'Naval Staff monographs (historical) vol 4 no 15 - Naval operations in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf' [‎75] (92/150)

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Vessel.
Loaded
Draft.
Troops. (If not
required to sleep
on Board.)
Cargo
(Tons).
Animals, and Remarks.
P. 1,2,3,4,5, 6,7
Safeh
Bahmanshir
Karun
Bahrein
Lewis Pelly
Edward Ross
Arab -
Anna
Delawar
Ft. Ins. |
4 4 I 1 battalion
to (P. 5,^ battalion)
5 0 1
(without
troops).
Deep
Too
deep
for
low
river.
5 0
5 0
3 6
2 companies
R.I.M. launches. P. 1,
2, 3,4 can take about
70 animals without
troops.
Taken at Amara.
Single screw launch.
Single screw launch.
Very old.
Single screw launch.
Thirty-six barges 300-600 tons capacity. Some captured German or
Turkish, remainder property of private firms in Basra.
On 8th July General Kemball 1 wrote a memorandum 2 in
whicli he emphasised the necessity of taking immediate steps
to procure river steamers of a suitable type. River transport
would no doubt continue to be the governing factor in future
operations. " A properly-equipped river fleet would double and
" treble the effective value of the Army in Mesopotamia at the
" present moment," he wrote. Up to the present we had never
managed to transport at any one time more than five battalions
with field and heavy guns (but without animals). Our com
munications naturally increased as we assumed control of the
Basra Vilayet, but the river steamers taken up locally were
commercial vessels and must sooner or later be returned to their
owners if trade up river was not to come to a standstill in spite
of our successful military operations. The 12 gunboats which
the Admiralty was sending out 3 would not be available for
general transport purposes. What we required were river
steamers which could tow a barge on each side; and General
Nixon put forward a demand to India for six paddle steamers,
three stern-wheelers, eight tugs and 43 barges. 4 "If steps are
not taken in good time to meet these requirements," wrote
General Kemball, " we are running grave risks of a breakdown
at possibly a serious moment."
Both the Admiralty and the War Office advised the India
Office that General Nixon's demands should be met in full,
1 Quartermaster-General. 2 M. 07167/15. 3 See para. 49.
4 H. 6772, from Yiceroy, 4-8-15.