'Railway Policy in relation to General Military Policy in the Middle East' [‎2v] (4/10)

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of our sphere of protection, will be the backbone of the defence of British Mesopotamia
in the future.
1 he question of gauge is dealt with in paragraph 6.
(ii.) The Baghdad— A hanikin—Kermanshah project. —This railway was commenced
as being the only means within the time available of maintaining forces in North-West
Persia and getting control of the Caspian.
Ihe enemy's progress eastward via the Caucasus and the Caspian will now cease.
1 he Germans will be forced to leave the Caucasus, and the Turks are already
withdrawing behind their former frontiers. In any case for the present we have an
easier line of approach via Batum and Baku, which we intend to use.
In these circumstances we have no longer any object in controlling the Caspian
from Baghdad. Our immediate aim is merely to obtain political and economic
ascendency in Persia, which would be greatly strengthened by the construction of a
railway on to the Per.-ian plateau.
We have no guarantee that in the future military conditions similar to those which
forced us to go into Persia may not recur, and in these circumstances a railway on to
the plateau would be a military necessity. It is true that the alignment from Baghdad
has the strategic disadvantage of being parallel to the front, but to a large extent it is
protected by the rugged nature of Kurdistan.
r l he projected scheme of continuing the railway now under construction to some
point beyond Khanikin is certainly the easiest method of obtaining our immediate
political and economic aims, and may well prove the only feasible means of providing
for future possible military requirements.
r l his latter point can, however, only be settled by further surveys of the Basra—
• Khoramabad—Kermanshah or Hamadau line {vide 3 (iv.)). In any case we should
complete the line to the Persian frontier, beyond which it is not clear that we have
any right to pro eed. The option of doing so should be obtained from the Persian
Government at the first convenient opportunity, with a view to further extension,
which in General de Candolle's opinion must be metre gauge. [See Appendix B,
telegram No. X 9278 of iith December, 1918, from General de Candolle.)
(iii.) The extension beyond Tekrit. —This extension has been made for tactical
reasons only, and has now been stopped. The continuation of the line to Mosul, which
would be its ultimate objective, is not considered now to be a war-time proposition. We
have neither the material nor the time to finish such a work, nor in view of the
uncertainty of the future frontier is there any immediate object in doing so.
As a post-war proposition, we must face the facts that the whole section from
Nisibin to Baghdad will be completed, and will be of the first importance, as forming a
link in an overland route from Great Britain to India. This will have to be considered
in relation to the final settlement of Anatolia Peninsula that forms most of modern-day Turkey. , and also with reference to the delimitation
ot spheres of influence between ourselves and other Great Powers.
(iv.) Khanikin—Kifri—Altun Kewpri. —The Political Officer, Baghdad, # advocates
for political and economic purposes an extension from Khanikin via Kifri—Kirkuk—
Altun Keupri—Erbil—Mosul which, like the section from Baghdad to Khanikin, might
in the first instance be of metre gauge up to our frontier,.from material released by
conversion to standard gauge elsewhere. If continued to Mosul it would render the
extension in (iii) up the Tigris unnecessary.
(v.) Extension of the Baghdad—Feluja—Dhihhan Line. —This is a feeder on
standard gauge built to maintain our detachment on the Euphrates, aiid to meet any
1 urkish advance down the Euphrates at a sufficient distance from Baghdad.
The question of its extension to join up w 7 ith the Palestine system can only be
decided when spheres of influence as between ourselves and the French have been
settled. Surveys must then be made to ascertain if there is any route lying wholly
within our sphere which could compete with the Baghdad—Mosul—Alexandretta route.
Strategically it is most desirable that rail connection between British Palestine and
Mesopotamia should exist, otherwise we shall always be at a disadvantage against an
enemy able to threaten both from the direction of Muslimie.
.(vi.) Extension from Altun Keupri via the Wasna Pass to Tabriz. —This is
recommended by General de Candolle as a branch feeder for economic reasons. It is
not of military urgency though it should be surveyed.
3. Persian projects. —The plains of Mesopotamia will never be secure unless
we are in a position to occupy the Persian plateau at least up to Kermanshah to
protect our right flank, and also to operate against an enemy attempting to penetrate
towards India through Persia.
• R. 9839, dated 14th November, 1918.