'Persian Gulf précis. (Parts I and II)' [‎37r] (73/120)

{Confidential?)
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. Precis, Part II.
The previous precis relating to the Baghdad Railway question and the
respective interests of Great Britain and Turkey in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. summa
rised the correspondence up to April 1911. The proposals which it was then
decided to ask the Turkish Government to accept are ^iven in detail in
Mr. Parker's memorandum* of 30th March 1911. Briefly the most
important of these were—(a) construction of the Baghdad Gulf section of the
railway to be undertaken by a company nominally Turkish, but in fact half
German, half British, British participation being 50^ ; (6) terminus to be
Kuwait; (c) Turkish suzerainty over Kuwait to be recognised, but Shaikh's
autonomy guaranteed; (d) adjustment of all Turkish claims in the Gulf to
form part of the settlement. The Government of India expressed general
approval of these proposals. In doing so they urged that the strength of our
position at Kuwait and in the Gulf should be steadily kept in view when
dealing with the adjustment of all Turkish claims in the Gulf, so that no
opening should be allowed for Turkey or any other Power to encroach on its
shores,^that complete autonomy should be claimed for the Shaikh with whom
we should share the absolute control of the harbour and port ashore and
afloat: that the pilotage and buoyage of the Gulf and the Shatt-el-Arab
should be in British hands; that none but British and local troops should be
stationed at Kuwait which was not to be fortified except with British consent
and that the duration of the enhanced Turkish customs should be contingent
on the non-infringement of British rights in the (iulf and on the absence
of preferential rates on the Baghdad and branch railway lines.
2. Up to this point the policy of His Majesty's Government had been
based on the assumption that Kuwait was
Cbange of policy. the only port where it was possible for
the railway to debouch and that, consequently, the line could find no exit on
the Gulf except at a port under British control. A survey of the Shatt-el-Arab,
however, disclosed the fact that a deep channel existed into the river which
could without difficulty be made navigable by any ships which could reach
and use the harbour at Kuwait. The Government of India were the
first to recognize that the position was thus entirely changed. Kuwait
lost at once much of its importance as a bargaining factor and the
chances of Basrah being eventually chosen as the terminal port for thrt
railway greatly increased. Moreover, during 1911 various incidents indicated
that the Germans and Turks were alive to the possibilities of the situation.
The latter demanded the removal of British buoys and marks, asserting
that Turkey alone is responsible for the navigation of the river where, for
over fifty years, the work of surveying and lighting had been carried out by
British Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. to the general satisfaction of all concerned. The impression
prevailed ^that the Turks intended shortly to levy _ dues on steamers. The
obvious intention was to challenge the British position and eliminate Persian
co-operation by appeal to the treaty of Erzeroum and the explanatory note
under which Turkey claims to control the entire river while guaranteeing free
access to Mohammerah.
From a British point of view the outlook was serious for 70 per cent,
of the trade and 85 per cent, of the shipping was British owned. It
was obviously imperative to take steps at once to safeguard British interests
and rights in the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab. llis Excellency the
Viceroy telegraphed to the Secretary of State, on the 8th June 1911, pointing
out that it would be a mistake to continue to press for Kuwait as the terminus
of the railway, for the Basrah -Kuwait section would never pay but fall into
disuse as Basrah developed. His Excellency urged that '* in the event of
Basrah becoming the terminus, our policy should be to endeavour to obtain
• Persiau Gulf Precas, July 1911, page 62,