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Typescript and printed cabinet papers and parliamentary papers on events in Egypt

Holding Institution	British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers
Reference	Mss Eur F112/262
Date(s)	10 Jul 1921-27 Feb 1922 (CE, Gregorian)
Written in	English and French in Latin
Extent and Format	1 file (260 folios)
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About this record

The file contains correspondence, memoranda, minutes, and other papers concerning the political situation in Egypt and negotiations between the British Government and an Egyptian delegation for the end of the British Protectorate in Egypt. The papers cover the effort to come to an agreement on future relations between the two parties following negotiations in the summer of 1921 and up until Britain's unilateral declaration of the end of the protectorate in February 1922.

The majority of the memoranda is written by Foreign Office officials, including the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon. Records of meetings of the Cabinet and a sub-committee on the Egyptian situation, and of a few high-level gatherings at 10 Downing Street, make up a substantial part of the file. There is also a large amount of correspondence between Curzon and Field Marshal Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby, High Commissioner of Egypt, on the question of Egyptian independence and events in Egypt. Other papers include printed collections relating to the Egyptian situation that were presented to Parliament.

At the back of the file is a chronological summary and a résumé of events in Egypt since the publication of the report of the Milner Mission to Egypt (folios 238-260).

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

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CONFIDENTIAL.

THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

AT the recent meeting of the British and Dominion Ministers at which the Egyptian question was discussed, I promised to circulate two recent despatches from Lord Allenby: (1) No. 311, dated the 16th April, 1921; (2) No. 530, dated the 17th June, 1921.

I also undertook to draw up and submit a draft of the governing clauses of a permanent convention with Egypt within the framework of the principles laid down in the Cabinet decision of February 1921. The draft clauses as now submitted I believe to be in accord with the general views put forward at the above meeting. I express no opinion as to the likelihood of their being accepted by the Egyptian delegation; but they represent, as I understand, the lines upon which I am to proceed.

In the event of its proving impossible to negotiate a permanent convention, it may become necessary to fall back upon the expedient of a temporary *modus vivendi*, to be operative for a period of, say, five or ten years. This should in all probability follow the main lines of the draft permanent convention but would differ from it in the extent of the financial and judicial control retained.

In such a temporary arrangement it would probably be necessary, as suggested by Sir William Hayter, to insist on His Majesty's Government appointing both the financial and judicial commissioners and on these officials being made responsible to His Majesty's Government though paid by the Egyptian Government.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

July 10, 1921.

[6578]

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

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CONFIDENTIAL.

DRAFT OF PRINCIPAL CLAUSES OF A PERMANENT CONVENTION WITH EGYPT.

I.—Termination of Protectorate.

1. THE Government of His Britannic Majesty agrees, in consideration of the conclusion and ratification of the present treaty, to terminate the protectorate declared over Egypt on the 18th December, 1914, and thenceforth to recognise Egypt as an independent State under a constitutional monarchy.

There is hereby concluded, and there shall henceforth subsist, between the Government and people of His Britannic Majesty on the one hand, and the Government and people of Egypt on the other hand, a perpetual treaty and bond of peace, amity and alliance.

II.—Military Occupation.

2. Great Britain undertakes to support Egypt in the defence of her vital interests and of the integrity of her territory.

For the discharge of these obligations and for the due protection of British Imperial communications, British forces shall have free passage through Egypt, and shall be maintained at such places in Egypt and for such periods as shall from time to time be determined. They shall also have facilities for the acquisition and use of barracks, exercise grounds, aerodromes and naval yards, and for the free use of naval harbours ~~at all times~~.

III.—Foreign Relations.

3. The Foreign Affairs of Egypt shall be conducted by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under a Minister so designated.

4. His Britannic Majesty's Government shall be represented in Egypt by a High Commissioner who, in virtue of his special responsibilities, shall at all times be entitled to an exceptional position, and shall take precedence over the representatives of other countries.

5. The Egyptian Government shall be represented in London by a High Commissioner, who shall deal directly with His Britannic Majesty's Government.

6. In view of the obligations which Great Britain has undertaken in Egypt, notably in respect of foreign countries, it will be necessary that the closest relations should exist between the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British High Commissioner, who will render all possible assistance to the Egyptian Government in respect of diplomatic transactions or negotiations.

7. The Egyptian Government will not enter into any agreement with foreign Powers without consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government through the British High Commissioner.

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8. The Egyptian Government will enjoy the right of appointing consuls in foreign countries when Egyptian interests require.

9. For the general conduct of diplomatic relations with foreign Governments, His Britannic Majesty's representatives in foreign capitals will place themselves at the disposal of the Egyptian Government and will render them every assistance in their power.

10. His Britannic Majesty's Government will continue to conduct the negotiations for the abolition of the existing capitulations with the various capitulatory Powers, and accepts the responsibility for protecting the legitimate interests of foreigners in Egypt.

IV.—Employment of Foreign Officers.

11. In view of the special responsibilities assumed by Great Britain and of the existing position in the Egyptian army and public services, the Egyptian Government undertake not to appoint any foreign officers or officials to any of those services without the previous concurrence of the British High Commissioner.

V.—Financial Control.

12. The Egyptian Government will appoint, in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government, a financial Commissioner, to whom shall be entrusted in due course the powers at present exercised by the Commissioners of the Debt, and who will more especially be responsible for the punctual payment of the following charges :—

I. The charges for the budget of the Mixed Courts.
II. All pensions or other annuities payable to retired foreign officials and their heirs.
III. The budgets of the financial and judicial Commissioners and their respective staffs.

13. For the proper discharge of his duties the financial Commissioner shall be kept fully informed on all matters within the purview of the Ministry of Finance, and shall at all times enjoy the right of access to the President of the Council of Ministers and to the Minister of Finance.

14. No external loan shall be raised nor the revenue of any public service be assigned by the Egyptian Government without the concurrence of the financial Commissioner.

VI.—Judicial Control.

15. The Egyptian Government will appoint, in ~~consultation~~ agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government, a judicial Commissioner, who, in virtue of the obligations assumed by Great Britain, shall be charged with the duty of watching the administration of the law in all matters affecting foreigners.

16. For the proper discharge of his duties, the judicial Commissioner shall be kept fully informed on all matters affecting foreigners which concern the Ministries of Justice and of the Interior, and shall at all times enjoy the right of access to the Egyptian Ministries of Justice and of the Interior.

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VII.—Sudan.

17. The peaceful development of the Sudan being essential to the security of Egypt and for the maintenance of her water supply, Egypt undertakes to continue to afford the Sudan Government the same military assistance as in the past, or in lieu thereof, to provide the Sudan Government with financial assistance to an extent to be agreed upon between the two Governments.

All Egyptian forces in the Sudan shall be under the orders of the Governor-General.

VIII.—Suez Canal.

18. During the ten years immediately following the coming into force of this treaty, the Egyptian Government will, in consultation with the Suez Canal Company and the British High Commissioner, frame proposals for the extension for a further period of 100 years of the concession held by the said company.

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

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

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SUMMARY OF PROGRESS OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EGYPTIAN
DELEGATION UP TO 25th AUGUST.

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1. It is proposed to take the Principal Clauses, as submitted to and approved by the Cabinet, one by one and trace the progress which has been made with each up to date.

2. I (1) Termination of the Protectorate.
This clause has not been discussed as its scope has already been defined in the declaration made to the Sultan by Lord Allenby in February 1921.

3. II (2) Military occupation.
The objects of His Majesty's Government were defined in the following formula sent to the delegation on 13th July:

"The objects for which the maintenance of a British force in Egypt is required are, as viewed by His Majesty's Government, four in number, and may be thus roughly defined:-

1. The protection, both in peace and war, of the Imperial

line....

6

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

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line of communications.

2. Assistance to the Egyptian Government when required for the defence of the integrity of Egyptian territory against external attack.

3. The protection of foreign interests in Egypt, as provided for by the new treaty.

4. Assistance to the Egyptian Government, when required, for the suppression of grave disorder, or the defence of public security.

For the discharge of these obligations it is proposed that British forces shall have free passage through Egypt, and shall be maintained at such places in Egypt and for such periods as may from time to time be determined. They shall also at all such times have facilities for the acquisition and use of barracks, exercise grounds, aerodromes and naval yards, and for the free use of naval harbours.

The British Government is prepared to discuss with the Egyptian Government in the most friendly way the best manner in which to carry out these requirements."

4.....

7

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

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(6)

4. The delegation on the 26th July defined the only terms on which they were prepared to agree to the presence in Egypt of British troops as follows:-

"Le maintien de troupes britanniques sur le territoire égyptien en temps de paix n'aurait d'autre objectif que la sauvegarde des communications impériales. Ces troupes seraient cantonnées dans la région du Canal en dehors de la zone neutre: les aérodromes et autres services auxiliaires seraient établis dans la même région. La présence de ces troupes ne constituerait pas une occupation militaire et ne porterait en aucune façon atteinte aux droits de souveraineté de l'Egypte.

A l'expiration d'un délai à déterminer, les deux Gouvernements examineraient la question de savoir si les communications impériales peuvent être assurées sans la présence de ces troupes.

Quant au droit de passage sur le territoire égyptien et l'usage des ports et aérodromes égyptiens, ils seraient réservés pour le temps de guerre. .....

8

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

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guerre. Il resterait bien entendu que l'Egypte offrirait toute facilité de transport entre le région où seraient cantonées les troupes et le port le plus proche."

5. On 4th August a further formula was submitted to the delegation in the following terms:-

"The main object for which Great Britain is called upon to maintain a military force in Egypt is for the protection of her Imperial communications.

In addition she will require, as indicated in Lord Milner's report, to assume the obligation of supporting Egypt in defending the integrity of her territory and of safeguarding foreign interests in Egypt, including the safety of the lives and property of foreigners.

For the due discharge of these obligations it is proposed that British forces shall have free passage through Egypt, and shall be maintained at such places in Egypt and for such periods as may from time to time be determined. They shall also at all times have facilities for the acquisition and use of barracks, exercise grounds, aerodromes and naval yards, and for the free use of naval harbours.

It....

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

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It is realised that the numerical strength and the location of these forces are matters which, as time passes, may admit of reconsideration, and accordingly it is proposed that this article of the treaty shall be open to revision by mutual consent at the end of ten years, when the question shall be re-examined in the light of the then existing situation, regard being had to the ability of the Egyptian Government to assume a fuller measure of responsibility for the execution of the objects to which reference has been made."

6. As a result of an exchange of correspondence between the Secretary of State and Adly Pasha it was decided that the question of the military occupation should be reserved until the Delegation had had an opportunity of ascertaining the other points in which to some extent it might prove possible to meet their views.

7. III. (3) to (10) Foreign Relations. This question was dealt with in the course of the second and third conferences and the delegation were given a general indication of the views of His Majesty's Government though no formula in writing was communicated to them.

8.....

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

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8. The Delegation b y a note dated 28th July gave their reasons for insisting on the claim to full foreign representation abroad, and for the protection of British interests suggested that Egypt should undertake not to conclude political treaties prejudicial to Great Britain.

5th Conference p. 4. 9. The question was again raised at the fifth conference and it was eventually decided that Foreign Relations like the Military Occupation should remain in abeyance whilst the delegation discussed other points with Mr. Lindsay.

1st Conference p. 7. 10. IV. (11) Employment of foreign officials. This question was considered at the first conference and the principle was accepted by the delegation though they preferred that the clause should not appear in the treaty.

11. V. (12) to (14) Financial Control. This question was raised at the second conference and the text of the formula approved by the Cabinet was sent to the delegation on 14th July.

12. On the 26th July the delegation

suggested...

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

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suggested an alternative text in the following words:

"Le Gouvernement égyptien nommera, d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, un Commissaire financier, auquel seront confiés les pouvoirs actuellement exercés par les Commissaires de la Dette. Il aura, à ce titre, droit d'acces auprès du Premier Ministre et du Ministre des Finances. En raison de ses connaissances techniques, le Commissaire financier sera à la disposition du Gouvernement égyptien pour toute mission dont il voudra le charger, ou pour tous avis qu'il voudra lui démander, sans toutefois que les avis qu'il aurait à donner puissent lier en aucune façon ledit Gouvernement."

13. The question was again considered at the sixth conference and subsequently in conversations between Mr. Lindsay and Adly Pasha. Finally on 20th August the following formula was sent to Adly Pasha:

"The Egyptian Government agree that the British Commissioner of the Debt shall at all times enjoy the right of access to the President of the Council of Ministers and to the Minister of Finance, and shall be entitled to receive information on any matter.....

12

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

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matter within the purview of the Ministry of Finance.

He shall be entitled more especially to satisfy himself that the following charges are being punctually met:-

1. The charges for the budget of the Mixed Courts.

2. All pensions or other annuities payable to retired foreign officials and their heirs.

3. The service of the Unconsolidated Debt and of the loans charged on the Ottoman Tribute.

14. Adly Pasha on 23rd August suggested an alternative formula but in the course of several conversations he conveyed the impression that the principle embodied in the text quoted in paragraph 13 above was not altogether unacceptable. The question has been left at this stage.

15. VI (15) and (16). Judicial Control. 2nd Conference p. 6. This question was considered towards the close of the second conference and on 14th July the text approved by the Cabinet was sent to the delegation, who on 26th July replied at some length maintaining that a British Procureur Général of the Mixed Courts was all that His Majesty's Government could require or the delegation concede.....

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

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(12)

concede.

16. In subsequent conferences it was made clear that the Judicial Reform scheme suggested in the Milner Report could not come into operation for several years and in the meantime the Egyptian proposal mentioned in the preceding paragraph was unworkable. Finally after conversation with Adly Pasha, Mr. Lindsay on 20th August sent him the following formula designed to secure protection for foreigners in Egypt:

"The Egyptian Government agree that the command of the police forces in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said, shall continue, as at present, to be entrusted to European officers with a sufficient European subordinate staff to ensure efficiency.

To ensure co-ordination in the work of the police in the said three cities, the Minister of the Interior will, in agreement with the High Commissioner, appoint an official who shall not exercise any executive functions, but shall report to the Minister on matters of police administration especially those affecting foreigners.

The Egyptian Government agree to appoint European legal advisers (conseillers sultaniens") in the Ministries of Justice and of the Interior. These legal advisers ("conseillers sultaniens") shall collaborate in the preparation of all laws or regulations

14

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

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regulations.affecting foreigners."

17. Adly Pasha was not ill disposed towards the first paragraph of this formula and showed signs of being prepared to accept the last paragraph, but the second paragraph involving a British official in the Ministry of the Interior was unpalatable

18. He suggested eventually that an alternative might be found by creating a Bureau in that Ministry under a British chief for watching over police matters affecting foreigners. If this solution was adopted he was anxious to omit reference in the Treaty to the three commandants though he admitted that in practice they would have to be Englishmen as Egyptians could not be found willing to take on the job and be made the scapegoats of the Governors in the event of trouble. The matter was left in this stage.

19. VII. (17) Sudan. The delegation beyond a passing reference during the first conference have avoided any mention of the Sudan. They no doubt feel on weak ground as the Sudan was specifically excluded by Lord Milner from his recommendations and its.....

Minutes of 1st Conference top of p. 4.

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

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its status is defined by the 1899 Convention. Ultimately they will have to mention it but it would seem to be better tactics to leave the delegation to make the first move.

20. VIII. (18) Suez Canal. This proposal was discussed by Mr. Lindsay with Adly Pasha who was sent on 19th August the text of the clause suggested by the Board of Trade:

"During the ten years immediately following the coming into force of this treaty, the Egyptian Government will, in consultation with the Suez Canal Company and the British High Commissioner, frame proposals for the extension for a further period of 50 years of the concession held by the said company.

Any question on which the parties are unable to agree wuth regard to the terms on which the extension shall be granted shall unless otherwise mutually agreed be determined by an umpire appointed by the Council of the League of Nations. In the event of the Company declining the extension on the terms so settled, the Egyptian Government and His Majesty's Government will determine in concert the status and management of the Canal after the expiration of the Concession."

This....

16

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

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This text was further discussed when Sidky Pasha was also present and it was arranged that the last named should go into the problems involved with the Board of Trade experts. Neither Adly Pasha nor Sidky Pasha were averse to some action on the lines indicated by the text but they felt themselves hampered by the fact that the old Legislative Assembly had practically unanimously rejected some ten years ago a proposal to prolong the concession.

Other points not included in the Principal Clauses submitted to the Cabinet.

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21. Cable and Wireless rights. The text of certain proposals made by the Post-master General and concurred in by the Admiralty and India Office was sent to Adly Pasha on 17th August:

"For the purpose of safeguarding British Imperial Communications

(1) The Egyptian Government agree that they will not grant permission for the landing of submarine cables or the establishment of wireless stations for communication with places outside Egypt without the concurrence of His Majesty's High Commissioner....

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

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Commissioner.

(2) The Egyptian Government agree that the existing cable-landing rights and wireless concessions granted by the present Egyptian Government or their predecessors shall continue in force.

(3) The Egyptian Government accord to His Majesty's Government the right to land additional submarine cables and to establish additional wireless stations for communication with places outside Egypt.

(4) The Egyptian Government agree to grant similar facilities to telegraph companies, if so requested by His Majesty's Government and upon such conditions as they may recommend."

Adly Pasha did not appear to be averse to meeting the requirements of the text but felt some doubt as to whether such stipulations were in place in a political treaty.

22. Retirement and compensation of British officials. The principles on which it is suggested that compensation should be based were communicated to Adly Pasha and discussed with him and Sidky Pasha on 24th August. They are going to examine the scheme and form an idea of the effect of its.....

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

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

(17)

its application.

23. Protection of Minorities. A formula taken from the Polish and Rumanian Treaties was submitted to Adly and Sidky Pashas who prima facie appeared to be prepared to accept it.

J. Murray
25.8.21.

19

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

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EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS.

Minute by Mr. Murray.

Situation in Egypt if a breakdown occurs.

1. IN this event it is almost inevitable that Adly will feel obliged to resign office on his return to Egypt. It is doubtful whether any Egyptian would then have the courage to form a Ministry—even of affairs—once it was plain that the offer of His Majesty's Government did not go as far in meeting Egyptian aspirations as that of the Milner Mission.

2. We should run the risk of a revolutionary movement breaking out, though it is more probable that in the first instance, at any rate, Egyptian resentment would take the form of an attempt to paralyse administration by partial or general strikes of the civil servants—a form of pressure which is difficult to combat, as we discovered in 1919.(1)

3. The Extremists would not find it difficult to prevent a Ministry prepared to co-operate with the High Commissioner from taking office by resort to methods of terrorism which would be impossible to suppress without the collaboration of the Egyptian police.(2)

4. If, therefore, a breakdown is inevitable, it is essential that it should occur over a point or points as to which we shall have *all* foreign sympathies in and out of Egypt on our side; and if a considerable measure of Egyptian sympathy is also to be won, our offer, looked at as a whole, must be at least as good as Lord Milner's.

Questions so far discussed with Delegation.

5. Three main issues have so far been considered, namely:—

(i.) The British forces in Egypt.
(ii.) Foreign relations.
(iii.) Financial and judicial control.

As regards (i), the delegation have been asked to accept four reasons for the presence of British troops, viz.:—

(*a.*) The protection of our Imperial communications.
(*b.*) The defence of Egypt from external aggression.
(*c.*) The protection of foreigners.
(*d.*) The maintenance of order.

The delegation accept (*a*) and (*b*) subject to the condition that our troops and auxiliary services are in peace time confined to a zone not far removed from the Canal. As regards (*c*) and (*d*) they take the line that these two reasons are really one and the same and they refuse to admit their validity.

6. Their point that (*c*) and (*d*) are really the same is good in that the need for protecting foreigners will only arise when disorder has broken out or is threatening, and conversely, when disorder is threatening, foreigners will always be in danger. The disturbances of 1919 and the recent Alexandria riots prove this.

7. As regards the condition which the delegation seek to impose in connection with (*a*) and (*b*), we can usefully argue that the confinement of British troops to a zone would prevent them furnishing any protection to foreigners, which is the one and only reason which makes their presence in Egypt welcome to all Europeans and to a considerable if silent body of native opinion.(3)

8. It would seem clear, therefore, that over the question of troops we have no concession of substance to make, but that if a break occurs on this point it will do so in conditions favourable to His Majesty's Government.

(1) Mr. Amos would like to paint this bogey even blacker than I have done.—J. M.
(2) Such a situation inevitably produces a rapid degeneration of the political situation.—R. C. L.
(3) And it is technically absurd. No soldier could assent to it for one moment.—R.C.L.

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9. As regards Foreign Relations (sub-head (ii) paragraph 5) we have not yet received the written observations of the delegation, but from their attitude at the conferences so far held, the arguments would seem to be :—

(*a.*) Representation abroad is enjoyed by every independent country, and consequently it is the very symbol of the independence which the delegation are pledged to secure.

(*b.*) Egypt has need to be kept in touch with modern developments in civilised countries and such touch can only be maintained by means of diplomatic representatives.

(*c.*) In negotiations or transactions with foreign Powers, the Egyptian case has hitherto had to be stated to the foreign diplomatic representative in Cairo, who in turn reports it to his own Government, which thus learns the Egyptian view at second hand and robbed of much of its cogency.

(*d.*) The presence of Egyptian diplomatic representatives in foreign countries will tend to prevent clandestine anti-British intrigue on the part of Egyptian anglophobes, whilst if an Egyptian diplomat were to countenance such intrigue, he would involve his Government in a breach of the treaty.

10. All of these arguments have a certain weight. Apart from this any attempt to circumscribe Egypt's liberty in regard to foreign relations can only be represented as an attempt to safeguard a purely British as opposed to a foreign interest. In insisting on limitations therefore in this matter we cannot count on enjoying foreign sympathy.

11. Those of the British advisers whom Lord Allenby has consulted on the question are unanimous in believing that in regard to foreign relations His Majesty's Government can afford to meet Egyptian aspirations to the fullest extent, and in all the circumstances it would not appear to be a point on which we could well let the negotiations break down.

12. There remains the question of the appointment of foreign non-British officials in Egyptian service. This is a point of fundamental importance, but from their attitude at the first conference the delegation would seem prepared to accept our point of view that such appointments should only be made with the concurrence of the High Commissioner.

13. As regards the extent to which it is necessary for His Majesty's Government to maintain a control over financial and judicial matters, the situation is no longer the same as it was when the Milner memorandum was conceived.

14. It has proved impossible up till now to conclude conventions with more than five of the Capitulatory Powers for their cession to us of the ex-territorial privileges which they enjoy in Egypt. Until the remaining six Powers come into line it will be impossible to hand over to a British official the functions now performed by the commissioners of the debt. If, therefore, we assume that the commission of the debt will continue to exist for some years to come, it falls to be considered what essential functions must be vested in the financial commissioner.

15. The delegation take the line that the special responsibilities, viz., payment of budget of Mixed Courts and of himself and judicial commissioner, and payment of foreigners' pensions imposed upon him by the formula proposed by the Secretary of State, are *ex hypothesi* treaty obligations on the Egyptian Government.

If the delegation accept our eventual proposals in regard to compensating British officials who may be retired from the service, their argument would appear to have considerable force, and if the delegation were prepared to accept the further obligation of meeting the service of the loans secured upon the Turkish tribute, the treaty itself would constitute a guarantee that essential payments would be made. Any attempt to starve the Mixed Courts would unite the Capitulatory Powers against Egypt, and would produce pressure which no Egyptian Government could sustain.

16. It would, however, appear essential that in foreign quite as much as British interests His Majesty's Government should be in a position to receive ample warning before any financial crisis occurred, or, indeed, of any serious degeneration in the financial and administrative standards of the Government. It is suggested that such warning would be obtained by the Egyptian Government recognising the right of the High Commissioner to send an officer responsible to himself, to whom all information concerning the financial administration of the country would at all times be made available.

17. This officer would neither interfere with the administration of the country nor

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proffer his advice unasked, but he would ensure that the financial administration was exposed to the healthy sunlight of publicity both in Europe and Egypt. It is thought that such an arrangement would not be unpalatable to the Egyptians, who maintain that they have nothing to hide, and that the Egyptian Government might be induced to provide the official's salary and expenses.

18. It is therefore suggested that, subject to the acceptance by Egypt of the obligations mentioned in paragraph 15 above, we could safely confine our financial control to securing that full publicity was given to all details of financial administration.

19. Turning to the question of judicial control, it has been explained in paragraph 14 that any reorganisation of the Mixed Courts as at present constituted cannot take place for some years, and in a previous minute (of the 22nd July in E. 8537) it was pointed out that it was undesirable to impose a scheme of judicial reform which no one really wants. This being the case and assuming the continuation of the régime of the Capitulations, what other safeguards are essential for the protection of foreigners?

20. In the first place, the standard of the present Mixed Courts must not be lowered, and to secure this it is suggested that the delegation might be induced to agree that the nomination of foreign judges and of the "Procureur général" should be effected in close consultation with the High Commissioner.

21. It is also necessary to protect foreigners against abuses of administrative authority. The Capitulations alone are not an adequate safeguard, as an ill-disposed administrative official could make a foreigner's life a burden by the arrest of the latter's native assistants or servants. Recourse to the Courts is, of course, always open, but it is an inadequate safeguard. It is suggested, on the analogy of paragraph 16, that the Egyptians might be induced to accept a provision whereby the High Commissioner would be entitled to send an officer to examine into any case where a foreigner had reason to complain of an abuse of power on the part of the local authorities. Such an arrangement would not constitute any interference with the internal administration of the country, but it would prevent clandestine oppression by means of decent publicity. It is thought that the Egyptian Government might be induced to defray the salary and expenses of such an official as being but a small price to pay for their freedom from control in matters of internal administration.

22. To sum up, we can afford to be generous on all points, and to go even further than Lord Milner except in the matter of British troops, their use and disposition.

The vital points on which we must insist are all matters where foreign interests in general and not merely British interests are involved.

23. It is suggested, therefore, that the delegation might be told that their arguments have impressed us, and that we are prepared to meet their wishes in many respects provided that they on their side will accept the fundamental principle that British troops are in Egypt to protect foreigners, as to which principle there can be no compromise.

24 If, on this basis, the negotiations cannot profitably be continued, there remains the last card, namely, that the delegation should accept the principle enunciated in the preceding paragraph as an interim measure for a term of years. In this case it is suggested that the whole treaty should be for a term of years, and consequently, as a natural corollary, that the protectorate should not be abolished but suspended for such period as the treaty may remain in force.

J. M.

July 27, 1921.

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

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EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS.

Mr. Lindsay to Sir Adly Yeghen Pasha.

My dear Pasha, *Foreign Office, October* 13, 1921.

AS I promised in the course of our conversation yesterday, I asked Lord Curzon if I might send you the texts of the five points in the negotiations which I was to discuss with you. Lord Curzon has authorised me to send you these texts, which I now enclose on the clear understanding that they are only draft formulæ proposed by me, and therefore they do not at the present stage come officially from his Lordship.

Yours sincerely,
R. C. LINDSAY.

Finance.

The Egyptian Government agree that the British Commissioner of the Debt shall at all times enjoy the right of access to the President of the Council of Ministers and to the Minister of Finance, and shall be entitled to receive information and express opinions on any matter within the purview of the Ministry of Finance.

He shall be entitled more especially to satisfy himself that the following charges are being punctually met:—

(*a.*) The charges for the budget of the Mixed Courts.
(*b.*) All pensions or other annuities payable to retired foreign officials and their heirs.
(*c.*) The service of the Unconsolidated Debt and of the loans charged on the Ottoman Tribute.

Protection of Foreign Interests.

A special bureau shall be set up in the department of Public Security in the Ministry of Interior under the direction of a European official to report to the Minister on matters of police administration affecting foreigners.

The Egyptian Government agree that the command of the police forces in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said shall continue, as at present, to be entrusted to European officers with a sufficient European subordinate staff to ensure efficiency.

The Egyptian Government agree to appoint European legal advisers ("conseillers sultaniens") in the Ministries of Justice and of the Interior. These legal advisers ("conseillers sultaniens") shall collaborate in the preparation of all laws or regulations affecting foreigners.

Suez Canal.

During the ten years immediately following the coming into force of this treaty, the Egyptian Government will, in consultation with the British High Commissioner, sympathetically consider any proposals which the Suez Canal Company may put forward for the extension for a further period of fifty years of the concession held by the said company.

Any question on which the parties are unable to agree with regard to the terms on which the extension shall be granted shall, unless otherwise mutually agreed, be determined by an umpire appointed by the Council of the League of Nations. In the event of the company declining the extension on the terms so settled, the Egyptian Government and His Majesty's Government will determine in concert the status and management of the Canal after the expiration of the concession.

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Cable and Wireless Rights.

For the purpose of safeguarding British Imperial communications—

(*a.*) The Egyptian Government agree that they will not grant permission for the landing of submarine cables or the establishment of wireless stations for communication with places outside Egypt without the concurrence of His Majesty's High Commissioner.

(*b.*) The Egyptian Government agree that the existing cable-landing rights and wireless concessions granted by the present Egyptian Government or their predecessors shall continue in force.

(*c.*) The Egyptian Government accord to His Majesty's Government the right to land additional submarine cables and to establish additional wireless stations for communication with places outside Egypt.

(*d.*) The Egyptian Government agree to grant similar facilities to telegraph companies, if so requested by His Majesty's Government, and upon such conditions as they may recommend.

Retirement and Compensation of British Officials.

The Egyptian Government shall be entitled to dispense with the services of British officials at any time after the coming into force of the treaty on condition that such officials shall receive monetary compensation as hereafter provided, in addition to any pension or indemnity to which their conditions of service may entitle them.

On the like condition, British officials shall be entitled to resign at any time after the coming into force of the treaty

The scheme shall apply to pensionable and non-pensionable officials as well as to employees of municipalities, provincial councils or other local public bodies.

An official dismissed or retiring under the terms of the preceding clause shall receive, in addition to compensation, a repatriation allowance sufficient to cover the cost of transporting himself, his family and his household goods to London.

Compensation and pensions shall be payable in Egyptian pounds at the fixed rate of 97½ piastres to the pound sterling.

A table of compensation, A) for permanent officials, (B) for temporary officials, shall be prepared by the president of the Society of Actuaries and shall be based on the following factors :—

(*a.*) The present value of the expectation of service of the official.
(*b.*) The present value of the expectation of pension.
(*c.*) The re-employability of the official at home.
(*d.*) The actual pension or indemnity payable to the official under the terms of service at the date of his dismissal or retirement.

An arbitration board shall be set up by the British and Egyptian Governments to decide :—

(*a.*) The percentage of the amount of compensation determined in accordance with Table (B) to be accorded to non-pensionable officials, having regard to the conditions of service in each individual case ;

(*b.*) The weight to be attached to claims for additional compensation put forward by officials in respect of personal, house or other allowances or emoluments for special services in addition to their pensionable salaries ;

(*c.*) The number of years' service which shall be added to the actual period of service in Egypt in the case of an official appointed to the Egyptian Government service immediately after having served in the war ; and

(*d.*) The claim of any official whose case does not fall within the general rules set out above.

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EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS.

Sir Adly Yeghen Pasha to Mr. Lindsay.

Egyptian Official Delegation, Carlton Hotel,
Londres, le 15 octobre 1921.

Mon cher Lindsay,

COMME je vous l'ai promis ce matin, je vous envoie ci-inclus des notes sur les questions suivantes :

1. Commissaire de la Dette.
2. Protection des étrangers.
3. Canal de Suez.
4. Câbles et télégraphie sans fil.

Je vous ferai parvenir, lundi matin, la note relative à la compensation des fonctionnaires. J'aurai le plaisir de vous voir lundi au Foreign Office à 11 heures.

Cordialement vôtre,
ADLY YEGHEN.

Commissaire britannique de la Caisse de la Dette.

Le Commissaire britannique à la Caisse de la Dette sera à la disposition du Gouvernement égyptien pour tout avis que celui-ci voudrait lui demander en matière financière et aura accès auprès du Président du Conseil, des Ministres et du Ministre des Finances, mais il demeure entendu qu'il n'aura aucun pouvoir d'ingérence dans l'administration financière du pays et qu'en aucun cas son avis ne liera le Gouvernement égyptien.

Observations.

Dans ce texte nous sommes allés au delà de l'opinion exprimée par le pays et des recommandations du Rapport Milner. Non seulement nous avons admis la consultation en matière financière que le pays a rejetée, mais aussi l'accès auprès du Président du Conseil des Ministres et du Ministre des Finances, dont il n'était pas question dans le Rapport Milner. La précision finale ne fait que traduire les explications qui nous ont été données sur le véritable rôle qu'on entend attribuer à ce fonctionnaire.

Quant aux attributions spéciales qu'on voudrait lui donner, elles sont superflues, parce qu'il s'agit de charges, les unes déjà consacrées par des accords internationaux et les autres devant faire l'objet d'engagements formels de la part de l'Egypte dans l'accord à intervenir.

Protection des Étrangers.

Les fonctions de commandant de police des villes du Caire, d'Alexandrie et de Port-Saïd continueront, pendant une période de cinq ans, à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent traité, à être remplies par des titulaires de nationalité européenne.

Observation.

Ce texte nous paraît devoir donner satisfaction.

La création, au service de la Sûreté, du bureau spécial proposé serait dangereusement exploitée contre l'accord comme établissant un organe destiné à maintenir sous une autre forme l'ingérence étrangère actuellement exercée par le Conseiller de l'Intérieur dans l'administration du pays.

La proposition relative aux Conseillers sultaniens est absolument superflue : sous le régime des Capitulations les lois concernant les étrangers sont subordonnées à l'assentiment des Puissances et de la Cour d'Appel mixte.

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Extension de la Concession du Canal de Suez.

On demande à l'Égypte de s'engager à entrer en pourparlers avec la Compagnie du Canal de Suez, dans les dix années qui suivront la mise en vigueur du traité en vue d'une prolongation de la concession.

On explique que la Grande-Bretagne a le plus grand intérêt à assurer l'entretien constant et l'amélioration du Canal et on fait le raisonnement suivant : le Canal devant, aux termes de la concession, faire retour au Gouvernement égyptien, sans payement, en 1968, la charge d'amortissement des nouveaux travaux à entreprendre deviendra de plus en plus onéreuse pour la compagnie au fur et à mesure de l'approche du terme de la concession ; il en résultera un arrêt des travaux d'amélioration ; peut-être même la compagnie négligera-t-elle le parfait entretien du Canal.

Tout en appréciant la préoccupation du Gouvernement britannique, nous sommes convaincus que la clause proposée n'est pas nécessaire et qu'elle serait en outre très impolitique.

Elle n'est pas nécessaire : En effet, la situation que l'on signale est inhérente à toute concession d'utilité publique qui prévoit la reprise par le Gouvernement sans payement. Bien avant la fin de telles concessions la difficulté se présente et est résolue d'une façon ou d'une autre, comme on le constate notamment pour les grandes entreprises des chemins de fer dont les concessions sont sur le point d'arriver à terme. Or, il y a plusieurs manières de porter remède à la situation, et le prolongement de la durée de la concession n'est qu'un remède parmi les autres. Le Gouvernement peut en effet contribuer lui-même à la dépense des nouveaux travaux, ou bien la concession reversible peut être transformée en concession rachetable. On voit donc que lorsque le moment sera venu l'Egypte ne manquera pas de se prêter à des négociations. Mais il n'y a pas lieu de la lier dès à présent par une formule quelconque et encore moins par celle de la prolongation de la concession. Elle doit être libre de choisir la formule qu'elle jugera alors plus conforme à ses intérêts.

Aucun Gouvernement en Égypte ne pourra se refuser à négocier un arrangement nouveau, mais il faut que cet arrangement soit commandé par les circonstances de l'heure et inspiré par celles-ci.

L'Égypte ne saurait perdre de vue à ce moment qu'elle aura, elle aussi, intérêt à traiter avec la compagnie parce que, le Canal lui revenant en 1968, il est nécessaire qu'elle le reprenne en bon état d'entretien et d'amélioration.

D'autre part et quelque aveuglement qu'on puisse supposer à un Gouvernement, il ne saura pas en tout cas résister à la pression de l'opinion publique de l'univers et aux injonctions de Puissances étrangères venant à la rescousse de cette opinion.

Quant à l'arbitrage de la Ligue des Nations en cas de désaccord entre la compagnie et le Gouvernement nous relevons : (1) qu'il n'y a guère à redouter des différences sérieuses avec la compagnie ; dans de pareilles questions, ce sont des calculs mathématiques qui dominent les arrangements ; (2) qu'il s'agirait en l'espèce d'une intervention dans un conflit, non entre deux États, mais entre un État et une compagnie liée par un contrat de concession, ce qui ne rentre pas dans le rôle de la Ligue des Nations.

L'insertion dans l'accord en cours des négociations de la clause proposée serait très impolitique ; en effet, on n'a pas oublié le mouvement d'opinion intense auquel a donné lieu en Égypte, en 1909, le projet d'extension de la concession du Canal pour quarante années à partir de 1968. Le Gouvernement britannique lui-même avait consenti, devant la force de ce mouvement, à laisser, à titre exceptionnel, à l'Assemblée générale égyptienne la décision finale sur ce projet, et l'Assemblée générale l'a écartée à l'unanimité, moins une voix. Inclure dans le traité une clause prévoyant cette même extension serait lui inoculer un virus destructeur, ce serait fournir aux adversaires de l'accord une arme terrible pour le combattre en réveillant d'anciennes passions. Ce n'est pas au moment où les esprits sont en ébullition, comme ils le sont actuellement, qu'on peut soulever la question du renouvellement de la concession du Canal.

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Câbles sous-marins et Télégraphie sans Fil.

Les autorisations d'atterrissement de câbles sous-marins et d'installation de télégraphie sans fil déjà accordées par le Gouvernement égyptien resteront en vigueur pour la durée de la concession.

Observation.

Ce texte répond au paragraphe 2, le seul que nous puissions accepter.

Le paragraphe 1 est une inutile atteinte à la souveraineté de l'Égypte. L'Egypte est aussi intéressée que la Grande-Bretagne à user d'une extrême prudence dans l'octroi de pareilles concessions.

En ce qui concerne le paragraphe 3, nous n'avons pas d'objection à l'installation par la Grande-Bretagne de moyens de communication télégraphiques dans la zone de la station militaire britannique, mais c'est dans la clause relative au cantonnement de la force militaire britannique que cette stipulation trouvera sa place.

Quant à reconnaître par anticipation au Gouvernement britannique et aux sociétés par lui recommandées le droit illimité de faire atterrir des câbles sous-marins ou d'établir de stations de télégraphie sans fil sur le territoire égyptien, ce serait de la part de l'Égypte une abdication de sa souveraineté et même une renonciation à des droits qu'elle n'a pas cessé d'exercer pendant l'occupation et sous le régime du protectorat.

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

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

(23)

Copy of letter from Mr. O. Walrond to Mr. Vansittart.

Private and Confidential.

St. James' Club,
PICCADILLY, W.1.
13 October 1921.

Dear Vansittart:-

I have had several conversations with Adly Pasha and tried to make out what he would agree to. I know him intimately and, while not guaranteeing it, think that he would agree to something of this kind, in the end. It is not a question of would but what he can agree to, in view of the hoots that will meet him when he goes back.

I gather that he thinks he would find a difficulty in agreeing to a continuation of the military occupation of the Cairo district but not such a difficulty in agreeing to Alexandria.

This is very informal and only part of the military clause, of course, but may help; otherwise please tear up.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) O. WALROND.

It is to the advantage of the British Empire that the safety of imperial communications and Egyptian independence should be inextricably involved and not kept apart.

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

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

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1. In time of peace when neither Egyptian independence nor the British Imperial communications are threatened, the zone within a triangle on Egyptian territory known as the Mutual Defence Zone, between the towns known as Zagazig, Port Said, and Suez, shall be occupied for purposes of defence by H.M's forces, and they shall have entire freedom of movement within the zone referred to, due notification being given to the Egyptian Government.

2. Outside that zone, when neither the independence of Egypt nor the Imperial communications are in danger, defence and public security will be primarily in charge of the Egyptian Government.

3. But as a precautionary measure, without prejudicing Egyptian independence or being in any way an army of occupation, the neighbourhood of (Cairo and) Alexandria will be provisionally occupied by H.M's. forces.

4. This precaution is found necessary on account of the alarm created among foreign nationals and the representation received by H.M. Government from the Governments of several of the Capitulatory Powers on account of the unfortunate riots at Alexandria.

5. It is only of a provisional nature and will be in operation until such time as the Egyptian Government has devised a system which will satisfy the Powers as well as H.M. Government that their Nationals will enjoy perfect security of life and property under it.

6. It is in the interest of H.M. Government that this

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

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this system be perfected without delay so as to release their troops for their primary duty of guarding Egyptian Independence and the British Imperial Communications within the Mutual Defence Zone.

7. Similarly it is in Egypt's interests that the Egyptian Government should have the full responsibility for the security of foreign nationals residing within their territory, as soon as possible.

8. A revision of this arrangement shall take place within every five years - and a permanent Committee shall be established forthwith, consisting of one British naval member and one military and one civil member, and three members to be nominated by the Egyptian Government, to be presided over by a British member of the League of Nations.

9. It shall be the duty of this Committee to take evidence, favourable and unfavourable, of incidents that may occur and make an annual report to H.M. Government and the Egyptian Government (and the ? Powers interested) as to what progress has been made with the new system.

10. The report of this Committee shall be submitted to the Egyptian Parliament and also to the League of Nations who shall be authorised to make their recommendations which will be accepted as final by the Capitulatory Powers and also by the Egyptian Government.

11. With these exceptions the Egyptian Government will undertake the responsibility of guarding all places within Egyptian territory, which would be naval points, in times of danger to either the Egyptian independence or the British Imperial Communications - such as aerodromes, &c.

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

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

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&c.

12. Until such time as the Egyptian Government are in a position to undertake their own naval defence, the ports of Egypt and the three mile limit shall be parts of the sphere of action of the British Admiral Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean, who shall report to the Egyptian Government on all matters of interest to them.

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

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Lord Curzon. (24)

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Allen 40

C A B I N E T.

SECRET.
C.P.3458.

SUB-COMMITTEE ON SITUATION IN EGYPT.

Minutes of the First Meeting, held in the Secretary of State's Room, Foreign Office, on Monday, October 24th, 1921, at 11 O'clock.

PRESENT:

The Most Hon. The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., (Chairman).

The Rt.Hon.W.S.Churchill, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Rt.Hon.H.A.L. Fisher, M.P., President of the Board of Education.

The Rt.Hon.Sir L.Worthington Evans, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The following were also present:

Field-Marshal the Viscount Allenby, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,

Hon: Ronald C.Lindsay, C.V.O., Foreign Office.

Lieut.Colonel Sir J.R.Chancellor, K.C.M.G., D.S.O., (Secretary).

TERMS OF REFERENCE.

To consider the military forces and measures required to deal with the situation likely to arise in the event of a breakdown of the negotiations with the Egyptian Delegation, and all relevant matters such as control of water supply &c.

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

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LORD CURZON stated that he had circulated to the Committee letters by Mr.Selby, First Secretary to the British Residency, Egypt, Mr.Scott, Acting British High Commissioner for Egypt, and Sir Gilbert Clayton, Adviser to the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior. Two important questions were raised, one political and the other military. The letters referred to political rather than military questions. The military questions under the Terms of Reference of the Committee were:-

> " To consider the military forces and measures required to deal with the situation likely to arise in the event of a breakdown of the negotiations with the Egyptian Delegation, and all relevant matters such as control of water supply &c."

As regards the military questions, the first was on the assumption that Adly Pasha accepts the proposals of the British Government and the troops are moved from Cairo and other stations to the Canal zone, would it be possible for us to move troops to Cairo and Alexandria in time to ensure the safety of foreigners, in the event of the Egyptian Government failing to maintain order? The second question was, assuming that the negotiations with Adly Pasha broke down, what would be the situation in Egypt, and what military force would be required to maintain order in the country?

He stated that he had suggested to the Cabinet that we should retain our existing garrison in their present stations / for, say, one year and after that if the country was tranquil that we might consider the possibility of withdrawing the Cairo garrison to Abbassia, four miles from Cairo, the Alexandria garrison to Mustapha Barracks, about six miles from Alexandria, and disposing the remainder of the forces in the triangle formed by Port Said, Zagazig and Suez. He was not hopeful of the successful conclusion of the negotiations with Adly Pasha, and he was now manoeuvring with the aim of putting us in a favourable position as possible in relation to the Egyptian people and public opinion at.....

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

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at home in the event of the refusal of the British Government's proposals by the Egyptian Delegation. With that object in view it was desirable that the British Government's offer should be as generous as possible subject to the necessity of making sure of its refusal. On the other hand we should not offer anything that we might find it undesirable ultimately to grant.

LORD ALLENBY said that the possibility of removing the troops from Cairo and Alexandria depended upon the state of Egypt. To withdraw the troops now would be regarded by Egyptians as a surrender to Zaghlul, and the consequence would be that Zaghlul would gain prestige in Egypt. He therefore considered it essential to retain the troops in the Citadel and in Kasr-el-Nil Barracks at present; but if after a year or so the situation improved, it might be possible to move the Cairo and Alexandria garrisons to Abbassia and Mustapha Barracks respectively, as suggested by Lord Curzon. He had no doubt that if the British troops were withdrawn from Alexandria now, Italian and American troops would move in to take their place; or that, at any rate, foreign ships of war would be sent. If it is decided to give Egypt a measure of autonomy, it should be a gradual process. It was essential that the Egyptian should realise that the British Government intended to adhere to whatever policy they might decide to adopt.

MR. CHURCHILL stated that he was strongly opposed to the withdrawal of the troops from Cairo and Alexandria. He was of opinion that troops quartered at Abbassia and Mustapha Barracks would be no less an infringement of the autonomy of Egypt than troops quartered in Cairo and Alexandria. He enquired if Lord Allenby was satisfied that troops in Abbassia and Mustapha Barracks would secure the protection of Europeans in Cairo and Alexandria. He considered that an offer at the present time to withdraw our garrisons from

Cairo

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

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Cairo and Alexandria would be an act of evacuation and an abrogation of our authority in Egypt which would have disastrous results.

LORD CURZON said that from his conversation with the Egyptian Delegates he inferred that they would appreciate the distinction between a force quartered at Abbassia and a force in the Citadel overlooking Cairo; but at the present time no such withdrawal was contemplated. The troops would only be withdrawn from Cairo if the Egyptians contentedly acquiesced in our control of the country and tranquility was re-established. The question was what troops would be required to maintain order when the negotiations with the Egyptian Delegation broke down as he was confident they would. He pointed out that it was predicted in the letters which he had circulated that the consequences of a breakdown of the negotiations would be that we should have to retain a considerable military force in Egypt for an indefinite time. Strikes, outrages, boycotts and sporadic risings would occur. The question was what garrison would be required to deal with such a situation, and what would be the cost.

LORD ALLENBY stated that he had informed the Cabinet that he believed he could keep order under those conditions with the force now in Egypt. He submitted a statement showing the troops in Egypt in September, 1920, and at thepresent time, and their distribution. (Printed as Appendix I to these Minutes). He explained that after the Cairo Conference Orders were given for the Egyptian garrison to be reduced by 30thof June to :-

1 Regiment British Cavalry.
9 Battalions British Infantry (1 in Khartoum)
1 Battery R.H.A.
1 Brigade R.F.A.
1 Pack Battery.

There were then only 7 British battalions in Egypt, but 2 were under orders for Egypt from Mesopotamia. 2 Battalions...

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

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Battalions were brought home from Egypt, however, so that the arrival of 2 from Mesopotamia still left only 7 in Egypt. To counterbalance this, approval was given on the 3rd of May to the retention of 2 Indian Battalions due for return to India. In the same telegram the retention of 2 further Indian Battalions and 2 Indian Cavalry Regiments was approved, in consequence of his telegram of 1st May regarding the dangerous internal situation.

Two British battalions are now under orders to proceed to Egypt, to complete the British Infantry there to 9 Battalions. This will, under present arrangements, be effected by the end of next February, and, when effected, two of the Indian Battalions specially retained should be returned to India. If necessary, these could be further retained, in which case the resulting garrison would be:-

1 Regiment British Cavalry
2 Regiments Indian Cavalry
9 Battalions British Infantry (1 at Khartoum)
4 Battalions Indian Infantry.
Artillery as above.

