'File 19/165 IV (C 57) Bahrain Reforms' [‎126v] (283/476)

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dency of Shaikh Abdulla, with Shaikh Mubarak marked to succeed event ually to the
Adviser s place.
15. I wish to emphasise that even at present there is considerably more Arab
control of the Bahrain administration than would appear at first sight. In conse
quence, the present administration is popular in the islands. 1 agree, however,
that the British are too much in the high-lights, and that the signs of British influ
ence appear too clearly in the Indian police force trained ILke an Indian infantry
regiment thousj^h their uniform has been modified. I recommend that this high
light be modified by substituting Sudanese, an Arab speaking force, which blends
better with the population. I recommend further that, unless a European is re
quired to deal with an influx of Europeans and Americans attracted by the Gulf Oil
^ the services of the European Commandant of I olice be dispensed with
at the termination of his present contract, but that the services of the Ad\ iser and
the Director of Customs be retained until suitable Arab substitutes have been trained
to take their place.
16. Shaikh Hamad has already extended the tenn of the Advisers contract
till March 1934. It will probably be necessary to grant him at least two further
quaternary extensions.
It is difficult to say when a substitute will be ready to replace Mr. de Grenier ;
but the period required for training cannot be less than seven years from now.
17. As the coming of an oil company is still problematical, I have not dis
cussed this matter at length. If the company should materialise it will of itself
we'sternise the islands in possibly an unfortunate way, and 1 presume there would
have to be a British element in the administration to counteract its effects.
18. It appears from paragraph 2 of your letter under reply that Government is
perturbed at the danger that with the example of Bahrain before their eyes, the
minds of the smaller Arab rulers may be turned increasingly in the direction of Bin
Saud. It is true that the Shaikhs of the Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. are extremely jealous of any
British encroachment on their independence just as Shaikh Isa was before
his forced reli quishment of power. They oppose any concession to the European.
I do not, however, ascribe this attitude wholly to the events in Bahrain. It is due far
more to the natural exclusiveness of the Arab. A certain section of Arab thought
would exclude the foot of the infidel throughout the holy land of Arabia, from Aden
as well as from Mecca.
No attempt had been made to westernise Bahrain when the " Hyacinth "
episode of 1911 occurred. It is from this incident and the comparative immunity
from evil consequences enjoyed by the people of Dubai that I date the increasingly
independent attitude of the Trucial Shaikhs. Sir Percy Cox stated at the time that
the incident furnished a convenient peg on which the Shaikh of Dubai could hang bis
objections to the admission of Europeans to the coast. His statement was true in
1911 and is true to this day ; but the British policy in Bahrain obviously cannot be
blamed for this.
If we interfere in Bahrain to put down misrule, depose its Shaikh, introduce
reforms and then permit the country to sink back into the slough from which we
have rescued it, then indeed will we have forfeited Arab respect and cleared the way
for Bin Saud. In 1920 Major Dickson reported " our position in the island is found
ed on fear and not respect." Now it is founded on respect. The Trucial Chiefs now
see that our intervention has benefited Bahrain and even its Chiefs. We cannot
expect them immediately to call in British advisers on their own account, but in
time their aversion from contact with the European may be overcome through the
influence of a civilised Bahrain. It will not be overcome through a reversion of
Bahrain to the conditions of 1920.
If it suits Bin Saud he will intrigue in Oman as his fathers did before him.
r I he attitude of the Shaikhs of the Coast will be guided by self-interest as it has
ever been. If we have consistently and with success espoused their cause against
Persia and Najd they will look to us for support. It we have shown no great
energy in supporting their case against third parties, they will be discouraged
and more easily succumb to Najd intrigue. If Bin Saud emerges victorious from