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أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦

المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند

Mss Eur F112/265

١١ أبريل ١٩١٧-٢١ أكتوبر ١٩١٩ (ميلادي)

الإنجليزية و الفرنسية في اللاتينية

ملف واحد (٨٣ ورقة)

غير معروف

المؤسسة المالكة

المرجع

التاريخ/ التواريخ

لغة الكتابة

الحجم والشكل

حق النشر



حول هذا السجل


يتألف الملف في أغلبه من مراسلات ومذكرات وقصاصات من الصحف تتعلق باتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ والسياسة البريطانية في الأراضي العثمانية السابقة بعد نهاية الحرب العالمية الأولى. طُبع وأعد العديد من الأوراق لصالح مجلس الحرب (ومن مارس ١٩١٨، اللجنة الشرقية في مجلس الحرب) وهي مؤرخة في الفترة ما بين مايو ١٩١٥ وسبتمبر ١٩١٩.

تتناول الأوراق عدّة أمور، منها:


- المفاوضات التي أدت إلى اتفاقية سايكس بيكو (المُصدق عليها في مايو ١٩١٦) والتي تتعلق بالحكومة المستقبلية في سوريا (بما في ذلك لبنان) وفلسطين وبلاد الرافدين [العراق] وتركيا الآسيوية، وضمن "الحقوق" البريطانية والفرنسية في المنطقة

- اتفاقيات أخرى في زمن الحرب تخص بريطانيا وفرنسا وروسيا وإيطاليا ورومانيا
 - تعديل اتفاقية سايكس بيكو في ١٩١٨ بعد التطورات اللاحقة أثناء الحرب، لا سيما "الثورة العربية" [انتفاضة القوميين العرب ضد الدولة العثمانية] وسيطرة القوات البريطانية والعربية على فلسطين وسوريا
 - نقاش عن إعلان أنجلو-فرنسي سيتم إصداره في محاولة تهدئة سكان المنطقة
 - رد الحكومة البريطانية على مذكرة أصدرها سبعة قادة عرب يسكنون في مصر بخصوص رغبتهم في تقرير المصير في المنطقة، خاصة سوريا
 - بيان أدلى به فيصل بن حسين بن علي الهاشمي إلى رئيس هيئة الأركان العامة، قوة الحملة المصرية، ٣١ أغسطس ١٩١٩، فيما يخص الأحداث الأخيرة في المنطقة، وعود قُدمت للعرب أثناء الحرب، وتصميم العرب على تحقيق الاستقلال.
- تدور المراسلات بشكل رئيسي بين الدبلوماسيين والسياسيين في الحكومات البريطانية والفرنسية والروسية والإيطالية، ومسؤولي وزارة الخارجية ومكتب الحرب البريطاني.
- تحتوي الأوراق ٧٠-٨٤ على ملاحظات ذات صلة كُتبت بخط يد اللورد كرزون.
- يتألف المحتوى الوارد باللغة الفرنسية من مراسلات من دبلوماسيين وسياسيين فرنسيين.


أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [١٥]
(١٧٠/١)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [ظ١]
(١٧٠/٢)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و٢]
(١٧٠/٣)



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(١٧٠/٥)



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Printed for the War Cabinet. April 1917.

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Agreement between the Three Powers and Italy.

D'ORDRE de son Gouvernement, le Marquis Impériali, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie, a l'honneur de communiquer au Très Honorable Sir Edward Grey, Principal Secrétaire d'État de Sa Majesté britannique pour les Affaires Étrangères, et à leurs Excellences M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de la République française, et M. le Comte de Benckendorff, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, le mémorandum suivant :

Mémorandum.

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Une convention militaire sera immédiatement conclue entre les états-majors généraux de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de l'Italie et de la Russie ; cette convention fixera le minimum des forces militaires que la Russie devra employer contre l'Autriche-Hongrie afin d'empêcher cette Puissance de concentrer tous ses efforts contre l'Italie, dans le cas où la Russie déciderait de porter son principal effort contre l'Allemagne.

La convention militaire réglera la question des armistices, qui relève essentiellement du commandement en chef des armées.

ARTICLE 2.

De son côté, l'Italie s'engage à employer la totalité de ses ressources à poursuivre la guerre en commun avec la France, la Grande-Bretagne et la Russie contre tous leurs ennemis.

ARTICLE 3.

Les flottes de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne donneront leur concours actif et permanent à l'Italie jusqu'à la destruction de la flotte austro-hongroise ou jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix.

Une convention navale sera immédiatement conclue à cet effet entre la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie.

ARTICLE 4.

Dans le traité de paix, l'Italie obtiendra le Trentin, le Tyrol cisalpin avec sa frontière géographique et naturelle (la frontière du Brenner), ainsi que Trieste, les comtés de Gorizia et de Gradisca, toute l'Istrie jusqu'au Quarnero et y compris Volosca et les îles istriennes de Cherso, Lussin, de même que les petites îles de Plavnik, Unie, Canidole, Palazzuoli, San Pietro di Nembi, Asinello, Gruica, et les îlots voisins.

Note.

La frontière nécessaire pour assurer l'exécution de l'article 4 sera tracée comme suit :

Du Piz Umbrail jusqu'au nord du Stelvio, elle suivra la crête des Alpes rhétiennes jusqu'aux sources de l'Adige et de l'Eisach, passant alors sur les monts Reschen et Brenner et sur les hauteurs de l'Oetz et du Ziller. La frontière ensuite se dirigera vers le sud, traversera le mont Toblach et rejoindra la frontière actuelle des Alpes carniques. Elle suivra cette frontière jusqu'au mont Tarvis, et après le mont Tarvis

[462-1]

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la ligne de partage des eaux des Alpes juliennes par le col Predil, le mont Mangart, le Tricorno (Terglouw) et la ligne de partage des eaux des cols de Podberdo, de Podlaniscam et d'Idria. A partir de ce point, la frontière suivra la direction du sud-est vers le Schneeberg, laissant hors du territoire italien tout le bassin de la Save et de ses tributaires; du Schneeberg la frontière descendra vers la côte de manière à inclure Castua, Mattuglia et Volosca dans le territoire italien.

ARTICLE 5.

L'Italie recevra également la province de Dalmatie dans ses limites administratives actuelles en y comprenant au nord Lisarica et Tribania, et au sud jusqu'à une ligne partant sur la côte du cap Planka et suivant vers l'est les sommets des hauteurs formant la ligne de partage des eaux de manière à laisser dans le territoire italien toutes les vallées et cours d'eau descendant vers Sebenico, comme la Cicola, la Kerka, la Butisnica et leurs affluents. Elle recevra aussi toutes les îles situées au nord et à l'ouest de la Dalmatie depuis Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Scherda, Maon, Pago et Patadura au nord, jusqu'à Meleda au sud en y comprenant Sant' Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Tercola, Curzola, Cazza et Lagosta, ainsi que les rochers et îlots environnants et Pelagosa, à l'exception seulement des îles Grande et Petite Zirona, Bua, Solta et Brazza.

Seront neutralisées :

(1.) Toute la côte depuis le cap Planka au nord jusqu'à la racine méridionale de la péninsule de Sabioncello au sud, de manière à comprendre toute cette péninsule; (2) la partie du littoral commençant au nord à un point situé à 10 kilom. au sud de la pointe de Ragusa Vecchia descendant au sud jusqu'à la rivière Voiussa, de manière à comprendre le golfe et les ports de Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno, Saint-Jean de Medua, Durazzo, sans préjudice des droits du Monténégro résultant des déclarations échangées entre les Puissances en avril et mai 1909. Ces droits ne s'appliquant qu'au territoire actuel monténégrin ne pourront être étendus aux territoires ou ports qui pourraient être attribués au Monténégro. En conséquence, aucune partie des côtes appartenant actuellement au Monténégro ne pourra être neutralisée. Resteront en vigueur les restrictions concernant le port d'Antivari auxquelles le Monténégro a lui-même consenti en 1909; (3) et, enfin, toutes les îles qui ne sont pas attribuées à l'Italie.

Note.

Les territoires de l'Adriatique énumérés ci-dessous seront attribués par les quatre Puissances alliées à la Croatie, à la Serbie et au Monténégro :

Dans le Haut-Adriatique, toute la côte depuis la baie de Volosca sur les confins de l'Istrie jusqu'à la frontière septentrionale de Dalmatie comprenant le littoral actuellement hongrois et toute la côte de Croatie, avec le port de Fiume et les petits ports de Novi et de Carlopago, ainsi que les îles de Veglia, Pervichio, Gregorio, Goli et Arbe. Et, dans le Bas-Adriatique (dans la région intéressant la Serbie et le Monténégro), toute la côte du cap Planka jusqu'à la rivière Drin, avec les ports importants de Spalato, Raguse, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno et Saint-Jean de Medua et les îles de Zirona Grande, Zirona Piccola, Bua, Solta, Brazza, Jaclian et Calamotta. Le port de Durazzo resterait attribué à l'État indépendant musulman d'Albanie.

ARTICLE 6.

L'Italie recevra l'entière souveraineté sur Vallona, l'île de Sasseno et un territoire suffisamment étendu pour assurer la défense de ces points (depuis Voiussa au nord et à l'est, approximativement jusqu'à la frontière septentrionale du district de Chimaru au sud).

ARTICLE 7.

Si l'Italie obtient le Trentin et l'Istrie conformément aux termes de l'article 4, la Dalmatie et les îles de l'Adriatique dans les limites indiquées dans l'article 5 et la baie de Vallona (article 6), et si la partie centrale de l'Albanie est réservée pour la constitution d'un petit État autonome neutralisé, elle ne s'opposera pas à ce que les parties

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septentrionale et méridionale de l'Albanie soient, si tel est le désir de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de la Russie, partagées entre le Monténégro, la Serbie et la Grèce. La côte à partir de la frontière méridionale de la possession italienne de Vallona (voyez l'article 6) jusqu'au cap Stylos sera neutralisée.

L'Italie sera chargée de représenter l'Etat d'Albanie dans ses relations avec l'étranger.

L'Italie accepte, d'autre part, de laisser dans tous les cas à l'est de l'Albanie un territoire suffisant pour assurer l'existence d'une frontière commune à la Grèce et à la Serbie à l'ouest du lac d'Ochrida.

ARTICLE 8.

L'Italie recevra l'entière souveraineté sur les îles du Dodécannèse qu'elle occupe actuellement.

ARTICLE 9.

D'une manière générale, la France, la Grande-Bretagne et la Russie reconnaissent que l'Italie est intéressée au maintien de l'équilibre dans la Méditerranée et qu'elle devra, en cas de partage total ou partiel de la Turquie d'Asie, obtenir une part équitable dans la région méditerranéenne avoisinant la province d'Adalia où l'Italie a déjà acquis des droits et des intérêts qui ont fait l'objet d'une convention italo-britannique. La zone qui sera éventuellement attribuée à l'Italie sera délimitée, le moment venu, en tenant compte des intérêts existants de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne.

Les intérêts de l'Italie seront également pris en considération dans le cas où l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire ottoman serait maintenue et où des modifications seraient faites aux zones d'intérêt des Puissances.

Si la France, la Grande-Bretagne et la Russie occupent des territoires de la Turquie d'Asie pendant la durée de la guerre, la région méditerranéenne avoisinant la province d'Adalia dans les limites indiquées ci-dessus sera réservée à l'Italie, qui aura le droit de l'occuper.

ARTICLE 10.

L'Italie sera substituée en Lybie aux droits et privilèges appartenant actuellement au Sultan en vertu du Traité de Lausanne.

ARTICLE 11.

L'Italie recevra une part correspondant à ses efforts et à ses sacrifices dans l'indemnité de guerre éventuelle.

ARTICLE 12.

L'Italie déclare s'associer à la déclaration faite par la France, la Grande-Bretagne et la Russie à l'effet de laisser l'Arabie et les lieux saints musulmans en Arabie sous l'autorité d'un pouvoir musulman indépendant.

ARTICLE 13.

Dans le cas où la France et la Grande-Bretagne augmenteraient leurs domaines coloniaux d'Afrique aux dépens de l'Allemagne, ces deux Puissances reconnaissent en principe que l'Italie pourrait réclamer quelques compensations équitables, notamment dans le règlement en sa faveur des questions concernant les frontières des colonies italiennes de l'Érythrée, de la Somalie et de la Lybie et des colonies voisines de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne.

ARTICLE 14.

La Grande-Bretagne s'engage à faciliter la conclusion immédiate, dans des conditions équitables, d'un emprunt d'au moins £50,000,000 à émettre sur le marché de Londres.

[462—1]

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ARTICLE 15.

La France, la Grande-Bretagne et la Russie appuieront l'opposition que l'Italie formera à toute proposition tendant à introduire un représentant du Saint Siège dans toutes les négociations pour la paix et pour le règlement des questions soulevées par la présente guerre.

ARTICLE 16.

Le présent arrangement sera tenu secret. L'adhésion de l'Italie à la déclaration du 5 septembre, 1914, sera seule rendue publique aussitôt après la déclaration de guerre par ou contre l'Italie.

Après avoir pris acte du mémorandum ci-dessus, les représentants de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de la Russie, dûment autorisés à cet effet, ont conclu avec le représentant de l'Italie, également autorisé par son Gouvernement, l'accord suivant :

La France, la Grande-Bretagne et la Russie donnent leur plein assentiment au mémorandum présenté par le Gouvernement italien.

Se référant aux articles 1^{er}, 2 et 3 du mémorandum, qui prévoient la coopération militaire et navale des quatre Puissances, l'Italie déclare qu'elle entrera en campagne le plus tôt possible et dans un délai qui ne pourra excéder un mois à partir de la signature des présentes.

En foi de quoi les soussignés ont signé le présent accord et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

Fait à Londres, en quadruple original, le 26 avril, 1915.

(L.S.) E. GREY.
(L.S.) IMPERIALI.
(L.S.) BENCKENDORFF.
(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON.

Déclaration par laquelle la France, la Grande-Bretagne, l'Italie et la Russie s'engagent à ne pas conclure de paix séparée au cours de la présente Guerre européenne.

LE Gouvernement italien ayant décidé de participer à la présente guerre avec les Gouvernements français, britannique et russe et d'adhérer à la déclaration faite à Londres le 5 septembre, 1914, par les trois Gouvernements précités,

Les soussignés, dûment autorisés par leurs Gouvernements respectifs, font la déclaration suivante :

Les Gouvernements français, britannique, italien et russe s'engagent mutuellement à ne pas conclure de paix séparée au cours de la présente guerre.


Les quatre Gouvernements conviennent que, lorsqu'il y aura lieu de discuter les termes de la paix, aucune des Puissances alliées ne pourra poser des conditions de paix sans accord préalable avec chacun des autres Alliés.

En foi de quoi les soussignés ont signé la présente déclaration et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

Fait à Londres, en quadruple original, le 26 avril, 1915.

(L.S.) E. GREY.
(L.S.) IMPERIALI.
(L.S.) BENCKENDORFF.
(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON.

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(١٧٠/١١)

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Printed for the War Cabinet. April 1917.

CONFIDENTIAL



Télégramme circulaire russe du 4 mars, 1915, au sujet de Constantinople et des Détroits.

LE cours des derniers événements amène Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas à penser que la question de Constantinople et des Détroits doit être résolue définitivement, selon les aspirations séculaires de la Russie.

Toute solution serait insuffisante et précaire si la ville de Constantinople, la rive occidentale du Bosphore, de la mer de Marmara et des Dardanelles, ainsi que la Thrace méridionale jusqu'à la ligne Énos-Midia, n'étaient désormais incorporées à l'Empire russe.

De même, et par nécessité stratégique, la partie du littoral asiatique comprise entre le Bosphore, la rivière Sakharja et un point à fixer sur le golfe d'Ismid, les îles de la mer de Marmara, les îles d'Imbros et de Ténédos devront être incorporées à l'Empire.

Les intérêts spéciaux de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne dans la région ci-dessus désignée seront scrupuleusement respectés.

Le Gouvernement Impérial se plaît à espérer que les considérations ci-dessus seront accueillies avec sympathie par les deux Gouvernements alliés. Lesdits Gouvernements alliés sont assurés de rencontrer auprès du Gouvernement Impérial la même sympathie pour la réalisation des desseins qu'ils peuvent former en d'autres régions de l'Empire ottoman comme ailleurs.

