'File 10/3 VI Qatar Oil Concession' [‎87v] (186/481)

50
(cp. paras.
145, 152,
164.)
F.O. to I.O.,
31.8.34.
241 In 1871 the Turks were called in by the Amir Sand, who subsequently
became the head of the Wahabis. The negotiations between the Saudis and the
Turks in the 10 years which followed appear consistently to have proceeded on
the basis that the Wahabi Amirs, in return for Turkish support to enable them
to re-establish themselves in Nejd and possibly Hasa, were prepared to accept
Turkish suzerainty. In 1890 they professed their obedience to the Turkish
authorities (paragraphs 125, 127, 128). Ibn Rashid, by whom they were finally
defeated in 1888, and who, from 1876 to 1901, was the leading ruler in Central
Arabia, consistently professed allegiance to Turkey. Between 1901 and 1913,
Ibn Saud, while continually endeavouring to secure British protection and British
assistance against the Turks, on various occasions appears to have submitted to
Turkish authority (see in particular paragraphs 136, 137, 150, 151), to have
drawn allowances from them for his father or himself (paragraph 141, but see
paragraph 152), and to have settled tribal disputes on behalf of Turkey
(paragraph 150). In May 1914, abandoning hope of the active assistance of
H.M. Government, he concluded a treaty as " Wali and Commandant of
Nejd " with the Wali of Basra, "who was specially empowered by imperial
iradeh," the text of which will be found in Appendix A, and which is only
consistent with Ibn Sand's full acceptance of the status of a Turkish subject and
official. It may be noted, too, that on the outbreak of the War, Ibn Saud did not
repudiate allegiance to Turkey, but gave as an excuse for his failure to lend
armed assistance to the Turks that he was engaged in hostilities with Ibn Rashid,
while at the beginning of 1915 he hinted to H.M. Government that, failing a
satisfactory written understanding with them, it would be necessary for him to
make overtures to the Turks.
242. The true position is no doubt that, throughout the whole of this period,
the Wahabi Amirs, solely concerned with their own interests, were prepared to
give a formal acknowledgment of Turkish suzerainty or to pay a nominal tribute
to Turkey if by doing so they could be assured of non-interference by Turkey in
their concerns. From one standpoint it would be unreasonable therefore to attach
undue importance to the acknowledgments of suzerainty constituted by the series
of incidents referred to above. But it is on the other hand open to H.M. Govern
ment in any dispute in which they may be concerned with Ibn Saud in which that
ruler claims that he and his ancestors have for the last century been the indepen
dent rulers of Nejd and Hasa, and that he is not the successor in title of the Turks
in those areas, to take advantage of the very frequent and consistent reiterations
of Wahabi allegiance to Turkey over almost the whole of the period.
(G) The legal ^position.
243. On the limited issue of the continued validity of the provisions affecting
the Blue Line of the Anglo-Turkish Conventions of 1913 (paragraph 165) and
1914 (paragraph 179 above), the Foreign Office, at an earlier stage, expressed
the view that the Blue Line remained internationally legally binding as against
Ibn Saud. On the wider question of what precisely H.M. Government are legally
entitled to maintain as against the King in regard to the Blue Line, they have
since expressed the interesting and important opinions : —
(а) That there is reason to believe that the territory immediately east of the
Blue Line, on the assumption that neither H.M. Government nor any
Arab State under their protection exercises any authority there, is at
present either res nullius or (conceivably) in parts already under the
sovereignty of Ibn Saud.
(б) That <£ while we are perfectly justified to use the Blue Line and the
position of Ibn Saud as the successor of Turkey, &c., as much as we
can in negotiating with Ibn Saud in order to secure the most accept
able frontier possible in wording future agreements, I do not think
we should win before a tribunal deciding the matter on legal principle 8
if the issue was whether the area immediately east of the Blue Line
was a part of the territory of the Sheikh of Qatar, a British protected
principality, or, if it was res nullius, whether Ibn Saud was free to
acquire territory by occupation or prescription if he could produce
evidence of the state of affairs necessary to support such a claim."
J. G. Laithwaite.
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. ,
1st September 1934.