‘Persian Gulf gazetteer. Part 1. Historical and political materials. Précis of Persian Arabistan affairs.’ [‎22v] (44/130)

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Enclosure No. 2.
(Opening of the Karun.)
The advantages, commercially financially, are so obvious and so fully admitted, that
the objections or misgivings must arise from other considerations. Possibly these are of a
political character, and the Persian Government may feel distrust of the motives of the
British in urging this proposal. They perhaps suspect England of ulterior designs against
thosa districts. |
Persia ought, however, to be perfectly free from such distrust of the British Government.
Persians can see for themselves that Kcgland^s position in the East renders her interests, in
many respects, identical with those of Persia, and that, therefcre, her policy is naturally to
preserve and foster the power, integrity and prosperity of a friendly Persia. To weaken and
assist in dismembering a friendly Persia would be totally opposed to British interests. For
England has all the territor\ r , power, and wealth she can possibly desire in India. Her policy
is therefore directed to maintaining that position and ensuring leisure tu develop India and
improve it^ people. England has no inducement to covet the territory of any other Asiatic
power, and if forced to war in defence of her hon >r or interests and temporarily occupy
territory beyond her Ir^ntier, her Government has always taken the earliest opportunity to
withdraw. J
Persia is also a power which seeks no aggression, but desires peace and independence and
to preserve the integrity of her territory.
. When we come to other powers different motives are at work, as is manifest by their
actions. This has been so obvious of late years as regards Russia that England feels the
necessity for watching her advance and considfring it as a possible danger to the peace of
Asia and India in the future To Persia this steady advance eastwards is of still oreater
moment, and Russia, formerly in contact on the noith-west only, now presses on her north
east provmce. England and Persia have a common interest in checking the further advance
of Russia m that direction. If ever Russian power preponderated over British in that part
of Asia, it is obvious that Persia and Afghanistan would ceaee to exist as independent
kingdoms. Therefore as England desires the maintenance of Persian integrity and power
so Persia must feel the vital importance to herself of the proximity and friendliness of the
power winch alone limits the growth of Russian Empire in Asia. The one power is by oolicv
and inclination, peaceful and stationary, the other aggressive and advancing.
It is often felt to be strange that with such community of interests, Persia and Eno-Iand
have not drawn closer politically to one another, and that the former does not to a p -reater
extent shape her policy m accordance with the advice of her natural ally. There are no dmibf
ful causes for this and th. fault is not all on ono side. Persia has to " manage " her powerful
and restless neighbour, and feds uncertain what support to reckon on in an hour of daneer
But I is obviously Persia B interests to attract the friendship and support of England Sd
folly to distrust or wantonly alienate that power. b 'ina
Persia should derive a sense of security and independence from feeling that she is not
wholly beyond reach of aid from a strong and friendly power in times of trouble in the north.
W ould not an unfriendly refusal of the Persian Government to concede +Iip noir,' +•
of the Karun which is for the benefit of both countries tend to alienate ? Whil J
commercial advantage be attained England has no inducement to oovet Persian ^to y ia 6
that quarter ? ill not relusal of the desired advantages to trade have a tendpnov ^
through estrangement, a political danger which at present does not exist ? 7 '
. . No doubt Russians would suggest and instill misgivings such as alluded to fnv fW
interest, which (totally opposed to those of Persia and England) is to keen tho^Vrl !
and estranged, and to isolate Persia and prevent facibt.es forrly sLS rLcMngher! ^
As regards the French endeavours to obtain a footino- in Arflbisfn^ w „ x <• t ,
and the ri^ht to place steamers on the Karun, it is scarcely crpdiM fT. + I! g^nt of land
parlers" of years with the British GoveZcnt the " pour-
French m the matter of river navigation. But apart from that ii "[j'* 311 'ofthe
point out objections which should lead the Persian Government tn h ? be difficult to
the French in that quarter. It ,s well knm™ toallr.^cr.^ ' be 0f admit «QS
that the breach are possessed by certain restless ambitions in the'East^thatXv 4
satisfied with their present position, but still seek means nf ant • ^ • 7 are not
influence. In Syria, in Arabia, in Africa their noHtiV^l U * . en ^ ar ging ^thdr power and
Recently new fields of enterprise have been sought as in well-informed,
be given to the fact that the operations iatelv onened at m 61 " 1S nce * attention
of mere merchants, but of officers of the French military 311^ n™ 61 ] are . un(ier direction not
to at once fly the national flag at Mohan,merah, whe"e no SonsXl Th ^ , W . ished
and the first consignments of goods consisted in ..re-if f , have been established,
fact he considered that the RuSs encwale " S 2ir» fh b T m T ding ar,ns - Let
in that part of Persia. This shows a p„3' obtct and 0f the Freilch
directed to tlw advantage of Persia. J t is one which is certainly not