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'Railway Policy in relation to General Military Policy in the Middle East' [‎4r] (7/10)

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The record is made up of 1 file (5 folios). It was created in 8 Dec 1918. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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APPENDIX A.
From Political, liut/lul id, Wth November, 1918.
(Repeated to Foreign.)
(No H. 9831).) (Received 16th, 1 p.m.)
Our railway policy in Mesopotamia has hitherto been determined by our immediate strategic needs.
The whole matter in its broadest aspects is now doubtless engaging' the attention ot Government, nit 1
venture nevertheless to submit, with consent of General Officer (Joiumanding-in-Chief, the following bnet
statement of certain local aspects of the question for such consideration as may seem called for.
Metre gauge lines exist from Basra to Nasiriyah, from Basra to .\marah, and from Kut through Bagnclacl
to near Khanikin. * A 2-ft. 6-in. line runs from Ilillah to Kill.
The following standard-gauge lines run from Baghdad
().) To Hi Huh.
(2.) To Dhibban, just beyond Felnja on Euphrates, and
(3.) To a point beyond Tekrit in direction of Mosul.
Brido-ino- and earthworks to link up Nasiriyah and Hillah by standard or metre gauge, as necessary, is in
hand and should be finished by March, 'ihe construction of this railway has become of greater importance
in view of general armistice, and it sliould be of standard gauge if possible, but if not, it should be
constructed on metre gauge and converted later. This line is of considerable importance from pditicul and
commercial point of view. The line from Baghdad to Kut is a military necessity only and could be taken
up on reduction of force and complelion oi Basia Baghdad line. , . c j a
The continuation of standard gauge nonhwards from Tekrit is being energetically pushed forward and
should reach northern limit of the Baghdad Vilayet by end of this month. Its continuance to Mosul is of
primary importance if we are to include this vilayet wnhin boundaries of the Irak btate. It, on the other
hand it is to fall within French sphere it is perhaps questionable whether it is expedient to utilize railway
material so urgently required elsewhere in these territories to extend our Irak railway system to Mosul. It
may not be linked up with Mediterranean for years to come, and m any case its completion would probably
militate against the construction of a British controlled line from Euphrates to Mediterranean the surveys
for which? n< w that we are in occupation of Karh-el-Qaim, could, if desired, be pressed forward.
It is doubtless realized that Baghdad—Mosul line passes through almost the whole of its length
through desert country which is not even potentially fertile except between Baghdad and bamarrah Ihe
alignment has been designed with an eye to through communication between Aleppo and Baghdad; tor
development of country [corrupt groupj at length alignment would be Khanikin Kitn Kirkuk A tun
Keupri Arbil—Mosul with branches to Sulaimanieh and Rania, but we are now presumably committtd to
^ ^ Whether or not Mosul is eventually excluded and Irak sphere is limited by Greater Zab, it will still be
possible to give effect to policy recently adumbrated for Kurdistan by carrying out foregoing railway
1 ,0,11.wards from Tekrit up the l-esser Zab to Altuu Keupn and Kania 1 regard this hue as essentia .f we
are to exercise any degree of effective control over Kurds aud thereby [.'uphoU] tlu destinies of
Armenians; the line would pass through very fertile wheat-growing country and could be extended to the
north-east eventually if desired. It could be surveyed forthwith.
Its construction would solve automatically many of the problems which now face us in Kiudis an,
Armenia aud North-West Persia, and might make an extension of the khanikin line to Germans hah
unnecessary for the present. . .... . . i „
If Lesser Zab is to be the north-west limit of Irak, ii becomes of primary political importance to make
the most of Sidaimanieh as a Kurdish centre; with this object we might well extend metre -gauge system
from Khanikin up the Dialha to Halebja plain and Sulaimameh. Tins line would almost certainly be
profitable The Ottoman tobacco regie is understood to have made 100,000/. per annum net profit out of the
tobacco frown n this district before the war, and it is a market for every sort of pastural and torest produce
as well as a line wheat-growing area. 1 recumme..d 'lut this be surveyed as soon as possible.
In conclusion 1 beg to urge importance of an early decision upon the general question of railways in
and beyond Mesopotamia. Apart from political and strategical issues involved it must be remembered that
river transport is almost entirely militarx ; at present personnel have been eMistjd ■ !or the <iurati u only,
and unless a proportion of fieet and personnel for working it is kept it is likely to be (^uite inadequate to
meet needs of the garrison and civil population unless supplemented by a through railway. . .
The same consideration applies in a lesser degree to railway personne but the numbers involved
relativl v totonnao-e [? handled] are much smaller and they should be more easily obtained.
APPENDIX B.
From General de Cundolle, Baghdad, to Director-!lener d of Movement* and Railways.
(No X ) 5th December, 1918.
I now submit mv report with suggestions as to what survey work might usefully be undei taken as
instructed in War Office telegram No. 70503, cipher, M.R. 2 ( a ) 02J, 9th November. \ou may desire type
of these surveys to be distributed, so as to be prepared to supply information needed during sitting o
Peace Conference. Time is very short and transport and escorts are difficult, so in that c ise reconnaissances
mitrht have to be substituted for the surveys suggested below. Technically, sole dependable basis tor
examining Persian railway problem are recent studies under Director ot Railways on line through
Kermanshah. Commercially, problem is inseparably (?) linked to development of prospects m Mesopotamia.
Taking first Kermanshah surveys and reconnaissances they prove that a reasonable lino can be o )tame( torn
Bae-hdad to Kermanshah, 258 miles. Only two bad stretches are descent to Maludasht 1 lam, miles to
miles 231, and Dardund Gorge, miles 170 to miles 178. Both will demand 1 m 30 gradient and it' degiees

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This printed report by the General Staff, War Office, concerns Great Britain's railway policy in relation to general military policy in the Middle East, covering projects in Mesopotamia, Persia, India, Syria and Palestine. There are also details concerning the question of track gauge and general conclusions. There are three appendices which include printed related correspondence and a map of 'The Middle East, Showing Railways Gauges, 1918' which is not present in this volume.

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1 file (5 folios)
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Foliation: The foliation sequence for this file commences at folio 21, and terminates at folio 25, as it is part of a larger physical volume; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio. An additional foliation sequence is also present in parallel between folios 7-153; these numbers are also written in pencil, but are not circled, and can be found in the same position as the main sequence.

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'Railway Policy in relation to General Military Policy in the Middle East' [‎4r] (7/10), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/18/B314, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100023488793.0x000008> [accessed 25 April 2024]

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