'Report by Sir Gilbert Clayton, K.C.M.G., K.B.E., C.B., on his Mission to the King of Hejaz and of Najd and its Dependencies, for the purpose of negotiating a settlement of outstanding questions. (April-June, 1928)' [‎5] (7/96)

5
8. In order fully to appreciate the King's attitude on this point,
it will be necessary to relate his version of the circumstances in which
the first Protocol of Uqair was drawn up. This Protocol was signed
at Uqair on the 2nd December, 1922, as an appendix to the Muham-
mara Convention of May, 1922, in which provision was made for
the fixing of a frontier between 'Iraq and Najd. Ibn Sa'ud alleges
that his delegates at Muhammara had signed the Convention in
error ; that he (Ibn Sa'ud) had steadfastly refused to ratify it on
the ground that a hard-and-fast frontier in mid-desert would be
contrary to all the established usages of nomadic life ; that he had
repeatedly pointed out at the time that such a frontier, with its
inevitable corollaries in the form of posts and fortifications in the
open desert, would be repugnant to his tribes ; and that he had
finally given his assent only when Sir Percy Cox had offered, six
months later at Uqair, to insert a clause containing such guarantees
as would meet his essential objections. Thus it was, according to
Ibn Sa'ud, that Article 3 of the Protocol of Uqair come into being.
He maintains that it was only because of his firm belief that that
Article was intended to prevent the erection of posts anywhere in
the open desert on either side of the border, that he consented to
accept the frontier and ratify the Convention.
9. I took the line that His Majesty's Government did not accept,
and could not admit, his interpretation of Article 3 of the Uqair
Protocol; that they regarded the distance of Busaiya from the
frontier to be such that it could not reasonably be held to lie " in the
vicinity of the frontier " ; and that they were bound to uphold the
principle that the 'Iraq Government, as well as the Najd Govern
ment, were at liberty to take such administrative measures within
their own territory as seemed to them necessary for the better super
vision of the desert. Throughout the conversations, I abstained
from embarking too far upon a discussion of the merits or demerits
of the posts at Busaiya and elsewhere. I preferred to take my
stand on the unassailable ground of a fixed principle, namely, that,
in the absence of any specific undertaking to the contrary, the
sovereign right of each Government to take such internal measures
as it thought necessary was one which His Majesty's Government
were determined to uphold.
10. Eventually, I came to the conclusion that not only was
Ibn Sa'ud unwilling on the ground of general policy to give way on
the question of the posts, but also that he was precluded from doing
so by the attitude of his people. I used every means of persuasion
and pressure at my disposal, and when these failed I decided to
recommend, as an alternative to rupture, that the negotiations be
suspended. The advent of the pilgrimage celebrations which were
requiring the King's presence at Mecca for over a month made it
necessary to bring our conversations to a close in any case. Ibn Sa'ud
accepted my suggestion, and he also agreed to a formal exchange of
letters {see Annexure 4*), in which a peaceful modus vivendi was
* Page 66.
(13548 C) b 3