'Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf. Vol I. Historical. Part IA & IB. J G Lorimer. 1915' [‎223] (366/1782)

223
The chief cause to which the Russian question, existing in a latent form
since 1828 or even since 1804, owed its appearance in the field of public
fari % debate was probably the accession to the throne of Persia in 1834 of
Muhammad Shah, whose conduct gave the impression of his being subser
vient, or likely to become so, to Russian policy. Fat-h ^Ali Khan, notwith
standing the Treaty of Turkmanchai, resisted successfully to his dying
day the establishment of a permanent Russian Mission at Tehran ; but his
grandson was more compliant. The new Shah, after a Russian Minister had
been definitely established at his Court, seemed to consult him no less freely
and intimately than he did the British representative. It is possible that
the Shah's cousins, the sons of the Farman-Farma of Fars, were counten
anced by the British Government as potential rivals to Muhammad Shah ;
and their reception in England in 1835 probably made an unfavourable
impression on that ruler and contributed to his estrangement from Britain.
The relative strength of British and Russian influence at the Persian
Court and the dissimilar manner in which the designs of the Shah upon
Herat were viewed by the British and Russian representatives at Tehran are
described in the chapter on the history of the Persian Coast and Islands.
Muscovite influence was decidedly in the ascendant, and Russia favoured
the idea of a Persian attack on Herat. That town and its districts were a
part of Afghanistan, but they formed a principality which was politically
detached from the rest of the country, being still governed by a branch of
the Sadozai family; and they seemed not unlikely to go down before a
military effort of even such moderate strength as Persia might be expected
to put forth. If Herat were annexed to Persia, it would come ipso faclo
under Russian influence and might be made the seat of a Russian political
agent for the prosecution of further designs in Afghanistan. If, on the
other hand, Persia failed at Herat, she would be weakened and would fall
more completely into the hands of the foreign power predominant at her
capital. In any case Britain could not but oppose all acts of Persian inter
ference in Afghanistan and must so, of necessity, make herself disagreeable
to the Shah. British influence was as a matter of fact exerted to prevent
the Herat enterprise, though without success ; and British representations
contributed to its abandonment in the end by the Shah, not however until
weight had been lent them by the occupation * of Kharag Island in
* Sir H. Eawlinson {England and Russia'' in the East, p. 59) seems to question the
existence of any real connection between the British occupation of Kharag and the Persian
withdrawal from Herat; but in this he seems to stand alone among eminent authorities.
There can of course be no doubt that the determined character of the defence of Herat,
inspired by Pottinger, was a more important factor than any other in the failure of the
Persians.
Immediate
cause of a
Russo-
Ikitish crisis
in Persia,
1834-36.
Persian ex
pedition to
Herat and
British occu«
patio n of
Kharag
Island,
1837-38.