Pétrograde, le 4 mars, 1915.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Russian Government.

SUBJECT to the war being carried on and brought to a successful conclusion, and to the desiderata of Great Britain and France in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere being realised, as indicated in the Russian communication herein referred to, His Majesty's Government will agree to the Russian Government's *aide-mémoire* relative to Constantinople and the Straits, the text of which was communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador by his Excellency M. Sazonof on the 4th March, 1915.

Petrograd, March 12, 1915.

Memorandum.

HIS Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to make the following observations with reference to the *aide-mémoire* which this Embassy had the honour of addressing to the Imperial Government on the 12th March, 1915.

The claim made by the Imperial Government in their *aide-mémoire* of the 4th March, 1915, considerably exceeds the desiderata which were foreshadowed by M. Sazonof as probable a few weeks ago. Before His Majesty's Government have had time to take into consideration what their own desiderata elsewhere would be in the final terms of peace, Russia is asking for a definite promise that her wishes shall be satisfied with regard to what is in fact the richest prize of the entire war. Sir Edward Grey accordingly hopes that M. Sazonof will realise that it is not in the power of His Majesty's Government to give a greater proof of friendship than that which is afforded by the terms of the above-mentioned *aide-mémoire*. That document involves a complete reversal of the traditional policy of His Majesty's Government, and is in direct opposition to the opinions and sentiments at one time universally held in England and which have still by no means died out. Sir Edward

[462—3]

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Grey therefore trusts that the Imperial Government will recognise that the recent general assurances given to M. Sazonof have been most loyally and amply fulfilled. In presenting the *aide-mémoire* now, His Majesty's Government believe and hope that a lasting friendship between Russia and Great Britain will be assured as soon as the proposed settlement is realised.

From the British *aide-mémoire* it follows that the desiderata of His Majesty's Government, however important they may be to British interests in other parts of the world, will contain no condition which could impair Russia's control over the territories described in the Russian *aide-mémoire* of the 4th March, 1915.

In view of the fact that Constantinople will always remain a trade *entrepôt* for South-Eastern Europe and Asia Minor, His Majesty's Government will ask that Russia shall, when she comes into possession of it, arrange for a free port for goods in transit to and from non-Russian territory. His Majesty's Government will also ask that there shall be commercial freedom for merchant-ships passing through the Straits, as M. Sazonof has already promised.

Except in so far as the naval and military operations on which His Majesty's Government are now engaged in the Dardanelles may contribute to the common cause of the Allies, it is now clear that these operations, however successful, cannot be of any advantage to His Majesty's Government in the final terms of peace. Russia alone will, if the war is successful, gather the direct fruits of these operations. Russia should therefore, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, not now put difficulties in the way of any Power which may, on reasonable terms, offer to co-operate with the Allies. The only Power likely to participate in the operations in the Straits is Greece. Admiral Carden has asked the Admiralty to send him more destroyers, but they have none to spare. The assistance of a Greek flotilla, if it could have been secured, would thus have been of inestimable value to His Majesty's Government.

To induce the neutral Balkan States to join the Allies was one of the main objects which His Majesty's Government had in view when they undertook the operations in the Dardanelles. His Majesty's Government hope that Russia will spare no pains to calm the apprehensions of Bulgaria and Roumania as to Russia's possession of the Straits and Constantinople being to their disadvantage. His Majesty's Government also hope that Russia will do everything in her power to render the co-operation of these two States an attractive prospect to them.

Sir E. Grey points out that it will obviously be necessary to take into consideration the whole question of the future interests of France and Great Britain in what is now Asiatic Turkey; and, in formulating the desiderata of His Majesty's Government with regard to the Ottoman Empire, he must consult the French as well as the Russian Government. As soon, however, as it becomes known that Russia is to have Constantinople at the conclusion of the war, Sir E. Grey will wish to state that throughout the negotiations, His Majesty's Government have stipulated that the Mussulman Holy Places and Arabia shall under all circumstances remain under independent Mussulman dominion.

Sir E. Grey is as yet unable to make any definite proposal on any point of the British desiderata; but one of the points of the latter will be the revision of the Persian portion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 so as to recognise the present neutral sphere as a British sphere.


Until the Allies are in a position to give to the Balkan States, and especially to Bulgaria and Roumania, some satisfactory assurance as to their prospects and general position with regard to the territories contiguous to their frontiers to the possession of which they are known to aspire; and until a more advanced stage of the agreement as to the French and British desiderata in the final peace terms is reached, Sir E. Grey points out that it is most desirable that the understanding now arrived at between the Russian, French, and British Governments should remain secret.

Petrograd, March 12, 1915.

Note verbale remise par M. Paléologue à son Excellence M. Sazonof, le 12 avril, 1915, en réponse au précédent.

Le Gouvernement de la République donnera son agrément à l'aide-mémoire russe remis par M. Isvolsky à M. Delcassé, le 6 mars dernier, et relatif à Constantinople et aux Détroits, à condition que la guerre sera poursuivie jusqu'à la victoire et que la France et la Grande-Bretagne réalisent leurs desseins en Orient comme ailleurs, ainsi qu'il est dit dans l'aide-mémoire russe.

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Printed for the War Cabinet. April 1917.

SECRET.

[176878]

No. 1.

Sir G. Barclay to Viscount Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 30. Secret.)

My Lord,

Bucharest, August 17, 1916.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 683 of to-day, I have the honour to transmit the Political Agreement and the Military Convention which have been signed to-day.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Political Agreement.

ENTRE les soussignés :

1. Sir George Barclay, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande et des Dominions britanniques au delà des Mers, Empereur des Indes, près Sa Majesté le Roi de Roumanie ;

2. Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de la République française près Sa Majesté le Roi de Roumanie ;

3. Le Baron Fasciotti, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie près Sa Majesté le Roi de Roumanie ; et

4. M. Stanislas Poklevski-Koziell, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies près Sa Majesté le Roi de Roumanie,

spécialement autorisés par leurs Gouvernements respectifs, d'une part ; et M. Jean J. C. Bratiano, Président du Conseil des Ministres du Royaume de Roumanie, au nom du Gouvernement roumain, d'autre part, il a été convenu ce qui suit :

1. La Grande-Bretagne, la France, l'Italie et la Russie garantissent l'intégrité territoriale du Royaume de Roumanie dans toutes l'étendue de ses frontières actuelles.

2. La Roumanie s'engage à déclarer la guerre et à attaquer l'Autriche-Hongrie dans les conditions stipulées par la Convention militaire ; la Roumanie s'engage également à cesser, dès la déclaration de la guerre, toutes relations économiques et échanges commerciaux avec tous les ennemis des Alliés.

3. La Grande-Bretagne, la France, l'Italie et la Russie reconnaissent à la Roumanie le droit d'annexer les territoires de la Monarchie austro-hongroise stipulés et délimités à l'article 4.

4. Les limites des territoires mentionnés à l'article précédent sont fixées comme suit :

La ligne de délimitation commencera sur le Pruth à un point de la frontière actuelle entre la Russie et la Roumanie près de Novoselitza et remontera ce fleuve jusqu'à la frontière de la Galicie au confluent du Pruth et du Ceremos. Ensuite elle suivra la frontière de la Galicie et de la Bukovine et celle de la Galicie et de la Hongrie jusqu'au point Stog côte 1655. De là elle suivra la ligne de séparation des eaux de la Tisza et du Viso pour atteindre la Tisza au village de Trebusa en amont de l'endroit où elle s'unit au Viso. A partir de ce point elle descendra le thalweg de la Tisza jusqu'à 4 kilom. en aval de son confluent avec le Szamos, en laissant le village de Vasaros-Nameny à la Roumanie. Elle continuera ensuite dans la direction du sud-sud-ouest jusqu'à un point à 6 kilom. à l'est de la ville de Debreczen. De ce point elle atteindra le Crisch à 3 kilom. en aval de la réunion de ces deux affluents (le Crisch blanc et le Crisch rapide). Elle joindra ensuite la Tisza à la hauteur du village Algyö au nord de Segedin, en passant à l'ouest des villages d'Oroshaza et de Bekessamson, à 3 kilom. duquel elle fera une petite courbe. A partir d'Algyö la ligne descendra le

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thalweg de la Tisza jusqu'à son confluent avec le Danube, et enfin suivra le thalweg du Danube jusqu'à la frontière actuelle de la Roumanie.

La Roumanie s'engage à ne pas élever de fortifications en face de Belgrade dans une zone à déterminer ultérieurement et à ne tenir dans cette zone que des forces nécessaires au service de police. Le Gouvernement Royal roumain s'engage à indemniser les Serbes de la région du Banat qui, abandonnant leurs propriétés, voudraient émigrer dans l'espace de deux ans à partir de la conclusion de la paix.

5. La Grande-Bretagne, la France, l'Italie et la Russie, d'une part, et la Roumanie, d'autre part, s'engagent à ne pas conclure de paix séparée ou la paix générale que conjointement et simultanément.

La Grande-Bretagne, la France, l'Italie et la Russie s'engagent également à ce que, au traité de paix, les territoires de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, stipulés à l'article 4, soient annexés à la Couronne de Roumanie.

6. La Roumanie jouira des mêmes droits que ses Alliés pour tout ce qui a trait aux préliminaires aux négociations de la paix, ainsi qu'à la discussion des questions qui seront soumises aux décisions de la Conférence de la Paix.

7. Les Puissances contractantes s'engagent à garder secrète la présente convention jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix générale.

Fait, en cinq exemplaires, à Bucarest, le 4/17 août, 1916.

(L.S.) G. BARCLAY.
(L.S.) SAINT-AULAIRE.
(L.S.) FASCIOTTI.
(L.S.) S. POKLEVSKI-KOZIPELL.
(L.S.) JON. J. C. BRATIANU.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Military Convention.

ENTRE les soussignés :

1. Le Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Thomson, Attaché militaire à la Légation de la Grande-Bretagne à Bucarest ;
2. Le Colonel A. M. F. M. Desprès, Attaché militaire à la Légation de France à Bucarest ;
3. Le Lieutenant-Colonel L. G. Ferigo, Attaché militaire à la Légation d'Italie à Bucarest ;
4. Le Colonel A. Tatarinof, Agent militaire de Russie en Roumanie,

spécialement autorisés par les commandements suprêmes de leurs armées respectives, d'une part ; et son Excellence M. Jean J. C. Bratiano, Président du Conseil des Ministres, Ministre de la Guerre du Royaume de Roumanie, d'autre part, il a été convenu ce qui suit :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Pour faire suite au Traité d'Alliance conclu le 4/17 août, 1916, entre la Grande-Bretagne, la France, l'Italie, la Russie et la Roumanie, la Roumanie s'engage, en mobilisant toutes ses forces de terre et de mer, à attaquer l'Autriche-Hongrie, au plus tard, le 15/28 août, 1916 (huit jours après l'offensive de Salonique). Les opérations offensives de l'armée roumaine commenceront le jour même de la déclaration de guerre.

ARTICLE 2.

Dès la signature de la présente convention et pendant la durée de la mobilisation et de la concentration de l'armée roumaine, l'armée russe s'engage à agir d'une façon particulièrement énergique sur tout le front autrichien dans le but d'assurer les opérations roumaines susmentionnées. Cette action sera spécialement offensive et vigoureuse en Bukovine, où les troupes russes devront tout au moins garder leurs positions ainsi que leurs effectifs actuels.

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A partir du 12/25 août, 1916, la flotte russe devra assurer la sécurité du port de Constantza, empêcher tout débarquement des troupes ennemies sur les côtes roumaines et toute incursion sur le Danube en amont des bouches de ce fleuve.

De son côté, la Roumanie reconnaitra à la flotte russe de la mer Noire le droit d'utiliser le port de guerre de Constantza et de prendre les mesures nécessaires contre la flotte sous-marine ennemie.

Les navires de guerre russes qui se serviront du Danube, tant pour garantir les rives que pour prêter concours à l'armée et à la flotte roumaines, seront sous les ordres du commandant en chef des armées roumaines et coopéreront sur ce fleuve avec l'escadre des moniteurs roumains. Les détails de cette coopération seront établis conformément aux articles de la présente convention.

ARTICLE 3.

La Russie s'engage au moment de la mobilisation de l'armée roumaine à envoyer en Dobroudja deux divisions d'infanterie et une division de cavalerie pour coopérer avec l'armée roumaine contre l'armée bulgare.

Les Alliés s'engagent à faire précéder, au moins de huit jours, par une offensive affirmée des armées de Salonique, l'entrée en guerre de la Roumanie, afin de faciliter la mobilisation et la concentration de toutes les forces militaires roumaines. Cette offensive commencera le 7/20 août, 1916.

Si, au cours des opérations militaires, les Puissances alliées, après entente entre les états-majors respectifs, étaient amenées à augmenter leur appoint militaire coopérant avec l'armée roumaine, cette augmentation de forces ne modifiera en rien les stipulations des conventions conclues.

ARTICLE 4.

La Grande-Bretagne, la France, l'Italie et la Russie s'engagent à fournir à la Roumanie les munitions et le matériel de guerre, qui seront transportés par des bateaux roumains ou alliés et transités par la Russie.

Ces livraisons et transports devront être exécutés de façon à assurer l'arrivée en Roumanie, d'une façon aussi continue que possible, d'un minimum de 300 tonnes par jour, calculé sur un mois de transport.

Au cas où les Alliés auront à leur disposition de nouvelles voies d'accès facilitant le transit des munitions, la Roumanie pourra en bénéficier.

ARTICLE 5.

Les Alliés s'engagent également à fournir à la Roumanie, dans la limite du possible, les chevaux, caoutchoucs, médicaments, articles de subsistance et d'équipement qu'elle demanderait dans les quantités et catégories qui seront fixées de commun accord.

ARTICLE 6.

Les Alliés mettront à la disposition de la Roumanie le personnel technique nécessaire à la fabrication dans le pays des munitions et du matériel de guerre.

ARTICLE 7.

Dès la conclusion de la présente convention les états-majors des armées roumano-russes, ainsi que l'état-major des armées de Salonique, se mettront d'accord pour établir les modalités de leur coopération.

L'accord, pendant les opérations militaires des armées roumano-russes, ou tout changement, éclaircissement et supplément en vue d'une liaison permanente, s'établira au quartier général respectif, ainsi qu'il sera dit ci-dessous.

ARTICLE 8.

La coopération des armées alliées n'implique pas la subordination d'une des parties contractantes à l'autre; elle n'implique que la libre acceptation des dispositions ou modifications dues à la situation générale, aux nécessités exigées par le but poursuivi et à la camaraderie d'armes.

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ARTICLE 9.

En principe, les troupes Royales roumaines et les troupes Impériales russes conserveront leur commandement propre, leur zone d'opérations distincte et une complète indépendance dans la conduite des opérations. La ligne de démarcation entre les deux armées passera de Dorna Vatra par la Bistritza et les vallées des rivières Chaio et Samesch à Debreczen. Le but principal de l'action roumaine, en tant que la situation militaire au sud du Danube le permettra, sera par la Transylvanie dans la direction Budapesth.

Les troupes russes prévues à l'article 3 destinées à coopérer avec l'armée roumaine, seront sous le commandement en chef de l'armée roumaine.

Au cas où le contingent des troupes russes opérant au sud du Danube serait considérablement augmenté de manière à être de force égale ou supérieure aux troupes roumaines avec lesquelles il coopérera, ce contingent pourra former, à la sortie du territoire roumain, une armée indépendante qui sera placée sous le commandement suprême russe. Dans ce cas, cette armée agissant hors du territoire roumain devra avoir une zone d'opérations distincte et sera conduite d'après les directions du commandement suprême russe, tout en se conformant entièrement aux plans des deux quartiers généraux sur les bases établies ci-dessus.

Si, en vue du but poursuivi, des opérations militaires avec des forces combinées roumano-russes devraient avoir lieu, le commandement de ces forces serait indiqué par la zone respective d'opérations. Tous les ordres et instructions relatifs à la conduite de ces opérations seront rédigés en roumain et en russe.

ARTICLE 10.

En principe, dans le territoire national, aussi bien que dans le territoire occupé par l'armée de l'une des parties contractantes, les armées de l'autre partie contractante ne pourront y pénétrer que si l'intérêt général et le but commun le réclamaient et avec le consentement écrit et préalable pour chaque cas particulier.