Lord Allenby suggested that the troops now in Egypt might, if trouble arose, be distributed as follows:-

4 Battalions at Cairo.
2 Battalions at Alexandria.
1 Battalion at Tanta.
1 Battalion at Benha.
2 Battalions in the Canal Zone.
1 Cavalry Regiment at Cairo.
1 Cavalry Regiment in the Canal zone.

On the.....

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

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On the outbreak of trouble he proposed that one black battalion should be moved from the Soudan to Assouan to protect the Dam and the Europeans in that locality. Defence Schemes were in existence for the Delta and, so far as possible for Upper Egypt which provided for the protection of Europeans; but it would not be possible to protect Europeans in isolated districts; especially in Upper Egypt. Mobile columns would at once be organised to operate in the Delta; and all motor cars and bicycles would be requisitioned. Upper Egypt, in the first instance, might have to be left to itself. If the whole population of Egypt were hostile, and if the Egyptian Army sided with them, a contingency which he did not consider probable, he considered that two Divisions (24 battalions) might be required to restore order. On the other hand he laid before the Committee a telegram, dated 22/10/21, from General Congreve to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (printed as Appendix II to these minutes), in which General Congreve stated that in the event of a rising similar to that of 1919, he would require 2 Brigades in addition to the present garrison in order to hold Egypt as well as the assistance of the Royal Navy.

LORD ALLENBY, continuing, said that if the negotiations broke down, the followers of Zaghlul would become excited, and Zaghlul would probably make some movement which would justify his arrest and banishment. If the British Government showed firmness, Zaghlul's arrest would have a very good effect. With assured support from His Majesty's Government a moderate Government could be formed which would maintain itself, with the support of the British Army. That had been the position after the rising of 1919 had been suppressed by British troops. The country was tranquil until Lord Milner resuscitated Zaghlul, who at that time was moribund. Zaghlul had seized on the opportunity to make extreme demands and had succeeded in a large measure in re-establishing his influence in the country.

LORD/

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

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LORD CURZON inquired if, assuming the negotiations broke down and Zaghlul was banished and ordered re-established as foreshadowed by Lord Allenby, we could count upon maintaining order and crushing out permanently the desire for independence? Could we count upon the Egyptians contentedly acquiescing in the re-establishment of our Protectorate?

LORD ALLENBY expressed the opinion that some form of independence should be granted, and that word "Protectorate" must be abandoned. Even if the Government did not come to terms with Adly Pasha the principle of independence for Egypt should be acknowledged. British troops must be kept in the country. A period of firm rule was now necessary otherwise Zaghlul would obtain control of the country. At present Zaghlul has a strong following in Egypt. If, however, we support the Sultan and the Egyptian Government, Zaghlul will lose his influence; and we shall have Egypt behind us. In a recent conversation with Mr. Amos, Adly Pasha had admitted that he could not sign any document which involved his receding in any way from the demands that he had made, or make any concession to Great Britain. He might, however carry on the Government with British support. Adly is weak and timid, and he would probably come to the High Commissioner for a decision on every question that arose.

LORD CURZON reminded Lord Allenby that authority had been given for the arrest and deportation of Zaghlul on October 3rd, if Mr. Scott thought it desirable to take such action. That authority had not been withdrawn.

MR.....

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

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MR.CHURCHILL suggested that it might be wise to deport Zaghlul before the negotiations broke down. That procedure would probably mitigate the acuteness of the second crisis which was inevitable when the breakdown of the negotiations was announced. He felt sure that the announcement of Zaghlul's arrest would give pleasure to Adly. We should not assume that events would take the worst possible course. He suggested that after the Delegation had rejected the proposals of the British Government Adly Pasha should be asked to consent to carry on the Government of Egypt on the condition that we gave effect to the proposals already approved by H.M. Government.

LORD ALLENBY suggested that if the negotiations broke down the British Government should set forth the terms offered to the Delegation in a letter addressed to the Sultan. This letter should proceed to inform the Sultan of the measures proposed by the British Government for carrying on the government of Egypt. The letter should be handed to the Sultan by Lord Allenby on his return to Egypt, and should be in a form suitable for publication.

MR.....

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

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MR. FISHER suggested the character of the document to be given to the Sultan was a matter of great importance. It must be realised that Egyptian nationalism was a force which had come to stay. If we can enlist it on our side, as he believed might be done, it would be a great help to us in our control of Egypt, and in our position in the world.

LORD CURZON explained that as regards the political aspect of the question he was preparing a paper for the Cabinet setting forth in parallel columns the proposals of the Imperial Conference, his own proposals, and the terms asked for by Adly Pasha.

Turning to the question of the ~~control of the water~~ supply LORD ALLENBY stated that it would take 48 or more hours to divert the sweet water canal at Cairo with the object of cutting off the water supply of the Canal Zone. Water could be obtained in the neighbourhood of Tel-el-Kebir by sinking wells. The general upshot of the military advice tendered to the Committee was that:-

(i) In the event of the breakdown of negotiations the present garrison would suffice to maintain order in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said, and to provide two mobile columns for use in the Delta.

(ii) In the event of an insurrection supported by Government and its officials, a reinforcement of two Brigades would be necessary.

(iii) Should the Egyptian army be hostile a reinforcement of two Divisions (24 battalions) would be required.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.
24th October, 1921.

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

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

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APPENDIX I — STATEMENT OF GARRISON IN EGYPT.

	September 1920	Latest distribution - corrected to 21/10/21.
BENI SUEF	Inf. Bde. H.Q. 2 Indian Inf.Bns. (less Det. up Nile to ASSIUT). 1 Light Car Patrol. 1 Armoured Train	
CAIRO AREA	G.H.Q. Divnl. H.Q. Cairo B.H.Q. Bde. R.H.A. (less 1 Bty.) 1 British Mountain Bty. 1 British Cavalry Regt. 5 British Bns. 1 Light Car Patrol.	G.H.Q. H.Q. Field Troops, Egypt. Cairo Bde. H.Q. Brigade R.H.A. (Less 1 Bty.) 1 British Mountain Bty. 1 British Cavalry Regt. 4 British Bns. 1 Indian Inf. Bn. H.Q. and 2 Sections L.A.C.Coy. 1 Armoured Train.
CANAL AREA	Inf. Bde. H.Q. 1 British Cavalry Regt. 2 Indian Cav: Regts. 4 Indian Inf. Bns. 1 Light Car Patrol.	Canal Bde. H.Q. 1 British Cavalry Regt. 1 Bde. R.F.A. 1 British Bn. 2 Indian Inf. Bns. 1 Armoured Train.
QUESNA.	Inf.Bde. H.Q. 2 Bns. Indian Inf: 1 Light Car Patrol.	
TANTA.	1 Bn. Indian Inf: 1 Armoured Train.	
ALEXANDRIA.	Inf: Bde: H.Q. H.Q. Bde. R.G.A. 1 Heavy Battery. 1 Indian Cavalry Regt. 1 British Bn. 3 Bns. Indian Inf: 2 Light Armoured Coys.	Alexandria H.Q. 1 British Bn. 1 Indian Inf: Bn. 1 Section L.A.C.Coy.
SOLLUM	1 Egyptian Bn. 2 Light Car Patrols.	1 Section L.A.C.Coy.
	R.A.F.	R.A.F.
	Group H.Q. Special Instruction Flight. 1 Flight Seaplanes. 4 Squadrons.	Group H.Q. 7 Squadrons. 40 Machines. Depot & Training Estbt.

M.O.2.b.
21/10/21.

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

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APPENDIX II.

SECRET.

Telegram from General Congreve, Egypt, to Sir Henry Wilson, dated 22/10/21.

"In the event of a rising supported by Government and its officials, I can do no more than protect myself. Supposing that conditions of March 1919 recur, I want 2 Brigades to keep the country, even given support of Royal Navy in Alexandria and the Canal. I have enough forces in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said to maintain order and 2 mobile columns for use in Delta after security of Cairo is ensured. These troops should suffice to deal with towns in Delta; but certainly some killing of Europeans probable before they could arrive. Egyptian Army has lately been increased to 7 Battalions in Egypt all officered entirely by natives, of whom juniors are all Zaghloulists. I can deal with the 4 in Cairo and Alexandria and can probably have the one at Tanta removed to safe place. Upper Egypt is unoccupied by British Troops and has 2 Battalions of Egyptian Army. It would have to be re-conquered after Delta is settled. To sum up, if outbreak takes form of a real patriotic war against us I shall want 2* Brigades plus Royal Navy. I cannot get more than 1 Regiment of Indian Cavalry from Palestine ad interim."

* The Committee concluded that General Congreve meant two additional Brigades towards which only one Regt. of Indian Cavalry can be obtained from Palestine.

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

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Oct 31 1921

MEMORANDUM.

In view of the near approach of the conclusion of the Egyptian negotiations it may be useful to attempt to analyse the alternative policies which may be open to His Majesty's Government in the event of no agreement being reached with the Egyptian Delegation.

Presumably our aim will continue to be to achieve a settlement of the Egyptian question either of a temporary or of a permanent nature.

The establishment in agreement with Adly of a modus vivendi for a term of years was advocated by Sir W. Hayter in his memorandum of June 5th, but the course of the negotiations hitherto has not given any indication that the addition of a time limit however brief to unpalatable clauses would induce Adly Pasha to swallow them. Such a modus vivendi, even if achieved, has the disadvantage that it would if anything encourage political agitation instead of checking it, as the nationalists would devote their energies to strengthening their position with a view to securing their full demands when the time limit expired.

Failing a temporary settlement by agreement with Adly Pasha, could such an arrangement be brought about by unilateral action on the part of His Majesty's Government? It would seem axiomatic that such action could not be so liberal in the matter of concessions to Egyptian aspirations as a Treaty would/

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

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would have been; for we should have to count on resolute opposition on the part of Zaghloul and his followers and consequently we should require our hands free in military matters and a greater control over the government departments in order to deal with such opposition.

It is even doubtful whether the strength of the opposition would vary inversely with the degree of our liberality, and if we had to count on time alone to produce a change of heart in the Egyptians, we should have no guarantee that with the passage of years their demands would become any more reasonable than they are to-day.

It might perhaps be argued that the régime set up with the Mohamed Said Cabinet after the disturbances of 1919 had begun to be tolerated and, if the shadow of the Milner Mission had not been cast upon it, might in time have come to be regarded as normal.

But the situation is no longer the same. In 1919 Egyptian Nationalists clamoured as loudly as they do to-day for independence but in their hearts they never really expected to receive it; to-day they must feel that the virtual independence of Milnerism has been within their grasp for over a year and has been rejected only because the complete independence of Zaghloul was so alluring a possibility.

It seems unlikely therefore that a policy of "carrying on" with or without the introduction of reforms in the direction of less British interference in the

government/

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

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government of the country is likely to render our presence more acceptable to Egyptians.

Sooner or later in all probability the difficulty of carrying on Government in cooperation with the intellectual and politically minded sections of the population will become insuperable and a position will be reached, whether as a result of disturbances or for any other reason where a solution on altogether different lines will have to be sought.

It would then become necessary to aim at a permanent settlement of the Egyptian question by means of some unilateral act which would have to be of such a nature that it could only be upset by foreign Powers as the result of successful military action ; Egyptian opposition to such a settlement would be inevitable but it is doubtful whether it would be more difficult to deal with than that which will be inherent in any kind of temporary arrangement.

To fulfil the first requirement of the preceding paragraph the incorporation of Egypt in the British Empire would seem the only solution, and for such incorporation to free Egypt from internationsl fetters it would have to be drastic and amount to undisguised annexation. Presumably recourse would only be had to such a step in the event of more or less open revolt against us breaking out.

Before considering the advantages and drawbacks of annexation, it may be useful to see how it could be defended.

The situation would seem to be that Egypt has

been/

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

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been offered independence outside the British Empire, subject only to the presence of British troops which is necessitated by foreign almost as much as British interests. The Egyptians argue that such independence would be a sham but there are historical precedents for military occupation by a foreign Power existing without prejudice to the sovereignty and independence of the country occupied.

This independence she is about to refuse in such a fashion as to block the road for further progress in that direction for some time to come. Once a part of the British Empire there is nothing in theory to prevent her arriving at the state of independence already reached by any of the Dominions, and if the persistent hostility of the politically minded section of the nation retards or prevents development on dominion lines, the Egyptians will only have themselves to thank.

The material advantages offered by such a solution are

(1) The elimination at one stroke of the dangers and embarrassments of internationalism; foreign diplomatic representatives would disappear and with them the Mixed Courts, the Caisse de la Dette, and the Capitulations.

(2) The Suez Canal question could be settled in an atmosphere free from political bias.

(3) The position of the Sudan would be cleared up and the development of that country rendered more easy by the consequent improvement of its financial/

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

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financial credit.

(4) Economy; there would be a possibility of Egypt being able to pay for her own defence, though for some years the Administration for political reasons might hesitate to increase taxation except as against foreigners.

The moral advantages would depend on the moment chosen for annexation; if it followed immediately on a revolution brought about by the followers of Zaghloul, the consequent reaction might be expected to lead many Egyptians to turn from their leader for having deluded them with false hopes. And the realisation that His Majesty's Government really meant business might make our secret sympathisers less fearful of owning their allegiance.

The material drawbacks to annexation are (1) the Sultan who together with his heir would have to disappear. He would not be deeply mourned in Egypt though the mere fact that the loss of his throne was due to British action would invest him with a semblance of popularity. He himself might not be altogether unwilling to exchange the cares of sovereignty in Cairo for life on a comfortable income in some European Capital. (2) The difficulty of carrying on the administration of the country with the present Egyptian personnel. Judges for instance would probably refuse to take the oath of allegiance and governors to maintain order. On the other hand a nationalist revolution, the necessary prelude to annexation, might produce the same inconveniences.

The moral/

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

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The moral drawbacks lie in (1) the disapproval with which public opinion in all countries would be induced by nationalist propaganda to regard our action. The attitude of foreign Governments would be guided mostly by their own interests and the official consciences of France and Italy might to some extent be lulled by concessions on our part over Tangier and Jubaland. The United States Government would feel that their missions were safe and their access to the Egyptian cotton crop unimpaired. The Greeks would probably welcome annexation as a useful precedent for similar action on their part at the expense of Turkey. Other foreign countries with the exception of Belgium, whose interests are financial and dependent on stable government in Egypt, have no great stake in that country.

But the weight of public opinion throughout the world, and it would be exploited by everyone with any desire to make trouble for us, would indeed be formidable, and unless annexation followed close on the heels of disturbances threatening the lives of foreigners and was in turn followed by the restoration of order, a storm might be roused which would neutralise any advantage accruing from our action.
(2) The effect in India where Muslim susceptibilities appear to become increasingly tender.
(3) The effect in Palestine and Mesopotamia.
Altogether it would seem that given the outbreak of revolution or really serious disorder in Egypt the arguments for and against annexation are fairly

evenly/

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

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evenly balanced so that the circumstances of the moment might well tilt the scale on one or the other side. It is therefore submitted that the possibility of our being compelled to have recourse to annexation in the near future should not be set aside and that in any statements which may be made in connection with the Egyptian negotiations nothing should be said which could be interpreted as a pledge not to annex.

J. Murray
31.10.21.

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

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CABINET 2. WHITEHALL GARDENS

Printed for the Cabinet. October 1921.

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C.P. 3453

CONFIDENTIAL.

A B & C

I CIRCULATE to my colleagues the Egyptian papers for which they asked.

They consist of :—

I. The declaration made, on the authority of the Cabinet, to the Egyptian Government on the 22nd February, and read out in the House of Commons on the 3rd March, 1921.

II. Drafts in three parallel columns of—

(*a.*) The principal clauses of a suggested convention as approved by the Cabinet on the 11th July, 1921.

(*b.*) Modifications of the above as now suggested by me after meetings with the Egyptian Delegation.

(*c.*) Conditions as demanded by the Egyptian Delegation.

(Initialled) C. OF K.

I.

Question asked in House of Commons, March 3, 1921.

EGYPT (STATUS).

Mr. Lawson asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the fact that the Egyptian people have made it clear to their delegates that they will not be satisfied with less than the abolition of the British protectorate and of the fact that the Milner Report does not exclude the possibility of this abolition, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to state their policy on this point.

Answer.

Mr. Harmsworth.—His Majesty's Government have addressed the following invitation to the Sultan of Egypt :—

"His Majesty's Government, after a study of the proposals made by Lord Milner, have arrived at the conclusion that the status of protectorate is not a satisfactory relation in which Egypt should continue to stand to Great Britain. While they have not reached final decisions with regard to Lord Milner's recommendations, they desire to confer regarding them with a delegation nominated by your Highness, with a view, if possible, to substitute for the protectorate a relationship which would, while securing the special interests of Great Britain and enabling her to offer adequate guarantees to foreign Powers, meet the legitimate aspirations of Egypt and the Egyptian people."

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II.

Drafts of (Column A) Principal Clauses of a suggested Convention as approved by Cabinet on July 11, 1921; (Column B) Modifications thereof; (Column C) Conditions as demanded by the Egyptian Delegation.

A.	B.	C.
I.—Termination of Protectorate.	**I.—Termination of Protectorate.**	**I.—Termination of Protectorate.**
1. The Government of His Britannic Majesty agree, in consideration of the conclusion and ratification of the present treaty, to terminate the Protectorate declared over Egypt on the 18th December, 1914, and thenceforth to recognise Egypt as an independent State under a constitutional monarchy. There is hereby concluded, and there shall henceforth subsist, between the Government and people of His Britannic Majesty on the one hand, and the Government and people of Egypt on the other hand, a perpetual treaty and bond of peace, amity and alliance.	1. (Same as column A.)	1. (Same as column A.)
II.—Military Dispositions.	**II.—Military Dispositions.**	**II.—Military Dispositions.**
2. Great Britain undertakes to support Egypt in the defence of her vital interests and of the integrity of her territory. For the discharge of these obligations and for the due protection of British Imperial communications, British forces shall have free passage through Egypt, and shall be maintained at such places in Egypt and for such periods as shall from time to time be determined. They shall also at all times have facilities for the acquisition and use of barracks, exercise grounds, aerodromes and naval yards, and for the free use of naval harbours.	2. It is recognised that the main object for which Great Britain is called upon to maintain a military force in Egypt is for the protection of her Imperial communications, and that, in addition, she is under the obligation of supporting Egypt in defending the integrity of her territory and of safeguarding foreign interests in Egypt, including the safety of the lives and property of foreigners. For the discharge of these obligations British forces shall have free passage through Egypt, and shall be maintained at such places in Egypt and for such periods as shall from time to time be determined. They shall also at all times have facilities for the acquisition and use of barracks, exercise grounds, aerodromes and naval yards, and for the free use of naval harbours. The disposition of troops shall in the first instance be as follows: If within one year after the coming into force of the treaty the condition of the country so permits, the British forces at or in the neighbourhood of Cairo shall be concentrated at Abbassia, and similarly the British forces at or in the neighbourhood of Alexandria shall be concentrated at Mustafa Pasha and Abu Kir. The remaining British forces, in such numbers as His Majesty's	2. The sole object for the maintenance of a British military force on Egyptian territory in time of peace being the protection of British Imperial communications, all British troops shall be stationed in the zone of the Suez Canal outside the neutral zone; aerodromes and other auxiliary services shall be established in the same district, and the presence of these troops shall not constitute a military occupation of Egypt nor in any way infringe her sovereign rights. The right of passage across Egyptian territory and the use of Egyptian harbours and aerodromes shall only be open to British forces in time of war though facilities for military transport between the Canal zone and the nearest port will at all times be accorded.

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A.	B.	C.
II.—Military Dispositions *(contd.).*	**II.—Military Dispositions** *(contd.).*	**II.—Military Dispositions** *(contd.).*
	Government may from time to time determine, shall be stationed within the Port Said–Zagazig–Suez triangle, where the Egyptian Government will provide suitable barrack accommodation. The arrangements described in the two immediately preceding paragraphs shall be open to re-examination by mutual consent five years after the coming into force of the treaty.	
III.—Foreign Relations.	**III.—Foreign Relations.**	**III.—Foreign Relations.**
3. The foreign affairs of Egypt shall be conducted by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under a Minister so designated.	3. (Same as column A.)	3. (Same as column A.)
4. His Britannic Majesty's Government shall be represented in Egypt by a High Commissioner, who, in virtue of his special responsibilities, shall at all times be entitled to an exceptional position, and shall take precedence over the representatives of other countries.	4. His Britannic Majesty shall be represented in Egypt by an Ambassador, and, in view of the special relations of alliance existing between Egypt and His Britannic Majesty, the Egyptian Government agrees not to receive any other foreign representative of that rank. The representative of His Britannic Majesty shall, in virtue of his special responsibilities, at all times be entitled to an exceptional position, and shall take precedence over the representatives of foreign countries.	4. (Same as column B.)
5. The Egyptian Government shall be represented in London by a High Commissioner, who shall deal directly with His Britannic Majesty's Government.	5. The Egyptian Government shall be represented in London, and in any other capital in which, in the opinion of the Egyptian Government, Egyptian interests may require such representation, by diplomatic representatives enjoying the rank and title of Minister.	5. (Same as column B.)
6. In view of the obligations which Great Britain has undertaken in Egypt, notably in respect of foreign countries, it will be necessary that the closest relations should exist between the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British High Commissioner, who will render all possible assistance to the Egyptian Government in respect of diplomatic transactions or negotiations.	6. In view of the obligations which Great Britain has undertaken in Egypt, notably in respect of foreign countries, the closest relations shall exist between the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British Ambassador, who will render all possible assistance to the Egyptian Government in respect of diplomatic transactions or negotiations.	6. (This clause to be omitted.)
7. The Egyptian Government will not enter into any agreement with foreign Powers without consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government through the British High Commissioner.	7. The Egyptian Government will not enter into any political agreement with foreign Powers without consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government through the British Ambassador.	7. The Egyptian Government will not enter into any political agreement with foreign Powers prejudicial to Great Britain.
8. The Egyptian Government will enjoy the right of appointing consuls in foreign countries when Egyptian interests require.	8. The Egyptian Government will enjoy the right of appointing such consular representatives abroad as their interests may require.	8. (Same as in column B.)

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A.	B.	C.
III.—Foreign Relations (*contd.*).	**III.—Foreign Relations** (*contd.*).	**III.—Foreign Relations** (*contd.*).
9. For the general conduct of diplomatic relations with foreign Governments, His Britannic Majesty's representatives in foreign capitals will place themselves at the disposal of the Egyptian Government, and will render them every assistance in their power.	9. For the general conduct of diplomatic relations, and the consular protection of Egyptian interests in places where no Egyptian diplomatic or consular representative is stationed, His Britannic Majesty's representatives will place themselves at the disposal of the Egyptian Government, and will render it every assistance in their power.	9. (Same as in column B.)
10. His Britannic Majesty's Government will continue to conduct the negotiations for the abolition of the existing Capitulations with the various capitulatory Powers, and accepts the responsibility for protecting the legitimate interests of foreigners in Egypt.	10. His Britannic Majesty's Government will continue to conduct the negotiations for the abolition of the existing Capitulations with the various capitulatory Powers, and accepts the responsibility for protecting the legitimate interests of foreigners in Egypt. His Majesty's Government will confer with the Egyptian Government before formally conducting these negotiations.	10. His Britannic Majesty's Government will continue to conduct the negotiations for the abolition of the existing Capitulations with the various capitulatory Powers, and agrees that (*a*) the conventions so concluded shall contain nothing incompatible with the rights secured by Egypt under this treaty; (*b*) effect will not be given to the conventions until Egypt has adhered to them.
IV.—Employment of Foreign Officers.	**IV.—Employment of Foreign Officers and Officials.**	**IV.—Employment of Foreign Officers and Officials.**
11. In view of the special responsibilities assumed by Great Britain and of the existing position in the Egyptian army and public services, the Egyptian Government undertakes not to appoint any foreign officers or officials to any of those services without the previous concurrence of the British High Commissioner.	11. (Same as column A with "Ambassador" substituted for "High Commissioner.")	11. The Egyptian Government agrees that British officials now in the civil service shall not be replaced by foreign officials of non-British nationality, they further agree that no foreign officers other than British shall be appointed to the Egyptian army. (*Above is based only on verbal statements by Adly Pasha.*)
V.—Financial Administration.	**V.—Financial Administration.**	**V.—Financial Administration.**
12. The Egyptian Government will appoint, in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government, a Financial Commissioner, to whom shall be entrusted in due course the powers at present exercised by the Commissioners of the Debt, and who will more especially be responsible for the punctual payment of the following charges:— (i.) The charges for the budget of the Mixed Courts. (ii.) All pensions or other annuities payable to retired foreign officials and their heirs. (iii.) The budgets of the Financial and Judicial Commissioners and their respective staffs.	12. (Same as clause 12 in column A.)	12. The British Commissioner of the Debt shall be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government should they seek his advice on financial matters. He shall enjoy the right of access to the President of the Council of Ministers and to the Minister of Finance, but it is understood that he shall have no power to intervene in the financial administration of the country and that his advice shall in no way bind the Egyptian Government.
13. For the proper discharge of his duties the Financial Commissioner shall be kept fully informed on all matters within the purview of the Ministry of Finance, and shall at all times enjoy the right of access to the President of the Council of Ministers and to the Minister of Finance.	13. (Same as clause 13 in column A.)	13. Nil.

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A.	B.	C.
V.—Financial Administration (*contd.*).	**V.—Financial Administration** (*contd.*).	**V.—Financial Administration** (*contd.*).
14. No external loan shall be raised nor the revenue of any public service be assigned by the Egyptian Government without the concurrence of the Financial Commissioner.	14. (Same as clause 14 in column A.)	14. Nil.
VI.—Judicial Administration.	**VI.—Judicial Administration.**	**VI.—Judicial Administration.**
15. The Egyptian Government will appoint, in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government, a Judicial Commissioner, who, in virtue of the obligations assumed by Great Britain, shall be charged with the duty of watching the administration of the law in all matters affecting foreigners.	15. (Same as clause 15 in column A.)	15. The functions of Commandant of Police in the towns of Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said shall continue for a period of five years from the coming into force of this treaty to be entrusted to European officers.
16. For the proper discharge of his duties, the Judicial Commissioner shall be kept fully informed on all matters affecting foreigners which concern the Ministries of Justice and of the Interior, and shall at all times enjoy the right of access to the Egyptian Ministers of Justice and of the Interior.	16. (Same as clause 16 in column A.)	16. Nil.
VII.—Soudan.	**VII.—Soudan.**	**VII.—Soudan.**
17. The peaceful development of the Soudan being essential to the security of Egypt and for the maintenance of her water supply, Egypt undertakes to continue to afford the Soudan Government the same military assistance as in the past, or, in lieu thereof, to provide the Soudan Government with financial assistance to an extent to be agreed upon between the two Governments. All Egyptian forces in the Soudan shall be under the orders of the Governor-General.	17. (Same as in column A.) Great Britain further undertakes to secure for Egypt her fair share of the waters of the Nile, and to this end it is agreed that no new irrigation works on the Nile or its tributaries south of Wadi Halfa shall be undertaken without the concurrence of a Board of three conservators representing Egypt, the Soudan and Uganda respectively.	17. Great Britain reaffirms the principle of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in the Soudan and undertakes that Egypt shall enjoy her fair share in the government and administration of that country, and shall be accorded priority in the distribution of the available water supply between the two countries. (*Above is based on verbal statements of Adly Pasha, who promised to send his views in writing.*)
VIII.—Suez Canal.	**VIII.—Suez Canal.**	**VIII.—Suez Canal.**
18. During the ten years immediately following the coming into force of this treaty, the Egyptian Government will, in consultation with the Suez Canal Company and the British High Commissioner, frame proposals for the extension for a further period of 100 years of the concession held by the said company.	18. During the ten years immediately following the coming into force of this treaty, the Egyptian Government will, in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, sympathetically consider any proposals which the Suez Canal Company may put forward for the extension for a further period of fifty years of the concession held by the said company. Any question on which the parties are unable to agree with regard to the terms on which the extension shall be granted shall, unless otherwise mutually agreed, be determined by an umpire appointed by the Council of the League of Nations. In the event of the company declining the extension on the terms so	18. This clause to be omitted. (The delegation maintain that it is unnecessary as it is to Egypt's own interest to come to an agreement with the company, and the force of public opinion throughout the world would compel her to do so. But the terms and occasion of such an agreement must be left to Egypt's own decision. The proposal put forward in 1909 to extend the lease provoked an outburst of popular feeling, and any mention of the subject in the treaty would be fatal to its reception in Egypt.)

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A.	B.	C.
VIII.—Suez Canal (*contd.*).	VIII.—Suez Canal (*contd.*).	VIII.—Suez Canal (*contd.*).
	settled, the Egyptian Government and His Majesty's Government will determine in concert the status and management of the Canal after the expiration of the concession.	
IX.—Tribute Loans.	IX.—Tribute Loans.	IX.—Tribute Loans.
20. Nil.	20. The sums which the Khedives of Egypt have from time to time undertaken to pay over to the houses by which the Turkish loans secured on the Egyptian tribute were issued, will be applied as heretofore by the Egyptian Government to the interest and sinking funds of the loans of 1894 and 1891 until the final extinction of those loans. The Egyptian Government will also continue to apply the sum hitherto paid towards the interest of the guaranteed loan of 1855. Upon the extinction of these loans of 1894, 1891 and 1855, all liability on the part of the Egyptian Government arising out of the tribute formerly paid by Egypt to Turkey will cease.	20. The sums which the Khedives of Egypt have from time to time undertaken to pay over to the houses by which the Turkish loans secured on the Egyptian tribute were issued, will be applied as heretofore by the Egyptian Government to the interest and sinking funds of the loans of 1894 and 1891 until the final extinction of these loans. Upon the extinction of these loans of 1894 and 1891, all liability on the part of the Egyptian Government arising out of the tribute formerly paid by Egypt to Turkey will cease. (*Based on attitude taken up by Sidky Pasha in his discussions with the Treasury.*)
X.—Retirement and compensation of officials.	X.—Retirement and compensation of officials.	X.—Retirement and compensation of officials.
21. Nil.	21. The Egyptian Government shall be entitled to dispense with the services of British officials at any time after the coming into force of the treaty on condition that such officials shall receive monetary compensation as hereafter provided, in addition to any pension or indemnity to which their conditions of service may entitle them. On the like condition British officials shall be entitled to resign at any time after the coming into force of the treaty. The scheme shall apply to pensionable and non-pensionable officials as well as to employees of municipalities, provincial councils or other local bodies.	21. The Egyptian Government shall be entitled to dispense with the services of foreign officials at any time within three years after the coming into force of the treaty on giving six months' notice and on condition that such officials where pensionable shall receive monetary compensation as hereafter provided, in addition to any pension or indemnity to which their conditions of service may entitle them. Foreign pensionable officials on giving six months' notice shall be entitled to resign at any time within three years after the coming into force of the treaty, and in addition to their earned pension or indemnity shall receive 50 per cent. of the compensation provided in the preceding paragraph. Certain classes of non-pensionable officials when asked to retire may at the discretion of the Egyptian Government be treated as though their service had been pensionable.
	22. An official dismissed or retiring under the terms of the preceding clause shall receive in addition to compensation a repatriation allowance sufficient to cover the cost of transporting himself, his family and his household goods to London.	22. An official dismissed or retiring under the terms of the preceding clause shall receive, in addition to compensation, a repatriation allowance sufficient to cover the cost of transporting himself, his family and his household goods to his country of origin, provided that he leaves Egypt within six months.

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A.	B.	C.
X.—Retirement and compensation of officials (*contd.*).	**X.—Retirement and compensation of officials** (*contd.*).	**X.—Retirement and compensation of officials** (*contd.*).
	23. Compensation and pensions shall be payable in Egyptian pounds at the fixed rate of 97½ piastres to the pound sterling.	23. Nil.
	24. A table of compensation, (*a*) for permanent officials, (*b*) for temporary officials, shall be prepared by the president of the Society of Actuaries. (Such tables, prepared by the Association of British Officials, have been submitted to the president of the Society of Actuaries.)	24. Compensation shall be accorded to pensionable officials in accordance with a table established by the Egyptian Government. (This table provides compensation of about one-third to one-fourth of the amount provided in table (*a*) mentioned in clause 24 in column B.)
XI.—Protection of Minorities.	**XI.—Protection of Minorities.**	**XI.—Protection of Minorities.**
25. Nil.	25. Egypt undertakes that the stipulations following shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.	25. (Same as column B.)
	26. Egypt undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Egypt without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion. All inhabitants of Egypt shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.	26. (Same as column B.)
	27. All Egyptian nationals shall be equal before the law, and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion. Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Egyptian national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours or the exercise of professions and industries. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Egyptian national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.	27. (Same as column B.)
	28. Egyptian nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Egyptian nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control, at their own expense, charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.	28. (Same as column B.)

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

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Lord Curzon.

(49)

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S E C R E T.

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C A B I N E T 86 (21).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Friday, 4th November, 1921, at 5 p.m.

P R E S E N T:-

THE PRIME MINISTER (IN THE CHAIR).

The Rt.Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.	The Rt.Hon. Viscount Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor.
The Rt.Hon. Sir Robert Horne, G.B.E., K.C., M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.	The Rt. Hon. E. Shortt, K.C., M.P., Secretary of State for Home Affairs.
The Most Hon. The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.	The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.
The Right Hon. E.S. Montagu, M.P., Secretary of State for India.	The Rt.Hon. Sir L. Worthington-Evans, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. S. Baldwin, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.	The Right Hon. H.A.L. Fisher, M.P., President of the Board of Education.
The Right Hon. Sir A. Griffith-Boscawen, M.P., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries.	The Rt.Hon. Sir Hamar Greenwood, Bart., K.C., M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., (For Conclusion 1).

Mr. Thomas Jones..... Acting Secretary.
Lt.Col. Sir J.R. Chancellor, K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

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

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EGYPT.

1. With reference to Cabinet 85(21), Conclusion 5, the Cabinet had before them a Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (C.P.3453), the Report of Lord Curzon's Committee, (C.P.3458) together with a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War on Military Requirements in Egypt (C.P.3465).

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that it was important to discuss certain aspects of the Egyptian question with Lord Allenby, who was returning to his post to-morrow. The main question in regard to which he especially desired to learn Lord Allenby's views, was the disposition of the troops. He enquired if there was any place on the sweet water canal, between Cairo and Ismailia, where the troops could be located if the Egyptian Government consented to build the necessary barracks.

LORD ALLENBY was of an opinion that a site could be found near Zagazig on the sweet water canal. It would be an unpopular station among the troops as compared with Cairo and Alexandria, but it would be healthy. Water could be obtained there from shallow wells in the event of the sweet water canal being cut. Tel-el-Kebir was the nearest point to Cairo where there was cultivation. The sweet water canal could be blocked in two or three days, but it would take a week for it to run dry at Zagazig.

In reply to questions, LORD ALLENBY stated that if the troops were removed from Cairo and Alexandria, the Europeans would be left without immediate protection, but troops at Abbassia and Mustapha could reach Cairo and Alexandria in about an hour. Between Abbassia and the Residency in Cairo lay four miles of the most populous part of the town, which separated the European quarter from the troops.

If he returned to Cairo now leaving the negotiations still in progress, it was possible that no disturbances might occur. There might be a general strike, but he believed he could maintain order for a time with the present garrison.

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

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He shared the views expressed in the War Office memorandum (C.P.3465) as regards the military situation. If disturbances occurred the existing troops would be sufficient to carry on only for a limited time. They would soon be immobilised by exhaustion, as they would be required to be on duty continuously to protect vital points, including the Power Station outside Cairo. During the 1919-20 disturbances the Egyptian army had behaved well on the whole. All the young officers in the Egyptian army are Zaghlulists. He admitted that it might be possible to arrest Zaghlul and deport him from the country without an explosion, but he was not inclined to take action against him until he had committed an offence which would justify his arrest. If Zaghlul were arrested now, Adly would be suspected of having caused his arrest, in order to justify him in making a bad settlement with the British Government.

LORD ALLENBY thought it would be disastrous for him to return to Egypt with the public announcement that negotiations with Adly had failed. He believed that would have the result of raising Zaghlul to the summit of power; Adly would resign; there would be a renewal of the extremist agitation, and the prestige of the British Government would vanish. He regarded an immediate decision as to our future policy in Egypt as essential. He thought that the decision to grant a convention on the terms agreed to by the Cabinet on 11th July, 1921, (C.P.3453, Column A.) would cause general disappointment in Egypt: but he believed that Adly could carry on the Government in such circumstances if he was assured that he had the firm support of H.M.Government. It was unlikely that disturbances would occur of such character as would call for the despatch of reinforcements.

Personally/

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

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Personally he would prefer an offer of terms more liberal than those proposed in Column A, in fact, approximating to those shewn in Column B to be made; but he could not advise on this point with confidence.

The view was expressed that a convention based on the clauses in Column B would be preferable to that of Column A. To offer the more liberal terms would place us in a more favourable light with the Egyptians, the Muslim world in general and public opinion at home. Islam was against us in all quarters of the world and it was important that our relations with the Muslim world should be improved. Improved relations with Egyptian Nationalists would be a first step towards the re-establishment of friendship with Islam.

The maintenance of order in Egypt was not a purely military problem. It was possible that a general strike might be organised or a strike of Governments employees which would throw the country into chaos. Such a situation could only be contemplated with dismay. Egyptian nationalism was a force which must be reckoned with. It was in a large measure due to English ideas and English education, and we must endeavour to guide it into useful channels. If a generous offer were now made to Egypt, grave dangers might be averted. Further the Government was committed by the publication of the Milner Report, which had been greeted with almost universal approval by the press. Public opinion expected concessions to be offered to Egypt which would not fall far short of those proposed in the Milner Report. Our position in Europe was so strong that such concessions could not be regarded as weakness so long as we had troops on the spot we should have control over Egypt.

On the other hand it was pointed out that as the proposals in column B were no more likely to be accepted by Adly Pasha than those in column A, to offer B would only mean that we had uselessly made concessions which we wished to avoid. It was suggested that the best

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

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course would be to offer Column "A", and on its rejection to put into operation those clauses which depended upon our action alone, and take all necessary steps to reduce to a minimum the evil consequences of the rejection of our proposals by the Egyptian Government.

It was recognised that to offer no more than was contained in Column "A" after the Foreign Secretary had been conducting negotiations with Adly Pasha for several months, would place him in a difficult position. It was not fair to expect him to carry on negotiations for that time without conceding anything. If further concessions were made, it was preferable to yield on the question of Egyptian representation in foreign capitals, than in regard to the disposition of the troops maintained in Egypt. The title of Ambassador proposed in Column "B" was considered open to serious objection. It would be difficult for the Egyptian Government to refuse to receive an Ambassador from France or one of the other Powers, if they desired to be so represented.

In summing up the discussion, the PRIME MINISTER stated that the general feeling of the Cabinet was that while the concessions proposed in Column "A" were beyond what the Cabinet would have proposed had they not been committed by the publication of the Milner Report, in the circumstances the proposals in Column "A" should be offered. He deprecated making concessions that would have lasting bad effects in order to meet temporary difficulties. It was clear that at this stage of her development Egypt could not have real independence; British control must be retained.

 There/

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

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There was no use in granting concessions in hopes of conciliating Muslim opinion; the Muslims would only think we were frightened of them. For thousands of years the Egyptians had never enjoyed self-government. Whenever they were left alone the country fell into confusion and foreign intervention became necessary. That had happened several times in the course of history; it would happen again. If we withdrew, some other foreign Power would take our place in Egypt. Broadly our attitude should be that which we had adopted in the case of India. He was opposed to the title of Ambassador for the British Representative; he should have some title that connected the association of Egypt with British power, and would shew that Egypt had Britain at hand to support and help her. He believed that the negotiations with the Egyptian Delegates had done good, and that Adly Pasha had been pleased to negotiate with the British Government.

It was pointed out that in Column "A" (I) Termination of Protectorate, it was stated that His Majesty's Government would recognise Egypt as an independent State, but that the subsequent clauses of the Convention really deprived Egypt of her independency. The Egyptians would inevitably point out the inconsistence and would charge us with bad faith. It was suggested that for "independent" some other word, such as "self-governing", "autonomous", or "sovereign", should be substituted.

The Cabinet agreed --

That the terms of the Convention, as approved by the Cabinet on July 11th, 1921, (Column "A" of C.P. 3453) should be adhered to subject to the amendments enumerated below.

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

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(a) I. "Termination of Protectorate" The Foreign Secretary should consider whether in the 9th line of paragraph 1, it would not be preferable to substitute the words "a sovereign" for "an independent".

(b) II. "Military Dispositions". The concluding sentence should read as follows :-

"They shall also at all times have facilities, as at present, for the acquisition and use of barracks, exercise grounds, aerodromes, naval yards and naval harbours.

(c) III. "Foreign Relations". Paragraphs 4-10 of Column B. to be substituted for paragraphs 4 to 10 of Column A., subject to amendments providing for the retention of the title of High Commissioner by His Britannic Majesty's representative in Egypt.

(d) VIII. "Suez Canal". Paragraph 18 to be omitted.

(e) X. "Retirement and Compensation of Officials." Paragraphs 21 - 24 of Column B. to be adopted.

(f) XI. "Protection of Minorities". Paragraphs 25 to 28 of Column B. to be adopted.

PROROGATION OF PARLIAMENT: KING'S SPEECH.

2. With reference to Cabinet 85 (21) 5, the Cabinet approved the draft of the King's Speech as now amended for submission to His Majesty.

UNEMPLOYMENT: RATE OF WAGES.

3. The attention of the Cabinet was called to the opposition which was being expressed in the House of Commons to the proposal that wages on public relief works should not be more than 75 per cent. of the district rate for a probationary period of 6 months. It was also indicated that a similar opposition would be voiced by the Association of Municipal Corporations.

It was pointed out, on the other hand, that unless some reduction below the current rate was insisted on

the/

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

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(56)

the inducement to leave regular employment for relief works would be considerable in more districts and occupations. Further, the more money spent on such relief works, which were usually very costly, the less would there be available for more remunerative methods of stimulating trade.

The Cabinet agreed --

That the principle of paying a rate lower than the district rate should be firmly adhered to even at the risk of a defeat of the Government, and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should be prepared to defend the policy of the Cabinet on financial grounds.

IRISH PRISONERS AND MILITARY LAW.

4. With reference to Cabinet 63 (21), Conclusion (3) the Cabinet had before them Memoranda by the Secretary of State for War and observations by the Judge Advocate General dealing with the issue of writs of Habeas Corpus by the Master of Rolls in Ireland directed to General Macready for the production of two Irish prisoners not later than the 15th instant (S.F.B.19,20).

The Cabinet agreed to refer the matter for decision to the following Committee :-

The Lord Chancellor (In the Chair).
The Attorney-General.
The Secretary of State for War.
The Chief Secretary for Ireland.

Mr. Pembroke Wicks (Secretary).

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,
4th November, 1921.

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

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CONFIDENTIAL.

EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS.

Reply of the Egyptian Delegation to the Proposals of His Majesty's Government.

LA délégation officielle égyptienne a pris connaissance du projet remis à son président par Lord Curzon le 10 courant.

Elle constate que sur la plupart des questions qui ont fait, depuis quatre mois, l'objet de nos discussions et des notes échangées entre nous, le projet reproduit les textes et formules qui nous avaient été présentés au début des négociations et que nous n'avions pas acceptés.

Ainsi pour la question militaire dont l'importance est capitale, le projet maintient, en aggravant même sa portée, la solution que nous avions si fortement combattue. La protection des communications impériales que les conversations de l'an dernier avaient donnée pour seul objectif à la présence d'une force militaire en Égypte, ne saurait justifier cette solution.

Alors qu'il eût été suffisant de déterminer dans la région du Canal, une zone où seraient localisés et les voies et moyens de communications impériales, et la force qui les protégerait, le projet confère à la Grande-Bretagne le droit de maintenir des forces militaires en tout temps, sur n'importe quel point du territoire égyptien, et met à sa disposition tous les moyens et voies de communications du pays. C'est là l'occupation pure et simple qui détruit toute idée d'indépendance et qui supprime jusqu'à la souveraineté intérieure. Dans le passé, l'occupation militaire, qui n'avait pourtant qu'un caractère temporaire, a suffi pour assurer à la Grande-Bretagne un contrôle absolu sur l'administration tout entière sans que besoin fut d'aucun texte de traité, d'aucune détermination de pouvoir quelconque.

Quant à la question des relations extérieures, seul point où la formule initiale du Foreign Office ait été modifiée par l'acceptation du principe de la représentation, le droit que l'on nous a reconnu est entouré de tant de restrictions qu'il devient en quelque sorte illusoire. On ne conçoit pas que le Ministre des Affaires étrangères puisse librement assumer les responsabilités de sa charge s'il est tenu par une stipulation formelle à être en contact étroit avec le Haut-Commissaire, c'est-à-dire, en fait, à subir son contrôle direct dans la conduite des affaires extérieures. En outre, l'obligation de soumettre au consentement de la Grande-Bretagne tous accords politiques, même ceux qui ne sont pas incompatibles avec l'esprit de l'alliance, porte une grave atteinte au principe de la souveraineté extérieure. Enfin, le fait de maintenir le titre de Haut-Commissaire, qu'il n'est pas dans l'usage de conférer aux représentants diplomatiques auprès des pays indépendants, fait ressortir encore plus le caractère du statut politique proposé pour l'Égypte.

D'autre part, le problème des Capitulations ayant été ajourné, nous avions tout lieu de croire qu'il ne devait plus en être question dans l'accord et qu'il serait traité plus tard par l'Égypte, principale intéressée, avec le concours diplomatique de son alliée. Or, le problème est envisagé aujourd'hui comme intéressant surtout la Grande-Bretagne, qui assume, d'ores et déjà, la protection des intérêts étrangers et compte, éventuellement conduire seule les négociations relatives à leur suppression.

Nous ne voulons pas, à propos des deux Commissaires financier et judiciaire et de leur ingérence dans toute l'administration intérieure du pays au nom de la protection des intérêts étrangers, ingérence allant dans certains cas, pour le Conseiller financier, jusqu'à tenir en échec le Gouvernement et le Parlement, revenir sur les objections présentées dans nos différentes notes.

Nous devons dire cependant que des discussions qui ont suivi l'ajournement de la question des Capitulations, nous avons eu le sentiment qu'un accord s'établirait au sujet de la protection des intérêts étrangers sur d'autres bases plus compatibles avec la souveraineté de l'Égypte.

Pour la question du Soudan, qui n'avait pas encore été discutée, nous tenons à faire remarquer qu'elle est l'objet de dispositions inacceptables pour nous, dispositions qui n'assurent pas à l'Égypte l'exercice de son droit incontestable de souveraineté sur cette contrée et de contrôle sur les eaux du Nil.

Les observations qui précèdent nous dispensent de faire l'analyse du projet. Elles

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en font suffisamment ressortir l'esprit et la portée. Et l'insistance avec laquelle le projet revient sur les obligations de la Grande-Bretagne, "les responsabilités spéciales" du Haut-Commissaire et le nouvel objectif—sauvegarde des intérêts vitaux de l'Égypte—donné à la présence de la force militaire achève de lui imprimer le caractère d'une véritable tutelle.

En acceptant la mission que Sa Hautesse le Sultan nous a confiée, nous avions l'espoir de conclure un traité d'alliance, qui tout en consacrant réellement l'indépendance de l'Égypte, aurait sauvegardé les intérêts britanniques, et l'Égypte alliée de la Grande-Bretagne aurait tenu à honneur de remplir scrupuleusement les obligations qui lui eussent incombé. Mais l'alliance entre deux peuples n'est réalisable qu'à la condition de ne pas constituer pour l'un d'eux un pacte perpétuel de soumission.

L'esprit de conciliation qui a présidé à nos discussions nous autorisait à envisager le résultat des négociations avec confiance. Le projet que nous avons entre les mains ne répond pas à cette attente. Tel qu'il se présente, il ne nous permet pas de conserver l'espoir d'arriver à un accord donnant satisfaction aux aspirations nationales de l'Égypte.

