil government; the "Agent-General" had become a High Commissioner who was also Commander-in-chief, and though Egyptian Ministers continued to hold office, the Legislative Assembly was suspended. The Administration in these circumstances had to be carried on in the teeth of almost universal opposition, affecting even the official class, upon which the Government had to rely for a large part of its executive work.

We soon came to the conclusion that this situation could not be met by any return to the pre-war system or by any reforms of a merely departmental character. A more radical change was required to meet the new conditions. But the agitation against the "Protectorate" had greatly increased the difficulty of finding any acceptable policy which would satisfy the Egyptians while securing British interests. The word "Protectorate" had become a symbol of servitude in the minds of the Egyptians, and they insisted that it must mean what they said it meant. Argument on this point was wholly useless, and it thus became evident to us that, unless we





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could get on to new ground, it would be impossible to reach a settlement by agreement.

Fortunately the informal conversations which we had with leading men in Egypt encouraged us to hope that such a settlement was not impossible on new lines. They said with one accord that, though they objected to having an inferior status imposed upon Egypt by the British Government, they would welcome a Treaty of Alliance freely entered into on both sides, which, while establishing the independence of Egypt, would give to Great Britain all those safeguards and guarantees which the Protectorate, as we understood it, was intended to secure. The greater part of our subsequent work lay in examining this possibility, and our aim throughout has been to find the basis of a Treaty which should supersede all debates about words and phrases, and be the sole and final definition of the relations of Great Britain and Egypt.

There is nothing new in the recognition of Egyptian independence by Great Britain. Throughout our occupation we have most carefully respected the theory that Egypt was a national unit under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey, and when we abolished the Turkish suzerainty we deliberately chose to proclaim a Protectorate in preference to annexing Egypt or making her part of the British Empire. We have constantly renewed our promise of self-government for Egypt. We are of opinion that the fulfilment of this promise cannot be postponed. The spirit of Egyptian Nationalism cannot be extinguished, and, though it may always be possible to suppress its more violent manifestations, the government of the country in the teeth of a hostile people, who charge us with breach of faith, must be a difficult and distasteful task, alike to those who take part in it and to the British people who are responsible for it.

But there are formidable difficulties in the way of any sudden or complete transfer of all the powers of government to Egyptian hands. There are essential British interests to be upheld; it is also imperative to ensure the safety and protect the rights of the large number of foreign residents whose presence in Egypt differentiates her position from that of other Eastern countries and greatly complicates the problem.

The essential British interests are that the great Imperial communications which pass through Egyptian territory shall not be jeopardised, either by internal disturbances or foreign aggression; that they shall be available in time of war, and for necessary purposes in time of peace; that the struggle for ascendency in Egypt between rival Powers shall not be renewed; and, finally, that an independent Egypt shall not pursue a foreign policy hostile or prejudicial to that of the British Empire. It is therefore necessary that any Treaty entered into between us and the Egyptians should secure the special position of the British representative in Egypt, enable us to maintain a force within Egyptian territory for the protection of our Imperial communications, and take adequate security that Egyptian policy shall be in line with that of the British Empire.

The protection of foreign rights presents a problem of even greater complexity. These are at present secured by the Capitulations. But the Capitulations are the greatest of all the disabilities from which Egypt now suffers (see note on p. 19). The multiplicity of jurisdictions arising out of them, and the facilities which they give to men of uncertain nationality to escape from the local jurisdiction greatly complicate the problem of law and order; while the exemption of foreigners from direct taxation, other than the land and house tax, cripples the Government in raising revenue, since it is in practice impossible to impose on Egyptians taxes from which foreigners are exempt. Thus, although the wealth of the country is rapidly increasing and its resources are now ample for all the needs of good government, the Administration has for some time past been compelled to starve essential public services, such as Education and Public Health. During the war it has only been possible to raise sufficient revenue for the auxiliary police (*Ghaffirs*) by a special tax imposed under Martial Law.

It was evident to us that, without the removal of these restrictions, no Egyptian Government could enjoy any real independence. To leave an Egyptian Ministry to struggle with conditions which threatened to bring the present Administration to a stand-still would be to foredoom it to failure. We foresaw that, if the Capitulations were maintained, the Egyptian Government without British support would in all probability be exposed to a competing pressure of foreign influences, which might paralyse its action. It was therefore clearly in the interests of Egypt that the Capitulations should be removed and the Mixed Tribunals reorganised so as to enable them to take over the jurisdiction of the Consular Courts and to act in criminal as well as civil suits affecting foreigners. But this could only be effected



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through the mediation of Great Britain, and Great Britain could only expect to succeed in inducing the Powers to part with their present privileges, if she were in a position to assure them that solvency would be maintained and that the lives and property of foreigners would be secure. Our efforts were accordingly directed to securing for Great Britain such a position as would enable her to give this necessary assurance. In order to achieve this object, it is necessary that any Treaty should provide for the right of Great Britain to intervene in legislation affecting foreigners and to exercise a certain measure of control over those branches of the administration which most directly affect foreign interests.

Subject to these safeguards for the special interests of Great Britain and the protection of foreign rights, we hold that the Government of Egypt should be restored in fact to what it has always, during our occupation, been in theory, a Government of Egypt by Egyptians. We have sufficient faith in the reforming work of the last forty years to believe that such a course can now be followed with a good prospect of success. But it must be adopted wholeheartedly and in a spirit of hopefulness and sympathy. Nothing would be more likely to lead to failure than to overload this policy with an excessive number of timorous restrictions, which would obscure the principle of Egyptian independence, create suspicion as to our real intentions, and defeat our main object—the re-establishment of mutual goodwill and hearty co-operation between British and Egyptians.

We make no attempt to conceal our conviction that Egypt is not yet in a position to dispense with British assistance in her internal administration. But the Egyptians know this, and when once the responsibility is clearly theirs, they will be slow to dispense with such help from us as is essential to the prosperity and good government of their country. They will be all the slower to do so, because under this system it will be impossible to attribute any failure that may occur to British dictation, and because the good work of British officials in the future will redound to the credit of the Ministers who are wise enough to retain them. Moreover, the whole atmosphere will, in our opinion, be completely changed when the Egyptians are satisfied that the purpose of British policy is to help them to realise their ideal of independence and not to stand in the way of its attainment. We are greatly fortified in that belief by our own experience in dealing with the representative Egyptians with whom we have come into such intimate contact. Once convinced of the sincerity of our intentions they showed every readiness to appreciate our point of view, to recognise the special interests which Great Britain has in Egypt, the debt of gratitude due to her for her past work in that country, and the indispensability of her future help in maintaining its integrity and independence. And we are not discouraged by the fact that they were not all as yet prepared to commit themselves unreservedly to every point in the settlement which they had collaborated with us in devising. We make no doubt that they are wholeheartedly in favour of the main features of the settlement and that they are anxious to secure its acceptance by their countrymen. And, as far as we can judge, public opinion in Egypt is moving decisively in that direction. There is a sensible diminution of the bitter feeling and violent propaganda which were recently so prevalent, and the country is anxious to settle down. The moment is favourable for placing the relations of Great Britain and Egypt on the satisfactory and enduring basis of a Treaty, which will at one and the same time establish the independence of Egypt and secure the essential interests of Great Britain. It will be an undoubted advantage to Great Britain to have those interests carefully defined and placed beyond challenge in a Treaty accepted by the Egyptians, as it will obviously be an advantage to Egypt to have her integrity and independence guaranteed by Great Britain. We therefore strongly advise His Majesty's Government to enter without undue delay into negotiations with the Egyptian Government for the conclusion of a Treaty on the lines which we have ventured to recommend. It would, in our opinion, be a great misfortune if the present opportunity were lost.

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We desire in conclusion to record our thanks to the two Secretaries of the Mission and to express our appreciation of their invaluable services.

Mr. A. T. Loyd, the senior of the two, had, after many years' experience in Egypt and in the Foreign Office, retired from the Public Service shortly before the Mission began its labours. But, yielding to the earnest request of our Chairman, he agreed to accompany us to Egypt and to act as our principal Secretary there, though





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



it was understood from the first that the call of other duties would not allow him to retain that position long after our return to England. During our stay in Egypt we derived great benefit from his intimate knowledge of the country and the people, his familiarity with all Departments of the Government, and his popularity both with British and Egyptians.

When Mr. Loyd left us in May last, the whole of the secretarial work of the Mission devolved upon Mr. E. M. B. Ingram, of the Foreign Office, who had also accompanied us to Egypt, as assistant to Mr. Loyd and Private Secretary to Lord Milner. Mr. Ingram's duties during the last seven months have been very arduous, but he has discharged them with unfailing zeal and ability, and we are deeply indebted to his assistance.

MILNER.
RENNELL RODD.
OWEN THOMAS.
CECIL J. B. HURST.
J. A. SPENDER.

*December* 9, 1920.



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

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No. 1.—SECRETARY OF STATE.

EGYPT AND SOUDAN. [February 9.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

[E 1766/260/16] No. 1.

*War Office to Foreign Office.*—(*Received February* 9.)

(Secret.)

Sir, *War Office, February* 8, 1921.

I AM commanded by the Army Council to forward herewith some notes on the Milner proposals, which notes contain protecting clauses which appear necessary on military grounds.

I am to say that a further memorandum on certain financial questions involved will be forwarded at an early date.

I am, &c.
H. J. CREEDY.

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Enclosure in No. 1.

*Notes on Lord Milner's Memorandum of August* 18, 1920: *List of Points it is considered should be added as Clauses to the Treaty with the Egyptian Government.*

SPECIAL INTERESTS.

1. PARAGRAPH 4 (2) of the memorandum states that—

"Egypt will confer on Great Britain the right to maintain a military force for the protection of her Imperial communications."

This wording should not be allowed to stand, and after the words "Imperial communications" the words "or other special interests" should be added.

CLAUSES TO BE INCLUDED IN THE TREATY.

2. Clauses for the protection of these special interests should be included and cover the following points:—

*Strength of Force.*

(*a.*) Right to determine the strength of the (Imperial) military force, including R.A.F. allotted to the army.

(*b.*) Right to determine the location of the (Imperial) troops and R.A.F., and these locations would be governed by the necessity to—

(i.) Guard our communications, such as the Canal, entry to Soudan viâ Cairo, &c.

(ii.) Garrison ports, such as Alexandria, Port Said, &c., required for the use of British forces.

(iii.) Provide aerodromes, landing grounds, &c., and guards for them. No restriction to be placed on British military aircraft flying over Egyptian territory.

(iv.) Provide troops and R.A.F. as escort and guard for the High Commissioners and in such localities as it may be deemed advisable for the protection of foreigners.

*Bases and Movement in Peace and War.*

(*c.*)—(i.) The right both in peace and war to concentrate British troops and R.A.F. in any strength that the British Government may consider desirable, and establish bases in view of a campaign in any theatre of war which might make Egypt a suitable point of concentration.

(ii.) The right to construct defences, temporary or permanent, against any form of attack, either actual or anticipated, both in peace and war, and to construct barracks, camps, &c., for the accommodation of troops in any locality.

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(iii.) Movement over in peace, and, if necessary, control in war, of Egyptian State Railway and the Sinai line, if it is taken over by Egypt. Existing facilities for rail or water transport not to be reduced without consent of His Majesty's Government, and facilities to be afforded for any extension of communications which interests of the latter may require. All existing concessions and privileges to be continued. The Egyptian Government shall at all times give every facility in their power for the transport of British troops through their territories to or from the Soudan.

(iv.) Control of all telegraphic, telephonic, wireless and signal communication in war. Right to full use of existing facilities and to erect and work wireless stations wherever we please for military purposes in peace and war. Present privileges as regards rates to be maintained.

(v.) Powers should be reserved for us to requisition supplies in the case of necessity arising.

*Training.*

(*d.*) The right to retain and to take over suitable localities for the training of troops, including R.A.F.

*Forces raised and maintained by Egypt.*

(*e.*)—(i.) The maximum size of the forces (navy, army and air force), both active and reserve, allowed to be maintained by the Egyptian Government to be laid down by the British Government. The clause should permit the Egyptian Government to submit proposals for increase for consideration of British Government from time to time, should changes in the situation appear to demand an increase.

(ii.) Egyptian Government not to construct fortifications, military works or strategical railways or to organise bases for military operations without the consent of the British Government.

(iii.) Egyptian Government to place at disposal of the British commander a certain quota of armed forces in any circumstances in which it appears likely that British troops in Egypt will be used in the defence of that country against foreign aggression or in the event of local risings.

(iv.) Foreign subjects, other than British subjects, are not to be employed in the armed forces of the Egyptian State or in the police or civil administration without the consent of the High Commissioner.

(v.) The Egyptian Government to guarantee the supply of maps and plans.

(vi.) All the arms and equipment of the armed forces of Egypt to be of British pattern and obtained from British sources.

*Police.*

(*f.*) The right to police towns with military and R.A.F. police to maintain order and discipline amongst our troops and camp followers, but not to interfere with the civil police.

*Trial in Civil Courts.*

(*g.*) The right to try members of our own forces and camp followers attached thereto in our own courts for all offences, and not submit them for trial to an Egyptian court of law.

*Import Military Stores.*

(*h.*)—(*a.*) The right to import and export military and aerial stores and supplies, and goods for the personal use of members of these forces, subject to rebate of duty.

*Or this—*

(*b.*) Here insert the Customs proposals, as contained in 15 A of War Office Jacket 0143/1607, which have been provisionally approved by the Army Council and the Director of Customs of the Egyptian Government.

*Munition Works and Factories.*

(*j.*) The right to construct electric power generating stations, lay cables and to erect munitions works, factories, refineries and other subsidiary works that



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may be considered necessary for the furtherance of our special interests, but no attempt to be made to enter into competition with local enterprise in purely civil industries.

*Intelligence.*

(*k.*) Provision to ensure for us access, for intelligence and other purposes, to all parts of Egypt at all times.

*Quartering.*

(*l.*) Right to retain existing barracks if required or recover possession of them if necessary.

If His Majesty's Government find it desirable to vacate such accommodation at any time its value (if originally erected by His Majesty's Government) should be credited to His Majesty's Government.

If it is found necessary to vacate accommodation, the property of the Egyptian Government, the latter should provide new and up-to-date equivalent accommodation. The practice by which the Egyptian Government obtains lands and accommodation for Imperial troops when required should be continued.

*Labour.*

(*m.*) Right to engage in the open market any civilian labour that might be required either in peace or war for service anywhere.

*Water.*

(*n.*) Provision of necessary facilities to obtain water for local cultivation, drainage, &c., in any place where troops are located, and such control of Ismalia Sweetwater Canal as will ensure adequate supply of drinking water in canal zone.

(*o.*) Provision for the military control of the canal after 1968.

(*p.*) Unrestricted power to use British troops in case of civil disturbances when the lives or property of foreigners are menaced.

*Arms Traffic.*

(*q.*) Control of traffic in arms.

*Frontier District Administration.*

(*r.*) Frontier district administration to be under control of British officers, as at present.

*Customs.*

(*s.*) The right to move military goods to Palestine from Egypt, subject to rebate of customs duties.

*Sinai Railway.*

(*t.*) The Egyptian Government to agree not to throw any impediment in the way of the maintenance of the Sinai Railway, provided that the arrangement does not involve control of this line by any private company not approved by the Egyptian Government.

DRAFTING.

3. The above clauses should be so drafted as to convey to the Egyptian people that our forces in the country do not constitute an "army of occupation," intended to keep them in subjection. On the contrary, such a force will be stationed in their country not to dominate them, but to secure objects of our own, extraneous to Egypt, while available, in case of need, for the defence of Egypt against foreign aggression or interference.

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



*Proposed Arrangements in regard to Imports and Exports by British Military Authorities for Troops in Egypt.*

I.—IMPORTS.

(a.) *By the British Military Authorities.*

Goods imported by the British military authorities, being the property of the British Government and destined for the use of the British army, may be imported free of duty, subject to the following conditions:—

*Conditions.*

1. They must be addressed to the British military authorities in Egypt, and taken delivery of by them.

2. The privilege of free import should only cover such articles as are imported by the army for official use, whether issue is made free or on repayment to troops.

It is understood that issue on repayment is confined to stores in the vocabulary of military issuing departments, and does not apply to tobacco.

3. The nature and quantity of all goods imported by the British army must be declared to the Customs before withdrawal through the customs gates, and, in case of foodstuffs, the value.

4. The Customs will have the full right of examining all goods passing through the customs gates.

5. Requisitions for entry of goods duty free will be made out on form (A) and signed by responsible officers, whose names and signatures should have been previously communicated to the Egyptian Customs Administration.

6. All goods of any kind imported into Egypt and subsequently sold in the country, whether by the military authorities or by another authority on their behalf, shall be subject to duty, and shall not be delivered to their purchasers until duty has been paid to the Customs and a clearance certificate given by the latter to the purchaser.

If, however, goods are sold to purchasers for immediate export, they may be exempted from the payment of import duty, but only if carried to the port of shipment and shipped abroad under full Customs supervision.

7. This arrangement will not apply to animals imported for slaughter, which are not covered by this arrangement.

(b.) *By Individuals, Units, or Navy, Army or Air Force Institutes.*

Members of His Majesty's forces on duty in Egypt, and those in the service of His Majesty's forces, all navy, army or air force institutes, and those in their service, provided that such members or persons are not permanently resident in Egypt, shall be entitled to import free of duty their personal effects and those of their families, or, in the case of institutes, articles required solely for the purpose of the institute. This privilege is confined to articles addressed to the person or institute claiming the privilege.

In order to claim personal exemption from duty or exemption in the name of the institute, certificate (B) must be handed to the Customs authorities, or, in the case of postal packets, postal form No. 43 M. must be handed to the Postal authorities.

Certificates may be dispensed with in respect of luggage with units on a troopship, provided that the Officer Commanding Troops certifies that he is satisfied no contraband is carried. This will not dispense with Customs examination.

This privilege shall not cover the importation of wines, tobacco, provisions, motor-cars, carriages, guns or such animals as are not on the ration strength of the unit, but, by arrangement with the Customs, the duty collected from units, navy, army or air force institutes on beer and provisions will be refunded in a bulk sum monthly to the General Officer Commanding, Egypt, who undertakes that any sum so received shall be distributed to the troops on a *per capita* basis to be fixed by the Army Council, but no refunds shall be made to individual units in respect of particular payments, nor should any portion of a sum be refunded to institutes.

General Officer Commanding will present monthly to the Customs a claim for refund, supported by Customs vouchers or Post Office receipts and by certificate (C)



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



signed by the persons, units or institutes concerned and countersigned by a responsible officer (the person, unit or institute concerned must be in each case the person, unit or institute to whom the parcel or goods were addressed).

As regards tobacco, so long as the British Government makes a free issue (which will enter free under (*a*) as a military store) no refund on individual imports will be made.

Should the free issue cease, a refund will be paid monthly on the basis of the free issue, that is to say, at the rate of 2 oz. per head per week, and certificate (C) will not be required for tobacco.

Motor cars or guns imported by individuals shall be the subject of a refund if re-exported within a period of two years on condition that—

(i.) The re-exporter should be the individual who originally paid the duty; and
(ii.) The gun or motor-car should be properly identified at the port of import.

II.—Exports.

All goods imported by the British military authorities may be exported free of duty, but all products of Egyptian industry or produce of Egyptian soil shall be liable to export duty. The nature and quantities, and, in the case of foodstuffs, also the values, of all goods exported will be declared by the military authorities to the Customs before loading.

III.

The Egyptian Government reserves to itself the right, after the proposed agreement has been in force for one year, to give six months' notice of termination, when negotiations will be undertaken for the revision of the above arrangements.

Note.

(*a.*) Certificates (A), (B) and (C) are attached.
(*b.*) The Director-General of Customs may require to revise the detail of the machinery for refunds to General Officer Commanding and the forms of certificate.

---

Certificate (A).

*Accord intervenu à la date du 1er juin 1899*

*Certificat modèle (A).*

The Director-General of Customs is requested to give instructions for the free entry of the goods embarked on board the transport , due at on the , 19 .

It is hereby declared that all the goods above mentioned are the exclusive property of the British military authorities, and that they are intended for the sole use of the British troops.

.....

(*Signature of D.A.Q.M.G., or of responsible Officer registered with Customs.*)

(*Date*) .....

---

Certificate (B).

1. I hereby declare that the , marked and bearing my address, arrived by the steamship from , contain only articles as per annexed list for my own use (for regimental use) (for use of institute), and not for sale.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [١٩٧ظ]
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

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2. Add if exemption desired for horses on ration strength of a unit.
I certify that the horses arrived by the steamship from
are on the ration strength of the unit.

.....
(*Signature of Claimant.*)

(Orderly Room Stamp.)

.....
(* *Signature of Officer Commanding Unit.*)

* In case of institutes, signature of D.A.Q.M.G., or the officer authorised to sign for him by arrangement with the Customs, will be required.

---

CERTIFICATE (C).

I hereby certify that the Customs or Post Office receipt No. attached covers goods delivered to me for the unit or institute.

.....
(*Officer of Unit or Manager of Institute.*)

(Orderly Room Stamp.)

.....
(*Countersigned by Commanding Officer of Unit or, in case of Institute, D.A.Q.M.G. or responsible Officer notified to Customs.*)

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# (٤٧٣/٣٩٨)

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*Printed for the Cabinet.* *February* 1921.

CONFIDENTIAL.

## THE EGYPTIAN SITUATION.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

I MUST ask the Cabinet to come to an early (preliminary) decision on the subject of Egypt. It cannot indeed either in honour or with safety be delayed. Acting upon the instructions of the Cabinet at our last meeting on the subject (4th January), I forwarded a copy of Lord Milner's report to Lord Allenby on the 6th January. In my covering despatch I said that we proposed to lay Lord Milner's report before Parliament at the opening of the session, that it should be simultaneously published in Egypt, that an advance copy should be given to the Sultan, and that the latter should be invited to constitute the long-promised official delegation which was to come to England to discuss the terms with His Majesty's Government. I added, in accordance with the Cabinet decision :—

> "Both parties will enter the discussion with free hands, since, pending the exchange of views to which I have referred, His Majesty's Government have not thought it right to arrive at a final judgment on either the principle or the details of the proposals contained in the report."

Then ensued a telegraphic correspondence with Lord Allenby, which has been circulated to the Cabinet in the printed collection of telegrams, and the salient features of which have been the following :—

From the start Lord Allenby expressed himself as confident (12th January) that before the Sultan agreed to form an official delegation he would require certain explanations as to the general attitude of His Majesty's Government, and that any very wide modification of the principles of Lord Milner's proposals would be regarded by all shades of opinion as a breach of faith on the part of His Majesty's Government. "Egypt," he said, "expects a declaration of policy by His Majesty's Government based on Lord Milner's conversations, and then to be called upon to produce a delegation to discuss details of settlement."