ARTICLE 11.

Chaque fois qu'au cours des opérations les armées alliées se trouveront dans la nécessité, pour le transport des troupes, provisions et fournitures militaires, d'user d'une ou plusieurs voies ferrées sur le territoire de l'Etat allié, l'utilisation sera établie pour chaque cas particulier par les délégués des grands quartiers généraux alliés.

L'administration, l'organisation des transports et l'approvisionnement avec les ressources locales incomberont dans tous les cas aux autorités territoriales.

ARTICLE 12.

Les prisonniers, le butin de guerre et les trophées pris par l'une des armées lui appartiendront.

Le butin de guerre pris dans des combats en commun et sur le même champ de bataille sera partagé proportionnellement aux effectifs qui y auront pris part. Toutefois, afin de faciliter l'approvisionnement de l'armée roumaine, le commandement Impérial russe cédera à celle-ci le matériel de guerre et les munitions compris dans ce butin mixte dont elle aura un besoin urgent.

ARTICLE 13.


Pour coordonner les actions des armées roumaines, russes et alliées et pour atteindre plus sûrement les buts militaires, un représentant de l'armée roumaine, aidé si nécessaire d'un certain nombre d'officiers adjoints, doit se trouver aux quartiers généraux russe et allié au moment de l'ouverture des opérations militaires roumaines. De même, les représentants des armées russe et alliées et leurs adjoints doivent se trouver au quartier général de l'armée roumaine.

Les quartiers généraux des armées coopérantes doivent se renseigner mutuellement et en temps utile sur les conjectures militaires, la répartition des forces et la marche des opérations.

ARTICLE 14.

Si, au cours des opérations, il survenait des situations exigeant la prise de mesures nouvelles et soulevant des questions non prévues dans la présente convention, toutes


أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٩و]
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SECRET.



[87247]

Memorandum communicated by Sir M. Sykes, May 8, 1916.

M. GEORGES PICOT returned from Petrograd on Friday, the 5th, having concluded with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the business which was committed to him by the French Government relative to the Arab question.

The following are the letters which were mutually exchanged between M. Paléologue and M. Sazonof:—

(1.)

M. Sazonof, *Ministre des Affaires Étrangères*, à M. Paléologue, *Ambassadeur de France en Russie*.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Pétrograd, le 26 avril, 1916.

En me référant aux aide-mémoire adressés par le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères à l'Ambassade de France en date du 4/17 et 8/21 mars, année courante, j'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Excellence qu'à la suite des entretiens que j'ai eus avec M. Georges Picot, délégué spécial du Gouvernement français, relativement à la reconnaissance de l'accord qui serait établi entre la France et l'Angleterre pour la constitution d'un État ou d'une fédération d'États arabes et à l'attribution des territoires de la Syrie, de la Cilicie et de la Mésopotamie, le Gouvernement Impérial est prêt à sanctionner l'arrangement établi sur les bases qui lui ont été indiquées aux conditions suivantes:

1. La Russie annexerait les régions d'Erzeroum, de Trébizonde, de Van et de Bitlis, jusqu'à un point à déterminer sur le littoral de la mer Noire à l'ouest de Trébizonde;

2. La région du Kourdistan située au sud de Van et de Bitlis entre Mouch, Sert, le cours du Tigre, Djeziret-ibn-Omar, la ligne de faîtes des montagnes qui dominant Amadia, et la région de Mergavar serait cédée à la Russie, qui, en revanche, reconnaîtrait à la France la propriété du territoire compris entre l'Ala Dagh, Césarée, l'Ak Dagh, l'Yildiz Dagh, Zara, Eghin et Kharpout. En outre, à partir de la région de Mergavar, la frontière de l'Arabie suivrait la ligne de faîtes des montagnes qui limitent actuellement les territoires ottoman et persan. Ces limites sont indiquées d'une manière générale et sous réserve des modifications de détail à proposer par la Commission de Délimitation qui se réunira ultérieurement sur les lieux.

Le Gouvernement Impérial consent, en outre, à admettre que dans toutes les parties du territoire ottoman ainsi cédées à la Russie les concessions de chemins de fer et autres accordées à des Français par le Gouvernement ottoman seront maintenues. Si le Gouvernement Impérial exprime le désir qu'elles soient modifiées ultérieurement en vue de les mettre en harmonie avec les lois de l'Empire, cette modification aura lieu d'accord avec le Gouvernement de la République.

En ce qui concerne les institutions, administrations, établissements religieux, scolaires, hospitaliers, &c., relevant des deux nations, ils continueraient à jouir des privilèges qui leur étaient accordés jusqu'ici par les traités, accords et contrats conclus avec le Gouvernement ottoman. Il demeure, toutefois, entendu qu'en stipulant une telle réserve les deux Gouvernements n'ont pas voulu exiger pour l'avenir le maintien des droits de juridiction, du protectorat religieux et des Capitulations dans les régions qui seraient ainsi annexées à la Russie et à la France, mais seulement assurer la survivance des institutions et établissements actuellement existant et ouvrir la voie, après la conclusion de la paix, à une négociation entre les deux Puissances.

Enfin, les deux Gouvernements admettent en principe que chacun des États qui annexerait des territoires turcs devrait participer au service de la Dette ottomane.

Veuillez, &c.
SAZONOF.

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(2.)

M. Paléologue, Ambassadeur de France en Russie, à M. Sazonof, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

Ambassade de France en Russie, Pétersbourg,
le 26 avril, 1916.

M. le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de la communication que votre Excellence m'a adressée à la date de ce jour, relativement à la reconnaissance par le Gouvernement Impérial, aux conditions suivantes, de l'accord qui serait établi entre la France et l'Angleterre pour constituer un État ou une fédération des États arabes et assurer l'attribution des territoires de la Syrie, de la Cilicie et de la Mésopotamie sur les bases qui lui ont été indiquées par le délégué spécial du Gouvernement français. De son côté, le Gouvernement de la République m'a chargé de vous faire connaître qu'il a décidé de sanctionner l'arrangement dont il s'agit :

1. La Russie annexerait les régions d'Erzeroum, de Trébizonde, de Van et de Bitlis jusqu'à un point à déterminer sur le littoral de la mer Noire à l'ouest de Trébizonde ;

2. La région du Kourdistan située au sud de Van et de Bitlis entre Mouch, Sert, le cours du Tigre, Djeziret-ibn-Omar, la ligne de fautes des montagnes qui dominent Amadia et la région de Mergavar serait cédée à la Russie, qui, en revanche, attribuerait à la France les territoires compris entre l'Ala Dagh, Césarée, l'Ala Dagh, l'Yildiz Dagh, Zara, Eghin et Kharpout. En outre, à partir de la région de Mergavar, la frontière de l'Arabie suivrait la ligne de fautes des montagnes qui limitent actuellement les territoires ottoman et persan. Ces limites sont indiquées d'une manière générale et sous réserve des modifications de détail à proposer par la Commission de Délimitation qui se réunira ultérieurement sur les lieux.


Le Gouvernement de la République prend acte avec satisfaction de ce que le Gouvernement Impérial consent, en outre, à admettre que dans toutes les parties du territoire ottoman ainsi cédées à la Russie les concessions de chemins de fer et autres accordées à des Français par le Gouvernement ottoman seront maintenues. Si le Gouvernement Impérial exprime le désir qu'elles soient modifiées ultérieurement en vue de les mettre en harmonie avec les lois de l'Empire, cette modification aurait lieu d'accord avec le Gouvernement de la République.

En ce qui concerne les institutions, administrations, établissements religieux, scolaires, hospitaliers, &c., relevant des deux nations, ils continueront à jouir des privilèges qui leur étaient accordés jusqu'ici par les traités, accords et contrats conclus avec le Gouvernement ottoman. Il demeure, toutefois, entendu qu'en stipulant une telle réserve les deux Gouvernements n'ont pas voulu exiger pour l'avenir le maintien des droits de juridiction, du protectorat religieux et des Capitulations dans les régions qui seraient ainsi annexées à la Russie et à la France, mais seulement assurer la survivance des institutions et établissements actuellement existant et ouvrir la voie, après la conclusion de la paix, à une négociation dont l'amitié des deux pays ne permet pas de mettre en doute l'heureuse solution.

Enfin, les deux Gouvernements admettent en principe que chacun des États qui annexerait des territoires turcs devrait participer au service de la Dette ottomane.

Veuillez, &c.,
PALÉOLOGUE.

أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و١١]
(١٧٠/٢١)



[88317]

M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 9 mai, 1916.

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

DÉSIREUX d'entrer dans les vues du Gouvernement du Roi et de chercher à détacher les Arabes des Turcs en facilitant la création d'un État ou d'une confédération d'États arabes, le Gouvernement de la République avait accepté l'invitation qui lui avait été adressée par le Cabinet britannique en vue de fixer les limites de cet État et des régions syriennes où les intérêts français sont prédominants.

À la suite des conférences qui ont eu lieu à ce sujet à Londres et des pourparlers qui se sont poursuivis à Pétrograd un accord s'est établi. J'ai été chargé de faire connaître à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français accepte les limites telles qu'elles ont été fixées sur les cartes signées par Sir Mark Sykes et M. Georges Picot, ainsi que les conditions diverses formulées au cours de ces discussions.

Il demeure donc entendu que :

1. La France et la Grande-Bretagne sont disposées à reconnaître et à soutenir un État arabe indépendant ou une confédération d'États arabes dans les zones (A) et (B), indiquées sur la carte ci-jointe, sous la suzeraineté d'un chef arabe. Dans la zone (A) la France, et dans la zone (B) la Grande-Bretagne, auront un droit de priorité sur les entreprises et les emprunts locaux. Dans la zone (A) la France, et dans la zone (B) la Grande-Bretagne, seront seules à fournir des conseillers ou des fonctionnaires étrangers à la demande de l'État arabe ou de la confédération d'États arabes.

2. Dans la zone bleue la France, et dans la zone rouge la Grande-Bretagne, seront autorisées à établir telle administration directe ou indirecte ou tel contrôle qu'elles désirent et qu'elle jugeront convenable d'établir après entente avec l'État ou la confédération d'États arabes.

3. Dans la zone jaune sera établie une administration internationale, dont la forme devra être décidée après consultation avec la Russie, et ensuite d'accord avec les autres Alliés et les représentants du Chérif de La Mecque.

4. Il sera accordé à la Grande-Bretagne : (1) les ports de Caïfa et d'Acre ; (2) la garantie d'une quantité définie d'eau du Tigre et de l'Euphrate dans la zone (A) pour la zone (B). Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, de son côté, s'engage à n'entreprendre à aucun moment des négociations en vue de la cession de Chypre à une tierce Puissance sans le consentement préalable du Gouvernement français.

5. Alexandrette sera un port franc en ce qui concerne le commerce de l'Empire britannique, et il ne sera pas établi de différence de traitement dans les droits de ports, ni d'avantages particuliers refusés à la marine ou aux marchandises anglaises ; il y aura libre transit pour les marchandises anglaises par Alexandrette et par chemin de fer à travers la zone bleue, que ces marchandises soient destinées à la zone rouge, la zone (B), la zone (A), ou en proviennent ; et aucune différence de traitement ne sera établie directement ou indirectement au dépens des marchandises anglaises sur quelque chemin de fer que ce soit comme au dépens de marchandises ou de navires anglais dans tout port desservant les zones mentionnées.

Caïfa sera un port franc en ce qui concerne le commerce de la France, de ses colonies et de ses protectorats, et il n'y aura ni différence de traitement ni avantage dans les droits de port qui puisse être refusé à la marine et aux marchandises françaises. Il y aura libre transit pour les marchandises françaises par Caïfa et par le chemin de fer anglais à travers la zone jaune, que ces marchandises soient en provenance ou à destination de la zone bleue, de la zone (A) ou de la zone (B) ; et il n'y aura aucune différence de traitement directe ou indirecte au dépens des marchandises françaises sur quelque chemin de fer que ce soit comme au dépens des marchandises ou des navires français dans quelque port que ce soit desservant les zones mentionnées.

6. Dans la zone (A), le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad ne sera pas prolongé vers le sud au delà de Mossoul, et dans la zone (B) vers le nord au delà de Samarra, jusqu'à ce qu'un chemin de fer reliant Bagdad à Alep dans la vallée de l'Euphrate ait été terminé, et cela seulement avec le concours des deux Gouvernements.

7. La Grande-Bretagne aura le droit de construire, d'administrer et d'être seule propriétaire d'un chemin de fer reliant Caïfa avec la zone (B), et elle aura, en outre,

[462—5]

أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [١١ظ]
(١٧٠/٢٢)

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un droit perpétuel de transporter ses troupes, en tout temps, le long de cette ligne. Il doit être entendu par les deux Gouvernements que ce chemin de fer doit faciliter la jonction de Bagdad et de Caïfa, et il est, de plus, entendu que, si les difficultés techniques et les dépenses encourues pour l'entretien de cette ligne de jonction dans la zone jaune en rendent l'exécution impraticable, le Gouvernement français sera disposé à envisager que ladite ligne puisse traverser le polygone Barries-Keis Maril-Silbrad-Tel Hotsda-Mesuire avant d'atteindre la zone (B).

8. Pour une période de vingt ans les tarifs douaniers turcs resteront en vigueur dans toute l'étendue des zones bleue et rouge aussi bien que dans les zones (A) et (B), et aucune augmentation dans les taux des droits ou changement des droits *ad valorem* en droits spécifiques ne pourra être faite si ce n'est avec le consentement des deux Puissances.

Il n'y aura pas de douanes intérieures entre aucune des zones ci-dessus mentionnées. Les droits de douanes prélevables sur les marchandises destinées à l'intérieur seront exigés aux ports d'entrée et transmis à l'administration de la zone destinataire.

9. Il sera entendu que le Gouvernement français n'entreprendra, à aucun moment, aucune négociation pour la cession de ses droits, et ne cédera les droits qu'il possédera dans la zone bleue à aucune autre tierce Puissance, si ce n'est l'État ou la confédération d'États arabes, sans l'agrément préalable du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, qui, de son côté, donnera une assurance semblable au Gouvernement français en ce qui concerne la zone rouge.

10. Les Gouvernements anglais et français se mettront d'accord pour ne pas acquérir, et ne consentiront pas qu'une tierce Puissance acquière, de possessions territoriales dans la péninsule arabique ou construise une base navale dans les îles sur la côte est de la mer Rouge. Ceci, toutefois, n'empêchera pas telle rectification de la frontière d'Aden qui pourra être jugée nécessaire, par suite de la récente agression des Turcs.

11. Les négociations avec les Arabes pour les frontières de l'État ou de la confédération d'États arabes continueront par les mêmes voies que précédemment aux noms des deux Puissances.


12. Il est entendu, en outre, que des mesures de contrôle pour l'importation des armes sur le territoire arabe seront envisagées par les deux Gouvernements.

Je serais obligé à votre Excellence, au cas où ces conditions auraient l'agrément du Gouvernement du Roi, de vouloir bien me le faire connaître.


Veillez, &c.

PAUL CAMBON.


أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [١٢ و]
(١٧٠/٢٣)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [١٢ظ]
(١٧٠/٢٤)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [١٣ و]
(١٧٠/٢٥)



[92559]

M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 16.)

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 15 mai, 1916.*

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

PAR sa communication de ce jour votre Excellence m'a exprimé le désir, avant de répondre à ma lettre en date du 9 de ce mois relative à la création d'un État arabe, de recevoir l'assurance que dans les régions qui deviendront françaises ou dans celles où les intérêts français seraient prédominants, les concessions et droits de navigation, ainsi que les droits et privilèges de tous les établissements religieux, scolaires et médicaux britanniques, seraient maintenus. Il serait entendu, par contre, que les mêmes droits seraient reconnus à la France par le Gouvernement du Roi dans la sphère dévolue à l'Angleterre.


J'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français est prêt à sanctionner les diverses concessions britanniques ayant date certaine antérieure à la guerre dans les régions qui lui seraient attribuées ou qui relèveraient de son action. Quant aux établissements médicaux, scolaires ou religieux, ils continueraient à fonctionner comme par le passé, étant entendu toutefois qu'une telle réserve ne comporte pas le maintien des droits de juridiction et des capitulations dans ces territoires.

