'The Baghdad Railway Negotiations' [‎62v] (14/32)

12
The Bagdad Railway.
route and extending along the ' southern variant from Konia. i he real reason for this
preference was political, for at that period Germany could not risk estrangement irom
Russia ; and Russian suspicion of German designs in Asiatic Turkey was never absent.
It may be concluded that the German Government had a very clear indication ot the
objections entertained by Russia to the northern variant before the Tuico-Geiman
railway agreement of December 1899 was reached, l our months later the Russo-
Turkish " Black Sea Basin agreement" was concluded, definitely securing to Russian
enterprise all railway construction in Northern Asia Minor. So much for the attitude
of Russia. As to that of France, while some French financiers did not abstain from
participation, the Government consistently refused, pending an agreement equitable
to the interests of all the Powers, to allow a quotation on the Paris Bourse of any issue
relating to the Bagdad Railway.
The attitude of the British Government, in presence of the German concession
of 1899, was to resist any encroachment by Turkey or any other foreign Power tending
to disturb the political status quo on the shores of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . In pursuance
of this policy various measures were adopted, and attempts on the part ol Turkey to
curtail the authority of the Sheikh of Koweit were frustrated not only by local action
but by representations at Constantinople ; moreover the German Government were
given very clearly to understand that, in so far as the increase of the 'Turkish
customs and the eastern terminus of the line were concerned, the British Government
must determine their future attitude towards the German enterprise in the light of
any proposals which might be made as to British interests.
We propose to pass over the actual texts of the Turco-German agreements of
December 1899 and January 1902. The first of these conceded in principle what the
Germans sought, but left all details to be settled at some future date ; and the concession
of 1902 was eventually replaced by the definitive Bagdad Railway Convention of
March 1903. After touching upon some of the leading provisions of this last instru
ment, we shall bring our narrative of the second period to a close with a short
reference to the negotiations, which culminated in failure in April 1903, regarding
British participation in the projected railway enterprise.
Under the definitive Bagdad Railway Convention (1903) the Ottoman Government
granted a concession for 99 years to the Anatolian Railway Company for an extension from
the Konia line to Bagdad and Basra, via Adana, Tell-Habesh, Mosul and Sadijeh.
The concession included branch lines to Aleppo, to Urfa, to Khanikin on the Persian
fiontiei, and to a point on the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. to be settled subsequently ; preferential
ri g ht8 were also given for branches towards Marash, Aiutab, Birijik, Mardin, Erbil,
luz Kharmath, and Hit, and for any lines connecting the maiu-line with the
Mediterranean at points situated between Mersina and Tripoli in Syria. Provision
ri! ,! 0 ™ a f r 4 an< ? from t 1 lle main - line to Diarbekr and Kharpnt, via the
minerals found whhm 2()TiWretrerL CO each 1 s C ide oftl'e^T ^ fT^ ? 7^ ^
important oil-bearing region. ^ MeToDot^i It T 7 110h ^ t0 traVei u Se
allowed to establish ports on the Tigns a Cda.l h i T t0 ^
at the terminal point on the Persian njf nnH + bhatt-el-Arab at Basra, and
service of the railway. Finallv if nnlv tl 0 Dav . 1 ? ate t ^ e ]n' an cl waterways in the
y* on v the requisite specific revenues could be