'Naval Staff monographs (historical) vol 4 no 15 - Naval operations in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf' [‎41] (54/150)

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enemy. It was found very difficult to navigate tlie Espiegle, in
the river wliich narrows very much above Qurna, and has many
sharp turns; and although the ships got nearly up to the
obstruction, 1 the actual state of affairs could not be ascertained
without carrying out diving operations. Until that was done
it was impossible to say how much the lighters were damaged
and what steps were necessary for raising them. Diving
operations would necessitate a force being stationed in the
neighbourhood for protection. The river was now rising, and
every day rendered salvage operations more difficult. 2 No
decision on the subject was made at the time as it was not
known whether the expedition would go higher up the river
than Qurna.
On 6th January the Espiegle. Shaitan, Comet and Lewis
Pelly convoyed the river steamers Medjidieh and Malamir
carrying a small force of troops np the Euphrates to make a
reconnaissance of the river and the Hamar Lake, and to deport
the pro-Turkish Shaikh of Chabaish, a large Arab village
among the swamps. 3 The Espiegle had to anchor two and a
half miles east of Chabaish on account of the shallow water, but
the shallow draught craft proceeded to the village. The
inhabitants displayed white flags, and the Shaikh was removed
without opposition. The Hamar Lake was found to be too
shallow for navigation even by the armed launches.
On the l^th January, while supporting the daily cavalry
patrol on the Tigris, which had been instituted to the northward,
the Miner sighted an enemy launch in Teardrop Bend. The
Espiegle came up and sank this at 5,000 yards range, and
exchanged some rounds with a force of Turkish troops.
At this time there were signs of Turkish activity, and
reports of large reinforcements 4 arriving at their camps at
Sachricha 5 and Rota. Finally, the Turks occupied the sandhills
6 miles north of Mazara, and General Barrett decided to drive
them back in order to impress upon our troops as well as upon
the enemy that it was not our intention merely to maintain a
passive defence of our position at Qurna-Mazara. 6 The Navy
was to co-operate from the Tigris and was also to guard the
mouth of the Shaib and Euphrates, the Medjidieh, with two
18-pr. field guns and some troops, being placed under the orders
of the S.N.O.
The troops moved off at dawn on 20th January, and at
6.50 a.m. the Espiegle (with some Army signal personnel on
board). Miner, and Medjidieh proceeded up the Tigris from their
anchorage off Tigris Camp. At 7.50 a.m. 7 the ships came into
action with the enemy's guns posted on the south side of Rota
1 See Plan 5.
2 Telegram from S.N.O. to G.O.C., 1st January 1915.
3 See Plan 7. 4 Intelligence Reports.
5 See Plan 5. 6 General Barrett's Report.
■ 7 S.N.O.'s Report. Captain Nunn's narrative gives 7.30 a.m.