Veillez, &c.
PAUL CAMBON.


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أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [١٣ظ]
(١٧٠/٢٦)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [١٤ و]
(١٧٠/٢٧)



[87247]

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

(Secret.)

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, May 16, 1916.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 9th instant, stating that the French Government accept the limits of a future Arab State, or Confederation of States, and of those parts of Syria where French interests predominate, together with certain conditions attached thereto, such as they result from recent discussions in London and Petrograd on the subject.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency in reply that the acceptance of the whole project, as it now stands, will involve the abdication of considerable British interests, but, since His Majesty's Government recognise the advantage to the general cause of the Allies entailed in producing a more favourable internal political situation in Turkey, they are ready to accept the arrangement now arrived at, provided that the co-operation of the Arabs is secured, and that the Arabs fulfil the conditions and obtain the towns of Homs, Hama, Damascus, and Aleppo.

It is accordingly understood between the French and British Governments—

1. That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States in the areas (a) and (b) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (a) France, and in area (b) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (a) France, and in area (b) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.

2. That in the blue area France, and in the red area Great Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.

3. That in the brown area there shall be established an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other Allies, and the representatives of the Shereef of Mecca.

4. That Great Britain be accorded (1) the ports of Haifa and Acre, (2) guarantee of a given supply of water from the Tigris and Euphrates in area (a) for area (b). His Majesty's Government, on their part, undertake that they will at no time enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus to any third Power without the previous consent of the French Government.

5. That Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade of the British Empire, and that there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards British shipping and British goods; that there shall be freedom of transit for British goods through Alexandretta and by railway through the blue area, whether those goods are intended for or originate in the red area, or (b) area, or area (a); and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against British goods on any railway or against British goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

That Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her dominions and protectorates, and there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards French shipping and French goods. There shall be freedom of transit for French goods through Haifa and by the British railway through the brown area, whether those goods are intended for or originate in the blue area, area (a), or area (b), and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against French goods on any railway, or against French goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.


6. That in area (a) the Bagdad Railway shall not be extended southwards beyond Mosul, and in area (b) northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Bagdad with Aleppo via the Euphrates Valley has been completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two Governments.

7. That Great Britain has the right to build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway connecting Haifa with area (b), and shall have a perpetual right to transport troops along such a line at all times.

It is to be understood by both Governments that this railway is to facilitate the connection of Bagdad with Haifa by rail, and it is further understood that, if the engineering difficulties and expense entailed by keeping this connecting line in the

[462-8]

أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [١٥ و]
(١٧٠/٢٩)



[93696]

Sir Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff.

(Secret.)

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, May 23, 1916.

I HAVE received from the French Ambassador in London copies of the notes exchanged between the Russian and French Governments on the 26th ultimo, by which your Excellency's Government recognise, subject to certain conditions, the arrangement made between Great Britain and France, relative to the constitution of an Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States, and to the partition of the territories of Syria, Cilicia, and Mesopotamia, provided that the co-operation of the Arabs is secured.

His Majesty's Government take act with satisfaction that your Excellency's Government concur in the limits set forth in that arrangement, and I have now the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government, on their part, in order to make the arrangement complete, are also prepared to recognise the conditions formulated by the Russian Government and accepted by the French Government in the notes exchanged at Petrograd on the 26th ultimo.

In so far, then, as these arrangements directly affect the relations of Russia and Great Britain, I have the honour to invite the acquiescence of your Excellency's Government in an agreement on the following terms:—

1. That Russia shall annex the regions of Erzeroum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis, up to a point subsequently to be determined on the littoral of the Black Sea to the west of Trebizond.

2. That the region of Kurdistan to the south of Van and of Bitlis between Mush, Sert, the course of the Tigris, Jezireh-ben-Omar, the crest-line of the mountains which dominate Amadia, and the region of Merga Var, shall be ceded to Russia; and that starting from the region of Merga Var, the frontier of the Arab State shall follow the crest-line of the mountains which at present divide the Ottoman and Persian Dominions. These boundaries are indicated in a general manner and are subject to modifications of detail to be proposed later by the Delimitation Commission which shall meet on the spot.

3. That the Russian Government undertake that, in all parts of the Ottoman territories thus ceded to Russia, any concessions accorded to British subjects by the Ottoman Government shall be maintained. If the Russian Government express the desire that such concessions should later be modified in order to bring them into harmony with the laws of the Russian Empire, this modification shall only take place in agreement with the British Government.


4. That in all parts of the Ottoman territories thus ceded to Russia, existing British rights of navigation and development, and the rights and privileges of any British religious, scholastic, or medical institutions shall be maintained. His Majesty's Government, on their part, undertake that similar Russian rights and privileges shall be maintained in those regions which, under the conditions of this agreement, become entirely British, or in which British interests are recognised as predominant.

5. The two Governments admit in principle that every State which annexes any part of the Ottoman Empire is called upon to participate in the service of the Ottoman Debt.


I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[462-9]


أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [١٥ظ]
(١٧٠/٣٠)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [١٦و]
(١٧٠/٣١)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [ظ١٦]
(١٧٠/٣٢)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [١٧ و]
(١٧٠/٣٣)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [١٧ظ]
(١٧٠/٣٤)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [١٨ و]
(١٧٠/٣٥)

[180511]

Count Benckendorff to Viscount Grey.—(Received September 1.)

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 1^{er} septembre, 1916.

M. le Vicomte,

PAR une note en date du 23 mai, année courante, votre Seigneurie a bien voulu m'informer qu'elle avait reçu de l'Ambassadeur de France à Londres une copie des notes échangées, le 26 avril, année courante, entre les Gouvernements français et russe, par lesquelles le Gouvernement Impérial accepte, à certaines conditions, l'arrangement conclu entre la Grande-Bretagne et la France relativement à la création d'un Etat ou d'une confédération d'États arabes, ainsi qu'au partage des territoires de la Syrie, la Cilicie et la Mésopotamie, pourvu que la coopération des Arabes soit assurée.

En outre, votre Seigneurie a bien voulu ajouter que le Gouvernement Royal est disposé, en vue de rendre l'arrangement complet, à reconnaître les conditions formulées par le Gouvernement Impérial et acceptées par le Gouvernement français dans les notes échangées à Pétersbourg le 26 avril, 1916.

J'ai, en conséquence, l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Seigneurie que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et le Gouvernement Impérial sont tombés d'accord sur les points suivants :

1. La Russie annexera les régions d'Erzeroum, Trébizonde, Van et Bitlis jusqu'à un point sur le littoral de la mer Noire à l'ouest de Trébizonde à déterminer ultérieurement.

2. La région du Kurdistan au sud de Van et Bitlis comprise entre Much, Sert, le cours du Tigre, Jesireh-ben-Omar, la ligne des montagnes dominant Amadia et la région de Merga Var, sera cédée à la Russie. A partir de la région de Merga Var, la frontière de l'État arabe suivra la ligne des montagnes divisant actuellement les territoires ottomans et persans. Les frontières susmentionnées sont indiquées d'une manière générale et sont sujettes à des modifications de détail devant être proposées ultérieurement par la Commission de Délimitation qui se réunira sur les lieux.

3. Le Gouvernement Impérial consent de maintenir dans toutes les parties du territoire ottoman ainsi cédées à la Russie toutes concessions accordées par le Gouvernement ottoman aux sujets britanniques. Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Impérial exprimerait le désir que ces concessions soient modifiées ultérieurement dans le but de les faire concorder avec les exigences des lois russes, cette modification aura lieu d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique.

4. Dans toutes les parties des territoires ottomans ainsi cédées à la Russie, les droits existants de navigation et les concessions diverses consenties au Gouvernement britannique, ainsi que les droits et privilèges des institutions religieuses, scolaires et médicales britanniques, devront être maintenus. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique reconnaît, de son côté, que les droits et privilèges similaires reconnus à la Russie dans les territoires attribués en toute souveraineté à la Grande-Bretagne ou dans lesquels les intérêts britanniques sont reconnus comme prédominants par le présent arrangement devront être maintenus.

Toutefois, je suis chargé de formuler la réserve suivante: Les avantages consentis par cet article, affectant la législation de l'Empire en matière de cabotage, législation qui a déjà donné lieu à des réserves spéciales dans plusieurs traités internationaux conclus entre la Russie et diverses autres Puissances, cette question ne saurait, dans l'opinion du Gouvernement Impérial, être préjugée dès maintenant, mais elle pourra être soumise ultérieurement à l'amical examen des deux Puissances en vue d'arriver à une solution satisfaisante pour l'une et pour l'autre.


5. Les deux Gouvernements admettent le principe que chaque État annexant une partie quelconque de l'Empire ottoman sera tenu de participer au service de la dette ottomane.

C'est avec la plus haute considération, &c.


BENCKENDORFF.

[462—12]


أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [١٨ظ]
(١٧٠/٣٦)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و١٩]
(١٧٠/٣٧)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [١٩ ظ]
(١٧٠/٣٨)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و٢٠]
(١٧٠/٣٩)



This Document is the Property of
His Britannic Majesty's Government.)

MEMORANDUM by Sir M. Sykes.

EASTERN COMMITTEE.

I have the honour to report on my private and personal conference with Monsieur Georges Picot.


We reviewed the whole of the situation as it now stands in regard to the Anglo-French Agreement 1916. I pointed out to Monsieur Georges Picot that the original situation had been profoundly affected by the exit of Russia, the entrance of the United States and the accentuation of the Democratic nature of allied War Aims in general.

Monsieur Picot gave it as his opinion that the Agreement could not be abolished, as such an act would raise violent opposition and ill feeling among the Colonials in France, and would give great strength to the financial pro-Turkish elements both of which would be most fatal developments, and helpful to the enemy. In this I agree and consider that to resuscitate anti-British feeling and pave the way for Pro-Turkistan would be a double mistake.

However I pressed upon Mons. Picot that there were three aspects from which the Agreement could be regarded as doing positive harm.

- I. That the Agreement was regarded by the Democratic forces of the Entente as an instrument of Capitalistic exploitation and Imperialistic aggression.
- II. That the Agreement had had a very unsettling effect on the Arab speaking peoples, giving them/

أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [ظ٢٠]
(١٧٠/٤٠)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و٢١]
(١٧٠/٤١)

٢١
them the impression that we were intent upon annexation.

III That the agreement could be construed in a sense quite contrary to President Wilson's policy.

To this Monsieur Picot agreed and after some discussion and careful examination, we jointly drew up the two enclosed papers.

The paper A. is suggested as a method of dealing directly with the Arab difficulty. I submit it for careful consideration, it is susceptible of amendment but I think that if in substance it is presented to the King of Hejaz and the main lines of it indicated when and where occasion required, our position vis-à-vis the arabic speaking peoples will be improved, and we shall be rid of a constantly recurring difficulty.

I do not believe we are sacrificing anything by making such a declaration, and it is in fact only slightly different from one which His Majesty's Government made to the Arab memorialists.


If we come out with such a declaration the way would be open to begin to pull the Arabic-speaking peoples together for common action and would dispel for good and all the idea that we are endeavouring to secure Syria as a French Colony.

Further such a declaration puts an end to the possibility of any further capital being made by the enemy on the lines of Jemall Pasha's speech. At the same time it will be seen that we in no way commit ourselves to any idea of a Pan-Arab Empire which is so detestable to Syrians and others and makes the King of Hejaz's cause less popular than it would otherwise be.


The/

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أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٢١ظ]
(١٧٠/٤٢)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و٢٢]
(١٧٠/٤٣)



22

The paper B. is designed to clarify the position of the two Powers in regard to the oppressed peoples of the Ottoman Empire. If such an exchange of views were made, we should then have a logical basis for our future policy. This paper divorces our policy from any charge of Imperialism, and would enable Ministers to give satisfactory answers to questions which are continually being put but are not susceptible of satisfactory reply.

There is a very strong opinion amongst the pro-gression and democratic elements of the Entente that the Turkish problem must be solved, but these same elements hold equally strongly that the solution must not be on an Imperialistic basis.


If the two Governments exchange views in the sense of Paper B. I believe that they will find themselves in accord with the views of the mass of the people. I further submit that if the existing Agreement is subject to the principles enunciated in Paper B. it is no longer objectionable in a Democratic sense. It would be acceptable certainly to the people most intimately concerned viz: the oppressed peoples themselves, who desire liberation and assistance, not absorption and loss of nationality.

If these two papers are agreed to in substance I think that the original Agreement is robbed of most of its objections: our statesmen would have a very free hand in speech and action in regard to Turkish Armenian and Arab affairs.


July 3rd 1918.

22


أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٢٢ظ]
(١٧٠/٤٤)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و٢٣]
(١٧٠/٤٥)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [ظ٢٣]
(١٧٠/٤٦)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٢٤ و]
(١٧٠/٤٧)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [ظ٢٤]
(١٧٠/٤٨)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٢٥ و]
(١٧٠/٤٩)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٢٥ ظ]
(١٧٠/٥٠)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و٢٦]
(١٧٠/٥١)



EGYPT

MILITARY

Cypher telegram to Sir R. Wingate (Cairo).
Foreign Office, 11th June 1918. 7.p.m.
No. 753

Following is reply of His Majesty's Government
to memorial of Syrians in Egypt.

(R).


His Majesty's Government have considered the
memorial of the seven with the greatest care. His
Majesty's Government fully appreciate the reasons why
the memorialists desire to retain their anonymity, and
the fact that the memorial is anonymous has not in any
way detracted from the importance which His Majesty's
Government attribute to the document.

The areas mentioned in the memorandum fall
into four categories:-


1. Areas in Arabia which were free and independent
before the outbreak of war.
2. Areas emancipated from Turkish control by the
action of the Arabs themselves during the present war.
3. Areas formerly under Ottoman dominion, occu-
pied by the Allied forces during the present war.
4. Areas still under Turkish control. In regard
to the first two categories, His Majesty's Government
recognise the complete and sovereign independence of
the Arabs inhabiting these areas and support them in
their struggle for freedom.

In


أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٢٦ظ]
(١٧٠/٥٢)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٢٧ و]
(١٧٠/٥٣)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٢٧ظ]
(١٧٠/٥٤)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٢٨ و]
(١٧٠/٥٥)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [ظ٢٨]
(١٧٠/٥٦)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و٢٩]
(١٧٠/٥٧)




and in area (B) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States".

4. In Mr. Balfour's opinion the time has come for formally recognising the belligerent status of the friendly Arabs operating in the Palestine-Syrian theatre against the Turks.


(initialled) A.J.B.

Foreign Office,
September 24th. 1918.


أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [ظ٢٩]
(١٧٠/٥٨)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و٣٠]
(١٧٠/٥٩)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [ظ٣٠]
(١٧٠/٦٠)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٣١ و]
(١٧٠/٦١)

(b) Such European advisory staff and assistants as the Arab Government or Governments set up in Area A. may require under Clause 1 of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916.

(c) Such personnel as may be necessary for civil duties in the littoral towns or other parts of the Blue area.

Provided that these officers will hold their posts under the supreme authority of the Commander-in-Chief who is empowered to require the Chief Political Adviser to replace any advisory, administrative or liaison officer on grounds of competence, conduct or discipline.

4. The Chief Political Adviser will be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for Political relations in Area A. and for political relations and provisional civil administration in the Blue area.


5. The above arrangement shall remain in force until such time as the Military situation justifies reconsideration of the question of civil administration and political relations.

II. The British Representatives undertook that representations should at once be made to Sir E. Allenby with a view to his arranging that in any operations in the "Blue Area", a prominent place should be assigned to French Troops so far as military considerations permitted.


III. The Conference agree to recommend that the British and French Governments should take an early opportunity to issue a declaration, or declarations, defining their attitude towards the Arab territories liberated from Turkish rule. Such a declaration should make it clear that neither government has any intention of annexing any part of the Arab territories, but that in accordance with the provisions of the Anglo-French Agreement in 1916, both are determined to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State or Confederation of States, and with this view to lend their assistance in order to secure the effective administration of those territories under the authority of the native rulers and peoples.

Foreign Office,
September 30th, 1918.

أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٣١ظ]
(١٧٠/٦٢)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٣٢و]
(١٧٠/٦٣)



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~~SECRET~~

WAR CABINET.

EASTERN COMMITTEE.

B. 1v
A. 11

FRANCE - MILITARY.

E.C. 1835.