While urging this course of action, which he has since emphasised and repeated, Lord Allenby did not conceal his own opinion that in certain respects His Majesty's Government would be well advised, when the Egyptian delegation comes to England, in insisting upon certain substantial modifications of Lord Milner's concrete proposals. They are the very respects in which I have in previous papers myself criticised them, viz. :—

(*a.*) The control of foreign affairs, as to which Lord Allenby thinks we should not acquiesce in the appointment by the Egyptian Government of diplomatic representatives in foreign capitals.
(*b.*) The right to maintain British troops in other places than the Canal zone, notably in the neighbourhood of Cairo.
(*c.*) The position and functions of the financial and judicial advisers.
(*d.*) The non-employment of foreigners in the Egyptian civil and military services except with the assent of the British representative.

In subsequent telegrams Lord Allenby has added criticisms or has suggested amendments on other points which would be appropriately discussed with the Egyptian delegation when it arrives.

The Sultan, when he had read Lord Milner's report, took exactly the line which Lord Allenby had foreseen. He said that, while entirely willing to meet our views, he could not form the delegation without a much more definite basis than the purely negative attitude so far assumed by His Majesty's Government. A little later (29th January) the Sultan formulated on his own account a fresh objection to the





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Milner proposals, viz., that the responsibility of the Council of Ministers to the Legislative Assembly would, in his opinion and that of many leading Egyptian politicians, be at present a dangerous experiment, leading to intrigue. But he repeatedly insisted that "it would be impossible for him to nominate an official delegation until His Majesty's Government come to a definite decision which would form a basis for discussion."

This, then, is the point at which we have arrived. If we mean to keep our pledge as to the delegation (and it is unthinkable that we should not), if we want to settle the Egyptian question peaceably and to escape a revival of controversy and agitation very likely in a much more dangerous form, we cannot procrastinate indefinitely, or wait till the Dominion Premiers arrive in June to help us to make up our minds. but must come to some prefatory decision without delay. What form should it take?

Lord Allenby, whose official telegrams, as well as his private correspondence, demonstrate that his views are substantially identical with those which I have more than once placed before the Cabinet, has supplied us with a formula (17th January). It is that we should forthwith make the following declaration to the Sultan :—

> "His Majesty's Government, after a study of the proposals made by Lord Milner, have arrived at the conclusion that the status of protectorate is not a satisfactory relation in which Egypt should continue to stand to Great Britain. While they have not reached final decisions with regard to Lord Milner's recommendations, they desire to confer regarding them with an official delegation, nominated by the Sultan with a view, if possible, to substitute for the protectorate a treaty of alliance which would, while securing the special interests of Great Britain and enabling her to offer adequate guarantees to foreign Powers, meet the legitimate aspirations of Egypt and the Egyptian people."

I am not wedded to these precise words. But they represent in substance the two principles which, while sharply criticising some of Lord Milner's proposals, I asked the Cabinet to accept in my note of the 1st January, viz., (*a*) the substitution of a treaty of alliance for the existing but disputed protectorate, and (*b*) the recognition within certain defined limits of the independence of Egypt.

If we are prepared to go as far as Lord Allenby proposes, then I believe, and Lord Allenby concurs with me, that when the delegation comes here we shall be able to exact pretty well what terms we desire about the disputed points, and even to insist upon the control of foreign relations. We shall also be able to take up a firm line about the Zaghlul reservations, which of course we shall be willing to discuss *pari passu* with the discussion by the Egyptians of our objections, but about which I hope that we shall decline to give way. In other words we should have made our maximum concession, and if we did not obtain the terms that we desired would then revert to the *status quo ante*. If we do not adopt some such line, but take refuge in further delay, we shall be acting in direct opposition to the emphatic and repeated advice of the Sultan, of Lord Allenby, of Lord Milner, and indeed of everyone I have met or heard from who is acquainted with the present position in Egypt; we shall obtain no delegation; Adly and Mazloum, who is to be president of the delegation, will decline to serve upon it (*vide* Lord Allenby's telegram of 19th January), and we shall be back in the quicksands. It is too late now to act as though Lord Milner had never existed, or as though his report had not been written, or was not about to be given to the world.

As a matter of fact the Egyptians are giving us a great opportunity by the superstitious and almost insane significance which they attach to the phrase protectorate. In their eyes it connotes servitude of a degrading character, inconsistent with the glorious Wilsonian discovery of self-determination as the future guiding principle of mankind. Why should we not humour them? Why worry about the rind if we can obtain the fruit? I take it that what we all have in view is that Egypt would remain inside rather than outside the British Imperial system. If the best way to do this is to drop the word protectorate and conclude a treaty of alliance with her, as we did with the Indian Princes a century ago (their relation to us has indeed been commonly defined by the constitutional writers as one of "subordinate alliance"), why not do it?

My advice therefore is :—

1. That we should now make up our minds to go as far as Lord Allenby proposes, and invite the Sultan to appoint and send the delegation on that basis.
2. That we should have an early discussion in Parliament. Indeed, we cannot escape it—at which we should, without committing ourselves to any acceptance in detail, lay down the above general propositions, and invite opinions as to detail.



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

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3. That when the delegation comes we should press for and even insist upon our conditions, which, in my belief, we shall obtain.

May I add this final reflection, that if we do not take this opportunity to settle the Egyptian problem on lines which, though we might not *à priori* have chosen them, are yet compatible with the retention of British predominance in Egypt, we may find that a British Labour or Socialist Government at no very distant date may grant complete independence and sacrifice our position altogether?

(Initialled) C. of K.

*February* 14, 1921.

The War Office have submitted to the Foreign Office certain criticisms of detail upon Lord Milner's proposals, which could be considered by a committee or conference before the discussion with the Egyptian delegates begins.

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

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

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EGYPT AND SOUDAN. [March 3.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 4.

[E 2893/260/16] No. 1.

*Question asked in House of Commons, March 3, 1921.*

EGYPT (STATUS).

*Mr. Lawson* asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the fact that the Egyptian people have made it clear to their delegates that they will not be satisfied with less than the abolition of the British protectorate and of the fact that the Milner Report does not exclude the possibility of this abolition, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to state their policy on this point.

*Answer.*

*Mr. Harmsworth.*—His Majesty's Government have addressed the following invitation to the Sultan of Egypt:—

"His Majesty's Government, after a study of the proposals made by Lord Milner, have arrived at the conclusion that the status of protectorate is not a satisfactory relation in which Egypt should continue to stand to Great Britain. While they have not reached final decisions with regard to Lord Milner's recommendations, they desire to confer regarding them with a delegation nominated by Your Highness, with a view, if possible, to substitute for the protectorate a relationship which would, while securing the special interests of Great Britain and enabling her to offer adequate guarantees to foreign Powers, meet the legitimate aspirations of Egypt and the Egyptian people."

[5795 *c*—4]

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



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No. 1.—SECRETARY OF STATE.

EGYPT AND SOUDAN. [March 31.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 5.

[E 3853/260/16] No. 1.

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.*—(*Received March* 31.)

(No. 225.)

My Lord, *Cairo, March* 18, 1921.

IN my telegram No. 175 of the 17th March I had the honour to report to your Lordship the composition of the new Ministry in Egypt under the leadership of Adly Pasha. I will now review the events which led up to this development.

On receipt of your telegram No. 119 of the 22nd February, I asked for an audience with the Sultan and visited him on the following day, the 24th February, accompanied by Mr. Selby, First Secretary, Mr. Scott, Councillor at the Residency, being absent on a few days' leave in Upper Egypt. I handed to His Highness a typewritten copy of the decision of His Majesty's Government, with a French translation. At the same time, in order to remind His Highness of the wishes of His Majesty's Government as regards the procedure to be followed in the appointment of the official delegation, I gave him a further copy of the *aide-mémoire* I had communicated to him on the 1st July, which embodied the views expressed in your Lordship's telegram No. 585 of the 30th June last.

Having regard to the considerable concession made by His Majesty's Government, I was surprised to see that His Highness did not show any special gratification on reading the terms of the message. He expressed the opinion that it did not advance matters to any appreciable extent, and he seemed to consider he would have difficulty in forming a delegation on the basis of it. He urged that it would be undesirable in the existing circumstances that it should become known in Egypt, and suggested that it would be preferable from every point of view that action should be postponed, at all events till the summer, when he seemed to consider that prospects would be more favourable. He asked for twenty-four hours to consider the matter, and at the same time suggested the desirability of resubmitting the point to His Majesty's Government. I did not give him an immediate reply. On thinking matters over afterwards, however, I came to the conclusion that the idea of a postponement had arisen in the Sultan's mind for the reason that he hoped that his prestige, which had risen considerably in the country in the last few months, would later on be still further increased, and that he would be better able, say, in July next, to achieve the objects aimed at by His Majesty's Government on his own conditions, rather than on those of the leaders he would have to approach.

Proceeding to discuss the composition of the delegation, the Sultan said that if action must be taken forthwith on the decision of His Majesty's Government, he proposed to approach Mazloum Pasha, President of the Legislative Assembly; Tewfik Nessim Pasha, Prime Minister; Adly, Mohammed Said, Rouchdy, Wahba and Sirry Pashas. As regards Adly Pasha, he was not of opinion that he represented any real party in the country, and expatiated on the danger of relying too much on him. Parties in Egypt, in the sense generally accepted in Western countries, were, in His Highness's view, non-existent, and Adly Pasha could not be regarded as controlling a coherent and important section of Egyptian public opinion.

At the close of the interview the Sultan impressed on me that he was only desirous of acting in accordance with the wishes of His Majesty's Government, and told me I could rely on him to do everything in his power to facilitate the realisation of the wishes of His Majesty's Government as regards the carrying out of their policy. I took leave of His Highness, telling him I would consider the points he had raised and return with an answer on the following day.

The same evening I received a visit from the Prime Minister, Tewfik Nessim Pasha, who came on behalf of the Sultan to urge the case for delay as regards taking action on the decision of His Majesty's Government. By that time I had had time to review the position, and had decided that no postponement was possible or desirable. I was aware that the concession which had been made by His Majesty's Government as regards the protectorate was the utmost limit to which they could be expected to go in the matter





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



of providing a basis for the formation of an official delegation, and it seemed that any delay in taking action at this end on this decision could only complicate the situation. I informed the Prime Minister accordingly, and told him I should tell the Sultan so when I saw him on the following day. Tewfik Nessim Pasha said he perfectly appreciated the position and would explain matters to the Sultan. The Prime Minister then said His Highness was anxious, if possible, that I should give him a letter showing that he had obtained a concession for the Egyptian people. His Highness was of opinion that this would strengthen his hand, and he trusted his request might be acceded to. I promised to see what could be done.

I realised that I had no authority to inform the Sultan that the concession as regards the protectorate was made to him in person. On the other hand, I had your Lordship's assurance that His Majesty's Government were willing to find an opportunity for enabling the Sultan to derive some personal advantage from the negotiations for a settlement. If a letter in more or less general terms would satisfy the Sultan I saw no objection to giving it, and I accordingly caused to be prepared the letter, the substance of which was communicated to your Lordship in my telegram No. 131 of the 26th February. For the sake of accuracy I enclose a copy.

At my interview on Saturday, the 26th February, when I was accompanied by Mr. Scott, who had by then returned to Cairo, and who has been present at all my succeeding interviews with the Sultan, I handed the letter I had prepared to the Sultan. His Highness read it and expressed great satisfaction with its terms, saying it would greatly strengthen his position in the country. He thanked me very warmly for it.

I then told His Highness that it was desirable to take action on the decision of His Majesty's Government and proceed with the formation of an official delegation. As regards Mohammed Said Pasha, I took the opportunity of pointing out that I was in some doubt as to the desirability of approaching him, since my information was to the effect that Mohammed Said was not in favour of a constitutional form of Government, and was opposed to the settlement desired by His Majesty's Government.

After remarking that all the politicians in Egypt, including Mohammed Said, were playing for their own hand, the Sultan said he would send for Adly, Rouchdy, Wahba, Mazloum, Sirry and perhaps one or two others. The Sultan said Zaghlul would be invited through Mazloum. He did not think Zaghlul would accept, but feared that His Majesty's Government might say that negotiations could not be carried on without him.

I then mentioned the fears of His Majesty's Government that if all the best men went to London Egypt might be left with a weak Government. His Highness said at most two or three of the Ministers would go to London, and it would be preferable to carry on with under-secretaries and advisers rather than appoint other Ministers *ad interim*. If necessary, it would be possible to appoint an extra Minister or two, such as a separate Minister of War. I did not dispute this proposition, but told His Highness I should be glad if he would be good enough to place those whom he might approach in touch with me after he had seen them. The Sultan willingly agreed, and the interview came to an end.

On Monday, the 28th February, I received a visit from Mazloum Pasha, who came to see me on the instructions of the Sultan.

Mazloum Pasha said he had accepted the presidency of the delegation which had been offered to him by the Sultan. He declared himself as satisfied with the decision of His Majesty's Government as regards the basis for negotiations, but as regards the formation of the official delegation he considered that members of the Legislative Assembly should be represented. On my enquiring what should be the proportion of such members to the total number of the delegation, Mazloum Pasha replied one-third. He pointed out that members of the Legislative Assembly were elected representatives of the people and would carry weight, as it was essential that the decisions of the delegation to be appointed should be ratified by the people subsequently.

Thereafter I received visits from Sirry, Wahba and Mohammed Said Pashas, the two last named coming together. Sirry Pasha expressed approval of the decision of His Majesty's Government, and said he would be glad to go to London. Mohammed Said and Wahba Pashas seemed eager to co-operate, but said much would depend on the composition of the delegation.

Your Lordship will perceive that up to this stage I had not seen Adly Pasha. I had, however, received unofficial information of a disquieting nature as to Adly Pasha's attitude to the coalition which the Sultan was hoping to bring about. It had been reported to me that under no circumstances whatsoever would Adly Pasha



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



co-operate if the present Prime Minister, Tewfik Nessim Pasha, remained in the Ministry or was appointed a member of the official delegation.

Though this information had not been corroborated in an interview which Mr. Keown-Boyd, Oriental Secretary at the Residency, had had with Adly Pasha (see my telegram No. 137 of the 3rd March), I considered it important that I should see Adly Pasha without further delay to ascertain the real position of affairs, especially since it had been decided that the publication of the decision of His Majesty's Government could no longer be withheld (see my telegram No 135 of the 1st March).

I accordingly informed His Highness of my intention to see Adly Pasha on the 4th instant, explaining to him that Adly Pasha's position was such that weight must be given to his views regarding the composition of the delegation.

His Highness said that Adly Pasha had already expressed his views to him, and he would be glad if I would see him. He expatiated at some length on the undesirability of making too many concessions to Adly Pasha, again emphasising that he must not be relied on to control the position in the country during the official negotiations.

I saw Adly Pasha the same evening and asked him to explain to me his position in the matter.

His views were briefly to the effect that the main essential was that the delegation to be formed should meet the requirements which had been laid down by His Majesty's Government that it should be able to assure with reasonable certainty that the agreement to be negotiated would be passed by the representative Assembly when the time came. Adly Pasha was not of opinion that the delegation as contemplated by the Sultan would ensure this. He considered that the number of the delegation should be limited; and that it should be composed of men respected by public opinion in the country, and in general sympathy with the policy which was being pursued by His Majesty's Government.

I asked Adly Pasha to submit to me his views in writing, since I thought it important to have them before me officially. This he promised to do.

In the meantime Mr. Keown-Boyd, thinking with me it was important to establish communication between the Prime Minister and Adly Pasha, had invited both to dinner at his house, and had included Mr. Selby in the party.

Both Mr. Selby and Mr. Keown-Boyd came in to me after my interview with Adly Pasha to ask for my instructions as to the line they should take at the forthcoming meeting.

I authorised them to explain that my attitude conformed to the policy of His Majesty's Government. The outstanding factor of that policy was that the Milner Report had been laid before Parliament with the authority of the British Cabinet, and that the British Government had now announced their decision, which they hoped would prove adequate for an official delegation to be formed. As regards the method of formation of that delegation it was necessary to turn to the Milner Report for guidance. The report clearly laid down as an essential condition that the delegation to be despatched to England should assure with reasonable certainty that it would be able to secure the acceptance of the agreement to be negotiated by the future representative Assembly. There were three further considerations which influenced my attitude. Firstly, the commitments of His Majesty's Government to His Highness the Sultan. His Highness had co-operated with them faithfully and loyally at a difficult time in the history of Egypt. He had been entrusted with the task of the formation of the official delegation by His Majesty's Government, and it was important his views should be met so far as was consistent with the main consideration to which allusion has already been made. Secondly, there were the commitments of His Majesty's Government to Tewfik Nessim Pasha, who had greatly increased his reputation in Egypt in recent months, and whose services had received honourable mention in Lord Milner's Report. Thirdly remained the commitments of His Majesty's Government to Adly Pasha himself, who had been influential in bringing about the unofficial discussion with Zaghlul in London (see your Lordship's telegram No. 585 of the 30th June).

At the close of the dinner the above attitude was explained to Tewfik Nessim and Adly Pasha, who were asked to give their views.

Adly Pasha, enquiring whether it was wished he should speak openly, and receiving a reply in the affirmative, said he did not consider the existing Ministry could be regarded as fulfilling the conditions that the agreement to be negotiated could be passed through the future representative Assembly, and that in his view a change of Ministry was essential. He emphasised the fact that at this critical stage in his country's history he had no personal ambition for himself. He felt that personalities





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٠٢ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٤٠٧)



should fall into the background, and said that he was prepared to efface himself altogether, provided the main object could be achieved.

Tewfik Nessim, speaking personally, said he was in entire accord with the views expressed by Adly Pasha as to the existing Ministry. It had been appointed as a Ministry of Affairs, and he had always held the view that when the time came for the official negotiations to take place it should be replaced by a Ministry of stronger political complexion. His own attitude in the matter was sufficiently explained by the fact that when His Highness mentioned to him the possibility of assuming the presidency of the official delegation in June last (see my telegram No. 644 of the 2nd July) he had declined the honour, and had pointed out that someone else should be chosen.

Seeing that there seemed to be agreement between the views of Tewfik Nessim Pasha and Adly Pasha as to the existing Ministry, it was suggested to both that a meeting should take place between the parties concerned with a view to arriving at a combination which would meet the situation.

Both Pashas seemed to think such a meeting would be possible. Nothing further was said, and Adly Pasha and Tewfik Nessim Pasha left the house in company.

Mr. Selby and Mr. Keown-Boyd immediately reported the result of the meeting to me, and I decided that the time had come to propose this solution to the Sultan. A note was accordingly drafted with a view to presentation to His Highness, suggesting that a meeting be called of those persons whom His Highness had approached, with a view to advising His Highness as to the measures to be taken to constitute the delegation in such a way as to fulfil the conditions laid down by His Majesty's Government. Subsequent to the preparation of this note, and before its presentation to the Sultan, Sir Gilbert Clayton informed me that the Prime Minister had asked for an interview with him and had elaborated his views. These views were, on investigation, found to be not in disagreement in substance with those of Adly Pasha, which had in the meanwhile been received in the memorandum copy of which is enclosed.

I accordingly decided to postpone making the suggestion of a meeting to His Highness and to confine my action with His Highness to communicating to him a copy of Adly Pasha's memorandum, informing him that I was in agreement with the plan proposed therein, and suggesting that he should discuss it with the Prime Minister. I relied on Tewfik Nessim Pasha repeating to His Highness the views he had expressed to Sir Gilbert Clayton, Mr. Selby and Mr. Keown-Boyd.

Accompanied by Mr. Scott, I informed His Highness accordingly on the morning of the 6th March.

His Highness agreed to consult the Prime Minister without further delay, but pointed out that the proposal practically meant an Adly Cabinet, which would collapse in a week, as Adly had no courage.

After this communication the Sultan resumed negotiations with the leaders, and from unofficial information I received prospects seemed favourable to a settlement. On Wednesday morning, the 9th instant, however, I was informed that Mazloum Pasha wished to consult me in regard to an obstacle which had arisen on which the Sultan desired my advice.

Mazloum Pasha came to the Residency and explained that the obstacle was the position of Mohammed Said. The Sultan, he, Sirri and Wahba Pashas were of opinion that Mohammed Said should remain in Egypt in control of the Ministry during the negotiations, as he was the only man with the necessary authority for this purpose. Adly and Rouchdi Pashas were strongly opposed to this. I informed Mazloum Pasha that I was in agreement with the view of Adly and Rouchdi Pashas, and that if Mohammed Said were included in the combination he should go to London as delegate. Mazloum Pasha went away seemingly satisfied with this decision, and I hoped that the difficulty would be overcome.

My reason for the advice I gave was that I did not trust Mohammed Said, and I thought he would be a danger if left behind.

On the following day it was necessary for me to go to Port Said to dine with His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught. To my annoyance, I learned in conversation with the Grand Chamberlain, Said Zulkifar Pasha, who had been invited to meet the Duke, that a settlement had not been reached and that meetings were still taking place at the palace, between the conflicting groups, Mazloum, Wahba and Sirry Pashas supporting the candidature of Mohammed Said to the Presidency of the Council *ad interim*, while Adly and Rouchdi Pashas remained opposed to this proposal.

It seemed to me that some explanation was required from the Sultan as to why, after asking my advice, he came to disregard it. I accordingly decided to ask



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٠٣و]
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



for an interview with His Highness immediately on my return to Cairo on Saturday morning.

I visited His Highness accordingly on the afternoon of Saturday, the 12th March, and asked him whether Mazloum Pasha had conveyed the message I had given him on the previous Wednesday, and whether, having regard to the fact that His Highness has had a fortnight to consider the composition of the official delegation, he was yet in a position to furnish me with a list of the delegation and Ministry which would meet the requirements I had repeatedly emphasised.

His Highness, evading my direct questions, said Adly Pasha was endeavouring to impose himself on him and enforce conditions as to the formation of the delegation and Cabinet. He was encouraged in this attitude by the support of the British Government, and but for that support he would be glad to be invited to be a member of the delegation without any conditions whatsoever.

The Sultan said there were only two possible candidates for the Ministry of the Interior, Mohammed Said Pasha or Tewfik Nessim Pasha. His Highness must stipulate that he should have a Minister of the Interior in whom he had confidence and who could keep order. I enquired again of His Highness whether he was in a position to furnish me with the agreed list of the Ministry and Delegation. He could not do so, but said he was prepared to agree that Mohammed Said should accompany the delegation; whereupon I informed His Highness that I intended to see Mazloum Pasha and Adly Pasha together the same evening. His Highness said he had no objection.