Londres, le 15 *novembre* 1921.

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APPENDIX.

EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS.

NOTE on the Reply of the Egyptian Delegation to the Proposals of His Majesty's Government.

ADLY PASHA called upon me yesterday at the Foreign Office in order to hand to me the reply of the Egyptian delegation to the proposals of His Majesty's Government with regard to the future of Egypt.

As I had warned the Cabinet, his reply, which was a typed paper of several pages, was a categorical and uncompromising refusal, which he accompanied by an expression of profound regret that except in the single particular of foreign representation (a concession which was materially qualified by the conditions attached to it) His Majesty's Government had not, as he alleged, advanced a single step towards the acceptance of the views which he and his colleagues had spent so many months in urging upon me at the Foreign Office.

I expressed my sincere regret that our discussions, which had been conducted with so much good humour and good faith on both sides, had not had a more successful termination, and I was particularly sorry to read the words in the concluding paragraph of the Egyptian reply, which seemed to me of a needlessly unqualified description. But I did not attempt to reargue the case, nor did I suggest that in any way it should or could now be reopened.

There were two questions, however, of some importance on which, I said, it was desirable to be clear. Was I to regard the reply handed to me by the Minister as the provisional refusal of the delegation, subject to confirmation by the Sultan and the Egyptian Ministry, when Adly Pasha had returned to/

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

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to Cairo, or was I to take this document as the final and definite refusal of the Egyptian Government as a whole? I felt it necessary to ask the question, because it was the Sultan who had, I believed, originally suggested the delegation; it was to him that the pledge that it should be received had been given; it was he who had selected its members; and I did not quite see how the negotiations could be terminated without reference to him. Accordingly, I asked whether the text of the reply had been communicated to the Sultan, whether he approved of it, and whether the act of the delegation was also the act of the Sovereign.

Adly Pasha was, I think, a little embarrassed by these questions, and had somewhat reluctantly to admit that, while the Sultan was aware of what was being done, he had neither seen the text of the answer nor had expressed approval of its contents. I more than once put the question "Knowledge or approval?" - to which the Pasha replied "Knowledge, yes" -- but beyond that , silence. He claimed, however, full powers for himself as Prime Minister and plenipotentiary to decide on his own responsibility.

Wanting to know what his Excellency proposed to do, I asked whether he would not esteem it a part of his duty to return and present the reply of the delegation to the Sultan personally.

To this he replied in the affirmative, thus apparently settling the question of his return to Egypt without immediate resignation. He thought, he said, of leaving London at the end of the week, and of going to Paris, where he would pick up his family, on his way back to Egypt.

These considerations brought me to my second point, viz., publication. Both parties were, I thought, concerned that there should not be premature, or piecemeal, or unofficial divulgation./

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

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divulgation. From the Egyptian point of view, I thought it would be unfair and discourteous to publish without reference to the Sultan -- besides which publication in the absence of Adly Pasha might prejudice his actions when he returned, and might give rise to Zaghlul demonstrations, which he would not be there to deal with. Further, publication in Egypt of the full text of both documents was impossible until the texts had had time to arrive. On the other hand, we in England were under a pledge to take no decision without previously submitting our proposals to Parliament; and although this did not strictly apply to draft proposals which had been put forward subject to this condition, which had now been definitely rejected, yet we must be careful as to the exact conditions under which publication in this country should take place.

Could the Minister, I asked, guarantee that his colleagues would not communicate in the interim to the press, and would he see them immediately on his return to his hotel, and pledge them to secrecy, until a decision, upon which I should like to consult the Prime Minister, was arrived at?

This he undertook to do, stating that as there were only two copies of the draft agreement in existence, both in his possession, and both under lock and key, it was impossible for the text to be divulged. Whether his colleagues will desist from talking is much more doubtful, and, I should say, from such knowledge as I possess of the Oriental character, most unlikely. Nevertheless, he agreed that it would be best to defer publication until he had returned to Cairo and presented both the draft proposals and his reply to the Sultan.

I said that if that could be arranged, I though that simultaneous publication in this country and in Egypt was desirable, in order that neither party might, so to speak, steal a march on the other. In publishing we should state that these were the proposals which had been made by His

Majesty's/

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

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

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Majesty's Government, subject to the approval of Parliament, if they had met with a favourable reception from the Egyptian Government.

I then sounded the Minister on a third point. I did not desire to press him, but could he tell me how the decision arrived at would affect his personal position when he returned to Cairo, and whether we might hope for his continued co-operation -- to which His Majesty's Government attached the highest importance in carrying on the Egyptian Administration? His Excellency did not give an absolutely definite reply to these questions, which were put with less precision than they appear to present in print; but he left on me the very clear impression that his present intention is to resign immediately upon returning to Egypt, and that his position under any other conditions would be untenable. I said that I would consult the Prime Minister as to the desirability of deferring publication until his return, and then providing for a simultaneous issue, and would let him know either personally or by letter before the end of the week. There remains the further question of what should be said in the press in the interim, in order to explain the departure of the delegation.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

FOREIGN OFFICE.

November 16, 1921.

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

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EGYPT.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Lord Allenby (Cairo).
17th November, 1921.

D. 4.30 p.m. 17th November, 1921.

R. 5.10 p.m. 17th November, 1921.

No. 629.

::::::::::::::

VERY URGENT.

Following is memorandum referred to in my immediately preceding telegram.

Begins.

Adviser to Ministry of Interior, Acting Financial Adviser, Adviser to Ministry of Education, and Acting Judicial Adviser are unanimously of following view, that a decision which does not admit principle of Egyptian independence and which maintains protectorate must entail serious risk of revolution throughout the country and in any case result in complete administrative chaos, rendering Government impossible. It must be realized that the whole structure of Government is Egyptian and that British officials are, almost exclusively, either in advisory, inspecting, or technical capacities. It is therefore impossible to exercise any British control without full Egyptian co-operation in all branches of administration, as was shown in the spring of 1919, when an attempt had been made to carry on Government without a Ministry and with a considerable portion of Egyptian staff on strike.

Unless

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

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Unless His Majesty's Government are prepared to give substantial satisfaction to expectations which Egyptians have legitimately formed on the basis of apparent (? policy of) His Majesty's Government during the past two years, it will be impossible to form any Ministry. This will sooner or later lead to strikes or organized obstruction among Government officials and in such an event police and probably army would side with the majority. Strong military force acting with severity could doubtless preserve certain measure of security to life and property in larger cities, but the task would be a much more difficult one in the provinces. No military administration however could hope to replace the complicated machinery of civil Government or prevent serious injury to financial and economic interests. The Advisers have been carrying on over two years in the belief that policy of liberal concessions would be adopted and have undoubtedly given this impression to various Ministers and others with whom they have been in contact. They feel bound therefore to point out that if a contrary policy is (? adopted) they cannot expect to retain the confidence of Egyptian Ministers or be able to render useful service in the future. If on the other hand a liberal programme is approved by His Majesty's Government, they are confident that it could be elaborated on the spot and a Ministry formed to carry it out even if no Egyptian Minister is prepared today to sign official convention containing that programme as full satisfaction of Egyptian claims.

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

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EGYPT

POLITICAL

Cypher telegram to Lord Allenby. (Cairo).

Foreign Office. November 17th, 1921. 10.30.p.m.

No. 502.

Confidential.

-----oOo-----

My despatch No. 1233 of November 15th now on its way contains terms of draft convention handed to Adly Pasha on November 10th and drawn up in accordance with the decisions of the Cabinet meeting at which you were present on the 4th of November.

Egyptian Delegation's reply, copy of which is enclosed in my despatch No. 1244, was handed to me by Adly on the 15th of November. They point out that except with regard to foreign affairs, where our concession is rendered in a sense illusory by the accompanying restrictions, we have made no alteration in the texts that were originally given them at the beginning of the negotiations.

They insist that the military clause constitutes occupation pure and simple which they point out has in the past without the guarantee of any treaty assured to Great Britain complete control over Egypt.

They object to any mention of the capitulations which they thought were to be dealt with later by Egypt with the diplomatic co-operation of her ally.

They also protest against the continuance of the title of High Commissioner and the proposed financial

and.....

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

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

and judicial commissioners, and the clause dealing with the Soudan.

Finally they express regret and disappointment and state that the draft agreement in it's present form does not allow them to retain the hope of arriving at an agreement which will satisfy the national aspirations of Egypt.

Adly seems to have decided to resign but not until he returns to Egypt.

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

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Decypher. Lord Allenby (Cairo)
November 18th, 1921.

D. 8.10 p.m. November 18th, 1921.

R. 8.35 p.m. November 18th, 1921.

No. 631.

VERY URGENT.

Secret.

Sarwat Pasha called on me this afternoon. He told me Adly reports that no agreement is likely to be reached. In that case, the Sultan anticipates that Adly will resign. Sultan does not desire this, but if Adly insists he will offer Premiership to Sarwat. Sarwat has declared his readiness to accept, and Sultan sent him at once to inform me. Sarwat thinks that he can undoubtedly form a Ministry. He regards it as all-important to keep together supporters of Government, in order to counter influence of Zaghoul. He is prepared to fight Zaghoul to a finish, and is confident of success.

I congratulated Sarwat on his courage and patriotism, and told him he might rest assured of my full support.

I trust that this communication may be treated as strictly secret. Sarwat's attitude is only known to Sultan and myself.

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

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EGYPT.

POLITICAL.

Cypher telegram to Lord Allenby (Cairo)

Foreign Office, 18th November, 1921. 9.30 p.m.

No. 503.

Your telegram No. 629.

We are somewhat surprised that, having been present at Cabinet when Draft agreement A was preferred to Draft B, subject to concession about foreign representatives, you should not have pointed out to British advisers that when they described decision of His Majesty's Government as not admitting principle of Egyptian independence and as maintaining protectorate, they were proceeding in complete ignorance of what has actually been proposed. Vide Article I of Draft A.

You should at once point out to them this error, which to a large extent vitiates their reasoning, and should give them in confidence general idea of concessions which His Majesty's Government has been prepared to make, and has in fact definitely made an agreement handed to Adly Pasha but rejected by him. Course of action now contemplated by His Majesty's Government is as follows. Copy of proposed agreement will doubtless be forwarded by Adly to the Sultan, and has already been sent to you by bag together with Adly's reply. We shall further send in a day/

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

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day or two a note for communication by you to His Highness containing a full explanation and defence of the position which His Majesty's Government have assumed. The draft agreement together with this note, and the reply of the Egyptian delegation should then be published simultaneously in both countries. In the interval we are issuing communiqué to Press here stating that publication will take place under the above conditions, and that premature or piecemeal disclosures in the interim should be discredited.

Pending publication His Majesty's Government rely upon you to take every suitable opportunity to refute misrepresentation of their policy and to defend very ample concessions which they were prepared to make.

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

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Lord Curzon (89)

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CONFIDENTIAL.

26

CP. 3505

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 1255.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 19, 1921.

IN my final conversation with Adly Pasha to-day, while explaining to him the procedure as regards publication of which the Cabinet had approved, I told him that in my opinion he and his colleagues had made a mistake, as soon as they had realised that their extreme demands could not be conceded, in not accepting, or, if that was too much, in not expressing their willingness to treat the British proposals as a provisional arrangement to which, in their own interests, they would be prepared to give a trial, in order to demonstrate, by the good administration inaugurated and the perfect security obtained under it, how mistaken the apprehension which had justified the British refusal of wider concessions had been. Taking the parallel of the ascent of the Great Pyramid as representing the Egyptian aspirations for independence, they had claimed to be transported by aeroplane straight to the summit instead of mounting by laborious stages, as all of us who had scaled that great monument had been obliged to do. In the present case the British Government had offered to help them, as the Arabs were in the habit of doing with visitors to Ghizeh, more than half-way to the top. But apparently the Egyptian Government, if they could not get there straight away, preferred to remain stationary at the base.

Adly Pasha asked me why we should not proceed ourselves to put into operation scheme (A). For the very obvious reason, I replied, that this could only be done with Egyptian co-operation; and yet he himself, the man most competent to give it, had told me at our previous meeting that his first step on returning to Egypt would be to resign.

I told him that the Egyptians could not have it both ways. They could not both enjoy the luxury of refusing our proposals and posing as national heroes in consequence, and at the same time expect us, without their assistance, to put into operation the scheme of very considerable independence which they had chosen to reject. The only consequence of their action would be to throw us back into the *status quo ante*, which would be equally regrettable for both parties.

I said I understood the difficulties of his position. But I rather wondered why, on the one or two occasions on which I had suggested the possibility of a provisional arrangement, to be replaced, after satisfactory experience, by something more liberal or advanced, he had turned down the suggestion. I invited him, while on his return journey, to consider very carefully whether on arriving in Cairo it would not be in his power to make to the Sultan and to your Lordship some proposal more in harmony with the facts of the situation both here and in Egypt, than the attitude of blank negation which he had hitherto assumed.

The Egyptian Prime Minister was far from rejecting these ideas, which I had made with the object of allowing them to germinate in his mind before he arrived in Egypt—although, naturally enough, he could express no acceptance of them. He left me with the warmest expression of thanks for the courtesy with which he and his colleagues had been treated at the Foreign Office and for the hospitality which they had enjoyed in England, and I could certainly say in return, as I did, that I had found him a very sincere and honourable negotiator with whom it had been a personal pleasure to deal.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

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

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EGYPT.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Lord Allenby (Cairo).
5th. December, 1921.

D. 2.10 a.m. 6th December 1921.

R. 8.30 a.m. 6th December 1921.

No. 656.

.....

1. I have no clear indication as yet as to possibility of either retaining in office present ministry or forming new one on the basis of recent declaration of His Majesty's Government, Sultan however is of opinion that he will have no great difficulty in forming a ministry, if as is probable, Adly resigns.

2. Assuming a ministry can be found to take office with a programme based upon contents of paragraph in His Majesty's Government's declaration beginning "With regard to immediate present" we risk a reversion to undesirable state of affairs when unstable government has, owing to political desirability of maintaining itself in office, been liable to drift without proper control on our part.

3. It is incumbent on us henceforth to justify predominant position which we claim in Egypt, and to show that we are not discouraged by the failure of weaker partnership to put into force, policy we consider desirable according to procedure we had intended.

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

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intended. I consider the time opportune for a bold lead on the part of His Majesty's Government designed to give those Egyptians who are not disinclined to work with us in Egypt a constructive programme.

4. In his final conversation with Your Lordship Adly Pasha enquired why His Majesty's Government did not of their own volition put in force scheme outlined in rejected draft treaty. Your Lordship's reply did not appear to exclude adoption of this course provided that an Egyptian ministry could be found willing to co-operate. Declaration which has now been made again asserts impossibility of giving effect to proposals embodied in draft convention without consent and co-operation of Egyptian nation but states in final paragraph that His Majesty's Government are prepared to consider any method of carrying out proposals whenever Egyptian government may desire. I have on more than one occasion in the past year expressed view that no signed agreement was possible unless Great Britain was disposed to grant greater measure of independence to Egypt than she is obviously ready to do and that it would consequently in the end be necessary for her to declare her own policy and put it into effect.

5. Eventuality foreseen has arisen and we must meet it.

6. Will Your Lordship leave it to my discretion, if I consider time has come, to inform the Sultan that His Majesty's Government are prepared to put

into

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

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into operation as occasion arises main provisions of scheme outlined in draft treaty and to furnish them to His Highness as a programme either for present ministry, if it remains in office, or for a new one?

7. Draft treaty represents a definite policy which, in my opinion, responds to our requirements as regards Egypt. While on the one hand it fully safeguards our essential interests, on the other hand it accords to Egyptian people distinct advance in the management of their own affairs. In operation it would have the marked advantage of fastening of certain responsibilities on Egyptian shoulders which they should properly bear. No one conversant with recent developments in the administration of the country can remain blind to the great drawback under which we are labouring owing to prevailing system of dual obligation which enables ministry to secure the credit for all that is successful in the administration of the country and to place the blame for mistakes, if they occur, on the shoulders of the British authorities. In my opinion draft scheme would go far to remove this drawback, while concession which it involves would not undermine or weaken ultimate authority we must maintain.

8. I recognize that adoption of course I suggest would involve abolition of protectorate by unilateral declaration on the part of His Majesty's government. Your Lordship will recollect that in memoranda transmitted in my despatches Nos. 311

of.....

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

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of April 16th and 530 of June 17th such a course was contemplated. I see no objection to its adoption. Word "protectorate" is doubtless convenient from the point of view of negotiations with foreign powers and as such has its justification. On the other hand, besides being a status particularly resented by Egyptians, it has little meaning in fact. So far as Egypt is concerned circumstances connected with political situation, have made it impossible in many respects to enforce a policy of protection, even in most elastic sense. At present moment Egyptians are not regarded as British subjects and an Egyptian nationality law is in contemplation. Further application of international conventions to Egypt as a part of British Empire has been postponed. Having regard to fact that machinery of measures relating to such matters by an Egyptian council of ministers there is little hope that either now or in the future we could get satisfactory settlement of these and cognate fundamental questions on a protectorate basis. This is state of affairs which should not be allowed to continue since our own prestige must in the long run suffer.

9. Declaration by His Majesty's Government to the Sultan amounts to pronouncement of a British Monroe doctrine in respect of Egypt. On the basis of that declaration it can no longer be any concern of a foreign power under what appellation we may choose to determine our relations with Egypt. Our policy

from....

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

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

from international point of view is unequivocal and substitution of sovereign state suggested in draft treaty for protectorate declared in 1914 should no longer be of any material importance abroad.

10. I recommend course of action I have indicated after full consideration of issues involved and have consulted my advisers on the spot who are in agreement with my views.

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

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(75)

EGYPT.

POLITICAL.

(E.13461/260/16)

Cypher telegram to Lord Allenby (Cairo)

Foreign Office, 8th December 1921, 6 p.m.

No. 529.

VERY URGENT.

Your telegrams Nos. 656 and 659.

1. Prime Minister in the House of Commons on October 27th stated that no change will be made in relation between Great Britain and Egypt without adequate opportunities being given for discussion by parliament. This pledge by itself renders it impossible now to set up a new régime which the abolition of the Protectorate would involve. No doubt when parliament meets next year there will be a discussion on the papers presented and we shall be better able to say how far we shall be supported by public opinion in going.

2. But apart from this consideration the adoption of your proposal would entail giving away the main concession, viz. foreign affairs, which the cabinet were only with the greatest difficulty persuaded to concede as part of a general settlement accepted by the Egyptians. Under your plan we should only receive in return for this concession the formation of a government of whose stability or good faith we should have no guarantee. A government so constituted might after a few weeks claim that their task was impossible unless further concessions were made to nationalist sentiment. We should in that case be exposing ourselves to a

system

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

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system of political blackmail and to the risks inherent in the existence of an Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs and of Egyptian diplomatic representatives abroad who would be under no treaty obligation to collaborate fully and honestly with His Majesty's Government.

3. I am not clear whether your proposal involved the immediate appointment of financial and judicial commissioners with the limited powers contemplated in the rejected draft treaty. This would not seem to be either necessary or desirable, as I should have thought that there was plenty of scope for a constructive programme on the lines indicated in the ninth paragraph of your communication to the Sultan of December 3rd.

4. Such a programme might be based on the following five points:-

(1) maintenance of order and suppression of crimes with violence.

(2) enactment of legislation necessary for the withdrawal of martial law.

(3) return to constitutional régime and election of legislative assembly.

(4) collaboration with His Majesty's Government in the replacement of foreign officials in the higher ranks of the civil service by qualified Egyptians.

(5) expectation of obtaining largest measure of concessions which His Majesty's Government may be willing to make to a friendly Egypt after the achievement of the above programme has proved her capacity for self government.

(5)

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

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5. Further than this it is impossible to go until the meeting of parliament in January or February when after full consideration both here and at Cairo, it may be possible to indicate such wider proposals as we might be prepared to carry out in conjunction with an Egyptian ministry who have meanwhile given proof of their will and capacity to govern. The interval may well be spent in the careful examination of such a scheme.

6. Do you consider that the acceptance by Ireland of allegiance to the King and incorporation in the Empire is likely to have an effect upon Egyptian opinion?

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

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EGYPT

POLITICAL

Decypher. Lord Allenby. (Cairo).
December 11th, 1921.

D. 2.00.p.m. December 11th, 1921.

R. 3.30.p.m. December 11th, 1921.

No. 664.

-----oOo-----

One. With regard to points enumerated in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 529 I offer following observations:

Point 1. Though this is first duty of any government, and moderate Egyptian opinion is opposed to violent methods, any ministry formed now on suggested programme will be in a weak position and will have to face a hostile country. Declared intention to keep order will be of little use to them unless rest of their programme is of a nature to induce country to suppose that good order will be politically advantageous.

Point 2. Abolition of martial law was conditionally promised by me to Adly Pasha's ministry and promise has not been withdrawn. In existing conditions offer would not be likely to attract any public interest.

As regards point 3, apart from difficulty of holding elections with the country in it's present temper a ministry which summoned assembly in conditions now prevailing and likely to prevail under suggested programme would be merely inviting either its own downfall.....

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

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downfall or immediate suspension of assembly.

Point 4. It has always been my practise to encourage promotion of Egypt's (gr.omit.) within limits of my responsibilities under protectorate. I cannot do more than I have already done without some new orientation of policy and consequently no promise I can make on this subject is likely to influence Egyptian leaders as regards taking office.

Point 5. Egyptians of all shades of opinion now view such promises with deep mistrust. With no definite date fixed for redemption, such a promise is not likely to influence prospects of forming a ministry likely to be able to direct destinies of the country and control it satisfactorily

Two. I realise that prime minister's pledge of October 27th renders it impossible to abolish protectorate without consulting parliament. On the other hand I cannot regard programme suggested in your telegram No. 529 as it stands as being of any assistance towards formation of ministry. Only helpful solution I can see lies in an extension of point 5 to a definite promise that when parliament meets His Majesty's Government will, provided that order is maintained in the country, meanwhile, propose abolition of protectorate and that this having been done substantial concessions on basis of rejected draft treaty will be favourably considered.

May I be authorized to make this promise when occasion arises?

Three. As regards your objection to proposals contained in my telegram No. 656 I would again urge

upon.....

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

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upon Your Lordship and His Majesty's Government, once and for all, fact that no Egyptian, whatever his opinions may be, can put his signature to any document which does not in his view involve complete independence, and that consequently, procedure dealing with Egyptian problem by treaty must be definitely abandoned.

Four. Consequently, concessions to Egyptians cannot be made by His Majesty's Government with expectation of treaty advantages in return. Great Britain's present relation to Egypt is similar to that of Turkey before the war, and procedure adopted by Turkey in making concessions to Egypt was by unilateral act on her part. By a succession of firmans dating from 1840 to 1892 Turkey conferred certain rights on Khedives of Egypt. Her most important concession was made in firman of 1873 when she conceded certain rights in the matter of their foreign relations. We have taken away what Turkey saw fit to concede, and nothing is more resented in Egypt to-day than this backward step on the part of Great Britain.

(Part 2 follows).

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

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(81)

EGYPT

POLITICAL

Decypher. Lord Allenby. (Cairo).
December 11th, 1921.

D. 5.15.p.m. December 11th, 1921.

R. 6.15.p.m. December 11th, 1921.

No. 664.

-----oOo-----

(Second portion).

Five. In draft treaty concession as regards foreign relations is hedged round, so far as Great Britain is concerned, by all essential conditions. It is my responsibility to see that those conditions are observed by Egyptians, while as regards foreign powers, in ultimate resort it must be for Great Britain to affirm exceptional position she claims. No foreign power can indulge in intrigues in Egypt without infringing terms of recent declaration to Sultan, which are admittedly addressed to foreign powers and not Egypt, and this issue, if it arises, will be decided, not by reason of any promises we may have been able to extract from weak Egyptian people but by political weapons of more powerful nature suitable to occasion.

Six. Difficulties of British administration under protectorate policy do not seem to me to have received consideration they deserve. We are as much interested as Egyptians in finding new basis on which to establish our course of action.

Seven.

83

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

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Seven. Policy of His Majesty's Government has had as one of its most important objects securing of a friendship with Egypt, and I do not see that we are likely to secure Egyptian co-operation unless we show that we trust them.

Eight. It is as yet too early to judge what effect agreement with Ireland, if accepted, is likely to have on Egyptian opinion, which is at present occupied with it's own affairs. It is to be anticipated, however, that though Egyptians may reflect that settlement may strengthen hands of Great Britain from a military point of view for dealing with Egypt, they will also reflect upon methods employed by Irish to extract this settlement from Great Britain and they will (group omitted) concessions granted to Ireland with those refused to Egypt.

Nine. I should be glad of immediate reply to suggestion contained in second paragraph of this telegram.

Ten. In the meantime, I read in newspapers that Adly Pasha has resigned. As I have received no official intimation to this effect, I have asked for audience of Sultan and am seeing him to-day.

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

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EGYPT

POLITICAL

Decode. Lord Allenby. (Cairo).
December 12th, 1921.

D. 11.5.p.m. December 12th, 1921.

R. 8.30.a.m. December 13th, 1921.

No. 665. (R).

-----oOo-----

I saw the Sultan yesterday morning December 11th. His Highness confirmed fact that Adly had resigned, but said that no decision had been taken as regards formation of a new ministry. He was seeing Sarwat Pasha that afternoon. Later in the day Sarwat Pasha called to see me on His Highness' instructions and submitted a programme on which he declared himself ready to take office.

Following are essential points of his proposed declaration of policy:

1. Taking note in memorandum of November 10th which was handed to official Egyptian delegation only of undertaking of British Government to terminate protectorate and to recognise Egypt as a sovereign state and while not being able to accept memorandum or to recommend it to acceptance of the country, ministry will (?gr.omit.) themselves henceforth - and in so doing will be helped by attitude of the country - to showing Great Britain that she has no need of increase of or accumulation of guarantees seeing that good faith of Egypt and interest which she has in respecting undertakings.....

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

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undertakings given would constitute best and most effective of safeguards for British and other foreign interests.

2. To this end ministry rely not only upon justice of national cause but also upon equitable spirit of British nation and upon a just appreciation of reciprocal interests of the two countries.

3. Ministry are persuaded that there will be no obstacle in the near future to restoring a normal régime in Egypt which will permit of granting of constitution to the country assuring an effective and serious co-operation between the government and the country's elected representatives.

Ministry intend forthwith, strengthened by approval of Your Highness, to work out scheme of constitutional reform in order that in their political task, they may rely upon a true national representation and may bring to a successful issue a whole series of urgent reforms which moral and economic progress of the country demands.

4. Cabinet consider that the moment has come to re-establish functions of ministry for foreign affairs which circumstances of war temporarily suspended.

5. Finally, realising responsibility of their task ministry will devote themselves to taking up the burden and to directing affairs of the country solely in national interests.

6. Ministry knowing intentions cherished by Your Highness for good of the country do not doubt that they will find in Your Highness a support for carrying out of their programme: they also count on confidence of the country to face a task of which they feel all the difficulties.

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

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

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(E/13654/260/16).

EGYPT.

POLITICAL.

Cypher telegram to Lord Allenby (Cairo).

Foreign Office, 15th December 1921. 11.50 a.m.

No. 534.

.....

VERY URGENT.

Your telegram No.666 (of December 12th. Sarwat Pasha's proposal to form a ministry).

You are authorised to give a general assent to Sarwat's suggested programme. It seems however essential in order to prevent misapprehension, to recall very clearly with reference to point 1 that His Majesty's Government have given no "undertaking" to terminate protectorate and to recognize Egypt as a sovereign state, but merely offered to do so as part of a contract, which in fact the other party has declined. Could you not persuade Sarwat to substitute the word "offer" for "undertaking" in his programme? I am anxious to avoid creating unnecessary difficulties or awakening any suspicions as to our good faith.

.....

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

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(86)

Egypt

(E/13654/260/16).

EGYPT.

POLITICAL.

Cypher telegram to Lord Allenby (Cairo).

Foreign Office, 15th December 1921. 3 p.m.

No. 536.

.....

In view of your telegrams Nos. 665 and 666, no answer is now necessary to series of questions raised in your No. 664, but I must point out that your suggestion that His Majesty's Government should pledge themselves to ask parliamentary sanction for abolition of the protectorate in the hope of obtaining an Egyptian ministry would have been quite unacceptable. Such a course would have been inconsistent with the decision of His Majesty's Government arrived at after consultation with Your Lordship and largely upon your advice.

.....

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

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EGYPT

POLITICAL

Decode. Lord Allenby. (Cairo).
December 24th, 1921.

D. 10.50.p.m. December 24th, 1921.

R. 8.30.a.m. December 25th, 1921.

No. 686. (R).

URGENT.

-----oOo-----

I much appreciate your telegram No. 545.

It may assist Your Lordship if I report recent events which have led to deportation of Zaghloul and his principal associates.

Draft treaty and especially my letter to the Sultan were received with great resentment which took in particular the form of nightly demonstrations in Cairo. There is no doubt that these were the work of Zaghloulist organization preparatory to Zaghloul himself resuming open activity. A week ago commandant of police stated that his men were being put to great strain as they were being stoned nightly. On December 19th as reported in my telegram of December 20th to Sir Lyre Crowe I prohibited a meeting which Zaghloul had called and which was bound to lead to disorder. Zaghloul replied with a manifesto in which he stated that this prohibition marked the beginning of a new British policy of absolute despotism.

Meanwhile elections for native bar council had taken place: none but Zaghloulists were elected.

Previous.....

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

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

Previous resolutions (? which, omit.) favoured (?Adly) ministry were rescinded and a five days strike was declared. This was generally and rightly regarded as omen of a landslide in favour of Zaghloul and of a period of intensive striking. I may recall that in Greece last year similar elections were one of the first signs of collapse of Monsieur Veniselos.

On December 20th William Makram, Zaghloul's chief agent in (? England) had arrived in Alexandria. He delivered provocative speech there and came to Cairo received ovations at stations on the way on December 21st. He was met by Zaghloul and they drove across the town together through large crowds which added "Down with Allenby" to usual cries for independence.

That night two British soldiers were shot in the streets of Cairo and one was killed. On December 22nd I ordered Zaghloul to go to his country house and to take no further part in politics and I gave orders that his principal associates should retire to their country houses.

Subsequent events are recorded in my telegrams Nos. 680, 681 and 682.

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

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EGYPT.

POLITICAL.

Decode. Lord Allenby (Cairo), 25th December 1921.

D. 11.45 p.m. 25th December 1921.

R. 8.30 a.m. 26th December 1921.

No. 689. (R).

.....

URGENT.

My telegram No.687.

Resignation of Adly Pasha's cabinet was accepted yesterday by the Sultan.

Cairo. There has been less actual disorder but situation remains unsettled. A government girl's school was attacked this morning and considerable damage done.

Schools are all on strike. Government officials strike is now general. It has been declared for three days and is being enforced by intimidation. I am taking steps to protect those who wish to work.

Number of Egyptians killed in Cairo is 11. One European-an eccentric living in poor quarter - was murdered by mob on 23rd. English lady driving in open cab was attacked and stoned by roughs on Friday in Boulac quarter. She escaped serious injury using as a shield her sun-shade which was broken by stones. This is the first case of attack on a woman in the whole of the last 3 years. Total arrests up to date 186.

Alexandria.

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

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Alexandria. No change. Situation is under control. Total arrests up to date 389 of whom 223 are boys. H.M.S. Ceres and Senator have arrived.

Canal zone. Port Said. Persistent demonstrations occurred this morning and finally town was handed over to military who were compelled to fire on crowd which had refused to disperse after a warning. Casualties 1 Egyptian killed and 3 wounded. Military forces are assisted by 90 bluejackets from guard-ship.

Ismailia. H.M.S. Sparrowhawk arrives tomorrow.

Port Said (sic). Town was to-day taken over by military who were forced to fire on demonstrations which refused to disperse after warnings from Egyptian police and British officers. Casualties 1 Egyptian killed 3 wounded. H.M.S. Sikh arrives tomorrow morning.

Upper Egypt. No disorder. Arrests are being made of well known agitators from Cairo amongst them Kamel Hussein, the lawyer of syndicalist movement in this country.

Lower Egypt. No disorder except for a demonstration at Zagazig which was dispersed by Egyptian camel corps. Propaganda is being spread by students.

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

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EGYPT

POLITICAL

Decypher. Lord Allenby. (Cairo).
December 27th, 1921.

D. 8.55.p.m. December 27th, 1921.

R. 10.15.p.m. December 27th, 1921.

No. 692.

URGENT.

-----oOo-----

Private and personal.

I have been in closest touch through Mr. Selby with Adly and Sarwat Pashas throughout the past ten days.

Five days ago Sarwat Pasha told me that he definitely would accept ministry but that I would appreciate that three weeks or a month should be allowed to elapse before it would be judicious for him to take office, so that the firm measures now being taken should produce their effect. Adly Pasha concurs in this view. (1 gr.undec.) I showed orders as regards Zaghloul to Sarwat before issue. He was strongly in favour of deportation.

This morning I sent Mr. Selby to see Sarwat Pasha to impress on him the importance of ministry taking office with as little delay as possible. Sarwat said he was doing everything in his power to prepare the way for ministry and that I could rely on him to come in at the earliest opportune moment.

He is thoroughly satisfied with the situation in the country and does not anticipate any serious complications.

In.....

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

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In the meantime he urges for no relaxation of present measures. In particular press must be prevented from commenting in any way on action taken under martial law.

I have already issued orders in this respect. Sarwat considers that in the meantime ministerial powers should be conferred on under-secretaries as was done in 1919. I shall issue necessary proclamation to-day.

Adly himself suggested such a step two or three days ago.

Above will show Your Lordship that I am in close touch with parties with whom I hope eventually to be able to co-operate.

Whole policy of His Majesty's Government has been explained and they fully appreciate intentions underlying present vigorous application of martial law.

For the moment there are no signs of any movement amongst the fellaheen such as occurred in 1919, while disturbances in towns have been easily dealt with. I am satisfied that weight of intelligent opinion is on my side.

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

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Communication from His Majesty's High Commissioner to His Highness the Sultan of Egypt, December —, 1921.

Your Highness,

I HAVE the honour, in accordance with instructions received from His Majesty's Government, to place before your Highness the following statement of their views in connection with the negotiations that have recently taken place with the delegation despatched by your Highness under the presidency of his Excellency Adly Pasha. His Majesty's Government have presented to Adly Pasha the draft proposals for a treaty between the British Empire and Egypt which they were prepared to recommend to His Majesty the King and to Parliament, and have learnt with keen disappointment that these are not acceptable to him. They regret it the more because they regarded their proposals as liberal in character and far-reaching in effect, and because they cannot hold out any prospect of reconsideration of the principle on which they were framed. It is therefore proper that they should acquaint your Highness fully with the main considerations by which they were guided and with the spirit in which their proposals were made.

One dominant fact has governed the association of Great Britain and Egypt for forty years and must always govern it—namely, the close coincidence between Great Britain's interests in Egypt and the interests of Egypt herself. The independence and the prosperity of the Egyptian people are both of great importance to the British Empire. Egypt lies upon the main line of communications between Great Britain and the King's dominions to the east. The whole territory of Egypt is indeed essential to those communications, since the fortunes of Egypt are inseparable from the security of the Suez Canal Zone. The immunity of Egypt from the dominant influence of any other Great Power is therefore of primary importance to India, Australia, New Zealand and all His Majesty's Eastern colonies and dependencies; it affects the welfare and safety of nearly 350,000,000 of His Majesty's subjects. The prosperity of Egypt is also important to them, not merely because Great Britain and Egypt are each other's best customers, but because any serious danger to financial or commercial interests in Egypt invites the intervention of other Powers and threatens her independence. These have been the governing motives of British association with Egypt, and they are as powerful now as in the past.

The general success of that association during the generation which preceded the great war was universally recognised. When Great Britain first began to take an active interest in Egypt, the Egyptian people were a prey to financial chaos and administrative anarchy. They were at the mercy of every comer, and could not have resisted those fatal forms of foreign exploitation which undermine a nation's self-respect and destroy its fibre. If the Egyptian people are a vigorous and self-respecting nation to-day, they owe that recovery largely to British assistance and advice. They have been secured against foreign intervention; they have been helped to create an efficient system of administration; large numbers of them have been trained in the arts of government; their power has steadily grown; their finances have prospered beyond all expectation; the welfare of all classes has been laid on firm foundations. There has been no shadow of exploitation in this rapid development. Great Britain has sought for herself no financial gain or commercial privilege. The Egyptian nation has garnered all the fruits of her counsel and help.

The outbreak of war between the Great European Powers in 1914 made the association between the British Empire and Egypt of necessity more close. When the Ottoman Empire joined the side of Germany, not only Britain's communications but Egypt's independence were forthwith jeopardised. The declaration of the protectorate was a recognition of the fact that only by common action under a single command could the common menace to the Empire and to Egypt be effectively repelled. In the extension of the war brought about by Turkey many thousands of the King's subjects from India, Australia and New Zealand as well as from Great Britain were maimed or killed. Their graves in Gallipoli, Palestine and Irak stand as witness of the great effort which Turkish intervention cost the British Commonwealth.

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Covered by their ranks, Egypt passed scathless through that period of ordeal. Her losses were inconsiderable; her debt was not increased; her wealth is now greater than before the war, whilst economic paralysis lies heavy on most other lands. It is not wise for her people to overlook these facts or forget to whom they are owed. But for the power exerted by the British Empire in the war, Egypt must have become a field of action between contending forces, which would have trampled on her rights and destroyed her prosperity. But for the victory of the Allies, she would not now be a nation claiming sovereign national status in lieu of the protectorate of a foreign Power. The freedom which she enjoys and the prospect of higher freedom to which she aspires she owes alike to British statesmanship and British arms.

His Majesty's Government are convinced that the close coincidence of interests between Great Britain and Egypt which has made their association so mutually beneficial in the past is the key to the relationship which they should still maintain. Now, as in the past, the British Empire has to shoulder ultimate responsibility for the defence of your Highness's territories against external menace, as also for such assistance as your Highness's Government may at any time request in the maintenance of your authority at home. It must claim, moreover, the exclusive right of tendering such advice as your Highness's Government may require in the administration of the country, the conduct of its finances, the development of its judicial system and the pursuance of its relations with foreign Governments. These claims are not, however, asserted with any desire to derogate from Egypt's enjoyment of the full rights of national self-government. They are pressed only as against other foreign Powers; and they are based upon the fact that the independence, good order and prosperity of Egypt are an essential element in the safety of the British Empire. His Majesty's Government regret that throughout the negotiations your Highness's delegation made little practical advance towards recognition of the British Empire's just title to these exclusive rights and responsibilities.

The treaty provisions which His Majesty's Government consider necessary to maintain these rights and cover these responsibilities were formulated in the draft proposals which Adly Pasha will communicate to your Highness. Of these the most essential are those relating to British troops. His Majesty's Government gave most careful consideration to the arguments advanced by the Egyptian delegation on this subject, and were unable to accept them. Neither the present condition of the world nor the course of events in Egypt since the armistice permits of any modification at this time in the disposition of the British forces. Egypt, it is necessary to repeat, is a part of the Empire's communications. Scarcely a generation has passed since she was rescued from anarchy, and there are signs that the extremer elements in the Nationalist movement are even now capable of plunging her back into the abyss from which she has so recently been raised. The anxiety of His Majesty's Government on this point has been aggravated by the unwillingness of your Highness's delegation to recognise that the British Empire must have firm guarantees against any such menace to its interests. Until such time as Egypt's record gives confidence in her own guarantees, the British Empire must maintain sufficient guarantees itself. Of these the presence of British troops in Egypt is the first and foremost. His Majesty's Government cannot waive or weaken it.

They repeat, however, with emphasis that their claims in this respect are not intended to involve the continuance of an actual or virtual protectorate. On the contrary, the ideal which they have sincerely at heart is that of an Egypt enjoying the national prerogatives and international position of a sovereign State, but closely wedded to the British Empire by a treaty guarantee of common aims and interests. With this end in view, they proposed to terminate the protectorate forthwith, to recognise Egypt as "a sovereign State under a constitutional monarchy," and to substitute for the present relation between the Empire and Egypt "a perpetual treaty and bond of peace, amity and alliance." Their hope was that Egypt, with a reconstituted Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would at once have despatched her own representatives to foreign courts; and they would readily have supported an application on her part for admission to the League of Nations. The Egyptian nation would have thus secured at once the powers and privileges of a sovereign State.

The rejection of these proposals by your Highness's existing Government creates a new situation. It will not affect the principle of British policy, but it necessarily reduces the measures which can now be carried out. His Majesty's Government therefore desire to state clearly where they stand.

With regard to the immediate present, they cannot give effect to their proposals without the consent and co-operation of the Egyptian nation; but they maintain the

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desire, which they have long entertained, to provide for the ever-advancing development of native talent by an increase in the number of Egyptians employed in every branch, and notably in the higher branches of the Administration, hitherto too extensively filled by Europeans. They are willing to pursue in consultation with your Highness's Government the negotiations in foreign courts necessary for the abolition of the Capitulations, so that the international situation may be clear when the Egyptian legislation necessary to take the place of the Capitulations is ready to be passed. They would wish that the powers now exercised by the commander-in-chief under martial law should be exercised only under the Egyptian civil law by the Egyptian Government, and they will gladly withdraw martial law as soon as the Act of Indemnity which is indispensable for the protection of that Government as well as of the British authorities in Egypt has been enacted and become operative in all the civil and criminal courts in Egypt.

With regard to the future, His Majesty's Government desire to state in plain terms the policy which they intend to pursue. They understand that the proposals presented to your Highness's delegation were rejected on the ground that the safeguards for British and foreign interests contained in them would be fatal to the genuine exercise of self-government. They deeply regret that the maintenance of British troops in Egypt and the association of British officials with the Ministries of Justice and Finance should be so gravely misunderstood. The progress of Egypt towards her ideals will not only be retarded, but completely jeopardised, if her people are tempted to indulge their national aspirations, however sound and legitimate in themselves, without sufficient regard to the facts which govern international life. Nothing is gained by minimising national obligations and exaggerating national rights. Extremist leaders who preach in this vein are not a stimulus but a menace to Egyptian development. By their influence on the course of events, they have repeatedly challenged the interests and provoked the fears of foreign Powers; and they have sought to affect the outcome of these negotiations during the past few weeks by subversive appeals to popular ignorance and passion. His Majesty's Government do not consider that they would be consulting Egypt's welfare by making concessions to agitation of this kind: and Egypt will make no progress until her responsible leaders show the will and strength to put it down. The world is suffering in many places at the present time from the cult of a fanatical and purely disruptive type of nationalism. His Majesty's Government will set their face against it as firmly in Egypt as elsewhere. Those who yield to it only make more necessary and so prolong the maintenance of those foreign sanctions which they denounce.

In these conditions, for Egypt's interest as much as for their own, His Majesty's Government will continue unshaken in their aims as Egypt's advisers and trustees. It is not sufficient for them to know that they could exercise the right of re-entry into Egypt, if, left to her own unaided counsels, she should revert to the waste and disorder of the last century. They desire to see the work of Lord Cromer's generation completed, not recommenced. They do not aim at keeping Egypt in tutelage. On the contrary, they desire to fortify the constructive elements in Egyptian nationalism, to give them scope, and to bring nearer the full attainment of the national ideal. But they must insist on effective rights and powers to safeguard both Egypt's interests and their own until the Egyptian people have shown the capacity themselves to preserve their country from internal disorder and its inevitable corollary, the intervention of foreign Powers.

The true line of advance for the Egyptian people is by co-operation with the British Empire, and not by antagonism to it. In this spirit of co-operation His Majesty's Government on their side are prepared to consider any methods which may be suggested for carrying out the substance of their proposals, whenever your Highness's Government may so desire. They cannot, however, modify the principle on which their proposals are based or relax the essential safeguards which they contain. The future of Egypt under these proposals would be in the Egyptian people's own hands. The more clearly your people recognise the identity of British interests with their own, the less necessary will safeguards become. It is for the responsible leaders of Egypt, in this second generation of her association with Great Britain, to prove by their acceptance and steady use of the national status now open to them that the vital interests of the Empire in their country may be progressively entrusted to their care.

I am,
Your Highness's, &c.

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

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

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PAPERS

RESPECTING

NEGOTIATIONS

WITH THE

EGYPTIAN DELEGATION.

Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

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

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

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Papers respecting Negotiations with the Egyptian Delegation.

No. 1.

MEMORANDUM OF CLAUSES OF SUGGESTED CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND EGYPT, HANDED BY THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON TO ADLY YEGHEN PASHA ON NOVEMBER 10, 1921.

I.—*Termination of Protectorate.*

1. The Government of His Britannic Majesty agree, in consideration of the conclusion and ratification of the present treaty, to terminate the Protectorate declared over Egypt on the 18th December, 1914, and thenceforth to recognise Egypt as a Sovereign State under a constitutional monarchy.

There is hereby concluded, and there shall henceforth subsist, between the Government and people of His Britannic Majesty on the one hand, and the Government and people of Egypt on the other hand, a perpetual treaty and bond of peace, amity and alliance.

II.—*Foreign Relations.*

2. The foreign affairs of Egypt shall be conducted by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under a Minister so designated.

3. His Britannic Majesty's Government shall be represented in Egypt by a High Commissioner, who, in virtue of his special responsibilities, shall at all times be entitled to an exceptional position, and shall take precedence over the representatives of other countries.

4. The Egyptian Government shall be represented in London, and in any other capital in which, in the opinion of the Egyptian Government, Egyptian interests may require such representation, by diplomatic representatives enjoying the rank and title of Minister.

5. In view of the obligations which Great Britain has undertaken in Egypt, notably in respect of foreign countries, the closest relations shall exist between the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British High Commissioner, who will render all possible assistance to the Egyptian Government in respect of diplomatic transactions or negotiations.

6. The Egyptian Government will not enter into any political agreement with foreign Powers without consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government through the British High Commissioner.

7. The Egyptian Government will enjoy the right of appointing such consular representatives abroad as their interests may require.

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8. For the general conduct of diplomatic relations, and the consular protection of Egyptian interests in places where no Egyptian diplomatic or consular representative is stationed, His Britannic Majesty's representatives will place themselves at the disposal of the Egyptian Government, and will render them every assistance in their power.

9. His Britannic Majesty's Government will continue to conduct the negotiations for the abolition of the existing Capitulations with the various capitulatory Powers, and accept the responsibility for protecting the legitimate interests of foreigners in Egypt. His Majesty's Government will confer with the Egyptian Government before formally concluding these negotiations.

III.—*Military Dispositions.*

10. Great Britain undertakes to support Egypt in the defence of her vital interests and of the integrity of her territory.

For the discharge of these obligations and for the due protection of British Imperial communications, British forces shall have free passage through Egypt, and shall be maintained at such places in Egypt and for such periods as shall from time to time be determined. They shall also at all times have facilities as at present for the acquisition and use of barracks, exercise grounds, aerodromes, naval yards and naval harbours.

IV.—*Employment of Foreign Officers.*

11. In view of the special responsibilities assumed by Great Britain and of the existing position in the Egyptian army and public services, the Egyptian Government undertake not to appoint any foreign officers or officials to any of those services without the previous concurrence of the British High Commissioner.

V.—*Financial Administration.*

12. The Egyptian Government will appoint, in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government, a Financial Commissioner, to whom shall be entrusted in due course the powers at present exercised by the Commissioners of the Debt, and who will more especially be responsible for the punctual payment of the following charges:—

(i.) The charges for the budget of the Mixed Courts.
(ii.) All pensions or other annuities payable to retired foreign officials and their heirs.
(iii.) The budgets of the Financial and Judicial Commissioners and their respective staffs.

13. For the proper discharge of his duties the Financial Commissioner shall be kept fully informed on all matters within the purview of the Ministry of Finance, and shall at all times enjoy the right of access to the President of the Council of Ministers and to the Minister of Finance.

14. No external loan shall be raised nor the revenue of any public service be assigned by the Egyptian Government without the concurrence of the Financial Commissioner.

