'Summary of the Hejaz revolt' [‎1] (3/32)

SECRET.
SUMMARY OF THE HEJAZ REVOLT.
Period from outbreak to end of 1917.
INDEX.
PAGK
J Narrative of events from June, 191to December, 191G.
2 Narrative of events from January. 1917, to November, 1917.
3 Narrative of events of December, 1917, and summary of the situation at the end of I j 1<.
4 Narrative of events during: Jahuary f nd February, 1918.
5 Narrative of events during March and April, 1918.
C Narrative of events during 1 April and May, 1918.
7 Narrative of events during .June, 1818.
8 Narrative of events during July, 1918.
9 Narrative of events during August, 1918, and summary of the situation up till the end of
August, 1918.
,11,12 Appendix A.—King Flussein.
12, 14 Appendix B.—Ibn Saud.
14 Appendix C. —Ibn Rnshid.
14,15 Appendix 1>.—The J^mal Pashas.
15, 16 Appendix E.—Maurice's report.
16, 17 Appendix F —Enemy political activity.
18 Appendix G.—Zionist movement.
18, 19 Appendix tl.—Turkish interposition between main British and Arab forces.
19, 20 Appendix K.—Koweit blockade
21 Appendix L.—Attitude of the Northern Arabian tribes towards the Ilejaz revolt.
22, 23 Appendix M.—Fakhri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. at Medina.
28, 21 Appendices N and 0.—Enemy casualties and Turkish troops.
Man.
1. Although the Shenf* did not issue his Proclamation to the world until some
days later, the Arab Revolt in the Hejaz may be said to have begun on the 5th June, 1916,
when a corJon of Arabs under the command of two of the Sherit s sons, Feisal and Ali,
was drawn up round Medina.
The Hejaz railway line was at once attacked at several points, but the Arabs,
inexpert in demolition work, were unable to effect serious damage before being dm en oti
by parties of Turks with machine guns. Traffic was. therefore, not seriously interrupted
and the Turkish line of communication to Damascus remained intact. Nor could the
Arabs, who were short of arms and supplies and who had but few guns, do more than
invest Medina from a distance. They, however, attacked Jeddah on the 9tli June,
and the garrison, cut off from Mecca by the loss of the blockhouses on the road, and
exposed to naval guns and aeroplanes, yielded to the demands of the civil population and
surrendered about a week later. About three weeks later the weak garrison remaining in
Mecca, after the summer move ofthe Governor-General to Laif,also surrendered. 1 his latter
place held out until the 23rd September after having been blockaded about three and a halt
months by Sherif Abdulla, the Sherif of Mecca's second son, with a mixed force of Bedouins
and Meccan townsfolk. Though regularly bombarded it had never really been assaulted.
Smaller places such as Lith and \ambo had surrendered as soon as they were
seriously attacked, and by the end of September, 1916 , the greater part of the Hejaz
was clear of troops, though the railway still remained intact.
2. Meanwhile Turkish reinforcements had been rapidly sent from the north, and
the situation at Medina was radically changed.t The Turkish forces, which had been
strengthened, re-armed, re-victualled and re-assured by successful sorties during these
past four months, were able in September to march out and, driving the Arabs before
them, to make Medina secure by establishing a cordon of fortified posts at a distance of
about 30 miles from the town along the roads leading to Mecca. They even at one
time (the end of October) threatened to occupy Rabegh and Yambo, out, with a ration
strength of about 14,000, they appear not to have felt capable of holding such distant
posts together with their long lines of communication ; and considerable Arab forces
having moved up from the south and south-west "they withdrew again towards the end
of 1916 to behind the line of fortified outposts and to the town itself.
(6144 19)
* See Appendix a.
| See Appendix 0.
A