'File 61/14 VII (D 51) Relations between Nejd and Iraq' [‎13r] (40/416)

of a raid at so critical a moment was of such advantage to both parties as to justify
the exceptional action taken. The other incidents related to the crossing of the
common frontier by aeroplanes and armoured cars engaged upon reconnaissance
duties. As you are now aware, on these occasions no bombs were dropped in Nejd
territory. In view of the circumstances existing at the time, and of the justifiable
uncertainty then felt as to the ability of King Ibn Saud to re-establish effective
control over his tribes. His Majesty's Government consider that any relaxation of
precautions at that time would have been unjustified and inconsistent with their
responsibility for the defence of Iraq. In these circumstances they consider that the
local authorities were justified in continuing reconnaissance across the Nejd frontier
until they were satisfied that the meeting between King Ibn Saud and yourself
would in fact take place, and that His Majesty would be si^ccessful in preventing
the serious raid which was then threatened and re-establishing some measure of
effective control over his recalcitrant tribes.
His Majesty's Government therefore consider it desirable that the explanation
conveyed to King Ibn Saud in regard to these incidents should not take the form
of an admission that the action in question was unjustified. Such an admission
would, in the circumstances set out above, in their opinion, be uncalled for, nor can
it be overlooked in this connexion that an explanation so worded as to admit of being
regarded as an admission of error on the part of His Majesty's Government and the
Iraq Government would be likely to encourage a demand on the part of King Ibn
Saud for the payment of damages. If, therefore. King Ibn Saud raises the question
again on your return to the Hejaz, you should acquaint him with the true facts, as
reported in Sir H. Dobbs's telegrams of the 23rd and the 26th May, and should
explain to him that in the absence of the definite assurance from His Majesty for
which His Majesty's Government had asked in regard to the prevention of further
raids, and in view of the disquieting and conflicting reports which reached Iraq
at the time of the conference at Buraidah, the continuance of active reconnaissance
as a precautionary measure was considered to be necessary. You may add that His
Majesty's Government would not, in view of the terms of article 6 of the Bahra
Agreement, have sanctioned these measures but for the critical conditions which
then obtained on the frontier. As already indicated in paragraph 5 of this letter, His
Majesty's Government regard this article as applying to British as well as to Iraqi
forces, and intend to observe its stipulations. The reconnaissances were in fact
suspended immediately reassuring information as to the situation was received, and
His Majesty's Government much regret that the action taken should have proved
a cause of embarrassment to King Ibn Saud.
7. From paragraph 27 of your report it is observed that King Ibn Saud proposes
to prefer a claim to compensation in respect of losses suffered by Nejdi tribesmen
in the course of the operations carried out by the Royal Air Force. His Majesty's
Government cannot regard any such claim as admissible, and you should do your
utmost to resist a claim of this nature if presented, and to obtain full compensation
for the Iraq Government both on account of the attack upon the post at Busaiyah
and on account of subsequent raids upon Iraqi tribes. If, however, you are satisfied
that there is no possibility of securing both compensation from Ibn Saud for the
Busaiyah incident, and at the same time the withdrawal of his claim in respect of
bombing operations in Nejd territory, and that insistence on this would have the
effect of endangering a settlement, you are authorised in the last resort to acquiesce
m an arrangement whereby the claim of the Iraq Government for compensation in
respect of the attack on Busaiyah would be set off against King Ibn Sand's claim
tor bombing operations, and these two claims would then be allowed to cancel out,
while the remaining and financially more important Iraq claims in respect of
subsequent raids would be referred to the special tribunal contemplated in article 2
of the Bahra Agreement.
8. In paragraphs 31 to 36 of your report you have recorded the results of your
discussions with King Ibn Saud and of subsequent conferences at Jerusalem on
questions arising out of past raids across the Nejd- Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan frontier. You are
authorised to inform King Ibn Saud, as is proposed in paragraph 34 of your report,
at, although His Majesty's Government cannot admit a condition such as that
proposed m clause 5 of the draft terms of reference to the arbitrator who is to
past raids, they are prepared to give him an assurance to the effect
that the arbitrator will be fully informed of his view that all past claims which were
not omcially registered at the time of the raid, or soon after, should be excluded from
purview of the arbitrator. You are also authorised to adopt the procedure