'File 23/15, 19 I (D 89) Mesopotamia - General' [‎110r] (237/455)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]
[January 11, 1927. J
Section 1.
E 161/161/34] No. 1.
Sir H. Dohhs to Mr. Clive.—(Communicated hy Colonial Office; received in
Foreign Office, January 11, 1927.)|
(Confidential.)
gi r) Bagdad, December 16, 1926.
I HAVR the honour to invite your attention to your despatch No. 391, dated the
18th November, 1926, forwarding an account of an interview between Major W. A. K.
Fraser and the Chief of the Persian General Staff, and to forward herewith a note by
Mr. Cornwallis, the adviser to the Iraq Ministry of the Interior.
2. I am in agreement with Mr. Cornwallis's appreciation of the respective
attitudes of the two Governments towards each other, and I consider that it redounds
to the credit of the Iraq Government that they have been so persistently reasonable
aud helpful, in spite of the lack of consideration (to use no stronger a term) which
thev have met with at the hands of the Persian Government. In this connection I
would invite attention to my telegram No. 182, dated the 16th October, 1926, and to
the aide-memoire on the subject of Sheikh Mahmud and Salar-ed-Dowleh which
were handed to you by Mr. Bourdillon during your recent visit to Bagdad.
I have, &c.
H. DOBBS,
High Commissioner for Iraq.
PERSIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Enclosure in No. 1.
Memorandum.
(Confidential.)
IN returning with thanks Major Eraser's note, received with your No. 14738 r
dated the 6th December, 1926, on his interview with the Chief of the Persian General
Staff, I cannot conceal my disappointment that the military attache should not have
made a more vigorous riposte to the animadversions of General Shaibani.
In considering frontier incidents, it will be best to clear the ground by admitting
frankly that there are certain sectors where neither Government has control. It would
be absurd to allow incidents in such areas to exacerbate relations; on the contrary,
they should serve to bring home to both sides the need of vigorous co-operation
wherever possible, so that each Government can extend its control to them.
Thus, there is at present no Government in the Kala Diza and Shar Bazher kadhas
and Panjwin opposite the Persian districts of Sardasht, Bana. The Sardasht incident
of last summer was therefore quite outside the power of the Iraq Government to
prevent; indeed, as is shown below, it was the direct result of a glaring instance of
Persian refusal to co-operate.
On the Persian side the Avroman, opposite our kadha of Halabja, has been
completely out of control for many years. Persian tribesmen have been prominent in
every subversive movement on the Sulaimani border for many years past, Mahmud
Khan Dizli has diverted the waters of the important Dilani Canal for several summers,
Iraqi officials and forces are frequently attacked, and if our control of the mountain
villages on the Iraq side of the Avroman is light, it is entirely due to the hostility of
tribesmen on the Persian side. The Iraq Government does not attribute this state
of affairs to any malevolence on the part of the Persian Government; it knows that
there is no control in the Avroman.
The Iraq Government feels that wherever it has been in its power it has not failed
to prove its earnest desire to co-operate with the Persian Government, and can point
to many concrete examples, e.g.:—
1. The elaborate and successful arrangements made to apprehend Salar-ed-Dowleh
when he emerged from the Avroman into controlled territory.
2. The suppression of the bands of Majid Kadir Aga.
3. The expulsion of Jahangir Kalkhani.
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