Cypher telegram to Lord Derby (Paris)

Foreign Office, October 8th 1918, 11.30 p.m.

No. 2116

Following for Lord Robert Cecil and Sir Mark Sykes from
Allenby to War Office dated October 6th No. 695 (BEGINS)
In continuation of No. 689.

The fact that Arab leaders are aware of assurances contained
in Foreign Office telegram 753 June 11th 1918 to High Commissioner
complicates position at Beirut; in this wire His Majesty's Government
recognised Native Army and sovereign of independent Arabs inhabiting
the areas emancipated from Turkish control by action of Arabs themselves
during present war. Concerning areas which Allied forces occupy His
Majesty's Government drew attention to proclamations issued on capture
of Baghdad and Jerusalem and added that future government of these re-
gions would be based principally on consent of those governed. I was
not consulted before this assurance was given. Further, Arab leaders
have never been officially notified of terms of Anglo-French Agreement.

Reproduced below for convenience of reference :-

EGYPT.

MILITARY.

E.C. 529.

Cypher telegram to Sir R. Wingate (Cairo)

Foreign Office, 11th June, 1918, 7 p.m.


No. 753.

Your despatch No. 90 (of May 7th - Syrian Moslem opinion in
Egypt).

Following is reply of His Majesty's Government to memorial
of Syrians in Egypt. Text begins. (Beginning of R).

His Majesty's Government have considered the memorial of
the seven with the greatest care. His Majesty's Government fully
appreciate the reasons why the memorialists desire to retain their
anonymity, and the fact that the memorial is anonymous has not in any
way detracted from the importance which His Majesty's Government attri-
bute to the document.

أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٣٢ظ]
(١٧٠/٦٤)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٣٣و]
(١٧٠/٦٥)

The areas mentioned in the memorandum fall into four categories :-

1. Areas in Arabia which were free and independent before the outbreak of war.
2. Areas emancipated from Turkish control by the action of the Arabs themselves during the present war;
3. Areas formerly under Ottoman dominion occupied by the Allied forces during the present war.
4. Areas still under Turkish control. In regard to the first two categories, His Majesty's Government recognise the complete and sovereign independence of the Arabs inhabiting these areas and support them in their struggle for freedom.

In regard to the areas occupied by Allied forces, His Majesty's Government draw the attention of the memorialists to the texts of the proclamations issued respectively by the General Officers Commanding in Chief on the taking of Baghdad () and Jerusalem (). These proclamations embody the policy of His Majesty's Government towards the inhabitants of those regions. It is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that the future Government of these regions should be based upon the principle of the consent of the Governed and this policy has and will continue to have the support of His Majesty's Government.

In regard to the areas mentioned in the fourth category, it is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that the oppressed peoples of these areas should obtain their freedom and independence and towards the achievement of this object His Majesty's Government continue to labour.

His Majesty's Government are fully aware of, and take into consideration, the difficulties and dangers which beset those who work for the regeneration of the populations of the areas specified.

In spite, however, of these obstacles His Majesty's Government trust and believe that they can and will be overcome, and wish to give all support to those who desire to overcome them. They are prepared to consider any scheme of co-operation which is compatible with existing military operations and consistent with the political principles of His Majesty's Government and the Allies.

(End of R.)

Text ends.


You should request Syrians to treat matter as confidential. Please report how reply is received by memorialists.

(12.6. 8-4).

(2)


33

أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٣٣ظ]
(١٧٠/٦٦)




His
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
أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية ساكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٣٤ و]
(١٧٠/٦٧)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٣٤ظ]
(١٧٠/٦٨)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٣٥ و]
(١٧٠/٦٩)



text, which I have the honour accordingly to
transmit herewith, will meet with Your Excellency's
acceptance and receive the approval of the French
Government.

I would add that it appears desirable, in the eyes
of His Majesty's Government, that the text of the
proposed declaration should be brought to the notice of
President Wilson for his information before it is
actually published. If the French Government agree
with this view, I am ready on hearing from Your Excellency
to this effect, to send the necessary telegraphic
instruction to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington.


We will also send a copy of the declaration
to the Italian Government.

I have, &c.,


(Signed) Arthur James Balfour.

* Already circulated.


أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٣٥ظ]
(١٧٠/٧٠)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و٣٦]
(١٧٠/٧١)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٣٦ظ]
(١٧٠/٧٢)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٣٧ و]
(١٧٠/٧٣)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٣٧ظ]
(١٧٠/٧٤)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٣٨ و]
(١٧٠/٧٥)



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
We will also send a copy of the declaration to the Italian Government.

I have, &c.,


(Signed) Arthur James Balfour.

** Already circulated.*


أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٣٨ظ]
(١٧٠/٧٦)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٣٩ و]
(١٧٠/٧٧)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٣٩ظ]
(١٧٠/٧٨)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و٤٠]
(١٧٠/٧٩)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٤٠ظ]
(١٧٠/٨٠)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و٤١]
(١٧٠/٨١)



l'éventualité en décidant de communiquer leur accord
au Président Wilson.

Mais le Gouvernement de la République estime que
les accords aux bases desquelles la France et la Grande
Bretagne ont mis leur signature restent bons et valables
jusqu'à nouvel ordre; ils sont le terme de négociations
et d'engagements fondés sur la reconnaissance des
aspirations respectives des deux pays dans des régions
où ils ont eu de tout temps des clients, des intérêts
et des droits.

Résolu à soutenir les revendications britanniques,
qui figurent dans les ententes de 1916, le Gouvernement
Français compte sur un égal appui du Gouvernement
Britannique.

M. Pichon estime d'ailleurs que la Grande Bretagne
et la France, avant d'aborder une conversation avec leurs
Alliés, ont un intérêt commun à s'entendre entre elles
sur les mesures à prendre dans le Levant.

M. Paul Cambon saisit cette occasion pour renouveler
à Son Excellence M. Balfour les assurances de sa haute
considération.


AMBASSADE DE FRANCE

A LONDRES.


Albert Gate House

22 Octobre 1918.


أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٤١ظ]
(١٧٠/٨٢)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و٤٢]
(١٧٠/٨٣)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٢٤٤ظ]
(١٧٠/٨٤)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٤٣ و]
(١٧٠/٨٥)




General Allenby, the Commander-in-Chief.

3. Further, the agreement refers to "territory occupied or to be occupied" and not to Cilicia, as to which no question arises at present, since it has not been occupied and may not be occupied in the future; still less does the agreement refer to Palestine which is outside the area of special French interest.

4. While taking note with pleasure of the acceptance by the French Government of our proposal that fresh conversations on the subject of the territories comprised in the agreement of 1916 should take place between the Governments of France Italy, the United States and Great Britain, His Majesty's Government find the reference to "the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire" in this connection open to possible misconstruction. If it means, as it no doubt does, that the territory in which the Ottoman Turks unquestionably predominate may rightly be claimed by a Turkish Government, His Majesty's Government would in principle agree, but the phrase might convey the impression, far removed as I assume from the intentions of the French Government, that Turkish domination over other races, such as for instance, the Armenians, the Syrians and the Jews, was not to be entirely abolished, and to any policy of that kind the British Government would be as resolutely opposed as would doubtless be the French Government also.

5. We seek, as has often been said, a lasting peace and such a peace must be based not on any considerations of finance or political advantage for this or that Power,

أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٤٣ ظ]
(١٧٠/٨٦)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و٤٤]
(١٧٠/٨٧)

Power, but on the principle of giving to each people as far as possible the Government which is most in accord with its desires and most likely to secure for it stability and prosperity, having regard to all relevant historical, geographical and strategic considerations.

6. Finally, His Majesty's Government, though always ready and willing to discuss with the French Government with the frankness and cordiality which befit Allies all questions connected with the subject matter of these agreements, yet ventures to point out that our experience of 1916 indicates the disadvantages and dangers of any separate negotiations between France and Great Britain upon a subject which is of great interest and importance to their other Ally, Italy.


I have, &c.,

(Signed) R. Graham.


(For the Secretary of State)

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أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٤٤ ظ]
(١٧٠/٨٨)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و٤٥]
(١٧٠/٨٩)



This document is the property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

SECRET.

B.IV

Printed for the War Cabinet, November, 1918.

E.C. 2133

NOTE ON POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

A.—The victories of General Allenby, culminating in the capture of Aleppo and the consequent liberation of all Syria from Turkish domination, together with the apparent imminence of an armistice with Turkey, render it essential that the position of Great Britain in relation to Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia should be reviewed, and that a final decision should be reached as to the policy which should be adopted in those countries.

B.—The chief obstacle to a satisfactory solution of the problems presented, at least so far as Syria is concerned, consists in the attitude of the French. They are intensely jealous of any interference by third parties in that area, while their claims are based on sentiment rather than on any solid foundation, such as that of military conquest. That difficulties would arise with the French in the event of British troops invading Syria has been foreseen since the early days of the war, and it was for the purpose of providing some *modus vivendi* both then and when peace was declared that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was concluded in the Spring of 1916. It is doubtful if this Agreement could ever have been satisfactory at any rate, owing to its inherent faults and to the vastly altered circumstances of the present time, it has become not merely unsatisfactory but a positive source of danger, likely to lead to constant friction with France, and, not improbably, to an eventual rupture with that Power.

C.—The circumstances which have contributed most largely to the discrediting of the Sykes-Picot Agreement are the following:—


- (1.) The Arab revolt, which has led to the expulsion of the Turks from Hejaz, and has been an important factor in the deliverance of Syria from the Ottoman yoke.
- (2.) The conquest of Palestine and Syria by General Allenby with practically no military assistance from the French, but with important assistance from the Arabs.
- (3.) As a result of (1) and (2), the establishment of Feisal and an Arab administration in Damascus and other parts of Syria.
- (4.) The recognition of Zionism by the British Government.
- (5.) The revolution and subsequent, and still existing, anarchy in Russia.
- (6.) The further massacres of Armenians, which have greatly decreased the numbers of that people.
- (7.) The British conquest of Mesopotamia.
- (8.) The wave of democratic feeling which has passed over the world and which has expressed itself in the condemnation of secret diplomacy, and of Imperial aggression, and in the acceptance of the principle, so loudly voiced by President Wilson, of popular determination.
- (9.) The entry of the United States into the war.

D.—Every one of these circumstances has militated against the usefulness of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The Arab revolt and the Anglo-Arab conquest of Syria have converted an academic exercise into a treaty fraught with the gravest practical consequences. Not least among the factors now apparent is the intensity of the mistrust of the French evinced by the Arabs and their resentment against the administration of Arab districts by Frenchmen. The danger of the position produced by adherence to the terms of the 1916 Agreement is exemplified by General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Egypt's, telegram No. I. 7052 P., of the 26th October, relating to Feisal's objection to the Ottoman Kazas of Hasbeya Rasheya and Baalbek being placed under the French Chief Administrator.

E.—It seems unnecessary to elaborate this point any further, as for some months past the Eastern Committee has recognized the imperfections and dangers of the Agreement and has sought some means of cancelling it. It is suggested that the best means of achieving this result is through the intervention of President Wilson, whose principles are diametrically opposed to those of the Agreement. It will be by insisting

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
أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٤٦ و]
(١٧٠/٩١)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٤٦ ظ]
(١٧٠/٩٢)




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(١٧٠/٩٣)




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(١٧٠/٩٤)




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(١٧٠/٩٥)




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(١٧٠/٩٦)




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(١٧٠/٩٧)




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(١٧٠/٩٨)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٥٠] (١٧٠/٩٩)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٥٠ ظ]
(١٧٠/١٠٠)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٥١و]
(١٧٠/١٠١)



SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL

Q. 1.

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SYRIA TO THE
BRITISH EMPIRE.

NOTE.—Syria as at present constituted, in addition to the Eastern littoral of the Mediterranean, includes the vilayet of Aleppo with its sanjaks of Aleppo, Marash and Urfa. Presumably, on the formation of an Armenian State it will lose the sanjaks of Marash and Urfa.

1. Syria is at present militarily important because—

- (a.) It is an avenue of approach to the Suez Canal and Egypt.
(b.) It contains the Pilgrimage Railway.

2. From the first point of view, Syria is not of vital importance provided—

- (i.) The Power holding it is confined to the strip of territory between the eastern shore of the Mediterranean and the desert, and is not linked up politically with Anatolia and Armenia.
(ii.) Its local forces are dependent upon their own resources.

As regards 1 (b) above, its importance lies in the fact that the Hejaz Railway will always be a factor because the British Empire contains a large proportion of Mohammedan subjects.

3. Provided the political situation remains favourable in Arabia and in Egypt, and as long as Great Britain maintains command of the sea, and Syria has no political connection with a hinterland controlled by a great foreign power, the development of the country by her own population need not cause anxiety to the British General Staff.

4. If Syria is brought into political connection with Anatolia or Armenia under the control of a great foreign power or combination of powers the whole aspect changes. Syria would then become the potential conduit for converging currents from Constantinople and Caucasia, while any foreign power which is able to concentrate troops in the neighbourhood of Aleppo is in a position to contain and threaten British forces on the Suez Canal and in Mesopotamia with a single central force. The degree of danger would vary with the situation at Constantinople and in the Caucasus.

5. The political and military situation in Constantinople and the Caucasus, however, though important, is not finally determinative, for pre-war Turkish territory in Asia is capable of sufficient material and economic development to form a base of operations against British possessions in the East if too large a portion is allowed to fall into the hands of any great foreign power, and if the control of the upper reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates is compromised.

6. The conclusion from the above is that from the strategic point of view we should aim at a politically detached Syria under our influence which must be accompanied by the retention of Mohammedan goodwill.

The creation of a buffer Jewish State in Palestine, though this State will be weak in itself, is strategically desirable for Great Britain so long as it can be created without disturbing Mohammedan sentiment and is not controlled by a power which is potentially hostile to this country.


Finally it is difficult to see how any arrangement could be more objectionable from the military point of view than the Sykes—Picot Agreement of 1916, by which an enterprising and ambitious foreign power is placed on interior lines with reference to our position in the Middle East.

GENERAL STAFF,
WAR OFFICE,
9th December, 1918.

(B18/436) 150 12/18 H&S 6635wo

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أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٥١ ظ]
(١٧٠/١٠٢)



Correspondence
between
Clemens
and C.
Crane
(Mch
1918)

EXTRACT from the *Le Matin du 10 Décembre 1918.*

Correspondance
between MM.
Clemenceau
and Chekri-
Ganem
(Paris, 10th
December,
1918).

Un des problèmes de la paix

La question de la Syrie sera traitée
dans toute son ampleur au congrès

M. Clemenceau en donne l'assurance
à M. Chekri-Ganem

Le comité central syrien, dans une séance tenue le 11 novembre dernier, avait manifesté son inquiétude au sujet des accords conclus en 1916 entre la France et l'Angleterre, et relatifs à la Syrie. Il lui avait paru que ces traités envisageaient une sorte de partage de la Syrie, assez peu conforme au droit des nationalités ; le bruit ayant couru, en outre, que ces contrats interalliés avaient été renouvelés le 20 octobre dernier, les Syriens avaient appelé l'attention du président du conseil sur la nécessité de maintenir l'unité de la Syrie, dont la France fut à travers les siècles la grande éducatrice.

Cet appel n'est pas resté sans réponse. De la très intéressante lettre de M. Clemenceau, que nous reproduisons ci-dessous, il résulte : 1° que la France fait sa cause de la cause syrienne ; 2° que des accords passés jusqu'ici entre les alliés gardent un caractère transitoire ; 3° que les grands problèmes internationaux ne peuvent être résolus par des conventions particulières ou secrètes et qu'ils seraient posés et traités « dans toute leur ampleur au congrès de la paix ».

Paris, 6 décembre 1918.

Monsieur le président,

J'ai reçu communication de la motion votée par le comité central syrien, réuni sous votre présidence, le 11 novembre dernier, au sujet de la situation envisagée pour la Syrie dans l'accord provisoire franco-anglais.

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître que l'état de choses imposé par les circonstances et les diverses déclarations auxquelles se réfère le comité ont un caractère absolument transitoire, et que la question qui vous intéresse sera traitée dans toute son ampleur au congrès de la paix.

