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'File 61/11 I (D 41) Relations between Nejd and Hejaz' [255r] (522/600)
The record is made up of 1 volume (295 folios). It was created in 19 Apr 1923-6 Nov 1924. It was written in English and Arabic. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .
Transcription
This transcription is created automatically. It may contain errors.
CONFIDENTIAL.
(158)
Memorandum from the British
Agency
An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent.
, Jeddah, dated the 21st September
1924. (S ecret.)
Forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and
Political Department, Simla, with the compliments of His Britannic Majesty's
Agent and-Consul, Jeddah.
From His Britannic Majesty's Agent and Consul, Jeddah, to His Britannic
Majesty's Principal Secretary op State for Foreign Affairs, Foreign
Office, London, S. W., No. 95-11-1, dated Jeddah, the 21st September
1924.
I have the honour to enclose a rather hastily compiled report on the Taif
incident.
2. Copies of this despatch are being or will shortly be sent to India, Singa
pore, Egypt, Khartoum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bairut (for Damascus),
Baghdad, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrain and Aden.
3. The refugee question will be dealt with in a separate despatch, copies of
which will be sent to India and Singapore only:
j . ... , • ; : "
—————— i ^
THE CAPTURE OF TAIF.
Bushire had news on August 8th that a force had left Riyadh on August 1st
to attack Taif. On August 17th when I commented on this report by telegraph,
there was still no news of a projected attack here. It was on August 31st that
I first heard of a " Wahabi " concentration near Taif. Shaikh Fuad, the Foreign
Secretary, mentioned it when he passed through on that date on his way to Tehran,
but not as being more serious than usual. Had the King, known how serious it was
he would have retained Shaikh Fuad, who would have been invaluable to him in
such a crisis. The Acting Foreign Secretary mentioned the report the next day on
the telephone, and said that the Amir Ah had gone out to tranquillise the people.
There was still nothing to show that the threat was more serious than in May (see
my report for that month) when the Russian airmen were sent out several times to
report and were asked—but refused—to drop bombs on the supposedly hostile en
campment. On September 4th the Hashimite Government informed me by letter
(not by telephone or telegraph) that the Wahabis had taken and burned the palace
of Suwaihit, situated to the north-east of Taif. This was reported to His Majesty's
Government and to the Government of India with the comment that the outer
defences of the Hejaz must have been penetrated. On the evening of Friday Sep
tember 5th, Taif was taken, the Hejaz forces under the Amir Ali withdrawing first
to Hadah, and later to Arafat.
2. The Hejaz Government at once telegraphed to me to ask His Majesty's
Government what steps should betaken "in view of such open hostility ". They
were quite unable to explain what kind of reply they thought His Majesty's Govern
ment could give. They wrote give later attributing their troubles to alleged
assurances by His Majesty's Government that Bin Saud would not attack and to
His Majesty's Government's refusal to provide them with munitions of war. When
the consular corps telephoned to Mecca to inquire as to the safety of British subjects,
we received the assurance that foreigners would be prot'ected as if they were Hejaz
subjects and would we let the Hejaz Government have four aeroplanes on payment.
3. All the reports received in Jeddah, particularly one from the Sudan notable
the Sharif Yusuf al Hindi, who made a special journey tor Jeddah with the King's
consent, and the King's demands for advice, aeroplanes, munitions, etc., made it
clear that Mecca was in danger if the Wahabis in Taii cared to advance or another
hostile force attacked from another direction. The regular army—such as it is—
began to melt away. Mecca W8 s known to be disaffected to King Hussein, and
the tribes to have been long tired of his blockade policy, -which kept them on very
short rations in the hope of keeping Nejd short of supplies, and particularly angry
mc643fd
About this item
- Content
The volume consists of letters, telegrams, and memoranda relating to relations between Najd and the Hejaz. The majority of the correspondence is between Reader Bullard, the British Agent in Jeddah, the Political Residency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. in Bushire, the Political Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. in Bahrain, the Political Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. in Kuwait, the High Commissioner in Baghdad, the Colonial and Foreign Offices, both in London, the High Commissioner in Jerusalem, the Government of India, and Ibn Sa'ud himself, or his representatives.
Most of the volume covers events leading up to, and immediately after, the Ikhwan's capture of Taif, including Hussein ibn 'Ali's abdication and his son 'Ali's attempts to retain control of the Hejaz. There is a detailed report of the capture of Taif by Bullard (folios 186-201, 273-281). The documents reflect British concern with the reaction of Indian Muslims, with duplicates of correspondence regularly forwarded to numerous offices back in India. Some papers are about the effort to evacuate British Indian refugees and pilgrims from the region.
Other subjects covered in the volume are:
- the build-up to and ultimate failure of the Kuwait Conference of 1923-24;
- King Fuad of Egypt's suspected financial backing of Ibn Sa'ud's takeover of the Hejaz;
- the defining of the Hejaz-Trans-Jordan border;
- the motivations and movements of St John Philby and Rosita Forbes, both of whom were thought to be trying to gain entryinto Central Arabia.
Notable in the volume are a newspaper cutting from The Times of Mesopotamia , dated 13 July 1923, regarding treaty negotiations between Britain and King Hussein (folio 4), and extracts of letters from Ameen Rihani to Ibn Sa'ud that had been intercepted by the British and which offer advice on foreign policy.
- Extent and format
- 1 volume (295 folios)
- Arrangement
The volume is arranged chronologically. The internal office notes at the back of the volume (renumbered as folios 247-258) include a chronological list of the main contents, together with a simple, running index number from 1 to 111. These index numbers are also written on the front of the documents they refer to, in red or blue crayon and encircled, to help identify and locate them within the volume.
- Physical characteristics
Main foliation sequence: numbers are written in pencil and circled, in the top right corner on the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. of each folio. The numbering, which starts on the front cover of the volume and ends on the inside back cover, is as follows: 1A-1D, 2-262.
Secondary and earlier foliation sequence: the numbers 1 to 322 are written in pencil in the top right corner on the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. of each folio, except for the internal office notes at the back of the volume, which are paginated in pencil from 1 to 23. Published copies of four British Government reports at the front of the volume (renumbered as folios 2-63) also have pencilled page numbers written on them.
Condition: broken spine cover.
- Written in
- English and Arabic in Latin and Arabic script View the complete information for this record
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Copyright: How to use this content
- Reference
- IOR/R/15/1/564
- Title
- 'File 61/11 I (D 41) Relations between Nejd and Hejaz'
- Pages
- front, back, spine, edge, head, tail, front-i, i-r:i-v, 1r:1v, 1ar:1bv, 2r:3v, 4v, 6r:36v, 39v:169v, 170v:172v, 174v:177v, 178v:293v, back-i
- Author
- East India Company, the Board of Control, the India Office, or other British Government Department
- Usage terms
- Open Government Licence