Mazloum and Adly Pashas came to the Residency a few hours later.

I stated that I understood a difficulty had arisen over Mohammed Said, and that I had already expressed the opinion he should not remain in Egypt but should go to London, and that the Sultan now agreed. Both Mazloum and Adly Pashas then gave me to understand that the last remaining difficulty had been removed, and Mazloum Pasha said he would be able to submit his list to the Sultan on the following day. At the time Adly Pasha made no comment; but in conversation with Mr. Scott the same evening he emphasised the fact he must be consulted as to the composition of the Ministry and the distribution of the posts, since if he agreed to co-operate on a basis other than that which would be approved in the country he would lose his whole influence.

Not hearing that any decision had been reached during the course of Sunday, the 13th March, I decided that the time had come to intervene directly in the negotiations.

I accordingly asked for an interview with His Highness on Monday morning, the 14th instant, with a view to demanding an immediate settlement of the question of the Ministry and delegation.

His Highness was unable to receive me, being ill in bed with a severe chill. His Highness, however, sent the Grand Chamberlain to see me at the Residency on his behalf.

I informed Said Zulkifar Pasha that time pressed, that His Highness had asked for my advice as regards Mohammed Said, that I had given it, and that my advice once given was not my own but the opinion of His Majesty's Government, which they would expect should be followed. I added that if Mazloum Pasha was unable to get together or hold together a coalition some other head must be found, and that at once. Too much time had been lost already, and if the Egyptians could not make up their minds I should have to act on behalf of and under instructions from His Majesty's Government.

The Grand Chamberlain promised to inform the Sultan at once, and to return with a reply in the course of the day.

At 4 o'clock I received a further visit from the Grand Chamberlain, who stated that Mazloum Pasha had informed the Sultan that the difficulties which had been placed in his way made it impossible for him to undertake the task of forming a Ministry and delegation. The Sultan now proposed to approach Adly Pasha, and Said Zulkifar Pasha said he was on his way to Adly Pasha with a view to asking him to come to the palace. He promised that after Adly Pasha had seen His Highness he would send him to see me at the Residency.

Meanwhile, not having heard the views of the Prime Minister on the recent developments, I sent Mr. Keown-Boyd to see him. Tewfik Nessim Pasha said he had realised for some days that the only possible solution of the difficulty was that the arrangements in connection with the delegation should be entrusted to a new Ministry. As regards himself, he could not see his way to accept a post in a Ministry to be formed





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٠٣ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٤٠٩)



by Adly Pasha. On the other hand, he would be willing to go to London if a wish were expressed to that effect. He did not, however, press the point so far as he personally was concerned.

Adly Pasha called upon me at 7 o'clock, and told me he had been asked by the Sultan to form a Ministry, and would be ready with his list on the following day.

The names of the new Ministry, which were communicated to your Lordship in my telegram No. 175, call for little comment, beyond that, as I have already pointed out, no Zaghlulists are included. Adly Pasha, however, seems satisfied he can count on the collaboration of the more prominent of Zaghlul's followers, who have been despatched by him to Paris with an invitation to Zaghlul to join the delegation. Adly Pasha tells me that if Zaghlul refuses to be a member of the official delegation his followers will probably desert him and support the Ministry; if, on the other hand, Zaghlul consents to join the delegation, his supporters will come in with him and the difficulty of Zaghlul's opposition to the official negotiations will have been overcome. On this point we can now only await the result of Adly Pasha's overtures to Zaghlul Pasha.

Your Lordship will perceive that my policy throughout these negotiations has been based on the fundamental requirements that the new Egyptian combination should have reasonable certainty of securing the adherents of the future representative assembly to the agreement to be negotiated with Great Britain. I repeatedly emphasised this point both to the Sultan and to the leaders who visited me.

Considering that the matter was one for Egyptians to decide among themselves, I had hoped that the Sultan would be able to come to an arrangement with leaders of opinion on the basis of a coalition, with due regard to the claims of the party headed by Adly Pasha, which would embrace all parties. Mohammed Said not excluded, since I was of opinion that it would be better to remove from Egypt such a potential danger as this notorious politician.

Unfortunately, as the days went by it became apparent that the Sultan could not be relied on to show the statesmanship required of him at a crisis in his country's history. Fearful for his own personal position and for the welfare of his dynasty, he fell completely under the influence of Mohammed Said, whose aim I could interpret as no other than to defeat the policy to which His Majesty's Government stood committed and which I had been instructed to facilitate as far as possible. I was left no alternative but to intervene with His Highness, with the result that Adly Pasha was summoned to the palace to assume the leadership. This result will, I believe, be satisfactory to your Lordship, since His Majesty's Government have for some time past looked to Adly Pasha to carry through on the Egyptian side the policy initiated by Lord Milner.

I should like to take this opportunity of paying a tribute to the statesmanlike qualities of the late Prime Minister, Tewfik Nessim Pasha. He was almost unknown when he became Minister of Wakfs in the Cabinet of Mohammed Said Pasha in May 1919, and when a year later he was summoned to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers he still had to give final proof of the qualities which he had displayed as Minister of the Interior in the short-lived Ministry of Wahba Pasha. He assumed office at a difficult moment, when the lives of Ministers were in danger, the credit of the Government in the country low, and the Government officials themselves restless and discontented. By hard work, good sense, firmness and absolute integrity he succeeded in the course of ten months in establishing for himself, both in the Ministry of the Interior and in the other administrations of the Government, and finally, in spite of much opposition and suspicion, in the country at large, a position of strength and respect exceeding the most favourable expectations; and his services at a critical time have been of inestimable value both to Egypt and to His Majesty's Government.

The events of the last three weeks have brought Nessim Pasha's statesmanlike qualities into particular prominence. His position, as closely associated with the Sultan and barely acquainted with Adly Pasha, was a difficult one; but while not swerving from his loyalty to the Sultan, and at the same time establishing friendly personal relations with Adly Pasha, he realised that the situation demanded of him an attitude of disinterested self-effacement, and he has consistently done everything within his power to facilitate the achievement of the end in view.

In conversation with me on the 15th instant, Nessim Pasha again emphasised that he had not the least intention of claiming inclusion in the official delegation. If, however, his services were required, he would gladly give them.

The Sultan has accepted his new Ministry with resignation, notwithstanding that many members of it are personally distasteful to him. At an interview I had with His Highness on the 16th instant he expressed no annoyance at the action I had taken, and



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



undertook to work with me in carrying out the policy of His Majesty's Government. His Highness can be counted on to carry out his undertakings with the same loyalty as he has done in the past in difficult times. If he was unwilling at first to admit the claims of the party to whom the country had come to look for leadership, some allowance must be made for the fact that the blood of Mohammed Ali runs in his veins. It is with difficulty that members of that house can be persuaded that the old order of things has passed away, and that even in Egypt the ruler must conform to democratic practice, and in matters affecting the fate of the country accept the expression of the people's will.

I have, &c.
ALLENBY, *F.M.*,
*High Commissioner.*

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Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

*High Commissioner to the Sultan.*

Your Highness,
Sire, *Cairo, February* 26, 1921.

I DID not fail to report to His Majesty's Government the views repeatedly expressed by your Highness as to the necessity of His Majesty's Government to come to a decision on the Milner proposals which would satisfy the legitimate national aspirations of Egypt and the Egyptian people, with which your Highness has always been known to be in sympathy.

I am now happy to be able to transmit to your Highness the decision of His Majesty's Government, which I feel sure will meet with the views of your Highness, and facilitate the important task now laid upon your Highness's shoulders by His Majesty's Government of nominating an official delegation to confer with them regarding the desired settlement. I would particularly draw your Highness's attention to the spirit of goodwill displayed in this matter by His Majesty's Government in making a concession as regards the abolition of the protectorate in advance of the official negotiations. This important concession is an index of the anxiety of His Majesty's Government to establish their relations with the Egyptian people on a firm and lasting friendly basis.

The decision of His Majesty's Government which I have been authorised to convey to your Highness personally is to the following effect :—

" His Majesty's Government, after a study of the proposals made by Lord Milner, have arrived at the conclusion that the status of protectorate is not a satisfactory relation in which Egypt should continue to stand to Great Britain. While they have not reached final decisions with regard to Lord Milner's recommendations, they desire to confer regarding them with a delegation nominated by the Sultan with a view, if possible, to substituting for the protectorate a relationship which would, while securing the special interests of Great Britain and enabling her to offer adequate guarantees to the foreign Powers, meet the legitimate aspirations of Egypt and the Egyptian people."

I have, &c.
ALLENBY, *F.M.*,
*High Commissioner.*

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Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

*Note to Adly Pasha.*

POUR assurer le succès des négociations officielles et l'acceptation de l'accord éventuel par le pays, il importe de satisfaire, autant que possible, aux conditions suivantes :

1. Les délégués doivent avoir dans le pays une autorité basée sur l'estime et la confiance. Non seulement cette autorité est nécessaire auprès et l'Assemblée nationale, mais encore l'adhésion sincère de la population aux stipulations de l'accord dépendra, en grande partie, du crédit dont jouissent les délégués.



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

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2. Le choix des négociateurs, tout en donnant satisfaction aux nuances de l'opinion, dans la mesure où celle-ci est répartie en Égypte, doit s'inspirer, autant que possible, de la nécessité de constituer un groupe homogène, uni dans le sentiment de la responsabilité qu'il assume à l'égard du Souverain et du pays.

Une délégation qui ne présenterait pas ce caractère de solidarité nécessaire risquerait de manquer son but, tant en Angleterre qu'en Égypte.

3. Il importe que durant tout le cours de sa mission, la délégation reste en contact constant avec l'opinion en Égypte. Il faut, notamment, qu'elle ait le moyen tant de s'assurer des tendances de cette opinion que d'excercer, au besoin, son influence pour la guider et la canaliser dans le sens qu'elle jugera utile. Ce contact et cette influence ne peuvent utilement s'excercer que par l'intermédiaire des membres du Cabinet restant en Égypte. Ceux-ci doivent donc, d'un côté, se solidariser avec la délégation et suivre son œuvre de très près et, de l'autre, posséder dans le pays l'ascendant nécessaire.

Il devient aisé, à la lumière des considérations émises ci-dessus, d'en tirer des conclusions pratiques pour la ligne de conduite à adopter : Afin de donner confiance au pays et, en même temps, d'assurer que ses intérêts seront scrupuleusement sauvegardés, il faut que le soin de la négociation et celui de la politique intérieures soit confié à des personnes possédant une particulière autorité et estime et qui soient connues pour leur compétence.

Les deux missions (négociation et direction intérieure) étant étroitement liées, un seul groupe les assumerait sous la forme de Ministère de Coalition, dont la présidence serait confiée à un homme n'appartenant spécialement à aucun groupe et jouissant de la considération générale, tel que Mazloum Pacha.

Afin de ne pas entraver la marche des affaires, au cours des négociations, les délégués, y compris le Premier Ministre, président, pourraient être des Ministres d'État sans portefeuille. Ils partageraient entre eux et avec les autres Ministres la responsabilité du pouvoir, et c'est ce qui illustre encore davantage la nécessité que le choix de ces derniers s'harmonise avec celui des négociateurs. Le fait que les membres actuels du Cabinet se sont en général tenus à l'écart de la vie politique du pays et n'ont pas cherché à nouer des liens de sympathie et de confiance avec le public, créerait pour beaucoup d'entre eux une situation d'infériorité au point de vue des services à rendre dans un Cabinet franchement politique et non plus seulement un Cabinet d'Affaires.

*Le 5 mars* 1921.

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

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SECRET.

# THE SITUATION IN EGYPT.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

THE Sultan having expressed a wish to see me in audience, and Lord Allenby advising that I should go, I accompanied him to the Abdin Palace this morning.

The Sultan said that he had long wished to speak to a Cabinet Minister, as he felt that the Egyptian situation was not properly understood by the British Government. How could they understand it when they had all the affairs of the world as well as of their own country on their shoulders? He complained that he was never consulted until things went wrong, and it then took a long time to get them right again. He could not understand why imperative orders should be sent from home hastening matters on without allowing people on the spot, like himself, to judge to some extent the time and method of action. I asked His Highness to give me an illustration of what he had in mind. In reply he said that, whereas the country was quite quiet three or four weeks ago and settling down very tranquilly, it had now all been disturbed again by the imperious wish of the British Government to have a delegation on the Milner Report. His countrymen were orientals, who rarely pursued the same object for long, and if they had been left alone there would have been a continued improvement in the Egyptian situation. Now, however, for the last three weeks, things had been getting steadily worse; excitement was rising, and there might easily be trouble and serious disorders, undoing all the appeasement of the last six months. He then went on to say that the British Government were woefully misinformed of the influence and strength of Adly Pasha. His influence was very limited. He was the leader of a small group who had their headquarters at the Mohammed Ali Club, and most of whom had received office in the new Ministry. He did not believe he had any strong elements of support in the country behind him. Moreover, Adly was not a man of courage or combativeness, and he believed he was already shaking in his shoes at what lay before him, with Zagloul on the one hand and the British Government on the other. He could not understand why it was we had forced a change of Ministry and insisted on reviving the whole Milner Report question again. Why not leave the initiative in these matters to the men on the spot—to himself and Lord Allenby, with whom he was in complete accord? Those two would know much better than statesmen in London how to handle the Egyptian situation and retrieve the false position into which the country had been plunged by the Milner Report and its premature publication last August. He supposed that the reason was that the British Parliament forced this action on the Government.

I explained to His Highness that this was not so; that the Conservative constitution of the present House of Commons would make it very averse from many of the provisions of the Milner Report, and that, so far from there being any pressure on the Government in the direction of Milnerism, Parliament might very easily manifest a strong opinion to the contrary. So far as the Cabinet was concerned, we had been placed in a false situation by the premature publication of the Milner Report. It might be a false situation; but we were obliged to recognise that it was a new one; and since then we had been endeavouring to act in a sincere manner to the Egyptian people with a view to meeting, as far as possible, their legitimate aspirations. However, I said the British Government would certainly insist on important reservations, and I thought it was quite possible that no agreement would be reached. The Sultan said he was certain that no agreement would be reached, that the delegation would demand absolute impossibilities, and that when these were refused they would return to Egypt to create trouble. It was not possible to meet their wishes in full, and nothing less than the full satisfaction would be accepted. The extremists were in control of this movement, and even if a moderate delegation signed

[6073]



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٠٥ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٤١٣)





an agreement on moderate terms in England, they would be repudiated when they got out here.

I asked His Highness what he thought would follow the breakdown of such negotiations, and he replied that undoubtedly there would be trouble, but that the right course in that event would be for the British Government to state absolutely what it was prepared to give in the way of liberal reforms; to govern with a firm hand, using martial law and having sufficient troops on the spot, and then to carry into effect under these conditions the principal measures of reform we intended to give. Do this bit by bit without ostentation for six or seven months and watch the effect of each concession very carefully, so that at the end of that period we should be able to say: "We have done all that we undertook to do. We are not talking about it: it is actually done. That is all, and there is no more to come. That is how matters stand for the present." His Highness was very insistent upon the need of a policy or "programme," he called it, from the British Government. "Programme and confidence," he repeated several times, "were the watchwords. Let the Government tell me and the High Commissioner what they want done, and let them give us a fair chance to carry it out in our own way. How could the British Government, or individual Members of Parliament who had been a few months in Egypt during the war as young soldiers, understand Egyptian politics as well as he, who, as Prince Fuad, had lived in the middle of it all for twenty years and knew all the personalities and intrigues?"

He evidently thought that his task had been rendered much more difficult by the recent handling of this question from London. It was not possible for him to say to his countrymen: "Remain slaves; cease to agitate for liberty." On the other hand, he regarded the demands put forward as absolutely impossible. He seemed greatly to regret the advent of the Adly Ministry, which he anticipated would either collapse or be dominated completely by the extremists.

Altogether the Sultan made a good impression upon me. His views about men and affairs were expressed with much pith and point, and his description of the practical difficulties in which he was placed by the Milner-Zagloul agitation would impress anyone who heard it. I am quite sure that if he had been able to make to the Cabinet the statement which he made to me my colleagues would have been very much impressed. This movement in Egypt at the present time is very largely run by the Pasha class, who have accumulated enormous wealth without being in any way subject to taxation on modern lines. They are now ambitious of getting the whole country in their hands and re-establishing a reactionary régime. These men are of course well known personally to the Sultan, and I expect he is capable of forming a very shrewd opinion of them.

It is quite impossible to stay even a short time in Egypt without feeling how gravely our interests have been prejudiced by the Milner Report, and by the lack of any policy in regard to it, into which we have been forced by its premature exposure. The agitation is fed on false hopes from day to day, and the belief grows in their breasts that they have only to push hard and keep on pushing for the British Government to surrender to their demands. As I have no doubt whatever that we shall not surrender to their demands, it is clear that a very unpleasant and abrupt shock lies ahead; and certainly we shall have ourselves created a greater part of the difficulties with which we are confronted.

W. S. C.

*March* 22, 1921.

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

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No. 1.—SECRETARY OF STATE.

EGYPT AND SOUDAN. [March 24.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[E 3549/260/16] No. 1.

*Earl Curzon to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).*

(No. 198.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 24, 1921.*

YOUR telegram No. 188.

Your view as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards their statement contained in my telegram No. 119 of 22nd February is entirely correct. It cannot be understood too clearly that this decision of the Cabinet, which I did not secure without much difficulty, is the utmost limit of concession to which His Majesty's Government are prepared to go in formulating a basis for negotiations. I had gathered that it was regarded as satisfactory by all reasonable and moderate elements in Egypt. If these now allow a situation to arise as a result of which the outstretched hand is refused the responsibility for possible consequences will not rest with His Majesty's Government, and I shall take care to make this plain.

The other points raised in conversation between yourself and Adly are of great though subsidiary importance. I still hold that the composition of the delegation is a matter to be decided by Egyptians, and I only insist that it shall be so broad as to be truly representative. It would not be so if, on the one hand, the Wafd party were excluded altogether, or, if, on the other, the president and majority of the delegation were drawn from any one party of an extremist complexion. So far as I can judge, the presidency of Adly is the best guarantee of success in the negotiations, and this is my main desire.

I am as fully alive as Adly himself to the desirability of abrogating the censorship and martial law. The decision as to the former I would willingly leave to the Egyptian Ministry. As for martial law, it is a good while since the maintenance of law and order has really depended on it other than technically, and it is to be presumed that a country anxious to prove its capacity for self-government would not turn its abrogation into an occasion for creating disorder. Its maintenance, however, is at present necessary to His Majesty's Government until the Act of Indemnity has been passed and the legislation enacted for the enforcement of the terms of the Peace Treaty. It is no less necessary for the domestic interests of Egypt, notably the enforcement of Egyptian legislation on foreigners, the rent law, the maintenance of rural police, &c. Provided the former interests are safeguarded, I should be quite willing to reconsider the matter at a later date, but I cannot consent to the sacrifice of the vital interests of His Majesty's Government, and I am at present not at all convinced that a precipitate abrogation of martial law is in the true interest of Egypt.

I quite realise what a difficult task Adly Pasha has undertaken and how much courage and resource it will require. He should understand that I am anxious to help in any way I can to secure an issue equally honourable and satisfactory to both countries.

[5795 *aa*—1] d



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



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

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EGYPT AND SOUDAN. [April 26.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[E 4919/260/16] No. 1.

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 26.)*

(No. 311.)

My Lord, *Cairo, April* 16, 1921.

FROM statements which have been published in certain sections of the British press it would appear that there is a large and influential party in England who are opposed to a settlement of the Egyptian question on the lines advocated by Lord Milner, and which will lose no opportunity of bringing pressure to bear on His Majesty's Government to withdraw from the position taken up by Lord Milner, with a view to maintaining British control over Egyptian affairs on a footing more or less similar to that which had prevailed during the thirty-nine years of the British occupation. At the same time there has existed, and indeed still exists, the possibility that the Egyptians themselves, by supporting the extreme demands hitherto advocated by Zaghlul Pasha, would render any acceptance of the basis for discussion of Lord Milner's proposal suggested by His Majesty's Government impossible, and thereby prevent negotiations from taking place between an official Egyptian delegation and the British Government which it is the object of the latter to bring about.

The existence of these two factors make it in my opinion necessary to consider the possibilities for British policy if, on the one hand, the section of British public opinion to which I have referred were strong enough to enforce even at the eleventh hour the rejection of the policy advocated by Lord Milner, or on the other, if the Egyptian extremists carried the day and made immediate negotiations with His Majesty's Government impossible. In either event it would be necessary for His Majesty's Government to find some alternative policy to meet the situation which would be created. It has been suggested in many quarters that such an alternative policy lay ready to hand in the adoption of measures which would enlist the sympathies of the fellaheen; making it possible for His Majesty's Government to rely on the support of this class of the population for a return to a system of government similar to that which prevailed during the many years Lord Cromer was in Egypt. Wishing to examine how far any truth lay in this suggestion, I requested Mr. Amos, the judicial adviser to the Egyptian Government, and Mr. Patterson, the adviser to the Ministry of Interior, both of whom are exceptionally well qualified from their long and close knowledge of Egypt and of the Egyptian question to furnish me with the expression of their views.

I enclose copies of the memoranda they have prepared for me.

Your Lordship will observe that both writers dismiss the idea that, in the present state of opinion in Egypt, there are any measures which we could take of such a nature as to render possible a return to a system of government approximating to that which existed in Lord Cromer's time. Though it may be to some extent true that discontent prevails among the agricultural and working class population of Egypt as regards the distribution of land and the powers of the Pasha and land-owning classes, it would be fallacious and dangerous for His Majesty's Government to draw the conclusion that they could exploit this discontent in the direction of securing support for a reconstituted Cromer régime. Western ideas of autonomy and self-government, not to speak of independence, to which the great war gave so considerable an impetus, have gained too strong a hold on all sections of the community in Egypt for it to be possible for us to return to old-time methods, or to look to the administrative devices employed by Lord Cromer for precedents, to guide us in our future action. The influence of such leaders as Zaghlul has entered too deeply into the imagination of the people of Egypt to render any such solution of the problem possible.

The conclusion to be drawn from the memoranda submitted by Mr. Amos and Mr. Patterson is that we stand committed to the general principles of the policy initiated by Lord Milner, and that His Majesty's Government must bring that policy to its logical conclusion. I am broadly in agreement with the views set forth in their





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memoranda. I have on many occasions emphasised to your Lordship that the memorandum published in Egypt in August last has come to be regarded, whatever the real intentions of His Majesty's Government, as a substantive offer; and that any wide departure from the main principles of the settlement which that memorandum advocated would be regarded as a breach of faith, not only in Egypt itself, but by world opinion at large.