Je tiens, d'autre part, à vous donner l'assurance que le gouvernement de la République n'a, en aucune façon, perdu de vue, au cours du conflit actuel, l'action traditionnelle exercée par la France en faveur des nationalités opprimées de l'Asie-Mineure. Il est spécialement résolu à assurer, par ses propres soins, l'évolution de la Syrie, en particulier, vers une civilisation pacifique, et il défendra les intérêts de cette nation dans la plus large mesure possible devant les alliés.

G. CLEMENCEAU.

Au nom des Syriens morts pour la cause de la civilisation les Syriens vivants demandent un peu plus de liberté

Par la Suisse — comme avant l'occupation de la Syrie — une lettre me parvient vieille de cinquante jours. Elle m'apprend des horreurs et me donne des détails infiniment douloureux. D'une famille que je connais, composée de six membres, frères et sœurs, une jeune fille seule est vivante ou à peu près, si affaiblie par les privations !

Une autre lettre vient de Tripoli de Syrie. Elle est d'un Français bien placé pour voir et pour savoir, écrite avec des larmes de pitié et... de rage impuissante. Des cadavres de femmes, d'hommes, d'enfants calcinés dans les rues comme à Beyrouth, d'où ce Français arrivait, comme partout, particulièrement dans le Liban où, sur une population d'un peu moins de 400.000 habitants, on compte 280.000 morts de faim, littéralement de faim.

Les Allemands avaient dit qu'ils extermineraient les Syriens avant l'arrivée des Français. Les Anglais arrivèrent les premiers. Mais, sauf cette erreur, ils ont tenu parole.

Ainsi des nouvelles attendues — avec quelle angoisse ! — par les Syriens du dehors filèrent à travers le tamis serré des occupants. Il y a plus de deux mois que la vaillante armée anglaise est en Syrie. Et la Syrie reste aussi fermée, plus fermée parce que mieux surveillée, qu'au temps des Turcs en guerre.

Passeports pour y aller ? Impossible d'en obtenir pour un Syrien, eût-il les pattes les plus blanches du monde. Passeports pour en sortir ? Plus impossible encore. Pourquoi ? Le pays est-il en révolte ? Il n'en a ni la force ni le désir. Craint-on encore l'invasion du bolchevisme, apporté dans les bagages des Syriens ? Aucun d'eux n'y songe. Ce sont des populations amies.

Cette séquestration de tout un peuple sans exception dépasse l'entendement. Elle est plus que cruelle : elle n'a pas de sens.


N'était-on pas allé en Syrie pour battre l'ennemi commun et, du même coup, apporter aux Syriens avec la délivrance physique quelque liberté de respirer ? La délivrance est obtenue, si tant est qu'on puisse appeler délivrance le fait d'échapper à la mort. Quant à la liberté — je parle simplement de celle de se défendre un peu — il faut encore l'attendre. Quatre années de baigne, d'un martyre « comme on n'en peut se faire une idée en Europe », dit la lettre du Français, ce n'est donc pas suffisant ? Et pour quel crime ?

Je ne fais pas là de politique. Mais je ne peux pas ne pas demander aux généraux occupants — en l'espèce à nos amis Anglais, puisque c'est leur autorité qui s'exerce en Syrie — quelles sont les raisons, de quelque ordre qu'elles soient, qui nécessitent la mise en quarantaine de ce peuple à peine convalescent ?


Avec les Turcs, on avait le soulagement de se plaindre et d'attendrir l'Europe. Nous n'avons plus cette consolation...

Chekri Ganem.


أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٥٢ظ]
(١٧٠/١٠٤)



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(١٧٠/١٠٥)



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(١٧٠/١٠٧)

MEMORANDUM.


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The following notes on the situation in Syria merely express an opinion formed after two and a half years constant intercourse with Bedouin and settled Arabs of Arabia and from knowledge gathered from close personal acquaintance with the responsible Arab chiefs and the leading personnel both civil and military who carried on the Arab revolt up to the date of the armistice with Turkey, and who are now administering occupied enemy territory East, which comprises practically the whole of Syria. My position as O.C. Troops and Military Adviser to Emir Faisal during operations, and subsequently as Liason Officer between G.H.Q. and all Arab troops in Syria have afforded me many opportunities of obtaining some insight into Syrian & Arabian affairs.

The history of the revolt is already well known and therefore unnecessary to refer to in detail. The racial hatred existing between the Arabs & Turks, their mistrust in the Turkish government, and its unprogressive methods of administration as far as Arabs are concerned, formed the foundation. The Grand Sherif of Mecca and his sons, and supported by all the Bedouin tribes identified themselves as the leaders of the movement and with the consent of the allies rose in open revolt against Turkish authority over the people of Arabia. Extensive propaganda on Nationalist lines was permitted and encouraged and large subsidies provided by Great Britain to support the movement. The Prisoners of War camps in Egypt, India and elsewhere were searched by Arab Patriots and Propagandists with the result that some ten to fifteen thousand Arabs of all classes and Representation of Mesopotamia, Syria, Palastine & Khurdistan voluntarily offered their services to fight for the freedom of the nation against their oppressors. This fact cannot be lightly passed over, by taking up arms against Turkish authority they became traitors in the eyes of the law and subject to the extreme penalties, and

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


أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٥٥و]
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2.

is sufficient to show the depth of political feeling which existed and that no individual risk was too great to take for the National ideal for which they offered themselves. The actual result of the Arab military campaign can be briefly summarized. The regular Arab army, composed of ex-Turkish subjects assisted by the Bedouin Tribes, paid and equipped by Great Britain with the approval of the Allies and ably led by Emirs Faisal, Ali, Abdullah & Zaid, the four sons of the King of the Hedjaz, vindicated to the fullest extent their utility in the military operations which resulted in the complete overthrow of the Turks. Their casualties were heavy in comparison to the numbers, and their courage and endurance beyond all praise. The Arab Troops eventually marched into Damascus side by side with Allied Troops and in recognition of their great services the administration of occupied enemy territory E. was entrusted by the Commander in chief to Arab administration and the National flag was permitted to be flown in Damascus. Since the date of the signing of the armistice with Turkey a period of nine months has elapsed, during which time many new circumstances have arisen which are instrumental in raising much doubt in the minds of thinking Arabs as to the future of their country. Mesopotamia under a rigid Imperialistic control affords at present no field for Arab efforts of Administration. Efficiency and progress may be acknowledged but it was not for European efficiency and administration that many thousands of Mesopotamian Arabs joined the revolt amongst whom we find the leading personnel. The political and press rumours about the future of Palastine are disquieting as to whether this country is to form the future home of the Jewish race to the detriment of 80% of Moslin Arabs which at present go to make up the population. The political entente existing at the moment between Emir Faisal and the leaders of the Jewish movement is in my opinion an entirely false one. In the present ratio of

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3.


numbers the Arabs have nothing to fear from the Jews, but if Palestine is occupied as a National Jewish country and colonization increases the entente will soon turn to open hostility, for the Arabs are clever enough to realise that at present they would be unable to compete with Jewish progress and that Jewish expansion would result in Arab evacuation which would be openly resisted in spite of the present entente protestations.

The large district of the Lebanon including Beyrouth known as occupied enemy territory W., forms another difficult problem for the Arab politician to understand. This is under French administration in spite of repeated application from Emir Faisal that part of the responsibilities should be shared by the Arabs. So far nothing has been conceded notwithstanding many protestations on the part of the French, that they concur in principle to future Arab administrations, but giving no practical sign of allowing it.

In a part of Syria alone therefore officially known as occupied enemy territory E. the Arabs control the affairs of the country for whose freedom they were given to understand they were fighting, and the result of this foreign administration of other districts naturally gave rise to very strong political criticism. They acknowledged their gratitude to Great Britain to the fullest extent for the whole-hearted way she supported the Arab revolt both as regards finance, personnel and material, and for the financial assistance furnished for the administration of occupied enemy territory E., but unity of Arabia is the foundation of all Arab desires and the present partition under foreign administrations is looked on with distrust. The actual result of nine months Arab administration is certainly open to criticism, and it is evident that without outside assistance the country is not sufficiently advanced for self government, but at the same time it must be borne in mind that this is the first effort of a young nation

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(١٧٠/١١٣)


4.

to manage their own affairs whose only school of instruction has been a corrupt Turkish government, and furthermore the country being still under martial law their hands are more or less tied in many essential details.

Unity and Independence are the foundation of their programme, and that a modern Arabia should be capable of taking its place in the progress of the world. The more responsible Arabs realise that this can only be accomplished by assistance and intercourse with European powers, and are therefore reconciled to the idea of a European mandatory power being appointed under the League of Nations who would concede a maximum amount of freedom and independence to an Arab government but would advise on essential matters of government and administration and who would therefore necessarily retain a certain executive control over the affairs of the country. The division of Arabia under different mandatory powers would be unacceptable to the majority of people, and the appointment of an unpopular mandatory power would almost certainly be resisted by force of arms. The Arabs argue, and with good reason, that having fought for the principles of freedom and independence that it is the country's undisputed right to control their future.

The foregoing outline of events in Arabia, though incomplete, may be sufficient to show the anxiety with which Arab politicians look to the future. The report of the American Commission sent out to ascertain local opinion has not yet been furnished, nor is it certain whether Mesopotamia which has produced the cleverest and most efficient Arab personnel and holding the strongest nationalist opinions, will be included in their area of investigations. In the meantime French propoganda and statements in the press whether official or otherwise are most misleading and convey the impression that France possesses the undisputed right of being appointed mandatory power for Syria and the Lebenon.

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
5.

Great Britain has made it clearly understood that not only is the mandate for Syria not desired, but that even if requested to accept it by an overwhelming majority that it would in all probability be refused. This line of action might well be calculated to throw Syria into the arms of France as being the only power willing to accept the responsibility, and which no doubt would be the most satisfactory arrangement as far as the Allies are concerned, but for the fact that France is at present an unacceptable mandatory power to the vast majority of Syrians. Emir Faisal, who voices the political views of the Arabs of Syria has declared that a decision arrived at in Paris will not be accepted unless in accordance with the views of the majority of Syrians, and he has also made it clearly understood that if an unacceptable decision is forced on the country that it will be resisted by force of arms. Unless public opinion changes to an enormous extent therefore it must be accepted that at present the appointment of France as Mandatory power for Syria would be unpopular and unacceptable, and the first signs of a French occupation of the country would in all probability be the signal for a general rising. Without an army of occupation it would be scarcely possible to administer Syria even with the lightest hand, and therefore if French influence is to predominate a backing of the French troops is essential.

In the present queer temper of the country the arrival of French troops would undoubtedly be resisted by every available means, and Syria is a country fully armed and possessing plenty of capable personnel for carrying on military operations. Taken as a serious campaign a rising could no doubt be easily quelled by trained and disciplined troops, but the very fact of a rising taking place as the result of an unpopular mandatory power being appointed would scarcely be in accordance with the principles adopted by the League of Nations, and furthermore in the

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
أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٥٩و]
(١٧٠/١١٧)

6.

event of its occurrence the position of the British troops in Syria would be an impossible one. The Arabs have been accepted as allies during the war and to have to take military action against them in order to introduce an unpopular element into the country is inconceivable. The problem is indeed a difficult one unless political opinions in Syria can be altered. France has a clear field for propoganda and British Officials acting as Liason with the Arabs would be only too pleased to see French influence making headway. The difficulties and dangers of administering Syria are thoroughly realised. They are not an attractive or straightforward nation to deal with nor are they by any means universally pro-British; still amongst many of their leading personnel is found a distinct British entente, though whether fostered by the provision of large subsidies or methods of national policy is uncertain. The fact remains that Great Britain provided the ^{دعم} sinews for the Arab revolt, France only the theoretical support, and to the Eastern mind the former carries more weight for the time being, though if suddenly removed it is extremely doubtful for how long a period the nation's gratitude would remain. It is not, however, in accordance with British ideas to see a nation who fought against oppression handed over to another unacceptable authority, and therefore until the French and Arabs come to a mutual understanding it is difficult to fight wholeheartedly for French claims in Syria. The leading French personnel connected with the Arab movement have been M. George Picot, Col. Bremond, Col. Cousse, Col. Monlin, Capt. Pisani, who are all personal friends of mine and of the majority of British officers connected with the Hedjaz & Syrian affairs. They are all clever men but their policy and statements are not trusted and no amount of British influence can make them so.

The acknowledgment of an independent Syria by the Peace Conference might be an alternative solution to the problem

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7.

and would be a popular decision to the majority of Moslean Syrians, but the country is not yet fit for self government and it is doubtful whether guarantees for the protection of non-Arabs could be obtained. They would certainly not be enforced under a national government.

To sum up therefore, and in spite of the present anti French feeling in Syria, I believe that France might yet overcome these by openly declaring her policy and providing the actual support and subsidy or loans necessary to carry on the Arab government. If proved by the report of the American Commission that under any circumstances France is unacceptable as mandatory for Syria, then an independent Arab government appears the only solution with British or American advisors who would have to be supported by an army of occupation for a period at all events. The strong feeling of Islam still existing in Arabia must not be overlooked and therefore the necessity for the careful handling of the country's future. The advantages of a single mandatory power are fairly obvious in a country where political intrigue is carried on to such an enormous extent and which will make internal administration an exceedingly difficult matter if the country is divided up.

18-8-19.


P. C. Joyce Lt Col

Special Services at. F. H. R.


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
أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٦٠ظ]
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Any Mohammedan feeling that the Shrines are in danger or insufficiently protected by an independent Mohammedan ruler, considers himself bound to attempt the establishment of such an independent State. If the course of events is shown to be opposed to this vital need, religious feeling will be stirred in him and forced to seek a remedy.


We now come to the following points. Mohammedans will strive to form a government on the lines mentioned and naturally they will encounter opposition on the part of the powers. This will begin the fighting and it will continue. Further, since the overwhelming majority of Moslems in the world are under the rule of Great Britain, the latter power will be the chief object and focus of the hatred of Moslems.

We, the Arabs, were formerly with the Turks and fought against them, not with the intention of dividing our country by giving a share to the French and a portion to the British. We cannot possibly brook that insult in the pages of history and in the eyes of the Mohammedan world. Our family, in particular, cannot tolerate that stain on its history, and will withdraw.

I myself shall not do so, but will take part in the defence of our principle, knowing that this is certain by any way or means and in its right time. When such defensive action commences in a country which is known all over the world to be sincere and loyal, there is no doubt that the Mohammedan world outside will be of opinion that the Arabs have been betrayed.

I have no wish to threaten you with these words, but to prove to you that I am sincere and loyal to you and to my country, and that on this point I have only done my duty as a perfect friend and true patriot. I only beg

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(١٧٠/١٢٥)

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that these words be remembered and written in your records,
and that they may be referred to should anything occur.


My greatest fear, and what I am trying to avoid is
that the national feeling against the division of our
country should be transformed into a religious one, an
event which will have the worst results for both sides.

Let me speak still more freely and talk of some recent
events. I tell you that no official and definite reports
have been received by me, yet as a Mohammedan, I can see
what is going on by instinct. The troubles in Afghanistan,
India, and to some extent in Egypt, are but a sign of the
fear and doubt in the Mohammedan world with regard to the
future. It is, at the bottom, on account of the questions
of the Holy Places and the Caliphate. By Almighty God, it
is not for the sake of the Turks, but for the symbol for
which the Turks stand that these things have taken place.
Now there is a man before the Mohammedan world named El
Hussein Bin Ali (The King of the Hejaz). He declares
openly that he is with the British, and that he is certain
to obtain from them true assistance for the Mohammedan
world and the safeguarding of the shrines. Imagine, then,
what a bad impression will be created if any trouble is
started between this very man and Great Britain, who were
Allies in a time of the greatest danger. I swear by Almighty
God, that in this case never more will be found a single man
to have confidence in anything British.

You must not say that I am an Arab and you are British,
and that we look at things from different points of view.
By my father, by my honour, I say this to you because I
love you as well as I love my own country.

An Englishman will never be able to feel in this way,
and particularly an Englishman living in England. He may
realise that there is feeling, but its nature and depth
he will never be able to gauge as I do myself.

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
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I have said what I believe to be strictly true and exact, and whether you accept it not, does not concern me. What I get from these declarations, is the feeling that I have done my duty as a friend and obtained quiet for my conscience.