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VI.—*Judicial Administration.*

15. The Egyptian Government will appoint, in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government, a Judicial Commissioner, who, in virtue of the obligations assumed by Great Britain, shall be charged with the duty of watching the administration of the law in all matters affecting foreigners.

16. For the proper discharge of his duties, the Judicial Commissioner shall be kept fully informed on all matters affecting foreigners which concern the Ministries of Justice and of the Interior, and shall at all times enjoy the right of access to the Egyptian Ministers of Justice and of the Interior.

VII.—*Soudan.*

17. The peaceful development of the Soudan being essential to the security of Egypt and for the maintenance of her water supply, Egypt undertakes to continue to afford the Soudan Government the same military assistance as in the past, or, in lieu thereof, to provide the Soudan Government with financial assistance to an extent to be agreed upon between the two Governments.

All Egyptian forces in the Soudan shall be under the orders of the Governor-General.

Great Britain further undertakes to secure for Egypt her fair share of the waters of the Nile, and to this end it is agreed that no new irrigation works on the Nile or its tributaries south of Wadi Halfa shall be undertaken without the concurrence of a Board of three conservators representing Egypt, the Soudan and Uganda respectively.

VIII.—*Tribute Loans.*

18. The sums which the Khedives of Egypt have from time to time undertaken to pay over to the houses by which the Turkish loans secured on the Egyptian tribute were issued, will be applied as heretofore by the Egyptian Government to the interest and sinking funds of the loans of 1894 and 1891 until the final extinction of those loans.

The Egyptian Government will also continue to apply the sum hitherto paid towards the interest of the guaranteed loan of 1855.

Upon the extinction of these loans of 1894, 1891 and 1855, all liability on the part of the Egyptian Government arising out of the tribute formerly paid by Egypt to Turkey will cease.

IX.—*Retirement and Compensation of Officials.*

19. The Egyptian Government shall be entitled to dispense with the services of British officials at any time after the coming into force of this treaty on condition that such officials shall receive monetary compensation as hereafter provided, in addition to any pension or indemnity to which their conditions of service may entitle them.

On the like condition British officials shall be entitled to resign at any time after the coming into force of this treaty.

The scheme shall apply to pensionable and non-pensionable officials as well as to employees of municipalities, provincial councils or other local bodies.

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20. An official dismissed or retiring under the terms of the preceding clause shall receive in addition to compensation a repatriation allowance sufficient to cover the cost of transporting himself, his family and his household goods to London.

21. Compensation and pensions shall be payable in Egyptian pounds at the fixed rate of 97½ piastres to the pound sterling.

22. A table of compensation, (*a*) for permanent officials, (*b*) for temporary officials, shall be prepared by the president of the Society of Actuaries.

X.—*Protection of Minorities.*

23. Egypt undertakes that the stipulations following shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

24. Egypt undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Egypt without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Egypt shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.

25. All Egyptian nationals shall be equal before the law, and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Egyptian national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Egyptian national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.

26. Egyptian nationals who belong to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Egyptian nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control, at their own expense, charitable, religious and social institutions, schools, and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

No. 2.

REPLY OF THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION TO THE PROPOSALS OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT, HANDED BY ADLY YEGHEN PASHA TO THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON ON NOVEMBER 15, 1921.

La délégation officielle égyptienne a pris connaissance du projet remis à son président par Lord Curzon le 10 courant.

Elle constate que sur la plupart des questions qui ont fait, depuis quatre mois, l'objet de nos discussions et des notes échangées entre nous, le projet reproduit les textes et formules qui nous avaient été présentés au début des négociations et que nous n'avions pas acceptés.

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

Ainsi pour la question militaire, dont l'importance est capitale, le projet maintient, en aggravant même sa portée, la solution que nous avions si fortement combattue. La protection des communications impériales que les conversations de l'an dernier avaient donnée pour seul objectif à la présence d'une force militaire en Égypte, ne saurait justifier cette solution.

Alors qu'il eût été suffisant de déterminer, dans la région du Canal, une zone où seraient localisés et les voies et moyens de communications impériales, et la force qui les protégerait, le projet confère à la Grande-Bretagne le droit de maintenir des forces militaires en tout temps, sur n'importe quel point du territoire égyptien, et met à sa disposition tous les moyens et voies de communications du pays. C'est là l'occupation pure et simple qui détruit toute idée d'indépendance et qui supprime jusqu'à la souveraineté intérieure. Dans le passé, l'occupation militaire, qui n'avait pourtant qu'un caractère temporaire, a suffi pour assurer à la Grande-Bretagne un contrôle absolu sur l'administration tout entière sans que besoin fût d'aucun texte de traité, d'aucune détermination de pouvoir quelconque.

Quant à la question des relations extérieures, seul point où la formule initiale du Foreign Office ait été modifiée par l'acceptation du principe de la représentation, le droit que l'on nous a reconnu est entouré de tant de restrictions qu'il devient en quelque sorte illusoire. On ne conçoit pas que le Ministre des Affaires étrangères puisse librement assumer les responsabilités de sa charge s'il est tenu par une stipulation formelle à être en contact étroit avec le Haut-Commissaire, c'est-à-dire, en fait, à subir son contrôle direct dans la conduite des affaires extérieures. En outre, l'obligation de soumettre au consentement de la Grande-Bretagne tous accords politiques, même ceux qui ne sont pas incompatibles avec l'esprit de l'alliance, porte une grave atteinte au principe de la souveraineté extérieure. Enfin, le fait de maintenir le titre de Haut-Commissaire, qu'il n'est pas dans l'usage de conférer aux représentants diplomatiques auprès des pays indépendants, fait ressortir encore plus le caractère du statut politique proposé pour l'Égypte.

D'autre part, le problème des Capitulations ayant été ajourné, nous avions tout lieu de croire qu'il ne devait plus en être question dans l'accord et qu'il serait traité plus tard par l'Égypte, principale intéressée, avec le concours diplomatique de son alliée. Or, le problème est envisagé aujourd'hui comme intéressant surtout la Grande-Bretagne, qui assume, d'ores et déjà, la protection des intérêts étrangers et compte éventuellement conduire seule les négociations relatives à leur suppression.

Nous ne voulons pas, à propos des deux Commissaires financier et judiciaire et de leur ingérence dans toute l'administration intérieure du pays au nom de la protection des intérêts étrangers, ingérence allant dans certains cas, pour le Conseiller financier, jusqu'à tenir en échec le Gouvernement et le Parlement, revenir sur les objections présentées dans nos différentes notes.

Nous devons dire cependant que des discussions qui ont suivi l'ajournement de la question des Capitulations, nous avons eu le sentiment qu'un accord s'établirait au sujet de la protection des intérêts étrangers sur d'autres bases plus compatibles avec la souveraineté de l'Égypte.

Pour la question du Soudan, qui n'avait pas encore été discutée, nous tenons à faire remarquer qu'elle est l'objet de dispositions

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inacceptables pour nous, dispositions qui n'assurent pas à l'Égypte l'exercice de son droit incontestable de souveraineté sur cette contrée et de contrôle sur les eaux du Nil.

Les observations qui précèdent nous dispensent de faire l'analyse du projet. Elles en font suffisamment ressortir l'esprit et la portée. Et l'insistance avec laquelle le projet revient sur les obligations de la Grande-Bretagne, "les responsabilités spéciales" du Haut-Commissaire et le nouvel objectif—sauvegarde des intérêts vitaux de l'Égypte—donné à la présence de la force militaire achève de lui imprimer le caractère d'une véritable tutelle.

En acceptant la mission que Sa Hautesse le Sultan nous a confiée, nous avions l'espoir de conclure un traité d'alliance, qui, tout en consacrant réellement l'indépendance de l'Égypte, aurait sauvegardé les intérêts britanniques, et l'Égypte alliée de la Grande-Bretagne aurait tenu à honneur de remplir scrupuleusement les obligations qui lui eussent incombé. Mais l'alliance entre deux peuples n'est réalisable qu'à la condition de ne pas constituer pour l'un d'eux un pacte perpétuel de soumission.

L'esprit de conciliation qui a présidé à nos discussions nous autorisait à envisager le résultat des négociations avec confiance. Le projet que nous avons entre les mains ne répond pas à cette attente. Tel qu'il se présente, il ne nous permet pas de conserver l'espoir d'arriver à un accord donnant satisfaction aux aspirations nationales de l'Égypte.

Londres, le 15 *novembre* 1921.

(Translation.)

The Egyptian Official Delegation have taken cognizance of the draft handed to their President by Lord Curzon on the 10th instant.

The Delegation note that with regard to the majority of the questions which have formed the subject of our discussions and of notes exchanged between us during a period of four months, the draft reproduces the texts and the formulæ which were presented to us at the beginning of the negotiations and which we did not accept.

Thus with regard to the military question, which is one of capital importance, the draft not only supports, but even extends the scope of, the solution which we so resolutely opposed. The protection of Imperial communications, which in the conversations of last year was given as the only reason for the presence of a military force in Egypt, could not justify this solution.

While it would have been sufficient to agree upon a zone in the region of the Canal, where the ways and means of Imperial communications and the force for their protection might have been localised, the draft confers on Great Britain the right to maintain military forces at all times, on any part of Egyptian territory, and places at her disposition all the ways and means of communication in the country. This constitutes occupation pure and simple, destroys every idea of independence and suppresses even internal sovereignty. In the past military occupation, although it had only a temporary character, sufficed to guarantee to Great Britain absolute control over the whole administration without the need of any textual treaty or any definition of powers whatever.

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With regard to the question of foreign relations, the only point on which the original formula of the Foreign Office has been modified by the acceptance of the principle of representation, the right which has been recognised as ours is surrounded by so many restrictions that it becomes to a certain extent illusory. It cannot be thought that the Minister for Foreign Affairs would be able freely to undertake the responsibilities of his office, if he were compelled by a formal stipulation to maintain the closest relations with the High Commissoner, that is to say, in fact, to submit to his direct control in the conduct of foreign affairs. Further, the obligation to submit to the consent of Great Britain all political agreements, even those that are not incompatible with the spirit of the alliance, constitutes a serious infringement of the principle of external sovereignty. Finally, the maintenance of the title of High Commissioner, which it is not customary to confer on diplomatic representatives accredited to independent countries, emphasises yet further the character of the political status proposed for Egypt.

Again, the problem of the Capitulations having been postponed, we had every reason to believe that there ought to be no further question of it in the agreement, and that it would be dealt with later by Egypt, the party chiefly interested, with the diplomatic co-operation of her ally. But now the problem is regarded as one that principally interests Great Britain, who takes upon herself from henceforth the protection of foreign interests and intends eventually to carry on alone the negotiations relative to the abolition of the Capitulations.

With regard to the Financial and Judicial Commissioners and their interference, in the name of the protection of foreign interests, with the whole internal administration of the country, interference going so far in certain cases, as regards the Financial Adviser, as to constitute a check on the Government and Parliament, we do not wish to touch again upon the objections put forward in our various notes.

We must, however, say that from the discussions which followed on the postponement of the question of the Capitulations we did receive the impression that an agreement would be reached with regard to the protection of foreign interests on other bases more compatible with the sovereignty of Egypt.

With regard to the question of the Soudan, which had not yet been discussed, we feel bound to point out that it has been made the subject of provisions which we cannot accept, and which do not guarantee to Egypt the exercise of her indisputable right of sovereignty over that country and of control of the waters of the Nile.

The foregoing observations render it unnecessary for us to analyse the draft, the spirit and scope of which they have sufficiently brought out. And the insistence with which it refers to the obligations of Great Britain, "the special responsibilities" of the High Commissioner and the new reason given for the presence of the military force, viz., the protection of the vital interests of Egypt, have the effect of investing the draft with the quality of an actual deed of guardianship.

When we accepted the mission with which His Highness the Sultan entrusted us, we hoped to conclude a treaty of alliance which, while truly establishing the independence of Egypt would have safeguarded British interests, and Egypt as the ally of Great Britain would have held it a point of honour scrupulously to fulfil the obligations which would have been incumbent upon her. But an alliance

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

between two peoples cannot be realised save on the condition that it does not constitute for one of them a permanent pact of subjection.

The conciliatory spirit in which our discussions were conducted entitled us to look forward to the result of the negotiations with confidence. The draft which we have in our hands does not correspond with that expectation. In its present form it does not allow us to retain the hope of arriving at an agreement which will give satisfaction to the national aspirations of Egypt.

London, November 15, 1921.

No. 3.

COMMUNICATION FROM HIS MAJESTY'S HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN TO HIS HIGHNESS THE SULTAN OF EGYPT, DECEMBER 3, 1921.

Your Highness,

I HAVE the honour, in accordance with instructions received from His Majesty's Government, to place before your Highness the following statement of their views in connection with the negotiations that have recently taken place with the delegation despatched by your Highness under the presidency of his Excellency Adly Pasha. His Majesty's Government have presented to Adly Pasha the draft proposals for a treaty between the British Empire and Egypt which they were prepared to recommend to His Majesty the King and to Parliament, and have learnt with keen disappointment that these are not acceptable to him. They regret it the more because they regarded their proposals as liberal in character and far-reaching in effect, and because they cannot hold out any prospect of reconsideration of the principle on which they were framed. It is therefore proper that they should acquaint your Highness fully with the main considerations by which they were guided and with the spirit in which their proposals were made.

One dominant fact has governed the association of Great Britain and Egypt for forty years and must always govern it—namely, the close coincidence between Great Britain's interests in Egypt and the interests of Egypt herself. The independence and the prosperity of the Egyptian people are both of great importance to the British Empire. Egypt lies upon the main line of communications between Great Britain and the King's dominions to the east. The whole territory of Egypt is indeed essential to those communications, since the fortunes of Egypt are inseparable from the security of the Suez Canal Zone. The immunity of Egypt from the dominant influence of any other Great Power is therefore of primary importance to India, Australia, New Zealand and all His Majesty's Eastern colonies and dependencies; it affects the welfare and safety of nearly 350,000,000 of His Majesty's subjects. The prosperity of Egypt is also important to them, not merely because Great Britain and Egypt are each other's best customers, but because any serious danger to financial or commercial interests in Egypt invites the intervention of other Powers and threatens her independence. These have been the governing motives of British association with Egypt, and they are as powerful now as in the past.

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

The general success of that association during the generation which preceded the great war was universally recognised. When Great Britain first began to take an active interest in Egypt, the Egyptian people were a prey to financial chaos and administrative anarchy. They were at the mercy of every comer, and could not have resisted those fatal forms of foreign exploitation which undermine a nation's self-respect and destroy its fibre. If the Egyptian people are a vigorous and self-respecting nation to-day, they owe that recovery largely to British assistance and advice. They have been secured against foreign intervention; they have been helped to create an efficient system of administration; large numbers of them have been trained in the arts of government; their power has steadily grown; their finances have prospered beyond all expectation; the welfare of all classes has been laid on firm foundations. There has been no shadow of exploitation in this rapid development. Great Britain has sought for herself no financial gain or commercial privilege. The Egyptian nation has garnered all the fruits of her counsel and help.

The outbreak of war between the Great European Powers in 1914 made the association between the British Empire and Egypt of necessity more close. When the Ottoman Empire joined the side of Germany, not only Britain's communications but Egypt's independence were forthwith jeopardised. The declaration of the protectorate was a recognition of the fact that only by common action under a single command could the common menace to the Empire and to Egypt be effectively repelled. In the extension of the war brought about by Turkey many thousands of the King's subjects from India, Australia and New Zealand as well as from Great Britain were maimed or killed. Their graves in Gallipoli, Palestine and Irak stand as witness of the great effort which Turkish intervention cost the British Commonwealth. Covered by their ranks, Egypt passed scatheless through that period of ordeal. Her losses were inconsiderable; her debt was not increased; her wealth is now greater than before the war, whilst economic paralysis lies heavy on most other lands. It is not wise for her people to overlook these facts or forget to whom they are owed. But for the power exerted by the British Empire in the war, Egypt must have become a field of action between contending forces, which would have trampled on her rights and destroyed her prosperity. But for the victory of the Allies, she would not now be a nation claiming sovereign national status in lieu of the protectorate of a foreign Power. The freedom which she enjoys and the prospect of higher freedom to which she aspires she owes alike to British statesmanship and British arms.

His Majesty's Government are convinced that the close coincidence of interests between Great Britain and Egypt which has made their association so mutually beneficial in the past is the key to the relationship which they should still maintain. Now, as in the past, the British Empire has to shoulder ultimate responsibility for the defence of your Highness's territories against external menace, as also for such assistance as your Highness's Government may at any time request in the maintenance of your authority at home. It must claim, moreover, the exclusive right of tendering such advice as your Highness's Government may require in the administration of the country, the conduct of its finances, the development of its judicial system and the pursuance of its relations with foreign Governments.

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

These claims are not, however, asserted with any desire to derogate from Egypt's enjoyment of the full rights of national self-government. They are pressed only as against other foreign Powers; and they are based upon the fact that the independence, good order and prosperity of Egypt are an essential element in the safety of the British Empire. His Majesty's Government regret that throughout the negotiations your Highness's delegation made little practical advance towards recognition of the British Empire's just title to these exclusive rights and responsibilities.

The treaty provisions which His Majesty's Government consider necessary to maintain these rights and cover these responsibilities were formulated in the draft proposals which Adly Pasha will communicate to your Highness. Of these the most essential are those relating to British troops. His Majesty's Government gave most careful consideration to the arguments advanced by the Egyptian delegation on this subject, and were unable to accept them. Neither the present condition of the world nor the course of events in Egypt since the armistice permits of any modification at this time in the disposition of the British forces. Egypt, it is necessary to repeat, is a part of the Empire's communications. Scarcely a generation has passed since she was rescued from anarchy, and there are signs that the extremer elements in the Nationalist movement are even now capable of plunging her back into the abyss from which she has so recently been raised. The anxiety of His Majesty's Government on this point has been aggravated by the unwillingness of your Highness's delegation to recognise that the British Empire must have firm guarantees against any such menace to its interests. Until such time as Egypt's record gives confidence in her own guarantees, the British Empire must maintain sufficient guarantees itself. Of these the presence of British troops in Egypt is the first and foremost. His Majesty's Government cannot waive or weaken it.

They repeat, however, with emphasis that their claims in this respect are not intended to involve the continuance of an actual or virtual protectorate. On the contrary, the ideal which they have sincerely at heart is that of an Egypt enjoying the national prerogatives and international position of a sovereign State, but closely wedded to the British Empire by a treaty guarantee of common aims and interests. With this end in view, they proposed to terminate the protectorate forthwith, to recognise Egypt as "a Sovereign State under a constitutional monarchy," and to substitute for the present relation between the Empire and Egypt "a perpetual treaty and bond of peace, amity and alliance." Their hope was that Egypt, with a reconstituted Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would at once have despatched her own representatives to foreign courts; and they would readily have supported an application on her part for admission to the League of Nations. The Egyptian nation would have thus secured at once the powers and privileges of a sovereign State.

The rejection of these proposals by your Highness's existing Government creates a new situation. It will not affect the principle of British policy, but it necessarily reduces the measures which can now be carried out. His Majesty's Government therefore desire to state clearly where they stand.

With regard to the immediate present, they cannot give effect to their proposals without the consent and co-operation of the Egyptian nation; but they maintain the desire, which they have long enter-

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

tained, to provide for the ever-advancing development of native talent by an increase in the number of Egyptians employed in every branch, and notably in the higher branches of the Administration, hitherto too extensively filled by Europeans. They are willing to pursue in consultation with your Highness's Government the negotiations in foreign courts necessary for the abolition of the Capitulations, so that the international situation may be clear when the Egyptian legislation necessary to take the place of the Capitulations is ready to be passed. They would wish that the powers now exercised by the commander-in-chief under martial law should be exercised only under the Egyptian civil law by the Egyptian Government, and they will gladly withdraw martial law as soon as the Act of Indemnity, which is indispensable for the protection of that Government as well as of the British authorities in Egypt, has been enacted and become operative in all the civil and criminal courts in Egypt.

With regard to the future, His Majesty's Government desire to state in plain terms the policy which they intend to pursue. They understand that the proposals presented to your Highness's delegation were rejected on the ground that the safeguards for British and foreign interests contained in them would be fatal to the genuine exercise of self-government. They deeply regret that the maintenance of British troops in Egypt and the association of British officials with the Ministries of Justice and Finance should be so gravely misunderstood. The progress of Egypt towards her ideals will not only be retarded, but completely jeopardised, if her people are tempted to indulge their national aspirations, however sound and legitimate in themselves, without sufficient regard to the facts which govern international life. Nothing is gained by minimising national obligations and exaggerating national rights. Extremist leaders who preach in this vein are not a stimulus but a menace to Egyptian development. By their influence on the course of events, they have repeatedly challenged the interests and provoked the fears of foreign Powers; and they have sought to affect the outcome of these negotiations during the past few weeks by subversive appeals to popular ignorance and passion. His Majesty's Government do not consider that they would be consulting Egypt's welfare by making concessions to agitation of this kind: and Egypt will make no progress until her responsible leaders show the will and strength to put it down. The world is suffering in many places at the present time from the cult of a fanatical and purely disruptive type of nationalism. His Majesty's Government will set their face against it as firmly in Egypt as elsewhere. Those who yield to it only make more necessary and so prolong the maintenance of those foreign sanctions which they denounce.

In these conditions, for Egypt's interest as much as for their own, His Majesty's Government will continue unshaken in their aims as Egypt's advisers and trustees. It is not sufficient for them to know that they could exercise the right of re-entry into Egypt, if, left to her own unaided counsels, she should revert to the waste and disorder of the last century. They desire to see the work of Lord Cromer's generation completed, not recommenced. They do not aim at keeping Egypt in tutelage. On the contrary, they desire to fortify the constructive elements in Egyptian nationalism, to give them scope, and to bring nearer the full attainment of the national ideal. But they must insist on effective rights and powers to safeguard both Egypt's

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

interests and their own until the Egyptian people have shown the capacity themselves to preserve their country from internal disorder and its inevitable corollary, the intervention of foreign Powers.

The true line of advance for the Egyptian people is by co-operation with the British Empire, and not by antagonism to it. In this spirit of co-operation His Majesty's Government on their side are prepared to consider any methods which may be suggested for carrying out the substance of their proposals, whenever your Highness's Government may so desire. They cannot, however, modify the principle on which their proposals are based or relax the essential safeguards which they contain. The future of Egypt under these proposals would be in the Egyptian people's own hands. The more clearly your people recognise the identity of British interests with their own, the less necessary will safeguards become. It is for the responsible leaders of Egypt, in this second generation of her association with Great Britain, to prove by their aceptance and steady use of the national status now open to them that the vital interests of the Empire in their country may be progressively entrusted to their care.

I am,
Your Highness's, &c.
ALLENBY, *F.M.*

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

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

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EGYPT No. 1 (1922).

Correspondence

RESPECTING

Affairs in Egypt

[In continuation of "Egypt No. 4 (1921)."]

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

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

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Correspondence respecting Affairs in Egypt.

No. 1.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, November 17, 1921.*

MY following telegram contains text of a joint memorandum which the British advisers to the Egyptian Government have handed to me.

I consider it expedient that you should be informed of the opinions of the advisers, as I understand that a further conference with Adly Pasha will take place very shortly.

It is an unquestionable fact that any settlement of which Egypt did not approve would render it difficult or even impracticable to continue to carry out the administrative functions of the Government.

No. 2.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, November 17, 1921.*

FOLLOWING is memorandum referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"Adviser to Ministry of Interior, Acting Financial Adviser, Adviser to Ministry of Education, and Acting Judicial Adviser are unanimously of following view, that a decision which does not admit principle of Egyptian independence and which maintains protectorate must entail serious risk of revolution throughout the country and in any case result in complete administrative chaos, rendering government impossible. It must be realised that the whole structure of government is Egyptian and that British officials are, almost exclusively, either in advisory, inspecting, or technical capacities. It is therefore impossible to exercise any British control without full Egyptian co-operation in all branches of administration, as was shown in the spring of 1919, when an attempt had been made to carry on Government without a Ministry and with a considerable portion of Egyptian staff on strike. Unless His Majesty's Government are prepared to give substantial satisfaction to expectations which Egyptians have legitimately formed on the basis of apparent policy of His Majesty's Government during the past two years, it will be impossible to form any Ministry. Strong military force acting with severity could doubtless preserve certain measure of security to life and property in larger cities,

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

but the task would be a much more difficult one in the provinces. No military administration, however, could hope to replace the complicated machinery of civil government or prevent serious injury to financial and economic interests. The advisers have been carrying on over two years in the belief that policy of liberal concessions would be adopted, and have undoubtedly given this impression to various Ministers and others with whom they have been in contact. They feel bound therefore to point out that if a contrary policy is adopted they cannot expect to retain the confidence of Egyptian Ministers or to be able to render useful service in the future. If, on the other hand, a liberal programme is approved by His Majesty's Government, they are confident that it could be elaborated on the spot and a Ministry formed to carry it out, even if no Egyptian Minister is prepared to-day to sign official convention containing that programme as full satisfaction of Egyptian claims."

No. 3.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 18, 1921.

IN view of the fact that you were present at the meetings of the Cabinet when the terms to be offered to Adly were decided, we cannot help feeling rather surprised that you failed to point out to the advisers that they were proceeding in total ignorance of the true position when in their memorandum mentioned in your telegram of yesterday's date they described the decision of His Majesty's Government as maintaining the protectorate and as refusing to accept the principle of Egyptian independence.

This error, which you should immediately explain to them, renders their argument to a large extent unsound. You should at the same time convey to them confidentially a general outline of the concessions which His Majesty's Government were not only ready to offer but did actually offer in the draft treaty communicated to Adly, which he refused.

His Majesty's Government now propose to adopt the following procedure. A copy of the draft treaty, together with the reply of the delegation, has already been sent to you by bag, and Adly will have no doubt communicated them to the Sultan. In a few days the text of a note fully explaining and defending the attitude taken up by His Majesty's Government will be communicated to you. This note you will in due course address to the Sultan, and it, together with the draft treaty and the Egyptian delegation's reply, should be simultaneously made public in England and Egypt. Meanwhile, the press here are being informed that publication in the manner described above will shortly take place and that in the interim no credence should be given to partial or premature disclosures.

Until publication takes place we trust that you will avail yourself of any suitable occasion to defend the very generous concessions which His Majesty's Government were ready to make and to refute misrepresentations of their intentions.

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

No. 4.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 6, 1921.*

AT the present moment I have no definite information as to the possibility either of keeping the existing Ministry in power or of forming a fresh one on the lines of the declaration lately made by His Majesty's Government. Sultan, however, thinks that in the event of Adly's resignation, which appears likely, he will be able to form a fresh Ministry without undue trouble.

Taking it for granted that a Ministry can be formed which is willing to base its policy upon the text of the paragraph in His Majesty's Government's declaration which commences with the words "With regard to immediate present," I consider the present moment is a favourable one for His Majesty's Government to adopt a strong line calculated to supply a constructive programme to those Egyptians who are not unwilling to co-operate with us.

In the course of his last interview with your Lordship, Adly Pasha asked why His Majesty's Government did not on its own initiative bring into operation the plan indicated in the draft treaty which was rejected. Your answer did not seem to negative the possibility of such a step, provided an Egyptian Ministry could be formed which would be prepared to work with us. The recent declaration once more lays down that the scheme contained in the draft convention cannot be put into operation unless the Egyptian nation agrees thereto and is prepared to work with us. The last paragraph, however, declares that His Majesty's Government are ready to consider any means of putting the scheme into operation whenever Egyptian Government so wish. During the past twelve months I have more than once given it as my opinion that no signed agreement was practicable unless His Majesty's Government were prepared to accord to Egypt a higher degree of independence than they are clearly disposed to grant, and that it would therefore eventually be incumbent upon them to define their own policy and give effect to it.

The situation which I foresaw has come into existence, and it behoves us to deal with it.

Is your Lordship prepared to give me discretionary power, if I think the moment has arrived, to tell the Sultan that His Majesty's Government are ready to bring into force, as circumstances demand, the principal proposals contained in the scheme embodied in the draft treaty, and to supply him with them as a programme either for a new Ministry or for the existing one if it continues in office?

I consider that the draft treaty definitely represents a policy which fulfils all our requirements so far as Egypt is concerned. This policy confers upon the people of Egypt a substantially greater participation in the conduct of their internal affairs, but at the same time ensures that our own vital interests are adequately safeguarded. A distinct benefit that would ensue, when it was put into operation, would be that it would place responsibility on native Egyptians in respect of certain matters for which it is only right that they should be made responsible. Nobody who realises the developments which have recently taken place in Egyptian administration can fail to appreciate the great handicap we are under, thanks to the existing system of dual responsibility whereby

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the Ministry is enabled to impute to the British authorities the blame for any errors that are made, and at the same time to take the credit for all administrative successes in Egypt.

This handicap would, I think, be in a great measure removed by the provisions of the draft scheme, while the concession which it contains would not enfeeble or weaken the ultimate degree of influence which it behoves us to retain.

I quite appreciate that the action I advocate would oblige His Majesty's Government to terminate the protectorate by a unilateral declaration on their part. You will recall that a step such as this was at one time suggested, and I cannot see why it should not be taken.

The main argument for insistence on the word "protectorate" is its value in connection with negotiations with foreign Powers. Apart from this, the term actually signifies very little, in addition to which it connotes a state of affairs which Egyptians dislike excessively. As regards Egypt, certain features of the political situation have rendered it impracticable in several ways to carry out a policy of protection even in the least stringent sense of the word. At the present time Egyptians are not looked upon as British subjects, and the introduction of an Egyptian nationality law is under consideration. Any further application of international conventions to Egypt as forming a portion of the British Empire has been suspended. When one considers that the procedure to which we must conform demands that all measures affecting such matters shall receive the assent of an Egyptian Council of Ministers, one realises that there is small chance either now or hereafter of our getting these and other similar vital questions satisfactorily settled on the basis of a protectorate.

These circumstances must eventually lower our prestige, and should therefore not be permitted to continue.

His Majesty's Government's declaration to the Sultan is equivalent to the declaration of a British Monroe Doctrine over Egypt. Under that declaration no foreign Power can any longer have any interest in the question of what term we elect to employ in order to define our relations with Egypt. From an international aspect our policy is perfectly clear, and our position in relation to foreign countries should be unaffected if we choose to replace the protectorate proclaimed in 1914 by the recognition of Egypt as a sovereign State, as indicated in the draft treaty.

It is only after careful examination of all the questions at issue that I have decided to recommend the adoption of the above proposals, which are endorsed by my local advisers, whom I have consulted on the matter.

No. 5.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 7.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 7, 1921.*

ADLY PASHA called to see me this afternoon and said he was going to see the Sultan to-morrow, and would probably offer his resignation which he had already discussed with His Highness.

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

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In that case Sultan would probably offer premiership to Sarwat. Sarwat, however, was in difficulty as to programme on which he could take office and form Ministry, and Adly thought Sarwat would come to me and ask for advice.

Adly assured me that he personally would continue to support Sultan's Government, and forces of law and order.

He added that, though disappointed at his failure, he did not despair of the future.

No. 6.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(Extract.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 8, 1921.

A DEFINITE statement was made by the Prime Minister on the 27th October, in reply to a question in the House of Commons that relations between this country and Egypt would not be modified until Parliament had been afforded an opportunity of discussing the question. In view of this undertaking it would clearly be impossible as contemplated in your telegram of the 6th December to establish the new régime which the withdrawal of the protectorate would imply. We shall be in a better position to appreciate how far public opinion will approve our going when Parliament meets next year, and has discussed the papers laid before it.

No. 7.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 11.)

(Extract.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December* 11, 1921.

I MUST ask your Lordship and His Majesty's Government to believe me when I state the fact that no Egyptian, no matter what his personal opinions may be, can sign any instrument which in his view is incompatible with complete independence. Consequently, it is necessary to abandon definitely the idea that the Egyptian question can be settled by means of a treaty.

His Majesty's Government therefore must renounce the hope of obtaining the advantages to be derived from a treaty in return for concessions which they may make to Egyptians. The relationship of Great Britain to Egypt to-day resembles that of Turkey prior to the outbreak of the war, and, when concessions were made by Turkey to Egypt in the past, the procedure which she followed was unilateral in character—for instance, certain rights were conferred on the Khedives of Egypt by a series of firmans between the years 1840 and 1892. Of these concessions the most important was that of 1873, bestowing certain rights with regard to the conduct of foreign relations. The action of Great Britain in withdrawing from Egypt what Turkey had conceded is to-day more resented than anything else.

The concession under which the draft treaty allowed Egypt to conduct her own foreign relations is, from the point of view of His

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

Majesty's Government, surrounded by safeguards in all really essential points. As regards foreign Powers, it is for Great Britain in the last resort to uphold the validity of the exceptional position to which she lays claim, whilst it is for me to see that the safeguards mentioned above are respected by Egyptians. It would be impossible for any foreign Power, without flouting the terms of my recent letter to the Sultan, to start intriguing in Egypt. The terms of that letter are clearly aimed more at foreign Powers than at Egypt, so that if this particular issue ever arises it must be decided by suitable diplomatic pressure which we are in a position to use rather than by any pledges which we may have succeeded in securing from Egypt.

I feel that insufficient consideration has been given to the disabilities under which, as a result of the policy of the protectorate, British administration in this country labours, and a fresh basis on which to frame our policy is quite as essential from our point of view as it is desirable in the eyes of Egyptians. Almost the chief aim of British policy has been to win the friendship of Egypt, and, unless we are ready to prove by our action that we have confidence in Egyptians, it seems to me unlikely that we shall induce them to co-operate with us.

The resignation of Adly Pasha is reported in the newspapers, and I am going to see the Sultan to-day, as I have not been informed officially of this development.

No. 8.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 12, 1921.*

I SAW the Sultan yesterday morning, 11th December.

His Highness confirmed fact that Adly had resigned, but said that no decision had been taken as regards formation of a new Ministry. He was seeing Sarwat Pasha that afternoon. Later in the day Sarwat Pasha called to see me on His Highness's instructions and submitted a programme on which he declared himself ready to take office.

Following are essential points of his proposed declaration of policy:—

1. Taking note, in memorandum of 10th November which was handed to official Egyptian delegation, only of undertaking of British Government to terminate protectorate and to recognise Egypt as a sovereign State, and while not being able to accept memorandum or to recommend it to acceptance of the country, Ministry will devote themselves henceforth—and in so doing will be helped by attitude of the country—to showing Great Britain that she has no need of increase of or accumulation of guarantees, seeing that good faith of Egypt and interest which she has in respecting undertakings given would constitute best and most effective of safeguards for British and other foreign interests.

2. To this end Ministry rely not only upon justice of national cause, but also upon equitable spirit of British nation and upon a just appreciation of reciprocal interests of the two countries.

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

3. Ministry are persuaded that there will be no obstacle in the near future to restoring a normal régime in Egypt which will permit of granting of constitution to the country assuring an effective and serious co-operation between the Government and the country's elected representatives.

Ministry intend forthwith, strengthened by approval of your Highness, to work out scheme of constitutional reform in order that in their political task they may rely upon a true national representation and may bring to a successful issue a whole series of urgent reforms which moral and economic progress of the country demands.

4. Cabinet consider that the moment has come to re-establish functions of Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which circumstances of war temporarily suspended.

5. Finally, realising responsibility of their task, Ministry will devote themselves to taking up the burden and to directing affairs of the country solely in national interests.

6. Ministry, knowing intentions cherished by your Highness for good of the country, do not doubt that they will find in your Highness a support for carrying out of their programme. They also count on confidence of the country to face a task of which they feel all the difficulties.

No. 9.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 12, 1921.*

SARWAT explains with regard to the first point mentioned in my preceding telegram of to-day's date that he hopes His Majesty's Government will see their way to abolish the protectorate in the near future, though he does not expect them to do so immediately.

The idea underlying the fourth point in Sarwat's programme is that Egypt should revert to the conditions which prevailed in 1914 before a protectorate was declared.

He has no objection to the appointment of someone to succeed Mr. Greg in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and he wishes that the relations between the Egyptian Government and the representative of His Majesty's Government should take the form of those which existed with the British agents in pre-war days.

He feels confident that he can form a Ministry on the basis of this programme, which, however, he insists must first be approved by His Majesty's Government. I think that Sarwat can be trusted to be as good as his word, and it is courageous of him to come forward when the task confronting any Ministry is bound to be difficult owing to the disappointment and resulting hostility amongst all parties towards the recent declaration of His Majesty's Government.

I would be grateful if your Lordship could inform me without delay of your attitude towards the programme of which I earnestly recommend the approval.

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

No. 10.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 15, 1921.

YOU may assent generally to the programme suggested by Sarwat Pasha as described in your second telegram of the 12th instant. As regards the first point, however, it is necessary, in order to obviate any misunderstanding, to recall explicitly that no "undertaking" has been given by His Majesty's Government to abolish the protectorate and to recognise Egypt as a sovereign State. His Majesty's Government only offered to adopt this course as part of a bargain which was rejected by the other party.

I do not wish to give rise to any suspicion as to our good faith or to render your task more difficult, but you may be able to obtain the substitution of "offer" for the word "undertaking" in the programme proposed by Sarwat.

No. 11.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 20.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December* 20, 1921.

SARWAT PASHA has not yet been able to collect a Ministry, in spite of his programme having been approved. I am not hurrying him unduly, and I am doing all I can to persuade members of the Adly Party to join the Government, for I feel that the party must go to pieces if they fail to come forward now. Zaghlul will then be the only gainer from what will amount to a surrender on their part.

Zaghlul announced that a meeting would take place next Friday. Yesterday I prohibited it in the interests of public security.

I am quite prepared to take the necessary action with regard to Zaghlul if he gives trouble, whereas if he makes no protest I shall have achieved my object. Should it prove necessary to deport him I hope arrangements can be made for him to be detained in some British overseas possession, as he ought not to be permitted to go anywhere in Europe.

No. 12.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 21.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December* 21, 1921.

MY telegram of 20th December.

Zaghlul has published in press protest against my order prohibiting his meeting on Friday. He characterises veto as first instalment of the new British policy, and makes appeal to Egyptians to show equal determination.

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

Yesterday Cairo was scene of disorder on the occasion of return of Professor Makram, Zaghlul's agent in London. Zaghlul met him at the station and was cheered by the crowds lining the streets, and anti-British cries were heard. In the evening two soldiers, one of the King's regiment and one of the East Surrey regiment, were shot in the streets in lower quarter of Cairo. One was killed, the other wounded. Assassins escaped.

I am to-day issuing an order under martial law prohibiting all further participation by Zaghlul in politics. His press is also being warned against further agitation. His more prominent adherents, Atif Barakat Bey, Fathalla Barakat Pasha, Mustafa-el-Nahas Bey, Sinnot Hanna Bey, Amin Ezz-el-Arab Effendi, Gaafar Fakhry Bey and William Makram Obeid Effendi, have been ordered to their homes under police supervision, and to refrain from political activities.

No. 13.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 23, 1921.*

LAST paragraph of my telegram of 20th December and my telegram of 21st December.

I have received Zaghlul's reply to my instructions to him to go to his country residence, and to take no further part in politics. The text of it is contained in my following telegram. I have also received letters from the following of his adherents associating themselves with him:—

William Makram,
Sinnot Hanna,
Mustafa Nahas.

The others who were warned have not at present replied, except Sadik Henein. His name was added to the list later and he has obeyed.

Last night I gave directions for the arrest of Zaghlul and of his three adherents mentioned above. The arrest of Zaghlul was carried out without incident this morning. I have sent him to Suez, where he will await deportation in the Indian transit camp.

I should be glad to receive by telegraph your authorisation to deport him and his associates, which I will then do as soon as possible. It is most important that this should be done without delay.

Ceylon would be, in my opinion, the most suitable destination, as it is remembered as the place of Arabi's captivity, and the name would therefore produce considerable effect.

I will let you know later by telegraph what I consider to be the effect on the country of the measures I have taken.

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

No. 14.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 23, 1921.*

FOLLOWING is the message referred to in my immediately preceding telegram from Zaghlul to adviser of the Ministry of the Interior:—

"I have the honour to inform you that I have received your letter of to-day's date, in which you communicate to me order of Field-Marshal Allenby preventing me from working in politics, and compelling me to go to my farm without delay to live there under surveillance of the Mudir. This is tyrannical order, against which I protest with all my power, because there is no justification for it.

"As I am delegated by the people of Egypt to strive for her independence, no one else has any authority to free me from this sacred duty. Therefore I shall remain at my post, loyal to my duty, and force can do what it wishes with us individually and collectively, as we are all prepared to meet what may befall us with a steady heart and a calm conscience, knowing that any possible measures used against our lawful endeavours will only help the country to realise her aspirations to complete independence."

No. 15.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 23, 1921.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Last evening there were demonstrations outside Zaghlul's house. Demonstrators were dispersed by police. Two rioters were killed and nine wounded.

Sinnot Hanna, Mustafa Nahas, and Makram, together with two Barakats, were arrested this afternoon, having refused to obey my instructions. They are proceeding forthwith to Suez. Action taken has caused considerable excitement and state of Cairo has been restless during the day. There has been considerable sabotage and hooliganism. At 10 A.M. military authorities took over the town in accordance with previous arrangements. Disturbance cannot as yet be said to be considerable, though it is general. Troops have had to fire, and as far as is at present ascertained two Egyptians have been killed and one wounded. One was ringleader in erecting a barricade to impede progress of troops, the other was killed after a revolver shot had been fired at lorry full of troops.

Zaghlul Pasha has arrived at Suez and is lodged in Indian transit camp.

At Alexandria there was demonstration, which was dispersed. Considerable number of seditious pamphlets have been distributed.

Only report received from provinces states that at Tanta there have been demonstrations, but British troops have been sent there to-day and situation is in hand.

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

No. 16.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 23, 1921.

THERE is no objection, so far as the Colonial Office are concerned, to your deporting Zaghlul and his adherents to Ceylon at the earliest opportunity, as suggested in your telegram of 23rd December. Instructions are being sent to the Governor of Ceylon accordingly, but, should it prove undesirable to detain them there owing to local considerations, they could be sent to the Seychelles. It is known that the necessary accommodation could be had at the Seychelles.

Full details as to date of sailing from Suez and composition of the party should be telegraphed direct to the Governor of Ceylon.

No. 17.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December* 24, 1921.

I MUCH appreciate your telegram of 23rd instant.

It may assist your Lordship if I report recent events which have led to deportation of Zaghlul and his principal associates.

Draft treaty, and especially my letter to the Sultan, were received with great resentment, which took in particular the form of nightly demonstrations in Cairo. There is no doubt that these were the work of Zaghlulist organisation preparatory to Zaghlul himself resuming open activity. A week ago commandant of police stated that his men were being put to great strain, as they were being stoned nightly. On 19th December, as reported in my telegram of 20th December, I prohibited a meeting which Zaghlul had called and which was bound to lead to disorder. Zaghlul replied with a manifesto, in which he stated that this prohibition marked the beginning of a new British policy of absolute despotism.

Meanwhile elections for native bar council had taken place; none but Zaghlulists were elected. Previous resolutions which favoured Adly Ministry were rescinded and a five-days' strike was declared. This was generally and rightly regarded as omen of a landslide in favour of Zaghlul and of a period of intensive striking. I may recall that in Greece last year similar elections were one of the first signs of collapse of M. Veniselos.

On 20th December, William Makram, Zaghlul's chief agent in England, had arrived in Alexandria. He delivered provocative speech there and came to Cairo; received ovations at stations on the way on 21st December. He was met by Zaghlul, and they drove across the town together through large crowds which added "Down with Allenby!" to usual cries for independence.

That night two British soldiers were shot in the streets of Cairo and one was killed. On 22nd December I ordered Zaghlul to go to

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his country house and to take no further part in politics, and I gave orders that his principal associates should retire to their country houses.

Subsequent events are recorded in my telegrams of 23rd instant.

No. 18.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 24, 1921.*

MY third telegram of 23rd instant.

Revised list of casualties in Cairo is as follows: British, none; Egyptians, three killed, fourteen wounded.

Disposal of the nine persons ordered by me to abstain from political activities is as follows: six are now at Suez pending embarkation for Ceylon by transport on 28th December; three, Sadek Henein, Amin Ezz-el-Arab, and Gaafar Fakhry, have obeyed my order and are under police supervision.

Cairo.—Town is still disturbed, and sporadic demonstrations accompanied by sabotage have been reported throughout the day. Helouan railway was damaged during the night and a train derailed this morning. No one was injured. Attempts to set fire to Boulac workshops and Ministry of Education stores early this morning were frustrated.

Attendance of Government officials at Ministries to-day was not satisfactory. Finance and Interior were normal, Education and Public Works bad, and remainder fair. Attempts are being made to intimidate officials. The schools are generally on strike.

Alexandria.—There have been minor demonstrations and some sabotage. Schools are on strike.

Provinces.—Upper Egypt is quiet, though some apprehension is reported at Assiout.

Lower Egypt is unsettled. The situation at Tanta has improved since the arrival of British troops. Railway and telegraph between Zagazig and Ismailia were cut and repaired. Demonstrations occurred in Zagazig. In Damanhur demonstrations created a menacing situation, and crowd succeeded in calling out Delta light railway employees, but police subsequently restored order. Detachments of Egyptian troops have been sent to all Mudiria towns throughout the country. Two aeroplanes are at Assiout and one is proceeding to Assouan. Cairo and Delta are being patrolled by aeroplanes. Eight Nile steamers armed with machine-guns are proceeding in charge of naval officers to Upper Egypt on 26th December.

No. 19.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 25, 1921.*

MY second telegram of 24th instant.

Resignation of Adly Pasha's Cabinet was accepted yesterday by the Sultan.

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

Cairo.—There has been less actual disorder, but situation remains unsettled. A Government girls' school was attacked this morning and considerable damage done.

Schools are all on strike. Government officials' strike is now general. It has been declared for three days, and is being enforced by intimidation. I am taking steps to protect those who wish to work.

Number of Egyptians killed in Cairo is eleven. One European—an eccentric living in poor quarter—was murdered by mob on 23rd. English lady driving in open cab was attacked and stoned by roughs on Friday in Boulac quarter. She escaped serious injury using as a shield her sunshade which was broken by stones. This is the first case of attack on a woman in the whole of the last three years. Total arrests up to date, 186.

Alexandria—No change. Situation is under control. Total arrests up to date, 389, of whom 223 are boys. H.M.S. "Ceres" and "Senator" have arrived.

Canal zone: Port Said.—Persistent demonstrations occurred this morning, and finally town was handed over to military, who were compelled to fire on crowd which had refused to disperse after a warning. Casualties: one Egyptian killed and three wounded. Military forces are assisted by ninety bluejackets from guard-ship.

Ismailia.—H.M.S. "Sparrowhawk" arrives to-morrow.

Suez.—Town was to-day taken over by military, who were forced to fire on demonstrations which refused to disperse after warnings from Egyptian police and British officers. Casualties: one Egyptian killed, three wounded. H.M.S. "Sikh" arrives to-morrow morning.

Upper Egypt.—No disorder. Arrests are being made of well-known agitators from Cairo, amongst them Kamel Hussein, the lawyer of syndicalist movement in this country.

Lower Egypt.—No disorder except for a demonstration at Zagazig, which was dispersed by Egyptian camel corps. Propaganda is being spread by students.

No. 20.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received December* 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December* 26, 1921.

MY telegram of 25th inst.

Cairo.—Attendance of Government officials in Ministries has improved to-day.

Schools are still on strike. There have been some demonstrations to-day in the poorer quarters of the town. A crowd attacked Darb-el-Ahmar police station this morning. Light armoured car which went to assist the police was stoned and fired on and retaliated on the crowd killing four and wounding five.

In the afternoon in the same quarter crowd erected barricades which army lorry was sent to demolish. It was opposed and fired to disperse the crowd inflicting casualties. At Azhar political meetings have been held.

Alexandria.—Situation is quiet.

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Canal zone: Port Said.—Situation still disturbed. Demonstrations accompanied by sabotage continue in native quarters and trouble is caused by intimidation.

Suez.—No further incidents have occurred.

Upper Egypt.—No disorder except at Girga where police were forced to fire on hostile demonstration, inflicting casualties. There was general three hours' strike to-day of telegraph operators.

