'Arabia. Political Situation in Nejd' [‎132v] (5/10)

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recently Bin Jilovi had occasion to order a Shiah inhabitant of Hoffuf to be beaten to
death for cursing in public Bin Saud, the Ikhwan and the religion of the Ikhwan.
The execution caused great resentment among Hassa Shiahs. At the same time, in
fairness to Bin Jilovi, it may be recounted that during the same week he ordered an
Akh to be executed in exactly the same way for being caught seducing a married
woman. In Qatif, owing to the behaviour of certain Ikhwan, who have demanded that
Shiahs should cease their readings (Qaraiyas) in their Husseiniyehs, much resentment
exists against the Ikhwans. The Emir, Abdur Rahman Bin Swelum, has returned
from Riyadh, and his strong arm may be trusted to keep things quiet. It is possible
the Qatif Shiahs, who are adepts at making mischief, may present a memorial to this
Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. detailing their wrongs. I trust they do not.
7. To turn to Bin Saud and his enemies. Undoubtedly he fears Shammar.
Zubair, Koweit and Hejaz he despises, though he knows how dangerous are their
intrigues. For all his recent talk about attacking Koweit, it may be taken as certain
that he will do no such thing. Firstly, he knows he would be up against us, and
realises that His Majesty's Government cannot stand still and see Kovveit become a
province of Bin Saud. Personally, I am not sure but that it would not be one of the
soundest bits of policy we could adopt to let Bin Saud over-run and conquer it, much
as he did Hassa. It would once and for all settle the Bin Rashid question and make
Bin Saud the dominant factor in Arabia. As this is not a likely contingency, it
behoves us to look round and see what line Bin Saud is likely to take. That he must
act and act within the next two or three months is certain.
Two courses are open to Bin Saud :—
(1) Open war with Bin Rashid and his friends.
(2) To gain his object over Bin Rashid by diplomatic action.
I do not think he will adopt (1), as the risks to his empire in case of defeat are
too great. He knows how difficult successful operation against Bin Rashid would be
in summer. There is not a well or waterhole anywhere throughout Shammar territory
which has not got a party of Rashidite scouts sitting on it. The element of surprise
is therefore from the start denied Bin Saud. Ordinary raids, which are always open
to him, will not accomplish much. In fact, in this game Bin Rashid would probably
fare best. Shammar are united with the exception of those Bedouins who have turned
Ikhwan and trecked south into Nejd. On the other hand, Qassim is a suitable field
for Shammar intrigue, and raiders from the north would not necessarily be received
as enemies.
Diplomacy or course (2) I think is the line Bin Saud will adopt. It should be
noted here that Bin Saud in matters diplomatic is without rival throughout Arabia.
He is capable of making rings round Bin Rashid in this respect. His blulf, candid
and open-hearted manner serve to act as cover for one of the astutest brains that can
be found. The Anazah, I think, are the means by which Bin Saud is most likely to
try and accomplish his ends.
Ihe bait he will offer is Jauf al Amr. From time immemorial the Anazah have
claimed this oasis. Their recent seizure of it and their final ejection by Bin Rashid
has made them very bitter against Shammar. Bin Saud is himself of Anazah stock,
and an appeal from him need not be in vain. What easier than to offer Anazah the
rich Jauf lands and assistance in helping them get it? Bin Safld will only demand
in return to be recognised by the Anazah as overlord of Bin Rashid with a Saudite
Governor at Hail. With fehammar attacked from north and south simultaneously,
neither Koweit nor Hejaz will be of much help. In fact, in such a war Koweit trade
with Hail could be stopped at once merely by cutting trade routes. The Mutair or
Ajman would be sufficient for the purpose.
8. The question here arises, " Would it be to the interest of His Majesty's Govern
ment to see Bin Rashid once more a vassal of Nejd ? " I think it would. A strong
Central Arabia under Bin Saud, and he on absolutely friendly terms with the British
Government, would, I venture to think, suit British policy down to the ground It
would solve many difficulties and incidentally make all the small coastal States very
much more dependent on us than they are now. Kow^eit, Bahrein, Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates.
Oman lemen Hejaz, and even Syria, would all live in terror of their powerful
neighbour, and would be more amenable to the wishes of His Majesty's Government
than they are to-aay At the present time, all these coastal States, as a result of the
Great W ar and much talk of the " rights of small nations," have, so to speak crot