'File 61/11 IX (D 159) Nejd-Hejaz Miscellaneous' [‎58v] (127/391)

aqent provocateur in carrying on the correspondence and cominunioating it to
another party. Eventnaiiy Sheikh Yusuf admitted that had Qassab been an
ordinary person his action would have been improper, but he maintained that as
Qassab had formerly been in Saudi employ as Director of Education he was 0I1 ly
doing his duty in transmitting the correspondence to the King. Any now, said
Sheikh Yusuf, His Majesty's Government said the letter was unwise and
discourteous; what were they going to do : I pointed to the general assuiance
at the end of the statement which I had made on the 13th October, and when
Sheikh Yusuf pressed for mention of some specific action I said I thought that
His Majesty, as a ruler himself, would realise that His Majesty s Government
might not find it convenient to say exactly what action they would take with
another ruler in such circumstances. Sheikh \usuf Yasin left that point and
said that Ibn Saud was in a difficulty in that the Amir Abdullah, whom the King
could easily deal with had the Amir stood alone, had attacked the King from
under the segis of the King s friends, the British Government. I said that His
Majesty's Government had specifically recognised their responsibility in the
statement which I had made. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin then said that they were
convinced that the Bludan pamphlets must have been prepared with the know
ledge of the Amir Abdullah ; he repeated that the pamphlets were conveyed to
Bludan by Fuad-al-Khatib, and suggested that Fuad-al-Khatib even arranged
for the printing at the press in Damascus to which the pamphlets had been traced.
I said it seemed to me that if the Amir had been behind the pamphlets he would
have chosen a less prominent emissary than Fuad-al-Khatib, and I made light
of Sheikh Yusuf's argument that the Amir's complicity was established by a
similarity between the tenor of the Qassab letter and that of the pamphlets. The
tenor of the pamphlets, I argued, was common form; every attempt to stir up
a revolution, or internal political discontent, used the argument that someone
was enjoying someone else's money. I should have liked to add that the pamphlets
might have been written by a Syrian, since they mentioned only the Nejdis as
blood-suckers, whereas the Hejazi classes Nejdis and Syrians together in this
respect, and has no more use for the greedy and corrupt Syrian Director of Works
than for his Nejdi chief, the Minister of Finance. The following day Sheikh
Yusuf Yasin said that he had conveyed to the King what I had said; the King
had listened attentively, but had made no comment. I am certain that Ibn
Saud would do more justice than Sheikh Yusuf to my argument that Qassab was
asking for trouble. At any rate, when I saw the King a few minutes afterwards,
for my final interview, he was as cordial as ever. Indeed, it was then that he
made the statement which I have recorded in another despatch, that when he
heard of the sinking of the British battleship he felt as though a son of his had
been drowned.
5. Since my return to Jedda I have received a copy of the telegram, No. 373,
which the High Commissioner at Jerusalem addressed to the Colonial Office on
the 21st October. I at once telegraphed instructing Mr. Wall to inform Ibn Saud
of the Amir Abdullah's personal assurance that he had no knowledge of the
pamphlets until the British Resident brought them to his notice.
6. I notice from the High Commissioner's telegram just quoted that his
Excellency is inclined to believe that the relations between the Amir Abdullah
and Ibn Saud are definitely improving, and that he cites in evidence the exchange
of telegrams about the accident to the Amir Saud and the beginning of Ramadan.
I should perhaps share the views of Sir Harold MacMichael, had' not Ibn Saud
stated the contrary opinion on this point. In the course of the conversation
on the 13th October the King said that, superficially, relations with the Amir
Abdullah were friendly: the moment the Amir heard of the accident to the
Amir Saud he sent a telegram of condolence; he always did that sort of thing,
but it made no difference to his real sentiments and aims. Abdullah's fine words,
in fact, butter no parsnips with Ibn Saud. The King probably regards it as
inevitable that the Amir Abdullah should resent the loss of the Hejaz to the
Hashimites, and should cherish a feeling of revenge for the personal humiliation
he suffered when the Hejazi force he nominally led was annihilated by the Wahabis
and he himself escaped in his shirt. Moreover, Ibn Saud must feel that his
own rule over the Hejaz is not popular. On one occasion during my visit he
spoke with contempt of the Hejazis, and I noticed that when he claimed to be
ruling with the consent of the people of Nejd he said nothing about the people