'Persian Gulf Gazetteer, Historical and Political Materials, Maskat [Muscat] territory, 1872-1903' [‎55] (57/138)

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failure proved incapacity to govern. Policy had been to support de facto ruler
and assist hira in quelling tribal disturbances ; that proposed might involve
support of a Sultan de jure who could not hold his own without it. Action
advocated entailed serious responsibility in Turki's lifetime and might be very
embarrassing after his death as children would claim similar aid (16-9). Re
sident replied not so much a change of policy desired as a more definite, consist
ed and effective carving out of present policy. In practice, responsibility conld
not be greater than that already assumed in case of attacks on Maskat, and
embarrassing situations would be avoided to greater extent. Policy meant to
apply to Turki only, not to successors. Normal and permanent policy should
be as heretofore non-interference in dynastic strugsrles and internal adminis
tration and avoidance of employment of armed force. Armed intervention
when resorted to should be thorough. Turki's case was exceptional: impossible
with credit, and consequently with expediency, to refuse armed support when
solicited by him. To refuse help to Turki now would be a policy of abandon
ment. Prom the fu st Turki had relied wholly on British Government and
carried out its advice implicitly to best of his power. His straight-forward
co-operation in slave trade matters had given a handle to his enemies. If Turki
were ousted it would be blow to British prestige in Oman. Leading men would
by proposed poliey be deterred from advancing on Maskat at all. Turki would
not rely too much on support and neglect defensive measures nor would he take
advantage of it to practise oppression (7-10). Miles entirely concurred with
Ross. If rebels occupied town in spite of fire of ships could they be allowed
to remain there ? Even Said, alter 20 or 80 years rule, would more than once
have been expelled but for Indian Navy. Turki a weak but not a bad ruler.
Had conciliated people and followed Arab ideal of Sheikh of Sheikhs, primus
inter pares. On Turki's death Arabs should be allowed to choose their own
ruler. None of his sons by Arab mother (17-10).
• 1886.
Government of India reposing confidence in Colonel Ross's knowledge of
situation and in soundness of his judgment decided to follow his recommenda
tion. Resident authorised to announce promise to Sultan and to his rivals and
enemies (9-2). Secretary of; State entertained grave doubts as to policy and
regretted he had not been consulted before issue of orders. Support only to be
continued while Sultan's administration not unsatisfactory to Government of
India. Glad that Colonel Ross had been instructed to point out clearly to Sultan
that the concession was personal (31-3). Announcement made by Mockler on
33th July in presenting insignia of K.G.C.S.I. (17-7). 36 rockets to
be supplied to Turki on payment (10-11).
1887.
Twelve cast-iron 12-pr. muzzle-loading guns, with usual proportion of am
munition, to be supplied to Sultan free of charge (return present for gold-
mounted swords, etc., presented by him) as armament for forts Merani and
Jalali (2-8).
1888.
Sultan died 3 p.m ., 4th June (6-6). Faisal assumed government and
hoped friendship of Government might be continued to him and promised
steadfastly to carry out orders. Solicited Government to grant protection
and favour (6-6). During Turki's funeral " Turquoise " fired royal salute
and-British and American flags were flown J mast high till 7th. Every
thing quiet (20-6j. Resident reached Maskat on 11th (20-6). Ross advised
Government not to recognise Eaisal, but to continue subsidy for purpose of
carrying on de facto Government and maintaining order (18-6). Government
of India recommended continuance of subsidies and trusted Her Majesty's
Government would contribute share (1:9-6), Aziz claimed succession and
asked intentions of Government (9-7). Government of India supported
Ross's proposal to Secretary of State viz., to hear proposals of Aziz and perhaps
thus bring about peaceful settlement. If not, Government of India could
still avoid committing selves to any party in Oman State (11-7).