'Summary of the Hejaz revolt' [‎2] (4/32)

3. In addition to this force at Medina, known as the Hejaz Expeditioparv Force, a
Composite Force under Jemal III.* of which the strength in January, 1917, wJs
some 5,000 rations, was established with headquarters at Tehuk, and another forcet
(consisting in June. 1917, of four battalions) had its headquarters at Maan. To these
forces were apportioned fixed sections of the line, each having small garrisons posted at
the various stations in its area. '
4. The Arab forces, though numerically strong, lacked guns and supplies. Thev
were deficient in small arms, equipment and organization. Sherlf Feisal, who at the
outbreak of the revolt commanded the Sherifial forces in the Medina area, had three
camps of some 10,000 men each, but no single camp had as many as 2,000 rifles ;
contingents of men joined or left at will, and his troops were quite inexperienced in the
art of modern warfare. Steps were taken to organize, arm and equip the Arabs, and
towards the end of 1916 they were formed into three independent groups, one under
Shenf Ali, about 8,000 strong, facing Medina on the south, another under Sherif
Abdulla, numbering some 4,000 men, encirclinor Medina on the east and north-east, while
Sherif leisal, with some 8,000 to 9,000 men, the pick of the force, was based on Yambo
and operated against the railway. Such supreme command as was exercised anpears to
havt^ been vested in Sherif Hussein personally with Aziz Bey el Masri as Minister
of War.
5. By this time it had become clear that little was to be hoped from an Arab sie^e
of Medina, and even less from any assaults the Arabs might be induced to make on its
works. The operations which suggested themselves as likely to produce the most
fruitful results were systematic raids on the Hejaz railway, which, from Medina to
Damascus, consists of some 800 miles of single track. But, to enable these to be carried out
and also to extend the revolt to the north towards Syria, it was necessary to have more
northerly bases. With this object in view Shenf Feisal with his northern army installed
himself at Wejh, already occupied by landing parties, in January, 1917, and proceeded
to extend his hold further to the north towards Dhaba and Moweilah on the Red Sea
coast. His brother Sherif Abdulla had meanwhile moved with his force to Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Ais,
north-west of Medina; while his other brother, Sherif Ali, remained in his old place
south and south-west of that town. The raiding carried out during the following six|
months, with British and French assistance, lowered the strength and spirit of the
Turkish forces at Medina, and attracted many fresh Arab elements, but it did not
isolate that town. The railway line proved harder to wreck permanently, and the
enemy better prepared to effect repairs, than had been expected. Demolition work
without hope of loot and any dogged occupation of points on the broken track did not
appeal to the Bedouins, and it was not till the autumn of 1917 that a different policy,
that ol mining trains, with the attraction of consequent plunder, was acted upon. This
immediately pioduced more satisfactory results, but the Arabs could not be induced to
complete the destruction of a train or of the permanent way before starting to search
for plunder.
6. Meanwhile, Akaba had been captured on the 6th July by a Sherifial force,
accompanied by Lawrence,§ and Sherif Feisal moved there in July, 1917, thus enablinii'
operations and propaganda to be extended much farther to the north. The railway
See Appendix D. f g €e Appendix 0.
+ Baghdad fell on the 11th March. This event does not seem to have reacted on the Hejaz situation to
the extent tliat might have been expected, possibly owing to the lack of cohesion which was still apparent
m August, 1918, between different factions in Arabia.
§ Capt%in Lawrence left Wejh on the 9th May, 1917, with a few men and Sherif Nasir, with the
intention of visiting some of the Northern Uejaz tribes, and, if possible, to open Akaba for use as a supply
base for the Arab forces.
His route lay to Jauf to see Nuri Shaalan, but on bearing he was north Lawrence proceeded to Nebk, near
Qaf, where he met Auda Abu Tayi, of the Howeitat. Sherif Nasir remained in Qaf to enrol Rualla, Sherarat
and Howeitat for the Akaba Expedition, while Lawrence proceeded north to near Tadmur and thence west to
Baulbek, where ho blew up a small railway bridge, and thence south to within 3 miles of Damascus ; thence
to Salkhad in the Druse country and from there to Azrak, where he saw Nuri Shaalan and his son, Nawwai.
About the end of June, Lawrence rejoined Nasir, and on the oOth they moved to El defer, east of Maair
thence to Km. 479, where the railway was destroyed on a large scale. They then marched to Fuweilah on thJ
. laan A kaba road, where the trendarme post had been destroyed by an advance column, but had been reoccupied
by the 4/1 1 8th beefiment from Maan. Ihey secured the practical annihilation of this battalion at Aba Lissan on
the 2nd duly, taking prisoner the Officer Commanding, ItiO men, with a mountain gun. They then captured the
post s at .Meriga and (iueira, capturing 5 officers and 100 men. then marched on El Kethira, wiping out a post
of 3 othcers and 140 men, thence to El Khadra, north of Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Ithm. The party entered Akaba on the
6th Jul}, 1917, with GOO prisoners, about 20 officers and a German non-commissioned officer, having- killed
some 700 Turks.
Lawrences journey was all the more remarkable for the fact that during the whole time his head was
worth to any enterprising Arab the sum of i;T. 5,000.