'The Baghdad Railway Negotiations' [‎63v] (16/32)

14
The Bagdad Railway.
honourable member, but was rather likely after a certain period of development to add greatly to tha
riches of Turkey and indirectly, it might be supposed, greatly to the riches of any other country
ready to take advantage of it. Was the British producer more likely to be able to take advantage of
it, if English capital was largely interested, than if it was confined to foreign capital ?
The Prime Minister had already stated on the preceding day that, while no final
arrangements had been arrived at, the suggestions which, it was understood, were to
be made, and would be carefully considered, were : —
(1) that British capital and British control were to be on an absolute equality with the capital
and control of any other Power; (2) that, in respect of the negotiations then going on with the
1 iirkish Government for a new commercial treaty (and which, quite apart from the Bagdad Railway,
raised the question of increasing the Turkish customs). His Majesty's Government should not object
to a reasonable increase in the customs duties, although a part of the increase might be used in
guaianteeing a railway so important for the commercial interests of Turkey; (3) that, if the railway
should prove to be a substantially better route for conveying the mails to India, it might be so used,
on terms to be agreed upon subsequently; (4) that His Majesty's Government should assist, not by
mone} or tlie promise of money, but by their good offices in providing a proper terminus at or near
Koweit* oit
A fortnight later the Prime Minister announced that: —
" the arrangements which have lately been under the consideration of His Majesty's Government
were designed to place the [Bagdad] railway, including the existing Anatolian Railway, throughout its
whole length from sea to sea, under international control, and to prevent the possibility of preferential
treatment tor the goods or subjects of any one country. In these arrangements it was suggested, inter
rt/m, that equal powers of control, construction, and management should be given to German. French,
and English interests. After careful consideration of these proposals, His Majesty's Government have
come to the conclusion that they do not give to this country sufficient security for the application of
the principles above referred to ; and they have therefore intimated that they are unable ' lo «dve the
suggested assurances with regard to the policy which they might hereafter adopt as to the conveyance
of the Indian mails by the projected route, as to facilities at Koweit, or as to the appropriation of a
part ot the lurkish customs revenue in aid of the contemplated guarantee."t
It is certam that the final German proposals in April 1903 did not rive to British
capital and British control that'absolute equality ' with the Germans, over the line from
o stantinople to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , which was to be one indispensable condition of a
compliant attitude on the part of His Majesty's Government. It is, according to all
available records, unlikely that further negotiations in 1903 would have resulted in
vte 80 ; tis ^
would still less concede in later years vvhen with™t ^ ^ 7
approaching a triumphant completion ' 0Ut rltlSl1
were, as we have7ndTca?ed''couTinecd th^tl' 0 " "f" 8 ", 1 ! 31 in this country
without British assent to an increase of , Coul ' :1 , n0t be finallce . d
appropriation as securitv for fhp roi'i . . inikish customs duties and their
Koweit was the only practicable S liai ^tees; they were also confident that
01113 practicable eastern terminus where an adequate harbour for
+ ^ P ( ! rli v rr ! entary Vol. exx, 1247, 1248
T Ibid., Vol. cxxi, 222