'A strategical study of Persia and the Persian Gulf' [‎57] (65/150)

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zone, as she may consider her requirements, commercial and
strategical, demand.
8. To sum up, though as shown above, the declared policy of
Russia is to observe the integrity and to promote the peaceful de
velopment of Persia, we have the following arguments pointing to
the possibility of a future change in that policy, followed by the
acquisition of some portion of Persian territory:—•
{i) That it is not in accordance with historical precedent
for Kussia to impose voluntarily an arbitrary limit to
the expansion of her frontiers and interests, except
under the pressure of superior force which was absent
at the time of the signing of the Convention.
(ii) That the actions of Russia in North Persia hardly accord
with the intentions expressed in the Convention, and
that from present indications it appears that Russian
diplomacy would be better served by the presence of
a puppet Shah, dependent on her good offices, than by
the existence of a strong and independent govern
ment, constitutional or otherwise, at Tehran.
{Hi) That the Convention, if adhered to, debars Russia from
what has long been considered her traditional policy 1 ,
i .e. the acquisition of a port on the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . The
voluntary abandonment of this policy was made a cause
of great criticism in certain Russian circles at the
time of signing of the Convention.
On the other hand we must remember that the Convention is not
only a local agreement regarding Persia, but has an important
bearing on European politics; and further whatever may have
happened in Persia, Russia has so far loyally observed its provisions
as regards Afghanistan and Tibet. Moreover, the present state of
anarchy in Persia cannot be allowed to last indefinitely and the
march of events may render Russian occupation of North Persia,
either by annexation or under the guise of protection, inevitable
in the near future and an event against which we shall no longer be
able to protest. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by
Austria affords a precedent for the disregard of international
instruments of this nature; and whether as the result of deliberate
policy, or by the force of circumstances, we must face the probability
of Northern Persia coming more or less directly under the control
of Russia during the next few years, if indeed it is not formally
incorporated in the Russian Empire.
S248GSB