While holding the view that His Majesty's Government are bound to facilitate on their side a settlement in the manner indicated, I do not wish to suggest that His Majesty's Government have not gone as far as they could be expected to go in the direction of furnishing a basis for discussion with the official Egyptian delegation. The concession as regards the protectorate announced in your Lordship's telegram No. 119 is a liberal and generous one, and it is difficult to see what further concessions His Majesty's Government could be expected to make in advance of the official negotiations. It is certain they could not agree to accept in advance the reservations of Zaghlul Pasha. Some of them involve the interests of the foreign communities in Egypt, which His Majesty's Government are bound to safeguard, and any specific limitation at this stage of the powers to be attributed to the financial and judicial advisers, without regard to the settlement as a whole, would be difficult, not to say impossible. Lord Milner's report does not preclude the discussion of Zaghlul Pasha's reservations, but London is the place for such discussion.

Mr. Amos deals with this aspect of the question, and seems to be of opinion that if the basis of discussion suggested by His Majesty's Government is now rejected by the Egyptians, His Majesty's Government would have a clear and strong case for the policy they have pursued. As regards world opinion, a factor not to be disregarded, His Majesty's Government could show they had made every concession that was reasonably possible to give effect to their undertakings, while, in the matter of Egypt itself, Mr. Amos seems to think that some support would be forthcoming for a policy, the initiation of which would inevitably devolve upon His Majesty's Government, if owing to the adoption of an unreasonable attitude on the part of the Egyptians there were to be a breakdown in the negotiations for the formation of an official Egyptian delegation.

The policy advocated by Mr. Amos in such an eventuality is as follows:—

(*a.*) The abolition of the protectorate.

(*b.*) The Constitution of 1913 to be put in force again; the advice of His Majesty's Government as to the constitution of ministries to continue to be authoritative; the Sultan to cease to preside over the council; the functions of the financial adviser to remain unchanged.

(*c.*) An Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs to be appointed; diplomatic representation, subject to proviso that Egyptian policy shall not conflict with British.

(*d.*) The army of occupation of course to remain and martial law to be abolished as soon as an Indemnity Act, applicable both to Egyptians and to foreigners, can be passed, either by resorting to the consent of the Powers *ad hoc*, or, if they can be brought into force, under the operation of the draft judicature laws. It would be a matter for consideration whether the abolition of martial law should also be made conditional upon the promulgation and bringing into effect, with the necessary consents, of these last-mentioned laws. This might be found somewhat difficult to justify.

(*e.*) A special régime for foreign officials in the Egyptian Government to be established; provision to be made to regulate more closely the number of posts available for foreigners.

With some significant modifications these proposals are in accord with the spirit of the policy advocated by Lord Milner. The reforms would, however, have to be put into effect, temporarily at least, without that consent on the Egyptian side which Lord Milner has hitherto regarded as a fundamental requirement. In this connection it is to be noted that without a sufficient measure of agreement on the part of the Egyptian Government so much of this plan as rests upon the promulgation of Egyptian legislation of a novel kind might prove difficult of execution.

The main requirement is that His Majesty's Government should be prepared for eventualities and be ready with an alternative policy which could be announced without further delay if present plans miscarry. That policy must accord in its main essentials with the spirit of the settlement aimed at by Lord Milner.



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It is hardly necessary for me to remind your Lordship of the disabilities under which the Egyptian administrative machine has been working for the last two years. The system which has prevailed since the occupation is admittedly of a somewhat illogical character, justifiable chiefly by the fact that for many purposes it proved effective in operation. With the growth of a new class of native officials, not lacking either in ability, administrative experience or ambition, a system which depended theoretically on advice was already beginning to wear somewhat thin before the war, and the question of the propriety of adopting some definition and limitation of the responsibilities of His Majesty's Government was beginning to be raised. The events of the last two years have brought this question into the utmost prominence, without, however, providing a settlement. The consequent underlying sense of uncertainty as to the present responsibilities and future powers and influence of the British authorities constitutes a serious obstacle to the administrative progress. A statement of our view of our responsibilities appears to be a necessity, however tempting it may appear, should an *impasse* be reached in our present political policy, to allow the present *modus vivendi* to continue.

I have, &c.
ALLENBY, *F.M., High Commissioner.*

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Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

*Memorandum by Mr. Amos.*

THERE are several circumstances in the present political situation which justify serious apprehensions as to the prospects of a policy based upon Lord Milner's report being eventually carried through to a successful conclusion.

2. The principal adverse influences consist in the currents of hostile opinion in England and in the possibility of dissensions between rival parties in Egypt. The fact that the scheme implies the abolition of the Capitulations increases the complexity of the position.

3. The prospects of success may be improved if the consequences of failure are carefully explored.

4. These consequences will differ to some extent according to the causes to which failure is due, or is commonly attributed. If the failure is obviously due to factious dissensions in Egypt, it seems not unlikely that effective political opinion in Egypt will form itself into two camps: the one will be composed of all those elements which now support Adly Pasha and who are satisfied that His Majesty's Government has gone as far as it can be expected to go; the other will be composed of the out-and-out supporters of Zaghlul Pasha, with possible support from Mohammed Pasha Said.

5. The former group is chiefly composed of the land-holding and official classes and the more educated and older members of the professions. The latter is composed, I imagine, chiefly of the Azharians, the students and the younger and less reflective members of the bar and the other professions.

6. All the different elements of these two groups have their ramifying influence on the great masses of the people. I believe the statement frequently made that the latter are not interested in politics to be exaggerated. There are, I suppose, few fellaheen who have not some relative or acquaintance in the Azhar, the Government service, or some other one of the politically active groups mentioned above; and any strong sentiments or infectious formulæ entertained or professed by the middle and upper classes tend to find their echo in the villages through the mechanism of the newspapers, the preaching in mosques, correspondence and conversation.

7. It is improbable that the majority of Egyptians desire to be governed by Saad Zaghlul Pasha, with or without the assistance of Mohammed Pasha Said. If these two succeed in making the conclusion of a reasonable agreement impossible, and affairs are so conducted that they are obviously responsible for the failure, I am disposed to think that there would be support in the country for an arrangement on the following lines, to be promulgated as the decision of His Majesty's Government.

8.—(*a.*) The abolition of the protectorate.

(*b.*) The Constitution of 1913 to be put in force again; the advice of His Majesty's Government as to the constitution of Ministries to continue to be authoritative, the Sultan to cease to preside over the council; the functions of the financial adviser to remain unchanged.





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(*c.*) An Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs to be appointed; diplomatic representation, subject to proviso that Egyptian foreign policy shall not conflict with British.

(*d.*) The army of occupation of course to remain, and martial law to be abolished so soon as an Indemnity Act, applicable both to Egyptians and to foreigners, can be passed, either by resorting to the consent of the Powers *ad hoc*, or, if they can be brought into force, under the operation of the draft judicature laws. It would be a matter for consideration whether the abolition of martial law should also be made conditional upon the promulgation and bringing into effect, with the necessary consents, of these last-mentioned laws. This might be found somewhat difficult to justify.

(*e.*) A special régime for foreign officials in the Egyptian Government to be established; provision to be made to regulate more closely the number of posts available for foreigners.

9. If the negotiations are broken off on the ground that, after consideration, His Majesty's Government is unable to see its way to acquiescing in the abolition of the protectorate, in the general terms of Lord Milner's report, an embarrassing situation will arise. The impression will be created throughout the world that the Egyptian problem has been seriously mismanaged, and the view that the British Government is chargeable with a breach of faith will be generally entertained, particularly in Egypt. The task that would devolve upon the British Administration in Egypt would be one of almost insurmountable difficulty, and would be highly distasteful to many of those concerned. It would probably prove impossible to constitute a Ministry, and it may be anticipated that it would be necessary to resort to direct military government. In the long run His Majesty's Government would almost certainly be driven to return to its present attitude, but in very much less favourable circumstances.

10. It is true that this forecast largely rests upon the assumption that it is impossible for the British Government, by adopting a programme of popular reform, to carry on the Administration in Egypt with an adequate measure of popular consent if the wealthy and educated classes are against us. And it may be suggested that this supposition is erroneous, and that such a policy is a possible one. It may, for example, be asked whether it would not be possible to make such a bid for the support of the fellaheen that the opposition of the other classes of the population could be ignored.

11. I am strongly of opinion that no such policy is a possible one.

12. In the first place, it might prove somewhat difficult when one came down to details to construct a programme of reasonable legislative measures which would be likely to make any very strong appeal to the peasant class. This is not a matter on which I can claim to speak with special knowledge. But I apprehend that the main concern of the fellaheen at the present time is to be relieved from the burden of rents fixed on the basis of a high price of cotton. This is a presumably temporary phenomenon.

13. Assuming, however, that an agrarian programme could be constructed of such a nature that it would secure the support of the peasantry, the question arises by whom that programme is to be carried out. It is to be remembered that such a programme would, by hypothesis, have to be initiated at a time of great anti-British political excitement. It might be difficult, if not impossible, in these circumstances to find Ministers, a Legislature, or even the necessary Egyptian officials, to put it into effect.

14. It may not be out of place in this connection for me to submit some observations upon the nature of the Nationalist movement, as I see it.

15. It is, I believe, a mistake to think of the population of Egypt as being divided into two sharply separated classes—on the one hand, the fellaheen and the working classes without political sentiments, and on the other, a comparatively small wealthy or educated class reacting readily to political propaganda.

16. The people of Egypt should on the contrary be regarded as a comparatively homogeneous population, the various classes of which are closely united by ties of relationship, neighbourhood and similarity of interest. The educated class has at its disposition very various means of acting on the passions and feelings of the people in general. This class itself is profoundly influenced by the prestige of Europe. The desire to imitate Europe is illustrated and symbolised by the general



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adoption of European dress. Everything in law, customs, manners which is not European is on the defensive. All the forces both of snobbishness and of the desire for improvement are against Islam. Few or no men of any position in the country observe the ritual or conform to the discipline of Mahommedanism.

17. There is a marked movement of opinion, even among the Cadys, in favour of reform of the religious law; but the standard of reform is set by the codes of European countries. European influence spreads through the country by a hundred channels: books, newspapers, advertisements, cinemas, the tales of returned travellers, the example of foreign residents, Government institutions. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the political ideas which have the greatest influence in Europe find in Egypt a field in which they appear almost to propagate themselves by their own proper energy. The ideals and traditions of the East are profoundly undermined, and their place is filled by the still rising and vigorous tide of European nationalism and democracy. It is perhaps a matter for regret that we have not realised earlier that if this system of thought is in danger of proving subversive or indigestible, it can only be combated or rendered wholesome by the intensive education of a governing class on the lines of our own best ideals. But England has not in the past taken the same view of its interests and responsibilities in these respects as, for example, have France and Italy. We have not sought to appeal to the imagination of the Egyptians. My belief, for what it is worth, is that we are more likely to restore British influence in Egypt by appealing to the imagination of the Egyptian people and to their desire for progress on Western lines than in any other way.

18. I do not wish to exaggerate. The Egyptian popular mind is a shallow sea, easily stirred to excitement, and incapable, or so it would appear, of any such profound and prolonged effort of national reconstruction as was made by the Japanese. But to pursue the analogy, this sea is inseparably connected with the European ocean, and the level of one cannot be altered without altering the level of the other. And, in short, unless I am much mistaken, any policy resting on the idea of overcoming the nationalist sentiments of the mass of the people by measures of a purely economic kind is essentially chimerical.

*March* 23, 1921.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

*Memorandum by Mr. Patterson.*

I HAVE no hesitation in saying that it is a mere chimera to formulate any scheme by which the fellaheen can be won over to a return to a Cromerian policy under which they support Great Britain against the Pashalik and land-owning classes. I would go further and say that, even if such a policy succeeded at first, we should in the end be faced with exactly the same problems by the fellaheen leaders whom we would have lifted out of the ruck.

It was once pointed out to me by a young scion of an old Turkish family that Lord Cromer had actually tried to do this, and that his policy had not been very successful. He instanced the case of Mahmoud Pasha Suliman, a pure fellah creation of Lord Cromer's, and of his son Mahmoud Pasha Mahmoud whose phenomenally repid advancement was entirely the work of the British agency. The former is president of the delegation in Egypt, and the latter is a most bitter Anglophobe—has been one of Saad Zaghlul's colleagues in Paris. Zaghlul himself is a pure Egyptian who was first given power by Lord Cromer.

The above must not be taken to imply that the fellaheen would prefer home rule to British rule. They would most emphatically prefer the latter. It is a great mistake, however, to suppose that their thoughts turn on politics at all. Being of the East eastern, they look on all these town squabbles with "patient, deep disdain." They have been roused up once after being stung by oppression and after having their feelings played upon by agitators who appealed to their feelings of revenge, greed and religious fanaticism. They have also suffered for this uprising, and have not been slow to observe that the agitators have got off scot-free. They are now fully occupied by their agricultural affairs and are most unlikely to take sides in any struggle between two Governments for power.





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٠٩ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٤٢١)





A return to Cromerism pure and simple is impossible. One cannot put the clock back a quarter of a century. We have educated a large class of intelligentsia, whose existence has entirely changed the face of the problem. Many of these are highly educated, and many most capable administrators under British guidance. The fundamental mistake since Lord Cromer's time has been that we have not allowed sufficient outlet for the activities of this growing class. Instead of seeing their opportunities for service—and incidentally for lucrative positions—increase in ratio with their educational advancement, they have seen the numbers of English officials constantly growing. Young men are still being poured into this country and these young men must obviously be offered some career. Hence there seems no hope of finality in the process and no chance of coming into their own in the matter of loaves and fishes. I am aware that the structure of Government is much more complicated now than in Lord Cromer's time, and that therefore a larger number of Englishmen is required, but I certainly think that importation has been carried to an excess and that this point should be more carefully watched in the future.

A return to a form of Cromerism would not, however, be outside the region of practical politics under certain circumstances which may well arise. If Saad Zaghlul breaks the present National Ministry by his uncompromising demands for further concessions from His Majesty's Government a new situation will have arisen. A new Ministry will have to be formed which will depend entirely on British support, and the British Cabinet will be honourably quit of their engagements under the Milner agreement. It may even prove necessary to deport Saad Zaghlul once more, but in this event it would be well to make the deportation a final banishment on the Arabi precedent. Action firm, decisive and final must be taken, and His Majesty's Government's definite policy as regards this country announced without delay. It would be possible to go back simply to the status and Constitution of 1913, but I think something wider than this and more in accordance with the spirit of the Milner proposals would be advisable. It must not be forgotten that a more autonomous régime has been promised them, but this is not incompatible with continued British control over the more important activities of Government. Amongst other things the odious name "protectorate" should go and the Assembly should be given some wider powers.

I am assuming hitherto that if the present Cabinet falls a Saad Cabinet is unthinkable. He would have placed himself in such a position of antagonism to His Majesty's Government that a Cabinet under his presidency would create an unworkable situation.

The alternative is for Saad Pasha to be broken by the present Cabinet. I do not mention their possible collaboration, as it seems most unlikely to come off, and if it did, would mean virtually political suicide on Saad's part after his much trumpeted intransigeance. If the present Cabinet withstand Saad, the negotiations will take place in London. I do not think it could be too strongly impressed from here on His Majesty's Government that it would be the most fatal error to go back on what is virtually an offer of the Government's to Egypt. Details may be modified and safeguards added, but in its general line the scheme should not be broken in Downing Street. If an agreement is come to, it will still have to be ratified by an Egyptian Assembly, and I feel that there is a most excellent chance that it would never be ratified, as the proposals have created genuine alarm in a large body of people, and Prince Ibrahim's letter to the "Times" voiced the opinion of thousands who would never have the courage to utter it. These people, if they wish to prevent the agreement, will join themselves to the extremists and make impossible demands for the Soudan, &c. If the Assembly refuses to ratify the agreement His Majesty's Government can once more start again with a clean slate.

Should, however, the agreement be ratified we must see it through. The evils of throwing over the Milner Commission appear to me greater than the evils of the experiment to be tried under it. British officials they will not be able to do without, and those that remain will, I am convinced, after some six months or so gradually begin to acquire more influence than they have, many of them, ever had in the past.

The great necessity, however, in the event of the agreement failing is to have a definite and distinct policy announced. All the evils of the past few years have come from this lack of decision. So long as our intentions are undefined Egyptians are encouraged to shout their demands, and being Orientals they naturally pitch their demands much higher than anything they ever expect to receive. The Milner proposals staggered the country as being far beyond anything they had ever dreamed of, and in the case of many, as I have already said, they were horrified at having



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



been taken so literally. As a member of the Legislative Assembly said to me, with tears in his eyes, "I never could have believed it of Lord Milner."

After all, history is only repeating itself. When the new Liberal Cabinet came in in 1906, the idea spread that the British Government could be squeezed in any direction. Under Sir Eldon Gorst's régime, the home Government did nothing to correct this impression, and we had similar years of agitation and difficulty. The appointment of Lord Kitchener was equivalent to a declaration of a change of policy, and a visible sign that England was far from thinking of abandoning Egypt. Egypt, sick of troubles, settled down to a régime of benevolent autocracy with almost a sign of relief. Lord Kitchener, though an autocrat, worked more through natives than his predecessors, and if history should, in the given circumstances, repeat itself, it will be necessary for us, as I have hinted above, to carry his policy a step further though on different lines.

R. S. PATTERSON.

*April* 2, 1921.

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



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# (٤٧٣/٤٢٤)



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*Printed for the Cabinet. April 1921.*

SECRET.

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MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

MR. CHURCHILL has recently circulated to the Cabinet a memorandum on his conversation at Cairo with the Sultan of Egypt, together with some reflections of his own on the Egyptian situation.

When the intention of the Colonial Secretary to visit Egypt was first announced, Lord Allenby telegraphed in some anxiety to ask whether this visit had anything to do with the Egyptian situation, but was assured by a comforting telegram from Mr. Churchill and by a message from me that the "visit was not connected with the Milner Report nor with the future of Egypt, for which the Colonial Secretary was not responsible." Lord Allenby made this known in Egypt, and the assurance had a pacifying effect.

I have no wish to complain of Mr. Churchill's audience with the Sultan, which, in the case of so distinguished a visitor, was natural and inevitable, although in the conversation that ensued I am far from being clear that the assurance contained in my telegram quoted above was strictly observed. However that may be, I am clear as to this—namely, that the Sultan displayed in this interview many of those characteristics which a closer familiarity with the regions which the Colonial Secretary has now taken under his sway will teach him are inseparable from the conversations of Oriental potentates, and, indeed, that His Highness consistently and successfully "pulled the leg" of my colleague. I will proceed to show how thorough and almost brazen was the operation.

1. The Sultan's first complaint was that "whereas the country was quite quiet three or four weeks ago, it had now all been disturbed again by the imperious wish of the British Government to have a delegation on the Milner Report."

Would it be believed that the suggestion of this delegation emanated not from ourselves but from Lord Allenby last summer, and that it was the result of an agreement between the Sultan and himself? During his visit to England last autumn Lord Allenby frequently insisted, at the Cabinet and elsewhere, on the fulfilment of this promise; and when the time for fulfilment came, not only did the Sultan choose the members of the delegation himself, but he fixed the date for their departure. In fact, when the Sultan remarked with ingenuous candour to Mr. Churchill: "Why not leave the initiative in these matters to the men on the spot—to myself and Lord Allenby—with whom I am in complete accord?" he correctly described the exact procedure which had been followed.

2. The Sultan then went on to denounce his own Prime Minister, Adly Pasha, and said he could not understand why we had forced a change of Ministry on him, and not left the matter to Lord Allenby and himself.

This, it may be remarked, is precisely what we did. It had always been understood that the stop-gap Ministry of Nassim Pasha should be superseded when the future political status of Egypt came under discussion, and, indeed, he had only accepted office on that condition. Accordingly, when the situation arose, we received on the 14th March the following telegram from Lord Allenby:—

"The Sultan, on my advice, is approaching Adly Pasha to form Ministry and delegation."

Two days later, having offered the post to Adly Pasha, the Sultan "assured Lord Allenby that he would do all he could to help the new Ministry."

How loyally he has carried out this promise is shown by the diatribes against his own Prime Minister which he poured into Mr. Churchill's ear, and which recall the

[6134]

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢١١ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٤٢٥)



exchange of mutual confidences that sometimes took place between the illustrious Queen Victoria and Mr. Gladstone.

As to the reasons for this ill-concealed hostility, the Cabinet may like a few words of explanation. The dislike entertained by the Sultan for Adly—unquestionably the ablest and most reliable of modern Egyptian statesmen—is of long standing. As far back as October 1918 Sir R. Wingate reported a somewhat acrimonious conversation which had taken place between Adly and the Sultan, shortly after the latter's accession, when the former had to complain of His Highness's practice of entertaining visitors with abuse of his Ministers.

The hostility has continued to grow, for Adly is himself honest in money matters and disapproves of anything that savours of corruption in others. But, in the Sultan's eyes, Adly's chief sin is that he stands for constitutionalism and for the theory of Ministerial responsibility—not, in all probability, from any natural love of democratic ideals, but from a well-founded fear of the abuses which inevitably would arise were the present Sultan or any member of his family to be left with the power of overriding the wishes of an elected Assembly. Whether or no His Majesty's Government "are woefully misinformed of the influence and strength of Adly Pasha," the fact remains that the Sultan himself failed to find any other one of the leading statesmen of Egypt able at the critical moment to form a Government. Not only has Adly done so, but the Government, when formed, was received with acclamation by the people, and for the first time for several years Ministers are able to dispense with police protection and are applauded when they appear.

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As a matter of fact the Milner Report was not even written in August last, and was not published until February of this year, and then only as the result of a Cabinet decision taken on the 4th January, 1921.

What the Sultan and Mr. Churchill were alluding to was the memorandum prepared by Lord Milner in July last, in which the outlines of a possible settlement with Egypt were sketched. This document was not published, prematurely or otherwise, by His Majesty's Government. It was communicated to the "Daily Herald" in August last by Zaghlul Pasha, and was copied thence by other papers. Concealment being impossible, it was telegraphed in full to Cairo on the 21st August. Its publication there was in any case inevitable, seeing that four of Zaghlul's followers had been sent by him to Egypt to explain the proposals to their fellow-countrymen.