Lower Egypt.—At Tanta where there is now a full British battalion, there is general strike, except Mudiria officials. At Zifta, mob which attacked Markaz building was repulsed by Egyptian army who fired, inflicting casualties, one killed and two wounded. Platoon of British troops has been sent there.

No. 21.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cario, December 27, 1921.*

MY telegram of 26th instant.

Situation in the country has improved during the last twenty-four hours. Work has been resumed in practically all Government offices on normal basis.

Cairo schools are still on strike and have been closed by advice.

No serious incidents are reported from large towns, though in Cairo, Damanhur and Minia there have been small demonstrations which were dealt with without difficulty. Situation at Port Said has considerably improved.

No. 22.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, January 12, 1922.*

FOLLOWING is list referred to in my following telegram:—

Abdel Khalek Sarwat Pasha, ex Minister.
Ismail Sidki Pasha, ex Minister.
Ibrahim Fathy Pasha, ex Minister.
Gaafer Wali Pasha, ex Minister.
Mustafa Fathy Pasha, procureur-général.
Mustafa Maher Pasha, ex official Wakfs Ministry and vice-president of General Agricultural Syndicate.
Mohammed Shukry Pasha, ex Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice.
Wassif Simeika Bey, Judge of Native Court of Appeal.

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

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No. 23.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, January 12, 1922.*

YOUR telegram of the 15th ultimo.

I propose with your Lordship's approval to address to the Sultan a letter, the text of which is given in my following telegram, and at the same time to announce that a Ministry has been formed under Sarwat Pasha, the names of whom are reported in my preceding telegram. The list was brought to me by Sarwat this evening, and constitutes a powerful and representative Ministry. There is no doubt that Sarwat has succeeded in winning over the soundest elements in Egypt. The politicians mentioned have definitely undertaken on the policy of my draft letter to the Sultan to take office under Sarwat.

The intention of the first four paragraphs of my draft letter to His Highness is to remove misapprehension regarding the letter which under your instructions I addressed to him on 3rd December. The articles of the draft treaty, which have been most misrepresented, are dealt with in paragraph 5. The motive of the deportation of Zaghlul and his associates is explained in paragraph 7. The goodwill of His Majesty's Government is emphasised in paragraphs 8 and 9, and I concur in the principles of Sarwat's programme in the two subsequent paragraphs. Those matters which formed part of the draft treaty, but are not referred to in Sarwat's programme, are as stated in paragraph 13 reserved for subsequent discussion. The question of the compensation of British officials is not mentioned, but the views of Sarwat are quite reasonable on this subject, which can be dealt with separately whenever the Egyptian Government desire.

The question of British troops in Egypt is covered by reservation A. Articles 6, 11 and 14 of draft treaty are covered by reservation B. Articles 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18 and 23 to 26 are covered by reservation C.

Paragraph 10 of draft letter, however, makes, as you will observe, a concession over the protectorate, which is more than Sarwat, as stated in the first paragraph of my second telegram of 12th December, originally contemplated.

It was stated in the last paragraph of the former letter to the Sultan that His Majesty's Government were prepared to consider any methods which might be suggested for carrying out the substance of their proposals. Such a method is contained in the scheme now put forward (*cf.* my following telegram, paragraph 13).

The disorders following on Zaghlul's deportation were shorter and less serious than might well have been anticipated. Many Egyptians viewed it correctly not as a tyrannical act of repression, but as a necessary preliminary to a final effort to create friendly relations between the two countries, which are surely sought for by His Majesty's Government and which the Egyptians, though their hopes have not hitherto been realised, still desire. They therefore considered the deportations both necessary and desirable. This promise to abolish the protectorate is, I am convinced, the only way to retain the goodwill of those political elements in Egypt which

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

have dealt with us honestly and lent us their support at times when it was difficult enough for them to do so, and in this way also we shall lessen the enmity of hostile elements.

It seems to me equally certain that the present is the most suitable moment for this concession. We cannot hope that the atmosphere of calm expectancy which now exists will continue unless we give some striking proof of our conciliatory attitude. If the hopes of Egypt are once more disappointed not only will it be impossible to get an Egyptian Government, but I despair of any future for the country, which will relapse into a state of alternating outbreaks and repressions, which do harm both to Egypt and Great Britain and of which I have already seen enough. The end would be either the annexation of a violently hostile country which would require to be governed by force, or else complete capitulation on the part of His Majesty's Government. We have been used to expect the world to admire our work in Egypt. I can imagine no more deplorable end to it. My proposals are put forward after protracted negotiations with Sarwat and his immediate adherents, who have been in touch with a wider range of opinion, and with Adly Pasha, whose assistance has been disinterested and valuable. I have the solid and whole-hearted support of my advisers, who differ from me in no particular. I must therefore urge your Lordship most earnestly to press His Majesty's Government to authorise the delivery of the draft letter to the Sultan without delay and without modification.

I should be grateful for a telegraphic reply.

No. 24.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, January 12, 1922.*

FOLLOWING is the message to Sultan of Egypt referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

'Your Highness,

"1. I have the honour to bring to your Highness' notice that certain passages of explanatory note which I addressed to you on 3rd December, 1921, have been interpreted, to my great disappointment, in a manner not in accordance with intentions and policy of His Majesty's Government.

"2. Judging by many comments which have been published on the subject of this note, it would appear that many Egyptians are under impression that Great Britain is about to abandon her liberal and favourable attitude towards Egyptian aspirations, and that she proposes to make use of her special position in Egypt in order to maintain a political and administrative régime incompatible with freedom she has offered.

"3. Such an interpretation of intentions of His Majesty's Government is quite mistaken. On the contrary, explanatory note emphasises dominating principle that guarantees claimed by Great Britain are not designed to involve continuance of an actual or virtual protectorate. Great Britain, as it is stated therein, sincerely desires to see 'an Egypt enjoying national prerogatives and international position of a sovereign State.'

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

"4. If Egyptians have regarded these guarantees as being out of keeping with position of a free country they have, on the other hand, lost sight of fact that Great Britain has been obliged to claim them out of consideration for her own security in face of a situation which demands great prudence on her part, particularly in the matter of disposition of her troops. Present world conditions, however, and state of effervescence which has prevailed in Egypt since armistice are not permanent factors, and it is to be hoped that while, on one hand, former will eventually improve, on the other hand, time will come when, in language of note, Egypt's record will give confidence in her own guarantees.

"5. As to any desire to interfere in internal administration of Egypt, His Majesty's Government have sufficiently stated, and repeat, that their most ardent desire is to place in Egyptian hands conduct of their own affairs. Draft agreement proposed by Great Britain does not depart from this idea, and in making provision for presence of two British officials in Ministries of Finance and Justice, it was not her intention to use these two officials for the purpose of intervening in Egyptian affairs but solely in order to preserve contact requisite for protecting foreign interests.

"6. Such is sole bearing of guarantees demanded by Great Britain. They are claimed without any desire to impede Egyptians enjoying full rights of a national Government.

"7. Animated as she is with these intentions, it will be understood that it is repugnant to Great Britain on the one hand to see Egyptians delay by their own acts realisation of an ideal aimed at by both parties, and on the other to be compelled herself to intervene to re-establish order when it is threatened in such a way as to arouse fears of foreigners and involve interests of foreign Powers. It would be much to be regretted if Egyptians should see in exceptional measures which have recently been taken any prejudice to ideal to which they aspire or an intention on the part of His Majesty's Government to alter policy I have indicated. In taking these measures, sole desire of His Majesty's Government has been to put end to a harmful agitation which by arousing popular passions might have such consequences as to jeopardise whole result of efforts of Egyptian nation. These measures were taken primarily in the interest of Egyptian cause, which has everything to gain by being studied in an atmosphere of calm and friendly discussion.

"8. Now that tranquillity seems to be re-establishing itself, thanks to wise spirit which is root of Egyptian character and asserts itself in times of crisis, I desire once again to interpret to Egypt good intentions which His Majesty's Government have not ceased to entertain towards her.

"9. Without wishing in any way to exercise pressure on free will of Egyptians to adhere to this or that treaty, His Majesty's Government desire, nevertheless, to prepare way for a régime of mutual understanding which will result, they are confident, in a satisfactory and final solution of the Egyptian problem.

"10. With this object in view, I am happy to be able to announce to your Highness that His Majesty's Government are prepared to recomend to British Parliament, without waiting for conclusion of a treaty, abolition of protectorate and recognition of Egypt as an independent sovereign State. There is no obstacle to re-establishment forthwith of an Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs which will

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prepare the way for creation of diplomatic and consular representation of Egypt.

"11. As regards internal administration of Egypt, His Majesty's Government will view with favour creation of a Parliament with right to control the policy and administration of a constitutionally responsible Government.

"12. I propose to abolish régime of martial law as set up by proclamation of 2nd November, 1914, so soon as necessary Egyptian act of indemnity shall have been promulgated with application to all inhabitants of Egypt. In the event of its being found impossible to put such an act in force before it is desired to hold the parliamentary elections, I shall be prepared, pending repeal of above-mentioned proclamation, to suspend application of martial law in respect of all matters affecting free exercise of political rights of Egyptians.

"13. As soon as this new state of affairs has been established His Majesty's Government will examine in concert with Egyptian Government, and in most friendly spirit, the conclusion of an agreement on following points which will remain for settlement:—

"(*a.*) Security of communications of British Empire.

"(*b.*) Defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect.

"(*c.*) Protection of foreign interests in Egypt and protection of minorities.

"(*d.*) The Soudan.

"14. It is now for Egypt to respond, and it is to be hoped she will justly appreciate good intentions of Great Britain and that reflection and not passion will guide her attitude."

No. 25.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, January 12, 1922.*

SPLIT has occurred in newly-reconstituted Wafd.

Abdel Aziz Bey Fahmy resigned yesterday, and it is expected that six other members will announce their secession to-morrow.

No. 26.

Sir E. Crowe to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 13, 1922.*

NO effort will be spared to obtain a prompt decision on the issues raised in your telegrams of the 12th instant. You will understand, however, that an immediate reply on so great a question cannot be sent in the absence of the Prime Minister and Lord Curzon at Cannes.

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

No. 27.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(Telegraphic.) *Cannes, January* 14, 1922.

THE Prime Minister and the rest of my colleagues have already left Cannes, so that I cannot deal immediately with the issue raised in your telegrams of the 12th instant, which must be referred to the Cabinet. I shall be back in London early next week, and I will lose no time in bringing forward your proposals and in acquainting you with the decision of His Majesty's Government.

No. 28.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 18, 1922.

YOUR telegrams of 12th January: Formation of new Egyptian Government.

Before arriving at final decision on your proposals, His Majesty's Government desire fullest available information as to the present position in Egypt, and would like to hear personally the authorities most capable of advising them on the matter. I suggest that you send to England with least possible delay Amos and Clayton, if you think that they best correspond to the above description.

No. 29.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 20.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, January* 20, 1922.

SIR G. CLAYTON, Mr. Amos, Mr. Patterson and Mr. Dowson completely agree with me and have nothing to add to the views which they have expressed already. Were I to send home the two advisers as suggested in your telegram of 18th January it would considerably undermine my position, and any prolonged indications of hesitation on the part of His Majesty's Government will have the same effect. Counsels of conciliation and moderation based on hopes for the near future prevail at present, but this situation cannot continue. Therefore the importance of not losing time is vital.

Mr. Selby will probably arrive in London on Sunday, and can give you an up-to-date and accurate account of the whole political situation here. You could have no better informant. In addition I can of course telegraph the fullest information on any specific point.

The following points have not perhaps been sufficiently explained:—

(*a.*) My next move will be interpreted as the true explanation of the action taken in deporting Zaghlul. I intended this as

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

an essential preliminary to a policy of conciliation and it has been interpreted as such to a greater degree than was to be expected.

(*b*.) I must urge His Majesty's Government to abandon the hope of finding any body of Egyptians of no matter what class, party, or creed who will be willing to co-operate with us if the policy which I am recommending is rejected. The prospect of arriving at some such *modus vivendi* has made it possible for me not only to consolidate for the time being those elements which honestly wish for a settlement, but even to gain to our side one or two of the leading members of Zaghlul's Party and greatly to weaken its influence.

(*c*.) The question is not whether we can or cannot get an Egyptian Government, but whether we are going to succeed or fail in bringing Egypt back to government by legal and constitutional methods.

(*d*.) It is the introduction of parliamentary institutions and not the formal abolition of the protectorate that will be mainly responsible for any increased power of resistance to our views that the Egyptian Ministers may acquire under the proposed arrangements as compared with that which their predecessors possessed before the war. Yet I presume that His Majesty's Government would not wish to oppose the creation of such institutions pending the conclusion of a treaty with Egypt. Such a policy would obviously be difficult to defend on general grounds, apart from which it should be noted that in recent years the pressure of public opinion voiced both in the press and through less reputable channels has produced an unmistakable increase in the independence of Ministers, *vis-à-vis* the British authorities.

The administration of Egypt has in the past been carried on by Egyptians with the assistance and advice of a very small body of Englishmen, and this has only been possible owing to the maintenance of good relations with their Egyptian colleagues. The great majority of administrative posts have always been filled by Egyptians and it must not be imagined that even in the most peaceful and normal times the English have tried to govern Egypt save as a small leaven relying on the largest measure of native co-operation.

Your Lordship may rest assured that no opportunist desire for immediate peace has inspired my proposals which are based upon what I sincerely believe to be the best interests both of Egypt and of Great Britain.

This is my final considered opinion which I have formed after prolonged discussion with those who are best fitted to offer sound advice. The opinions of responsible Egyptians have also been extensively consulted and they unanimously support my view.

If my proposals are accepted without delay I am convinced that they will lead to a permanent settlement of the Egyptian question; if they are rejected the only alternative that I can foresee will be repressive measures that will ultimately compel us to annex Egypt. No problem of government will be solved in this manner, but the difficulties of Great Britain will be largely increased.

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

No. 30.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, January 23, 1922.*

THE Wafd, excepting dissentient members, have published a manifesto this evening calling upon all Egyptians to refuse to co-operate in any way with English and to boycott all British goods, commerce, &c. Manifesto is couched in vehement terms, and is direct challenge to my authority.

I have ordered suspension of all newspapers which have published it and am preventing its publication in the remainder.

I have ordered the arrest of the signatories, who are as follows: Hamid-el-Basel, Wissa Wasif, Aly Maher, George Khayat, Wasif Ghali, Morcos Hanna, Elwi-el-Gazzar, Murad-el-Shareii. Last three are newly-elected members.

Reuter's agent is telegraphing full text of manifesto to London.

No. 31.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(Extract.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 24, 1922.*

YOUR telegram of 20th January.

Government are most anxious to obtain a peaceful solution of the present difficulty by installation of an Egyptian Ministry under a Minister as patriotic and capable as Sarwat Pasha. Nor do they think that this should be found impossible, if all parties act with a due appreciation of the feelings and convictions of the others, and with a firm desire to find a solution that will be equally honourable to Egypt and Great Britain.

Whilst giving full weight to your explanations and to the assurances which you have received, the Cabinet feel strongly that His Majesty's Government might be surrendering a position which they consider vital to the Empire. If these assurances are sincerely proffered, and if they are to have a binding value, there should not be any insurmountable difficulty in putting them in an acceptable and tangible form. In their present shape they imply an obligation which might afterwards be disputed or even repudiated, and which might expose His Majesty's Government to the just charge of having abandoned our main position without safeguards for the future. For if the abolition of the protectorate and the recognition of Egypt as a sovereign State be conceded without any clear undertaking as to the sequel, we might find ourselves confronted with conditions which neither His Majesty's Government nor Parliament would be prepared to ratify later on, thus leading to a breakdown even more disastrous than that which you contemplate. In such a case the sanction of the presence of British troops within the country, though an effective guarantee against formidable disturbance, might be impotent to secure us the peaceful solution which all desire.

His Majesty's Government are quite willing that the reserved subjects should provide the basis of free and friendly discussion

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between both parties. But this should be subject to a clear understanding on the points to which due importance has been rightly attached in your conversations with Egyptian statesmen, but which should admit without difficulty of a more concrete definition.

No. 32.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(Extract.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 28, 1922.

HIS Majesty's Government will be glad if you will come home at once to acquaint them with your views. In the meantime, as it seems desirable that no misapprehension should exist as to the present position and policy of His Majesty's Government, or as to the circumstances in which you are being invited to come here to discuss it, we propose to issue here on Monday, 30th January, and shall be glad if you will issue simultaneously in Egypt, a brief summary of the situation, the text of which is contained in my immediately following telegram.

No. 33.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 28, 1922.

FOLLOWING is summary of situation for publication on Monday, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"The High Commissioner has been summoned to England to give full information and advice to His Majesty's Government as to the present situation in Egypt, and as to the communications that have been passing between him and the Egyptian ex-Ministers, with regard to the future Government of the country.

"There appears to be an impression in some quarters that Great Britain has abandoned, or is about to abandon, her liberal attitude towards Egyptian aspirations, and that she desires to make use of her special position in Egypt to maintain a political and administrative system there incompatible with the freedom which she has declared her willingness to recognise.

"This is not the case. The policy of His Majesty's Government, both during and since the Adly Mission to England, has been founded upon the following principles:—

"While unwilling to cede to disorder or violence what they are prepared to grant on its own merits, His Majesty's Government have explicitly stated their readiness to invite Parliament to terminate the protectorate, which was declared in 1914; to recognise the existence of Egypt as a sovereign State and to agree to the constitution of an Egyptian Parliament and the re-establishment of an Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as soon as they are satisfied as to the following conditions, which they regard as vital to the interests both of Egypt and the Empire.

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"They must have full and effective guarantees:—

"1. That the Imperial communications, to which Egypt is essential, are assured.

"2. That Great Britain retains both the right and the power to afford that protection to the foreign communities in Egypt which the Governments of these peoples in existing conditions look to her to supply.

"3. That Egypt is safeguarded against all foreign interference or aggression, direct or indirect.

"As soon as an agreement, satisfying these conditions, has been drawn up between an Egyptian Government and the British Government, there will be no hesitation on the part of the latter in inviting Parliamentary sanction to such an accord."

No. 34.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, January 29, 1922.*

IN accordance with instructions contained in your first telegram of the 28th instant, I shall arrive London, Wednesday, 8th February, travelling viâ Trieste, and leaving Alexandria on Friday next. Sir G. Clayton and Mr. Amos will accompany me.

At noon to-morrow I shall issue statement contained in your second telegram of the 28th instant.

No. 35.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 21, 1922.*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copies of the following documents:—

(*a.*) A declaration which His Majesty's Government will invite Parliament to approve terminating the protectorate over Egypt.

(*b.*) A letter which your Lordship should address to the Sultan when communicating to his Highness the above declaration.

2. His Majesty's Government are convinced that the people of Egypt will show themselves worthy of the independence which they have now secured and will prove by their use of it that the confidence reposed in them has not been misplaced.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

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

Enclosure 1 in No. 35.

Communication to be Addressed to the Sultan by the High Commissioner.

Your Highness,

I HAVE the honour to bring to your Highness's notice that certain passages of the explanatory note which I addressed to you on the 3rd December, 1921, were interpreted, to my great disappointment, in a manner not in accordance with the intention and policy of His Majesty's Government.

2. Judging by many comments which have been published on the subject of this note, it would appear that many Egyptians were under the impression that Great Britain was about to abandon her liberal and favourable attitude towards Egyptian aspirations and to make use of her special position in Egypt in order to maintain a political and administrative régime incompatible with the freedom she had offered.

3. Such an interpretation of the intentions of His Majesty's Government was quite mistaken. On the contrary, the explanatory note emphasised the dominating principle that the guarantees claimed by Great Britain are not designed to involve the continuance of an actual or virtual protectorate. Great Britain, as it is stated therein, sincerely desires to see "an Egypt enjoying the national prerogatives and the international position of a sovereign State."

4. If Egyptians have regarded these guarantees as being out of keeping with the position of a free country they have, on the other hand, lost sight of the fact that Great Britain has been obliged to claim them out of consideration for her own security in face of a situation which demands great prudence on her part, particularly in the matter of the disposition of her troops. Present world conditions, however, and the state of effervescence which has prevailed in Egypt since the armistice are not permanent factors, and it is to be hoped that while, on the one hand, the former will eventually improve, on the other hand, the time will come when, in the language of that note, Egypt's record will give confidence in her own guarantees.

5. As to any desire to interfere in the internal administration of Egypt, His Majesty's Government have sufficiently stated, and repeat, that their most ardent desire is to place in Egyptian hands the conduct of their own affairs. The draft agreement proposed by Great Britain did not depart from this idea, and in making provision for the presence of two British officials in the Ministries of Finance and Justice, it was not her intention to use these two officials for the purpose of intervening in Egyptian affairs, but solely in order to preserve the contact requisite for protecting foreign interests.

6. Such is the sole bearing of the guarantees that were demanded by Great Britain. They were claimed without any desire to impede Egyptians enjoying the full rights of a national Government.

7. Animated as she is by these intentions, it will be understood that it is repugnant to Great Britain on the one hand to see Egyptians delay by their own acts the realisation of an ideal aimed at by both parties, and on the other to be compelled herself to intervene to re-establish order when it is threatened in such a way as to arouse the fears of foreigners and to involve the interests of foreign Powers. It would be much to be regretted if Egyptians should see in the exceptional measures which have recently been

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

taken any prejudice to the ideal to which they aspire or an intention on the part of His Majesty's Government to alter the policy I have indicated. In taking these measures, the sole desire of His Majesty's Government has been to put an end to a harmful agitation which, by arousing popular passions, might have such consequences as to jeopardise the whole result of the efforts of the Egyptian nation. These measures were taken primarily in the interest of the Egyptian cause, which has everything to gain by being studied in an atmosphere of calm and friendly discussion.

8. Now that tranquillity seems to be re-establishing itself, thanks to the wise spirit which is the root of the Egyptian character and asserts itself in times of crisis, I am happy to be able to announce to your Highness that His Majesty's Government are prepared to recommend the accompanying declaration for the approval of Parliament. This will, I am confident, establish a régime of mutual confidence and lay the foundation for a satisfactory and final solution of the Egyptian problem.

9. There is no obstacle to the re-establishment forthwith of an Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs which will prepare the way for the creation of the diplomatic and consular representation of Egypt.

10. The creation of a Parliament with a right to control the policy and administration of a constitutionally responsible Government is a matter for your Highness and the Egyptian people to determine. Should circumstances arise to delay the coming into force of the Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt mentioned in the declaration accompanying this note, I desire to inform your Highness that I shall be prepared, pending the repeal of the proclamation of the 2nd November, 1914, to suspend the application of martial law in respect of all matters affecting the free exercise of the political rights of Egyptians.

11. It is now for Egypt to respond, and it is to be hoped she will justly appreciate the good intentions of Great Britain, and that reflection and not passion will guide her attitude.

Enclosure 2 in No. 35.

Declaration to Egypt.

WHEREAS His Majesty's Government, in accordance with their declared intentions, desire forthwith to recognise Egypt as an independent sovereign State; and

Whereas the relations between His Majesty's Government and Egypt are of vital interest to the British Empire;

The following principles are hereby declared:—

1. The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated, and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign State.

2. So soon as the Government of his Highness shall pass an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt, martial law as proclaimed on the 2nd November, 1914, shall be withdrawn.

3. The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to

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conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt:—

(*a.*) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt;
(*b.*) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect;
(*c.*) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities;
(*d.*) The Soudan.

Pending the conclusion of such agreements, the *status quo* in all these matters shall remain intact.

No. 36.

THE Secretary to the Cabinet presents his compliments to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and transmits to him herewith, a copy of a telegram which has been addressed to the Prime Ministers of the Dominions.

Cabinet Offices, 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W. 1,
February 27, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 36.

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor-General of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa.

Downing Street, February 27, 1922.

FOLLOWING from Prime Minister to your Prime Minister:—

"I am happy to inform you that His Majesty's Government have now decided, in complete agreement with Lord Allenby, upon a declaration to Egypt which terminates the Protectorate while fully preserving the *status quo* with regard to the special interests of the British Empire in Egypt. This declaration has been framed in close accordance with the views expressed at the Imperial Conference and carries out the principles there laid down.

The terms of settlement offered by His Majesty's Government in November together with the documents published in December were communicated to you at the time. In consequence of the failure of the negotiations the Ministry resigned and minor disturbances took place in several towns which were easily suppressed. There have been some political murders, and attempts were made to organise a commercial boycott and a general strike of Government servants, but with little success. Just after Christmas, Zaghlul Pasha, the leader of the Nationalist agitation, having declined to refrain from further political activity, was exiled under Martial Law with his five principal lieutenants. They are now *en route* to Seychelles.

Meanwhile negotiations were pursued by Lord Allenby with a

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

view to the formation of a Ministry, and in January he submitted proposals with that object to this Government. The gist of these was that Great Britain should immediately terminate the Protecorate and recognise Egypt as an independent Sovereign State, reserving for future discussion and agreement the measures necessary to protect the special interests of the British Empire in Egypt. We regarded these proposals as inadmissible, since the form of reservation proposed appeared to us inadequate as a guarantee for our special interests, which would rest on no juridical basis when Protectorate was terminated, and would therefore depend only on such agreements as Egyptian Ministers might in future be prepared to negotiate. We accordingly suggested an alternative procedure under which we would declare our readiness to recommend the termination of the Protectorate to Parliament as soon as Egyptian Ministers had concluded agreements with us sufficiently safeguarding British interests. Lord Allenby declared that this proposal would be inconsistent with his own undertakings to Egyptian statesmen, and that he could not hold out any hope of securing an Egyptian Ministry to take office upon it. We thereupon asked him to come home for consultation, which has led to very satisfactory results.

As all recent negotiations have been without results it has been decided to proceed to the termination of the Protectorate on the basis of a unilateral declaration which is telegraphed to you herewith. This pronouncement, while recognising Egypt as an independent sovereign State, lays down the position which we claim in Egypt *vis-à-vis* all other Powers, and enumerates the matters in which the maintenance of our special position is vital to Imperial security. In all these matters the *status quo* is maintained, but we declare our willingness to negotiate specific agreements upon them with the Egyptian Government at some later date when they desire it and circumstances promise success. In the meantime the Egyptians will be free to develop national institutions in accordance with their aspirations.

In communicating the substance of this declaration to foreign Powers, we propose to announce that the termination of the British Protectorate over Egypt involves no change in the *status quo* as regards the position of other Powers in Egypt. We propose to declare that the welfare and integrity of Egypt are necessary to the peace and safety of the British Empire, which will therefore always maintain as an essential British interest the special relations between itself and Egypt long recognised by other Governments. In calling attention to these special relations as defined in the declaration recognising Egypt's independence, we propose to declare that we will not admit them to be questioned or discussed by any other Power; that we will regard as an unfriendly act any attempt at interference in the affairs of Egypt by another Power; and that we will consider any aggression against the territory of Egypt as an act to be repelled with all the means at our command.

The declaration is to be handed to the Sultan by Lord Allenby on 28th February. It will be presented to Parliament here the same afternoon. Text follows in separate telegram.

D. LLOYD GEORGE."

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

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s/s Foreign Affairs

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S E C R E T.

C.P.-3014.

C A B I N E T.

11.

E G Y P T.

Copy of Decypher Telegrams from Lord Allenby.

No. 1.

Telegram from Lord Allenby (unnumbered) dated 15th January, 1922.
Sub-Committee. Most Urgent.
Private and Personal.

Sir Gilbert Clayton and Mr. Selby two days ago saw two prominent members of Wafd who are seceding from reconstituted body.

As a preliminary to discussion they were asked whether they accepted condition that all territory of Egypt was necessary for defence of Imperial Communications of Great Britain, that is to say that no Foreign Power could under any circumstances whatsoever be allowed to establish itself or intervene in internal affairs of Egypt.

They replied that they absolutely accepted this view and indicated they would be ready to support a policy such as that outlined in my proposed letter to Sultan, adding that in such circumstances it would be desirable that a member of Saadist party should be included in Cabinet. They suggested Mustapha Maher. Sarwat Pasha has already secured agreement of latter to join Cabinet.

They further expressed their opinion that under no circumstances should Saad Zagloul be allowed to return to Egypt. This is general feeling in all circles desirous of carrying through a settlement.

. . . . . .

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

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

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No. 2.

Telegram from Lord Allenby No. 17 dated 12th January, 1922.

.....

SUB-COMMITTEE. VERY URGENT.

Following is list referred to in my telegram No. 18.

Abdel Khalek Sarwat Pasha, ex-minister,

Ismail Sidky Pasha, ex-minister,

Ibrahim Fatlon Pasha, ex-minister,

Gaafar Wali Pasha, ex-minister,

Mustafa Fatlon Pasha, procureur-général,

Mustafa Maher Pasha, ex-official Wafd Ministry and vice-president of general agricultural syndicate,

Mohammed Shukry Pasha, ex-under-Secretary of State Ministry of Justice,

Wassif Simeika Bey, judge of native court of appeal.

.....

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

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No. 3.

Telegram from Lord Allenby No. 18, dated 18th January, 1922.

SUB-COMMITTEE.

Your telegram No. 534.

My immediately following telegram contains text of a letter which I propose, with Your Lordship's approval, to address to the Sultan and to publish simultaneously with announcement of formation of Sarwat Pasha's Ministry. Sarwat called on me this evening and submitted list contained in my immediately preceding telegram as having definitely agreed to accept office under him on the policy outlined in my proposed letter to the Sultan. List is a strong and representative one and Sarwat is undoubtedly rallying to himself all the best elements in the country.

Paragraphs one to four of my proposed letter are designed to emphasise the more conciliatory parts of recent letter I was instructed to address to the Sultan. Paragraph 5 comments on provisions of proposed draft treaty which have been the particular subject of misrepresentation. Paragraph 7 explains my object in dealing with Zaghloul and his chief supporters. After re-asserting in paragraphs 8 and 9 friendly intentions of His Majesty's Government, I assent in paragraphs 10 and 11 to main provisions of Sarwat's programme. Paragraph 13 reserves for subsequent negotiation matters included in proposed draft treaty which do not find place in Sarwat's programme with the exception of section 9; this matter can be dealt with separately when Egyptian government desires to raise it, and I need only say that Sarwat Pasha's views on the subject are quite moderate.

Reservation A. covers retention of troops in the country. This is our essential and effective safeguard: it has formed the strength of our position in Egypt in the past and is in no way impaired by present proposals. Reservation B. is designed to cover in particular clauses 6, 11 and 14 of suggested convention. Reservation C.

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

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to cover clauses 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18 and 23 to 26.

Your Lordship will observe, however, that paragraph 10 of my proposed letter makes a concession as regards protectorate which goes further then explanation of Sarwat's programme conveyed in first paragraph of my telegram No. 666.

I returned in fact to proposal made in my telegram No. 664 that His Majesty's Government should support in Parliament abolition of protectorate. In this connection I do not forget statement in your telegram No.536 that suggestion that His Majesty's Government should agree to do this in the hope of obtaining a ministry would have been quite unacceptable.

I am therefore, though in slightly different circumstances since that hope is now certainty, again proposing a course inconsistent with decision of His Majesty's Government, but it is only course which I see my way to pursuing.

In final paragraph of previous letter to the Sultan, it is stated that His Majesty's Government are prepared to consider any methods which may be suggested in a spirit of co-operation for carrying out substance of their proposals: present scheme is such a method. (See in this connection paragraph 13 of my immediately following telegram).

My proposed letter is result of exhaustive negotiations with Sarwat Pasha and his immediate adherents. They, on their part, have been in contact with wider circle and Adly Pasha has been in close touch and has lent valuable and disinterested assistance.

Deportation of Zaghloul Pasha was followed by less disturbance and of shorter duration than might well have been expected and there is a large body of opinion which regard it as necessary and desirable seeing it in

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

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its true character, not as an act of arbitrary retribution, but as an essential preliminary to a final attempt to realise the friendly relations with Great Britain which in spite of disappointment, they still desire and which are surely a necessity to His Majesty's Government. I am convinced that there is no other means of maintaining friendly disposition of those political elements in Egypt, who, through times difficult enough for themselves have helped us and dealt straightforwardly with us, and of assuaging hostility of others, than to give this pledge regarding abolition of protectorate. I am equally convinced that this is the moment to give it. Atmosphere which has become calm and is now expectant is not likely to remain so without a striking act of conciliation on our part and if expectations are again disappointed, I despair not only of forming an Egyptian Ministry, but of any future except a state of alternating outbreaks and repressions of which I have already had sufficient experience which are detrimental both to Egypt and to Great Britain, and of which end would be in default of complete capitulation on our part, annexation and arbitrary government of a bitterly hostile country.

I can conceive of no more lamentable end to our work in Egypt which we have been accustomed to hold up to the admiration of the world.

My views have the solid and whole-hearted support of my advisers without the least divergence and I must very earnestly beg Your Lordship to obtain the approval of His Majesty's Government to terms of this letter without modification and to authorise me to address it to the Sultan without delay.

I urgently request early reply by telegraph.

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

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No. 4.

(Telegram from Lord Allenby No. 19 dated 12th January, 1922.

SUB-COMMITTEE.

Following is the message referred to in my immediately preceding telegram from Sultan of Egypt:-

Your Highness

1. I have the honour to bring to your Highness' notice that certain passages of explanatory note which I addressed to you on December 3rd, 1921 have been interpreted to my great disappointment in a manner not in accordance with intentions and policy of His Majesty's Government.

2. Judging by many comments which have been published on the subject of this note it would appear that many Egyptians are under impression that Great Britain is about to abandon her liberal and favourable attitude towards Egyptian aspirations and that she proposes to make use of her special position in Egypt in order to maintain a political and administrative régime incompatible with freedom she has been offered.

3. Such an interpretation of intentions of His Majesty's Government is quite mistaken. On the contrary explanatory note emphasizes dominating principle that guarantees claimed by Great Britain are not designed to involve continuance of an actual or virtual protectorate. Great Britain, as it is stated therein, sincerely desires to see "an Egypt enjoying national prerogatives and international position of a sovereign state".

4. If Egyptians have regarded these guarantees as/

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

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as being out of keeping with position of a free country they have on the other hand lost sight of fact that Great Britain has been obliged to claim them out of consideration for her own security in face of a situation which demands great prudence on her part, particularly in the matter of disposition of her troops. Present world conditions however and state of effervescence which has prevailed in Egypt since armistice are not permanent factors and it is to be hoped that while on one hand former will eventually improve, on the other hand time will come when, in language of note, Egypt's record will give confidence in her own guarantees.

5. As to any desire to interfere in internal administration of Egypt, His Majesty's Government have sufficiently stated and repeat that their most ardent desire is to place in Egyptian hands conduction of their own affairs. Draft agreement proposed by Great Britain does not depart from this idea and in making provisional presence of two British Officials in ministries of finance and justice it was not her intention to use these two officials for the purpose of intervening in Egyptian affairs but solely in order to preserve contact requisite for protecting foreign interests.

6. Such is sole bearing of guarantees demanded by Great Britain. They are claimed without any desire to impair Egyptians enjoying full rights of a national government.

7. Animated as she is with these intentions it will be understood that it is repugnant to Great Britain on the one hand to see Egyptians wholly by their own acts (?group omitted) realization of an ideal aimed at by both/

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

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both parties and on the other to be compelled herself to intervene to re-establish order when it is threatened in such a way as to arouse fears of foreigners and involve interests of foreign powers. It would be much to be regretted if Egyptians should see in exceptional measures which have recently been taken, any prejudice to ideal to which they aspire or an intention on the part of His Majesty's Government to alter policy I have indicated. In taking these measures sole desire of His Majesty's Government has been to put end to a harmful agitation which by arousing popular passions might have such consequences as to jeopardize whole result of efforts of Egyptian nation. These measures were primarily in the interest of Egyptian cause which has everything to gain by being studied in an atmosphere of calmness and friendly discussion.

8. Now that tranquillity seems to be re-establishing itself thanks to wise spirit which is root of Egyptian character and asserts itself in times of crisis, I desire once again to interpret to Egypt good intentions which His Majesty's Government have not ceased to entertain towards her.

9. Without wishing in any way to exercise pressure on free will of Egyptians to adhere to this or that treaty His Majesty's Government desire nevertheless to prepare way for a regime of mutual understanding which will result in confidence in a satisfactory and final solution of the Egyptian problem.

10. With this object in view I am happy to be able to announce to Your Highness that His Majesty's

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

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Government are prepared to recommend to British parliament, without waiting for conclusion of a treaty, abolition of protectorate and recognition of Egypt as an independent sovereign state. There is no obstacle to re-establishment forthwith of an Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs which will prepare the way for creation of diplomatic and consular representation of Egypt.

11. As regards internal administration of Egypt His Majesty's Government will view with favour creation of a parliament with right to control the policy and administration of a constitutionally responsible government.

12. I propose to abolish régime of martial law as set up by proclamation of November 2nd 1914 so soon as necessary Egyptian act of indemnity shall have been promulgated with application to all inhabitants of Egypt. In the event of its being found impossible to put such an act in force before it is desired to hold the parliamentary elections I shall be prepared pending repeal of above mentioned proclamation to suspend application of martial law in respect of all matters affecting free exercise of political rights of Egyptians.

13. As soon as this state of affairs has been established His Majesty's Government will examine in consort (sic) with Egyptian government and in most friendly spirit the conclusion of an agreement on following points which will remain for settlement.

A. Security of communications of British Empire.

B/

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

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

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B. Defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect.

C. Protection of foreign interests in Egypt.

14. It is now for Egypt to respond and it is to be hoped she will justly appreciate good intentions of Great Britain and that reflection and not passion will guide her attitude.

.....

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

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

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No. 5.

Telegram from Lord Allenby (unnumbered) dated 13th January, 1922.

SUB-COMMITTEE.

My telegram No. 19.

Paragraph 13 should read "will examine in concert with Egyptian Government."

Same paragraph. Clause B should read "foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect."

Clause C. should read "Protection of foreign interests in Egypt and protection of minorities."

Please add also Clause D "The Soudan."

. . . . . .

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

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

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No. 6.

Telegram from Lord Allenby No. 20, dated 12th January, 1922.

SUB-COMMITTEE.

Most Urgent.

Split has occurred in newly re-constituted Wafd. Abdel Aziz Bey Fahmy resigned yesterday and it is expected that six other members will announce their secession to-morrow.

. . . . . .

2 Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.
16th January, 1922.

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

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

Jan 16 S/S. Foreign Affairs (131)

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SECRET. 1922

C.P. 3616. CABINET. 11

THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I feel some difficulty in advising the Cabinet on the subject of Lord Allenby's recent telegrams, for (1) my advice as to the form of treaty to be offered to Adly Pacha and the reply to be sent to the Sultan was not taken in November last and (2) the Cabinet preferred to take a course which has been attended with the very consequences which I then unavailingly predicted. Lord Allenby correctly informed the Cabinet on that occasion that he could command sufficient military and naval strength to prevent a general rising and to get rid of Zaghlul Pacha, should the latter present him with an opportunity. But he was incorrect in assuring us that he could find an Egyptian Ministry willing to take office under the conditions laid down in our official letter to the Sultan: and the forecasts which I ventured to make as to the breakdown of the administration, the refusal of the Egyptians to co-operate with us, and the revival of a general and in the long run dangerous form of discontent have been amply realised. Further, although my colleagues assured me that our decision would receive the unanimous support of all the more responsible organs of the British Press -- an assurance which I took leave to mistrust -- I have not found that, with the exception of the "Morning Post" (non tali auxilio) any important journal has consistently backed our policy, while several of the more influential organs that ordinarily support the Government such as the "Daily Telegraph", "Daily Chronicle", "Observer", "Pall Mall Gazette", "Evening Standard" -- I set aside the Northcliffe papers -- have openly doubted its wisdom.

There did indeed occur a moment in December when Sarwat Pacha appeared likely to form a Government on acceptable conditions, and I lost no time in encouraging those proposals./

x C.P. 3614.

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

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But they fell through owing to the consolidation of nationalist opinion in Egypt and to the pressure exercised by the Zaghlulist Party. Since then we have been without an Egyptian Government; and the administration has only scraped along under martial law, and with the aid of the British Under-Secretaries in the various Departments.

Such a condition cannot of course continue indefinitely; for it is the negation of Government; it will increasingly alienate all the more friendly elements in the Egyptian community; it will provoke periodical if not chronic disturbances and risings; and, as I also pointed out to the Cabinet and as Lord Allenby now admits, it will lead either to a complete ultimate capitulation on our part or to the necessity of annexation.

These are the circumstances in which Lord Allenby comes forward with a renewed proposal. There appears to be a temporary reaction among the better elements against the policy of uncompromising hostility to Great Britain which has manifested itself during the last six weeks; Lord Allenby has all the time been busily occupied with private negotiations; and he now tells us, with the approval of all his advisers, that the psychological moment has arrived when we can either obtain an Egyptian Ministry on the terms which he suggests, or must abandon all hope of conciliation. The delay of a few days necessitated by my absence abroad and the impossibility of consulting my colleagues may already have imperilled the chances of agreement, since the nature of the compromise and the formation and even the composition of the proposed Government have been fully revealed and widely canvassed in the Egyptian Press; and it is by no means certain that, before we have telegraphed our decision, Sarwat Pacha may not have been terrified into withdrawal.

Let me accordingly examine the conditions now put forward.

They

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

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They are :-

1) That we should implement the first condition of our proposed treaty by proposing to Parliament the termination of the Protectorate and the recognition of Egypt as a Sovereign State:

2) That we should accept, also as proposed in our treaty, the revival of the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs:

3) That we should favour the election of a native Parliament - also a point which we have no reason to contest:

4) That we should agree to the abolition of martial law - as to which we have long ago declared our willingness to act at any time on the advice of the High Commissioner.

So far the concessions proposed are not in excess of anything that we have all been prepared to make. Hitherto however the first two have been contemplated as part of a treaty and have been contingent upon the acceptance of the other conditions laid down in the draft Agreement approved by the Cabinet. Lord Allenby now suggests a different procedure. In the earlier part of his proposed letter to the Sultan he defends and apparently adheres in general terms to the two main guarantees which we have hitherto exacted as regards:-

(a) disposition of troops, and

(b) financial and judicial advisers,

but he suggests that as soon as the conditions which I have summarised above have been carried out, we should undertake in concert with the Egyptian Government to examine the conclusion of an agreement on the following points.

(a) Security of communications.

(b) Defence of Egypt.

(c) Protection of foreign interests and minorities in Egypt.

(d) Soudan.

Now these four heads may, according as they are interpreted, mean

much/

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

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much or little. They may point to a revival of the Adly discussions under less favourable conditions, because the Government with which we should conduct them would already, if Parliament had approved the suggested programme, have acquired independance and might utilise its position to be obstinate on any or all of the reserved points, even resigning if it did not get its way and making as much trouble for us, inside and outside of Egypt, as it could.

On the other hand if such a Government proved reasonable, we might obtain conditions approximating to those which some of my colleagues were prepared to join me in conceding two months ago. With that object in view, if we generally fall in with Lord Allenby's proposals, we can still, I think, safeguard the position by saying that while prepared to discuss these subjects with an Egyptian Government as soon as it has shown its capacity successfully to undertake the administration of the country, and while anxious to advocate a solution with regard to all of them, our views have been sufficiently clearly indicated to leave the Egyptian Government in no doubt as to the basis upon which the discussions must proceed.

Of course it may be held that even this is dangerous. I concede an element of danger. The question is whether it is greater or less than the danger of refusing Lord Allenby's advice and exposing ourselves with our eyes open to the alternative which he very clearly depicts. The situation is not quite what it was when we had broken off with Adly Pacha. We now have the High Commissioner making definite proposals which we shall assume no small responsibility if we reject. We have so far failed to get any sort of native ministry. We now have the chance (in all probability the last one) of obtaining one on terms which if they are onerous are in no sense humiliating. We are warned of the grave consequences if we refuse. The Irish settlement, so far from helping us, will greatly have encouraged the Egyptians, for they see British troops being withdrawn in toto from Ireland, a

position/

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

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position vital to the safety of Great Britain, at the same time that we persist in retaining them in Egypt in such place and in such strength as we please; and they see a form of independence conceded to Ireland, much more absolute than anything which we are prepared to give to them. I am convinced that we cannot permanently maintain this position.

I would point out in conclusion that the responsibility for the carrying out of the suggested policy is one which we are not invited to assume ourselves to-day or to-morrow. Lord Allenby only asks that we should declare our willingness to recommend it to the British Parliament. In practice this means that we shall get an Egyptian ministry at once, while the parliamentary decision will necessarily be postponed for the best part of a month. I should not hesitate myself to take the verdict of either House of Parliament on the matter, since I believe there is an almost universal desire to extricate ourselves from a position which, already difficult, may easily become intolerable.

I would further point out that Lord Allenby has successfully prevented the Egyptians from attaching as a condition to their co-operation the return of Zaghlul. That would have been an impossible condition; and his continued absence from the country is an essential element of success.

(Initialled) C. of K.

January 16th, 1922.

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

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

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Telegram to Lord Allenby

18th January, 1922.

PERSONAL.

For your personal information. Cabinet this morning insisted that your letter to Sultan contained no guarantees either that proposed Egyptian ministry share your view about reservations, or would be prepared to accept British interpretation of latter as a condition of attaining independence. They argued that once the Protectorate has been abolished and independence secured - supposing the House of Commons to agree to these proposals, which was seriously doubted - there will exist no sanction to compel Egyptian government to meet us in any particular except the presence of British forces in the country which is equally our sole effective guarantee now. To grant independence therefore before a treaty was concluded would be to place ourselves at mercy of Egyptian government. I mention this to you, in case you should find it possible to suggest any means by which letter to Sultan can be so expanded ~~so~~ as to offer the requisite security.

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

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

SECRET.

Lt for Foreign Affairs

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12

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CABINET
G.P. 3643
2, WHITEHALL GARDENS

Jan 21 19[illegible]

THE EGYPTIAN SITUATION.

I circulate to the Cabinet four telegrams relating to the above:

(I) the telegram which I sent to Lord Allenby after the last Cabinet on January 18th asking him to send two representatives to London;

(II) his reply to the above, dated January 20th;

(III) a further telegram from him dated January 20th, regarding his personal position;

(IV) a personal telegram from him to me dated January 20th which he gives me leave to make use of.

I understand that there is to be a Cabinet on Monday at which the situation created by these telegrams will be discussed.

(Initialled) C. of K.

January 21st, 1922.

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

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I

EGYPT

POLITICAL.

Code telegram to Lord Allenby (Cairo)

Foreign Office, January 18th, 1922. 6.0 p.m.

No. 21 (R)

****

VERY URGENT.

Your telegrams No. 17 to 20 (of January 12th: Formation of new Egyptian government).

Before arriving at final decision on your proposals, His Majesty's Government desire fullest available information as to the present position in Egypt and would like to hear personally the authorities most capable of advising them on the matter. I suggest that you send to England with least possible delay Amos and Clayton if you think that they best correspond to the above description.

****

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

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II.

EGYPT.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Lord Allenby (Cairo).
20th January, 1922.

D. 8.00 p.m. 20th January, 1922.

R. 10.35 p.m. 20th January, 1922.

No. 27.

Most Urgent.

::::::::::::::::

Your telegram 21.

1. Advice I have given to His Majesty's Government is my final considered opinion after full discussion with those most capable of advising me. I am certain that my proposals if immediately accepted will prove the basis of a lasting settlement in Egypt: if they are rejected, I foresee nothing but a rule of repression driving us to annexation of the country which far from solving any problem of government would greatly increase our difficulties.

Responsible Egyptian opinion has been thoroughly sounded and is entirely with me.

2. I may perhaps not have sufficiently explained.

(a) That it is not a question of obtaining or failing to obtain a Sarwat ministry, but of succeeding or failing in attempt to carry on government of Egypt by constitutional and legal means.

(b) That existence of a prospect of some such modus vivendi being reached as I am recommending has enabled me for the time being not only to consolidate

those

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

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those elements in Egypt which honestly desire a settlement but greatly to weaken influence of Zaghloulist following, and even to win over several of its leading members. I must beg His Majesty's Government to banish any idea that if this policy is rejected, there will be any body of Egyptians of whatever party class or creed upon whose support we shall be able to rely.

