'File 61/14 VII (D 51) Relations between Nejd and Iraq' [‎6r] (26/416)

Demi-official letter from L. D, Wakely, Esq.,
C.B., Secy., Pol, Deptt., India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. ,
No. 'P.-3559128, dated the 12 th July 1928.
I enclose herewith, in order that you may have
it at the earliest possible date and in ease it may
be useful for purposes of reference, three advance
opies of Sir Gilbert Clayton's report, dated 10th
■July on his recent mission to Ibn Saud. The
annexures to the report are not yet available.
Letter from Brigadier-General Sir Gilbert
Clayton, K.C.M.G., K.B.E., C.B., to the
Under Secretary of State for the Colonies,
dated the 10 th July 1928.
v I have the honour to refer to Colonial Office
letter No. 59092128 of the 17th April 1928 (Serial
No. 195 in F. No. 63-N.|28), relating to the nego
tiations which I was appointed to conduct with
His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Najd
and its Dependencies, and to submit my report
on the progress and the results of my mission.
2. I left London on the 19th April accompanied
by Flight Lieutenant G. M. Moore, M.C., and
arrived in Alexandria on the 24th April. I was
met by Mr. G. Antonius, C.B.E., Assistant Sec
retary to the Palestine Government, and proceed
ed on the same day to Cairo where I was met
by Mr. B. H. Bourdillon, C.M.G., Counsellor to
the Kesidency in Baghdad, Mr. K. Cornwallis,
C.M.G., C.B.B., D.S.O., Adviser to the Ministry
of the Interior in Iraq, and Captain J. B. Glubb,
O.B.E., M.C., Administrative Inspector in the
Iraq Government Service.
3. I spent two days in Cairo during which I
had the advantage of conversation with Lord
Lloyd, and also with Mr. Bourdillon who had
been specially deputed by the High Commis
sioner for Iraq to acquaint me more fully with
his view on the subject-matter of the negotiations.
Mr. Bourdillon left for Baghdad on the 26th
April, and on the same day I left for Port Said
with Captain Glubb and Flight Lieutenant Moore
and embarked on the S. S. " Chindwin " for
Port Sudan. Mr. Cornwallis and Mr. Antonius
joined the u Chindwin " at Suez, as did also Mr.
A. Antippa of the Palestine Service, who had
been lent as Stenographer to the Mission.
4. The Mission reached Port Sudan on the
afternoon of the 30th April and sailed at noon
on the following day on board H. M. S.
*' Dahlia " (Commander H. Cotton, R.N.),
^arriving at Jedda at 10 a.m . on the 2nd May. On
'/arrival I was informed that the King had been
delayed in Buraida and could not reach Jedda
till the end of that week. His Majesty passed
through Jedda on the 5th May on his way to
Mecca where he had to pay the customary ritual
visit, and returned to Jedda on the morning
of the 7th. At 10-30 a.m . on that day, he re-
iCeived me with the other members of the Mission
in formal audience, and it was then arranged
that negotiations should be opened on the follow?
ing day.
5. Accordingly, the first meeting took place at
<8 a.m . on Tuesday the 8th May. Negotiations
were formally opened at that meeting and conti
nued with little intermission until Sunday the
20th May. Twelve meetings were held at which
both His Majesty and myself were present, and a
detailed summary of the conversations will be
found in the' enclosed Record of Proceedings
(Annexure* 1). Concurrently with my con
versations with the King, Mr. Cornwallis held
a series of meetings in committee with His
Majesty's advisers (see enclosed memorandum
and minutes, Annexure* 2) at which the subsi
diary questions atfecting Iraq were discussed. As
soon as these were over, a further series of meet
ings were held by Mr. Antonius in committee
with the King's advisers, at which questions
affecting Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan were dealt with (see en
closed memorandum, Annexure* 3).
6. The first question which came up for dis
cussion was, naturally, that of the desert posts,
and the incidents connected therewith. The
King seized the earliest opportunity of defining
his attitude; and from that attitude, as defined
by him at our first meeting, he never receded.
The deadlock to which our conversations carried
us may be said virtually to have been reached at
the end of the second meeting, when I had com
municated to him the views of His Majesty's
Government. My first task in this Report will
be to set forth, as briefly as possible, the main
points of the attitude taken up by the King,
together with an outline of the course which I
adopted to meet his arguments.
7. It will be remembered that the immediate
cause of the present dispute was the construction
by the Iraq Government of a post at Busaiya
which is a w T ater-point in the desert, at a distance
of some 75 miles from the Iraq-Najd frontier,
and 55 miles from the nearest point in the neutral
zone. On various grounds the King objected
to the construction of that post, and in support
of his objection invoked Article 3 of the first
Protocol of Uqair, which reads as follows :—
The two Governments mutually agree not
to use the watering-places and wells
situated in the vicinity of the border
for any military purpose, such as
building forts on them, and not to
concentrate troops in their vicinity".
The Iraq Government, on the other hand, re
jected Ibn Sa'ud's contention, and held that the
above clause could not by any reasonable inter
pretation be regarded as applying to Busaiya.
8. In order fully to appreciate the King's
attitude on this point, it will be necessary to relate
his version of the circumstances in which the
first Protocol of Uqair was drawn up. This pro
tocol was signed at Uqair on the 2nd December,
1922, as an appendix to the Muhammara Con
vention of May, 1922, in which provision was
made for the fixing of a frontier between Iraq
and Najd. Ibn Sa'ud alleges that his delegates
at Muhammara had signed the Convention in
error; that he (Ibn Sa'ud) had steadfastly re
fused to ratify it on the ground that a hard-and-
fast frontier in mid-desert would be contrary to
all the established usages of nomadic life ; that
he had repeatedly pointed out at the time that
such a frontier, with its inevitable corollaries in
the form of posts and fortifications in the open
desert, would be repugnant to his tribes; and
that he had finally given his assent only when
Sir Percy Cox had offered six months later at
Uqair, to insert a clause containing such guaran
tees as would meet his essential objections. Thus
it was, according to Ibn Sa'ud, that Article 3
of the Protocol of Uqair came into being. He
maintains that it was only because of his firm
belief that that article was intended to prevent
the erection of posts anywhere in the open desert
U3UFD
*Not received.