'British interests in Arabia' [‎1r] (1/4)

SECRET.
B. 247.
BRITISH INTERESTS IN ARABIA.
It is understood that a memorandurn is desired, explaining why the
•exclusion of Italy from Western and Southern Arabia and the Red Sea
littoral is important in British interests.
1. The importance of Arabia from its geographical position, lying along
two of tUe main approaches to India, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , is a
commonplace. ISio part of the country can be completely indifferent to
Great Britain, who is the only Power that at present has a foothold in the
country. Our hold is limited to a narrow fringe along the coast, from Aden
to Koweit; its security depends ultimately upon the tranquillity of the
interior. Since we are unable to intervene in, or control, the interior, it is
essential to exclude all possible seeds of disturbance.
2. Arabia is not a State in any effective sense, but a fortuitous concourse
of tribes—more or less settled in the fertile regions near the coast, elsewhere
wandering—under Chiefs, the limits of whose sway are determined, not by
frontiers, but by the tribes which they for the time being control. Their
politics are closely interwoven, and a quarrel may run light across the
continent. With the tribes and Chiefs along the coast mentioned we have
treaty relations.
3. In addition to this we occupy at Aden an area of 75 square miles
with a considerable hinterland, the frontier of which, with the Yemen, has
been demarcated. The Chiefs within this frontier are under our protec
torate.
4. The strategical importance of Aden need not be emphasised. The
fortress of Aden is almost impregnable against tribal forces. In circum
stances as they existed before the war we could hold it with a very small
force, and control the protectorate by means of prestige and subsidies.
5. The Aden-Yemen frontier is a frontier quoad the Turks, not quoad
the Arabs, who do not greatly respect it. Its demarcation was necessitated
largely by the intrigues of our semi-independent neighbour the Imam of
Sanaa, whom the Turks encouraged when it served their purpose, but could
never effectively control when he chose to defy them. But we had recognised
Turkish authority, and whenever some petty local incident occurred the only
remedy was representations at Constantinople. The Imam has pretty
extensive claims on our side of the frontier—indeed, they extend to the
Hadramaut tribes on the coast the other side of the protectorate. To the
north and north-east, where the frontier has not been demarcated, we are
safeguarded by the great desert, the Ruba al Khali, and by our treaty
relations with the Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla, which, however, suffice
only so long as the tribes of the Hadramaut hinterland are not tampered
with. '
0. In addition to being a fortress, Aden is the gateway of a considerable
land trade with the Yemen (worth before the war about 300,000i. per annum).
The construction of a railway from Aden to Taiz—desirable for political
reasons as well—would make Aden the main outlet for the trade of the
Yemen. If another Power is master of the Yemen, it will build a line from
Hodeida to Sanaa ; Hodeida will become the outlet, and Aden will lose the
trade it already possesses.
7. It is the Yemen on which Italian ambitions are mainly fixed. The
Yemen is as little a unity as Arabia itself, and when the Turk is ejected from
Arabia it will fall to no one Arab master. The Idrisi, we know, will claim
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