'Railway Policy in relation to General Military Policy in the Middle East' [‎3v] (6/10)

Against the above must be put the following disadvantages :—
{a.) The port of Basra has been constructed to deal with metre-gauge traffic, but
with a view to possible conversion to standard gauge. The section from
Basra to Nasrie has also been laid with a view to conversion to standard
gauge.
It may, however, be mentioned that Basra is not necessarily the best
port obtainable, the Khor Abdulla being free from the disadvantage of the
bar and giving safe anchorage in deep water close in shore. As an
alternative to Basra or Koweit it merits consideration.
(6.) Lay-out has been designed at Baghdad for facilitating change from standard
to metre gauge, with the idea of converting the Baghdad —Hillah section
from standard to metre gauge.
(c.) Standard gauge would compete with India for heavier rails, for which there is
a great demand in that country ; against this, however, there is a certain
amount of standard-gauge material which should be available from Egypt.
{d.) Standard-gauge rolling stock is barely sufficient for working the existing line.
It is believed that there is little, if any, plant in India capable of
constructing or adapting locomotives for standard gauge. Therefore, at the
present time, all additional rolling stock would have to come from European
or American markets.
Summing up the above, it may be said that the retention of metre gauge will
meet existing requirements, and will be less expensive, but that looking to the future
there can be no question that a larger gauge is far preferable for through traffic, and
will eventually be adopted, and that the most suitable appears to be standard gauge.
(ii.) The Basra—Khoramabad—Kermanshah or Ramadan line, should it be
feasible would be strategically of great importance, but it seems possible that once
Hamadan is linked by rail with Baghdad the mam flow of trade will be to the great
central mart which the latter place will become, as it was in the past. General de
Candolle reports that this or any other long distance project in Persia must be metre
gauge for technical reasons.*
(iii.) The branch line from Baghdad eastwards and its extension might in the
first instance be metre gauge to the extent of completing work already in hand,
i.e., the line Baghdad — Khanikin — Kifri — Kirkuk — Altun Keupri. A change,
however, to standard gauge will be necessary if this is selected as the through route,
and the formation should be designed accordingly.
(iv.) The Baghdad—Feluja—Dhibban is now standard gauge. As it may
eventually be connected up with the Palestine system it should so remain.
(v.) The Baghdad—Kut meire-gauge line can be taken up and used elsewhere.
7. Conclusions. —(1.) Priority should be given to the construction of Euphrates
Valley line with a view to conversion to standard gauge, this being the backbone of
any future railway system in Mesopotamia.
(2.) Work on the Khanikin extension should be continued up to the frontier, as
at present, on metre gauge. An agreement should be made with the Persian
Government for its extension into the plateau, if such an agreement is necessary, and
work pushed on.
(3.) A survey should be made for an alignment to Mosul, via Kifri and Kirkuk,
■and from Altun Keupri up the Wasna Pass.
(4.) No extension should be made for the present towards Hit or Mosul.
5. A survey should be carried out on the various projected lines towards the
Persian plateau from the head of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .
6. The above projects should be carried out up to the limits of material available
from India so long as military, prisoner and other cheap labour is available.
7. Work should be stopped on the Mirjawa—Neh extension of the Indian
railway system.
8. The Chaman Keserve should only be replaced when cheap labour is no longer
available for construction in Mesopotamia.
General Staff,
%th December, 1918.
* Appeudix B.