4. Finally, Mr. Churchill, stepping boldly on to ground ordinarily reserved for the Foreign Office, not merely let the Sultan know quite clearly what were his own sentiments (with which the Cabinet is already familiar) on the matter, but even expressed the opinion, which was warmly endorsed by the Sultan, that "it was quite possible that no agreement would be reached." This exchange of confidences will not, I fear, render my task more easy. It is surely better from every point of view that an agreement should be made if this can be done with prudence and honour. I have myself been one of the severest critics of some of Lord Milner's proposals, but I have never conceded the view that an agreement is both desirable and possible, and I have never ceased to work for that end. Lord Milner himself, who had abundant experience of the extremists, always held that such an agreement was feasible with the more moderate Egyptian elements, who look to Adly as their leader. Lord Allenby has never given any indication of regarding an agreement as impossible of attainment, and has expressly indicated the modifications of the Milner proposals by which, in his opinion, it might be attained.

5. Mr. Churchill concludes that the present movement in Egypt is very largely run by the Pasha class, who are seeking to get the whole country into their hands and to re-establish a reactionary régime.

Far from this being a true picture, it is the Sultan and Pashas of the type of Mohamed Said who are reactionary and dread any change in the *status quo* as being likely to curtail the exercise of their prerogatives.

It is true that the rich landowners have been the largest subscribers to the Nationalist funds; but the driving force of nationalism is in the "intelligentsia," which is far from being confined to the Pasha class, whilst more liberal-minded statesmen, like Adly and his followers, look to the political settlement with England as



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢١٢و]
# (٤٧٣/٤٢٦)



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providing a firm basis for constitutional principles which will prevent, or at least circumscribe, the many abuses which the present Sultan, like the ex-Khedive, only desires to foster to his own advantage.

In conclusion, it is satisfactory to note that since Mr. Churchill's departure from Egypt affairs have not pursued the rather sombre lines which his diagnosis might have led us to expect. The despised Adly Pasha has handled Zaghlul with great tact and success. The latter has agreed to support the delegation, of which Adly is to be president, and will, I doubt not, join it himself. When it comes to London next month we shall be in a better position to form a judgment both as to personalities and policy.

*April* 21, 1921.

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



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

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*Printed for the Cabinet. April* 1921.

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SECRET.

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



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It is true that the rich landowners have been the largest subscribers to the Nationalist funds; but the driving force of nationalism is in the "intelligentsia," which is far from being confined to the Pasha class, whilst more liberal-minded statesmen, like Adly and his followers, look to the political settlement with England as



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢١٤و]
# (٤٧٣/٤٣٠)





providing a firm basis for constitutional principles which will prevent, or at least circumscribe, the many abuses which the present Sultan, like the ex-Khedive, only desires to foster to his own advantage.

In conclusion, it is satisfactory to note that since Mr. Churchill's departure from Egypt affairs have not pursued the rather sombre lines which his diagnosis might have led us to expect. The despised Adly Pasha has handled Zaghlul with great tact and success. The latter has agreed to support the delegation, of which Adly is to be president, and will, I doubt not, join it himself. When it comes to London next month we shall be in a better position to form a judgment both as to personalities and policy.

*April* 21, 1921.



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



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

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No. 1.—SECRETARY OF STATE.

EGYPT AND SOUDAN. [June 27.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

[E 7320/260/16] No. 1.

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 27.)*

(No. 530.)

My Lord, *Cairo, June 17, 1921.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 311 of the 16th April, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of an interesting memorandum which has been communicated to me by Sir William Hayter, legal adviser to the Ministry of Finance and the Residency, in regard to the prospects of a settlement on the lines and in accordance with the procedure contemplated as a result of the report of Lord Milner's Mission.

Sir William Hayter expresses the opinion that no Egyptian could at the present moment consent to become a party to a permanent arrangement between Great Britain and Egypt, which fell short of securing complete independence for the latter, with any prospect of securing the approval of his countrymen for such an arrangement. That consequently there is little prospect of a successful issue to the impending negotiations, and that some other solution must be found. He suggests a provisional arrangement for a period of ten years, and seems to think that, provided it were clearly understood that the arrangement was provisional, it might be possible to secure acquiescence in conditions on which His Majesty's Government must be expected to insist.

Should it prove impossible to secure Egyptian agreement to the *modus vivendi* he suggests, he expresses the opinion that the policy upon which His Majesty's Government may decide should be put in force by proclamation of His Majesty, and he seems to consider that if a policy on the lines of his *modus vivendi* were adopted it would be generally accepted as satisfactory.

I consider that the views expressed by Sir William Hayter are worthy of the serious consideration of your Lordship. I have on many occasions recently indicated my belief that a settlement of the Egyptian problem in accordance with the present contemplated procedure was not within the bounds of practical politics, and that His Majesty's Government must accordingly be prepared with an alternative policy which they may have to enforce without preliminary agreement from the Egyptian side.

Sir William Hayter's scheme is in general accord with the principles of the policy advocated by Lord Milner, and I see no reason why the adoption of something on the lines he suggests should not be attended with ultimate success should the failure of the present negotiations which I contemplate as possible be realised.

Sir William Hayter defines British responsibilities. It is of vital importance that this should be done without much further delay, since it is not too much to say that the entire reorganisation of the Egyptian Government, on which depends the proper and efficient administration of the country, is in suspense pending the now long-awaited decision on the main question of policy.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY, *F.M.*,
*High Commissioner.*

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Enclosure in No. 1.

*Memorandum on a Political Settlement in Egypt.*

WHEN the proposals of Lord Milner's Commission were first published, they were received by Egyptians with something like enthusiasm; while public opinion in England was certainly not unfavourably impressed. There is no doubt that those proposals served one very good purpose in that they were accepted in Egypt as an *amende honorable* for feelings which had been a good deal hurt by recent events. Much of the bitter hostility of 1919 has now disappeared, partly as a result

[6384 *dd*—2] B

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# (٤٧٣/٤٣٣)



of steady and humane government, but partly also because an eminent English statesman has put forward proposals which do not treat Egyptians as a subject race. But the definite scheme advocated by Lord Milner's Commission has certainly lost ground in popular favour since it was first promulgated, and it seems every day less likely that a satisfactory settlement can be affected on the basis of that scheme. It is extremely ingenious, but it is not, to speak plainly, sufficiently straightforward to form the basis of a lasting settlement, nor does it provide for the real practical difficulties of the situation.

2. The whole controversy really turns on the meaning of the word "independence." The Milner scheme aims at establishing "the independence of Egypt on a secure and lasting basis" (article 1). Great Britain will recognise "the independence of Egypt as a Constitutional Monarchy with representative institutions" (article 3 (i)); but if Egypt is to be independent, how is Great Britain concerned with the form of Government which she may adopt? Then, under article 5 (ii), Egypt is to be under an obligation to enter into an alliance with Great Britain, and the rest of the scheme for a treaty contains a number of provisions, nearly all of which impose restrictions on the independence of Egypt. Egypt, in fact, is to purchase her independence at the price of stipulations which, in the eyes of most Egyptians, would make that independence little more than a name.

3. I think that many of us have paid too little attention to the persistent claim for complete independence. It is obviously impossible for England to evacuate Egypt and leave her to her fate, that we are inclined to regard "Istiklal-el-Tam" as a mere parrot-cry, adopted to save the trouble of thought. But I think that there is much more in it than that. Saad Zaghlul was not, in the past, a very popular person, or very much trusted; since his return to Egypt he has made numerous blunders, and has been thrown over by most of his principal adherents; but he still retains a great hold on the country, simply because he stands for complete independence. The present Cabinet has placed "undoubted independence" in the forefront of its programme; I do not doubt that they would lose all popular support if they lowered their claims.

4. I think the explanation is this. All Egyptians naturally desire the complete independence of their country, as their ultimate object; but all Egyptians with the slightest knowledge of public affairs are perfectly well aware of the fact that complete independence for Egypt is not attainable at the present stage of the world's history. If we were to evacuate Egypt to-morrow, another Power would inevitably replace us, as soon as the necessary international bargains had been made; Egypt is rich, defenceless and not difficult to control, at any rate by a Power without humanitarian scruples, and such a prize would not long go begging. Sensible Egyptians know this, and do not want us to evacuate the country; on the other hand, they do not want to bind themselves to any arrangement which would deprive them of their hope of complete independence if the civilised world should come to a better mind.

They want our protection until international affairs are placed on a sound basis, and then they want to enter on equal terms into the community of nations. They thus desire the widest possible autonomy which they can get without losing our protection; but they do not want any scheme which would make Egypt part of the British Empire. They would regard such a scheme as prejudicing their legitimate hopes for the future, and they accordingly detest such words as "protectorate" and "dominion," which would imply membership of the British group of nations.

5. On these points the Milner Report appears to me to be sound; it is the conclusions drawn which I think defective. What is wanted is not a precise definition of the international status of Egypt, but a *modus vivendi* which would enable Egyptian institutions to follow their normal course of development under our protection. If we ask Egyptians to accept, and embody in a treaty, any status for Egypt short of complete independence they will resist to the last, for fear of prejudicing the future; but a *modus vivendi* for (say) ten years would involve no final decision as to their ultimate future. The desiderata from the Egyptian point of view would thus appear to be:—

(1.) Protection by England against external foes;
(2.) The largest measure of autonomy possible, consistently with such protection;
(3.) No definition or binding agreement which would prejudice the claim of Egypt to complete independence, as soon as she can safely dispense with British protection.



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# (٤٧٣/٤٣٤)



6. From the British point of view we have, I suppose, no sort of desire for domination for its own sake. But we have special interests in Egypt which we desire to protect. Forty years of occupation have made us responsible, in the eyes of the world, for the safety of the life and property of foreigners in Egypt; and we cannot divest ourselves of this responsibility by merely abandoning our right to interfere. There are great financial interests established in Egypt on the faith of our occupation. Egypt is a nodal point of our lines of communication, which are far too important to us to be left unprotected, while Egypt is too weak to protect them, even if she were so minded. Finally, there is the organisation built up in Egypt by Lord Cromer and his successors, which England would presumably regret to see entirely ruined, and there is, perhaps, some sympathy with 1,500 or 1,600 Englishmen who seem likely to join the ranks of the unemployed.

7. The objects desired by England and Egypt respectively, as above stated, are clearly not irreconcilable. The protection of Egypt against external enemies carries with it the protection of our communications against the same enemies. The military force employed for these purposes could also be made available, in case of necessity, for the protection of the life and property of foreigners in Egypt, and the banks and commercial establishments owned by foreigners resident abroad. If once the principle of an army of occupation is admitted, it would only remain to devise suitable measures of financial control and some sort of supervision over the irrigation service, which is essential to the life of the whole country and so the concern of all its inhabitants, Egyptians and foreigners alike.

8. Thus the really important question is that of the army in Egypt; and here the proposals of Lord Milner's Commission appear to me to be radically unsound. There is to be a British force, but it is only to be used for the defence of our communications, and presumably for the defence of Egypt against external foes. The High Commissioner is charged with the defence of foreign interests, but he is not to use the British army for the purpose. However many foreigners are murdered by an Egyptian mob, the British army is to stand aside. It is, perhaps, not necessary to labour the point; recent events in Alexandria have made it impossible to support any such proposal. It is, however, possible to make a distinction. There is no reason why the British army in Egypt should be charged with the general maintenance of order, so long as the interests or lives of foreigners are not in danger; and I suggest that the duties of that army might be defined as—

(1.) The protection of Egypt against external foes;
(2.) The protection of our Imperial lines of communications; and
(3.) The protection of foreigners in Egypt.

An assurance could be given that British troops would not be employed for any other purpose, except at the request of the Egyptian Government. My impression is that, when things settle down, a force of about the strength of the pre-war garrison will prove to be amply sufficient. The year 1919 must not be taken as a precedent; the fellaheen then felt that they had a personal grievance against the British army; but I do not believe that they will move on political grounds. If the fellaheen are quiet, it has never taken any very great force to protect foreign interests in the great towns. It is quite likely that there may be agrarian trouble in the near future; but that will probably take the form of land grabbing and refusal of rents on a large scale, and the Egyptian Government will have to deal with it as best it can.

9. It is clearly impossible for British troops to mobilise whenever a Greek grocer's shop is looted in the provinces, or a French landowner cannot get in his rents. The Egyptian Government must be under an obligation to protect the lives and property of foreigners, so far as it can; and, in order that they should take a more lively interest in the matter, I suggest that the agreement should contain a clause imposing on the Egyptian Government liability to pay compensation for all damage caused to the person or property of foreigners as the result of riots or disturbances. There would be no need for any special tribunal; once the principle is established, they could bring their action before the Mixed Courts.

10. The clauses (4 (iii) and (iv) of Lord Milner's memorandum) as to the financial adviser and judicial officer appear to me to be altogether misconceived. The former is to perform the purely mechanical duties which are all that is left to the "Caisse de la Dette," and to give advice when consulted. He will have the name of an important office, with no power whatever. The judicial officer may go to see

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# (٤٧٣/٤٣٥)



the Minister whenever he likes, and can ask for information as to the Mixed Tribunals. They are both of them to be appointed by decree, presumably as officials of the Egyptian Government. The offices, as defined, would be mere sinecures.

11. The real difficulty of the English high officials in Egypt, on which the report never touches, is that they have to serve two masters, the Egyptian Government and the British High Commissioner. It has not so much mattered in the past, since the British representative has, in the last resort, been the ruler of Egypt; but it is already becoming difficult, now that Egyptian Ministers are allowed a free hand, and it will be quite impossible with an autonomous Egyptian Government. I suggest that it should be laid down as a principle that any control which may be retained over Egyptian Administration should be exercised by the High Commissioner and his officers, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, but by no one else; and that accordingly both the financial and the judicial commissioner should be appointed by His Majesty's Government as members of the High Commissioner's staff. It would be a natural corollary that all British officials retained in, or appointed to, the Egyptian service should owe allegiance only to their Egyptian chiefs, and should not be entitled to call in the aid of the Residency, except in respect of personal grievances. The High Commissioner would, in fact, be dealing with the Egyptian Government at arm's length, and British officials would have to shape their course accordingly.

12. The duties of the financial commissioner should be, I suggest:—

(1.) To replace the "Caisse de la Dette" in respect of the service of the Consolidated Debt, and to be also responsible for:—

(*a.*) The service of the Unconsolidated Debt, Ottoman Loans charged on the Tribute, &c.
(*b.*) The payment of all foreign pensions.
(*c.*) The payment of the salaries and expenses of the Mixed Tribunals.
(*d.*) The payment of the salaries and expenses of himself and the judicial commissioner and their respective staffs.
(*e.*) Any other periodical payments to be made outside Egypt.

For these purposes, additional revenue would have to be assigned; probably the customs duties would be the most suitable.

(2.) To act as auditor-general of the financial administration, reporting to the High Commissioner.

(3.) To assist in the preparation of the annual budget reporting to the High Commissioner any proposals which appear to him to be likely seriously to impair Egyptian credit.

He would have access to all files and accounts of the Egyptian Government, for himself and his staff, for any of the purposes above mentioned; but he would have no right to intervene in the ordinary administration of the Ministry of Finance for any other purpose.

13. The judicial commissioner would advise the High Commissioner as to all matters concerning the legal rights of foreigners, the appointments of judges and staff for the Mixed Tribunals, legislation application to foreigners, &c. He would not be concerned in any way with the native tribunals, except that he would be entitled to be consulted as to the prosecution of any Egyptian accused of an offence against a European, reporting the facts to the High Commissioner if there was any reason to fear a miscarriage of justice.

14. The control of the Nile would, as suggested in the Milner report, be placed in the hands of the Nile Commission representing all the countries interested; I suggest that the High Commissioner, as representing foreigners in Egypt, should have a representative on this commission. The relations between the Nile Commission and the irrigation services of the different countries would have to be worked out by those competent in the matter.

15. With regard to legislation applicable to foreigners, I suggest that such legislation should require to be countersigned by the High Commissioner on behalf of:—

(*a.*) His Majesty's Government.
(*b.*) Foreign countries without capitulatory rights.
(*c.*) Foreign countries which have lost their capitulatory rights.
(*d.*) Foreign countries which are prepared to delegate their powers in this respect to the High Commissioner during the period of the *modus vivendi*.



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# (٤٧٣/٤٣٦)



With regard to this last category, it appears that the Powers might reasonably be asked to make this delegation, in view of the measures proposed for the protection of their nationals in Egypt. The delegation would only be temporary, so that their ultimate rights under the Capitulations would be in no way affected. It would not be necessary to wait until all had adhered to this arrangement; every adhesion would lessen *pro tanto* the difficulty of getting legislation through.

16. The result would be that, during the period of the *modus vivendi*, the High Commissioner and his officers, with the support of the army of occupation, would be entrusted with certain specified and definite powers for the protection of British and foreign interests; and that, subject to the exercise of those powers, the Egyptian Government would be free to govern as it thinks best. I can see no reason why we should prescribe constitutional monarchy and ministerial responsibility as the form of Government; it seems to me a matter for Egyptians to decide. Education, justice (except as regards foreigners), public security, public works, provincial administration would be entirely in the hands of Egyptian Ministers, so would finance, subject to an outside audit, and to some control over the budget; so would the Egyptian army. The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be re-established, and I see no reason why Egypt should not have diplomatic representatives in foreign capitals.

17. As to the British officials, I think the scheme proposed by the Milner Commission is a fair one, but I have the gravest doubts whether it could be carried out without serious dislocation if the policy of the commission is adopted as a whole. In that event, a Nationalist Ministry would be chiefly concerned in cutting the Administration loose from the Residency, and no better means could be adopted than the wholesale dismissal of British officials. Under the proposed *modus vivendi*, on the other hand, British officials of the Egyptian Government would have nothing to do with the Residency, while the Egyptian Government would have an obvious interest in securing the highest possible efficiency in administration. If they could show, at the end of the ten years' period, that the British forces had never had to turn out for the protection of foreigners, that the financial and judicial commissioners had had no serious fault to find with the administration of finance and justice, and that the country was peaceful, prosperous and well-governed, they would be able to approach His Majesty's Government and the Powers with a very strong case for complete independence. It is therefore to be supposed that they would utilise that period for the formation of a really strong and efficient native administration, for which purpose the assistance of the British officials, during at least the first few years, is clearly indispensable. But I suggest that, while the Egyptian Government should always be free to replace an Englishman by an Egyptian, an Englishman should not be replaced by another foreigner, except with the express consent of the High Commissioner. There is a real danger of the introduction of foreign officials for political purposes.

18. The plan of judicial re-organisation, generally known as the Hurst scheme, has had the unhappy fate of meeting with universal opposition. I have yet to meet one friend of the scheme, English, foreign or Egyptian. Mr. Amos has done his utmost to keep the project alive, and has, I believe, drafted some four or five editions in succession in a loyal attempt to disarm opposition, but all his efforts have been quite fruitless. Foreign residents in Egypt are looking with concern and apprehension at their probable future in this country; it is the worst possible time to deprive them of their accustomed safeguards. It does not help matters to offer them other safeguards in exchange, alleged to be just as good; they do not believe it. The British colony is at least as much opposed to this scheme as any other. Even if the scheme were more acceptable, I should still postpone its application for the present. I am convinced that we should do well to ask the Powers to renew the Mixed Courts for another five years, with the sole condition that we should have a much greater liberty in the choice of judges than at present. In this respect, I suggest that each Power should be entitled to one representative, and that subject to that we should have a free hand. I should leave the Consular Tribunals as they stand until much quieter times.

19. It may be asked how the High Commissioner is to enforce his views in those matters left to his control. I see no reason why Lord Granville's despatch, which is the foundation of the British control in Egypt, should not be considered as remaining in force. By that despatch Egyptian Ministers were informed that, so long as the British army of occupation remains in Egypt, they must fall in with





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



the advice formally tended on behalf of His Majesty's Government by the British representative, or else resign. Apart from that, the High Commissioner will be able to take his own measures, with the assistance of the British army, for the protection of British or foreign interests, if the Egyptian Government is unable or unwilling to take effective action. Legislation will not be applicable to foreigners unless approved by him. In matters of finance, the Egyptian Minister will always have the report of the financial commissioner hanging over his head; and Ministers, who will naturally wish to establish in the eyes of the world their capacity for sound financial administration, will think twice before they risk an unfavourable report, which would be most damaging both to their immediate credit and to their ultimate political aspirations.

20. Many of the specific proposals made above may, and probably will, need amendment, if any scheme of the kind outlined is to be adopted; I have purposely left the proposals as to the duties of the judicial commissioner vague, because Mr. Amos is far more capable than I am of defining them. But there are some propositions which, I am convinced, are essential as the foundation of any practical scheme. They are as follows:—

(*a.*) No Egyptian Minister can fairly be asked to sign a treaty fixing the permanent status of Egypt at anything short of complete independence. If he does, he will be accused of signing away the liberties of his country, will lose all political backing, and will very probably be assassinated. When Boutros Pasha was murdered, Wardani gave as his first reason for the crime the fact that Boutros had signed the Convention of 1899, giving to Great Britain a share in the Government of the Soudan. Saroit Pasha conducted the examination, as procureur général; it is not likely that Ministers have forgotten the facts. Probably, Adly Pasha knows perfectly well that, if he signed anything at all like the treaty foreshadowed in Lord Milner's report, he would be signing his own death warrant.

(*b.*) The British army in Egypt must be available for the protection of the lives and property of the foreign colonies and of British interests in general, at the discretion of the High Commissioner.

(*c.*) Control must be centralised in the hands of the High Commissioner, and not distributed among a number of commissions and commissioners.

(*d.*) Any settlement effected must be a *modus vivendi*, adopted for a limited time.

21. It is quite possible that Egyptian Ministers would not be prepared to sign even a treaty establishing a temporary *modus vivendi*. They ought, I think, to be given the chance; but if they refuse, a scheme on the general lines set out above could be put into force by proclamation of His Majesty, and would, I believe, be very generally accepted as satisfactory. I think that there is no doubt that the great majority of Egyptians would be glad of a solution.

Whichever way the scheme is put into force, it should be made clear that we recognise the fact that the Egyptian claim is one for complete independence, and that the *modus vivendi* established is not in any way to prejudice the consideration of that claim as soon as the ten years' period has elapsed.

22. I wish to say, in conclusion, that I do not regard the proposal for a temporary *modus vivendi* as mere camouflage intended to cover a permanent settlement. I think it quite probable that in ten years' time international arrangements will have been made which will make the world a much safer place for defenceless nations, and will provide efficient safeguard for international lines of communication. I also think it quite likely that Egyptian Ministers and officials, given a definite task to perform and a free hand to deal with it, will do better than even their best friends now expect. The last few years have been for them a time of great difficulty and perplexity; but when the main political question is settled, and Ministers have an obvious and straightforward policy to follow, I personally believe that they will do well. I also believe that they will find no lack of able and energetic assistants among Egyptians of the younger generation. I think it likely that, after ten years of trial under favourable conditions, the claims of Egypt for complete independence would have to be very seriously considered.

