'British Desiderata in Regard to the Baghdad Railway' [155r] (5/6)
The record is made up of 1 file (3 folios). It was created in 1918?. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .
Transcription
This transcription is created automatically. It may contain errors.
e can enueavour to tone down our insistence on strict national control {i.e.,
control by us, selected as representatives of the self-determined Mesopotamian
Htate) by allowing a representative of each section of the line to sit on the railway
board of the others. For this plan would involve dividing the line into several
sections worked by separate managements under a joint traffic agreement, providing
explicitly for equalisation of rates and conditions over the railway as a whole, or
such stipulations for equitable transit (especially for the unrestricted interchange
of all through traffic), and against any discrimination, direct or indirect, as we
may deem desirable. Provisions of this kind have, in fact, figured in all the pro
jects of territorial division in Asia Minor hitherto discussed with our Allies.
Given national control, the question of through traffic would become a pure ques
tion of a railway agreement between the owners of the line on the two sides of
the frontier—an agreement, in fact, similar to that which regulates through traffic
on the Gothard Railway. It seems essential in our interest that our section of the
line should run at least as far as Mosul. This will not be obtained without great
resolution on our part. It has also been held to be essential, as above indicated, that
Alexandretta should be a free port. The Board of Trade view, however, is that,
while this would no doubt have certain advantages for the purpose of working the
line, they do not regard it as essential. If ^o, our policy should be to try for this
without making it a sine qua non, as there might be objection to making a free
port of Basra, which would be the logical counterpart of our demand for a free
port at Alexandretta. (Our historic position and record in the
Persian Gulf
The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran.
might
give us some ground for resisting the application to the Gulf terminus of the control
which we should try for at Alexandretta; but this line of argument would hardly
be held valid by foreign Powers.) It might, however, be wise to provide in the
settlement that no undue preference shall be shown by the French to railway traffic
using the port.
If we obtain these desiderata we should not need to trouble ourselves too greatly
about the management of the other sections, as practically all our trade would go
either by the Gulf or by Alexandretta. We need not, therefore, object if the French
obtain in .the northern sectors—this they would have to settle with the Italians—a
mandate similar to that which we shall obtain in the southern. We could make this
declaration of desinteressemeM with a lighter heart, as the French would probably
be unable in practice to obtain such a mandate.
Such an attitude on our part would, however, give us material for dealing with
them, even if they refuse to be lured into Armenia; and we shall probably, after
much bargaining, be able to offer them a sufficient inducement to leave us in control
of the line as far north as Mosul, provided we are quite clear in our own minds
before we meet them that no other solution will be satisfactory to us.
The formula of self -determination should cover us from Presidejnt Wilson.
The French are the real people with whom we have to settle. As already indicated,
their interests in the line have hitherto been mainly financial; they cannot pretend
to political interest in the Gulf end/ If necessary, we can transiger on the financial
aspect, though it may be better to keep this suggestion m reserve. The Board ot
Trade point out that any French or other friendly interests entitled at present to a
share in the concession must be properly compensated for expropriation. This is. of
course incontestable. The debatable point is whether the French financiers arc to
look for compensation from us or to the Germans whose interests they subserved.
If. then, national control is our proper aim, it is suggested that the toilowing
method 1 might conciliate all parties in the attainment of it:—
1. Turkey to expropriate all the shareholdings in private hands.
2. Germany to find the money for this operation. .
3. Turkey then to cede, with Germany's assent, the whole concession to the
Inter-Allied Pool. # i cu i. v
4 The Inter-Allied Pool then to sell to the Government of each State through
which the line passes so much of the line as lies withm the boundaries ot
that State.
The advantages of this method would be as follows:—
1. The countries ravaged by the war would get some benefit In the transtei of
the concession, as they would share the price obtained b\ the oo . an
would 1 not depend on getting the territory m Asia Minor in order to
benefit by the cession of the railway. This would help Belgium, 10
is not wholly disinterested. The Baghdad Railway Company had an
About this item
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This confidential memorandum, signed R V, concerns Britain's policy with regards to the Baghdad Railway following the occupation of the Mesopotamia. The memorandum details two variant policies: (1) regarding the Railway not as private property, but as a Turkish State railway, and that all its assets in Mesopotamia should therefore be transferred to the Iraq State pending transfer to an Allied Railway Company; and (2) a proposal for the internationalisation of the Railway to be controlled by Great Britain, France and Italy, and perhaps the United States of America. The advantages and disadvantages vis-a-vis British interests are then further discussed throughout the report.
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Foliation: The foliation for this description commences at folio 153, and terminates at folio 155, as it is part of a larger physical volume; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio. An additional foliation sequence is also present in parallel between folios 11-158; these numbers are also written in pencil, but are not circled, and can be found in the same position as the main sequence.
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- Reference
- IOR/L/PS/18/B304
- Title
- 'British Desiderata in Regard to the Baghdad Railway'
- Pages
- 153r:155v
- Author
- East India Company, the Board of Control, the India Office, or other British Government Department
- Usage terms
- Open Government Licence