'Biographical Notes' [‎254v] (514/611)

and Egypt, for Mecca. He is to visit England and return by Constantinople and
Enssia. This young man is a worthy son of his father, and his development is watched
with some apprehension. The father has some moments of remorse, the son none. He
is agent for the Persian line of steamers at Mohammerah.
The Eeis-ul-Tujjar has an interest in the English carrying trade on the Karun in
the form of an annual subsidy of 4,000 kntns; at the expiration of the present agree^
ment, in two years, this may be altered by Messrs. Lynch Brothers to a fee for each
package carried by their steamers. It is very necessary that the Reis-ul-Tujjar's great
influence with the Sheikh ot Mohammerah and in Arabistan should be used on our^side.
It is impossible to say, as yet, whether his son will take his place.
The Sheikh of Mohammerah has extended his power, in a verv marked manner
tayond that of his late brother. There arc now few signs of Persian authority south of
Band-i-Kir to the border of Ears. The Governor of Arabistan does not appear at
Ahwaz, nor is there a Karguzar there, as was the case in 1807, when I was last in the
country. The Sheikh now nominates the Governors of Ahwaz and Mashur, and controls
the Chaab Arabs of Fellahieh, whose Chief is under surveillance at Mohammerah.
I ha^e not seen enough of the Sheikh to form an opinion as to his real character.
But this extension of his authority must have been brought about by the exercise of a
fixed purpose and great ability; perhaps this may be looked for in the direction of the
Reis-ul-Tujjar; though the negotiations with the Arabs must have been carried out by
Mirza Hamza.
Shei ! dl ' s tei rito . rv ^retches apparently along the coast as far as Shah Abdul
Shah, a few miles west of Dilani; his authority over this coast is of great importance to
us. He has also bought Zeitun, in conjunction with the Bakhtiari Chiefs. He has
intimate relations with these Chiefs, and may have come to an understanding with them
for mutual defence.
His frontier marches with that of the Bakhtiaris from the latitude of Band-i-Kir to
south of Ram Hormuz. I do not know exactly where it lies towards the Kuhgdu tribes,
but the whole is remarkably safe owing to their combined authority, and there appears to
be now no raiding in that direction. r '
The Sheikh's authority is not established towards Hawizeh and the Karkhah in the
same manner as it is on the left bank of the Karun - but his operations against the Beni
W ' l\t Ver ™! n l d 0U X may extend his P ower in thafc q^rter, though the nebulous
state of the Turkish and Persian borders will always tend to insecurity.
✓vPfi don _ e ™ uc h for the suppression of piracy on the Shat-el-Arab, and the safety
pljrYn' Karun River in Arabistan ; with encouragement, and to please the
affeeW ^ ver ^ Iientj J ould do more - He can give us great assistance in matters
attectmg oui Karun trade. The wheat embargo has been lately enforced, probably
rZh-L* 0 hls instl ^ atl< ^ n - He would, I imagine, use his influence against such mediseval
and MnZVl We 1 asked h 7 t( ? do so - The opening of the roads from Hawizeh to Ahwaz
and Mohammerah could also be arranged for by him.
En^lkh e rni eikh ^ C0U ^ alS i 0 ^ PP0Se tbe rumiin S on the Karun of steamers other than
^ sh ones, and seriously hamper such schemes as the irrigation projects of the Dutch
of dei)ute from Tehran to the Karun. His ownership of the river banks is
Khi;^3 o foTd c u o m cir' and also with reference to the startins point of the
m ore T nn^r e +L h n 0f M n ha , mmer t h ha * been allowed ^ the Peisian Government to attain
variance with fhm 18 ^ u? . to ^ era ^ d much longer, and his position is quite at
it does not -if ill fni? 0 ^^ to the weakness of the present Shah
coming^o the thron^ W ^ Vallahd ^ n0t inStitUte ^ ite a difFerent ^ ime
affainSVis^w^CnvA^ 61 d ^ ur ^ ln ^ our relations with Tehran in guaranteeing him
nst hi^ ^rif nt 80 long as we 11 d0 not a Pli ear in the matte? till they actually
to enable him to a ^ lia ^ a . ntee w1 ^ merely give hip the confidence he requires
the Persian Govertfmpne f 01ln , ( : ertain ev ontualities in such a manner as to induce
propped action nnd Thp T ^ ^ He COlll(l be squired to submit his
pioposed action, and the reasons for it, to us for sanction.
present state of decnv hZ ^ 0 T 6 ^! 0 - 118 sea ^ ari(i ^e Persian army remains in its
acti(m^ affa^nlt him wUh an T ^ ^ . Hu ^ if necessary, we could prevent any
.h. K/rr sljSS in ,be •"
.un s azr niza t i0n fxT the - ^ ersian arl, V an increase in the number of men and
arMcAam^^h^^ouid^t^hirpositLn'o/se'curit^ 6886 ' 8 ^ ^ ^ ^