W. G. HAYTER.

*June* 5, 1921.





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EGYPT AND SOUDAN. [June 27.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

[E 7320/260/16] No. 1.

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 27.)*

(No. 530.)

My Lord, *Cairo, June 17, 1921.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 311 of the 16th April, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of an interesting memorandum which has been communicated to me by Sir William Hayter, legal adviser to the Ministry of Finance and the Residency, in regard to the prospects of a settlement on the lines and in accordance with the procedure contemplated as a result of the report of Lord Milner's Mission.

Sir William Hayter expresses the opinion that no Egyptian could at the present moment consent to become a party to a permanent arrangement between Great Britain and Egypt, which fell short of securing complete independence for the latter, with any prospect of securing the approval of his countrymen for such an arrangement. That consequently there is little prospect of a successful issue to the impending negotiations, and that some other solution must be found. He suggests a provisional arrangement for a period of ten years, and seems to think that, provided it were clearly understood that the arrangement was provisional, it might be possible to secure acquiescence in conditions on which His Majesty's Government must be expected to insist.

Should it prove impossible to secure Egyptian agreement to the *modus vivendi* he suggests, he expresses the opinion that the policy upon which His Majesty's Government may decide should be put in force by proclamation of His Majesty, and he seems to consider that if a policy on the lines of his *modus vivendi* were adopted it would be generally accepted as satisfactory.

I consider that the views expressed by Sir William Hayter are worthy of the serious consideration of your Lordship. I have on many occasions recently indicated my belief that a settlement of the Egyptian problem in accordance with the present contemplated procedure was not within the bounds of practical politics, and that His Majesty's Government must accordingly be prepared with an alternative policy which they may have to enforce without preliminary agreement from the Egyptian side.

Sir William Hayter's scheme is in general accord with the principles of the policy advocated by Lord Milner, and I see no reason why the adoption of something on the lines he suggests should not be attended with ultimate success should the failure of the present negotiations which I contemplate as possible be realised.

Sir William Hayter defines British responsibilities. It is of vital importance that this should be done without much further delay, since it is not too much to say that the entire reorganisation of the Egyptian Government, on which depends the proper and efficient administration of the country, is in suspense pending the now long-awaited decision on the main question of policy.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY, *F.M.*,
*High Commissioner.*

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Enclosure in No. 1.

*Memorandum on a Political Settlement in Egypt.*

WHEN the proposals of Lord Milner's Commission were first published, they were received by Egyptians with something like enthusiasm; while public opinion in England was certainly not unfavourably impressed. There is no doubt that those proposals served one very good purpose in that they were accepted in Egypt as an *amende honorable* for feelings which had been a good deal hurt by recent events. Much of the bitter hostility of 1919 has now disappeared, partly as a result





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# (٤٧٣/٤٣٩)



of steady and humane government, but partly also because an eminent English statesman has put forward proposals which do not treat Egyptians as a subject race. But the definite scheme advocated by Lord Milner's Commission has certainly lost ground in popular favour since it was first promulgated, and it seems every day less likely that a satisfactory settlement can be affected on the basis of that scheme. It is extremely ingenious, but it is not, to speak plainly, sufficiently straightforward to form the basis of a lasting settlement, nor does it provide for the real practical difficulties of the situation.

2. The whole controversy really turns on the meaning of the word "independence." The Milner scheme aims at establishing "the independence of Egypt on a secure and lasting basis" (article 1). Great Britain will recognise "the independence of Egypt as a Constitutional Monarchy with representative institutions" (article 3 (i)); but if Egypt is to be independent, how is Great Britain concerned with the form of Government which she may adopt? Then, under article 5 (ii), Egypt is to be under an obligation to enter into an alliance with Great Britain, and the rest of the scheme for a treaty contains a number of provisions, nearly all of which impose restrictions on the independence of Egypt. Egypt, in fact, is to purchase her independence at the price of stipulations which, in the eyes of most Egyptians, would make that independence little more than a name.

3. I think that many of us have paid too little attention to the persistent claim for complete independence. It is obviously impossible for England to evacuate Egypt and leave her to her fate, that we are inclined to regard "Istiklal-el-Tam" as a mere parrot-cry, adopted to save the trouble of thought. But I think that there is much more in it than that. Saad Zaghlul was not, in the past, a very popular person, or very much trusted; since his return to Egypt he has made numerous blunders, and has been thrown over by most of his principal adherents; but he still retains a great hold on the country, simply because he stands for complete independence. The present Cabinet has placed "undoubted independence" in the forefront of its programme; I do not doubt that they would lose all popular support if they lowered their claims.

4. I think the explanation is this. All Egyptians naturally desire the complete independence of their country, as their ultimate object; but all Egyptians with the slightest knowledge of public affairs are perfectly well aware of the fact that complete independence for Egypt is not attainable at the present stage of the world's history. If we were to evacuate Egypt to-morrow, another Power would inevitably replace us, as soon as the necessary international bargains had been made; Egypt is rich, defenceless and not difficult to control, at any rate by a Power without humanitarian scruples, and such a prize would not long go begging. Sensible Egyptians know this, and do not want us to evacuate the country; on the other hand, they do not want to bind themselves to any arrangement which would deprive them of their hope of complete independence if the civilised world should come to a better mind.

They want our protection until international affairs are placed on a sound basis, and then they want to enter on equal terms into the community of nations. They thus desire the widest possible autonomy which they can get without losing our protection; but they do not want any scheme which would make Egypt part of the British Empire. They would regard such a scheme as prejudicing their legitimate hopes for the future, and they accordingly detest such words as "protectorate" and "dominion," which would imply membership of the British group of nations.

5. On these points the Milner Report appears to me to be sound; it is the conclusions drawn which I think defective. What is wanted is not a precise definition of the international status of Egypt, but a *modus vivendi* which would enable Egyptian institutions to follow their normal course of development under our protection. If we ask Egyptians to accept, and embody in a treaty, any status for Egypt short of complete independence they will resist to the last, for fear of prejudicing the future; but a *modus vivendi* for (say) ten years would involve no final decision as to their ultimate future. The desiderata from the Egyptian point of view would thus appear to be:—

(1.) Protection by England against external foes;
(2.) The largest measure of autonomy possible, consistently with such protection;
(3.) No definition or binding agreement which would prejudice the claim of Egypt to complete independence, as soon as she can safely dispense with British protection.



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# (٤٧٣/٤٤٠)



6. From the British point of view we have, I suppose, no sort of desire for domination for its own sake. But we have special interests in Egypt which we desire to protect. Forty years of occupation have made us responsible, in the eyes of the world, for the safety of the life and property of foreigners in Egypt; and we cannot divest ourselves of this responsibility by merely abandoning our right to interfere. There are great financial interests established in Egypt on the faith of our occupation. Egypt is a nodal point of our lines of communication, which are far too important to us to be left unprotected, while Egypt is too weak to protect them, even if she were so minded. Finally, there is the organisation built up in Egypt by Lord Cromer and his successors, which England would presumably regret to see entirely ruined, and there is, perhaps, some sympathy with 1,500 or 1,600 Englishmen who seem likely to join the ranks of the unemployed.

7. The objects desired by England and Egypt respectively, as above stated, are clearly not irreconcilable. The protection of Egypt against external enemies carries with it the protection of our communications against the same enemies. The military force employed for these purposes could also be made available, in case of necessity, for the protection of the life and property of foreigners in Egypt, and the banks and commercial establishments owned by foreigners resident abroad. If once the principle of an army of occupation is admitted, it would only remain to devise suitable measures of financial control and some sort of supervision over the irrigation service, which is essential to the life of the whole country and so the concern of all its inhabitants, Egyptians and foreigners alike.

8. Thus the really important question is that of the army in Egypt; and here the proposals of Lord Milner's Commission appear to me to be radically unsound. There is to be a British force, but it is only to be used for the defence of our communications, and presumably for the defence of Egypt against external foes. The High Commissioner is charged with the defence of foreign interests, but he is not to use the British army for the purpose. However many foreigners are murdered by an Egyptian mob, the British army is to stand aside. It is, perhaps, not necessary to labour the point; recent events in Alexandria have made it impossible to support any such proposal. It is, however, possible to make a distinction. There is no reason why the British army in Egypt should be charged with the general maintenance of order, so long as the interests or lives of foreigners are not in danger; and I suggest that the duties of that army might be defined as—

(1.) The protection of Egypt against external foes;
(2.) The protection of our Imperial lines of communications; and
(3.) The protection of foreigners in Egypt.

An assurance could be given that British troops would not be employed for any other purpose, except at the request of the Egyptian Government. My impression is that, when things settle down, a force of about the strength of the pre-war garrison will prove to be amply sufficient. The year 1919 must not be taken as a precedent; the fellaheen then felt that they had a personal grievance against the British army; but I do not believe that they will move on political grounds. If the fellaheen are quiet, it has never taken any very great force to protect foreign interests in the great towns. It is quite likely that there may be agrarian trouble in the near future; but that will probably take the form of land grabbing and refusal of rents on a large scale, and the Egyptian Government will have to deal with it as best it can.

9. It is clearly impossible for British troops to mobilise whenever a Greek grocer's shop is looted in the provinces, or a French landowner cannot get in his rents. The Egyptian Government must be under an obligation to protect the lives and property of foreigners, so far as it can; and, in order that they should take a more lively interest in the matter, I suggest that the agreement should contain a clause imposing on the Egyptian Government liability to pay compensation for all damage caused to the person or property of foreigners as the result of riots or disturbances. There would be no need for any special tribunal; once the principle is established, they could bring their action before the Mixed Courts.

10. The clauses (4 (iii) and (iv) of Lord Milner's memorandum) as to the financial adviser and judicial officer appear to me to be altogether misconceived. The former is to perform the purely mechanical duties which are all that is left to the "Caisse de la Dette," and to give advice when consulted. He will have the name of an important office, with no power whatever. The judicial officer may go to see





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# (٤٧٣/٤٤١)



the Minister whenever he likes, and can ask for information as to the Mixed Tribunals. They are both of them to be appointed by decree, presumably as officials of the Egyptian Government. The offices, as defined, would be mere sinecures.

11. The real difficulty of the English high officials in Egypt, on which the report never touches, is that they have to serve two masters, the Egyptian Government and the British High Commissioner. It has not so much mattered in the past, since the British representative has, in the last resort, been the ruler of Egypt; but it is already becoming difficult, now that Egyptian Ministers are allowed a free hand, and it will be quite impossible with an autonomous Egyptian Government. I suggest that it should be laid down as a principle that any control which may be retained over Egyptian Administration should be exercised by the High Commissioner and his officers, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, but by no one else; and that accordingly both the financial and the judicial commissioner should be appointed by His Majesty's Government as members of the High Commissioner's staff. It would be a natural corollary that all British officials retained in, or appointed to, the Egyptian service should owe allegiance only to their Egyptian chiefs, and should not be entitled to call in the aid of the Residency, except in respect of personal grievances. The High Commissioner would, in fact, be dealing with the Egyptian Government at arm's length, and British officials would have to shape their course accordingly.

12. The duties of the financial commissioner should be, I suggest:—

(1.) To replace the "Caisse de la Dette" in respect of the service of the Consolidated Debt, and to be also responsible for:—

(*a.*) The service of the Unconsolidated Debt, Ottoman Loans charged on the Tribute, &c.
(*b.*) The payment of all foreign pensions.
(*c.*) The payment of the salaries and expenses of the Mixed Tribunals.
(*d.*) The payment of the salaries and expenses of himself and the judicial commissioner and their respective staffs.
(*e.*) Any other periodical payments to be made outside Egypt.

For these purposes, additional revenue would have to be assigned; probably the customs duties would be the most suitable.

(2.) To act as auditor-general of the financial administration, reporting to the High Commissioner.

(3.) To assist in the preparation of the annual budget reporting to the High Commissioner any proposals which appear to him to be likely seriously to impair Egyptian credit.

He would have access to all files and accounts of the Egyptian Government, for himself and his staff, for any of the purposes above mentioned; but he would have no right to intervene in the ordinary administration of the Ministry of Finance for any other purpose.

13. The judicial commissioner would advise the High Commissioner as to all matters concerning the legal rights of foreigners, the appointments of judges and staff for the Mixed Tribunals, legislation application to foreigners, &c. He would not be concerned in any way with the native tribunals, except that he would be entitled to be consulted as to the prosecution of any Egyptian accused of an offence against a European, reporting the facts to the High Commissioner if there was any reason to fear a miscarriage of justice.

14. The control of the Nile would, as suggested in the Milner report, be placed in the hands of the Nile Commission representing all the countries interested; I suggest that the High Commissioner, as representing foreigners in Egypt, should have a representative on this commission. The relations between the Nile Commission and the irrigation services of the different countries would have to be worked out by those competent in the matter.

15. With regard to legislation applicable to foreigners, I suggest that such legislation should require to be countersigned by the High Commissioner on behalf of:—

(*a.*) His Majesty's Government.
(*b.*) Foreign countries without capitulatory rights.
(*c.*) Foreign countries which have lost their capitulatory rights.
(*d.*) Foreign countries which are prepared to delegate their powers in this respect to the High Commissioner during the period of the *modus vivendi*.



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# (٤٧٣/٤٤٢)



With regard to this last category, it appears that the Powers might reasonably be asked to make this delegation, in view of the measures proposed for the protection of their nationals in Egypt. The delegation would only be temporary, so that their ultimate rights under the Capitulations would be in no way affected. It would not be necessary to wait until all had adhered to this arrangement; every adhesion would lessen *pro tanto* the difficulty of getting legislation through.

16. The result would be that, during the period of the *modus vivendi*, the High Commissioner and his officers, with the support of the army of occupation, would be entrusted with certain specified and definite powers for the protection of British and foreign interests; and that, subject to the exercise of those powers, the Egyptian Government would be free to govern as it thinks best. I can see no reason why we should prescribe constitutional monarchy and ministerial responsibility as the form of Government; it seems to me a matter for Egyptians to decide. Education, justice (except as regards foreigners), public security, public works, provincial administration would be entirely in the hands of Egyptian Ministers, so would finance, subject to an outside audit, and to some control over the budget; so would the Egyptian army. The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be re-established, and I see no reason why Egypt should not have diplomatic representatives in foreign capitals.

17. As to the British officials, I think the scheme proposed by the Milner Commission is a fair one, but I have the gravest doubts whether it could be carried out without serious dislocation if the policy of the commission is adopted as a whole. In that event, a Nationalist Ministry would be chiefly concerned in cutting the Administration loose from the Residency, and no better means could be adopted than the wholesale dismissal of British officials. Under the proposed *modus vivendi*, on the other hand, British officials of the Egyptian Government would have nothing to do with the Residency, while the Egyptian Government would have an obvious interest in securing the highest possible efficiency in administration. If they could show, at the end of the ten years' period, that the British forces had never had to turn out for the protection of foreigners, that the financial and judicial commissioners had had no serious fault to find with the administration of finance and justice, and that the country was peaceful, prosperous and well-governed, they would be able to approach His Majesty's Government and the Powers with a very strong case for complete independence. It is therefore to be supposed that they would utilise that period for the formation of a really strong and efficient native administration, for which purpose the assistance of the British officials, during at least the first few years, is clearly indispensable. But I suggest that, while the Egyptian Government should always be free to replace an Englishman by an Egyptian, an Englishman should not be replaced by another foreigner, except with the express consent of the High Commissioner. There is a real danger of the introduction of foreign officials for political purposes.

18. The plan of judicial re-organisation, generally known as the Hurst scheme, has had the unhappy fate of meeting with universal opposition. I have yet to meet one friend of the scheme, English, foreign or Egyptian. Mr. Amos has done his utmost to keep the project alive, and has, I believe, drafted some four or five editions in succession in a loyal attempt to disarm opposition, but all his efforts have been quite fruitless. Foreign residents in Egypt are looking with concern and apprehension at their probable future in this country; it is the worst possible time to deprive them of their accustomed safeguards. It does not help matters to offer them other safeguards in exchange, alleged to be just as good; they do not believe it. The British colony is at least as much opposed to this scheme as any other. Even if the scheme were more acceptable, I should still postpone its application for the present. I am convinced that we should do well to ask the Powers to renew the Mixed Courts for another five years, with the sole condition that we should have a much greater liberty in the choice of judges than at present. In this respect, I suggest that each Power should be entitled to one representative, and that subject to that we should have a free hand. I should leave the Consular Tribunals as they stand until much quieter times.

19. It may be asked how the High Commissioner is to enforce his views in those matters left to his control. I see no reason why Lord Granville's despatch, which is the foundation of the British control in Egypt, should not be considered as remaining in force. By that despatch Egyptian Ministers were informed that, so long as the British army of occupation remains in Egypt, they must fall in with



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the advice formally tended on behalf of His Majesty's Government by the British representative, or else resign. Apart from that, the High Commissioner will be able to take his own measures, with the assistance of the British army, for the protection of British or foreign interests, if the Egyptian Government is unable or unwilling to take effective action. Legislation will not be applicable to foreigners unless approved by him. In matters of finance, the Egyptian Minister will always have the report of the financial commissioner hanging over his head; and Ministers, who will naturally wish to establish in the eyes of the world their capacity for sound financial administration, will think twice before they risk an unfavourable report, which would be most damaging both to their immediate credit and to their ultimate political aspirations.

20. Many of the specific proposals made above may, and probably will, need amendment, if any scheme of the kind outlined is to be adopted; I have purposely left the proposals as to the duties of the judicial commissioner vague, because Mr. Amos is far more capable than I am of defining them. But there are some propositions which, I am convinced, are essential as the foundation of any practical scheme. They are as follows:—

(*a.*) No Egyptian Minister can fairly be asked to sign a treaty fixing the permanent status of Egypt at anything short of complete independence. If he does, he will be accused of signing away the liberties of his country, will lose all political backing, and will very probably be assassinated. When Boutros Pasha was murdered, Wardani gave as his first reason for the crime the fact that Boutros had signed the Convention of 1899, giving to Great Britain a share in the Government of the Soudan. Saroit Pasha conducted the examination, as procureur général; it is not likely that Ministers have forgotten the facts. Probably, Adly Pasha knows perfectly well that, if he signed anything at all like the treaty foreshadowed in Lord Milner's report, he would be signing his own death warrant.

(*b.*) The British army in Egypt must be available for the protection of the lives and property of the foreign colonies and of British interests in general, at the discretion of the High Commissioner.

(*c.*) Control must be centralised in the hands of the High Commissioner, and not distributed among a number of commissions and commissioners.

(*d.*) Any settlement effected must be a *modus vivendi*, adopted for a limited time.

21. It is quite possible that Egyptian Ministers would not be prepared to sign even a treaty establishing a temporary *modus vivendi*. They ought, I think, to be given the chance; but if they refuse, a scheme on the general lines set out above could be put into force by proclamation of His Majesty, and would, I believe, be very generally accepted as satisfactory. I think that there is no doubt that the great majority of Egyptians would be glad of a solution.

Whichever way the scheme is put into force, it should be made clear that we recognise the fact that the Egyptian claim is one for complete independence, and that the *modus vivendi* established is not in any way to prejudice the consideration of that claim as soon as the ten years' period has elapsed.

22. I wish to say, in conclusion, that I do not regard the proposal for a temporary *modus vivendi* as mere camouflage intended to cover a permanent settlement. I think it quite probable that in ten years' time international arrangements will have been made which will make the world a much safer place for defenceless nations, and will provide efficient safeguard for international lines of communication. I also think it quite likely that Egyptian Ministers and officials, given a definite task to perform and a free hand to deal with it, will do better than even their best friends now expect. The last few years have been for them a time of great difficulty and perplexity; but when the main political question is settled, and Ministers have an obvious and straightforward policy to follow, I personally believe that they will do well. I also believe that they will find no lack of able and energetic assistants among Egyptians of the younger generation. I think it likely that, after ten years of trial under favourable conditions, the claims of Egypt for complete independence would have to be very seriously considered.

W. G. HAYTER.

*June* 5, 1921.





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

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CHRONOGRAPHY.

| | |
|---|---|
| November 1918. | Armistice. First steps by Zaghloul. |
| January 1919. | Resignation of Rushdi Cabinet. |
| February | Sir R. Wingate proceeds to London. |
| March | Deportation of Zaghloul to Malta.<br>Riots<br>Arrival of Lord Allenby in Egypt.<br>Release of Zaghloul. |
| April | Rushdi Cabinet formed and fell. |
| May | Mohammed Said Cabinet formed.<br>Lord Milner's Mission announced. |
| November | On approach of Mission, Mohammed Said resigns.<br>Wahba Ministry formed. |
| December-March 1920. | Milner Mission in Egypt. |
| May 1920. | Wahba Ministry succeeded by Tewfik Nessim Ministry.<br>Zaghloul meets Milner Mission in London. |
| August | Zaghloul's Delegates proceed to Egypt. |
| December. | Milner report submitted to Cabinet. |
| February 1921. | Milner Report published.<br>Declaration by H.M.G. |
| March | Adly Ministry formed.<br>Zaghloul returns to Egypt. |
| April | Riots in Tanta. |
| May | Riots in Alexandria. |

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



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

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Résumé of events in Egypt from the Armistice
up to the present time.

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Almost immediately after the Armistice a deputation of Egyptian Nationalists headed by Saad Zaghloul called on Sir Reginald Wingate, then High Commissioner, at the Residency in Cairo and presented claims of a far reaching character amounting to a demand for the complete independence of Egypt and the withdrawal of all British control. Sir R. Wingate though he received the deputation did not give any encouragement to them and Saad Zaghloul's active agitation dates from that day.

Shortly afterwards Rushdy Pasha then Prime Minister proposed that he should visit England, together with his colleague Adly Pasha and certain of the nationalist leaders, in order to discuss with His Majesty's Government the future status of Egypt. At the time it was not considered desirable to receive the nationalist leaders whose immoderate demands could not possibly be granted and owing to the pressure of work due to the Peace Conference Rushdy and Adly were requested to postpone their visit. Their position was already becoming difficult owing to Zaghloul's agitation and Rushdy Pasha tendered his resignation. This was not immediately accepted and he and Adly were later invited to visit England but they refused to do so unless accompanied by the nationalist leaders.

Meanwhile the situation was so unsatisfactory that in February 1919 Sir R. Wingate was recalled to London to discuss with His Majesty's Government the policy which should be pursued. The Nationalist Party continued their agitation and adopted methods of intimidation which

soon.....

