'Persian Gulf Gazetteer, Part I Historical and Political Materials, Précis of Turkish Expansion on the Arab Littoral of the Persian Gulf and Hasa and Katif [al-Qaṭīf] Affairs' [‎137] (154/164)

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blackmail. We do not doubt that, if a lazaret were also established there, the extortions to
which native craft are now subjected would be more freely practised, and probably extenied to
vessels of greater burthen, so that the inconvenience and loss inflicted by delay at Fao would
fall more heavily on British trade. It has also been represented that delay at Fao might
involve the loss of one of the fortnightly tides needed by large steamers in crossing the bar, and
if in consequence it became necessary to tranship into lighters, the loading and unloading
would entail heavy expenditure.
The objections we entertain to the proposals of the Conference are no less serions in view
of the political considerations involved. The 'pretensions of the Porte to sovereignty over
Bahrein, its claim to Mohammerah as evidenced hy the levy of dues on its imports and exportSy
and the jealousy evinced hy the Turkish Government of the position of Great Britain on the
Persian Gnlf, render it especially inexpedient that Turkish officials should he allowed, under the
pretext of enforcing quarantine regulations, to interfere in the affairs of Arab trihes under the
influence, of Her Majesty's Government. It will be observed moreover from the letter cited in
From Major Hayes Sadler, dated 9th October 1894, the margin that His Highness the Saltan of
in Enclosure No. 3. Maskat wotld object to sanitary posts at bwadur
and Maskat, and if this portion of the scheme were left unexecuted, the object with which the
measures have been proposed would be defeated. Similar considerations apply to Fao. The
position of this place at the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab would render these quarantine measures
ineffective without the assent and co-operation of Persia. It would be contrary to the pro
vision of the capitulations and of the treaty of Erzeroom for the sanitary establishment at lao
to control the movement of British and Persian ships bound for any place on the Persian side
of the stream. Such control would amount to exercise of ^ sovereignty over the_ entire Shat-
el-Arab to the detriment of Persian rights and of our traffic with Basrah. Nut improbably, as
has been prdutedout in the course of the correspondence, the assertion of such a claim is the
real object of the Ottoman Government in its desire to establish a lazaret at 1 ao.
513-E When the plague broke out in India at the close of the year
Secret i. March 1897, Nc. 87.U6. 1896, the Sanitary Board at Constanti-
secret i, April 1897, no. 8. nople decided m February 1897, to estab,-
lish Quarantine stations on the Arabian coast at Katif, Bahrein, Katar and
Koweit. The Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. in the Gulf anticipated these measures by
establishing quarantine at Bahrein. As to Katif, no objection could be raised,
as it was, held to be in Turkish territory. Ko^eit was thought to be ' doubtful,
while Turkish pretensions to Katar had been always denied by us. Her
Majesty's Government accordingly decided that Turkish intervention, even, on
the pretext of sanitary precautions, should not be permitted either on the
Katar coast or at Bahrein or at Koweit.
SIS-F. Nevertheless a Turkish quarantine post was established at Koweit,
the vexatious acts of interference of which are treatad in the Koweit JPfecis,
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