'Persian Gulf Gazetteer, Part I Historical and Political Materials, Précis of Nejd [Najd] Affairs, 1804-1904' [‎11] (24/72)

11
M The Right Hon'ble the Governor-General in Council is not prepared to sanction the
emplovment of the British arms for the purpose of maintaining the integrity of the continen
tal possessions of the Imam of Maskat. If we were once to commit ourselves by a declaration
of our intention to support that Chief, this line of p licy must be followed up at any expense,
and it is impossible to set limits to the waste of blood and treasure which might ensue m
consequence.
« The Wahabis evidently exist in considerable force, and the Imam has acknowledged
their ascendancy by entering into tributary engagements with them, and engaging to bc-ld hw
forces at their disposal for carrying on offensive operations against their enemies. If both
parties are left to themselves, a sense of mutual interest will probably lead tliem to abstain
from carrying to extremity any differences that may hereafter arise between them whereas
if we were to make an offer of military assistance to the Imam, he would probably avail
himself of the support of our alliance to rid himself of the burden of the connection^ which tie
h:is been forced to enter into with the Wahabis, and we should become involved in a series
of distressing operations, carried on at a distance from our resources and under great disadvan
tages from the heat of the climate and the nature of the country, against a brave people with
whom we have ourselves no cause of dispute of any kind.
" Our concern is only with the maritime commerce of the Gulf, and as long as that is not
molested it matters not to us whether one power or another holds dominion on its shores. Even
if the Wahabis were to get possession of the harbour of Maskat, an event, of which the
Imam himself does not appear to entertain any apprehension, it does not of necessity follow
tbat they would commence a system of piracy. It is more probahle that, being already sensible,
from their recollection of past events in the Gulf, of our maritime superiority, they would
dread to provoke us, and, as they would, under the circumstances supposed, have taken their place
as a substantive power in that quarter, that they would be g^d to continue the same inendly
connection with us which has always subsisted between us and the Imam.
" It is believed that the Joasmis and other rab tribes in the Wahabi interest are even
now possessed of establishments in the Gulf, but we do not hear of any P ^acies being com
mitted bv them. They are probably restrained by the fear of our well-known ability to punish
them, and this salutary dread would be likely to have even a greater infjaenee over their con
duct than it ba^ at present, after they become possessed of a port like M askat with a flourish
ing trade and other interests at stake which they must sacritice by provoking hostility with us.
" Bnt even if the worst contingency that can be supposed likely to take place were actually
to" happen, and the Wahabis were not only to acquire possession of the port of Maskat, but
also to commit acts of piracy upon the Gulf trade, it is conceived that it would be much cheaper
and easier to chastise them under these circumstances than to take up the question m its pre
sent state and constitute ourselves the guardians of the possessions ot the Imam of M ask at
aeainst all his enemies. In the former case the whole extent of our operations would be
comprised in such measures as might be deemed most advisable for the purpose of putting
down piracy, while in the latter we might become engaged m a system of continental warfare,
the final result of which it would be impossible to foresee. In the former case we should know
exactlv how far we should be committed, we should engage with all the advantage arising
from our maritime superiority, and, under Providence, success would certainly attend our
efforts * while in the latter we should abandon our vantage ground to fight the VV ahabis
in their own country, we should unnecessarily provoke the hostility of a free and powerful
people, and should be involved in difficulties from which we could not retreat with honor.
" On the whole His Lordship in Council considers it fortunate that it has been so clearly
established by the result o»ormer discussions that we are not under any defeus,ve engage
ments with the Imam of Maskat, and it is requested that the British Author,ties m the Gulf
may be instructed to observe a strict neutrality in any disputes that may anse between him
and anv of his neighbours on the Continent of Arabia. From areference to the 16th paragraph
of Mr Warden's memorandum, dated i7th February 1826 it will be observed that this l.ne of
policy is in strict accordance with that which was prescribed by the Supreme Government when
the Imam solicited our aid against the Wahabis after the expedition against the_ Joasm.
nirates in 180H, on the plea tuat owing to the assistance he afforded ns on that occasion they
(the Wabalds) threatened to overwhelm him. At present so far from entertaining such an
apprehension, he appears to rely with a considerable degree of confidence on bis Treaty
with them, and the main purport of his commumcatmu to Mr. Blanc was to enquire how he
was to act in case they called upon him to engage in hostile measures against nelghbour-
ine States. Mr. Blane 's answer « as marhed by great judgment, and it is hoped that if the
Imam adopts the prudent course recommended to him by that gentleman, he will not be
subjected to any serious difficulty from his connection with his new Allies.
X.—(1) Turki murdered by Meshari- (2) Mesliari executed by
Feysal- (3) Feysal assumes the kingdom, ISui.
40 But the difficulty in which the Imam and we as his allies were in
volved was almost immediately solved hy the occurrence of events m Inejd,
which effectually diverted, the Wahabis from schemes of foreign invasion.
Turki in 1834i was assassinated by his nephew Meshari, and the murderer
usurped the govermnent.