(c) The character which my action in deporting Zaghloul will wear will depend on the spirit of my next immediate action. It was designed and has to a remarkable degree been interpreted as being necessary preliminary to a policy of conciliation.

(d) That any increased power of resistance to our views which Egyptian ministers might acquire under proposed arrangements as compared with their predecessors under pre-war régime, will be mainly due not to formal abolition of protectorate, but to the introduction of parliamentary institutions. I do not conceive that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to take up an attitude opposed to establishment of such institutions pending the acceptance of a treaty. Quite apart from obvious difficulty on general grounds of defending such an attitude, it is to be observed that independence of ministers vis-à-vis British authorities, has been increasing unmistakeably in recent years under pressure of public opinion as manifested in press and through less orderly channels. There is considerable ground for hoping that cautiously formulated parliamentary institutions

such

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

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such as are contemplated by Sarwat and his friends may tend to clarify and moderate this pressure.

3. I trust that His Majesty's Government fully appreciate that Egypt in the past has been administered by Egyptians with advice and assistance of a very small body of Englishmen whose work has been rendered possible only by the good relations we have been able to maintain. If those relations are destroyed, machinery of government must break down and we shall be quite unable to restore it. It must not be supposed that English have even in most normal and peaceful times attempted to govern country except as a small leaven dependent on largest measure of co-operation by Egyptians who have at all times held great majority of administrative posts. Strained political situation of last three years has brought these Englishmen to the end of their resources and they will be powerless in face of situation which would arise on rejection of my present proposals.

4. Time is a matter of vital importance; at present counsels of moderation and conciliation prevail based on hope for near future. This situation will not continue and any prolonged indications of hesitation on the part of His Majesty's Government will seriously undermine my influence. Departure to England at this juncture of two advisers could not fail at once to have same effect. Amos Clayton Patterson and Dowson have nothing to add to opinions they have already expressed. They are in complete accord with me.

5. I am prepared of course to give Your Lordship fullest

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

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fullest information by telegram on any specific point, but you could look for no better informant than Mr. Selby who should reach England on Sunday: he will be able to give you an accurate and up to date explanation of whole political situation in this country.

6. I must ask Your Lordship to trust me that my recommendations are not based upon an opportunist desire for immediate peace, but are inspired by a careful consideration of best interests of two countries.

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

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

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

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III

Decypher. Lord Allenby (Cairo)
January 20th, 1922.

D. 1.20 a.m. January 21st, 1922.

R. 8.30 a.m. January 21st, 1922.

No. -.

MOST URGENT.

-.-.-.-.-

My telegram No. 27 and my telegram personal of today.

Situation admits of no delay, and if my advice is not accepted I shall resign.

-.-.-.-.-

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

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IV.

Decypher. Lord Allenby (Cairo).
20th January, 1922.

D. 1.20 a.m. 21st January, 1922.

R. 8.30 a.m. 21st January, 1922.

No. -.

::::::::::

Personal.

Conversations with Sarwat and Sidki Pashas show that proposed Egyptian ministry share my view about reservations, and that pending conclusion of negotiations thereon, they have no intention of altering actual state of affairs in the matter touching those subjects. They have signed procés verbal of these conversations in which they explicitly agree inter alia that no foreign loans shall be concluded or foreign civil officials above certain rank or officers in the army or police shall be appointed without my consent.

I propose adding to my letter to the Sultan in paragraph 13 after "spirit" the words "and with full freedom of discussion on both sides". This will show that our hands are not tied and will also enable Sarwat to meet a criticism which he anticipates.

If protectorate is abolished and independence secured, we must rely upon the presence of troops in the country as a sanction to compel Egyptian government to meet us. But this is our sole effective sanction

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

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sanction even now; the protectorate without troops is of no value and double guarantee of protectorate and troops is of no greater practical value as against Egyptian government than the single guarantee of troops, while on the other hand maintenance of protectorate means a hostile Egypt.

Subject to observations in paragraph 2 (D) of my telegram No. 27, it may be said that effect of my proposals would be a return to pre-war conditions minus Turkish suzerainty but with the new advantage to us that we should have staked out a claim in respect of subjects covered by reservations.

I may perhaps remind you of the phrase in the previous letter I addressed to Sultan to the effect that the declaration of a protectorate was a recognition of necessity of common action against a common enemy; this phrase appears to admit the justice of what Egyptians have always contended, that establishment of a protectorate was essentially a war measure which should disappear with the restoration of peace.

I have replied officially to the request for Amos and Clayton. I do not in the least wish to be obstructive, but apart from ruinous delay involved - and previous delays during the last three years have, as you know, always led to our missing our opportunities and increasing our difficulties - you will appreciate the impossible position in which both they and I would be placed. Both these two advisers and Dowson and Patterson

are

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

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

are in most complete agreement with me and consider proposals essential.

I consider however that Cabinet should certainly hear Selby.

Risk which Cabinet is prepared to run is much greater than that of (? los)ing a Sarwat ministry and my proposals will save the position rather than surrender it.

I may add that I showed Sultan my proposed letter as soon as I had telegraphed it to Your Lordship. His Highness was delighted though of course he makes specious reserves on one subject of constitutional government.

I have now brought to bear all the arguments which seem to apply to question as seen from here, and I repeat the sands are running out.

Though this telegram is addressed to you personally, you are of course at liberty to make such use of it as you may think fit.

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

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EGYPT.

POLITICAL.

Decode. Lord Allenby (Cairo). 23rd January, 1922.

D. 10.55 p.m. 23rd January, 1922.

R. 11.00 p.m. 23rd January, 1922.

No. 23. (R).

::::::::::::

Very Urgent.

The Wafd excepting dissentient members have published a manifesto this evening calling upon all Egyptians to refuse to co-operate in any way with English and to boycott all British goods, commerce, etc. Manifesto is couched in vehement terms and is direct challenge to my authority.

I have ordered suspension of all newspapers which have published it and am preventing its publication in the remainder.

I have ordered the arrest of the signatories who are as follows: Hamad El Basel, Wissa Wasif, Aly Maher, George Khayat, Wasif Ghali, Morcoss Hanna, Elwi El Gazzar, Murad El Shareii. Last three are newly elected members.

Reuters agent is telegraphing full text of manifesto to London.

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

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Lord Curzon (dup).

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(149)

SECRET.

Egypt Ireland 4

CABINET 3 (22).

DRAFT CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Monday, January 23rd, 1922, at 5 p.m.

PRESENT:-

THE PRIME MINISTER (IN THE CHAIR).

The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. Sir Robert Horne, G.B.E., K.C., M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Most Hon. The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. E.S. Montagu, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

The Right Hon. S. Baldwin, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.

The Right Hon. H.A.L. Fisher, M.P., President of the Board of Education.

The Right Hon. T.J. Macnamara, M.P., Minister of Labour.

The Right Hon. The Viscount Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor.

The Right Hon. E. Shortt, K.C., M.P., Secretary of State for Home Affairs.

The Right Hon. W.S. Churchill, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. Sir L. Worthington-Evans, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. Sir A. Mond, Bart., M.P., Minister of Health.

The Right Hon. Sir A. Griffith-Boscawen, M.P., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries.

The Right Hon. Sir Hamar Greenwood, Bart., K.C., M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland.

The Right Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart, K.C., M.P., Attorney-General.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Sir Edward Grigg, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Mr. Lionel Curtis.

Mr. Thomas Jones.....Acting Secretary.
Sir John Chancellor, K.C.M.G., D.S.O., Principal Assistant Secretary, C.I.D.
Mr. R.B. Howorth.....Assistant Secretary, Cabinet.

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

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VISIT OF THE PRINCE OF WALES TO INDIA.

(1) With reference to Conference of Ministers held on December 20th 1921, the PRIME MINISTER informed the Cabinet that after consultation with several of his colleagues he had sent to the Prince of Wales last week the following message of congratulations on the success of his visit to India:-

"My colleagues and I wish gratefully to express to Your Royal Highness on behalf of the British people our warm appreciation of the spirit in which you have entered upon and are fulfilling your high undertaking and our pleasure in the deep impression which you have made. From unofficial no less than official sources, in all parts of India which you have visited, convincing tributes have reached us of the respect and affection which you have inspired. We know that you have reached the real heart of India, and that there as everywhere your personality will leave an unfading memory. Your fortunes and your happiness are so dear to every nation of the Empire that India touches us all when she shows her heart to you. Every incident of your progress is watched with interest here. We rejoice in the splendid hospitality of the Indian Princes, in the enthusiasm of Indians of every class, in the eager greeting of Indian children, in every spontaneous tribute which you receive; and we look forward more keenly than ever before to the welcome home which we shall give you from yet another great Imperial mission successfully discharged."

(Sgd) D.LLOYD GEORGE.

He had received from the Prince of Wales a reply as follows:-

"I greatly appreciate and thank you and the Cabinet most sincerely for the message you have sent me on behalf of the British people. I have met with such cordiality and goodwill on the part of the Princes and peoples of India during my travels that I am encouraged to hope the future of the Indian Empire will fully uphold the fine traditions of its past. I shall feel most gratified and indeed proud if my visit to this great country serves in any way to foster and maintain that feeling of mutual understanding and unity that I trust will ever prevail throughout the British Empire."

(Sgd) EDWARD P.

He would like to have the views of the Cabinet as to the publication of the Prince's message.

The Cabinet agreed that the message should be published.

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

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EGYPT.

(2) With reference to Cabinet 2 (22) 5, the Cabinet had before them telegraphic correspondence which had been exchanged between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Lord Allenby (C.P.-3643).

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS reminded the Cabinet that at the last meeting it had been decided that it was undesirable to reach a conclusion in regard to Egypt in the absence of the Lord Privy Seal, and that a desire had been expressed for more information as to the exact state of Egypt. He had accordingly telegraphed to Lord Allenby on the 18th January (see telegram No.21.R). He had circulated to the Cabinet Lord Allenby's reply of the 20th January (No.27). In that telegram Lord Allenby had explained and defended his present action and had indulged in serious prognostications as to the situation which would arise in Egypt if his advice were not accepted. In his second telegram of the 20th January, which was intended to be personal to himself (Lord Curzon), he had threatened to resign if his advice were not accepted. His third telegram of the 20th January was also a personal telegram to himself in reply to one which he had sent in order to acquaint Lord Allenby of the views that had been expressed by the members of the Cabinet when the Egyptian question had been discussed on the 18th January. In his reply Lord Allenby had referred to the fact that the British forces were the sole effective guarantee of our position in Egypt, but he regretted that Lord Allenby had not taken up his suggestion to expand his letter to the Sultan in such a way as to get over the difficulties which had been foreseen by certain members of the Cabinet.

/LORD CURZON

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

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LORD CURZON stated that he had discussed the question with the ~~Lord Privy Seal~~, especially in regard to the parliamentary difficulties to be overcome. The main difficulty was that in Lord Allenby's proposals we were asked to make concessions which we could not retrieve. Lord Allenby proposed to abolish the Protectorate in the hope that the Egyptian Government would at a later date discuss the reserved points in the spirit in which we desired, and would make a treaty on that basis. The undertakings given to Lord Allenby by Adly and others were purely personal and in no way committed the Egyptian Government. He thought it would not be unreasonable to ask the Egyptian Ministers for much more specific undertakings as regards the reserved subjects. He had drafted a telegram to send to Lord Allenby with that object. Parliament would no doubt take the view that the assurances given by the Egyptian Ministers were not sufficient to justify the abolition of the Protectorate before the treaty was signed. He suggested that that difficulty might be got over in the following way. The agreement might eventually take the form of a treaty which would go before the British Parliament and the Parliament in Egypt, but he proposed that the consent of the British Parliament should be obtained by Resolution in advance to the abolition of the Protectorate on condition that a satisfactory agreement was arrived at with regard to the reserved points. His telegram to Lord Allenby had been drafted in a conciliatory manner and with the object of not offending the susceptibilities of the Egyptian Ministers. It also explained the parliamentary difficulty which

/confronted

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

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confronted His Majesty's Government of which it appeared that Lord Allenby had no knowledge. He proposed that they should also ask the Egyptian Government to make a formal statement giving the assurances which were involved by implication in Lord Allenby's telegram, and which he believed they might not be unwilling to give. In the meantime, before the Treaty was concluded, he proposed that martial law should be abolished, that the Egyptian Government should be encouraged to set up a Parliament, that the Egyptian Foreign Office should be re-established, and finally that during the interval which must elapse before the Protectorate was formally abolished, the country should practically revert to the status quo before the war, except that the Turkish Suzerainty would no longer exist. We should thus maintain our juridical rights and the government of the country would be carried on by an Egyptian Ministry and an Egyptian Foreign Office very much as in Lord Cromer's time. He was not very sanguine as to whether these proposals would be accepted; but from a parliamentary point of view they would not be seriously open to attack, as they would show a sincere attempt to arrive at a settlement without making an unconditional surrender.

It was suggested that the difficulty in the case of Egyptians was the same as that experienced by all delegates of extreme movements. They did not dare to sign a document which might be regarded as treasonable by their supporters. The articulate party in Egypt was an educated minority with extreme views; and no moderate Egyptian could sign a document which could satisfy them.

/The question

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

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The ~~question was raised~~ as to whether an instrument in the form of a treaty was absolutely necessary, and it was suggested that a unilateral declaration or an instrument in the form of a parliamentary resolution setting forth our view of our relations with Egypt might suffice. No immediate steps could be taken to draw up a treaty. The first thing to be done was to draw up a Constitution for Egypt. If a treaty was agreed to between the British and Egyptian Governments it would have to be submitted to the Parliaments of Britain and Egypt. Up to now we had favoured a treaty as the Egyptians attach great importance to concluding a treaty on equal terms with a great Power. It was also very important that any arrangements made as regards the reserved points should be embodied in a formal document signed by both parties.

LORD CURZON read the draft of a telegram which he proposed to send to Lord Allenby.

The view was strongly expressed that the crux of the question was that our juridical position in Egypt should not be altered until we obtained a satisfactory agreement as regards the reserved points. It was true that the troops were our greatest security, but our use of the Army could be more easily justified morally if our Protectorate rights were still in being.

The view was generally shared that the telegram drafted by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would secure our position and offered the best chance of extricating the Government from the difficult position into which it had been forced.

/The Cabinet agreed:-

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

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

(155)

The Cabinet agreed:-

That a Committee consisting of:-

The Prime Minister,
The Lord Privy Seal,
The Chancellor of the Exchequer
The Lord Chancellor
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
The Secretary of State for the Colonies
The President of the Board of Education

should meet to-morrow, the 24th January at 3.0 p.m. to consider the draft telegram to Lord Allenby (C.P. 3647) and the position created by Lord Allenby's threat to resign.

15b

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

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

(156)

THE IRISH NEGOTIATIONS.

3. With reference to Cabinet 89 (21) Conclusion 1 the Cabinet were informed that the Conference between Sir James Craig and Mr. Collins which had resulted in the published agreement (C.P.3644) was in all respects satisfactory and that great hopes were entertained that it would lead to closer relations between the Free State and Ulster Governments.

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

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(51)

RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY AND APPROVAL OF THE CONSTITUTION.

4. The Secretary of State for the Colonies further informed the Cabinet that the recent meetings with Irish Ministers had covered much ground and the results had been embodied in Heads of Working Arrangements (C.P.3648) for implementing the Treaty. It was clear that the Irish Ministers wished, if possible, to avoid the necessity for the setting up of an Irish Provisional Government and a Parliament for Southern Ireland by Act of the Imperial Parliament and would like to obtain a Free State Government and an approved Constitution within the shortest possible time, and that an Irish Parliament should be elected as soon as the fresh registers could be prepared. It was worthy of consideration whether without infringing the Treaty it was possible to ratify the Treaty and approve the Constitution of the Free State by means of a One Clause Bill. There were great advantages from the point of view of the Irish Ministers in getting their draft Constitution approved by the Parliament for Southern Ireland not only because the followers of Mr. De Valera abstained from attending that Body but because they could then contend that their Constitution derived its authority from the Treaty and not from a British Act of Parliament.

The Cabinet agreed:-

To refer the question whether without breach of the Treaty the Free State Government could be set up by means of a One Clause Bill, ratifying the Treaty and the Free State Constitution to the following Committee:-

The Attorney General (in the Chair)

Sir Hamar Greenwood.

Sir F. Liddell.

Sir F. Greer.

Mr. L. Curtis (Secretary)

The Lord Chancellor agreed to assist the Committee with advice.

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

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FINANCE.

6. In the event of the Free State Government being established in (say) 3 months' time it would be necessary to finance the Irish Government in the meantime and it was proposed to ask the House of Commons for £500,000 for the purpose of carrying the Provisional Government on to 31st March 1922 and if necessary take a vote on account for Irish services for the period from 1st April to the date of the establishment of the Free State Government. It was very desirable that the "intercepted grants" should be recouped as that the Irish Local Authorities could undertake various schemes in relief of unemployment, etc.

The Cabinet agreed:-

To approve the proposal that so much of the intercepted grants as had already been applied should be recouped to the Irish Government on the distinct understanding that the amount in question should be regarded as a payment on account of the British Government's share of the compensation payment.

COMPENSATION/

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

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COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES.

6. The Cabinet were informed of the arrangements in contemplation for the assessment of compensation for injuries sustained in the recent conflict. The general view was favourable to an offer being made to the Irish Ministers that the British Government should bear half the total losses; such an offer would lead to a limit being placed on the number and amount of the claims. It was also urged that inducements should be given to claimants to settle quickly. Reference was also made to a claim by Sir J. Craig that the British Government should bear the whole cost of compensation in the case of Ulster on the ground that all the damage in Ulster had been inflicted by the Sinn Fein party. There was general concurrence with the view that Ulster should not receive in this matter more favourable terms than were granted to the rest of Ireland.

(In this connection a letter was read to the Cabinet from Sir James Craig, and a draft reply prepared by the Lord Privy Seal.)

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

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AMNESTY: IMPORTATION OF ARMS AND IRISH UNIVERSITIES.

7. Reference was then made to the desirability of making the amnesty as wide as possible, to the wish of the Irish Ministers that for the present the restrictions on the export of arms etc. from Great Britain to Ireland should be maintained and to the expressed intention of those Ministers to continue the grant of financial assistance to the Irish Universities and in particular to make no differentiation in this respect as regards Trinity College, Dublin.

IRISH/

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

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IRISH REPRESENTATION AT GENOA.

8. In the course of the general discussion emphasis was laid on the desirability of impressing on the Irish Ministers the necessity for maintaining order in Ireland and of observing the spirit as well as the letter of the Treaty in such matters as the status of the Representative of the Crown. Caution should be observed as regards the money paid to the Provisional Government and care should be taken to retain a substantial amount in hand. Steps should also be taken to secure that the Draft Constitution was fully in accord with the letter and spirit of the Treaty. If an agreed Bill and Constitution was in draft by 8th March, no technical objection need be raised to the attendance of Free State Representatives at the Genoa Conference.

The Cabinet agreed generally with the views expressed above.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

January 24th, 1922.

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

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EGYPT

POLITICAL.

Code telegram to Lord Allenby (Cairo)

Foreign Office, January 24th, 1922. 8.30 p.m.

No. 26 (R)

VERY URGENT. -.-.-.-.-

Your telegram 27 (of January 22nd).

Government are most anxious both to retain advantage of your services to which in present critical situation they attach highest value, and also to obtain a peaceful solution of the present difficulty by installation of an Egyptian ministry under a minister as loyal and capable as Sarwat Pasha. Nor do they think that this should be found impossible, if all parties act with a due appreciation of the feelings and convictions of the others, and with a firm desire to find a solution that will be equally honourable to Egypt and Great Britain.

Whilst giving full weight to your explanations and to the assurances which you have received, the Cabinet feel strongly that His Majesty's Government might be surrendering a position which they consider vital to the Empire. If these assurances are sincerely proferred and if they are to have a binding value, there should not be any insurmountable difficulty in putting them in an acceptable and tangible form. In their present shape they imply an obligation which might afterwards be disputed or even repudiated, and which might expose His Majesty's Government to the just charge of having abandoned our main position without safeguards for the future. For if the abolition of the

Protectorate/

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

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Protectorate and the recognition of Egypt as a sovereign state be conceded without any clear undertaking as to the sequel, we might find ourselves confronted with conditions which neither His Majesty's Government nor Parliament would be prepared to ratify later on, thus leading to a breakdown even more disastrous than that which you contemplate. In such a case the sanction of the presence of British troops within the country, though an effective guarantee against formidable disturbance, might be impotent to secure us the peaceful solution which all desire.

His Majesty's Government are quite willing that the reserved subjects should provide the basis of free and friendly discussion between both parties. But this should be subject to a clear understanding on the points to which due importance has been rightly attached in your conversations with the ministers, but which should admit without difficulty of a more concrete definition.

These are the following:-

(1) A formal recognition by the Egyptian Government that the advice which we are prepared to offer to Parliament shall be the prelude to the institution of relations of perpetual friendship and close alliance between the two countries.

(2)/

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

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(2) The exclusion of foreign intervention or influence by any foreign power in the internal affairs of Egypt, as willingly admitted in the interview of Clayton and Selby with the members of Wafd.

(3) A full recognition by the Egyptian government, in return for the concession as regards foreign representation, of the superior diplomatic position and influence of Great Britain.

(4) a full recognition by the Egyptian government of the vital importance of Egypt as a part of our Imperial communications, and of the resultant fact that in any arrangement which may be proposed we must be at liberty to take such steps as may be required to maintain and defend that position.

If the Egyptian Ministers hold the views upon all these points which may be inferred from your conversations with them, they should experience no difficulty in giving the explicit assurances for which we ask. In their absence I am afraid that we could not justify nor would Parliament approve a proposal which would certainly be represented as an unconditional surrender on our part and which we ourselves feel provides insufficient security for vital Imperial interests. Egyptian Ministers should consider our position as well as their own, and should reflect that a rebuff in Parliament would be as bad for Egypt as it would be unwelcome to His Majesty's Government. If Egyptian government

is/

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

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is prepared to give these assurances, His Majesty's Government will then engage to ask the consent of Parliament early in the forthcoming session to a resolution which will declare the willingness of His Majesty's Government formally to terminate the Protectorate, and to recognise Egypt as a Sovereign State, so soon as an agreement has been reached on the reserved subjects in accordance with the above assurances.

In the interim, the government of Egypt would, as indicated by you in your personal telegram of January 20th, revert in practice to the status quo ante bellum, with the difference that Turkish suzerainty would of course have disappeared.

His Majesty's Government would in these circumstances also gladly agree to the conditions named in your proposed letter to the Sultan, namely (1) that steps shall be taken by the Egyptian government forthwith to set up a parliament (2) that martial law shall be abolished or suspended as soon as Egyptian government and yourself are agreed to recommend this, and (3) that an Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be re-established which will prepare the way for the creation of diplomatic and consular representation.

I most earnestly request you to use your influence with the Sultan and the Egyptian

authorities/

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

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authorities to obtain their acceptance of these conditions, which represent a sincere desire on our part to meet Egyptian aspirations, and to follow your advice.

If you are able to communicate to us their assent, terms of final letter to Sultan will need revision and will of course be considered by the Cabinet.

We could settle later on the precise time for resumption of negotiations on the reserved points.

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

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EGYPT.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Lord Allenby (Cairo).
25th January, 1922.

D. 12.25 p.m. 25th January, 1922.

R. 8.30 a.m. 26th January, 1922.

No. 31.

Very Urgent.

::::::::::::::

Your telegram No. 26.

The long delay has caused a rapid deterioration in political situation. What was possible last week may be impossible next week. I have dealt with Zaghloul and enemies of order and now is the time to show confidence in and uphold those who are ready to work with us in the interests of Egypt. Unless His Majesty's Government generously and boldly make concessions I have recommended, I see no chance of retaining co-operation of those who appreciate true situation. I will do my best to carry out policy of His Majesty's Government but I have no hopes of being able to obtain pledges required. No ministry exists and if it did no Egyptian dare at present sign his name to a bargain for anything less than complete independence.

If His Majesty's Government will not take my advice now they throw away all chance of having a friendly Egypt in our time.

I

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

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

I am confident of success if my advice is followed even now but there must be no delay. Though I have divulged no secrets, my opinions are well-known here and if the advice I have offered is rejected I cannot honourably remain.

I therefore beg that my resignation may be tendered to His Majesty with expression of my humble duty.

Pending my removal I shall of course continue loyally to carry out your instructions.

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

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EGYPT.

POLITICAL.

Cypher telegram to Lord Allenby (Cairo).

Foreign Office. 28th January, 1922. 3.5 p.m.

No. 32.

::::::::::::::

VERY URGENT.

His Majesty's Government have made every effort to meet the views of the Egyptian statesmen and yourself, and we are profoundly disappointed that you are unable to recommend these proposals to them. You and they have been equally familiar since the beginning of December with the general principles underlying the policy of His Majesty's Government and the limits to which we were prepared to go. These limits have been stretched to the uttermost in our anxiety to arrive at a settlement.

We have offered to invite Parliament to enter into an immediate engagement under which the abolition of the protectorate and the recognition of Egypt as a sovereign state would be brought about automatically, as soon as the assurances which the Egyptian negotiators themselves agreed to proffer were embodied in a shape giving us security for their fulfilment. That this solution should be regarded by Your Lordship as so incompatible with Egypt's claims as to make you unwilling to put it forward as the agent of His Majesty's Government, is deeply deplored by them.

When you returned to Egypt early in November you were fully informed of the policy of His Majesty's Government, which was formulated largely in consultation with yourself and was personally explained to you.

Upon

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

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Upon this basis you expressed a confident hope of obtaining the co-operation of an Egyptian government, and, indeed, at one stage when Sarwat Pasha stated the conditions on which he was prepared to assume office, we accepted them without demur. It was with some uneasiness that His Majesty's Government saw weeks pass before this offer took effect. Nor during this period had we any clear indication as to the lines on which you were seeking to come to a final understanding with Egyptian statesmen.

Your telegrams Nos. 17 to 20 suddenly presented His Majesty's Government with a plan in which almost the entire position hitherto taken up by them was to be abandoned and a decision demanded without delay. Your Lordship practically presented His Majesty's Government with an ultimatum demanding complete and immediate capitulation on points in which the British Parliament will feel the deepest concern, and which, involving as they do the absence of any guarantee for the future position of Great Britain in Egypt, raise an issue that is vital to the Empire.

Nevertheless, in the endeavour to enter as far as possible into the spirit of the Egyptian representatives, His Majesty's Government have shown their willingness to go to the extreme of concession. They

might

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

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might have expected His Majesty's representative to welcome the bridge which they were ready to build for the Egyptians. But Your Lordship without either recognising the merits of our carefully elaborated scheme, or suggesting any improvements or modifications which might facilitate its adoption, merely reiterates your ultimatum, declaring that nothing can be accepted or even discussed but what you have put forward yourself, this in fact being identical, as we gather, with the demands which the Egyptians have now formulated as their minimum.

If it be true that no Egyptian dare at present sign his name to anything short of complete independence, there must have been a change in Egyptian sentiment which was neither foreseen by yourself when you left England nor by Sarwat Pasha when he first offered to form a ministry. We have as yet received no adequate explanation of this violent metamorphosis, and we cannot but regret, from this point of view, that you did not accept our suggestion to send Amos and Clayton to furnish the fuller information which we sought. His Majesty's Government cannot therefore accept your resignation until they have had an opportunity of seeing you in person and hearing from your own lips the circumstances that have led to the present position. Accordingly they will be glad, if you will come home at once to acquaint them with your views. In the meantime, as it seems desirable

that

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

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that no misapprehension should exist as to the present position and policy of His Majesty's Government, or as to the circumstances in which you are being invited to come here to discuss it, we propose to issue here on Monday January 30th, and shall be glad if you will issue simultaneously in Egypt, a brief summary of the situation, the text of which is contained in my immediately following telegram. It is of course useless at the present stage to place before the Egyptian ex-ministers proposal which you state your inability to support and which, for reasons we are unable to appreciate, are certain, in your opinion, to meet with a hostile reception.

.....

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

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EGYPT.

POLITICAL.

Code telegram to Lord Allenby (Cairo).

Foreign Office, 28th January, 1922. 3.30 p.m.

No. 33. (R)

URGENT. -.-.-.-.-

Following is summary of situation for publication on Monday, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram. Begins:-

The High Commissioner has been summoned to England to give full information and advice to His Majesty's Government as to the present situation in Egypt, and as to the communications that have been passing between him and the Egyptian ex-Ministers, with regard to the future government of the country.

There appears to be an impression in some quarters that Great Britain has abandoned, or is about to abandon, her liberal attitude towards Egyptian aspirations, and that she desires to make use of her special position in Egypt to maintain a political and administrative system there incompatible with the freedom which she has declared her willingness to recognise.

This is not the case. The policy of His Majesty's Government, both during and since the Adly mission to England, has been founded upon the following principles:-

While unwilling to cede to disorder or violence what they are prepared to grant on its own merits, His Majesty's Government have explicitly stated their

readiness/

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

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readiness to invite Parliament to terminate the Protectorate, which was declared in 1914; to recognise the existence of Egypt as a sovereign state and to agree to the constitution of an Egyptian parliament and the re-establishment of an Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as soon as they are satisfied as to the following conditions, which they regard as vital to the interests both of Egypt and the Empire.

They must have full and effective guarantees:-

(1) that the imperial communications, to which Egypt is essential, are assured;

(2) that Great Britain retains both the right and the power to afford that protection to the foreign communities in Egypt, which the governments of these peoples in existing conditions look to her to supply.

(3) that Egypt is safeguarded against all foreign interference or aggression, direct or indirect.

As soon as an agreement, satisfying these conditions has been drawn up between an Egyptian government and the British government, there will be no hesitation on the part of the latter in inviting Parliamentary sanction to such an accord.

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

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Lord Curzon (Dup)

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C.P. - 3674.

CABINET.

EGYPT.

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COPY OF TELEGRAMS TO LORD ALLENBY.

(Previous Papers Nos. C.P. 3614, 3616, 3631, 3643, 3647, and 3659 - Also Cabinet Mins. 2(22)5, 3(22) 2, 4(22)1, 6 (22) 2 and Conference of Ministers dated 24th January, 1922).

NO. 1.

Cypher Telegram to Lord Allenby No. 32 of 25th January, 1922.

VERY URGENT.

His Majesty's Government have made every effort to meet the views of the Egyptian statesmen and yourself, and we are profoundly disappointed that you are unable to recommend these proposals to them. You and they have been equally familiar since the beginning of December with the general principles underlying the policy of His Majesty's Government and the limits to which we were prepared to go. These limits have been stretched to the uttermost in our anxiety to arrive at a settlement.

We have offered to invite Parliament to enter into an immediate engagement under which the abolition of the protectorate and the recognition of Egypt as a sovereign state would be brought about automatically, as soon as the assurances which the Egyptian negotiators themselves agreed to proffer were embodied in a shape giving us security for their fulfilment. That this solution should be regarded by Your Lordship as so incompatible with Egypt's claims as to make you unwilling to put it forward as the agent of His Majesty's Government, is deeply deplored by them.

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

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When you returned to Egypt early in November you were fully informed of the policy of His Majesty's Government, which was formulated largely in consultation with yourself and was personally explained to you. Upon this basis you expressed a confident hope of obtaining the co-operation of an Egyptian Government, and indeed, at one stage when Sarwat Pasha stated the conditions on which he was prepared to assume office, we accepted them without demur. It was with some uneasiness that His Majesty's Government saw weeks pass before this offer took effect. Nor during this period had we any clear indication as to the lines on which you were seeking to come to a final understanding with Egyptian statesmen.

Your telegrams ø Nos. 17 to 20 suddenly presented His Majesty's Government with a plan in which almost the entire position hitherto taken up by them was to be abandoned and a decision demanded without delay. Your Lordship practically presented His Majesty's Government with an ultimatum demanding complete and immediate capitulation on points in which the British Parliament will feel the deepest concern, and which, involving as they do the absence of any guarantee for the future position of Great Britain in Egypt, raise an issue that is vital to the Empire.

Nevertheless, in the endeavour to enter as far as possible into the spirit of the Egyptian representatives, His Majesty's Government have shown their willingness to go to the extreme of concession. They might have expected His Majesty's representative to welcome the bridge which they were ready to build for the Egyptians. But Your Lordship without either recognising the merits of our carefully elaborated scheme, or suggesting any improvements or modifications which might facilitate its adoption, merely reiterates your ultimatum, /

ø C.P.3614.

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

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declaring that nothing can be accepted or even discussed but what you have put forward yourself, this in fact being identical, as we gather, with the demands which the Egyptians have now formulated as their minimum.

If it be true that no Egyptian dare at present sign his name to anything short of complete independence, there must have been a change in Egyptian sentiment which was neither foreseen by yourself when you left England nor by Sarwat Pasha when he first offered to form a ministry. We have as yet received no adequate explanation of this violent metamorphosis, and we cannot but regret, from this point of view, that you did not accept our suggestion to send Amos and Clayton to furnish the fuller information which we sought. His Majesty's Government cannot therefore accept your resignation until they have had an opportunity of seeing you in person and hearing from your own lips the circumstances that have led to the present position. Accordingly they will be glad, if you will come home at once to acquaint them with your views. In the meantime, as it seems desirable that no misapprehension should exist as to the present position and policy of His Majesty's Government, or as to the circumstances in which you are being invited to come here to discuss it, we propose to issue here on Monday, January 30th, and shall be glad if you will issue simultaneously in Egypt, a brief summary of the situation, the text of which is contained in my immediately following telegram. It is of course useless at the present stage to place before the Egyptian ex-Ministers proposal which you state your inability to support and which, for reasons we are unable to appreciate, are certain, in your opinion, to meet with a hostile reception.

3.

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

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No. 2.

Code telegram to Lord Allenby No.33 of 28th January,1922.

Following is summary of situation for publication on Monday, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram. Begins:-

The High Commissioner has been summoned to England to give full information and advice to His Majesty's Government as to the present situation in Egypt, and as to the communications that have been passing between him and the Egyptian ex-Ministers, with regard to the future government of the country.

There appears to be an impression in some quarters that Great Britain has abandoned, or is about to abandon, her liberal attitude towards Egyptian aspirations, and that she desires to make use of her special position in Egypt to maintain a political and administrative system there incompatible with the freedom which she has declared her willingness to recognise.

This is not the case. The policy of His Majesty's Government, both during and since the Adly mission to England, has been founded upon the following principles:-

While unwilling to cede to disorder or violence what they are prepared to grant on its own merits, His Majesty's Government have explicitly stated their readiness to invite Parliament to terminate the Protectorate, which was declared in 1914; to recognise the existence of Egypt as a sovereign State and to agree to the constitution of an Egyptian parliament

and...

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

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and the re-establishment of an Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as soon as they are satisfied as to the following conditions, which they regard as vital to the interests both of Egypt and the Empire.

They must have full and effective guarantees:-

(1) that the imperial communications, to which Egypt is essential, are secured;

(2) that Great Britain retains both the right and the power to afford that protection to the foreign communities in Egypt, which the governments of these peoples in existing conditions look to her to supply.

(3) that Egypt is safeguarded against all foreign interference or aggression, direct or indirect.

As soon as an agreement, satisfying these conditions has been drawn up between an Egyptian Government and the British Government, there will be no hesitation on the part of the latter in inviting Parliamentary sanction to such an accord.

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

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Lord Curzon (160)
dup.

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S E C R E T.

C.P. 3686.

37.

C A B I N E T.

EGYPT.

(Previous Papers Nos. C.P.- 3614, 3616, 3631, 3643, 3647, 3659 and 3674 - also Cabinet Minutes 2(22)5, 3(22)2, 6(22)2, and Conference of Ministers, dated 24th January, 1922.

Decypher Telegram from Lord Allenby, No. 41 of 29th January, 1922.

Your telegram No. 32.*

I shall leave Alexandria for Trioste on Friday and am due to arrive in London on Friday February 8th. I am bringing Amos and Clayton with me.

Announcement contained in your telegram No. 33ø will be issued here at noon to-morrow.

I should inform Your Lordship that upon receipt of your telegram No. 26‡‡ I acted upon instructions contained therein to the extent of causing a full paraphrase of that telegram to be communicated to Sarwat Pasha unofficially with a view to myself putting conditions of His Majesty's Government to him on the following day; though I had no hope of his accepting conditions he was begged to explore every possible means of doing so. I also arranged for interview with the Sultan for the following day.

Upon receipt of your telegram No. 31X I caused communication which had been made to Sarwat Pasha to be withdrawn.

When I went to see the Sultan I shewed him above paraphrase and withdrew it.

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* No. 1 in C.P.-3674.

ø No. 2 in C.P.-3674.

‡‡ C.P. 3647.

X Appendix.

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

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

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APPENDIX.

Code Telegram to Lord Allenby No. 31 of 26th January, 1922.

Please take no action on my telegram No. 26 until you hear further from me. Cabinet will meet to consider your No. 31. to-morrow.

C.P. 3647.

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

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EGYPT AND SOUDAN. [February 10.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[E 1482/1/16] No. 1.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 81.)

My Lord, *Cairo, February 2, 1922.*

IN anticipation of learning the result of the meeting of the Cabinet announced in your Lordship's telegram No. 31 of the 26th January, I postponed the sending of a full reply to your telegram No. 26 of the 24th January. Your expected telegram No. 32 of the 28th January has now arrived, and I propose to devote this despatch to an answer to both telegrams as exhaustive as this critical moment demands.

2. From the contents of your telegram No. 32 in particular I am bound to conclude that the communications which I have made to your Lordship since I returned to Egypt last November, numerous and detailed as they have been, have failed to convey to His Majesty's Government a sufficiently clear idea of the course of political events here, or, indeed, of my own attitude in relation to these events and to the Egyptian policy of His Majesty's Government. I shall endeavour in what follows to remedy this apparent failure, and if I am led by the facts, as I shall be, to traverse in many particulars the statements and implications of your latest telegram, I must respectfully ask your Lordship's indulgence.

3. Upon the receipt of your telegram No. 26 of the 24th January, containing what I was informed were the final instructions of His Majesty's Government, I instructed Mr. Scott and Mr. Amos to convey these proposals to Sarwat Pasha and to beg him earnestly to consider every possibility of accepting them, at the same time arranging for him to see me on the following day, the 26th January, when he had had time to think the matter over. I also requested an audience of His Highness the Sultan, in order that I might comply with the instructions contained in the antepenultimate paragraph of your telegram.

4. In the meanwhile, however, I telegraphed to your Lordship asking that my resignation might be tendered to His Majesty; this I did, and I hope I have made it sufficiently clear, on the ground that His Majesty's Government had rejected my advice to pursue the course which alone, in my conviction, could lead to a solution of the Egyptian question satisfying alike the interests of the Empire and the reasonable national aspirations of the Egyptians, and providing a foundation upon which to build those relations of lasting friendship and alliance between Great Britain and Egypt which it is the desire of His Majesty's Government to secure. The recommendations which I had made to His Majesty's Government were known to His Highness the Sultan, and to certain ex-Ministers and other prominent Egyptians who had agreed to take office if my recommendations were accepted, and after their rejection I could not honourably continue in my present post.

5. Nevertheless, I proceeded loyally to carry out, pending my removal, the instructions of His Majesty's Government.

6. But before Sarwat Pasha visited me, and before my audience with the Sultan, I received your Lordship's telegram No. 31 of the 26th January, requesting me to take no action upon your telegram No. 26. I therefore cancelled the preliminary action I had taken with Sarwat Pasha, and before reading to His Highness a paraphrase of the contents of the latter telegram, I informed him that it was to be regarded as null. Since, however, both the Sultan and Sarwat Pasha have had cognisance of the contents of that telegram, I may acquaint your Lordship that, as I anticipated, neither did Sarwat Pasha see any possibility of taking office himself, nor did the Sultan see any likelihood of any Ministry taking office, upon those conditions.

7. If any omission or lack of clarity on my part has led His Majesty's Government into the misconceptions, as in my respectful judgment they appear, upon which your Lordship's following telegram (No. 32) is based, I deeply regret it.

8. This telegram is mainly devoted to two contentions, as follows:—

(*a.*) That, being fully cognisant of the policy of His Majesty's Government, said to have been formulated largely in consultation with myself, I suddenly advised,

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in the form of an ultimatum, a departure from this policy so grave as to imply the abandonment of almost the entire position which they had taken up; presumably partly as a result of some violent and unexplained change in Egyptian sentiment.

(*b.*) That although His Majesty's Government, in view of this advice, have shown their willingness to go to the utmost limit of concession, I have refused to support their liberal proposals in Egypt.

9. (*a.*) I am fully aware that the aim of British policy in Egypt has been, and is, to combine, under conditions of lasting alliance and amity, the realisation of the legitimate aspirations of the Egyptian people with the safeguarding of Imperial communications, the protection of foreign interests in Egypt, and the defence of the country against foreign aggression or interference; with this aim I have always been, and remain, in complete accord.

10. The method chosen by His Majesty's Government for the attainment of these aims has been to conduct with representatives of Egypt negotiations by which it was hoped, in return for certain concessions, notably the abolition of the protectorate and the recognition of Egypt as a sovereign State, to obtain the signed agreement of the Egyptian representatives, and the ratification of a Constituent Assembly, to certain British rights regarded as essential for the securing of the Imperial and foreign interests enumerated above, and notably to the right of maintaining troops in Egypt, whether in certain specified places as some have thought sufficient, or for a certain specified time, as others have preferred, or in unspecified places and for an unspecified time, as was finally demanded by His Majesty's Government in the draft convention proposed to and rejected by the Egyptian official delegation last November.

11. While, naturally, I had not attempted to dissuade His Majesty's Government either before or during the negotiations from pursuing this most proper method of reaching a solution of the Egyptian question, I had not disguised from them my opinion that it would be a matter of extreme difficulty to pursue it to ultimate success. Though the proposals of the Milner Mission were on their first announcement regarded as surprisingly liberal, Egyptian opinion soon began to harden against them, and in any case, when its report was officially published, it was generally considered that His Majesty's Government were committed to the policy recommended therein. His Majesty's Government might therefore expect to meet probably insuperable obstacles if they desired to negotiate a treaty in terms more restrictive than those general terms which had received the approval of the mission. In particular, as I more than once had occasion to warn your Lordship, no responsible Egyptian could be expected to sign, or to obtain the ratification of, any provision giving His Majesty's Government unlimited rights to maintain troops in Egypt. He would have been recognising in a binding form a claim which Egypt had not previously admitted, against which Egyptians had always and increasingly protested, and which His Majesty's Government at intervals for the last forty years had declared not to be a permanent claim.

12. Such being my views, I had not failed to draw your Lordship's attention to the necessity of preparing a policy, as liberal as possible, for declaration and application, by way, at any rate, of a *modus vivendi*, in the probable event of the negotiations with the Egyptian Official Delegation breaking down and its being impossible to conclude a treaty. I did so more particularly in my despatches No. 311 of the 16th April, 1921, and No. 530 of the 17th June, 1921, in the former of which I specifically contemplated the unconditional abolition of the protectorate, while in the latter I put forward the view—which, when again put forward to your Lordship a few days ago, appears to have amazed His Majesty's Government and led them to infer a "violent metamorphosis" in Egyptian opinion—that no Egyptian could "become a party to a permanent arrangement between Great Britain and Egypt, which fell short of securing complete independence for the latter, with any prospect of securing the approval of his countrymen." If I may select for repetition a sentence from the former despatch, I would remind you that I wrote: "The main requirement is that His Majesty's Government should be prepared for eventualities and be ready with an alternative policy which could be announced without further delay if present plans miscarry."

13. I do not know how far these representations may have been considered at the time, but, so far as I am aware, when the negotiations with the official delegation approached the breaking-point, no alternative policy had been prepared.

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14. At that time I was in England, and I had the advantage of being consulted by the Cabinet. Since it appears to be suggested that this involves me in considerable responsibility for the course of action which His Majesty's Government subsequently thought fit to adopt, it is necessary that I should remind your Lordship of the nature of this consultation.

15. I was first invited to attend a meeting on the 24th October of a sub-committee of four members of the Cabinet, to whom I read a scheme for applying an alternative policy to Egypt: the policy was, according to my notion, to be independent of a treaty, and to take the form of a declaration by His Majesty's Government. It was designed to combine the achievement of the aims of His Majesty's Government with the satisfaction of the reasonable aspirations of Egypt, and included an unconditional recognition of the independence of that country: we were to rely upon our acquired preponderance there, and upon a reassertion of our special position in the country, to secure the necessary practical safeguards for our interests and those of foreign colonies, as well as for the prevention of interference by other Powers. It was a policy of certain definite concessions and certain definite insistences, and it was not a policy of bargaining. It found no support in the sub-committee, who made their recommendations to the Cabinet, and did not meet again.

16. Later I was summoned to the Cabinet, whom I found preparing to decide upon the text of a proposed draft convention between Great Britain and Egypt. There was some disposition to shelve the whole question and to resume its consideration in the spring of 1922. I represented how disastrous an effect this renewal of delay would have in Egypt: that after months of negotiation between plenipotentiaries His Majesty's Government should be unable to make up their mind, would be taken as an admission of indecision most detrimental to our prestige in that country. I was then shown two drafts of the proposed convention, each of which had its adherents in the Cabinet, though the less liberal draft (which was eventually presented to the Egyptian delegation) was evidentally preferred. I was asked whether I thought the Egyptian delegation would be prepared to sign either draft: I replied that they would certainly sign neither. I was asked what would be the effect in Egypt of the publication of the preferred draft: I replied that the effect would be bitter disappointment. I was there and then invited to formulate a policy, which I necessarily refused to do, seeing that His Majesty's Government had been for some months in possession of my views, and that I could not dictate a policy in five minutes.

17. It was then enquired of me whether I could maintain order in Egypt if the rejection of the proposals of His Majesty's Government were to provoke a hostile outburst, and I assured the Cabinet of my ability to do so. It was enquired whether a Ministry could be formed upon Adly Pasha's expected resignation, and I said that I thought it could, though whether it would be a political Ministry or a Ministry of Affairs I did not know. Finally, I impressed upon the Cabinet the vital and urgent importance of deciding upon and declaring their Egyptian policy.

18. That is the extent to which I was consulted. I observe that my perhaps too sanguine forecast of the possibility of forming a Ministry of some sort is now represented as a confident hope of obtaining the co-operation of the Egyptian Government. I neither cherished nor voiced any such expectation. A Ministry of Affairs would have been politically a Ministry of non-co-operation, useful only for maintaining the Administration and preserving law and order, and a political Ministry would have been, as every political Ministry in Egypt has been during my High Commissionership, a Ministry of polite opposition to the policy of His Majesty's Government.

19. Such expectations as I had were at first somewhat fortified when I returned to Egypt early in November by my realisation of the position which the Ministry, under the temporary Presidency of Sarwat Pasha, had secured for itself: the country was still awaiting calmly the issue of the negotiations in London, and though it was soon afterwards privately known that Adly Pasha no longer expected to bring back a signed agreement, it was hoped that, especially if he returned with some tangible concession, the existing Ministry, somewhat rearranged, might continue in office; and in any case it was not doubted that they and their principal supporters would remain attached to orderly government, and await a more favourable opportunity of realising their aims of independence.

20. The confidence of the Sultan and of Sarwat Pasha, which I communicated to your Lordship in my telegram No. 620 of the 12th November, was not shared by

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the British advisers in this country, and on the 17th November I telegraphed the text of a joint memorandum which I had received from them, and expressed my opinion that a settlement of the negotiations in London which proved unacceptable to Egypt would make it very difficult to carry on the administration.

21. But the question whether or not I was over sanguine in the view I stated to the Cabinet has never been put to the proof. A letter was prepared in London, setting forth the intentions of His Majesty's Government towards Egypt consequent upon the rejection of the proposed draft convention, which, I was informed, it had been decided that I should present to the Sultan. On the 1st December this letter, with whose contents I had no previous acquaintance, arrived, and I was instructed to present it to the Sultan on the 3rd December, on which date it was to be published in London.

