'The Arms Traffic in the Persian Gulf' [‎43r] (28/62)

27
7tli May 1909, from Admiral Slade, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies
Station, in which lie submitted proposals for blockading the Mekran coast
f rom the sea. Admiral Slade estimated that four second or third class cruisers
would be required for this service, so that one vessel might always be away
coaling and resting, while the other three were actively employed in
blockading the coast. I wo out of the four vessels could be supplied from
the East Indies Station, but the two others must be specially detailed for the
woik- Admiral Slade added that it would be necessary for all four ships to
be fitted with wireless telegraphy, and that " it would add greatly to the
efficiency of the blockade if the Government of India would sanction and
erect the proposed wireless station at Jask." The Admiral also recom
mended the reinforcement of the J ask guard, :i: ' to protect the station from
possible reprisals by land, and the posting at the same place of a trained
Intelligence officer.
Admiral Slade felt confident that, if the measures proposed by him were
adopted, it ought to be possible to stop a large proportion of arms going
through. Every dhow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean. approaching the coast would be searched night and
day, and, with a capable officer in charge of the blockade, " the price of arms
on the Afghan frontier ought to rise two or three hundred per cent." The
blockade should, in the Admiral's opinion, last from the 1st January to the
end of April.
44. The Government ol: India expressed their full concurrence in Admiral
Slade's proposals, but considered that, to be effective, the blockade should
be maintained for a full year and should be started with the least -possible
delay. They also referred to the question of cost, and expressed the view that,
under the terms of the Welby Commission's Report, " the cost of any
naval measures outside the fixed contribution which India now pays should
" fall on the Imperial Government."
In conclusion the}^ reaffirmed their opinion as to the necessity of coming
to some arrangement with France, by which His Majesty's Government w T ould
secure a free hand to take action at Muskat.
45. A subsequent report from Mr. Holland, dated the I3th September
_ ^ . 1909, showed that the import of arms
Arms Depots on Mekran Coast. ail( j ammim itioii into Mekran was pro-
1531/09. ceeding with great rapidity,! and that
arms depots were apparently being formed along the coast, which, if the
smuggling continued unchecked, would, in a few weeks "contain sufficient
arms to satisfy Afghan caravans for the whole of the cold weather." As
regards these depots. Admiral Slade stated, in a letter to the Government
of India, dated I9th November 1909, that "it appears that the arms
" which are landed on the Persian coast are never taken far inland at
" once, but are stored in the villages
4350/09. u a f ew m iles of the places at
" which they are disembarked." The Admiral added that he had, at the
moment of writing, information as to the whereabouts of some 0,000 rifles
and corresponding ammunition.
46. The Government of India's proposals were communicated to the
T t ^ i. Foreign Office in Sir R. Ritchie's letter
n^w a i909 ce gI1 of the 15th October 1909, with the
1332/09. recommendation that " an effective
naval blockade should be undertaken at once " ; it was also suggested that
" a series of short raids by boats' crews upon the Mekran depots described
by Mr. Holland " might be a feature of the operations.
* See paragraph 58. • i i i
t Mr. Holland reported that 3,000 rifles and 212,000 rounds of ammunition had been
imported during the past month, as compared with 645 rifles and 69,000 rounds of ammunition
daring the corresponding period of 1908.