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٢٢ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٤٤٧)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٢٣و]
# (٤٧٣/٤٤٨)



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soon rendered it almost impossible to carry on the government of the country and it was therefore decided in March 1919 to deport Saad Zaghloul and three other prominent agitators. Their deportation was followed by an outbreak of violent disorders which rapidly spread throughout the whole of Egypt.

By March 21st the disorders had assumed such serious proportions that Lord Allenby, who had just proceeded to Paris for the Peace Conference, was hastily sent back to Egypt as special High Commissioner with full authority to restore order.

This task he successfully accomplished, one of his first acts being to release the deported agitators who had been imprisoned in ~~March~~ Malta. Zaghloul and his associates were then joined by some colleagues from Egypt and the whole party proceeded to Paris with the object of laying their claims before the Peace Conference.

Early in April Lord Allenby induced Rushdy Pasha to form a new Ministry but this was of short duration and Rushdy Pasha again resigned on April 22nd.

A new Ministry under Mohamed Said Pasha was formed on May 21st and by degrees the country commenced to settle down. In the meantime His Majesty's Government had decided to send a special mission to Egypt under Lord Milner to enquire into the causes of the existing unrest and to make recommendations for the future government of the country. There were obvious objections to the mission proceeding forthwith to Egypt where order had scarcely been restored and where the extreme heat of summer would have rendered their task unusually trying.

It....

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٢٣ظ]
# (٤٤٩/٤٧٣)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٢٤و]
# (٤٧٣/٤٥٠)



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It was therefore decided largely on the advice of the Prime Minister and the Sultan to postpone the departure of the mission until the autumn. In the meantime Lord Allenby had been confirmed in the office of High Commissioner in place of Sir R. Wingate who had resigned.

The Prime Minister, however, showed himself increasingly opposed to the idea of the mission going at all and when it was finally decided to despatch it towards the end of November, Mohamed Said Pasha resigned office and a new Ministry under Wahba Pasha was formed on November 21st.

The Milner Mission arrived in Cairo at the beginning of December and were met by a public boycot which was carefully organised by the partisans of Zaghloul Pasha. In spite of the fact that the boycot was maintained throughout their three months stay in the country the members of the Mission were able to see most of the leading Egyptians in private and to get into touch with all sections of opinion and to accumulate large quantities of evidence and material for a report. By the end of February they had obtained all the information available in Egypt and the Mission accordingly returned to England, but before compiling their report they determined, if possible, to get into touch with the Nationalist Party headed by Zaghloul Pasha who with his colleagues was still in Paris conducting a campaign of propaganda in Egypt, Europe and America against the British occupation.

The Milner....

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٢٤ظ]
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



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٢٥و]
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

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The Milner Mission, through the agency of Adly Pasha, eventually succeeded in getting into touch with Zaghloul who accepted their invitation and in May came over to London accompanied by his colleagues and engaged in a series of conversations with the Mission which lasted until August.

By that time both parties had reached agreement on a general scheme for establishing the future relations between England and Egypt. Zaghloul Pasha was, however, unable to bring himself boldly to accept the project and accordingly he sent four of his adherents to Egypt with a view to ascertaining how public opinion in that country would regard the scheme. (The) Proposals as to which agreement had been reached were published by Zaghloul in the English Press towards the end of August and his four emissaries received an enthusiastic welcome in Egypt and the proposals were generally very well received by practically all sections of the people, notably by the surviving elected members of the Legislative Assembly, which had not met since the outbreak of the war. None the less certain reserves were formulated by the members of this last named body, and Zaghloul accompanied by his colleagues returned to England in October and communicated these reserves to Lord Milner who took note of them but held out no hope of their being accepted by His Majesty's Government.

The conversations then came to an end and Zaghloul returned to Paris whilst the Milner Mission conpleted their report which was laid before the Cabinet in December.

Meanwhile Wahba Pasha ~~was~~ (had been) obliged through increasing....

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٢٥ظ]
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



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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٢٦و]
# (٤٧٣/٤٥٤)



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The result of this declaration was that after considerable intrigues between the leading Egyptian politicians and an unsuccessful attempt to form a Coalition Government representing all parties, a ministry was formed under Adly Pasha which was received with the greatest enthusiasm throughout the country.

Shortly after the formation of the Ministry Zaghloul returned to Egypt. The Government were most anxious to obtain his cooperation and negotiations took place between him and Adly. A close approximation to agreement between these two was reached, but negotiations finally broke down on one point only, due to the inordinate vanity almost megalomania of Zaghloul, who insisted on holding himself both the Presidency and the control of the Egyptian Mission. Adly pointed out that as Prime Minister of the country he could not serve on the delegation in a subordinate position. The most important of Zaghloul's own followers the members of the former Wafd have deserted him on the ground that his present attitude is unreasonable. His language becomes more and more intemperate and it is clear that he has lost ground among the more intelligent classes in Egypt.

A delegation has now been appointed by the Sultan under the Presidency of Adly and will arrive in England early in July. In the meantime Zaghloul and his less responsible followers have devoted themselves to a bitter campaign of agitation against the present Ministry which culminated towards the end of May in violent disorders in Cairo, followed by riots in Alexandria which rapidly turned into an attack on Europeans without distinction.....

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



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

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- 7 -

distinction of nationality. Many lives were lost and a great deal of material damage done and order had finally to be restored by the intervention of British troops who were enthusiastically welcomed by the European residents.

At the present moment the majority of the intelligenzia are in favour of Adly's policy of moderate nationalism. Unfortunately the hotheads in Egypt are sufficiently numerous and sufficiently powerful when supported, as they are, by Zaghloul's immense influence over El Azhar, to have materially weakened the position of Adly's Government. This, and the prevailing unrest throughout the Levant make the chances of a successful negotiations in London doubtful, and of the ratification in Egypt of an agreement if reached, more than doubtful.

J Milner
30.6.21.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٢٧ظ]
# (٤٥٧/٤٧٣)





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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٢٨و]
# (٤٧٣/٤٥٨)



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*Printed for the Cabinet. July* 1921.

SECRET.

**C.P. 3173.**

**THE CABINET.**

## THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN EGYPT.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

THE following letter has been forwarded to me by Lord Colwyn, and I think this aspect should be seriously considered by the Cabinet.

W. S. C.

*Colonial Office, July* 28, 1921.

To the Right Hon. Lord Colwyn.

You have been good enough to state that my views concerning the present situation in Egypt—as it affects the lives, property and interests of the various European communities resident there—also concerning some possible results of the proposed British evacuation of Egypt, may be useful to you. I shall accordingly try to confine myself to such matters, and to give reasons for the anxiety felt by many people who have been connected with Egypt for a considerable time past, and who have their families and interests there, at the prospect of that country being handed over to the Egyptians, without any British authorities to whom they could appeal, when necessary, for justice and protection.

The present delegation may represent the views of part of the Egyptian people, but the great majority of the Egyptians live "on the land" and are much more interested in the progress of their crops, and the price their cotton will fetch, than in anything connected with politics, although they would no doubt occasionally shout for "Independence," now that it has become a catch word.

Since December 1918 there has been no shortage of plausible "orators" in Egypt —self-seeking and imbued with a hatred of every European and non-Mohammedan— who have done their best to develop in the native a hatred of everything British or European. Their efforts led to many excesses in 1919 and 1920, and to the more serious riots which occasioned considerable loss of life and damage to property in Alexandria and Cairo during May this year.

It seems to me that the fanatical behaviour of the Egyptians in the recent riots in Alexandria has hardly been realised yet in this country, and that we have not yet learnt the lesson of what Egyptian hatred may at any time mean to the Europeans resident among them. That Europeans of any nationality should be attacked at sight in the main streets of the town and butchered under revolting conditions, while the Egyptian police watched unconcernedly and even helped the mobs; that Egyptian troops on being drafted into the town to restore order should look upon it as their chief duty to fire upon the Europeans and to incite the mobs to further looting and murder; that these riots would have become even more widespread, to the grave danger of every European in Egypt, had not the British troops eventually stepped in and restored order—these are not pleasant topics for one's mind to dwell upon, and residents in Egypt will have cause for anxiety if the Egyptian police force and troops are to provide the "protection" in future!

Many such people are leaving Egypt, or, when possible, disposing of their lands and interests there; and this week I have had a letter from an importer of British goods in

[6677]



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# (٤٧٣/٤٥٩)





Alexandria stating that he is anxious to transfer part of his capital to some other country, so as to be able to leave Egypt, should that become necessary.

Everything to-day is uncertain in Egypt, as the people who are interested financially in the country are waiting to know the results of the discussions that are now going on concerning its future. But if it were certain that Great Britain had decided not to evacuate Egypt, I think there would be little doubt about a continuation of that country's prosperity. Egypt has made wonderful progress during the past twenty years or more, yet there can surely be few countries where the natives have had so little to do with the results obtained.

Practically all imports and exports are dealt with by foreign firms, who originally founded these businesses. The finest buildings in Cairo and Alexandria are the work of European architects, and are owned by Europeans. The big banks, hotels, &c., are in no way due to native enterprise.

The attempts made to found purely Egyptian banks or commercial concerns have generally been doomed to failure. The Egyptians, or a good many of the Egyptians, would like to have control of a country they have done little to develop; but the Europeans, who have achieved everything under British law and justice, would run the risk of seeing their life's work ruined.

The chief cotton-exporting firms of Egypt are British. Many of the most important banks and land companies are British. They are viewing the prospective change of Government with real concern. If it is not too late, I should like to express the hope that some of the prominent English residents in Egypt—men who have spent a lifetime in the country—should be consulted before any decisions are finally arrived at with the Egyptian Delegation in London. Great Britain has done fine work in Egypt, and continental countries recognise the fact, however much they may at times try to belittle this work.

The British and foreign communities out there have created vast business houses, and have done their share in making Cairo and Alexandria two of the most prosperous towns in Africa. Surely the people who have achieved so much are entitled to some protection from the corruption of the native Law Courts—and from outbursts of hatred on the part of the Mohammedan mobs and military forces!

Great Britain has done much for Egypt, and she can do a great deal more by not allowing her good work to be ruined; whilst there may be commercial and political advantages to be derived which will make it worth any country's while to be strongly represented there. But if Great Britain should decide to withdraw from Egypt, many of us will fear that the days of Egypt's material well-being are at an end, and that there will in the future be anxious times for many living in that country.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

COPY OF A LETTER FROM MR. SCOTT, BRITISH ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT, TO MR. LINDSAY.

My dear Lindsay, *Ramleh, September* 30, 1921.

THE local situation has developed rapidly in the course of this week—I have described the process fully in my telegrams, and for the moment have nothing to add on that score.

I take it that we are bound to continue negotiations with Adly until we either succeed or fail. You know better than I do what chance there is of succeeding, and meanwhile there is not very much that we can do at this end to help towards success. But I felt that Zaghlul's propaganda, which I do not believe he would or could have opened again without the Labour members' moral support, was cutting the ground under the feet of Adly and his Government, rendering much less probable the chance of Adly agreeing to a settlement which there was a reasonable prospect of the country accepting and possibly even leading him to throw up the sponge on his return to London. I therefore supported the Council of Ministers' request that these proceedings of Zaghlul should be stopped by martial law, the only means we have of stopping them.

Amos, who had been in Cairo for a few days, came in this evening and I showed him the telegram to you giving Sarwat's statement and my comments. He was rather horrified, and feared that the course I proposed might lead to the deportation again of Zaghlul and company and to incalculable measures of repression. He seems to think that the possibility of winning Zaghlul over by money or some other means is not excluded. Clayton does not believe in this possibility, nor do I. Sirry Pasha, who has known Zaghlul for many years, told me yesterday that Zaghlul would not be contented even with the Premiership, and that we shall never have peace in this country as long as Zaghlul is here, and Sirry is not a man of strong political leanings. I may be wrong, but I do not think that we may necessarily be forced to deport Zaghlul.

But the events of the last three years show pretty clearly the truth of Roosevelt's advice of twenty years ago: "Either govern or get out." As a result of two years' talk and attempt at compromise, we are in a worse position as regards the terms we are likely to get than we were at the start, and if we talk for another year we shall be worse off still and may even eventually be fired out, bag and baggage, with nothing to the credit side.

We are now face to face with the choice of one of two courses: (1) To make up our minds what concessions we can make, lay down our policy and enforce it. I mentioned in may telegram that there was reason to believe that, even if Adly failed to get his terms accepted in London, he and his present colleagues would continue to be on the side of law and order. I asked Sarwat if I might telegraph this and he agreed. It is worth something to us, though how much is difficult to predict. (2) To agree to complete internal independence and withdraw our troops to the canal.

As regards (1), I understand there are only two points now on which there is likely to be serious difficulty with Adly: (*a*) Foreign affairs; (*b*) question of troops. Foreign affairs seems to me relatively unimportant. Question of troops is more difficult. But if we retain them in Cairo, Alexandria, &c., we must be prepared for chronic restlessness in the country, we must have sufficient troops to prevent that restlessness from breaking out into disorder, and we must be assured that no questions of financial stringency or political difficulties in Ireland or elsewhere shall at any time be allowed to reduce the number of troops in Egypt deemed by the military authorities to be adequate for our purpose. All this suggests a policy of repression and it is likely that such a policy will be necessary, but it would have to be faced and carried on as long as the circumstances required it, regardless of criticism from anywhere. Can His Majesty's Government guarantee us the troops and the money to pay them? If not, I believe it would be better to go for (2) and have done with it.

547—2 [7152 A]

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

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It is an awful confession of failure to throw up in a day the responsibilities we have accumulated and borne for forty years, but experience seems to show that we are not temperamentally fitted to govern Egypt by the methods of compromise so dear to the Anglo-Saxon heart. The one fatal policy is to deport people like Zaghlul one day and be obliged to give them a free run the next because we have not the determination or sufficient troops to follow up a drastic policy. If we decide for (2), we should do so before Adly leaves London and not wait to be forced into it by Zaghlul. The Capitulations would presumably remain indefinitely in order to afford our subjects and foreigners the minimum protection that would be indispensable. The Egyptians are susceptible of foreign criticism and will be more so under the responsibilities of independence, and our fears for the personal safety of foreigners might prove groundless. But we should reserve our exclusive right to come into Egypt again if our fears should be realised.

We are under engagements to Sultan Fuad taken when we were the protecting Power. We should have to explain to him that it had proved impossible to maintain the protectorate, and that in the altered circumstances we could not guarantee his throne. If he elected to remain as Sultan, he would have to do so on his own responsibility. If he preferred to go we would guarantee him an income of, say, 50,000*l*., or whatever sum might be considered suitable.

You may possibly have thought of all this. It is the result mainly of discussions with Clayton and Selby, and I have thought it worth while sending it to you. It is easier to put it in the form of a private letter rather than a despatch, especially as it is written late at night and the bag goes to-morrow.

Yours sincerely,
ERNEST SCOTT.

# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٣٠و]
# (٤٦٢/٤٧٣)



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CONFIDENTIAL.

COPY OF A LETTER FROM MR. SELBY, FIRST SECRETARY AT BRITISH RESIDENCY, EGYPT, TO SIR WILLIAM TYRRELL.

My dear Willie, *October* 1, 1921.

ALTHOUGH I know you must be overwhelmed with many questions of graver importance than the particular issue with which I happen to be concerned, I do not hesitate to write to you my views of the present situation, since I am anxious that at the present juncture, when a settlement of the Egyptian problem for better or for worse may be in sight, no considerations should be overlooked.

I dare say you will remember I have frequently expressed misgivings as regards the view that we could achieve our aims in Egypt with the willing consent of public opinion in the country. There has seemed to me too wide a divergence between the two points of view. If we must insist on such limitations of real independence as the maintenance of troops in the country, control of foreign affairs and other items in the hitherto accepted programme of His Majesty's Government, I have felt that the settlement must in the ultimate resort be one imposed by Great Britain, and that they must accordingly be prepared to pay the requisite price for bowing before her imperial requirements. I hear some talk of prospects being fairly bright at the present moment as between Adly Pasha and His Majesty's Government. I cannot estimate what this exactly means. If, however, as I assume, it indicates a disposition on the part of Adly Pasha to concede the claims of His Majesty's Government on the main issues—from the papers I have seen I have no reason to suppose His Majesty's Government as at present advised have any intention of giving way on those issues—it does not alter my conclusion on the situation as a whole. Adly Pasha could not, in my humble opinion, secure acceptance of an agreement in Egypt which involved considerable concessions on the Zaghlul programme, without our complete and effective support for some time to come. The means which would be required to carry Adly Pasha through would not be very much less than those we should require if we had to impose a settlement of our own dictated from London. Zaghlul and the ideas which he represents are still too all-pervading for that.

Are His Majesty's Government prepared to provide the means for carrying through the policy which insistence on their present major reservations entails? On the answer to this question should, in my humble opinion, depend the attitude taken up towards Adly Pasha when the negotiations are resumed. If it is in the affirmative, there is none who will be better pleased than I shall be. I have an intense reluctance to giving up what we hold. On the other hand, it is futile and dangerous to commit oneself to a line of action which altered circumstances make impossible of realisation.

What are the means required to maintain such limitations of the Zaghlul programme, to which Adly Pasha has himself committed himself out of fear of Zaghlul, as maintenance of garrisons in Egypt, &c., involves?

Firstly, I consider that Lord Allenby should be assured the garrison in Egypt as it exists to-day is secured to him for some time to come, and that, so far as expenditure on the maintenance of troops in Egypt is concerned, Irish and other complications and budgetary considerations have already been determined for next year at least. At the present moment I understand that General Congreve, who is commanding the troops here, is satisfied he could deal with troubles on any foreseeable scale. It is true that if we had a repetition of anything like what occurred in 1919, all his time would be taken up in dealing with the situation in the towns for two or three weeks, and that the country would have to wait. Still, he could get through without much danger of catastrophe. It is perhaps useful to notice in passing that even now we could not in certain eventualities protect the lives and property of foreigners in remote districts. They would be left, till mobile columns could be formed, to such protection as the Egyptian police might provide. The point is not without interest in relation to our claim we must keep troops to protect foreigners.

Shrewd observers of the present position do not anticipate a repetition of the events of 1919. They may be right, but we should not take too many risks, since

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٣٠ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٤٦٣)



Zaghlul has stated that if he does not get what he wants he intends to resort to Irish methods. Our calculations as regards troops should err on the side of safety, and military authorities have assured me they have reached the minimum if any serious political crisis lies ahead.

Secondly, His Majesty's Government should be able to count with some certainty on the support of British public opinion for administrative measures which will be necessary if they adhere to their conditions whether the settlement is worked with or without the assistance of Adly Pasha. These measures, according to British ideas, may be of an aggressive nature, since here it is fatal if you wish a policy to be successful to give too much latitude to your opponents. The people simply regard such an attitude as a sign of weakness, and the Government loses its authority. Even the coercion of Zaghlul is not excluded from the vista We could not afford to leave him loose to denounce us if we ever were to hope for peace and quiet.

Could His Majesty's Government withstand the pressure of British public opinion in the event of such developments?

I have been too long away from home to form any useful estimate of the trend of opinion here, but, from all I see and read, the British people are not disposed to facilitate the task of His Majesty's Government in carrying through an undertaking of the nature I have in view. The recent visit of the M P.'s has been a signal lesson; they have gone far to undermining the good effect of six months of hard toil. If we cannot contain such influences—and I imagine from this recent incident there are insuperable difficulties in the way—we should take the opportunity proffered by the negotiations with Adly Pasha to "get out" on the best terms we can.

Adly Pasha would probably be prepared, in return for concessions on the, from his point of view, major points, to give us fairly satisfactory conditions as regards non-employment of foreigners, retention of Englishmen and other points through which we should be enabled to retain a beneficial influence on the Government. The Egyptian does not want to lose his British assistant. We won India through the initiative of a private company; I have hopes we could still have a considerable voice in the direction of Egyptian affairs through those Englishmen who would remain behind.

The impossibility of evacuation has been frequently urged on the ground that foreign Powers, France, Italy and Greece, would seize the opportunity to send troops to replace the British forces in process of withdrawal, and that Egypt would in consequence be lost to us as a British preserve. Surely that brings us back to British naval preponderance in the Mediterranean, and what is there to prevent simultaneously with the withdrawal of British troops to the canal zone a declaration of the Monroe doctrine, or, to bring it up to date, the Curzon doctrine, as regards Egypt? Is not Mexico a precedent? Thousands of foreign lives and much valuable foreign property have been destroyed in that unfortunate country, yet no one has challenged the United States on the policy propounded a hundred years ago. Besides, I am not unduly apprehensive as regards the persecution of foreigners on an extended scale. A Greek, Frenchman or Italian may lose his life here and there, but that is the usual course of things, and no foreign Power, unless for an ulterior motive, and with the forces to challenge our world position, could advance such as an excuse for attempting to occupy the country. France, Greece and Italy are, besides, too busy elsewhere to concern themselves with their fat profiteers in Egypt, who are no more good to their country of origin than to that of their adoption.

To sum up, before we finally insist on our major reservations, we should assure ourselves we have the means to enforce the policy they represent.

Are the arguments clear? I hope so. I would have endeavoured to have arranged them better had I had time, but I have written under pressure of bag departure.

Yours ever,
W. S.

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٣١و]
# (٤٦٤/٤٧٣)



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No. 1.—SECRETARY OF STATE.

EGYPT AND SOUDAN. [October 19.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[E 11503/260/16] No. 1.

*Mr. Scott to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received October* 19.)

(No. 882.)

My Lord, *Ramleh, October* 10, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to enclose for your Lordship's consideration an interesting memorandum on the question of the political settlement with Egypt which I have received from Sir Gilbert Clayton, adviser to the Ministry of the Interior.

Sir Gilbert Clayton expresses his agreement with the views set out by Sir William Hayter in the memorandum, of which a copy was enclosed in Lord Allenby's despatch No. 530 of the 27th June last, but he goes rather further, and, assuming that the general financial situation of Great Britain imperatively demands a reduction of her military expenditure and commitments in Egypt, discusses the possibility of an agreement with Egypt by which this reduction might be effected without imperilling the vital interests of her Imperial communications, while at the same time affording reasonable guarantees for the protection of foreigners and the maintenance of public order in the country. Sir Gilbert Clayton suggests, in effect, that the two latter objects might be secured by assigning to a special body of British police constables the duties which, in the last resort, would fall upon the British troops.

There can, I think, be no question that any settlement, or even a *modus vivendi*, which was not arrived at by agreement with the Egyptians and therefore required to be imposed by British authority, could only be enforced by the continued occupation of the country by British troops.

