'Summary of the Hejaz revolt' [‎8] (10/32)

8)
which is centred in Riadh, with the result that the Governor of Khurma had defected
to the Wahabis. Hussein, at the instigation of Abdulla, despatched a punitive force
to Khurma which was ignominously defeated. Though it is not clearly established
that Ibn Saud, the Emir of Nejd, was directly responsible for the situation at Khurma,
Hussein's instinctive fear of his rival was sufficient to suggest Wahabi designs against ^
Mecca, Hussein feeling particularly vulnerable on account of the commitment of the
most efficient part of his forces to the north under Feisal. There is no doubt that at
this period the mind of King Hussein was in a thoroughly unsettled state, and
that the long, simmering trouble between him and Ibn Saud was on the point of
boiling over.
24. I setters from Ibn Rashid, intercepted by bedouins, showed that, although
he had reached Hail (see paragraph 20), he was unable, owing to British precautions,
to obtain supplies from Koweit. He complained bitterly of his treatment by the
Turkish officers, particularly by Fakhri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. . In reply to a letter sent to him by
Sherif Abdulla offering him good treatment if he threw over the Turks, he expressed
his willingness to join the Sherifians, but asked for delay, probably with a view to
consulting the Turkish political agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , Abdul Hamid, who was en route to join him,
and to whom reference is made later, and in expectation of the arrival of his own agent)
Rashid Ibn Leilah, * from Damascus, with two guns and two machine guns,t presents
from the Turks. (His a^ent was still in Damascus, July, 1918.) In the light of the
above-mentioned situation at Khurma the motive underlying Abdulla's overtures
seems apparent.
25. On the 1st and 3rd July , Maan w-as bombed. On the 4th the Arabs attacked
Jerdun and the railway, damaging the latter, and tqok 13 prisoners, exclusive of a
Turkish picquet. On the 5th, reports from Maan showed that there was no money
to purchase supplies, the (garrison had lived on indifferent rations for two months,
desertions, even among officers, had been frequent and animals were dying daily from
starvation. On the 6th, the town was again bombed, and Jerdun was bombed on the
8th. On the 12th July it was reported that the railway from the north had apparentlv
been repaired as far as Hasa, and on the 14th orders were issued that repairs to the
north of Maan were to be effected by removing rails from the line south of that place
(.see note to paragraph 18), but it was not anticipated that it would be completed through
to Maan before the end of July.
26. On the 17th July a Turkish force, composed of two columns, concentrated at
Kutrani and Samra respectively, with the object of operating against an Arab detach
ment north-west of Kutrani. The Turks claimed to have encountered this force and to
have driven it southwards in disorder, but this was not confirmed. On this date the
food question at Maan was again reported to be critical; rations and forage consumed
daily amounted to three tons, while the weekly convoys from Juruf rarely carried more
than nine tons. The population had created disturbances and demanded to be allowed
to proceed to Damascus if food was unobtainable at Maan; the Sheikhs had held a
meeting and passed a resolution deciding to co-operate w'th Feisal in the event of his
attacking the town. On the 21st the Arabs attacked the line between Jerdun and
Maan and held the line and its water supply up to the evening of the 23rd. The
enemy's loss was considerable. Their relief column advancing towards Jerdun was
engaged by the Arabs and forced to retire, though the Turks claimed to have inflicted
heavy casualties on the Arabs (our official reports say 70), and themselves admitted to
11 killed and 20 wounded. The Maan transport animals which were at Jerdun at the
time carrying water and supplies, were all killed by shell fire, Maan thus being deprived
of transport. On the 20th and 23rd Maan was again bombed.
27. In the southern Hejaz the Arabs destroyed 250 rails, some bridges and
* First heard of about November, 1916, when, as Ibn Kashid's agent, be visited Ajaimi es Saadun,
escorted by some 30 Turkish soldiers, and in December, 1916, purchased certain stores in Nejf, for which
ae wns unable to arrange a safe passage back to Hail through the tribes which lay on his road. He was
made a I'asha by the Turks in order to secure his interest in their propaganda. He was all powerful at Hail
and the Emir was under his thumb. He was present at the light between the Kashid^'te and Sherifal lorces
near Ilanakiyah {{see paragraph 9), although it is not certain if the Emir himself was present. lie arrived
at Medain Saleh with the Emir in August. 1917, and shortly afterwards left for Constantinople and returned
to Uamascus on the 12th February. 1918, where he still was at the beginning of August.
f Nuri Shaalan, paramount Sheikh of the Rualla (Anazah), is now believed to have definitely come into
the open on the side of the Sherif against the Turks. He has until recently been sitting on the feuce and
making a i<ood thing out of the contraband caravan traffic (see note to paragraph 19). He was recently
reported to have stated that lie would pass Rashid Ibu Leilah through his^ capital, Jauf, on the road to Hail,
but would hold up any guns or munitions of war accompanying him. {See Appendix L.)