'File 61/14 VII (D 51) Relations between Nejd and Iraq' [‎47r] (108/416)

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his agreement to this arrangement, and I deem it vital that it be strictly observed by
the Iraq Government and by His Majesty's forces in Iraq.
15. A sharp attack of fever incapacitated me for the next four days, during
which Taufiq Bey Suwaidi had an interview with the King and discussions with his
advisers. He was unable, however, to bring about any change in Ibn Sand's attitude,
and I decided to fix the date of our departure for Thursday, the 9th August,
lequesting the presence at Jeddah of H.M.S. " Clematis" on that date.
16. During my indisposition the King paid me a personal visit for the purpose
of asking after my health, and two days later Mr. Antonius had an interview with
him in order to convey my thanks for his kindness and courtesy. During this visit
Mr. Antonius had the opportunity of conversation on the questions under discussion,
and I also had another interview on the 8th August, the day before our departure.
17. On both these occasions the King, while maintaining his attitude
unchanged, gave clear evidence of his sincere desire to avoid any break of his
relations with His Majesty's Government, and gave us the very definite impression
that he meant to do his utmost to keep his tribesmen under control and to maintain
peace on the frontier. I am of opinion that, while he has been somewhat shaken by
the, to him, unexpected attitude of His Majesty's Government in the matter of the
XJqair Protocol and by their decision in respect of the advanced posts, his long
standing feelings of friendship towards Great Britain remain substantially
unchanged, and that he will do his utmost to maintain friendly relations and observe
the provisions of existing agreements. . . „ - j
18. He appears convinced that his obligations towards his people m Nejd
render it impossible for him to give way, and it is probable that he hopes, by holding
out firmly, to make it clear that he has supported them, thus strengthening his
influence to an extent which will enable him to keep them in hand and prevent any
serious outbreak. > . .
19. If this is a correct appreciation, there is justifiable hope that the situation
may resolve itself in the course of time, provided no untoward incidents on the
frontier inflame it afresh.
20. I recommend, therefore, that the policy to be adopted be one of scrupulous
observance of existing agreements, and that, above all, no violation of the Nejd
frontier be permitted, unless a situation of such gravity should arise as to render
abnormal measures unavoidable and entirely justifiable. There will almost certainly
be unrest, and possibly a recrudescence of raiding across the frontier in the coming
autumn and winter; but the line between raiding and deliberate hostile attack
should be kept clearly defined. Constant vigilance and a carefully thought-out
defensive organisation'will be essential, but I submit that the measures taken should
be such as cannot be construed as violating the provisions of existing agreements;
otherwise they will inevitably provoke the very danger which they are designed to
meet, and may produce a situation which will commit the Iraq Government to
indefinite embarrassment and expense.
21. To summarise the questions which I was instructed by the terms of your
letter under reference to discuss with Ibn Sand :—
{a.) The major issues of the interpretation of article 3 of the Uqair Protocol
and of the advanced posts have been dealt with above.
(b.) The proposed extradition and hon voisinage agreements were not discussed
in detail with the Hejaz and Nejd Government, either by my mission or by the Iraq
delegation, as our instructions laid down clearly that their negotiation and conclu
sion were conditional upon an acceptable settlement in regard to the question of the
posts. I was not reluctant to drop these agreements for the present, as, in view of
the distrust and suspicion of the Iraq Government which exists in the minds of the
King's advisers, and, indeed, of Ibn Sand himself, I feel that they would serve no
useful purpose at this stage, and would probably only be used as a means of
supporting future complaint against the Iraq Government of violation of treaty
engagements. They are better reserved until such time as an atmosphere of greater
friendliness and mutual confidence may prevail.
{c.) For the same reason the questions of recognition of the Hejaz and Nejd
Government by Iraq and Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , and of the exchange of representatives, were
not carried beyond a general intimation to Ibn Sand that they were susceptible of
solutions favourable to him if a satisfactory settlement could be arrived at in regard
to the posts. It was obviously undesirable to make for no return concessions which
may be of use in the future.
(d.) Ibn Sand did not again allude to his vehement protest against the violation
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