Whatever Adly Pasha's attitude might be in face of such a contingency, it would be strenuously and persistently resisted by Zaghlul Pasha and the extremists. As your Lordship is aware, Zaghlul Pasha has recently renewed his campaign for "complete independence" and, while making every allowance for his ability in canvassing and stage management and for the loss he has sustained by the defection of many of his more intellectual supporters, the power which his eloquence and personality still exercise upon the masses is admitted to be great.

It is therefore a matter for reflection whether, under pressure for economy at home and in the face of unremitting agitation in this country, the policy of maintaining British troops in Egypt in any form which would imply military occupation could be successfully upheld. It is asserted, and I do not for a moment question the truth of the statement, that the mere presence of British troops acts as a powerful deterrent upon would-be disturbers of public order, and there are doubtless countless people in Egypt who would regret to see them go, but the idea of independence, whether it is understood or not, has so taken a hold upon the public mind of the country that it is at least arguable whether their presence cannot be manipulated by the skill of the professional agitator to create just the unrest which it is designed to allay.

I may remind your Lordship that the influence exercised by the army of occupation has of late years been closely bound up with the powers wielded by the Commander-in-chief under martial law. On the termination of martial law, the power to take administrative measures which are not within the compass of Egyptian law will lapse and, in the position of greater freedom and responsibility in which the Egyptian Government will be placed, there will inevitably be more reluctance than there is now to utilise the troops for maintaining public order. It seems probable that in practice they would only be called in to quell disturbances of a widespread character involving grave danger to Europeans. It would be the natural duty of a body of British police constables to prevent such a situation arising.

From conversations which I have had from time to time with the representatives of foreign Powers here, I am impressed with the confidence, apparently generally felt among the foreign communities, in the benevolent intentions of Egyptian higher officials towards them. Their chief fear is that of ill-treatment on the part of the

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# تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [٢٣١ظ]
# (٤٧٣/٤٦٥)



Egyptian policemen. This fear would, I think, be neutralised by Sir Gilbert Clayton's proposal, especially if British commandants of police were retained in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said, and a high British official were appointed to the Department of Public Security. It would probably be necessary to stipulate that the British police force should not be used for political purposes by the Egyptian Government, but this and other points of detail would require further elaboration if the suggestion were favourably entertained in principle.

A drastic example is being made of the perpetrators of the murders of Europeans in Alexandria last May. Whatever were the causes which led to the outbreak, it shook the sense of security of the European communities, but I think there is some truth in the assertions of Egyptians that the circumstances were exceptional and the outrages are now generally condemned by Egyptian public opinion. It is scarcely necessary to allude to the damage to the prestige of the country and to the risk to its newly-won independence which would be involved by an attitude of Zenophobia on the part of the Egyptian Government, and I believe responsible Egyptians to be fully alive to these dangers.

I have, &c.
ERNEST SCOTT, *Acting High Commissioner.*

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Enclosure in No. 1.

*Memorandum.*

I HAVE only recently had an opportunity of seeing Sir William Hayter's memorandum on "A Political Settlement in Egypt," forwarded to the Foreign Office under cover of Viscount Allenby's despatch No. 530 of the 27th June, 1921.

I desire to express my complete agreement with Sir William Hayter's analysis of the situation, as well as with the principles upon which he has based his suggestions. The course which events have taken since the date on which the memorandum was written has served to confirm the soundness of Sir William Hayter's conclusions.

It is clear that no Egyptian negotiators can hope to secure popular acceptance of an agreement which is based on anything less than the independence of Egypt. Any arrangement, therefore, which is not prefaced by an acknowledgment by Great Britain of the principle of Egyptian independence can only be maintained by force and will entail the retention of British military forces in Egypt for an indefinite period.

The suggestion of a *modus vivendi* appears to be a possible solution, but it is most improbable that the Egyptian negotiators could secure the popular assent to such an arrangement, which would therefore require to be put into force by proclamation of His Majesty.

It is reasonable to hope, with Sir William Hayter, that such a *modus vivendi* would lead eventually to a satisfactory result, and that at the end of the period fixed the Egyptian Government would have proved itself capable of governing the country in a manner reasonably satisfactory to the various interests involved. At the same time, the *modus vivendi* will not, for a considerable time, obviate the necessity of the presence in Egypt of a force which can be depended upon in all circumstances to safeguard the lives and property of foreigners.

A British military force in the country will always furnish the required safeguard, but its retention entails—

(*a.*) An obvious and undoubted negation of the principle of Egyptian independence.

(*b.*) The maintenance of a military commitment with its consequent expenditure, at a time when it is understood to be the declared policy and earnest desire of His Majesty's Government to reduce such commitments wherever possible.

It is obvious that a long stride will have been made towards the solution of the Egyptian problem if means can be found of discharging in some other way the functions which are performed to-day by the British army in Egypt.

The functions in question may be briefly summarised as :—

I. The protection of Egypt against external foes.
II. The protection of our Imperial communications.
III. The protection of foreigners in Egypt.



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The protection of Egypt against external foes does not appear to be any reason for the maintenance of a British force in Egypt itself. Egypt has the Soudan on the south and Palestine on the north-east, both of which countries are under British control and therefore present no menace. Any attack by the Senussi, unsupported by Italy, on the western frontier could probably be met by Egypt from her own resources supplemented by a small measure of British assistance, which could be easily and rapidly furnished.

Any serious attack on Egypt, therefore, must come from a European Power if it comes at all, would presumably mean that Great Britain was at war with that Power, and would be preceded by a diplomatic situation during the existence of which preparations for war on a large scale would be pushed forward. A few battalions stationed in Egypt in such circumstances would probably not affect the situation one way or the other, especially as Egypt would be our active ally being primarily affected.

The protection of our Imperial communications presumably means in the first place the protection of the Suez Canal, with perhaps as minor desiderata the keeping open of an alternative land-route to the East viâ Alexandria and Port Soudan and the maintenance of direct communications by rail and river with the Soudan and Uganda.

It is hardly conceivable that any Egyptian Government would ever by itself challenge the world by attempting to interfere by force with the traffic through the Suez Canal, or, if it were so mad as to do so, would have the slightest chance of success against British naval action. The Egyptian army is small, and even its present efficiency will be much impaired by the withdrawal of most of the British officers. Financial considerations are bound for many years to prevent any sensible increase in the Egyptian army, even if an Egyptian Government were so bold as to extend the scope of the already intensely unpopular recruiting law. Moreover, any serious augmentation of numbers would take time and would doubtless be made the subject of diplomatic protest by His Majesty's Government, backed up, if need be, by a show of force.

Any real threat against the Suez Canal, therefore, will come from outside Egypt, and will mean war with some great Power, and consequently immediate naval and military dispositions for the protection of Imperial communications, of which the Suez Canal is perhaps the most vital.

Again, it is not easy to see how the presence of a relatively small permanent garrison in the interior of Egypt would greatly affect the issues; indeed, the fact of its presence, which would mean a potentially hostile, instead of a probably friendly, Egypt, might well add to our embarrassments by necessitating the maintenance of a military occupation of the country.

There remains the question of the protection of foreigners in Egypt.

It may be assumed as most improbable that any Egyptian Government would expose itself to the measures on the part of the European Powers which the adoption of an anti-foreign policy would entail, and it may be considered as practically certain that its efforts would be directed towards the safeguarding of all legitimate foreign interests, partly with a view to giving evidence to the world of its capacity to govern, and partly in order to avoid the foreign intervention which would certainly follow any failure in this respect.

The only real fear, therefore, is the inability of the Egyptian authorities to maintain order, or such an internal political situation as might threaten the stability of the Government itself. In such an event disturbances might occur in the course of which the lower classes might get beyond control, with grave danger to the life and property of the foreign communities, unless some reliable force were available for their protection.

It is suggested that the need for such a force—at present furnished by the British army—might be met by an undertaking on the part of the Egyptian Government to maintain an adequate corps of British constables under British officers.

A force of this nature, properly trained and organised, would serve the purposes of public security even more effectively than does the British army, in that it would be specially trained for the duties it might be called upon to perform, and would intervene in the earliest stages of trouble instead of being withheld until the situation had become really serious and the trouble widespread.

From the Egyptian point of view, the force, though European, would be under the control and direction of the Egyptian Government, and would not, therefore, be



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

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any negation of the principles of independence. In normal times it would be employed on ordinary police duties with special reference to foreigners, while in time of emergency it would be particularly charged with the protection of foreigners and their property, and would at the same time furnish a trained body of men, untouched by local political influences, on which the Government could rely to assist in the general maintenance of public order.

(It would, of course, have to be clearly laid down that this force could not be used for any political purpose whatsoever.)

From the British point of view His Majesty's Government would be relieved of a military commitment and a large item of expenditure which otherwise bids fair to remain at something very near its present figure for a considerable time to come. Such British troops as are considered necessary to keep in the area could be stationed in some convenient locality in the Suez Canal neighbourhood or the Sinai Peninsula. and so serve as a central reserve available either for Palestine or Egypt.

In regard to negotiations now being carried on in London, it is not improbable that the removal of the main stumbling-block might enable a permanent agreement to be arrived at, or at least ensure the acceptance by Egypt of a *modus vivendi* on the lines suggested by Sir William Hayter in his memorandum.

The above suggestion is made on the assumption that it is vital to reduce military expenditure and commitments, and therefore to come to an agreement with Egypt. Failing an agreement, a *modus vivendi*, as outlined by Sir William Hayter, put into force by proclamation of His Majesty, offers probably the best chance of a really satisfactory solution, but it is absolutely dependent on the retention in Egypt for an indefinite time of the existing British garrison.

G. F. CLAYTON.

*October* 8, 1921.

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

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CONFIDENTIAL.

MEMORANDUM BY SIR GILBERT CLAYTON, ADVISER TO EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.

I HAVE only recently had an opportunity of seeing Sir William Hayter's memorandum on "A Political Settlement in Egypt," forwarded to the Foreign Office under cover of Viscount Allenby's despatch No. 530 of the 27th June, 1921.

I desire to express my complete agreement with Sir William Hayter's analysis of the situation, as well as with the principles upon which he has based his suggestions. The course which events have taken since the date on which the memorandum was written has served to confirm the soundness of Sir William Hayter's conclusions.

It is clear that no Egyptian negotiators can hope to secure popular acceptance of an agreement which is based on anything less than the independence of Egypt. Any arrangement, therefore, which is not prefaced by an acknowledgment by Great Britain of the principle of Egyptian independence can only be maintained by force and will entail the retention of British military forces in Egypt for an indefinite period.

The suggestion of a *modus vivendi* appears to be a possible solution, but it is most improbable that the Egyptian negotiators could secure the popular assent to such an arrangement, which would therefore require to be put into force by proclamation of His Majesty.

It is reasonable to hope, with Sir William Hayter, that such a *modus vivendi* would lead eventually to a satisfactory result, and that at the end of the period fixed the Egyptian Government would have proved itself capable of governing the country in a manner reasonably satisfactory to the various interests involved. At the same time, the *modus vivendi* will not, for a considerable time, obviate the necessity of the presence in Egypt of a force which can be depended upon in all circumstances to safeguard the lives and property of foreigners.

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The functions in question may be briefly summarised as:—

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The protection of Egypt against external foes does not appear to be any reason for the maintenance of a British force in Egypt itself. Egypt has the Soudan on the south and Palestine on the north-east, both of which countries are under British control and therefore present no menace. Any attack by the Senussi, unsupported by Italy, on the western frontier could probably be met by Egypt from her own resources supplemented by a small measure of British assistance, which could be easily and rapidly furnished.

Any serious attack on Egypt, therefore, must come from a European Power if it comes at all, would presumably mean that Great Britain was at war with that Power, and would be preceded by a diplomatic situation during the existence of

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# (٤٧٣/٤٦٩)



which preparations for war on a large scale would be pushed forward. A few battalions stationed in Egypt in such circumstances would probably not affect the situation one way or the other, especially as Egypt would be our active ally being primarily affected.

The protection of our Imperial communications presumably means in the first place the protection of the Suez Canal, with perhaps as minor desiderata the keeping open of an alternative land-route to the East viâ Alexandria and Port Soudan and the maintenance of direct communications by rail and river with the Soudan and Uganda.

It is hardly conceivable that any Egyptian Government would ever by itself challenge the world by attempting to interfere by force with the traffic through the Suez Canal, or, if it were so mad as to do so, would have the slightest chance of success against British naval action. The Egyptian army is small, and even its present efficiency will be much impaired by the withdrawal of most of the British officers. Financial considerations are bound for many years to prevent any sensible increase in the Egyptian army, even if an Egyptian Government were so bold as to extend the scope of the already intensely unpopular recruiting law. Moreover, any serious augmentation of numbers would take time and would doubtless be made the subject of diplomatic protest by His Majesty's Government, backed up, if need be, by a show of force.

Any real threat against the Suez Canal, therefore, will come from outside Egypt, and will mean war with some great Power, and consequently immediate naval and military dispositions for the protection of Imperial communications, of which the Suez Canal is perhaps the most vital.

Again, it is not easy to see how the presence of a relatively small permanent garrison in the interior of Egypt would greatly affect the issues; indeed, the fact of its presence, which would mean a potentially hostile, instead of a probably friendly, Egypt, might well add to our embarrassments by necessitating the maintenance of a military occupation of the country.

There remains the question of the protection of foreigners in Egypt.

It may be assumed as most improbable that any Egyptian Government would expose itself to the measures on the part of the European Powers which the adoption of an anti-foreign policy would entail, and it may be considered as practically certain that its efforts would be directed towards the safeguarding of all legitimate foreign interests, partly with a view to giving evidence to the world of its capacity to govern, and partly in order to avoid the foreign intervention which would certainly follow any failure in this respect.

The only real fear, therefore, is the inability of the Egyptian authorities to maintain order, or such an internal political situation as might threaten the stability of the Government itself. In such an event disturbances might occur in the course of which the lower classes might get beyond control, with grave danger to the life and property of the foreign communities, unless some reliable force were available for their protection.

It is suggested that the need for such a force—at present furnished by the British army—might be met by an undertaking on the part of the Egyptian Government to maintain an adequate corps of British constables under British officers.

A force of this nature, properly trained and organised, would serve the purposes of public security even more effectively than does the British army, in that it would be specially trained for the duties it might be called upon to perform, and would intervene in the earliest stages of trouble instead of being withheld until the situation had become really serious and the trouble widespread.

From the Egyptian point of view, the force, though European, would be under the control and direction of the Egyptian Government, and would not, therefore, be any negation of the principles of independence. In normal times it would be employed on ordinary police duties with special reference to foreigners, while in time of emergency it would be particularly charged with the protection of foreigners and their property, and would at the same time furnish a trained body of men, untouched by local political influences, on which the Government could rely to assist in the general maintenance of public order.

(It would, of course, have to be clearly laid down that this force could not be used for any political purpose whatsoever.)

From the British point of view His Majesty's Government would be relieved of a military commitment and a large item of expenditure which otherwise bids fair



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# (٤٧٣/٤٧٠)



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to remain at something very near its present figure for a considerable time to come. Such British troops as are considered necessary to keep in the area could be stationed in some convenient locality in the Suez Canal neighbourhood or the Sinai Peninsula, and so serve as a central reserve available either for Palestine or Egypt.

In regard to negotiations now being carried on in London, it is not improbable that the removal of the main stumbling-block might enable a permanent agreement to be arrived at, or at least ensure the acceptance by Egypt of a *modus vivendi* on the lines suggested by Sir William Hayter in his memorandum.

The above suggestion is made on the assumption that it is vital to reduce military expenditure and commitments, and therefore to come to an agreement with Egypt. Failing an agreement, a *modus vivendi*, as outlined by Sir William Hayter, put into force by proclamation of His Majesty, offers probably the best chance of a really satisfactory solution, but it is absolutely dependent on the retention in Egypt for an indefinite time of the existing British garrison.

G. F. CLAYTON.

*October* 8, 1921.

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



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

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Oct 14 1921 (236)

EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS.

MEMORANDUM.

1. THE Roosevelt phrase of "Govern or get out," to which both Mr. Scott and Mr. Selby refer in their letters of the 30th September and the 1st October, is an unfortunate one when used in connection with Egypt. British policy in Egypt has consistently aimed and will probably continue to aim at a state of affairs in which Great Britain does not govern, but in which British influence remains predominant. The ideal Egypt from a British point of view would be a prosperous and contented Egypt under a native Government, which could be relied upon to look only to Great Britain for assistance, protection and advice.

2. The importance of securing such an Egypt and the realisation that it can only be secured by friendly agreement with the Egyptian people led to the negotiations of Lord Milner's Mission with Zaghlul and to the subsequent negotiations with the official delegation. Throughout it has been our endeavour to discover conditions which would be acceptable to the Egyptian people, and would approximate as nearly as possible to the ideal defined in the preceding paragraph. Recent developments do not indicate that this endeavour is likely to be attended with success. But Mr. Scott and Mr. Selby seem now to contemplate with comparative equanimity a further and drastic reduction of British requirements. It might be well therefore to analyse the irreducible minimum to which British demands on Egypt could be limited without seriously damaging Great Britain's international and imperial position.

3. Great Britain must insist upon—

(*a.*) Retention of troops in the zone of the Suez Canal, described at the Imperial Conference as the "jugular vein of the British Empire."
(*b.*) Retention of troops at Alexandria for a specified period only to be concluded with the consent of the capitulatory Powers. Without such a provision we could hardly insist on foreign Powers refraining from sending Legation guards or at least guardships.
(*c.*) The right to veto the appointment of foreigners to posts in the Egyptian Government service.
(*d.*) The continuance of the *status quo* in the Soudan.
(*e.*) The compensation of British officials.
(*f.*) The enactment of an indemnity law.
(*g.*) The payment of interest on the loans secured on the Ottoman tribute.

4. If an agreement were concluded with Egypt on these lines the notification to foreign Powers of the withdrawal of the protectorate would have to be accompanied by a declaration on the part of Great Britain to the effect that she would regard as an unfriendly act the interference of any other Power in Egyptian affairs—in fact, the declaration of a Monroe doctrine.

5. It is probable that the Egyptian delegation would consent to an agreement on these lines, and would be able to secure its ratification in Egypt as it concedes nearly every point that even the extremists have ever raised. We must, however, contemplate the result of having made this offer in the event of its being refused.

6. Whatever terms are refused by the present delegation will constitute a little less than the minimum of the future programme of the Egyptian nationalists. If the limit of concession outlined above is offered to the delegation and refused, the future programme of nationalists will of necessity be so extreme as to recommend itself to no one outside their own ranks. It would not win any support from foreign or British public opinion.

7. The immediate consequence of a breakdown of negotiations will be to heal the breach which has recently occurred in the ranks of the Egyptian nationalists and to reunite all parties in hostility to Great Britain. His Majesty's Government will have to deal with a united, hostile and disappointed Egypt, and repressive measures will be necessary in order to maintain order. Whatever Government or system of government is set up, it will be based on force. Reforms on the lines of the Milner report will be useless to win the goodwill of the Egyptian people, who indeed could hardly be expected to value concessions presented to them on the points of bayonets.

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



8. Government on these lines might ultimately succeed in subduing the nationalist movement and securing the prosperity of Egypt. But the following two conditions are essential to its success:—

(*a*.) The maintenance of at least 12,000 troops in Egypt for an indefinite period.
(*b*.) The support of the British Parliament for coercive measures for the same period involving quite possibly many sentences of deportation or death.

9. Even if these conditions are fulfilled the success of government by repression is not assured. We rely upon the Egyptian army for the control of the Soudan. Were we no longer able to rely upon it, our military commitment would not be limited to the 12,000 troops mentioned above.

10. It should also be borne in mind that a certain measure of consent among the educated classes in Egypt, even if only obtained by coercion, is essential to carrying on the government of Egypt. There is no British civil service in Egypt as there is in India, and a complete strike of the native civil servants can paralyse the entire machinery of government, as was shown when it actually took place in 1919. Nor would any constitutional machinery for legislation exist. Ministers would be supported not by public opinion but by the High Commissioner, and would be obliged to rely more and more on enactments under martial law.

11. The terms given above as the irreducible minimum would not of course be presented to Adly Pasha as they stand, and he might be induced to accept something far more favourable to Great Britain. It is suggested, for instance, that the Egyptian Government should undertake by a certain date, say the 1st January, 1925, to provide barracks on the Canal for the British troops, who would not proceed there until the barracks were ready. Such an arrangement would give the Government of the new Egypt three years in which to put their house in order, and show their ability or inability to govern. Other modifications in our favour could probably be introduced in the course of negotiations.

12. The withdrawal of troops from Cairo and eventually from Alexandria would undoubtedly be attended by grave risks, but it is remarkable that the officials on the spot are willing to take the risks involved. The views of Mr. Scott and Mr. Selby on this subject are supported by Mr. Amos and Judge Perceval. Lord Milner is also understood to have seen no insuperable objection to the withdrawal of troops to the Canal zone, where their water supply would be guaranteed by the fact that Great Britain would, owing to her position in the Soudan, control the whole water supply of Egypt.

13. The worst consequences that could ensue upon the concession of everything except the "irreducible minimum" defined in paragraph 3 would be the gradual decay and corruption of the Administration of Egypt, which would lead to financial difficulties, agricultural errors, the reduction of the cotton crop, conditions of life for foreigners rendered impossible, and, perhaps, outbreaks of disorder and the massacre of Europeans. One such outbreak would, of course, justify the reoccupation of Egypt by British troops, and the interval between the withdrawal and the reoccupation would be merely so much time wasted, save in so far as Egypt and the world in general might have profited by the object lesson.

14. The evils referred to in the preceding paragraph might equally result from any measure of self-government that it has ever been proposed to concede to Egypt.

15. The only guarantee against gradual deterioration would be the anxiety of Egyptians to justify their independence and their increased reliance upon the assistance of British officials.

16. The risk involved in the policy of repression is that the nationalist movement which has taken firm hold on the people of Egypt may not die out In that case we should be faced with a problem of perpetual conspiracy in Egypt and probably also in the Soudan, culminating periodically in assassinations and in outbreaks which in turn would necessitate reprisals and lay the foundations of national and traditional hatred. We might end by creating another Ireland, without an Ulster, which would be a storm centre in the Mediterranean and a perpetual menace to the Suez Canal.

17. To sum up, we have to choose between—

( .) The dangers involved in making wider concessions than those hitherto contemplated, and
(*b*.) The dangers arising out of a failure to reach an agreement.

Of the two, the former would seem the less formidable.

A. D. COOPER.
J. MURRAY.

*October* 14, 1921.



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