22. The effect of this letter was such as largely to change the situation. It was universally taken in Egypt as barring the way to the restoration of harmonious relations between the two countries, as destroying the hope of any resumption of negotiations, and as rendering the acceptance of ministerial office by any Egyptian an act of treachery to the national cause. At any moment these sentiments, however unreasonable, were liable to be fanned into flame by political agitators.

23. The maintenance of constitutional or even of legal government in Egypt involves as a minimum condition the existence of a Ministry. Moreover, from the immediately practical point of view, the attempt to carry on indefinitely the government of the country without the authority provided for by the constitution could only lead, especially in the presence of increasing popular hostility and bitterness, to a general breakdown of the whole machine of administration.

24. I lost no time in placing my proposals before your Lordship. My telegrams Nos. 656 of the 5th December and 664 of the 11th December are doubtless still fresh in your memory, and I need only remind you that I argued once again in favour of His Majesty's Government abandoning their desire to bargain, and acting on their own initiative in conceding the protectorate and retaining their essential safeguards. Your reply (telegram No. 529) pointed out the impossibility of altering the status of Egypt without previous discussion by Parliament, and made a suggestion as to a possible programme upon which an Egyptian Ministry might take office. In my telegram No. 664, I demonstrated the uselessness of the suggested programme; and, recognising the bar to the immediate abolition of the protectorate, I proposed that His Majesty's Government should undertake to recommend its abolition when Parliament met. I need not recapitulate the arguments with which, both from the Imperial and the Egyptian point of view, I supported my case.

25. It was at this moment that Adly Pasha resigned, and in my telegrams Nos. 665 and 666 I communicated to your Lordship, and supported, the programme upon which Sarwat Pasha, who had been sent for by His Highness the Sultan, then declared himself willing to take office. The chief feature of this programme, which disregards the draft convention except in so far as it declared the willingness of His Majesty's Government to terminate the protectorate, was the proposal to re-create an Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The entire control of the foreign affairs of Egypt had hitherto been regarded as an essential part of the protectorate (see, for example, Sir E. Grey's telegram to Mr. Cheetham, No. 425 of the 15th December, 1914), and—since later in this despatch I shall have to contest the reality of certain other supposed concessions—I should here say that when your Lordship on the 15th December authorised me to assent to Sarwat Pasha's programme I fully appreciated that this was a generous concession, and conformable to the method of procedure which I had long advocated.

26. A new and disturbing factor now appeared and complicated the situation. Saad Pasha Zaghlul, whose first hope, upon the failure of the negotiations, had been to see himself rise supreme upon a wave of universal disappointment, had been willing, as long as the prospects of the formation of a Ministry seemed remote, to trust to a gradual disintegration of the Governmental parties by accessions to his own side. Alarmed now by the apparent imminence of a new Government, he resolved to make an immediate bid for the recovery of his old domination. My report on the situation in Egypt for the week beginning on the 15th December records, in sharp contrast with those for previous weeks, a notable recrudescence of popular excitement. The anniversary of the declaration of the protectorate, on the 18th December, and the return to Egypt on the following day of one of Zaghlul Pasha's more prominent supporters, were made the occasion for strikes and demonstrations. Two British soldiers were assassinated in the streets of Cairo. Zaghlul Pasha had

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decided to open his overt campaign by holding a large meeting on the 23rd December. The supporters of the parties of law and order were wavering, and Sarwat Pasha, feeling that he might find himself without the backing in the country which he had anticipated, became reluctant to assume office. The situation had become dangerous, and every day seemed to be bringing us nearer to the moment when the machinery of government would come to a standstill, and we should have all classes of Egyptians united against us, both in passive and in active hostility.

27. With these considerations before me, I decided to silence and to reduce to impotence Saad Pasha Zaghlul and the other leaders of the party which carried hostility to our claims and influence to the point of reckless indifference to public order; in short, the revolutionary party.

28. This measure was successful. After two or three weeks of suspense, it became apparent that I had rightly gauged the main current of Egyptian sentiment, which, while abandoning in no respect its ideal of independence, desired to pursue that object with a reasonable regard for law and order.

29. It would not appear from recent despatches that His Majesty's Government has adequately appreciated the importance, the bearing, or the effects of these events. But in point of fact they changed the political situation. All those leaders of public opinion who are aware that a policy of intemperate hostility to Great Britain could only lead to consequences disastrous to Egypt, and that the best hopes for the political future of the country depend upon the maintenance of the Council of Ministers and the revival of representative institutions, gave unmistakable signs of their readiness to seek for a *modus vivendi* under which England and Egypt, without either the one or the other abandoning their views or interests, would be able to continue to collaborate, pending the arrival of a time when a final agreement might be possible. The *impasse* which had confronted us no longer existed; a door had been opened. But that door must be kept open by appropriate measures. And these measures involved a change in the attitude and reservations of His Majesty's Government corresponding to the change in the situation.

30. It appears to be suggested that I have not kept His Majesty's Government sufficiently advised of the steps by which the political situation has been transformed. This cannot be admitted. The critical character of the proceedings against Zaghlul Pasha was obvious. The likelihood that it would produce widespread disorder was notorious. It was known to His Majesty's Government that that consequence did not follow. This was a most outstanding and remarkable fact. Comment was not necessary. As soon as the situation which was obviously in process of crystallising, if properly handled, as it was, had in fact crystallised, and specific proposals for a reorientation of our policy had been framed, they were immediately communicated to His Majesty's Government in my telegrams Nos. 17–20.

31. At this moment, transient as it seemed likely to be, I presented His Majesty's Government with an opportunity of laying the foundations for a settlement of the Egyptian question. I requested a quick decision; and my request that His Majesty's Government should seize the right moment for action is now qualified as an ultimatum.

32. I again pointed to the abolition of the protectorate as the preliminary condition of the attainment of the aims of His Majesty's Government. I did so, in a sense, suddenly; for though up to a month before, and for eight months previously I had repeatedly urged this course of action, I had indeed for a month left your Lordship in the belief that a Ministry would take office otherwise. But during that month I had been engaged in preparing from the fluid elements of wavering opinion and fluctuating passion a momentarily stable situation. Had its equilibrium been sustained by the force of the proposed concession, not only would a Ministry have taken office, but they would have done so upon terms auguring most favourably for the settlement of outstanding differences by the method of negotiation which His Majesty's Government still maintained their desire to employ. I confess that the elements were not so manageable as to render it possible for me to present my plan gradually; nor would an incomplete and tentative plan have merited sufficiently the consideration of His Majesty's Government.

33. As to the contention of your telegram No. 32 that my plan involves the absence of any guarantee for the future position of Great Britain in Egypt, the question whether it involves the absence of an adequate guarantee is indeed the main question at issue; and my recent telegrams have been largely devoted to an attempt to show that it does not. On the one hand the protectorate (genuinely believed in Egypt to have been intended as a purely war measure) has undoubtedly

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for the last three years vitiated our whole relations with the Egyptians, served as an irritant by which hostile passions can at any moment be inflamed, and sapped time after time the influence and good intentions of those statesmen who have been willing to meet our claims in a reasonable spirit; on the other hand, in my opinion, its value to us as a guarantee has been overestimated. Whatever may be the final solution of the problem, our effective guarantees are our military and naval position in Egypt, and the variously penetrating influences of our forty years' moral predominance in the country.

34. I have been solicitous that my particular proposal that His Majesty's Government should recommend to Parliament the termination of the protectorate, contrary though it may be (except as part of a general bargain) to their expressed intentions, should precisely not imply the abandonment of "almost the entire position taken up by them." In your Lordship's parting interview with Adly Pasha, after the negotiations had broken down, you stated that the British policy could only be executed with Egyptian co-operation which by his intended resignation he was refusing; and in the final paragraph of the letter to the Sultan of the 3rd December it was stated that His Majesty's Government were prepared to consider in a spirit of co-operation any methods which might be suggested for carrying out the substance of their proposals. I had produced, by silencing the elements of disruption, the state of affairs which is contemplated in the antepenultimate paragraph of that letter as the condition of further progress towards a settlement; and in giving the advice which appears to have been so unwelcome I did not feel that I was acting unharmoniously with your statement and that of His Majesty's Government. While making it possible for an Egyptian Government, willing to co-operate, to take office, I by no means overthrew the principle of negotiation, but left the majority of the subjects of discussion for eventual settlement by that means, safeguarding in the meanwhile their present state. But for any negotiation and any settlement healthy conditions were essential; as it was, the protectorate was a sore infecting the whole relation of the two countries.

35. Though I had already pointed out that no Egyptian would sign his name to anything short of independence, His Majesty's Government have expressed surprise at this statement in my telegram No. 33, have inferred a violent change in Egyptian sentiment, and have implied that I have been driven to suggest a desperate expedient. This is not the case. The Egyptians are inherently suspicious of the policy of His Majesty's Government, and their suspicions have doubtless increased under the influence of recent disappointments. They feel that they negotiate under the disadvantages of weakness and inexperience and are excessively apprehensive of unwittingly compromising themselves. To the extent to which these suspicions have grown, and are reflected in intractability, their sentiments may be said to have changed; but in the sentiment of hostility to the protectorate, common to all the educated and semi-educated classes, there has been no change. This sentiment, kindled by agitation, provocation, or, occasionally, material grievance, has from time to time flared up; but it is not at such a time that I should conceivably recommend to His Majesty's Government the bold and generous concession which I believe to be a necessary condition to a settlement giving any sure hopes of security and friendship. I have recommended it at a moment when, the resentment caused by the letter to the Sultan having subsided, and the forces of subversion having been weakened, it can be considered, as His Majesty's Government would have desired that it should be considered, upon its own merits.

36. His Majesty's Government claim to have gone, in response to my advice, to the utmost limit of concession, and charge me with having refused to recommend their liberal proposals to the Sultan and to the Egyptian authorities.

37. I must here shortly recapitulate the advice which I gave, without repeating the arguments which I advanced in favour of its acceptance.

38. Your Lordship had authorised me to assent to the original programme of Sarwat Pasha, of which the main features were :—

(1.) The abolition of martial law.
(2.) Extension of Egyptian control in the administration.
(3.) Constitutional Government.
(4.) The establishment of an Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
(5.) Recognition of the offer of His Majesty's Government to abolish the protectorate, but not of the other provisions of the rejected draft convention.

39. Of these, the first two had been conceded by the letter to the Sultan of the 3rd December; the third was not open to opposition on the ground of British

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interests; and the fourth (hitherto held to be essentially bound up with the termination of the protectorate) was now conceded by His Majesty's Government. The fifth was understood to be an expression of hope that His Majesty's Government might, at a date not long distant, find it possible to abolish the protectorate.

40. As I have explained early in this despatch, a new factor arose, which prevented the formation of a Ministry upon this programme. The elimination of that factor left, in two or three weeks, a position in which I saw that were the opportunity swiftly and decisively taken, the use of a new concession would produce not only a Ministry, but effects much more far-reaching for the well-being and contentment of Egypt and for the relief of His Majesty's Government from a harassing perplexity.

41. I advised His Majesty's Government to authorise me to address a letter to the Sultan, of a different tone, indeed, to the previous letter, but couched in such language as evidently to arise out of and to be consistently referable to that letter. The first four of the above-enumerated points were admitted, an undertaking was added that His Majesty's Government would recommend to Parliament, without waiting for the conclusion of a treaty, the abolition of the protectorate, and the following four matters were left for free and friendly discussion at some future date:—

(*a*.) The security of the communications of the British Empire.
(*b*.) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect.
(*c*.) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities.
(*d*.) The Soudan.

42. This letter was to be published simultaneously with the assumption of office by Sarwat Pasha and his Ministry, and an official registration would thus be constituted of British claims in respect of those four matters, though the measures which might be regarded as necessary for the satisfaction of those claims were left for future discussion unrestricted on both sides.

43. I explained in my telegram No. 18 of the 12th January how the definition of the reserved subjects had been framed to cover all points in the draft convention which His Majesty's Government could desire to bring under those headings.

44. I learnt from your Lordship in return that the apprehensions of His Majesty's Government had been aroused by my not producing any guarantee that the proposed Egyptian Ministry agreed with my view about the reserved subjects, or would be prepared to agree to the British interpretation of them as a condition of the concession which I had advised. I therefore entered into further conversations with Sarwat and Sidki Pashas, the results of which were formally drawn up: this enabled me to report that they were in entire accord with my view as to the points covered by the reserved subjects, and that they undertook not to change the existing state of affairs in matters affecting those subjects until an agreement upon them had been reached with His Majesty's Government.

45. In response to my communicating to your Lordship the result of these conversations, I received your telegram No. 26 of the 24th January, which contains the counter-proposals of His Majesty's Government, described in your telegram No 32 as the extremity of concession.

46. His Majesty's Government desired that the assurances I had received should be embodied in an acceptable and tangible form less susceptible of evasion; they required in fact the following explicit assurances:—

(1.) A formal recognition by the Egyptian Government that the advice which His Majesty's Government were prepared to offer Parliament should be the prelude to the institution of relations of perpetual friendship and close alliance between the two countries.
(2.) That foreign intervention and the influence of any Foreign Power in the internal affairs of Egypt should be excluded.
(3.) A full recognition of the superior diplomatic position and influence of Great Britain.
(4.) A full recognition of the vital importance of Egypt as a part of our Imperial communications and of the resultant fact that in any arrangements which might be proposed, His Majesty's Government must be at liberty to take such steps as may be required to maintain and defend that position.

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47. Your Lordship's telegram then pointed out that in default of such explicit assurances His Majesty's Government could not approve of a proposal which would certainly be represented as an unconditional surrender. In the context and without further qualification the proposal referred to would appear to be the proposal which I had recommended to His Majesty's Government. Had it indeed been my proposal which His Majesty's Government intended, upon receipt of the required assurances, to recommend to Parliament, the first three assurances would, I think, readily have been given; the fourth, however, would have been refused, since such an assurance would have armed His Majesty's Government with a right to insist upon taking military dispositions even in excess of those contemplated under the draft treaty. It was doubtless mainly upon that clause of the draft treaty that negotiations with Adly Pasha failed: Egyptians believe that divergent views exist as to the required extent of military dispositions; and this was not a matter upon which the Egyptian Government could conceivably commit themselves in advance to accepting whatever conclusions His Majesty's Government might ultimately be found to have reached.

48. But from a later passage in your Lordship's telegram it appears that the proposal which His Majesty's Government were prepared to recommend to Parliament was in fact not the proposal which I had made, namely that the protectorate should be abolished before the conclusion of a treaty. The proposal which they were prepared to recommend was that the protectorate should be abolished after the conclusion of an agreement between the two Governments which should settle the outstanding questions. Four steps were evidently contemplated:—

(1.) The giving of explicit assurances.
(2.) The assent of Parliament to a conditional abolition of the protectorate.
(3.) The fulfilment of that condition, *i.e.*, the successful termination of negotiations.
(4.) The actual abolition of the protectorate.

It was therefore clear that the Egyptian Government would have had one of two prospects before them: either they must have given assurances of such a nature as to allow themselves no scope for negotiation at all; or they might have left themselves a certain scope for negotiation, but without any guarantee against finding the actual abolition of the protectorate impossible unless, when they came to negotiate, they accepted in every respect the desires of His Majesty's Government.

49. Further, if I understand your Lordship's telegram aright, the re-establishment of an Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which His Majesty's Government had assented to a month before without demur, was now made subject to the giving of the explicit assurances enumerated above.

50. It was perfectly clear to me that a proposal involving such assurances, so conditioned, would not be entertained: but the suggestion that I refused to recommend them to His Highness the Sultan and to Sarwat Pasha is inaccurate, as I have shown in my telegram No. 41 and in the early part of this despatch. In this, as in other matters, I have scrupulously carried out your Lordship's instructions.

51. In this despatch I have traced, in so far as they seem to be relevant, the course of events in Egypt since my return last November, and have set forth the justification of the form and occasion of the advice I have offered. The substance of that advice I have fully supported in other communications, and I have not sought here to recapitulate or elaborate my arguments.

52. The commission which I hold from His Majesty is to maintain His Majesty's protectorate over Egypt. I have done so: but I do not think it has the elements of durability, and I have now advised its being brought to an end, as it was established, by a unilateral declaration. I have laid open to His Majesty's Government a course which, in my judgment, accords with the general traditions of British policy and British institutions, and is in the true interest of the Empire, while it is consistent with that political development of Egypt which His Majesty's Government have always desired to encourage, and which has been the goal of the labours of my predecessors, men who in serving their own country have sought the welfare of the Egyptian people.

I have, &c.
ALLENBY,
High Commissioner.

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

Lord Curzon.

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FINAL COPY NO.

- SECRET -

S. 40

MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION AT 10 Downing St., LONDON, S.W./1 on WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15th, 1922 at 11.0 a.m.

PRESENT:

The Prime Minister

Lord Curzon — General Clayton

Lord Allenby — Mr. Amos

Sir Maurice Hankey

Sir Edward Grigg.

EGYPT.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was glad of an opportunity to discuss the difficulties in regard to Egypt with Lord Allenby. Difficulties often arose when communications were exchanged entirely in writing. Misunderstandings were very liable to occur as to the exact interpretation to be placed on a phrase in a telegram or a despatch. When the matter was discussed face to face, it would often be found that misunderstandings were removed and agreement reached. It might, of course, be found that there were questions of principle which separated the views of Lord Allenby from those of the Government. It was very important, however, to insure that there should be no dispute over some mere misunderstanding. Consequently, he would like Lord Allenby to explain exactly what his position was and he would then explain the position of the Government, and they could try and understand one another's point of view. The Prime Minister then referred to Lord Allenby's Despatch of February 2nd, 1922, drawing attention in particular to paragraphs 16 and 17 in which Lord Allenby gave some account of what had occurred at a Cabinet Meeting held on November 4th, 1921. When he read these paragraphs, the Prime Minister said that they conveyed quite a different impression to what

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

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was his recollection of what had occurred at the meeting. Accordingly, he had consulted the Cabinet Minutes, which contained a very full summary of what had occurred, and this entirely confirmed his own recollection. There had no doubt been expressed differences of opinion at this meeting, as at most Conferences or Cabinet meetings, but at the end there had been a definite summing up by the Prime Minister himself and the conclusion of the Cabinet had been recorded in plain language. When he read Lord Allenby's account of the same meeting, he obtained the impression that there had been a great conflict of opinion and no decision.

LORD CURZON entered at this point.

THE PRIME MINISTER repeated, for the benefit of Lord Curzon, what he had already said to Lord Allenby. He then asked Lord Allenby if he could summarise what was the difference between him and the Cabinet.

LORD ALLENBY said that the Cabinet appeared to think that an Egyptian Government might be formed which would be prepared to sign a Treaty which did not give full independence to Egypt. He himself said that this was impossible. His conviction was that any concession or arrangement must be unilateral. No Egyptian Ministry would sign a treaty making a bargain with the British Government for anything less than complete independence. He himself had promised Sarwat Pasha to recommend that the Protectorate over Egypt should be lifted, leaving for subsequent discussion and eventual settlement certain subjects relating to the British position in Egypt. He had pointed out to H.M.Government that t is was a most admirable opportunity for achieving a settlement. When this opportunity had not been seized, he had felt that there was no alternative but to resign, as the views he held were perfectly well known in Egypt. The point at issue, therefore, was that Lord Curzon thought it was possible to make a bargain with an Egyptian Government and he was convinced that it was not. Lord Allenby then pointed out that Sarwat Pasha's life would not be worth a fortnight's purchase if he were to enter into a bargain.

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

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

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The fundamental difference was that Lord Curzon thought a bargain could be made and he knew that it could not. It was essential that the friends of the British Government should not be treated as though they were enemies. If he had been permitted to offer the terms he had proposed, he would have had to deal with a strong and friendly Egyptian Ministry, which was prepared to treat honestly and openly. It was essential to have a friendly Ministry. The sort of Ministry which he had had to deal with during the last three years had been politely hostile or else merely a Ministry of Affairs, and that had been of no value. Lord Allenby at this point referred in detail to some of the Ministries with which he had to deal, culminating in Adly Pasha's Ministry, which had resigned owing to the failure of the London negotiations. Sarwat Pasha was so hopeful of forming a Ministry and the prospects had been so bright that he had actually intended to include one of Zaghlul's old supporters. Owing to the long delay by the British Government, however, in taking its decision, the situation had changed. The result was the non-co-operation manifesto whose authors Lord Allenby arrested. He had since seen them and had told them to return to their homes and keep quiet there and had given them warning of the serious danger to which they would be exposed if they did not do so. He had also released the five newspapers which he had found it necessary to suspend. This had been a salutary lesson and he had no fear of a repetition of this incident.

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

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The fact was that all these Egyptian leaders were willing to back the favourite but not if they thought it was going to be pulled. One main cause of many of these difficulties had been that Lord Allenby had not been allowed to hang Abdel-Rahman Fahmy, who had been condemned to death, in the Conspiracy Trial of 1920.

LORD CURZON recalled that the only reason why Abdel-Rahman Fahmy had not been hanged was that Lord Milner had represented that to carry out this sentence would be to destroy all chance of a settlement.

LORD ALLENBY said that the reasons did not affect the matter, but the fact was that our failure to deal with these people had resulted in a reign of terror. Those who co-operated with us in their own homes were treated as though they were traitors. The Egyptian moderates all feared that Zaghlul Pasha would be allowed to return. At present he was detained at Aden because the British Government were unwilling to charter a ship to take him to the Seychelles. The British Government said that the Egyptian Government ought to pay, but he could not ask the Egyptian Government to do so.

He himself felt that Great Britain was strong enough to allow Egypt to have independence. If this were done, Great Britain would still retain effective guarantees in its army, its navy and its position in Egypt.

As regards the proposal that Egypt should have its own foreign relations against which so much stress had been laid in the past, (in this connection Lord Allenby referred to

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

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correspondence of 1914) that had now been conceded and the protectorate was thereby virtually abolished.

LORD CURZON asked exactly what Lord Allenby meant by this.

LORD ALLENBY replied that this had been part of Sarwat Pasha's programme.

LORD CURZON agreed that at one point this had been conceded on condition that Sarwat Pasha took office. Lord Curzon then raised the question as to whether Lord Allenby's account of what had occurred was quite fair. He recalled that after Lord Allenby's return to Egypt he had been sent a despatch, dated December 3rd, which informed him of the policy adopted by the British Government. Sarwat Pasha had then put forward a programme on which he was willing to take office. Lord Curzon had accepted it. He had in his possession a telegram in which Lord Allenby expressed his gratification at this acceptance. The British Government had then waited for some time for Sarwat Pasha to take office. Lord Allenby had explained that Sarwat Pasha was apprehensive of Zaghlul. The British Government had then consented that Zaghlul should be removed. After the removal of Zaghlul, Sarwat Pasha had entirely changed his terms. Lord Allenby had telegraphed the new terms to Cannes and Lord Curzon had replied that he would give an answer as soon as he got home. The real reason for the present difficulties, however, was that Sarwat Pasha had been frightened to continue.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that at the moment he would like to avoid these controversial points as regards the past. He himself had never heard Lord Curzon express the view that any Egyptian Ministry would sign any Treaty. First there had been the Report of Lord Milner's Committee. The Cabinet had rejected this, but had agreed on the abolition of the Protectorate, subject to a suitable Treaty being

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

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concluded with Egypt. Lord Curzon had undertaken to do his best to carry out this decision. He had carried on the negotiations with Adly Pasha which had failed. Then Lord Allenby had tried to obtain a treaty and had not succeeded. The reason of this failure was the one Lord Allenby had given, namely, that Sarwat Pasha had been afraid. The Prime Minister then recalled that Sir William Hayter - an English official in Egypt, had written a Memorandum in which he stated that no Egyptian Government would ever be willing to sign a Treaty conflicting with the policy of the Egyptian Nationalists. This policy really amounted to nothing less than complete independence, such as was enjoyed by Roumania. Anyone who gave away that policy would be regarded as a traitor and he himself had always thought it would be impossible to obtain a treaty.

LORD ALLENBY agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER, continuing, said that if no treaty was possible what was to be done? He hoped he was wrong in what he believed to be the fundamental difference between Lord Allenby and the British Government and if he was wrong, he hoped Lord Allenby would say so. As he understood it, the position was that the British Government did not intend to give up Egypt, that is to say, the special interests in and control of the British Government over that country. Notwithstanding the Egyptian attitude and even the attitude of some of the newspapers in this country, they were not willing to give this up. Sarwat Pasha, he gathered, was a Turk and a person in whom the Egyptian public had little confidence.

LORD ALLENBY expressed doubts in regard to this.

THE PRIME MINISTER, continuing, said that in saying this, he was only repeating a view which had been expressed to him by British and Egyptian residents in Egypt. He was told that Egyptian public opinion had not the same respect for Sarwat Pasha as they had for Adly Pasha. Still, the choice of individuals must rest with the High Commissioner. The

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

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line of difference between Lord Allenby and the British Government appeared to be that the British Government said that the Protectorate should be abolished, but only on certain specific terms. Lord Allenby said "No. Get rid of the Protectorate and then the effect will be such that opinion in Egypt will be so mollified that the Egyptians will concede your terms." The British Government said, "No; we will not let go until we know exactly where we are in regard to our terms". Lord Allenby said, "Let go now and trust to the effect of your beau geste". If that was the difference, it was fundamental. If the Egyptian Government would accept office on the declaration that they would subsequently agree to the British Government's terms, that was a different matter.

MR. AMOS at this point asked permission to intervene to say that they were not resting in the hope of creating a good feeling. In fact, they were abandoning the Milner policy, but the proposed letter to the Sultan provided a modus vivendi which would preserve British interests intact.

LORD ALLENBY then referred to the draft letter to the Sultan contained in his telegram No.19 of January 12th, 1922, and said that it was an attempt to put the policy adumbrated in Lord Curzon's despatch of December 3rd, in a good light to the Egyptians.

LORD CURZON then referred to paragraphs 10 and 11 of the despatch.

THE PRIME MINISTER, after reading the draft letter, said that it confirmed him in the belief that he had previously stated Lord Allenby's point of view quite fairly. This letter made it clear that the British Government, without waiting for the conclusion of the treaty, would abolish the Protectorate and recognise Egypt as a Sovereign State. They would provide no obstacle to the re-establishment of the Egyptian Ministry of

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

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

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Foreign Affairs, and would abolish the régime of martial law.

He then quoted paragraph 13 as follows :-

"As soon as this state of affairs has been established His Majesty's Government will examine in consort (sic) with Egyptian Government and in most friendly spirit the conclusion of an agreement on following points which will remain for settlement:-

A. Security of communications of British Empire.

B. Defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect.

C. Protection of foreign interests in Egypt."
D. The Sudan.

MR. AMOS said that the intention of the draft letter was that these subjects would be reserved.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked if there was any point in which he had been unfair to Lord Allenby's point of view. Mr. Amos had to deal with Egyptian opinion and he and his colleagues had to deal with Parliament. He presumed that the procedure would be that the representative of the Foreign Office in the House of Commons would have to introduce a Bill which would provide for the abolition of martial law, the withdrawal of the Protectorate, and the setting up of Egypt as a Sovereign State. He would be asked whether there were any conditions attached to these concessions. The reply would be, "No, we have written a letter to the Sultan saying that certain points were left over for specific negotiation." His Government would be quite unable to take up such a line in the House of Commons and a policy of this kind would at once be rejected.

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

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

On Mr. Amos indicating dissent from his remarks the Prime Minister asked him to say what he would tell the House of Commons, if he were in the Prime Minister's place.

Mr. Amos said his case would be that the British Government held the goods in their possession. All the matters which were to be reserved for subsequent discussion with the Egyptian Government were actually in our hands. He would tell Parliament that these matters were reserved for future consideration, and that in the meanwhile they were in our possession.

The Prime Minister said that there could be nothing worse than to send a letter which the Egyptians would understand in one sense and we in another. The Cabinet had taken a different view of the meaning of the draft letter from that which Mr. Amos appeared to take, and he felt sure that the Egyptian Government would take the same view as the Cabinet. He asked Mr. Amos to shew him one word in the draft letter which reserved the status quo.

Mr. Amos said that the status quo was a solid fact, namely the military occupation.

The Prime Minister pointed out that before the war Egypt was not independent. Its sovereignty had been vested in Turkey. If this draft letter were sent, this sovereignty would be handed over to Egypt. That was not maintaining the status quo. If it was intended that the status quo on these reserved questions was to be maintained, it would be much better to draw up a document which would say so. That could easily be done. He did not wish to have any misunderstandings. If the

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

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Government mean the same thing as Lord Allenby and his advisors a document could, and should, be drawn up which would state it clearly and without ambiguity. Was he to understand that Lord Allenby did not intend to let go of Egypt?

Lord Allenby said his intention had been to state that there were some things which we were willing to let Egypt have beginning with the withdrawal of the Protectorate. Our guarantee for the powers we wished to retain were that we had kept the country for 40 years and could continue to do so for another 40 years if we so desired.

The Prime Minister said that if Lord Allenby's draft despatch had been approved and sent, every fez in Cairo would have been thrown into the air and every Egyptian would have interpreted it as meaning that the British were to be cleared out of Egypt and that they had entire independence. His suggestion was that two people, one representing Lord Allenby and one representing the British Government, should put down in plain terms exactly what was intended and tell the Egyptians in clear and definite terms how far we were prepared to go. If the Egyptians would not accept these terms then they must be told that they would have to.

Lord Allenby said that in that case he could not go back to Egypt. It was perfectly well known in Egypt that his policy was as indicated in the draft letter.

The Prime Minister asked if Lord Allenby considered that Mr. Amos had interpreted the letter wrongly.

Lord Allenby replied in the negative.

/The Prime Minister

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

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The Prime Minister suggested that in this case Mr. Amos' interpretation should be put down in perfectly clear terms.

Lord Curzon said that some way might be found by which an Egyptian Government taking office might state clearly and explicitly that they interpreted the arrangement in the same way as the British Government.

Mr. Amos pointed out that the construction to be placed on the proposed letter had been clearly indicated by the designated Egyptian Ministers, and was recorded in a Procés Verbal. He had not thought it worth while to trouble the Prime Minister with this detail.

Lord Curzon said that a Procés Verbal was not sufficiently authoritative. His idea was that the Ministers on taking office might address a letter to the Sultan containing the interpretation of the Agreement in similar terms to those used in the Procés Verbal.

Lord Allenby was certain that Ministers would never do this. They were not sufficiently sure that they would be backed up by Great Britain.

The Prime Minister said that there should be no great difficulty in putting in writing what Mr. Amos had said to him to-day. He suggested that Mr. Amos should put it in writing himself. He believed he was a very gifted writer.

Mr. Amos said that he was not the author of any of the despatches which had been referred to at this Meeting.

/The Prime Minister

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

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The Prime Minister said that if he was, there was nothing to be ashamed of in the despatches which were very fine reading; his only complaint of the despatches was that they did not appear to express the interpretation of the draft letter in the telegram of 12th January, placed on it by Lord Allenby.

Mr. Amos pointed out that the diplomatic situation in Egypt was very different from the political situation in London. The British Government, no doubt, had its own particular difficulties, but in Egypt they were threatened with the great danger of a complete breakdown in the Government. This would be certain to be followed by a period of annexation since there would be nothing else to do. Eventually there would inevitably be a reversal of policy

The Prime Minister asked why.

Mr. Amos said that in ten years time some Government would come in which would be unwilling to continue the difficult situation in Egypt.

The Prime Minister said that of course he could not say what a Socialist Government would do if it came into office, but that apart from this no British Government would be willing to give up British control over Egypt.

Lord Allenby asked if this would be the case for ever. In that event no Egyptian Government would ever accept office.

Mr. Amos said that talk of annexation filled the British Officials working in Egypt with despair.

The Prime Minister asked whether the policy which Mr. Amos favoured would not result in our losing all control of Egypt.

/Mr. Amos

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

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Mr. Amos replied that it would not. No misapprehension had occurred on this subject to anyone in Egypt.

The Prime Minister said that his information was that both among Egyptians and foreigners the policy Mr. Amos favoured was being interpreted as the surrender of our position there.

Mr. Amos asked whether people were saying that the presentation of the draft letter would enable the Egyptians to call for the withdrawal of the troops.

The Prime Minister said that the view held was that it was an abandonment of the British position in Egypt and trusting to luck. He could not go to the House of Commons with such a policy.

Mr. Amos asked how the position, if the policy of the draft letter were adopted, would differ from the position in 1914.

Lord Curzon pointed out that it would give Egypt her independence, which she had never had before.

The Prime Minister expressed similar views and pointed out that Egypt had never had independence for centuries.

Mr. Amos said that the suzerainty of the Turks before the war did not affect the position of Egypt vis-à-vis Great Britain.

Lord Curzon pointed out that the essential difference was that Egypt would be given independence for the first time.

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Amos if he was willing to put in writing what he had said verbally.

Mr. Amos said he was here in a very humble capacity.

The Prime Minister pointed out that Mr. Amos had intervened spontaneously in the conversation. He had no objection to his having done this, but as he had

/done so,

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

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done so he hoped he would not object to putting in writing what he had said.

Mr. Amos turned to Lord Allenby.

Lord Allenby said he had no objection to Mr. Amos doing this. His own advice had been very carefully considered and now had been rejected. For three years he had endeavoured to maintain the Protectorate, not without success, and now his advice had been rejected for the second time he must ask the Prime Minister to accept his resignation.

The Prime Minister said he was not sufficiently clear as to the difference existing between them.

Lord Allenby said that the difference was that he insisted on a unilateral declaration and did not believe that any bargain was possible.

The Prime Minister said that all he asked was that the things should be made clear in the letter which Lord Allenby admitted should be made clear. If Mr. Amos, in consultation with Lord Allenby, would put in writing the views he had expressed, another meeting might be held the same afternoon further to consider the matter.

The Conference then adjourned until 6 p.m. on the same date.

2,Whitehall Gardens, S.W./1
15th February,1922

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

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

Lord Curzon. 200

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SECRET.

S. 41.

CABINET.

Memorandum of a conversation held at 10 Downing Street, London, S.W.1. on Wednesday, February 15th at 6 p.m.

.....

PRESENT:-

The Prime Minister, General Clayton,

Lord Curzon, Mr. Amos.

Lord Allenby.

Sir Maurice Hankey,

Sir Edward Grigg.

.....

EGYPT.

LORD ALLENBY handed in the following re-draft to be substituted for paragraph 13 of the draft letter contained in his telegram No. 19 of the 12th January, 1922 (C.P. 3614, No.4.) :-

The following questions, however (toutefois), which are vital to the interests of the British Empire, are absolutely reserved until such time as it may be possible, after free discussion on both sides in the most friendly spirit, to conclude an agreement in regard thereto between

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

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His Majesty's Government and the Government of Your Highness:-

(a) The security of the communications of the British Empire;

(b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect;

(c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities;

(d) The Sudan.

Pending the conclusion of an agreement the present situation in regard to these questions will remain intact.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether the position of the Financial Adviser would stand in this draft.

LORD ALLENBY replied that this was the intention.

LORD CURZON asked whether, if the Egyptian Parliament were set up and an unfriendly Government came into office, they would be able to stand by everything? Could they refuse to acknowledge Sarwat Pasha's engagements for example?

MR. AMOS said he thought he would have to reply in the affirmative. We could not guarantee that we should have no opposition and no political difficulties in the future, but our problem at the present time was to take up the position which, in respect of its essential importance, and its defensibility, was the most prudent.

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

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

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THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought this paragraph provided the basis of an understanding. It was now a question of framing procedure. This was no longer a question merely of whether Sarwat Pasha would agree. What they now required was a basis of policy. He asked if it would not now be possible to get formulated a clear declaration to be made by the High Commissioner of the terms on which we intended that Egypt should be ruled. He had asked Sir Edward Grigg to frame something on these lines.

LORD CURZON asked if the Prime Minister contemplated a statement being made to the Sultan.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied in the affirmative. Whoever took office, whether it was Sarwat Pasha or someone else, would do so on the understanding that he was acting on this declaration. This would be the basis of our position in Egypt and and should not be dependent on the attitude of any particular individual. He himself thought that it would not be possible to get an agreement at once. No Egyptian Minister could sign any agreement. If he did so he would be thrown over by his own people. If, however, we were to wait, the present feeling in Egypt might disappear and be forgotten. It was important however to have an instrument setting forth exactly the terms on which we would deal with Egypt. He had felt that very strongly the same morning in his conversation with Lord Allenby

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

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He believed that he and Lord Allenby had the same ultimate ends in view. He felt that some declaration was necessary. It should not be long and should merely constitute a short compendious declaration of our position in Egypt including a statement of the concessions we were prepared to make.

SIR EDWARD GRIGG shewed a rough but incomplete draft which the Prime Minister read.

LORD ALLENBY did not think that any Egyptian Minister would accept this. The revised draft of para. 13 was as far as he was willing to go to modify the attitude expressed in his letter. His position was perfectly well known in Egypt. Five weeks ago he could have guaranteed a sound, stable and friendly Ministry on the basis of that letter. He hoped that he might still be able to secure this, but he was less sure. He appealed, however, to the Prime Minister to let him try. Any new phraseology, however, would arouse the utmost suspicion. It was difficult to believe how much effort had been expended in overcoming the suspicions of the Egyptians, and inducing them to accept the wording he proposed. He felt that the new draft of para. 13 gave the fullest guarantees that we required. He only proposed to send the letter after the Government had been formed.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that it would be necessary to govern on some such lines as were indicated in the rough draft proclamation (Sir Edward Grigg's draft) which he had just read.

LORD ALLENBY said that in this event he would have to insist on the acceptance of his resignation which he had offered some weeks ago.

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

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THE PRIME MINISTER asked Lord Allenby, who said he had been patient for five weeks, to be patient for five minutes more. He was doing his utmost to meet Lord Allenby's views. If the Egyptians refused to form a Ministry on the basis of Lord Allenby's policy then they must be governed somehow. That was a reason for drawing up a definite basis of policy. Lord Allenby would ask them to form a Ministry on this basis. If they refused then some document must be issued shewing the basis on which Great Britain had offered that Egypt should be governed.

MR. AMOS said that in that event an entirely new document would be required. The basis now under consideration/which contemplated the handing over of foreign affairs to Egypt and containing a declaration of policy etc., presupposed the co-operation of the Egyptians.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that in this event it would of course be necessary to govern Egypt as a conquered country. It would be important, however, to issue a document shewing exactly what the position of the British Government was.

LORD ALLENBY said that if he could go back with his draft letter of January 12th modified as regards para. 13 as set forth above, he thought he might succeed in getting together an Egyptian Ministry, but he could not do so on any other terms.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he fully realised Lord Allenby's difficult personal position.

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

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LORD CURZON suggested that an additional paragraph might be added at the end of Lord Allenby's letter to the effect that "Upon the above terms His Majesty's Government are willing to co-operate with the Egyptian Government in the government of the country". Failing this the British Government would have to govern in its own way.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would like to think further about the matter, and in any event it was necessary to consult the Cabinet. In the meanwhile he would like to see whether a simpler draft than Lord Allenby's letter could not be prepared. Such a draft should include the gist of paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and the new 13 in Lord Allenby's draft despatch contained in his telegram of the 12th January. If a document of that kind could be framed the Cabinet might meet the following day at 5 p.m. to consider it.

LORD ALLENBY asked why the Prime Minister would not accept his draft letter as it stood.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was quite alive to Lord Allenby's difficulties but he wanted Lord Allenby to realise that Great Britain was a Parliamentary country. There would be a very fierce resistance to the policy Lord Allenby proposed. Certain sections would say that we were giving up Egypt, evacuating it, shewing the white feather etc. Quotations from the early part of Lord Allenby's letter would be made and would be criticised as highly objectionable. After all they were not essential and were to a certain extent "flummery".

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

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LORD ALLENBY said that this portion of the letter was important in the East.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that in this event the early portion of the letter should be put into a separate document, but Parliament would not like the letter as it stood. He felt that with the early part of the letter attached he would not be able to carry the essential portions through Parliament. He suggested that there should be a separate letter from Lord Allenby to the Sultan containing the gist of the early portion of Lord Allenby's draft and that the essential part of it, namely paras. 10 to 13, should be included in a separate document.

LORD ALLENBY suggested that his paras. 10 to 13 as revised should be adopted as they stood. If his advice was not accepted he felt the Government had better find someone else, whose advice they could accept.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he had suggested the adoption of Lord Allenby's 10 to 13 including the new para. 13, to be taken as the basis He suggested that that should be framed in the form of an instrument and that the remainder of the letter should be embodied as a separate covering letter to the Sultan. This the letter would end at paragraph 9 of the original draft, and paras. 10 to 13 would be embodied in a separate document.

LORD CURZON said that, as Lord Allenby had pointed out, paragraphs 1 to 9 were merely preambles.

LORD ALLENBY said he attached importance to this in dealing with orientals.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that his proposal was that these paragraphs should be addressed to

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

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orientals but not to the British Parliament Paragraphs 10 to 13 would be what he and Lord Curzon would have to get accepted in the British Parliament.

MR. AMOS said he understood that the early part of the letter was not to be included in the instrument. There were, however, political advantages in the letter appearing in the same Gazette as the announcement of the opening of the new Egyptian Government. As he understood the matter, under the procedure now proposed, the essential parts of the letter were to be communicated to Parliament, in which case they would be published before Lord Allenby returned.

THE PRIME MINISTER said this was a mere question of tactics which could be discussed afterwards.

MR. AMOS insisted that the procedure as well as the language was being changed. The moment the question was discussed in Parliament the High Commissioner would be bound to publish the document that was under discussion there.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he only contemplated discussing a document based on paragraphs 10 to 13 in the British Parliament, the remainder was for Egyptian consumption.

LORD ALLENBY asked if he might go back to Egypt and tell the Sultan that this was being recommended.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would like paragraphs 10 to 13 put into shape in the form of an instrument

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

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or proclamation. He would like to have it in draft and put it before the Cabinet at 6 p.m. on the following evening.

LORD CURZON questioned whether in paragraph 10 it was advisable to include the words "without waiting for the conclusion of the Treaty". He was not sure if there was to be a Treaty.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed.

LORD ALLENBY said that if the document was to have a bad effect as it be materially altered it would would arouse suspicion in the mind of those Egyptians with whom we were dealing.

The Meeting adjourned with the understanding that Lord Allenby and his advisors should meet a representative of the Foreign Office and Sir Edward Grigg on the following morning with a view to drafting an instrument or proclamation to be based on paragraphs 10 to 13 (para. 13 as revised) of the draft letter included with Lord Allenby's Telegram No. 19 of the 12th January. This draft to be available for the Cabinet at 6 p.m. on the following evening.

.....

2 Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

15th February, 1922.

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

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Lord Curzon

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S E C R E T .

C A B I N E T 10 (22).

DRAFT CONCLUSIONS of a meeting of the Cabinet, held in Mr. Chamberlain's Room, House of Commons, S.W., on Thursday, 16th February, 1922 at 6 p.m.

....

P R E S E N T :-

THE PRIME MINISTER (in the Chair)

The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A.J. Balfour, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. Sir Robert Horne, G.B.E., K.C., M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. E. Shortt, K.C., M.P., Secretary of State for Home Affairs.

The Most Hon. the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W.S. Churchill, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. E.S. Montagu, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

The Right Hon. the Lord Lee of Fareham, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Right Hon. S. Baldwin, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.

The Right Hon. Sir Alfred Mond, Bart., M.P., Minister of Health.

The Right Hon. H.A.L. Fisher, M.P., President of the Board of Education.

The Right Hon. T.J. Macnamara, M.P., Minister of Labour.

The Right Hon. R. Munro, K.C., M.P., Secretary for Scotland.

The Right Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart, K.C., M.P., Attorney-General.

Lieut-Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B., ... Secretary.
Mr. R.B. Howorth ..... Assistant Secretary.

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

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INDIAN COURTS BILL.

INDIAN LOAN BILL.

(1) The Cabinet took note of the fact that the Lord Privy Seal had approved the introduction in the House of Commons, by the Secretary of State for India, of the following Bills:-

THE INDIAN COURTS BILL (Paper C.P.-3671).
THE INDIAN LOAN BILL (Paper C.P.-3645).

The Cabinet approved the action taken by the Lord Privy Seal.

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

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EGYPT.

(2) With reference to Cabinet 5 (22), Conclusion 2, the Cabinet had before them the following documents relating to policy in Egypt:-

(i) Telegrams to Lord Allenby, No.32 dated January 20, 1922, and No.33 dated January 28, 1922 (Paper C.P.-3674):

(ii) Lord Allenby's despatch dated February 2, 1922 (Paper E.1482/1/16):

(iii) A draft communication to the Sultan of Egypt from the High Commissioner (Paper C.P.-3745):

(iv) A draft Declaration by the British Government to Egypt (Paper C.P.-3745 A).

The Prime Minister reported to the Cabinet the results of Conferences he and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had had with Lord Allenby during the last two days. He first recalled the circumstances in which the present difficulties had arisen. After the breakdown of the negotiations with Adly Pasha, Lord Allenby had approached Sarwat Pasha with a view to the formation of a Ministry. As the result of these negotiations, Sarwat Pasha had agreed to set up a Government on condition that, without waiting for the conclusion of a Treaty, His Majesty's Government should abolish the protectorate, recognise Egypt as an independent Sovereign State, accept the re-establishment forthwith of an Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, favour the creation of a Parliament with the right to control the policy and administration of a constitutionally responsible Government, and abolish martial law. Only after all this had been done were the points of special concern to the British Government to be discussed, e.g., security of the communications of the British Empire, the defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression, protection of foreign interests in Egypt. The Cabinet, however, had decided that in so vital a matter it could not trust to luck, and that the points affecting the British Government must be definitely reserved as part of the arrangement. Lord Allenby had then offered his resignation. On this the Government had

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

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invited him to return to London to discuss the situation. Lord Allenby's attitude had become well known in Egypt before he left for England, and this had necessarily affected his attitude in the recent Conferences. The Prime Minister and Lord Curzon, in their conversations with Lord Allenby, had not questioned his right to resign if there was a real difference of opinion between the Government and himself, but had set themselves to ascertain whether there was in fact such a difference of principle or merely a misunderstanding which could be cleared up. The Prime Minister had asked whether it was not correct to say that under Lord Allenby's plan, when the Protectorate was abolished, he intended to trust to luck that agreement would be reached in regard to the points essential to British interests. Mr Amos, a British official in the Egyptian Ministry of Justice, who was one of Lord Allenby's advisers, had replied that this was not the intention, and that the status quo in regard to these points would be unaffected. The Prime Minister had then asked in which part of the document this was to be found, without eliciting any satisfactory reply. The fact was that everything the Egyptians desired was provided for in the document. Everything the British Government insisted on was left to the future. The Prime Minister had then suggested that the position of the British Government should be made unmistakeably clear on the face of the document. Lord Allenby had replied that the document had been agreed textually with Sarwat Pasha and his supporters, and that if there was any material alteration he had no alternative but to resign. He had insisted that his honour was pledged to Sarwat Pasha.

Eventually the Prime Minister had suggested that Lord Allenby's advisers should meet a representative of the Foreign Office and Sir Edward Grigg, with a view to drawing up two documents, both based on Lord Allenby's draft letter to the Sultan enclosed with his telegram No.19 of January 12, 1922 (Paper C.P.-3614, No.4). What the Prime Minister had laid stress upon was a draft Declaration to be issued by the British Government

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

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to Egypt, to be based on paragraphs 10 to 13 of Lord Allenby's draft letter, though the original paragraph 13 was to be considerably strengthened. He had insisted on this being a short and separate document. Lord Allenby had pressed for the remainder of his draft letter to be incorporated in a new draft letter to be sent on his own responsibility to the Sultan as a covering letter to the British Government's Declaration. The meeting had taken place, Mr Amos, one of Lord Allenby's advisers, being absent through indisposition, with the result that the two documents now before the Cabinet had been drawn up (Papers C.P.-3745 and C.P.-3745 A). In regard to these documents Lord Allenby had written the following letter:-

"February 16, 1922.

My dear Prime Minister,

The enclosed drafts are to my mind completely satisfactory.

I am grateful to you for the generous spirit in which you have met my proposals.

My task in Egypt will be greatly facilitated by this clear declaration of His Majesty's Government's policy.

