'The Arms Traffic in the Persian Gulf' [‎33r] (8/62)

i
time held undesirable, in view of the Sheikh of Koweit's position in regard to
the warfare then in progress in Central Arabia,* to impose any fresh restrictions
on the mportation of arms at Koweit. The necessary arrangements with
lurkey also presented difficulty. See also paragraphs 32 and 61.
II.
The Situation in 1907.
17. In the preceding paragraphs a brief summary has been given of the
o • j j • . tvt i + earlier history of the arms traffic in the
Situation at Muskat. n i / i * ^ . i
1 ersian Cxult and of the measures taken
with a view to its suppression. Speaking generally, it cannot be said that
those measures were attended with much success. It was generally acknow
ledged that the key to the question lay at Muskat, and that until that port
was closed to the importation of arms it would be impossible to place any
effective check on the export trade by native dhows to other ports on the
Gulf littoral. Owing, however, to the terms of the Sultan's commercial
treaties {see paragraph 9), the importation of arms into His Highness's
dominions couJd not be prohibited without the consent of the French
Government, a consent which there appeared to be small likelihood of
obtaining.']'
Meanwhile the import trade from Europe to Muskat rapidly increased.
According to figures supplied by the British Customs authorities, the number
of rifles imported from Great Britain, which was then the main source of
supply, rose from 5,435 in 1898 to 13,831 in 1900. The total number of
rifles imported into Muskat from all sources in 1900-01 was declared by the
Muskat Customs to be 25,000. The figure declined to 17,000 in 1901-02,
and in the following year (1902-03) there was also a decrease. But in
190-1-05, " in spite of the fact that the local Oman market had long since
been glutted," the number of rifles imported from all quarters was estimated
at not less than 20,000 ; in 1906-07 the numbers rose to 44,927, and in
1907-08 to 87,680. In 1908-09 the number of imported rifles was returned
at 85,820.
The above figures, it should be observed, are based for the most part on
statistics furnished by the Muskat Customs authorities, and it is not possible
to vouch for their accuracy. The same remark applies to the figures given
below of the values of the arms and ammunition imported into Muskat.
The table below was included by the Government of India in their
despatch of the 2nd September 1909, as giving the " most reliable figures "
which they had been able to obtain. It will be seen that as regards imported
rifles, the figures given in this table are somewhat smaller than those given
above.
* In view of the support rendered by the Turks to Abdul Aziz bin Rashid, Amir of Nejd,
one of the warring chiefs in the interior, the Government of India (telegrams of 20th and
29th Ma}' 1904) considered that no additional check should, for the time being, be imposed on
the arms traffic at Koweit, which was the main source of supply to the rival chieftain,
Abdul Aziz bin Saoud, Amir of the Wahabi. This view was approved by His Majesty's
Government on the 24th June 1904.
t In their despatches of 29th January and 30th July 1903, the Government of India urged
that the French Government should be approached with a view to obtaining their consent to
the prohibition of the importation of arms and ammunition into Muskat. On the 1st October
1903 Lord Lansdowne suggested informally to the French Minister in London that the British
and French Governments might cooperate in inducing the Sultan to expel M. Goguyer (see-
paragraph 18) and to put a stop to the arms traffic. M. Geoffray returned a guarded answer,
and nothing further seems to have come of the suggestion.