'File 61/11 V (D 95) Hejaz - Nejd, Miscellaneous' [‎168v] (353/530)

2
Arabia is a primitively organised State, whose admission to the League might
not bring with it an accession of strength, but rather tend, if anything, to weaken
the authority of that body. Secondly, in spite of the intentions attributed to
King Ibn Saud by Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, there seems no reason to anticipate that
any serious effort is likely to be made by King Ibn Saud and his Government to
put an end to the institution of slavery as part of the social structure of Saudi
Arabia. The Abyssinian precedent is not a safe one to invoke in this connexion,
since, apart from the fact that the general attitude of the Abyssinian Government
towards the possible abolition of the institution of slavery is probably less
unsatisfactory than is likely to be that of the Saudi Government, an application
by the Saudi Government for admission to membership of the League is not likely
to attract at Geneva the general political support which was responsible for the
election of Abyssinia in 1923, and such an application might, indeed, meet with
powerful opposition. Finally, a further and serious disadvantage, from the
point of view of His Majesty's Government, is that, if the Saudi candidature
were successful, this would undoubtedly increase the discontent felt in Egypt
against her exclusion from the League pending the negotiation of a treaty
settlement with His Majesty's Government.
6. You will appreciate the fact that the argument based on the indefinite
character of the Saudi frontiers is not strong, since, unless the Saudi Government
were formally and finally to renounce their claims to the Maan-Akaba area—
which seems in the highest degree improbable—it would, as you are aware, not
be to the interest either of His Majesty's Government or of the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan
authorities to accede at this moment to any request from the Saudi Government
for the delimitation on the ground of the Hadda frontier between Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan
and Nejd, or for a more precise definition of the de facto frontier between
Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan and the Hejaz. In point of fact, the somewhat doubtful character
of certain of the frontiers of Saudi Arabia might not in itself lead to serious
difficulties at Geneva. The most important of the undelimited frontiers are
those between Saudi Arabia and Iraq and between Saudi Arabia and Trans
jordan. But the fact that the frontier between Saudi Arabia and Iraq was
undelimited did not prevent Iraq from being admitted to membership of the
League of Nations last October, while the similarly undelimited character of the
Hadda frontier, and the purely de facto nature of the Maan-Akaba frontier
between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , which affects both countries equally,
has never, so far as I am aware, been questioned at Geneva in connexion with
the 'administration of Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan by His Majesty's Government under the
Palestine mandate. Meanwhile, recent reports appear to confirm the Saudi
Minister's statement that the frontier between Asir and the Yemen has now been
| practically agreed upon between King Ibn Saud and the Imam, and that there
Ijy is no important area in dispute. As regards the south-eastern frontiers of Saudi
|! Arabia, Ibn Saud, by recognising under article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda the
pi special relations between His Majesty's Government and the Arabian rulers of
11 the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , may be regarded as having virtually recognised the boundaries
|'laid down in the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 1914. In these circumstances,
' except possibly for the Saudi claim to the Maan-Akaba area of Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , it
seems unlikely that serious difficulty would arise at Geneva over the frontiers of
Saudi Arabia, and it is undesirable that the question should be raised
prematurely. Since, however, the frontier difficulty has on past occasions been
mentioned as one of the possible objections to the candidature of Saudi Arabia
for membership of the League, there is some danger that the Saudi Government
may attempt to obtain a demarcation of the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan frontier by linking up
the two questions and by representing His Majesty's Government as refusing
to remove one of the principal defects which render Saudi Arabia ineligible for
entry into the League. If any move of this kind is made or appears likely to be
made, you should refer to me for further instructions.
7. Meanwhile, if the Saudi Government show signs of wishing to press
their application. His Majesty's Government will not feel justified in actively
discouraging them from doing so. Both Iraq and Persia have undoubtedly
strengthened their international position as a result of their membership of the
League, and it is not unnatural that Saudi Arabia should wish to follow their
example. Provided that the Saudi Government realise the objections which are
likely to be raised to their candidature—particularly in connexion with the
existence of slavery in their country—and provided that they do not expect His