'Administration Reports 1925-1930' [‎31r] (66/418)

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bad been most casual and unsatisfactory marketing arrangements before
Russian oil comes, too in unwieldy drums ; and the Russian oil agent s practice
of decanting this into A. P. 0. C. tins and selling it in tins convenient form has
been stopped, after some trouble, by the Persian Government. The sale of
Russian oil has therefore dropped materially for the time being.
For a time Russian piece-goods—excellent in quality and cheap in piice—-
were seen on the market in Kerman : but after the first supply was sold (and it
sold at once) transport difficulties prevented further consignments from reaching
Kerman ; and he was unable therefore to drive this initial success home.
12. Military Affairs.— Sarhang Mohamed Khan remained in charge of
the Kerman troops which were increased in the autumn by the return irom
Shiraz of the detachment (6 officers, 358 men) who had gone to Arabistan m che
preceding year. He is ambitious, intelligent, and full of energy ; but his severity
makes him unpopular with officers as well as men. He is feared by all the civil
officials. He is friendly—even at times intimate—with the boviet Consul : but
takes care to keep on good terms with His Majesty's Consulate_: and his courtesy
in postponing at the eleventh hour a Military display to which he had invited
the British community and which had been fixed for the day at'ter the news came
of Queen Alexandra's death, was spontaneous and sincerely meant.
He is very keen on physical training and efficiency-—with excellent results
as that same Military Display proved to a very large gathering of Kermanis who
watched the manoeuvres with interest and pride. But military service_ is as
unpopular as ever. Officers and men, who are any good, cannot get'their dis
charge as Mohamed Khan refuses to entertain such applications ; the pay ot the
ranks is many months in arrears ; desertions are ruthlessly dealt with by me
imprisonment and whipping of parents, wives and children. The announce
ment therefore, of the ratification of the compulsory service law was received
with apprehension, though generally speaking the acts of the military are ac
cepted with passive resignation.
The disarming of the populace was carried out with fair thoroughness ; but
the tribes in Rudbar—led by Zargham -es -Saltaneh—successfully resisted the
orders, pleading", reasonably enough, that until and unless the Baluch tribes co
the East had surrendered their arms they would be exposed to plunder and heavy
loss unless they were allowed to retain the power, of self-deience. Theie uie
matter rests for the present.
In political affairs, the influence of the Officer Commanding is supreme. He •
had Vossuq-es -Saltaneh under his thumb to such an extent that he even rorced
the latter to make peace with his enemies, the Socialist leaders of Kerman. in
the a^i-Kajar movement his word was law.
13. Persian Baluchistan, Jiruft and Rudhar. —The Kerman authorities made
spasmodic efforts during the year to get to grips with Dost Mohammed of Bam-
pur but the Central Government's policy as regards Persian Baluchistan m
general and Bampur in particular is so undecided, and their efforts to deal with
the question so lacking in cohesion that it is not difficult for Dost Mohammad
evade any issue. In the spring for example the Ministry of the Interior got to
hear of trouble in Dashtyari which they attributed to Dost Mohammed's intri
gues. The Governor General (Nizam ed-Dauleh) was called on for explanation
of the lawlessness going on within his jurisdiction and ordered to make proposals
for dealing with Dost Mohammed. As this was the first time the Governor
General had been called to any account for the situation in Persian Baluchistan
where Dost Mohammed was practicallv independent corresponding direct wit i
the Government in Tehran—Nizam-ed-Dauleh first asked for his responsibilities
in that region to be defined. (He never got any answer to this question). At
the very same time two missions had actually left Kerman for Bampur a
militarv and a financial—unbeknown to the Governor General. Dost Mohammed
naturally snaps his fingers at a local government which betrays such entire lack
of co-ordination. But the practical question raised by Nizam-ed-Dauleh as lo
where his iurisdiction over " Persian Baluchistan " begins and ends, forced it
self into notice again in the early summer when the tribes in the Sarhad rose
against the Persian Government. Sarhad is part of Persian Baluciiistaii
and therefore nominallv under the Kerman administration. ^- iie com P e e
ignorance of these affairs and of the situation there shared by all departmen s
of government in Kerman, and the realization that even if they had known tiiey
could not have intervened, caused Vossuq-es-Saltaneh to suggest to his govern
ment—after discussion of the matter with myself—that as that part oi Persian