Yours sincerely,

ALLENBY."

The Prime Minister added that Sir Edward Grigg had drawn his attention to the fact that the term "status quo" was used in the concluding sentence of the Draft Declaration (Appendix I) without further definition, so as to give the High Commissioner the widest possible powers. Under this clause the High Commissioner could insist on maintaining every power and privilege we now possess, and could veto any action inconsistent with those powers and privileges. It gave us our original basis under the Granville Declaration plus the powers (if need be) which we have superadded since the declaration of the Protectorate. The Prime Minister ended by commending the draft Declaration to the approval of his colleagues.

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

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The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs supplemented the Prime Minister's statement by explaining that the procedure would be that Lord Allenby should return to Egypt with the two documents, and should endeavour to form a Government on this basis. On its acceptance and the formation of an Egyptian Government, the Declaration would be presented to the British Parliament, and would not be ratified until after a Debate in both Houses.

In the course of the subsequent discussion the Attorney-General was asked whether the British Government's proposed Declaration would have the force of a Treaty. Supposing, for example, an Egyptian Government was set up as a Sovereign Independent State, and, having joined the League of Nations, put in question the whole validity of the British position, would the Declaration sufficiently establish British claims? Was independence compatible with the conditions imposed?

Sir Gordon Hewart said he was unable to say what view the League of Nations would take, but the document must undoubtedly be read as a whole, and the grant of independence could not be separated from the conditions.

Mr Balfour pointed out that in any event one dissentient voice was sufficient to prevent action by the League of Nations.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that he had felt some misgivings in regard to the possible attitude of the proposed Egyptian Parliament. As the result of enquiries he had learned that a Constitution had been drawn up for the proposed Egyptian Parliament. Egyptian Ministers did not wish to be too much at the mercy of this body, and had provided for a somewhat old-fashioned Constitution with two Chambers, one of which would be composed of nominated members. This would tend to alleviate the situation.

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

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In the course of the discussion attention was drawn to the inconsistency between Article 1 of the draft Declaration, which declared Egypt to be an Independent Sovereign State, and Article 3, which reserved important matters to the discretion of His Majesty's Government. This was felt to be unavoidable.

Some discussion took place in regard to the draft letter to be sent by Lord Allenby (Paper C.P.-3745). Some criticism was directed against paragraph 5, but it was pointed out that this paragraph enunciated no new policy and was intended merely as a reply to criticisms of the despatch of December 3, 1921.

The suggestion was made that the last sentence of paragraph 6, viz.:-

> "They are claimed without any desire to impair Egyptians enjoying full rights of a national Government",

was hardly consistent with the reservations made in the interests of British Imperial needs. In view of Lord AllXnby's insistence on the suspicion which would be aroused in Egypt if material alterations were made in the draft, it was considered that it would suffice to alter the first words, "they are claimed" to "they were claimed".

In reply to a question, Lord Curzon informed his colleagues that the capitulations remained unaffected by the policy contemplated. The negotiations already begun would be continued by the British Foreign Office, with the co-operation of the Egyptian Foreign Office.

The Cabinet agreed --

(a) To approve the draft Declaration to Egypt (Appendix I):

(b) That Lord Allenby should endeavour to form an Egyptian Government on the basis of this Declaration. On the formation of such a Government he should communicate the Declaration to the Sultan of Egypt. The Declaration should be simultaneously communicated to the British Parliament, but should not be ratified urtil after a Debate in both Houses:

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

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(c) That Lord Allenby should be authorised, on his own responsibility as High Commissioner, to accompany the Declaration by the covering letter (Paper C.P.3745), but that in the last sentence of Paragraph 6 he should be asked to substitute the words "they were claimed" for "they are claimed".

(d) In the event of his being unable to form a Government on the above basis, Lord Allenby will publish the British Government's Declaration in order to make their policy clear, and will make such provisional arrangements as he may deem advisable to govern the country pending the formation of a constitutional Ministry. In this event the Declaration will be communicated to Parliament simultaneously with its publication in Egypt.

(e) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should notify this policy to Lord Allenby.

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

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IRELAND.

Release of Sinn Feiners arrested in Ulster.

(3) The Cabinet were informed that, as a result of communications with Sir James Craig, the latter had offered to give favourable consideration to the question of the release of certain Irish Republican Army officers recently arrested in Ulster, after the Irish Provisional Government had secured the release of the Ulster residents recently kidnapped, on condition that the Provisional Government would recognise the validity of the decisions of the Ulster Courts and would give a solemn undertaking not to ask in future for the release of any more prisoners on political grounds. Sir James Craig had also intimated his acceptance of the proposal to hold an impartial enquiry into the Clones affair.

The Cabinet approved a proposal to communicate to Mr Michael Collins the substance of Sir James Craig's offer.

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

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IRELAND.
--
Boundaries of Ulster.

(4) With reference to Cabinet 3 (22), Conclusion 3, the Cabinet had under consideration the Reply to be given in the House of Commons by the Attorney-General to a Question as to the interpretation placed by him on Clause XIV of the Treaty respecting the boundaries of Ulster.

It was urged, on the one hand, that, having regard to the feeling of anxiety among many of the supporters of the Government on this question, it was most desirable that a definite pronouncement should be made to the effect that the Government had in no way departed from the attitude which had been previously taken up on this subject, and which had been explained to the House of Commons by the Prime Minister and the Lord Privy Seal in the Debate on the Treaty last December.

On the other hand, the opinion was expressed that it would be most undesirable to make any statement which would in any way conflict with the terms of the speech made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in introducing the Irish Bill, and that in particular it would be most dangerous for the Attorney-General to give any interpretation of the meaning of Clause XIV, the interpretation of which would have to be settled by the Boundary Commission itself.

The Cabinet agreed --

That the Attorney-General should base his statement on the declarations made on December 14, 1921, in the House of Commons, by the Prime Minister and the Lord Privy Seal, and that at the same time he should make it clear that in his opinion the interpretation of Clause XIV of the Treaty was a matter for the Boundary Commission, which, in defining the boundaries in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, would have to do so with due regard to economic and geographical conditions.

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

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OIL IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

(5) With reference to Cabinet 11 (21), Conclusion 2, the Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the President of the Board of Trade (Paper C.P.-3546) covering a Note by the Secretary for Mines respecting the question of oil production in the United Kingdom.

The Cabinet were informed that an opportunity now presented itself for settling the legal proceedings instituted by the Duke of Devonshire, on terms under which the Duke would forego his claim to the oil already won and would take over the plant on the site at a valuation, on condition that his right to the remainder of the oil produced was definitely recognised and that he or his nominee was given a licence to work the area on the usual royalty basis. While this settlement involved the reversal of the policy in pursuance of which the Government had declared against private ownership in oil and the right of landowners to exact royalties, such reversal could be justified on the ground that as a result of recent developments it had been ascertained that oil production in the United Kingdom was never likely to become a commercial proposition. Moreover, so long as the present uncertainty prevailed, it was out of the question for private enterprise to engage on any work of this character.

The Cabinet agreed —

To approve the proposed settlement with the Duke of Devonshire on the lines suggested in the Note by the Secretary for Mines, notwithstanding that this settlement involved recognition by the State of private ownership in oil and the withdrawal of the Government ban on the payment of royalties.

. . . .

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1,
February 16, 1922.

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

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APPENDIX I.

February 16th 1922.

DRAFT DECLARATION TO EGYPT.

Whereas

His Majesty's Government, in accordance with their declared intentions, desire forthwith to recognize Egypt as an independent sovereign State, and

Whereas

The relations between His Majesty's Government and Egypt are of vital interest to the British Empire;

The following principles are hereby declared:-

1. The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated, and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign State.

2. So soon as the Government of His Highness shall pass an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt, martial law as proclaimed on the 2nd of November, 1914, shall be withdrawn.

3. The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt:-

(a) The security of the communications of the British Empire and Egypt;

(b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign agression or interference, direct or indirect;

(c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities;

(d) The Sudan.

Pending the conclusion of such agreements, the status quo in all these matters shall remain intact.

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

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

(221)

OFFICES OF THE CABINET,
2, WHITEHALL GARDENS,
S.W.1.

18th February, 1922

Dear Lord Curzon,

I want to draw your particular attention to the draft Conclusion on the discussion on Egypt - Cabinet 10 (22), Conclusion 2.

I was a little doubtful as to whether I had got the Parliamentary procedure right in Conclusion (b), and I shall be glad if you will check this.

Another difficulty is in regard to Conclusion (d), dealing with the question of what happens in the not improbable event of Lord Allenby's failing to form a Ministry in Cairo. The fact was the point was not much discussed at the Cabinet, the only note I have being a statement by the Prime Minister that in that event the status quo would be maintained. From the conversations with Lord Allenby, however, I got the impression that the intention in that event was to publish the British Governments statement and then to rule by martial law or in the best way that Lord Allenby could achieve.

I was engaged all yesterday morning with the Prime

The Most Hon.
the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston,
K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

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

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

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Minister and was unable to see my draft Minutes until comparatively late in the day when you had left London. I accordingly consulted the Prime Minister who approved the draft Conclusion (d). As you have to issue Lord Allenby's instructions, however, I am very anxious to make sure that I have your approval.

I have just heard that the Prime Minister is proposing to meet Lord Allenby at Noon on Monday to discuss this question and I have asked your Private Secretary to inform you by telegram.

Yours sincerely,

M. P. A. Hankey

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

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(223)

Lord Curzon

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S E C R E T.

C A B I N E T 10 (22).

DRAFT CONCLUSIONS of a meeting of the Cabinet, held in Mr. Chamberlain's Room, House of Commons, S.W., on Thursday, 16th February, 1922 at 6 p.m.

....

P R E S E N T :-

THE PRIME MINISTER (in the Chair)

The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A.J. Balfour, O.M., M.P., Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. Sir Robert Horne, G.B.E., K.C., M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. E. Shortt, K.C., M.P., Secretary of State for Home Affairs.

The Most Hon. the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W.S. Churchill, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. E.S. Montagu, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

The Right Hon. the Lord Lee of Fareham, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Right Hon. S. Baldwin, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.

The Right Hon. Sir Alfred Mond, Bart., M.P., Minister of Health.

The Right Hon. H.A.L. Fisher, M.P., President of the Board of Education.

The Right Hon. T.J. Macnamara, M.P., Minister of Labour.

The Right Hon. R. Munro, K.C., M.P., Secretary for Scotland.

The Right Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart, K.C., M.P., Attorney-General.

Lieut-Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B.,.....Secretary.
Mr. R.B. Howorth.....Assistant Secretary.

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

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EGYPT.

(2) With reference to Cabinet 5 (22), Conclusion 2, the Cabinet had before them the following documents relating to policy in Egypt:-

(i) Telegrams to Lord Allenby, No.32 dated January 20, 1922, and No.33 dated January 28, 1922 (Paper C.P.-3674):

(ii) Lord Allenby's despatch dated February 2, 1922 (Paper E.1462/1/16):

(iii) A draft communication to the Sultan of Egypt from the High Commissioner (Paper C.P.-3745):

(iv) A draft Declaration by the British Government to Egypt (Paper C.P.-3745 A).

The Prime Minister reported to the Cabinet the results of Conferences he and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had had with Lord Allenby during the last two days. He first recalled the circumstances in which the present difficulties had arisen. After the breakdown of the negotiations with Adly Pasha, Lord Allenby had approached Sarwat Pasha with a view to the formation of a Ministry. As the result of these negotiations, Sarwat Pasha had agreed to set up a Government on condition that, without waiting for the conclusion of a Treaty, His Majesty's Government should abolish the protectorate, recognise Egypt as an independent Sovereign State, accept the re-establishment forthwith of an Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, favour the creation of a Parliament with the right to control the policy and administration of a constitutionally responsible Government, and abolish martial law. Only after all this had been done were the points of special concern to the British Government to be discussed, e.g., security of the communications of the British Empire, the defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression, protection of foreign interests in Egypt. The Cabinet, however, had decided that in so vital a matter it could not trust to luck, and that the points affecting the British Government must be definitely reserved as part of the arrangement. Lord Allenby had then offered his resignation. On this the Government had

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

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invited him to return to London to discuss the situation. Lord Allenby's attitude had become well known in Egypt before he left for England, and this had necessarily affected his attitude in the recent Conferences. The Prime Minister and Lord Curzon, in their conversations with Lord Allenby, had not questioned his right to resign if there was a real difference of opinion between the Government and himself, but had set themselves to ascertain whether there was in fact such a difference of principle or merely a misunderstanding which could be cleared up. The Prime Minister had asked whether it was not correct to say that under Lord Allenby's plan, when the Protectorate was abolished, he intended to trust to luck that agreement would be reached in regard to the points essential to British interests. Mr Amos, a British official in the Egyptian Ministry of Justice, who was one of Lord Allenby's advisers, had replied that this was not the intention, and that the status quo in regard to these points would be unaffected. The Prime Minister had then asked in which part of the document this was to be found, without eliciting any satisfactory reply. The fact was that everything the Egyptians desired was provided for in the document. Everything the British Government insisted on was left to the future. The Prime Minister had then suggested that the position of the British Government should be made unmistakeably clear on the face of the document. Lord Allenby had replied that the document had been agreed textually with Sarwat Pasha and his supporters, and that if there was any material alteration he had no alternative but to resign. He had insisted that his honour was pledged to Sarwat Pasha.

Eventually the Prime Minister had suggested that Lord Allenby's advisers should meet a representative of the Foreign Office and Sir Edward Grigg, with a view to drawing up two documents, both based on Lord Allenby's draft letter to the Sultan enclosed with his telegram No.19 of January 12, 1922 (Paper C.P.-3614, No.4). What the Prime Minister had laid stress upon was a draft Declar[illegible] the British Government

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

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to Egypt, to be based on paragraphs 10 to 13 of Lord Allenby's draft letter, though the original paragraph 12 was to be considerably strengthened. He had insisted on this being a short and separate document. Lord Allenby had pressed for the remainder of his draft letter to be incorporated in a new draft letter to be sent on his own responsibility to the Sultan as a covering letter to the British Government's Declaration. The meeting had taken place, Mr Amos, one of Lord Allenby's advisers, being absent through indisposition, with the result that the two documents now before the Cabinet had been drawn up (Papers C.P.-3745 and C.P.-3745 A). In regard to these documents Lord Allenby had written the following letter:-

"February 16, 1922.

My dear Prime Minister,

The enclosed drafts are to my mind completely satisfactory.

I am grateful to you for the generous spirit in which you have met my proposals.

My task in Egypt will be greatly facilitated by this clear declaration of His Majesty's Government's policy.

Yours sincerely,

ALLENBY."

The Prime Minister added that Sir Edward Grigg had drawn his attention to the fact that the term "status quo" was used in the concluding sentence of the Draft Declaration (Appendix I) without further definition, so as to give the High Commissioner the widest possible powers. Under this clause the High Commissioner could insist on maintaining every power and privilege we now possess, and could veto any action inconsistent with those powers and privileges. It gave us our original basis under the Granville Declaration, plus the powers (if need be) which we have superadded since the declaration of the Protectorate. The Prime Minister ended by commending the draft Declaration to the approval of his colleagues.

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

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The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs supplemented the Prime Minister's statement by explaining that the procedure would be that Lord Allenby should return to Egypt with the two documents, and should endeavour to form a Government on this basis. On its acceptance and the formation of an Egyptian Government, the Declaration would be presented to the British Parliament, and would not be ratified until after a Debate in both Houses.

In the course of the subsequent discussion the Attorney-General was asked whether the British Government's proposed Declaration would have the force of a Treaty. Supposing, for example, an Egyptian Government was set up as a Sovereign Independent State, and, having joined the League of Nations, put in question the whole validity of the British position, would the Declaration sufficiently establish British claims? Was independence compatible with the conditions imposed?

Sir Gordon Hewart said he was unable to say what view the League of Nations would take, but the document must undoubtedly be read as a whole, and the grant of independence could not be separated from the conditions.

Mr Balfour pointed out that in any event one dissentient voice was sufficient to prevent action by the League of Nations.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that he had felt some misgivings in regard to the possible attitude of the proposed Egyptian Parliament. As the result of enquiries he had learned that a Constitution had been drawn up for the proposed Egyptian Parliament. Egyptian Ministers did not wish to be too much at the mercy of this body, and had provided for a somewhat old-fashioned Constitution with two Chambers, one of which would be composed of nominated members. This would tend to alleviate the situation.

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

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In the course of the discussion attention was drawn to the inconsistency between Article 1 of the draft Declaration, which declared Egypt to be an Independent Sovereign State, and Article 3, which reserved important matters to the discretion of His Majesty's Government. This was felt to be unavoidable.

Some discussion took place in regard to the draft letter to be sent by Lord Allenby (Paper C.P.-3745). Some criticism was directed against paragraph 5, but it was pointed out that this paragraph enunciated no new policy and was intended merely as a reply to criticisms of the despatch of December 3, 1921.

The suggestion was made that the last sentence of paragraph 6, viz.:-

> "They are claimed without any desire to impair Egyptians enjoying full rights of a national Government",

was hardly consistent with the reservations made in the interests of British Imperial needs. In view of Lord AllXnby's insistence on the suspicion which would be aroused in Egypt if material alterations were made in the draft, it was considered that it would suffice to alter the first words, "they <u>are</u> claimed" to "they <u>were</u> claimed".

In reply to a question, Lord Curzon informed his colleagues that the capitulations remained unaffected by the policy contemplated. The negotiations already begun would be continued by the British Foreign Office, with the co-operation of the Egyptian Foreign Office.

The Cabinet agreed --

(a) To approve the draft Declaration to Egypt (<u>Appendix I</u>):

(b) That Lord Allenby should endeavour to form an Egyptian Government on the basis of this Declaration. On the formation of such a Government he should communicate the Declaration to the Sultan of Egypt. The Declaration should be simultaneously communicated to the British Parliament, but should not be ratified until after a Debate in both Houses:

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

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(c) That Lord Allenby should be authorised, on his own responsiblity as High Commissioner, to accompany the Declaration by the covering letter (Paper C.P.3745), but that in the last sentence of Paragraph 6 he should be asked to substitute the words "they were claimed" for "they are claimed".

(d) In the event of his being unable to form a Government on the above basis, Lord Allenby will publish the British Government's Declaration in order to make their policy clear, and will make such provisional arrangements as he may deem advisable to govern the country pending the formation of a constitutional Ministry. In this event the Declaration will be communicated to Parliament simultaneously with its publication in Egypt.

(e) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should notify this policy to Lord Allenby.

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

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Lord Curzon. (250)

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SECRET.

C. P. 3763.

MEMORANDUM of a MEETING at 10 Downing Street, London, S.W.1., on Monday, 20th February, 1922, at 12.0 Noon.

.....

PRESENT:-

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O.M.,M.P., Prime Minister.

The Rt. Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Most Hon. the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G.,G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Field Marshal Viscount Allenby, G.C.B.,G.C.M.G., High Commissioner for Egypt.

Sir Maurice Hankey, G.C.B.,

Sir Edward Grigg,K.C.V.O.,C.M.G., D.S.O.

.....

EGYPT.

THE PRIME MINISTER explained that he had summoned this meeting in order to arrange exactly how to carry out the policy decided on at the Cabinet on Friday, the 17th instant conformably with the pledges made to Parliament. He then read the following answer he had given to a question in Parliament on October 27th, 1921:-

> "With regard to the last part, my Honourable Friend may rest assured that no change will be made in the relation between this country and Egypt without adequate opportunities being given for discussion by Parliament."

and the following answer given on November 10th, 1921:-

> "Undoubtedly Parliament will have to be consulted in any important change in our relations with Egypt. Anything done will be with the sanction of Parliament; but it is quite impossible for the Foreign Secretary to conduct negotiations if every suggestion put forward is to be submitted to Parliament."

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

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The Prime Minister pointed out that on the one hand it would be very awkward if the policy were announced before Lord Allenby had communicated it to the Sultan of Egypt, but on the other hand, after he had communicated it to the Sultan, it would be difficult to change the policy; in fact, it would be Lord Allenby's last offer. Consequently, the final offer would have been made before Parliament had been consulted.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL recalled the criticisms that had been made in the House of Commons as to the fulfilment of Government pledges on other questions and laid stress on the importance of arranging a procedure that could not be criticised in this respect.

LORD CURZON, asked by the Prime Minister to give his ideas of the procedure, said it was that some sort of general sketch of the policy should be given in Parliament the same day. Then Lord Allenby would return to Egypt taking with him his draft letter to the Sultan, with the Government's Declaration as an Annex, and would present it to the Sultan of Egypt. He hoped and anticipated that Lord Allenby would be in a position to say that he had not only presented the letter, but that Sarwat Pasha had succeeded in forming a Ministry. Simultaneously, the document would be presented to Parliament. There would then be a debate in both Houses. The only doubt he felt was as to the situation if Lord Allenby should not succeed in forming a Ministry. Then a more difficult situation would arise, for it would be absurd to ask Parliament to agree to a policy when no Egyptian Ministry would carry it out. He had considerable hope, however, that this situation would not arise. He felt that it was very important to be in

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

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a position to announce to Parliament that an Egyptian Ministry was being formed at the same time as the policy was being communicated. He presumed that in Parliament, the approval of the policy would be moved by resolution. He thought by this means every pledge would be fulfilled.

THE PRIME MINISTER recalled that in the draft of the letter forwarded in his telegram No. 17 of January 12th, C.P. 3614, No.4. - Lord Allenby had included the following phrase :-

> "With this object in view I am happy to be able to announce to Your Highness that His Majesty's Government are prepared to recommend to British Parliament, without waiting for conclusion of a Treaty, abolition of Protectorate and recognition of Egypt as an independent Sovereign State."

That sentence had dropped out of the new draft letter. If it were re-inserted it would merely inform the Sultan that the British Government were prepared to recommend this policy to Parliament. In this way the Government's pledges would be fulfilled.

LORD ALLENBY agreed that there was no objection to this.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the same Committee as had drafted the new letter and the Government's Declaration, namely, Sir Edward Grigg, Mr. Murray and General Clayton - should meet in order to re-insert this phrase.

The Ministers then discussed the question of when the announcement should be made in the House of Commons.

LORD ALLENBY said he expected to be able to hand the Declaration to the Sultan next Monday afternoon and it was arranged that the announcement in both Houses of Parliament should be made on Tuesday afternoon - February 28th.

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

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THE LORD PRIVY SEAL undertook to arrange that if necessary, a day should be given for the discussion in the House of Commons on Wednesday, March 1st.

LORD CURZON raised the question of what would happen if Sarwat Pasha, should decline to form a Ministry.

LORD ALLENBY thought that probably Sarwat Pasha would not decline, but in that event he hoped he would be able to find someone else to form a Ministry.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that if no Ministry was formed, Lord Allenby would govern according to the status quo.

The conclusions of the Conference may be summarised as follows:-

(a) In order to carry out the policy approved by the Cabinet (Cabinet 10 (22)conclusion 2) consistently with pledges given to Parliament the following Committee:-

Sir Edward Grigg,
Mr. Murray of the Foreign Office.
General Clayton.

should meet the same day in order to insert in the letter to be sent by Lord Allenby to the Sultan, words similar to those used in Lord Allenby's original draft letter of January 12th, to show that the policy set forth in the Declaration to Parliament (Cabinet 10 (22), Appendix). was one which His Majesty's Government was prepared to recommend to Parliament.

(b) That the Declaration should be communicated to the Sultan by the High Commissioner immediately on his return to Egypt, that is to say, on Monday, February 27th.

(c) The policy should be announced in both Houses of Parliament on Tuesday February 28th.

(d) The Lord Privy Seal should arrange for a day to be given to the discussion on Egypt if desired by the House of Commons, on Wednesday, March 1st.

(e) If the High Commissioner is unable to form an Egyptian Ministry on the basis of this policy, he should continue to govern the country as at present.

- 4 -

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

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PLAYING THE NATIONAL ANTHEM IN EGYPT.

2. LORD ALLENBY then raised some minor points on which he wished to have guidance.

LORD ALLENBY said that on his official appearances in public, he was accorded a guard of Honour, and the band usually played the first five bars of "God Save the King." He presumed that it would be advisable to continue this.

LORD CURZON agreed that he should do so.

OFFICIAL CALLS ON THE SULTAN.

3. LORD ALLENBY said that the practice was for the Sultan to call on him on the King's birthday, while he called on the Sultan on the Accession Day and on the Sultan's birthday; thus he called twice and the Sultan called once.

LORD CURZON said that anything that maintained the High Commissioner's prestige should be continued, and that there should be no change in this procedure.

PUBLIC HOLIDAY ON THE KING'S BIRTHDAY.

4. LORD ALLENBY said that at present King's birthday was a public holiday in Egypt. This rather brought the Protectorate into prominence and was repugnant to many Egyptians.

LORD CURZON agreed with Lord Allenby that it might be desirable to drop this public holiday as there were ample other public holidays, but he thought Lord Allenby should not do so on his own initiative but only if asked to do so.

LORD ALLENBY said he only wanted general guidance on this point and might have to refer for instructions later.

VISITS TO THE RACES.

5. LORD ALLENBY said that if he went to the races, the procedure was for him to go first and be received by the Guard and five bars of the National Anthem. The Sultan

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

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arrived later and was received with the Khedivial Anthem. The Sultan left first to the strains of the Khedivial Anthem and Lord Allenby left afterwards when five bars of the National Anthem were played. He presumed that this procedure should continue.

LORD CURZON agreed that it should.

DIPLOMATIC VISITS.

6. LORD ALLENBY said it was his custom as High Commissioner to send for the French or Italian Ministers and not to visit them. He presumed that this should continue in order to show that the British High Commissioner was the senior foreign representative.

LORD CURZON agreed that this should be the case.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.
20th February, 1922.

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

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

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FOREIGN OFFICE

Later.

Sir E. Grigg has now been through this & has no changes to recommend.

It is merely going to suggest that something should be said about Lord Allenby, to the effect that H.M.G. were always in substantial agreement with him but that they necessarily viewed the whole question

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

from a wider, international point of view which naturally escaped his notice.

R. C. L.

Feb. 27

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

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Lord Curzon

These are notes for a statement on Egypt which Mr Murray prepared yesterday. He would have sent them to you last night but that he was to have met Sir E. Grigg to cobalt them this morning; however Sir E. Grigg arrived an hour late today, so that no such collation has yet taken place.

Nevertheless I think I had better submit them to you at once.

R.C.L.
Feb. 27

There are three parts:—

1. Chronology of the year 1921
2. Narrative of 1921, with special reference to Zaghloul's nefarious activity
3. Dissertation on the Declaration of tomorrow & its bearing.

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

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Chronological Summary of Political Events
subsequent to the Publication of the
Milner Report.

----------oOo----------

1921.	
February 11.	Milner report laid before Parliament.
February 26.	Lord Allenby invited the Sultan to nominate a delegation to confer with H.M.G.
March 3.	The Text of the invitation announced by Mr. Harmsworth in the House of Commons.
March 17.	Adly Pasha took office as Prime Minister.
March 18.	Zaghloul telegraphed to Adly demanding as a preliminary to all negotiations with H.M.G. the abolition of the protectorate, the censorship, and martial law, and the acceptance by Great Britain of all the reservations formulated by him with regard to the Milner project. He also demanded that his own followers should form a majority of the delegation and that the president should be chosen from amongst their number.
March 25.	Lord Allenby reported the spontaneous enthusiasm with which the Adly Ministry was greeted and the unsuccessful attempts at counter-demonstrations by the followers of Zaghloul.
End of March.	The new government were plunged in serious financial and economic difficulties owing to the heavy fall in the price of cotton.
April 4.	Zaghloul arrived in Egypt returning from Paris.

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

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April 8.	Zaghloul gave an interview to a representative of the Egyptian Gazette in the course of which he stated that the Sudan was beyond doubt Egyptian territory.
April 15.	Lord Allenby reported that Zaghloul had moderated his original demands and was prepared to support the official delegation, but he still insisted on being President of that body.
April 21.	Lord Allenby communicated the text of a letter which Adly had addressed to the Sultan explaining that the divergence between himself and Zaghloul no longer existed. Lord Allenby deplored the extent to which Adly had been forced to commit himself to Zaghloul's demands.
April 25.	Zaghloul delivered a violent speech at Shubra attacking the Ministry and Great Britain.
April 27.	Lord Allenby reported a deadlock in the negotiations between Adly and Zaghloul as the latter absolutely refused to give way over the presidency of the delegation.
April 29.	Riots broke out at Tanta and the police were attacked by the mob in their barracks. Zaghloul was seen by Mr. Boyle, formerly Lord Cromer's oriental secretary and a personal friend of the Pasha. He described Zaghloul's attitude in the following words: "He spoke as if he was the absolute ruler of the country and seemed to be under the control of some sort of megalomania."
April 30.	A serious split took place amongst Zaghloul's followers and the principal section went over to Adly.

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

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April 30.	The Acting Adviser to the Ministry of Interior reported that "among the instructions sent by Zaghloul's sympathisers is one to the effect that it is essential to clear out every foreigner from Egypt, more particularly the English, and that at the earliest date possible." He added "that Zaghloul was obviously out for trouble, immediately if he cannot oust the present Ministry otherwise, or later when he has succeeded in breaking off the negotiations in London."
End of April.	The weekly situation report stated that there were clear indications that Zaghloul's followers were at work trying to stir up trouble.
May 7.	Lord Allenby reported that, in his opinion, Adly's attitude in the forthcoming negotiations would be greatly influenced by developments in Egypt which it was impossible to forecast. He would prove tractable or intractable according as Zaghloul lost or gained ground.
May 11.	The weekly situation report said that Zaghloul was directing his efforts towards fomenting strikes and demonstrations.
May 18.	Demonstrations against the Government were reported and foreigners were described as being nervous.
May 19.	The Belgian Consul informed Lord Allenby that the police protection afforded by the Egyptian Government (to his nationals) was inadequate.
May 21.	The Alexandrian riots broke out accompanied by disturbances in Cairo.

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

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May 25.	The United States Diplomatic Agent asked Lord Allenby whether he should send for an American warship.
During June.	The weekly situation reports related that Zaghloul realising the damage done to his cause by the Alexandrian riots was devoting his energies firstly to plans destined to hamper the delegation while in England, and secondly to secure control for himself of the future constituent Assembly.
July 1.	The official delegation sailed from Alexandria and had a good send off.
July 23.	Zaghloul retired to his country estate.
August 7.	Zaghloul was reported as being much dissatisfied with the situation and very anxious to take part in the negotiations with H.M.G. if he could get rid of Adly.
August 12.	The situation report stated that Zaghloul had spent large sums on propaganda since his break with Adly in May, the amount currently mentioned being £50,000. William Makram Obeid was being sent by Zaghloul to England to conduct a campaign of propaganda on his behalf. Zaghloul had inspired the series of questions which were being asked by Labour Members in the House of Commons. The situation report mentioned that "any thirst for information which turns the enquirer into ridicule is now called 'swanni' in the current Arabic slang of Cairo." after Mr Swan M.P.
August 25.	Zaghloul returned to Cairo. During the course of this month he had been engineering the visit of the

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

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Labour M.P.s to Egypt.

Secret. Zaghloul was much perturbed because some Liberal Members of Parliament were also thinking of coming to Egypt.

September 5. It was reported that elaborate preparations were being made by Zaghloul to organise impressive demonstrations to greet the British M.P.s.

September 7. Zaghloul was reported to be trying to get members of the French and Italian parliaments to visit Egypt.

September 13. Lord Allenby reported that students were being urged by Zaghloul's lieutenants to intimidate individuals who supported the government. Two newspaper editors had already been terrorised.

September 19. Zaghloul was reported to be making plans for his political campaign in Lower Egypt. The situation report stated that Zaghloul was determined at all costs to wreck the government. The Labour M.P.s. arrived at Alexandria.

September 22. The visit of Zaghloul and the Labour M.P.s to Tanta was forbidden as serious disturbances were certain to occur.

September 28. Secret. The Government asked Mr. Scott that all provincial visits of the M.P.s should be forbidden.

September 30. Mr. Scott reported that he had offered to get the M.P.s into touch with supporters of the Government, but after a show of acceptance they did not follow up his invitation. He added that ~~indications~~ indignation

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

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was growing amongst the supporters of the Government at the unwarranted interference of the M.P.s in Egyptian domestic affairs.

September 30. A telegram was despatched from Assiut signed by several thousand persons, including members of the Legislative Assembly, and other notables, protesting against the proposed visit of the M.P.s to that town.

October 3. Zaghloul cancelled his projected visit with the M.P.s to Upper Egypt.

October 7. The M.P.s left Alexandria on their way back to England.

October 10. Mr. Scott reported that the visit of Zaghloul and the M.P.s to Mansoura had not been an unqualified success.

October 11. Zaghloul accompanied by some adherents left by steamer for Upper Egypt.

October 12. Secret. Zaghloul cancelled the arrangements for the visit of French and Italian members of parliament.

Middle of October. Zaghloul was badly received in Upper Egypt and serious disturbances occurred at Assiut and Girga.

October 20. The Inspector of Interior reported "had Zaghloul landed at Girga there is little doubt he would have been killed." French subjects in the Fayoum officially ~~delivered~~ telegraphed to their diplomatic agent ~~a letter~~ asking that Zaghloul's visit to that province might be forbidden as otherwise their lives would be in danger.

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

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October 30.	Zaghloul landed in Cairo after his unsuccessful tour in Upper Egypt.
November 2.	The majority (36) of the surviving elected members of the Legislative Assembly formally repudiated Zaghloul in a published telegram addressed to him.
November 9.	Zaghloul was reported to be organising a big demonstration for November 13.
November 13.	The Zaghloul demonstration took place but was attended chiefly by the riff-raff of Cairo and the students, whilst a similar demonstration in favour of Adly was attended by all the better elements.
November 23.	Zaghloul was reported to be delighted at the break down of Adly's negotiations with H.M.G.
December 5.	Adly Pasha and his delegation arrived on their return from London and had a very good reception. They were invited a a great tea-party at the Continental Hotel which was attended by all the notables of Cairo and the provinces. Zaghloul organised the raga-muffins of Cairo and spent his afternoon driving up and down in front of the Continental Hotel in a motor urging the riff-raff to spit and throw mud at the notables assembled to greet Adly.

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

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[Passages in square brackets to be omitted] 245

Resumé of events in Egypt since the publication of the report of the Milner Mission.

The Milner report was laid before Parliament on February 11th 1921 and on February 26th Lord Allenby made the following declaration to the Sultan:-

"His Majesty's Government, after a study of the proposals made by Lord Milner, have arrived at the conclusion that the status of protectorate is not a satisfactory relation in which Egypt should continue to stand to Great Britain. While they have not reached final decisions with regard to Lord Milner's recommendations, they desire to confer regarding them with a delegation nominated by Your Highness with a view, if possible, to substitute for the protectorate a relationship which would, while securing the special interests of Great Britain and enabling her to offer adequate guarantees to foreign powers, meet the legitimate aspirations of Egypt and the Egyptian people".

The Sultan at once set about forming a representative delegation but his task was rendered difficult by the intrigues of place hunters [notably Mohamed Said a former prime minister and Mazloum Pasha a relative and....

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

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and supporter of Zaghloul].

Adly Pasha kept clear of these intrigues and when they resulted in the breakdown of the original combination he was the outstanding figure to whom everyone looked for a lead. He was able to form a delegation and the ministry of Tewfik Nessim Pasha, which had been one of affairs only, resigned and their place was taken by Adly Pasha's cabinet.

The new government was greeted by a spontaneous and genuine demonstration of welcome on all sides and for days the ministers were fully occupied in receiving deputations of notables who flocked to Cairo to welcome them on taking office. These manifestations of confidence were entirely unsought and were not affected by attempts on the part of Zaghloul's followers to organise counter demonstrations in favour of their hero.

Hearing of the enthusiastic reception of the new ministry Zaghloul who was still in Paris at once telegraphed to Adly Pasha demanding as a preliminary to any negotiations with His Majesty's Government, the immediate abolition of the protectorate, the censorship, and martial law and the acceptance by Great Britain of all the reservations which had been formulated to Lord Milner's proposed settlement. He also demanded that the majority of the official delegation

should....

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

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should be selected from his own immediate followers and that he himself should be the president.

He followed up his telegram by returning to Egypt in person when he received a delirious welcome which completely turned his head. When the excitement had cooled down Adly Pasha entered into negotiations with Zaghloul with a view to securing his collaboration in the forthcoming conferences with His Majesty's Government and at first the latter appeared to be willing to abate his demands but in one respect he proved adamant and this was his insistence that he himself should preside over and control the delegation. Finding himself unable to get the better of the prime minister in this matter he suddenly shifted his ground and on the 25th April he delivered a violent harangue denouncing the government as the tools of Great Britain.

Despite his asseverations His Majesty's Government had deliberately refrained from any interference with the formation of the Egyptian delegation or indeed with the creation of an Egyptian ministry after they had issued their invitation to the Sultan in February.

Having decided to oppose the government Zaghloul at once set himself to promote disorder with a view to embarrassing them and the first fruits of his efforts were the serious....

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

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serious riots at Tanta on the 29th April when the police were beseiged in their barracks and heavily attacked.

Amongst the instructions issued by Zaghloul's lieutenants to his sympathisers at this time was one to the effect that it was essential to drive all foreigners out of Egypt more particularly the English, and that at the earliest date possible. Zaghloul in fact was obviously "out for trouble"; immediately, if he could not otherwise bring about the fall of the government, or later if he could succeed in breaking off the negotiations in London.

Encouraged by the difficulties of the ministry caused by the serious economic and financial situation which the heavy fall in the price of cotton had produced, and by the blow to their prestige caused by the riots at Tanta, Zaghloul directed his efforts to fomenting strikes amongst government and other public servants and organising rowdy demonstrations.

The inevitable results were not long delayed: on May 19th the Belgian consul in Cairo felt obliged to tell Lord Allenby that the police protection to his nationals accorded by the Egyptian government was inadequate and two days later the riots in Alexandria broke out and occasioned the loss of many lives and much property.

The full history of those deplorable events is already in the possession of

parliament ....

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

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parliament and it is unnecessary here to dwell upon them.

Zaghloul himself was somewhat sobered when he realised the damage which his agitation had done to his own cause and during June he confined himself to devising plans to hamper the delegation during the course of the negotiations in England and to securing for himself the control of the future constituent assembly in Egypt.

On the 1st July Adly Pasha and his delegation left for England and were accorded a hearty send off by representatives of all the important bodies in Egypt. On his arrival in London negotiations were undertaken without delay and were actively pursued until the end of August by which time each party was thoroughly acquainted with the views of the other.

His Majesty's Government on the one hand were bound to safeguard certain vital Imperial interests upon which the greatest stress had been laid by members of the Imperial conference during the discussions which took place in June and July.

On the other hand the Egyptian delegation found themselves in a position of grave difficulty; themselves experienced and reasonable men they knew that the passions of their more ignorant and excitable countrymen had been fanned by Zaghloul to such a pitch that public opinion in Egypt was no longer

capable....

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

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capable of taking an impartial and dis-
passionate view of any arrangement which
might be reached.

Adly Pasha and his colleagues spared
no effort to promote the settlement which
they no less earnestly than His Majesty's
Government desired, but the money lavishly
expended by Zaghloul on propaganda had done
its work.

That sinister influence was in the
meantime actively at work though seriously
perturbed because the negotiations had not
immediately broken down. During August
Zaghloul was busily engaged in engineering
a visit not only of British but of French
and Italian members of parliament to Egypt.

His scheme was jeopardised however and
he himself thrown into consternation by the
rumour that some liberal members of parliament
intended to accompany the party. This peril
was however averted and towards the middle
of September the little party of M.Ps.
arrived in Egypt to be greeted by a carefully
worked up enthusiasm which no doubt produced
its intended effect.

Zaghloul accompanied by his friends
visited some important towns in the Delta
though Lord Allenby had to forbid an
expedition to Tanta where passions were so in-
flamed that serious consequences would in-
evitably have followed the visit.

Zaghloul had planned a similar tour
of Upper Egypt but here he met with a serious
rebuff as the inhabitants of Assiout refused
to....

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

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to have him. He took this refusal so seriously that the whole scheme was abandoned and even the visits of the French and Italian deputies were countermanded and the British M.Ps. left for home on October the 7th.

Zaghloul however changed his mind and decided to essay the visit to Upper Egypt accompanied by a few of his lieutenants. Party feeling ran high and serious disturbances broke out wherever his steamer appeared. In fact a reliable witness reported that had he landed at ~~Griga~~ Girga as he intended he would almost certainly have been killed.

Such was the ferment that on the 20th November the French subjects in the Fayoum telegraphed to their diplomatic agent at Cairo asking that Zaghloul's visit to that province should be forbidden as otherwise their lives would be in danger. He himself realised the failure of his tour and returned to Cairo, whilst ~~the~~ reasonable Egyptian opinion appreciated the danger of his agitation. On the 2nd November the majority of the surviving elected members of the Legislative Assembly formally repudiated his policy and leadership in a telegram which they published.

Meanwhile the conversations with Adly Pasha had been renewed here during October but the events in Egypt had greatly damaged

the....

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

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the prospect of the negotiations succeeding and on November 15th Adly Pasha felt obliged to reject in a courteous and dignified note the proposals which His Majesty's Government had presented to him some days earlier.

The delegation therefore returned to Egypt and on their arrival on the 5th December they were entertained at the Continental Hotel by a large and representative gathering of notables from all over the country.

This was too much for Zaghloul who spent the afternoon driving up and down in front of the hotel urging the riff-raff of Cairo to fling mud and even to spit on the assembled notables.

The later developments in the situation are fully recorded in the papers now before the House.

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

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Objects of the Declaration
to Egypt.

The termination of the Protectorate, which in the words of the invitation addressed to the Sultan a year ago, was recognised as no longer a satisfactory relationship in which Egypt should continue to stand to this country, has long been the aim of His Majesty's Government.

But this object could only be achieved if British imperial interests were fully safeguarded. This Adly Pasha and his colleagues were the first to admit, but the difficulty of reconciling these interests with Egyptian aspirations proved insuperable during the negotiations last summer. At the present moment there is no Egyptian government who could go so far as to commit their country to a treaty relationship with Great Britain of a nature to afford "as adequate safeguards in these matters, and His Majesty's Government have therefore determined to achieve their purpose by unilateral action in precisely the same way as the protectorate was originally declared.

In this course they enjoy the whole hearted support of Lord Allenby and of the British officials of all ranks in the service of the Egyptian government, and they are confident that their action will

equally/

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

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equally be endorsed by Parliament, and by public opinion in this country.

The next point in the declaration which calls for comment is the provision relating to the abolition of martial law. As to this a good deal of misapprehension exists both here and in Egypt. In most continental countries the "état de siège" is recognised as a necessity in times of grave national emergency, and is provided for in the constitution so that the transition from the normal constitutional regime to martial law and vice-versa is a simple matter.

Egypt, however, resembles Great Britain in that her constitution makes no provision for a state of martial law, and consequently before it can be withdrawn the enactment of an act of indemnity is a necessary preliminary.

It is not perhaps realised to what extent Egyptian, as well as British, interests would be jeopardised by the premature withdrawal of martial law before such an act of indemnity had become operative. Two instances of this will suffice to show what is meant. During the course of the war the Egyptian government found it necessary to provide more effective police protection in the larger towns and villages, and as this entailed considerable expense the

It must be remembered that Martial Law was proclaimed in Egypt not only for the preservation of public order, but for other reasons too. The Capitulations in time of peace were a terrible & often unnecessary trammel on Egypto legislative powers; in time of war they might have rendered the machinery of government unworkable. Martial Law served as an expedient to circumvent this disability

necessary/

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

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necessary funds were provided by means of a special cess on house property. But by reason of the capitulations such a levy could not be imposed on foreigners, except under martial law, to which expedient recourse was had with the result that an additional revenue of over £1,000,000 (one million pounds) a year is provided. Were martial law to be withdrawn tomorrow, not only would this levy become impossible in future, but the Egyptian government would have to refund, with interest, the sums collected in the past to pay for a very necessary service.

Another instance in which martial law alone provided a solution of a very pressing difficulty was in the case of house rents, which at one time became so greatly inflated that the poorer classes, both Egyptian and foreign, were driven to desperation. Egyptian legislation alone was powerless to help them so a law limiting the amount by which rents could be increased was enacted by the Commander-in-Chief, and proved a real god-send to the vast majority of the urban population. With the premature withdrawal of martial law all this would be undone ,and many poor families would find themselves homeless and without the means to pay the extortionate rents which would be demanded for a lodging.

The/

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

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The necessity therefore for an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt whether native or foreign is indisputable and with its enactment there will no longer be any need for martial law to remain in force.

The concluding article of the declaration deals with subjects of vital importance to this country and it is designed fully to protect our interests until such time as it may be possible to settle in a more permanent manner the arrangements which will afford us the security we deem essential.

As regards the communications of the British Empire it is unnecessary to elaborate the importance of this subject which is frankly recognised by all Egyptians.

The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect, is equally in Egyptian and British interests. Great Britain would find her Imperial communications in danger and Egypt would lose her recently acquired independence were any foreign power to succeed in supplanting us in the special position which we occupy in that country.

The termination of the British protectorate over Egypt involves, however, no change in the status quo as regards the position of other powers in Egypt itself.

The/

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

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The welfare and integrity of Egypt are necessary to the peace and safety of the British Empire, which will therefore always maintain as an essential British interest the special relations between itself and Egypt long recognised by other governments. These special relations are defined in the declaration recognising Egypt as an independent sovereign state. His Majesty's Government have laid them down as matters in which the rights and interests of the British Empire are vitally involved, and will not admit them to be questioned or discussed by any other power. In pursuance of this principle they will regard as an unfriendly act any attempt at interference in the affairs of Egypt by another power, and they will consider any aggression against the territory of Egypt as an act to be repelled with all the means at their command.

The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities are responsibilities which are inseperable from the special position which we hold and intend to maintain.

These responsibilities have not infrequently been brought home to His Majesty's Government in the course of the last few years when the passions of the ignorant masses of Egypt have been enflamed by the

activities/

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

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

activities of political agitators. It is to be hoped that with the recognition of their status as an independent nation the Egyptians will themselves realise how imperative it is to keep political passions within their proper bounds and the efforts of any Egyptian government in this direction will always enjoy the sympathy and support of His Majesty's Government.

The Sudan calls for more than a passing word. The combined efforts of Great Britain and Egypt were needed to rescue that vast country from the devastation and ruin into which the Mahdist movement had plunged it. Since the reconquest more than 20 years ago Great Britain and Egypt have alike contributed men and money towards the restoration of peace and prosperity to what should one day prove a country as fertile and populous as it is now barren and empty.

His Majesty's Government will never allow the progress which has already been made and the greater promise of future years to be jeopardised by the introduction of elements in the administration alien alike to the country and its inhabitants.

Service in the Sudan is unpopular with Egyptians and one of the main reasons why conscription is disliked is due to the fact that it entails such service. On the other hand/

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

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hand Egyptian officials are not welcomed by the Sudanese, in whose minds the memories of Egyptian mis~~judgment~~ government 50 years ago still rankle.

Nor can His Majesty's Government agree to any change in the status of that country which would in the slightest degree diminish the security for the many millions of British capital which are already invested in its development.

The progress already made is largely due to British initiati~~on~~ve and enterprise, and while determined that these qualities shall in future have a fair field in that country, His Majesty's Government are animated by no selfish wish to exclude Egypt, their partner in the great enterprise of reclaiming the Sudan from barbarism, from contributing towards the success of the common task.

Egypt, ~~however~~ indeed, has undeniable right to the most ample guarantees that the development of the Sudan shall never threaten or interfere with her existing water supply, or with that which she may require in order to b?ing her own territory under full cultivation. Such guarantees His Majesty's Government will be ready to afford, and there is no reason why they should in any way hamper or retard the progress of the Sudan.

But/

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

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

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But the form of administration which has proved so successful in the past and is so popular with Sudanese themselves cannot lightly be changed to suit a political catchword [invented by Zaghloul].

For these reasons His Majesty's Government have felt bound to reserve the question of the Sudan amongst the other matters dealt with in the concluding article of the convention.

End
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

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