'THE WAR WITH TURKEY. Memorandum by Political Department, India Office.' [‎52v] (4/8)

4
to l)e reckoned with that the educated Hindus, though tliey have thrown
in their lot with us, are not averse to seeing British pride humbled, and
humbled by an Asiatic Tower—and to convince the peoples of India' that
a handful of white men can still control them, a task which will not have
been rendered easier by indiscriminate eulogy of the exploits of the Indian
troops in France. In the regions adjoining India, where for a variety of
reasons the military prestige of Great Britain had sullered serious eclipse
in the 10 years preceding the war, we shall have to rehabilitate it. To
restore order on the frontier and maintain tolerable relations with Afghanistan •
to conduct the business of everyday life in Persia; to keep order in the
Gulf and control those Aral) chiefs with whom we already have relations
and to whose number the very important Amir of Xejd lias recently been
added ; and finally, if it should so turn out, to develop the resources of
Mesopotamia: in all of which regions the Islamic self-consciousness will
have been intensitied. The Arabian policy of His Majesty's Government, so
far from diminishing the didiculty of these tasks, will add to it, unless
Turkey has been decisively defeated—and defeated by us, not merelv by
Russians or French. For while the Arabs are content to use us now for
their own ends, it is certain that if and when those ends are attained their
attitude will always be less antagonistic towards the Moslem Turk,
whatever their grievances against him in the past, than towards the
Christian; and if the former is believed to be the better soldier they will
play him off against us to their heart's content. Indeed, the policv of
fanning the Arab nationalist spirit to a flame is, as far as eastern Arabia
and Xejd are concerned, a two-edged weapon of a verv dangerous
description—innocuous only if the Turk is beaten in the field, but otherwise
likely e\entuall\ to lesult in acute antagonism between the Arabs and
ourselves.
Nor will our difficulties end there. For we shall have to face in the Far
East the ambitions and claims ot a highly aggressive Japan, who will
reckon thus|he Japanese have beaten the liussians, the Russians have
beaten the lurks, the 1 urks have beaten the British ; erno. \
line of argument which will not be the less convincing to them if— as is
presumably quite possible-the war ends without the British fleet having
battle 11 0pp iinity demonstrating its superiority to the German fleet in
If this prognosis is sound, then—unless we are content prop/<??• vilam viveudi
pc.rdcie eausas, or until we are m the last ditch—there can be no short
cut to peace with lurkey. The war with Turkev was thrust udoii us
precisely because the Germans realised its vital iinportance to us and we
grief if vve attach ,eso in wi,ce
resumfoperaTions on"u ^argu-lc'l'le''it,''\| ''7°™* l08t gr0l,,ld . aud U ]
weather uermits -mrl fn i • ' Mtsopotanua, as soon as the cool
Purely militarv considpr-1" X ^ I1 r I' 1 e l )aratl0Ils to that end without delay.
ment, but it mav be pointed out 'hat'it^'- r'' 0 C0 ' 1 '.P etel l ce of this Depart-
that His Majesty's Goverunient n 1 I l>"rely military considerations
against the Turk, and that the success oftln!; 0 ?' r U ) r - ,SU ^ i''® ^
by our failure in Egypt at Aden f vl poll . cy 13 being endangered
military strength necessary in order to L 10 the <l,8 P la ' V of
them when in motion ; with the r,.s„lt il 11 ® Aral) ® 111 motion, or to support
that the Turks, who appear to llv 'T 18 " 0W cou «derab]e risk
buy the Arabs bv oftenu -- then. • t clushed J the movement in Syria, will
that Turco-Arab bloc which the miilHi 0 " 0 '^ • hat i We sllaI1 ^ fi ' Ce(i "' itl1
so greatly add to their difficulties" in t utl ' 0 " tles last year declared would
therefore that they were right in dipt, ' I elsewhere. Supposing
cogent nature for early action ' . there are military reasons of a
In the meantime all tenrntqtmn
firmly resisted. That temnt'itiV * <l I )roniature peace with Turkey must be
wTk ,rp7rLb.Y b :r" , ' te ' l :°■
opposition party, may ofter terms 1/ ( - 1 Jn ^ nrkey, or some other
any Turkish party could + ]S ' vevei '» a^nost inconceivable that
consent to part with Constantinople or Syria on