'Papers Respecting the Slave Trade on the East Coast of Africa and the System Pursued for its Suppression' [‎37r] (13/72)

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Inclosure in No. 11.
The Governor'- General of India in Council to Sir S. Northcote.
Sir, Simla, May 14, 1868.
WE have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Political despatch, dated
15th February, 1868, submitting: for our consideration a copy of a letter addressed to you
by direction of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which questions of much
importance are raised regarding the future relations between Zanzibar and Muscat, and the
position of the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. and British Consul at Zanzibar.
2. In our despatch of 14th January, Her Majesty's Government have already been
informed of our decision that the payment of the annual subsidy of 40,000 dollars to
Muscat is an obligation which the Chief of Zanzibar is bound to discharge; and we are
of opinion that no evasion of this obligation could be countenanced by the British
Government without prejudice to our good faith, and the risk of serious political complica
tions in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .
3. The award given by Lord Canning in 1861, was expressly declared not to be a
temporary arrangement, but to be binding on the successors of the then ruling Chiefs of
Zanzibar and Muscat, and " to be a final and permanent arrangement, compensating the
Ruler of Muscat for the abandonment of all claims upon Zanzibar, and adjusting the
inequality between the two inheritances derived from " His late Highness Syud Saeed,
which two inheritances were thenceforth to be distinct and separate. The negotiations
which resulted in this award were undertaken at a time when Syud Thoweynee, of Muscat,
had actually started on an expedition against Zanzibar, in which there was every prospect
of his being successful, but which he was induced to abandon solely on the promise of the
British Government to effect a just settlement of his claims. If it is to be left to the
option of the Sultan of Zanzibar to evade fulfilment of an award so unequivocal in its
terms, and concluded under such circumstances, it appears to us that the moral influence
of our Political Officers in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. will be weakened, the Chiefs of the Om^n
Coast will prefer seeking the adjustment of their quarrels by the sword to relying on the
mediation of the British Government, and there will be danger of a relapse to the state of
anarchy in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , which it has cost many years of negotiation and not a little
bloodshed to put down
4. The annual subsidy, morever, was intended as compensation to Muscat for the
loss of valuable claims in Zanzibar, from which its revenues could be recruited. The
State of Muscat is poor, and if the Zanzibar subsidy be withheld, it will be difficult, and
probably impossible, for the Sultan to maintain a settled government, or preserve his
position against Wahabee influence, which even now it is difficult to resist. The efforts of
the British Government to preserve the peace of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and suppress piratical
aggressions, which are liable to occur at all times, and more especially where Wahabee
influence is felt, are intimately bound up with the establishment of a firm government
at Muscat, and we strongly deprecate the adoption of any measures tending to weaken
the authority of the Sultan.
5. With respect to the character and conduct of the Sultan of Muscat, it has never
been satisfactorily proved that he murdered his father, Syud Thoweynee, and however
grave may be the suspicion that he did so, that suspicion can furnish no ground on w^hich
we can countenance the withholding of any of the rights appertaining to him as Chief of
Muscat, after we have formally recognized him as Ruler of that principality. If we once
admit the propriety of the refusal of the Sultan of Zanzibar to pay the subsidy, on the
ground of the misconduct of the Chief of Muscat, to be consistent, it would be incumbent
on us to retrace our steps and deny the right of Syed Salim to the Throne of Muscat. In
point of fact, however, we did not allow, as we ought not to allow, the personal merits or
demerits of Syud Salim to weigh in our consideration of the question of his recognition.
Our duty is to support that Ruler whom the subordinate Chiefs and people have chosen
for their head, and, so long as he can maintain his position, we are bound on broad grounds
of policy to give Syud Salim at any rate our moral support.
6. Having regard to the position of Zanzibar and its general relations to India, and
to the tribes on the shores of the Indian Sea, it appears to us that the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency.
there ought to be under the Government of Bombay From c. 1668-1858, the East India Company’s administration in the city of Bombay [Mumbai] and western India. From 1858-1947, a subdivision of the British Raj. It was responsible for British relations with the Gulf and Red Sea regions. , subject to the control of the
Government of India, rather than under the Foreign Office; and that the Agent should
be chosen by the Government of Bombay From c. 1668-1858, the East India Company’s administration in the city of Bombay [Mumbai] and western India. From 1858-1947, a subdivision of the British Raj. It was responsible for British relations with the Gulf and Red Sea regions. , who have the best opportunities for making a
good selection. Indeed it would, in our opinion, be better that the present anomalous
state of things, and the inconveniences alluded to in paragraph 7 of your despatch, should
continue, than that the control of political affairs at Zanzibar should be entirely transferred
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