'Eastern Bureau, Basrah Branch' [‎57] (110/188)

the aggressive policy of the new regime in Turkey and would welcome,
if he recovered the Hasa 3 a British Agent in one of his ports, and lie added
that our trade would benefit from the increased security which he would
maintain on the caravan routes. Captain Shakespear could make no other
rejoinder than that the British Government confined its interests to the coast
and had never challenged Turkish claims to the ordering of affairs in Central
Arabia, with which we had no concern ; that we were moreover on amicable
terms with Turkey and should be averse from anything in the nature of
intrigue against the Ottoman Government, but in his comments on the report
of this interview, Sir Percy Cox pointed out that as the Porte seemed disposed
to be intractable in the adjustment of matters relating to British interests in the
Gulf, we could not afford to ignore ibn Sa'ud*s attitude. His personal authority
had greatly increased, and it would be well to entertain cordial if distant relations
with him. The Foreign Office, however, decided that it was impossible at that
time to swerve from our policy of strict non-interference.
Two years later ibn Sa'ud, without the assistance which he had tried to
obtain from us, though he was credited throughout Arabia with having secured
it, overran the Hasa, ejected without difficulty the small Turkish garrisons and
established himself on the coast at Qatif and Ojair. Captain Shakespear, on
his return to England in June 1914, from a long projected journey across
Arabia in the course of which he had visited Biyadh, bore witness to the strong
personal domination which ibn Sa'ud's vigorous and commanding personality
had established, and from other reports it was clear that he was regarded
beyond his own frontiers as the coming man. He proved more than a match
for the ineffective efforts of the Turks to retake the Hasa; they resorted to
diplomacy and opened negotiations with him through Saiyid Talib of Basrah.
Early in May Tal'at Beg had formulated in private conversation at the British
Embassy the expectations of the Ottoman Government in terms which seemed
to his hearers little consonant with actual conditions. He proposed to estab
lish a strictly delimited frontier between ibn Sa'ud and ibn Bashid, place repre
sentatives of the Sultan at Riyadh and at Hail, and rely upon the guile of these
officials to control without the aid of force the actions of the two Amirs. As
for the Hasa, ibn Sa'ud would be appointed Mutasarrif of the province, but
the collection of the customs would remain in Turkish hands and Turkish
garrisons would be replaced in the ports.
Nothing was more certain than that ibn Sa'ud appearance on the coast
must ultimately bring him into direct contact with ourselves whether we
welcomed it or sought to avoid it; and this anxiety underlay and possibly
accelerated the action of the Porte. But at the moment Turkish fears were
groundless. We were concerned wholly with the conclusion of prolonged nego-^
tiations with Constantinople touching interests in Mesopotamia and the Gulf
which w T ere of vital importance, and were less inclined, if possible, than before
for Arabian adventure. We made a friendly offer of mediation w 7 hich was
refused, and when, in April 191A, the Amir met the British Agent, Colonel
Grey, outside Kuwait, he was given to understand that we had recently con
cluded a comprehensive agreement wdth Turkey and could hold out to him no
hope of support. Ibn Sa'ud was thrown back on his own resources, but these
were considerable, and the secret treaty which was signed in May by himself
» u n Q ,, n , 1Qlft and the Wali of Basrah, fell short of Tal'at
Arab Bureau, 8th October 1916. tt i 1 ,
Beg s anticipations. He accepted the title
of Wali and Military Commandant of Najd which was offered to himself and
his descendants as long as they should remain loyal, and engaged to fly the
Turkish flag, but he was to have charge of the customs, on behalf of the Ottaman
Government, raise his own levies and provide the garrisons for Qatif and Ojair.
Deficiencies in the Najd budget were to be met from the customs, and no revenue
from any local income was to be paid to Constantinople until such time as there
was a surplus—an eventuality of doubtful occurrence. But while exercising in
his own territories an authority which w r as in all but the name that of an inde
pendent ruler, his correspondence with foreign Powers w 7 as to be conducted
solely through the Porte, and in case of war he was to come to the assistance of
the Sultan.