Fighting will start first against the French, and naturally you will interfere, and the Commander-in-Chief will crush us, but I assure you by God, we will open our breasts to him and his troops, and no shot will be fired by an Arab against any British, though this I cannot guarantee in countries outside Arabia.

There are certain papers in which we see that they try to mislead the British Government in England by saying that our excitement and unrest is due to British officers. I here openly declare upon my word of honour, that nothing of the sort has happened, and one of the causes which impels me to go to London, is that I wish this to be understood by the authorities there and by the whole world, and I will give proof of it. On the contrary, we are somewhat disappointed with those officers in that they remain as silent as ever.

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PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

Ag. D. 2 Syria
Sep 9, 19

MEMORANDUM.

SYRIA—PALESTINE—MESOPOTAMIA.

I.

THE effect which the Syrian question is producing on Anglo-French relations is causing me considerable anxiety—an anxiety not diminished by the fact that very little is openly said about it, though much is hinted. The silence which the French Press maintains about the Prime Minister's declaration that under no circumstances will Britain accept a Syrian mandate is itself ominous. All know it, none refer to it; and it has done little or nothing to modify the settled conviction of the French Government and the French Colonial Party that British officers throughout Syria and Palestine are intriguing to make a French mandate in these regions impossible.

These misunderstandings are no doubt in part due to the same cause as most misunderstandings; namely, a very clear comprehension by each party of the strength of his own case, combined with a very imperfect knowledge of, or sympathy with, the case of his opponent. In this particular instance, for example, I have never been able to understand on what historic basis the French claim to Syria really rests. Frenchmen's share in the Crusades of the Middle Ages, Mazarin's arrangements with the Turk in the seventeenth century, and the blustering Expedition of 1861 lend in my opinion very little support to their far-reaching ambitions. I could make as good a case for Great Britain by recalling the repulse inflicted by Sir Sidney Smith on Napoleon at Acre, and a much better case by asking where French claims to Syria or any other part of the Turkish Empire would be, but for the recent defeat of the Turks by British forces, at an enormous cost of British lives and British treasure.

If, however, we start from the French assumption that they have ancient claims in Syria and the Middle East, admitted as it has been in all the recent negotiations, then we must in fairness concede that they have something to say for themselves; and it is well to understand exactly what that something is.

Suppose, then, we were to ask M. Clemenceau to speak his full mind in defence of the attitude of resentful suspicion adopted almost universally by his countrymen. I think he would reply somewhat in this fashion:—

“ In Downing Street last December I tried to arrive at an understanding with England about Syria. I was deeply conscious of the need of friendly relations between the two countries, and was most anxious to prevent any collision of interests in the Middle East. I therefore asked the Prime Minister what modification in the Sykes-Picot Agreement England desired. He replied, ‘Mosul.’ I said, ‘You shall have it. Anything else?’ He replied, ‘Palestine.’ Again I said, ‘You shall have it.’ I left London somewhat doubtful as to the reception this arrangement would have in France, but well assured that to Great Britain, at least, it would prove satisfactory.

“ What, then, was my surprise when I found that what I had given with so generous a hand was made the occasion for demanding more. Mosul, it seems, was useless unless large adjoining regions were given also. Palestine was no sufficient home for the Jews unless its frontiers were pushed northward into Syria. And, as if this was not enough, it was discovered that Mesopotamia required a direct all-British outlet on the Mediterranean; that this involved, or was supposed to involve, the possession by England of Palmyra; so that Palmyra must follow Mosul, and be transferred from the French sphere to the British.

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problem so inextricably confused that no really neat and satisfactory issue is now possible for any of them.

The situation is affected by five documents, beginning with our promise to the ruler of the Hedjaz in 1915; going on to the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France of September, 1916; followed by the Anglo-French Declaration of November, 1918; and concluding with the Covenant of the League of Nations of 1919; and the directions given to the Commission sent out to examine the Arab problem on the spot—directions which, it must be observed, were accepted by France, Britain and America, though the Commission itself was, in the end, purely American in composition. These documents are not consistent with each other; they represent no clear-cut policy; the policy which they confusedly adumbrate is not really the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers; and yet, so far as I can see, none of them have wholly lost their validity, or can be treated in all respects as of merely historic interest. Each can be quoted by Frenchmen, Englishmen, Americans, and Arabs when it happens to suit their purpose. Doubtless each will be so quoted before we come to a final arrangement about the Middle East.

These difficulties are well illustrated by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. What its authors aimed at was the creation of two clearly defined areas, one carved out of Syria and the other out of Mesopotamia, the first of which should be French, as Tunis is French; the other English, as Egypt is English. Between them was to lie a huge tract occupied in part by nomad Bedouins, in part by a sedentary Arab-speaking population, urban and agricultural, who should be independent in the sense that they would live their own life in their own way, but who would be under the patronage, and for certain purposes under the control, either of France or of England, according as they belonged to what in the agreement was described as Area A, or Area B. The scheme was not thought out, it had obvious imperfections; but if honestly and sympathetically worked by the superintending Powers, it might easily have proved a success. For, as I read history, such an overlordship is not alien to the immemorial customs and traditions of this portion of the Eastern world.

On the other hand, the scheme *does* seem to me quite alien to those modern notions of nationality which are enshrined in the Covenant and proclaimed in the Declaration. These documents proceed on the assumption that, if we supply any aggregate of human beings, more or less homogeneous in language and religion, with a little assistance and a good deal of advice; if we protect them from external aggression and discourage internal violence, they will speedily and spontaneously organise themselves into a democratic State on modern lines. They will, in language borrowed from the Declaration, establish "a national government," and enjoy "an administration deriving its authority from the initiative and free choice of the native population."

If by this be meant, as I think it is, that when the Turkish tyranny is wholly past, the Arabs will desire to use their new-found freedom to set up representative institutions, with secret voting, responsible government, and national frontiers, I fear we are in error. They will certainly do nothing of the sort. The language of the Covenant may suit the longitude of Washington, Paris or Prague. But in the longitude of Damascus it will probably get us into trouble—unless, indeed, we can agree to treat it with a very wide latitude of interpretation.

How, indeed, when dealing with this series of documents, is latitude of interpretation to be avoided? Consider the following analysis:—

In 1915 we promised the Arabs independence; and the promise was unqualified, except in respect of certain territorial reservations. In 1918 the promise was by implication repeated; for no other interpretation can, I think, be placed by any unbiassed reader on the phrases in the Declaration about a "national government" and "an administration deriving its authority from the initiative and free choice of the native population."

But in 1916 (Sykes-Picot) the independence even of the most independent portion of the new Arab State (*i.e.*, Areas A and B) was qualified by the obligatory presence of foreign advisers; as, indeed, it is under the mandatory system of 1919. Now, by an "adviser" these documents undoubtedly mean—though they do not say so—an adviser whose advice must be followed; and assuredly no State can be described as really independent which has habitually and normally to follow foreign advice—supported, if the worst comes to the worst, by troops, aeroplanes and tanks!

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In our promises with regard to the frontiers of the new Arab States, we do not seem to have been more fortunate than in our promises about their independence. In 1915 it was the Sherif of Mecca to whom the task of delimitation was to have been confided, nor were any restrictions placed upon his discretion in this matter, except certain reservations intended to protect French interests in Western Syria and Cilicia.

In 1916 all this seems to have been forgotten. The Sykes-Picot Agreement made no reference to the Sherif of Mecca, and, so far as our five documents are concerned, he has never been heard of since. A wholly new method was adopted by France and England, who made with each other in the Sykes-Picot Agreement the rough-and-ready territorial arrangements already described—arrangements which the Allied and Associated Powers have, so far, neither explicitly accepted nor explicitly replaced.

By implication, indeed, they have rejected them. The language of the Covenant assumes or asserts that, in the regions we are discussing, as in other portions of the Turkish Empire, there are in the advanced chrysalis state "independent nations" sufficiently "developed" to demand "provisional recognition"—each of which is to be supplied by the Powers with a mandatory till it is able to stand alone. Where and what are these "independent nations"? Are they by chance identical with Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine? If so, the coincidence with the Sykes-Picot arrangement is truly amazing, for no such idea was present to the minds of those who framed it. They started from the view that France had ancient interests and aspirations in Western Syria; that Britain had obvious claims in Bagdad and Southern Mesopotamia; that Palestine had a unique historic position; and that if these three areas were to be separately controlled, it was obviously expedient that none of the vast and vague territory lying between them, which had no national organisation, should be under any other foreign influence. In other words, when they made the tri-partite arrangement they never supposed themselves to be dealing with three nations already in existence, ready for "provisional recognition," only requiring the removal of the Turk, the advice of a mandatory, and a little time, to enable them to "stand alone." It never occurred to them that they had to deal at all with nations in the modern and Western sense of the term. With the Arab race, Arab culture, and Arab social and religious organisation (to say nothing of Jews, Maronites, Druses and Kurds) they knew they had to deal. But this is a very different thing.

Now, where the Covenant of 1919 is in contradiction with the Agreement of 1916, it is presumably the Covenant which must be held to represent our policy. We are seemingly committed, therefore, to the view that the whole area we are considering already consists of an independent nation or nations, and that all we have to do, after having got rid of the Turk, is to supply every independent nation with one, but not more than one, suitable mandatory.

Without further considering whether the political picture drawn by the Covenant corresponds with anything to be found in the realm of fact, let us ask on what principle these mandatories are to be selected by the Allied and Associated Powers. On this point the Covenant speaks as follows:—

"The wishes of these communities (*i.e.*, the independent nations) must be a principal consideration in the selection of a mandatory."

The sentiment is unimpeachable; but how is it to be carried into effect? To simplify the argument, let us assume that two of the "independent nations" for which mandatories have to be provided are Syria and Palestine. Take Syria first. Do we mean, in the case of Syria, to consult principally the wishes of the inhabitants? We mean nothing of the kind. According to the universally accepted view there are only three possible mandatories—England, America, and France. Are we going "chiefly to consider the wishes of the inhabitants" in deciding which of these is to be selected? We are going to do nothing of the kind. England has refused. America will refuse. So that, whatever the inhabitants may wish, it is France they will certainly have. They may freely choose, but it is Hobson's choice, after all.

The contradiction between the letter of the Covenant and the policy of the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of the "independent nation" of Palestine than in that of the "independent nation" of Syria. For in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country, though the American Commission has been going through the form of asking what they are. The four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism,

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be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.

In my opinion that is right. What I have never been able to understand is how it can be harmonised with the Declaration, the Covenant, or the instructions to the Commission of Enquiry.

I do not think that Zionism will hurt the Arabs, but they will never say they want it. Whatever be the future of Palestine, it is not now an "independent nation," nor is it yet on the way to become one. Whatever deference should be paid to the views of those who live there, the Powers in their selection of a mandatory do not propose, as I understand the matter, to consult them. In short, so far as Palestine is concerned, the Powers have made no statement of fact which is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which, at least in the letter, they have not always intended to violate.

III.

Since the literal fulfilment of all our declarations is impossible, partly because they are incompatible with each other, and partly because they are incompatible with facts, we ought, I presume, to do the next best thing. And the next best thing may, perhaps, be attained if we can frame a scheme which shall, as far as possible, further not merely the material interests, but the hopes and habits of the native population; which shall take into account the legitimate aspirations of other peoples and races, in particular of the French, the British, and the Jews, and which shall embody as completely as may be the essential spirit of the various international pronouncements, whose literal provisions it seems impossible in all cases to fulfil.

To this end I venture to lay down the following propositions:—

1. The fundamental conception underlying the Sykes-Picot Agreement should be maintained, namely, a French sphere centring round Syria, a British sphere centring round the Euphrates and the Tigris, and a home for the Jews in the valley of the Jordan.

2. The Sykes-Picot Agreement should, however, be brought into closer harmony with the Covenant by the abandonment of the special privileges in the "blue" and "red" territories, where France and England were given rights not easily distinguishable from complete sovereignty. These should be absorbed in the general body of areas A and B, as ultimately defined.

3. Moreover, the economic monopoly assigned by the Sykes-Picot Agreement to France and Britain respectively shall be abandoned, France and Britain will become mandatories, and the fundamental principles laid down by the Covenant for the government under mandate of territories outside the Turkish Empire shall as far as possible be maintained.

4. The French zone of Syria shall extend in the direction of Anatolia at least sufficiently far to include Alexandretta and its hinterland. Whether France obtains more of Cilicia than this must depend on the arrangement of Armenian mandates, and the claims of Italy under the Treaty of London.

5. The British zone in Mesopotamia shall extend at least as far as Mosul. Even if this general scheme be provisionally adopted as a basis of discussion there evidently remains a large number of difficult questions of delimitation which still await solution. In solving them I think the following principles should be borne in mind:—

In the first place, I would lay it down that frontiers should be determined by economic and ethnographic considerations rather than strategic.

If other things are equal, by all means choose a good military frontier rather than a bad one. But do not let us further impede the already slow and difficult movements of diplomacy by providing needless safeguards against so remote a possibility as a war with France. It will probably never take place; if it does take place it will probably be waged with weapons whose character and use we cannot foresee; in any case it will not be decided in Syria. Let us therefore for the moment forget these local views of strategy and take a more practical view of the position.

We have three coterminous areas to consider: Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. Their frontiers may be doubtful, but the great central core of each is disputed by no one. Syria includes Lebanon, Damascus, Aleppo, and the eastern seaboard of the Mediterranean north of Palestine. Palestine is essentially the valley of the Jordan, with the adjacent coast and plains. Mesopotamia is essentially the region watered by the Tigris and Euphrates. What we have got to do is to make such international arrangements, economic and territorial, as will enable each region to develop itself to

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the best advantage without giving occasion for jealousies or disputes. The task ought not to be impossible, but it will require to be worked at by experts who have far more knowledge than I possess or can obtain. What follows are casual notes on such points as occur to me.

PALESTINE.

If Zionism is to influence the Jewish problem throughout the world, Palestine must be made available for the largest possible number of Jewish immigrants. It is therefore eminently desirable that it should obtain the command of the water power which naturally belongs to it, whether by extending its borders to the north or by treaty with the mandatory of Syria, to whom the southward flowing waters of Hamon could not in any event be of much value.

For the same reason Palestine should extend into the lands lying east of the Jordan. It should not, however, be allowed to include the Hedjaz railway, which is too distinctly bound up with exclusively Arab interests.

MESOPOTAMIA.

So far as I know, the only two economic needs of Mesopotamia which are likely to cause trouble with the mandatories of Syria are rights of water and rights of access. On both subjects I am ignorant, and on neither is there much expert knowledge available in Paris. Nevertheless, I venture the following observations:—

In this part of the world fertility is in proportion to irrigation. If, therefore, for other reasons, a river is anywhere taken as a frontier, elaborate provisions will have to be made by treaty for dividing the water between the cultivators on its two banks, who (by supposition) are under different mandatories. Such a scheme might be difficult to devise and yet more difficult to enforce. It would therefore be best, where possible, to avoid using rivers as frontiers.

The question of access to Mesopotamia is a more complicated affair. By sea the only obstacles are: (1) the distance from European markets; (2) the unhealthiness of the Persian Gulf; (3) the dues of the Suez Canal.

Nothing can change the first; we are not likely to modify greatly the second and third. And for these reasons engineers are much preoccupied with schemes for giving to Mesopotamia direct access by pipe and railways to a Mediterranean port.

So far as I can learn, the subject as a whole has so far been very imperfectly studied. I am not sure that, as regards pipe lines, it has been studied at all. A great deal, indeed, is known, and much has been done, with the Bagdad railway; and its eastern section—if it were connected with Alexandretta, and the port of Alexandretta were improved and modernised—would provide the natural outlet to the commerce of Northern Mesopotamia.

But, it will be objected, Alexandretta is going to be French, and we know enough of French methods to be aware how successfully the most "open door" can be half closed by the ingenious zeal of local officials.

I do not deny that this is an argument of some substance, and, if the sea route is too costly to protect us from this species of blackmail, we must consider the possibility of finding an alternative land route wholly within our own control. On this point I shall say something in a moment.

In the meanwhile, however, let me observe that the force of this criticism is easily exaggerated. The pinch of French methods is felt, *not* in the case of through traffic, but in such cases as Morocco, where the local officials control the whole machinery of railway distribution. There, no doubt, French traders have a strong interest in hampering their foreign rivals, and their malpractices, aided by official methods, are extremely difficult to check.

