'A strategical study of Persia and the Persian Gulf' [‎56] (64/150)

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6. There is thus reason to believe that, in spite of protestations
to the contrary, Russia has made but little effort to assist t e
powers that be in Persia to establish a stable government, ihe
principal evidence in support of this view is the return of the ex-
Shah from Russian territory in 1911, a proceeding that cou d
easily have been prevented, had she so desired. The dismissal of
Mr Shuster at Russia's demand is a further instance ; for, though
possiblv lacking in diplomatic tact, there is every reason to suppose
that he was working honestly and with some prospect of success
to restore the financial equilibrium of Persia vvhich is m itself
the first step in the direction of national stability. Russian action
is therefore open to the imputation, that his work m this respect
was regarded as inimical to Russian interests, irrespective of the
benefits it might confer on Persia, and for this reason his dismissal
was sought and obtained. The Potsdam agreement with Germany
concluded in 1911, relative to railway construction in what is
known as the neutral zone, though not contravening the Anglo-
Russian Convention, caused considerable dissatisfaction in England
as hardly in accord with the spirit of the entente between the two
nations.
7. As regards Russian policy for railway construction in Persia
fho proposal for a Trans -Persian Railway was originally put forward
in 1901 by the Russian Government as a result of the travels and
investigations of Captain Rittich of the Russian General Staff
The strategical project was dropped owing to tne Russo-Japanese
war but has now been revived at the instance of a commercial
"Consortium " in St. Petersburg. This project is viewed by many
as an insidious attempt to take advantage of the present Anglo-
Russian entente to bridge the gulf at present existing between the
Russian and Indian frontiers. Without going thus fax it is m (
possible that the Russian military authorities are not fully aware
of the strategical advantages that will accrue to Russia on the
completion of the project, nor is it possible to believe tnat it was put
forward without their knowledge and advice as to its military
nsnects. We get a light on Russian policy as regards other rail-
wav proiects from the provisions of the Potsdam agreement, m
which it is stated that Russia intends to construct a system of
railways in North Persia and among these a line linking up the
Baghd ^Khaniqin Railway with Tehran. Though we are m pos-
fiion of no details as to her intentions,, we may confidently
anticipate that, if for any reason the project for the Trans-Persian
Railway falls through, Russia will at once embark on the cons
truction of such lines within her zone, and possibly m the neutral