'A strategical study of Persia and the Persian Gulf' [‎60] (68/150)

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16, While the above considerationa embody the principles of the
British relations with Persia, we are intimately concerned with the
question of railway construction in that country. In this connection
the Trans-Persian Railway is the most important project at present
under discussion. The outlines of the project are given in Part I,
and it has been touched on in commenting on Russian policy. Our
declared policy in respect to this railway is that, while realising the
strategical disadvantages its construction will entail, it would be fu
tile to oppose it permanently, should the feasibility of its commer
cial success be established; and further, that it is to our advantage
to partake in the enterprise while as at present in agreement with
Russia, rather than to stand aloof and have nothing to say in the
matter, as we have done in the case of the Baghdad Railway. Should
we so stand aloof, it is possible that the line, or a considerable por
tion of it, might be built without any consideration for our interests,
strategical or commercial; thus, as stated by Sir B. Grey, while
assenting to the principle of construction and to investigations of
its financial possibilities, the Imperial Government has reserved to
itself the opinion as to its alignment and gauge in British territory
and sphere of influence. As regards other projects, there is an old
standing agreement with the Persian Government, to the effect
that should Russia construct railways in the north we shall have
equal privileges in the south. Under this arrangement several
projects have been mooted at different times ; the principal being
that of a line from the head of the Gulf to Khurramabad. The
object of this line is chiefly commercial, and its construction under
British auspices would be a doubtful advantage from a purely
strategical point of view.
17, Generally speaking, from a military point of view, as
apart from commercial considerations, it is not to our advantage
that a single line of railway should be laid in Persia, but owing to
the impossibility of permanently opposing all construction, it is
considered that we should participate in certain projects for the
purpose of rendering them as strategically innocuous and as com-
merciallv favourable to our interests as the claims and demands
of the various interested parties will admit.
18, Turning to Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , we find
British policy following the same lines as in regard to Persia, viz.
the maintenance of the " status quo," the protection of the large
British trade interests at Basrah and Baghdad and the exclusion
of foreign political interests from Gulf waters. During the past
hundred years British interests have been predominant in the
Gulf, but, as in the case of Persia proper, signs are not wanting
that our position in this respect may be challenged in the futme^