But the case is quite otherwise when we are dealing with through traffic, and with a port which, like Alexandretta, must largely depend on through traffic. Here the interests of those who own the port and railways are identical with those of the importers and exporters in the foreign country which they serve. There is no opening for differential treatment, and if the familiar expedients by which through traffic to such places as Switzerland and Bohemia is protected in transit are insufficient in the case of Mesopotamia (and I cannot conceive why they should be), it would always be possible to retaliate at the Bagdad end—a fact which would probably render retaliation unnecessary.

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I think the people who shrink from the idea of allowing a British Protectorate to depend in part on a foreign-owned railway are in the main moved by arguments which are either sentimental or military. With the sentimental argument I sympathise, but I would not let it control our policy. I would neither allow it to drive us into wasting millions on unprofitable projects, nor into an interminable series of petty squabbles with our neighbours. But this does not mean that we shall refuse to consider alternative methods of connecting Mesopotamia with the Mediterranean by rail and pipe line through all-British Protectorates. On the contrary, it is of the first importance that we should know without delay whether any such prospects are physically possible and economically sound. The mere fact that we were considering them would keep the appetites of French concessionnaires at Alexandretta within reasonable limits. At the same time, such conversation as I have had with experts has not raised my hopes. The route by Palmyra is circuitous. It could be tapped by a short line to a port in French Syria. Palmyra itself belongs naturally to the sphere of Damascus, if it belongs anywhere, and the French will take more trouble to prevent our having it than it will ever be worth, either to them or to us. Such, at least, are my first impressions.

On the other hand, a direct line south of Palmyra and wholly in the British sphere, B, would have a longer continuous stretch of desert to cross before reaching Palestine, and in Palestine itself the succession of mountain ridges running parallel to the coast renders the construction of a transverse railway line difficult and costly.

On these subjects, however, I speak without any sort of authority. I doubt whether they have ever been adequately examined.

Paris, August 11, 1919.

A. J. B.

Annex.

Some Difficulties to be Borne in Mind in any Syrian Negotiations.

1. On whatever basis the arrangement with the French is arrived at—whether Sykes-Picot or League of Nations or any other—it will be difficult to show reason why Feisal should have a larger measure of independence in Damascus and Eastern Syria than we are prepared to accord to him or other Arab rulers in Mesopotamia.

2. The distinction between the Blue and Red areas, on the one hand, and the A and B areas, on the other, created by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, is not recognised by the Covenant, and cannot well be embodied in an A mandate, which recognises no distinctions of authority within any mandated area. Therefore the French can hardly claim more in Western Syria (Lebanon) than they give in Eastern Syria (Damascus, Aleppo, &c.), and the English cannot claim more in the Red area (Bosrah and Lower Mesopotamia) than they give in Upper Mesopotamia (Mosul, &c.).

But to me this seems difficult to reconcile with our quasi-territorial ambitions, and quite impossible to reconcile with the ambitions of the French. Neither of us wants much less than supreme economic and political control, to be exercised, no doubt (at least in our case), in friendly and unostentatious co-operation with the Arabs, but nevertheless, in the last resort, to be exercised.

3. In all the ordinary talk I hear on the subject of Mesopotamian oil, it is assumed that if this is found in the British sphere it belongs, to all intents and purposes, to Britain. But this is quite inconsistent with the assumption underlying the whole Covenant and expressly embodied in its clauses. For in all mandated territory the "open door" is to be completely maintained, and all nations are to enjoy equal opportunities.

4. This will prove an inconvenient argument when we are urging our inherent rights to an all-British railway and an all-British pipe line to carry all-British oil to the British Navy and the British Mercantile Marine.

5. Quite apart from this consideration I do not think the French will be much impressed by our claim to a right of direct access to Mosul based on the ground that, as they have given us Mosul, they must clearly give us that, without which Mosul would be useless. They will reply with perfect truth (a) that the gift of a great oil-bearing and wheat-growing district is one of extraordinary value, even if its whole produce has to go round by the Suez Canal, and (b) that they see no great hardship in sending it under international guarantees over a partly French railway and through a neutralised and internationalised French port. Nor, in fact (in ordinary times), is there.

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It is, of course, quite true that the Sykes-Picot Agreement ought never to have given Mosul to France. But it *did*, and that through no fault of the French, but in consequence of a miscalculation of Lord Kitchener, who was unwilling to have territories in which Britain was interested coterminous with a military Monarchy such as Russia then was. I remember agreeing with him.

6. I think these are considerations which must not merely be kept in mind during our negotiations with the French, but should be brought to Lord Milner's attention in framing a scheme for mandate A. I am inclined to go further and say that he ought to read carefully the survey of the situation contained in my long paper on "Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine."

Paris, September 9, 1919.

(Initialled)

A. J. B.

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HEAD OF DEPARTMENT.

EASTERN.

[October 23.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

SECTION 1.

[144535]

No. 1.

Mr. Kerr to Mr. Kidston.—(Received October 23.)

Mr. Kidston,
10, Downing Street, October 21, 1919.
I ENCLOSE copies of messages which passed between the Prime Minister and
M. Clemenceau, preceding the Prime Minister's *aide-mémoire* of the 13th September.
P. H. KERR.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Message from Prime Minister to M. Clemenceau.

IT looks to me as if the question of mandates for Turkey would take longer to settle than we had anticipated, in view of the delay in American decision. The British Government, however, cannot any longer undertake to maintain an army of over 400,000 men to garrison the Turkish Empire. This involves the question of what will happen in the parts of the Turkish Empire we withdraw from. When the Syrian question is discussed, the British Government wish to lay certain proposals before the Supreme Council in regard to it. With this object, I propose to come to Paris on Friday next to discuss this and the Armenian question and could see you at any time on Saturday or Sunday, but I shall have to leave on Tuesday in order to keep an engagement in London on Wednesday. As the British and French Governments are both pledged to the Emir Feisal that he shall be present when the settlement of the Syrian question is reached, I have taken the responsibility of inviting him to Paris. As he may not be able to reach Paris before next Tuesday, I hope that you will see no objection to his paying me a visit in London.

September 11, 1919.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.


Message from M. Clemenceau in reply to Mr. Lloyd George's Message.

I AGREE with you that the settlement of the mandates in Turkey by the Allied and Associated Powers must be delayed until the American Government is in a position to acquaint us with its views on this subject. We have decided to wait until the Conference examines in its entirety and with full knowledge the settlement of the Eastern question.

The general difficulties which can result from the final settlement of the Ottoman questions, and, as regards the maintenance of order, from the retreat of the British troops from the territories of the Turkish Empire, are assuredly within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council. It is not possible to isolate the question of Syria from the other questions connected with the final liquidation of the Ottoman Empire, and to submit it to the Supreme Council independently from those connected with Constantinople, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia. The Supreme Council is only actually informed (and that by the Americans themselves) that imminent danger threatens the Armenians, in addition to the fact of the retreat of the English troops from the Caucasus and of the Turkish nationalist movement in Asia Minor. The American, British, and Italian Delegations have declared that they are not in a position to send troops to protect the Armenians. The French Government has, therefore, offered to send 12,000 men as from the 10th September through Cilicia to effect this purpose. The reply to our proposal awaits the British opinion. Mr. Balfour, who told me that he had consulted you and who is favourable to the proposal, has told me, that you also had given your assent in principle. He added that Marshal Sir Henry Wilson was sick in

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 (2) Port of Tripoli, Haifa & Hama
 (3) St. Barbara Hama - Haifa
 (4) between Lebanon & Haifa
 (5) coast of Haifa
 (6) all camps in Jordan
 (7) Haifa & be in in his own town
 to choose her for advisers

Syria in strategic situation how 2
 (1) Haifa for weak. to little Syria too much
 (2) Lebanon & Haifa, deposed to be in 'sue dam'
 (3) Haifa would be a start (new movement
 Neo-Syria
 with Haifa)

Syria in trouble N
 (1) forced hostility of Haifa
 (2) Turkey; peace talks now in Aleppo since
 Amistice
 Dad & keep ducts in Syria
 (3) Keep but include admin of Arab Syria
 of Arab Syria

أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٧١ و]
(١٧٠/١٤١)

(1) Syria apart from Palestine already. Cilicia. & Jewish. (71)

[Q] p 2

Fach & S.P. devised as faces held of suit a
sit. believed never arise. Conceded to
wonder to battle of fact. French interest in Palestine
Take 2 cases (a) British France to Mosul suppose
Don & Kurdistan. & come to


- (b) Splitting up Arabs in A & B. of a
fantasy here & there
- (c) certain sources & picture
- (2) France did o to respect. Arabs a great
deal
- (3) Arabs united nor any A (Damascus, Hama, Hama, Aleppo)
but in candid parts B (by Ant. Lebanon -
Set up nature at Druze, Latakia)

(4) France by French in her 500 French
troops. my pretensions of fact & miles sit
would with greatest merit of Arab.
In her, make bad start

(5) If Syrians had & chose a single power
she wd be much more likely to choose the
1/2 of the

- (6) ^{simple} Syria new international developments
(a) trial for weak. Too little Syria. Too much Hejaz
newly 'Syria for Syria' not Syria for
herself
- (b) Turkey N. Turkish prestige with near Aleppo
success at ~~Antioch~~
(i) Turkish troops
(ii) Turkey kept in fact

أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٧١ظ]
(١٧٠/١٤٢)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٧٢ظ]
(١٧٠/١٤٤)

هذه الصفحة لا يمكن إتاحتها نظراً لضوابط متعلقة بحقوق النشر أو حماية
البيانات.

Syria 3 (73)

Ante. Polig

in the area Lebanon French claims are really incompatible with 1861-4
 if self determined Maronites for France
 Druses

For will probably stick to Lebanon What area?
 Syria Beirut & border of Palestine (ditani)
 St. Bukaa Hama & Huleh. to Damascus & Hama
 Front with: deb. sh. retain indep. esp. unless in control of routes to
 from Syria & Iraq. Front stop army & invade to
 II Arzo to Tripoli in Lebanon Latakia
 & railway Tripoli to Hama
 Front units

III Suez Chaudun Alexandria Asou - Dapas. (used
 up & cost of Amman, Lavee
 Alexandria via S. for Port for Port Said sub
 S-11
 Front claims: same

IV then Cilicia Armenians
 This is elaborate system of partition
 certain & make down

Alternative is to buy into Syria altogether of offer
 of Armenia. This is best. Then
 presence in S. will be a nuisance in Tal
 or presence of Egypt


Some say Baer Fronts as Special
 Mes. Front as Fronts

It is possible when will say Cancel all these matters
Near Polis back F. up & point of no alternative
 Front


(1) play 'self determined' for all world

73

أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٧٣ظ]
(١٧٠/١٤٦)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٧٤ و]
(١٧٠/١٤٧)



Draufraul

- ① Ann with all for
university to be
- ② Connect with him as per

I checked all ally papers

Connect references

74

Lecture

with the Prince of Rome
handwritten
of
to me reach from most directly
I upon to make any of a year

Lance

tray over Acquire tray To Arab
tray as document

Puck

Law two needed
also by translating

Cabinet
difficult
Romaine Other

Arab
Arab
Arab
Arab
Arab
Arab
Arab


clear from public reference

74

أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٧٤ظ]
(١٧٠/١٤٨)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٧٥ و]
(١٧٠/١٤٩)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٧٥ظ]
(١٧٠/١٥٠)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية ساكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٧٦ و]
(١٧٠/١٥١)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٧٦ظ]
(١٧٠/١٥٢)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٧٧و]
(١٧٠/١٥٣)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٧٧ظ]
(١٧٠/١٥٤)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية ساكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٧٨ و]
(١٧٠/١٥٥)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٧٨ظ]
(١٧٠/١٥٦)




أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٧٩ و]
(١٧٠/١٥٧)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٧٩ظ]
(١٧٠/١٥٨)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و٨٠] (١٧٠/١٥٩)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [ظ ٨١]
(١٧٠/١٦٢)

Council
 matters were manifested for the well - kind
 the material cattle ^{see} material elements
 or of the ^{modern} historical fiction. Later a
 as time progresses material ^{idea} was substituted
 the cattle assumed a ^{higher} more
 successful character; ^{higher} ^{level} ^{of} ^{luxury}
 back to ^{simple} ^{primitive} ^{and} ^{less} ^{of}
 the requirements ^{scarcely} ⁱⁿ ^{defence} ^{and} ^{peace}
 & then the ^{force} ^{of} ^{the} ^{middle} ^{ages} ^{was} ^{marked}
 in the ^{material} ^{man} ^{of} ^{the} ^{Juda}
 period until a ^{mass} ^{was} ^{born} ^{whose}
 except for the ^{force} ^{of} ^{the} ^{middle} ^{ages}
 the ^{material} ^{man} ^{of} ^{the} ^{Juda}
 and we are ^{confronted} ^{with} ^{the}
^{idea} ^{of} ^{the} ^{middle} ^{ages} ^{and} ^{the}
^{idea} ^{of} ^{the} ^{middle} ^{ages} ^{and} ^{the}
 the Stuart and later a ^{the}
 League age
^{idea} ^{of} ^{the} ^{middle} ^{ages}
 a ^{material} ^{man} ^{of} ^{the} ^{Juda}
 latter part of the ^{middle} ^{ages} ^{and} ^{the}
 back part of the ^{middle} ^{ages} ^{and} ^{the}
 a ^{mass} ^{was} ^{born} ^{whose}
 and ^{not} ^{only} ^{called} ^a ^{middle} ^{ages}
 the ^{idea} ^{of} ^{the} ^{middle} ^{ages} ^{and} ^{the}
^{idea} ^{of} ^{the} ^{middle} ^{ages} ^{and} ^{the}
^{idea} ^{of} ^{the} ^{middle} ^{ages} ^{and} ^{the}

Judah - Judah &
 Herodotus - Pausanias
 Herodotus - Pausanias
 Herodotus - Pausanias

أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٨٢و]
(١٧٠/١٦٣)

nos special Youth (82)
Chancellor myst. Latur. Agl had
Cologne - your cancer - Recus
Judge politics stadnkor Union 3 brots
I men Counsel ^{Nov. 1917} best opportunity ^{preliterate}
Where of Liberalism ^{Paul previous future}
Liberalism ^{J. E. F.} ^{no distance}
Equalize all women
Fraternity Free Trade
Medians 40 well defined Perm.
2 Leaders ^{call} Pagan ^{Aspect} Primer of future
Socialism Call labour
her chance 9 months im posture
in hand to success in hand to success
in hand to success in hand to success
Wheatley 82

أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٨٢ظ]
(١٧٠/١٦٤)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٨٣ و]
(١٧٠/١٦٥)

~~Yon...~~ (83)
 class was part. debt & debt Capit
 Pacific war. was in peace
 Essentially illegal. Inevitable
 Sec. Programme Disturbance
~~admission~~ ~~desires~~ ~~was for~~
 s. of in consequence ~~no parties~~ ~~patent~~
 class ~~Count~~
 strike ~~useful~~
 Commission
 are trustee parties ~~organ~~ ~~debt~~ ~~only~~
~~million~~ ~~cooperation~~
 Great opportunity no catalogue
 houses. ~~enough~~ ~~trade~~ ~~tax~~ ~~Emp~~ ~~peace~~
 ownership
 no want
 Show working class. Copartner in
~~depression~~ ~~indirect system~~
 nor release or strip
 Accuse team v. 3 Party ~~system~~
 capital ~~controversial~~
 last year ~~deb~~ ~~credit~~ ~~deb~~ ~~had~~
 Liberal idea - balance ~~trust~~ ~~money~~
~~no~~ ~~deb~~ ~~credit~~
 ∴ focal point for ~~symp~~ ~~mean~~ ~~expressing~~ ~~ideas~~
 all in favour of ~~deb~~ ~~credit~~ ~~of~~ ~~part~~ ~~is~~
~~Liberal~~ ~~London~~ ~~or~~ ~~perfectly~~ ~~balanced~~ 83


أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٨٣ظ]
(١٧٠/١٦٦)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٨٤ظ]
(١٧٠/١٦٨)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [و٨٥]
(١٧٠/١٦٩)



أوراق مجلس الحرب المتعلقة بسوريا واتفاقية سايكس بيكو لسنة ١٩١٦ [٨٥ظ]
(١٧٠/١٧٠)

